Active citizenship through mobility?
Young and educated citizens’ perceptions of identity, rights and participation in the European Union

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Declaration of authorship

I, Nora Siklodi, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: ______________________

Date: ______________________

Abstract

This thesis starts with the proposition that EU (learning) mobility makes the realisation of European Union (EU) citizenship most likely. More specifically, it conceptualises EU citizenship as a dynamic bond between the EU and its citizens, with an important role in community building processes, including processes of differentiation (between EU citizens) and exclusion (of non-citizens). EU citizenship is then observed as a multidimensional construct, made up of EU identity, EU rights and EU participation. These propositions are tested using original focus group evidence of young and educated EU citizens in Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The findings of the thesis provide a more nuanced understanding of EU citizenship: it is activated by citizens’ mobility rather than by political participation, as is the case with national citizenship. However, its dependence on mobility makes EU citizenship irrelevant for stayers (the majority of the EU’s population) and results in a brief and temporary experience for EU mobiles.

Overall, the thesis emphasises the benefits of attending to the dimensions of EU citizenship concurrently and acknowledging the mobile/stayer distinctions. It provides original insight into the genuine significance of EU citizenship for mobiles and stayers, and sheds new light on the role of EU citizenship in the quest for further political integration.
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The last line goes to W. Thank you.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
<td>CDA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern European</td>
<td>CEE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizens’ Initiative</td>
<td>CI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>CoM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Court of Justice of the European Union</td>
<td>CJEU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Directorate General</td>
<td>DG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Directorate General for Communication</td>
<td>DG COMM</td>
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<td>Directorate General for Education and Culture</td>
<td>DG EAC</td>
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<td>Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion</td>
<td>DG EMPL</td>
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<td>Directorate General for Justice</td>
<td>DG JUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Health Insurance Card</td>
<td>EHIC</td>
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<td>European Economic Community</td>
<td>EEC</td>
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<td>European Union (the Union)</td>
<td>EU</td>
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<td>European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights</td>
<td>ECFR</td>
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<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>EP</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Year of Citizens 2013-14</td>
<td>EYC2013-14</td>
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<td>Sweden Democrats</td>
<td>SD</td>
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<td>Single European Act</td>
<td>SEA</td>
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<td>Third Country Nationals</td>
<td>TCNs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty)</td>
<td>TEU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of Paris)</td>
<td>ECSC Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty)</td>
<td>TFEU</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
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Introduction

It is generally accepted that globalisation is transforming the relationship between nation states and their citizens (Isin and Turner, 2002; 2007). In this context, the European Union (EU) has been seen as an exemplar of cosmopolitanism and an ideal context to illustrate these transformations (Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Beck 2006; Beck and Grande, 2007). Accordingly, the introduction of EU citizenship in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, TEU) (Article 8) can be interpreted as a direct challenge to national models of citizenship (Meehan, 1993; Joppke, 1998; Tambini, 2001; Olsen 2008b) and the first genuine attempt at establishing democracy beyond nation states (Laffan, 1996; Bruter, 2005; Gillespie and Laffan, 2006; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). However, rather than the emergence of an EU-wide (political) community, as the European Commission (‘the Commission’) (1997: 3) and some scholars would have us believe (Habermas, 1996; Preuss, 1996; Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2005; Bruter, 2005; Risse, 2010), the 20 years following the treaty were characterised by the development of new processes of differentiation and exclusion within and beyond the EU’s borders (Favell and Hansen, 2002; Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006; Favell, 2008; Fligstein, 2008; Shore, 2012; Ross, 2014).

In fact, the introduction of EU citizenship coincided with a popular veto of an EU treaty in Denmark – the first of its kind, which contested the original provisions on EU citizenship (Adler-Nissen, 2008). Similarly, recent analyses draw our attention to the increasing level of popular discontent (Hooghe and
Marks, 2005; 2009) and widespread ambivalence towards European integration (White, 2011; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). These attitudes are, perhaps, most pronounced in the United Kingdom (UK), where many citizens are in favour of the country’s exit from the EU, a so-called ‘Brexit’ (Geddes, 2014; Wellings and Baxendale, 2015). Similar issues are also noticeable in other member states however, especially in the growing popularity and electoral success of right wing and anti-EU populist parties (Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz, 2012; Mudde, 2014). At first it may appear as if, in its response to these developments, the Commission has moderated its narrative on European integration (Juncker, 2014a). Yet, a closer inspection of its discourse suggests that, with EU citizenship acting as “the crown jewel” of political integration, the Commission’s supranational aspirations “remain on the horizon” (European Commission, 2013b: 2; 2014f; Reding, 2013a). Hence, there appears to be a growing disparity between the attitudes of (EU) citizens, national political actors and the Commission. So it is more important than ever to address the issue of citizenship – the dynamic bond that ties a sovereign political community and the individuals together – within the EU and, in particular, the significance of EU citizenship in the context of European integration.

Against this backdrop, the thesis examines how EU citizenship is realised in practice. More specifically, it investigates the scope for the realisation of EU citizenship as envisaged by the Commission and it tests the proposition that EU mobility in combination with education makes its fulfilment most likely. The thesis establishes that a subgroup of mobile, highly-educated and young
citizens are expected to achieve a sense of EU identity and utilise the rights and opportunities for participation associated with EU citizenship. It then inspects this premise using a multi-method approach to research. First, it analyses the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship using critical discourse analysis (CDA). Second, it builds on original focus group evidence of young and educated citizens in their role as EU mobiles and stayers in Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). The combination of these two qualitative methods provides for a more comprehensive examination of EU citizenship, thereby enhancing the empirical and conceptual contributions of this thesis.

The thesis seeks to advance our knowledge and understanding of EU citizenship in two respects. The principal empirical contribution of the thesis stems from its interrogation of the relationship between EU citizenship and EU mobility. To this end, it reports the findings from CDA of the Commission’s post-1993 discourse on EU citizenship and focus group research conducted in Sweden and the UK. The CDA is illustrative of the Commission’s approach to EU citizenship and the focus groups of how (young and educated) EU mobiles and stayers are likely to realise the dimensions of EU citizenship – EU identity, rights and participation – and take part in new processes of differentiation and exclusion.

The chief conceptual contribution of the thesis is two-fold. First, due to the role of mobility in activating EU citizenship, the thesis proposes that we reconsider
the dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens – traditionally observed through citizens’ political engagement – along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. Second, it suggests that the dimensions of EU citizenship are more heavily interlinked than is generally recognised in the existing literature and should thus be considered concurrently, just as the dimensions of national citizenship tend to be explored concurrently. Adopting a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship provides new insights into how national and EU policy-makers can pursue further political integration, if they so wish, through the medium of EU citizenship.

Taken together, the empirical and conceptual contributions of the thesis provide a more nuanced understanding of EU citizenship: it is activated by citizens’ mobility – rather than political participation as is the case with national citizenship. However, its dependence on mobility makes EU citizenship irrelevant for the majority of the EU’s population (the stayers) and results in a brief rather than long-lasting experience for the rest (the EU mobiles). Moreover, mobility seems to have uneven effects on the dimensions of EU citizenship and does not turn EU mobiles into ‘ideal’ EU citizens. For example, mobility may enhance the sense of shared EU identity among mobiles, but it is unlikely to be fruitful for their approaches to EU participation. Overall, the thesis makes a compelling case for adopting a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship and for considering the dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. The original qualitative analysis enables the thesis to deliver an in-depth
interrogation of EU citizenship and sheds new light on the role of EU citizenship in furthering political integration in Europe.

I.1. EU citizenship in context

Proponents of a more closely integrated EU, were, from the outset, explicit about the role of EU citizenship in attaining their supranational and political aspirations. For example, in its very first citizenship report, written one month after the TEU came into force, the Commission (1993: 2, emphasis in original) declared that the (mere) introduction of EU citizenship in the Treaty “created a direct political link” between the EU and member state citizens “with the aim of fostering a sense of [EU] identity”. Similar ideas can be seen in some of the Commission’s (see for example 2008a; 2010a; 2013a) more recent reports. They too place citizens “at the heart of European integration” and identify EU citizenship as the “fundamental status of nationals of the member states” (European Commission, 2013a: 2, 3, emphasis in original). More often than not, however, the transformative potential of EU citizenship has been an aspiration rather than a demonstrated fact.

All too often the Commission has said what it would like to see happen rather than what has actually happened (see for example Hansen and Hager, 2010). For example, despite its increasing efforts to promote EU mobility among citizens (more recently within the framework of the ‘European Year of Citizens, 2013-14’), only a very small segment of the EU’s population have actually exercised their mobility rights. Even the ‘direct political link’ EU
citizenship supposedly represents can be questioned considering its “complementary” status to member state citizenship (Hansen, 2009). The situation has only been worsened by the fact that member state governments have recently curtailed some of these mobility rights (Shore, 2012). Official figures indicate that about 20 per cent of the EU’s population is actively mobile in the EU (TNS Opinion and Social, 2011), though only around 2.7 per cent or 13.6 million people actually reside in an EU member state other than their country of origin on a semi-permanent basis (Eurostat, 2014a). Although there is much variation between these figures, there is a highly charged political debate in some member states over the effects of EU mobility on the host country. In the UK for example, Prime Minister David Cameron (2013) recently announced that national governments must ‘crackdown on EU immigration’ by capping EU citizens’ access to the welfare systems of host countries.

Partly for these reasons, both the EU and its citizenship policies are more often condemned than applauded. National leaders, who possess the political support of EU citizens, have recently begun a process of inter-state dialogue that aims to propose arbitrary policies restricting EU citizenship rights, most notably EU mobiles’ access to welfare provisions (Mikl-Leitner et al., 2013; Mills and Grimston, 2014; Wagstyl, 2014). In this context, critical scholars depict EU citizenship as “pie in the sky” (D’Oliveria, 1995). These approaches do not, however, recognise that EU citizenship is, in some sense, already a reality: member state citizens exercise their EU rights when they vote for the

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1 In comparison, third-country non-EU immigrants make up around 4.1% of the EU’s population (20.7 million people) (Eurostat, 2014a).
European Parliament (EP) or move between the EU’s member states. Additionally, the EU’s unrelenting push for political integration (arguably at the cost of national sovereignty) and the current debate between EU and national leaders about freedom of movement make EU citizenship a highly topical issue within contemporary European studies.

Against this background, the thesis seeks to shed light on the extent to which member state citizens, or in this case ‘EU citizens’, realise the ideals of EU citizenship. In so doing, it embeds the study of EU citizenship in the broader field of citizenship studies. According to scholars in this field, citizenship can be broadly defined as the dynamic bond between a sovereign political community and the individual (Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005). It shapes community-building processes, including both, processes of differentiation, distinguishing between different categories of citizens (Turner, 1997: 15) and exclusion, separating citizens from non-citizens (Castano et al., 2002: 319).

The latter aspect usually stems from the traditional Aristotelian definition of citizenship, observing the active/passive dichotomy of citizenship from a political engagement perspective (Bellamy, 2008a: 97-123). It is also generally accepted that citizenship entails three interlinked and collective dimensions, namely identity, rights and participation (Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005; Bellamy, 2008a; Bosniak, 2008). These dimensions have been common to citizenship models across diverse historical and political contexts and can shed light on the range of existing theories and practices.
The establishment of EU citizenship has instigated the development of a more specialised research agenda on EU citizenship (Meehan, 1993; Wiener, 1998; Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001). The resulting literature is, however, separated almost entirely from the broader field of citizenship studies (Chapter 1.1.). The bulk of this research probes whether the different dimensions of (national) citizenships are present at the EU level. However, the (alleged) *sui generis* character of EU citizenship usually leads most scholars to question its practical aspects (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009), including the vigour of citizens’ sense of collective EU identity (Duchesne et al., 2013), their awareness of EU rights (White, 2011) and interest and actual participation in EU elections (Hobolt, 2012). Therefore, these scholars highlight the limits of contemporary EU citizenship and political integration. This thesis argues that by considering the dimensions of EU citizenship separately and within its normative, institutional or empirical frameworks, these scholars present a very partial understanding of what EU citizenship actually signifies.

Many scholars recognise the multidimensional character of national citizenships in Europe (Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005; Bellamy, 2008a). Yet, most studies on EU citizenship have failed to adopt a similarly inclusive approach. Some fail to recognise the existence of all three dimensions of EU citizenship and test one dimension alone – usually EU identity (Bruter, 2005; Shaw, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Ross, 2014). Others recognise that EU citizenship is multidimensional but do not test these dimensions empirically (Bellamy 2008b; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Karolweski, 2010; Risse, 2010; Olsen, 2012). Again others test two dimensions together at
any one time (Recchi and Favell, 2009; White, 2011; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). These approaches do not seem to notice the interlinked character of the dimensions of EU citizenship and do not consider their concurrent effects.

In contrast to these studies, this thesis argues that the three dimensions of EU citizenship are equally important (Chapter 1.2.). They are interlinked and constantly reinforce and stimulate one another. By the same token, if one or more of these dimensions are absent, they undermine the intensity of the other dimension(s) and can lead to ambiguity in the broader citizenship framework as well. Consequently, examining one dimension over the others may lead to false conclusions about EU citizenship’s actual significance. The necessity to adopt a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship is apparent if we consider how individuals can turn their mere subjecthood into citizenship. EU rights define the legal parameters within which individuals (in this case member state citizens) can realise their EU citizenship. The exercising of these rights has the potential to enhance individuals’ sense of EU identity, which in turn can influence their approaches to EU level political participation (Sanders et al., 2012).² Moreover, EU rights underscore who has the right to participate in EU politics. In turn, EU participation defines the boundaries of the EU community and the parameters of EU identity. Should it be realised, the latter dimension could render EU citizenship a political model of

² There is not a simple linear relationship between the dimensions of EU citizenship – as demonstrated by Sanders et al. (2012). Instead, EU identity can lead to political participation and, in turn, EU participation may enhance citizens’ sense of EU identity. The complementary character of EU citizenship to national citizenships also complicates this process. The multiplicity in how these dimensions may reinforce one another (Figure 1.1.) makes adopting a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship all the more appropriate and necessary.
citizenship (Bellamy, 2008b). The political potential of EU citizenship has been addressed by empirical studies and policy-makers to a considerable extent (mainly in their attempt to address the EU’s so-called democratic deficit) (especially in Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2010). Yet, there is very little scholarly work that considers the interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship (these are Favell, 2008; 2010; Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012).

Consequently, this thesis adopts a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship and defines and examines its frameworks and dimensions concurrently. The empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 5 – 7) will shed light on how the interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship are likely to manifest themselves. Although young and educated citizens may find it challenging to make sense of their (EU) citizenship – after all, it is an unlikely topic of discussion in their everyday lives – the deliberation within and between the focus groups is likely to provide us with an indication of how these dimensions interact with one another in the EU context (possibly at both the national and EU levels). A central argument of this thesis is that if academics and EU officials really want to address the issue of EU citizenship (in relation to EU political integration) they should attend to its dimensions concurrently.

While participation in political-decision making has been at the centre of nation state citizenship in Europe (Marshall, 1950; Bellamy, 2008a; 2010), a

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3 The establishment of EU citizenship thus supports a political (Hix, 2008; Hix and Høyland, 2011) rather than a regulatory approach to the EU (Majone, 1998).
closer inspection of the institutional framework of EU citizenship reveals that only EU mobility makes it relevant to the lives of its citizens (Chapter 2.). Every EU treaty places citizens’ EU mobility rights at the heart of EU citizenship (European Commission, 2013a) and prior to their EU level political engagement (see for example Article 20 of the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, TFEU)). Until recently these texts only discussed the rights of EU mobiles and even now they do not specify the rights of stayers.⁴ Even more, EU mobility facilitates citizens’ claims for most of their EU rights, including non-discrimination on the basis of nationality and it activates some political rights, including the right to vote in the EU and municipal elections at the country of their residence (Guild, Rotaeche and Kostakopoulou, 2013). Therefore, the institutional framework of EU citizenship implies that member state citizens’ EU mobility, including economic, labour and learning mobility, activates their EU status.

Actually, from the different types of EU mobility that citizens can exercise, the Commission (2008c; 2010c; 2010d) has been particularly outspoken about the positive effects EU learning mobility has on young citizens’ sense of EU citizenship (Chapter 2.2.). Consequently, and despite the fact that member states continue to set educational policies in the EU, the Commission has dominated the relevant policy discourse (Keeling, 2006; Curaj et al., 2012). For example, in the current Erasmus+ programme, the learning mobility of over four million individuals, including two million higher education students is

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⁴ The Citizens’ Initiative (CI) was introduced in Article 24 of TFEU in 2009. However, its impact has been marginal. The Commission turned down the very first initiative that gathered the required support from citizens (Right 2 Water) (Appendix 3).
positioned as the first of three action points to be realised by 2020 (European Commission, 2014a). There is some empirical evidence to support the Commission’s approach (King and Ruiz, 2003; Van Mol, 2014; Mitchell, 2012; 2014). However, a number of studies also suggest that participating in educational exchanges does not have a considerable impact on students’ sense of EU identity (Sigalas, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; Wilson, 2011) or that it only enhances the EU identity of less-well educated students (Kuhn, 2012a).

Most of these studies explore the effects of EU (learning) mobility through the transactionalist approach to European integration (Deutsch et al., 1968). Whilst building on their findings, this thesis also explores the interaction that occurs *between* EU mobiles and stayers in the context of heightened EU mobility. Due to the central role EU mobility has in activating EU citizenship, processes of differentiation and exclusion – an integral aspect of how citizenship shapes community building processes – are expected to manifest differently than what has been observed in national contexts. Accordingly, EU mobility is expected to lead to processes of differentiation between (*and* among) EU mobiles and stayers, and is likely to heighten processes of exclusion (of non-EU citizens). The thesis proposes that we re-consider the dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. In order to elucidate how the research was carried out to address the issue of EU citizenship and its relationship with EU mobility, the next section discusses the questions, methods and case studies adopted.
I.2. Key questions, research methods and case studies

This thesis examines how EU citizenship is realised in practice. More specifically, it probes whether and how young and educated citizens realise their EU citizenship (Research Question 1). In so doing, it aims to explore the extent to which the ideals of EU citizenship, as envisaged by the Commission, are fulfilled by these citizens or are ever likely to be fulfilled (Research Question 2). The previous section drew attention to the interlinked character of the dimensions of EU citizenship. This issue raises another question, namely how EU identity, rights and participation are likely to transform one another and shape the broader structure of EU citizenship (Research Question 3). EU citizenship departs from national models because it is activated through EU mobility (rather than political participation). Against this backdrop, the thesis includes a qualitative interrogation of new processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU (Research Question 4). Finally, by reflecting on the (alleged) link between EU citizenship and political integration in Europe (Research Question 5), the thesis makes an attempt to contribute to the debate about democratic legitimacy.

In order to provide a better understanding of EU citizenship (its different frameworks and dimensions), this thesis adopts a multi-method approach to research (Bryman, 2012: 383) and complements the findings of CDA with original focus group evidence. First, the thesis undertakes CDA of the Commission’s ideals on EU citizenship. Analysing the Commission’s discourse, it sheds light on the normative and institutional frameworks of EU citizenship, and the actual scope these frameworks grant to citizens for
realising their EU status. Discourse is understood in this thesis as a “form of social practice” that is “socially shaped and socially constitutive” (Fairclough, 2013: 92). It is expected to “sustain and reproduce the social status quo, …[because] it contributes to transforming it” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). More specifically, the thesis is interested in the Commission’s “practical argumentation” (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 1) about EU citizenship. To this end, it studies how the analytical components of CDA – power relations between political actors, their pre-determined objectives and the ideological implications of their actions (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 78-116) – are likely to shape the Commission’s discourse.

The CDA includes qualitative, in-depth and thorough analysis of EU treaty texts, legislative proposals, formal evaluations and reports, as well as media statements that were first and foremost written by the Commission or by Commission representatives. The selection of documents was made on whether the argument they present is credible, typical and comprehensible (Scott, 1990: 6).⁵ Due to the ever-changing institutional setting of the EU – in which the Commission also re-invents itself every five years – documents with an explicit focus on ‘EU’ (or ‘Union’) citizenship were considered in more detail. By evaluating these documents, the thesis draws attention to a disparity in official EU thinking: the economic rationales of EU citizenship dominate the everyday workings of the Commission as well as the legal structure of EU citizenship. However, this fits uncomfortably with the oft-cited political aspirations of the Commission, which grants a somewhat elitist

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⁵ See Appendix 1 for CDA research sample.
character to EU citizenship and establishes different categories of EU citizens. From these categories of citizens, EU-15 mobiles and, especially, the young and highly educated EU mobiles are expected to realise their EU citizenship to the fullest.

The Commission was selected as the case study for the CDA due to its executive role in the EU (Hix and Høyland, 2011), pro-integrationist and supranational outlook (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000), sole responsibility for communicating EU policies to citizens (European Commission, 2013q) and interest in developing an EU level citizenship regime since the 1950s (Olsen, 2012). Its interest in citizenship has a political community-building function – similarly to the role national citizenships have had in nation states (Wiener, 1998). However, the Commission’s executive power has shrunk considerably in the recent years (Kassim and Menon, 2010) due to the increased power of legislative institutions (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 27) – the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the European Union (EU Council) –, the institutionalisation of the European Council (Puetter, 2012) and the recent crisis (Hodson, 2013). Therefore, we cannot be sure to what extent its discourse on EU citizenship is likely to also echo the changing dynamics of the broader, institutional structure of the EU.

Second, the findings of the CDA aid the analysis of primary focus group evidence, which explores how EU citizenship is actually perceived and realised by a sub-group of citizens – the young and educated EU mobiles and
stayers. There are two main reasons for selecting focus groups as the main research method for this thesis. On the one hand, focus groups are particularly suitable for carrying out exploratory research in a sensitive field of study (Morgan, 1998: 11). Considering that citizenship, identity and political participation are unlikely topics for everyday discussions, making sense of the perceptions of participants would have been difficult using survey or interview data. Focus groups are seen as a more appropriate research method. They allow for the expression of diverse views and facilitate interaction and ‘collective sense-making’ among participants (Bryman, 2012: 503-4). On the other hand, the interaction, reasoning and forms of reflection present in the focus groups are expected to provide more in-depth data. Participants can go beyond a set of interview questions and probe one another for holding certain perspectives. The resulting interaction among them is expected to highlight the issues they consider important and produce insights that would be harder to access using a different research method (Morgan, 1998: 12).

The focus groups referred to in this thesis covered three main topics. First, it explored how participants defined their national and EU citizenships, and whether EU mobiles were more likely to identify themselves as EU citizens than stayers. Second, it investigated participants’ approaches to the three dimensions of EU citizenship; their sense of identity (EU, country of origin or host country), perceptions of dis/advantages as EU mobiles/stayers, and engagement in political participation at the EU, national and local levels. Third, the focus groups probed participants’ views about their experiences of EU (learning) mobility and its impact on their sense of (EU) citizenship. In some
cases, the focus groups questioned participants about the most appropriate and effective methods for promoting the idea of EU citizenship across member states.⁶

Ten focus groups were carried out with EU mobiles and stayers in Sweden and the UK between May 2012 and March 2013. Participants were recruited through snowballing technique, using social-media resources, posters, flyers and public announcements. They were aged between 18 and 30 years old and required to have arrived in Sweden or the UK as a result of their exercising of EU mobility rights. The interviews lasted for approximately 1.5 hours and the language of discussions was English.⁷ Four groups of EU mobiles and one of stayers were conducted in each country. The stayer groups were included for controlling purposes. The likely effects of mobility on participants’ perceptions could only be explored if rival explanations for changes in their perceptions, including the effects of national and educational contexts were also considered. In total, these groups included 66 EU mobiles and stayers, 29 in Sweden (including 22 EU mobiles and 7 stayers) and 37 in the UK (including 24 EU mobiles and 13 stayers). Participants came to these countries from a variety of member states, including EU-15 and Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. They had spent different lengths of time in Sweden and the UK before the research was conducted, ranging from one week to over four years. On average, participants in Sweden were aged 23.5

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⁶ See Appendix 2 for focus group related information, including questionnaire and demographic information on participants. Access to the focus group data is available from the researcher upon request.

⁷ The majority of EU mobiles in Sweden did not speak Swedish.
years and arrived 14 months before the research was carried out. For the UK, the figures were 21.5 and 2.5 years, respectively.

Sweden and the UK were selected as case studies due to their willingness to allow free movement from CEE states immediately upon their accession. Their subsequent contradictory approaches towards EU residents are indicative of the ever-changing state of affairs in a crisis-stricken EU (Chapter 3.2.2). It is well known that EU rights were limited following the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004. Although initially three EU-15 states opened their borders to CEE mobiles, namely Ireland, Sweden and the UK, by 2007 only Sweden had left its borders open. Therefore, there is only one EU-15 member state where all EU citizens can and have been able to exercise their EU rights, namely Sweden. As a result, Sweden recorded around 276,000 EU mobiles in 2011 (Eurostat, 2014a) and has seen a gradual growth in overall numbers: 16,500 in 2004 and 25,100 by 2011 (Eurostat, 2014a). Interestingly for this thesis, almost half of all EU mobiles who arrived to Sweden in 2011 went there for educational purposes (making up approximately 10,500 visiting EU students) (SHEA, 2013). Even though EU mobiles continue to arrive to Sweden, Swedes still have the most welcoming attitude towards them across the EU (GMF, 2013). While the majority of Swedes (61 per cent) express a growing concern about the extent to which immigrants integrate into the

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8 The EU rights of students are not restricted by transitional measures. However, students can only really enjoy the same rights as stayers once any restriction on their residence is also lifted (e.g. access to employment and healthcare).

9 EU-15 member states are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. CEE member states are part of the EU since 2004. They include EU8 countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland. Cyprus and Malta also joined the EU on the 1st of May 2004. The so-called EU2 states joined on the 1st of January 2007: Bulgaria and Romania. Finally, Croatia joined the EU on the 1st of July 2013.
Swedish society (GMF, 2013), non-integration makes it more likely that EU mobiles interact with one another and develop a ‘community of Europeans’.\(^\text{10}\) Therefore, Sweden seems to be an ideal context for young and educated EU mobiles to realise their EU citizenship, which makes it a particularly appropriate case study for this thesis.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that EU mobiles are still the exception rather than the rule in Sweden (Doyle, Hughes and Wadensjö, 2006). Their small number is even more striking when it is compared with numbers in the UK, the second case study of this thesis. The UK had received around 2.3 million EU mobiles by 2011, representing about 3.7 per cent of its total population (Eurostat, 2014a).\(^\text{11}\) Even more, the number of EU mobiles arriving to the UK is still on the rise: net migration doubled from 65,000 to 131,000 in the year ending September 2013, corresponding to approximately half of the UK’s foreign net migration (Migration Watch, 2014). From the estimated 209,000 EU mobiles who arrived during this year, 47,500 were EU mobiles with long-term study plans (Migration Watch, 2014). Actually, the UK has had, for a number of years, the largest inflow of foreign students. For example, in 2012 just under a third of all EU mobiles studied in the UK – almost twice as many as in the second most popular study destination, namely Germany (these three figures were 728,600 for the EU, 205,600 for the UK and 121,000 for

\(^{10}\) GMF (2013) report refers to general public attitudes towards immigration and does not make a distinctions between TCNs and EU mobiles. Some of the hostility is, nonetheless, expected to be towards TCNs rather than EU mobiles as apparent from the policy strategies of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and Sweden Democrats (SD), both of which gained considerably public support recently (Berg and Spehar, 2013; Geddes, 2014).

\(^{11}\) For a more detailed evaluation of member states’ immigration rules and their likely impact on mobile EU citizens’ perceptions, see Chapter 3.
Germany) (Eurostat, 2014b). The British public’s reaction to the inflow of EU mobiles has been characterised by mild hostility: 64 per cent consider migration to be “more problem than opportunity”, 55 per cent believe that “too many” migrants are in the country (GMF, 2013) and, in a referendum on Britain’s EU membership sizable minority, 39 per cent would vote in favour of leaving the EU (YouGov, 2014). Hence EU mobiles are likely to be less welcome in the UK than in Sweden. The UK is expected to demonstrate the negative impact a host country context can have on young citizens’ ability to realise their EU citizenship. In addition to its adverse approach towards EU mobiles, practical considerations also underpin the selection of the UK as a case study for this thesis. The researcher was based at a British university, which eased both the recruitment process and organisation of focus groups. Other considerations included language requirements, access to funding and the time constraints of completing this thesis.

Since this thesis relies on exploratory qualitative evidence, it has a somewhat limited scope to make generalisations about the link between EU citizenship and EU (learning) mobility. Considering that the conclusions of existing quantitative studies on one or the other dimensions of EU citizenship are inconsistent (see for example Recchi and Favell, 2009; Sanders et al., 2012), adopting a quantitative approach would have only added another layer to the existing diversity in the field. While the exploratory evidence is not representative of the general population, it is expected to shed light on the

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12 Furthermore, no data set is currently available which includes measures of the dimensions of (EU) citizenship and could also account for the effects of EU mobility. The best alternative is the mass survey data from IntUne; an EU-wide dataset with indicators linked to EU citizenship, identity and participation – apart from EU mobility.
likely impact mobility has on those citizens who are most susceptible to changes in their perceptions of citizenship. The evidence also allows for contradictory evidence to emerge – EU mobiles at Swedish and UK universities may exhibit a range of non-EU citizenship perceptions and experiences. This should become apparent through their focus group debates. Moreover, it is only through qualitative exploratory evidence that contemporary processes of differentiation and exclusion can be interrogated. To the knowledge of the researcher, it is the first time this issue is addressed by academic work on EU citizenship. Although existing qualitative research on (young) citizens’ sense of EU citizenship recognises the importance of EU mobility, they only investigate how the perceptions of EU mobiles or stayers are likely to change following intra-EU mobility (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; Skey, 2011a; Ross, 2014). The focus group evidence used in this thesis also draws attention to the way in which EU mobiles and stayers approach one another. It can thus make clear empirical and conceptual contributions to the debates these studies have begun to generate.

Furthermore, this thesis cannot reach any conclusions about whether and to what extent those citizens who were originally targeted by the EU – EU labour mobiles (Maas, 2005; Olsen, 2012) – actually realise EU citizenship or how they perceive its different dimensions. This would be a novel and highly topical research project that would likely to generate interest amongst academics and policy-makers. However, due to the time constraints and limited resources of the researcher, as well as the well-documented difficulty associated with securing access to these groups of EU mobiles (European
Commission, 2013a), this thesis probes the perceptions and behaviours of EU students in their roles as EU mobiles and stayers. It can thus only really draw conclusions about the likely impacts (institutionalised) EU learning mobility has for EU mobiles and stayers. Nonetheless, research on EU learning mobility is also important considering that the Commission identifies participating students as the ideal EU citizens and also because these students determine the type of EU citizenship that is likely to persist into the future.

I.3. Structure of the thesis

The remainder of the thesis is organised around eight substantive chapters. Chapter 1 sets the scene for addressing the issue of EU citizenship in this thesis. A short overview of the existing literature on EU citizenship suggests that there is a tendency among scholars to observe EU citizenship as *sui generis* and attend to its frameworks and dimensions separately. In an attempt to re-embed the study of EU citizenship within the broader field of citizenship studies, the chapter draws attention to debates, which played out across diverse historical and political models, and the extent to which these debates accord with the case of EU citizenship. Subsequently, the chapter considers how the dimensions of (EU) citizenship – (EU) identity, rights and participation – can be operationalised in empirical terms.

Chapter 2 explores the European Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship and demonstrates that the young, educated and mobile citizens are
recognised as the ideal EU citizens. The main finding is that largely due to the broader institutional structure of the EU, EU citizenship’s economic rationale rather than political aspirations dictates the Commission’s everyday discourse. Actually, the Commission seems to work towards expanding the scope EU mobiles have for realising their EU citizenship. Due to its principal focus on EU mobiles, the Commission grants an elitist character to EU citizenship and adopts selective policies towards different categories of EU citizens, including stayers, CEE and EU-15 mobiles. As a result, it institutionalises processes of differentiation and exclusion within the EU.

Chapter 3 considers the main hypothesis of this thesis. In particular, it proposes EU mobility (together with education) is required to enhance citizens’ ability to realise their EU citizenship. In order to shed light on the likely relationship between these two issues, the chapter revisits the transactionalist approach to European integration, the development of mobility rights and educational policies in the EU, and the findings of empirical studies, most of which have applied the contact hypothesis to understand citizens’ experiences. The chapter then investigates how EU mobility is likely to impact the relationship between different categories of EU citizens by revisiting the main findings of qualitative studies on EU identity and citizenship. It then proposes that we reconsider the dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens along the mobiles/stayers distinctions.
In order to illustrate the likely effects of EU mobility on citizens’ sense of EU citizenship, Chapters 4 to 7 use original focus group evidence of EU mobiles and stayers in Sweden and the UK. After a short overview of the processes associated with conducting focus group research, Chapter 4 emphasises that mobility can transform the perceptions of young citizens about EU and national citizenships. The majority of EU mobiles who participated in the focus groups assumed there is a (direct) bond between the EU and its mobiles, while for stayers EU citizenship was secondary to their national citizenships. However, most participants believed EU citizenship does not really exist (more specifically, not to the same extent as national citizenships do). Depending on their country of residence, this deduction led to increasing differences between participants’ perceptions of the shape and future of EU citizenship. Accordingly, participants in Sweden were more likely to observe EU citizenship as “something for the future” than those in the UK.

Chapter 5 explores EU mobiles’ sense of EU identity across three elements: sense of belonging, shared identity and recognition of the “other”. The key findings indicate that EU mobiles were more likely “to feel European” than stayers, especially considering their sense of belonging to the EU. There also appeared to be significant differences between the approaches of EU mobiles and stayers to the other two elements of EU identity. However, novel processes of differentiation and exclusion might overshadow the initially fruitful effects of EU mobility. Most importantly, the evidence suggests that participants’ sense of EU identity was particularly exclusive in character and likely to have a civic aspect. For example, EU mobiles had a difficulty in
bridging the differences between CEE and EU-15 mobiles. Nonetheless, they were even less likely to socialise with stayers. Similar concerns emerged from the debates among (EU-15) stayers; they too appeared to find it difficult to socialise with EU mobiles, especially CEE mobiles. Against this backdrop, the cosmopolitan outlook of some participants – mainly male mobiles – might be characterised as ambiguous at best.

Chapter 6 sheds light on the likely similarities and distinctions between the perceptions of EU mobiles about their EU rights, considering their awareness and presumed advantages of their rights, and whether and, if so, to what extent these rights were expected to guarantee equality among EU citizens and access to member state and (possibly) EU communities. The chapter highlights that young and educated EU citizens increasingly referred to EU mobility as the basis on which a model of EU citizenship might materialise. Nonetheless, participants also suggested that a clear divide is emerging between EU-15 and CEE mobiles, probing the extent to which EU citizenship is relevant for other categories of EU citizens, including the stayers, the uneducated and those with limited economic resources. Thus the chapter provides a strong indication of how processes of differentiation (and exclusion) are emerging in the EU context.

Chapter 7 turns to the last dimension of EU citizenship, EU participation, and explores which of the young and educated citizens were likely to participate, what were the main reasons for and the most likely forms of their participation
— whether they participated in traditional or alternative forms of engagement. The evidence suggests that mobility matters for how these citizens approached participating in politics. Accordingly, EU mobiles focused on the nuanced characteristics of the EU — which could be used to justify their abstention from traditional forms of engagement —, while stayers transferred their knowledge of national politics to the EU level in order to make sense of the latter. Although tackled somewhat differently, the majority of both groups of citizens appeared to be critical of the EU and its political-system, observing it to be largely undemocratic. None of the groups considered EU participation as an aspect of EU citizenship and, instead, the ensuing debates portrayed EU participation as yet another source of processes of differentiation. These findings indicate that EU mobility together with EU participation may undermine rather than enhance the EU’s quest for political integration.

Chapter 8 provides an overall assessment of EU citizenship. It summarises the key findings of the thesis and pays particular attention to the likely impact EU mobility has on how citizens realise their EU citizenship. The chapter then considers the implications of these findings in the context of the EU’s political integration and the Commission’s ideals and, finally, identifies potential research agendas and questions for future studies.
Chapter 1. Addressing the issue of EU citizenship

The majority of literature on EU citizenship tends to demarcate EU citizenship from the other models of citizenship. Regardless of the specific arguments made by scholars, the result of their endeavour is to suggest that EU citizenship is *sui generis* (Pollack, 2005; Kostakopoulou, 2007; Bellamy, 2008b; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009) or not even worthy of the name (Aron, 1974; Smith, 1992; Shore, 2000) – to the extent that it is entirely divorced from the broader field of citizenship studies. Also within EU citizenship studies, scholars have tended to focus on one dimension of citizenship – identity, rights or participation – to the exclusion of the others, and consider EU citizenship’s institutional, normative and empirical frameworks separately (see for example Kostakopoulou, 2001; Maas, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Olsen, 2012). This practice has led to a very partial understanding of what EU citizenship *actually* signifies.

This chapter attempts to respond to these two problematic features of the existing literature on EU citizenship. First, it seeks to firmly re-embed the study of EU citizenship in the field of citizenship studies. To do so, it provides a general definition of citizenship and considers how its dimensions accord with different models, including historical, national and EU citizenships. Although the contested character of citizenship – the differences between models in practice and theory – serves as the point of departure for the majority of the existing literature in this field (Marshall, 1950; Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; Isin and Turner, 2002; Bellamy, 2008a), there is a tendency among scholars to acknowledge the significance of the different dimensions of
citizenship – identity, rights and participation. Second, as a consequence of embedding the study of EU citizenship in the field of citizenship studies, the chapter establishes the desirability of adopting a more inclusive approach to (EU) citizenship. This means that we attend to all three dimensions of EU citizenship concurrently and (preferably) across its institutional, normative and empirical frameworks.

This chapter lays down the conceptual foundations of citizenship and sheds light on why citizenship has been difficult to apply to the case of the EU. The proposed approach – attending to the dimensions of EU citizenship concurrently – is used for structuring and analysing the empirical evidence in the subsequent chapters of this thesis (Chapters 3 – 7). This chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part offers an overview of the literature on EU citizenship. The second part provides a general definition of citizenship and draws upon the dimensions of citizenship across historical and political contexts. The third part considers how the dimensions of (EU) citizenship – (EU) identity, rights and participation – can be operationalised in empirical terms.

1.1. An overview of the literature on EU citizenship

The (formal) establishment of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty has been perceived as a new turning point in the history and development of citizenship (Habermas, 1996: 505; Gerstenberg, 2001: 299; Heater, 2004a: 276). Due to the distinctively political role of citizenship (Magnette, 2005: 15; Bellamy, 2008a: 2), it has also been interpreted as the EU’s attempt at
community-building and political integration (Laffan, 1996; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Karolewski, 2009). However, contradictory conclusions about the actual significance of EU citizenship have emerged (see for example Smith, 1992; Habermas, 2003). This section provides a short overview of the existing literature on EU citizenship and, in particular, on what has been revealed about its normative, institutional and empirical frameworks.\(^{13}\)

1.1.1. The normative, institutional and empirical frameworks of EU citizenship

Scholars tend to make overly optimistic or overly cynical assumptions about the normative framework of EU citizenship.\(^{14}\) Some emphasise the transformative potential of EU citizenship as the first supra- or post-national model (Habermas, 1996; 1998; 2003; Preuss, 1996; 1998b; Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2005; Nicolaïdis, 2004; 2015; Aradau, Huysmans and Squire, 2010), and the constituent of a cosmopolitan model (Soysal, 1994; Cesarani and Fullbrook, 1996; Linklater, 1998; Gerstenberg, 2001; Beck, 2006; Delanty, 2006; Benhabib, 2007; Schlenker, 2012). Their analyses point to the ‘hollowing-out’ of national citizenship in favour of more inclusive models of

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\(^{13}\) The literature on EU citizenship has expanded considerably over the years, especially after the Maastricht Treaty (for overviews see Warleigh, 1998; Olsen, 2014). Since this thesis explores the normative, institutional and empirical frameworks of EU citizenship, the focus in this section is on the seminal contributions that have been made in relation to these frameworks. As a result, legal approaches to EU citizenship are omitted from this section. Their omission is due to the fact that they are not part of the practices through which citizens realise their citizenship. Nonetheless, it is not the intention of the chapter to suggest that legal approaches do not make an important contribution to the existing literature on EU citizenship (for example Closa 1992; Oliveira 1995; O’Leary 1996; Carrera 2005; Kostakopoulou, 2007; 2013; Craig and de Búrca, 2008; Kochenov, 2012; 2014). In fact, their arguments are used in the analysis of EU rights (Appendix 3) and the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship (Chapter 2).

\(^{14}\) There are only a handful of scholars who have explored EU citizenship’s normative framework and considered what it actually signifies rather than what it should do so (Weiler, 1999; Bauböck, 2007). These scholars accept that EU citizenship has its potentials and limitations, but also maintain its significance on its own right. Their argument is thus more empirically embedded than the normative debates discussed in this section.
citizenship (Tambini, 2001: 199). Those in the supra- or post-national strand stress that more and more EU citizens are united across national borders, and (previous) distinctions between national citizens and non-citizens are increasingly blurred (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 160-4; 2005; see also Eder and Giesen, 2001: 2). The cosmopolitan strand goes one step further by making a case for granting (EU) citizenship status on the basis of personhood rather than nationality (Soysal, 1994; Gerstenberg, 2001: 299; Habermas, 2003). Even when these scholars accept that empirical evidence points to an enduring multiplicity in citizens’ sense of identity (Duchesne and Frognier, 2008), they infer positive assumptions about the future of EU citizenship. For example, they argue that by participating in EU-wide projects, citizens have the opportunity to develop an EU level ‘demoi-cracy’ (Nicolaïdis, 2004; 2015). These scholars thus observe EU citizenship as a key aspect of the EU’s burgeoning political union and usually adopt an argument that corresponds with the expectant tone of neofunctionalist (Haas, 1968) and transactionalist approaches to European integration (Deutsch et al., 1968).

Other scholars draw attention to the limitations of EU citizenship, especially compared to national models in Europe (Smith, 1992; Miller, 1995; Shore, 2000; Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004; Bellamy, 2008b). The main question these scholars attempt to answer is “how can one be a citizen of a non-state?” (Shore, 2004: 32, emphasis in original). Starting from the 'no-demos' thesis, they suggest that introducing citizenship at the EU level (and, for that matter, any attempt at introducing citizenship beyond the nation state) is far-fetched. To support their argument, these
scholars identify certain aspects as prerequisites for contemporary (democratic) citizenships to thrive, including a shared language, history and political culture (Miller, 1995: 162; 2000; see also Smith, 1992; Grimm, 1995). Due to the effects of globalisation and citizens’ growing distrust of politics (Isin and Turner, 2007), this list has been extended to include public interest in EU and national politics, as well as a receptive political elite and a dynamic civil society (Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004; Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006).

By comparing EU citizenship to national models however, these scholars are predisposed to underplay its potentials and some have done so even before the formal establishment of EU citizenship took place (Aron, 1974: 653). Actually, by equating citizenship with national models, these scholars cannot observe EU citizenship as an example of citizenship at all (Smith, 1992; Shore, 2000; Bellamy, 2008a). Instead, they see it as an(other) illustration of the importance of national models (Bellamy, 2008b). Accordingly, the bi-level structure of EU citizenship underscores its ‘misnomer’ quality (Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001: 8), making it an ‘indirect’ and ‘second-order’ link that is highly dependent on member state citizenships (Neunreither, 1995; Delanty, 1997). As a result, citizenship is perceived as a matter of nation state policy (see for example Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004).

The contradictory conclusions and partial explanations of these two normative strands in the literature provided the necessary ground for further investigation of EU citizenship. Consequently, a number of studies have begun to explore
the institutional framework of EU citizenship and shed new light on how its meaning and significance have changed over time (Meehan, 1993; Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Olsen, 2012). Most of these studies focus on the evolution and expansion of EU rights and draw attention to its origins in the early days of economic integration in Europe (see for example Everson, 1995; Maas, 2007: 5-8). Against the backdrop of an emerging ‘political union’ it is perhaps not surprising that initial research in the 1990s and early 2000s was inclined to observe EU citizenship as “a new kind of citizenship” (Meehan, 1993: 1; see also Shaw, 1998; Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 2005; Maas, 2007). At this point the EU was usually observed as an ideal setting in which the first post- and supra-national demos could surface (Kostakopoulou, 2001).

However, more and more scholars became mindful not to exaggerate the evolutionary appeal of EU rights (Vink, 2005; Shaw, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Olsen, 2012; Shore, 2012; Maas, 2014). As a result, there is an inclination to observe EU citizenship as a ‘transnational model’, which heavily relies on citizens’ cross-border mobility and national citizenships (Vink, 2005; Olsen, 2012; Maas, 2014). These scholars emphasise that heightened processes of exclusion (of non-citizens) and differentiation (between different categories of EU citizens – mobiles and stayers) are apparent in the EU (Favell and Hansen, 2002; Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006; Shaw; 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2009; Shore, 2012; Andreouli and Howarth, 2013). They also maintain that the early and late 2000s, including the public veto of EU treaties (Hansen and Hager, 2010) and, especially, the recent crisis (Shore,
created a suitable context for such processes to be embedded in the institutional framework of EU citizenship. These scholars provide us with insight into the actual scope citizens have to realise EU citizenship.

At first it may seem that research on the empirical framework of EU citizenship – studies which investigate citizens’ sense of citizenship – complement the literature on its normative and institutional frameworks (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008, 2010; Recchi and Favell, 2009; Gaxie, Hubé and Rowell, 2011; White, 2011; Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). A closer inspection of empirical research reveals however that most attended to one or the other dimensions of EU citizenship, while overlooking the others. Actually, they seem to have been interested in investigating citizens’ perception of the EU/Europe and the presence and strength of their EU/European identity. In an attempt to illustrate these issues however, research is usually carried out in isolation from other theories and from the framework of EU citizenship, not to mention the broader field of citizenship studies (the exceptions so far are Favell (2008; 2010) and Sanders and his colleagues, Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012). It is then difficult to reconcile the implications of their findings for contemporary (EU) citizenship. Thus most empirical research appears to have

There are obvious practical benefits for adopting a more focused research design. First, it can provide us with a more in-depth and rigorous investigation of each dimension of EU citizenship. Second, the scope of the research project becomes more manageable if we investigate one dimension rather than three dimensions and EU citizenship together. However, such a ‘selective’ approach is bound to further the existing diversity in the specialised literature on EU citizenship. It thus allows for reaching further contradictory assumptions about what EU citizenship signifies, which is the very reason why most scholars carry out empirical research in the first place.
proliferated the existing diversity in the specialised literature on EU citizenship.

The inconsistency in the findings of empirical research is likely to amplify this issue further. Earlier studies and those with a quantitative approach often conclude, “the glass of EU citizenship is perhaps best regarded as half full rather than half empty” (Sanders et al., 2012: 222, see also Bruter, 2005; Recchi and Favell, 2009; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012). In one of the few pieces of empirical research carried out on EU citizenship specifically, Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka (2012) demonstrate that even though rational cost-benefit calculations direct citizens’ sense of EU citizenship, it could be enhanced through citizens’ heightened political participation at the EU level. Nonetheless, these scholars resolve that “a sense of EU citizenship among European mass publics is [already] extensive” and fairs well “against comparable standards of ‘national citizenship’” (Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012: 231). In contrast, most qualitative studies conclude, ‘the glass of EU citizenship’ is half empty. For example, White (2011: 221, emphasis added) stresses that the civic lives of taxi drivers in Czech, German and UK cities are framed by nation states and “rarely corresponded to the contours of any recognisable European polity.” In their investigation of citizens’ reaction to different aspects of European integration in Paris, Oxford and Brussels, Duchesne et al. (2013) illustrate that, depending on their professional background (workers compared to employers and activists) and city of residence (especially Oxford compared to the other two cities), quite a few citizens are likely to find it difficult to form any opinion about the EU. In fact,
most citizens who participated in their focus groups “barely ha[d] consciousness of Europe at all” (Duchesne et al., 2013: 197).

In an attempt to bridge the inconsistency between these findings, Van Ingelgom (2014) adopts a mixed method research design and studies citizens’ reactions towards the European integration process. She highlights that a substantial portion of citizens – ‘the median European’ – is not integrated into the EU and do not have Europhile or Eurosceptic attitudes. Instead, they exhibit ambivalent dispositions towards the integration project.16 This finding compels Van Ingelgom (2014: 3) to call for a re-conceptualisation of citizens’ attitudes towards the EU, which also includes “the notion of indifference”. From these examples it is apparent that even if they vary in their approaches to and assumptions of the (developing) bond between the citizens and the EU, empirical studies complement also the literature on the normative and institutional frameworks of EU citizenship. In particular, they illustrate well the diversity of processes through which citizens activate one or the other dimensions of EU citizenship today.

16 Isin and his colleagues are omitted from this list (Isin and Nielsen, 2008; Isin, 2009; Isin and Saward, 2013). They consider how the “other” (non-citizens) attempt to achieve citizenship recognition, though some consideration have also been given to how marginal groups do the same, including the Roma (Aradau et al., 2013) or prostitutes in the EU (Aradau, Huysmans and Squire, 2010). Although these scholars make an important and timely contribution to the literature on (EU) citizenship, their focus on the ‘acts of (EU) citizenship’ – the processes through which any individual may make claims for the status, identity and rights of EU citizenship – means that, from the outset, their study challenges both the normative and institutional frameworks of (EU) citizenship. Since we are still lacking a more nuanced understanding of what EU citizenship actually signifies, this thesis takes these two frameworks as the starting point of its analysis.
1.1.2. Adopting a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship

The previous section attempted to demonstrate that by attending to the various frameworks and dimensions of EU citizenship separately, scholars reached contradictory conclusions about its significance. In so doing however, there is a risk that they entirely divorced their study from the broader field of citizenship studies. In fact, the chasing of an ideal (within normative studies) and the investigation of a single dimension of EU citizenship (EU rights within institutional and EU identity within empirical studies) seems to have led scholars to neglect the oft-cited character of citizenship as being contested and in ‘flux’ (Isin, 2009). In contrast, the broader field of citizenship studies is dedicated to exposing the contested character of citizenship. Since an “elaborate theory” (Turner, 1993: viii) or approach to citizenship does not exist, scholars in this field have been concerned with “producing analytical and theoretical tools” which aid the comparability of different models (Isin and Turner, 2002: 4; Tilly, 2003: 611; Bellamy, 2004: 3; 2010: xvi-xvii; Heater, 2004a: 288; Joppke, 2007: 46-7). In doing so, they draw attention to certain debates – general inquires about the definition of citizenship and the applicability of its dimensions –, which played out across diverse historical and political contexts (see for example Isin and Turner, 2002; 2007).

Consequently, some parallels can be drawn between the main theoretical traditions of citizenship. The republican, liberal and communitarian traditions

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}}\text{As a result, scholars within the field of citizenship studies usually explore the dimensions of citizenship, which are linked to “the three fundamental axes, extent (rules and norms of inclusion and exclusion), content (rights and responsibilities) and depth (thickness or thinness) of citizenship” (Isin and Turner, 2002: 2-4, emphasis in original; see also Isin and Turner, 2007). Thus, in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of EU citizenship, we should adopt a more inclusive approach to (EU) citizenship and attend to its three dimensions concurrently (Heater, 2004a: 287; Bellamy, 2004: 3).}\]
idealist the political, legal and social dimensions of Greek, Roman and national citizenships respectively (Heater, 1999; Bellamy, 2008a; Bosniak, 2008). More recently, the cosmopolitan, multiculturalist and feminist traditions seek to highlight the universality of citizenship rights. The cosmopolitan tradition advocates a world citizenship model in which human rights and citizenship rights are one and the same (Falk, 1994; Linklater, 1998; Heater, 2004b; Delanty, 2009). While the multiculturalist and feminist traditions promote the introduction of group-differentiated rights based on ethnicity or gender (Kymlicka, 1995; Lister, 2007; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010).

Even though these traditions have a clear preference for addressing the issue of citizenship through a certain dimension, they do not dismiss the significance of the other dimensions all together. For example, the republican tradition expects to see citizen participation in politics to translate into a sense of political identity. Nonetheless, by idealising one dimension and a specific historical model, they too tend to afford a somewhat stagnant character to citizenship.

Moreover, while it is true that a definition of citizenship must “take on both broader and deeper meaning” (Heater, 2004a: 293) in order to reflect reality, it should not be stretched too far. The tendency to broaden the definition of citizenship can and, to some extent, has already led to observing any new phenomenon as a novel model of citizenship (Magnette, 2005: 8). Purely on this basis for instance, EU citizenship has been interpreted as sui generis.
(Pollack, 2005). Yet, there are important similarities between EU and national citizenships. For instance, a comparison between their normative frameworks reveals that both models have a similar purpose, namely to shape community-building processes at the national and EU levels.\textsuperscript{20} Similarly, until scholars and policy-makers can agree on “what the nature of the beast is” (Risse-Kappen, 1995), whether the EU is a political, economic or a regulatory community (Majone, 1998; Hix and Høyland, 2011), it is difficult to accept that its citizenship policies outline an innovative model. Therefore, recognising that each political community creates its own model (Aristotle, 1946) should not challenge the “heuristic advantage” of citizenship nor lead to further diversity in this research field (Magnette, 2005: 2). Even more, it should not diverge us from the distinctively political role of citizenship (Bellamy, 2008a: 2). Instead, more attention should be paid to how different models emerge, transform and become consolidated over time; how these models can be described and compared to one another; and what these processes tell us about the actual significance of each model.

Against this backdrop, it is worth noting that while many scholars recognise the multidimensional character of national citizenships in Europe, most fail to adopt a similar approach to EU citizenship. There is thus a risk that much of the existing literature provides a less nuanced understanding of what EU citizenship actually signifies. This problem was already identified in the previous section but it is particularly striking when we take into account the contribution of Richard Bellamy and his colleagues to the literature on EU citizenship.

\textsuperscript{20} See Tilly (1975) for a discussion on nation states’ attempt to shape community-building processes through citizenship. In a similar fashion, Reading (2013a) also emphasised that the main purpose of EU citizenship is to uphold further political integration.
citizenship (Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004; Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006; Bellamy, 2008b). After all Bellamy (2004: 8; 2006: 4; 2008b: 601; 2010: xiii) has, time and again, advocated the benefits of addressing the issue of citizenship through its three dimensions. Yet, he has only ever explored all three dimensions in the national contexts, making comparisons within and across member states (Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004). In contrast, he has only really been interested in the lack of active (participatory) citizenship at the EU level (Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006). Interestingly, both studies led him to the same conclusion; citizenship is “only [possible within] a political community with properties similar to those we now associate with a state” (Bellamy, 2008a: 6). This led Bellamy (2008b; 2011) to welcome the complementary character of EU citizenship. Hence, the very scholar who originally advocated adopting ‘a more inclusive approach’ to citizenship seems to have failed to follow his own instructions in the case of the EU. Considered in this light, it is not surprising that many of the other scholars have not adopted ‘a more inclusive approach’ to EU citizenship either.

Therefore, and in an attempt to complement and fill an important gap in the existing literature, this thesis adopts a ‘more inclusive approach’ to EU citizenship. Specifically, it seeks to attend to the dimensions of EU citizenship concurrently and across its normative, institutional and empirical frameworks. In doing so, it is anticipated that the thesis can provide us with a more nuanced understanding of what EU citizenship actually signifies. It will also aid
the comparability of EU citizenship with other models – a requirement for any research “to be recognizable as accounts of citizenship” (Bellamy, 2004: 3) within the broader field of citizenship studies. Comparability is also important in the case of the EU, due to the interdependency between national and EU citizeships (see for example Kochenov, 2014). The focus group evidence used in this thesis is likely to be useful in this additional way. In particular, it will shed light on how a select group of young citizens makes sense of and compares their two citizenships in the EU (Chapter 4.1.).

1.2. Re-embedding EU citizenship in the field of citizenship studies

By exploring the various definitions of citizenship across diverse historical and political contexts, this section will attempt to re-embed the study of EU citizenship within the broader field of citizenship studies.

1.2.1. A general definition of citizenship

Broadly speaking, citizenship can be defined as a dynamic bond between a sovereign political community and the individuals within it (Aristotle, 1946; Isin and Turner, 2002; Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005). For instance, in its initial form (c. 700 BC), citizenship referred to the bond between the Greek polis (city-state) and the citizens, and the emphasis was on citizens’ participation in the city-state’s public affairs (Pocock, 1998: 32-4). In comparison, Cīvis Romanus [Roman citizenship] signalled a more complex and, at the same time, dynamic bond (Clarke, 1994: 49) between the Roman Empire and its male residents. The dynamism of this model is particularly apparent in the
distinct ways in which Roman citizenship was acquired by some male residents (Salmond, 1901: 274). During the Middle Ages, citizenship was within a city state and denoted an economic “class concept” where “membership in specific class groups [the guilds] made the person a citizen” (Weber, 1998: 44).21 The Renaissance brought little change to this feudal relationship, though there was some movement towards the idea of citizenship as an exclusive relationship between a sovereign and the individuals (Heater, 2004a: 24-6). Only following the French Revolution did a constitutional contract between equal individuals and the state emerge (Salmond, 1901). Since then, citizenship has indicated “a relation between individuals and [the nation-] states” (Bauböck, 1994: 23).

However, even contemporary national citizenship varies from one state to the next and even within state boundaries (Bellamy, 2008a). For example, British citizenship has had an “extraordinarily confused history” (Dummett, 2006: 554). At the outset it signalled a liberal bond between residents, the Empire and the Crown (Heater, 2004a: 298). More recently however, we can see a slow but gradual shift towards a territorially defined status (Dummett, 2006: 560-1). Thus a clear definition of what British citizenship really entails is still lacking (Anderson, 2012: 2). Although Sweden is similar in this respect – the Citizenship Act does not define medborgarskap [citizenship] only deals with the acquisition and loss of citizenship – yet here a shift occurred from less towards a more liberal model of citizenship (Howard, 2009: 77). This is apparent in the continuous ease of acquisition process, the (supposed)

21 Weber (1998: 43-4) argues that the economic class concept of citizenship in the Middle Ages paved the way for (contemporary) national citizenships, which are inherently political and Western at the same time.
openness of the Swedish labour market (MIPEX, 2012c), the lack of an official citizenship test and language requirement, and the (relatively) low cost of citizenship acquisition – 1,500SEK (approximately £135) as of early 2015. Thus Swedish citizenship is fairly accessible to residents (Goodman, 2010; Wiesbrock, 2011). This is reflected in the number of citizenship acquisitions (which are considerable in light of the population). This shift corresponds with the needs of the Swedish labour market (Berg and Sephar, 2013: 144-5) and, as a result, Sweden now has one of the highest numbers of citizenship acquisitions in the world (OECD, 2011: 19).

Even though (national) citizenships have different meanings in European states, it is only EU citizenship that is observed as distinctive and *sui generis* – simply because it indicates the first dynamic bond between a transnational political community (the EU) and the individuals (Habermas, 1996: 505; Weiler, 1997: 497; Gerstenberg, 2001: 299; Heater, 2004a: 352; Kostakopoulou, 2007; Bellamy, 2008b; Maas, 2013). Since citizenship has referred to a different (type of) bond, political community and group of individuals (as citizens) across diverse historical and political contexts, EU citizenship is more likely to be another example in a long list of models. There is thus a requirement to support the observation of EU citizenship as distinct or *sui generis* with further theoretical underpinnings and/or empirical evidence.

Debates about the general definition of citizenship are usually accompanied by reference to its role in shaping community-building processes, reflecting on how citizens approach one another as members of the community and how
they recognise the non-citizens. This aspect has been mainly emphasised by scholars in their consideration of nation state citizenships (see for example Marshall, 1950; Tilly, 1975; Brubaker, 1992; Turner, 1997). However, it is particularly well-suited to highlighting the inherent association of the idea of citizenship with processes of differentiation, distinguishing between categories of citizens, and processes of exclusion, dividing citizens from non-citizens (the “other”) (Bosniak, 2008: 19-25). The rest of this section considers how such processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU context accord with diverse models of citizenship.

The political engagement perspective – focusing on citizens’ participation in traditional forms of engagement (propensity to vote and run for office) – dominates the bulk of the literature on active/passive citizenship (Magnette, 2003; Martiniello, 2005; Welge, 2015), including those addressing the issues of British and Swedish citizenship respectively (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Amnà, 2006; Sloam, 2007; Bevelander, and Pendakur, 2012). The origins of this approach can be traced to Greek citizenship, where the dichotomy of active/passive citizens was established on the basis of their participation in the policy-making process (Bellamy, 2008a: 97-123). However, the political engagement perspective may not be as relevant to addressing contemporary models (Turner, 1997: 15). For example, there is growing evidence to suggest that due to citizens’ unequal access to influencing politics (Sloam, 2013: 10-11), more and more citizens now participate in alternative forms of engagement (like volunteering and protesting) not only at the national (Putnam, 2000; Whiteley, 2012; Smets and van Ham, 2013) but also at the
EU level (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Applying the active/passive dichotomy from the political engagement perspective may thus tell us little about the actual categories of citizens (Zani and Barrett, 2012).

Nonetheless, as long as it is applied in view of the broader context, the active/passive dichotomy can still to be an effective analytical tool in addressing the issue of citizenship. This is precisely what a closer inspection of historical models of citizenship indicates to us. In the case of Roman citizenship for example, different categories of citizens had access to a distinctive set of rights (Clarke, 1994: 49). These categories were drawn up according to certain criteria, including descent, manumission, privilege or legislative grant (Salmond, 1901: 274-6). Accordingly, the male members of the Empire were recognised as full Roman citizens and could enjoy some well-defined public and private rights. In comparison, women were partial citizens – they possessed the rights enjoyed by their parents apart from that of voting in the assembly. With the expansion of the Empire, dual (Latin and Roman), half and partial citizenships were granted to allies and the male members of conquered regions (Heater, 2004a: 17-8). Slaves were the only resident group with no access to citizenship rights (Clarke, 1994). In light of these categories, applying the political engagement perspective would provide us with a rather simplistic portrait of Roman citizenship. Similarly, political participation was not the key factor during the Middle Ages or the Renaissance. In these cases, economic and military service, and civic consciousness distinguished between categories of citizens (Weber, 1998: 45; Heater, 2004a: 23-4).
Considered in this light, it is perhaps less astonishing that the institutional framework of EU citizenship has set out categories of citizens on the basis of their intra-EU mobility status (Olsen, 2012; European Commission, 2013a.). Even more, the current EU treaties require citizens to move in order to activate their EU level status (Guild, 2004; Maas, 2007). Against this backdrop, the dichotomy of active/passive EU citizenship from the traditional political engagement perspective seems irrelevant. This thesis proposes that we should instead investigate the differences between the perceptions and behaviour of stayers as passive and mobiles as active EU citizens. A latter chapter of this thesis will shed further light on the resulting processes of differentiation against the backdrop of heightened mobility in the EU context (Chapter 3.3.).

Similarly to processes of differentiation, processes of exclusion have been an integral aspect of citizenship across diverse historical and political contexts (Bosniak, 2008: 2-3; Bellamy, 2010: xvi; Karolewski, 2010: 26). They were apparent in the Greek *polis*, where citizenship defined a community of ideal citizens – “all who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn” (Aristotle, 1946: 95; see also Pocock, 1998: 77). In sharp contrast, an increasingly hollow sense of citizenship accentuated the decay of the Roman community. As Roman citizenship was extended to every man in the Empire (that is other than slaves), a sense of honour and public duty declined among citizens (Heater, 2004a: 19). During the Middle Ages, property-ownership was observed as a proof of citizens’ commitment towards the city-state and the
guild (Weber, 1998: 44, 48). In an attempt to enhance the loyalty of citizens to the city-state, citizenship during the Renaissance was perceived as the “commonwealth” among citizens” (Heater, 2004a: 25). In the context of nation states, nationalism, national unity and citizenship became interchangeable, often at the cost of individual freedoms (Bauböck, 1994: 23). These developments intensified the process of exclusion and created considerable divisions between (national) citizens (the ethnic majority) and the “other” (often the ethnic minority groups) (Hage, 1998).

Although the UK and Sweden have an increasingly heterogeneous population, they adopted contradictory approaches to citizenship, immigration and integration policies and these differences are also apparent in British and Swedish public attitudes. Due to the gradual securitisation of British identity politics following 9/11 and 7/7 (Blunkett, 2002; Gilroy, 2005), we can see a slow move away from inclusive and multiculturalist principles towards a more exclusivist notion of citizenship (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). By and large, Sweden still attempts to fulfil its self-portrayal as a modern EU state (Brochman and Hagelund, 2012: 26). It has thus made small institutional distinctions between the rights of Swedish residents and citizens, and supports the integration of migrants into the Swedish society. Arguably, “Sweden is setting an example, which hopefully others in Europe will follow” (Billstörn, 2008).

Both approaches are apparent at the EU level. Although EU citizenship still ‘only’ unites member state citizens (of course these are already the “other”
from a national citizenship viewpoint), the distinctions between EU citizens and non-citizens, especially third country nationals (TCNs), have lessened over time. This is mainly due to the ambiguous boundaries of EU citizenship, which do not actually provide a coherent classification of who citizens and non-citizens are (Eder and Giesen, 2001: 2; Eder, 2005: 197). Even more, certain rights are available to non-citizens – mainly TCNs and EEA residents – including political rights such as voting in the local elections of the host country (Shaw, 2007). Although the Commission has attempted to revise the institutional framework of EU citizenship to require residency status rather than nationality (Hansen and Hager, 2010: 53-5), member states continue to define the boundaries of national and EU political communities. Due to recent security and cultural concerns however, processes of exclusion are becoming more acute at the EU level, especially when it comes to anti-Semitism and Islamophobia (Bunzl, 2005). We already know that anti-immigration sentiments shape the institutional framework of EU citizenship (Hansen and Hager, 2010: 7-8). These examples illustrate the similarity between the debates surrounding the broad definition of citizenship and related processes of community building across diverse historical and political contexts.

1.2.2. The dimensions of citizenship: identity, rights and participation across diverse historical and political contexts

Existing historical overviews underscore that, from the outset, citizenship “contained a cluster of meanings [dimensions] related to a defined legal or social status, a means of political identity, a focus of loyalty, a requirement of duties [and] an expectation of rights” (Heater, 2004a: 166). The institutional
framework of and citizens’ approaches to these dimensions (Balibar, 1988: 724) – identity, rights and participation – establish the vigour of each model (Kratochwil, 1994).22 This section sheds light on the relevance of these dimensions across historical, national – British and Swedish – and the EU models of citizenship, and, subsequently, on the broader implications of the interlinked character of these dimensions. The objective of this section is to illustrate that EU citizenship is another example of the debates that have played out across diverse historical and political contexts.23

The identity dimension of citizenship has been considered as particularly relevant to national models. It is often observed that nation states reconfigured citizens’ sense of belonging by adding geographically and culturally distinct layers to their pre-existing (social) identities (Miller, 1995; Brubaker, 1998; Schnapper, 2002; Beiner, 2003; Bellamy, 2008a). The resulting identity of citizens has become infused with exclusionary, ethnic and culturist ideals (Smith, 1995; Balibar, 2009), and continues to nourish group struggles for recognition (Kymlicka 1995; 2011). However, EU citizenship does not seem to have a comparable impact on citizens’ sense of identity. For example, instead of creating a sense of collective EU identity, EU citizenship, together with the European integration process, often lead to a sense of dual

22 As a result, some scholars identify citizenship as a “process” or “practice” (Nisbet, 1974; Wiener, 1998; 2005; Olsen, 2012).
23 To some extent at least, the approach of Duchesne (2008: 402) and her colleagues (Duchesne et al., 2013: 11) support a similar point in relation to researching EU identity. They advocate placing EU identity (preferably, EU identification) within the framework of EU citizenship. This chapter goes a step further and calls for placing the dimensions of EU citizenship within the framework of EU citizenship and then the study of EU citizenship within the broader field of citizenship studies. Since the aim of this section is to illustrate the similarities between various models of citizenship, it will not provide an in-depth investigation of every model. For further discussion of the historical and political models of citizenship referred to in this section see Heater (2004a), Magnette (2005), Bellamy (2008a) or Bosniak (2008).
identity – national and EU identities together – or enhances the exclusive aspect of citizens’ national identity (Risse, 2010: 39-46). Existing research shows that the development of EU identity seems to be highly contingent on certain factors, including the political context – at the national and EU levels –, whether citizens’ (existing) national identity is nested, portrayals of the country’s EU membership by the political elite, media and the public (Medrano, 2003; Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 433-6; Duchesne and Frognier, 2008; Bruter, 2009). Accordingly, it is perhaps less surprising that some scholars have dismissed the significance of EU citizenship all together (Smith, 1992; Shore, 2000; Bellamy, 2008b). Observed from the broader field of citizenship however, the focus shifts from replicating national identities at the EU level to recognising that citizenship as identity manifests differently across diverse historical and political contexts.

In the Greek polis, for example, a political ethos stems from citizens’ mutual understanding of “one another’s characters” (Aristotle, 1946: 292), which defined one of the first examples of an imagined community (Ludwig, 2002). Questions of belonging were at the forefront in the case of Roman citizenship, where the expansion of the Empire made it particularly challenging to exclude non-citizens (Magnette, 2005: 19). The Middle Ages and Renaissance highlighted the impact social groups, in particular professional (Weber, 1998: 44) and religious groups (Riesenberg, 1992: 88) can have on citizens’ shared identity. While it is true that in the context of nation states feelings of patriotism became closely associated with citizenship, there are also important variations between citizens’ sense of ethnic (exclusive, cultural) and
civic (inclusive, political) identities across and within state borders (Smith, 1992; Brubaker, 1998). This is exemplified by the variation between contemporary British, Swedish and EU identities.

Both civic and ethnic components are part of British national identity today (Smith, 1992; Parekh, 2000; Heath and Roberts, 2008). The civic component stems from a shared “belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for the country and its shared heritage” (Blair, 2006; see also Wellings, 2002; Curtice, 2006).\(^{24}\) Established during the ‘glorious’ days of the British Empire, it legitimised the rule of the ethnic majority – the English – but rejected the ethno-nationalist approach to community-building processes (especially one that could be comparable to the nationalist movements of the European continent) (Kumar, 2003: 145).\(^{25}\) Nonetheless, a slow transition from the original emphasis on civic towards the ethnic component of British identity has taken place recently (Skey, 2012a). This is due to internal processes (especially regional devolution) and external pressures (decolonisation, immigration, multiculturalism and EU membership) (Gilroy, 2005; Hewitt, 2005; Skey, 2011a). Actually, the ethnic component is particularly salient nowadays and has become an integral part of the institutional framework of British citizenship – as apparent through the introduction and constant revision of the 2005 British Citizenship Test (Gray and Griffin, 2014: 299).

\(^{24}\) However, this approach may be an attempt to correct historical deficits of an exclusivist British nationalism (Meer and Modood, 2008: 475).

\(^{25}\) In reality however, assimilationist, hierarchical and racist ideologies were at the heart of the Empire (Rich, 1990: 12-27). As a result, its dismantling turned British national identity (and, by association, ‘Englishness’) into “an empty signifier” and the “mark of an outsider” (Asari, Halikiopoulou and Mock, 2008: 12, see also Nairn, 1977; Condor, Gibson and Abell, 2006).
In comparison, the civic component still defines Swedish (national) identity (Roth, 2004). Without a clear demarcation of who Swedish citizens are (Bernitz, 2012: 17), the emphasis is on the promotion of communitarian principles (Stråth, 2004; Agius, 2006). These principles are embedded in the relative success of Folkhem [welfare state] (Daun, 1996; Roth and Hertzberg, 2010, Swedish ‘neutrality’ (Stråth, 2004; Agius, 2006) and a social model of Swedish citizenship (Borevi, 2012: 25-7). They promote a collective sense of safety, national coherence, solidarity, equality and localism among citizens (Ginsburg, 1992). Moreover, due to the institutional importance placed on facilitating access to citizenship, aspects of a multicultural model of citizenship are also apparent in Sweden (Roth, 2004; Berg and Sephar, 2013). Anticipated to counteract xenophobic tendencies among the population and decouple the bond between the nation state and its citizens, Sweden is slowly implementing a post-national model of citizenship (Gustafson, 2002; Roth, 2004).

EU citizenship is somewhat different from these two examples since its institutionalisation did not translate into a genuine sense of EU identity among citizens (Painter 1998; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012.). In order to ratify this issue, more and more effort went into applying identity technologies – prevalent within nation states (see for example Billig, 1995) – through top-down and bottom-up processes (for an overview see Karolewski, 2009: 62-8). Top-down processes rely on EU symbols (European day, flag, hymn and the Euro) (Risse, 2003: 487-505,
Bruter, 2004a: 21-39; 2005: 123-33; Hymans, 2004: 5-31), values (democracy and peace) (Della Sala, 2010) and the EU’s normative, cosmopolitan and civilian images (Lavenex, 2001: 851-74; Habermas, 2003: 86-100; Eriksen, 2006: 252-69). Bottom-up processes require citizens’ actual involvement, such as exercising EU mobility and political rights, using the Euro and shopping across state borders (Bruter, 2005; Recchi and Favell, 2009; Risse, 2010).

Although these processes have had varying results (Bruter, 2004; 2009; Fligstein, 2008; Favell, 2008; 2010), there is an important distinction between their long-term effects. While top-down processes tend to enhance the cognitive level of citizens’ EU identity (Meinhof, 2004; Kaina and Karolewski, 2013: 33-5; Bellucci, Sanders and Serricchio, 2012), bottom-up processes appear to have a more enduring influence (Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012). The latter may thus be particularly constructive towards the behavioural level of citizens’ EU identity. The latter finding is relevant for addressing the issue of EU citizenship and considering its association with citizens’ EU identity (Føllesdal, 2001; Besson and Utzinger 2008; Karolweski, 2010; Koopmans 2012; Schmidtke 2012).
Table 1.1. Frequencies of EU27, Sweden and the UK responses to Eurobarometer question on European Identity (% Attachment to the EU) (2007 - 12) (Source: European Commission 2012j;2013r)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>May 2007 (EB 67.2)</th>
<th>May 2012 (EB 77.3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very / Fairly attached to the EU</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very / Not at all attached to the EU</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A glimpse of EU identity (2007-12) is included in Table 1.1. Firstly, the table illustrates that citizens in both Sweden and the UK have generally low feelings of EU attachment, especially when compared to the EU as a whole (see also Henjak, Tóka and Sanders, 2012). Secondly, the table shows that, generally speaking, citizens’ sense of EU identity is not particularly stable (as apparent in % change columns). Nonetheless, EU identity seems more stable in Sweden than in the EU27 and, especially, the UK. It is thus more likely for citizens to develop a more stable sense of EU identity in Sweden than in other parts of the EU or in the UK. Actually, changes in EU identity in the UK appear to be particularly erratic (-10.5% and +12.2%) compared to the smaller numbers in Sweden (-0.8% and +1.4%). The UK numbers are striking even when compared to the EU27 average (-5.1% and +6.1%). Not surprisingly perhaps, the UK may be an especially challenging context for citizens to develop a lasting sense of EU identity (also supported by existing empirical research on EU identity, see for example Favell, 2008; Duchesne et al.,
Finally, the table demonstrates the destructive effects of the recent crisis on citizens' sense of EU identity. Thus we can observe a general decreasing trend in the frequency of citizens reporting a strong and fair sense of attachment to the EU, and a general increasing trend in citizens’ reporting a weaker sense of attachment or non-attachment to the EU.

From the different studies on citizenship as rights, the most well-known and, perhaps, oft-cited study is by Thomas H. Marshall (1950). Marshall traces how conceptions of British citizenship developed over time and across three strands of rights, namely civil, social and political rights. He concludes that citizenship guarantees full membership and equal treatment in the community (Marshall, 1950: 102). Although there are some obvious limitations to Marshall’s analysis, including its exclusive focus on citizenship as rights (Turner, 1997), he makes an important contribution to citizenship studies by drawing attention to the dynamic nature of citizenship and the way in which rights can shed a different light on this dynamism. The same point is apparent if we consider the relevance of rights across historical and political models of citizenship.

Citizens’ individual characteristics such as gender or class restricted access to historical models of citizenship. In the Greek polis, the male members of the founding families and, later, the male members of one of the geographically allocated political units (demes) had access to citizenship (Parton, 2004: 77-9). Access to Roman citizenship was originally based on gender and nobility, however these categories were widened through the gradual expansion of the
Empire (Heater, 2004a: 17-8). During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, contributions to the guild’s output and membership in religious groups served as the first point of access to citizenship (Riesenber, 1992: 88; Isin, 2002: 112). In comparison, the “ontological priority of the individual” is apparent in contemporary models of citizenship (Karolewski, 2010: 11). These models guarantee the equal status of every citizen within state boundaries (Poggi, 2003: 42), making the territorial principles of nation states and access to citizenship synonymous (Brubaker, 1992: 21). These principles guide the legal frameworks of British, Swedish and EU citizenship (Bernitz and Bernitz, 2006; Dummett, 2006; Kostakopoulou, 2014). However, neither of these models seems to have found it easy to implement the territorial principle.

From a historical perspective, citizens could move freely within the British Empire. However, these mobility rights were curtailed with the introduction of the British Nationality Act (1981), leaving a substantial segment of UK residents caught up in transitional procedures (Sawyer and Wray, 2014: 9). The lack of a definition of citizenship created an interesting political context in Sweden, where a good number of citizens believe that they have access to Swedish welfare state provisions even if they reside abroad (Bernitz, 2012: 17). The constantly changing borders of the EU make it rather difficult to draw clear boundaries for EU citizenship (Kostakopoulou, 2014). These issues are further complicated by the interdependent relationship between national and EU citizenships. EU free movement provisions clearly challenge the territorial principles of British and Swedish citizenships – and, for that matter, of all national citizenships across the EU (Kochenov, 2009). In turn, EU citizenship
is under considerable constraints internally. Member states can pose limitations on citizens’ access to their EU level status, through, for example transitional measures or residency requirements (Carrera, 2005; Guild, Peers and Tomkin, 2014). The variability between these models illustrate well that rights should be integral to considerations of the institutional and empirical frameworks of citizenship – the latter of which can shed light on the scope citizens have to realising citizenship. Nonetheless, it does not make rights the only dimension of (EU) citizenship, despite of what some scholars would like us to believe (Marshall, 1950; Meehan, 1993).

In fact, citizenship has been observed as “meaningless” if it does not also include “some kind of participation in public affairs” on behalf of the citizens (Heater, 2004a: 216; see also Dalton and Klingemann, 2007: 1-3). Considered as a sign of the ‘highest and harmonious capabilities’ (Mill, 2002 [1861]), citizens’ participation has important implications for the legal structure of citizenship and it is a central feature of (democratic) political communities (Heater, 2004a: 216-7; Bellamy, 2008a: 97).26 There is some disagreement about whether participation is an end goal (as with the republican tradition of citizenship, see for example Dagger, 2002: 146-52; Bellamy, 2006) or an important aspect and consequence of the community’s political culture (as with the civic tradition of citizenship, see for example Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).27 These

26 Democratic political communities expected to guarantee public autonomy through certain constitutional arrangements, which sustain political debate among citizens and the political elite (Bellamy, 2005: 157, see also Habermas 1996; Rawls 1993).

27 Nonetheless, there has been an almost exclusive focus in the field of citizenship studies on participation as the key to distinguishing between different categories of citizens (addressed in the previous section).
disagreements are also apparent across historical and political models of citizenship.

In the Greek *polis*, the political prerequisites of the city-state and the community were fulfilled by the participation of the “citizen proper” (Aristotle 1992: 169, emphasis in original). Participation was an end goal in the Roman Empire in political *and* legal terms, though Roman citizens could not really make an impact on political decisions or shape laws (Heater, 2004a: 19). The Middle Ages and the Renaissance saw citizens’ participation likened to tax bargaining (Magnette, 2005: 54). In the context of nation states, the focus shifted to public autonomy and the duty of citizens to participate in politics (Poggi, 2003: 42; Bellamy, 2008a: 109-114). However, we are witnessing a general decline in citizens’ participation, which may signal that national citizenships are in crisis (Barber, 2007: 291-339; Bellamy, 2008a: 114-23). The problem with this argument is that it does not take into account the fact that an increasing number of citizens participate in individualised and alternative forms of engagement, including public demonstrations, volunteering, acts of civil disobedience (such as riots), consumerism and online petitions (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Kaase, 2007; Dalton, 2009). The changes in citizens’ participation underscore the requirement for us to reconsider our approaches to participation within the broader field of citizenship studies (see for example Almond and Verba, 1963; Hirschman, 1982; Franklin, 2004; Dalton and Klingemann, 2007; Putnam and Helliwell, 2007). These issues are also apparent when we compare citizens’ participation across the UK, Swedish and EU contexts.
Political participation in the recent local and general elections has been one of the lowest in the UK compared to other EU countries (Steinbrecher and Rattinger, 2012: 93). Nonetheless, there is growing empirical evidence to indicate that half of Brits who do not vote in elections participate in alternative forms of engagement (Desmoyers-Davis, 2003; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Akram, 2009). From the different groups of citizens, the younger generation, especially those aged 30 and under, have been found to be the least likely to vote, run for office or be members of political parties (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Pattie and Johnston, 2009; Sloam, 2013 Phelps, 2014). In fact, young Brits are the least likely to vote even when their turnout level is considered in the generational context across the EU (Fieldhouse et al., 2007). Whilst we should be concerned about this trend, it may be too early to interpret it as a crisis for (the future of) British citizenship (Stoker, 2006). It is, in fact the younger generations of Brits who are the most likely to participate in alternative forms of engagement (Marsh, O’Toole and Jones, 2007; Norris, 2011; Sloam, 2014a; 2014b) – at twice as likely as the rest of the population (Sloam, 2013: 12). Thus the low participation levels in traditional forms of engagement in the UK may be interpreted in the broader trend of declining voter turnout (Franklin, 2004). It can also be observed as one aspect in the recent transformation of British citizenship this section has already touched upon.

In comparison, participation in Sweden remains comparatively high across both traditional (Steinbrecher and Rattinger, 2012: 94) and alternative forms of
engagement (Norris, 2011). The Swedish educational system has been recognised as particularly stimulating for (young) citizens’ political participation (especially when observed through a comparative perspective) (Gallego 2009; Persson, 2012). In fact, it has already been found to lead to particularly high levels of cognitive mobilisation – a process through which the political resources and skills of citizens are enhanced – among Swedes (Welzel and Inglehart, 2010: 55). Against this backdrop, perhaps the most striking gap in levels of participation can be observed when we compare the participation of residents and citizens (Bevel, Ander and Pendakur, 2006). Although both groups can vote in the local and regional elections, members of the former group rarely do so (Seidle, 2015), that is until they acquire Swedish citizenship – which seems to increase their propensity to participate significantly (Endeghal, 2011).

Similar issues are relevant to our consideration of citizens’ participation at the EU level, including generational change (Bhatti and Hansen, 2012), migration – EU mobiles abstention from voting in the host county (Muxell, 2009; Favell, 2010) – and the increased use of alternative forms of engagement – especially in the context of the crisis (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Accordingly, the declining trend in the electoral turnout of European Parliament (EP) elections could and perhaps should be observed in the broader context of declining citizen participation (Franklin, 2004), rather than a crisis of EU citizenship (Bellamy, 2008b). A snapshot of EP electoral turnout is included in Table 1.2. below. Specifically, the table reports the turnout levels across the EU (EU average) and in Sweden and the UK for the 1999-2014 period.
Table 1.2. EP electoral turnout in the EU, Sweden and the UK (% of total population) (1999 – 2014) (Source: European Parliament, 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/State</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU average</td>
<td>49.51</td>
<td>45.47</td>
<td>-4.04</td>
<td>43.00</td>
<td>-2.47</td>
<td>42.61</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>38.84</td>
<td>37.85</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
<td>45.53</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>48.80</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38.52</td>
<td>14.52</td>
<td>34.70</td>
<td>-3.82</td>
<td>34.19</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2 demonstrates the continuous decline in the EU average over the last 15 years – despite the Commission’s (2012b) recent efforts to turn this trend around. Actually, a 7% fall in the EU average over this time period led to the lowest ever turnout in 2014 at 42.61%. Some of this variation can be explained by Eastern enlargements to countries with lesser democratic structures and traditionally low level of voter turnouts (Hix and Marsh, 2007; Steinbrecher and Rattinger, 2012; Tilley and Hobolt, 2014). Furthermore, citizens’ perception of their country’s EU membership, the state of national politics and trust in national institutions are likely to dominate their attitudes towards and actual political behaviour at the EU level (Hix and Marsh, 2007; Schmitt and Van der Eijk, 2007; Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011; Söderlund, Wass and Blais, 2011; Armingeon and Ceka, 2014). Thus a direct ‘electoral connection’ between the EP and EU citizens has not materialised (Hix and Hageman, 2009). These trends support the second-order thesis of EP elections (Seif and Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 2005; Hix and Høyland, 2011).

Nonetheless, even if EP electoral turnout continues to decline, the literature on EU electoral politics underlines that more and more EU citizens consider
EU politics as relevant for their daily lives (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). In other words, EU politics maybe an important factor in citizens’ decision (not) to vote (Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley 2009). Actually, a number of other factors have been found to influence citizens’ decision to (not) vote, including the level of EU politicisation, citizens’ affective EU identity and the (perceived) significance of the EP (Sanders et al., 2012; Torcal, Bonet and Lobo, 2012; Hobolt, 2012; 2014; Corbett, 2014). Accordingly, low turnout levels are likely to be an indication of (dis)satisfaction with the EU project (Hix and Marsh, 2011; Stockemer 2012).

In this light it is perhaps even more interesting to note that EP electoral turnout has been fairly low in both Sweden and the UK (as demonstrated in Table 1.2.), with showings well below the EU average until 2009 – a year that marked a turnaround in the Swedish case. In fact, during the 2004 elections, the turnout in the UK surpassed that in Sweden – at 38.52% and 37.85%, respectively. The Eastern enlargement and the holding of postal ballots in the northernmost regions of England have been used to explain the 2004 peak in the UK (Hawkins and Miller, 2014: 14). Overall, the variation between the turnout patterns in each country is likely to reflect broader trends, while Sweden exhibits more stable voter turnout; the UK shows more variable results (Steinbrecher and Rattinger, 2012: 95). Interestingly, the UK is also only one of few countries where the gap between turnout at the national and EP elections has not increased over time (Hawkins and Miller, 2014). This gap could be the result of the UK using different electoral systems for its general (first past the post) and EP elections (party list proportional representation).
(Hawkins and Miller, 2014). In contrast, the same electoral system is used for both elections in Sweden (party list proportional representation) and here the gap between turnout levels has increased over time (European Parliament, 2014).

Before we move onto operationalising the dimensions of EU citizenship – specifically, before we break them down into elements that will then be used as empirical indicators for the analysis of EU citizenship in the empirical chapters of the thesis – we must also recognise that the aforementioned dimensions of citizenship are expected to have an interlinked and collective character (Tilly, 2003; Bellamy, 2008a; 2010). They constantly reinforce and stimulate one another and, at the same time, if one or more of these dimensions are not present, they are likely to undermine the depth of the other dimension(s) and obscure the model (Tilly, 2003: 611; Bellamy, 2008a: 12, 2010: xvi).

In light of these issues, studies, which only focus on one dimension of citizenship, can only provide a partial understanding of what citizenship really signifies. For example, Marshall’s tri-partite model of civic, political and social rights is at the heart of the majority of recent studies on national (Barbalet, 1998; Isin and Turner, 2002) and EU citizeships (Meehan, 1993; Hansen and Hager, 2010). Although these studies raise some valid points about the significance of rights, it should be quite apparent that these studies can only contribute to our knowledge about national and EU citizenships to a certain degree. In other words, failing to contemplate rights in the context of identity
and participation grant these studies a limited analytical scope. Therefore, if we are to address the issues of citizenship fully, we should look at its various dimensions concurrently and (preferably) across normative, institutional and empirical frameworks.

Even (some) policy-makers have recognised that the dimensions of citizenship are interlinked, and as a result, they revised the institutional framework of citizenship. For instance, public pay was introduced in the mid-fifth century to guarantee the political participation of citizens in the Greek polis (Burke, 1992). Similarly, and despite the European Commission’s (1993, 2001) increasingly inconsistent approach to promoting the various dimensions of EU citizenship (Chapter 2.2.), it used to be quite outspoken about how EU citizenship enhances citizens’ sense of EU identity, awareness of rights and EU level participation, (most notably in the early Union citizenship reports). Due to the interlinked character of the dimensions of citizenship, we are more likely to gain a ‘more nuanced’ understanding of a model of citizenship if we attend to its dimensions concurrently. This issue can, once again, be illustrated if we consider models of citizenship across diverse historical and political contexts.

The expansion of Roman citizenship was coupled with a decline in the strength of citizens’ sense of identity (Magnette, 2005: 19). In comparison, experiencing a heightened sense of belonging to the nation states was supposed to have made it more likely for citizens to participate in national politics (Bellamy, 2008a: 12-7). While participatory rights were anticipated to
enhance a collective sense of identity among citizens – also emphasised in the Greek *polis* (Thucydides, 1954: 119) –, economic and religious rights were useful for enhancing citizens’ individual identities during the Middle Ages (Riesenberg 1992: 88; Weber, 1998: 44-5). The different impact of these rights may explain why attempts were made to enhance citizens’ public autonomy during the Renaissance (Heater, 2004a: 24-7). In the UK, there is much concern about the weakening bond between the state and its citizens due to the tension between the civic and ethnic components of British national identity and, subsequently, citizens’ low levels of participation (Hay, 2007; Pattie and Johnsnton, 2009; Whiteley, 2012). The Swedish case is almost the opposite in this respect. The promotion of ‘Swedish exceptionalism’ has been effective in both promoting a sense of Swedish civic identity and mobilising citizens’ participation in politics (Billstörm, 2008; Brochman and Hagelund, 2012: 26; Borevi, 2012: 70-3). EU citizenship may be lagging behind both of these models, due to the aforementioned limitations in citizens’ sense of EU identity and EU level participation (especially evident in Favell’s (2008; 2010) analyses). There is, nonetheless, some empirical evidence to suggest that these two dimensions of EU citizenship are likely to be enhanced in the near future (Bruter, 2005; Sanders *et al*., 2012; Ross, 2014).
Figure 1.1. The interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship

Figure 1.1. illustrates the likely shape of the interrelated character of the various dimensions of EU citizenship. It suggests that the exercising of EU rights is expected to be constructive towards citizens’ sense of EU identity and enhance citizens’ propensity for EU participation. However, if and when one dimension of EU citizenship is weaker than the others, it is likely to have an impact on the depth of the other dimensions as well, and, ultimately, it will have an important impact on the significance of EU citizenship on the whole. Thus for example, if citizens do not participate in EU politics, their EU identity is likely to have a weaker civic aspect. It is rather self-explanatory that by not participating in EU politics, EU citizens also make less use of the EU rights available to them.
### 1.3. Operationalising the dimensions of (EU) citizenship

The previous part of this chapter underscored that once we have a general definition of citizenship, the dimensions of citizenship determine how the different models have been realised in practice (Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005; Bellamy, 2008a). Since the thesis is mainly interested in exploring how young and educated citizens realise EU citizenship, these dimensions are placed at the centre of the succeeding chapters. In order to provide an operational definition of each of these dimensions, they are broken down into their constituent elements and these elements will be used as empirical indicators for the analysis of focus group evidence. *Table 1.3.* below provides a summary of these elements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>The dimensions of EU citizenship</strong></th>
<th><strong>Empirical indicators</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Identity</td>
<td>A sense of belonging to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Rights</td>
<td>Awareness of EU rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Participation</td>
<td>Which EU citizens participate (Citizens' socio-economic background)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1.3. Analytical framework to approaching EU citizenship*
Following an interrogation of young and educated citizens’ general definition of (EU) citizenship (Chapter 4), the summary provided in Table 1.3. will structure the evidence on participants’ sense of identity, approaches to EU rights and participation in politics. Thus, EU identity will be explored across participants’ sense of belonging to the EU, shared EU identity with fellow citizens, and recognition of the “other”, the non-EU citizens (Chapter 6). Their EU rights will be analysed in light of participants’ awareness of EU rights and perceptions of the various advantages their EU rights hold, including the access they expected to provide to national and (possibly) EU level communities (Chapter 6). The final empirical chapter of the thesis will explore which segment of the young and educated EU citizens from the focus groups were the most likely to participate in EU politics (and local politics in the case of EU mobiles), the reasons for their EU participation (or abstention) and their preferred forms of engagement (Chapter 7). In order to define each of these elements in more detail, the rest of this chapter is divided into three sections with each section defining one dimension of citizenship – identity, rights and participation.

1.3.1. Citizenship as identity

Although most scholars acknowledge the significance of identity for considerations of citizenship (for example Tilly, 1996: 1-18; Delanty, 2002: 159-174; Heater, 2004a: 187-97; Bellamy, 2008a: 52-77; Karolewski, 2010: 20-2), there is a disagreement about the genuine meaning of and the most appropriate methods for addressing this issue (for an excellent overview see Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 2–14). They disagree about, for example, the
importance of individual and collective identities for citizenship (Smith, 1992; Bellamy, 2000: 10-15; Duchesne and Frognier, 2008). Others find multi-disciplinary approaches to identity unfortunate, since these are likely to grant a sense of ambiguity to the concept (Kanter, 2006: 502; Kaina, 2013). Consequently, identity may seem somewhat meaningless for the purposes of social research (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 2).

In response to these critics, more and more scholars have begun to disaggregate the concept of identity into its constituent elements, including a sense of belonging to a sovereign political community, shared identity with fellow citizens (a “we” feeling) and recognition of the non-citizens (the “other”) (see for example Kanter, 2006; Duchesne, 2008; Bellamy, 2008a: 52–77; Risse, 2010: 22-8; Karolewski, 2011: 37-57). First, a sense of belonging to the community is expected to legitimise the workings of the community, including the regulation of citizens’ lives (Bellamy, 2010: xvii). It places an emphasis on how citizens identify with the community and whether the community accepts them as one of its members (Smith, 1992: 59f; Bruter, 2005: 8). Furthermore, the collective self-image of citizens assists in recognising the community as a group from within and from the outside (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez, 2001: 754). Even if citizens only hold a single status of citizenship, they can often feel a sense of belonging to a number of (political) communities – in the case of the EU this could be the national and EU communities. However, these feelings are not (necessarily) placed in order or likely to clash (Risse, 2004: 249). For example, existing research shows that most EU citizens feel a sense of belonging to continental Europe, the EU and their nation states
simultaneously (Schild, 2001). Hence, citizens’ sense of belonging is not (necessarily) exclusive in practice. In this context, top-down processes can be particularly fruitful in enhancing citizens’ sense of belonging to a community (see for example Risse’s (2003) assessment about the constructive effects of the Euro).

Top down processes include the establishment of definite geographical boundaries, common symbols (e.g. a hymn, a flag or a common currency) and shared values (e.g. democracy and peace), and the community’s promotion of a positive self-image (e.g. democracy promotion beyond borders) (Billig, 1995; Karolewski, 2009: 60). Bottom-up processes, emphasise what citizens do, including the exercising of rights, use of gestures and language, and how these practices could then be constructive towards consolidating the effects of top-down processes (Risse, 2010: 30-3). If we are interested in exploring how citizens realise their citizenship, the focus becomes, clearly, on bottom-up approach to identity formation, especially how citizens’ exercise of rights – usually political participation – enhances their citizenship as identity (Bellamy, 2010: xvii).

Second, a shared identity among citizens affects their ability to realise citizenship (Aristotle, 1946: 292) and live their lives on an equal basis as ‘legitimate members’ of a political community (Kofman, 1995: 130; Bellamy, 2008a: 12-3). In particular, it requires that citizens collectively recognise one another as full members of the community. Even though the importance of a shared identity is disputed by some scholars (Bellamy, 2010: xvii), a “fellow-
feeling” (Mill, 2002 [1861], 391f) is expected to produce a sense of social trust and obligations among citizens, both of which are necessary preconditions for democratic decision-making processes (Miller, 1995). A shared identity can arise from a common purpose, history, language and culture (Gellner, 1983:7; Kanter, 2006: 507-508; Risse, 2010: 25-26).\(^{28}\) It can then be enhanced by citizens’ interactions with one another, which may lead to mutual recognitions of a common fate and purpose (Smith, 1992: 58; Delanty, 1999: 269; Fuss and Grosser, 2006: 212-3; Citrin and Sears, 151-2). However, citizens’ shared identity is expected to be “both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 1983: 6) because not every citizen of a community knows each other. As a result, it is built on a collective understanding among citizens that their fellows have the same identity. Therefore, their shared identity defines an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983; Risse, 2010) – a sense of “we” compared to the non-citizens, the “other”.

Third, and stemming from the last point, for citizenship as identity to emerge, a clear definition the “other” is required (Castano et al., 2002: 319).\(^{29}\) Similarly to a sense of shared identity, the “other” is only meaningful if it is recognised collectively by citizens. ‘Codes of distinctions’ (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995: 74) may facilitate citizens’ ability to recognise the “other”. In particular, definitive geographical, political, economic and cultural self-images have been proposed as useful for this purpose (Herrmann and Brewer, 2004: 6). These codes reinforce the actual boundaries of the political community, making an

\(^{28}\) These issues refer to “the contents of identity” and are constantly shaped by citizens as well as the political elite (Abdelal et al., 2009: 27).

\(^{29}\) The “other” is one of the basic assumptions raised by social identity theorists as well (see for example Tajfel, 1982).
initially ‘imagined community’ real in the minds of citizens (Castano et al., 2003: 450-2, also Risse, 2010: 23). This issue then points to identity and, by association, citizenship as a form of ‘categorisation’ (Karolewski, 2010: 26).

While recognition of the “other” is often regarded as one of the most significant components of identity (Citrin and Sears, 2009: 146; Risse, 2010: 26; Karolewski, 2012), it also underscores the increasingly controversial and exclusive character of contemporary citizenships (Bellamy, 2008a: 52-4).

Thus for example, resulting processes of exclusion have enhanced negative attitudes (and often negative feelings) towards the “other” (Brewer, 2001: 119). This is because when citizenship as identity becomes increasingly conventional and accepted by citizens, their rejection of the “other” is also heightened (Neumann, 1996: 150-4).

Furthermore, citizens’ sense of identity is anticipated to be multiple and multi-layered in practice (Citrin and Sides, 2004). As mentioned earlier, citizens can belong to a number of political communities and social groups simultaneously. In fact, citizens’ socio-individual relationships in each of these communities and groups may result in separate, nested, cross-cutting or multi-layered identities (Herrmann and Brewer, 2004: 8-10). Their identity is also likely to

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According to Herrmann and Brewer (2004: 8-10), multiple identities have a number of opportunities to fit together. Separate multiple identities indicate no overlap between different identities. Nested multiple identities suggest a hierarchy between different identities, as citizens of smaller social groups are also members of and can feel a sense of belonging to larger groups (see also Herb and Kaplan, 1999; Diez Medrano and Gutierrez, 2001). This is often used in surveys researching and measuring some form of collective identity (e.g. in Eurobarometer surveys). Crosscutting multiple identities reflect the fact that some citizens are members of a number of social groups and identify with these groups, while others (from the same groups) are not. These identities can also clash (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2006). Similarly, multi-layered (or marble cake) multiple identities recognise that citizens have multiple memberships and identities but suggest that these identities are blended together − due to intersecting social factors − which make it difficult to separate identities. As a result,
be influenced by a number of intersecting social factors, including gender, race, class and social standing (Yuval- Davis, 2007: 562-3). However, even if multiple in number, citizens’ identities do not (necessarily) clash since some layers are prone to comprise others (Taylor, 1989: 25). This holds particularly true for citizenship as identity. Indeed, it is quite normal for citizens to negotiate between the contrasting sense of their identities on a daily basis (related to gender and religion, for example) and according to the egalitarian principles of citizenship, the latter of which emphasise the virtue in conciliating clashing identities and taming disruptive behaviours (Hobsbawm, 1996: 39). Thus, citizens tend to negotiate between the different layers of their identities and often use them according to the specific context (Kofman, 1995: 130). These contexts can then promote the endorsement of different social identities and sustain certain elements of citizenship as identity, while neglecting others.

Thus this thesis follows in the footsteps of scholars who aggregated the concept of identity. The subsequent empirical chapter of the thesis (Chapter 5) will explore young and educated citizens’ sense of EU identity across its constituent elements, including citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU, their shared EU identity and recognition of non-EU citizens, the EU’s “other” (as illustrated in Table 1.3.). The depth of citizens’ EU identity will also be considered according to whether it seems to be positioned at the cognitive (awareness of citizenship), affective (evaluation of and feelings about citizenship) or behavioural levels (collective motivations) (Abdelal et al., 2009:

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citizens’ identities are expected to be context-specific (Maier and Risse, 2003: 18; Risse, 2010: 25).
While the cognitive level is likely to denote a weak identification, the behavioural level is going to be indicative of a strong sense of EU identity (Kaina and Karolewski, 2009: 18).

1.3.2. Citizenship as rights

Rights are “resources provided by social institutions which protects and legitimises the existence, the needs and interests, or the actions of the bearer of the right” (Bauböck 1994: 209, emphasis added). Due to the legitimising role of rights, scholars tend to regard it as the principal dimension of citizenship (see for example Marshall, 1950; Balibar, 1988: 723; Isin and Turner, 2002: 1; Bellamy, 2010: xvii; Karolewski, 2009: 10). They define the legal structure of citizenship and provide an indication of the attitude of a particular community towards its citizens (Bauböck, 1994: 211). Rights can thus shed light on what the community expects citizenship to be in practice. However, there is an inherent tension in the idea of rights because citizenship is expected to have a collective character but rights are individually orientated (Karolewski, 2010: 11).

Moreover, rights are the only institutionalised dimensions of citizenship (Bellamy, 2005: 163-70). In other words, this dimension is not defined by citizens’ practices on an everyday basis – as is the case with the other two dimensions of citizenship – but by the political community. Since citizens do not (directly) define these rights, we must first try and shed light on the extent to which they are aware of their rights and can

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31 Some citizens, most notably in the UK, have been barred from accessing their political rights, based on gender and ethnic backgrounds, migration status, criminal convictions and so on (Liebich, 2009; Sievers, 2009). Therefore, not every citizen can enjoy their citizenship rights fully.

32 Bellamy (2005: 174-6) makes a similar point when he underscores that due to the individuality of rights they are insufficient as the basis of a ‘common moral framework’ – citizenship – in a sovereign political community.
recognise the junctures in which they tend to exercise these rights. We can then move on to exploring two elements of citizenship as rights – membership in a sovereign political community and access to political rights, and civil, social and economic entitlements (Vink and Bauböck, 2013: 5-9).

The first element, membership, refers to the formal rules individuals must fulfil in order to gain access to the political community (and, subsequently, citizenship). This element “makes citizens part of a select group, who enjoy privileges denied to non-members” (Bellamy, 2008a: 52) and reinforces the idea that citizenship is exclusive (Bauböck 1994: 23). Contemporary models of citizenship use territorial principles to separate citizens from non-citizens (most notably state borders) (Brubaker, 1992: 21) and also offer access to citizenship for non-citizens, once they fulfil certain criteria related to visa, residential and, often, language requirements (Bauböck Perchinig and Sievers, 2009).

Although these criteria are wide-ranging, there is some convergence in the EU context, mainly due to the degree of European integration (Hansen and Weil, 2001; Joppke, 2007). This issue may, at first suggest that national citizenships have become less exclusive over time, paving the way for citizens to access regional, cosmopolitan and world communities (Meehan, 1993: 17; Soysal, 1994: 195-206; Heater, 1999: 134-48, 2004b). Nonetheless, the actual, formal rules of access to these

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33 This is an important aspect of how states deal with temporary immigrants and long-term residents, raising questions about the possibility of dual and partial citizenship or even ‘denizenship’ (for a more theoretically embedded discussion on the variety of ways in which citizenship can be acquired see Bauböck, (1999; 2011) and for a more empirically-embedded evaluation see for example Vink and Bauböck (2013)).

34 However, not every scholar agrees with the positive tone granted to ‘world citizenship’ (see for example Arendt, 1968: 82; and for an evaluation of world citizenship Heater, 1999: 149-54). This is because while world citizenship is based on the universality of human rights (Delanty, 1997) – moral requirements, which should be upheld by all communities and are
communities remain to be defined by national governments. This issue is apparent in the EU, where EU citizenship is derogative of national citizenships (Hansen, 2009). Ultimately, membership in a community should provide us with “a conceptually clear [and] legally consequential … distinction between citizens and foreigners” (Brubaker, 1992: 21).

The second element of rights refers to the ability of citizens to access political rights, and civil, social and economic entitlements on an equal basis (Marshall, 1950; Wiener, 1998; Bellamy, 2008a: 54-69).\textsuperscript{35} Citizens’ access to political rights is, perhaps, the most important for their citizenship because it allows them to reinterpret the legal structure of their citizenship (and the outlook of the community) (Bellamy, 2005: 177-83; Karolewski, 2010: 3). Furthermore, “individuals become citizens through possessing the right to decide what rights they should have and being able to influence the character of the community to which they belong” (Bellamy, 2006: 7). Hence citizens’ equal access to their political rights opens up the opportunity for them to realise a democratic form of citizenship. In comparison, citizens’ equal access to civil, social and economic entitlements is perhaps best described as a virtue of their citizenship status (Bellamy, 2005: 163-70). It cannot shape the legal structure of their citizenship in the same way as their political rights do. This issue may explain why, broadly speaking, long-term residents tend to gain

\footnotesize{usually defined in abstract terms – citizenship rights are institutionalised and set out by a specific political community (Bellamy, 2005: 163-70). This distinction renders human rights insufficient to serve as the basis of citizenship. Even more, not everyone agrees on what moral requirements should human rights uphold (most notable are East/West distinctions) (Heater, 2004b).}

\footnotesize{35 Civil, political and social rights are the three strands of rights defined by Marshall (1950). Nonetheless, the actual “list of citizenship rights is open ended and varies with particular political traditions, social structures and cultural understandings” (Bauböck, 1994: 211). The rights included in such list can thus give us an indication of how the political community approaches its citizens. For an evaluation of EU rights see Annex I.}
access to civil and social entitlements but not to political rights. It could also explain why EU mobiles have not yet secured access to national level voting rights in the host country. Therefore, the differences in the access of residents and citizens to political rights and socio-economic entitlements are likely to reinforce the inclusive/exclusive character of citizenship (Brubaker, 1992: 21; Karolewski, 2010: 3).

Thus, the relevant empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6) will explore the extent to which young and educated citizens were aware of their EU rights. It will then shed light on citizens’ perceptions of whether EU rights provide access to member state and (more broadly) to EU communities. Finally, the chapter will consider the potential of EU rights to guarantee political rights and civil, social and economic entitlements to citizens across the EU’s territory (as illustrated in Table 1.3.).

1.3.3. Citizenship as participation

This chapter has already established the fundamental role participation has been observed to play in activating various models of citizenship (see for example Bosniak, 2008). It can be broken down into three elements, including who (socio-economic background), why (models of participation) and how (forms of participation) participates in politics. First, there is much evidence to suggest that there is an age gap in the participation of younger and older citizens (Smets, 2012). The reasons for this are threefold and include generational, life-cycle and period effects (Norris, 2003). Furthermore, young people are more likely to participate when political issues have a clear
personal relevance (Sloam, 2014b). In addition to age, studies demonstrated the positive effects education and gender have on citizens' propensity to participate (Torney-Purta et al., 2008). Thus for example, women are more likely to participate than men (Torney-Purta and Amadeo, 2011).

A number of theoretical models of participation have been put forward to elucidate the reasons for citizens' decision to participate in politics. The continuous application of these models suggests that more than one model may be relevant to explaining the situation (for an overview see Smets and van Ham, 2013). The rational choice model suggests that a cost-benefit analysis (Downs, 1957) and, also, citizens' sense of civic duty (Blais, 2000) are important determinants of participation. The resource model suggests that the most important factor is related to individual resources (i.e. money, time, and civic skills) (Verba and Nie, 1972). Thus the economically well-off, highly educated and politically knowledgeable citizens are expected to participate more than others. The mobilisation model argues that we “must move beyond the worlds of individuals to include [the effects of] family, friends, neighbours, and co-workers, plus politicians, parties, activists, and interest groups” in order to really understand why citizens participate (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993: 23). Psychological models focus on the role of attitudes and psychological predispositions such as political interest (Mattila, 2003), while sociological models explore the effects of (parental) socialisation, education and habit-formation (Plutzer, 2002) on decisions about participation. Finally, the political and institutional contexts are the focus of the political institutional model (Jackman, 1987).
Finally, this chapter has already suggested (and even illustrated) that citizens’ participation in traditional forms of engagement (voting, standing for public office, party membership and so on) is declining (Franklin, 2004; Bellamy, 2008a: 114-23). Instead of traditional forms of engagement, a growing number of citizens participate in individualised and alternative forms of engagement, including public demonstrations, volunteering, acts of civil disobedience (such as riots), consumerism and on-line petitions (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Kaase, 2007; Dalton, 2009). Therefore, if really want to explore how citizens realise their citizenship today, we must take a broader approach to participation and allow citizens to tell us about their preferred form of engagement and the reasons for this change (see for example Sloam, 2014a).

Based on the extant literature on citizens’ participation, the relevant empirical chapter of the thesis (Chapter 7) will explore the issue of EU participation by considering which segment of the EU mobiles and stayers were the most likely to participate in politics at the EU, national and local levels, the reasons for their (EU) participation – or, alternatively their abstention – and their preferred forms of engagement, including traditional forms of engagement, like voting in the EP elections and alternative forms of engagement, such as volunteering or participating in protests.
1.4. Summary

This chapter laid down the conceptual foundations of citizenship and shed light on why it has been difficult to apply citizenship to the case of the EU. The first part of the chapter demonstrated that the study of EU citizenship has become separated from the broader field of citizenship studies. This issue was evident in two problematic features of the specialised literature on EU citizenship. First, the chapter identified a tendency in the literature to explore the extent to which EU citizenship is distinct from other models. Second, the chapter suggested that existing studies usually attend to a particular framework (institutional, normative or empirical) and dimension (EU identity, rights or participation) of EU citizenship and disregard the others. As a result, most of the literature is expected to provide a partial understanding of what EU citizenship signifies.

In order to provide a more nuanced understanding of EU citizenship, the chapter made an attempt to bring its dimensions together. To do so, the second part of the chapter explored the debates about citizenship, which played out across diverse historical and political contexts. These debates usually define citizenship as a dynamic bond between a sovereign political community and the individuals, and in relation to this, expect citizenship to play an important role in shaping community-building processes (processes of exclusion and differentiation). Moreover, citizenship is normally observed as multidimensional and composed of three collective and interlinked dimensions – identity, rights and participation. By applying the multidimensional definition to diverse historical and political models of citizenship, including Swedish, UK
and EU citizenship, EU citizenship was observed as yet another example in the long line of models. In this context, the dimensions of citizenship were observed as imperative to elucidating the affects of diverse historical and political contexts. These dimensions were expected to underline the actual significance of any model within the broader field of citizenship studies. If we are to re-embed the study of EU citizenship within this broader framework, we must attend to its dimensions concurrently. In order for us to be able to do this however, we had to operationalise the dimensions of citizenship.

The third part the chapter operationalised the dimensions of citizenship. More specifically, this part broke the dimensions of citizenship down into its constituent elements. These elements were then identified as potential empirical indicators for analysing the original focus group evidence about EU citizenship (as summarised in Table 1.3.). Although the third part of the chapter grants a sequential order to the dimensions of EU citizenship – which will also be replicated in the organisation of the later chapters of this thesis – it was anticipated that these dimensions transform one another due to their interlinked character. Since the dimensions of citizenship have been combined differently across diverse historical and political contexts (Tilly, 2003: 611; Joppke, 2007: 46-7; Bellamy, 2010: xvi-vii), the relationship between the dimensions of EU citizenship may be configured specifically to fit the EU context. The empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 2, 4–7) will attempt to shed more light on how the relationship between the dimensions of EU citizenship is configured. For now, the existing literature on citizenship
provided us with an indication of how each dimension is likely to transform one another (as illustrated in Figure 1.1).

Even if the interlinked character of the dimensions of citizenship is likely to be configured differently from one context to the next, we know that in every context it is policy-makers who set the scope for individuals to activate their citizenship. More to the point, it is the institutional framework of citizenship that sets out how individuals can exercise their rights. So exploring the institutional framework of citizenship is a useful starting point for addressing the issue of any model of citizenship. In the case of the EU, it is the European Commission, which proposes legislation and defines the institutional framework of EU citizenship. The next chapter of this thesis will, as a result, investigate the Commission’s discourse on and ideals of EU citizenship, and highlight the symbiotic relationship between intra-EU mobility and EU citizenship.
Chapter 2. The European Union and EU citizenship

Chapter 1 shed light on the difficulty associated with applying citizenship to the case of the EU. This issue was, perhaps, most apparent in the contradictory conclusions reached by the specific literature on EU citizenship (see for example Shore, 2000; Habermas, 2003). Nonetheless, we cannot be too critical about the inconclusiveness of this literature since EU citizenship policies seem equally inconsistent (Hansen and Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012). Interpreting the intentions of the European Commission – the EU’s executive that has an inherently pro-integrationist and supranational disposition (Nugent, 1995: 605-13) – we would expect to see the dominance of supranational political aspirations (and some have already done so) (Meehan, 1993; Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2008).

However, by being (mostly) ambiguous about the relationship between the member state and EU citizenships for example, the Commission (2001: 7; 2010a: 3) has nourished the bi-level structure and derivative character of EU citizenship (Hansen, 2009). This structure grants a ‘second order’ quality to EU citizenship (Delanty, 1997) and has, as a result, been invoked by scholars to underline its limitations compared to member states models (Neunreither 1995; O’Leary, 1996). Research on the institutional framework of EU citizenship also draws attention to the importance the Commission continues to attribute to citizens’ intra-EU mobility (Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Olsen, 2012). This issue raises questions about the democratic credentials EU citizenship affords to the political integration process in Europe (Maas, 2014). Despite these limitations however, legal

Against this backdrop, the chapter investigates the Commission’s ideals on EU citizenship. It assesses the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship as present in treaty texts, legislative proposals, formal evaluations, reports and media statements after 1993. These documents are assessed on the basis of whether or not the argument they present is credible, typical and comprehensible (Scott, 1990: 6). The chapter also considers how power relations between political actors, their pre-determined objectives and the ideological implications of their actions (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 78-116) are likely to shape the Commission’s discourse. In so doing, it sheds light on the institutional framework of EU citizenship, and the actual scope this framework grants to citizens for realising their EU status. By studying the Commission’s ideals, the chapter attempts make a small contribution to previous research on the institutional framework of EU citizenship (Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2005; Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Olsen, 2008a; 2012; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012). The findings of this chapter suggest that the Commission is mainly concerned with expanding the scope EU mobiles have for realising their EU citizenship. Due to its principal focus on EU mobiles, the Commission grants an elitist character to EU citizenship and classifies stayers as primarily member state citizens.

Moreover, the Commission differentiates between categories of EU mobiles, depending on the type of mobility they undertake, and, more recently, their ethnic backgrounds. These categories are added to the initial distinctions between EU citizens on the basis of their country of origin – since some EU member states are more important than others (Moravcsik, 1998). Accordingly, EU-15 mobiles and, in particular, the young and highly educated EU mobiles are identified by the Commission (2010d: 2; 2014a) as the most likely to realise their EU citizenship. In comparison, the political objectives of EU citizenship only seem to come to the forefront during the (lead up to) EP elections and EU treaty revisions. By exploring the Commission’s relevant discourse, this chapter serves as a contextual backdrop for exploring the role of mobility in activating EU citizenship (Chapter 3) and interpreting citizens’ perceptions of EU citizenship in the subsequent empirical chapters (Chapters 4 – 7).

This chapter has two main parts. The first part introduces the EU’s broader institutional structure and highlights that the changing dynamics between these institutions appears to be echoed in the bi-level structure, economic rationale and political objectives of EU citizenship. The second part sheds light on just how the Commission expects citizens to realise the different dimensions of EU citizenship, specifically EU identity, EU rights EU and participation.
2.1. The structure and rationale of EU citizenship

Before we consider the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship, it is important to shed light on some aspects of the EU’s institutional dynamism, which shape both the Commission’s workings and its policy discourse. First, the Commission (2013a) is the EU’s executive and holds monopoly over initiating and implementing legislation. Its executive role allows the Commission to develop a coherent agenda across member state borders and define the depth and breadth of EU policies (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 27). This is true for EU citizenship policies as well, the development of which the Commission monitors and reports to the EU Council and the EP (every three years under Art. 25, TFEU). Second, the Commission has a pro-integrationist and supranational outlook (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). This is mainly due to its historical function as the “motor of European integration” (Lodge, 1989: 37) and signals the continuation of neofunctionalist and bureaucratic approaches to European integration (Haas, 1958: 16; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997; Nugent, 2000).37 The Commission’s supranational outlook is reflected well in the requirement for Commissioners to pledge alliance to the EU (Georgakakis and Weisbein, 2010). Third, the Commission has sole responsibility for communicating EU policies to citizens. For instance, one of the main objectives of the Directorate General (DG) for Communication (DG COMM) has been to “[d]evelop a sense of ownership of European integration and of European identity” among EU citizens (European Commission, 2013q). Similarly, the main DG responsible for EU citizenship – currently DG Justice

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37 Intergovernmental approaches to European integration would argue that its influence is the result of the willingness of nation states to delegate some powers to the supranational level in order to guarantee that member states comply with inter-state agreements (Moravcsik, 1998). This makes the Commission an agency of member states.
DG JUS) – has similar tasks and objectives (see for example European Commission, 2001). We could thus expect to find cooperation and coordination between different DGs in their attempt to support EU citizenship.

Fourth, the Commission has expressed an interest in developing EU level citizenship policies since the early 1950s (Maas, 2007; Olsen, 2012). Its basic approach has highlighted the EU’s supranational political aspirations – recognising that citizenship shapes community-building processes – in an emerging ‘community of Europeans’ (European Commission, 1993: 3).

Due to the institutional setting and recent developments in the EU, including the increased power of the EU’s legislatures (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000), the institutionalisation of the European Council (Puetter, 2012) and the economic crisis (Hodson, 2013), the Commission must make sure it does not tread on the interests of member states. Actually, these developments put further constraints on the Commission’s (formal) executive role (Kassim and Menon, 2010; Peterson 2012). For example, the EP and EU Council can now request legislative proposals (Art. 225 and 241, TFEU), which the Commission is likely to find difficult to ignore (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 27). Even when the Commission initiates the legislative process, it tends to propose legislation that is likely to be accepted by the EP and the EU Council (Bache, George and Bulmer, 2012: 232). This is because, in the very few cases where these two institutions do not agree with the Commission’s original proposal, they can reject it all together or, possibly, revise it in the Conciliation Committee (Hix and Høyland, 2013: 172). Thus, the revised legislative process grants
conditional agenda-setting powers to the EU’s legislatures (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000).

Since 2009 the Commission (2015a) can ‘only’ set the EU’s mid-term agenda, which must also correspond to the long-term goals set out by the European Council. Compared to its increased powers during the 1970s and ‘80s (Dinan, 2010), the Commission’s role is considerably weaker today (Puetter, 2012: 172). These limitations seem legitimate and echo the intergovernmentalist demands put forward by an increasingly Eurosceptic public in the wake of the economic crisis (Fabbrini, 2013). Finally, there might be little continuity in the actual workings of Commissioners. Member state governments nominate Commissioners every five years and can change the nominee after a term should they adopt an overly supranational approach. Similarly, the portfolio of Commissioners often changes between terms and, sometimes during their five-year term as well (Egeberg, 2013). Therefore, the Commission’s discourse (on EU citizenship) is anticipated to echo the complex dynamics embedded in the EU’s evolving institutional structure (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 46) and the restrictive effects of the recent crisis.

2.1.1. EU citizenship – an indirect bond between the EU and its citizens

The continued importance and, possibly, the fortification of member states’ significance are mostly evident in the bi-level structure of EU citizenship, which turns EU citizenship into an indirect bond between the EU and its citizens. This contradicts the broad definition of citizenship as a direct bond between a political community and citizens across diverse historical and
political models (Chapter 1.2.). Nonetheless, the Commission has (1993: 1, emphasis in original), rather optimistically, claimed that by introducing EU citizenship the TEU “created a direct political link between the citizens of the Member States and the European Union.”\(^{38}\) However, academics and politicians dispute the Commission’s claim (Neunreither 1995; O’Leary, 1996; Preuss, 1995; Vink 2005; see also Chapter 1.3.3.). Although EU citizenship has a cross-border application and supersedes national borders, member states resolve who EU citizens and non-citizens are. Since every state has its own citizenship acquisition procedure (Council of Europe, 1997), 28 national laws ‘frame’ access to EU citizenship (EUDO, 2015).\(^{39}\) As a result, EU citizenship is highly dependent on member state citizenship.

Ironically, the structure of EU citizenship was not discussed in the Commission’s initial discourse.\(^{40}\) For example, Article 8 of the TEU stated, matter-of-factly, that the treaty introduces EU citizenship and that member state citizens are considered EU citizens. “Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union” (TEU, Art. 8(1)). The early EU citizenship reports had a similar, ambiguous terminology: “every national of a Member State is

\(^{38}\) The Commission made references to ‘Union citizenship’ until the TFEU entered into force at the end of 2009, renaming the European Community to the EU. Notwithstanding the political implications for European integration (Church and Phinnemore, 2013), for the purpose of clarity and consistency this chapter refers to EU citizenship in its discussion of both Union and EU citizenship (and related documents).

\(^{39}\) Moreover, the Commission (2010f; 2013a, b, c) has expressed an interest in standardising some national laws – especially those related to the integration of TCNs and citizens’ electoral rights. As a result, member states have already had to make some changes to national laws (for academic evaluation of these policy areas see Shaw, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010).

\(^{40}\) Declaration 2, which was annexed to the TEU hinted at the complementary structure of EU citizenship; “the question whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned” (emphasis added).
automatically a citizen of the Union” and “[c]itizenship of the Union is conferred on nationals of all member states by the Maastricht Treaty” (European Commission, 1993: 2; 1997: 6). The ambiguity in the Commission’s initial approach goes hand in hand with the first time citizens expressed an attitude of ‘constraining dissensus’ towards European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; 2008). Although the EU’s executives (the Commission and the European Council) retained their objective of turning the European Economic Community (EEC) into a political union, they were aware of a growing popular discontent with the intensified level of European integration (see for example European Council, 1992). This was perhaps most apparent in the Danish referendum on the EU, which led to a symbolic opt-out from the treaty’s provisions on EU citizenship – the very provisions which introduced EU citizenship in the first place (Adler-Nissen, 2008).

Despite of these early setbacks, the Commission (1997: 17) sustained its aim to expand the scope of EU citizenship. For example, it has made an attempt to grant EU status to all residents irrespective of their nationality. Due to further pressure from member state governments however, the subsequent treaties curtailed rather than expanded the scope of EU citizenship (Ferrera 2005: 142). For instance, the revised Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty strengthened the relationship between EU citizenship and nationality. It added a new sentence to the previous article, clarifying that “[c]itizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship”. The treaty thus granted a constitutionally recognised bi-level structure to EU citizenship that, due to the very slight changes made in subsequent treaties, is still applicable.
today. However, the bi-level structure of EU citizenship clearly contradicts the emerging supranational direction of the EEC prior to the 1990s. It also sheds a dubious light on the expectant tone of transactionalist and neofunctionalist approaches to European integration (Haas, 1958; Deutsch et al., 1968, see also Chapter 3.1.). Although the introduction of EU citizenship appeared to have challenged “the exclusive sovereignty of national citizenship”, its enduring dependency on member states has been observed to turn it into “a second-order citizenship” (Delanty, 1997: 296).41 This is why, as Chapter 1 highlighted, many academics have treated EU citizenship as derived from national citizenships (O’Leary, 1996: 66; Hansen 2009: 6).

Yet, the expectant tone of the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship seems to defy these cynical conclusions. This holds true despite the Commission’s own admission of the fact that “[n]ationality of a Member State is the only way to acquire citizenship of the Union” (European Commission, 2008: 3, emphasis added) and “citizenship of the Union complements and does not replace national citizenship”. Actually, the Commission (2001: 7) begun to deduce the impact of EU citizenship’s bi-level structure, interpreting it as a contribution towards realising a “new type of multiple citizenship on different levels” in Europe. Disguised as a ‘new type of citizenship’, its post-2000 statements and publications turned EU citizenship’s bi-level structure into a possible avenue for advancing integration from the bottom-up. For instance, it has argued that since EU citizenship is “a means of facilitating

41 Some academics with a legal background have disputed such claims, asserting that EU citizenship’s dependency on member states is merely a determinant of access to the status and does not have an implication for actual EU rights (Maduro, 2000: 325; Kostakopoulou, 2012).
integration of immigrants... the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the Member State ... would automatically mean gaining citizenship of the Union as well” (European Commission, 2004: 5).

Some progress towards a supranational model of citizenship was made as well, especially on the back of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) post-1998 rulings (Carrera, 2005: 710; Kostakopoulou, 2005: 233; for an overview see Craig and De Bürca, 2008: 819-53). For example, the CJEU established that EU citizens have an inherent right of free movement and residence, regardless of their economic role (Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Kari Uecker and Vera Jacquet v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997; Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State, 2003). It also clarified that mobiles accrue the same social rights as host nationals due to the EU’s non-discriminatory principle (Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, 1998).\textsuperscript{42} Most importantly for EU citizenship, the CJEU declared that it “is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States” (Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre citizens d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001). This judgement came around the same time when the Nice European Council debated the legal scope and content of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR). The ECFR was to expand the rights of EU citizens considerably. Although the Irish no-vote on the Nice Treaty – a protest vote against the ECFR, Eastern enlargement and the EU (Garry, Marsh and Sinnott, 2005) – ensured that the ECFR did not enter into force, the CJEU interpreted the political context suitable for

\textsuperscript{42} However, the CJEU also underlined the cross-border requirement of citizens’ EU status (Shaw, 1997; Oliveira 2002; Shuibhne 2002; Mather 2005).
clarifying the relationship between EU and member state citizenships (Maas, 2007: 70-2).

Its subsequent rulings reinforced the fundamental status of EU citizenship. For instance, the CJEU established that the loss of member state citizenship should always be considered according to EU law, rather than national traditions (Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010). More recently, it declared that any national provision, which may restrain citizens’ EU level rights, should be applied in accordance with EU law” (Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi, 2011). Both of these ruling clearly confine the ability of member states to deprive individuals of their EU level rights and point to a slow wearing-down of member state citizenships (Kochenov, 2011: 101-4). They have even led to a spectacle of ‘reverse discrimination’ in which member states can withhold certain rights from their own citizens but must provide these to EU mobiles (Shuibhne, 2010: 1614). In this light, the reformist approach of the CJEU could be observed as “a glimpse into the future” (Joppke, 2010: 22) of EU citizenship. This is the case especially so if we recognise that the necessary legal basis for invoking the supremacy of EU law and, as a result, EU citizenship is available to the CJEU (Flaminio Costa v ENEL, 1964).

The Commission has followed the example set by the CJEU. To ensure precision and the coherent implementation of EU citizens’ rights, it integrated the different directives, rules and regulations under the ‘Citizenship Directive’ (2004/38/EC) (European Commission, 2004). This was followed by closer
scrutiny on how member states implement the rights of EU citizens (European Commission, 2008, 2009b), which then led to some changes in the broader structure of EU citizenship as present in the EU treaties. For instance, by making EU citizenship “additional” rather than “complementary” to member state citizenships (Art. 20(1), TFEU), the TFEU underscores that EU citizenship grants novel rights to member state citizens (see also Kochenov, 2009: 206). Even if these changes did not go as far as decoupling EU citizenship from member state citizenship – a consequence of being able to introduce a directive rather than a regulation on EU citizenship – they gave it a more independent status (Kostakopoulou, 2011; Kochenov, 2014).

Chapter 1 already mentioned that some academics have long argued that due to its transnational scope, the EU rights of citizens could not be granted by member states alone (see for example Preuss, 1996: 548-9). By comparison, given the necessary administrative resources, the Commission could grant national level rights to EU citizens (Kochenov, 2012). This is a rather unlikely scenario however and would require substantial concessions of member state sovereignty. Actually, it would require an almost complete reversal of the EU’s recent institutional reforms (Fabbrini, 2013; Bache et al., 2014). In so doing, the Commission could also damage the EP’s recent gains of legitimacy (Hix and Høyland, 2013).

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43 The relevant articles in the (new) TFEU (especially Art. 25) not only introduce EU citizenship matter-of-factly but also provide for an EU level safety mechanism. It allows for the Commission to propose, implement and monitor legislation on EU citizenship and has resulted, for example, in the Commission’s (1993; 1997; 2001; 2004; 2008a; 2010a; 2013a) informative EU citizenship reports.
While its scope for revisions was substantially limited in terms of EU citizenship _per se_, a more progressive approach is visible in the Commission’s approach to TCNs’ rights (for an evaluation see Hansen and Hager, 2010). It has called for “a common solution not only to the problem of Community mobiles but also for those from third countries” even before the introduction of EU citizenship took place (European Commission, 1976: 12). The same point is apparent today. For example, the 2014 re-shuffling of the Commissioners’ portfolios brought external migration and internal mobility together in one department – DG JUS. Moreover, it should be noted that some TCNs – those with family ties to EU citizens – already enjoy access to intra-EU mobility and residence rights (Art. 10, Regulation (EEC) No.1612/68 of the Council and Art. 3(2) Citizenship Directive). EU treaties also grant some political rights to TCNs, including petition to the EP and the European Ombudsman (Art. 227 and 228, TFEU). Finally, TCNs have different political rights in different member states. In some states, including Sweden, they can vote in local elections while in others they cannot (for an evaluation see Shaw, 2007).

While, the Commission’s approach to TCNs could be championed as an important step in developing a post- or supra-national model of citizenship based on the liberal traditions (Soysal, 1994; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Rumford, 2003), it also blurs processes of exclusions between EU citizens and non-citizens. As such, it may cause some difficulty to actually identifying what rights each group of EU resident have and who belongs to which group, especially EU mobiles and long-term TCNs. It could thus prove difficult for both member state governments and citizens to exclude the EU’s ‘other’.
Since categorisation is an integral part of citizenship politics (Shaw, 2007; Karolewski, 2010: 26) and strengthens citizens’ sense of identity (Risse, 2010: 26), a blurred line between EU citizens and non-citizens may limit the significance of EU citizenship in practice.

Nonetheless, neither the CJEU nor the Commission has gone as far as to fully revise the bi-level structure of EU citizenship. As a result, there is now a contradiction between the rules applied to the acquisition and loss of EU citizenship. The acquisition of EU citizenship reinforces the much-criticised relationship between citizenship and nationality (Soysal, 1994; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Shaw, 2007), while the loss of EU citizenship points to an emerging supranational model (Joppke, 2010: 22; Kochenov, 2012: 26). This contradiction has led to a dangerous trend during the crisis with the Commission turning a blind-eye on how member states treat EU mobiles, especially those of Roma ethnicity (Aradau et al., 2013). Actually, even before the crisis, the Commission (2008a: 3) admitted profound problems remain with how member states have implemented the measures of EU Citizenship Directive, concluding that “[n]ot one Article of the Directive has been transposed effectively and correctly by all Member States”. More recent academic assessment of these measures found that very little improvement has been made since 2008 (Guild, Peers and Tomkin, 2014).

Consequently, member state citizenships continue to take precedence over EU citizenship. From a comparative perspective, the CJEU may have been more successful – and more blunt – in its approach to strengthening the
institutional framework of EU citizenship. Actually, the Commission’s discourse since 1993 has been rather ambiguous about this issue. For instance, it is not very clear whether the Commission considers individuals first EU and then member state citizens or the other way around. If and how EU citizenship expected to shape the legal and political structure of member state citizenships is another question that requires clarification. Since multiple and often contradictory expectations are placed on Commissioners due to the EU’s institutional structure (Egeberg, 2013), its ambiguous discourse on the bi-level structure of EU citizenship might be the best-case scenario (for now). However, it has important consequences for the actual significance of EU citizenship.

For example, we know that member state influence at the EU level changes from one country to the next (see for example Featherstone and Kazamias, 2014). In so doing, there appears to be an internal hierarchy between states, depending on whether or not their membership deemed crucial to sustaining the EU project (arguably the original six, especially Germany and France do so). This issue was particularly apparent in the recent debates about a possible Brexit and Grexit (Zank, 2015). In this context, we can expect that hierarchy also exists between EU citizens based on their country of origins. Broadly speaking, citizens from EU-15 and CEE states are likely to have very different experiences of EU citizenship (Favell and Nebe, 2009; Ross, 2014). Because of the crisis, ethnic background has become the latest factor based on which EU citizens are differentiated by member states (Shaw, 2012). Against this backdrop, the focus group evidence sheds light on the extent to
which different groups of young citizens have been able to realise their EU citizenship in Sweden and the UK (Chapters 4 – 6).

2.1.2. EU citizenship – a community of Europeans?

The role of citizenship in shaping community-building processes – especially processes of differentiation and exclusion – was identified as normally accompanying debates on citizenship (Chapter 1.2.). EU citizenship is no exception. However, we know that the legacy of market citizenship (Everson, 1995), the top-down introduction of EU citizenship (Laffan, 2006) and the public’s growing Eurosceptic attitude (Usherwood and Startin, 2013) make it rather difficult to distinguish a community of EU citizens. These developments have not quite deterred the Commission’s (2013b: 2, Juncker, 2014a) political aspirations, though recent admissions about the desperate state of the EU indicates that it is acutely aware of the ‘no European demos’ puzzle. This section demonstrates that the Commission’s discourse on how EU citizenship shapes community-building processes has two contradictory features. Establishing an EU political community was the (projected) objective of the introduction of EU citizenship. However, in the everyday context the Commission tends to support the development of an EU economic community. Due to the EU’s institutional dynamics, the Commission may find it easier to promote policies with an economic rather than political bearing (Bauer and Becker, 2014). Thus, the introduction of EU citizenship has not put an end to the EU’s endless support for and promotion of citizens’ free movement and residency rights (see also Chapter 3.2.).
The introduction of EU citizenship was, according to the Commission (1993: 1-2), “[o]ne of the most significant steps on the road to European integration” and “underscore[d] that the Treaty of Rome is not concerned solely with economic matters”. Although economic considerations were at the forefront of its policies prior to the 1990s, the Commission had pondered on the need to establishing a “people’s Europe”, a “citizens’ Europe”, a “Community of citizens”, “European citizenship”, “European identity” and a representative democracy at the EU level before (European Commission, 1973; 1975a, b, c; Patijn Report, 1976; European Council 1984). Its subsequent statements reveal that these early references played a crucial role in the TEU’s final, political provisions (see for example European Commission 1993; 1997). Its contemporary approach to how EU citizenship may shape community-building processes seems similar to these earlier descriptions. Thus for example, EU citizenship is perceived today as “the crown jewel of European integration” and similar to “what the euro is to our Economic and Monetary Union” (Reding, 2013a). While the Commission’s approach seems to be more or less the same today as it was 50 years ago, we know that citizens’ support for European integration has turned increasingly sceptical (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). For example, French and Dutch voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, and Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. However, these developments did not really halt the Commission’s approach to the European integration progress (Church and Phinnemore, 2013).

Maas (2007) shows that the very first articulations of a Europe-wide citizenship model predate the free movement provisions of the ECSC Treaty. In fact, the objective of the Schuman declaration (1950) was to develop “a wider and deeper community between countries”.

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Thus for example, the political underpinnings of EU citizenship gained further constitutional support. Accordingly, the Lisbon Treaty placed EU citizenship in the main section on the provisions on the democratic principles of the EU (Title II, TEU). The Commission’s (2010a, 2013a) approach to EU citizenship was also altered in order to highlight the significance EU citizenship has for the everyday lives of citizens. To this end, the Commission (2009a; 2014c) initiated a number of citizens’ consultations and programmes, starting with a communication on guiding the implementation of the Citizenship Directive and peaking with the EYC2013-14 programme. The latter marked the 20th anniversary of the introduction of EU citizenship and, by association, the EU’s political turn (European Commission, 2011a; 2012b; 2012c; 2013e), and was aiming to develop “a holistic EU citizenship policy” (European Commission, 2014d: 62, emphasis added). The programme then identified citizens’ political participation as having a “primary importance” for EU citizenship since,

> [t]he better the people of Europe understand their rights as EU citizens, the more informed their decisions will be. Informed citizens understand that they have a stake in the European project. They therefore want to engage in the democratic life at all levels. This is the vision for the European Year of Citizens 2013 (European Commission, 2011a: 1).

However, EU participation only came to the forefront of activities during the early months of 2014 – that is after the original programme (EYC2013) had been prolonged by about six months. Afterwards, EYC2013-14 underlined, “strengthening the civic democratic participation of Union citizens” was one of
the main aspects of realising EU citizenship (European Commission, 2014d: 27). Nonetheless, its consultations were (as before) directed at civil societies, businesses and different levels of government. In other words, they did not include citizens *per se*. This reflects a broader trend that has prevailed in the Commission’s activities – the *indirect* engagement of EU citizens and the promotion of EU level civil societies and participatory democracy (Warleigh, 2006; Greenwood, 2007). Actually, the pursuit of the latter two objectives seem to guide the citizenship programmes run by DG COMM, including Active European Citizenship’ (2004-2006) and the Europe for Citizens (2007-2013, 2014-2020) programmes (European Commission 2011e; 2011f; for an evaluation of these programmes see Pukallus, 2012).

Against this backdrop, the Commission’s oft-cited objective – to bring the EU closer to its citizens and “create an ever-closer [political] union among the peoples of Europe” (Art. 1, TEU) – seems out-of-place (Smith, 1992; Cederman, 2001). The more recent remark of the first (indirectly) elected Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker (2014a: 14) appears to be more appropriate; “[t]he gap between the European Union and its citizens is widening” and “[o]ne has to be really deaf and blind not to see this.” As a result, after 20 years of citizenship provisions, a political EU community remains to be “on the [far] horizon” (Reding, 2013a). The Commission’s failure to deliver on this premise has served as grounds for denouncing the genuine significance of EU citizenship (Smith, 1992; Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2006; Garry and Tilley 2009). However, a closer inspection of the Commission’s
discourse suggests that a political EU community has not actually been part of its everyday considerations.

Instead, the Commission has had an almost exclusive focus on developing a community of EU mobiles. It is apparent in the wider workings of the Commission, as well as across its different DGs, including DG JUS, which is responsible for the legal scope of EU citizenship (European Commission, 2013a), DG COMM, which frames EU citizenship policies and strategies (European Commission, 2014c), and sectoral DGs, including DG Education and Culture (EAC) and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL). In the short-term address setting out the political guidelines for the 2010-14 period, then Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso (2009: 3, emphasis added) established, EU citizenship offers citizens “rights, protection and opportunities in the marketplace”. The EU's long-term agenda, the Europe 2020 strategy, puts a similar case forward in its call for citizens’ empowerment “in the Single Market” (European Commission, 2010c: 20).45

Although the DG JUS's citizenship report (Art. 25, TFEU) is supposed to reinforce the actual political implications of EU citizenship two thirds of it is devoted to free movement and only one third on citizens' participation in the EU (European Commission 1993a; 1997a; 2001; 2004; 2008a; 2010a; 2013a). Although the TFEU positioned EU citizenship as part of the EU's democratic principles, the Commission’s (2010a; 2013a) reports explored

45 Europe 2020 promotes citizens' digital literacy and accessibility. It also makes a case for introducing EU politics at multiple government levels (local, state, regional) in order to allow citizens to get a “sense of ownership” of the EU project (European Commission, 2010c: 29). Interestingly, the only point in which citizens are mentioned is within the new framework for promoting and enhancing cross-border shopping.
possibilities to ‘dismantle’ EU rights and deal with the ‘obstacles’ EU mobiles face. Even during the lead up to the 2014 EP elections, DG JUS’s action programme (Reding, 2013) only included one point which promoted citizens’ political participation. The remaining 11 points considered issues related to mobility. Similarly, the original aim of the DG COMM run EYC2013-14 programme was to promote and facilitate intra-EU mobility. “The overall purpose of the proposed European Year of Citizens is to ensure that all Union citizens are aware of the rights available to them in a cross-border context by virtue of their Union citizenship status” (European Commission, 2011a: 2). EU participation was only added later to the programme.

Sectoral DGs also tend to promote citizens’ EU mobility, rather than political participation. This has been the case for DG EAC for quite a while now (see for example European Commission, 1976; 2010d: 2) and, more recently, DG EMPL. The latter has argued for example that since workers’ mobility is “one of the pillars of the Single Market”, a directive dedicated to their rights would “guarantee a more effective and homogeneous application of EU law” (European Commission, 2013o: 1-2). However, its proposal contradicts the original purpose of the Citizenship Directive (2004/38/EC) – to unite various EU level legislations on citizenship (European Commission, 2004). It could, potentially, set off a proliferation of secondary legislations on different types of intra-EU mobility. This is likely to have a negative rather than constructive effect for an EU citizenship rigged by tension in its institutional framework.

46 Although only two DGs are discussed in this section, the variety of sectoral DGs (including DG Internal Policies, DG Administration, DG Tourism and Inter-institutional Relations and so on) with the capacity to influence existing legislation on EU citizenship suggests that citizenship is an integral part of contemporary EU politics.
There is an inconsistency in the Commission’s discourse on the way in which EU Citizenship may shape community-building processes in the EU. It has been working hard at accentuating what the EU provides its mobile citizens – often at the expense of actually engaging with citizens in making EU level policies (European Commission, 2010a; 2010b; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c). The expectation has been that citizens would, eventually, ‘return the favour’ and assist in upholding the EU’s economic market (Barroso, 2009; Juncker, 2014a). The tension between the economic rationale and projected political substance of EU citizenship is bound to lead to a different kind of community than those apparent in the member states. We already know that in the latter cases, the focus has been on promoting citizens’ sense of identity, rights and political participation simultaneously (Chapter 1.2.). Thus it seems that the Commission has been working towards realising a community of EU mobiles and created an exclusive membership that pays little attention to how stayers can realise their EU citizenship. There are thus processes of differentiation embedded in the Commission’s discourse and, consequently, in EU citizenship’s institutional framework.

Therefore, it seems misguided to search for an emerging political EU community. Even if it is not intentional, the mobility-focus of the Commission grants an elitist character to EU citizenship. The EP (2009: 16, 14 emphasis added; see also 2010) has been particularly perceptive of these shortfalls and called on the Commission “to improve [its] communication with the average Union citizen and to ensure broad dissemination” of its programmes. It also
warned the Commission that failure to do so might lead to the “exclusion” of some stayers “from European societies” – those with low level of education and ethnic backgrounds. Chapters 5 and 7 on EU identity and EU participation provide some indication of the extent to which the EP’s doubts are echoed by young EU mobiles and stayers in Sweden and the UK.

2.2. The dimensions of EU citizenship

The previous section gave an indication of the context in which member state citizens could realise a dynamic, yet indirect bond with the EU and the expectation that EU mobiles might create an economic EU community. The chapter now turns to the final, but perhaps most important aspect of citizenship models across diverse historical and political contexts – their multidimensional character (Chapter 1.2.). The Commission’s discourse recognises that EU citizenship is the source of citizens’ EU identity, rights and participation (perhaps most apparent in European Commission, 2001: 7). Due to the almost singular focus of the Commission to promote citizens’ intra-EU mobility however, it seems to only really expect EU mobiles to realise these dimensions. The previous section already hinted that the Commission differentiates between citizens on the basis of their mobility status. Its approach to the dimensions of EU citizenship makes these processes of differentiation even more pronounced. Thus, this section underscores that the Commission seems to apply the active/passive (EU) citizenship dichotomy along the mobiles/stayers distinctions.
2.2.1. EU identity

Citizens’ sense of EU identity has been an integral part of the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship (Pukallus, 2012). In particular, the Commission has assumed that EU citizenship and EU identity have a causal relationship. The promotion of EU identity through the provisions of EU citizenship has been apparent throughout the workings of DG JUS (European Commission 2013a), DG COMM (European Commission, 2014c) and among sectoral DGs as well, including, most importantly perhaps DG EAC (European Commission, 2014a). These DGs tend to anticipate citizens’ exercising of their EU level rights to enhance the different elements of their EU identity.

Accordingly, DG JUS has claimed that EU citizenship was introduced “with the aim of fostering [citizens’] sense of identity with the Union” (European Commission, 1993: 2). It was also “meant to make the process of European integration more relevant to individual citizens by increasing their participation, strengthening the protection of their rights and promoting the idea of an European identity” (European Commission, 1997: 6). Against this backdrop, the bi-level structure of EU citizenship – especially its dependency on member state citizenships – has been expected to assist EU citizens to distinguish between their fellows and ‘the other’, the non-citizens (Kostakopoulou, 2012). Notwithstanding the considerable overlap between the rights of EU citizens and TCNs (Shaw, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010), the enduring objective of the Commission (2004: 4) to disseminate information about EU citizenship could then be interpreted in the context of globalisation, which has required
that we revise processes of exclusion stemming from citizenship (Chapter 1.2.).

Moreover, the Commission has attempted to promote citizens’ exercising of EU level political rights and, consequently, to enhance their EU identity (Pukallus, 2012). Its concurrent approach to these dimensions suggests that it perceived the different dimensions of EU citizenship as interlinked (see for example Wallström, 2007a; Reding, 2013a; see also Olsen, 2012). This collaborates one of the main proposals of this thesis, specifically that we must recognise the interlinked character of the dimensions of citizenship and, as a result attend to them concurrently (Chapter 1.2.2.). Accordingly, the Commission (2013d: 53) has accepted, citizens’ “participation in civil society, community and/or political life, characterised by mutual respect and non-violence and in accordance with human rights and democracy” as fruitful for their emerging EU identity. It has even accepted that alternative forms of engagement may be useful for developing citizens’ EU identity. EU political participation “does not simply mean asking the citizens of Europe to elect a European Parliament every five years. It means allowing – and encouraging – people from all walks of life to have their say in shaping EU policies” (Wallström, 2007b: 5). There is thus an expectation that citizens’ participation in traditional forms of engagement – in this case EP elections – would be complemented by their active involvement in individual and alternative forms of engagement, all of which together provide citizens a “say in shaping EU policies”. Thus the Commission has adopted a similar approach to developing citizens’ EU identity that historically prevailed at the national level (Leonard,

Notwithstanding the importance of these examples, the Commission has actually paid little attention to promoting citizens’ EU level political participation in its general discourse on EU citizenship (Maas, 2007; Olsen, 2012). The focus instead has been on EU mobility. Interestingly, it has not even admitted that the majority of citizens have EU level political rights. The EU’s primary and secondary laws all require that citizens first move within the EU. Against this backdrop, it seems that the Commission has actually provided stayers with a rather slim scope for developing a sense of EU identity on the basis of their EU participation – that is through similar processes as it has been the case at the national level. In contrast, it has promoted EU mobility quite extensively. Although DG COMM and DG JUS have adopted different approaches to disseminating information on EU mobility (for a historical evaluation see Pukallus, 2012), they tend to agree that free movement and EU citizenship are “virtually synonyms” (European Commission, 2011a: 1). In fact, they tend to adopt a rather dynamic approach to promoting EU mobility – one that reflects the broader political context of the time. For example, against the backdrop of the crisis, DG JUS has attempted to make EU citizenship more comprehensible and its provisions more citizen-friendly (Pukallus, 2012: 382-6). As a result, its website now includes profiles of EU mobiles, which emphasise the genuine significance of EU citizenship in the everyday context (see for example European Commission, 2010h, 2010i). It also provides sound reasoning for the necessity to introduce further EU level
legislation on intra-EU mobility – so as to prevail over the obstacles faced by EU mobiles (European Commission, 2010c).

The same approach has prevailed in the case of sectoral DGs. The most explicit of these seem to be the argument put forward by DG EAC, which has underscored that the learning mobility of EU students “foster[s] a sense of European identity, helps knowledge circulate more freely [and] contributes to the internal market, as Europeans who are mobile as young learners are more likely to be mobile as workers later in life” (European Commission, 2010d: 2; for more on this see also Chapter 3.2). As a result, the Commission (2014a; 2014g) increased its current budget for the Erasmus+ programme to just under 15 billion Euros – just shy of a two-fold increase on the previous budget –, most of which is expected to be spent for supporting the learning mobility of higher education students. It is important to note however that these changes do not only contribute to the political aspirations of the EU – and thus EU citizenship – but also correspond with the very real problems facing European youth today. The alleged “skills deficits and skills mismatch” seems to (partially) explain why over 5 million under 25s were unemployed in January 2015 (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015). Thus there are high expectations in terms of both political and economic return on the back of young citizens’ (increased) learning mobility (European Commission, 2015b).

In addition to this, and despite the fact that member states retain competency over educational policies, the Commission has begun to dominate higher educational policies in the EU, through the Bologna process, the Lisbon and
(more recently) Europe 2020 strategies (Keeling, 2006; Curaj et al., 2012). These processes and strategies have one important aspect in common – they all facilitate the learning mobility of young EU citizens. Hence, the Commission’s integrated approach to learning mobility and EU citizenship seem to depict young EU mobiles as the ideal EU citizens.

A recent study by the Commission (2014g: 33, 183) seems to be quite explicit about this assumption and underscore the fruitful association between learning mobility, EU identity and EU citizenship.

European citizenship refers to a European identity, fuelled by a common history and common customs, and jointly constituting the European Union as a political entity... Erasmus wishes to further the underlying ideas of European citizenship... [since] [o]ne of the core strategic interests of mobility in Europe is the promotion of a European identity.

Its claims shed a new light on Juncker’s (2014b) recent attempt to bring the EU’s policies on education and citizenship together for the mandate of the current Commission. However, the EP rejected his original proposals due to Juncker’s selection of personnel and triggered a re-shuffling of the Commission removing citizenship (and internal mobility) from DG EAC’s portfolio (Keating, 2014). Therefore, it seems not only the Commission, but the EP (2013) recognises the positive impact learning mobility has for young citizens’ sense of EU citizenship. The same seem to have been the case for

47 At first, Tibor Navracsics, the Hungarian Commissioner, was allocated this portfolio. Since citizenship, youth and education policies were considered to be under duress in Hungary, the EP rejected his nomination (Keating, 2014).
the EU Council (1986), which accepted the original proposals introducing the Erasmus programme with “a People’s Europe” in mind.

Against this backdrop, a recent admission by Vivien Reding (2013a), then Commissioner responsible for DG JUS, that it is EU mobiles, whose “identity as EU citizens is being shaped everyday” (Reding, 2013a) hints that the Commission’s almost singular attentiveness to securing citizens’ intra-EU mobility is likely to stay for the long-term. Thus, rather than EU participation, the Commission promotes EU mobility. The resulting market approach to EU identity contradicts the Commission’s supranational political aspirations and sheds a dubious light on the democratic credentials the EU can really gain through EU citizenship. Nonetheless, its approach to EU citizenship – be it on the basis of a political or market model of citizenship – clearly accentuates that the Commission has had a preference for developing citizens’ EU identity through a bottom-up process (see also Pukallus, 2012).

This is not to say that the Commission has not adopted other measures to promote EU identity (Shore, 2000; Pukallus, 2012: 248-50; Kaina and Karolewski, 2013: 33-8). Indeed, it has been rather active in introducing top-down approaches to promoting EU identity, citing the common value, history and culture of member states, the EU’s commitment to democratic principles and the role of EU symbols, including the EU flag, the Euro or hymn (European Commission, 2011f; 2013d). Its top-down approach is apparent in the ‘Active European Citizenship’ and the more recent ‘Europe for Citizens’ (2007-2013, 2014-2020) programmes, both of which are run by DG COMM
These programmes are, supposedly, concerned with engaging citizens directly in EU policy-making. However, town twinning can hardly be seen as a politically contentious issue. Actually, these programmes and, to a large extent, the latest addition to EU rights, the citizens’ initiative (CI) seem to facilitate an interaction among an emerging EU level civil society and non-governmental organisations at the expense of integrating citizens at the EU level (European Commission, 2011a: 2; 2014e). A closer inspection of these documents also reveals that the Commission tends to be rather broad about, for example, what the EU’s common history or values actually refer to. This is particularly apparent in its ‘Unity in Diversity’ motto – one that brings to the fore the diversity between the identities and cultures of member states and EU citizens (European Commission, 2007a). We know that some empirical evidence found these top-down approaches fruitful in developing citizens’ EU identity – though often to a varying extent (Bruter, 2009; Risse, 2005, 2010). Against this backdrop, the Commission’s attempt to develop citizens’ EU identity from the bottom up seems to have had a more constant and unambiguous character (Olsen, 2008a: 225-32; Pukallus, 2012).

However, even its bottom-up approach to promoting EU identity has its shortfalls. Most importantly perhaps, it fails to recognise that EU identity is not one-dimensional. The Commission’s (2004) reports often make references to EU-wide surveys – often commissioned by DG COMM – which provide empirical evidence of citizens’ multiple, crosscutting, hierarchical or nested identities (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Risse, 2010; Duchesne, 2012; TNS
Social and Political, 2013). These underscore that citizens are not likely to have an exclusive EU identity but hold a number of identities simultaneously. For example, survey data has revealed that around 44.7% of EU citizens had a sense of attachment to the EU (illustrated in Table 1.1.) compared to 91% feeling the same for their country of origin in 2012 (EB, 77.3). There is thus likely to be much overlap between how citizens approach their sense of attachment to the EU and national levels. Even the bi-level structure of EU citizenship already hints at the presence of more than one identity for citizens (Meehan, 1993: 3). The way in which these two levels of identity manifest is then likely to be multiplied by the different ‘frames’ applied by member states to European integration and, consequently, to EU citizenship (Medrano, 2010). Currently, 28 member states as well as the Commission frame EU citizenship, allowing for 29 different ‘frames’ to emerge. We also know that these ‘frames’ are likely to be multiplied further by the complexity associated with identity broadly speaking, including for example its multilayered character (Citrin and Sides, 2004). Therefore, it is most likely that the majority of EU citizens hold both national and EU identities simultaneously. Empirical findings underline, EU citizenship may in fact foster citizens’ national and EU identities simultaneously (Rother and Nebe, 2009; TNS Social and Political, 2013). While the Commission (2010a) seems to be aware of these possibilities, it has not incorporated them into its discourse on EU citizenship and identity. Its one-dimensional approach may be too idealistic and make it unlikely for EU citizens to ever realise the Commission’s ideals.
2.2.2. EU rights

Due to their historical embedding in workers free movement rights (Chapter 3.2.) and the CJEU’s expansive reading of relevant secondary laws (Craig and De Bürca, 2008: 819-53), EU citizens’ rights make up the most established dimension of EU citizenship. Appendix 3 provides an overview of the potentials and limitations of these rights. It demonstrates that rights linked to citizens’ EU mobility are the most advanced at present. Actually, most rights require that citizens move within the EU, including their right to vote and stand as candidates in the municipal and EP elections in the host country (Art 22, TFEU). Others necessitate cooperation between citizens across member state borders, including CI (Art. 24, TFEU). Intra-EU mobility also facilitates citizens’ access to further rights, most importantly perhaps, non-discrimination on the basis of nationality (Art. 18, TFEU, see also Guild, 2004; Maas, 2007; Olsen, 2012). None of these rights are likely to have considerable significance for stayers. Even more, in some cases, they led to a form of reverse discrimination, where states treat EU mobiles better than they would their own national citizens (Shuibhne, 2010). Therefore, the structuring of EU rights is prone to reinforce the distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers.

The same trend is apparent in the Commission’s discourse. It has had an almost singular focus on citizens’ mobility (Guild, 2004; Maas, 2007; Olsen, 2012), underscoring the legacy of market citizenship (Everson, 1995; Preuss 1998) and depicting EU mobiles as the ideal EU citizens (Favell, 2008; Recchi and Favell, 2009). Moreover, within its discourse on EU citizenship, the Commission has spent more time on discussing, shaping and guaranteeing
citizens’ EU rights than their identity or participation (Olsen, 2012; Chapter 3.1.2.). Against this backdrop, its admission that the dimensions of EU citizenship are interrelated seems to be of little significance. Its almost singular focus on citizens’ EU rights is prone to have left less scope for citizens to activate the other two dimensions of their EU citizenship. Therefore, the Commission’s focus on EU mobility might place another constraint on citizens’ ability to realise its ideals of EU citizenship.

The transnational scope, historical rooting and dynamic expansion of EU rights might account for the Commission’s extensive focus on this dimension. Even academics have long argued that these rights carry a real potential for realising a post-, supra-national or cosmopolitan model of citizenship in the EU (Closa, 1992; d’Oliveira, 1995; O’Leary, 1996; Carrera, 2005; Kostakopoulou, 2012; Kochenov, 2012; Maas, 2013; Guild, Peers and Tomkin, 2014). Nonetheless, the “exceedingly limited” (Shaw, 1998: 246) novelty in these rights in the TEU – they can be traced back to workers’ economic and member state citizens’ EP voting rights (Wiener, 1998; Maas, 2007; Olsen, 2012) – places an profound challenge to the supposed progress of EU citizenship beyond the limits of regional economic integration. The recent changes made to the structure of EU citizenship demonstrate that the Commission (2010a) has some opportunity to revise the text of the treaties. Yet, in reality, citizens’ EU rights have been listed in the same order across the different EU treaties for over 20 years. First citizens’ mobility rights are
spelt out and then their political rights are specified. Even the so-called ‘Citizenship Directive’ (2004/38/EC) only really regulates the mobility of EU citizens and their family members (for a recent evaluation see Guild, Peers and Tomkin, 2014). These issues underscore that the Commission really believes, citizens’ mobility rights are the most important aspect of EU citizenship (European Commission, 2004, 2008a, 2010b, 2013a).

Accordingly, it has been seeking “to inform citizens of their [mobility] rights to ensure that they actually benefit from such freedoms across the Union” (European Commission, 2008a: 3, emphasis added). The very first EU citizenship report (2010) responded to this requirement well. It identified 25 action points to guarantee EU citizens could fully enjoy their mobility rights across the EU’s territory (European Commission, 2010b). It was issued parallel to the Commission’s last Union citizenship report (2010a) and communication on the Single Market (2010g), all of which together afford EU citizenship a strong economic focus. These reports recognise the fragmentary way in which the Commission deals with EU citizenship and, in order to ratify this issue, they seek to create “a Citizen’s Europe” and “a well-functioning Single Market”. To this end, they try to eliminate the “obstacles faced by Europeans when exercising their rights conferred to them by the Single Market acquis, i.e. when they are acting as economic operators within the Single Market, for instance as entrepreneurs, consumers or workers” (European Commission, 2010b: 4, emphasis added). Thus the Commission shifted focus from EU citizenship and political union to EU citizenship and

48 The only exception to this rule is the ECFR, which first lists the right to vote at the EP (Art. 39) and municipal elections (Art. 40) first, followed by mobility rights (Art. 45) and diplomatic protection (Art. 46).
economic union. Its shifting focus is not really surprising in the aftermath of the institutional changes that were introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Hix and Høylan, 2011: 23-48) and against the backdrop of the crisis (Hodson, 2013). It is more than likely that the Commission found it easier and less controversial to focus on promoting citizens’ EU rights than their EU identity or EU participation – the latter dimensions are, after all, much more politically contentious than (economic) rights. The legal specialism of then Commissioner in charge of DG JUS Vivien Reding seem to have also made a better fit at the time (Pukallus, 2012: 390-2).

The second EU citizenship report (2013) followed the example set out in 2010 and identified 12 new action points in six areas, all of which, once again relate to intra-EU mobility (European Commission, 2013a; 2013i). These include the introduction of social security coordination across state borders in order to guarantee EU mobiles’ access to social benefits, the requirement to provide more opportunities to young EU citizens to participate in cross-border traineeships and to offer (an optional) EU identity card to citizens in order to ease their intra-EU mobility. Actually, the only action point that touches on citizens’ EU participation, relates to an issue that has been raised since 1993 (European Commission, 1993: 7). In particular, it pledges to identify “constructive ways to enable EU citizens living in another EU country to fully participate in the democratic life of the EU by maintaining their right to vote in national elections in their country of origin” (European Commission, 2013i). The Commission (2013a; 2013b; 2013c) seems to understand this pledge as a positive development – a direct response to resolving the obstacles faced
by EU mobiles. However, it does not propose measures to actually enhance mobiles’ participation at the EP or municipal elections, nor does it guarantee them the right to vote in national elections in the host country. Even though the public consultations considered during the writing of the report identified EU mobile voting rights of primary importance (European Commission, 2012b).

Therefore, the Commission’s discourse on and the institutional framework of EU citizenship differentiate between EU citizens on the basis of their mobility status. Added to the previous discussion on EU identity, the Commission seems to observe EU mobiles as active and stayers as passive EU citizens. However, not all mobiles can realise the Commission’s ideals since their mobility rights are also limited on the basis of economic resources (Citizenship Directive 2004/38/EC) and the transitional measures applied by member states (Shaw, 2012). These limitations underscore the presence of further differentiation processes in the EU. However, these limitations are not an inherent aspect of the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship. They are the culmination of issues linked to the bi-level structure of EU citizenship and the legacy of the EEC market. Or, from a broader perspective, they stem from the EU’s institutional dynamics.

This issue reinforces the notion that the Commission identifies students as the ideal EU citizens. By institutionalising learning mobility under the Erasmus+ programme for example, the Commission forgoes the earlier mentioned limitations on EU mobility. Similarly, students have access to the host
country’s labour market by the virtue of their residency, while their national fellows must adhere to transitional procedures. Hence, we can differentiate between EU mobiles and stayers on the basis of their economic resources, country of origins and, in the case of EU mobiles, also on the basis of the form of mobility they undertake. Existing research showed that these distinctions do have a considerable influence on how EU mobiles and stayers realise their EU citizenship (see for example Recchi and Favell, 2009). Chapter 3 addresses the issue of EU mobility in a greater detail and sheds light on its likely impact on citizens’ perceptions.

2.2.3. EU participation

EU citizens’ participation in the policy-making process was expected to come to the forefront of an EU “representative democracy” (Art. 10(1), TEU; Meehan, 1993). Nevertheless, we know that it has had a secondary role in the Commission’s discourse, especially compared to citizens’ mobility (rights) and resulting EU identity (European Commission, 2008a; 2013a, b, c, f, g, h). Even when the Commission (2011a; 2013d) has taken a specific interest in participation, including both traditional and alternative forms of engagement, it has had a tendency to promote and safeguard the political participation of some citizens, namely EU mobiles (Maas, 2007; European Commission, 2010h; Olsen, 2012). The alternative to this trend has been the indirect mobilisation of citizens, especially through EU level civil societies and NGOs (Greenwood, 2011: 128-75). The Commission established an EU level participatory democracy (Kohler-Koch, 2009: 48), engaging with leaders from

49: These rights are listed and analysed in Appendix 1 together with the rest of EU rights.
large civil society and non-governmental organisations. This was the case, for example, during the Constitutional Convention (The European Convention, 2002). Its revised approach however, raises questions about the quality of the EU’s representative democracy (Kohler-Koch, 2010). This is not to suggest that the Commission (2013g: 1) has not acknowledged the need to engage all EU citizens in public debates on the future direction of the EU. It even stated that the main political role of EU citizens is to vote in the EP elections. They can thus guarantee “democratic control and accountability occur[s] at the level at which [EU] decisions are taken” (European Commission, 2013g: 2). This practice, according to the Commission, would strengthen “the house of European democracy” (Barroso, 2012: 9).

To turn its ideals into reality, it argued, EU citizens must be better informed about their right to vote in the EP elections and the choices they have between different Europarties (European Commission 2000; 2006b; 2010f). The prolonged EYC2013-14 programme aimed to inform citizens about the upcoming election (European Commission, 2014f) while the Commission (2013f) asked national parties to provide information about their EU level affiliations. To make EP elections more personal to voters, Europarties were also asked to announce their candidates for Commission president prior to the elections (European Commission, 2013g). Consequently, most Europarties announced their candidates for Commission president in advance. These candidates received some national media coverage and even had the opportunity to participate in EU-wide public debates (Corbett, 2014). The

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50 Article 14(1) TEU gives the EP the right to elect the Commission president.
results of the elections were also announced simultaneously across the EU’s 28 member states. Despite of these developments, EU citizens did not participate in the 2014 EP election in greater numbers than they had done so previously (illustrated in Table 1.2.) and well below the expected levels (European Commission, 2012h). Citizens’ low turnout might demonstrate the Commission’s failure to realise its goals and make these elections personalised (Möller, 2014).

Moreover, there is a disparity between the Commission’s consideration of the participation of EU mobiles and stayers. EU treaties and secondary legislation only regulate the participation of EU mobiles, while ignoring stayers in their entirety (European Commission, 1999, 2006, 2010a, g). This is because every EU level participatory right requires a cross-border context (see Appendix 3.). For example, the right to participate in the municipal elections of the host country is only meaningful for EU mobiles. Nonetheless, the Commission (2002) has perceived these elections as a necessary component of the EU’s emerging democracy. This is mainly due to the EU’s subsidiarity ideal, which requires that decisions are made as close to citizens as possible (European Commission, 2012a). Moreover, EU mobiles’ right to stand as candidates and vote in the municipal elections is the only EU level right that is, traditionally speaking, belongs to nation states (European Commission, 1986: 11). Thus the Commission has the capacity to alter pre-existing member state legislation if and when it wants to do so.
According to the Commission’s (2010f: 3) discourse then, EU mobiles are likely to have the most opportunity to participate at the EU level and, subsequently, to “consolidate their European identity.” Nevertheless, there are important deficits in the scope available for the EU participation of EU mobiles. For example, the relevant EU directives have not actually harmonised member state laws on conducting municipal elections. Some rights of EU mobiles have not actually been completely implemented (European Commission, 2007, 2012a). Since citizens tend to perceive national elections as first-order (Schmitt, 2005), they may not have an interest in the municipal elections. Due to the gap between the number of EU mobiles and stayers (Chapter 3.2.), the extent to which EU mobiles can enhance the democratic quality of the EU is limited. With just under 28% of EU mobiles participating in traditional forms of engagement across the EU, national and local levels (Strudel and Michalska, 2012: 27), the foundations of a democracy made up of EU mobiles seem rather shaky.\(^51\)

In comparison, there are no EU level rights possessed by stayers only and nor do any of the Commission’s recent programmes on EU participation apply to stayers (see for example, European Commission, 2013b). Actually, the participation of stayers has only been promoted indirectly. For example, the Commission’s (2010b) recent *public dialogue* with EU citizens, which had included both mobiles and stayers, led to proposals only relevant to the lives of EU mobiles. The exception is, perhaps DG COMM’s long-running

\(^{51}\) Not to mention that the EU’s democracy seems to be currently built on EU mobiles’ participation at the local and EU levels, leaving out the national level. Against this backdrop, the Commission’s tendency to scale-up the significance of the former two levels may be an attempt to mask a limitation inherent to EU citizenship – its second-order character.
programme on ‘Active European citizenship’ (European Commission, 2012a), which seeks to engage and mobilise all EU citizens. It has also been fairly outspoken about the significance of citizens’ participation in alternative forms of engagement across the different levels of EU policy-making, including volunteering at the EU level and town twinning at the local-level (European Commission, 2011a). However, these programmes rely heavily on an emerging EU level civil society (Decision No 1904/2006/EC; European Commission, 2013d) and promote the indirect participation of citizens. Thus they do not actually bring citizens closer to the EU.

Both EU mobiles and stayers can exercise the other three EU participatory rights, namely citizens’ initiative (CI) and petition to the EP and the European Ombudsman. According to the Commission (2013f: 3), “by introducing the citizens’ initiative, the Lisbon Treaty enables EU citizens to participate more directly and fully in the democratic life of the Union”. EU citizens’ right to petition the EP and the European Ombudsman are non-judicial means of redress (European Commission, 2004) and have been observed as “a well-established practice” at the national level (European Commission, 1993: 7). Nonetheless, these rights have only been used by a small number of EU citizens. In fact, CI ‘only’ requires the signature of one million EU citizens from seven member states. It thus has the potential to engage less than 0.25% of the EU’s population at any one point in time. Besides, even if a CI passes all the requirements set out by the relevant EU regulation (211/2011), the Commission can still reject its proposal. This has happened with the very first CI that fulfilled these registration requirements. Even though a million
signatures were collected, the Commission initially stalled the policy-process linked to the Right2Water initiative (Vogel, 2014). Moreover, the initial registration requirements have only been met by CIs, which have at least some relevance to the programmes run by Commission DGs (Garcia and Greenwood, 2014). For example, the objective of Fraternité2020 (2013) has been to “enhance EU exchange programmes – such as Erasmus or the European Voluntary Service (EVS) – in order to contribute to a united Europe based on solidarity among citizens”. It’s objective could have easily been taken from any of DG EAC’s points on the ‘Youth on the move’ or ‘Erasmus+’ programmes (European Commission, 2010f; 2014a; 2014g; 2015b).

Petitioning the EP and the European Ombudsman does not require collective action from citizens and has been used by a tiny segment of citizens since their introduction in 1993 (European Commission 2010a). For example, the EP received 1,924 and the Ombudsman 727 petitions in 2009. EU mobiles actually made the largest number of applications in both cases. However, the relevant EU actors did not consider the majority of these applications because they failed to pass certain procedural technicalities (European Commission, 2010a). As a result, these three participatory rights have had a small impact on EU citizens’ lives. So, for now, it seems, the Commission has granted EU mobiles the largest scope for EU participation. Whether young EU mobiles in Sweden and the UK have been able to realise the Commission’s ideal of participation is explored in the last empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 7).
2.3. Summary

This chapter investigated the institutional framework of EU citizenship, and the scope this framework provides to citizens for realising their EU citizenship. In its attempt to make a small contribution to the findings of previous research on the institutional framework of EU citizenship (Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2005; Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Olsen, 2008a; 2012; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012) the chapter studied the Commission’s ideals and discourse on EU citizenship. The findings suggest that the dominant tone and key objectives of the Commission has been guided by the legacy of the EEC market (similar conclusions reached by Maas, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Olsen, 2012). This issue was apparent in the bi-level structure of EU citizenship, the support provided to building a community among EU mobiles (only) and the expanding scope EU mobiles seem to have for realising the dimensions of their EU citizenship. In particular, the Commission seems to invest much effort into facilitating and promoting EU mobility – which is then expected to impact citizens’ sense of EU identity (and to some extent EU participation). Despite this optimistic notion, there is an inherent tension between the economic rationales and – as it were – ‘more recently’ introduced political objectives of EU citizenship. This is apparent in the everyday workings of the Commission, which seem to only really endorse the economic rationale of EU citizenship. To a large extent, we can explain this tendency through the institutional setting of the EU, which provides member states the power to restrict the Commission’s supranational aspirations (Egeberg, 2013).

The recent crisis intensified member state scrutiny over the Commission as
well as the legitimacy of their scrutiny (Hodson, 2013), and accentuated citizens' growing Euroscepticism with the integration project (Shaw, 2012).

These issues have important consequences for EU citizenship in practice. Most importantly, the Commission has had to adopt a discourse on EU citizenship that is accepted by member states. Accordingly, national models of citizenship retain their political legitimacy in an increasingly integrated Europe. Due to the hierarchy between member states, there is a classification of EU citizens from the outset. Adding the EU level on top of member state citizenships, the Commission has managed to multiply these classifications. So rather than bringing citizens together in a 'European community', it has differentiated between them depending on their mobility status and propensity to move in the future. For example, it has had some expectation towards EU mobiles, developing a sense of EU identity and participation. Yet, to date, there is little, if any, expectation towards stayers realising their EU citizenship. Within the legal framework of EU citizenship, EU mobility has become institutionalised so as to activate citizens' EU level status – rather than political participation, as is the case with national models of citizenship. This issue raises questions about the extent to which EU citizenship really departs from previous policies that were simply there to ensure intra-EU economic mobility. It certainly leaves a narrow, if any, scope for stayers – the vast majority of (potential EU) citizens – to activate their EU citizenship and grants a very obvious elitist character to EU citizenship. In this context, the younger generation of citizens who fall outside the more elitist, mobile group are likely to become susceptible to the appeals of Eurosceptic and nationalist parties,
which feed off the economic problems in the aftermath of the crisis (Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz, 2012; Sloam, 2014). There is thus likely to be a growing gap between the young EU mobiles and stayers.

Moreover, the Commission also differentiates between EU mobiles. There seems to be a preferential treatment between EU mobiles depending on their country of origin, the type of mobility they undertake and, recently, their ethnic backgrounds. The Commission tends to identify (and to this end support) the young and highly educated EU mobiles – the visiting EU students – as the ideal EU citizens. This tendency is reflected in the effort that the Commission pours into promoting intra-EU learning mobility and educational programmes. The next chapter builds on these findings and explores how the Commission’s ideals on EU citizenship, which clearly emphasise the role of intra-EU (learning) mobility, are likely to impact citizens’ actual experiences.
Chapter 3. The role of EU (learning) mobility in realising EU citizenship

Much has been written about Europe as “the stereotype of the old world of ingrained privilege, tradition, and slow moving change” (Recchi and Favell, 2011: 51), where the national framework dominates EU citizens’ lives (Favell, 2008: 9; Skey, 2011a: 148; White, 2011: 29; Duchesne et al., 2013: 3). Against this backdrop, the provisions that facilitate the EU mobility of citizens signal a shift towards “a new world of [economic, social and political] opportunity, achievement and flux” (Recchi and Favell, 2011: 51; see also Recchi, 2009). To some extent at least, it corroborates academic readings of the EU as the exemplar of cosmopolitanism (Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Beck and Grande, 2007).

Existing empirical studies have found that EU mobility has an important social aspect (Recchi, 2009), and transforms the identity (Rother and Nebe, 2009) and political behaviour of mobiles (Muxel, 2009). Despite these findings however, the literature on EU citizenship has largely downplayed the significance of EU mobility (Meehan, 1993; Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004; Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006; Bellamy, 2008b). Indeed, there is only a small amount of empirical research, which recognises the potential of EU mobility beyond the usual discussions of spatial or social mobility. However, a comprehensive

52 The exceptions are the publications stemming from four EU-funded projects; PIONEUR, ENACT, MOVEACT and EUROCROSS. Favell (2008, 2010) carried out the very first – and since only – ethnographic study of EU-15 mobiles – the ‘Eurostars’.
study about how mobility helps citizens to fully realise EU citizenship is still lacking.\textsuperscript{53} This thesis attempts to fill an important empirical gap in the existing literature. It also seeks to make a theoretical proposition, namely that we should reconsider the conceptual dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. By focusing on the theoretical premise of this doctoral thesis – that EU mobility in combination with education makes it most likely for citizens to realise EU citizenship – this chapter assists the ensuing interrogation of how EU (learning) mobility might effect the perceptions of EU mobiles and stayers (Chapters 4 – 7).

This chapter has three main parts. The first part revisits the transactionalist approach (Deutsch \textit{et al.}, 1968) to European integration and the role it grants to mobility. The second part considers the development of mobility rights and current flows of EU mobility, and the EU’s policies in higher education (HE) followed by contemporary student mobility flows. The third part considers the main findings of previous qualitative research on (young) citizens’ EU identity and citizenship (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; Skey, 2011a; Ross, 2014) in order to draw out the likely distinctions between mobiles/stayers along the active/passive (EU) citizen dichotomy.

\textsuperscript{53} The only exception to this trend is Favell (2008, 2010), whose research explored the perceptions of EU-15 mobiles across the three dimensions of EU citizenship. However, he did not include stayers in his study. If we really want to explore the link between EU mobility and EU citizenship however, we must identify the implication of non-mobility for the perceptions of stayers.
3.1. EU mobility and European integration

The EU has been understood to “represent the classic historical counter-example to the political and social ontology of the nation state” (Beck and Grande, 2007: 2, emphasis added). The erosion of the nation state in the EU is particularly apparent in two (simultaneous) developments – the abolition of state borders and growing levels of intra-EU mobility. The impact of these developments for citizenship in Europe has been studied extensively, not least by considering the opportunity the EU presents for realising a post-, supra-national or cosmopolitan model of citizenship (Soysal, 1994; Føllesdal, 2001; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Hansen and Hager, 2010). However, most of this literature tends to search for an opportunity the EU presents to integrate long-term third country nationals (TCNs). In comparison, there has been minimal research on the actual impact of EU mobility on the attitudes and behaviour of (formal) EU citizens (Favell, 2008; 2010; Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012). This is because the majority of the existing literature on EU citizenship overlooks or dismisses EU mobility. Once observed as an individualist process, it is not expected to serve as the basis of citizens’ shared sense of EU identity or EU participation.

A considerably different interpretation of mobility emerges from the literature on European integration. More specifically, transactionalist (Deutsch, 1954; Deutsch et al., 1968) and neofunctionalist (Haas, 1958; Lindberg 1963; Schmitter, 2004) approaches to European integration observe citizens’ EU mobility as the counterpart to or natural succession of economic integration. Indeed, both approaches identify mobility as one of the basic principles of the
EU’s social and political integration. They predict two important outcomes of mobility. First, it enhances citizens’ EU identity, creating a truly EU level society. Second, mobility legitimises community-building processes at the EU level. Since transactionalists focus more explicitly on the role of EU mobility in furthering European integration, this part of the chapter discusses the main argument put forward by these scholars and the extent to which the actual experiences of EU citizens – as explored by previous research – correspond with this argument.

3.1.1. The transactionalist approach to European integration and mobility

According to Deutsch (1954), European (regional) integration is the result of increased cross-border transactions, including transnational trade, capital and labour flows, student exchanges, tourist visits and so on. These transactions have the potential to create new and meaningful networks of communication between citizens and institutions, superseding state borders. It is suggested that similar transactions and networks between the elite and the masses sustain national societies and generate a shared identity. However, cross-border transactions and networks may only replicate similar processes if they fulfil certain criteria. Regulation through common decision-making structures

54 Neofunctionalist and transactionalist approaches interpret European integration from different angles. While neofunctionalists focus on the ‘spill-over’ effects of an elite-led process (Haas, 1968: 292), transactionalists consider citizens’ cross-border mobility as one of the most important drivers of integration (Deutsch et al., 1968: 170). Nonetheless, neofunctionalists also recognise that citizens’ cross-border mobility is an important aspect of how integration might create a ‘pluralistic society’ and enter in the political realm (Haas, 1968: xxiv).
and a constant, multifaceted and long-term outlook for transactions are identified as requirements (Deutsch et al., 1968: 120).

Deutsch et al. (1968: 54) also recognised that cross-border transactions can appear in different forms, including cultural exchanges and scientific collaborations. However, they identified citizens’ mobility as “more important than [the mobility of] either goods or money” (Deutsch et al., 1968: 54). It allows direct interaction between citizens from different member states, which may create a sense of shared identity among citizens and support further institutional integration. Nonetheless, transactionalists recognise that not everyone participates in the integration process equally. In this context, the limited mobility of some citizens is anticipated to serve as “a serious deterrent to further [integration] progress” (Deutsch et al., 1968: 154). Thus transnationalists underline the active and passive roles mobiles and stayers have in European integration.

Deutsch’s theory is clearly relevant to some aspects of what the EU represents today. Thus for example, an emerging EU society may be observed as a ‘pluralistic security community’, which was originally introduced in order to abolish war between member states (Deutsch, 1954). The merging of states under a common authority – the Commission and, increasingly, the European Council – upholds the idea of an emerging EU society. At the same time, governmental divisions persist at the national level (Deutsch et al., 1968: 5-6). We also know that more and more citizens move within the EU, have
multi-ethnic backgrounds, are familiar with foreign languages and have been exposed to international media (Recchi and Favell, 2009; Favell et al., 2011; Sigalas 2010b; Kuhn, 2012a; Bellamy, 2011). A recent application of the transactionalist approach to the contemporary EU concluded that due to their increased level for EU mobility, citizens will come to see each other less as Italians, French, and thus foreign, and more and more as sharing common interests, a process that will eventually lead to seeing themselves as Europeans and less as having a merely national identity (Fligstein, 2008: 139).

This conclusion seems rather optimistic, however. The actual flows of EU mobility have been highly complex and uneven. Empirical studies also underline the variation in the effect of mobility on citizens’ attitudes and behaviour. They hint at the emergence of new processes of differentiation and exclusion within the EU. First, citizens’ EU mobility flows and cross-border transactions have been highly stratified (Kahanec, 2013). This is demonstrated well in Tables 3.1. and 3.2. in the next section. The variation in these numbers also highlights the significance of the economic and political contexts of the sending and receiving countries. More importantly perhaps, they may have long-term impacts due to the pull-power represented by mobile networks (Delbecq and Waldorf, 2010). Furthermore, EU mobility has not increased citizens’ mobility across the whole of the EU’s territory. It only affected some member states. While some EU-15 states, notably Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK, sent and received a large number of EU mobiles – usually from 2004 and 2007 CEE states – the rest received a much
smaller portion. Rather than intensified flow of EU mobility then, what we see is sporadic trends of mobility in some parts of the EU (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010).

Second, the interaction between mobiles and stayers has also been irregular. It has varied between states and across different national groups. Hence we have multiple processes of differentiation between EU citizens, exclusion of non-EU citizens and the exclusion of non-nationals in the host state. These processes are demonstrated well by the different context in which EU mobiles are received in the UK and Sweden (discussed in more detail below). Across the EU some mobiles are welcomed by member states – often from EU-15 states – while others are shut out – usually from CEE states (Favell, 2009). Mobiles with certain ethnic and employment background have also found it more difficult to exercise their mobility rights, including the Roma (Shaw, 2012) and sex workers (Aradau, Huysmans and Squire, 2010). Thus, while some EU citizens are encouraged to be integrated into an emerging EU level society through mobility, others are turned away.

Third, EU mobility has had different impact on citizens’ sense of identity and citizenship. Soon after the introduction of workers’ mobility rights in the EEC, empirical evidence already underlined that foreign workers’ presence did not necessarily lead to the emergence of a cross-national communication network (Feldstein, 1967). Similarly, the findings of recent research reveal that the EU identity of mobiles and stayers are different, owing to the type of activity they
engage in, the length of time they spend abroad and the educational and economic resources they have (Bruter, 2004; Fligstein, 2008; Rother and Nebe, 2009; Kuhn, 2012a; for an evaluation of these factors see Favell et al., 2011). Geographical factors have also been found to influence citizens’ attitudes. For example, EU citizens who live in border regions and do their weekly shopping in different states have different identities than those who take on permanent jobs, “shop around” for education or focus on temporary work but plan to return home (Favell, 2008; Sigalas, 2010b; Kuhn, 2012b).

Nonetheless, when multiple factors are measured together, empirical research usually finds that the sketch of an EU level society is most apparent in the context of mobility – made of EU mobiles and those stayers who interact with mobiles (Favell, 2008, 2010; Rother and Nebe, 2008; Roeder, 2009; Kuhn, 2012a). Thus, there is some support for the transactionalist focus on citizens’ cross-border mobility as a driver of further integration. However, recent empirical studies have underlined that the limitations associated with the transactionalist approach could be addressed by applying the contact hypothesis (for an overview see Favell et al., 2011). These studies rely heavily on Allport’s (1979 [1954]) seminal work on the contact hypothesis. According to Allport (1979 [1954]), reduced prejudice between previously separate groups is the result of four positive conditions of interaction: (1) equal status of groups, (2) common goals, (3) intergroup cooperation, and (4) institutional support, rules or customs.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{55} The relevant literature in social psychology may be split into three clusters. While some found evidence that inter-group contact causes more conflict between previously separate
Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by *equal status* contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by *institutional supports* (i.e., by law, custom, or legal atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that *leads to the perception of common interests* and *common humanity* between members of the two groups (Allport, 1979 [1954]: 281, emphasis added).

In order to test whether EU mobility guarantees the desired outcome through the interactions of EU mobiles and stayers, a growing number of empirical studies applied Allport’s conditions. These studies underscore that from the different forms of mobility available to citizens, EU mobility for educational purposes rather than labour or short-term mobility provides the most favourable context for positive cross-border interactions to emerge (Sigalas, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; Wilson 2011; Mitchell, 2012; 2014). By introducing the opportunity for learning mobility, the Commission has adopted a proactive approach to promoting mobility among the EU’s population that is likely to be most susceptible to changes in their citizenship (Sloam, 2013). Furthermore, the institutionalisation of mobility through the EU’s various educational policies (specifically in higher education (HE)) overcomes most burdens that EU groups (Ford, 1986), others observed it as particularly effective in reducing prejudice and conflict between previously separate groups (Harrington and Miller, 1992; Pettigrew, 1998). Again others recognised that inter-group contact has the potential to reduce prejudice, but stressed the complexity of this process (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). They proposed further conditions, such as the need to support and uphold friendships between different group members (Pettigrew, 1998). Overall, growing empirical evidence supports the original conditions proposed by Allport (Pettigrew *et al.*, 2011). Thus his conditions are usually used in the EU context.
mobiles would otherwise have to face on their own. We already know that these issues are important for citizens’ decisions to move (and stay) (Recchi, 2009). In particular, they can contribute to the clarification about why we only have a small number of EU mobiles after over 50 years of free movement provisions. Since education is expected to raise ‘good’ and ‘active’ citizens (Dalton, 2009), the mobility of young citizens for educational purposes can be expected to raise ideal EU citizens. The next section revisits the development of mobility rights and educational policies in the EU, followed by a short examination of contemporary mobility flows.

3.2. Mobility rights and educational policy in the EU

Despite contemporary popular belief and just as transactionalists anticipated, EU mobility has been at the heart of the European project since the very beginning (Meehan, 1993). It is one of the four pillars upholding integration – the other three being the free movement of capital, goods and services. Mobility also predates both British (1973) and Swedish (1995) membership of the EU. This section provides a short overview of how citizens’ mobility rights developed since the early days of the ECSC (for more details see Maas, 2007: 29-45; Hansen and Hager, 2010: 38-57; Olsen, 2012: 17-31).

3.2.1. An overview of citizens’ EU mobility rights

Article 69(1) of the Treaty of Paris (1951) (Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC Treaty) guaranteed the free movement of
workers and non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality (Art. 69(4)).

Nonetheless, these rights were limited in scope and applied to sectoral (coal and steel) workers. The Council of Ministers (now Council of the European Union, EU Council) reserved the right to recognise (or reject) workers’ qualifications and define the actual parameters guiding their mobility and subsequent integration (Art. 69(2)(3)). The High Authority, the predecessor of the Commission, was guiding and facilitating member states (Art. 69(5)). Although they had a clearly intergovernmental character, these provisions served as the basis for introducing more extensive regulations on peoples’ free movement, including EU citizenship (Hansen and Hager, 2010: 38-56).

Thus the later development of EU mobility is “simply the expansion of an already established framework of politically negotiated provisions that granted free movement rights” (Maas, 2005a: 1011, emphasis added).

The free movement provisions in the subsequent Treaty of Rome (1957) (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community) were considerably more detailed (Maas, 2007: 26-9). They granted mobility (Art. 48(1)), residence (Art. 48(3)) and establishment (Art. 52) rights to workers, as well as non-discrimination on the basis of their nationality (Art. 48(2)). They also included various stipulations to enhance workers’ mobility, including the first EEC-led scheme to recognise workers’ educational qualifications (Art. 57).

In the long-term, these rights broadened the scope of European integration,

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56 Workers’ mobility rights were in fact introduced on the back of national preference (Maas, 2005). The Italians wanted to lower domestic unemployment rates and increase the living standards of foreign workers (Romero, 1993).

57 These rights were however “subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health” (Art. 48(3)).
“giving shape to the wish for a political union” (European Commission, 2006a: 55, emphasis added). A transitional period was set at this point however, granting the CoM a policy-making role (Art. 49) and reinforcing the intergovernmental origins of EU mobility (Hansen and Hager, 2010: 41-4).

The mobility and residence rights of workers and their families were later implemented through different regulations and stages (Maas, 2002: 2). Regulation 1612/68 guaranteed non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, considering work conditions, salary and unemployment benefits, and access to social and tax benefits, including vocational training. Directive 68/360 scrapped visa requirements within the territory of the EEC for member state citizens, allowing cross-border mobility with the use of identity cards. Even during the slowdown of European integration in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Dinan, 2004), workers’ rights were enhanced by secondary laws (e.g. social security rights in Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72) (Griffiths, 2014: 165-84) and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (Jacobs, 2007: 592). By establishing the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality, the CJEU shifted the economic rationale of mobility towards a political ideal (Davies, 2003: 195). It was during the 1970s that early discussions of an EU citizenship emerged (Wiener, 1998: 10-1).

The economic recovery of the 1980s gave a new impetus to European integration (Dinan, 2010: 78-80) and intensified the scope of mobility for member state citizens – from this point observed as their “new personal right”
In 1985 the Schengen Agreement was signed by seven of the then ten EEC member states, abolishing border controls. Its preamble connected this intergovernmental agreement with citizens’ free movement (Wiener, 1998: 130). The agreement was followed by a speedy ratification process of the Single European Act (SEA) (1986), which then introduced an “area without internal frontiers”. Its (non-binding) preamble also made an explicit reference to furthering economic and political cooperation among member states, and, for the first time an EU treaty, spoke of the idea of (an indirect) European-level democracy. Accordingly, states adopted the SEA “convinced that the European idea, the results achieved in the field of economic integration and political co-operation, and the need for new developments correspond to the wishes of the democratic peoples of Europe”. Subsequently, the mobility rights of non-economic mobiles, including students, pensioners and the unemployed were guaranteed by secondary legislation (Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 90/366 – later replaced by 93/96). The mobility of some of these non-mobiles were then linked to the earliest definitions of EU citizenship (Sigalas, 2010a: 1346-7);

[W]e must encourage greater integration in educational matters by promoting student exchanges. The aim is to give Europeans of tomorrow a personal and concrete impression of the European reality and a detailed knowledge of our languages and cultures since these constitute the common heritage which the European

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58 Their rights were also subjected to certain criteria, including health insurance and sufficient resources so as “to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence” (Art 1, Directive 90/364).
Union aims specifically to protect (European Commission, 1976: 24).

Notwithstanding the significance of the first 40 years of European integration, the most important development in the broadening of EU mobility (rights) was the introduction of EU citizenship in the TEU in 1993 (Meehan, 1993: 3; Wiener, 1998: 7; Maas, 2007: 11; Olsen, 2012: 15; Hansen and Hager, 2010: 38). Projected as a political turning point in the process of integration (European Commission, 1993, Meehan, 1993: 5), the (economic) mobility of citizens remained at the centre of subsequent EU citizenship provisions and policies (Maas 2007: 45; Olsen, 2012: 82). The treaty was followed by the so-called ‘Citizenship Directive’ (Directive 2004/38), which brought the various pre-existing regulations on free movement together, including some of the central tenets of the CJEU’s ruling. It has guaranteed the access of mobiles and their family members to welfare benefits in the host country, and their right to apply for permanent residence after 5 years (Carrera, 2005: 711-5). It has turned the status of EU mobiles into a form of citizenship that echoes residency – a so-called “citizenship-of-residence-light” (Shaw, 2007). Furthermore, the citizenship provisions of the TEU together with the directive have weakened the original intergovernmental impetus of free movement (Maas, 2007: 45; Olsen, 2012: 98). By allowing the Commission to propose, implement and monitor policies, they strengthen the trans- and supra-national scope of EU mobility and EU citizenship (Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 178).

59 For an analysis of the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship see Chapter 2. For an analysis of EU citizenship rights, including the currently applicable secondary legislation see Appendix 3.
However, both pieces of legislation also reinforce the economic and neo-
liberal basis of EU citizenship (Hansen and Hager, 2010: 123). Indeed, the
legacy of market integration from an EU citizenship perspective is the
emergence of two (legal) categories of EU citizens: mobiles and stayers
(Everson, 1995).

Moreover, the Citizenship Directive provided a legal basis on which
differentiation among mobile EU citizens can take place – according to the
length of time they spend in the host country (see Appendix 3). Further
categories of EU mobiles were then introduced by transitional measures,
which allowed EU-15 member states to limit the economic mobility of CEE
citizens from the 2004, 2007 and 2013 countries. Initially perhaps these
restrictions were similar to those that had followed previous Southern
enlargement rounds, namely for Greece (1981), Spain (1986) and Portugal
(1986). Indeed, both Eastern and Southern enlargements lead to a strategic
‘race to the bottom’ among Western EU states, especially when it came to
their social policy provisions for migrants (Kvist, 2004).

However, the scale of EU mobility just after 2004 was at record levels
(Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmerman, 2010) and the period after 2007 has
been marked by a severe economic and political crisis. As a result, citizens’
Eurosceptic attitudes reached new heights (Shore, 2012) and public, media
and policy antagonism about CEE mobiles have become the norm rather than
the exception (Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz, 2012). These
developments also transformed member states’ approaches to mobility across the EU (Jordan, 2014). Most notably, the UK, Germany, Ireland and Austria have called for limiting mobility rights and for introducing sanctions against ‘benefit tourists’ (Mikl-Leitner et al., 2013). 2014 marked another milestone in the development of EU mobility. In particular, it highlighted that an uneven power relationship between policy-makers persists, favouring member state preferences. For instance, the CJEU’s recent decision to curb opportunities of intra-EU ‘benefit tourism’ might be interpreted as consenting to the populist ideals, which have grown in prominence across the EU-15 states (Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, 2014). In this context some countries, most notably the UK, have gone as far as to discussing a possible exit from the EU. These developments are likely to hinder the Commission’s (2010a, 2013a) more recent attempts to underscore the genuine significance of EU citizenship by promoting the mobility of citizens.

In the UK, the increasing anti-immigration sentiment of the public and the media has been coupled with a surge in the popular support for UKIP (Geddes, 2014). They led to a reversal in migration policies and the introduction of limitations for Bulgarian, Romanian and Croatian workers. These measures did not seem to have met the expectations of an increasingly disgruntled British public. The Conservative Party then made a pledge to hold a referendum on EU membership, should it win the 2015 general election. Yet, UKIP gained more support in the 2014 EP elections and won the majority of seats with 27% share of the votes. Following Tory defections, UKIP also secured the party’s first two seats in Westminster. The other main parties
have begun to follow the example set by the Conservatives and proposed policies to curtail EU mobiles’ access to social benefits. Despite these changes, survey data tend to show that a substantial segment of the British public remains discontented with free movement rules and the UK’s membership of the EU (YouGov, 2014).

In comparison, Sweden has maintained its open-border migration policy. However, the Swedish public has also become increasingly concerned with the growing level of EU mobility and external migration (mainly refugees) (Berg and Spehar, 2013). The disparity between Swedish migration policies and public sentiment is perhaps most apparent in the growing electoral support for the far-right Sweden Democrats (SD). In 2010, SD gained its first ever seats in the Swedish Parliament, receiving 5.7% of the votes. By 2014, the public support of SD almost tripled. The party gained 13% of the votes in the September 2014 elections, making it the third largest party in the parliament that also holds the balance of power. SD has acted as the power-broker between the main parties since September. Siding with the opposition on a vote for the centre-left government’s budget, it narrowly missed out on triggering a new election for early 2015. According to the latest opinion polls, the SD could have won these elections (Milne, 2014). The growing public support for populist- and right-leaning ideologies may challenge the supposedly ‘ideal context’ Sweden represents for EU citizenship. Sweden thus may follow the trend we have seen in other EU-15 states and limit the EU mobility of future EU citizens.
3.2.2. Contemporary mobility flows in the EU

Having discussed the context in which contemporary EU mobility takes place, this section provides an overview of contemporary mobility flows in the EU. As a result of the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargement rounds, EU membership increased from 15 to 28 states and the EU’s population grew from approximately 323 million in 2003 to 505 million in 2013 (Eurostat, 2014a). So a considerably greater number of citizens could make use of free movement provisions after 2004 and their mobility could also be used across a larger geographical area than before. Today, 26 of the EU’s 28 member states aspire to keep their borders open to EU citizens within the Schengen framework. Nonetheless, only a tiny segment of the EU’s population has been mobile. The annual rate of EU mobility flows over the last ten years has stood at an average of 0.29%, compared to 2.4% in the USA, and is unlikely to change substantially in the near future (OECD, 2014). In this context, about 17% of EU citizens are currently saying that they might move for economic purposes later (TNS Opinion and Social, 2010). In 2012, there were about 13.6 million EU mobiles, making up 2.7% of the total population (Eurostat, 2014a). Their number has also been consistently lower than that of third country nationals (TCNs) – at 20.7 million or 4.1% in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014a). These numbers underscore that the EU is still “no flat world” when it comes to EU mobility (Favell, 2008: 222, emphasis in original). Against this backdrop, the prevalent anti-migration sentiments in EU-15 states may seem out of touch (Recchi and Kuhn, 2013). Indeed, most negative sentiment can be

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60 EU member states apart from UK and Ireland are currently Schengen members or have a candidate status. The Schengen Area also includes the four members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
explained by the crisis, which has accentuated processes of differentiation between EU stayers and mobiles – without much economic basis to support these approaches (Blanchflower et al., 2007). For example, EU-15 stayers often overestimate the number of CEE residents in their country. They tend to have similar misconceptions about CEE mobiles’ educational level and contribution to the host countries’ economy (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). Even though it is true that most EU2 mobiles come from the lower educated segment of their sending countries, EU8 mobiles tend to be better educated than the population in the host country (Kahanec, 2012).

Even if the number of EU mobiles looks small compared to the EU population, it is also true that EU mobility flows have been on the rise since 2004 (Kahanec, 2012, 2013; Triandafyllidou and Maroufof, 2013: 374). This is mainly due to the mobility of CEE citizens, mainly EU8 and EU2 mobiles (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010). Previous statistics have shown that in 2004 the number of CEE mobiles residing in an EU-15 state was fewer than two million and the average annual rate of their migration was at around 58,000. Five years later, the number of CEE mobiles reached almost five million – signalling an increase of almost 150% – and occurred at an annual rate of almost 256,000 (Kahanec, 2013: 139-40). Thus CEE mobiles represented 1.2% of the total EU-15 and 4.8% of the total CEE population. These numbers are also considerable in light of the total EU mobile population, summarised in Table 3.1. for the 2009-12 period. The table demonstrates that although the number of EU mobiles grew until 2010, there was a small drop in 2011 – a likely result of the crisis but also the fact that
most CEE citizens who wanted to move for economic purposes had done so prior to 2009 (Kahanec, 2013: 145).

Table 3.1. Number of EU mobiles in the EU-27, Sweden and the UK (2004-12, in thousands) (Source: Eurostat, 2014a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/State</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,731.1</td>
<td>1,811.3</td>
<td>1,750.6</td>
<td>1,693.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>196.9</td>
<td>211.9</td>
<td>218.7</td>
<td>243.3</td>
<td>282.8</td>
<td>263.4</td>
<td>269.3</td>
<td>252.6</td>
<td>237.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1. also displays the number of EU mobiles in Sweden and the UK for the 2004-12 period. It shows that, relatively speaking, a small portion of the total EU mobiles actually arrived to these two countries. However, the distribution of mobiles between these countries was highly uneven. The UK has received almost six times as many EU mobiles than Sweden. In fact, the UK has been one of the most popular destinations for EU mobiles and, together with France and Germany, has hosted the largest number of EU mobiles since the 1980s (Triandafyllidou and Maroufof, 2013: 375). In the recent years, the annual ratio of EU mobiles arriving to the UK varied between 14 to 20% (Eurostat, 2014a). By 2011, the number of EU mobiles was around 2.5 million, making up about 3.7% of the UK’s total population (Eurostat, 2014a). From these numbers, half were CEE mobiles (ONS, 2014: 10). Even if considerable in their numbers, the open-border policy of the UK towards CEE mobiles seemed to have paid off from an economic perspective (Blanchflower et al., 2007). Even more, the skill composition of the mainly female composed EU8 mobiles have, over time, improved in the UK, but
worsened in those member states with closed-border policies (Blanchflower and Lawton, 2010).

In comparison, Sweden has received only about 2% of all EU mobiles. Although it experienced a 15% increase in its EU mobile population after the 2007 enlargement (as shown in Table 3.1.) its EU mobile population remains marginal. In 2012, the number of EU mobiles was around 370,000, making up around 2.9% of Sweden’s total population (Eurostat, 2014a). Most EU mobiles came to Sweden from the Nordic countries, though there was an increase in the number of CEE mobiles after 2004 (Constant, Nottmeyer and Zimmermann, 2013: 64). The ratio of male and female CEE mobiles in Sweden was fairly equal and included relatively young and highly educated citizens. However, the educational level of CEE mobiles was not reflected in their position in the Swedish labour market or in their wages (Gerdes and Wadensjö, 2010).

Even though the UK kept its borders closed after the 2007 enlargement round, it experienced a similar increase in the percentage of its EU2 mobile population as Sweden did (Kahanec, 2012). While some countries have seen a decrease in their EU mobile populations, the UK can expect to see larger inflows of EU mobiles in the future (Kahanec, 2013: 145). The reasons for this are manifold and include social and labour market conditions, such as language requirements and the available vacancies with which the (British) labour market welcomes EU mobiles (Doyle et al., 2006). We already know
that EU mobility flows have been mainly influenced by the different labour market conditions, which have prevailed across member states (Kahanec et al., 2010). Thus different groups of labour market winners and losers have emerged across the EU, and among host and sending countries (Baas, Brücker and Hauptmann, 2010).

The increase in the number of EU mobiles is also apparent when it is compared to the ratio of TCNs. In fact, by 2012 the number of TCNs and EU mobiles were equal – including around 1.7 million people in each category (Eurostat, 2014a). However, this ratio varied across member states and, as shown in Figure 3.1., EU mobiles considerably outnumbered TCNs in three member states, including Luxembourg, Cyprus and Belgium. Actually, in 2012 EU mobiles outnumbered TCNs in eight out of (then) 27 EU states, including Slovakia, Ireland, Malta, Hungary and the Netherlands (Eurostat, 2014a).
While there has been much discussion of the need to integrate TCNs in a ‘multicultural Europe’ (Geddes, 2000; Kostakopoulou, 2002; Jacobs and Rea, 2007), the significance of EU mobiles has been largely ignored in these debates. This is interesting since, for academics at least, the integration of TCNs, presents the possibility of implementing the first post- or supra-national citizenship model in the EU (see for example Soysal, 1994; Shore, 2004; Kostakopoulou, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010). Yet the integration of EU mobiles has not been observed through the same lens. The current ratio of mobiles and TCNs, and the on-going growth in the flow of EU mobiles modifies the context in which EU citizenship can be realised by citizens, and stresses the importance of exploring whether, and if so, how mobility activates citizens’ EU status (Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 6).
3.2.3. The development of educational policy for ‘active’ EU citizenship

The previous chapter (Chapter 2) suggested that from the different types of mobility, the Commission (1976; 2014a) has promoted the mobility of university students as a particularly powerful force for realising EU citizenship. This section considers the role of mobility in combination with education for realising EU citizenship. To some extent at least, the Commission’s approach corresponds with the processes that have prevailed at the state-level (Heater, 2004c; Arthur, Davies and Hahn, 2008; Biesta, 2011). In fact, most citizenship studies would suggest that the democratic quality of any political community rests on the educational attainment of citizens (Heater, 2004c: vii). Some scholars highlight the normative link between citizens’ education and the strength of their national identity (Heater, 2004b; Zajda, Daus and Saha, 2009). Others vouch for the potential schools represent for promoting cosmopolitan and civic values, and human rights among young people (Milligan et al., 2004; Dilworth, 2008; Osler, 2008). Again others document the political literacy and actual participation of well-educated citizens (Almond and Verba, 1989: 315-316; Putnam, 2000: 68; Davies, 2008). These scholars convey the same message. “The educated citizen is attentive, knowledgeable, and participatory, and the uneducated citizen is not” (Converse, 1972: 324).

Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising that nation states have used (public) education as a tool for creating (politically) active citizens (Heater, 2004c: 26-64). The same can be said of the EU. Soon after the introduction of EU citizenship, the Commission (1998: 12) adopted a “pedagogic approach to
citizenship”. In particular, it stressed that higher education (HE) “plays a crucial role in individual and societal advancement, and in providing ... the articulate citizens that Europe needs to create jobs, economic growth and prosperity” (European Commission, 2011g: 2). Although primary and secondary education remains shaped by member state policies, HE has, gradually, become a transnational policy field (Walkenhorst, 2008: 569) and the Commission influences and shapes national HE policies to a considerable extent (Keeling, 2006). The findings of recent empirical research support the Commission’s focus on HE (Arthur, 2005; Reichert, 2009). They show for example that the longer a citizen spends in education, the more likely s/he is to become politically active. Regardless of early socialisation practices, citizens with HE degrees have also been found to be more active in their political and cultural roles than those who leave education early (Hoskins, D’Hombres and Campbell, 2008: 397).

The EU’s HE policy was already in the making during the mid-1980s (Walkenhorst, 2008). The CJEU’s decision to rule discrimination unlawful on the basis of nationality was an important step in this regard (Françoise Gravier v. City of Liège (1985). It allowed for charging full time home and visiting EU students the same tuition fees, and for granting resident rights to visiting EU students (Demmelhuber, 2000: 59). These opportunities were further enhanced by the introduction of the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) 61 To some extent at least, the EU’s focus on HE is also the result of practical considerations. EU educational mobility is only feasible if students have the language skills required for studying abroad. Moreover, students in HE are on the brink of obtaining employment and enhancing their employability is one of the most often cited objectives in the Commission’s (2011g, 2014a) relevant documents, especially in the context of the crisis.
and the mutual recognition of degrees and competences by member states (Wende, 2000: 308-9; see also Huber, 2012 for a critical evaluation). However, it was the introduction of the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (Erasmus) programme in 1987 that really transformed the EU’s HE landscape (Beerkens and Vossensteyn, 2011; Corbett, 2012: 48). Under this programme, the EEC became committed to making financial contributions to the learning mobility of students and academics (Council of Ministers, 1987). Over the next 25 or so years, the number of inter-institutional Erasmus agreements between European university faculties expanded considerably (European Commission, 2012i), leading to a growing number of Erasmus students. In the first year of the Erasmus programme 3,244 students studied abroad, by 2012/13 academic year it was 268,143. In fact, by 2013, the EU had funded the mobility of nearly three million students (European Commission, 2012i: 3).

The current Erasmus+ programme (2014-2020) seeks to provide financial support to another four million students in a seven-year period. From the proposed numbers, about half are anticipated to be HE students (European Commission, 2014a). The scope of support for HE students is perhaps not surprising in light of the expected (Pépin, 2007; Petit, 2007) and, according to some studies, achieved political and economic return (King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2007). There have been various changes to the structure of the Erasmus programme over the years (for an overview see Feyen and Krazkelvska, 2012). It was merged with other educational initiatives under the Socrates programme and then with vocational training initiatives in the EU’s ‘Lifelong Learning Programme’. The recent return to Erasmus+, which now serves as an umbrella programme for educational and vocational mobility underlines the central position of HE students’ mobility (European Commission, 2014a).
2003; Van Mol, 2013, 2014; Mitchell, 2012, 2014; European Commission, 2014g). The Erasmus programme in particular was designed to strengthen the interaction between citizens in different Member States with a view to consolidating the concept of a People’s Europe... [and] to ensure the development of a pool of graduates with direct experience of intra-Community cooperation, thereby creating the basis upon which intensified cooperation in the economic and social sectors can develop at the Community level (Council of Ministers, 1987: 21).

In this context, the role of universities was identified as highlighting the EU’s ‘cultural unity’ and ‘common values’. [T]he existence of cultural unity within Europe is a fact that is nowhere called into question... One expression of this cultural unity is the university, which is an institution common to all the member states” (European Commission, 1985: 355). Universities also have an important economic role because they grant EU citizens with “the necessary competences to face the challenges of the new millennium” (Bologna Declaration, 1999: 1). Thus the learning mobility of HE students is projected as “an indispensable component” to consolidating and enriching their sense of EU citizenship and identity, as well as long-term economic well being (Bologna Declaration, 1999: 1).

There is some empirical evidence to support the Commission’s ‘pedagogic approach to EU citizenship. For example, HE attainment makes it more likely
for students to use their mobility rights later in life (Fligstein, 2008: 25; Roose, 2010). It is also one of the most useful predictors of students’ propensity to develop a sense of EU identity (Citrin and Sides, 2004; Duchesne et al., 2013). Learning mobility in particular has been found to enhance students’ EU identity (King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Petit, 2007; Fligstein, 2008; Mitchell, 2012, 2014; Van Mol, 2014) and improve their awareness of EU level status and rights (Fernández, 2005: 60). However, students’ learning mobility may have an elitist character. Considerably different economic resources are required if a student from CEE or southern states attempt to move to EU-15 or northern member states. Although there is some variation in the financial assistance the EU provides to students, depending on the living costs in the host country (see for example, British Council, 2014), the contribution students have to make can still be substantial. These issues have deterred a large number of students from participating in study exchanges (Souto-Otero et al., 2013). Against this backdrop, the Commission’s neo-liberal approach may have detrimental consequences for an emerging (political) EU citizenship model. The constant focus on students’ skills and employability (Pépin, 2007; Walkenhorst, 2008: 576) and the pressure on universities to support the privatisation and commercialisation of (scientific) research have been observed to have turned universities into ‘marketised institutions’ (Lock and Martins, 2009).

The question is then whether and to what the extent universities can raise “attentive, knowledgeable, and participatory” (Converse, 1972: 324) EU citizens. Even if we have some evidence about the impact of learning mobility
on students’ EU identity and awareness of rights, there has been no research about their political behaviour. The inconsistency in these findings and the lack of evidence warrant for an in-depth qualitative study – a contribution this doctoral thesis seeks to make to the literature.

3.2.4. Learning mobility flows in the EU

Similarly to EU mobility, the level of students’ learning mobility seems negligible compared to the total number of students who study in the EU. From a potential pool of 20 million students, just under 3% moved to study another EU member state in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014b). Nonetheless, as Table 3.2. displays, the number of visiting EU students has been on the rise since 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / State</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>446.4</td>
<td>458.4</td>
<td>515.4</td>
<td>545.9</td>
<td>553.4</td>
<td>596.2</td>
<td>646.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>728.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>106.5</td>
<td>144.4</td>
<td>159.9</td>
<td>165.5</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>186.4</td>
<td>195.4</td>
<td>205.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2. Mobility of students in the EU: Visiting EU students in the EU-27, Sweden and the UK (2004-12, in thousands) (Source: Eurostat, 2014b)

The difference between the number of students arriving in Sweden and the UK was enormous. The UK welcomed twice as many visiting EU students than Germany did, which was the second most attractive destination in 2012. The table also reveals that, since 2009, almost 1 in 3 visiting EU students has studied in the UK. While the number of visiting EU students in the UK has
been on the rise, there was a sharp decline in the number of students arriving to Sweden after 2007. In fact, Sweden has received less than 3% of all visiting EU students since 2007.

These patterns can only be interpreted speculatively (King, 2003: 159-61) but the most important factor is likely to be language. Even today, EU students are prone to find the opportunity to study in English attractive. So we see a large number of students arriving in EU states where degree programmes are delivered (at least partially) in English. By the same token, EU students from these states have been less likely to study abroad because there was a reduced incentive for them to learn a new language. In addition to language considerations, the academic reputation of universities, their facilities and organisation levels were also likely to influence students’ choices (King and Findlay, 2013: 272). For example, even though CEE countries, Greece and Italy have had a considerable outflow of students, only a small number of visiting EU students arrived to study there – with the exception of the Czech Republic, where the inflow of international students rose noticeably after its accession to the EU (King and Raghuram, 2013: 127, see also Eurostat, 2014b).
Against this backdrop, Table 3.3. above summarises the number of Erasmus students in the EU-27, Sweden and the UK for the 2004-12 period. The table demonstrates that, Sweden received less than 3% and the UK around 10% of all Erasmus students. In fact, UK was the fourth most attractive destination among Erasmus students in 2012 (European Commission, 2012j). The factors which shape EU mobility flows are likely to be responsible for the differences in these numbers as well, including language requirements and labour market conditions. Nonetheless, Table 3.3. also reveals that there were some similarities in the flow of Erasmus students to both countries. For example, the number of incoming students exceeded the number of outgoing students in both cases – by three times in Sweden and twice in the UK. The number of incoming and outgoing students has also been on the rise across the board, signalling the growing popularity of the Erasmus programme. Most students arrived to both countries from the same states, namely Germany, France and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic year</th>
<th>EU-27 Total</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Outgoing students</td>
<td>Incoming students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>268.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>252.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>231.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>213.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>198.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>182.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>159.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>154.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3. Erasmus students in the EU-27, Sweden and the UK (2004-12, in thousands) (Source: European Commission, 2012i, 2012j; 2014g)
Spain. EU-wide surveys also reveal that the majority of Erasmus students are female, on average 22 years old and study abroad during their undergraduate degree (European Commission, 2012j).

Overall, the tables in this section of the chapter demonstrated that despite a growing anti-EU sentiment and the recent introduction of transitional measures, the UK has been a particularly attractive destination for both EU mobiles and visiting EU students. In comparison, EU mobiles and visiting EU students have been the exception rather than the rule in Sweden. Due to the different contexts these states represent, there is a difference in the scope EU mobiles have for realising their EU citizenship. The focus group chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4 – 7) offer empirical insight into the likely effects of these diverse contexts on EU mobiles’ (and stayers’) attitudes and behaviour. Having considered the different contexts and cases used in this doctoral thesis, the next (and final) part of this chapter sheds light on the dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens along the mobiles/stayers distinctions.

3.3. Mobiles and stayers as active/passive citizens in the EU

Recent qualitative studies are indicative of how (young) citizens’ perceptions and behaviour are likely to change as a result of their EU mobility and/or greater exposure to mobility (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; Skey, 2011a; Ross, 2014). The empirical chapters of this thesis (especially Chapters 4-7) seek to complement and build on the findings of these studies. In addition to its conceptual contribution – proposing to reconsider the active/passive (EU)
citizen dichotomy along the mobiles/stayers distinctions – the thesis also makes an important empirical contribution to the literature. Existing studies only rely on qualitative evidence from stayers (Bruter, 2005; Skey, 2011a; Ross, 2014) or mobiles (Favell, 2008, 2010). This thesis investigates the perceptions of both EU mobiles and stayers – though the latter is only to a limited extent and for the purpose of control.

Michael Bruter (2005) explored citizens’ perceptions of EU/European identity and the way in which the media and political institutions influenced these perceptions. His objective was “to understand how EU citizens feel” (Bruter, 2005: 6 emphasis in original). His evidence indicates that “a mass European identity has progressively emerged … and continues to grow, and has already achieved high enough levels not to be ignored by academic commentators and politicians” (Bruter, 2005: 166). It also supports the proposition that political institutions and the media have played an important role in developing citizens’ European identity (Bruter, 2005: 123-33).

Most importantly perhaps, Bruter (2004: 26) distinguishes between two components of citizens’ EU/European political identity – a cultural and a civic component. The cultural component manifests itself through citizens’ sense of belonging to the European continent and expected to be shaped by culture, social similarities and ethnicity. The civic component manifests itself through citizens’ identification with the EU’s political structures, including its institutions, rights and rules. The civic component is found to have a particular
relevance to how EU citizens feel, because they observe the EU as a source of their (mobility) rights and (cosmopolitan) identity (Bruter, 2004: 34-5). In comparison, citizens’ cultural European identity stems from a ‘shared baggage’ related to a number of historical, cultural and social features (Bruter, 2005: 85). These findings underscore the “predominantly positive” EU/European identity of citizens (Bruter, 2004: 36) that is only really challenged by the EU’s changing borders (Bruter, 2005: 159).

Alistair Ross (2014) investigated how young citizens (aged 11 to 19) construct their identity in ‘New Europe’ – in countries, which have recently joined or are about to join the EU. His evidence shows that the identity of young citizens is kaleidoscopic and context-contingent. It “change[s] as one looks through a lens, possibly through a filter” because young citizens use “a palette of materials” (Ross, 2014: 183) to construct their identity, including socio-economic background, age, nationality and ethnicity. Their resulting identity is “momentary, situational [and] observer-dependent” (Ross, 2014: 184). Ross (2012a: 96; 2012b: 41) finds support for the distinctions between the cultural and civic components of citizens’ national and EU identities. Nonetheless, he detects considerable variability in these identities.

The civic component of young citizens’ national identity was enhanced when they compared their home country to countries with (allegedly) lesser democratic structures (e.g. Russia) (Ross, 2014: 163-73). In comparison, the cultural component of young citizens’ EU identity was accentuated when they
discussed how ‘liberated’ they felt compared to the ‘historical fear’ of their parents from the “other” (Ross, 2014: 188). By distinguishing themselves from older generations, young citizens’ discussions paved the way for the emergence of ‘internal others’ at the national and EU levels (Ross, 2014: 90). These findings underscore the context-contingent character of young citizens’ sense of identity.

Michael Skey (2011a) applied Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) concept of cultural capital in order to investigate the extent to which the ‘idea(l)s’ of national belonging, identity and ‘home’ country are imagined and experienced by those citizens who make up the ‘dominant class’ in England (namely, the white English). His evidence indicates that national idea(l)s were “taken-for-granted” by these citizens (Skey, 2011b: 245) and continue to shape the different elements of their identity (Skey, 2011a: 148). Skey’s studies also provide some innovative insight into how citizens interact with “the Other”.

For instance, cosmopolitanism was recognised as a desirable outlook by this group of citizens (Skey, 2012b: 482). As a result, they often “present[ed] a rational and enlightened self-image” (Skey, 2011a: 131), receptive to different cultures and peoples. However, there was inconsistency in citizens’ actual engagement with “the Other”. While the majority seemed eager to travel abroad and become acquainted with different cultures, they were detached through their engagement with “the Other” and so their engagement did not challenge citizens’ original (national) identity (Skey, 2012b: 483). Hence these
citizens safeguarded their status as ‘Western citizens, able to wield a privileged passport and to expect the support of powerful institutional authorities’ (Skey, 2011b: 248). Against this backdrop, travelling abroad accentuated the significance of the national framework and the values of the privileged group of citizens. As a result, their cosmopolitanism had a “temporal, conditional and often fragile” character (Skey, 2011a: 8). In order to really account for this contrast, Skey (2011b: 146) suggests that future research on citizens’ engagement with “the Other” explores “how, when and in what context such shifts occur, and the backgrounds of those involved, including the type of resources they are able to bring to bear in their engagements”.

Adrian Favell’s (2008, 2010) ethnographic research of the ‘Eurostars’ (highly skilled EU-15 mobiles) in three ‘Eurocities’ (Amsterdam, Brussels and London) is the only comprehensive qualitative study, which explored how mobiles realise the different dimensions of EU citizenship. In particular, the research inquired about who EU mobiles are and what the social and political contours of their EU citizenship resemble. Although Favell (2008: x) seeks to compare the experiences of EU mobiles and stayers, the latter group is not actually included in his research. Thus stayers cannot corroborate or criticise his main conclusion, specifically that “[t]he real boundaries [of the EU] lie only at the edge of the nation [state]” (Favell, 2008: 222).

Favell (2008: 15-61) finds evidence to support some aspects of the Commission’s approach to EU mobility. For example, the emerging EU
identity of a few ‘Eurostars’ seems to assist them in juggling between and feeling comfortable with their otherwise incompatible national and regional identities. There are also ‘Eurostars’ with ‘de-nationalised’ identities, whose main reason to move was to be free from national frameworks (Favell, 2008: 3-11). These findings indicate that distinctions are emerging between the identities and lifestyles of mobiles and stayers in the EU, especially considering their sense of ‘freedom’.

The European movers thus open up dimensions in their life, inaccessible to the national stayers: the people back home whose lives are immersed and contained in their own national culture. Move even once, and it has consequences; it changes you. You can never really go back. The liberating feeling can even get to be quite addictive. You might keep chasing it. It could even hold the key to the deepest freedom of all: freedom from your self (Favell, 2008: 11, emphasis in original).

Nonetheless, Favell’s (2008) main findings underscore that European integration and EU mobility reinforce the on-going significance of the national framework. This seems to be the case despite the (presumably) ideal contexts of his research – each city was selected for its ‘de-nationalised’ setting with cosmopolitan tendencies. For example, a few ‘Eurostars’ were even sceptical about the homogenising effects of European integration (Favell, 2008: 60). Although they initially appreciated being treated on an equal footing with stayers (Favell, 2008: 74), the inconsistencies in national provisions on social welfare cast a dubious light on the equality of stayers and mobiles. Since
stayers were observed to have benefited from these provisions, ‘Eurostars’
did not expect to see “the replacement of the stabilized national structures for
a fully massified and thereby Europeanized system” (Favell, 2008: 96). Even
more, they felt that the perils of EU mobility could only ever be enjoyed by the
few rather than the ‘masses’. These findings present a clear challenge to the
transactionalist approach to European integration and the Commission’s
almost exclusive focus on mobility as the basis of EU citizenship (Chapter 2).

By the same token, a rather gloomy portrait emerges when the political
participation of ‘Eurostars’ are explored (Favell, 2010). They hardly expressed
the kind of political citizenship the Commission (2012d) and other researchers
with a clear pro-EU stance have vouched for (for example Bruter, 2005;
Fligstein, 2008; Risse, 2010). While ‘Eurostars’ seem to be more interested in
politics than stayers and often have the opportunity to make a considerable
impact on the host city’s political landscape, the actual level of their political
participation in traditional forms of engagement was found to be negligible
(Favell, 2010: 203-12). The non-participation of ‘Eurostars’ was highest in
London, but similar trends were revealed in all three cities. The main reasons
cited for abstention were interest in home country politics or the presumed
complexity of the registration system in the host country. Nonetheless,
‘Eurostars’ did participate in alternative forms of engagement, which was most
apparent in “the choices and actions of consumers, tourists, students, and
cross-border workers” (Favell, 2010: 212).
Table 3.4. Analytical framework for reconsidering the dichotomy of active/passive EU citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active EU citizens</th>
<th>Passive EU citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobiles</td>
<td>Stayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual engagement with the “other”</td>
<td>Willingness (?) to travel abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic (EU) identity</td>
<td>Cultural (national) identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-political forms of engagement at the local level in the host country</td>
<td>Political participation at the national and local levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political participation in the home country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In light of the aforementioned qualitative studies, Table 3.4. provides an analytical framework to how we could reconsider the dichotomy of active/passive EU citizens along the proposed mobiles/stayers distinctions. More specifically, it proposes recognising active citizens as mobiles – they have the opportunity to actually engage with the “other” on a daily basis. However, their engagement is likely to accentuate the presumed differences between various peoples and cultures, and their national identity is expected to have a central stage in making sense of these differences. As a result, mobiles are likely to participate in the politics of their home country. In comparison, passive citizens are the stayers – their attitudes towards and capabilities and actual engagement with the “other” is likely to be limited in the everyday context. Furthermore, because these differences are mostly noticeable through mobility, it may be used as a point of reference that distinguishes mobiles from stayers and vice versa. Therefore, a real
cosmopolitan outlook (through the cultural component of mobiles’ EU identity for example) is not expected to develop among either group.

3.4. Summary

This chapter shed light on the role of EU (learning) mobility in two themes; realising the dimensions of EU citizenship (1) and leading to new processes of differentiation and exclusion (2). The first theme has been discussed by previous empirical research, which often tests the transactionalist approach to European integration. However, they rarely link their studies to EU citizenship literature nor do they analyse the dimensions of EU citizenship concurrently. So they reach diverse and inconsistent conclusions about EU citizenship. These issues warrant for further empirical exploration into the extent to which EU (educational) mobility enhances citizens’ notions of EU citizenship, identity, rights and participation. The ensuing chapters of this thesis (Chapter 4 – 7) will make an empirical contribution to this literature.

The second theme has not been considered within the EU context before. This is surprising considering that the community-building role of any citizenship model entails processes of differentiation and exclusion and transforms the dimensions of citizenship. Moreover, previous qualitative research into the perceptions of EU mobiles/stayers already suggested that there might be important distinctions between their attitudes and behaviour as EU citizens (as illustrated in Table 3.4.). Building on their findings, this thesis proposes that we reconsider the dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens along the mobiles/stayers distinctions, The next chapters (Chapters 4 – 7)
explore the proposed distinctions between the perceptions of EU mobiles/stayers, using original focus group evidence. In so doing, they make an empirical contribution to the EU citizenship literature (discussed in Chapter 1.1.).
Chapter 4. The values of citizenship

The previous chapters of this thesis set out the analytical framework for approaching the issue of EU citizenship (Chapter 1) – defined as a dynamic bond between the EU and its member state citizens (Laffan, 1996; Painter, 2008; Bellamy, 2008b). Although the relevant chapter proposed observing EU citizenship as another example in the long list of citizenships, more often than not EU citizenship has been seen as *sui generis* either because it cannot match the significance of national models of citizenship (for example Smith, 1992; Shore, 2000) or because it signifies “a new kind of citizenship” (Meehan, 1993: 1) which is “superimposed” on member state citizens (European Commission, 2001: 7). Against this backdrop, the European Commission has emphasised the reliance of EU citizenship on EU mobility, expecting the “practical significance” of EU citizenship to be visible to “the many nationals of member states who exercise the right of free movement” (European Commission, 2001: 13; Chapter 2). More specifically, the young and educated EU mobiles are expected to act as the ideal EU citizens (European Commission, 2010d).

Nonetheless empirical studies usually reach inconclusive and contradictory conclusions about how EU (learning) mobility affects the sense of EU citizenship among these so-called “ideal EU citizens” (Sigalas, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; Van Mol, 2013; Kuhn, 2012a; Mitchell, 2012, 2014). In order to complement these findings, this chapter provides a more in-depth investigation of young and educated citizens’ perceptions of EU citizenship, using original focus group evidence from Sweden and the United Kingdom.
More specifically, it seeks to illustrate the distinctions between the perceptions of EU mobiles about EU citizenship. Overall, the chapter demonstrates the contingent and temporal character of young and educated citizens' sense of EU citizenship. Whilst most groups perceived EU citizenship as bi-level – incorporating both EU and national citizenships –, important differences between the interpretations of participants on what this bi-level structure might indicate emerged. For EU mobiles, this structure highlighted the “novelty” of EU citizenship that is “different” from national citizenships. For stayers, it accentuated the idea that EU citizenship is second-order and an extension of their national citizenships. Nonetheless, both groups emphasised the implications EU mobility can have on the perceptions of citizens (rather than participation in politics as is the case with national models) (Research Question 1). Hence, the initial discussions in the focus groups corresponded with the anticipated distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers (Research Question 4).

Due to the contingent character of EU citizenship however, the chapter also challenges the Commission’s observations of EU mobiles as the *ideal* EU citizens (Research Questions 2). In fact, EU mobiles did not seem to use their EU citizenship as a reference point for their identification as (EU) citizens and most of them seemed to find the idea of introducing themselves as EU citizens as amusing. There were considerable differences between how the groups in Sweden and the UK approached the future of the EU and EU citizenship. Swedish groups seemed fairly certain that the EU *and* EU
citizenship would become more prominent in the (near) future, while those in the UK seemed less convinced about the prospects of their EU citizenship.

This chapter is the first of four chapters to follow, which uses original focus group evidence of young and educated citizens’ perception of their EU citizenship in Sweden and the UK. In order to begin answering the main research questions of the thesis (as indicated above), the chapter refers to the opening discussions that took place in the focus groups and illustrates how participants approached the issue of citizenship (broadly speaking). The chapter has three main parts. The first part provides a short insight into the process that was associated with conducting focus group research. The second part offers an insight into the opening phase of the focus group discussions, exploring participants’ perceptions of national and EU citizenships. The third part discusses the limits of the EU and EU citizenship as identified by the participants.

4.1. Working with focus groups

Before we begin to explore how participants perceived EU citizenship, this part of the chapter offers a short overview of the process that was associated with conducting focus group research. In particular, this part illustrates the role of the researcher prior, during and after the fieldwork, and the group dynamics that emerged during the focus groups.
4.1.1. Role of the researcher

Since the outset of her doctoral studies, the researcher was puzzled by the lack of empirical analysis on what EU citizenship signifies and how it is realised and perceived by citizens. Having read extensively about the opportunities the EU grants to its citizens and having directly benefitted from free movement rights and associated benefits, it seemed obvious that EU citizenship was a novel model of citizenship with much potential for the future. Previous experiences of conducting empirical research on the same topic albeit, admittedly, on a much smaller scale at undergraduate and postgraduate levels (with Hungarian mobiles and then Somali and Roma mobiles in the UK) added a further layer of optimism to her approach. Some contradictions about the actual significance of EU citizenship and citizens’ attitudes towards the EU had already been noted by empirical studies, most notably by Favell (2008) and Fligstein (2008). Nonetheless, the preparation for the fieldwork in Sweden and the UK were done in anticipation of illustrating the way in which EU citizenship is, surely, realised by students – the ‘ideal’ (EU) citizens – and so as to complement functionalist and transactionalist approaches to European integration (Haas, 1968; Deutsch et al., 1968).

Despite the lack of funding and difficulties that emerged during the recruitment process for the focus groups, especially to find and enlist visiting students for the EU groups in Sweden, a sense of eagerness characterised the fieldwork. Participants were recruited using posters, social media and email alerts, which were circulated across the larger universities in Stockholm and London. There had been very little contact between participants and the researcher prior to
the Swedish groups – amounting to a couple of email exchanges confirming the time and place of interviews at most. In comparison, the majority of participants in the UK groups had met with the researcher prior to the interviews. For some, she acted as seminar tutor, for others she was a fellow PhD student. As a result, her role as the moderator of focus groups was considerably different in the two countries.

Due to her slightly detached status in Sweden, it is perhaps not surprising that she had a more formal role in moderating these groups. Despite of the generally energetic atmosphere there, these discussions had a tendency to start off slightly slower than those in the UK. For example, initial responses were often made in the same order in which participants were seating and they had a descriptive and complementary character. It was thus necessary for the moderator to ask follow-up questions and be more interactive. As participants established rapport with one another, their debate had an increasingly dynamic tone and the moderator’s contribution lessened. Nonetheless, her (simple) presence appeared to have some sway over the direction of the debates. Every group was introduced to the topic of the thesis and the main research questions at the beginning of the session. However, only in Sweden did one or another participant point out if and when the debates appeared to depart from the original topic. In comparison, the UK groups had a more open atmosphere and participants appeared at ease throughout the discussions. They were quick to challenge the answers provided by one another or, quite often, started laughing and speaking in smaller groups – expressing their opinion in different ways. In some cases
they even challenged the moderator’s questions, allowing for less involvement from her.

The focus groups were originally planned to last for about 1.5 hours and were broken down into three main parts. The discussions opened with broader questions about what national and EU citizenship meant to participants so as to ease them into the group setting. After about 20 minutes, more specific questions about the dimensions of (EU) citizenship were posed. The main objective of the thesis has been to investigate whether, and if so, how young citizens realise EU citizenship (Research Question 1), to draw attention to the multidimensional character of their EU citizenship and the effectiveness of mobility in activating these dimensions (Research Questions 2, 3 and 4). Therefore, the second part of the focus groups, which explored these issues, were expected to last the longest – approximately 45 to 55 minutes. To come full circle, the discussions ended with more general questions about what participants were likely to take away from the groups and how they would advise other citizens about the significance of their EU citizenship.

The evidence was then transcribed, reduced and analysed by the researcher. An initial ‘profile’ for each group was developed based on the first reading of the transcripts and the researcher’s notes from the discussions. These profiles made references to the definitions of national and EU citizenships as provided by the groups, followed by approaches to the

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63 The questionnaires for the mobile and control groups are included in Appendix 2.
64 Following the ‘guidelines’ and reflections provided by academics working with focus groups as a research method (especially Morgan (1998), Burnham et al., 2008; Byman, 2012; Halperin and Heath, 2012) or in relation to EU integration (Duchesne et al., 2013; Ross, 2014).
various dimensions of (EU) citizenship – EU identity, EU rights and EU participation. The themes, which emerged from the reflections at the end of the focus groups, completed these initial profiles. Another reading of the transcripts allowed for the identification of key issues each groups settled on or tended to diverge from. Based on these more polished group profiles, the first drafts of joint profiles for the two countries were also drawn. It was only after the third, fourth and sometimes fifth reading (in the case of UK stayer group for example) that an evaluation of participants’ individual attitudes towards the EU and EU citizenship, and their positions within the groups were noticed. The broader group dynamics only really came to light much later in the analysis process.

Despite of what may seem a one-directional process, the different stages of analysis described above were often repeated. In fact, it was well in to the drafting of empirical chapters that the researcher begun to really grasp the issues, which were at the heart of the evidence she had collected. It was particularly challenging to recognise, acknowledge and incorporate the contradictions between her (and the Commission’s) expectations and the evidence. More specifically, it became apparent that the focus groups drew attention to the main challenges young citizens were facing in their attempts to realise a “so-called” EU citizenship – the existence of which they often did not know about and at other times expected to have little relevance. It is true that during the discussions the researcher had noted that participants expressed some doubts about the significance of (their) EU citizenship. Actually, similar issues were raised across the groups and in both countries. However, these
seemed trivial at the time of the discussions. By reading and re-reading the transcripts and adopting an increasingly systematic approach to analysing the evidence, the researcher’s expectations were gradually subdued, allowing for participants’ perceptions to really dominate the evidence presented in the empirical chapters (Chapter 4 – 7).

4.1.2. Composition of groups and group dynamics

Before exploring these young citizens’ perceptions of EU citizenship however, this section provides a short assessment of the group dynamics. The previous section already noted that group dynamics were often shaped by the presence of the moderator. Additional factors shaping these dynamics included participants’ social backgrounds, including language skills and the length of time they had spent in the host country, and whether or not the groups were comprised of participants who had known one another previously. All groups were interviewed in English. While it was the official language of study for participants in the UK, only a minority used English in their everyday lives in Sweden. Coupled with their recent arrival to Sweden, it perhaps not surprising that the contribution of a few participants to the discussions – most notably French Male in EU Group 2, German Female in EU Group 3 and Italian Male (2) in EU Group 4 – was more limited. The groups in the UK were mainly composed of friends and university fellows, whilst the groups in Sweden, especially the EU groups, brought together students who had not met before. These factors added a further layer of ‘formality’ to the Swedish groups, while easeing the atmosphere of the UK groups. The next few paragraphs offer a closer insight in to the dynamics of
each group and the opportunities and limitations the moderator was presented with in her attempt at working with these groups.

EU Group 1 in Sweden included four participants, none of who had known each other prior to the research. Perhaps due to the smaller number of participants and their expertise and genuine interest in European politics, they appeared to ease into the group setting fairly quickly. The Italian and Portuguese Male formed an alliance early on and so agreed with the issues raised by one another throughout the discussions. While no such alliance formed between the other two participants – French Male and German Female –, it was the insightfulness of the French Male that usually dominated the ensuing debates. Overall, the discussions appeared to have a natural flow and there was hardly any requirement for the moderator to pose follow-up questions or request the involvement of any one participant.

EU Group 2 was slightly larger than Group 1 and the discussions had a similarly natural flow, though some involvement from the moderator was necessary on occasion. Two participants had known each other prior to the discussions – German Female and Italian Male – but it was, once again, a couple of male participants, who formed some sort of an alliance – British-Hungarian and Portuguese Males. Accordingly, when the Bulgarian Female and Portuguese Male disagreed about something – this happened a couple of times throughout the discussions –, the latter enjoyed the support of the British-Hungarian Male. The Bulgarian Female was not disheartened however, and kept putting her arguments across. Instead of her, it was the
French Male who appeared slightly out of place. He hardly engaged in any of the main debates and only spoke up when the moderator asked him to do so specifically.

German Female 3 was similarly quiet and had a somewhat limited involvement in the debates that occurred in EU Group 3. In comparison, the arguments of the most outspoken participant of the group – Lithuanian Male – were often rebuffed by the others. None of the participants had met prior to the research and no ‘alliances’ – that could be compared to those in the previous two groups – emerged. However, it was apparent that three participants – Hungarian Female, German Female and French Male – understood one another slightly better. This somewhat uneven dynamic was particularly apparent when the discussions turned to EU participation. The Lithuanian Male answered the question of the moderator, asking the others to contribute as well. However, his request was met with silence. The others simply did not follow up – they did not question, disagree nor complement his comments. Their silence marked the end of participants’ consideration of EU participation in this group. Moreover, the female participants had a tendency to acknowledge the perceptiveness of their French Male fellow. So when the Lithuanian Male challenged the issues raised by his French counterpart, they were quick to offer their support in his defence. The moderator intervened in this group so as to ensure that the German Female spoke up.

EU Group 4 was the largest in Sweden and the only group where CEE mobiles outnumbered their EU-15 fellows. The two Romanian and two Italian
participants were friends, but the others had not met prior to the research. Both Polish females had a tendency to express themselves powerfully throughout the discussions – though they often disagreed with one another. Actually, the sentiments of Polish Female (2) were usually met with disagreement from the rest of the group. Polish Female (1) appeared as a member of the group but her overly positive stance on the EU and EU citizenship separated her from the others towards the end. Once again the male participants appeared to form an alliance. Although the three of them had not met prior to the research, the Italian and French participants were usually in agreement and offered some support to each other’s comments. The debate in this group was lively from the outset and apart from encouraging Italian Male (2) and Romanian Female (1) to speak up every now and then, the moderator’s role was limited to asking questions.

The Swedish control group was particularly lively and the discussions lasted for well over the original time frame – for about 1.75 hours –, prompting a couple of participants to leave before the final questions were asked (about participants’ reflection on the focus group). Most participants knew each other. They had studied together or were taught by one of the PhD students who were present. Only one participant – Swedish Female (5) – studied something different than political science but she too was an active member of the group from the beginning. The most vocal member of the group was, perhaps, Swedish Female (2). She responded to the moderator’s every question – usually starting off the debates – and often requested her fellows to answer as well. Some members of this group expressed a slight uneasiness of having to
debate in English, however most of the discussions went smoothly and without any major disruption. Due to the informal atmosphere of the group and participants’ similar attitudes towards the EU and EU citizenship, the moderator’s role was, once again, limited to asking questions.

Compared to the Swedish groups, most UK groups were comprised of participants who had known each other for years, studied politics together and had a good command of English. Participants’ attitudes towards the EU and EU citizenship often had a contradictory and quite cynical character. While they were often in favour of the EU, the UK’s broader and more pronounced Eurosceptic context had a very clear and palpable impact on their ensuing debates. Overall, these groups had a stimulating atmosphere filled with energetic discussions. The moderator’s role was mostly limited to asking questions and settling disputes, instead of asking follow-up questions or prompting any one participant to engage in the debates.

Apart from the Italian Male, the other members of EU Group 1, UK knew each other well. Their friendship may explain why they had a tendency to question his comments – much to the frustration of the Italian participant. The German and Dutch Male were in agreement throughout the discussion – though they did not quite form an alliance that can be compared to that in the Swedish groups. The German, Italian and German-Swiss Female also had a somewhat similar ‘bond’ forming. However, it was the position of the Romanian Female that was particularly interesting in this group. As the only CEE mobile, her references to the restrictions she had encountered whilst studying in the UK,
were met with silence from the others. She turned to the only other CEE mobile in the room for support – the moderator –, often reservedly smiling and looking at her.

All members in EU Group 2 had known each other and studied politics at the university. This group included the only female alliance across all groups – between the two Finnish participants. It also comprised the only EU mobile who had used her free movement right as a child – the French-British Female. However, her long-term settlement (and no doubt integration) in the UK appeared to have had no clear impact on her approach to EU citizenship – at least none that would have separated her from the others in this group. Actually, these participants often agreed with one another and their comments were supportive in character. No disputes or debates arose within the group and the particularly good-natured discussions that took place lasted for less than 1.2 hours – the shortest time of all interviews. This group required quite a bit of involvement from the moderator. However, her attempts to start off some debate were quickly pacified by participants’ complementary responses.

EU Group 3 had a more lively debate with the German-British Female quickly establishing herself as an EU and the Swedish participant as a world citizen – albeit the latter changed considerably as the discussions progressed. While both participants appeared to be pro-EU, the other two female members of the group had more cynical attitudes towards the EU and often questioned the very idea of EU citizenship. Due to the disagreement between these participants and, no doubt, the ease with which they carried themselves in
front of one another – a number of heated debates erupted in the group. It was the late arrival of Swedish Male – 45 minutes after the discussion started – that injected some balance to the discussions. However, it is possible that his actual arrival rather than comments or contribution shaped the flow of the discussions. The moderator’s attempts to complement the emerging debates were mostly without success. Participants expressed their opinions rather enthusiastically – and long after the ‘formal’ discussions ended.

A similarly animated debate ensued in EU Group 4, with the moderator having to ask participants to speak slower and avoid talking at the same time with others. It was apparent that these participants knew each other well and felt confident to speak openly about their experiences of EU citizenship in the UK. Contrary to the other UK groups – where no one participant appeared to take a leading role – the two Italian participants and German Female (1) were, clearly, shaping the direction of these debates. The Austrian Female made a few interventions and made her reservations about these emerging dynamics known. The subsequent rebuff from her from fellows then made her slightly detached from the rest of the group. Compared to the outspoken attitude of most members, the French participants were, perhaps, slightly quieter – possibly a sign of their nervousness and somewhat poorer command of English language.

With 13 members, the UK control group was the largest of all. It was also the most energetic and vigorous with the debates lasting just under 2 hours. Almost every participant had known each other before the research and, apart
from one—British Female (3)—, they were actively engaged from the very beginning until the end of the discussions. Strong personalities—British Male (1), (2) and British Female (1)—and much disparity in participants’ perceptions of the EU and EU citizenship, created a group filled with heated disputes and cynical smirks. There was a requirement for the moderator to step in the resulting debates often and in order to move the discussions along or ensure that everyone had a chance to speak up when they were wishing to do so.

4.2. The structure of national and EU citizenships

Having provided an insight into the processes associated with conducting focus group research, the remaining of this chapter focuses on the initial debates that took place across the focus groups. All discussions opened with a general question on what citizenship meant to participants. Most participants seemed initially puzzled by the broadness of the question but once they begun responding, a debate about the definition and significance of national and, eventually, EU citizenships emerged. It shed light on the similarity between the approaches of participants to their national citizenship and the impact mobility seemed to have on their approaches to EU citizenship. This section illustrates the main distinctions between the perceptions of EU mobiles and stayers of what citizenship signifies.

4.2.1. Defining (national) citizenship

Citizenship was often defined as an “agreement”, “exchange” or “contract” between the state and the individuals—a dynamic and direct bond.
Finnish Female (1), EU Group 2, UK: To me, it's a guarantee of rights you get. It’s a contract between you and the state. It's guaranteed, for example, education and other public goods, um, and that when you go abroad you have a place to go to. Like, an embassy, if you are in a problematic situation. So you have external and internal dimensions, including defence and police force, and things like that. It’s entrusting the state like that.

Subsequently, participants focused on the reciprocal value of citizenship and highlighted its dependence on democracy and democratic values.

French Male, EU Group 1, Sweden: I would relate [citizenship] more to a democratic kind of state because … it implies rights and duties. But it also implies, I think, [an] agreement from the citizen in his relation to [a] state. And in a more authoritarian state, I think, the agreement is not really present. So it’s kind of different from that relation. It’s more like subjection, than citizenship.

Actually, the majority of participants seemed to agree on these two issues, suggesting that their approaches to citizenship did not seem to have been affected by EU mobility.65

However, it should be noted that the Swedish stayer group approached citizenship differently from the other groups. It described a top-down process and focused on the “rights”, “entitlements” and “benefits” the Swedish welfare

65 A couple of other participants, mainly the well-educated and male participants (and only one female (6) student in the British stayer group), took a similar stance. For them, citizenship was important due to its cosmopolitan ideal. Some of these participants then categorised national borders and laws as limiting the ideals of citizenship.
state provides to its citizens. Swedish stayers suggested that their citizenship was different from other national models in Europe because the identity dimension, which usually binds citizens together, was not as important.\textsuperscript{66} At this point of the discussions, participants appeared to be in general agreement. Hence they approved of and built on each other’s statements.

\textit{Swedish Female (1), Stayer Group, Sweden}: It’s not like you are proud to be Swedish because you haven’t gone through the process to become Swedish citizen…

\textit{Swedish Female (5)}: I don’t really feel that like Swedish. Sweden isn’t a country where, you’re not so very like, I don’t feel like Swedish people in comparison to other nations … we’re not very Swedish. We don’t, you know, talk a lot about our own Swedish, you know, culture and just identity overall.

Therefore, they depicted some form of a post-national Swedish citizenship, in which the emphasis was on the values, rights and welfare benefits Swedish citizens received.

Hence the initial approaches of Swedish stayers correspond with the literature on Swedish citizenship, which depicts this model as an ideal of post-national citizenship (Brochman and Hagelund, 2012: 26) that relies on principles of community and generous welfare state provisions for all (Bernitz, 2012). However, the difficulty EU mobiles faced in their attempts to integrate into the Swedish (student) society indicate that the ideal presented by the literature on

\textsuperscript{66} For the same reason, Swedish stayers alleged that they were more likely to develop a sense of EU identity than others (Chapter 5.1.).
Swedish citizenship is likely to be far from the reality experienced by to-be-citizens.

In their broad definitions of (national) citizenship, every group touched on the three dimensions of citizenship, namely identity, rights and participation as defined in this thesis (Chapter 1.2.). The following dialogue in EU Group 2, Sweden exemplifies well the complementary nature of these early exchanges.

*British-Hungarian Male, EU Group 2, Sweden:* It is the right to fully reside in a country without limitations and fully have to obey their laws ...

*Portuguese Male:* Being part of that nation, member of that nation to be full member, to have full rights, to be part of it.

*German Female:* Since I study Political Science, maybe I have more of a theoretical background. For me it's the social and civil and political rights.

*Bulgarian Female:* From [an] anthropological perspective, culture is very important for me. And sharing common values and it's things like that... but then if I have to define it more strictly, I would also go for having certain rights in a certain space. It's a combination of both.

Nonetheless, some disagreement between participants and the groups about the importance and weight of the different dimensions of citizenship emerged with the progression of the focus groups. These disagreements are explored in more detail in the subsequent chapters. For now however it is important to
note that three groups, the Swedish Stayer group, EU Group 4, UK and EU Group 3, Sweden did not follow the same pattern as the others. They adopted a more static concept of citizenship. From the earlier example it is evident that for Swedish stayers, the most important dimension of their citizenship was rights. And so rights dominated the majority of their debates. For example, this group considered in length how Swedish rights were likely to impact citizens’ sense of Swedish identity. The other two groups defined citizenship mainly with reference to identity. So for example, even when the moderator asked more specific questions about the other dimensions of citizenship – rights and participation –, these two groups referred back to identity. In contrast, other groups, were more flexible in their conceptualisation of citizenship. For example, some groups did not seem quite comfortable with the idea that there is a link between citizenship and (national) identity, they found it difficult to separate the two concepts. “I think that’s really important. I mean how to separate citizenship as a political institution from identity as a social construct?” (British-Canadian Male, Stayer Group, UK). One group did not want to link identity and citizenship together (the British Stayer Group). The emerging diversity in the approaches between and within these groups suggests that citizens – similarly to academics and policy-makers – may have a preference for one or another of the dimensions of citizenship. These exchanges hint that contemporary citizenships in Europe are likely to be contested.

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67 This could have also been the result of research bias. It is plausible that participants’ approaches to EU citizenship were influenced by the follow up questions of the moderator.

68 This issue maybe linked to the ‘many categories’ of British citizens (Dummett, 2006).
4.2.2. Defining EU citizenship

When probed about EU citizenship, the initial reaction among participants was, once again, that of surprise. It quickly became apparent that none of them really comprehended EU citizenship as comparable to their national citizenship – a form of “exchange” for the lack of a better word. In fact, a good majority of participants across all groups looked puzzled when the moderator introduced the topic of the doctoral research. Even after 10 or so minutes into the discussions, most of them were surprised that EU citizenship *per se* existed. Of course, citizenship is not a topic students would have to actively think about in their everyday lives – even if they study politics. Nevertheless, their initial reactions shed a rather dubious light on the real extent to which the so-called ‘ideal EU citizens’ are aware of their EU level status – despite of what the Commission would have us believe (Chapter 2.2.).

Once students moved beyond their initial surprise, they suggested that there are likely to be important differences between citizens’ approaches to national and EU citizenships based on their mobility status. 69 Most importantly perhaps, none of the stayers was expected (nor appeared) to identify as EU citizens, but the majority of EU mobiles was expected (and appeared) to do so. This finding supports one of the basic assumptions of this thesis: EU mobiles are the most likely to identify themselves as EU citizens (Chapters 2.2.1. and 3.2.3.). Even more, EU mobiles seemed rather optimistic about

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69 This section builds on the idea that in the case of the EU it is possibly more accurate to examine individuals’ identification with the EU rather than their collective EU identity (Duchesne, 2008; Favell, 2008; Medrano, 2010). There was much overlap between the focus group debates about these two issues. Hence it was not always evident which point made by participants belonged to the section on identification with the EU and which point to EU citizenship as identity (Chapter 5). The examples included in this chapter are those in which participants made references to their *individual* identification as EU citizens.
what EU citizenship signified to them (Bruter, 2005) and perceived it as something “novel”, an “extra feature of citizenship” that is “a guarantee” and “security”, especially during travels. Considering the structure of EU citizenship, most participants suggested that it did not diminish the significance of national citizenships. The majority agreed with one another on the assertion that states remained the first point of call for issues most relevant to their lives, such as welfare and educational programmes, paying taxes and so on (Favell, 2008; Skey, 2011a; Duchesne et al., 2013). As a result, they expected to find considerable variations between citizens’ senses of national and EU citizenships. This section sheds further light on these issues.

The early exchanges between EU mobiles about EU citizenship were largely complementary. They thus spoke of the different “contexts” in which they were likely to identify as (national and/or) EU citizens. Their discussions portrayed multiple, intersecting (Risse, 2010) and kaleidoscopic identities (Ross, 2014, see also Chapter 1.2.1.). Many suspected that it was “hard to separate” citizenship “from the context it comes from” and subsequently stressed how, in certain situations, including during their residency in a host state, the significance of the EU was liable to intensify. 70 These issues are illustrated well in the following exchange in EU Group 4, Sweden. Each participant seemed to agree with previous comments and, at the same time,

70 Except for EU Group 3 Sweden and EU Group 4 UK. This chapter makes references to the dimensions of EU citizenship in order to provide a more accurate portrait of how participants initially defined EU citizenship. These dimensions are discussed in considerably more detail in the later chapters (Chapters 5 – 7).
complemented them. Hence there is some form of incremental progression in these earlier exchanges about EU citizenship.

*Polish Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden:* I think that's how it works, that there are different levels of citizenship… It's like you are citizen of your city and then of your region, maybe of your country and then [the] European Union. And then there [are] some, like, citizens of the world. But I don't know about that. …And then it's linked to how you feel, the identity. 'Cause, I guess, there are some people that feel mostly the citizens of their own country. But there are some that feels more like citizens of the Europe or the city. …

*French Male:* I think it's a kind of belonging. You belong to a community and this community could be small or wider. You have different scales of identity of community. …

*Bulgarian Female (1):* So maybe we then have to differentiate between citizenship by nation, by where you are coming from, your origin, and citizenship within the boundaries of the EU.

*Polish Female (1):* Yeah!

*Bulgarian Female (1):* ‘Cause you say citizenship is to be bound to some kind of community and, at the same time, you have the European Union… [which] allow[s] a uniform system between old [and] different kind[s] of citizenships.

Subsequently, nearly everyone assumed that citizens have an abstract and shallow sense of identification with the EU. The abstract nature of the EU stemmed from everyday personal benefits *(European Commission, 2001;*
Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; Duchesne et al., 2013), such as paying with the Euro, using one’s European passport outside the EU and the crossing of national borders within the EU. These benefits afforded a sense of “freedom” to citizens, which was often presumed to be “taken for granted” by the younger generation.⁷¹

*Dutch Female, EU Group 3, UK:* [EU citizenship] really just means that I have less passport checks. It’s, like, really easy to travel and that’s literally all it means to me. It’s probably because I’m not a taxpayer or something like that. Like for me, it’s just easier to travel it’s easier to pay with Euros everywhere...

*Swedish Female:* It opens up more, yeah, possibilities for you. It’s more freedom, I would say! Like you have this kind of citizenship… or it’s a sense of belonging. You belong in the European Union. Like, *everywhere* is home! You’re allowed everywhere. You can do the same things almost as you can do at home in whatever country you choose.

Only three EU mobiles (interestingly all female and in three separate groups) assumed that realising a political form of EU citizenship – that stems from citizen participation in EU level politics (European Commission, 2012a) – was already possible (French-British and German-British Females in EU groups 2 and 3 in the UK, and Polish Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden). Instead, the majority of EU mobiles and the EU groups more broadly supported the idea

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⁷¹ Similarly to the findings of Ross (2012a, b; 2014), participants then believed that their sense of belonging to the nation state was also likely to be less rigorous than it has been the case for older generations, who “had to fight for” recognition.
that EU mobility was the most relevant aspect of their EU citizenship, and assumed that EU citizens only really knew about their mobility rights.

_Romanian Female, EU Group 1, UK:_ I think most of the European citizens just know that they can travel. They can travel without visa. I think, that’s the main thing that all European knows. And other than that, I think, no one knows. I mean, aside from European Studies students.

Nearly every EU mobile suggested that EU mobility makes citizens’ identification with the EU more likely. The same point is emphasised when we consider the approaches of EU mobiles and stayers to EU citizenship. EU mobiles were more inclined to expand on what EU citizenship _personally_ meant to them. The majority of these participants – mostly females – identified as EU citizens during their EU mobility. “[I]f you speak about European citizenship, I never felt so European than this year as an Erasmus student. And I see that I can share much with the other people from Europe” (French Male, EU Group 3, Sweden). “You know, studying here it’s always about I’m [a] member of the European Union. I have a lot of advantages! So you get this feeling that you are a European citizen” (German Female, EU Group 1, Sweden).  

Once EU mobiles focused on the role of mobility, they spoke of EU citizenship as their formal “status”, which made them “something between” TCNs and national citizens. This meant that EU citizenship gave EU mobiles a “huge,

72 This is not to say that there was not any disagreement between participants about how EU mobility might affect citizens’ identity. This issue is discussed in more detail in the chapter on EU identity (Chapter 5).
incalculable advantage over other [non-EU] citizens”, making their EU status a “convenience”. Their responses correspond to the main hypothesis of this thesis, namely that EU citizenship is likely to be most relevant to a small group of potential EU citizens: the EU mobiles (Bruter, 2005) and, specifically, the young and educated (student) segment of EU mobiles (Ross, 2014).

In comparison to the complementary and incremental discussions that took place across the various mobile groups, the control groups did not define EU citizenship as new or different, and made sense of it through a comparison with their national citizenships. The following example illustrates that stayers hardly used personal stories to explain their approaches to EU citizenship and were much less likely to identify as EU citizens than EU mobiles (cited earlier). As a result, the descriptions of EU citizenship among the two control groups appeared to signal the “extending [of] national citizenship” and a shallow sense of “belonging to a wider community”, granting a second-order character to their EU citizenship.

Initially at least, Swedish stayers seemed excited about the prospects of assessing EU citizenship and almost all of them believed that it was important for their daily lives – as an extension of their national citizenships. Later however, two stayers openly admitted that they had never heard of EU citizenship prior to their university studies and/or participation in the research.

Moreover, participants with dual citizenships and/or multicultural backgrounds often said that EU citizenship was their preferred status (see for example the comments made by Swedish Female, EU Group 3, UK). This finding seems to support the small but important number of existing studies, which show how identification with the EU might resolve cognitive dissonance in citizens’ identities (Favell, 2008, 2010; Rother and Nebe, 2010). Furthermore, male EU mobiles often observed global rather than EU citizenship as the best alternative to the conflicting nationalities in Europe (especially apparent in EU Group 4, Sweden).
Swedish Female (2), Stayer Group, Sweden: Yes, more and more. We have extended our rights outside the national borders and it means that it should be easy to live in another European country the same way that you live in your own country. You can work, study or travel without any problems. And therefore we are now European citizens. That identity has now been prolonged, stretched and I think that's the ambition of the EU is to create the notion of European citizen.

Swedish, Female (1): I heard it for the first time in our political theory course when we were talking about citizenship. I've never come [into] contact with the concept ‘European citizen’ [before] and I find it surprising because I consider myself being, well, at least not ignorant. … So I was also surprised that I haven't been well, no one had tried to convince me that I am a European citizen. Well, that's my reflection.

British stayers assessed EU citizenship in quite the opposite manner. They distanced themselves from the rest of the EU from the very beginning of the focus group discussions. Their negative perceptions towards the EU and, consequently, EU citizenship was justified on the basis that the EU was not relevant to their everyday lives. Some stayers alleged that without adopting the Euro, EU citizenship was unlikely to foster British citizens’ EU identity. Others believed differences in language, culture and the UK’s proximity to the rest of the EU – the “British moat” – prevented British citizens from realising EU citizenship. Subsequently, most British stayers identified themselves as
EU citizens among other identifications and two approached EU citizenship as an extension of their national status.

*British Female (6), Stayer Group, UK:* I think, European citizenship is quite economic in terms of working. And, I think, it’s quite different living in the UK because we don’t have the Euro. And, I think, that living here we are not as attached to being European as maybe other countries are. And I think that’s something that hasn’t been created. …

*British Male (3):* I would back that and …the Schengen as well … And European citizenship is for them, not us. There’s a lot of mind-set going on. Well, mind-set in my opinion. But that’s how it could be considered. We say European. You don’t think of the UK.

*British Female (5):* I suppose it’s partly our fault that we don’t really like to get involved…

*British Male (4):* I think,… European citizenship is, uh, about being part of something a little bit bigger, a little bit greater than just our quite small, pathetic little island…

*British Male (2):* I think, I could feasibly describe myself as European. But it [would] probably be one in a succession of things... I would first probably say I’m from Suffolk and then I would go greater and say I’m English, then I’m British and then I’m European! But I think it’s [a] particularly banal statement to make that you are ultimately going to describe yourself as a European citizen.
Whilst EU mobiles recognised both internal mobility and external migration as useful in highlighting the “practicalities” of their EU citizenship status, the control groups did not really see EU mobility as useful for developing their identification as EU citizens. Moreover, only a handful of Swedish and a couple of British stayers expected EU mobility to assist in realising EU citizenship.74

Therefore, the initial discussions hint at important distinctions between young and educated citizens’ perceptions of EU citizenship and identification as EU citizens on the basis of their mobility status. EU mobiles were more likely to use personal stories about EU citizenship and identify as EU citizens. In contrast, stayers had a tendency to define EU citizenship as an extension of their national status. These discussions then reflect the expected distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers. However, in some instances the significance of national citizenship was also stressed, pointing to the limitations of EU citizenship as the (proposed) ‘fundamental status of citizens’. The next part interrogates the limitations EU mobiles and stayers identified when attempting to realise their EU citizenship, including issues linked to defining what the EU signifies and, subsequently, the type of community EU citizenship may establish by bringing member state citizens together.

74 The two exceptions were two (female) stayers, one in each control group, who had identified as EU citizens during their previous experiences of EU mobility. However, they seemed to have lost their EU identification once they returned home.
4.3. Limits to realising EU citizenship

The contradictions between participants’ definitions of EU citizenship, contradictions which characterised the main part of the discussions, are reflected well in the rich and rather diverse conceptions of the EU and the references they made to ‘regionalisation’, cross-border divisions and the EU’s external borders. Participants appeared to really struggle with identifying a clear set of values that is common across the EU and depicting where its geographical, cultural and social boundaries are. In fact, the tone of discussions about these issues kept changing and had a strong, contradictory character not only between, but also within groups. Furthermore, a large number of participants adjusted their responses on this topic as the discussions progressed. The focus group evidence presented in this section of the chapter emphasises the consequences and challenges associated with separating the EU (civic) and European (cultural) spheres (Bruter, 2005) of young and educated citizens’ identification as EU citizens (Ross, 2014).

Although participants were not required to give a definition of the EU, every group attempted, and failed, to agree on whether it is an “economic union”, a “political construct”, a “community of Europeans”, a “European federation” or a “congregation” of nation states. The diversity in their definitions could be linked to the distinctive framing of the EU within each member state (Medrano, 2010) as well as the Commission’s inability to really move beyond the EU’s economic legacy towards a political community (as revealed in Chapter 2.). These issues are illustrated in more detail in the next two sections of this part of the chapter.
4.3.1. **Defining an EU characterised by regionalisation, internal divides and external borders**

First, it is worth noting that the majority of participants could not imagine the EU as a single political union due to the historical differences between and ongoing relevance of member states. Whilst they seemed to recognise that the EU was different from the rest of Europe, participants often made sense of it as the prototype example of ‘regionalisation’, signalling a move towards a nation-like community at the EU level (Karolewski, 2009). Perhaps because these issues were discussed during the initial stages of the focus groups, participants were more inclined to complement than contest each other’s comments. In some cases – mainly in the EU groups in Sweden – this approving approach spilled into a rather optimistic interpretation of the EU and, by extension, EU citizenship.

*Lithuanian Male, EU Group 3, Sweden:* I think [the] European Union and Europe are different. I would say... So you can be, like, from also Europe but not part of the European Union. So they would still refer to you as European.

*German Female:* Yes, that's true!

*Lithuanian Male:* So, I think, it’s a political construct, the European Union citizenship. And [it] does not really work. Well, they are trying to [make it work], but I do not think so it does at the moment.

*Hungarian Female:* Yeah. It is a construction, as you said. And so, we are kind of in the European Union. And maybe in our head it even goes further than that. But it isn't [doing so in practice]. ...
French Male: And then if we are going to become a European federation, I don't know, you will still identify yourself from your country or from your region, even if there is European citizenship. …

Lithuanian Male: But, I think, “European” does not exist in general. I don’t think “European identity” exists. It's just politically constructed. If you see, the countries are very different. Like, you have France and Portugal, Dutch and then English kind of civilisations. … It's very different approaches, not alike.

French Male: But, look at the nations as well! Like, France, Italy, Germany – [they] were [first] nothing … but politically and economically constructed a few hundred years ago. And then the [national] identity was founded after that.

Lithuanian Male: Yeah, sure. … I think, in general, that Europe is changing. And that Europe… [used to be the place for] nationalism-construction. So now, I think, national states will fade away and become, like, more institutionalised organisations. Like, kind of [the] European Union. And then Latin America tries to do UNASUR [Union of South American Nations] – maybe a similar thing? But, I do not know. They have been focusing on different things. I think, it's [a] new creation, regionalisation!

However, not all groups were as optimistic about where the EU is heading as the example suggests above. Others quickly identified the significance of regional divides within the EU along the east/west, and north/south contrasts.
They then considered how these divides influence citizens’ ability to realise EU citizenship. Residency in Western states was seen as more constructive towards realising EU citizenship than residency in an Eastern state. Even in the Swedish EU groups – which originally adopted an optimistic tone – EU-15 mobiles were increasingly vocal about the fact that they perceived Eastern states as “a little bit weird” part of Europe that “doesn’t feel so home” (EU Group 2, Sweden). The political influence of these states was also considered in some groups, suggesting that certain states were “more European” and had more “value” than others. For example, Swedish stayers did not recognise Sweden to be one of the “more European” states. Nonetheless, they believed that it had a higher “value” – political influence – than “many of the former Soviet countries”.

The debate among British stayers added an extra facet to these regional divides. Referencing vibrant differences between the UK and the rest of Europe, including geography, language and culture, the discussion of these participants identified internal EU ‘others’. The use of “they” – continental Europeans – and “us” – British – marked the earliest instances where divisions were drawn within the EU and among its citizens. Even if most British stayers appeared to agree with these notions, some – if somewhat limited – attempts were made by a couple of participants to bridge these differences. In the exchange below, British Female (5) suggests that even if

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75 What is also interesting about this exchange between British stayers is that they observed English language – recognised as the European language by all other groups – as detrimental to their ability to realising EU citizenship. In this context, the reasons cited by British stayers seem to especially resonate the ‘framing Europe’ thesis (Medrano, 2010).

76 This points to relevance of applying cultural capital to the case of the EU and is discussed in more detail in the section on ‘Shared EU identity among EU citizens’ (Chapter 5.2.).
the UK is ‘separated’ from mainland Europe, it is not “that far away” geographically. Although she was a vocal pro-European member of the British stayer group, she subsequently admitted that there likely to be more “in common” between the British and the Americans, than the British and ‘some Europeans’ – in this case referring to Italians. Her contribution then allowed another member of the group to invoke the “peculiarities of the Anglo-sphere”.

*British Male (3), Stayer Group, UK:* [I]t comes down to also geographical things as well. … [I]f you live in… the west side of Switzerland or something, to get all around Europe, you can drive there [in] a couple of hours! And you can take advantage of [the] Schengen [Area] and the language barriers to a point aren’t [important]. If you are a natural, say, French-speaker, if you like. The language barrier to an Italian or a Spanish, at least what I understand, is, you could get by…! Whereas, we don’t have that! …[T]hey can feel European because they are all sort of there together …

*British Female (5):* Saying that, we are not that far away!

*British Male (3):* Oh, I know!

*British Female (5):* I mean, in terms of transportation… like, it takes … two hours on [the] Eurostar. It’s not like it takes seven hours to get there. Yet, we still have, seem to have, more in common with [the] Americans than with [the] Italians in terms of how we see others…

*British Male (2):* …[T]hat’s the peculiarities of the Anglo-sphere.
These peculiarities would later allow for British stayers to underline that, for example, English was not actually a *European* language.\(^77\)

Not surprisingly perhaps, British stayers’ Eurosceptic approach had a strong impact on EU mobiles’ perceptions. EU mobiles often claimed that they had more in common with other European visiting students (including those coming from beyond the EU’s borders), than with British stayers. These issues then shed a dubious light on the prospects of realising a political EU community that could be comparable to national communities and clearly challenge the optimistic expectation of functionalist approaches to European integration – in particular the awaited positive effects of cross-border interaction among mobiles and stayers (Haas, 1958; Deutsch et al., 1968; see also Chapter 2.1.2.)

Once they highlighted the presence of regional divides and the “peculiarity” of EU membership, participants begin to probe whether these differences should be preserved or not. Their opinions on this point were rather contradictory and often varied from one issue to the next *within* a single focus group. For example, Swedish stayers were quite vocal about the damaging character of the EU’s homogenisation policies on education, which had led to the introduction of university fees in many EU states and, in Sweden affected international students. However, they were disapproving of the EU’s failure to introducing a single professional language – English – that could ease

\(^77\) The link between language and EU identity is explored in detail in Chapter 5.2.
citizens’ EU mobility further. Their focus on regional divides and internal differences and whether, and if so, how the EU should deal with these issues, suggests that these EU mobiles and stayers could not quite resolve the question of what the EU currently signifies or should signify.

Moreover, the fact that participants shared “common references” with non-EU European citizens obscured their definitions of the EU. For example, the fact that Switzerland is not an EU member state did not seem to matter for participants, because it was treated as “European”. Indeed, participants did not think being part of the EU necessarily meant that EU citizens associated with each other more closely than with those Europeans who stayed outside of the EU. “[Swiss] shares the language with Austrians and Germans [and though Switzerland is not in the EU] do you ever hear an Austrian say they’re more affiliated with the Germans?” (German-British Female, EU Group 3, UK).

Some groups went further and underlined the link between some member states and non-European countries – like in case of British stayers who made references to an “Anglo sphere” (cited earlier). Against this backdrop, a handful of participants seemed worried about how the EU and EU mobility might create ‘artificial’ boundaries between EU and European citizens. Although the latter group does not have mobility rights, some students believed they too shared common history and traditions with (some) EU citizens. Actually, European citizens were often included in discussions of cultural/ European identity.

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78 The majority of Swedish stayers originally chose their university course because it was taught in English.
**German Male, EU Group 2, UK:** I think, at the same time, it’s interesting to see how … especially freedom of movement, obviously sort of reinforces external boundaries. … The way that countries have, in the past, defined themselves… a lot more [based] on geography. …Whereas in a way, the European Union, you could argue, sort of levels that out a bit … then suddenly there is a border to one side. And that sort of overlap of different identities or even ethnicities, uh, if that can sort of flow anymore? Then that creates … an artificial situation.

However, demographic factors influenced participants’ approaches to what this “artificial situation” of EU community signified. Previous quotes have already hinted that some participants appeared to have preferred considering the EU community as part of an emerging cosmopolitan community. Actually, apart from one EU mobile (French Male, EU Group 2, Sweden), the other male mobiles in Sweden exhibited a cosmopolitan outlook, and spoke of a sense of belonging to the world. They did not consider the EU level as important for their identification as citizens, though their sense of national belonging remained significant in some respects (mainly in relation to exercising citizenship rights and privileges). In comparison, only a female participant (Polish Female (2), EU Group 4, Sweden) seemed convinced about the appropriateness of thinking about the EU with a cosmopolitan ideal in mind. Accordingly, she adopted a broader approach to understanding her experiences of EU mobility, comparing this with what we might find in the
USA. However, before and after this comparison, she reverted back to a more ‘Eurosceptic’ attitude.79

4.3.2. EU(ropean) values and the shaping of an (un)political mobile community for the future

Although participants seemed to find it quite challenging to define what the EU signifies and where its borders should end, they recognised that it was easily associated with certain values, namely democracy, freedom and safety, as well as Christianity and a ‘European mind-set’. The importance of these values is the topic of this section. For instance, quite a few participants in the UK deemed the EU safer and more democratic than the rest of the world and, more importantly perhaps, than the rest of Europe.

*British Male (3), Stayer Group, UK:* [W]hen I went outside the EU this academic year, and it wasn’t a completely unsafe place, but it was on my mind that, no, you are outside the EU. No one is coming to get you help if all goes wrong here. And there … [is a] perceived [sense of] security maybe that you are safe here. Your rights are safer within the EU.

This finding is particularly interesting because only one EU mobile in Sweden made a similar comment, Polish Female (1) in EU Group 4, who was also the only participant to believe that EU citizenship already existed. However, her fellows did not follow her optimism and a couple of them even questioned the extent to which “EU standards” – for instance drinking water standards – really

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79 Her rather ‘fluid’ approach is illustrated well across the various quotes from this group, especially those in Chapter 5.2.
worked. Others felt that citizens “misunderstood the European Union”, which has a sole purpose, namely to promote economic integration. Providing security was then observed as an important part of state-function.

*Italian Male (1), EU Group 4, Sweden:* [T]he right to be safe is secured by the state because we don't have any European army. And this is another really difficult thing. I mean, we have experienced 50-60 years of peace so we don't know who is going to defend us if there will be a war in the future. And it will not be Europe.

Instead of safety, most groups in Sweden emphasised the role of religion, particularly Christian values, and an essentially ‘Western’ culture as necessary part of “European lifestyle” and useful in depicting what the EU does not signify. They made an extensive use of ‘categorisation’ processes and stressed that new processes of differentiation and exclusion are emerging in the EU. For example, a French EU mobile in EU Group 1 probed the perceptions of his fellows about the role of religion and culture in deciding whether Turkey should be allowed to join the EU some day. His questions led to a number of statements about the need for a geographical border for the EU and debates about “what is not European”. Although participants appeared to find it difficult to define what consists of being European, they were quick to dismiss certain countries and values as non-European.

As one participant pinpointed, by deciding what does not constitute being “European”, there was a sense among her fellows about what is “European”.
The following deliberation between EU mobiles reflects well the vibrant discussion that took place in almost all groups, which tried to define European and/or EU values.\(^{80}\) Initially, some participants seemed uncomfortable with using religion as an identity signifier. As the discussion progressed however, more and more participants got involved in the debate and observed Turkey as “they” compared to “us” – the “truly Europeans”. Issues linked to culture, religion, lifestyle, history and geographical position were raised, dismissed and raised again. Against this backdrop, the participation of Turkey in some EU-led initiatives, such as European Capital of Culture, and Cyprus’s EU membership seemed to hinder rather than enhance these EU mobiles’ sense of identification with the EU.\(^{81}\)

*French Male, EU Group 2, Sweden:* What do you think about Turkey wanting to become a member?... Don't you think that the main problem about Turkey is, like, that they are Muslim and we are not?

*Portuguese Male:* I hope it's not!

*Hungarian-British Male:* Yeah, but I think for a lot of people this is the main reason.

*German Female:* Yes.

*Portuguese Male:* Probably.

*French Male:* They are Muslim and like [us, we are] European. We are Catholic.

*Italian and Portuguese Male together:* Christians, basically.

\(^{80}\) Also discussed in relation to the EU’s “external other” (Chapter 5.3.).

\(^{81}\) The idea that it is difficult to develop a sense of EU identity due to geographical proximity, historical ties and cultural distinctions have been identified by other empirical studies (see for example the findings in Ross (2012c) about young citizens’ sense of EU identity in Cyprus).
Bulgarian Female: In terms of the European identity, it's based on the Judeo-Christian or Roman Catholic [religions], something along these lines.

Italian and Portuguese Male nod in agreement.

French Male: I think it will be weird for me to say like, ‘Yes, Turkey is Europe[an]’. I mean, like, Istanbul is a very nice city and people there live like us. Like, European [people]. Like in Paris or London. But the rest of Turkey… it's totally different.

Bulgarian Female: But what is confusing is that actually Istanbul was European capital of culture.

French Male: Yeah! And they live, like, European. This is like European lifestyle. They can drink alcohol. They have clubs.

Bulgarian Female: What I was thinking is, what is European? Because they [Turkish people] do participate in certain European initiatives but yet they are not truly European.

Italian Male: If there are no limitations on who joins Europe, then even Israel wants to join Europe someday, which is quite far. So it has to be some process that countries have to follow… And, it will take some time for them to join Europe even if it's relevant and, possibly, good for them and [for] Europe to let them join. Because you can make them join, … but where will we stop? We say that St Petersburg is part of Europe. But now St Petersburg is part of Russia. Can you give European status to the whole [of] Russia? And it goes all the way to the United States and China. Or should we just give European citizenship to people that are from this
[Western] part of Russia? So there is always this question. Do you really want to open this?! Because there is no limit. Everyone wants to be in Europe! ... And it starts taking over. I don't know. It's complicated...

_Bulgarian Female:_ But then you have Cyprus, which is not really that close to Europe. It's closer to Turkey, closer to Asia. How come they are members?

_Italian Male:_ Half of Cyprus!

_Bulgarian Female:_ Well, yeah, politics and such, but still! Part of Cyprus is in the EU. So is it geographical?

_German Female:_ But isn't that funny that when we feel threatened that Europe is going to be too big, then we already say “No, these countries are not European”? Doesn't that say that we already feel European and we can already say well, we have certain habits and certain characteristics that these countries don't have? I think that's very interesting because we started from the point where we said I am here I come from there [referring to a member state], you come from there. But now we already say “No, you know, the rural area of Turkey isn't European enough.” I mean, there must be something that we feel truly European for us to be able to say, “No, they are not!” ... I think that's always a thing with a threat. As soon as [you] feel threatened you create already a community. You say, “Okay, we are this block.” And I agree with you [refers to Italian Male] we can't expand Europe too much.
All groups seemed to agree on or make references to the latter point: the easiest way of constructing a community was believed to be in response to a threat.

The first part of this chapter demonstrated that – once they moved beyond their initial puzzlement – participants adopted somewhat different approaches to their national and EU citizenships. The majority of groups perceived national citizenship as some kind of an “exchange” between the nation state and its citizens. Yet, none of them really comprehended EU citizenship as an “exchange”. In fact, quite a few participants were surprised to learn that it already existed. This finding calls into question the real depth of these participants' identification with the EU that was ‘exposed’ during the discussions. The same issue is underscored by the fact that participants did not really consider their EP voting right as part of EU citizenship. This is important since almost every group underlined the importance of voting at the national elections as a duty of citizens. Yet, almost none of them mentioned that EU citizens had a duty to participate in the EP elections or that EU participation was necessary to realising EU citizenship.82 If this select group of citizens – most of whom studied political science or European studies at the time of the interviews – tend to separate EU citizenship from EU participation,

82 The only group, in which more than one participant discussed EU participation within the framework of EU citizenship and identity prior to the direct questions posed by the moderator was EU Group 2, UK. Here the three female EU mobiles had more favourable perceptions towards the EU’s political union and how this might evolve, using a bottom-up approach as example. A German-British mobile in EU Group 3, UK also had a more positive perception of this issue. Interestingly, in the other cases where EU participation was raised during the initial stages of the interviews (mainly by the male participants) in EU Group 1, 3 and 4 in Sweden – was so as to underline the weaknesses associated with a political union and EU citizenship more specifically (Chapter 7).
it is even less likely that ordinary citizens will observe a link between these two issues.

On this basis, it is not startling that most participants did not vote in the previous EP elections - though quite a few said that they were too young to do so. “I was too young for the EP elections, but for the next one, it’ll be fine. Yeah I will vote next year, probably, why not?” (Italian Male, EU Group 1, UK). The small number of participants who had voted before did not feel their vote had a real impact on the EU’s decision-making process because it “doesn’t count as much”. They also believed that being aware of this limitation “turn[s] people off”. As a result, participating in the EP elections had little or no constructive impact for most participants’ sense of EU citizenship. “I don't even feel like I have that European citizenship when I vote for the European Parliament” (Portuguese Male, EU Group 1, Sweden). This point will be repeated throughout the rest of this thesis: apart from three participants, the focus groups did not link EU participation to EU citizenship.

These issues challenge the Commission’s (2013a) assumption that EU mobiles are politically active and correspond with the findings of previous empirical studies, which draw attention to mobiles’ (lack of) political participation (Muxell, 2009; Favell, 2010; Recchi, 2012; see also Chapter 7). Because of the (proposed) interlinked character of the dimensions of (EU) citizenship (Bellamy, 2008a: 12), these issues may restrict the ability of EU citizens to fully develop a sense of EU identity and awareness of their EU rights (similar conclusions reached by Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012).
Both EU mobiles and stayers seemed to recognise EU mobility rather than (political) participation as the key to realising their EU citizenship. However, their discussion questioned the supposition that EU mobility can have long-term positive effects on citizens’ perceptions of the EU. In fact, their responses suggest that EU citizenship – based on mobility – is unlikely to establish a permanent bond between the EU and its citizens. Rather, there is a possibility that EU citizenship is but a temporary phase in citizens’ lives, similarly to their EU mobility. Accordingly, a number of EU mobiles said they identified as EU citizens only “briefly” and in “isolated spots”.

_Italian Male, EU Group 1, Sweden:_ I am European but in occasions, not structurally. Travelling, crossing borders freely. Moving especially in the West German-Dutch-Belgian joint where you can experience that a form of European Union has already been reached. It’s multi-speaking and really moving communities long before Schengen Agreement. So in some occasions travelling, I did experience that very closely, but in just isolated spots.

Since the majority of participants assumed that citizens “always see national government[s] first”, it is plausible to propose that once EU mobiles return home, they might lose their previous identification with the EU. Two stayers did just that. They said that they had only ever identified as EU citizens during their previous experiences of EU mobility. During this time they could relate to other EU citizens. However, since they have returned home, they identified as
national citizens and could grasp the differences between themselves and other EU, non-national citizens.

Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: When I was working in France for a month, I met some... Russians and a guy from Jordan... In contrast to them, I really felt like me and the French people had more in common. ...Even though here, in Sweden, ... these French [people], they are so different from me! But there, I really felt this European notion.

British Female (6), Stayer Group, UK: I think that living in a different European country makes you slightly more European. I don’t think I would have ever considered [being a European] if I haven’t lived in Spain for a year. And now... I have done that, been living there and I can speak Spanish, I probably relate [to this feeling] more than before.

Hence the focus group evidence suggests that contemporary EU citizenship maybe nothing more than a temporary phase in citizens’ lives. It thus challenges the possibility of developing a community of EU mobiles – one that is constantly realised by citizens. Since EU mobility is circular (Kahanec and Kurkova, 2011), it is likely that the majority of mobile EU citizens only identify as EU citizens for the duration of their mobility. Once they return home or, alternatively, stay in the host country and integrate into that society, they are likely to turn back to the national framework. The findings of previous research on the on-going significance of the national framework seem to support this suggestion (Skey, 2011a; 2012b). Clearly, more research is needed to show
whether EU citizenship is likely to have a temporary character and how, if at all, EU mobility might affect citizens’ perceptions in the long term. Moreover, more research is necessary on how different types of mobility (including circular mobility, non-mobility, learning mobility, etc.) may lead to new processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU. For now at least, the evidence suggests that EU citizenship has not quite built a community of citizens at the EU level.

Some debate also emerged about where the EU is heading and if citizens were likely to realise EU citizenship in the near future. Participants then spoke of the economic crisis as an important change to the current legitimacy of the EU. However, almost all participants in Sweden and quite a few in the UK seemed to believe that the EU is, currently, in a state-building process and its significance might be enhanced later.

_Finnish Female (1), EU Group 2, UK:_ [W]e’ve got a nascent institution and a nascent form of supranational, in quotation for the record, “democratic institutions”. And just because it’s so new and now, because of the euro crisis, it’s going through a lot of dispute. It’s going through a lot of political argument to disassociate and create in-fighting in the European Union. But …political institutions change and, I don’t know. I think, that the public sentiment towards the European Union will change and the idea that we can still be who we are. We’ll adopt with the European Union, if that makes sense? It’s just so young at the moment that it hasn’t been as accepted as it perhaps will be by future generations.
Most of these participants also assumed that the growing number of EU mobiles has already begun to assist in the state-building process in the EU. “I think this European Union citizenship is going to be more visible in the future because… we are travelling so much now” (Polish Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden).

However, the debates in the UK portrayed a different picture. The majority of stayers and a good number of EU mobiles in Groups 3 and 4 claimed that it will always be “very difficult” to realise a form of regional citizenship in the EU.

_Italian-Mexican Female, EU Group 4, UK:_ I’m just saying that, right now, it is still too early … Maybe in the future it’s gonna be a good option. Uh, especially for people who had a very, uh, multicultural background… But you also have to consider that some people, even though they are aware of this, uh, cultural difference that exists, will still prefer to pick a nationality that [is] attached to their country…. Because even though I’m aware of this, and I feel like, it’s a great thing to study abroad and just like … share your values and traditions … I will still prefer to have a nationality that attaches me to Italy.

### 4.4. Summary

This chapter provided a short overview of the processes associated with conducting focus group research, explored EU mobiles’ and stayers’ perceptions of national and EU citizenships, and the limits they identified to realising their EU status. The main findings seem to raise serious questions
about the relevance of EU citizenship today. Although EU mobility did not appear to change EU mobiles’ approaches to national citizenships, it altered their observations of EU citizenship considerably. In particular, EU mobiles were more vocal about their identification as EU citizens. These findings underline the anticipated distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers.

Nonetheless, most participants did not believe that their EU citizenship was an appealing alternative to their national citizenships. An obvious question arises here: why would they then practice their EU participatory rights? The focus group evidence and previous empirical findings about EU mobiles’ political participation (Muxell, 2009; Favell, 2010; Recchi, 2012) suggest that they would not. So, it is unlikely for EU mobiles to realise a political EU community. Besides, only a small segment of participants recognised their exercise of EU rights within the framework of EU citizenship. This was due to either a lack of knowledge about EU citizenship or an assumption that it did not (yet) exist. If the young and educated citizens, the so-called “ideal EU citizens” did not know that EU citizenship already exists, how could they activate it? These findings are in sharp contrast with recent Eurobarometer data, which suggests that more and more citizens are aware of their EU citizenship (see for example TNS Opinion and Social, 2011). The inconsistency of these two findings goes to the heart of current debates about the significance of the EU and the role of EU citizenship in integrating citizens at the EU level (Shaw, 2012; Reding, 2013). In order to begin answering some of the questions this chapter raised, the next three empirical chapters of the thesis will look into the dimensions of EU citizenship in more detail, starting with EU identity.
Chapter 5. EU citizenship as EU identity

EU identity is, perhaps, the most studied aspect of EU citizenship – so much so that some scholars have used these two terms interchangeably (Laffan, 1996; Habermas, 1998; Painter, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Bruter, 2005; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Karolewski, 2010; Risse, 2010). This tendency is not surprising considering that the introduction of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty coincided with a shift in citizens’ attitudes towards European integration – from ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 277) to ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 9). However, the very concept of identity is ambiguous at best, leading to doubts about its actual purpose for social research (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 2). In light of this issue, the tendency to expand the meaning of EU identity is only likely to have extended the existing ambiguity in this concept (for more in-depth criticism of this issue see Kanter, 2006; Duchesne, 2008; Kaina, 2013).

Starting on the premise that EU identity has a legitimising role in the European integration process (Shore, 2000), empirical studies have adopted a range of approaches and (as a result) reached contradictory conclusions about its actual meaning and significance (for a comprehensive overview of the existing literature see Kaina and Karolewski, 2013). Some investigated whether citizens’ sense of EU identity includes a civic as well as a cultural aspect (Bruter, 2004; 2005; Fligstein, 2008; Ross, 2014). Others placed the issue of EU identity in the context of public attitudes towards European integration
(McLaren, 2006; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Medrano, 2010; Gaxie, Hubé and Rowell, 2011; White, 2011; Sanders et al., 2012; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). Again others studied whether and, if so, how EU identity fits with citizens’ pre-existing national identities (Carey, 2002; Citrin and Sides, 2003; Duchesne and Frognier, 2007; Karolewski and Suszycki, 2009; Sanders, Magalhães and Tòka, 2012).

Nonetheless, some agreement between these scholars has also emerged, including the way in which EU (civic aspect) and national (cultural aspect) identities are expected to become compatible over time (for an optimistic evaluation see for example Risse, 2010: 39-46). There is also an increasing agreement about the diversity in citizens’ sense of (EU) identity (Gaxie, Hubé and Rowell, 2011; Duchesne et al., 2013; Ross, 2014) – one that is likely to be multiplied by the experience of EU mobility (Favell, 2008; Rother and Nebe, 2009; Roeder, 2011; Siklodi, 2014). These studies underline that EU identity remains highly susceptible to context and to contextual changes (including political and economic changes) (illustrated in Table 1.1.). Accordingly, the recent crisis is likely to have challenged citizens’ emerging sense of civic EU identity rather than supporting it (Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz, 2012; Henjak, Tóka and Sanders, 2012). Nonetheless, it is precisely a crisis that was expected to make EU identity ever more salient (Cram, 2012). The diversity in the EU identity literature makes it ever more surprising that, in its discourse on EU citizenship, the Commission has only ever recognised EU identity as one-dimensional (Chapter 2). These issues
warrant an in-depth interrogation of EU identity as a dimension of EU citizenship.

Against this backdrop, the chapter explores young and educated citizens’ sense of EU identity using original focus group evidence from Sweden and the UK. More specifically, it explores the perceptions of these citizens about the first dimension of EU citizenship – EU identity. A previous chapter conceptualised EU identity as composed of three elements – sense of belonging to the EU, shared identity among EU citizens, and recognition of the “other” (the non-EU citizen) (as defined in Table 1.3.) –, which served as empirical indicators for the analysis of focus group evidence presented in this chapter. Overall, the findings of the chapter suggest that EU mobility is effective in developing the three elements of citizens’ sense of EU identity to a certain extent (Research Question 2). However, even the mobile specific segment of ideal EU citizens appears to find it difficult to form a “community of Europeans” and then separate this community from the “other” (Research Question 3). Rather than a “community of Europeans”, mobility seems to lead to processes of differentiation between EU mobiles and stayers, and also within these two groups, allowing for the emergence of ‘internal EU/national others’ (Research Question 4). EU mobility is also expected to obscure (some) processes of exclusion, especially when it comes to having to recognise whom the non-EU citizens are in the everyday context. In light of these findings, the role of EU identity in furthering political integration in Europe seems uncertain at best (Research Question 5).
This chapter forms the first of three empirical chapters (Chapters 5 – 7), which probe how young and educated EU citizens perceive one of the dimensions of their EU citizenship. In so doing, these chapters together provide a response to the main research question, namely whether and how young and educated citizens realise their EU citizenship (Research Question 1). The chapter has three main parts. The first part illustrates how participants perceived their sense of belonging to the EU. The second part sheds light on their perceptions about whether a “community of Europeans” exists and illustrates differentiation between categories of EU citizens (internal EU/national others). The third part draws attention to emerging processes of exclusions, which seem to divide young EU citizens from the non-EU citizens (the EU’s “other”).

5.1. Sense of belonging to the EU

In an attempt to explore what participants understood under ‘being EU citizens’, they were asked about the relationship between citizenship and identity, the different levels of their identity and how their EU mobility experiences (or lack of experiences in the case of stayers) may have influenced their sense of EU identity. The majority of groups then saw EU mobility as effective in developing a sense of belonging to the EU among EU mobiles. However, they were quick to suggest external migration as even more effective than EU mobility. Yet, it was top-down approaches to EU identity promotion that these participants recognised as perhaps the most productive for enhancing their sense of belonging to the EU. In order to shed more light on the perceptions of young and educated citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU, these issues are discussed in the next two sections.
5.1.1. Developing a sense of belonging to the EU through mobility

The previous chapters of this thesis already suggested that there is likely to be a distinction between citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU on the basis of their mobility status (especially Chapter 3.3.). The focus group evidence appears to confirm this expectation, illustrating that EU mobility can contribute to EU mobiles’ emerging sense of civic belonging to the EU (Bruter, 2005; Ross, 2014). The majority of EU mobiles in the focus groups suggested that mobility was necessary to make the EU “relevant to [their] lives” as EU citizens and to “develop [their] sense of belonging to Europe”.

Italian Male (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: When you move out and you travel you can develop this sense of “Europe”... I think we are developing this kind of identity in this vague sense. We are an elite compar[ed] to our national fellows, [our] compatriots. I mean, it’s easier for us to feel European in general than people that don’t move away.

However, as the above example suggests, the discussions quickly resonated the extant literature about the multi-layered and multilevel character of citizens’ sense of identity – one that is highly contingent on political and social contexts (for an overview of the relevant literature see Duchesne, 2008). Participants’ recognition of the complexity associated with citizens’ sense of identity then led to doubts about the actual extent to which EU mobility was likely to only affect EU identity. This issue was apparent in the discussions
that took place across the various EU groups. In their attempt to shed light on their sense of belonging to the EU, most EU mobiles started off on an optimistic note about how EU mobility had enhanced their sense of EU belonging (as cited above). Increasingly however, EU mobiles expressed a sense of uneasiness about the distinctions EU mobility may lead for both EU mobiles and stayers’ senses of belonging to different communities.

The gradual change that occurred across the various EU groups is illustrated particularly well by EU Group 2, UK. To start with, the participants in this group did not believe stayers are EU citizens or can be seen as “Europeans” to the same extent as mid- or long-term EU mobile residents, who “move around” and “actually sort of live in other places” are. Their initial notions thus corresponded to the expected distinctions between mobile (active) and stayers (passive) EU citizens. However, these participants became increasingly concerned about whether EU mobiles can actually be observed as “better Europeans” than stayers. Even though they attended to a contested issue – identity – and began to move away from the group’s original observation – an optimistic notion of the role of EU mobility –, the actual tone of their subsequent discussion was complementary and supportive. On the one hand, EU mobility was observed to not only enhance EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU but other communities as well. In fact, EU mobiles suspected that EU mobility strengthened their senses of belonging to the EU, country of origin and local regions because it highlighted the similarities and
persisting differences between member states. The resulting exchanges were personal, descriptive and supportive of one another’s stories.

_German Male, EU Group 2, UK:_ I define myself as a Berliner, … [and] I feel German. But I also feel European. So, in a way, you could argue that there is a multilevel identity thing going on. [Others nod in agreement.] But, I think, it sounds sort of weird, I guess. … I like to think of it spatially. So my base is my home city but the people who speak my language, who vote for the same parliament, I guess, you could say that’s sort of the next level, the country. But then, at the same time, Europe is sort of the wider geographical base where I can move around freely, where I can enjoy the rights of being a citizen without … feeling foreign, I suppose. So, yeah I would say that there is sort of a two-level identity going on.

_Finnish Female (2):_ I consider myself to be from Helsinki. But then I’m Finnish, like, that is my nationality and that’s where I’ve always pretty much lived. But there is also this bigger [and] wider concept of being part of the EU and being a part of Europe. And I do understand that identity as well…

_German Male:_ But, I think, … for us it becomes clearer because we don’t live where we … [are] originally from. Or, let’s say, were raised or lived for the most period of our lives. So it becomes clearer the further you move away [from] those different levels. …

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83 EU mobiles’ observation of EU identity was usually portrayed with some references to how, in general, EU identity and EU citizenship are likely to reinforce national identities too.
**French-British Female:** I really think European identity can coexist or is already coexisting with other forms of identity. And after many adolescence identity crises [All laugh.] because of the fact that you can have all sorts of different identities depending on the context in which you are in. Sometimes, you’re European. Sometimes, you’re something else.

On the other hand, some participants – as in the group above – were very perceptive in their recognition that some stayers may also have a strong sense of belonging to the EU. “[I]f you are perfectly happy with staying in your small town, more power to you! And you feel European, that’s great!” (Finnish Female (2), EU Group 2, UK). In considering these two, rather optimistic examples, the members of this group collectively raised an important question – whether it is appropriate to distinguish between different categories of EU citizens according to their mobility status. Similar debates took place in the other EU groups as well. Overall, these exchanges indicate the likely variety in the effects EU mobility can have on citizens’ sense of identity.

For some EU mobility EU mobility was also observed to be fruitful for accentuating their sense of belonging to their ethnic group (Rother and Nebe, 2009). This was the case especially across the EU groups in the UK. Due to the UK’s multicultural character, participants observed an emphasis on peoples’ ethnic background rather than their nationality or legal status. This emphasis was observed to create a peculiar context in the UK, the result of
which was that, none of the EU mobiles developed a sense of belonging to the UK.

_Austrian Female, EU Group 4, UK:_ [I]t’s never been as important before to... associate yourself to where you come from. Because, ever since I’ve come here, the first question is always, “Oh, where are you from?”... Austria, which is my nationality, which is where my culture, my home, everything is based. But, especially in Britain, I find because they have such a diverse background... they don’t have this shared sense of citizenship. I don’t think it exists in England. Everyone is very-very, yeah, very close still to where they come from, if they’ve immigrated.

Naturally, the majority of EU mobiles also observed the Swedish context as peculiar and so they too failed to develop a genuine sense of belonging to their host country.

EU mobiles also underscored, more specifically, that context was an important factor in how their (EU) identity emerged. Their approaches to this issue were often contradictory however, illustrating ‘kaleidoscopic’ identities (Ross, 2014). For example, they underlined that certain member states tend to be “more European” than others. These were then observed as ideal contexts for underlining the significance of the EU for citizens’ lives and were subsequently observed as enhancing citizens’ disposition to “feeling more European”. Interestingly though, the “less European” (i.e. relatively Eurosceptic) atmosphere of Sweden and the UK seemed to have also been quite effective
in enhancing EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU. To elucidate this trend, EU mobiles compared the geographical proximity, cultural peculiarities and national identity of these countries to the rest of Europe. Geographically, Sweden was perceived as “not too far away” and the UK as “far away” from the core of the EU. Hence, in the UK, EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU was often associated with continental Europe.

_Dutch Male, EU Group 1, UK:_ I even feel that [European identity] here in the UK. And that’s not so much European, but more “continental-European”. Well, the difference is mostly made by the British themselves. [All laugh.] So, if they ask me about, like, “How do they do this or that in Europe?” I thought we were already in Europe! So I started out from seeing all of Europe and now I do see a distinction. And that makes me more kind of conscious about the fact that I relate more to, say, the French and the Germans than I do to the English, perhaps.

Similarly, in terms of their cultural background and national identities, both Sweden and the UK were perceived as exclusivist by EU mobiles.

_German Female, EU Group 1, Sweden:_ Actually, most of my Swedish friends that I have, and there is a quite a couple of them, I do speak English with [them]. I don’t speak Swedish with them. I think, the language is not a barrier at all. I think, it's more that cultural thing that you just explained. [Portuguese male nods in agreement.] Everything that comes from the outside is viewed as
quite sceptical, first of all. So they keep their distance. And I mean, different studies [have] shown like, for example, studies with diplomats that if they come from Scandinavian or Nordic countries they always ... keep on moving backwards. Because they keep th[eir] distance. They are friendly. But, they don't get so attached in the first place. And they're not, like, really open.

Even EU mobiles acknowledged that the ‘exclusivist’ character in the cultures of these two countries were particularly effective in promoting their sense of belonging to the EU.

*French Female (2), EU Group 4, UK:* I think, I felt that I am more European since I’m in England, because I feel like English people feel that they are not European. And I’ve heard quite a lot of [the] time people [are] saying, “Oh you’re European!”, as if they were not! [Some sarcastic smiles from the others in the group.] And I think that I felt pretty European since this moment.

Therefore, EU mobility was likely to promote EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU *simultaneously* with their sense of belonging to their country of origin (Favell, 2008; Rother and Nebe, 2009). Even if the cultural aspect of their sense of belonging seemed limited compared to that of their national sense of belonging (similarly to the findings underscored by previous qualitative research Bruter, 2005; Ross, 2014), it was considerably stronger than the attachment EU mobiles had for their country of residence (Favell, 2008). The evidence also indicates that context was particularly important for
participants’ sense of belonging to the EU and that mobility ‘reconfigured’ their already multilayered and kaleidoscopic identities (Ross, 2014). Against this backdrop, both “more European” and “more Eurosceptic” member states seemed to serve as ideal contexts for developing EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU. It is hence possible that member states with a more neutral approach may be less useful for developing EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU – exactly because the EU would not score highly on the every day political and social agenda. However, this proposition needs further empirical investigation.

By contrast, stayers did not really perceive EU mobility as effective in enhancing their sense of belonging to the EU. Swedish stayers said they felt “dull” when they were mobile in the EU because their nationality was not as interesting as other EU nationalities. They believed that due to a lack of Swedish national identity and culture, Swedes “don’t really feel that … Swedish”, which is likely to make them “almost feel more European than Swedish”. They observed Sweden as a peculiar country in the EU, different from other states where national identity had a pivotal role, such as France and Italy. They then portrayed a post-national Swedish community (similarly to that of the literature on Swedish citizenship, for example Roth, 2006), where shared values, including “equality” and “justice” promoted a sense of belonging to Sweden. Similarly, their sense of belonging to the EU was (supposedly) enhanced through specific values, including “peace” and “democracy”. However, Swedish stayers also believed that for other EU citizens (that is, non-Swedes) a common national history was an important
aspect of their identity. These EU citizens were then projected to have a stronger sense of belonging to their (nation) state than the EU.

Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: I'm also wondering, as you were talking a bit about if Swedes are not that promoting of their national identity like other nationalities maybe are. So, I'm thinking, if I were living in France, for example, or in another country with a strong sense of national identity, maybe my national identity would grow stronger in comparison with the European notion. Maybe Swedes don't treasure their national identity [as] much and …[their] European feeling [is] maybe stronger.

In comparison, EU identity was seen “as part of Swedish identity”, because the EU “takes a big part of Swedish politics”. Hence, Swedish stayers suggested that a sense of belonging to the EU might be more pronounced in Sweden than in other parts of the EU. However, their exchanges ultimately underlined the (presumed) importance of (national) contexts (Ross, 2014).

Nonetheless, a few Swedish stayers also acknowledged that the idea of EU citizenship was new to them, questioning the extent to which their approaches to developing a sense of belonging to the EU can be generalised to other Swedish citizens.

Swedish Female (1), Stayer Group, Sweden: I always think about this European notion that prior to the political science [course] for me ‘European’ was a name only heard in American movies... I never felt like a European myself. And I'm not ignorant either! But
I’ve never come across that people talked that we were Europeans instead of Swedish. So, I thought, it was very peculiar … It’s something for us in political science. We are, how to say? We are aware of it in another way than the usual Swedes.

Moreover, as the discussion progressed, Swedish stayers became more and more agitated about what the EU signifies (this issue was already discussed in detail Chapter 4). For instance, they expected citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU to be “contradictory” because of the ‘unity in diversity’ approach of the Commission (see also Chapter 4). Their sentiments thus underline the kaleidoscopic (Ross, 2014) and exclusivist character of citizens’ EU identity.

Compared to Swedish stayers, UK stayers were more likely to consider some aspects of EU mobility constructive towards their sense of belonging to the EU. They suggested living in the territory of another EU member state, interacting with other EU citizens, being part of the Schengen area or the Eurozone could “make [citizens] slightly more European”. While almost half of UK stayers claimed to have had a sense of EU identity, they were also aware of a distinction that exists between UK and other ‘European’ citizens. Interestingly however, this distinction was anticipated to be a result of how British politicians and the media portrayed the relationship between the EU, its member states and the UK.

UK Male (5), UK Stayer group: [T]he conceptions of Europe that we have is always to refer to something other than ourselves. Whenever you hear it mentioned in the news or you have a kind of
substantial discussion about European citizenship, the European Union or aspects of the European identity, you often hear with reference to decisions the Europeans made. Being referred to as “Europe said this”. And European Union is being presented as something “otherly”. And there is Europe and there is Britain that’s somehow sucked into this, but doesn’t really belong.

UK Male (1): [Smiles] That’s true, actually. It doesn’t really come across as we are a part of it.

UK Female (6): The media puts it across as them and us… It’s not always together, is it?… It’s never “We decided this”.

Whilst these stayers appeared to be in agreement about the role media and political actors might play in challenging the prospects of developing UK citizens’ sense of EU identity, others relied on post-imperialist and, quite often, a populist logic (similarly to what Skey, (2012a) expects to see). Hence, due to its geographical proximity, including the role of the British “moat” that surrounds “our little island” some participants felt “far away… from Europe.”

These examples suggest that territorial identities (Bruter, 2004a) and ‘geographical imaginaries’ (Abell, Condor and Stevenson, 2006) were important for some stayers’ approaches to their sense of belonging to the UK (and the EU). Even those UK stayers who were originally more enthusiastic about discussing the EU and expressed a sense of belonging to the EU, later acknowledged the negative impact the UK’s geographical position can have

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84 The same notion was expressed by participants in EU Group 4, UK.
on citizens’ perceptions of the EU’s political system.\textsuperscript{85} Since both Swedish and British stayers were able to probe and even alter each other’s perceptions’ of their sense of belonging to the EU, most stayers’ original perceptions were probably instinctive (rather than reasoned) and certainly very shallow.

5.1.2. External migration and EU symbols as an alternative for developing a sense of belonging to the EU

The evidence presented in the previous section suggests mobility can be constructive towards EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU, but substantial differences are then likely to emerge between the identity of EU mobiles and stayers. In fact, quite a few EU mobiles seemed to agree with stayers about the limitation EU mobility can have when attempting to enhance a sense of belonging to the EU more broadly. Most importantly, they all spoke about the exclusive character EU mobility has, referring to the type of EU citizens, who can use this right compared to those who cannot be anything other than stayers. Subsequently, participants identified external migration and certain EU symbols as having a more positive effect on developing citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU.\textsuperscript{86}

Firstly, participants perceived EU mobility as a “privilege” because “a big issue is money… for a lot of people”. They also believed that time spent in the

\textsuperscript{85} This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{86} Participants’ focus on different forms of movement could be the result of research bias – since, from the outset, the focus group discussions revolved around some form of movement and citizenship.
country of residence, citizens’ educational background and knowledge of foreign languages, mainly their proficiency in English, might also impact their EU identity. Subsequently, participants identified the well-off, educated and (longer-term) EU mobiles as the category of EU citizens who has the opportunity to develop a sense of belonging to the EU.

**Polish Female (1) EU Group 4, Sweden:** If we don’t travel and we stay in our own country, then probably we feel our national identity. … If somebody stays in one village for his/her whole life, then it's very possible that this person would have, like, local identity instead of [a] national identity. And, I think, it's the same with the national and European identity. … If you don't travel then you have to be extremely ambitious and motivated to follow what's happening around Europe and read a lot and learn languages and follow all the news. But it's much easier if you just travel and talk to people, go to the museums, [and] learn some culture. And that's what we do! [Others nod in agreement.]

**Italian Male (1):** Yeah, I think, it's not only a thing of travelling, because it depends also on our level of education. Because we know English, and that's why we can develop this sense of “Europeanness” … So, if we would be only tourists… and if we come here without knowing English … we wouldn't develop this kind of ‘sense of membership to Europe’. I think that's a matter of travelling, but also a matter of being educated [and] knowing foreign languages.
Similarly to what is apparent from the latter half of the above exchange, a number of EU mobiles (and Swedish stayers) linked the ability to develop a sense of belonging to the EU with a ‘necessary’ educational level and English language proficiency. Moreover, a clear differentiation was made by the majority of EU mobiles between different categories of EU citizens, depending on the reason for citizens’ movement in the first place. Long-term stayers’ EU mobility (in fact any type of movement) was often depicted as the portrait of the EU’s very own “parochial tourist” (Thompson and Tambyah, 1999: 216). These citizens were expected to go abroad for holiday purposes and stay in a hotel without actually engaging with members of the host community. Their subsequent cosmopolitan outlook could then be nothing but momentary at best (Skey, 2013).

German Female, EU Group 2, Sweden: When I look at my friends that never have left Germany. They don't feel European. They really don't. I mean, it's nice for them to go [outside of Germany] once in a while for a summer holiday, all inclusive, staying at the hotel, doing a bus-trip and going to the beach... [T]hey go outside of Germany to go on holidays, but not to feel part of [the host] community.

Despite the critical tone apparent in the last two exchanges between EU mobiles, every group, including stayers suggested external migration – outside the EU – as predominantly constructive towards developing citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU. This was mainly because external migration (allegedly) made being “European” more pronounced than any other
reference point. In comparison, EU mobility was alleged to bring national
citizenships into clearer focus. “I think I would feel more European if I was
outside of Europe but within Europe I think my Swedish background would
prevail [over] other feelings” (Swedish Female, Stayer Group, Sweden).

German Female, EU Group 1, Sweden: I think it's an interesting
fact what I realise when I see other Europeans. Once you are
within this kind of area where you're considered a citizen you
always, like, more specifically refer to your country. So within
Europe I am from Germany, I am from Sweden, bla-bla-bla. But
once you leave Europe, it becomes more evident that you are
European. So that's a really funny way. Like, from the EU, from the
inside, we always look differently than when you leave it. Then it's
like “Okay, now I'm a European”. What I gain from my own
experience, leaving Europe is more dominant. I am from Europe.

Actually, the only time a British stayer said he could imagine introducing
himself as a European was during his stay “far away” from the EU.87 His
sentiments were, of course, in sharp contrast to the general tone of the
discussion in the UK stayer group and led to quizzical looks, a couple of
follow-up questions and laughs. Interestingly, the collective reaction of the
group and the negative approach of British Female (1), who exhibited stronger
Eurosceptic sentiments than the others, initiated a slight shift in the approach
of British Male (2). Initially, he was surprised by the optimistic approach of

87 Some Swedish stayers also expected external migration to be effective in promoting their
national identity because “when you are outside of Europe it's very obvious that you're
Swedish”.

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British Male (3). Later however, he considered the claims put forward by British Female (1) as slightly exaggerated. The constantly changing attitudes of UK stayers and the dynamics within the group – the outspoken approach of some members and the openness with which others reacted to what has been said – is particularly well illustrated in the following exchange.

**British Male (3), Stayer Group, UK:** I think for me, personally, citizenship in the EU is something unrealised, something they are trying to foster. They want us to be members of a European community, uh, when you go abroad you call yourself European, not British. We are states of a federal Europe, if you like... When I’m outside the EU. And I felt, and the law and order was not quite what it would be. So … there is a slight [sense of] belonging to a secure world maybe as well.

**British Male (2):** But would you ever introduce yourself to someone by default as *the* European?

**British Male (3):** That depends on where I was. If I was really far away, *maybe*!

[All laugh.]

**British Female (1):** I don’t think I ever referred to myself or will ever refer to myself as being a European citizen. Like, … we are so far away it feels from Europe.

**British Male (3):** We are not that far away! What is it like…?

[Laughs.]

**British Female (1):** I can’t walk there though…
British Male (3): You could swim there if you want[ed]!

British Male (2): It’s not quite far away as the Atlantic is…

British Female (1): It’s not like we’re bordering them. It’s like…

Furthermore, quite a few participants anticipated that, from a legal perspective as well, the international outlook of EU citizenship (status) was more positive than any national citizenship could be. Indeed, most participants considered their EU status and passport to have a similar value to that of an American passport. Hence not only internal mobility, but also external migration underlined the significance of EU legal status. It, once again, appeared to underline participants' sense of civic belonging to the EU (Bruter, 2005).

German Female, EU Group 3, UK: As EU citizens, you’re hailed to a higher account than [non-EU citizens.] You’re on the same level as an American citizen, I think, internationally as least. You can go wherever you want and you’ll never struggle to get a visa.

Italian Male, EU Group 1, Sweden: It's much more convenient to be a European citizen just because [the] passport of the European Union is possibly so much better when you travel. If you have [a] passport from Columbia, you might be hindered [from] travelling to some states into obtain[ing] residence and so on. So to be a European citizen for me it also means huge incalculable advantage over other citizens.
These examples suggest that external migration could be used to enhance citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU. Nonetheless, it should be noted that participants comprehended EU mobility and external migration quite differently. While they were sceptical about the costs and prerequisites of EU mobility (illustrated in the first half of this section), only one group evaluated the economic and social prerequisites of external migration. Actually, quite a few groups agreed that they preferred to continue their studies within the EU because it was easier or cheaper to do so. They spoke of the decreasing costs of travelling within the EU due to the recent boost in budget airlines (especially the low prices of Ryanair flights) and the accessibility of EU rail services (especially the Eurostar). Yet, there were little or no considerations about the costs external migration carried – the latter is, of course, likely to be substantially greater than that of EU mobility.

In addition to the focus of the discussions on movement, there were some references made to the role EU symbols have in promoting EU identity. These references indicate that EU symbols had a variable effect on participants’ sense of belonging to the EU. From the different EU symbols available to them, most groups, including the control groups, mentioned the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) as particularly effective in symbolising the EU’s “commonalities” – an EU symbol that is directly related to EU mobility. Since the EHIC can turn EU citizens’ (supposed) equal rights in to reality, it was projected to have significant impact on citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU.

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88 Also discussed in Chapter 6.1. in relation to participants’ awareness of their EU rights and entitlements.
In fact, the EU was expected to be the most visible to its citizens through “little things like that”.

_British Male (2), Stayer Group, UK:_ In some specific ways I always feel, like, when I travel inside the EU and have my EU [EHIC] card with me, it’s like my mind is calm. It’s little things like that. And thank goodness I never actually had to use it for anything! Touch wood! But I… actual feel that by having it on me, just this tiny piece of purple, laminated plastic … there is a kind of symbolic aspect to it.

_Swedish Female (6), Stayer Group, Sweden:_ I think also when I received my European Health Insurance Card and that was some kind of symbol [Others nod in agreement] … I haven’t used it. But I kind of knew I think that we have a _common_ health insurance system. Those kinds of benefits or entitlements are… strengthening the [EU] feeling.

In addition to EHIC, Swedish stayers referred (albeit with some cynicism) to the role of the Euro and the Eurozone in supporting citizens’ emerging sense of belonging to the EU. Accordingly, they felt that the current economic crisis underlined the legacy of the EEC market and emphasised the contradictory character of the concept of EU identity. By using the Euro crisis example, Swedish stayers revised their previous definition of national identity, which was now presented as a form of identity that “should be stronger than borders.
and passport, it should be [culturally] linked to this country, for [realising] this loyalty”.

Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: [Y]ou just adjust to what's happening right now, and when it's not going very well for a certain state, it's very easy to just kind of, well, you know, “Are we really gaining anything from this? Is this working out for us and for our country?” It's about your country at the end of the day anyway.

Similarly, UK stayers were critical about the market legacy of the EU, but also believed that in the Eurozone and Schengen areas citizens were more likely to develop a sense of belonging to the EU than those in the UK. This relates back to the earlier point made in this section about how some member states were presumed to be “more European” than others. Hence, the focus group evidence suggests that EU symbols which highlight the actual benefits of EU membership – especially the EHIC or the Euro – can be quite effective in making the EU more tangible for some EU citizens.

Therefore, the focus group evidence suggests EU mobility was effective in enhancing EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU. EU mobility experiences (or lack of experiences in the case of stayers) appeared to have clearly influenced this aspect of participants’ sense of EU identity. However, the exclusive character of EU mobility appeared to propel participants to suggest alternatives to enhancing citizens’ sense of belonging – which then led them to debating the effects of external migration and EU symbols. While external migration seems to be a new proposition – with obvious limitations to the
extent to which it may be made relevant to ordinary citizens’ lives – the role of symbols has been much debated by previous empirical research. They too underline the discrepancy in the actual effectiveness of these symbols across the EU’s member states (see for example Bruter, 2005; 2009; Risse, 2010; TNS Opinion and Social, 2010).

5.2. Shared EU identity among EU citizens

Similarly to their sense of belonging to the EU, the focus group evidence indicated that EU mobility was likely to have a constructive effect on young and educated citizens’ sense of shared EU identity. However, their resulting EU identity was in fact divided between EU mobiles and stayers. EU mobiles often stated that they had “something in common” with each other due to their “similar experiences” of EU mobility, which brought a “family of Europeans” together in Sweden and the UK. There was thus a very explicitly articulated link between EU mobility and shared EU identity – a reference to the interlinked charter of the dimensions of EU citizenship. However, the “family of Europeans” did not seem to include stayers. Even more, EU mobiles’ sense of shared EU identity appeared to lack a cultural aspect and so differences between categories of stayers and EU-15 and CEE mobiles were recognised. Even more, in a few cases, the possibility was raised that a shared EU identity was not EU-specific at all but an example of broader trends – a component of cosmopolitan identity. In order to shed light on young and educated citizens’ perceptions of their shared EU identity, this section explores these three issues in more detail.
The majority of EU mobiles agreed that EU mobility is likely to serve as the basis for their sense of shared (civic) EU identity since it intensified cross-border interactions with other “people from Europe” (as expected by Bruter 2005; Risse, 2010 and Ross, 2014). “[T]he more people you come across, the more you realise that there is something you share on the basis of being European” (British-French Female, EU Group 2, UK).

*British-Hungarian Male EU Group 2, Sweden:* [I]t’s like when you are here, when you are out with your friends and you feel like it’s an international community of Europeans. You don’t go like, “Yeah, that’s German people. That’s French people.” We are like Europeans, but no one kind of says it. It’s just in the air. You feel it, like we are from kind of the same place but different areas of it.

The only EU mobile who did not seem to have a shared EU identity with his EU fellows was a French male participant in EU Group 2, Sweden. His approach maybe explained by the limited time he had spent with the “community of Europeans” – he only arrived a week before the focus group research took place. He kept quiet most of the time and when he did speak usually emphasised the importance of cultural aspect of his national identity. There is therefore a possibility that the length of time EU mobiles spent abroad greatly influenced their sense of shared EU identity. Nonetheless, the general proposition by the different groups about the requirement to be mobile in order to develop a sense of shared EU identity seems to support the
expectations of transactionalist and neofunctionalist approaches to European integration (Haas, 1964; Deutsch, 1968).

The idea that EU mobility was a requirement for citizens to develop a sense of shared EU identity could be interpreted in the (proposed) framework of the interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship. As the previous chapter noted, similar expectations have been an important part of citizenship studies literature, though, differences are likely to emerge between models of citizenship (Chapter 1.2.). In the case of national citizenships for example, developing a sense of national identity among citizens is normally linked to their collective participation (see for example Brochman and Hagelund, 2012: 26; Borevi, 2012: 70-3). In comparison, the focus group evidence suggests that when we consider the interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship, rather than EU participation, we may have to focus on the relationship between EU mobility and EU identity. As a result, the initial evidence on young and educated citizens’ sense of EU identity already hints at the relevance of applying the mobiles/stayers distinctions – and so active/passive EU citizenship – to our analysis of EU identity.

Nonetheless, EU mobiles’ sense of shared EU identity was characterised by contrasts, some of which may explain why we have a wide-ranging diversity of findings about the effects of EU (learning) mobility on EU identity (compare for example King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Fligstein, 2008; Wilson, 2010; Sigalas, 2011; Kuhn, 2012a; Mitchell, 2012; Van Mol, 2013). Along with their sense of belonging to the EU, EU mobility often appeared to enhance EU mobiles’
shared national and EU identities. Even more, whilst the majority of EU mobiles agreed that EU mobility made them feel they “have something to share” with other EU citizens, it did not always translate into a common sense of being “Europeans”. This issue was usually linked to the absence of a cultural aspect that could support EU mobiles’ emerging EU identity. In comparison, their national identity was assumed to be more stable due to its strong cultural aspect.

Italian Female, EU Group 4, UK: [W]hen I relate to, like, other European people, well European people who come from the European Union, I just feel that we have something to share. But that doesn’t make me feel European at all. Like, I feel Italian. Like, I’m never gonna say, “I come from the European Union”. I’m just Italian. But there’s something shared there, between, like, maybe the way we behave or because we’re just people who came here. So we’re, like, we did this effort. So maybe, we… sort of bond better. I don’t know if it makes sense?

Hence EU mobiles appeared to have become more disposed to “stick together” with their fellow mobiles than to socialise with stayers. Some even assumed that European integration provided an excellent context for EU mobiles to meet, but not to bring EU mobiles and stayers together. The EU was then identified as “a place to meet with fellow visiting students, but not so much a place where British [residents] and foreigners encounter” (German Male, EU Group 1, UK). The (supposed) antagonistic contexts of Sweden and the UK were once again deemed as helpful in building a “family of Europeans”
– as long as this family did not include Swedish or UK stayers. In EU Group 1 UK for example, it provided an ideal backdrop for bringing together EU mobiles, including both EU-15 and CEE mobiles. So by observing English stayers as particularly different from them, EU mobiles could refer to a sense of “mutual understanding” among them.

* Moderator, EU Group 1, UK: * Who do you socialise with, could you please also mention that? [In response to claims from group members that much personal exchange in the UK “remains on the surface”].

* Romanian Female: * I think, not English. I think, with an English person you’d have a beer and a talk about football. But you meet an Italian or German person the next week for a coffee rather than you’d meet an English person. …

* German Female: * I live with only British people and I have, like, only European friends. … I really feel like the Europeans stick together…

* German-Swiss Female: * I have much more European friends than I have English friends, actually. I don’t know why that is. Might just be because we have, at least in our course, at least half of the people are European or [are] from [Europe]…

* Italian Female: * Yeah, there is a kind of mutual understanding.

* German-Swiss Female: * Yeah!
In the broader context of EU mobility however, these two groups of EU mobiles had been observed as quite distinctive – making this a particularly dominant theme in the focus group.  

Similarly, stayer groups recognised that EU mobiles were more likely to “stick together” than to interact with stayers. They even supposed that some EU mobiles, from France, Germany or Italy were disposed to exercise their EU mobility rights more so than Swedes or the British citizens, due to their language skills and cultural similarities. Subsequently, stayers believed that EU mobiles from the aforementioned member states were particularly well placed to develop a sense of shared EU identity.

*British Female (6), Stayer Group, UK:* I think, if you lived in another country and spoke another European language. I think, language is a big part of it. I mean, being in Spain and being in the Erasmus programme, … I was meeting people that were German but then spoke six other European languages. And, I think, they would associate more with being European citizens because they spend so much time in other European countries and can speak to so many other European people. But for me, it was just English and Spanish. So, I think, living [abroad] and speaking other European languages makes you more of a part of that community.

It is interesting that British stayers’ perceptions about proficiency in English was observed as an insufficient basis for developing a sense of EU identity.

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89 This divergence and the resulting dynamics between the CEE and EU-15 members of EU group 1, UK is illustrated in detail in Chapter 6.3.2., which considers the impact of national stereotypes on young citizens’ perceptions of their EU citizenship.
with other EU citizens. English is, after all, often recognised as the international language by the academic literature (King, 2003; Alaminos and Santacreu, 2009; Igarashi and Saito, 2014) and it was also perceived as a requirement for developing a sense of shared EU identity by the other EU and stayer groups. The difference between British stayers’ perceptions about ‘European’ language requirement is then likely to be the result of particularly strong Eurosceptic sentiments, which have been visible in the UK during the crisis (Geddes, 2014), rather than logical considerations – just like their earlier proposition about and the so-called “peculiarities of the Anglo sphere” coupled with the assumption that the very idea of EU citizenship signals the peculiar place of the UK in the EU (both cited earlier).

As the discussion progressed both EU mobiles and stayers became agitated by the requirement to move within the EU in order to belong to the ‘community of Europeans’. Hence the idea that EU mobility led to a genuine, unifying force, was questioned by the finding that it also served as the basis of separation between EU mobiles and stayers. “[S]ince we can move it starts to be relevant to be European but that’s the problem I think, not for us but for people that don’t move. Why should they feel European?” (French Male, EU Group 1, Sweden). Stayers were then referred to as “they” in the EU groups and were categorised as some form of an ‘internal EU other’, while the community of EU mobiles was expected to be the “minority” and the “elite”.

*French Male (1), EU Group 4, Sweden:* [W]e are kind of [a] minority. We are the elite. We are students and of course we have this Erasmus exchange. And it gives us opportunity to go abroad.
But it's also based on your social class, I would say, and your education level. ...So, I think, this is more a student elitist community than European community and this is a minority. I think of course we are very different from people who don't move from their place.

British and Swedish stayers also predicted that a shared EU identity required EU mobility (and knowledge of European languages). They then criticised the (current) elitist quality of shared EU identity and were clearly worried about the extent to which it could (ever) be realised among all EU citizens.

Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: [I]n the lower classes maybe the national identity is very strong, because they have not been abroad. They haven't travelled to all these European countries and they are not citizens of the world in the same extent as middle class people [are]. So, maybe, we are evolving into something [like a] middle class European citizenship.

These examples correspond with the expectation that EU (learning) mobility leads to novel processes of differentiation between EU mobiles and stayers (as illustrated in Table 3.4.). Participants underlined that EU mobiles interacted or at least had the opportunity to interact with the non-national “other” during their EU mobility and so developed a sense of (civic) EU identity. However, (some) stayers – from lower classes and without the necessary language skills – could not participate in these processes. As a result, these stayers were not expected to develop a sense of EU identity that
is comparable to that of EU mobiles' identity. Actually, their national (cultural) identity was projected to remain “very strong”.

Since similar discussions did not emerge about categories of EU citizens on the basis of their EU participation, the evidence supports the proposition made in the theoretical chapter of this thesis: we should reconsider the dichotomy of active/passive EU citizens along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. As a result, we may also have to reconsider how we assess the depth of citizens' sense of EU identity. The traditional approach considers the weakest level of citizens' sense of EU identity to be positioned at the cognitive level (awareness of EU citizenship), followed by affective (evaluation and sense of EU citizenship) and, the deepest, at the behavioural level (EU participation) (Abdelal et al., 2009: 27-31). Based on the evidence presented in this section (and considering the oft-cited low level of EU participation in the context of declining citizen participation – also discussed in Chapter 7) the last of these three levels does not seem to be applicable to the case of the EU. Instead, the evidence suggests that if we accept the role of EU mobility in activating EU citizenship – which is what a growing number of studies appear to do so (most notably Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; 2010; Recchi and Favell, 2009; Recchi et al., 2012; Ross, 2014; Siklodi, 2014) – we should begin to really assess which groups of EU citizens use their EU mobility rights and how this effects their (emerging) sense of EU identity.

Existing research has already demonstrated that EU citizens (including students) who have a greater disposition towards developing a sense of EU
identity are more likely to use their EU mobility rights (see for example Fligstein, 2008; Rother and Nebe, 2009; Khun, 2012a). These findings then point to the possibility of distinguishing between further categories of stayers. The young and educated stayers who participated in the focus groups raised similar ideas, for example, when they spoke of an emerging ‘middle class European citizenship’. However, almost every stayer (admittedly) belonged to the segment of stayers that is better positioned on the socio-economic ladder and can, as a result, exercise their EU mobility rights at some point. These stayers then spoke of the “lower class” stayers as ‘they’ – the member state-oriented citizens as an ‘internal EU/national other’, who cannot use EU mobility rights to the same extent.\(^{90}\) As the discussions progressed, it became apparent that from all the stayers, only one counted herself in the category that was unlikely to exercise EU mobility rights in the future (British Female (1)). Nonetheless, her perception of EU citizenship did not appear to be distinctively more negative than the other stayers’ in the UK group. This example might be another illustration of the importance (country) contexts have for how stayers’ sense of (EU) identity is configured (an oft-cited character of EU identity, see for example Duchesne and Frognier, 2007; Duchesne et al., 2013).

Even if the focus groups seem somewhat inconclusive about what the ‘internal EU/national other’ might look like, it strongly suggests that we could and should begin to explore which community EU mobiles engage with whilst

\(^{90}\) Recent qualitative studies have already begun to ‘unpack’ the likely distinctions between groups of stayers’ as ‘internal national/EU others’. Duchesne (et al., 2013) and Van Ingelgom (2014) suggest that socio-economic factors, especially type of employment and country context is likely to be important for how stayers approach European integration. A recent qualitative study by Ross (2014: 90) also adds age as an important factor.
residing abroad. Do they close up between themselves and only socialise with their fellow national citizens? Do they start to realise a community of (mobile) Europeans (and so replicate the Commission's expectations)? Or, possibly, do they integrate into the host society? Since welcoming and pro-EU country contexts might lead to integration into the host society at the cost of an emerging sense of EU identity (as it has been shown by Rother and Nebe, 2009), there is a strong indication that antagonistic member state contexts towards the EU might be the most effective in enhancing EU mobiles’ sense of shared EU identity.

Nonetheless, the focus group evidence also suggests that EU mobility led to further processes of differentiation between EU mobiles and so further categories of ‘internal EU others’. Once EU mobiles admitted that they often socialised along the mobiles/stayers distinctions, in so doing, they also admitted that they hardly socialised with just any EU or European citizens. As a result, the opportunity for more intense cross-border ‘transactions’ between different groups of young and educated EU citizens (Council of Ministers, 1984) did not seem to translate into a single ‘community of mobile Europeans’. Instead, these EU mobiles appeared to realise a community of EU-15 mobiles and another community of CEE mobiles. As a result, their emerging shared EU identity had a contradictory and exclusive quality – it included some EU mobiles while excluding others.

Even though EU Group 4 UK did not include any CEE mobiles, the Austrian participant seemed puzzled by her fellows’ tendency to speak about EU-15
mobiles as “the Europeans”, leaving out those citizens, who originally came from CEE member states. Consequently, she tested the actual cosmopolitan outlook of her fellows. The others in the group acknowledged the validity of her point but continued to support their original point – it was easier for them to socialise with EU-15 than CEE mobiles. This example suggests that the desirability of presenting oneself with a cosmopolitan outlook (and so with a strong sense of EU identity may be defeated by national, regional and cultural stereotypes (Skey, 2013).

_Austrian Female, EU Group 4, UK: _[T]hat’s one of the points I wanted to make earlier. Because we keep speaking of the Italians and French and Germans and maybe Spanish, but we’ve left out all the other Europeans or European Union members that there are… And I have lots of friends who are from Bulgaria, for example, which are European Union members but they are not necessarily as often referred to as being European. But they’re just as well my friends as others, as the French are, or the Italians, Spanish or wherever they may be from. … but then there are distinct cultural differences. There is still this common denominator that they all make the effort to come here [smilingly]... this long way from home and I think, wherever they may be from, I just doubt that their similarities count rather than their differences. I think that’s the important part. … Because if you just keep focusing on all the differences that there are, you just make your life that much more difficult.
German Female (2): I agree ... we have to embrace everyone around us and with all the differences and all the things we share. Because it's not about where a person is from, it's how much we have in common... But I believe that like the average person from the Eastern European country ... is different than the average person from the middle European county.... [T]hey don't share the same history, they don't believe in the same things, they have other cultural values. ... Like, obviously I can bond with anyone that I feel that there is a connection. But I think that just when you think about the average person there and the average person in Western Europe, ... there [are] differences.

It is interesting to note that the underlying rationale for separating EU-15 and CEE mobiles appeared to be on the basis of cultural differences based on a historical divide between Western and Eastern Europe – a divide these young and educated citizens did not actually get a chance to experience at first hand. Yet, even CEE mobiles felt that these cultural differences – often referred to as national stereotypes, though they were usually made along regional divides – were important and so impacted their experiences of EU mobility to a considerable extent.

Bulgarian Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: To some extent I feel that I am discriminated even if I go as a European citizen... because, [coming from] the new EU countries, people all expect that we are beggars and everything bad and negative... [W]e are not even given the chance to show who we are...
Romanian Female (1): I come from Romania. I experienced this transition form when we entered the European Union… It’s true that by presenting our nationality, people already get a picture … according to the stereotypes or the image the country has in Europe.

These examples illustrate that the way in which EU mobiles approached their separate ‘community of mobile Europeans’ introduced further processes of differentiation in the EU context – and so led to further categories of ‘internal EU others’. Accordingly, EU-15 mobiles, may signal that they are distinctive from their non-privileged fellows, in this case CEE mobiles. Moreover, as the above exchange suggests, rather than making an attempt to challenge these distinctions, CEE mobiles also appeared to re-establish the ‘distinctive’ position of EU-15 mobiles. Their mutual acknowledgement of these distinctions might suggest that certain regional divisions between EU citizens are too deep-rooted for intensified flows of EU mobility to rectify – despite what transactionalist approaches to European integration would expect to see. Hence, in addition to the differences between EU mobiles and stayers as categories of EU citizens, further categories of ‘internal EU/national others’ were also distinguished by the focus group participants. The resulting distinctions of citizens are illustrated in Table 5.1. below.
Although Table 5.1 might suggest considerable distinctions are likely to emerge between EU citizens, it should be noted that there were a few instances where EU-15 mobiles did not consider their experiences of EU (learning) mobility to be exclusive to the EU context. In these instances, EU mobiles, mainly male participants in Sweden, referred to an “international experience” of (learning) mobility that is likely to be the same across different regions. They even suggested that their resulting shared (EU) identity was not European at all, but part of an emerging ‘cosmopolitan’ identity. These EU mobiles exhibited a strong sense of ‘cosmopolitan outlook’ (Skey, 2011a) and spoke of “the international community of visiting students”. There appeared to be a clear gender divide on this issue however.

Actually, only one female participant agreed with the notion that her EU (learning) mobility experience was not likely to be exclusive to the EU and would be similar to what participants experienced when they studied in the USA, for example. However, she appeared to have considered the broader international context due to peer-pressure in her group – the male participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of EU citizens</th>
<th><em>Internal EU</em>/national others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU mobiles</td>
<td>EU-15 and CEE mobiles, and stayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayers</td>
<td>EU mobiles and CEE mobiles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.1. Internal EU/national others*
in this group exhibited traces of a cosmopolitan outlook – rather than as a sign of a genuine interest in this issue. Before and after she made the comparison, she reverted back to a more ‘Eurosceptic’ attitude. Thus her ‘cosmopolitan outlook’ was rather short-lived.

*French Male, EU Group 4, Sweden:* It’s not that our small Erasmus community is more international than globalised than European. Because you have the exact same thing in American universities with people from all over the world. And here, of course, we are European people. But if you go to students’ housing, you have people from all over the world and not only [from] Europe. These people are together and it’s not even the European scale, but it’s kind of international student community. Which is based on the common language, which is English. It’s not even European language, because we are more talking American English. I think. Yes, it’s Europe, because we are in Europe. But it could be the same … in [the] US or Australia. According to the laws, this is a European privilege. But according to the social reality, this is a more international student educated privilege.

*Polish Female (2):* I think you are right. It’s more of a global experience. Of course, it’s much harder for people from outside [the] European Union to study here in Sweden or in [the] European Union in general. But I think it’s just you travel, you talk to people from other places, you get to know different cultures and it educates you in a way. And I think that’s mostly it.
The thesis has already hinted that Polish Female (2) represented a quite distinct voice in EU Group 4 (Chapter 4.1.2.). For example, she often tested the points raised by the other participants, though she shared a similar personal background and experiences with them. In fact, all females in this group came from CEE states and had lived in a number of member states prior to their arrival in Sweden. There is a possibility that she was looking to ‘fit in’ with the male members in this group when she drew attention to the similarities between the experiences of student migrants more broadly. Nonetheless, by the end of the focus group, it was apparent that she had a quite different point of view compared to the rest of the group.91

In the UK groups, EU mobiles and stayers, with multicultural backgrounds but regardless of their gender exhibited a similarly (shallow) cosmopolitan outlook that was “fragile” and “momentary” in character (Skey, 2013: 238-40). For example, despite of her original claim to having a ‘global’ identity, the identity of a Swedish participant did not seem to be inclusive in reality but associated with a “Western” community.

*Swedish Female, EU Group 3, UK:* For me, ... the international society really does not have any boundaries. For me, it is the feeling of, like, I can’t [describe it]... Like, if someone ask[ed] me where I feel most at home, I would not be able to [give an answer]... Because for me, there is no [such] place... I could

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91 Even if the male participants appeared more receptive towards her Eurosceptic comments, they too found her cynicism about the importance of citizens' political participation slightly excessive. See Chapter 7.1. for an illustration of the dynamics of this group towards the end of the focus group.
probably say that it would be somewhere we call the “west.” Like, the US and Europe. Like, I can say that’s somewhere there.

Apart from a stayer (British Male (1)), all participants in the UK groups who had a multicultural background also completed their secondary education in international, more specifically, in one of the European Schools. They then used their shared educational experiences to enhance the division between them and their EU mobile and stayer fellows (this issue is discussed in more length in Chapter 6.2). The differences between Swedish and the UK groups – in terms of gender – might then be interpreted as another indication of the context-specific and kaleidoscopic (Ross, 2014) identities of (young and educated) citizens more broadly.

Hence, even when EU mobiles and stayers recognised that a specific link between EU mobility and shared EU identity existed, the “family of Europeans” did not seem to include stayers. Even more, EU mobiles’ sense of shared EU identity appeared to lack a cultural aspect and so differences between EU-15 and CEE mobiles and different categories of stayers were drawn upon. Even when a shared international identity was discussed – a supposed component of cosmopolitan identity – it was likely to be exclusive in character.

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92 The implication of their educational background for the approaches of these participants to their EU status is discussed in more detail in the next chapter (Chapter 6).
5.3. Recognising the EU's “other”

The previous two sections of this chapter have found some evidence to support the twofold approach of the Commission towards citizens’ EU mobility and EU identity (Chapter 2.2.1.). Perhaps the benefits of EU mobility were most apparent when participants made a distinction between who EU and non-EU citizens are. In this respect, EU mobility or, rather EU rights appeared to be very effective in separating EU citizens, including stayers and EU mobiles, from the “other”, the non-EU citizens. Against this backdrop, university contexts might actually prove effective in separating EU and non-EU citizens from one another. Nonetheless, EU mobility also appeared to multiply the number of “others” young and educated citizens recognised. They actually described two types of “others”: the EU’s (external) “other” (the non-EU citizens) and the ‘internal EU/national other’ (different categories of EU citizens – as illustrated in Table 5.1.). However, once participants admitted that EU mobility intensified processes of differentiation to the extent that it weakened citizens’ prospects of (ever) realising an all-encompassing EU community, they once again turned to external migration as more effective in underlining who EU and non-EU citizens are and so creating a more common sense of EU citizens. In order to flesh out the diversity in young and educated citizens’ perceptions about the EU’s “other”, the rest of this chapter considers the possible impacts of EU mobility and external migration.

EU mobiles and stayers across the focus groups felt that citizenship and identity are “always very closely connected to some kind of exclusion” and “often or always developed in opposition to something”. Hence they proposed
that a clearly defined EU “other” is likely to be constructive towards their sense of EU citizenship and citizens’ emerging EU identity. Once participants had some definitions of what “European” meant for them personally, their debate about EU mobility seemed to have helped them to collectively observe who belongs to the EU’s external “other” – that is who the non-EU citizens are. EU groups looked to find it easy to distinguish between EU and non-EU citizens on the basis of their EU level rights of mobility and equality. Accordingly, they distinguished between EU citizens and the “other” using a civic component of their EU identity – linked to EU rights (Bruter, 2005). EU mobiles compared their “freedom” and how “easy” it was to reside, study or work in different EU member states to the limitations imposed on international migrants. The majority could see that EU citizens enjoy a “special status” in the EU, which is not readily available for external migrants or long-term residents.

*Italian Female, EU Group 3, UK:* [Y]ou do have freedom. Like, to choose where to study... Like, it’s pretty easy... it’s everything is much easier. Like, we don’t have to pay, like, extra fees like international students, like, we pay, like, UK students. And, I think, its pretty good. Like, we can literally decide! We have so many chances, so many opportunities! Much more than if you, like, live somewhere else or if you are, like, an international student.

Subsequently, the differences between the rights of EU and non-EU citizens enhanced a *couple of* EU mobiles’ sense of EU identity.

*German Female, EU Group 1, Sweden:* You always have this special status as an EU student, at least. ...[I]n Sweden, you have
an extra line, which goes a lot quicker than the other applicants from non-EU countries. And also studying here, it's always about I'm member of the European Union. So I have a lot of advantages. So you get this feeling that you are a European citizen. And there's something else here, the non-European citizen, the distinction of others that makes you feel more European.

Similarly, the majority of stayers recognised the differences between the legal statuses of EU and non-EU citizens in Sweden and the UK. When asked about whether the EU makes everyone equal, most British stayers said that EU and UK citizens were equal because if EU citizens “come over, they will have the same rights as UK citizens, more or less”. But they also acknowledged that there were some important differences between the rights of EU citizens and international “refugees and migrants”.

*British Female (6), Stayer Group, UK:* Well in terms of refugees, we learnt just few weeks ago that they have a certain amount of months to find work and if they don’t they are either deported or get food stamps. And the conditions are so bad that, to the point where it’s easier for them to go back than stay here! And… it’s done on purpose. … So in that sense they are not treated equally! Whereas for us, we’d be given time to find, we don’t have six months time limit to find work or anything like that.  

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[^93] This was not true at the time for Romanian and Bulgarian nationals.
The Swedish stayer group discussed the difficulty international migrants faced when seeking to study and travel within the EU or participate in politics. Interestingly, nearly all Swedish stayers were rather surprised about the gap between the entitlements of Swedish, EU mobiles and international students. The disparities between the statuses of these groups were evident for them mainly because Swedish universities had recently introduced “pretty high” tuition fees for international students but Swedish and EU citizens could continue studying for free. In terms of identity, Swedish stayers considered the shared values of EU citizens as distinct from the values of non-EU citizens. For them, the EU’s external “other” was clearly linked to the Eastern regions of the world and an “Eastern apprehension”. Their debate suggests that the “apprehension” of non-EU citizens from the western parts of the world, like Americans or Canadians, was not much different from that of EU citizens.

Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: It's again, I think, it's about contrasts. When I was working in France for a month, I met some, there were working some Russians and a guy from Jordan and everything and, in contrast to them, I really felt like me and the French people had more in common than, even though here in Sweden I would, these French they are so different from me. But there, I really felt this European notion ... in contrast to the more Eastern apprehension of things. It gave more a sort of European belonging to see how to identify with European values. I think that I do.
Even when the distinctions between EU and non-EU citizens appeared to blur in the minds of some participants, especially in the case of EU mobile males in Sweden and participants with multicultural backgrounds in the UK, they admitted that they hardly socialised with international migrants. This was supposedly *not* the result of individual preferences but that of the “separatist culture” Swedish and British university contexts imposed on them. Actually, nearly all groups believed educational contexts in these countries reinforced the gap between different categories of citizens – including those linked to the EU and international groups.\(^{94}\)

*British Female, Stayer Group, UK:* Last year, there was a student who came to me. He was really distressed and he said he was having a nervous breakdown and … I was trying to ask him why he was upset. And he had stressed himself out with a lot of workload. But, he was Russian, and … he was really secluded because he was put in a flat with other Russian students. And he hadn’t come to the UK to be with Russian students. He came to the UK [because]… he wanted to speak English and learn about British culture.

Thus the university contexts appeared to institutionalise processes of exclusion in the EU. The evidence then seems to complement more recent suggestions about how a ‘hierarchically structured global educational field’ can keep some applicants (those from the East) out, while let others mainly from the West in (in particular Igarashi and Saito, 2014). Actually, even when

\(^{94}\) For the UK stayer group the university context served as the place to meet with international and EU mobiles for the first time. But this interaction was likely to reinforce their local, regional and British or English identities rather than develop a shared EU or international identity – as the previous part of this chapter suggests.
international students gain access to these ‘better’ ranked universities, the
differences with the host society and Western societies more broadly are likely
to be reinforced by institutional rules on how to integrate students – seemingly
achieving the opposite of what these rules set out to do in the first place.
Nonetheless, the institutional separation of EU and international students did
prove useful for embedding processes of exclusion in the EU context.
Coupled with the way in which EU-15 mobiles created a community of
‘exchange students’ that excludes CEE mobiles, it became apparent that
these institutionalised processes of exclusion added a further layer to what a
‘community’ of young and educated EU citizens might look like today.

_French Male, EU Group 3, Sweden_: I think I don’t have Indian or
African friends here. And it’s not because I don’t try, but precisely I
communicate easier with people from Europe or, maybe, even
Western Europe. There are not so many people from Eastern
Europe. Estonia is not in Eastern Europe, yes? But not so many
from Romania or Bulgaria. Like, most of my friends are from
Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Sweden also, from the Masters.
And these people I know they are not “Stockholmers”. They are
also kind of exchange [students] here in Stockholm. [All smile.]
That helps and they need to make friends too.

_German Female_: Actually, there are a lot of Chinese students at
KTH [Royal Institute of Technology] at least. But I do not so much
mix with them. Because where I live they have put all the Asian
guys together. On one floor it’s only Chinese people and on the
next floor it’s only European people. So that doesn’t really make it
easier for us to mix. And I think it’s because they are kind of different. It’s easier for them and easier for us actually to stick to our group let’s put it that way.

Therefore, EU mobility and the rights of EU citizens were considered important factors by the majority of young and educated citizens when attempting to distinguish who the EU’s external “other” is and appeared to enhance young and educated citizens’ sense of EU identity. Thus it is plausible that the decision taken by the relevant Swedish and British universities to separate home, EU and international students was beneficial for some participants’ ability to recognise who the EU’s (external) “other” is.

However, because EU mobility also underscored processes of differentiation, a number of participants suggested external migration was perhaps a better alternative to underlining the differences between EU and non-EU citizens. They often considered their nationality and national stereotypes as their first point of reference within the EU. However, externally, the EU or Europe was taken as reference points. Nearly all participants agreed on this point: the differences between EU citizens and the EU “other” were expected to be more noticeable externally.

*German Female, EU Group 1, Sweden:* On [the] one hand, just the basic fact that I’m able actually to move … and study in different places in Europe more easily than outside of the EU, makes me feel more European. On the other hand, like living in this
international environment, being an international student, it always pointed back closer to my actual national identity. So you [are] more referring to yourself as I am the German… It would be funny to like see how people react[ed] if you say “Where are you from?” “From Europe, I'm European.” [All laugh.] [It] would be interesting to see [their] reaction.

French Male: I think [in] the United States they have this reaction.

Portuguese Male: Yeah!

French Male: Oh, you are from Europe?

Actually, the way in which the “other” used the EU or Europe as a reference point to approach participants when meeting abroad appeared to be internalised towards developing a sense of EU identity.

German Male, EU Group 2, UK: I think if you travel outside the European Union you realise that other people regard you as a European and that you yourself come to think of yourself as a European. At least I find that happens to me or has happened to me.

Even those participants who had never migrated externally assumed external migration would be an effective approach to enhancing their sense of EU identity.

Italian Male (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: I think it [considering ourselves as European citizens] depends on the context where you are because here [in Sweden] I consider myself as an Italian citizen. But I don't know how I would consider myself if I was in
Asia or Latin America. Maybe, I would describe myself as more European only to make the people understand who I am because it's very difficult for [non-EU] people to understand the difference[s] between a French guy and an Italian guy. So maybe I would describe myself as a European citizen. But I don't know … because I've never been away from Europe.

The majority of participants also appeared to believe that external migration was advantageous in elucidating the differences between EU member states – particularly the East-West divide – and between the EU and the rest of the “Western world”. Some pinpointed that “relating to” EU citizens was much easier for them than “relating to” American citizens, especially so when they resided outside the EU. Even the Eurosceptic and slightly more cynical groups seemed to agree on this point. For example, most participants in EU Group 4, UK were sceptical about the EU’s future and the existence of a single EU and European citizenship (cited earlier in relation to the distinction between EU-15 and CEE mobiles, and EU mobiles and stayers). Yet, they too proposed to have found common ground with EU and European citizens whilst residing outside the European continent. Actually, this was the only time where the members of this group did not challenge the Austrian participant’s sense of attachment to CEE citizens – the ‘Eastern Europeans’.

_Austrian Female, EU Group 4, UK:_ I met some US, like, some people from the US. And I would say I would distance myself in

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95 The same point was made in the previous two sections on students’ shared EU identity and sense of belonging to the EU.
cultural terms from them so much. And I would relate to every single European, [including] Eastern European unlike to them, like, in every single way.

_Italian Female_: Yeah, I don’t know who said that at the beginning that you can relate to Europeans so much when you’re outside Europe…

_French Female (3)_: Yeah. Yeah. Relate yourself to it.

_Italian Female_: …but you can’t really relate yourself to Europe when you’re inside it. But if I go, I went to America a couple of weeks ago and all I could think was, like, “Europe is different.” I wasn’t thinking Italy is different. Europe is different. Like, you know…

[The three French students nod in agreement.]

_Austrian Female_: I think, if you live there, it is like a unique experience and you get a different perception of it.

_Italian Female_: Probably.

These examples indicate that external migration may be the most fruitful towards developing citizens’ sense of EU identity.

5.4. _Summary_

The focus group evidence sheds new light on the role of EU mobility in developing a sense of EU identity among citizens. At first, it may appear as if EU mobility enhances EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU, their shared
EU identity and ability to recognise the “other”, the non-EU citizen. In fact, there were quite a few examples throughout the focus group discussions to suggest that there is some support for the supra- and transnational expectations placed on EU mobility in furthering European integration (Haas, 1958; Deutsch et al., 1968), and activating the EU identity of citizens (European Commission, 2001; Bruter, 2005; Ross, 2014). These findings also indicate that the interrelated dimensions of EU citizenship is likely to have a positive relationship – as long as this relationship is observed through the exercising of EU mobility (and external migration) rights and the way in which these rights shape citizens’ sense of EU identity. The exercising of EU participation was hardly mentioned by participants, suggesting that its impact on their sense of EU identity is likely to be marginal.

However, a closer inspection of the focus group evidence revealed that EU mobility is also likely to enhance processes of differentiation within the EU, contesting the sense of belonging to the EU among both EU mobiles and stayers. It is also anticipated to lead to an elitist sense of shared EU identity among EU mobiles and, consequently, appears to create different ‘internal EU/national others’ – as illustrated in Table 5.1. Considering for example that participants appeared to find it difficult to bridge the differences between CEE and EU-15 mobiles in their approaches to socialising in the host country, the evidence suggests that their EU identity is particularly exclusive and, at most, likely to have a civic aspect. This finding seems to resonate with earlier references made to the so-called “Eurostars” (Favell, 2008, 2010) – the
alleged ideal EU citizens, whose actual sense of EU identity is, in fact, far from progressive.

These findings suggest that functionalist approaches to the way in which EU mobility enhances European integration (Haas, 1958; Deutsch et al., 1968) may just be too simplistic to really explain the actual exchanges, which take place between citizens. Similarly, the evidence seems to shed a rather dim light on the relevance of normative frameworks, which observe EU citizenship as ‘cosmopolitan’ (Habermas, 1996, 1998, 2003; Linklater, 1998, 2002; Delanty, 2007) and the more optimistic tone of previous quantitative studies of EU citizenship and identity (Sanders et al., 2012: 222; see also Bruter, 2005; Fligstein, 2008; Recchi and Favell, 2009; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012). Actually, by drawing our attention to emerging processes of differentiation between young and educated EU mobiles, the evidence also seems to defy the hopeful tone of studies about EU learning mobility and identity, which would be difficult to study using quantitative data.

Moreover, the evidence highlights that processes of exclusion in the EU are considerably different from those present in the national contexts. There may well be a cosmopolitan context in the EU (Beck, 2006), especially in English speaking universities (King, 2003: 160), in which these participants could make contact with international students. However, these contacts were institutionally framed and the resulting cosmopolitan outlook of participants was characterised by relative “obscurity” (Skey, 2011b). Thus, even the
“cosmopolitan outlook” of young and educated citizens is likely to reinforce the importance of the national framework. These findings call in to question the extent to which EU identity is likely to contribute to a single EU citizenship and, subsequently, boost the EU’s democratic credentials. The next chapter complements these findings by exploring young and educated citizens’ perceptions of EU citizenship as EU rights.
Chapter 6. EU citizenship as EU rights

Rights are usually seen as the principle dimension of citizenship (see for example Marshall, 1950; Isin and Turner, 2002: 1). So it is not surprising that in the case of the EU, academics have long argued that EU rights carry a real potential for realising a post-, supra-national or cosmopolitan model of citizenship (see for example Closa 1992; d’Oliveira 1995; O’Leary, 1996; Carrera 2005; Olsen, 2008b; Kostakopoulou 2012; Kochenov, 2012; Maas, 2013). Against this backdrop, the Commission has admitted that a lot of “pedagogical work is required” to explain EU rights to citizens (Reding, 2013b). As a result, it has invested endless efforts into informing citizens about these rights – recently under the umbrella of the European Year of Citizens 2013-14. If we are to address the issue of EU citizenship through rights alone (as has been the case with the scholars cited earlier), the Commission’s focus on this dimension could be interpreted as a signal of its supranational aspirations. However, by adopting a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship, we might expect EU rights to be the least politically charged aspect of EU citizenship. This may explain why EU institutions have allowed the Commission to focus on this dimension to a much greater extent than has been the case with EU identity, for example (Chapter 2.2.2.).

Despite of the Commission’s efforts, citizens remain extremely ignorant about their EU rights (see for example Favell, 2008; TNS Opinion and Social, 2010; European Commission, 2010; 2013a). Actually, citizens’ ignorance and the effects of the crisis have created a context in which national governments
have begun to challenge the legitimacy of EU rights. For example, David Cameron (2013) announced a crackdown on EU mobility and even threatened to veto the EU’s future enlargement rounds if other member states did not support his policies (Parker, Barker and Fontanella-Khan, 2013). In its response, the Commission made clear that even if “a lot of pedagogical work is required to explain European rules” to citizens, “[t]he right to free movement is not up for negotiation” (Reading, 2013b). Hence the Commission has, seemingly, stood its ground in the face of national adversity. However, a closer inspection of its discourse reveals that its programmes on EU rights have had a clear focus on EU mobility and associated advantages (as illustrated in Chapter 2). With just under 3% of the EU’s population mobile each year (Eurostat, 2014a), the Commission has clearly overlooked the largest segment of EU citizens – the stayers.

Against this backdrop, empirical evidence about citizens’ awareness and perception of their EU rights is urgently needed. This chapter makes a contribution to the aforementioned debate on EU rights by illustrating the young and educated citizens’ perceptions about the significance of these rights. To this end, the chapter uses original focus group evidence of EU mobiles and stayers in Sweden and the UK and breaks EU rights down into its constituent elements – awareness of EU rights, access to civil, social and political rights across the EU, and membership in the EU (and host countries) (as defined in Table 1.3.). The evidence suggests that young and educated citizens are most likely to be aware of their EU mobility rights and their associated civil, social and economic entitlements. In this sense, they seem to
realise the ideals of the Commission (Research Question 2). However, they do not in general, make use of their EU participatory rights, especially voting in EP and municipal elections (an issue that was also raised in Chapter 4). Since the dimensions of EU citizenship are interlinked, not activating one dimension might challenge the extent to which young and educated citizens fully realise EU citizenship (Research Question 3). In its investigation into the extent to which EU rights provide access to member state and EU communities, the chapter emphasises emerging processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU (Research Question 4). In so doing, it challenges the idea that EU citizenship allows for a ‘community of Europeans’ to emerge, a community that could eventually solve the EU’s democratic problem (Research Question 5).

This chapter forms the second of three empirical chapters (Chapters 5 – 6), which probe one of the dimensions of EU citizenship. In so doing, these three chapters together provide a response to the main research question, namely whether and how young and educated citizens realise their EU citizenship (Research Question 1). This chapter is structured as follows. The first part sheds light on young and educated citizens’ awareness of their EU rights. The second illustrates how EU mobiles and stayers accessed their EU rights and associated entitlements. The third part elucidates the extent to which EU mobility provides access to member state and EU communities.
6.1. Awareness of EU rights

The moderator explicitly asked participants to name their EU rights, the main advantages of their rights, whether and to what extent these rights guaranteed equality among citizens, and access to member state and (possibly) EU communities. Initially, both EU mobiles and stayers appeared to be quite optimistic about the EU’s ‘homogenising’ effect for education and health care provisions and depicted the EU as an area of ‘freedom’, ‘security’ and ‘guarantees’. However, their approach to EU rights changed considerably as the discussions progressed. Some of this could be due to the ordering of the focus group questions. Some groups were asked about the advantages of their EU rights and then were requested to identify any disadvantages they had experienced during their residency abroad. Others were questioned about EU citizens’ equality – though this question was raised as a follow-up and complementary to the discussions about the disadvantages of EU rights. The order and actual phrasing of questions might have influenced how participants approached their EU rights. Nonetheless, a similar dynamic emerged across the groups as the discussions progressed; participants became increasingly critical about their EU rights and could not explain why some (EU) rules were applied differently from one member state to the next.

In the exchange below, for instance, EU mobiles seemed quite excited about the opportunity to discuss their EU rights, or, at the very least, to showcase their awareness of EU rights. Accordingly, even if having to show their passports at the UK border was considered to be a “hassle” by a couple of EU mobiles, they continued their discussion on an optimistic tone, citing the EU’s
healthcare provisions as a “good” example for the EU benefits they had enjoyed.

*Moderator, EU Group 2, Sweden:* Can you think of any advantages of being EU citizens?

*Bulgarian Female:* Free Education.

*Hungarian-British Male:* Easy travel, no border control[s].

*German Female:* Although you do have border control when you come from the UK!

*Hungarian-British Male:* Yeah, it's true. But, do you know how tight that border control is? You just walk through.

*Italian Male:* But you need the document in your hand.

*German Female:* Yes!

*Italian Male:* If you didn't have it, you wouldn't walk through. You would be sent back!…

*Portuguese Male:* The health insurance we have.

*Hungarian-British Male:* Yes!

*Portuguese Male:* You just take it in your country and it's available everywhere.

*Hungarian-British Male:* That's a good one!

*Portuguese Male:* It's a good one.

The majority of participants (again) observed EHIC as a particularly advantageous aspect of their EU status. The similarly beneficial aspect of
European Health Insurance Cared (EHIC) was noted in the previous chapter as the only example observed by all groups as effective in promoting citizens’ sense of EU identity. It is also interesting to note that while EU mobiles in Sweden often perceived UK border controls as a ‘hassle’, EU mobiles in the UK felt that it was in fact constructive towards their sense of EU identity.

EU also mobiles spoke about the social and economic entitlements their EU status granted. These discussions usually focused on migration and EU mobility rights, especially, learning mobility, and associated entitlements, including reduced fees, fee-waivers and easier registration processes. In fact, the overwhelming majority of EU mobiles were really outspoken and, usually, quite positive about their experiences of EU mobility. However, they were quick to note that citizens would not necessarily stop at every point and express gratitude for the benefits they receive from the EU. Indeed, participants underlined that most benefits were likely to be taken for granted and so go unnoticed by citizens in their everyday lives. This issue is illustrated well in the discussion that took place in EU Group 3, UK. Participants appeared upbeat about the opportunity to speak about their EU rights (as was the case in the previous example) and, at the same time, shed light on the ambivalence, which is likely to characterise citizens’ perceptions of their EU rights.

96 The same finding was reached by previous qualitative research on this issue (Fémandez, 2005; Favell, 2008; Siklodi, 2014).
97 Their points echo the findings of more recent qualitative studies on citizens’ attitudes towards the EU and European integration (White, 2011; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014)
Swedish Female, EU Group 3, UK: Well, if I am in a crisis in a country where there is not a Swedish embassy, I can always go to the other ones, which is just quite practical… we can travel. [At a later point in the discussion, this participant mentioned that knowing she had the right to ask for help from any of the EU embassies, made her feel more secure during a previous visit to Pakistan.] …

Italian Female: Yeah I think, you do have freedom, like to choose where to study… [and] it’s pretty easy… We have so many chances, so many opportunities! Much more than if you [were] like, living somewhere else or if you were, like, an international student. Yeah, so I think, everything that has to do with bureaucracies, like, [it’s] really easy for us. …

German-British Female: I think [also], the idea that you can drive somewhere and [you] don’t have to show your passport … I mean my parents, … [when] they travelled East to the USSR. The idea that … First, you have to get a visa to go over to East Germany. Then, you have to give your passport and then you were interrogated! You know, all these things that we can’t really imagine. I mean, we often forget that [these are benefits coming from the EU].

Dutch Female: That’s what I’m saying. We take it [EU rights] for granted.

Besides their EU mobility rights and associated entitlements, four EU mobiles also mentioned their rights to consular protection from the embassy of another
member state outside the EU – in the UK across three EU Groups (1, 2 and 3) and in Sweden in EU Group 1. Only two (female) EU mobiles – in the UK EU Groups 2 and 3 – linked their right to vote in the EP to EU rights, from a positive stance, that is. Actually, the male participants in EU Group 1, Sweden dismissed the (oft-cited) idea that citizens’ EU level political participation presents an opportunity for them to develop a sense of EU citizenship at the very beginning of the focus group. Interestingly, not once did the same EU mobile name both of these rights. Moreover, the fact that a couple of EU mobiles in the UK were the only ones to mention EP voting rights in a positive light counters the expectations laid down at the outset of this thesis where Sweden was identified as the most likely context in the EU for post-national citi- zenships to emerge (Chapter 1.2.).

Hence, EU mobiles seemed, on the whole, well-informed about their EU rights. This was especially the case for EU mobility and associated entitlements since these rights were considered as having a personal relevance to participants’ lives. Subsequently, EU mobiles also seemed to express a sense of worry about EU mobility rights being taken for granted by young citizens. This was, in fact a reoccurring trend across the focus groups. After EU mobiles and stayers listed their EU mobility rights, they stressed that younger citizens may not appreciate the actual advantages of these rights because they would be considered as part of everyday life within the EU.

Similarly to EU mobiles, stayers in both control groups spoke of the “pragmatism” that is associated with their EU rights. But then they too ended
up focusing on their EU mobility rights. Their claims were, as a result, paradoxical. While stayers argued EU mobility, even EU learning mobility, had a personal connotation to them, they were the same participants who decided not to take advantage of these rights and stayed in their country of origin for educational purposes. In comparison, the only EU right that stayers could, in reality, exercise – voting for the EP – was not raised during the discussions by either of the stayer groups. This finding may contradict the expectations laid down in the institutional framework (Shaw, 2007) of and the Commission’s (2010f) discourse on EU citizenship, namely that EP voting rights integrates all member state citizens at the EU level.

Nevertheless, British stayers did speak about the EP at this point of the discussion in response to whether or not equality existed in the EU. The moderator was, in fact, interested in participants’ personal experiences about equal treatment, rather than their perceptions of whether or not equality existed across the EU. British stayers debated the later issue and provided a small glimpse into how even citizens who (seem to) have a fair level of knowledge about the EU are, perhaps, most likely to adopt a critical attitude towards the EU. Since Swedish stayers remained more optimistic about the EU, the disapproval of British stayers is likely to be the result of being situated in a notoriously Eurosceptic country.

*British Male (1), British Stayer Group:* I think, I don’t know whether this concerns us, as British citizens of Europe, but … I thought. I know the EU quite well, but from what I understand, … the important seats given in the European Parliament sort of reflects, to
a certain extent, the size of the country. But, arguably, that limits the influence of smaller countries within the European Union. So you could stretch that and say that they are not, not on an equal footing with the British, because they haven’t had larger population! We therefore have more say. And whether that’s justifiable or not, I suppose that’s a debate in itself. …

*British Male (3):* If you have Luxemburg, they are really heavily weighted!

*British Male (1):* Well, yeah! Exactly… That’s true! Yeah, I guess. Maybe.

*British Female (6):* Isn’t it all kind [of] done proportionately?...

*British Female (5):* That’s not entirely proportionate.

*British Female (6):* No, no, but then how would you ever get proportionate [representation]?

*British Male (1):* Hmm, true.

*British Female (6):* It’s [a] very sensitive and very highly judgemental [issue]…

*British Male (3):* Equality is a very, very broad thing.

Due to the (self-proclaimed) peculiar case of the UK in the EU, it is perhaps understandable that British stayers made references to states, which are supposedly on “equal footing with” one another. Interestingly, Swedish stayers also spoke of the inequality between member states and explored how some states are usually considered ‘more European’ – in their value system but also in how they could influence EU decisions – than others. Swedish stayers then
identified the original six and the UK as having the principal role in reaching EU level political decisions. Although Sweden was not expected to have an important say in EU level decisions, Swedish stayers stressed that Swedish opinion was likely to be more influential than that of CEE (states). Even more, they believed Sweden benefited from its EU membership, which raised the country’s profile against the backdrop of globalisation. “[I]t's more competitive to be part of the European Union rather than being Sweden in Scandinavia, I think we have more to say now being a bigger actor than of having these little European countries” (Swedish Female (2), Stayer Group, Sweden). Thus, both stayer groups touched on the idea that some states were ‘more European’ than others. British stayers were, naturally, more sceptical about the UK’s membership in the EU than Swedish stayers. Nonetheless, in their observation of the differences between member states influence within the EU, stayers placed the UK into the ‘more European’ category.

In addition to member states’ inequality, the control groups also focused on their EU mobility rights and associated entitlements. For instance, British stayers mentioned they had benefited from the EHIC card, less visa applications and mobile workers’ rights previously. Swedish stayers also spoke of EU mobility, but mainly in relation to educational mobility. Actually, a number of stayers in this group said that their EU rights made it more likely for them to continue studying within, rather than outside the EU.

_Swedish Female (2), Stayer Group, Sweden:_ I think, that accessibility, to be able to move and travel and study abroad, and have the same opportunities in Sweden as in the rest … of Europe.
I think, that's the way I've been in touch... with the [EU] rights...

For example, [I'd] prefer to study in Europe than the US because it's much easier. And it's much cheaper. And you have Erasmus, and you have these others [programmes] that make you feel the incentives to study in Europe.

There was thus a possibility that EU mobility, even if taken for granted, granted a sense of geographical proximity between young EU citizens and the EU (Siklodi, 2014), including stayers.

Hence, in their initial discussion of EU rights, both EU mobiles and stayers paid particular attention to the “practical” and personal advantages of their EU citizenship, namely mobility and the associated civic, social and economic entitlements they received (Férrandez, 2005; Favell, 2008; Ross, 2014; Siklodi 2014). Participants were, in fact, fairly well-informed about the range of EU rights and entitlements that were available to them. This finding could be used as the basis for reaching positive assumptions about the relevance of EU citizenship or, at least, the relevance of EU mobility today. In their attempt to address and analyse EU rights however, most (EU-15) participants suggested that they often took EU mobility for granted. There might thus be a requirement to inform EU citizens about their mobility rights as coming from their EU rather than national citizenship. On a more positive note, participants appeared to firmly embed EU mobility as part of their everyday life within the EU. Especially Swedish groups, but also a good number of participants in the UK expressed a sense of geographical proximity to the EU. EU mobility was not only identified as the most advantageous of the various EU rights, but
appeared to serve as a foundation for building a dynamic bond between the EU and its young and educated citizens – which is precisely what we understand by the concept of ‘citizenship’ (see for example Heater, 2004a: 2).

6.2. Accessing political rights, and civil, social and economic entitlements across the EU

Contrary to the largely optimistic tone of the previous section, both EU mobiles and stayers were quite quick to note that the link between EU mobility and EU citizenship granted an exclusive character to EU citizenship. The way in which these citizens accessed their EU rights is the subject of this section. In particular every group expected EU citizenship to be relevant to citizens’ lives once they were mobile within (or migrated outside) the EU. As such, it was likely to be irrelevant to the lives of stayers: “I think we just experience the fact of European citizenship when we go abroad, as we are now. But in our country, I think, we never think ‘Okay I have European rights’, only our national rights” (French Male, EU Group 4, Sweden). As a result, EU citizenship was not perceived as a political, but a liberal model of citizenship.

Moreover, EU mobiles were quick to underscore the ‘obstacles’ they faced when attempting to benefit from the civil, social and economic entitlements, accompanying their mobility rights (the very same ‘obstacles’ were identified by the Commission (2010a) as well). Some participants felt these obstacles underlined that EU citizenship did not make a huge difference in their everyday lives and experiences of EU mobility. Others assumed these obstacles to be country-specific. In fact, similar exchanges took place in all EU
groups and each group spoke of similar ‘obstacles’, including opening bank accounts, taking out mobile contracts and accessing health care services. Therefore, the following example is illustrative of the type of exchanges, which occurred across the EU groups when discussing the ‘obstacles’ they faced when exercising their EU mobility rights.

*Dutch Female, EU Group 3, UK:* [But] as a Dutch citizen, I couldn’t get a bank account here. It was impossible! It only worked when I was there [in person] and they [were] like, looked at their international bank accounts. They wouldn’t let me have one [until then]! And they wouldn’t let me have a phone contract unless I paid extra…

*German-British Female:* I think that’s bank specific to be honest.

*Swedish Female:* But there are so many other things like…[when I] first came here it was a year before I started studying … and I wanted to work. But for that I needed a national insurance number. So I went to get a national insurance number and they told me, “But you don’t have a job, so you can’t get a national insurance number.” And then I was like, “Ok, I’ll get a job!” And then, I tried to get a job and they [prospective employers] were like, “No, you need a national insurance number to get a job”. So it’s … sometimes it feels like the country is working against you a little bit …

*German-British Female:* I think that’s England specific I don’t think it has anything to do with being an EU citizen… Yeah, I think that’s just a lack of organisation …
Dutch Female: I think it wouldn’t make a difference for me… Like, it [EU citizenship] didn’t make it easier for me to get a bank account at all or a phone contract …

As apparent from the above dialogue, the obstacles EU mobiles faced were, in large part, believed to be due to a lack of knowledge among Swedish and British bureaucrats and service providers about EU citizenship.

Even if the participants, including EU mobiles and stayers appeared to turn increasingly critical about the extent to which they could exercise their EU mobility rights, it was in relation to mobility rights that their discussions generated some debate. Even when participants touched on EU participatory and consular protection rights, it appeared as if though these rights were not heard by anyone in the groups or were mentioned in order to demonstrate EU mobiles’ awareness of the political aspect of their EU rights (see for example second quote in this chapter). There was no follow-up question about any of these rights. Even when an EU mobile admitted to knowing nothing about his right of consular protection (German Male, EU Group 1, UK), he did not probe his fellows about what this right actually entailed. When one of his fellows offered an explanation saying, correctly, that this right is included in all EU passports, the other members in the group asked sarcastically, “who reads that?”.

Quite contrary to their perceptions about the personal advantages of EU (mobility) rights, participants appeared to struggle when they were asked to identify the advantages these rights grant to member state citizens more
broadly. When they could not think of what benefits other citizens received from the EU, they offered an alternative interpretation of EU citizenship. Suddenly, EU citizenship was not about EU rights or EU mobility, but EU identity – the relevance of which dimension they had dismissed previously. This issue illustrates the tendency mentioned in the previous chapter; rather than addressing a problematic dimension of EU citizenship at hand, almost all groups of students attempted to make up for the shortfall in one dimension of EU citizenship by pointing to another dimension. Hence the very same groups, which had previously questioned the existence of and prospects for developing EU identity through EU citizenship (as a legal status) as long as it assisted in easing the weight of the on-going discussion. Accordingly, when the discussions turned to addressing the advantages of EU rights, many participants suggested equating EU citizenship with EU identity instead. A good example for the change in participants’ approaches is the case of EU Group 1, UK. The unease that had surfaced during the discussion of citizens’ lack of EU identity – including, EU-15 and CEE mobiles, as well as stayers – was long forgotten. This shift may illustrate that, as expected, citizenship is a difficult issue to address and not one that is much considered by (these) young citizens extensively (Ross, 2014).

German Female, EU Group 1, UK: [M]aybe with European citizenship, it’s more about identity than knowing about your rights and obligations. Like, I think, not many people know what are the rights and obligations. Like, what are the national rights and what are the European rights. You don’t make really a distinction.
Romanian Female: I think most of the European citizens just know that they can travel. They can travel without visa. I think, that’s the main thing that all Europeans know. And other than that, I think, no one knows. I mean, aside from European Studies students.

German Male: It’s not very practical, I would say. I mean, if we go to the airport and then there you have a row for EU citizens when you have to show your passports. And then there is another row for others. And then you feel a bit European, I would say. But that is, well, the exception.

The latter half of this quote suggests that participants also addressed, albeit implicitly, the (proposed) interlinked character of EU identity and EU rights. However, with EU rights presumed as “not very practical”, this dimension was expected to make citizens feel “a bit more European” and only in exceptional circumstances.

Stayers also had a tendency to speak of EU mobility as the main advantage of their EU rights. However, their focus on EU mobility could not be interpreted as being a result of their actual personal advantage. Instead, stayers’ focus was likely to have been result of the media and political hype surrounding intensified EU mobility flows against the backdrop of the crisis. Actually, the crisis and Eurosceptic perceptions were, perhaps, at their height at the time of the interviews. Greek protests and the increased support of the UKIP dominated the news headlines. Both stayer groups made references to the crisis and, subsequently, raised important questions about the rationale for EU membership and the future of the EU. As the following exchange between
Swedish stayers illustrates, these participants expected the political structures of the EU to be particularly susceptible to changes. More specifically, they expected to see future changes to underscore the on-going relevance of member states. Perhaps because most Swedish stayers agreed with this proposition, they could draw upon a supportive group context in their attempts to develop each other’s ideas further. Starting from the contested characteristic of the European integration process, they moved on to discuss the current developments in Greece and, more broadly, the different “value” of member states and their varying impact in (future) EU policy-making.

Swedish Female (2), Swedish Stayer Group: [I]t's interesting to see in the case of the EU, in one way it feels like we're going to this kind of the federation with the states ... and it feels as if the European identity is growing ... But on the other hand, when you see the crisis, like in Greece ... and you see Germany and France being very rigid, and you feel that maybe this [federation] will collapse. Maybe, they will go back to their national [countries]. ... Swedish Female (5): At the end of the day... Yeah, like what's happening in Greece. ... things are going pretty bad in Greece ... people are... questioning should they maybe just leave the European Union because this isn't really working out ... and when it's not going very well for a certain state [in the EU], it's very easy to just kind of, well, you know, “Are we really gaining anything from this? Is this working out for us and for our country?” It's about your country at the end of the day anyway...
Swedish Female (2): I would actually agree ... [and] say that there is a difference between the European countries. I think there is still a clear line between East and West and I think that obviously being France and Germany and the UK, ... their ideas [are], perhaps more in focus ... whereas, look at Greece, for example. People blame Greece [for the crisis]. ... And look at Italy! ... I think there is a very [clear] difference between the countries... [A]nd I think that even though for example Sweden does not have many places in the [European] Parliament, it still has much of its, like, soft power in terms of having “high value” in the EU. Whereas I think perhaps many of the former Soviet countries don't have that value in the EU.

Hence, the context in which the focus groups took place had an important effect on how these participants accessed EU citizenship. So it is perhaps less surprising that none of the control groups spoke about EU participatory rights as a benefit of their EU rights and, instead, considered the national level as more apparent in this respect. Nonetheless, the final point of Swedish Female (2) is quite paradoxical. She raised the possibility that Sweden had gained a form of ‘soft power’ through its EU membership, especially its position in the EP. Yet, as mentioned before, none of the (Swedish) stayers actually participated in the EP elections prior to the focus groups.98

Therefore, almost every participant identified EU mobility as the main advantage of his or her EU status. However, it was likely to have been

98 For further details on the reasons for stayers’ abstention from EP elections, see Chapter 7.1.
selected as a topic of discussion for quite different reasons by EU mobiles and stayers. While mobility had a clear, personal relevance to EU mobiles, stayers were observing political debates about the future of the EU at the time of the interviews. If we are to accept that mobility – for better or worse – is at the heart of EU rights and, more broadly, EU citizenship, the question arises whether it can also guarantee citizens’ access to an EU community – one of the elements of citizenship as rights this thesis identified. Since the contemporary EU community is made up of member state communities, EU mobility must also provide access to these communities. In order to shed light on the extent to which EU mobility fulfils this requirement, the next part of this chapter will consider the issue of membership.

6.3. EU mobility for membership in member state and EU communities

This section looks at two of the most cited obstacles participants identified as preventing them from exercising their EU mobility rights fully. On the one hand, almost every participant mentioned member state differences, including national languages, cultures and welfare state systems as greatly influencing their experiences of EU mobility. On the other hand, the debates touched on the very real inequalities, which exist between different categories of EU citizens, mainly citing the differences between the rights of stayers and different groups of EU mobiles, including CEE and EU-15 mobiles. The second section thus underscores the way in which contemporary processes of differentiation appear to classify different categories of EU citizens. In light of
these two obstacles, almost all participants suggested that the EU is “far away from being a unitary union”.

6.3.1. Member state differences and the exercising of EU mobility rights

The political, social and economic differences, which we know to prevail between member states, seem to have made it quite difficult for participants to consider their EU citizenship as a means to accessing EU and member state communities. Although EU mobiles spoke of similar issues at this point – national languages, cultures or registration requirements – perhaps it is not surprising that they adopted quite different approaches to this issue, depending on their country of residence. In Sweden, most EU mobiles identified proficiency in Swedish language and assimilation into an (allegedly) peculiar socialising culture as especially difficult. On top of these issues, a number of EU mobiles, particularly those who planned to stay in Sweden for a shorter period of time – up to 10 months under the Erasmus exchange programme – found obtaining a Swedish personal identity number an almost impossible task. While the first two issues were likely to hinder participants’ socialising prospects (though proficiency in Swedish language would have also been a requirement for obtaining employment), the last issue clearly infringed the ability of EU mobiles to live their lives on an equal footing with Swedish stayers.

*French Male, EU Group 1, Sweden:* I don't speak Swedish.

*Everyone together:* Yeah, that's a big problem!
Portuguese Male: That's a big problem in terms of circulating in the European Union. Okay, you want to work here and there. But, if you don't know the language [in the host country]...

German Female: No. But, I think, in Sweden that's not actually the problem at all if you don't speak Swedish.

Portuguese Male: Why? Can you get a job? [Shakes his head in disagreement.]

German Female: Maybe not when it comes to working, but regarding participating in Swedish life. It's not necessary...

Portuguese Male: But how do you participate in Swedish life without money, without working?

Italian Male: When it comes to work, language is still det[rimental]. However, compar[ed] with the rest of the [EU] countries, there are lots of levels of interaction that can actually take place without [speaking] Swedish. Only the most structural thing at all cannot take place. …

German Female: Consider life in Sweden without a personal number!

Italian Male: You can’t even rent a DVD!

German Female: That's the main issue in Sweden! [All nod in agreement.] If you don't have those 10 digits, you don't exist. You can't even get into the system without it! They need to create it. If you come somewhere with an emergency, you can't get treated
because you don't fit in the system, because you don't have 10 digits.

*Italian Male:* You are a pain in the ass for any type of administration.

From an initial disagreement about the relevance of speaking different European languages in order to integrate in the host country, EU mobiles moved to express a collective sense of frustration in relation to the more country-specific requirement of obtaining a Swedish personal number. Similar exchanges surfaced across the other groups also. While familiarity with foreign languages is a challenge every EU citizen must face if they intend to use their EU mobility rights, the Swedish personal number is a country-specific issue and so its challenge might have been seen as more personal and only really understood by fellow EU mobiles residing in Sweden. A challenge commonly experienced by EU mobiles may then help in developing a sense of ‘mutual understanding’ – to use the phrase put forward by Italian Female, EU Group 1, UK – among a specific group of EU mobiles. Such sentiments were certainly felt and were much articulated by the EU groups in Sweden. A few EU mobiles then expressed a sense of uneasiness with the ‘uneven’ system that seems to prevail within the EU and across member state borders. 99 Even if the interaction between these participants suggested that a sense of “mutual understanding” may be developed as a result of facing

99 Another example for this was apparent in EU Groups 1 and 2 in Sweden, where UK mobiles participated and for whom the prospects of introducing a single EU identity card appeared to be peculiar in the first place.
common challenges, they often observed these challenges as another example underlining the importance of national frameworks.

EU mobiles in the UK adopted a somewhat different approach to the question about EU citizens’ equality and (subsequent) ability to access member state and EU communities. The discussions were particularly interesting because a good number of EU mobiles had attended a European School before. It is precisely these type of pre-university schools that have been portrayed as most favourable to providing access to an increasingly globalised and hierarchically structured HE system (Igarashi and Saito, 2014). The evidence suggests that EU mobiles were aware of this issue and identified international educational contexts as particularly effective in raising young and educated citizens with a (desired) cosmopolitan outlook (as defined by Skey, 2011b). For example, they were quite outspoken about their previous educational experiences as being much stronger than that of British stayers. They then identified their EU mobility as helping them become even more “aware” of EU similarities and national differences than they had been hitherto. Yet, for EU mobiles these (alleged) differences between the abilities of EU mobiles and British stayers were found to be not recognised by the UK HE system – much to the annoyance of participants.

*French Female, (3), EU Group 4, UK:* I think the biggest disadvantage I ever felt … it’s kind of the level of education you need to come into the UK [higher education system]. Like they expect so much more from non-UK students in order to study here. … I did the international bachelorette … [and it] is worth 20 A-levels
…it’s ridiculous! I don’t know, my first year, it was actually a joke. There are people who didn’t know how to write their essays. And I had written so many essays… they were just catching up with me …

_Austrian Female_: Yes.

_German Female (1)_: Yes, I totally agree with you.

_Austrian Female_: I think the same.

_German Female (1)_: Because last year, I felt like I am on summer vacation.

_French Female (3)_: I felt like I went back a few years!

_German Female (1)_: I felt like, I don’t know, I felt like I could have taught some of the courses cause I knew the things … And I think that is also one of the key differences [between stayers and the] people that come from abroad… And we have to know so many different things, that when we come here we are more open-minded. And then the people, the students here are rather limited in what they, not knowledge-wise, I won’t say they’re stupid, I don’t say …

_Italian-Mexican Female_: Yes they are!

The above exchange hints that these EU mobiles did not only make distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers but also identified an _exceptional_ group of EU mobiles – those who were raised to have a ‘cosmopolitan outlook’.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that registration processes and migrant integration requirements at the national level are deliberately stopping the integration of EU mobiles. All EU groups mentioned that their actual access to welfare services was hindered by their lack of knowledge about these processes. Indeed, EU mobiles said that the EHIC – the very symbol participants previously observed as being most effective in cementing a sense of EU citizenship – did not always work. For EU mobiles in Sweden this issue was once again intensified by the requirement of having a Swedish personal identity number. “[I]t is hard from my experience if you don't have the Swedish personal number. I [am] only stay[ing] for 10 months and I don't get a personal number because you have to stay for more than a year (German Female, EU Group 3, Sweden).

Although most EU mobiles in the UK seemed to have found it easy to register with the National Health Service (NHS), a few seemed disappointed about the lack of information that was available to them when attempting to use this service. Subsequently, EU mobiles established that member states do not make it easy for them to take advantage of their civic, social and economic entitlements, which stem from their EU rights.

*German Female (2), EU Group 4, UK:* [T]he medical system for example… I have [a] health condition and when I go to the doctor here, it’s just awful! … [I] don’t get the right medication … and the things is..., I tried to explain to them [my condition] and they don’t
want to give me antibiotics. It’s just that they are so strict, narrow
minded on their things. And they didn’t even give me like the
address, or the opportunity of me seeing another doctor… [I] have
to go to the healthcare centre of the uni[versity] and [am] not
allowed to go somewhere else. And, I don’t know! But if I want to
see someone else, I can see someone else… this system is so
weird! They don’t make it possible for you as a foreigner to
understand it or to integrate. …

*Italian Female:* But that’s not Europe…

*German Female (2):* It’s the system [that] exploits you.

*Italian Female:*

*German Female (2):* … I know I’m allowed, but where the hell am I
supposed to go if I don’t know any [other centres]?

Hence, a lot of frustration and disappointment characterised EU mobiles’
debates about the way in which they could (not) take advantage of their EU
mobility rights and associated entitlements in both countries. These EU
mobiles clearly relied on civic, social and economic services, which are not
harmonised by the EU. But even when there are certain EU level initiatives to
help EU mobiles for the duration of their residency abroad, such as the EHIC,
citizens’ actual experiences of using these non-harmonised initiatives are
likely to underscore the continuing priority of member states. Such differences
are likely to have two-fold impact on the attitudes of EU mobiles. They may underline the importance of member states. They could also assist in developing a sense of “mutual understanding” among EU mobiles – but only those, who reside within the same member state. There is thus a chance that these differences lead to further categories of EU (mobile) citizens. The next and final section of this chapter sheds light on the resulting categories of EU citizens.

6.3.2. Categories of EU citizens

This section sheds further light on EU citizenship as EU rights, illustrating the way in which possible categories of EU citizens – some of which were also identified following the analysis of the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship (Chapter 2) – are likely to be realised by young and educated citizens. Some of the exchanges included in the previous sections of this chapter already gave some illustration of the likely similarities and differences between EU mobiles and stayers’ perceptions of their experiences of and exposure to EU mobility. In addition to the (primary) mobile/stayer distinctions, every group made references to further categories of EU citizens. In their discussion of whether or not EU citizens were equal, participants implied that depending on their country of origins – especially whether they came from EU-15 or CEE but also Northern or Southern member states –, EU mobiles were treated differently. At this point, national immigration, integration and labour market polices were identified as limiting the ability of CEE mobiles to fully exercise their EU rights.
Although EU learning mobility and the young and educated EU citizens in the focus groups are expected to be the least affected by these policies, the dynamics in the groups changed considerably at this point. In fact, these students begun to explicitly classify EU citizens into different categories according to their ability and propensity to use EU mobility rights. Thus for example, when CEE mobiles stressed that their EU citizenship was partial, EU-15 mobiles suggested it was not surprising since their country of origin only recently joined the EU and were often compared to countries, which have been EU or EC members since the inception of the European project. This issue was particularly apparent in EU group 2 in Sweden. As the exchange below demonstrates the dynamic shifts slightly between the Portugal and Bulgarian mobiles when discussing this issue. Once the Bulgarian mobile suggests that she is treated differently to her EU-15 fellows, the Portugal mobile underscores that she is from a recent member state and should try to understand that people do not know about her EU status yet. The other EU-15 mobiles then join in and, by supporting the claim that EU-15 citizens might not know much about the recent countries, they too appear to reinforce the distinctions between different categories of EU mobiles. Their resulting debate underlines the limitations of contemporary EU citizenship.

_Bulgarian Female, EU Group 2, Sweden:_ Here [in Sweden] I have to explain [Bulgaria is] within the EU. Like when I dealt with bureaucracy …

_Portugal Male:_ It's a recent member so...

_Bulgarian Female:_ 2. 5 years!
Portugal Male: One of the last ones, or they are the last ones. Croatia is just coming through. So you are the last ones. So that's why. You understand why? No? Well, you are compared with countries that entered like 20 years ago.

Hungarian-British Male: Like, the original members.

Portugal Male: I am not saying that I agree with it, but I can understand.

Bulgarian Female: No, I also understand and am being very patient with it, but still. It's a bit annoying…

German Female: But then again, if you would truly feel there exists a European citizenship then you would be much more interested in if there is another country joining! Right? I mean, take Germany. We have 16 federal states. If we had a 17th federal state joining, everyone would know about it.

Italian Male: … [A] number of countries joined 5 years ago, but if you would ask me to name them now for a million SEK [Swedish Crowns] I would not be able to [do that]. …

German Female: But I think that's a drawback … I mean, we are not truly there yet with European citizenship that we really feel we are one and we are very interested in one another.

Even more, CEE mobiles from EU2 states, Romania and Bulgaria, indicated that their EU citizenship was partial compared to mobiles from EU8 states, including Hungary and Poland. Although EU-15 participants, including mobiles and stayers appeared to agree with these sentiments at first, they did not
seem to quite understand just how these issues might affect CEE mobiles’ ability to exercise their EU rights nor did they appear particularly interested in finding out more about this issue. They, once again, appeared to reinforce their more established status in the EU. The following exchange in EU Group 1 in the UK demonstrates these tendencies well. When a Romanian participant spoke of the limitations she faced in her attempt to secure employment in the UK, there was very little or no follow up from her EU-15 fellows.

*Romanian Female, EU Group 1, UK:* As a Romanian, I am restricted for my working hours. I don’t need a visa, but I needed a residence and working permit, which was more or less the [same] process [as applying for] a visa. It means you have to show that you’ve got fantastic funds, or you have a very generous sponsor who wants to pay for all your expenses, and other paper works, of course. And, as a student, my working permit … was quite easy to get in comparison to if I was just a [Romanian] person wanting to come here and work because they have [to pass] even more formalities. I can only work 20 hours a week and I can’t go over that because it’s registered… The good news is that by 2014 they promised to take that off and I will be able to work just as Polish people and other people do. However, they are trying to write like a petition and cancel it for another five years.

*German-Swiss Female:* Who wants to put that into place?

*Romanian Female:* I think it’s English people-initiated. So, yeah! In my experiences, it’s quite hard. And, it’s going to be quite hard
because I’m graduating and I need a working permit … and it’s going to be very-very hard to get…

*German-Swiss Female:* Maybe you won’t stay here.

*Romanian Female:* Yeah, I could go somewhere else.

Thus once she voiced her concern, the Romanian participant did not really get a chance to speak more about how to resolve the difficulties she had to face whilst residing in the UK. This is apparent in the suggestion that “maybe she won’t stay” in the UK – a simple, seemingly understanding remark, that seemed to have also had an underlying message: the discussion should move on. Subsequently, the other mobiles in the group, all of whom came from an EU-15 state, returned to discussing the advantages of their EU rights, rather than dwell on the difficulties of CEE mobiles.

In addition to limiting their rights, CEE mobiles also spoke about the detrimental effects national stereotypes had on their experiences abroad. This issue was debated in detail in EU Group 4 in Sweden, which included more CEE mobiles than any other groups did. In fact, it was the only EU group where CEE mobiles (5) outnumbered EU-15 mobiles (3). These CEE mobiles, could, as a result, dominate the part of the discussions they considered most relevant to them – unlike the dynamics, which prevailed in the other EU groups as illustrated above. Thus, when asked about equality, CEE mobiles were quick to draw attention to their personal experiences in which they felt

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100 The impact of national stereotypes on the identity of participants was illustrated in Chapter 5.
discriminated. Once again, the differences between EU2 and EU8 mobiles were drawn upon.

*Bulgarian Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden:* I feel that I am discriminated even if I go as a European citizen 'cause Bulgaria is part of the EU [but] sometimes, I am being considered as a person coming from somewhere else that doesn't belong to the EU. Because it's Bulgaria! Because [from] the new EU countries people all expect that we are beggars and everything bad and negative. It's kind of like, we are not even given the chance to show who we are.

*Polish Female (1):* But don't you think it's maybe, now a little bit better than if you stayed outside of EU? Cause, I'm coming from Poland and, uh, sometimes I feel quite [the] similar way. …

*Polish Female (2):* [If] young people like us, keep on travelling and going to different places and meet different people, then perhaps those stereotypes will phase out.

 Nonetheless, as the second half of the exchange illustrates, these CEE mobiles also observed some progress over time – associated with accession to and membership in the EU – and seemed, on the whole, optimistic about how CEE mobiles will be able to exercise their EU mobility rights in the future. Their optimism corresponds with that of other EU groups in Sweden about the future of EU citizenship more broadly. The only exception to this trend was the place of mobile Roma – an issue only really raised in the Swedish groups –
which appeared to illustrate, once again, the limitations of a non-harmonised EU system.

*Swedish Female (6), Stayer Group, Sweden:* Look at how Roma people are treated and that's a very clear example of inequality between EU citizens…

*Swedish Female (2):* Exactly! … France is supposed to be a democracy. … You know, it's contradictory I think. You create this Union to keep the stability and democracy and interdependence. And then you have these people who are not part of this Union. That is a form of exclusion to say that, well they are not part of this Union, “So out you go!”

*Swedish Female (6):* … they were from Romania, Bulgaria, Greece.

*Swedish Female (5):* So again, very contradictory, … when it's suits you, [EU membership is] great! And when… [there is] a problem, you just kind of want to get rid of it. … And it's kind of absurd to have such a big, huge system in all of Europe, because you don't really follow your own rules.

Moreover, the sense of optimism in Swedish groups about the position of CEE mobiles did not appear to prevail in the UK groups. In fact, both EU mobiles and British stayers attempted to avoid lengthy discussions about these stereotypes. In these groups one, at most, two participants drew attention to this issue, but the others did not join in. Instead, they changed the topic of
discussion when the opportunity arouse (as illustrated in the excerpt from EU Group 1, UK earlier). The same internal dynamics prevailed in the British stayer group. In this group however, the participant raising the issue of national stereotypes – British Male (2) – managed to turn the discussions around and, unintentionally perhaps, he touched upon the notion that coupled with EU mobility flows, these issues weakened the status of stayers. His monologue complements the citations from EU-15 mobiles earlier – about the differences between EU-15 and CEE citizens –, and sheds light on the significance of the member state in an increasingly integrated EU. Accordingly, the dominant group within member states might hold on to their privileged positions and express an apparently desired cosmopolitan outlook, but one that is “temporal, conditional and often fragile” in character (Skey, 2011a: 8).

**British Male (2), Stayer Group, UK**: I went to Malta. … I got on the plane the same way [as] a couple of months before… [when] I went to Edinburgh and I didn’t really think about it. I thought it was quite novel! I thought it was quite nice, if you contemplate going on a little break in another country. [Some laughs.] How cosmopolitan it made me feel! But then, … if you ask a lot of British people … they would say that [EU mobility] kind of works against us. You’re constantly bombarded with [this] rhetoric, which claims that far too many people are coming into this country and that… [there is a] flow of Eastern European migrants who are coming in and snapping up jobs! And there are people like Nigel Farage who, although they aren’t implicitly saying things that are racist, … [they
are] kind of quoting … the fears that a lot of people have about this! [I am] coming from East Anglia where fruit-picking, for instance, is quite a big business during the summer. [Some smiles.] And you end up with a lot of seasonal workers! And I remember, speaking to … a Polish chap I met in the pub and he had a Masters degree and yet he was coming over to do fruit picking because … he wanted to work! He really did! … I thought it was quite admirable. I thought that was quite impressive. I thought he has the initiative to come over here because … he's following money. Whereas, I don’t think if anyone offered me a job, fruit picking in Poland… I would be particularly happy about it! … But one joke that I heard was that we have a lot in common with the Polish people. We are both from quite heavy drinking cultures [Some laughs.], we both have a national love of meat-based dishes and…

British Male (1): Terrible!

British Male (2) : … and a shared similarity is that none of us want to be in Poland! [A lot of heavy, but also sarcastic laughs.] And as funny as it is, I actually thought, ‘Yeah, that’s not really something you can say.’ But there is, sadly, a little bit of truth in it. [Others still laugh.] I’m the only one in the room whose face has gone red!

In addition to the aforementioned differences between CEE and EU-15 mobiles, most participants also differentiated between stayers. The latter distinction was made on the basis of whether EU citizens could afford to exercise their EU mobility rights. Two types of stayers were classified; the
potential EU citizens, who have the means to be mobile at some point in their lives, and member state-oriented citizens, who cannot afford to do so. The latter group was expected to be the largest segment of the EU’s population today. Nonetheless, from the two stayer groups, only one stayer classified herself in the later category of EU citizens. Thus the others belonged to, most likely, the ‘potential’ EU citizens category.

*British Female (1), Stayer Group, UK:* I think, a big issue is money. Like, the majority of people can’t afford to go, like anywhere. [Sarcastically.] …I mean, like, I remember … talking to my parents about the [EU] benefits and they were just like, ‘Well, how does this affect me? We can’t afford to go to [another] country anyway!’

*British Male (3):* [That is the case] for a lot of people.

*British Male (5):* Ahham.

*British Female (1):* So, yeah. It’s very much, … it [is] aimed at probably the middle class [and] upwards, you know?

*British-Canadian Male:* I think this is really interesting… I mean, I agree with both of what you guys said as well, especially about the freedom of labour, the freedom of movements. It’s not that equal at all, in anyway!

Every group suggested that the different categories of EU citizens, were “here to stay”, making it rather unlikely for EU citizenship (with its current roots in mobility) to become relevant for the less privileged segment of the EU’s population. In fact, both EU mobiles and stayers suggested that it could, one
day, replace the role of class structures in the EU. Thus the majority of participants agreed that national rather than dual (national and EU) citizenships were likely to remain the main point of call for them.

French Male, EU Group 1, Sweden: [S]ince we can move, it starts to be relevant to be European. But that's the problem I think, not for us but for people that don't move. Why should they feel European? They do not take advantage of it. Okay, it's like an extra-upper institution that they don't really understand and I think it will create very soon a gap between like cosmopolitan citizens, whether they are European or not, and national citizens [who] can't be anything but national citizens. It will be just a social difference.

Portuguese Male: Do you think that might replace class structure in a sense?

French Male: I think class will still be relevant but like in forbid relations because our lower class that won't be able to travel or to meet the other people of the world or Europe or whatever, they will close [up between] themselves. And that actually what'd happened because unfortunately quite an important part of our lower class turned their vote from left parties to far-right parties. Sweden might be different, but in Denmark, in France, in Germany, in Switzerland [that is what's happening]. There will be really a distinction of people that could feel European or citizen of the world or whatever and the people that can't because they just don't have the opportunities even to experience travel. So it's not ...a general citizenship. At least I think it's like national citizenships will be the
same at the end, you can be French, British or whatever, but it
does not mean that you are co-national [EU] citizens.

Therefore, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian mobiles, who
participated in the focus groups, classified themselves as having a different
type of EU status from that of EU-15 mobiles. Even EU-15 mobiles (and EU-
15 stayers) recognised that they were more encouraged to practise their EU
mobility rights and, subsequently, had different opportunities across the EU
than their CEE fellows. Thus two categories of EU mobiles emerged from the
focus group debates: the ‘Eurostars’, in this the case EU-15 mobiles (Favell,
2008; 2010) and second-class ‘Eurostars’, in this case CEE mobiles.

Moreover, all groups suggested that stayers might find the basic concept of
EU citizenship baffling – similarly to the reaction of some Swedish stayers
(quoted in Chapter 4). They also made distinctions between further categories
of stayers, depending on whether or not these stayers could afford exercising
their EU mobility rights in the future. Stayers who do not speak foreign
languages or have the necessary economic resources to move within the EU
were expected to remain member state-oriented citizens. They were expected
to “close up between themselves” in response to European integration and
thus exhibit Eurosceptic attitudes. However, most stayers in the focus groups
appeared to make up yet another category of EU citizens. They belonged to a
(supposedly) growing group of stayers who had the potential to exercise their
EU mobility rights but decided to stay in their country of origin due to personal
or professional reasons or, quite often, because it was assumed to be “easier”
to do so. These stayers are likely to be part of the “median European” group who expresses a sense of ambivalence rather than outright scepticism towards the EU (Van Ingelgom, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active EU Citizens</th>
<th>Passive EU Citizens</th>
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<tr>
<td>Eurostars</td>
<td>Potential EU citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second-class Eurostars</td>
<td>Member state-oriented citizens</td>
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*Table 6.1. Categories of EU citizens*

The resulting categories of EU citizens are illustrated in *Table 6.1.*. The table suggests that rather than uniting EU citizens in a truly EU society, EU mobility rights are likely to lead to further processes of differentiation. Even if not explicitly, these categories of EU citizens are embedded in the Commission’s discourse and the institutional framework of EU citizenship, both of which define an exclusive model of EU citizenship. These categories are, thus, not the outcome of the recent crisis or the result of unreceptive host country contexts and, unless the institutional framework of EU citizenship changes, likely to shape citizens’ experiences of EU mobility for the foreseeable future.

**6.4. Summary**

The evidence in this chapter suggested that both EU mobiles and stayers were fairly well-informed about their EU rights, especially their EU mobility rights and associated civic, social and economic entitlements. They also appeared fairly upbeat when discussing these rights, especially when the
focus was on how EU ‘harmonisation’ processes ensured health care coverage for EU mobiles and the effective implementation of the EHIC card. This finding complements previous studies about the tendency among (young) citizens to substitute the advantages of their EU citizenship with EU mobility rights (Férdandez, 2005; Favell, 2008; TNS Opinion and Social, 2010). Moreover, when participants spoke about the way in which EU mobility is already “taken for granted”, they suggested it might already be a significant aspect of citizens’ everyday lives within the EU. As such, EU mobility appeared to create a sense of geographical proximity between the EU and its citizens (Siklodi, 2014). Even more, it was observed to build a dynamic bond between the EU and its citizens – which is precisely how scholars in the field of citizenship studies defined the concept of ‘citizenship’ (see for example Aristotle, 1946; Isin and Turner, 2002; Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005). Nonetheless, obstacles faced by EU mobiles in Sweden or the UK were also identified, including for example when EU mobiles attempted to open a bank account or use health care services. The same obstacles were identified by the Commission (2010b) in its very first EU citizenship report. Although it has recognised that rectifying these obstacles requires the urgent attention of policy-makers, the Commission has not really provided a solution so far.

There were no major differences between the approaches of EU mobiles and stayers to EU rights. Both EU mobiles and stayers spent little time discussing EU participation at this point – though it is the only EU right stayers could exercise in their country of origin. Nonetheless, there was an interesting difference between the approaches of EU mobiles in the two countries. Due to
the emphasis on the principles of neutrality and cognitive mobilisation among the public, Sweden is usually identified as the ideal context for post-national models of citizenships to emerge (Agius, 2006: 588; Welzel and Inglehart, 2010: 55). Accordingly, every group in Sweden adopted a rights-based approach to (EU) citizenship. However, it was the UK rather than the Swedish context, which increased the likelihood for EU mobiles to consider EU participation within the theme of EU rights (albeit to a limited extent here as well). In this context, factors, which were likely to prevent mobiles from realising their EU citizenship, including the array of European languages, cultures and welfare state provisions (especially those related to health care and education) (Favell, 2008; European Commission, 2010b; 2013a), and the distinctive levels of member state influence within EU institutions (Moravcsik, 1998) were debated by participants in much more detail.

These debates then illustrated the way in which EU mobility is likely to lead to new processes of differentiation and exclusion. Although the young and educated citizens are likely to be the least affected by national migration policies and stereotypes, EU (learning) mobility appeared to accentuate the importance of these issues, leading participants to classify different categories of EU citizens, depending on their mobility status (EU mobiles/stayers), country of origin (especially along the East/West and North/South divides, and length of membership in the EU) and socio-economic backgrounds (students/workers, ethnic backgrounds, language skills, economic resources and educational qualifications). Depending on their country of residence, participants also had different hopes so as to whether these categories of EU
citizens were likely to become more clearly delineated in the future – with the UK groups exhibiting more cynical attitudes.

These findings seem to shed a rather dim light on the likelihood of these citizens (ever) realising a ‘community of Europeans’ and, in so doing, legitimising the EU’s democratic quest. The only other way for citizens to rectify these issues was through EU participation. However, the preceding chapters already hinted that participants often overlooked EU participation. As a result, the moderator probed each group about the participatory dimension of their EU citizenship towards the end of the discussions. The next chapter presents the key issues young and educated citizens’ identified as important for realising EU citizenship as EU participation.
Chapter 7. EU citizenship as EU participation

Citizens’ participation activates models of citizenship and, as a result, has dominated most of the literature within the field of citizenship studies on the dichotomy of active/passive citizenship (see for example Magnette, 2003; Bellamy, 2008a: 97-123; Welge, 2015). However, the introduction of EU citizenship did not boost citizens’ EU participation. Actually, their EU participation has declined since the 1990s (as illustrated in Table 1.2.). This decline seemingly supports the second-order thesis of EP elections, which depicts EP elections as secondary to general elections (Seif and Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 2005). It has also been explained in light of the EU’s enlargement to CEE states with historically lower levels of participation than in EU-15 states, and changing public attitudes towards the European integration processes, EU institutions and national politics (Hix and Marsh, 2007; Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011; Söderlund, Wass and Blais, 2011; Armingeon and Ceka, 2014; Tilley and Hobolt, 2014).

Considered through the framework of EU citizenship, these findings are not particularly surprising. For example, the Commission’s (2010a, 2013a) discourse seems to suggest that its focus on EU participation is temporary and selective at best. Actually, due to its almost exclusive focus on EU mobiles’ participation, its discourse seems to question the extent to which EU citizenship is there to enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy in the first place (Chapter 2.2.3.). However, the findings of existing research on EU mobiles’ participation are clearly at odds with the Commission’s expectations.
These studies underline the rather limited, just short of negative, impact EU mobility has on citizens’ actual EU participation (Mattila, 2003; Muxel, 2009; Favell, 2010; Strudel and Michalska, 2012). The previous empirical chapters of this thesis also indicated that young and educated citizens rarely considered their EU participation within the framework of EU citizenship and, in the very few cases they did, appeared rather sceptical about its actual relevance to their (and more broadly to citizens’) lives (Chapters 4 – 6). Considered together, the institutional and empirical frameworks of EU citizenship suggest that the lived experiences of EU citizenship might not be comparable to national citizenships.

Against this backdrop, the chapter explores young and educated citizens’ perceptions of participation in more depth. More specifically, it interrogates EU mobiles and stayers’ perceptions of EU participation, using original focus group evidence from Sweden and the UK. The evidence considered in this chapter further refines the distinction between EU mobiles and stayers (that has been a focal point of the previous chapters, especially Chapters 5 and 6). In exploring the indicators for citizens’ participation, which have been set out previously (see Table 1.3.), the chapter draws a rather complex portrait, echoing broader trends associated with issue-based approaches to and rational cost-benefit calculations of (EU) participation (Downs, 1957; Smets and van Ham, 2013). Most importantly perhaps, the chapter frames EU participation as the weakest dimension of EU citizenship for both EU mobiles and stayers (Research Questions 2), and one that is likely to call into question the relevance of the other two dimensions of their EU citizenship as well
(Research Questions 3). Instead of EU participation, the focus among participants was, once again EU mobility and how it made citizens ‘more knowledgeable about the EU’, leading to further processes of differentiation between EU citizens (Research Question 4). This finding has important consequences for how we should approach the quest for democratic legitimacy in the EU (Research Question 5).

This chapter forms the last of three empirical chapters (Chapters 5 – 7), which probe how EU mobiles and stayers perceive one of the dimensions of their EU citizenship. In doing so, these three chapters together provide a response to the main research question, namely whether and how young and educated citizens realise their EU citizenship (Research Question 1). The chapter has three main parts. The first part underscores the complexities in EU mobiles and stayers’ perceptions of (EU) participation. The second part underscores the relevance of (EU) mobility to addressing the issue of EU citizenship and makes references to the (perceived) interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship and the categories of EU citizens, which may emerge when EU mobility and approaches to EU participation are combined. The third part sheds light on what young and educated citizens considered to be the most appropriate avenues for promoting the EU and EU citizenship.

7.1. EU mobiles and stayers’ perceptions of (EU) participation

Although a number of opportunities were given to participants to discuss their participation in traditional and alternative forms of engagement in EU, national
and local politics – not to mention that most of them were studying politics at a university at the time the focus groups were carried out – they did not really speak about this issue until the moderator probed them directly. In fact, from the ten focus groups, only one discussed EU participation without probing.  

Hence it seemed as if though EU participation was not, in the eyes of young and educated citizens, as contentious or important dimension of EU citizenship as EU identity or EU mobility rights. To some extent at least, this finding should not be surprising. All EU mobiles and stayers were studying at a university at the time of the interviews. So they were likely to have been removed from the political sphere in which other types of EU mobility takes place. They also would not have had to go through the same bureaucratic hassles EU labour mobiles do. As a result, they can be expected to harbour particularly positive opinions about EU mobility (Cairns, 2010).

However, the focus groups were composed of a select group of young and educated citizens – mostly with an interest and expertise in politics and/or European studies (see Appendix 2 for demographic information). Considered in this light, it is rather surprising that most participants did not deliberate on EU participation within the framework of EU citizenship. Nonetheless, after the moderator asked them about (EU) participation, their expertise in politics

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101 The issue of EU participation was raised in four groups but only one discussed it in detail. It has already been illustrated that the German-British mobile in EU Group 3, UK appeared to be particularly enthusiastic about realising a political model of EU citizenship compared to her fellows. In Sweden, EU mobiles mentioned the low level of EU participation as another reason why they preferred to adopt a ‘cosmopolitan’ sense of citizenship. EU Group 2, the UK was the only group, where some discussion about EU participation between participants took place. Actually, from the outset it was quite apparent that the three female EU mobiles in this group had a more favourable attitude towards realising a political union in the EU – especially by integrating citizens into the EU level.
manifested through the rather long and detailed debates that ensued about the most important level of participation and most effective forms of engagement available to EU mobiles and stayers. Even then however, it quickly became apparent that hardly any of these young and educated citizens had participated in EU politics prior to the focus group research. The next two sections shed light on these issues, considering first EU mobiles and then stayers’ perceptions of participation.

7.1.1. ‘Are we making an impact?’ EU mobiles’ approaches to (EU) participation

Most discussions started out by a consideration of how young and educated citizens could make their voices heard in politics. At this point almost every participant – regardless of his or her mobility status – suggested that participation was issue-specific and had a personal connotation. In the ensuing discussions however, this basic assumption led to some differences between how EU mobiles and stayers approached (EU) participation. This section sheds light on these emerging differences.

The basic assumption that their participation was issue-specific shaped how EU mobiles selected the level (local, national or EU) of their participation. In particular, most EU mobiles adopted a multi-level approach to participation –

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102 This was the case in all groups apart from EU Group 3, Sweden – where the educational background of students was more mixed (see Appendix 2).
similarly to their approaches to identity — and suggested citizens will likely select one or the other level based on the issue they find the most important.

*German Male, EU Group 1, UK:* I think the subsidiarity principle should be applied to [participation in] Europe. Where you get these European issues that the European-level should be dealing with, and there are national issues that should be dealt with at the national level.... The European-level should be dealing with foreign policies, defence. But then if you take them to be the most important, then definitely [the EU level is important for you]! But if you think it’s more about education and things like that, then maybe it’s the national level that’s more important.

Accordingly, those EU mobiles who previously exhibited traces of a cosmopolitan outlook seemed to prefer participating in alternative forms of engagement, and especially when the issue at hand had an international scope.

*French Male, EU Group 3, Sweden:* I went to the 1st of May march with Swedish friends. [All laugh.] Precisely, the workers’ day is international and by walking there with the Swedes, I was actually kind of walking with also French people, or everybody in the world! That made sense for me.

These examples suggest that the approaches of most EU mobiles to participation were dynamic and issue-specific. They also appear to echo the expected shift in how young citizens’ approach participation. Specifically, in order to make their voices heard on the issues they consider the most
important, young citizens are expected to participate in a range of traditional and alternative forms of engagement (see for example, Sloam, 2014a).

As the discussions progressed however, it became apparent that the approach of EU mobiles to EU participation, especially, was anything but dynamic. At first almost every EU mobile said EU participation, usually understood as voting in the EP elections, was important to them. Later they revealed that the EU and its institutions looked “too abstract” and “complicated to really understand” and so a good number of EU mobiles said they did not feel they could have “any real influence” over the decisions reached by the EU executive.\(^{103}\) As a result, only seven of the total 52 EU mobiles, who participated in the focus groups, voted in the EP elections (two across the groups in Sweden and five across the groups in the UK).

*Bulgarian Female, EU Group 2, Sweden:* … I don't think anyone gets European politics, like voting for your MP in the European Parliament. I don't get it! I don't understand what these people do there. Like, what decisions they make [or] how they make them. I was a bit annoyed a couple of years ago when they voted the European President [Herman Van] Rompuy. Who voted [for] him?! …

*Portuguese Male:* Yeah, you didn't vote for him… I would agree with you, that with European politics you don't really know what's

\(^{103}\) In fact, quite a few EU mobiles – predominantly females and mainly those in Sweden – also expressed a sense of disappointment when it came to the effect of their political participation more broadly.
happening. But then suddenly you see all these things happening, the certifications and … these common laws. And I like it. So I'm not going to criticise. I think they are doing a good job. Maybe, they are doing such a good job that it's not so political …!

As apparent from the response of the Portuguese mobile, some EU mobiles shifted the focus of the prevalent discussions and suggested it was acceptable not to participate at the EU level, because this level is, perhaps "not so political" and even if citizens did not participate, "everything still worked". Actually, this EU mobile appeared to grant the EU a regulatory function, which does not require ordinary citizens to really understand EU politics or, for that matter, to participate in EU politics (echoing the case put forward by Majone, 1998).

Nonetheless, it is more likely that the response of the Portuguese Male served a very specific purpose – to justify citizens’ (and so his) abstention from EU participation. This is only one of a number of examples where similar points were raised by EU mobiles. However, if these ‘ideal EU citizens’, did not consider EU participation as a necessary part of their every day life, it is even less likely that other EU citizens would do so. Moreover, it is interesting to note, once again the dynamics between these two EU mobiles – the frustrated Bulgarian Female is ‘calmed down’ by the ‘more knowledgeable’ Portuguese male. It appears to resonate with the example earlier when the (same) Bulgarian Female was speaking about how EU-15 bureaucrats did not appear to know her country was in the EU (Cited in Chapter 6). This exchange once
again indicates the possibility that the previously identified distinctions among
EU mobiles were relevant to discussions about EU participation as well.

The discussions which took place in EU Group 3, UK support the point raised
earlier: EU mobiles did not seem to adopt a dynamic approach to EU
participation. Actually, EU mobiles engaged with this dimension to a rather
limited extent. There were a couple of exceptions nonetheless. Perhaps the
most obvious occurred in EU Group 3, UK where a participant – German-
British Female – tried really hard to find an alternative to enhancing the level
of citizens’ EU participation and, consequently, sense of EU identity. She
suggested introducing an EU-wide list of candidates for the EP elections – so
as to draw attention away from national parties and national politics, and turn
these elections into truly ‘European’ affairs. However, the other participants in
her group did not find her idea convincing and were quick to rebuff it. They
cited a number of reasons on why an EU-wide list of candidates would not
work in practice, including citizens’ lack of knowledge about (non-national)
candidates, the increase in the (already) elitist character of EU elections and,
most importantly perhaps, the clash of European and nationalist ideals. The
tone of the discussion hence turned from a sense of eagerness – expressed
by the German-British Female participant about the prospects of enhancing
citizens’ sense of EU citizenship – to that of (Euro)scepticism – articulated by
the other members in the group.
German-British Female, EU Group 3, UK: I would feel much, much more European if I voted for example for a Hungarian candidate for, no, let’s say for example that, or an Italian candidate…

Italian Female: But … [y]ou wouldn’t have the knowledge to do that. That’s what I think.

German-British Female: Why wouldn’t I? I can read about it, can’t I?

Dutch Female: You don’t know whether [the candidates] are capable. You don’t know. Like, you would have to do research… I don’t think many people would [do that].

German-British Female: But that would make it European!

Italian Female: I think only a really rich politician [could run an EU-wide campaign]…

Swedish Female: But then I think there is a national bias as well. Because I think it’s, like form a perspective from someone from Sweden, to say that an Italian person is a best person, no offence to be in the EU, first will be like “No! A Swedish person is the best!” Because that’s what you know …

Dutch Female: Patriotism, yeah! …

German-British Female: I don’t believe that…

Swedish Female: I think a Swedish person would say, “But what does this Italian person know about Sweden?” We’re like on
different poles! Like we are cold and ... population wise really tiny country compared to Italy or the UK. Why would we want someone who ... doesn't understand our society?

The way in which some of these issues were raised – in short and often cut-off sentences – may suggests that most participants were slightly frustrated with the strong pro-EU stance of German-British Female. Rather than offering alternatives to enhancing citizens EU participation, they identified reasons for why her proposition was flawed in the first place. Similar dynamics were prevalent between the members of this group throughout the discussion. Actually, similarities can be drawn between the main dynamics that occurred in EU Group 3, UK and EU Group 4, Sweden – the two groups with a strong pro-EU participant each (German-British Female and Polish Female (1) respectively). Compared to these two participants then, the others may have seemed somewhat ‘Eurosceptic’. However, labelling them as such may not quite grasp their actual perceptions.

As apparent from the exchange above, most participants in EU Group 3 were not (simply) addressing the issue of EU participation but the manner in which it was framed by their German-British fellow. Their frustration then led to a lively discussion that sometimes was lacking in substance. The critical and passive approach they adopted to EU participation was present in the others

\[^{104}\text{It is also worth noting that the Swedish Female who brought up the issue of national pride was the same who originally declared herself as a “world citizen”. Her comments once again suggest that her ‘cosmopolitan outlook’ was “fragile” (Skey, 2013) at best.}\]
groups too. In these groups however, participants were in agreement and so their discussion was cut short. These examples suggest that in reality EU mobiles’ approaches to EU participation – and actually to participation more broadly – were not really guided by issue-based considerations. Instead, they depended on group dynamics and, specifically, the perceived impact their participation was likely to have.

*Polish Female (2), EU Group 4, Sweden:* I don't think we have any real influence in politics on a bigger level, like [the] EU level or any actual big decisions. I'm a bit pessimistic about it… I think that where there is money involved, lots of money especially, no one will back [away from] the decisions that will allow him [or her] to earn millions… Of course, it's important for people to be heard and for people to have a medium to voice their opinion. But I really don't think that we have any big influence on the things that happen on this huge [EU] level…

*French Male (1):* It's also a technical question. How to participate? Where is the European-level when you are in your county? [It is] difficult to find it. You're more used to know your average realities… Of course, to be a volunteer is maybe the [simplest] way to engage… But for the election, … I'm a bit more pessimistic as you are in this [EU] level. Because we voted against the European Constitution and it passed! So yes, this is something more personal.
From the various explanations scholars have put forward to explaining citizens’ participation (and more recently wide-spread abstention) from (EU) politics (for an overview see Smets and van Ham, 2013), EU mobiles’ debates appeared to have underlined the importance of perceived impact and, subsequently, the role of rational cost-benefit calculations.\textsuperscript{105} Both of these issues seemed to have stirred EU mobiles to abstain, rather than participate in EU politics.

Once EU mobiles accepted that they were likely to have little or no impact on how EU decisions are made, most of them selected participation at the national level as the most relevant to their and (ordinary) citizens’ lives more broadly. Considered in this light, their debates granted EU participation a second-order character (compared to participation in the general elections). This is precisely what scholars who work on turnout at the EP elections have assumed to be the case (especially Schmitt, 2005).

\textit{Finnish Female (1), EU Group 2, UK: … I still think that national elections are the most important. Yeah, just because of like, issues of taxation and defence and what not. All the things that make a state a state are decided at that level and elections feed into that – that is the public policy process. Although, I think, the European Union is really important. I just think that national elections are the most important.}

\textsuperscript{105} There was only one exception to this at the group level – in EU Group 2, UK. Here participation was discussed as a duty of citizens.
**Finnish Female (2):** I think since moving to the UK, local elections have become, I still vote in them, but it’s become less important for me. Just because I’m not in Finland that much anymore… I still vote because I believe everybody should participate. ... But it’s not that important. But it definitely does play a part… I also agree that national elections are more important for me, especially ’cause it’s the whole, entire country. But I didn’t vote at the European elections either, so I can’t say [much about that]. Next year though, will see…

Since most EU mobiles only considered participation *within* their country of origin, this dimension was, once again, clearly placed within the national citizenship framework (the same point was apparent in EU mobiles and stayers’ initial approaches to citizenship – illustrated in Chapter 4). In comparison, hardly any EU mobiles mentioned that their EU citizenship allowed them to participate in the local and EP elections in Sweden or the UK. Nonetheless, quite a few EU mobiles, especially those in the UK, anticipated in the 2014 EP elections – as the quote from the Finnish Female (2) suggests.¹⁰⁶

In the few cases where the right to participate in the host country was mentioned, differences between EU mobiles’ perceptions of this issue emerged, depending on the length of time these participants had spent in

¹⁰⁶ This was more apparent in the EU groups in the UK, probably because of the timing of the focus groups – they took place almost a year after the Swedish interviews and just a year before the 2014 EP elections. At the time a possible ‘Brexit’ was offered by the Conservatives and the popularity of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was also on the rise.
Sweden and the UK. Those EU mobiles, who stayed in Sweden or the UK on a semi-permanent basis or for a longer period of time, had a tendency to participate in the host country as well as in their country of origin. They were also much more likely to support the granting of national electoral rights to EU residents – an option the Commission has also been thinking about for a few years (see for example European Commission, 2010f).\textsuperscript{107} In the case of Sweden in particular, EU mobiles often said they did not know enough about Swedish politics to help them make a choice. Moreover, a long-term EU mobile mentioned that Swedish parties never “really reach[ed] out to migrants” and instead “focused on Swedes”. As a result, only one of the 25 EU mobiles had participated in Swedish politics prior to the focus groups.

\textit{German Female, EU Group 2, Sweden:} [Full time student, lived in Sweden for 3.5 years.] [E]ven though we live outside of our home countries and some longer than others, we still vote in our national elections... But we don’t actually live in that country! ... [W]e don't participate in the policies that are taking place where we live that could actually benefit us.

In comparison, temporary EU mobiles only ever participated in their country of origin. They identified a number of reasons for their abstention from Swedish and UK politics, including a lack of knowledge about their EU electoral rights, which provided them the option to participate in the

\textsuperscript{107} Mainly male students expressed the sentiment that it was not “their place” to participate in the host country, while female students supported the idea of granting national electoral rights to EU mobiles. However, due to the small number of cases in which these issues were raised and the limited scope of students’ debates, it is difficult to really underscore whether students’ sentiments really differed based on gender or if it was the result of peer-pressure and focus group contexts.
first place and a sense of uneasiness these EU mobiles felt about participating in a society of which they were not full members. These mobiles then assumed it was not “their place” to participate in the host country. In response, EU mobiles with semi-permanent residency became critical about the reasoning behind recent EU mobiles’ abstention from participating in the host country. The ensuing debates then revealed that, quite often, these young and educated citizens were not familiar with the residency requirements that were attached to EU mobiles’ right to participate in the host country.

*Italian Male, EU Group 1, UK:* The thing with participating in another country is that, firstly, I wouldn’t like the person who comes [here] for one month to have a voice. Not because he can’t, but because it’s not really right. Live there for one year, two years and then you decide. Obviously, if you live there for a long time, you work there, you live there, you have family there – it’s right that you can actually vote. But, like, last year there were some council elections and I didn’t even think of going. Because it wouldn’t feel right! Why would I do that, you know? I came here in September, why would I vote in October?…

*German-Swiss Female:* But maybe if that had happened at the end of your three years here, you would have had something to add. Just because other students will be living here in Egham, in the university…

*Italian Male:* Yeah of course! If you live for a long time in one place… But I didn’t know anything about it!
German-Swiss Female: …Yeah, I know. I’m saying if it had happened after[wards]…

Dutch Male: I would also feel the same way as well. Even, for instance, in the Netherlands I studied in Maastricht which is not my hometown. I didn’t feel like I could vote for them [or] I could make a decision for them. Even if I lived there for three years! It would still feel just wrong.

Regardless of whether these EU mobiles expressed a preference for participating in the country of origin or the host country, the ensuing discussion between them appeared to reinforce an earlier finding of this chapter – participating at the national level was observed as the most important by these young and educated citizens.

Although no differences emerged between EU mobiles’ perceptions of the importance of EU participation and preferred level of participation, there was a slight variation in their approaches to different forms of engagement, depending on the host country. EU mobiles in the UK usually focused on national elections, while those in Sweden appeared to favour alternative forms of engagement, including for example volunteering at the EU level.108 This finding seem to contradict the broader trends we have observed to take place in both of these countries – with Sweden showing particularly high and the UK particularly low turnout levels in national and EU elections (as illustrated in

108 In the case of the EU mobiles in the UK, alternative forms of engagement were mentioned when participants spoke about issues that they considered important, like helping Syrian refugees. Their subsequent participation in alternative forms of engagement was then not linked to the various levels of politics in the EU.
Table 1.2). Actually, the extant literature has underlined, when considered from the broader EU context, young people’s preference for participating in alternative forms of engagement is, perhaps, most visible in the UK (see for example Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Sloam, 2013). The same did not seem to hold true for the case of the select group of EU mobiles who participated in the EU Groups in the UK.

While the evidence appears to contradict the broader trends, which have been apparent in these country contexts, EU mobiles’ responses seem to complement the idea that the recent transformation in (young) citizens’ participation can be issue specific (Norris, 2002; Franklin, 2004; Favell, 2010; Sloam, 2012a, b). Actually, for the first time it was apparent that these EU mobiles’ participation (at least in) alternative forms of engagement could have been guided by issue-specific considerations.

*Romanian Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden:* I volunteered in an NGO which had projects funded through [the] EU. But in a way, they only worked with people from the [national] ministry that filtered the money from the EU. So everything was also inside the country, except the money was coming from [the] outside.

*Polish Female (1):* I participated in a couple of training courses like …the European Youth in Action programme. [M]y organisation [has] also established … [the] ‘national youth organisation council’ and all of the European countries have this… [it] is responsible for whenever, for example the Commission wants to introduce new
laws [and it wants to] … consult the youth. … And I know, it's [a] very little thing, but I think it helps. There is also something called a ‘structured dialogue’ and it's basically the idea that in every country [we] consult the youth … on topics like unemployment … or participation in democracy and so on… [The resulting recommendations] go to the European Commission. And of course it has no real legal force, but I think it's good that youth has some kind of voice. …

*Bulgarian Female*: Do you really think that the Commission reads this?

*Polish Female (1)*: Oh they have to! Because some people are attending this conference and there are some people from the European Commission that are involved. [Although] I don't know what … they do later with this [recommendation].

*Polish Female (2)*: At least it exists!

*Polish Female (1)*: As I said, it might be a little drop in the sea.

However, even when some EU mobiles expressed a sense of enthusiasm about participating in alternative forms of engagement and on issues that they felt closest to, there were one or two EU mobile who then questioned the extent to which these forms of engagement could really make an influence. Similar tendencies emerged in the other groups as well, suggesting that the majority of EU mobiles’ (in both countries) selected both the level of their
participation and forms of engagement according to the perceived impact their participation could have on politics.

At this point it is perhaps worth noting that a couple of EU mobiles also spoke about the various participatory rights they had as EU citizens. However, these rights were mentioned only fleetingly and without generating much discussion. For example, the right to petition the EP or the European Ombudsman was only cited in one group and by the openly pro-EU participant who was also keen to make the EP elections truly ‘European’ (German-British Female, EU Group 3, UK). Similarly, only one EU mobile in Sweden spoke of the European Citizens’ Initiative (CI). In this case however, he expressed a very strong sense of sarcasm about the real purpose of CI. His tone echoed that of the other male EU mobiles in Sweden who appeared to have a ‘cosmopolitan outlook’.

\textit{French Male, EU Group 1, Sweden:} I'm really looking forward to the day it will be used, the [European citizens’] initiative. Because one million of Europeans, yeah, okay. I think, it's only possible if [the] European Union decided to attack the United States. Then you will have 200 million [or] so of Europeans signing the petition “No we should not!” [All laugh.] Otherwise, I don't want to be pessimistic, but look at the turnout for the European election[s]! It's so low. [Portuguese and Italian males nod in agreement.]… [It is] even lower in [the] recent countries that have joined the Union. Whereas, it should be so high [there], because it's so important for them!
Hence there is some indication that EU mobiles’ preferred forms of engagement were likely to differ from one issue to the next. In light of the focus group evidence, it appears as if these young and educated citizens only really agreed on one issue – the distant character of EU politics and the very little return they could expect to see from their EU participation. In this context there seemed to be very little, if any, support in the evidence that would suggests that EU mobility made it more likely for these citizens to participate in EU politics. The evidence seems to echo the findings of previous empirical research that has shown that EU mobility does not enhance mobiles’ disposition to participate in politics (Mattila, 2003; Muxel, 2009; Favell, 2010; Strudel and Michalska, 2012). The evidence does not seem to suggest that EU mobiles became particularly engaged in the host city’s political landscape – contrary to what older generations of EU-15 mobiles seem to do (Favell, 2010). This finding could, however, be the result of selection bias – all EU mobiles were in full time education at the time of the research and the educational context would have (more or less) shielded them from having to experience the political adversities, which arose in the (local) host society.

Similarly to what we found with EU mobiles and despite of their earlier claims about the importance of issue-specific deliberations, rational considerations appeared to guide stayers’ approaches to participation as well. As a result hardly any stayers participated in EU politics and most found the local-level to be the most attractive. The latter was deemed “easier” to influence and did not
seem to “feel” as “political” as national and EU level politics. These examples are illustrative of oft-cited transformations in (young) citizens’ approaches to politics (see especially Norris, 2003; Sloam, 2014a). The rest of this section sheds light on stayers’ perceptions of (and subsequent approaches to) the various levels and forms of participation available to them in their role as (EU) citizens.

7.1.2. ‘We are making an impact’: Stayers’ approaches to participating in local politics

Contrary to the very apparent impact-focus of the EU groups in their discussion of participation, a number of UK stayers maintained, from the outset that citizens’ participation should not (ever) be judged on the basis of the likely impact they were to make.109 Most UK stayers then alleged that for them participation was “just” about raising “visual awareness”, especially when they participated in alternative forms of engagement. Yet, whether these UK stayers exercised their EU participatory rights clearly depended on the extent to which they perceived their participation to have an influence on EU politics – similarly to the EU groups before. They too then granted a secondary character to EU elections.

*British Male (5), Stayer Group, UK:* I think that voting didn’t come up [in the previous discussions about citizenship], shows the kind of

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109 Interestingly, the same participant (British Male (5)) spoke about how important it was to “see the benefits” of participation (in the EU context especially) in order to mobilise citizens. Yet, he later concludes that “participation should [n]ever be judged on whether it was effective or not”. The shifting opinion of this participant illustrates well the often sporadic and contradictory points put forward by these young and educated citizens. Evidently, discussing a sense of citizenship is and can prove difficult to students (even to experts on the subject).
change in notions of contemporary citizenship … So, you know, the idea of voting in the European elections is something so distant. Whereas, you know, … we want to… be involved with participatory acts that we can see having the benefits [of]…

*British Male (2):* There are so many great problems, I think, with participation at the European-level and the fact that … we fight the elections on national issues. They seem to be an extension, … a little sub-act to our national elections. If they occur separately from a national election, it’s your opportunity to punish a government for things that it’s done domestically, rather than because you admire any kind of views that they have on Europe. Unless [Sarcastically], you’re a UKIP voter and just want to spoil your ballots…

Interestingly however, some stayers appeared to be almost more critical about their abstention from EU participation than (most) EU mobiles had been hitherto. In fact, a Swedish stayer actively encouraged her fellows to participate in future EP elections. The earlier example from EU Group 3, UK illustrated how little effort EU mobiles were likely to make in order to enhance their (and citizens’) disposition to participate in the EU elections.

*Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden:* When I think about it the commissionaires and the people in the council they are representatives of the [national] government[s] or are appointed by the national governments so still the national governments have a
say in the European Union. So by voting in the national level you also interact in the European Union.

*Swedish Female (4):* Sometimes I think, well I don't have to know so much to vote in the European Union, because you can... vote [for] the socialists, the conservatives or if you choose the extreme, vote for the Greens. You can choose your political ideology and vote for that, [and] then, hopefully. things will turn out fine. I mean ... you do not have to know so much to go to vote. I do not think we should take it as seriously as some do, because it's hard to get to know information about the European Union, [about] what will [candidates] do if they come to power. [So] just go there and vote!

Nonetheless, even these stayers’ approaches to enhancing citizens’ disposition to participate in EU politics appeared to accentuate the second-order character of EU elections (Schmidt, 2005). In fact, the idea that citizens “should not take” EU participation “as seriously” because they “don't have to know so much to vote in the European Union” seemed to have granted a secondary character to their EU participation and, by association, their EU citizenship status. This is a considerable shift from the initial suggestion by the very same stayers who said they felt ‘more European’ than Swedish because national identity was not deemed an important aspect of their Swedish citizenship (Chapter 5). The evidence then suggests that these stayers did not consider EU participation as an important aspect of their EU citizenship.
Once probed about which level of politics stayers preferred to participate in, the majority spoke of the local level because it was seen to have a clear relevance to their lives and still did not ‘feel’ as political (or from the previous exchanges distant) as the national or EU levels. The following exchange between UK stayers is also useful in illustrating the somewhat indifferent tone of the discussions, which occurred when the groups were prompted to address the issue of (EU) participation. This dimension of EU citizenship has been studied extensively by academics (see for example Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011; Söderlund, Wass and Blais, 2011; Armingeon and Ceka, 2014; Tilley and Hobolt, 2014). Yet, the indifferent tone that characterised the discussions at this point or the largely ambivalent approach of participants in their discussion of this dimension – may already underline that (EU) participation was the last thing on the minds of these citizens. Hence they did not take up the offer of the moderator to discuss various forms of participation and their relevance at different levels of policy-making in the EU. The discussions that emerged were then slow-paced, shallow and descriptive – despite of numerous attempts by the moderator to challenge the points raised by participants.

Admittedly, the somewhat slow-pace of these discussions may also be the result of the focus group settings. After all, EU participation was the last dimension discussed by these groups, starting approximately an hour into the focus groups. However, in the exceptional cases when the moderator probed groups about EU participation at an earlier point of the discussion – as was
the case with EU Group 1 UK and EU Group 1, Sweden – similar sentiments and dynamics emerged.

*British Female (1), Stayer Group, UK:* But also, ... if you want something done at the local-level, it doesn’t feel political. Whereas, if you get it to [the] European-level or [the] national level, it does. ...

*British Male (1):* It’s got the weight to it. But then, the kind of effectiveness with which you can deal with it, just really dissipates the bigger and bigger the issue becomes.

*British Female (1):* Yeah! ... I remember when my family were getting involved with phone marketing, I was like, ‘Oh, you’re engaging in politics! You’re doing something!’ And they were like, ‘No, this isn’t politics. Not doing anything to do with that!’ ...

*British Male (5):* It’s true. I also think the British [public] kind of envisages politics as party-politics... And ... they could get very, you know, involved in campaigns like that and not see it as political participation...

Hence, most stayers appeared to echo the well-documented shift among young citizens in the EU, who are expected to prefer participating in alternative rather than traditional forms of engagement and at the local-level – at the level of the politics they perceived as having the most relevance to their lives (see for example, (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Sloam, 2012; 2014a).
The previous section already underlined that there was slightly more discussion about alternative forms of engagement among EU mobiles in Sweden than in the UK. The opposite was the case for stayers. Swedish stayers only discussed different levels of participation in traditional forms of engagement, while British stayers debated the convenience and impact of alternative forms of engagement. Once again, the discussion among British stayers was framed around the proposition that their participation was issue-specific.

*British Male (1), Stayer Group, UK:* Sometimes it’s just about visual awareness and..., obviously, [protests] didn’t stop the Iraq War. As you said, it wasn’t successful. But, it’s still, like, ... the student protests here, like, the tuition fees. ... [T]here was... a visualisable amount of people against that. And that in itself meant that the government couldn’t use the discourse “Well, everyone’s in agreement. This is the right thing to do.” Just little things like that. It is visibly aware that there are people against it[s policy] and... that in itself can have, consequences...

It is interesting to note the similarities between EU mobiles and stayers’ explanations of their reasons for participating in alternative forms of engagement. For EU mobiles, participating in alternative forms of engagement was seen as “a little drop in the sea”, but still worth the effort. Similarly, UK stayers said participating in alternative forms of engagement was not about making an “impact” but was there to create “visual” awareness on a broader scale. In comparison, all groups appeared to be quite critical about how little
impact they could make on EU politics, which then meant that they abstained from EU elections all together. Hence it seems these young citizens applied different principles to their approaches to local-, national and EU level politics. Since hardly any of them participated in EU level politics, it seems dubious that EU participation was relevant in their everyday lives. Compared to the preceding debates about EU identity and EU rights, the evidence suggests that EU participation was the weakest dimension of young and educated citizens’ EU citizenship.

Therefore, the focus group evidence suggests that country contexts might have had little, if any impact on EU mobiles’ perceptions of and approaches to participation. Nonetheless there were some differences between the perceptions of EU mobiles and stayers, especially since EU mobiles appeared to favour participating in national, while stayers preferred local level politics. However, there were also considerable similarities between the approaches of EU mobiles and stayers to EU participation. Actually, every group appeared to find EU level participation to be secondary to the national and local levels, respectively. Most participants also appeared to prefer to adopt an issue-specific approach to participation, however their actual approach to participation appeared to have a rational connotation. Hence young and educated citizens’ choices between different forms of engagement were seemingly made on whether or not they could really make an impact at the local and national levels. Accordingly, the evidence indicated that the abstention of EU mobiles and stayers from EU participation was another manifestation of the broader trend of declining citizen participation (Norris,
2002; Franklin, 2004; Sloam, 2014), and the second-order character of EP elections (Schmitt, 2005), rather than an indication of the crisis of EU citizenship (Bellamy, 2008b).

7.2. Reinforcing the link between EU mobility and EU citizenship

The previous section and even the previous chapters of this thesis have underlined that focus group debates about EU participation were often short-lived and quite limited in scope. The implications of these findings for the interrelated dimensions of EU citizenship and emerging processes of differentiation are considered in this part of the chapter. It illustrates how EU mobiles and stayers expected the interlinked dimensions of their EU citizenship – in light of the almost non-existent level of citizens’ EU participation – to affect their EU citizenship (and shape the future of the EU). Moreover, their approaches to the dichotomy of active/passive EU citizenship appear to, once again, distinguish between EU mobiles as ‘knowledgeable’ and stayers as ‘uninformed’ citizens. In doing so, this part of the chapter complements the findings in the previous chapters (especially Chapters 5 – 6) about the way in which we can shed light on emerging processes of differentiation between EU citizens based on their mobility status.

At this point is important to note that, two groups did not discuss participation in any great detail – though they too were directly probed about this by the moderator (EU Group 3, Sweden and EU Group 4, UK). Nonetheless, the discussions kept going back to the same issue: how mobility and different
forms of movement was likely to enhance citizens’ prospects for realising the EU citizenship. Accordingly, young and educated citizens associated political participation and national citizenship, and mobility and EU citizenship (as it was illustrated in Chapter 4). Similarly, the previous part of this chapter suggested that when young and educated citizens considered the link between EU citizenship and EU participation, they granted a second-order character to EU citizenship.

The same point was evident when the various groups spoke about the interlinked character of the dimensions of EU citizenship. Interestingly, it was in the context of EU participation where every group made some references to the interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship. Participants usually invoked this ideal in order to explain why they (and more broadly citizens) did not participate in EU politics. Some of these issues were already apparent in the previous quotes (e.g. in how the UK Stayer Group approached EU participation). In other groups, participants addressed this issue more explicitly. Interestingly, even the Swedish stayers, who originally adopted a value-based approach to (EU) citizenship, mentioned that their abstention from EU participation might explain their lack of EU identity. “I might not feel much like a European citizen because it doesn't feel like anything I will do will make a difference on [the] European-level” (Swedish Female (1), Stayer Group, Sweden). Participants in EU Group 1 UK appeared to reach similar conclusions – not only about their abstention from EU participation but more broadly about how (young) citizens are likely to approach this issue today.
As with their discussion on identity and rights, this group first acknowledged the peculiar case of the UK – on the account of which the media was likely to ignore the developments in the EU. As a result, British citizens were not expected to develop a bond with the EU. However, these EU mobiles went beyond simply criticising the UK example in order to underline how little every other EU citizen was likely to know, “do” and “feel” about the EU.

Romanian Female, EU Group 1, UK: I think there is so many things happening and you can watch the news everyday on the BBC and you’re not gonna see anything. I think if we don’t have that information [about EU politics delivered by the media], you do have to do the research on your own. But that takes a lot of initiative … [in order] to awake that kind of willingness to go and vote and contribute to something…

German Female: British people [especially] don’t really, like, have [a] big connection to the European Union… they are like not connected at all. …This feeling about Europe or the European Union is just not as present [as elsewhere]. …

Dutch Male: I think, everywhere in Europe it’s going downhill in the sense of activeness and ‘informedness’ in politics… in terms of the EU, yeah, definitely! British people are probably way less interested in the EU than other European countries. But even in other European countries… My football friends [in the Netherlands] really don’t do anything about the EU and probably don’t know anything about [it]…
**Italian Female**: I really would like to know which country really believes in the cooperation of countries ... that's why also maybe people don't feel very European as we didn't build yet this kind of sense of cooperation between states.

Hence, observed through the interlinked character of the dimensions of EU citizenship, participants appeared to draw attention to the limitations EU citizens faced in their attempts to realise a political model of EU citizenship (especially against the backdrop of the crisis). This issue then led EU Group 4 in the UK – one of two groups, which adopted an identity-based approach to citizenship – to question whether the EU has a future at all (as illustrated in Chapter 4).

Since EU mobility did not lead these young and educated citizens to question the very existence of the EU, these findings appear to provide further support to one of the main propositions of this thesis: the dichotomy of active/passive citizenship from a political engagement perspective seems irrelevant for the case of the EU. In comparison, once observed as “the kind of citizenship that belongs to mobility”, young and educated citizens appeared to find it easier to approach the issue of EU participation as well. Actually, in so doing, they, once again, portrayed various categories of EU citizens – along the EU mobiles/stayers distinctions and depending on citizens’ educational level.

Hence EU mobiles identified an emerging and very elitist ‘European mobile community’ that is made up of well-educated EU mobiles, in this case ‘knowledgeable’ EU citizens, and is separated from stayers, in this case
‘uninformed’ EU citizens. EU mobiles were then labelled as being “cultured”, “intelligent” and “aware”. This community could not include stayers, who were perceived as “ignorant” and “nothing”. These emerging distinctions between EU citizens led to a long and in-depth debate in EU Group 4, UK, about who (which category of EU citizens) should be allowed to vote in the EP in the first place. These exchanges draw attention to how, when considered together, EU mobility and EU participation are likely to reproduce and (even) widen the existing differences between EU citizens.

The dynamics that prevailed during the discussion of EU participation suggest that participants felt quite strongly about the likely distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers levels of awareness about EU politics – a distinction that was expected to be enhanced further in the future. Once again, participants did not probe but complemented each other’s points – resonating to the initial parts of their discussions. Similar exchanges took place in all EU groups. Hence, the distinctions these participants touched upon are likely to have at least some relevance to what is happening in the context of intensified EU mobility. EU Group 4, UK spent a considerable amount of time on debating this issue. The frankness and often amusing detail with which this group discussed the likely distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers may underline the added benefit of recruiting participants with whom researchers have strong professional relationship.

> Italian-Mexican Female, EU Group 4, UK: I swear to God most of the people back at home see me as an alien. Because I’m studying abroad and I’ve decided to stay here and never go back to Italy.
They are like, ‘Oh my God, I don’t know how you can do that?!’ And I’m like, ‘Well, I don’t know how you can stay in a small town for the whole life, you know?’ [Some laughs.] … ‘Do you think that people in the rest of the world are aware of the town where you’re living right now? Like, you’re nothing!… [My difference] is based on … how I’ve been raised… My family always told me, “Don’t stay in the same place. Go and travel.” …Even though it’s in Europe, like, from the differences that you can find between the cultures, you can actually become ‘more cultured’. And you can actually learn something from these differences. It’s not like you are ignorant.

*French Female (3):* Yeah…. []If you stay in the same country, you are ignorant. … And I feel, like, you still need to travel a lot to… be just intelligent, overall. Like, not even just intelligent school-wise, but just *be aware*. Aware! Aware of, like, … everyone else...

*German Female (1):* [But] we have to be thankful to our parents [for that]… We can’t just generalise it and just say, well, we travel more so we vote [or] we want to vote [more]. I don’t think it’s that. Because there are people who travel a lot and [don’t vote]…

*Italian Female:* That’s true.

*German Female (1):* And then, at the end, they just don’t understand [the EU] because … they weren’t raised in a way that enables them to perceive things in the same way [as us].

*Italian Female:* [Quietly.] So again, not everybody should be able to vote who are European!… []If you don’t have the knowledge, you can’t vote… [And then] if you want to vote, … at least you have to
know what you’re voting for. … [And then], if you don’t want to vote, if you don’t want to study, … then you … shouldn’t do it and just stop complaining about everything that happens around you. That’s what people do all the time.

Rather than uniting EU citizens in a truly EU level political community, as the Commission (2010f) and some of the existing literature (which have applied the political engagement perspective to the case of EU citizenship) have us believe (Bruter, 2005; Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012), it is possible that when approaches to EU participation is influenced by experiences of EU mobility, it accentuates processes of differentiation between different categories of EU citizens. Accordingly, well-educated EU mobiles, in this case ‘knowledgeable’ EU citizens, are separated from stayers, in this case ‘uninformed’ EU citizens. The association made between mobility and level of knowledge also suggest that the more mobile EU citizens are, they are also more knowledgeable, while those who do not move at all are likely to be the least informed. The resulting categories of EU citizens are illustrated in Table 7.1. below.
Against this backdrop, and considered together with the findings of previous studies on EU mobiles’ almost non-existent EU level participation (Mattila, 2003; Muxel, 2009; Favell, 2010; Strudel and Michalska, 2012), the Commission’s attempts to promote a political union among EU mobiles seem misplaced. Instead, to try and bring the emerging differences between EU citizens along their level of mobility and (supposed) disposition to participate in politics, more information must be provided to citizens about the EU. The next and final part of this chapter demonstrates what sources of information young and educated citizens expected to be the most effective in informing EU citizens.

### 7.3. Notifying (EU) citizens about their EU citizenship

The last part of the focus group discussions turned to the issue of how to inform citizens about their EU citizenship, including EU mobility and participatory rights and EU politics more broadly. In light of the earlier finding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active EU Citizens</th>
<th>Passive EU Citizens</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU mobiles</td>
<td>Stayers</td>
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<tr>
<td>The “knowledgeable” citizens</td>
<td>The “uniformed” citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More mobile – more knowledgeable</td>
<td>Less mobile – less informed</td>
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*Table 7.1. EU participation: Further categories of EU citizens*
about an emerging distinction between EU citizens on the basis of their mobility – and associated knowledgeable quality – it seem that providing information about the EU and about citizens’ EU status should become a priority. Accordingly, most groups first spoke about the requirement to build the EU through bottom-up processes, including mobility and EU participation in order to make the EU relevant to citizens’ lives, and so legitimise the current level of European integration. Subsequently, references were made to the need for more extensive media coverage, introduction of EU politics in the secondary school curricula and national government support for the on-going initiatives undertaken by EU institutions to inform citizens. This final part of the chapter sheds light on these issues.

In the very initial stages of the focus group discussions, some participants said they did not expect (ordinary) citizens to have in-depth knowledge about their EU citizenship status. In fact, a couple of EU mobiles and stayers looked surprised to hear that they would be counted as EU citizens already. In some cases, this led to attempts at pinpointing the most appropriate ways to advise citizens about their EU status – including its significance and benefits (especially EU Groups 1 and 4, UK – cited earlier). The moderator probed the other groups about this issue directly. In nearly every group, participants initially said they would advice citizens to use their EU mobility because “it’s quite a good thing. It’s a cool thing. You can travel freely! (Swedish Female, EU Group 3, UK). Due to the age group of participants, this point often translated into the possibility of participating in Erasmus – even by stayers.
Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: In the position we are in today, we are students and maybe I would like try to advocate, trying to go abroad within the Erasmus program that is close to us and close to them.

In response to the moderator’s questions about how to inform citizens about the EU, both EU mobiles and stayers mentioned the role of media – especially the lack of “visibility” EU institutions and EU politicians suffered from – the most often, along with introducing the EU in secondary curricula. In terms of EU media coverage, participants identified the almost exclusive focus on European national level politics received compared to the sporadic and, usually, sceptical reporting about the EU and EU institutions.

Romanian Female, EU Group 1, UK: I think, there should be more media coverage on the European Union to awake[n] that kind of willingness [among citizens] to go and vote and contribute to something.

Romanian Female, EU Group 2, Sweden: I think Europe really need[s] like a more unified media exposure kind of thing. We don’t really have media where you can get a sense of what’s happening in [the] Europe [Union]. I do think that there is more European news in the media, but it’s not the same. It’s not really in the European-level but more on a [cross-]national [level], like choosing a new president, … or the Dutch government failing a couple of weeks ago, but not really European structural-level, so to say.
UK groups seemed especially worried about how the distorted portrait of EU politics is likely to affect the attitude of an already Eurosceptic British public, especially against the backdrop of the crisis (see earlier example from EU Group 1, UK).

A solution that every group mentioned was introducing the EU in school curricula. This education should really stress how different levels of European politics works and therefore increase people's participation in EU politics. However, not every participant seemed comfortable with the idea that citizens should wait around to receive information (from the top down) without actually doing something to receive information.

*Polish Female (2), EU Group 4, Sweden:* I think that education of the people is the key, because people are not very conscious of what's going on around them in general. I'm talking about the majority...

*Romanian Female (2):* I was thinking that being a member state means that every decision taken at the EU level impacts on the local [-level]. In a way, there is an influence between them. If more people were educated about Europe they would get more involved in the European elections that now people don't really participate in...

*Bulgarian Female:* I just wanted to say that we are all excusing ourselves for not being informed. But when are we going to be
informed? Who is going to give us this sphere of knowledge when we cannot define things like EU citizenship?

Debates about the role of media and education were often followed by the role of politicians, especially EU institutions and national governments in raising awareness among citizens. However, there were some differences between participants’ perceptions of whether politicians were doing enough already. Quite a few EU mobiles stated that EU institutions were fairly pro-active in this respect, but their efforts were in vain because they did not have the support of national governments. Subsequently, a number of groups, including the UK stayer group, were critical about the way in which national governments ‘do not trust’ their citizens’ capability to understand that both EU and national level politics are important today.

*German Male, EU Group 2, UK*: I think… the European institutions, let’s not kid ourselves, they do a lot to sort of publicise themselves. And there’s only so much they can do. And if we say “Oh the European Commission has to be more present in our daily lives…”, … I think it’s as much the responsibility, well firstly [the] individuals but also … [the] national governments, acknowledging the European component… and sort of trusting people to understand that there is another dimension… would be a big step. I think it’s an issue of communication … But that has to come from not only the European Commission but also, let’s say, national governments, more regional governments…
**French-British Female**: I think that when national government figures, like our prime minister rally up Eurosceptic views ... basically, just to distract people from other issues, I think they’re really wronging people. I think it’s an injustice done to the people to create and reinforce this perceived separation [between the UK and the EU]. I think it’s really, really unjust. And it’s very patronising as well... I think national governments play a big role ... As you said, institutions of the EU can only do so much to publicise themselves. [The EU] is online. It is present.

Similarly critical sentiments were raised across all groups. It is interesting that it was almost at the end of the discussions when, for the first time, national governments were criticised by young and educated citizens, including the UK stayer group. The latter group even suggested that other national governments were also disposed to use the EU as a “very easy scapegoat”.

The EU was (somewhat dramatically) compared to the Soviet Union to illustrate how both have been “blamed” for everything.

*British Male (5), Stayer Group, UK:* Europe is something like a very easy scapegoat for things that have gone wrong, it’s like “Oh yeah, it’s Europe’s fault!” [Some smiles.] “It’s not our fault! We have to do it because of Europe!”

*British Male (2):* It’s Europe and our assumption of Europeans as different from us. We are not complicit within Europe in anyway. It
is presented as being so and having things inflicted upon us rather than actually participating in their creation, I think.

*British Male (3)*: Don’t politicians do it in every country though? Blame it on Europe?...

*British Male (1)*: Yeah. [Some laughs.] Before it was the USSR [Soviet Union] and now it’s the EU [Laughs].

A good number of participants also said that the focus group discussions were useful in highlighting the importance of the EU and EU citizenship to them. Certainly, the initial surprise some participants expressed about their EU citizenship status appeared to wear off during the discussions. Most participants were, generally, engaged and enthusiastic throughout the discussions, regardless of whether or not there were disagreements within the group. Participants also seemed at ease during the discussions – as apparent especially in how they tackled some really sensitive issues, especially in their discussions of the emerging processes of differentiation in the EU. Hence the focus group evidence suggests that in-depth group discussions where citizens are probed about their perceptions could be quite effective in raising awareness of their EU citizenship and the EU more broadly.

*Lithuanian Male, EU Group 2, Sweden*: I think in general these discussions are really good. And I think we will hear more about these issues [the EU and EU citizenship] in the popular media probably and then the youngsters and stuff, and the situation will radically change in 50 years.
French Male: So progressive!

Lithuanian Male: Yes. I think we will move towards more union.

French Male: Lower barriers, and you will marry a Swede and your children will be naturally European!

Lithuanian Male: Yeah. Of course! I mean that's different times. For example, I have a good friend, she was actually born in France but her father is British, her mother is Swedish and she lives in... Germany. And She is a European! Because, I mean, who she is? She can't live in a box, can't put herself in a box. And more people are like this I think, or becoming like that.

As the above exchange illustrates, the discussions usually ended on a positive note, through which young and educated citizens expressed a sense of anticipation about where the EU and its citizenship were heading (– similarly to the findings of Bruter, 2005).

7.3. Summary

This chapter illustrated that the (initially) fleeting debate about EU participation in the focus groups was a reflection of a general trend among young and educated citizens; hardly any of them had participated in EU politics prior to the focus groups. Even though these citizens believed the EU was important for their everyday considerations, they perceived EU level politics as “too distant” and “abstract”, and therefore hard to really influence. As a result, EU mobiles preferred participating at the national level (in their country of origin or in the host county), while stayers at the local level of politics. Although most
participants suggested that their approach to participation was based on issue-specific considerations – these considerations seem to have only influenced their approaches to alternative forms of engagement. In comparison, rational considerations seemed to guide their actual participation at the EU level. Accordingly, the findings in this chapter complement previous studies which have suggested that EU mobility does not enhance EU mobiles’ disposition to participate in politics (Mattila, 2003; Muxel, 2009; Favell, 2010; Strudel and Michalska, 2012).

Moreover, quite a few participants interpreted their abstention from EU participation as a sign of their fragile sense of EU identity and lack of knowledge about EU rights – making an explicit reference to the proposed interrelated relationship between the dimensions of (EU) citizenship (Tilly, 2003: 611; Bellamy, 2008a: 12, 2010: xvi). In light of the findings from the previous chapters, we can assume that the lived experiences of EU citizenship – as long as it is activated by EU mobility – is likely to be substantially different from that of national citizenships – which are activated by citizens’ participation. These issues then led to further debates and the supposition that the combination of EU mobility and (interest in) EU participation separated EU mobile/knowledgeable from stayer/uninformed citizens. Nonetheless, once prompted, participants identified prospective avenues for raising awareness among citizens – all of which had a top-down course. Overall then, the findings in this chapter seem to echo the conclusions reached by the previous two chapters of this thesis on EU identity and EU rights (Chapters 5 – 6): rather than EU participation, EU (learning) mobility
makes the realisation of European Union (EU) citizenship most likely. The concluding chapter provides an overall assessment of the resulting model of EU citizenship, and considers its implications for scholars and policy-makers interested in addressing this issue.
Chapter 8. Conclusion and discussion

Globalisation processes are transforming the relationship between nation states and citizens (Isin and Turner, 2002), revising processes of differentiation and exclusion (see for example Skey, 2011a). These transformations are particularly evident in Europe (Beck, 2006), where the first direct bond between a transnational political community (the EU) and the individuals (member state citizens) was introduced in the form of EU citizenship. Despite their newly found transnational status, EU citizens have exhibited discontent with the project of European integration (Favell, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). Centrifugal forces emanating from the recent financial crisis and depression have led to a growing sense of Euroscepticism (Shore, 2012; Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014), and, in some cases, demands for exiting the EU (Geddes, 2014; Wellings and Baxendale, 2015). These developments have not quite deterred the Commission’s (2013b: 2; 2014f) political aspirations – even though it is aware of the obstacles it must tackle before any supranational ideals can be turned into reality (Juncker, 2014). The mismatch between the attitudes of citizens, national and EU political actors to European integration compel us to address the issue and significance of EU citizenship today.

Against this backdrop, the thesis investigated how EU citizenship is realised in practice. More specifically, it explored whether and how young and educated EU citizens realise their EU citizenship (Research Question 1), and, in so doing, the extent to which they also realise the Commission’s ideals of EU
citizenship (or are ever likely to do so) (Research Question 2). Adopting a more inclusive approach to its study, an additional question was raised about the relationship between the dimensions of EU citizenship – EU identity, EU rights and EU participation. Accordingly, the thesis was interested in how the dimensions of EU citizenship are likely to transform one another and, eventually, shape the broader structure of EU citizenship (Research Question 3). Due to the role of EU mobility in activating EU citizenship, the thesis then interrogated resulting processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU (Research Question 4). Finally, the thesis examined the alleged link between EU citizenship and political integration in Europe (Research Question 5).

In order to investigate how citizens realise their EU citizenship, the thesis embedded its study in the broader field of citizenship studies (Chapter 1). It emphasised the requirement to adopt a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship and, as a result, attend to the various frameworks and dimensions of EU citizenship concurrently. The thesis then studied the institutional framework of EU citizenship and the scope it provides for citizens to realise their EU status. In an attempt to make a small contribution to previous research on the institutional framework of EU citizenship (Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2005; Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Olsen, 2008a; 2012; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012), Chapter 2 included a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship. Once the institutionalised connotation between EU citizenship and EU (learning) mobility was illustrated, the thesis begun to explore the likely effects mobility can have on citizens’ perceptions. To this end, the thesis considered
the findings of existing qualitative studies on (young) citizens’ sense of EU citizenship and identity (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; 2010; Skey, 2011a; Ross, 2014; see also Table 3.4.). To complement and develop these findings further, it used original focus group evidence with young and educated citizens in Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). More specifically, the focus group evidence investigated the perceptions of EU mobiles and stayers (as the control group) about EU citizenship broadly speaking (Chapter 4) and across the aforementioned dimensions of EU citizenship (Chapters 5 – 7).

Building on the key findings from the five empirical chapters, this concluding chapter presents an overall assessment of EU citizenship and sheds light on how contemporary EU citizenship is likely to shape the course of political integration in Europe. The chapter has three main parts. The first part summarises the key findings from the empirical chapters and, especially, illustrates the likely distinctions that may emerge as a result of young citizens’ different experiences of EU mobility. The second part considers the likely implications these findings have for scholars and policy-makers interested in addressing the issue of EU citizenship, including the never-ending debate about democratic deficits. The third part identifies potential research agendas and questions for future studies.

8.1. Main findings

Chapter 2 analysed the institutional framework of EU citizenship, and made an attempt to illustrate the scope these frameworks grant for citizens to realise
their EU citizenship. To this end, it examined the Commission’s ideals on EU citizenship. The chapter drew attention to the continued emphasis placed on promoting (member state) citizens’ EU mobility – a finding that has been emphasised by previous research as well (Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2005; Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Olsen, 2008a; 2012; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012). For example, rather than expecting to raise a ‘community of Europeans’, the Commission appears to support the building of a community of EU mobiles. It provides an ever-expanding scope for EU mobiles to realise their EU citizenship. Even more, the chapter suggested that the Commission (2010d; 2012i; 2014a) seems to place a special emphasis on facilitating and promoting the learning mobility of young and educated EU citizens. In this sense, the educational setting, which supposedly raises ideal national citizens (Heater, 2004c; Arthur, Davies and Hahn, 2008; Biesta, 2011), is projected to replicate similar results at the EU level (see for example Council of Ministers, 1987).

Despite its optimistic tone, there is an inherent tension in the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship. Specifically, the original economic rationale of EU mobility – it was introduced to facilitate EU labour mobility (Maas, 2007) – seems to supersede the political objectives of EU citizenship. This tension is perhaps due to the institutional dynamics of the EU, which has weakened the Commission’s influence (Egeberg, 2013) but increased the legitimacy of the EP and the EU Council (for an overview see for example Hix and Høyland, 2011: 23-48). Hence, the Commission might find it easier to shape economic rather than political decisions (Hodson, 2013; Bauer and Becker, 2014). This
could explain why there is a permanent focus in its discourse on economic rights – EU mobility – instead of the political dimensions of EU citizenship – EU identity and EU participation. In fact, these political dimensions have only really come to the fore during the lead up to (recent) EP elections and EU treaty revisions. These issues have important consequences for the scope citizens have for realising EU citizenship. In particular, only through EU (learning) mobility can citizens realise the ideals of the Commission. Using original focus group evidence from Sweden and the UK, the four subsequent empirical chapters shed light on the extent to which these ideals were indeed realised by young and educated citizens.

Chapter 4 drew attention to the distinctiveness in the initial approaches of EU mobiles and stayers to EU and national citizenships, and the contingent character of their sense of EU citizenship. Most importantly, the chapter underlined that EU mobility was likely to lead to a brief experience for EU mobiles and was perceived as somewhat irrelevant by stayers. For example, while EU mobiles observed EU citizenship as a “novelty”, stayers saw it as “an extension” of their national citizenship. In support of their argument, EU mobiles had a tendency to use personal stories, which underlined the “huge [and] incalculable advantage[s]” of their EU status. These advantages were then observed as effective in enhancing EU mobiles’ sense of identification as EU citizens. By contrast, hardly any stayers identified as EU citizens and some appeared to be surprised by the proposition that they could be regarded as EU citizens from a legal perspective. The oft-cited British Euroscepticism manifested itself in the UK stayer group early in the discussions. Actually, the
UK stayer group identified EU citizenship as yet another aspect that accentuated the peculiar position of the UK compared to “the rest of Europe”.

Nevertheless, the other groups also underscored the contingent character of EU citizenship and, especially, the reasons why EU citizenship was not an attractive alternative to, or a possible replacement for their national citizenships. For example, European integration did not draw attention to the similarities across the EU but emphasised the divisions between member states and intra-EU regions (East-West/ North-South). The dynamism of the EU’s external borders was then identified as another factor undermining the idea of a single EU community. Moreover, a good number of EU mobiles and stayers assumed that EU citizenship did not yet exist. While the focus groups in Sweden expected EU citizenship to become more prominent over time, UK groups concluded that due to the precedence of national citizenships, it will always be “very difficult” to realise a deeper sense of attachment to EU citizenship.

Hence, the initial findings of the focus groups corresponded with previous arguments about the importance of personal advantages, especially mobility in developing citizens’ sense of identification as EU citizens (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; TNS Opinion and Social, 2011; Sanders et al., 2012; European Commission, 2013a; Ross, 2014). The evidence suggests that nationalist approaches to EU citizenship (Smith, 1993; Delanty, 1997; Bellamy, 2008b) might be the closest to explaining how the majority of EU citizens – the stayers – approach their ‘second-order’ EU status. Moreover, these findings
support the conclusions reached by previous qualitative studies that point to the ambiguity in how citizens perceive European integration (White, 2011; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). By comparison, the generally more favourable tone of quantitative studies (Recchi and Favell, 2009; TNS Opinion and Social, 2011; Recchi et al., 2012; Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012) was only really corroborated in the Swedish groups and only when EU mobiles and stayers considered what the future of the EU and EU citizenship might hold.

The subsequent empirical chapters explored more specifically young and educated EU citizens’ perceptions of the different dimensions of EU citizenship – EU identity, EU rights and EU participation – and the likely impact EU mobility had on their perceptions. Chapter 5 illustrated the diversity in young and educated citizens’ sense of EU identity. Both EU mobiles and stayers were quick to underscore the context-contingent and “kaleidoscopic” character of their national and EU identities (Ross, 2014). These identities were then reconfigured by citizens’ varying experiences of EU mobility, which enhanced EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU and shared EU identity with their fellow mobiles. In this context, an antagonistic rather than welcoming or neutral country context emerged as constructive for EU mobiles’ sense of EU identity. In reality, EU mobility appeared to contribute towards a sense of contradictory civic EU identity among EU mobiles – assigning the cultural aspect of citizens’ identity at the national level (Bruter, 2005; Ross, 2014). Moreover, it was likely to lead to a growing “community of visiting EU students”, and sometimes to a community of visiting students only, with the
latter also including international students. However, a “community of Europeans” based on an increased level of transaction between EU mobiles and stayers (Deutsch et al., 1968) did not materialise. In this context, stayers’ exposure to EU mobility either did not have any effect on their sense of EU identity – nourishing a sense of ambivalence towards the EU (White, 2011; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014) – or hindered rather than enhanced their sense of EU identity. In the latter case, EU mobility was shown to accentuate persisting national differences and the ‘peculiarity’ of Sweden and the UK within the EU.

Nonetheless, both EU mobiles and stayers appeared to be quite perceptive of the deficits in their sense of EU identity. They proposed external migration and top-down approaches as possible alternatives to promoting EU identity. However, none of the participants acknowledged the costs associated with external migration – even though the same issue made it more likely for both groups of citizens to continue studying within rather than outside the EU. They simply replaced an elitist process of EU identity promotion – EU mobility – with an even more elitist process – external EU migration. In comparison, top-down processes of EU identity promotion appeared to be more effective in enhancing citizens’ sense of EU identity, especially in the case of symbols, values and regulations, which emphasised the practical benefits of their countries’ EU membership. Nonetheless, the actual effects of these top-down processes were highly dependent on member state implementation procedures. Existing studies also demonstrate the inconsistent effect of these
processes and prevalence at the cognitive level of citizens’ sense of EU identity (for an overview see Kaina and Karolewski, 2013: 33-5).

Chapter 6 shed light on the perceptions of EU mobiles and stayers about their EU rights. The initial findings suggested that both groups were fairly well-informed about their EU rights, especially their EU mobility rights and associated civic, social and economic entitlements. This finding complements previous studies about the tendency among (young) citizens to substitute the advantages of their EU citizenship with EU mobility rights (Férrandez, 2005; Favell, 2008; TNS Opinion and Social, 2010). The chapter went beyond this finding by suggesting that both EU mobiles and stayers had a tendency to firmly embed EU mobility as a significant aspect of citizens’ everyday lives within the EU. Mobility then created a sense of geographical proximity between the EU and its citizens (Siklodi, 2014). Even more, the subsequent debates suggested that EU mobility might effectively serve in creating a dynamic bond between the EU and its young and educated citizens – which is precisely how scholars in the field of citizenship studies define the concept of ‘citizenship’ (see for example Aristotle, 1946; Isin and Turner, 2002; Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005).

Nonetheless, EU mobiles quickly identified a range of obstacles they had to face whilst residing in Sweden or the UK (when they had attempted to open a bank account for example). Both EU mobiles and stayers then spoke about the diversity in European languages, cultures and welfare state provisions (especially those related to health care and education) (Favell, 2008;
European Commission, 2010b; 2013a), and the uneven influence of national governments at the EU level (Moravcsik, 1998) as limiting citizens’ scope for realising their EU status. Although the Commission has not offered a solution of its own, it has also acknowledged that most of these issues require the urgent attention of EU policy-makers (European Commission, 2010b).

Against this backdrop, EU mobiles suggested that EU citizenship might be irrelevant for stayers because it did not deliver them any advantages. However, stayers also focused on EU mobility as the main advantage of their EU rights. Interestingly, none of the stayer groups spoke of EU participation at this point – though it is the only EU right they could use within their country of origin. Thus there were no major differences between the approaches of EU mobiles and stayers to EU rights. Nonetheless, there was an interesting difference between the approaches of EU mobiles in the two countries. Although Sweden is usually identified as the ideal context for post-national models of citizenships to emerge (Agius, 2006: 588; Welzel and Inglehart, 2010: 55), it was the EU groups in the UK, which considered EU participation within the theme of EU rights (albeit to a limited extent as well).

These debates illustrated the way in which EU mobility likely to lead to new processes of differentiation in the EU. Although young and educated citizens are likely to be the least affected by national migration policies and stereotypes, EU (learning) mobility appeared to accentuate the importance of these issues. As a result, different categories of EU citizens were classified, depending on their mobility status (EU mobiles/stayers), country of origin
(especially along the East/West and North/South divides, and length of membership in the EU) and socio-economic backgrounds (students/ workers, ethnic backgrounds, language skills, economic resources and educational qualifications). Similarly to the discourse of the Commission (2014b), EU-15 mobiles were then identified as having the best prospects to fully exercise their EU rights. However, the Swedish groups predicted that these different categories of EU citizens would likely to disappear in the future.

This somewhat optimistic assumption was, however, challenged by the findings of Chapter 7, which shed light on young and educated EU citizens’ perceptions of EU participation. It suggested that the (initially) fleeting debate about EU participation in the focus groups was a reflection of a general trend across the focus groups; hardly anyone had participated in EU politics – understood here as the participatory right enjoyed specifically by virtue of the status of EU citizenship. Abstention from EU participation was interpreted by the participants as a sign of citizens’ fragile sense of EU identity and lack of knowledge about EU rights – making an explicit reference to the interlinked dimensions of (EU) citizenship (Tilly, 2003: 611; Bellamy, 2008a: 12, 2010: xvi). In practice however, the abstention of EU mobiles and stayers appeared to be either the result of ineligibility (due to age restrictions) or issue-based approaches to participation coupled with rational cost-benefit calculations. Since they observed the national or local levels as the most relevant to their lives, these citizens mostly participated at these two levels of politics. Hence their resulting abstention from EU participation was another manifestation in part of the second-order character of EP elections (Schmitt, 2005) and the
broader trend of declining citizen participation more broadly (Norris, 2002; Franklin, 2004; Sloam, 2014). Considered in light of the findings from the previous chapters, especially the emphasis placed on experiences of EU mobility, it is quite apparent that the lived experiences of EU citizenship are likely to be substantially different from that of national citizenships. The almost non-existent participation among these young and educated EU citizens in EU political activities granted to them specifically by virtue of their status as EU citizens could also be interpreted as replicating the differences between these two models of citizenship. The same point is supported by the previous findings about the way in which most of these young and educated citizens admitted to taking EU mobility rights for granted. Similar discussions did not ensue in relation to EU participation.

Moreover, a number of differences between and among EU mobiles and stayers’ perceptions of (EU) participation emerged. Most importantly perhaps, EU mobiles were more likely to use alternative forms of citizenship engagement to make an impact, while most stayers (especially in Sweden) used traditional forms of engagement. Some of these differences could perhaps be explained by the variation between EU mobiles’ perceptions about their preferred forms of engagement. Those who had arrived in Sweden or the UK recently and for a temporary period, expressed a sense of awkwardness about being able to participate in the local and EP elections there. In comparison, EU mobiles who resided in one of these countries on a semi-permanent basis, were also more prone to support the granting of general electoral rights to EU residents. Since EU mobility flows are circular and
temporary in character (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010), the above-mentioned differences between short and long-term EU mobiles’ perceptions may shed light on why the majority of EU citizens do not participate in the host country (Strudel and Michalska, 2012), but do so in their country of origins (Muxel, 2009) or through alternative forms of engagement (Favell, 2010).

The role of EU mobility in new processes of differentiation was once again noticeable when EU mobiles and Swedish stayers differentiated between EU citizens, depending on their perceived awareness of EU politics. EU mobiles equated awareness of EU politics with mobility status and suggested that the opportunity to participate in EU politics should be made on the basis of whether citizens were mobile and thus more “knowledgeable” about the EU or stayed in their country of origin and remained “uninformed”. Nonetheless, prospective avenues for raising awareness among citizens were also offered, including the introduction of the EU as a unit in secondary schools as well as more extensive media coverage of EU level politics. The UK groups were also outspoken about the role national governments should play in disseminating information about EU citizenship and EU rights. Most of these avenues require little if any initiative from citizens, perhaps echoing the broader context of citizens increasing preference for passive forms of non-engagement (Smets and van Ham, 2013; Sloam, 2014).

Thus the empirical chapters complemented one another by providing different insight into how young and educated citizens were likely to realise EU citizenship in relation to the distinctive but interlinked and related dimensions
of identity, rights and participation. By considering these findings together, we can also make some inferences about how the interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship might transform one another. From the preceding discussion the inconsistencies in participants responses should be apparent. Every now and then an attempt was made by the participants to supplement the perceived shortfall of one dimension of their EU citizenship by pointing to the substance of another dimension. For example, when participants recognised the diversity in their perceptions of EU identity, they suggested EU citizenship is perhaps best understood as EU rights. However, having decided that EU rights – mostly EU mobility – did not support their attempt to access member state and EU communities, participants then spoke about EU citizenship as having the utmost meaning as a sense of EU identity. Yet, during their discussion of EU participation, EU identity was once again deemed too fragile to mobilise citizens and EU rights were deemed irrelevant.

These findings suggest that EU rights (especially EU mobility) and EU identity are likely to be perceived as having a positive reciprocal effect on one another. However, EU participation – clearly the weakest dimension of EU citizenship for both EU mobiles and stayers – questions the relevance of the other two dimensions. If anything, these findings underscore the distinctions between the dimensions of national and EU citizenships. That is, the dimensions of EU citizenship are likely to affect one another differently to the dimensions of national citizenships. Against this backdrop, advocating the promotion of EU participation in order to strengthen citizens’ sense of EU identity and awareness of EU rights (beyond mobility) (Sanders et al., 2012;
Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012) might prove futile. Instead, the main challenge for scholars is to resolve the exclusive character EU mobility grants to EU citizenship. In other words, to ensure it is not perceived as an exclusive status reserved for EU mobiles only.

The empirical evidence suggests that EU mobiles and stayers are likely to have different approaches to realising their national and EU citizenships (Research Question 1). Accordingly, the Commission’s expectations of the role of EU citizenship in shaping community-building processes effectively – and following the example set out by national citizenships – are likely to be misplaced (Research Question 2). The exclusive character of EU citizenship is reflected in how citizens’ approach their EU status (and experiences). Moreover, EU mobility – the principal right of EU citizens – seems to give an uneven boost to the other dimensions of EU citizenship (Research Question 3). While the evidence suggests that mobility might encourage a temporary sense of EU identity and (to some extent) awareness of EU entitlements among EU mobiles, it is not likely to make them more interested or engaged in EU participation. In contrast, EU mobility is prone to make EU citizenship almost irrelevant to the lives of stayers – the overwhelming majority of EU citizens. Rather than bringing EU mobiles and stayers together, EU mobility seems to serve as a basis for (new) processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU. The evidence suggests that these processes are apparent even among a supposedly ideal group of EU citizens – those who are the most protected from the adversities of the recent crisis or the differences in the immigration policies of member states. Rather than building a ‘community of
EU citizens’, these processes seem to accentuate the differences between (young and educated) EU mobiles and stayers (Research Question 4). These findings cast doubt on the extent to which contemporary EU citizenship – founded on mobility in the Union – can further the Commission’s supranational political aspirations (Research Question 5).

There are several reasons why the findings of this thesis should not be overstated. Most importantly perhaps, the focus group evidence was drawn from a small and non-representative sample and so it is not suitable for making generalisations about the broader population of young and educated EU mobiles and stayers. Similarly, it is not appropriate for establishing the effects of EU learning mobility and, by association, country contexts on EU citizenship. The evidence is only illustrative of these processes. Moreover, due to the focus group setting, it is likely that group interactions influenced individual answers. However, the group setting allowed for the expression of diverse views and the pattern of discussion drew attention to the issues participants considered most important. The resulting evidence is likely to be more in-depth and exploratory in character than data drawn from interviews or surveys. The focus here on two country cases is a starting point, but does not allow generalisations across the EU-27. As the thesis has shown, the differences between Sweden and the UK are already large. Such differences even within a small study suggest the value of extending the study further. The findings presented by this thesis are a basis for a more ambitious interrogation of what EU citizenship signifies, how EU (learning) mobility is
likely to shape young citizens’ perceptions and what the associated processes of differentiation and exclusion might look like in the EU context.

8.2. Implications

This section considers the likely implications the thesis’s findings have for scholars and policy-makers interested in addressing the issue of EU citizenship. First, the discursive and focus group evidence underlined the benefits of adopting a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship and attending to its frameworks and dimensions concurrently. By exploring the Commission’s ideals on EU citizenship and whether young and educated citizens realise these ideals, the thesis suggested that an economic rationale instead of the EU’s democratic quest dominates the various frameworks of EU citizenship. Similarly, the Commission’s approach to, and citizens’ perception of, the dimensions of EU citizenship were found to fluctuate considerably from one day to the next. Besides, the evidence indicated that the interlinked relationship between the dimensions of EU citizenship (i.e. identity, rights, and participation) is important and likely to be different from what we have observed in the nation state context. As a result, unless we account for the various frameworks and dimensions of EU citizenship together, citizens’ often fragile sense of EU identity and their abstention from EU participation might be interpreted as signalling the crisis of EU citizenship. In contrast however, these findings might be telling us that there are already a handful of EU citizens – the EU-15 mobiles – who have already begun to realise the current ideals of the Commission. In order to make EU citizenship – as a meaningful
status – more common, there is a requirement to revise the Commission’s exclusivist ideals. We could either decouple EU citizenship from EU mobility – and risk losing the only aspect of EU citizenship citizens cherish – or make access to EU mobility more affordable to everyday citizens.

Second, the almost exclusive focus on EU mobility raises serious questions about the broader significance of EU citizenship today. It has little, if any, bearing for the lives of the majority of EU citizens – the stayers. Even if EU mobiles’ sense of EU citizenship alters following periods of EU mobility, often allowing for more favourable attitudes to emerge, their resulting attitudes are expected to be temporary – they last whilst citizens reside aboard but do not integrate into the host country (similar conclusions were reached by Favell, 2008). If we do accept the role of EU mobility in activating EU citizenship, it becomes evident that there is an urgent need to address the temporary character of EU mobiles’ sense of EU citizenship. We could attempt to complement the role of EU mobility by placing more emphasis on the non-neutral (and often antagonistic) approaches to the EU, which seem to prevail in some member states. Similarly, EU symbols, which underline the practical benefits of EU membership, might have a more lasting effect on citizens’ sense of EU identity. In order to make the EU “more democratic” – if, indeed, that is what the Commission aspires to do – putting an emphasis on these issues could prove rewarding. Since the EU is an ever-expanding community, making the EU level more attractive for current and prospective EU mobiles should be a priority. Failing to do so could pose a real threat to attempts to realise a dynamic bond between the EU and the individuals – what EU
citizenship was created to achieve in the first place (see for example European Commission, 1993: 2).

Third, a closer inspection of the dimensions of EU citizenship made a compelling case for addressing the dichotomy of passive/active EU citizens along the stayers/mobiles distinctions. EU mobility reconfigures citizens’ perceptions of the dimensions of EU citizenship. The evidence suggested that, for active EU citizens (in this case ‘EU mobiles’) EU citizenship is chiefly connected to their mobility experiences, while for passive EU citizens (in this case ‘stayers’) EU citizenship has a second-order status and flows from their existing national citizenships. Further sub-categories of EU citizens were also identified throughout the empirical chapters, though these categories varied somewhat from one dimension of EU citizenship to the next. Interestingly, even though young and educated citizens form a specific segment of the EU’s population, those who are safeguarded from the adversities of member state policies, they too found their EU rights as being particularly important in accentuating the differences between EU-15 and CEE mobiles. Further categories of stayers were also identified, according to whether or not citizens could afford to exercise their EU mobility rights in the future. Accordingly, primarily member state citizens might exhibit Eurosceptic attitudes and potential EU citizens a sense of ambivalence towards the EU (see Table 6.1. for an illustration of these categories). If we are to build a “community of Europeans” we should seek to identify avenues for bringing the different categories of EU citizens together.
Finally, the overall findings of the thesis emphasise that we must explore the effects of EU mobility on how citizens realise their (EU) citizenship and, subsequently, the distinctions between the perceptions of EU mobiles and stayers and their approaches to one another. For example, depending on their mobility status, EU mobiles and stayers classified each other as ‘internal EU/national others’, indicating how the interpenetration of EU and national citizenships has provided a further basis for differentiation and internal othering within Europe. In this respect, EU mobility has led to new processes of differentiation between and among EU mobiles and stayers, and blurred the distinctions between EU citizens and the “other”, the non-EU citizens.

Accordingly, some EU mobiles developed a sense of shared identity with international students instead of their fellow EU citizens (the stayers). Distinctions were also made within the categories of EU mobiles and stayers, depending on citizens’ country of origins. Taken seriously, the findings of the thesis suggest that any concrete efforts made by the Commission to further develop EU citizenship, as a relevant status in practice, needs to reflect the variegated ways in which it is experienced and practised by EU citizens themselves. Processes of differentiation and exclusion are a central feature of European societies – local, regional, national and, as the findings here would suggest, increasingly supranational – and which cannot be eradicated simply by a well targeted policy.
8.3. Potential areas for future research

This thesis shows the requirement to attend to the various dimensions of EU citizenship concurrently and recognise the role of EU mobility in activating EU citizenship. In order to settle the question of whether “the glass of EU citizenship … is half full or half empty” (Sanders et al., 2012: 222), quantitative analysis, more specifically, structural equation modelling could be used to test how the various dimensions of EU citizenship relate to one another. To this end, there is a need for EU-wide quantitative data with indicators that can account for the dimensions of EU citizenship and the effects of EU mobility. Using this data could help establish whether the different categories of EU citizens, as identified in this thesis, can be generalised across the EU’s member states. Alternatively, readily available data from the IntUne project, which includes a number of indicators for the dimensions of EU citizenship – albeit it makes little or no references to EU mobility – could be utilised. This data would provide a basis for further unpacking the relationship between the interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship, beyond the focus group evidence here, in order to create a more complete picture of processes of differentiation within the EU.

Against the backdrop of intensified EU mobility flows, there is also a requirement to investigate emerging processes of differentiation and exclusions in the EU. Due to the rather sensitive nature of this issue, qualitative research, especially ethnographic study could be used to flesh out how the different categories of EU citizens – stayers/mobiles but also citizens who participate in different types of mobility (including economic and learning
mobility) – understand how they are affected by these processes. The resulting study might tell us something about the differences between processes of differentiation and exclusion occurring at the national and EU levels across a variety of national contexts.

In their attempt to explore these processes, scholars may find Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of cultural capital and its recent application in the national and (more recently) cosmopolitan contexts a useful starting point (see for example Thompson and Tambyah, 1999; Urry, 2002; Calhoun, 2003; Weenink, 2008; Skey, 2011a, b, 2013). Cultural capital – understood as high-class cultural signals, which underscore processes of differentiation and exclusion – was originally developed to shed light on how social class inequalities were generated and reproduced by the (French) educational system (especially in Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; 1979). In his later works, Bourdieu (1986: 46) highlighted that cultural capital is an inherent aspect of every community and is applicable to different fields (social domains). The concept has not only been adopted to shed light on various processes of differentiation and exclusion in the national and cosmopolitan contexts but in the global student migration context as well (Kim, 2011, 2012; Carlson, 2013; Igarashi and Saito, 2014). Hence, applying the concept of cultural capital to EU mobility and, especially EU learning mobility, could also shed light on the extent to which processes within the EU echo broader developments linked to global (student) migration flows and the cosmopolitan outlook of (chiefly) Western travellers (see for example Calhoun, 2003; Weenink, 2008; Skey, 2013).
Finally, notwithstanding the richness of quantitative and qualitative approaches to research, our understanding of EU citizenship would greatly benefit from mixed-method research. The thesis underlined that there is an urgent requirement to incorporate the findings of qualitative evidence about the ideals of policy-makers regarding EU citizenship with EU-wide data on EU citizens' attitudes and behaviour. It is only by attending seriously to both the top-down and bottom-up aspects of citizenship and citizenship practice that we will further extend our understanding of what is at stake in the on-going process of forging a dynamic bond between the EU and its citizens.
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Farewell to Arms? From ‘Long War’ to Long Peace in Northern Ireland,


http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page10563.asp


Appendix 1. CDA research sample

Treaties

Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of Paris), 18.4.1951.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), 25.3.1957.

Legislative Acts


Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, OJL, L149, 05.7.1971.


**Case of the Court of Justice of the European Union**


Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6-64, Judgment of 15.7.1964.


Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, C-135/08, Judgment of 2.3.2010.

Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Kari Uecker and Vera Jacquet v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Joint cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Judgement of 05.06.1997.

Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, Case C-85/96, 12.5.1998.


**Official European Union documents**


European Commission (1973) Declaration on European Identity,


European Commission (1975c) European Union Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European Council, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/76.


European Commission (2010i) Building E-Justice in the EU, Citizens


European Commission (2010m) Securing a fair trail in the EU, Citizens Factsheets.


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Their Say, Luxemburg: European Union Publication Office.


Appendix 2. Focus group questionnaire and demographical information

Focus group guide – EU Groups

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Welcoming and pre-session questionnaire completion

2. Introduction

a. Introduction of researcher and the purpose of the focus group;

Welcome everyone, my name is Nora Siklodi and I am a PhD candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London (and a Visiting Researcher at the Political Science Department at Stockholm University).

This focus group is organised as part of an academic project on young, migrant citizens’ experiences and practices of citizenship in the European Union. To shed light on these issues a number of focus groups, 8 to 10, are carried out in two cities Stockholm and London. Each session is recorded and later transcribed by me and the analysis of the discussions will be included in my doctoral thesis. Ultimately the discussions in these sessions will assist in outlining a citizenship model based on your actual practices and concepts.

3. Guidelines

Before we start this session, I would like to ask you to bear in mind a few things;

a. This session is recorded, which means, inevitably, that your name will be included in the recordings. However, your name and personal details will be kept confidential and only I will have access to these. In the analysis, thesis and publications your names will be altered to keep your details confidential.
b. To ensure clarity of recordings, could I ask you to let everyone express their views and motivate each other to participate, but for only one person to talk at a time.

For the same reason, I would be grateful if you could switch off your phones or put them on silent.

c. This session is expected to last approximately 90 minutes. Please let me know in advance if you need to leave earlier than that.

d. At the end of the session you will be given 100SEK in Sweden/sweets and pizza in the United Kingdom as a token of thanks.

About our discussion:

This is an informal session, just like the ones you have with your friends at home. I prepared a couple of questions for the beginning and I will drop in a couple of questions or ideas to guide the discussion, but the emphasis here is on how you can relate to this topic. It is your experiences, practices opinions and attitudes that I am interested and value.

Do you have any question about what I have said so far?

4. Participants introduction - Recorded

Please introduce yourselves. (Name and country of origin)

II. DISCUSSION

PART I. GENERAL DISCUSSION

1. Preliminary Questions

To start off the discussion, preliminary questions and issues are raised by the moderator on citizenship, migration and the European Union in general and the experiences of respondents.

To begin with, we are going to discuss some very broad concepts which served as the basis of this research. Please feel free to express your opinions on the questions and also on what you hear from others.

Q1. What does citizenship mean to you?
Q2. What does it mean to be a European citizen?

Have you ever thought of yourself in these terms?
Q3. Why did you leave your home country and choose Sweden/the UK for you studies/residence? Would you have gone somewhere else if you could? 
Cut off discussion after 20 minutes

PART II. STRUCTURED DISCUSSION

Now we are going to consider dimensions that are closely linked with the ideal of modern citizenship and its practices in Europe.

2. **Identity**

Q4. Do you agree or disagree that democratic citizenship should be based on nationality and national sentiments only? Why?

Q5. Do you consider yourself firstly as a British/Swedish *(use as applicable)* or European, country of origin? Can you think of any personal experience(s) that made you feel this way?

Q6. Do you think you would feel ‘more European’ if you lived in another member state? If so, please tell us why.

3. **Rights**

Apparently, we are all supposed to be equals in the EU.

Q7. Can you think of any advantage or disadvantage of not being a native resident of Sweden/ the United Kingdom *(use as applicable)*?

Q7.1. Have you experienced either?

Q7.2. If this was a negative experience, how do you think these issues could be resolved?

Q8. Do you think you gain additional benefits and rights due to European citizenship compared to your national entitlements? Please mention a couple of ‘benefits’ you know of or have experienced

4. **Participation**

Q9. Considering the various types of political participation that is available, for example voting, volunteering, local community action, working for an NGO, etc., could you tell us what forms of political participation have you done in Sweden/ the UK?

Q9.1. Was there a specific reason, maybe issue, that made you participate this way?

Everyone seems to think that participation in politics is the most important feature of citizenship, because people feel that they have a say in political decisions. To what extent do you agree?
Q10. How important do you think it is to be politically engaged in
   a. your country of origin?
   b. country of residence?
   c. Europe?
Q10.1. Have you participated in all of these levels? How?

Cut off discussion after 1 hour.

PART III. STRUCTURED DISCUSSION CONT.
In the following, we would like to learn a little more about your experiences as migrant Europeans in the European Union.

5. Mobility
   You have now travelled a lot.
   Q11. Has travelling within the EU made you feel more or less European?
   How about your experiences in the UK/Sweden?
   Q12. Has living in Sweden/the UK (use as applicable) changed the way in which you perceive politics as a whole? How?
   Q13. Where do you see yourself in 5-10 years’ time?

6. Socialising Practices
   Q14. How do you differentiate, if at all, between acceptable and offensive behaviour and practices? Please give an example.
   The EU is working hard to bring together people by crossing borders.
   Q15. Do you relate differently to people with diverse cultures and background due to your experiences in Sweden/the UK? How?
   Q15.1. What type of people are you likely to socialise with? Why?

Cut off discussion after 1 hour 20 mins

PART IV. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

And finally to finish off the discussion...

7. Closing Questions
   Q16. How would you advise someone who has never heard of European citizenship and just realised that he/she is a European citizen?
   Q17. Has this discussion made you feel more conscious of European citizenship and EU citizens?
Would you like to get more information on this issue, maybe even directly from the EU?

Q18. Would you like to add anything to what has already been said?
Do you have any questions?

Thank you for your time and participation!
End discussion at 1 hour 30 mins
Focus group guide – Stayer Groups

I. SAME INTRODUCTION AS FOR MOBILES

II. DISCUSSION

PART I. GENERAL DISCUSSION

1. Preliminary Questions

To start off the discussion, preliminary questions and issues are raised by the moderator on citizenship, migration and the European Union in general and the experiences of respondents.

To begin with, we are going to discuss some very broad concepts, which served as the basis of the research. Please feel free to express your opinions on the questions and also on what you hear from others.

Q1. What does citizenship mean to you?

Q2. What does it mean to be a European citizen? Have you ever thought of yourself in these terms?

Q3. Have you considered studying/ residing somewhere other than UK/Sweden (use as applicable)? Would you have done this, if you could? Where?

Q3.1. What were the main reasons why you did not go abroad?

Cut off discussion after 20 minutes.

PART II. STRUCTURED DISCUSSION

Now we are going to consider dimensions that are closely linked with the ideal of modern citizenship and its practices in Europe.

2. Identity

Q4. Do you agree or disagree that democratic citizenship should be based on nationality and national sentiments only? Why?

Q5. Do you firstly consider yourself as a European or British/Swedish (use as applicable)? Can you think of any personal experience(s) that made you feel this way?
Q6. Do you think you would feel ‘more European’ if you lived in another member state? If so, please tell us why.

3. Rights

Apparently, we are all supposed to be equals in the EU.

Q7. Do you think this is the case?

Q7.1. Have you personally experienced something relevant?

Q7.2. If this was a negative experience, how do you think these issues could be resolved?

Q8. Do you think you gain additional benefits and rights due to European citizenship compared to your national entitlements? Please mention a couple of ‘benefits’ you know of or have experienced

4. Participation

Q9. Considering the various types of political participation that is available, for example voting, volunteering, local community action, working for an NGO, etc., could you tell us what forms of political participation have you done?

Q9.1. Was there a specific reason, maybe issue that made you participate this way?

Everyone seems to think that participation in politics is the most important feature of citizenship, because people feel that they have a say in political decisions. To what extent do you agree?

Q10. How important do you think it is to be politically engaged at the

d. Local level?

e. National level?

f. European level?

Q10.1. Have you participated in all of these levels? How?

Cut off discussion after 1 hour.

PART III. STRUCTURED DISCUSSION CONT.
In the following, I would like to learn a little more about your experiences as non-migrant European citizens.

5. Mobility

Q11. Have you ever made use of your freedom of movement rights within the EU, for what reasons and why?

If not, how often do you travel outside Sweden/UK and why?

Q12. Where do you see yourself in 5-10 years time?

6. Socialising Practices

Q13. How do you differentiate, if at all, between acceptable and offensive behaviour and practices? Please give an example.

The EU is working hard to bring together people by crossing borders.

Q14. Do you relate differently to people with diverse cultures and background as a result? How?

What type of people are you likely to socialise with?

Cut off discussion after 1 hour 20 mins

PART IV. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

And finally to finish off the discussion…

7. Closing Questions

Q15. How would you advise someone who has never heard of European citizenship and just realised that he/she is a European citizen?

Q16. Has this discussion made you feel more conscious of EU citizenship and citizens?

Would you like to get more information on this issue, maybe even directly from the EU?

Q17. Would you like to add anything to what has already been said?

Do you have any questions?

Thank you for your time and participation!

End discussion around 1 hour 30 mins
A2.3. Demographic survey

Nationality: ________________________________________________________

Country of origin: ________________________________________________

Country of residence: _____________________________________________

Have you lived in other countries? If so, please tell us where and for how long:
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________

How long you have been living in Sweden? ______________________________

What are you studying? _____________________________________________

What is your age? _________________________________________________

Do you identify with any social or ethnic groups other than your national one?
(Optional) ________________________________________________________

In the following, please **TICK** the relevant box:

**Gender:**
1. Male □
2. Female □

**Highest level of education (completed):**
1. A-levels / International Baccalaureate □
2. Bachelors/ First Degree □
3. Masters Degree □
4. PhD □
5. Other: _________________________________________________________
**Focus group sample and coding**

**EU Group 1, Sweden**

14 May 2012, Stockholm University

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**EU Group 2, Sweden**

14 May 2012, Stockholm University

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EU Group 3, Sweden

16 May 2012, Stockholm University

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EU Group 4, Sweden

28 May 2012, Stockholm University

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### Swedish Control Group,
15 May 2012, Stockholm University

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### EU Group 1, UK
26 February 2013, Royal Holloway

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27 February 2013, Royal Holloway

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27 February 2013, Royal Holloway

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**1 March 2013, Royal Holloway**

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### UK Control Group

**27 February 2013, Royal Holloway**

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Appendix 3: EU citizenship rights today: an evaluation

Current list of legislation on EU citizenship\textsuperscript{110}

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<th>Primary legislation</th>
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<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td>Treaty on the European Union\textsuperscript{111}</td>
<td>01 December 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Declaration on Nationality</td>
<td>01 November 1993</td>
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<td>Long-term Residence Directive</td>
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<td>Municipal Elections Directive</td>
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<td>Direct Elections Act</td>
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<td>Amendment of Direct Elections Act</td>
<td>10 August 1976</td>
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<td>Amendment to European Parliament Elections Directive</td>
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<td>European Citizens’ Initiative Regulation</td>
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\textsuperscript{110} For a more detailed list of current EU legislation which has implications for EU citizenship visit EUDO (2014).

\textsuperscript{111} Originally introduced in 1993. It was then amended by the Treaty of Nice, the Treaty of Amsterdam and finally by the TFEU in 2009. It is legally binding in its most recent, 2012 version.
## Overview of citizens’ EU rights: potentials and limitations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Document</th>
<th>EU Citizens’ Rights</th>
<th>Potentials</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Article 18, TFEU</td>
<td>Non-discrimination on the basis of nationality</td>
<td>Observes human rights as citizenship rights. It thus, potentially, strengthens EU citizenship rights and opens an avenue for supra, post-national and cosmopolitan citizenship models in the EU (Soysal 1994; Habermas, 2001; Kostakopoulou, 2007). Provides additional rights to EU mobiles.</td>
<td>It is too broad and applies to all residents in the EU, blurring the distinction between EU citizens and non-citizens. As such, it should not be included under the citizenship provisions of the TFEU. It is only relevant to intra-EU mobiles – has not been applied to the case of stayers to limit the prospect of reverse discrimination (Shuibhne, 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 19, TFEU</td>
<td>Non-discrimination on the basis of intersecting social factors</td>
<td>Same as above. Besides, it provides rights to all EU residents and has served as the foundation for secondary legislation preventing discrimination (Kostakopoulou, 2014).</td>
<td>Same as above. The recent reports by the Commission (2013j, k, l) highlight that the resulting directives have not actually been implemented by member states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 20(1), TFEU Also Article 9, TEU</td>
<td>Introduction of EU citizenship and its bi-level structure</td>
<td>They introduce the first transnational citizenship model (Heater, 2004b). They give a clear indication of who EU citizens and non-citizens are (Kochenov, 2009).</td>
<td>They afford a derogative character to EU citizenship (Hansen, 2009), making it dependent on member state citizenships (Delanty, 1997).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 20(2), TFEU</td>
<td>Preliminary summary of citizens' rights (and duties), and limitations applicable to these rights</td>
<td>It provides substance to EU citizenship. This is the first time citizens’ rights are listed in the EU Treaty.</td>
<td>It is too abstract. The duties of EU citizens are motioned but not defined here or elsewhere in the Treaty. It makes EU rights subjected to the limitations and conditions of the Treaty, most of which are in fact defined by secondary law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 21(1), TFEU</td>
<td>Free movement and residence within EU</td>
<td>It enlists and details mobility and residency rights as the first EU right. The Commission’s (2010a, b, 2013a, b, c) reports have underscored that these rights are simultaneous with EU.</td>
<td>It is not universal because the secondary legislation makes distinction between EU mobiles, depending on the length of their residence (under and over 3 months). The residency rights of mobiles who are staying for over 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
citizenship *per se*. As a result, any restriction on these rights has been narrowly interpreted (Kostakopoulou, 2014). Months are linked to their sufficient economic resources. Also allows for limitations to be imposed by member states on the grounds of national security and public interests – these are decided by the member states (Aradau et al., 2013).

### Article 22, TFEU

| EU mobiles rights to vote and stand as a candidate at the local (Art. 22(1)) and EP elections (Art. 22(2)) | It grants political rights to EU mobiles – one that is comparable to the rights of member state citizens (Shaw, 2007). It introduced representative democracy at the EU level. | It only mentions the voting rights of EU mobiles. There is no discussion of stayers’ political rights. EU mobiles do not receive any right to participate in the national elections in the host country. This may limit their ability to fully integrate there (European Commission, 2012b). It allows member states to introduce registration or residency requirements (Directive 94/80/EC, 93/109/EC and 2013/1/EU). |

### Article 23, TFEU

| Diplomatic protection outside the territory of the EU | Applicable to a fair portion of EU citizens – those who stay in a TC, amounting to around 30 million in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014a). Since it is to be coordinated by the Commission (2010a), it might be the first supranational level right of EU citizens. | After 20 years this right is still not fully introduced in national laws and embassy members are not informed about citizens’ entitlement (European Commission, 2011d). Originally, it was to be implemented and coordinated by member states (Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom). Due to their lateness, the Commission (2010a) has recently adopted a more dynamic role. Even then, it is more of an inter-state than supranational right because in order for citizens to be able to use this right, their country of origin must guarantee and pay all costs (European Commission, 2011d). A secondary legislation to implement this right is still only in the making. |

### Article 24, TFEU

<p>| Right to petition to the | It gives direct access to all EU residents to EU level | It is not in the citizenship title of the TFEU and not only relevant for EU |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EP and Ombudsman in any of the EU's official languages</strong></th>
<th><strong>institutions. Introduces deliberative democracy at the EU level (European Commission, 2008).</strong></th>
<th><strong>citizens. Hence, it blurs the distinction between citizens and non-citizens once again. Though an increasing number of residents make use of this right each year, their total is still less than 1% of the EU’s population (European Commission, 2010a).</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Article 24, TFEU</strong></td>
<td><strong>Citizens’ Initiative</strong></td>
<td><strong>It introduces direct democracy at the EU level and grants agenda-setting right to citizens.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>There are initial composition and qualification requirements for projects to be recognised formally by the Commission (European Commission, 2010e). Even if a CI has been recognised and necessary signatories collected, the Commission is not obliged to propose EU law (EU Regulation 211/2011). For example, the Commission stalled the process in the case of the very first CI that passed these requirements, the right2water initiative.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECFR Title V: Citizens’ Rights</strong></td>
<td><strong>Summarises the rights of EU citizens and introduces additional rights, including citizens’ right to good administration (Art. 41) and access to documents (Art. 42)</strong></td>
<td><strong>It is on the same footing as EU treaties since 2009 (European Commission, 2013j). Thus, whenever a new EU legislation is drawn up, references to the ECFR must be made (Council Decision 2007/252/JHA, European Commission 2013j). It enhances the ‘rights-based’ model of EU citizenship pointing to its supranational potentials (Kochenov, 2012).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>It is not included in the text of the TFEU, blurring its actual impact on policies. UK and Poland has opt-outs, thus it does not actually apply across the EU. It only adds administrative rights to the existing list of EU citizens’ rights. Social rights are introduced under separate titles and most apply to all EU residents (Title V and III respectively).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Although called the “citizenship directive”, it only regulates intra-EU mobility. Introduces three categories of EU mobiles depending on the length of time they spend in the host state.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Directive 94/80/EC</td>
<td>Regulates EU mobiles' right to vote and stand as candidates in the municipal elections (at the host state)</td>
<td>It is a move towards implementing a state-like citizenship at the EU level (European Commission, 1986) and making decisions close to citizens (European Commission, 2012a). It assists the integration of EU mobiles into the host country, which has been shown to matter most to mobiles (Favell, 2010).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council Directive 93/109/EC, Amended by Council Directive 2013/1/EU</td>
<td>Regulates EU mobiles' right to vote and stand as candidates in the EP elections (at the host state)</td>
<td>It summarises the rights and limitations of EU mobiles in the host state and gives them a 'direct' say in EU level policy-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Regulation 211/2011</td>
<td>Citizens’ Initiative</td>
<td>It introduces participatory democracy at the EU level (Garcia and Greenwood, 2014).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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112 Yet DG EMPL (2013e) has proposed another, more specific directive on workers' mobility.
A supranational right. The relevant laws are implemented and drafted by the Commission. It is dynamic and allows for citizens to embrace alternative forms of engagement. Thus it raises new questions about the EU’s legitimacy problem. Commission, 2010f). Even if a CI overcomes these hurdles the Commission is not obliged to propose an EU law. Thus, it underlines the ‘elitist’ character of the EU’s policy-making process (Hix and Høyland, 2011).

| 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom: Decision of the EP | Right to petition the Ombudsman | It guarantees citizens’ direct access to an EU level political actor. | Long-term residents can also make use of this right. Hence it blurs the distinction between EU citizens and ‘the other’. |