The Colonial Palimpsest in Taiwanese Literature

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Wei-ting Liou, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: Liou Wei-ting

Date: 18 May, 2015
Abstract

The thesis investigates the multi-layered colonial history of Taiwanese literature using the concept of the colonial palimpsest and drawing examples from the period of Japanese Rule to the present. The thesis concerns the construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of a Taiwanese subjectivity. I also explore relevant issues in relation to historiography, cultural nationalism, and the State powers so as to re-picture the narrative of Taiwanese literature, diachronically, and synchronically.

In the Introduction, an outline of the history of Taiwan, and the theories of Pierre Bourdieu are discussed. In Chapter One, the layered cultural nationalism of Taiwan is presented and examined. In Chapter Two, I take Wu Zhuoliu's writing to exemplify how the colonial palimpsest has worked in relation to Wu during the transitional periods of the Qing Governance, Japanese Rule, and the KMT regime. In Chapter Three, I examine how the 2-28 Incident has shaped an essential part of the cultural nationalism in Taiwanese literature, and conversely, how the newly-formed 2-28 Literature palimpsestically and dialectically narrated this national trauma. The legitimate Mei chunniang is used to inspect the relationship between literary production and state power. In Chapter Four, Combat Literature, Modernist Literature, and Nativist Literature are examined, demonstrating how Taiwanese subjectivity developed in the immigrant Chinese literary field in Taiwan. The
Chinese diasporic writer Bai Xianyong’s highly-praised *Taipei People* is re-examined in regard to Taiwanese perspectives during the Taiwanese Nativist Literary Debate. In Chapter Five, the emergence of Indigenous Literature during Taiwan’s post-martial-law period is discussed along with problematic Han-centric Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism, as exemplified by the indigenous writer Syman Rapongan’s writing. Finally, Zhu Tianxin’s writing and her *Juancun* background are discussed in the Epilogue as another dimension of the colonial palimpsest.
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For the last three hundred years the Taiwanese have never known a government they could trust. They did not trust the Spaniards, they did not trust the Dutch. They thought they could trust Koxinga but no sooner had they begun to than they fell under the Qing. For Manchus and Japanese alike Taiwan was a colony where principled behaviour had no place.

Introduction: An Outline of the History of Taiwan and the Research Methodology

I. The Palimpsest

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED), a palimpsest means: “A parchment or other writing-material written upon twice, the original writing having been erased or rubbed out to make place for the second; a manuscript in which a later writing is written over an effaced earlier writing.” Palimpsest as a verb means “to make into a palimpsest, to write anew on (parchment, etc.) after erasure of the original writing.”¹

Taiwan’s history is a palimpsest made up of different layers of colonial and postcolonial cultures, experiences and ethnicities. Multiple colonial forces have joined together to form Taiwan’s historical and cultural legacy. In this thesis, I will focus on reviewing this historical process through an examination of Taiwanese literary writing with the help of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s theories. The thesis will concentrate on Taiwanese literary writing (focusing mostly on the genre of fiction) and explore how it has been created out of, and represents, this layered colonial culture of disguised truths and invented realities. The writers of Taiwan have had to negotiate difficult terrain: what is considered historically “true” in one period is perceived as “untrue” under the subsequent regime; what is covered-up by one order is newly-revealed when fresh evidence emerges with the establishment of new political leadership. The resulting shifting, layered understanding of history is a

haunting and problematic process, constituting as much cultural bondage as heritage. As Salman Rushdie puts it in *Midnight’s Children* (1981): “Suddenly you are forever other than you were; and the world becomes such that parents can cease to be parents, and love can turn to hate.”

A complex canvas, re-written over and over by different cultures, discourses, and experiences: this is how I understand Taiwan’s historical and cultural past. I have defined it as a “colonial palimpsest,” and the uncovering and deciphering of its many layers is what lies at the heart of this thesis.

**II. The Research Methodology**

Each chapter of this thesis will discuss the Taiwanese literary history of a specific period, and then go on to analyse the work of an individual author. The complexities and tensions of the colonial palimpsest, either shared collectively—as in the era of a regime-change—or felt and expressed by individual authors in terms of an identity struggle, will be discussed chronologically. With my discussion of both master narratives and smaller ones, I hope—by uncovering layers of social context, and through detailed literary analysis—to highlight and explore the diverse layers of social and individual meaning that have gone into the making of Taiwan’s colonial palimpsest.

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III. An Outline of the History of Taiwan

It is generally agreed at present that the written history of Taiwan can be divided into the following periods: the period of Dutch colonisation (1624-1662 in southern Taiwan) and Spanish colonisation (1626-1641 in Northern Taiwan); the Ming-Zheng Kingdom Period (1661-1683), the period of Qing Rule (1683-1895); the period of Japanese Rule (1895-1945); and the takeover by the KMT party of the Republic of China (from 1945 until 2000, hereafter ROC). As a result of this series of colonisations, Taiwan’s history has precisely what might be termed “palimpsestic” characteristics. In addition, there is always the interference of politics in historiography—that is, colonisation by each successive power has crucially influenced the writing of history. Taiwan has experienced both European (Dutch and Spanish) and Asian (Chinese and Japanese) colonial powers. I have treated different periods and forms of Chinese rule (involving partial or island-wide political dominance from China from the past to the contemporary period in the Ming-Zheng Period, the Qing dynasty, and during the period of the KMT party) as colonial rule due to their governing ideology—that is, they came to this island for political or financial reasons like the other colonial powers. As a result of this complex colonial

\[\text{3 By “present” I mean historiography after the lifting of martial law in 1987. Before it, under the period of KMT rule, the idea that Taiwan had been ruled by five equally powerful regimes could not be suggested. To survive, historians had to (over-)emphasise the positive impact of the KMT rule of Taiwan, while reducing other regimes’ (positive) influences. See the detailed discussion of the KMT’s control of the historical narrative in later chapters of this thesis.} \]

\[\text{4 In Jian Houcong’s Taiwanshi [History of Taiwan] (Taipei: Wunan, 2003), Taiwan’s historical periods are divided by KMT-Chinese historical perspectives. See pp. 280-287, 407, 462, 565, 573, 683. This kind of periodisation reflects the KMT-based historical narrative in various historical textbooks remaining on the market.} \]
situation, it is hard for historians to portray Taiwan’s history objectively. Before the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in 1987, there were large numbers of historical books and textbooks depicting the “history” of Taiwan. However, the historical discourses in these works published before 1987—which were often based on historical texts (in Dutch, Spanish, English, Chinese, Japanese, etc.)—tended to represent and are inevitably marked by the historical perspectives of the hegemonic contexts of Western World-Oceanic-history, Chinese history, and the Japanese Empire. These written “histories” crucially neglected the existence of the indigenous people (at most, they were treated as being of anthropological significance) and their oral cultural heritage, which dates back to 30,000 BC and plays an important role in forming present-day Taiwanese subjectivity and nationalism.

According to present-day historiography (since the 1980s), the very early Austronesian (or Malayo-Polynesian) cultures which occupied the islands across the East Pacific (Oceanic) and the West Pacific (Hesperonesla) are thought to have originated from these “pre-history” indigenous people in Taiwan. Gradually over time—and particularly since the Ming-Zheng period—Han immigrants from the

7 The Han dynasty (202 BC- 220 AD) lasting over 400 years, is commonly considered to be one of the greatest periods in the history of China. It was notable for its expansion, as well as its spreading of Confucian culture to the neighbouring nations. To the present day, the people of China still refer to themselves as the Han people. The political term thus becomes a cohesive cultural identity. However, it should be noted that, genealogically, “Han ethnicity” is a long abused myth when used in relation to
mainland began to inter-mix with the indigenous people in Taiwan, who thus became partially or largely Sinicised, or “civilised” in Han-centred terms. Originally, based on a geographical division, Han immigrants referred to groups of Austronesian indigenes who had settled mainly in the western plains of Taiwan as the “Pinpufan” (plains indigenes), while the indigenes who settled in the mountainous area were named as the “Gaoshanfan” (high mountain indigenes). During the Dutch period, Ming-Zheng period, Qing Rule period, Japanese Rule, and KMT Rule, whenever the idea of “civilisation” was brought in as a criterion to categorise the indigenes, they were seen as “Other” and given differentiating names to be more easily ruled. Thus, during the period of Qing Rule, based on Han-centric ideology, the indigenes were described and differentiated as “Raw Savages” [shengfan], “Cooked Savages” [shoufan], and “Acculturated Savages” [huafan], according to different degrees of assimilation and submission. The “Acculturated Savages” were the median between the civilised “Cooked Savages” and the un-civilised “Raw Savages.” During the period of Japanese Rule, the terms “raw savages” and “cooked savages” were used initially. Later the government and scholars started to label them geographically Chinese migrants who moved to Taiwan from South-East China. See Dr. Lin Mali’s HLA research on Taiwanese genetics in Lin Mali, Women liuzhe buton de xieyi [We Have Different Bloods] (Taipei: Qianwei, 2010). Dr Lin claims that Taiwanese are the offspring of the “yuezu” [Yue ethnic group], who lived in ancient Southern China, rather than the offspring of the Han ethnic group who lived in ancient Northern China.

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9 Ibid.
as “high mountain tribes” (Takasago tribes)\textsuperscript{10} [\textit{Kaoshazu}] and “plains tribes [\textit{Pinpuzu}].\textsuperscript{11} These different discriminatory terms were adopted by the historical narratives of the Ming-Zheng regime, the Dutch,\textsuperscript{12} Qing dynasty, the Japanese, and the later KMT regime. A civilising agenda, involving various attempts to “civilise” a perceived savagery, was embedded into these written historical narratives. As a result, the oral heritage and traditions of the indigenous culture were controlled and misrepresented through the rhetorics of colonial writing, both officially and non-officially.

The Dutch East India company (V.O.C.) occupied Southern Taiwan from 1624-1662\textsuperscript{13} until the late-Ming general, Zheng Chenggong,\textsuperscript{14} overthrew the regime;

\textsuperscript{10} Taiwan was referred to as “Takasago” (highland nation) during the Edo period.

\textsuperscript{11} Tai, \textit{Jianming taiwanshi} [\textit{The Concise History of Taiwan}], pp. 38-39.

\textsuperscript{12} The Dutch missionaries conducted an educational programme, which helped the indigenes under their rule to learn the Sinkan language from 1636. This was the Romanised writing system of the oral native language created by the Dutch missionaries. This writing system remained in use in Southern Taiwan until 1813.

\textsuperscript{13} The V.O.C. was established in 1602. It entered Dayuan (in Tainan) in southern Taiwan with the tacit consent of the Ming dynasty. The Dutch colonisers were called by Taiwanese people “red-hair barbarians.” In 1642, the Dutch drove out the Spaniards and fully controlled the whole of Formosa. Tai, \textit{[The Concise History of Taiwan]}, pp. 118-125.

\textsuperscript{14} Zheng Chenggong [\textit{Koxinga}] was a general in the post-Ming period. His fighting against Qing was mainly in the southern-coastal part of China. In 1662, Zheng defeated the Dutch who were occupying southern Taiwan and founded a prolonged “Ming” regime—the Ming-Zheng regime (1661-1683) in Taiwan. Because the history of the prolonged Ming regime established by Zheng Chenggong was perceived as similar to the prolonged history of the ROC established by the KMT, it provided the basis for a (modern Chinese) national allegory, and Zheng was promoted as a “national”(Han) hero by the KMT. However, Zheng was not exclusively promoted by the KMT, PRC and Japan both regarded him positively (in different ways), as the “Han ethnosymbolism” associated with him itself is
the Ming-Zheng Kingdom went on to occupy present-day Tainan and some southern parts of Taiwan with the help of Han soldiers and Han immigrants, while at the same time cracking down on the indigenous people to gain their land. After the takeover of the Qing Empire, most of the Ming-Zheng soldiers and immigrants were deported back to the mainland in accordance with the Qing Empire’s temporarily restrictive immigration policy (which was conceived to control Han immigrants and thereby prevent their rebellion). However, illegal Han immigrants, mostly male—who can be mainly divided into the Hoklo and Hakka ethnic groups in South-east China—continued to cross the strait, and integrated and prospered by marrying local indigenous women. As the Taiwanese saying goes: “There are only Tangshan [immigrants from China] grandfathers, but no Tangshan grandmothers.” The arrival (or invasion, from the indigenous perspective) of the Han people not only created conflicts between these two cultures, but also led to serious and long-term tensions between the Hoklo and Hakka, ranging from disagreement over the choice of names and music styles to violent ethnic discord. During the period of Qing Rule, these ethnic conflicts were generally of three kinds: between the offspring of the

problematic as Zheng was half Japanese. These politicised imaginations of Koxinga can be seen as the palimpsest of consecration. See the later section of the discussion of Bourdieu’s idea of consecration. However, during the rule of Yongzheng and Qianlong, the immigration policy loosened up.

Ethnic Chinese from Northern China who, at various times between the 4th and 12th centuries, moved to the south of China to escape from strife in their original homelands. Many settled in the border region between Fujian and Guangdong province in present-day China. They speak a distinct Hakka dialect. The name itself means “guest people” and reflects their history of immigration. See Wu Zhuoliu, The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot, trans. Duncan Hunter (Bloomington: 1st Books Library, 2002), p. 289.

Jian, [History of Taiwan], pp. 507-515.
immigrants from Quan and Zhang prefectures of the Fujian province from the Qing Empire; between the offspring of immigrants from Fujian and Guangdong provinces; and between the offspring of the “Han” immigrants and the Taiwanese indigenes. It was through the growth and development of the society of Han immigrants, beginning in the Ming-Zheng regime and evolving during the period of Qing rule (and the later KMT regime) that “Han” culture found a solid place in Taiwan’s history.

In the context of this history, the term “Chineseness” in this thesis will be employed to denote the process of gradual integration and assimilation to the dominant colonial culture—a layered formation—crucial to the history and the history of historiography of Taiwan. More importantly, as I will demonstrate in this thesis, the multi-textured concept of “Chineseness,” whether seen from the perspective of political nationalism or that of cultural nationalism (the latter is the main concern of this thesis), is best understood as an idea of constant and dialectical interplay, exchange, and debate. Each layer of “Chineseness” has been formed by, and bears the particular character of, its time, its political ideology, its cultural production, and its ethnic and economic relationships—in short, the contemporary ethos. Each layer overwrites another, and is, in its turn, overwritten: each layer is distinct and different, but also carries—and must engage with—the indelible trace of what came before.

This process of “palimpsestic differentiation”—how each layer of historical

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18 By “contemporary ethos” I mean the collective feeling and the perceived contextualisation of the diachronic contemporariness.
narrative repeatedly overwrites previous layers—also applies to the later “Japanese layers” in Taiwan (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter One). I will demonstrate—from the Meiji restoration (when Japanisation and Westernisation discourses were prioritised to the detriment of Chineseness, or in other words, when de-Chineseness was the dominant agenda), through the period of Taishō democracy (1912-1926, after World War One, when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s suggestions of self-determination in 1919 to some extent enlarged Japanese tolerance of the social movements in Taiwan\(^1\)), to the rise and fall of Right-wing Militarism (when the Kōminsha policy of assimilation was at its peak\(^2\))—how these different and differing layers of Japanese culture and politics form an important part of the Taiwanese palimpsest.

**Under Japanese Rule:**

The social movements in Taiwan under Japanese Rule—broadly ranging from violent anti-Japanese uprisings to a species of non-aggressive cultural nationalism—can be divided into four periods: first, armed anti-Japanese uprisings (1895-1930); second, a transition from forceful uprisings to cultural nationalism; third, the birth and influence of the Taiwanese Cultural Association [*Taiwan wenhua xiehui*] (1921-1927); and last, the growth of left-wing and right-wing movements

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\(^2\) The more rigid and comprehensive assimilating policy of turning Taiwanese subjects into the subjects of the Japanese emperor during World War Two Taiwan. See Chapter One for details.
(1937-1945).

The idea of a Taiwanese Cultural Association was initially conceived in 1920 by Jiang Weishui (1891-1931), and formally came into being on 17th October 1921.21

75% of its members consisted of landlords, doctors, and cultural workers. In its early years, the association was mainly led by the intelligentsia—men who had wide social connections or received higher and modern education under Japanese Rule.22 These were men such as Lin Xiantang (1881-1956), Jiang Weishui (1891-1931), and Cai Peihuo (1889-1983), Lian Wenqing (1894-1957), Li Yingzhang (1897-1954), and Lai He (1894-1943). In this context, the Taiwan New Cultural Movement [Xinwenhua yundong], which took part in the so-called Xinjiu wenxue lunzheng [New-Old Literary Debate] during the period of Japanese Rule (1920-1942)23, which involved various magazines, writers, and several members of the Taiwanese Cultural

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22 Ibid., pp. 74-79.
23 Liang Mingxiong argues the Taiwanese New Literature Movement was mainly led by Zhang Wojun’s Vernacular Literature Movement against Old (Verse) Literature. The Movement can be counted from 1920, the publication of the magazine Taiwan qingnian [The Taiwan Youth], to 1945, the year that Taiwan was restored (by the KMT). See Liang Mingxiong, Rijushiqi taiwan xinwenxue yundong yanjiu [The Study of Taiwanese New Literature during the Period of Japanese Occupation] (Taipei: Wenshizhe, 2000), p. 149. See a detailed discussion of the Taiwanese New Literature Movement in Chapter One, pp. 62-70. Huang Meie gives a definition of the Taiwanese New-Old Literary Debate from 1924 to 1942. See Huang Meie, Chongceng xiandaixing jingxiang: rizhishidai taiwan chuantong wenren de wenhuashiyu yu wenxue xiangxiang [Mirrors of Multiple Modernities: Cultural Vision and Literary Imagination of Traditional Taiwanese Literati under Japanese Rule] (Taipei: Maitian, 2004), p. 134.
Association, can be mainly traced through two resources:24 through democratic developments in the outside world (democratic events and ideas were allowed and were mostly introduced through the translation of Japanese texts in the Taishō Democratic Period in Taiwan) and the May-Fourth (New Cultural) Movement [Wusi (xinwenhua) yundong] (a culturally modernising project) in China led by Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) and Hu Shi (1891-1962) between 1915-1924.25 They share some similarities: the mobilisation of diverse groups of young people, the advocating of reform of the old society and the New Literature Movement [Xinwenxue yundong], which included the reform of both traditional oral and written forms (to vernacular writing) by Huang Chengcong (1886-1963), Huang Chaoqin (1897-1972), Zhang Wojun (1902-1955), and Lai He.

The pursuit of an emerging political Taiwanese nationalism—albeit subject to strict governmental surveillance—was embedded in these advocates’ vigorous promotion of cultural change and reform. The main difference between the May-fourth Movement in China and the New Cultural Movement in Taiwan lies in their aims. While the movement in China was designed to build up a united cultural

24 The comparison of the two resources of Taiwanese New Literature can be seen in Liang, [The Study of Taiwanese New Literature during the Period of Japanese Occupation], pp. 29-34.
25 The political May-Fourth Movement took place on 4 May 1919 in China. A huge amount of students and many social groups participated in this Chinese nationalist protest, which was against the Chinese government’s timid response to the Treaty of Versailles, allowing Japan to take over territories in Shandong province (which were previously occupied by Germany). These national-level demonstrations were deeply related to the social context of China between (1915-1924), during which reflexive calls for a modernising new China were also embodied in various cultural reforms. See a detailed discussion of the influence of the May-Fourth Movement and the New Cultural Movement in China on Taiwanese New Cultural Movement in Chapter One, pp. 66-67.
movement powerful enough to resist foreign invading powers, the movement in Taiwan was employed in order to get away from the colonial dominance of Japan.\textsuperscript{26} Although neither movement achieved its ultimate aim, both made their influence felt nonetheless.

During the period of Japanese governance, Han culture was gradually seen as a species of counter-colonialism: remaining stubbornly Chinese became a strategic weapon for resistant Taiwanese “Japanese subjects”. However, the pro-Chinese cultural policy under the Japanese colonial government, primarily exemplified by the promotion of Han poetry\textsuperscript{27} all over the island in the early period of colonisation, successfully relaxed the tensions of the of Han-Japan dichotomy. While a return to “native” (Han-Taiwanese) culture is usually seen as an attempt to search for a Taiwanese subjectivity (which was different from a Japanese identification), or, even to decolonise the colonial culture in once-occupied countries, the declining Han culture was not perceived by the Japanese colonial government as a de-colonising weapon in the early period of Japanese Rule. Instead, Han poetry, and other Chinese cultural symbols became practical tools of cultural assimilation to unite Japanese officials and traditional Han literati in Taiwan, since both had undergone an elite education based on the Chinese classics. The Japanese government’s promotion of Han poetry from the early period (such as the development of Han poetry groups,

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 86.
\textsuperscript{27} The term Han poetry in the context of Taiwanese history refers to classical poetry in a general verse form, which can include \textit{Yuefushí} [Musical Bureau Poetry] around the Han dynasty, \textit{Jueju} (verse in quatrain) and \textit{Lushi} (eight-line regulated poetry) popular in the Tang dynasty, Songci (Song lyrical poetry) in the Song dynasty, \textit{Yuanqu} [Yuan lyrics], and \textit{Zhuzhici} (a 7-character verse mainly describing local scenes and peoples) popular in Taiwan under Qing Rule.
Lishe (1902-1943), Yinshe (1909-), and Nanshe (1906-), and its appropriation of the Chinese language in the early 1940s (such as the permission of publication of Fengyuebao during the Sino-Japanese War period, while Han writing was prohibited since 1937)\textsuperscript{28} can be seen as the results of the collaboration between the literary field and the state power.

With the establishment of a modern infrastructure (such as post offices, railways, daily newspaper, schools, the 24-hour timing system) and the dissemination of modernity discourses through modern education and the ideological state apparatus,\textsuperscript{29} “Japaneseness” gradually replaced “Chineseness” (including the

\textsuperscript{28} It is believed that the Office of Taiwan Governor-General prohibited Han writing in magazines on 1 April 1937. But it remains arguable whether this prohibition was severely practiced. In private domain, Taiwan xiaoshuoxuan [A Collection of Taiwanese Novels] was edited by Li Xianzhang in 1940, although its publication was forbidden by the Japanese government. See Shimomura Sakujirō, Cong wenxue du taiwan [Reading Taiwan from Literature] (Taipei: Qianwei, 1988), pp. 62-78. Even after 1937, Fengyuebao (changed its name to Nanfang in 1941), an entertaining magazine written in Chinese, remained its good publication until 1943. See Wang Dewei. Ed. Taiwan: cong wenxue kan lishi [Taiwan: A History Through Literature] (Taipei: Maitian, 2006), p. 123. In 1941, Nanfang started to advertise more slogans and articles about Japanese national policy and War-collaboration. See Yang Yongbin, “Cong ‘Fengyue’ dao ‘Nanfang’—lunxi yifen zhanzhengqi de zhongwen wenyi zhazhi” [From Fengyue to Nanfang— An Analysis of A Chinese Literary Magazine During the War Period] in Fengyue fengyuebao nanfang nanfang shiji zongmulu zhuanshu zhuohe suoyin [A Thorough Index of the Special Essays and the Authors of Fengyue, Fengyue Newspaper, Nanfang, Nanfang Poetry] Eds. Guo Yijun and Yang Yongbin (Taipei: Nantian, 2001), pp. 68-150.

\textsuperscript{29} Using a very different paradigm, this could be seen as what Louis Althusser calls the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). The State Apparatus contributes to the accretion of cultural sediments under each colonial rule, and thus helps to form both cultural and political nationalist discourses in accordance with the expectation of each colonial regime. Althusser argues there are two versions of State Apparatus: Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) and Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). Although RSA and ISA seem to be different in their practice, they both contain violence and ideology. The
layers of old Han-ness and modern Chineseness since the May-Fourth Movement) as the dominant discourse. Many Taiwanese people internalised “being Han/Chinese” as something “derogatory”, while “becoming Japanese” was seen as something “modern”. As a result, traditional Han culture was inevitably associated with something “backwards” in the eyes of some Taiwanese intellectuals (and especially so in Japanese imperialist discourses in the prime time of the Kōminka

RSA involves the military and prisons, while the ISA consists of education, media, and literature controlled and influenced by political propaganda. ISA institutions, especially schooling and language policy in education, help to shape individual habitus and thus collective nationalism (the latter is Althusser’s main concern). See Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (London: NLB, 1971), pp. 140, 141, 136-137. In the following chapters, Althusser’s conception of ISA, though a theory based on a specific Western context, will be referenced in reviewing the cultural policies on national terms by the colonial regimes in Taiwan to demonstrate the political interference in the literary field.

30 See the discussion of Wu Zhuoliu’s *Orphan of Asia* for one of the examples, in which the portrayal of teacher Peng and Zhida represents such polarised images. Teacher Peng embraces himself in “outdated” Han values, whereas Zhida is a Japanised imperial subject associated with “modern flavour”. See pp. 172-174 in the thesis. Especially in the highly politicised period of Kōminka, Japaneseness and Chineseness could be considered incompatible for the Japanese officials then. However, the two concepts could be mutually compatible for the intellectuals and authors discussed in the thesis. The Vernacular Literary Movement promoted by Zhang Wojun and some Taiwanese intellectuals gained inspiration from the May-Fourth New Literature movement in China. This Chinese resource was considered modern in the eyes of some Taiwanese intellectuals. On the other hand, using Japanese as an access to world literature and to leftist and modern trends was also considered modern in the eyes of some Taiwanese intellectuals. In addition, according to Shih Shu-mei, Westernisation mediated by Japaneseness was deployed by Chinese modernist writers to forge new elements of Chineseness in the May-Fourth Movement. See Shih Shu-mei, *The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China 1917-1937*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 140-144.

31 Such as the intellectuals in the New-Old literary debate. Even though there existed different approaches to “new” literature, the “New” school included Zhang Wojun, Lai He, Chen Xugu, Chen Fengyuan, and Ye Rongzhong.
Movement during World War II Taiwan, in which the division between “Japaneseness” and “Chineseness” was enforced and the two identities were considered incompatible, many of whom had received “modern” Japanese education. In their eyes, when constructing a “modern” and a national identity in relation to the more modern “Other” (Japan), “being Chinese” was less attractive than “being Taiwanese”\textsuperscript{32}—a hybrid identification combining “native Taiwaneseess”\textsuperscript{33} (localised Han identification) and colonial Japanese modernity.

It was during this cultural crisis that the Taiwan huawen debate (Debate on the Taiwanese language) emerged in the literary field between 1930-1932.\textsuperscript{34} Compared with the New/Old Literary Debate, in which literary genres represented struggles between modern and premodern discourses, issues concerning the use of language in the Taiwan huawen debate brought embedded national thinking\textsuperscript{35} in relation to language to the front. In this debate, different routes of establishing a

\textsuperscript{32} “Being Taiwanese”, the developing of discourses contrary to the imperial discourses of “becoming Japanese”, in this colonial context refers to the self-awakening process of a presumed “national subjectivity” (as well as other nationalist discourses based on a search for roots in other parts of the world) from the armed anti-Japanese activities, through the Parliamentary Petition, and to the later “cultural” approaches led by the people in colonial Taiwan. Ethnic or national identification was usually involved in these actions.

\textsuperscript{33} Different from “being Taiwanese”, “native Taiwaneseness” refers to a search for the “roots” (most of which were based on Han terms) against the “alien” Japanese culture. Political nationalism is not necessarily involved in this search.

\textsuperscript{34} See pp. 78-86 for a detailed discussion of the Taiwan huawen debate.

vernacular-written system were proposed and supported with different (national) ideologies. Cai Peihuo, with his Presbyterian background, proposed a Romanised-Hoklo transcription system. Zhang Wojun, with supporters such as Liao Yuwen (1912-1980), Lin Kefu, and Zhu Dianren (1903-1951), advocated borrowing the Chinese Vernacular system (Beijing/Mandarin in spoken communication with Han characters in written form). Huang Shihui and Guo Qiusheng’s *Taiwan huawen* [Taiwanese speaking and writing] proposed using Han characters to write down the spoken Taiwanese (Hoklo).

### Under the KMT

Having been defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) which established the public of China (hereafter PRC) in 1949, Chiang Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan where he proceeded to take over and rule the island under the KMT. This regime went on to inscribe yet another layer of “Chineseness” on Taiwan’s palimpsest.

The rule of the KMT will be discussed in detail in Chapters Three and Four. The 2-28 Incident stands in a crucial position in the transitional period bridging Japanese rule and the KMT regime. This incident is largely responsible for the distinct shaping and form of Taiwanese nationalism.36

### The 2-28 Incident

36 The 2-28 Incident probably holds the most clearly nationalist position in the longue duree of Taiwanese history. Many typical discourses of Taiwanese Literature keep referring to it as a turning point, as regards a break with Chinese nostalgia, and the building of Taiwanese subjectivity.
The word “incident” is chosen as a neutral term in this thesis in preference to “riot” which adopts the ruling perspective and is mainly adopted by pro-KMT critics. However, personally, I prefer the term “uprising” to “incident,” because the term “uprising” registers the revolutionary definition of this event. This is adopted mainly by pro-Taiwan scholars to evoke suppressed Taiwanese nationalism. As Hsiau A-chin notes in his *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*: “the 2-28 Incident is a major source of Taiwanese nationalism.”

Following Japan’s surrender, Taiwan was taken over by Chiang Kai-shek’s military forces and was made a province of the Republic of China in the autumn of 1945. Although the KMT still insists on its legitimate dominance over Taiwan, Mainland China, and even Mongolia, it is agreed in most post-martial-law historiography in Taiwan that Taiwan was in fact taken-over (rather than “re-covered”) by Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT regime through UN commissions. According to Tai Pao-tsun, Chiang Kai-shek sent delegates “to take over Taiwan according to the No.1 Order of the Allies.” However, in sharp contrast to Taiwanese people’s high expectations, the warmly welcomed KMT Chief Executive Officer of the Taiwan Provincial Government, Chen Yi, along with his officials and troops, gradually disappointed the Taiwanese people with discriminatory ethnic policies (policies which caused greater gaps between the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese and policies which created a social hierarchy that prioritised the Mainlanders over the Taiwanese). In addition, Chen Yi’s administration brought

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37 Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, p.5.  
38 Tai, *The Concise History of Taiwan*, pp. 158-159.
economic chaos (such as financial inflation) and administrative corruption. The 2-28 Incident in 1947 happened under the governance of the Executive Office of the Taiwan Province [Taiwansheng xingzheng zhangguan gongshu], of which Chen Yi was the governor. 39 In Taipei in the evening of 27 February 1947, four agents from the Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau attempted to confiscate black-market cigarettes and cash from an elderly widow, Lin Jiangmai. She was pistol-whipped on the head, and the onlookers were so inflamed that they started to chase the agents. A warning shot fired by one of the agents accidentally killed a bypasser, Lin Wenxi. This accidental killing caused much more anger among the crowds and ignited the long-felt dissatisfaction with the Chen Yi Administrative Government. The crowds demanded that the shooter, who was hiding in a police station, be brought to justice.

On 28 February, mass anger began to escalate in Taipei. Demonstrators went to Governor-General Chen Yi’s building to protest, but, instead of being given the official explanation they had expected, they were shot at with machine guns by the security forces. Two protestors were killed on the spot. The news of this local event spread all over Taiwan via radio broadcasts, and the local disturbance was transformed into an island-wide conflict. 40 The dissatisfied Taiwanese transferred their anger to the newly-arrived Chinese Mainlanders, who became the next target of violence; some of them were attacked or even killed. The weapons in police stations

39 The short-lived government of Taiwan from September 1945 to April 1947, set up by the Republic of China (KMT), was used to take over and govern Taiwan after the defeat of Japan in WWII in 1945. After the 2-28 Event, it was soon replaced by the Taiwan Provincial Government (April 1947-).

in many counties were confiscated by Taiwanese citizens, and public order was then temporarily maintained by local high-school students.

The Settlement Committee of the 2-28 Incident was then formed by local leaders to negotiate with the KMT governor, Chen Yi. The committee members presented a list of thirty-two demands, which mainly asked the Chen Yi government to settle the 2-28 Incident by consenting to the following three main resolutions: (1) to put an end to ethnic discrimination and political corruption; (2) to guarantee freedom of speech; (3) to enhance local autonomy. Chen Yi appeared to accept the demands. But, in fact, Chen Yi remained unmoved; he saw the incident as insurgency, and secretly asked for troops from Chiang Kai-shek (from Mainland China) to quell the “rebellions conspired by the communists.” Troops of the Republic of China from the Mainland launched a crack-down over the whole island, starting on the 8th March 1947, followed by an island-wide Pacification and Town-Cleansing program which resulted in a death toll standing at around 18,000 to 28,000 people. During the course of this action, many Taiwanese elites disappeared, were killed, or were put in prison. After the island-wide Incident, the 2-28 incident became a forbidden topic in public until 1987, when martial law was lifted. As Hsiau concludes, the incident “soured the relationship between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders,” and the “distrust bred by this event has dominated ethnic politics on the island ever since.”

According to Hsiau, this KMT regime, termed by some critics as the “new

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41 Ibid., pp. 51-61.
42 Ibid., pp. 63-73.
43 Hsiau, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism, p. 5.
colonial government” because it was responsible for the 2-28 Incident, “resulted in constant hostility between the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese.”\textsuperscript{44} The 2-28 Incident, as a collective trauma, still causes tensions within present-day ethnic politics in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{46} The KMT’s subsequent stricter policy of mono-lingualism (the legitimising of spoken Mandarin based on written Chinese)\textsuperscript{47} along with the later, propaganda-motivated Combat Literature [Zhandou wenyi] of the 1950s\textsuperscript{48}, and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement [Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong] (since 1967), all consolidated the KMT’s role as the legitimate inheritor of the cultural and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{44} The term non-provincial/mainland [\textit{waisheng, or shengwai}] people refers to the ethnic group from provinces outside Taiwan province, as Taiwan was included in the Republic of China as a province in 1945. By non-provincial/mainlanders, I mean non-Taiwanese-provincial people [\textit{waishengren}], most of whom migrated to Taiwan in/after 1949. The terms provincial [\textit{bensheng}] and non-provincial [\textit{waisheng, or shengwai}] carry more neutral meanings than terms like Taiwanese/non-Taiwanese and Chinese/non-Chinese. These were less used in historical and literary study during the White Terror, because they ethically challenged the KMT’s political ideal that Taiwan has long been a province of China. Non-provincial means the same in most cases as “Mainland Chinese.” “Mainland Chinese” refers to a broad geographical and a general cultural identity rather than a political reality of being a state—of a cultural Fatherland, referring to people from China in history. I prefer the use of “non-provincial” to “Mainland Chinese” or even “Chinese,” because the former has a more precise meaning. However, “Mainland Chinese” and “Chinese” were “legitimate” terms more often used in the context of the period of martial law.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{45} A-chin Hsiau, \textit{Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism} (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 56-57.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{46} Such as the tension of identification between “mainlander” and “Taiwanese” ethnic group, which is a constant political issue masterminded by politicians during election campaigns, although this tactic often causes backfires.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 57.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{48} The state-mobilised patriotic (anti-communist) literary movement in 1950s Taiwan. See pp. 183-184 in Chapter Three and pp. 253-259 in Chapter Four for more details.}
political heritage of the Han symbols\textsuperscript{49}, formerly suppressed by the Japanese Rule. Through this political crackdown and exercise of cultural control, the KMT thereby justified its presence in Taiwan after the United States defeated Japan in the Second World War.

However, the implementation of martial law (1949-1987) by the KMT, along with its cultural propaganda mentioned above, could not stop the attempted pursuit of literary autonomy by writers, either by local “Taiwanese” or non-provincial ones. This saw the development of (Taiwanese) Modernism led by the Chinese diasporic writer Bai Xianyong (1937-) in the 1960s\textsuperscript{50} under the influence of American anti-communist cultural policy during the Cold-War\textsuperscript{51}—and the (Second) Taiwanese Xiangtu wenxue yundon [Native Literary Debate] (1977-1978)\textsuperscript{52} initiated by Wang Tuo (1944-), Wang Zhenhe (1940-1990), Chen Yingzhen (1937-), Huang Chunming (1935-), Yang Qingchu (1940-)\textsuperscript{53}. The latter not only dialectically reflected upon, and engaged with, the previously-imported Modernist literary fashion (1950-60s

\textsuperscript{49} These Han symbols were grafted to the Nostalgia tone in Combat Literature and the “Chinese Culture” in the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement. See pp. 159-160 and note 5 in Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of how the KMT legitimated themselves through projects of Becoming Chinese.
\textsuperscript{50} See the discussion of the Modernist Movement in 1960s Taiwan in Chapter Four.
\textsuperscript{51} See Frances Saunter, \textit{Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War} (London: Granta, 2000).
\textsuperscript{52} According to Chiu Kuei-fen, the post-war Nativist Literary writing emerged in the works of Wang Zhenhe, Li Ang, Shi Shuqing, and Zhong Lihe in the 1960s. It continued its impact on the works of Xiao Lihong, Hong Xingfu, and Song Zelai in the 1980s. See Chiu Kuei-fen, “Fanyi qudonli xia de taiwan wenxue shengchan” [The Taiwanese Literary Production Driven by Translation], in \textit{Taiwan xiaoshuo shilun [Essays on Taiwan Literary History]} (Taipei: Maitian, 2007), p. 257.
\textsuperscript{53} See the detailed discussion of the Xiantu literary debate in pp. 315-319 in Chapter Four.
Modernism), which was closely linked with the intrusion of the political field, it also detailed and acknowledged a (re-)emerging political Taiwanese identity, seen through the Native Literature’s bolder use of a “new” and “separatist” (Taiwanese) national allegory by Ye Shitao.

This Taiwanese national allegory during the Xiangtu literary debate was mainly expressed through a native and realist literary approach, in which a local social context and long-suppressed Taiwanese identity and “Taiwan nationalism” was emphasised, rather than the canonical brand of Chinese “nostalgia” which had previously prevailed as the legitimised and legitimate discourse, especially during the Combat Literature period and the Taiwanese Modernism period. “China” was a privileged memory to Mainland emigres and writers canonised by the KMT’s state apparatus, whether that memory was personally felt and experienced, imagined, or (even later, through the reproduction of cultural institutions) mimicked by new-generation Taiwanese writers. And the articulation of this nostalgia had become

54 Bourdieu’s theory of field will be discussed in more detail later in this Introduction, pp. 31, 42-43.
55 Chiu argues that Ye Shitao first points out the concepts of “Taiwan Consciousness” [Taiwan yishi] and “Taiwan as the Centre” [taiwan zhongxin] in his “Taiwan xiangtu wenxueshi daolun” [An Introduction to Taiwan Xiangtu Literature] (1977). This Taiwan-centric literary perspective in Ye and in the Xiangtu Literary Movement, which appropriated the “anti-Japanese” spirit of Taiwan New Literature in the period of Japanese Rule, not only connected “post-war Taiwan Literature” to pre-war Taiwan Literature, it also provided “necessary cultural symbols” of nationalism for the development of Taiwan nationalism. See Chiu, “Fanyi qudonli xia de taiwan wenxue shengchan” [The Taiwanese Literary Production Driven by Translation], pp. 241-242.
57 See the section of Combat Literature and the Legitimation of Chinese Literature in Taiwan in Chapter Four for more detailed discussion of how a legitimate Chinese Literature was set up through a variety of institutions (magazines, awards, and academies), pp. 253-258.
one of the necessities for *consecration* in a highly politicised literary field.\(^{58}\)

The heated discussions of the Chinese complex and the Taiwanese Complex\(^{59}\) in the (Second) Taiwanese Nativist [*Xiangtu*] Literary Debate (1977-1978)—discussions born out of the difference in literary approach—finally led to political democratisation at the end of the 1980s. Accordingly, the lifting of martial law in 1987 not only symbolised the deconstruction of a long-dominant Chinese political nationalism and Chinese cultural nationalism, it also encouraged a more comprehensive thinking about what Taiwaneseness is, looking beyond a relentlessly Han-centred ideology.

The development of Taiwan’s post-war historical textbooks is an embodiment of the politics of nationalism in the cultural field. During the post-war period, the educational system had been state-controlled and the fact that the KMT government had its own editorial/publishing department had an obvious impact on the dissemination, production, and reproduction of legitimate narrative. However, during the 1980s and the 1990s, when the field of text-book publication opened to the market, the China-centric historical narrative that had appeared in history textbooks since 1945 under the KMT regime’s rule (in which Taiwanese materials only occupied 4% of the total content) started to feature emergent Taiwan-centred discourses (such as historian Du Zhengsheng’s theory of a “*Tongxinyuan shiguan*”

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\(^{58}\) See the later section of in this introduction on Pierre Bourdieu for more details about *consecration*.

\(^{59}\) The Taiwanese complex and the Chinese complex were firstly literary terms mainly used in the debate about whether Taiwanese literature was part of Chinese literature or could be seen as an independent literary production. Since it could also refer to a disguised political thinking about Taiwanese Independence, it finally drew so much political attention to itself that the Debate was forced to stop.
[concentric-circle historical narrative], which proposes “starting from a local and present” historical perspective).\(^6\) As a result, the silencing of 2-28 and other political taboos, such as suppressed provincial and political issues, started to emerge. Japanese rule and its related discourse were reassessed. With the change of international and cross-strait politics, anti-communist ideology and unificationist stance were debated. The re-energised conversation between the indigenous people (the most native native Taiwanese) and the Han ethnics was accompanied by the Indigenous Self-Enlightenment Movements of the 1980s. As a result, this stage also witnessed the reflection on Han cultural chauvinism, as the rising of Taiwanese nationalism requires a new understanding of Xiangtu (which not only belongs to the Hoklo/Hakka ethnic group, but Waishengren, indigenous peoples, and new immigrants) and a renegotiation between the cultural, national, and historical borderlines of “Who we are/were/to be” and “the Other.” Therefore, the palimpsestic Taiwaneseness, which consists of major dominant forces (as well as my focus in the thesis) of Japanese rule, the silencing of 2-28, anti-communist ideology, and Han consciousness/chauvinism, requires painstaking re-historiography. Therefore, cases that could reflect these palimpsestic forces were chosen in the thesis. Wu Zhuoliu’s problematic Han identification is explored through its conversation with colonial Japanese modernity, the Kōminka movement, his Chinese experience, and his postwar 2-28 witness. 2-28 is chosen to examine how collective/collected memory

\(^6\) This proposal was practised in the “Knowing Taiwan” historical textbooks series under the DPP’s rule. See Q Edward Wang, *Taiwan shixue wushinian 1950-2000: chuancheng, fanfa, quxiang* [Writing History in Taiwan: Tradition and Transformation, 1950-2000] (Taipei: Maitian, 2002), pp. 213-234.
was produced for/against official narrative within the anti-communist context. Bai Xianyong’s writing is explored in order to extract “nativist” elements from this non-provincial writer. Next, the fact that Syman Rapongan’s (and the Tao tribe’s) search for subjectivity has to rely on an idealised Tao-nationalism suggests a necessary national allegory against Han-centred assimilation.\(^6^1\) Finally, Zhu Tianxin is chosen to understand her peculiar and subtle identification route (to construct identification through a “bitterly sarcastic” way).

Taiwan’s various colonial regimes have, of course, carried out their own process of history-writing in an attempt to legitimise their presence on this island. When it comes to Taiwan’s “history of history,” it becomes evident that each colonial power “makes” a history about its predecessor(s) which contradicts the previous version, and, in most cases, contradicts what we know now.\(^6^2\) It is the fact of this complicated colonial history of Taiwan in which the ruling classes or ruling powers shifted so many times in a very short time span that this thesis addresses, rather than the question which historical discourse is “genuine”. Nevertheless, these contradictions between the historical discourses of different colonial powers have caused confusion in attempts to (re)explain the past. Hayden White provides an

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\(^6^1\) Craig A. Smith argues that “nationalism (and possibly a pan-ethnic aboriginal consciousness) has been an important defensive strategy for Taiwan aboriginals in resisting Han hegemony.” See Craig A. Smith, “Aboriginal Autonomy and Its Place in Taiwan’s National Trauma Narrative” in *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2012, p. 217.

\(^6^2\) I don’t assume a hierarchy of understanding here by suggesting “what we know now” is superior to the “history” composed by previous regimes, because these (various) “current understandings” and my own methodology are also subject to my criticism of the political agenda behind historiography under the rule of different regimes.
illuminating reflection on this situation. As Hayden White points out, a governing “authority” (an annalist or a writer) is selective in its choice of “recordable” historical or fictional material—at the necessary expense of other, neglected, and absent, writing.63 White emphasises the relationship between narrativity (whether of the fictional or the factual sort) and its social contexts.64 As White observes: “the more historically self-conscious the writer of any form of historiography, the more the question of the social system and the law that sustains it, the authority of this law and its justification, and threats to the law occupy his attention.”65 He concludes that, “historical self-consciousness, this kind of consciousness capable of imagining the need to represent reality as a history, is conceivable only in terms of its interest in law, legality, and legitimacy, and so on.”66

Under this banner, if we bring in the factor that legitimised powers (such as the colonial powers in Taiwanese history) constantly manipulate historical writing—they are more intensive and more political-ideology based than an individual historian or a writer—the authentic history (whether in official historical textbooks or in pro-political-agenda fictitons) that colonial powers often provide

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63 Hayden White, *The Content of the Form* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), p.10. “Every narrative, however seemingly full, is constructed on the basis of a set of events that might have been but were left out; this is as true of imaginary narratives as it is of realistic ones. And this consideration permits us to ask what kind of notion of reality authorizes construction of a narrative account of reality in which continuity rather than discontinuity governs the articulation of the discourse.”

64 Ibid., p.13.


66 Ibid.
requires not only authoritative “emplotment”\textsuperscript{67} by writers, but also relies on the mobilisation of a whole political system. As a result, historical fiction (especially those fictions dealing with the colonial context, or simply situated in it), a genre which explicitly involves the writing of the past, is, in fact, produced and shaped by various forces including political ideology, with its ability to engender selective memory and selective amnesia. In the tradition of Taiwanese literature, historical fiction (fiction containing a sizable historical material)\textsuperscript{68} is never free from the dominance of governmental machines—though some novels do attempt to retain autonomy and avoid the imprint of the state apparatus. Some Taiwanese authors represent their own version of history indirectly, through literary devices and through poetic strategies such as synecdoche, metaphor, metonymy, and irony (as suggested by White); and by the creative deployment of fictional narratives. These writers use elusive and allusive language to attempt to represent the “author-rial” and “true” colonial/de-colonial struggles of their time.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{67} According to White, “Emplotment is the way by which a sequence of events fashioned into a story is gradually revealed to be a story of a particular kind”. See Hayden White, \textit{Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe} (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 7.

\textsuperscript{68} There exists an overlapping space between “historical fiction” and fiction that deploys and closely echoes historical narrative, especially between the opinions of critics and writers. Margaret Hillenbrand discusses the dialectical relation between the use of historical and literary element in defining the boundary of the genre of 2-28 fiction. See Margaret Hillenbrand, “Trauma and the Politics of Identity: Form and Function in Fictional Narratives of the February 28th Incident” \textit{Modern Chinese Literature and Culture} Vol. 17, No. 2, 2005, pp. 53-55.

\textsuperscript{69} By fictional narratives, one of its species refers to the genre of magical-realism writing produced in 1980s Taiwan, especially before the lifting of martial law in 1987, in which elements of magical
When dealing with colonial/post-colonial texts that are often under the surveillance of official or even the Author's own internalised self-censorship, the colonial/de-colonial Author’s elusive voice and submissive context or the relationship between the Author and the targeted readership (probably illegitimate readers), should be treated as the main priorities, rather than the legitimate reader’s interpretation. Chapters Two and Five offer an analysis of “illegitimate” Authors such as Wu Zhuoliu and Syman Rapongan, while in Chapters Four, Five, and the Epilogue, “legitimate” Authors such as the author of Mei chunnian and Bai Xianyong are discussed.

The idea of the palimpsest is also related to Fredric Jameson’s analysis of reading literatures from a culture’s past—an analysis in which he questions the influence exerted by “monuments from distant and even archaic moments of the cultural past on a culturally different present.”70 It is important to situate the text in its original context, but also, as Hayden White suggests, to simultaneously engage with the concerns and preoccupations of the present as well: “to have distinguished a past from a present world of social thought and praxis…implies a conception of the form that knowledge of the present world also must take, insofar as it is continuous with that past world.”71 The narratives of Taiwanese literature must be explored and understood with the sensibility of present eyes, even as the “history” which produced realism were adopted by authors to reflect the unspeakable political reality then. See Chapter Four for more detailed discussion.

71 White, Metahistory, p. 21.
those narratives is acknowledged and contextualised—especially when highly politicised texts and contexts are dealt with. Examples of this can be found in the shifting of certain labels that I have used in the thesis. In chapter Four, for example, Bai Xianyong is categorised by me as a Taiwanese writer in the (later-defined) paradigm of Taiwanese literary history. However, in the martial law context, Bai, as well as other writers, were undoubtedly addressed as “Chinese” writers, as well as the “Chinese” literature which they produced. In short, the politics behind these shifting namings, though confusing, also marks the palimpsestic nature of re-narrating literary production in Taiwan.  

The Colonial Palimpsest

History becomes problematic when it is represented in either historical or literary writing—whether it is by the coloniser or the colonised; whether to enhance colonisation or de-colonisation. In A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction, Linda Hutcheon addresses the problem of representing the past through writing fictions. Hutcheon argues that what she calls “historiographic metafiction” does not simply produce historic narratives but also engages with the related problems of historiography that are addressed by Hayden White in Metahistory, by

72 To make a clear differentiation between past and present narratives, labels used in past narrative, such as “Chinese diasporic writers” would be put in double quotation marks in the thesis.

73 George Lukacs, The Historical Novel (London: Merlin, 1989); White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, pp. x-xi, 5-7. White stresses the poetic (or artistic) “emplotment” process, and the invention process of data (whether historical or fictional), is shared by both historians and novelists.
Fredric Jameson in *Political Unconscious*,\(^{74}\) and by Georg Lukacs in *The Historical Novel*. Above all, historiographic metafiction addresses issues such as:

those of narrative form, of intertextuality, of strategies of representation, of the role of language, of the relation between historical fact and experiential event, and, in general, of the epistemological and ontological consequences of the act of rendering problematic that which was once taken for granted by historiography – and literature.\(^{75}\)

Similarly, Hayden White questions the complicated structure beneath the construction of narratives in historiography and literature. According to White, he attempts to show “how the ideological considerations enter into the historian’s attempts to explain the historical field and to construct a verbal model of its processes in a narrative.” Furthermore, White makes clear that in fact the political interests of some historians and philosophers “have specific ideological implications.”\(^{76}\) In this context, both Hutcheon and White attempt to demystify the embedded (political) ideological implication in historical and literary narratives. This inspires me to look into how these narratives and ideology are infiltrated or transferred from the supposed political field to the

\(^{74}\) Jameson, *The Political Unconscious*, p.x.


literary field.\textsuperscript{77}

When it comes to historical fictions which are set in colonial, de-colonial, or post-colonial context(s), the ideologies carried by the narratives are often “manufactured” in association with grand narratives—the grand narratives of imperialism, the State, nationalism, etc. When it comes to fiction dealing with multiple colonial-contexts, as in the case of Taiwan and India, the selection, presentation, and even omission of the layered “history” reflect the author(s)’s personal choice of historical narrative(s); it also reflects the external ideologies (such as nationalism), the habitus, the field,\textsuperscript{78} or, to put it more simply, the various “forces” behind the author(s)’s masterminding of narrative(s). In some specific texts (such as those we are dealing with subsequently in this thesis), the narrative(s) and the ideologies it carries are historically “palimpsestic” (if we see each historicity as a text, then it can be regarded as inter-textually palimpsestic).

This thesis will describe and analyse the collisions and interminglings of colonial and national “inherited narrative paradigms” in Taiwanese literature, and will focus specifically on those and the ideologies they continue to “emit.” Fredric Jameson refers to the “interminable set of operations and programming procedures”

\textsuperscript{77} In some Taiwanese novels, for example, Wu Zhuoliu’s works, which were produced long before conceptions such as magical realism and metafiction emerged, distrust of an authentic historiography had already been addressed. These works are not regarded as historiographic metafictions. However, the ways the narrative in these works creates a fluid space of communication between factual and fictional history become a crucial point when discussing the politics of the palimpsest in Taiwanese fictions. This will be discussed in Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{78} See the next section of Pierre Bourdieu’s theories.
which governs the novel form in the shape of “inherited narrative paradigms”.\textsuperscript{79} He argues that ideology is embedded in narratives: “Such ideologemes are the raw material, the inherited narrative paradigms, upon which the novel as a process works and which it transforms into texts of a different order.” He then suggests that “a specific narrative paradigm continues to emit its ideological signals long after its original content has become historically obsolete…”\textsuperscript{80} This suggests the “narrative paradigm” and “its ideological signals” that we perceive from texts may in fact be products which are “palimpsestically manufactured” through the cooperation of both the author and the social context(s) where the author and the text are located.

**Narratives of National Allegories**

This power-transfer (and historicity-transfer) process brings to mind Fredric Jameson’s discussion of “allegorical narratives” in *The Political Unconscious* in which he proposes that a dialectical relationship exists between the master narrative and other hidden narratives: “Allegory is here the opening up of the text to multiple meanings, to successive rewritings and overwritings which are generated as so many levels and as so many supplementary interpretations.”\textsuperscript{81} This idea of allegorical interpretation is relevant to the multi-colonial rewritings of Taiwan’s history—the existence of palimpsestic narratives and contending cultural representations—with

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\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., pp. 172-174.

which Taiwan must still engage and negotiate. As I will suggest, to understand the “superstructural symptom or category and its ‘ultimately determining reality in the base,’” requires a palimpsestic decipherment—a focus on diachronic palimpsestic contexts, rather than on synchronic and binary explanations of the oppressor and the oppressed. More relevantly still, Jameson’s concept of “national allegories” offers another way to read “third-world” literature. He argues, “all third-world texts are necessarily…allegorical, and in a specific way: they are to be read as what I will call national allegories.” Whether it is appropriate to describe the literary texts of Taiwan as “third-world texts” (which could be seen as Jameson’s own national allegorical reading of the “third world” literature), national or/and allegorical representation is frequently and thus “necessarily” used by “ Taiwanese” writers to engage the difficult issues concerning colonization, ethnic/national identity, collective memory, national trauma, and state powers in the so-called history of Taiwan. For example, Margaret Hillenbrand points out that Zhu Tianxin uses her “layered allegorical” *Juancun* narrative as a metaphorical microcosm to portray the overlapping referencing relationship between China, the KMT, the mainlander community on Taiwan, Taiwan itself, and the tension between *Waishengren* identification and Taiwanese nationalism in 1990s Taiwan. Hillenbrand points out further: “Taiwan is a place where coloniality is less a past then an ongoing state of

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82 Ibid., p.18.
being, in which various players regularly shift their places in a game of musical
chairs that allegory—with its inherent sense of both presence and absence—is
preeminently skilled at transcribing into culture. “85 In this sense, to explore further
the national-allegorical understanding of the cacophony of literary production in
Taiwan, a colonial-palmipsestic understanding should be added to Jameson’s
perspective. That is, a palmipsestic national-allegorical scope is used in the thesis to
read the colonial/postcolonial narratives of Taiwan, which include boundary-shifting
terms such as Han, Chinese, Qing, Taiwanese, Xiangtu, Bentuhua, and New
Taiwanese in the development of the subjectivity and epistemology of Taiwanese
literature.

IV. Bourdieu’s Theories

The idea of the colonial palmipsest invites an extended historical reading by
seeing the development of Taiwanese literature in terms of different historical layers.
However, Taiwanese literary studies often focus on the consequences86—the
palmipsestic characteristics in Taiwanese literary works87—rather than the causes
and the process of formation of such works. With the help of the idea of the colonial
palmipsest, we can see how the history of Taiwanese literature has evolved.

85 Ibid., p. 656.
86 Such as the New Criticism approach which started to be popular in 1960s Taiwan, and is still
popular in present-day Taiwanese literary field, which adopts close reading of the text rather than the
emphasis on its social context. See Chapter Four for details of the introduced American Modernism.
87 See the literary works discussed in the subsequent chapters, in which historicity is always a field of
power struggle.
However, I am not content with simply finding literary expressions of the colonial palimpsest in Taiwanese historical writing in fiction; I also want to know how this layered and complex character is formed. Pierre Bourdieu’s approach, which emphasises the external and social contexts of the research object, provides a useful theoretical frame for the exploration of Taiwan’s historical fiction and Taiwanese fiction that characterises palimpsestic historicity.

One of the characteristics of Bourdieu’s theory is that it politicises the research object, including the researcher himself/herself, since both the research objects and researchers are contained within an ultimate power-structure explanation.88 While the research object (e.g. Taiwanese fiction, including the literary texts, authors, critics, and the social contexts) is explained politically, the researcher (myself, or in Bourdieu’s idea, the academy89) is also included, and my context for conducting this research should be examined reflexively too. This is useful to keep in mind when examining the historical-writing of fiction which has been deeply influenced by colonial regimes’ politicised cultural policy, whether the fiction in question has been banned or promoted (as the beginning of the production line), or whether the critic/researcher is considering the form and content of published novels (as the output of the end of the production line). Although such an approach is often accused of totalitarianist interpretation and social-determinism,90 I am using this method,

88 This is termed “self-reflexivity” in Bourdieu’s theory.

89 Bourdieu presents an analysis of academic sociology in terms of the relationship of intellectuals’ academic productions and the academic institution that help shape them in his *Homo Academicus* (1990).

along with the idea of the colonial palimpsest to help develop a new way of
appreciating Taiwanese fictions. I want to take a different path from that followed by
the de-contextualised and purely literary critical tradition (e.g. the New Criticism
fashion) imported and made popular since the 1960s in the Taiwanese academy. In
the following chapters, I will appreciate literature through a palimpsestic approach
and with a societal eye on the research object’s development and on its interaction
with its context. To this end, Bourdieu’s theory offers a self-reflexive practice in
subsequent chapters, because it provides an analysis of previous literary fashions and
of the academic and social context that helped shape them.

The sociological approach towards cultural study developed by Bourdieu has
already been adopted as a paradigm by Chang Sung-sheng in Taiwanese literary
on the transitions in the literary arenas of two critically-different social contexts—the
Taiwanese literary field before the lifting of martial law and after. Her adoption of
Bourdieu’s theory reflects her concern with whether the shifting of the literary field
in this period was, and can be described as, “from martial law to market law” (which
I would rather rephrase as “from colonial law to postcolonial law.”) Chang posits the
model “from martial law to market law” to explain the transitions of the literary field

\[91\] See Yvonne Sung-sheng Chang, *Literary Culture in Taiwan: Martial Law to Market Law* (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Her use of Bourdieu’s theories in Taiwan’s particular 1960s
Modernism will be further discussed in Chapter Four. Also in the literary field, Michel Hockx applies
Bourdieu’s theories to do research on Chinese literature. See Michel Hockx’s Introduction in *The
Literary Field of Twentieth Century China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), pp. 1-20.
See also Michel Hockx, “The Literary Field and the Field of Power: The Case of Modern China”,
from the postwar period to the period after lifting of martial law. However, my focus throughout, as a result of the palimpsestic model, is on colonial and post-colonial relations.

Bourdieu’s idea of field proposes a space in which agents compete with each other through the accumulation and exchange of various capitals (economic, cultural, social, and symbolic). However, their initial social positions grant them *habitus* (the habitual dispositions gained from agents’ positions) which more or less shape their actions. (Terms like field, habitus, and capital will be explained in detail later in this section.)

The comparatively pure French cultural model (which ignores the influence of the colonial paradigm) analysed by Bourdieu in his *The Field of Cultural Production* (1993) and *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field* (1996) on which the theories above were based—92—is also used by Chang Sung-sheng. She adds martial law as a factor to Bourdieu’s field prototype to suit the particularities of Taiwan. To engage with the martial law element in the Taiwanese cultural field, she then introduces Raymond Williams’s notion of “a tripartite structure of dominant as hegemonic (the *Mainstream*), alternative (the *Modernists*), and oppositional (the *Nativists* [Xiangtu] and the *Localists*) cultural formations.”93 However, in my view, a post-colonial vantage—Bourdieu’s theories and the colonial palimpsest—should

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be brought together to explain the transitions which occurred in the Taiwanese literary field. In Taiwan’s case, there is a larger panorama than Raymond Williams’s modified tripartite paradigm describes, a threefold structure in which the triple forces keep changing their dynamic positions before and after the lifting of martial law. This is one of the instances where translating Bourdieu’s paradigms to Taiwan’s palimpsestic colonial and social context—in which the field, habitus, and capital have been reshuffled drastically many times requires adaptation when applied to literary works and other cultural products.

After his aggregation at Ecole Normale Superieure in 1955, Bourdieu started as a self-taught ethnologist in colonial Algeria, and his anthropological encounter with colonialism led him to reflect on legitimacy, a main motif in his later theories. In the preface to The Logic of Practice (1990), Bourdieu described his experience in colonial Algeria, where he conducted a study of Kabyle ritual as an anthropologist. He reflected on the “scientific humanism” conducted by Levi-Strauss: the “meta-scientific enthusiasm for science… led some people, especially in formerly colonised countries, to see ethnology as a kind of essentialism, focusing on those aspects of practice most likely to reinforce racist representations.”

Bourdieu continues, “virtually all the works partially or totally devoted to ritual … seemed to me guilty … tending to justify the colonial order.” Initially, this reflection turned him towards sociology, as a means of addressing the deeper structural issues behind anthropological objects. He also came to (self-)reflect on legitimacy in the academia.

95 Ibid.
(and beyond) and questioned whether it was legitimate to have a research subject on the Kabyle rituals. Therefore, through his anthropological research in colonial Algeria, and sociological research in Béarn, he came to develop his preliminary concept of habitus and field, and concepts of economic capital, cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital.

Given this background, the question that naturally arises is why did Bourdieu ignore the post-colonial. I presume the answer is that post-colonial study as an academic “discipline” only became popular in the academy in the 1990s. Although Bourdieu’s theories are not directly dealing with colonial or de-colonial issues, such as the racial inequalities in Frantz Fanon’s psychological analysis of racism in Black Skin, White Masks (1952), Bourdieu’s responsive inquiries based on the systematic and societal inequalities can still be seen as the prototype of the postcolonial discipline.

The concept of habitus, originated in Bourdieu’s anthropological studies in Algeria. He combined “the logic of the economy of honour” and “good faith” with later researches into financial institutions and their customers in order to understand a whole system of concepts (both economic and cultural determinants are

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96 During this time, agency, power structure, and field gain their theoretical ground, and anthropological examples like gift-exchange later become analogies for his sociological theories.


considered) that determine economic action. The preliminary concept of habitus, which was mainly formed in the context of pre-capitalist society to explain people’s economic decisions, was later revised to account for people’s actions across a range of cultural practices (both economic and cultural). By habitus, Bourdieu means a collective mind-set tendency on the part of the agent, which is internalised through everyday practice and interactions between the agent and the objective world. The internalised tendency as habitus (or “structures” as Bourdieu often terms the concept) makes perceived actions naturalised, and, in turn, naturalises the agent’s own actions.

In other words, the mechanism of habitus works at an individual or micro level, on the agent, to internalise externalities, while, in its macro aspect, habitus helps to shape mutually accepted rules within specific groups, such as the rules of art for artists and rules of politics for politicians. At the macro level of society, it functions as the *structuring structure* for beginning agents entering their specific field. At the same time, habitus performs as a constructed rule—that is, as the *structured structure*—to regulate those who are already familiarised with the already-set rules of the game. Swartz notes that habitus constructs and is constructed

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100 To answer these questions, according to Bourdieu, the concept of habitus was developed to account for “the practices of men and women who found themselves thrown into a strange and foreign economic cosmos imported and imposed by colonialism, with cultural equipment and dispositions—particularly economic disposition—acquired in a precapitalist world.” Ibid., p. 2.


through everyday practice: “structures are themselves socially constructed through everyday practices of agents.”  

Swartz continues, “this leads Bourdieu to explore the practical character of agency and to develop the concept of habitus’ to integrate ‘actor-symbolic representations with structural factors.’”  

In this sense of “everyday-practice,” Swartz concludes that habitus is most appropriately applied to undifferentiated society where honour regulates social interactions as well as people’s deeper and unconscious actions. However, in “highly differentiated societies,” where law and consciousness regulate people in critical and codified actions, honour is not enough to explain the complicated social interactions. Bourdieu thus modifies and applies habitus to a sphere where “everyday interactions … stem more from the dispositions of habitus than from rational choice or norm conformity.” However, it should be noted that Bourdieu did not explore habitus specifically in a colonial context, but only through investigation of the macro-aspect and everyday-practice interactions outlined above. In my view, in a colonial context, the social structures constructed and controlled by colonisers can be seen as a collective colonial habitus, and the agents (i.e. the colonial subjects, especially the elite class) can be seen as the producers and thus re-producers of colonial habitus.

104 Ibid. p.58.
105 Ibid., pp. 113-114.
106 “The habitus is the universalising mediation which causes an individual agent’s practices, without either explicit reason or signifying intent, to be none the less “sensible” and “reasonable”. That part of practices which remains obscure in the eyes of their own producers is the aspect by which they are
Pedagogy, Legitimacy, and the Educational System

As mentioned above, habitus constructs and is constructed through everyday practice. Habitus starts to play its role in familial life, and subsequently in schooling, and then society at large. Accordingly, Bourdieu stresses the influence of familial life, since it shapes the predominant conception of the agents, who receive ideology, culture, and language without objective distance through their families and schooling. Here, the concept of “pedagogic action” is introduced by Bourdieu. By pedagogic action, Bourdieu refers to the soft but ubiquitous approach through “affective understanding,” such as everyday culture instilled by parents and through school education. Pedagogic action generates the illusion that it is non-aggressive, and Bourdieu develops the idea of “symbolic violence” to describe and to demystify this seemingly neutral process.

These conceptions such as pedagogy, legitimacy, symbolic violence, and arbitrariness are mainly used by sociologists (including Bourdieu) to analyse the objectively adjusted to other practices and to the structures of which the principle of their production is itself the product.” Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 79.

107 Again, see Jenkins’s comment: “by insistent appeal to an affective understanding, etc. is to gain possession of that subtle instrument of repression, the withdrawal of affection, a pedagogic technique which is no less arbitrary than corporal punishment or disgrace.” Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, pp. 17-18.
108 As Jenkins observes: “Symbolic violence...is the imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning (i.e. culture) upon groups or classes in such a way that they are experienced as legitimate. This legitimacy obscures the power relations which permit that imposition to be successful. Insofar as it is accepted as legitimate, culture adds its own force to those power relations, contributing to their systematic reproduction.” Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, p. 17-18.
dominant relationships among classes and to demystify the idealised conception of social mobility through schooling and other “modern” devices. In this thesis, these terms are also considered useful tools to analyse and reveal the coloniser’s “soft” methods of dominance;¹⁰⁹ I am referring, in particular, to the systems of colonial education and the corresponding formation of legitimate¹¹⁰ culture under colonial rule, which are often disguised under the names of assimilating projects such as “enlightenment,” “modernity,” and “civilisation.”¹¹¹

According to Patrice Bonnewitz, “Bourdieu considers the mainstream culture is the culture of the dominant class. Through a long process of legitimising, people forget the dominant culture was once only an arbitrary culture.”¹¹² It is through these soft and everyday mechanisms, that a cohesive (colonial) dominance, and thus a more homogenised society (than pre-capitalist society), is shaped. However, at the same time, social divisions—such as the most obvious differences between the dominant class and the dominated within society—are also evident, and become naturalised,¹¹³ because both sides accept the normative habitus—the “structuring

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¹⁰⁹ See Jenkins’s comments: “their place in the system of authority techniques making up the dominant mode of imposition helps to prevent agents formed by this mode of imposition from seeing their arbitrary character.” And “…as the Church, the school, the family, the psychiatric hospital or even the firm or the army, all tend to substitute the ‘soft approach’ (non-directive methods, ‘invisible pedagogy,’ dialogue, participation, ‘human relations’) for the ‘strong arm’…” Ibid.


¹¹¹ This is deeply related to cultural nationalism, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

¹¹² Bonnewitz, [Premieres lecons sur La Sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu], p. 125.

¹¹³ In the Foreword to Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture, Tom Bottomore points out the research carried out in the second part of this book serve to “a confirmation (or in some cases a questioning) of a theory of class relations initially taken for granted.” Bourdieu’s social classification,
structure” and the “structured structure”—and are thus not able to challenge it so easily.

To look more deeply into the ways in which symbolic goods become dominant—for example, through language and the culture of the dominant class—Bourdieu expands terms such as “legitimate”, “legitimation”, and “legitimacy” from their original definition of bureaucratic and legal systems to refer to symbolic objects within a wider power structure. These symbolic goods often occupy a dominant position, frequently working well with legal or official institutions like the state’s educational system. These symbolic goods operate on processes, such as the legitimate official language (as a “normalised product”) and the legitimate culture within the symbolic market. Moreover, as regards, considering the effect of a legitimate linguistic expression in the literary field, linguistic criteria such as “distinction” and “correctness” form the basis for writers to impose models in literary expression. Bourdieu’s ideas of pedagogy and legitimacy will be applied to Taiwan’s cultural context in subsequent chapters – concentrating in particular on the national language policy adopted during the period of Japanese colonial rule and by the following KMT Nationalist government.

**Habitus, History, Palimpsest, Hysteresis**

Since habitus is under constant construction through everyday practice, what Bourdieu means by habitus inevitably bears a palimpsestic character. Primary
habitus received from the family can condition newly-learned habitus, such as the collective “mind-set” later learned from schooling. They together form an integrated habitus, adjusting through time – even though the integration is itself still deeply influenced by the primal experience. Such a phenomenon can be described as the palimpsestic habitus. When this palimpsestic habitus analysis is applied to an individual, it engages with the micro-aspect of habitus as mentioned above. This (more totalising) approach of an author’s life-span is used in the following chapters to analyse the experience of individual authors.

For example, the causal “structuring structures” of Wu Zhuoliu’s Han education, his modern education under Japanese Rule, his China experience in Nanjing, and, finally, his experiences under the KMT regime, are linked in order to analyse his own structured structures in his works. The palimpsestic habitus also deals with a macro-scale conception, such as a literary group (like the Taiwanese modernists in the 60s), a cultural phenomenon (such as the development of 2-28 literature), and even a field (such as the autonomisation of the Taiwanese literary field).

These “structuring structures” and “structured structures”—here generally referred to as agents making history and the history of agents—are used to analyse the related literary works featured in subsequent chapters. In Bourdieu’s mind, there is a dialectical relationship between history and habitus. On the one hand, history is made by agents and the social structure; on the other hand, history also shapes agents and the social structure. As Bourdieu notes, “the habitus, the product of history,

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114 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, pp. 102-104.

115 This will be discussed in details in Chapter Three of Wu Zhuoliu and his works.
produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with
the schemes engendered by history.”

He goes on to talk about the concept of “the system of dispositions” in terms of:

a past which survives in the present and tends to perpetuate itself into the future
by making itself present in practices structured according to its principles, an
internal law relaying the continuous exercise of the law of external necessities
(irreducible to immediate conjunctural constraints)."117

In other words, history is dynamically formed and also forms agents, but it can also
be understood as a palimpsest. In his account of habitus, Bourdieu emphasises the
importance of early experiences:

[T]he structures characteristic of a determinate type of conditions of
existence, through the economic and social necessity which they bring to
bear on the relatively autonomous universe of family relationships, or
more precisely, through the mediation of the specifically familial
manifestations of this external necessity (sexual division of labour,
domestic morality, cares, strife, tastes, etc.), produce the structures of the
habitus which become in turn the basis of perception and appreciation of
all subsequent experience.118

He then goes as to explain what he calls “the hysteresis effect” in terms of

116 Bourdieu, Outline of A Theory of Practice, p. 82.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid, p. 78.
This is why generation conflicts oppose not age-classes separated by natural properties, but habitus which have been produced by different *modes of generation*, that is, by conditions of existence which, in imposing different definitions of the impossible, the possible, and the probable, cause one group to experience as natural or reasonable practices or aspirations which another group finds unthinkable or scandalous, and vice versa.119

Accordingly, the past of an individual, or the collective memory of a specific group, can play an unconscious part for the agent(s)—in a belated form—since they carry their out-dated habitus to engage with present. *Hysteresis*, using Bourdieu’s term, refers to the situation which unfolds when the environment which used to constitute the habitus begins to fail to fit into that environment. When the old habitus becomes detached from the new objective environment, the residual “gap” performs on the agent as an outdated act. Therefore the agent says or does something inappropriate—that is, “he continues to do things fitting his old social position (where his habitus was formed), but the actions do not fit his position now (the environment has changed).”120 Bourdieu expands the application of habitus, from individuals to groups, and from the individual life-span to generational differences.

In this thesis, I intend to use hysteresis, a belated form of habitus, as part of the colonial palimpsest paradigm. For example, the hysteresis effect can be used to explain the colonial subjects’ failure to adapt in Taiwan from the period of Japanese Rule to the period under the KMT regime. They maintained their Japanese identity and were proud of their “modernity” under Japanese Rule, compared with the

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119 Ibid.

120 Bonnewitz, *Premieres lecons sur La Sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu*, p. 115.
newly-arrived Mainlanders. This thus caused ethnic and cultural conflicts between the provincial (previously Japanese subjects) and the non-provincial Chinese immigrants who had acquired a Han-centric ideology during the post-war Taiwan.

**Field, Capital, and Consecration**

In Bourdieu’s definition, a field is “a social arena within which struggles or manoeuvres take place over specific resources or stakes and access to them.” He defines field in terms of the valuable capital which is at stake—“cultural goods (life-style), housing, intellectual distinction (education), employment, land, power (politics), social class, prestige or whatever”; he also notes that these stakes “may be of differing degrees of specificity and concreteness.” Each field, according to Bourdieu, “by virtue of its defining content, has a different logic and taken-for-granted structure of necessity and relevance which is both the product and producer of the habitus which is specific and appropriate to the field.”

Though each field has its own logic and rules, each shares similar structures internally: “each has its dominant and its dominated, its struggles for usurpation or exclusion, its mechanisms of reproduction, and so on.”

Apart from the fact that the analysis of all fields can ultimately be traced back to the original force—power—these fields also share capitals, as the currency upon which agents could work. According to Jenkins, the field contains

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121 Ibid., p.84.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., p.87.
goods which can be categorised as economic capital, social capital (various kinds of valued relations with significant others), cultural capital (primarily legitimate knowledge of one kind or another) and symbolic capital (prestige and social honour).\textsuperscript{125}

Bourdieu makes clear that the purpose of cultural capital is to explain “otherwise inexplicable differences in the academic performances of children with unequal cultural patrimonies,” and, more generally, “in all kinds of cultural or economic practices.”\textsuperscript{126} Bourdieu defines social capital as that which accounts “for residual differences, linked, broadly speaking, to the resources which can be brought together \textit{per procurationem} through networks of ‘relations’ of various sizes and differing density,” which is his corrected version of “social networks.”\textsuperscript{127} According to Bourdieu, the concept of symbolic capital “explain[s] the logic of the economy of honour and ‘good faith,’” which is formed “by and for the analysis of the economy of symbolic goods, particularly of works of art.”\textsuperscript{128} These capitals can be accumulated and are exchangeable between fields. For example, a teacher’s cultural capital, his/her knowledge, can earn him/her a salary (economic capital), while a merchant can invest his/her children’s future in education, so as to increase his/her children’s cultural capital with the exchange of his/her economic capital.

In Bourdieu’s definition, to understand the term \textit{consecration} within cultural

\textsuperscript{125} Jenkins, \textit{Pierre Bourdieu}, pp. 229-231.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., p.2.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
productions,¹²⁹ our understanding must include “not only those institutions which ensure the production of competent consumers, but also those which produce agents capable of renewing it.”¹³⁰ Consequently, he argues that one can only comprehend the functioning of the field of restricted production “as a site of competition for properly cultural consecration—i.e. legitimacy—and for the power to grant it unless one analyses the relationships between the various instances of consecration.”¹³¹ According to Bourdieu, the various forms of consecration include “institutions which conserve the capital of symbolic goods, such as museums” and “institutions (such as the educational system) which ensure the reproduction of agents imbued with the categories of action, expression, conception, imagination, perception, specific to the ‘cultivated disposition.’”¹³² Consecration also includes “learned societies, literary circles, reviews or galleries.”¹³³ As a result, according to Bourdieu, the works which are to be consecrated might include “avant-garde works on the road

¹²⁹ Bourdieu argues there are two kinds of cultural productions – the field of restricted production and the field of large-scale production. By “the field of restricted production” (e.g. literature, which “tends to develop its own criteria for the evaluation of its products, thus achieving the truly cultural recognition accorded by the peer group whose members are both privileged clients and competitors”), Bourdieu refers to “a system producing cultural goods objectively destined for a public of producers of cultural goods.” In contrast, “the field of large-scale cultural production” is specifically organised with a view to “the production of cultural goods destined for non-producers of cultural goods, ‘the public at large,’ which submits to the laws of competition for the conquest of the largest possible market.” Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 4-5.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

to consecration, works of ‘bourgeois art’ aimed at the non-intellectual fractions of the dominant class and often already consecrated by the most official of legitimising institutions (the academies),” and “works crowned by the big literary prizes…”134

To take the issue of colonisation into consideration, in the cultural field, the mechanism of consecration helps to shape a top-down trend since the colonial state defines what legitimate prestige is and is able to cannonise legitimate examples through its control over national institutions, such as the educational system, the academies, language policy, and the awarding system behind some literary prizes. As a result, it helps to construct a bottom-up literary taste internalised by both the writers and the readership.

I will apply these theories in the subsequent chapters to explain the production of works by the individual author and particular literary trends. I will also focus on a textual interpretation based on “how it works,” rather than “what it means”; or, in other words, as Jameson suggests, my analysis will be closer to the “syntactic or structural,” rather than the “semantic” interpretation of texts.135 The production, reproduction, and diffusion of literary phenomena will be my main concern in this thesis.

VI. Romanisation

Because this thesis mainly deals with Chinese texts (Chinese texts, and

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134 Ibid., p. 19.
Japanese texts through translation into Chinese) as its primary sources, names of authors and materials quoted are given in the romanised original (in Japanese and Chinese) within parentheses “[ ]”, which I then follow with English translation within “[ ]”. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from primary and secondary sources into English are my own. Sources are normally translated into English using the Hanyu Pinyin transcription system, unless English translation has been provided.

In terms of Chinese and Japanese names: to respect their traditional name order, the family names are given before the first names in the main body of this thesis, as well as those cited in the footnotes and bibliography. Taiwanese and Chinese names are normally spelt in Hanyu Pinyin spelling, but occasionally exceptions are made in line with personal name-spelling choice. In footnotes, the entry of a resource is spelt in Hanyu Pinyin system first, followed by the English translation within [ ]. If the English translation is provided by its original resource, the English translation will be put within “( )”.
Chapter One: Layered Taiwaneseness and the Layered Cultural Nationalism of Taiwan

As Wu Zhuoliiu suggests, Taiwan’s history can be seen as a colonial palimpsest¹, correspondingly, there are palimpsestic nationalist discourses that I need to engage with in this thesis in regard to the production and reproduction of literature. However, my focus is directed more closely on the discussion of cultural nationalism, or the prototype of it, the ethno-symbolism of Taiwaneseness,² than political nationalism—though both have contributed to palimpsestic nationalist phenomena in Taiwanese literature.

In this section, I aim to analyse how layers of “Chineseness” have been formed

¹ See p. 8 in this thesis.
² Whether or not Taiwanese cultural nationalism emerged under the period of Japanese Rule remains debatable, especially when the term nationalism is closely related to the idea of a modern “state”. Nevertheless, cultural nationalism may be seen as a solid foundation of nationalism (its prototype can be traced even before a political nationalism is developed). This has been demonstrated in the works of Eric Hobsbawn, John Hutchinson (who first coined the term “cultural nationalism” and drew the cultural nationalist paradigm from the Irish Independence campaign), Anthony D. Smith, and A-chin Hsiau. In Taiwan’s context, Han culture and Han identification served as the foundation for such a proto-nationalist imagination. See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Eds. The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State and Nationalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987); Anthony D Smith, Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (London: Routledge, 2009); A-chin Hsiau, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000).
in Taiwan (with the presumption that there also exists layered Japanese-ness which also helps shape the development of “Taiwanese” discourses). I use the term Chineseness rather than the general term Sinocisation because the localised Sinocisation in Taiwan over the past four hundred years has been different from the process of Sinocisation which has taken place in China at large especially after the Cultural Revolution (1966) in which traditional Chinese cultures like Confucianism and Daoism were deliberately destroyed (before this event, traditional Chinese written characters had already been replaced by simplified Chinese characters). In Taiwan, on the other hand, these Chinese cultures have been deliberately preserved and revived by the KMT regime as part of its assertion of its “Chinese” legitimacy in international and domestic politics. In KMT’s Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement [Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong] in 1967, in complete contradiction to China’s Cultural Revolution, traditional Chinese cultures became more important than ever.

When Taiwan was under the rule of the Qing Empire, traditional Chinese cultures were mainly circulated by the Imperial Examination System [Keju zhidu]. At that period, classical Chinese cultures could be learned from the classical education provided by the academies of classical learning [Shuyuan]. At the beginning of the period of Japanese rule—among other traditional Chinese cultures—Han poetry [Hanshi] was highly praised, especially by the Japanese officials. From the discussions above, it can be seen how Chinese cultures were politicised by each colonial regime, from Qing, Japan, the KMT, the DPP government in Taiwan (2000-2008), and again by the re-ruling KMT government.
(2008-). Because of the Han identity imposed on the Taiwanese, some scholars, such as Chen Fang-ming, refer to the KMT regime in Taiwan as a kind of Colonialism (rather than Internal Colonialism).³

Benedict Anderson states in his *Imagined Communities*: “It [the nation] is imagined as a *community*, because regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”⁴ Anderson also argues that “print-capitalism,” such as the large dissemination of newspapers in the modern age, “laid the bases for national consciousnesses.” As a result, “the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community,” and therefore “set the stage for the modern nation.”⁵ I have shown how Japanese colonialism successfully transformed Taiwan into an imagined community through its introduction of elements of modernity and modernisation, such as the dissemination of printed language (Japanese and Chinese), capitalism, and 24-hour timing system.⁶ As Anderson observes, these “modern” practices, introduced through Japanese Rule in colonial Taiwan, were all “visibly rooted in everyday life.”⁷ According to the Japanese critic Fujii Shozo, Taiwanese nationalism—or the process of Taiwan becoming an Imagined Community—burgeoned after the systematic introduction of the Japanese language by Japan in

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⁵ Ibid., pp. 37, 40, 44-46.

⁶ See p.19.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 35-36.
1895. He says, “Japan, the suzerain over Taiwan for fifty years, introduced the national language [Japanese] system to Taiwan in 1895. The islanders of Taiwan were Japan-ised through the island-wide language assimilation.” At the same time, he argues, “the shared ‘national language’ surpassed the small-scale awareness of sameness which was constituted by dialects, ties of blood, and localism.” He continues, “[t]his ‘national language’ formed the island-wide Community,” and can be seen as “the budding of Taiwanese nationalism.”

It is true that Japan’s introduction of modernity to Taiwan, including the Japanese language and the “modernising” agenda behind it, contributed to the formation of Taiwanese nationalism during the period of Japanese rule. One example of this would be the literary magazines issued under Japanese rule (either in Japanese, Chinese, or both): in accord with Anderson’s view, these form a kind of “printing capitalism.” In regard to national language and print-capitalism contributing to modern nation-building, the search for Taiwanese nationalism and the collective feeling of a community in Taiwan seems to be more elusive in the “pre-modern” period of Qing Rule, than was evidenced under Japanese rule. However, in the subsequent sections, I will explore whether Taiwanese nationalism – even a

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9 Ibid.

10 Such as *Taiwan Qingnian [The Taiwanese Youth]* (1920-1922), *Chidao [The Equator]* (1930-), *Mazu [The Goddess Mazu]* (1934-1938), *San liu jiu xiaobao [The Third Sixth Ninth Tabloid]* (1930-1935), *Nanyin [The South Sound]* (1932), *Taiwan wenyi [Taiwan Literature and Art]* (1934-1936), *Taiwan xinwenxue [The New Literature of Taiwan]* (1935-1937) and *Wenyi taiwan [The Literature and Art of Taiwan]* (1930-1944).
preliminary Taiwanese nationalism—can be detected under the period of Qing Rule. That is, I am trying to understand if there was an inherited and “localised” Han cultural/ethnic identity or a (pre-modern) national level of identification based on an island-wide consciousness. One example of this might be the history of the Republic of Formosa [Taiwan minzhu guo] (May-October, 1895), a short-lived Taiwan-based political reaction against the cession of Taiwan to Japan.\(^{11}\) Although this elite-led mobilisation failed to produce effective political and cultural result in a “nationalist” level, exploring the prototype of Taiwanese nationalism through this critical “diversion from Qing provincial-identification” context of Taiwanese history\(^{12}\) should be considered as important as the Japanese route (especially the Taishō Democratic Trends) and the modern Chinese route—the impact of May-Fourth Movement in China on Taiwan.

I. From Han Identity under Qing Rule to Chinese Identity under the KMT Regime

In Wu Zhuoliu’s early writing, Taiwan was still seen as a local or minor provincial part of China, while China was seen as the geographic fatherland by Han migrants, or, more specifically speaking, the Han dynasty, was seen as the epitome of cultural heritage. Such beliefs were inherited by generations of Han descendants in Taiwan. This projection of ancient China was inevitably an imagined construct, or,

\(^{11}\) See later section for discussion of the history of the Republic of Formosa.

\(^{12}\) See Wu Rwei-ren, “Taiwan fei shi taiwanren de taiwan bu ke: fan zhimin douzheng yu taiwanren minzuguojia de lunshu” [Taiwan Must be Taiwanese People’s Taiwan: Discourses of Anti-colonial Struggles and Taiwan National State] in Minzuzhuyi yu liananguan [Nationalism and Cross-Strait Relationship], Lin Jialong and Zheng Yongnian, eds. (Taipei: New Naturalism, 2001), pp. 43-110.
to put it in other terms, this Han identity was inevitably largely “imaginary” and “learned” by the “Han” diaspora, who had migrated to Taiwan since the Ming dynasty, and was to a large degree “forged” by the Ming-Zheng and the Qing imperial government. This process of “learning” Han identity involved both the ISA (Ideological State Apparatus) and the RSA (Repressive State Apparatus) of the Ming-Zheng Kingdom and the Qing Empire over a time-span of generations.  

Before discussing the “Han”/“Ming” identity of the Chinese immigrants in Taiwan, it is necessary to provide a brief history of Taiwan from the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) to the period of the Qing Empire (1636-1912). It has been claimed that the Ming dynasty was the last in the history of China created by “Han” people.

13 Although the Ming-Zheng Kingdom and Qing Rule in Taiwan did not fully produce the modern characteristics of a “state” in Althusser’s terms of ISA and RSA, their ways of control over their subjects are similar in operation to the ISA and RSA: that is, they operated through cultural and military governmental policies.

14 Such essentialist claims of being a purely ethnic “Han” people (or a “Han” culture) in Taiwanese history were similar to the problematic presumption that there exists a certain kind of essential Chineseness which could represent all the Chinese elements. In Rey Chow’s “Introduction: On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem”, Rey Chow reviews recent “Orientalist” China discourses produced in the West and the reactionary China discourses in PRC (reacted out of trauma and idealised by recent economic boom). She challenges a chauvinistic sinocentrism by arguing that a notion of a monolithic Chineseness (either in ethnicity, language, or literary representation) within the boundary of mainland China is problematic, because it neglects the voice of ethnic minorities within China, and other anti-homogeneous “Chinese” voice in places such as Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. See Rey Chow, “Introduction: On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem”, boundary 2, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1998), pp. 1-24. Rey Chow’s reconsideration of such monolithic definition of Chineseness is also similar to the rethinking of the Han-Chinese historical perspective on the Qing Empire in in the “New Qing History” studies. See Pamela Kyle Crossley, Mark C. Elliot, and Evelyn Rawski’s works. They study Qing history through a Manchu ethnic perspective, rather than a traditional Han-centric
since the Qing Empire was created by the Manju people, from the Northeast part of China. Thus, the war between Ming and Qing dynasties has often been referred as an inter-ethnic war between Han and Manju. Among the Taiwanese, who had a strong sense of Han identity, the slogan “anti-Qing-restore-Ming” [Fanqing fuming] had been very popular during the period of the Qing’s occupation (1683-1895). Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) was a celebrated general in the late/post-Ming period who fought against the Qing mainly in the southern coastal part of China.\textsuperscript{15} In 1662, Zheng Chenggong defeated the Dutch V.O.C. and built a short-lived “prolonged Ming regime” (1661-1683), the Eastern-Peace Kingdom [Dongning wangguo], (known as the Formosan Kingdom in English documents).\textsuperscript{16} The Ming-Zheng regime was the first “Han” regime in Taiwan, and it represented “the first Han kingdom outside mainland China.” \textsuperscript{17} Indeed, its aim was to “restore China from perspective. What my thesis provides is a practice to decouple the traditional “Han” ethnicity that has long been represented in the historical, cultural, and literary discourses of Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{15} Jian, [History of Taiwan], p. 409.

\textsuperscript{16} Contemporary English accounts about the history of this period—from Dutch colonisation to the Ming-Zheng regime—can be found in the work of the Scottish agent (of the Company), David Wright, in his Notes on Formosa (London, 1671) and in the works of the Scottish missionary William Campbell (of the English Presbyterian Church): Formosa under the Dutch, Described from Contemporary Records with Explanatory Notes and a Bibliography of the Island (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trumbner, 1903). See Li Jiazhan, Shiqi shi de ouzhou wenxian dangan zhi fuermosha wenxue kao [A Scholarly Research of European Literatures & Archives Concerning Formosan Literature in the 17th-18th Centuries] (Taipei: Tangan, 2007), p. 147-150.

\textsuperscript{17} Tai, [The Concise History of Taiwan], p. 127.
Qing.”  

It was under this self-claimed Han heritage that the Ming-Zheng regime introduced “cultural and educational systems from China.” In 1683, the Ming-Zheng regime in Taiwan was defeated by the Qing Empire, and Taiwan then became a part of the latter—in other words, Taiwan came under Qing Rule. Taiwan was then officially “integrated” into a “Chinese” dynasty (in terms of political governance and historiography rather than in terms of Qing Empire’s Manchu ethnicity) for the first time.

However, the immigrants under Qing Rule in Taiwan—the so-called Han people—in their imagination, felt closer to the Ming-Zheng regime rather than to Qing Rule in Taiwan. This may be because the Ming-Zheng regime claimed a Han legitimacy, while the Qing Empire was founded by the ethnically-different Manju people, and also because the “indigenisation” [Tuzhuhua] process of the Han society had taken place for about two hundred years in Taiwan. Therefore, it was no surprise that the Han identity adopted by “Han” society in Taiwan still bore some degree of ethnic basis (in opposition to the Manju ethnic group) up to the period of Qing Rule. However, this Han identity, or, at least, the Taiwanese loyalty to the Qing Empire, underwent a traumatic experience as a result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 (according to which, Taiwan, the Penghu islands, and Orchid island were

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18 From the “Dongdu huiyi” [The Meeting at the Eastern Capital]. Quoted in Jian, Taiwanshi, [History of Taiwan], p. 420. The Ming-Zheng regime was culturally rather than genetically related to the Ming dynasty.
19 Tai, [The Concise History of Taiwan], p.129.
20 Jian, [History of Taiwan], pp. 462-463.
21 Tai, [The Concise History of Taiwan], p.128.
22 See the subsequent section regarding the concept of layered Taiwaneseness.
ceded to the Japanese Empire by the Qing Empire), while “pre-matured” Taiwanese nationalism, as Rei-ren Wu calls it, was called into being by the following short-lived Republic of Formosa (25 May-19 October, 1895), and the subsequent anti-Japanese uprisings in middle and southern Taiwan.23

II. The Effects of Palimpsestic Nationalism on Wu Zhuoliu and his Writing

In the light of the palimpsestic Han identity up to the period of Qing Rule, and the mature social context for Imagined Communities in the period of Japanese Rule (produced by the introduction of print-capitalism and the national Japanese language), described in the previous section, I want to discuss in this section the literary effects of these social factors through Wu Zhuoliu and his writing. I want to consider this writing as an example of palimpsestic nationalism—an important dimension of the colonial palimpsest. Wu was a teacher serving in Japanese common schools under colonial Japan (this position-taking makes him an agent involving in disseminating “pedagogic action” in Bourdieu’s theory), and, at the same time, he can be seen as an intellectual of Hakka ethnicity who internalised “Han” ideology and received “modern” Japanese education while attempted to maintain autonomy for himself and in his writing in the face of the colonial Japanese Modernity.24

However, with the heightened tensions between China and Japan, and the fact that

23 Wu Rwei-ren, “Taiwan fei shi Taiwanren de taiwan bu ke: fan zhimin douzheng yu taiwanren minzuguojia de lunshu” [Taiwan Must be Taiwanese People’s Taiwan: Discourses of Anti-colonial Struggles and Taiwan National State] in Minzuzhuyi yu liananguan [Nationalism and Cross-Strait Relationship], Lin Jialong and Zheng Yongnian, eds. (Taipei: New Naturalism, 2001), pp. 43-110.

24 See Chapter Two for details of Wu’s struggle to maintain a “Han” identity during the period of Japanese rule.
the de-Sinicisation movement within Japanese language and culture was gaining ground back in Japan during the 1930s\textsuperscript{25}, the Japanese Kōminka policy of forced assimilation (1937-1945)\textsuperscript{26}, whereby Taiwanese were to be transformed into the imperial subjects of the Japanese Emperor, was rigidly imposed by the state apparatus of the Japanese imperialism.\textsuperscript{27} The question is: how did Wu maintain both acceptance and resistance against and within colonial discourses? How did he negotiate the fraught issues of ethnic/nationalist identity (of the Han, the Qing, the Japanese, the Chinese, or the Taiwanese) and modernising projects?

Taiwanese humanist intellectuals, such as Lin Xiantang (1881-1956), Lin Youchun (1880-1939), Jiang Weishui (1891-1931), and Cai Peihuo, enthusiastically participated in the literary debate and in the cultural and political reforms of the early 1920s and early 1930s. These activities were largely promoted by members of the Cultural Association \textit{[Wenhua xiehui]}. This association proposed to carry out

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\textsuperscript{25} See pp. 159-160 for the discussion of the development of the de-Sinicisation movements in Japan since the Meiji period.

\textsuperscript{26} The Japanese colonial government implemented the Kōminka (imperial-subject) movement from 1937-1945. In this movement, the government attempted more forceful assimilation projects intended to make Taiwanese subjects “become” real people of the Japanese Emperor, in order to be mobilised for the wars against China (from 1937) and other nations during WWII. See Chapter Two for a detailed discussion.

\textsuperscript{27} According to Yang Ziqiao, from 1937 to 1945, “Taiwan literature was dominated by the state apparatus of the Japanese imperialism.” He continues, the Kōminka movement started from the set-up of the “komin jinshen zongdongyuan zongbu” [The Headquarters for Total Mobilization of the Citizens’ Spirit] in 1937 by Taiwan Governor-General. See Yang Ziqiao, “Lishi de beiju rentong de mangdian—du zhou jinpo shuiai chi de dansheng yougan” [The Tragedy of History and Blind Spots of Identification—A Reflection of Reading Zhou Jinpo’s “Water Cancer” and “The Birth of Rulers”] in \textit{Taiwan Wenxue [Literary Taiwan]}, Vol. 8, 1993, pp. 231-232.
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cultural and political reforms (although their political aims were less apparent, due to
the political censorship under Japanese Rule). As A-chin Hsiau has argued,
anti-colonial intellectuals and the Taiwanese people, who, “for the first time
experienced the rule of a modern state apparatus,” shared a major concern for “mass
enlightenment – the reflexivity of the whole cultural and political context dominated
by the colonial Japanese Rule in Taiwan, whose various modernising projects
contributed greatly both to the waning of traditional [Han] ethnic identity and to the
formation of a ‘Taiwanese people’ identity”.28 The enlightenment proposed by these
Taiwanese intellectuals related to the Cultural Association primarily entailed
“awakening the colonised to political consciousness and heightening their will to
counter Japanese assimilation”.29

At least in appearance, Wu did not participate in these social activities in
company with members of the Cultural Association probably because of his career
as a teacher in a Japanese common school. Intriguingly, he is still defined—later by
PRC Chinese, KMT Chinese, or Taiwanese critics—as a “nationalist” author with
strong feelings of resistance against colonial Japan, though each group of critics
interpret Wu within a different “national” thinking.30 This controvertial performance

28 Hsiau, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism, p.46.
29 Ibid.
30 Wu’s anti-Japanese stance is shared by all the three groups of critics. However, PRC Chinese
critics tended to argue that Wu maintained a leftist stance towards Japanese capitalism and embraced
a strong Chinese nationalism; ROC Chinese critics either neglected Wu’s works (because most of
Wu’s works were forbidden and first published in Japanese) or saw Wu as an inheritor of traditional
Chinese cultures; while later “Taiwanese” critics such as Chen Fang-ming argued Wu already
possessed a strong “Taiwanese” ideology in Wuhuaguo after Wu’s experience of the 2-28 Incident,
of Wu—of a combined compromised and anti-colonial attitude—perhaps can be explained by what Bourdieu would call Wu’s position-taking. Apart from the reason that there was severe censorship of literary writing conducted by Japanese rule in Taiwan, in order to maintain the image of a teacher within the colonial educational institution—an official institution which embodies a species of symbolic violence, functioning as an important branch of the Repressive State Apparatus – Wu should have had to be necessarily obliged, for the sake of “discipline” as Michel Foucault calls it in *Discipline and Punish*,\(^{31}\) to present himself to some extent as “neutral” to those liberal movements whose activities, at their peak, were censored by the Japanese colonial government. (In Wu’s *Orphan of Asia*, the protagonist who stands apart from the cultural elite may be because of this reason.)

Discipline in Foucault’s terms, or internalised self-censorship in Bourdieu’s terms, as a result of his being a teacher, may perhaps may have stopped Wu from overtly participating in these activities. However, mentally, his “young blood was often boiling.” However, “in the countryside without stimulation, it has no chance to

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31 Foucault argues: “The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines…the disciplines provide, at the base, a guarantee of the submission of forces and bodies.” Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 222.
surface, but instead hides in consciousness”. He had no other way out but to focus on his educational career.\textsuperscript{32} It was in such surrounding disciplinary field that Wu’s liberal thoughts were suppressed and drawn back to his inherited Lao-Zhuang Chinese philosophy.

However, in real life performance, even though confined by the position-taking as a teacher and self-excluded himself from political activities, Wu Zhuoliu was not so “conformist”, his liberal thoughts and actions were seen “radical” in terms of the rules of the Japanese educational field. He read magazines such as \textit{Taiwan qingnian} [The Taiwanese Youth] and \textit{Gaizao} [Reformation], which enlightened him with liberal thoughts and were aware of the discriminatory treatment of the Japanese Rule towards the Taiwanese people. However, according to protagonist in \textit{Taiwan lianqiao} [Taiwan Lilacs], because of his “Eastern pessimism”, “escapist and skepticist thoughts”, he did not join the Cultural Association. He was spiritually “paralysed by Lao-Zhuang philosophy” in the isolated country school.\textsuperscript{33} Even so, in 1922, he was degraded and transferred to a more remote school because of his “radical thoughts”, his “reading of Taiwan qingnian and Gaizao”, and “showing no respect for the school principal and the police”.\textsuperscript{34} In 1940, Wu protested against a Japanese educational inspector’s discriminatory attitude and physical assault towards Taiwanese teachers, and consequently left the teaching position for 21 years.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{32} Wu Zhuoliu, \textit{Taiwan lianqiao} [Taiwanese Lilacs] (Taipei: Caogen, 2006), pp. 47.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., pp. 46-47.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p.55.

\textsuperscript{35} In Wu’s \textit{Orphan of Asia}, the semi-autobiographic work written before the end of World War II (1943-1945), Wu expressed such pessimistic sentiment more strongly through the protagonist Hu
All in all, Wu displayed an “ambiguous” attitude—that there was not a certain “performance” predicatable by his particular layered *habitus* (mainly shaped by the “Han” culture, his “Han” identification, and “modern” Japanese education)—towards the cultural and social enlightenment led by both Japanese and Taiwanese humanist intellectuals, and also suffered a psychological struggle in relation to the Kōminka movement.

First, regarding “Han” identity, Wu Zhuoliu saw the Qing’s occupation of Taiwan as occupation by a colonial power like Japan, and, indeed, as just one in a series of foreign occupations:

“For the last three hundred years the Taiwanese have never known a government they could trust. They did not trust the Spaniards, they did not trust the Dutch. They thought they could trust Koxinga but no sooner had they begun to than they fell under the Qing. For Manchus and Japanese alike Taiwan was a colony where principled behaviour had no place.”

In the eyes of Wu, then, Taiwan was a colony of the Spaniards, the Dutch, the Qing, and the Japanese. Intriguingly, in *Orphan of Asia* (written before the end of WWII), rather than identifying with the political regime of the Qing Empire, the protagonist Taiming (as Wu himself) who suffers from discrimination between the Japanese and Taiwanese teachers in school. The accident in which Wu protested against a Japanese educational inspector is performed through the character, the Taiwanese inspector Zeng, rather than the protagonist Hu Taiming. The more suppressed characterisation of the protagonist Hu Taiming (than the protagonists in *Wuhuaguo* and in *Taiwan lianqiao*, in which the protagonists protest against the Japanese educational inspector and carry more of Wu’s autobiographically straightforward character) may probably be because of the severe censorship during the wartime. See Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion of Wu’s works.

Hu Taiming identifies himself, as his grandfather does, with the Han or Ming dynasty in terms of their Han culture and “Han” ethnicity, as well as with the Ming-Zheng regime represented by Koxinga who bears a strong Han identity. In other words, at this stage of writing, Wu’s “Taiwanese” identification entails strong Han-centric ethnic factors. Although he was considered an anti-Japanese humanist intellectual (in his politics), Wu’s cultural identities were involuted and ambiguous. He sometimes claimed himself as Chinese, sometimes Taiwanese, and sometimes Han. (He never identified himself as Japanese.) For example, in Orphan of Asia, the protagonist Hu Taiming is seen not as “Chinese” in China, but a Japanese spy. Apparently, Wu considered Japanese as the “Other,” while Chinese, Taiwanese, and Han were all ethnically or racially “Us.” These different classifications of identity might be because “cultural Han” identity still overlapped with “political China” at that time (especially during the period of the KMT regime in Taiwan). Thus I can find no clear division between Taiwanese and Chinese identity in Wu’s work. However, the word “Taiwan” seems to be used more frequently in his writing after the 2-28 Incident and after his China experience—which suggests that his Chinese

37 The protagonist was originally named as Hu Zhiming, but it was replaced by Hu Taiming because Hu Zhiming was the same name as the communist leader of Vietnam then. Taiming can mean “the great Ming (dynasty) in Chinese. Hu Taiming’s grandfather insists that Taiming should learn Han Classics. See Wu Zhuoliu, Ya xiya de guer [Orphan of Asia] (Taipei: Caogen, 1998), pp. 1, 17.

38 With the Ming-Zheng regime’s strong claims of Han heritage, it was no wonder General Koxinga became a symbol of Han nationalism. This Han ethnosymbolism associated with Koxinga (if not yet defined as nationalism in terms of the modern state) went on to be appropriated by the later KMT regime as part of its claim to a legitimate Chinese heritage.

39 See Chapter Two for a detailed discussion of Wu’s development of identification.

40 See Chapter Two for a detailed discussion of this orphanage complex in Orphan of Asia.
identity was gravely challenged by both these experiences.

Before engaging upon a discussion of this “Han” ethnicity, I want to explore a Chinese national/ethnic\textsuperscript{41} myth shared by most Taiwanese at Wu’s time, and also by some Taiwanese in the present day. It should be explained that this imagined ethnicity of the Han dynasty (202 BC- 220 AD) is a cohesive myth, appropriated by the historiography of each “Han” dynasty and by the offspring of migrants from China desirous of a secure and stable cultural identity. This appropriation takes the form of a popular ancient myth which maintains that all Chinese are the offspring of Huang Di,\textsuperscript{42} thereby functioning in a similar way to the story of the Mayflower in America’s migration history. Cultural and political nation-building, for both feudal dynasties and modern states, requires and necessitates originary myths, so as to invoke a collective identity. However, at the same time, these mono-ethnic myths—as appropriated by the dominant State Apparatus as the grand narrative of nation—inevitably eliminate other small narratives.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41} The boundary between a nation and an ethnicity is sometimes blurred. However, in modern cases, such as those in the period of Japanese rule, I use the term “nation” instead of “ethnicity.” In pre-modern cases, such as the General Koxinga and Han myths before 19\textsuperscript{th} century, I use the term “ethnicity.”

\textsuperscript{42} Huang Di is a legendary Chinese hero, whose story embodies the Chinese cultural and political myth of the origin of the Chinese people. He was originally a tribe leader, who, after defeating Chi You, the leader of the “barbarian” tribes, he reigned approximately from 2697-2597 or 2696-2598 B.C. He is credited with devising the early Chinese calendar and written characters; he tamed wild animals; he also invented carts, boats, clothing, and the code of musical laws. As a collective ethnosymbol, and a resonant political metaphor, he has been claimed by a number of subsequent Chinese dynasties—including the Republic of China (KMT)—as the original ancestor.

\textsuperscript{43} For example, when the peripheral races in Chinese histories were conquered, or when Native American were displaced by early European settlers, their native stories were marginalised by
Han ideology—a historical product of the construction of a grand narrative and the destruction of small narratives—was shared by the “Han” generations under Qing rule in Taiwan, and was inherited by many present-day Taiwanese, through the work of the Ideological State Apparatus and the Repressive State Apparatus. The Imperial Examination System, along with its printing materials and cultural symbols, helped to spread a sense of “togetherness” among traditional Chinese literati and non-literati in the period of Qing rule in Taiwan. Although the period of Qing rule in Taiwan—which can be seen as the “pre-modern/early modern” stage of Taiwanese/Chinese history—could not be termed a “modern” period (nor can the amount of print disseminated by Qing rule be termed “print-capitalism”), there is no doubt that the origins of cultural nationalism are mainly to be found in the activities of the Han literati, the intellectuals who were familiar with the “legitimate” Chinese Classics. Old Hu in Wu’s Orphan of Asia (started in 1943, finished in 1945, written in Japanese) can be seen as a typical traditional-Han intellectual:

His mind was full of admiration for the Chronicles of Lu, the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, Han and Tang literature, Song-Ming philosophy, and the magnificent culture of ancient China, and he wanted this heritage transmitted to his descendants at all costs.44

Through the discipline of classical Chinese education, this imagined Chinese ideology—or, in other words, this Chinese cultural and national identity—did

dominant historiography, and thus many small narratives were displaced by the grand narrative of the conqueror.

contribute a lot to the security and maintainance of “Han” identity, and, at the same
time, the construction and reproduction of the habitus of Han intellectuals. However,
this Han identification was vulnerable in the face of Japanese cultural and political
nationalism with its accompanying notions of modernity and modernisation. This
may be because the “pre-modern”, feudal apparatus of Qing rule was far less
efficient than that of the modern State Apparatus.

III. The Palimpsestic Split of the Han/Us in the Period of Japanese Rule

Following the analysis of a small narrative through Wu’s case, this section
attempts to investigate the politics of collective narratives and the “Narrative”—the
shifting of the Han/Chinese identity of “We” in the context of cultural nationalism in
the 1920s-30s—when the “Other” (the Japanese colonial government) had
ownership of the interpretation and dissemination of modernity and modernisation
discourses. The “We,” who were capable of making their voice heard, mainly refers
to “Taiwanese” intellectuals (some of them might still consider themselves as
Chinese, or Japanese subjects in legal terms, while some of them consider
themselves as Taiwanese), consisting of traditional Han literati45 and the young
intellectuals who had received a modern Japanese education.46

Under Japanese colonisation, originally, Han culture was perceived and

45 By traditional Han literati, I principally mean those who had received classical Chinese education,
including the study of Confucianism, traditional Chinese philosophy, and Han poems. For the
younger generation, they might have received only Japanese school education, while Wu received
both traditional Chinese and Japanese education.

46 See the discussion of Wu Zhuoliu’s “Nanjing zagan” in Chapter Two for a more complicated
politics of “We” and “the Other”.

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presented in a way that made the newly-acquired Japanese subjects—the Taiwanese people—distinct from the Japanese settlers both in culture and in ethnicity. However, the Japanese colonial government’s shrewd pro-Han cultural policy in the early period of colonisation (1895-1920s)—a pro-Han cultural policy primarily exemplified by the colonial government’s official promotion of Han poetry and Han-Poetry societies all over the island in the early period of colonisation—were primarily aimed to create a consensus of cultural sameness (a gesture by the Japanese Rule to endorse the Chinese cultural capital in Bourdieu’s term) so as to tame the literati or gentry classes. From the 1920s, the Japanese government showed attempts to diminish the cultural differences further by introducing the policy of replacing the traditional Han schools with Japanese schools with the help of this idea of a cultural heritage shared by both the coloniser and the colonised. In particular, in the run up to the War period (1937-1945), the outnumbering by Japanese schools of the largely decreasing Han schools successfully reduced the dichotomy of Han-Japan to a very minimal level.47 Being Han/Chinese had been looked down upon during the later colonisation under the Japanese as this newly and gradually introduced education system not only replaced the Han traditional schools but eventually remove its cultural significance all together.

As a result of the expansion of “modern” discourses in the political and cultural field in Taiwan (the construction of the legitimate Japanese cultural capital in

47 According to Shozo Fujii, under the suppression of Japanese colonial government, the numbers of traditional Han private schools had decreased from around 1700 in 1898, to 302 in 1919, and there were only 7 in 1941. These Han schools used Hoklo (Taiwanese) as the teaching language, not Mandarin. See Fujii, [The One Hundred Years of Taiwanese Literature], p.47.
Bourdieu’s term), Han identity, and Han cultural identity based on Han poetry-writing and versed-writing, which was once representative of anti-Japanese expression, would not stand in the New/Old Literary Debate. In Bourdieu’s term, Han-poetry writing was no longer seen as an autonomous literary field but rather as an outdated and decadent literary form — “pre-modern” in comparison with “modern” Japanese education and culture—serving for the literary entertainment of Japanese colonial officials who had organised Han-poetry prizes as a way to win over Han literati. With the implementation of the national “modern” Japanese language, World literature, including movements such as European Romanticism, European Naturalism, and European Modernism, was translated and enjoyed by many (young-generation) Taiwanese intellectuals and writers, who had received Japanese education. Fujii Shozo points out that, at the end of the Nineteenth century, only ten percent of the population was using classical and/or vernacular Chinese (such as Hoklo) for reading and writing. By the 1940s, more than half of the Taiwanese had acquired the ability to read and write in Japanese. The number of Japanese readers had outnumbered that of Chinese readers. Fujii argues that the high literacy rate in the Japanese language, and the growth of the Japanese reading market for Japanese magazines and books, not only contributed to the building of what Anderson calls

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48 At least this claim was embraced by some Old Han intellectuals, but in reality, Han poetry-writing as representative of anti-Japanese expression would not stand in the New/Old Literary Debate.

49 See Ye Shitao’s review of these modern Taiwanese writers during the period of Japanese rule. Ye Shitao, *Taiwan wenxue de huigu [A Retrospective View of Taiwan Literature]* (Taipei: Jiuge, 2004), p. 95.

50 According to Fujii, up to 1941, Japanese could be understood by 57% of the Taiwanese. The literacy rate should be higher among Taiwanese intellectuals. Ibid., p.46.
the imagined community, but also to the development of Taiwanese nationalism.\textsuperscript{51} Therefore, within the literary field in Taiwan, the sub-field and the cultural capital of classical Chinese writing, Han-poetry writing—such as Han poets like Lian Yatang (1878-1936), Menhulusheng (a pseudonym), and Zheng Kunwu (1885-1959)\textsuperscript{52}—and the newly developed Chinese vernacular-writing forms, were all eroded and devalued by the “civilising” Japanese cultural sub-field and cultural capital—especially among the intellectual elite who possessed the desire and power to control national discourses.

Initially, the New/Old Literary Debate took place from 1924 (led by Zhang Wojun) aimed to criticise the aristocratic and stiff formally of classical Chinese literature.\textsuperscript{53} In addition, in response to the situation where “modern” Japanese language capital gradually dominated the literary field, the minor Chinese-writing literary sub-field, which was seen by the Japanese as Peripheral/Frontier Literature [\textit{Waidi wenxue}] within Japanese Literature, did undergo a change from using classical and verse-writing cultural capital (the so-called Old Literature) through the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid., pp. 51-61, 78-83.
\item \textsuperscript{52} See Liang, \textit{[The Study of Taiwanese New Literature during the Period of Japanese Occupation]}, pp. 55-59.
\item \textsuperscript{53} In Beijing in April in 1924, Zhang directly and severely attacked the problems of old versed literature and argued their works did not contain literary values in “Zhi taiwan qingnian de yifengxin” [A Letter Addressed to Young Taiwanese]. In November in 1924, Zhang further criticised that the Old literati utilised poetry as a tool for gaining fame and pleasing the dominant class in his “Zaogao de taiwan wenxuejie” [The Terrible Taiwanese Literary Field]. From 1924-1929, Zhang published a series of articles to promote New Literature on \textit{Taiwan Minbao} [Taiwan Civil News]; in addition, he introduced New Literary works from China to Taiwan, such as works by Lu Xun, Bing Xin, Guo Moruo, and Xu Zhimo; He also published his short novels written in vernacular Chinese. See Liang, \textit{[The Study of Taiwanese New Literature during the Period of Japanese Occupation]}, pp. 53-70.
\end{itemize}
cultural capital of vernacular writing (the New Literature, which could be divided into the use of vernacular Chinese and vernacular Hoklo [Taiwan huawen]), and some to Japanese writing.\(^{54}\) This shift was not a clear-cut process. Instead, it involved a process of resistance, negotiation, and collaboration between the Old and New literati groups. Many of the members of the New literati group, were more or less influenced by Han literature. On the other hand, according to Huang Meie, the traditional Taiwanese literati in fact also employed modern practices: the use of printing media, writing about modern social issues such as opium and prostitution, and engaging with the subjects of modern life like twenty-four-hour time and mass transportation. Traditional literature had begun to lean towards the mass-orientated and popular phenomena, showing signs of reinvention with the purpose of entertainment. At the same time, some Han literati even lost their Han cultural identity and were lured by Japanese modernity, explicitly supporting the Japanese Empire.\(^{55}\)

But after the Taiwanese New-Old Literary Debate (1924-26) in the 1920s and


\(^{55}\) See the modern practices adopted by the Han literati in Huang Meie, *Chongceng xiandaixing jingxiang: rizhishidai taiwan chuantong wenren de wenhuashiyu yu wenxue xiangxiang* [Mirrors of Multiple Modernities: Cultural Vision and Literary Imagination of Traditional Taiwanese Literati under Japanese Rule] (Taipei: Maitian, 2004), pp. 153-176. The mention of Han literati lured by Japanese modernity refers particularly to the case of Wang Shi-pon, who spoke ill of Qing rule in Taiwan while stressing the bright modernity of Japanese rule in Taiwan. Ibid., pp. 343-374.
1930s—though some still advocated traditional Han writing because of its abundant Chinese content and its Han-ethnic nature as a revolt against Japanese rule —this traditional literary genre was not seen by young Taiwanese intellectuals as an effective counter-colonising approach, perhaps because most of them had received a modern Japanese education.

In addition, under the two influential articles of “Wenxue geming” [Literature Revolution] (by Chen Duxiu) and “Wenxue gailiang chuyi” [The Draft of Literary Reformation] (by Hu Shih) in China in 1917 and the introduction of the vernacular works by Chinese scholars and writers such as Hu Shih, Lu Xun (1881-1936), Guo Moruo (1892-1978), Zhang Ziping (1893-1959), Bing Xin (1900-1999) on Taiwan minbao [Taiwan Civil News], Chinese vernacular writing, rather than Han classical-writing, became the new means of de-colonialism for Taiwanese intellectuals. As mentioned, the most distinct proponent of this form of rebellious

56 Huang Meie offers a broader view of the Taiwanese New-Old Literary Debate (1924-1942), more reflective of a palimpsestic interpretation of the debate, rather than focussing on the historical context of the 1920s and 1930s, as some scholars consider from 1924-1926. Ibid., p. 134. This debate was seen as the first literary debate (the first Nativist Xiangtu Literary Debate) in the history of Taiwanese literature. (The other debates were the Post-war Literary Debate in 1945-1949, the Modern-Poetry Debate in 1972-1974, and the Nativist Literary Debate in 1977-1978.)

57 In China in 1917, Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu respectively published influential articles, “The Draft of Literary Reformation” and “An Essay of Literature Revolution.” The former argued for the adoption of vernacular-writing, rather than maintaining the formalism of classical-writing. The latter promoted the idea that literature should be national, realist, and social, rather than being aristocratic, classical, and mysterious as seen in old classical writing. This new literary fashion and the changes it brought about, was known as the Literature Revolution. It also influenced Taiwan’s literary field in the 1920s.

expression was Zhang Wojun (1902-1955), who attacked the Old Literature (mainly Han poetry) because it served the Japanese government’s cultural-assimilating aims and because it spoke of ‘‘corruption and feudal society.’’ Zhang also proposed Taiwanese writers should learn from the New Literature Movement of the May-Fourth Movement in 1919 in China.

In terms of language use, Zhang Wojun’s positive view of Chinese vernacular writing in this literary debate also influenced Liao Yuwen (1912-1980), Lin Kefu (?), and Zhu Dianren (1903-1951), who supported the use of Chinese Vernacular Writing (Beijing/Mandarin in spoken communication with Han characters in written form) in the following Taiwán huáwen lúnzhān [Debate on Taiwanese language] (1930-1932). In fact, another route of language use had long been practiced—Taiwanese Vernacular (Hoklo) Romanisation by Presbyterian missionaries and their followers, which emphasises on transcribing how Hoklo is spoken in daily life. The first public newspaper in the history of Taiwan was Taiwán fūchēng jiào huíbāo [The Church Paper of the Prefecture in Taiwan], issuing from 1885-1891, had used this romanisation system. In 1914, Cai Peihuo (1889-1983) had started to promote Romanised-Hoklo Spelling inside Taiwán tōng huá hùi.61


60 It continues its issues except for two short periods: first, April 1942 to November 1945; second, April to November in 1969. From 1969, because of the sanction of the KMT government, it stopped the use of romanisation but used Beijing language and Chinese characters instead.

Taiwan Assimilation Association] 62 (Cai initially learned the system of romanisation of Hoklo from his brother, who learned it from a Presbyterian church in Tainan). He published “Taiwan xinwenxue yundong han luomazi” [Taiwan New Literary Movement and Romanisation] in 1923. Under Cai’s promotion, the Cultural Association adopted the Romanised-Hoklo Spelling system and aimed to run a class of it in 1925, which was stopped by the Japanese colonial government for the reasons that the dissemination of the Romanised-Hoklo Spelling would harm the teaching of Japanese and the integration of the Taiwanese and Japanese people). 63 Nevertheless, the Cultural Association was the first non-religious cultural group which promoted Romanised Hoklo Spelling in public. Cai’s Chap-hang koan-kian [Ten Humble Thoughts] (1925), covering issues such as romanisation, social life, civilisation, characteristics of the Han people, 64 is the first collection of essays written in Romanised-Hoklo Spelling in Taiwan. 65 In 1929, Cai managed to run three times of Taiwan Vernacular-Words Study Workshop. 66 In 1931, Cai accepted (Ex-)Taiwan Governor-General, Izawa Takio’s suggestion, and used kana to spell Hoklo, and then ran some classes and petitions about it. However, because either

62 The association was established by Itagaki Taisuke (1837-1919), Lin Xiantang, Cai Peihuo, and Cai Huiru (1881-1929) on 20 December, 1914, aiming to decrease the different treatment between Japanese and Taiwanese in Taiwan. It was soon disbanded by the colonial government in 1915, because it “created social insecurity”.


64 Ibid., pp. 21-22.


66 Chiung, [Cai Peihuo and the Romanisation Movement of Taiwan Cultural Association], p. 24.
Romanised-Hoklo Spelling or Kana-spelt Hoklo Spelling were against the government’s Japanese language policy, the classes taught by Cai were often interfered by Japanese police, and thus the effect was quite reginal. After the Restoration in 1945, Cai became an official in the KMT government. In 1948, Cai started to use Zhuyin fuhao (the transcription of spoken Chinese advocated by the KMT government) to spell Hoklo. However, under KMT’s Chinese language policy, his efforts did not achieve a very successful result, either. As Lin Peirong observes, Cai’s reliance on both the Japanese government and the KMT government to promote vernacular Hoklo transcription failed, because “the rulers worshipped ‘national languages’ (Japanese and Beijing).” Even though Romanised Hoklo transcription has the advantage of recording the sounds of Hoklo, apart from governmental issues, Chiung analyses why the Romanisation approach failed. Chiung argues that the reasons were because 1) Han characters were once used by the Japanese government to reduce the Taiwanese people’s resistant consciousness, 2) intellectuals looked down on Romanisation, treating it as a system used by children, Christians, and foreigners, while Han characters represented a high-class literati and officialdom (in the context of the Qing Imperial Exam) and a certain degree of Han ethnic spirit, 3) the Taiwanese people lost confidence in Hoklo because of the civil discourses instilled by the Japanese government, and that the Taiwanese people lack a “glorious history of dynasties” to return to. Chiung’s comments explain why

70 Chiung, [Cai Peihuo and the Romanisation Movement of Taiwan Cultural Association], pp. 29-31.
Romanisation remained a minority written choice for both the elite and the common Taiwanese people during the period of Japanese Rule, and did not gain much attention (compared with Zhang Wujun’s Chinese-Vernacular and Guo Qiusheng’s Hoklo-in-Han-characters approaches) in the following Debate on Taiwanese Language (1930-1932).

According to Ye Shitao, the so-called “Taiwan New Literature” advocated by Zhang focuses only on promoting a new literature, but not a literature with a strong anti-colonial function or nativist concerns, since Zhang still saw Taiwanese literature as part of Mainland (Chinese) Literature, and, similarly, did not address the fact that “Taiwanese” literature was dominated by the effects of Japanese colonisation. Both Chang and Old Han literati shared the perspective that Taiwanese literature was part of Chinese literature.71 But, as Ye points out, Zhang did not adhere to the old literati’s “nationalism of the ‘Qing left-over subjects’”; his (Zhang’s) nationalism belonged to that of more “modern times” in that it was “under the influence of the Chinese Revolution in 1911 and the May-Fourth Movement, and was more democratic and scientific.”72 Zhang Wujun borrowed the modern discourses from China in order to speak against the modern Japanese discourses in Taiwan; and so did some of the young Taiwanese intellectuals in this debate.

In fact, even the Taiwanese intellectuals still shared a degree of Han-identity and employed Chinese writing as in China, just like Zhang Wujun and the traditional literati. However, the consolidated political governance of Japanese rule in Taiwan at

71 It was initiated by Zhang Wujun from 1924. Ibid., p.31. See details of this debate in Chapter Two.
72 Ibid., p.23.
that time showed that there was little hope after 1911 (when the Republic of China was founded) of Taiwan returning to Qing or to be included into China. As A-chin Hsiau argues, this “cultural identity dilemma” of Taiwanese intellectuals (given that Chinese identification was impractical in the period of Japanese-Rule in Taiwan) also generated a group of young Taiwanese intellectuals at that time who “shifted toward identifying themselves with the island and advocated a vernacular tai-oan-oe [Taiwanese Speaking-Writing] writing form.”\(^73\) While localised and native Taiwanese culture came to be seen as a more practical approach to decolonising during the Japanese colonial regime—with the result that the migrated Han culture integrated with native discourses and was then re-wrapped with a fresh anti-colonial face—the declining, once-legitimate classical Han culture was no longer seen as a functional, de-colonising weapon in the Japanese period. As previously discussed, Han classical literature was mostly seen as a backward and pre-modern form of artistic expression in the eyes of the young Taiwanese elite at that time.

This shift also shows the change of political identity in the *Taiwan huawen lunzhan* [Debate on Taiwanese language] (1930-1932): “being nativist [Xiangtu] (Taiwanese)” and “being modern and realist (vernacular-writing),” were more attractive choices, when they redefined “We” in order to be different from the modern “Other” (Japan). The strategy of remaining Han/Chinese (like Zhang and the Old Han literati) now had to compete with the Taiwanese definition of cultural national identity—as exemplified by the nativist writer, Huang Shihui (1900-1945), who was once the chief-director of the special Tainan branch of the Taiwanese

\(^73\) Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, pp. 46-47.
Cultural Association. In Huang’s articles “Zenyang bu tichang xiangtu wenxue?” [Why not Promote Nativist [Xiangtu] Literature] (1930) and “Zaitan xiangtu wenxue” [Another Discussion of Nativist Literature] (1931), he not only attacked Old Literature, but also attacked Zhang Wojun’s negative views of Hoklo-writing (Taiwanese-language-writing). Huang’s argument initiated the Taiwanese Vernacular Language Debate [Taiwan huawen lunzhan] (1930-1932), which was closely related to and can be seen as an extension of the previous Taiwanese Literary Debate (1924-26).

Huang proposed a strong Taiwan nativist [Xiangtu] literary vision through his emphasis on this Hoklo language perspective: “You are Taiwanese. The Taiwanese sky is above you. The Taiwanese land is under you…you are speaking the Taiwanese [Hoklo] language…you should write the literature of Taiwan.” Huang also urged people to use Hoklo to write articles, poetry, songs, and to use it to describe things about Taiwan. Nevertheless, Huang’s “Taiwanese approach”, being Nativist in terms of language and literary content (Hoklo compared with Zhang Wojun’s Beijing approach; a very Taiwan-location-based literary ideal), as Zhao Xunda points out, did not give a clear clue to how to practice this Hoklo performance—whether this proposed Hoklo-written project should emphasise on the

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74 Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], p.26. The first article was published in Wurenbao [Five-People Newspaper], the second in Taiwan xinwen [Taiwan Newspaper].

verbal or the written characteristics, or both? Following Huang’s preliminarily Taiwanese approach, both the term and the content of “Taiwan huawen” were mentioned in detail by Guo Qiusheng [1904-1980] for the first time. Guo proposed the idea—writing down what Taiwanese (Hoklo) people speak of with Han characters. In addition, in terms of national imaginations through the use of Han characters, according to Zhao, Huang and Guo’s Taiwan huawen objected the classical syntax in classical Chinese writing (which was supported by traditionalists such as Lian Heng), because Guo and Huang’s Taiwan huawen aimed to seek “modernity and Taiwaneseness” (for everyday life use) rather than Lian Heng’s “Chineseness and classicality” (to verify Taiwan’s connection with Chinese history). In the end, this language debate mainly concerned the issue of whether to employ the vernacular Taiwanese [Hoklo] language as a replacement for Chinese classical language [Wenyen] in written form.

Different from Zhang Wojun’s inspiration from Chinese Vernacular Writing from China, Huang and Guo’s shared position of and a search for a native [Bentu] Taiwanese language, either through the Hoklo spoken language or through a

77 Ibid., 305.
78 Ibid., pp. 304-305.
79 Ibid., pp. 305-309.
recreation of Han characters by Hoklo, (compared to Japanese and contemporary Mandarin) can be seen as a reaction against the domination of Japanese language and culture over the gradually endangered Han culture in Taiwan. Taiwanese language and culture, with its deeper native characteristics than Chinese classical language (and traditional “Han” culture), could be seen as a way carrying more effective “anti-Japanese approach.” (Although the promotion of Taiwanese language was not necessarily for resisting Japan. It had a strong leftwing agenda of popularising literature). However, this Taiwan-ised language reform was stopped by the subsequent Kōminka Movement (1936-45), the Chinese-Japanese War (1937-1945), and the official prohibition of Chinese writing (1937)⁸⁰.

As a result of these discourses imported from Japan and China, and those that rose from native Taiwan, neither traditional Han intellectuals nor the New literati who proposed nativist views maintained a stable status during Japanese Rule. Instead, Western Modernity introduced by the Japan, the Chinese Vernacular Movement, and the nativist views of Taiwan all left their mark on Taiwanese intellectuals. In regard to the modern elements displayed in the work of the traditional literati during the period of Japanese rule in Taiwan, Huang Meie observes:

> Writings on modern civilisation can be found in the early period of Japanese rule…the [traditional literati] writers often focused on … modern terms, including theatres, mansions, coffee shops… people might be

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⁸⁰ The ban on using Chinese only applied to newspapers and journals, and it was not completely carried out. There remained some space for writers to create their works, such as through writing privately, as what Wu Zhuoliu did in writing *Orphan of Asia*. See Chapter Two for a detailed discussion of Wu’s resistance through literature.
driving… A.D. is used to record time, names of the characters are often translated from English…which shows that the atmosphere of modern society existed in Taiwanese society in the early period of Japanese rule.81

Thus, the change of social context made some Han intellectuals carry hybrid cultural elements.

IV. Palimpsestic Taiwaneseness

I use the term “palimpsestic Taiwaneseness” to describe the unique historical vision of Taiwanese subjectivity which is a result of layered Chineseness, layered Japanese, and a “re-discovered” indigenous essence, along with other cultural heritages co-existing in Taiwan.

Zhang Liangze argues in “Wuhuaguojie” [An Analysis of The Fig Tree] that “Wu Zhuoliu’s Taiwanese consciousness is dynamic” so that even the term “Taiwanese” is replaced by other terms due to the passage of time. When being oppressed by an “Alien nation” (such as the Japanese), Taiwanese consciousness and Fatherland consciousness are raised; when being oppressed by “Fatherland” (such as that promoted by the KMT), Taiwanese consciousness is stronger.82 Zhang posits three periods in the formation of Taiwanese consciousness: first, the Budding Period, which describes the traditional Taiwanese consciousness; secondly, the Developing Period, when the Taiwanese consciousness was awakened; and finally, the

81 Huang, [Mirrors of Multiple Modernities: Cultural Vision and Literary Imagination of Traditional Taiwanese Literati under Japanese Rule], p. 309.
82 Zhuoliu Wu, Wuhuaguo: taiwan qishinian de huixiang [The Fig Fruit: A Seventy Years’ Reflection on Taiwan] (Taipei: Qianwei, 1989), pp. 29-30.
Judgmental Period, which sees the emergence of a self-reflexive Taiwanese consciousness. This paradigm can be seen as the epistemology of the prototype of Taiwaneseness which has evolved with time.

However, as a discursive consciousness, it owes much to external forces which then became an integrity of Taiwaneseness through the process of indigenisation. According to Chen Chi-nan, writing from the perspective of the Han communities of Taiwan, the Han immigrant society, dating from the Ming dynasty to the period of Japanese Rule, underwent an “indigenisation”[tuzhuhua] process, as a result of which they developed a distinctive “Taiwaneseness” over a long period of time. Chen argues that Han immigrants and their offspring gradually turned themselves from being an “Immigrant Society” to becoming the newly settled “Native society,” during the period of Qing Rule in Taiwan from 1683 to 1895. Chen considers the frequent ethnic conflicts [fenlei xiedou] which flared up owing to the differences of original Mainland-China domicile of these Chinese immigrants in Taiwan in early Qing Rule. He argues that these in fact show the immigrants’ attempts to maintain their Mainland identification, even over the new land. However, Chen continues, with the advance of time, Taiwanese society gradually entered into a stable period, in which “the demographic distribution generated different levels of sedimentation which shaped the strata according to different domicile groups.” As a result, “with this transformation, localised religious and patriarchal groups based on the newly-

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83 Ibid., pp. 21-29.
acquired land taken from Taiwanese indigines, gradually developed.”  

Though these Han settlers and their offspring might still identify themselves as “pure” Han in ethnic terms (a strategy adopted to differentiate themselves from “savage” and “uncivilised” Taiwanese indigines), in everyday life they gradually developed a preliminary island-wide awareness and then a Taiwanese identification in the late period of Japanese Rule, when modernisation (through forms such as print-capitalism) contributed to the dissemination and forming of Taiwan-related discourses (such as the call of “Taiwan is Taiwanese people’s Taiwan”). By the end of the period of Japanese Rule, the island-based Taiwanese ideology, or, in other words, Taiwanese subjectivity, had replaced the immigrant identification which had resulted from the Mainland-Chinese domicile-based, geo-based, and blood-based grouping of the past—at least among the discourses of intellectuals.

However, the popular Taiwanese discourses initiated under the period of Japanese Rule were severely restricted by subsequent events: (1) the Kōminka Movement (1937-1945)—a cultural propaganda movement which aimed to transform those colonised in Taiwan into the subjects of the Japanese Emperor; (2) the 2-28 incident (1947)—a tragedy which took place on 28th February 1947 in which many Taiwanese civilians (and many members of the cultural elite) were

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85 Ibid.
86 Some argue that the Republic of Formosa (1895) and the subsequent revolutions over the Formosa since 1895 might contribute to this preliminary island-wide awareness of “Taiwaneseness”: the former mainly mobilised Qing officials in Taiwan and intellectuals in Taipei city, while the latter mostly mobilised locally town-based Taiwanese common people.
87 Chen, Guanjian niandai de taiwan [The Cricial Ages of Taiwan], pp. 12-13.
88 See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of the Kōminka Movment.
killed by the KMT troops;\(^\text{89}\) (3) the Cultural Sanitation Movement (1954);\(^\text{90}\) and (4) the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (1966-70), in which classical Chinese culture was “re-invented” and legitimised by the KMT regime.\(^\text{91}\)

In the 1970s, a series of diplomatic setbacks (i.e. the Sankaku islands Event in 1970, and the ROC was expelled by UN resolution 2758 in 1971) challenged the legitimate Chinese governance of the KMT in Taiwan.\(^\text{92}\) According to Yu Sheng-kuan, for the first time, Chen Guying and Wang Xiaopo brought in the “anti-Imperial” and “unification” phenomena from overseas Protect-Sankaku Movement, and which became two main discourses of (Chinese) nationalism. Yu argues that that two nationalist discourses became the guardians of Chinese consciousness in the 1970s (with the decline of the Legitimate Chinese Discourse of the KMT government).\(^\text{93}\) The 1977/78 Xiangtu [nativist/native-soil] literary debate started to engage the issues of the existence of “Taiwanese literature”

\(^{89}\) See the beginning of Chapter Three for details.

\(^{90}\) Also termed the Cultural Cleansing Movement. This politically-engaged cultural movement strongly supported President Chiang Kai-shek’s “Two Amendments of Education and Entertainment of The Principle for People (1953)” and argued the need to cleanse the “poison of redness (communism),” the “harm of yellowness (pornography),” and the “crime of blackness (dirt-digging news).” See Chapters Four and Five for details.

\(^{91}\) See Chapters Four and Five for a detailed discussion.

\(^{92}\) See Chapter Four for a detailed discussion.

\(^{93}\) However, the “nationalism” promoted by Wang Xiaopo, Chen Guying (and Chen Yingzhen) argued by Yu is more leftist-leaning, which is different from the KMT’s rightist nationalism. In addition, according to Yu, they even carried a stronger stance for unification than the KMT. See Yu Sheng-kuan, *Taiwan wenxue bentulun de xingqi yu fazhan* (*The Rise and Development of Taiwan Nativist Literary Discourse*) (Taipei: Socio, 2009), pp. 202-207.
This debate was mainly initiated by Wang Tuo and Ye Shitao’s realist [Xianshi] and Taiwanese perspectives of literature. For example, in “Taiwan xiangtu wenxueshi daolun” [An Introduction to Taiwan Nativist Literature] (1977), Ye provides a “Taiwan-centred” view of the Xiangtu literature in Taiwan, which argues to “view the works of the whole world from a Taiwanese position”. According to Tang Xiaobing, this essay also describes a “‘Taiwanese consciousness’ [Taiwan yishi] that is the product of a prolonged colonial and anticolonial history.”

However, the acknowledgement of Taiwanese literature by nativist writers was considered socialist realism, separatist, and even communist in the eyes of establishment writers such as Peng Ge, Yin Zhengxiong, Zhu Xining, and Yu Kwang-chung. Taiwanese consciousness, or in other words, the search for Taiwanese subjectivity in literature, embedded in these Xiangtu discourses was finally put to a stop by General Wang Sheng, the Chief Director of the Political Warfare Department in January 1978. The Taiwanese consciousness finally surfaced with the company of [Bentuhua] Nativisation in the 1980s. After the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979, Zhan Hongzhi’s article “Liangzhong wenxue xinling” [Two Kinds of Literary Mentality] (1980), which was originally a criticism of two awarded works in the supplement of Lianhebao, accidentally initiated the following debates

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94 See Chapter Four for a detailed discussion, pp. 314-318.  
95 Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], p.221.  
97 Ibid., pp. 58-62.  
98 See Chapter Four for more details.
about Taiwanese consciousness and Chinese consciousness. Zhan expresses his anxiety that the literary achievement in Taiwan in the past thirty years will be considered “peripheral literature”.\(^9^9\) Zhan’s lament was retorted by Gao Tiansheng, Peng Ruijin, Song Dongyang [Chen Fang-ming], Li Qiao, and Song Zelai. Nativist views of Bentuhua [nativisation] and Taiwan yishi [Taiwanese consciousness] were offered by Peng and Song Dongyang (Chen Fang-ming) in response to Zhan and Chen Yingzhen’s China-centred views.\(^1^0^0\) According to Tang, following Chen Fang-ming’s essay,\(^1^0^1\) China complex and Taiwan complex started to be vigorously debated between the nativists and the unificationists between 1983 and 1984.\(^1^0^2\) This Taiwan yishi lunzhan [Taiwanese identity debate] had widely extended its influence to the non-party movement in the political field.\(^1^0^3\) The seminar, “Ba taiwanren de wenxue zhuquan zhaohuilai” [Seeking for the Literary Sovereignty of the Taiwanese],\(^1^0^4\) held in 1994 (seven years after the lifting of martial law in 1987), in

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\(^1^0^1\) Song, [The Current Issues of Nativisation of Taiwanese Literature] (1984).

\(^1^0^2\) Tang, “On the Concept of Taiwan Literature”, pp. 64-65.

\(^1^0^3\) Shi, Preface to [A Collection of the Debate of Taiwanese Consciousness: A General Account of Taiwan Complex and China Complex], p.1.

which many nativist literary critics and writers of the so-called sourthern school were gathered to reflect the development of discourses of subjectivity of Taiwanese literature such as *Dutexing* [Uniqueness] (1940s), *Zizhuxing/Zhizuhua* [Originality/self-determination/autonomy] (1970-80s), *Zhutixing* [Subjectivity/sovereignty] (1990s). Ye argued that although the Taiwanese were Japanese in law, they commonly considered themselves as Han people. In order to resist assimilation by Japanese literature, many Taiwanese writers had identified with the literature of the Han people. But Ye thought it questionable how much Han literature was actually absorbed and how much Han Literature could be seen as an integral part of Taiwanese literature then: since “[Old] Taiwanese writers were very unfamiliar with Chinese vernacular literature, which still belonged to foreign literature.”

The period of Japanese Rule was a special and complex de-colonising

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105 According to Tang, “the sourthern school, associated with Wenxue jie in Kaohsiung, was behind the the nativisation program outlined by Peng Ruijin.” In terms of geopolitics, the southern school generally maintained a stronger Bentu stance and rhetoric in their works and criticism than the northern school such as Chen Yingzhen. See Tang, “On the Concept of Taiwan Literature”, p. 62.

106 See Tang, “On the Concept of Taiwan Literature”, p. 55; See also Yu, *The Rise and Development of Taiwan Nativist Literary Discourse*, pp. 303-323.

107 Han literature in written form can be roughly divided into the study of Han classics (literature written in verses) and the new vernacular literature (literature written in the everyday, spoken language) after the May-fourth Movement in 1919. Traditional Han study, as we have seen, was largely replaced by modern Japanese education in the middle of the period of Japanese rule in Taiwan. After the war between Japan and China in 1937, the import of vernacular Chinese literature to Taiwan, under Japanese military restrictions, was restricted to Taiwanese intellectuals who comprehended Chinese. Also, this meant that Chinese culture, including classical Chinese study and vernacular Chinese literature, carried “foreign” characteristics to young Taiwanese intellectuals who had only received Japanese education and did not understand Chinese.

108 [Seeking for the Literary Sovereignty of the Taiwanese], p.108.
context for some Taiwanese intellectuals and the cultural elite. In dealing with the Japanese colonial hegemony, some intellectuals advocated a “Taiwanese literary subjectivity”,\(^{109}\) whilst others appealed to the most familiar cultural nation (or cultural ethnicity)—the Han culture. This top-layered Han culture (to intellectuals who were familiar with it) deeply influenced the ideology of their settler ancestors—and, now, made its influence felt upon themselves—even though the literature that belonged to that culture was perceived as “foreign” (and even degraded) to modern Japanese eyes. At the same time, the process of “indigenisation” had in fact gradually and dynamically divorced Taiwanese intellectuals and writers from Han culture in everyday life for more than two hundred years. However, this zigzag in the identification of some Taiwanese writers under Japanese Rule (which involved including and re-identifying with the already-alienated Han, and identifying with a constructed Taiwanese literary subjectivity, to challenge Japanese inclusive discourses) has been neglected or oversimplified by Mainland Chinese writers and officials since 1945. Ye Shitao continues, “Chinese writers who came to Taiwan during the post-war period (after 1945) asserted that Taiwanese literature was a part of Chinese literature whether they [the Chinese writers] were leftists or rightists.” However, he continues, “the leftists could still admit the *Dutexing* [uniqueness] of Taiwanese Literature, while this uniqueness was totally denied by the rightists.”\(^{110}\) The comparatively unrestricted political atmosphere in Taiwan between 1945 and 1947 generated a respectful attitude towards the Taiwanese literary tradition. But

\(^{109}\) See Chapter Two for details of how Taiwanese literary subjectivity was generated in resistance to the “inclusion” attempts by Japanese Rule.

\(^{110}\) [Seeking for the Literary Sovereignty of the Taiwanese], p.105.
understanding Taiwanese literature as “total blankness,” or as “enslaved by Japanese Literature,” were views commonly expressed in public by officials. After the 2-28 Incident in 1947, the right to interpret what constitutes literature and what constitutes “our” literary history, was taken into the hands of the state institutions controlled by the KMT Nationalist government.

Ye goes on to present his palimpsestic and dialectical view of the issues of the subjectivity of Taiwanese literature. He expresses the view that many Taiwanese writers under Japanese Rule (the older generation, born under Japanese Rule) treated Chinese literature as “foreign” literature, and this attitude remained unchanged in the post-war period. Nevertheless, Ye’s claim that “many Taiwanese writers under Japanese Rule treated Chinese literature as foreign literature” is quite subjective and is derived from his own experience. Generational difference is important here too, as for those born in the early years of Japanese Rule, “Han” literature served as an important foundation for their literary resources (such as Wu Zhuoliu). Nevertheless, for those born after 1945 in Taiwan received their education under the KMT government’s mono-Chinese language policy, Chinese-centred literary history was privileged in their education, they were less familiar with Taiwanese literature’s pre-war tradition under Japanese Rule. In addition, the concept of Dutexing [Originality] offered by Ye should not only apply to literature developing in Taiwan’s special context(s). On these grounds, Nostalgia, Juancun, and Military literature also carry their own “uniqueness”, even though they were associated with the curtural policy of the state power then.

111 See Chapter Three for an analysis of the cultural field before the 2-28 Incident.
To fit the context of 1990s Taiwan, Ye proposes a Taiwan-centred view that: “‘Chinese literature’ should be treated as part of Taiwanese literature rather than as foreign literature.”112 Ye goes further: “Taiwanese writers under Japanese Rule had the condition of double-identification—seeing themselves as both Han people and as Taiwanese.” However, Ye continues, “Taiwanese writers [in the 1990s] finally realised that the literature of Taiwan will ultimately belong to the geographical environment and history of Taiwan… and is not Han literature.” However, Ye points out that “this kind of thinking [that sees Chinese literature as “our” literature] is quite obvious in the mind of the post-war writers,” because they received Chinese education under the KMT government. (For non-provincial writers, in particular, their Chinese ethnic background also played an important part in forming this Chinese cultural ideology.) At the same time, Ye argues, “there were loopholes of thinking among the prewar-generation writers.” He explains what he means by “loopholes”: from detailed analysis of works by pre-war writers, he argues, “we can find there exists the contradiction of ‘Father-land Nationalist discourses’ and strong autonomous [Taiwanese] consciousness.” By “Father-land Nationalist discourses,” he refers to the combined discourses of cultural Han, carried by the “Han” immigrants to Taiwan ever since the Ming dynasty, and by the latter, he means the evolved political identification of the modern state—the Republic of China established in 1912. Ye concludes, “It was not until the 1980s that this contradiction

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112 [Seeking for the Literary Sovereignty of the Taiwanese], p.106.
could be totally eliminated. This is a long process of awakening of the Taiwanese.\textsuperscript{113}

Another nativist critic attending this seminar, Peng Ruijin, argues similarly that the search for the subjectivity of Taiwanese literature is “inevitably political”: “It is very boring but we cannot help it. After seventy years’ growth of the movement [the search began in the 1920s], Taiwanese writers should still fuss over the ownership of Taiwanese literature…” Peng explains: “Since the period of Japanese Occupation, there always has been a power which intends to dominate the development of Taiwanese literature.” As a result, “Taiwanese writers have been forced to devote themselves to the line of resistance and anti-dominance.”\textsuperscript{114} Ye and Peng both conclude that, in the 1990s, Taiwanese literary discourses would appear to be finally free from the anxiety of searching for a Taiwanese Zhutixing [subjectivity].

Regarding the situation produced by the multiple languages in Taiwanese literary history, the scholar Zheng Jiongming asserts that it is necessary “to transcend the language argument in order to discuss issues of Zhutixing [subjectivity],” and he argues that the literature of Taiwanese subjectivity is “the literature of the will of the Taiwanese that integrates with the land of Taiwan and people’s existence.”\textsuperscript{115}

The first Taiwanese literature department established in Aletheia University in Taiwan, in 1996, was a belated legitimisation (and institutionalisation) of the study of Taiwanese literary discourses and subjectivity. (Chinese Literature Departments

\textsuperscript{113} “Ibid., pp.108-109.

\textsuperscript{114} Peng Ruijin, \textit{Taiwan xinwenxue yundong 40 nian} [Fourty Years of Taiwan New Literature] (Kaohsiung, Chunhui, 2004), p. 70.

\textsuperscript{115} [Seeking for the Literary Sovereignty of the Taiwanese], p.110.
had been long-legitimised in Taiwan). Chen Fang-ming, in his *Taiwan xin wenxueshi* (A History of Modern Taiwanese Literature) (2011), expands the definition of Bentu [nativist] literature: “after the lifting of martial law, *Bentu* should transcends pathos and suffering, and thus any literature bred on the island can be incorporated in the camp of *Bentu*.” On these grounds, Chen argues further that indigenous writing, *Waisheng* and *Juancun* writing, Japanese writers’ writing in the Kōminka Movement, official literature [Combat literature], the works of some writers who were accused as “Hired writers”, and queer literature should be included in the history of Taiwanese literature.\(^{116}\) Under the constant influence of various political agendas from a multi-colonial past and present (such as the re-ruling of the KMT in 2008, with its strong China-centric cultural policy), it seems that Taiwanese literary discourses will continue to bear the characteristics of resistance, and acceptance, palimpsestically.

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Chapter Two: The Colonial Palimpsest in Wu Zhuoliu’s Writing

Because of Wu Zhuoliu’s (1900-1976) experiences as a writer who worked across different national and political arenas, this chapter will not only analyse his writing through close reading, but also trace the direction and flow of the literary movements in his time. In this chapter, I will use Wu as a representative cross-era, and cross-national, Taiwanese writer from the period of Japanese Rule (1895-1945) to the KMT regime (1945-1987). I will aim to demonstrate how the national discourse of Taiwaneseness is palimpsestically portrayed in Wu’s writing, and I will also explore how this discourse interacts with notions of Chineseness and Japaneseness. As this trio of cultural and national influences has interfused over time to form what Taiwan is now, so-called “Taiwaneseness”—the defining and refining of Taiwanese subjectivity—cannot be reduced to a pure essence through the simple process of eliminating Chineseness and Japaneseness. In short, “Taiwaneseness” cannot be understood nor recovered through the decolonising national paradigm, which is used where only two forces (the colonial and the colonised) are mainly concerned. Rather, this complex cultural discourse should be extracted through an erosive and sedimentary process that addresses the localisation of layered Chineseness and Japaneseness during Wu Zhuoliu’s time.

To be able to clarify the palimpsestic cultural politics that exist under the
surface of the relationship between China, Japan and Taiwan, I firstly need to
anatomise and deconstruct the entangled agglomeration of the three
cultures/politics/literatures. By presenting the social context and Wu’s writing
together, I aim to create a conversation between the literary text and the social
context, so as to better understand how the mixture of Chineseness and Japanese
essness has been palimpsestically formed, and, thereby, how Taiwanese-ness (either in literary
or historical discourse) has been portrayed and narrated. This conversation between
text and context is relevant not only to Wu Zhuoliu’s time; the pervasive influence
of the China-Japan-Taiwan trio, also haunts the island’s contemporary political,
cultural, and economical field.

In order to allow my discussion of historical influence and cultural
representations to reach its fullest and most articulate expression, I will structure this
chapter as follows. First, I will discuss the social context of Wu’s time, then go on to
talk about Wu Zhuoliu himself, notions of Chineseness, Japanese
essness, Taiwanese-ness, and, finally, to analyse his writing. My aim is to focus on the
synchronic and diachronic politics of cultural agglomerations and to concentrate on
the competition, resistance and cooperation within this giant structure so as to avoid
centrung my argument on a narrow epistemological or anthropological interpretation.
Acknowledging the necessity of cultural essentialism in categorising these mixed
cultures, at the same time, I will also try to avoid excessive use of cultural
essentialism (e.g. to presume a genuine and orthodox Chinese essence exists in
Chinese culture).

After dealing with the social context in which Wu lived and worked, a close
reading of Wu’s works will be accompanied by an analysis of how the colonial palimpsest operates in his writing. This chapter will demonstrate how Wu’s accumulated and transformed identities adapted to the various transitions of colonial regimes: from Qing Rule, via Japanese Rule, to the KMT regime, as well as from Han culture under Qing, via colonial modernity under Japanese Rule, to another Chinese culture advocated by the KMT regime. This chapter will also discuss how the issue of cultural nationalism—Taiwanese-ness, or the preliminaries of it, the ethnosymbolism of Taiwanese-ness—was portrayed and reiterated through his writing. This chapter will further discuss how Wu’s writing reacted when it encountered top-down colonial ideologies embedded in the state power of Japanese Rule and the KMT regime. Finally, the chapter will try to consider why and how Wu’s literary writing insisted on discussing sensitive political issues under periods of political censorship. To discuss these issues, I will explore some of his short stories and three long works in this chapter: *Yaxiya de guer* [*Orphan of Asia*] (started in 1943, finished in 1945, written in Japanese),¹ *Wuhua guo* [*The Fig Tree*] (finished in 1967, written in Chinese),² and *Taiwan lianqiao*. (Began in September 1971, finished on 29 December 1974, and written in Japanese.)³

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³ Reference will be made to the Chinese version: Wu Zhuoliu, *Taiwan lianqiao* (Taipei: Caogen, 2006).
I. The Social Context of Wu Zhuoliu

The “Civilising” Period of Japanese Rule in Wu’s Time

According to Yosaburo Takekoshi (in 1907), Japanese education was seen as the necessary means to “civilise” the Formosans:

Education has a great future before it in Formosa. In fact, it may be looked upon as the most important means of civilising the island. If the inhabitants are ever to be raised to a higher level, their customs and manners must be entirely changed.\(^4\)

It was through these “civilising” attempts of schooling and pedagogy—a form of symbolic violence as Bourdieu would have argued—that the rebellious Taiwanese subjects could be tamed and disciplined. Yosaburo’s “civilising” attitude can be taken as a general reflection of the attitude of the dominant Japanese officials towards their newly-dominated Formosan subjects.

The Taishō period (1912-1926), which was also the period when Wu Zhuoliu (1900-1976) received his modern Japanese education, saw a transition from armed uprisings to cultural nationalist movements and reformational movements within institution.\(^5\) This education policy was part of the Japanese government’s assimilation policy. The Taiwanese Cultural Association (1921-1927), the most representative and influential cultural organisation during the period of Japanese


governance in Taiwan, was first conceived of by Jiang Weishui in 1920, and, after
the necessary preparation had taken place, was formally established on 17th October,
1921. Its principal members consisted mostly of landlords, doctors, and cultural
workers (75% in total). In other words, the association in its beginning was led by
the intelligentsia, who had received their higher education in colonial Taiwan or in
Japan.7

The New Cultural Movement, promoted by the Taiwanese Cultural Association,
was deeply influenced by the May-Fourth New Cultural Movement in China. The
influence of the latter could be seen in their manifesto: the assembling of different
groups of young people, the reformation of the old society, the New Literature
Movement (Oral Speaking-and-Writing Movement), and the promotion of a
Taiwanese nationalism. The difference was that, while the movement in China, a
country already, was designed to build up a united, fresh cultural enlightenment to
resist foreign invading powers, the movement in Taiwan, a national-level movement
within the Japanese colony, was to get away from the colonial dominance of Japan.8

It was during the 1930s (after forty years of Japanese Rule) that, finally, three
Taiwanese authors started to make their mark on the Inland (Japanese) literary field
with their acquired colonial Japanese language. They were Yang Kui (1906-1985),
Lu Heruo (1914-1951), and Long Yingzong (1911-1999), and their works were

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6 Lin, [The History of the Taiwanese Cultural Association], pp. 65-68.
7 Ibid., pp. 74-79.
8 Ibid., 86.
published in Japanese literary periodicals in Japan since 1934 onwards. According to Shimomura Sakujirō, “The foreign language, Japanese, which they [these Taiwanese authors] were forced to learn, has reached the level of literary expression.” Sakujiro continues, “However, the process of their learning Japanese, is also, at the same time, the process of losing their father language [Han languages, such as Hoklo], which is not a sudden transition, but a continuous and overlapping process.”

The Kōminka Movement Reassessed

As Li Yuhui points out, nowadays, discourses about Kōminka Literature have gradually abandoned the question of “moral judgment,” and, instead, concentrate on the discussion of its content, and “the psychological struggle of elite intellectuals” at this time. In relation to this recontextual approach, Richard J. Evans argues that the recent historical studies have adopted (or have returned to) a re-contextualised analysis, which gradually reinstates a non-clear-cut inbetween-ness of the texts and the contexts studied. It also recognises that this recontextualised analysis derives from its own historical context. It refuses to be easily categorised, or absorbed by the institutional machine, instead introducing a fluid and textured discussion of

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9 Shimomura Sakujirō, Cong wenxue du taiwan [Reading Taiwan from Literature] (Taipei: Qianwei, 1988), pp. 2-6.
10 Ibid., p. 5.
causation and varied social context.\textsuperscript{12}

It is necessary to discuss the Kōminka Movement in relation to Wu and his writing, because the underlying political agenda—to make Taiwanese subjects become “real Japanese”\textsuperscript{13}—had invaded the autonomy of the cultural field in Wu’s time. According to Chou Wan-yao, “the eight years between 1937 and 1945 was totally different from the previous colonial dominance which had lasted more than forty years, the Kōminka Movement [imperial-subject movement] was largely carried out by the colonial government between 1937 and 1945, trying to turn Taiwanese into Japanese.” She continues, “this unprecedented patriotism movement was the most comprehensive and intense event ever in the period of colonial Japanese Rule in Taiwan.”\textsuperscript{14}

For the purpose of fully mobilising Taiwanese subjects during the Japan-China war, the Kōminka movement claims the “Sameness between the Japanese and the Taiwanese” \textit{[Neitai yiru]} so as to make Taiwanese “become” Japanese and therefore able to fight under the banner of that new nationality. Chou continues: “patriotism” and the “Kōminka spirit [the imperialist spirit]” were championed by various educational institutions. On the positive side, discriminatory treatment was systematically eradicated and national borderlines were blurred. Chou concludes, “no matter what the motive of the ruler is, the last eight year of Japanese Rule could be considered the most equal period between the Taiwanese and the Japanese in


\textsuperscript{13} This was an imperialist call to make Taiwanese become rightist Japanese subjects who would believe in the Emperor and would support overseas military activities.

\textsuperscript{14} Chou Wan-yao, \textit{Haixingxi de niandai} \textit{[The Age of Sea-Sailing]} (Taipei: Yunchen, 2003), p.11.
‘discourse’ and even in real context.” Although, according to Chou, this seemingly ideal equal treatment was implemented during the very last eight years of Japanese Rule, this assimilation was not a willing choice of the Taiwanese, and any idea of national equality “in ‘discourse’ and even in the real context” was mostly a top-down construction rather than a bottom-up construction. Therefore, the Kōminka movement, “the extreme form of assimilationism” and a “Japanisation movement”, still left space for bottom-up resistance, as in the secretive writing of Orphan of Asia by Wu Zhuoliu. Even though state power was at its most influential stage during this period, cracks in Japanese imperialisation could be found, even on Kōminka collaborators.

Just as there is palimpsestic literary writing of the past, so there exists palimpsestic criticism of that writing. In hindsight, and with the advantage of the accumulated criticism of the literature of this era under Japanese Rule—from viewpoints variously endorsed by Japanese Rule or by the KMT regime, and then endorsed by the DPP after it became the ruling party in 2000—this era is regarded as

15 Ibid. p. 11.
16 Ibid., p. 35.
17 See the later discussion of so-called Kōminka writers (or more precisely, Taiwanese writers who were easily categorised as “Kōminka writers” by post-war criticism). According to Nakajima Toshiro, some of the Taiwanese writers, such as Lu Heruo, Zhang Wenhu, Long Yingzong, Yang Yunping, Yang Kui, Chen Huoquan (Takayama Bonseki), and Zhou Jinpo, were commissioned by the Intelligence Division of Taiwan Governor-General Office to write field reports of production sites (which were published as a way to boost war morale). See Nakajima Toshiro, “Huangmin zuojia de xingcheng—zhou jinpo” [The Formation of “Kōminka Writers”—Zhou Jinpo] trans. Song Ziyun, in Zhou Jinpo ji [A Collection of Zhou Jinpo’s Works] Eds. Nakajima Toshio and Zhou Zhenying (Taipei: Qianwei, 2002), pp. 318-319, 336-337.
a “colonial chapter.” Such an interpretation has invited post-colonial attempts to define (and to re-define) a work, an author, or even a nation through the dichotomous ideological discourses (similar to the dualistic perspective of the “colonial Manichean” in Frantz Fanon’s terms) that privilege the stance of either the oppressor or the oppressed.

However, such dichotomous readings of literary texts rarely satisfy as these oversimplified discourses have been inevitably disciplined by the state power and are often compliant with the ideology backed up by the ruling power (or its opposite). This reductionist application of the dichotomous treatment to literary texts under Japanese Rule—whether they are named as Kōminka (imperial-subject) or non-Kōminka work, writings by Taiwanese nationalist writers, leftists or not—has been, gradually replaced with a more open reading. The response to authors such as Wang Changxiong (1916-2000), Zhou Jinpo (1920-1996) and Chen Huoquan (also known as Takayama Bonseki, 1908-1999), who were once tagged as “Kōminka writers” in the post-war period of KMT-rule, represent this change in critical attitude. Researchers now tend to perceive the “Kōminka writers” of this colonial period as social agents full of reflection and conflict, confronting the colonial-social structure. As a result, their writing is read as displaying characteristics of enlightenment, resistance, and struggle. In addition, a more diachronic account of their works,

18 In The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon defines the colonial society as a Manichean society, a world divided in two, in which white are against black; the good is set against the bad; “niggers” are set against humane whites.

19 Hoshina Hironobu argues that Chen Huoquan’s “Dao” [The Way] has “transcends the original framework of ‘Kōminka literature’”. As a result, “in a sense, it can be interpreted as a work of
from works written before WWII to those written after WWII, rather than focusing on a specific “Kōminka” work, is frequently applied.20

In fact, criticism of them was palimpsestically influenced by the social context, especially by political propaganda. Nationalism and state power—the enabling identity struggles of returning to or becoming Han, Japanese, Chinese, or Taiwanese—have together played important roles in the interpretation and appreciation of their works. In the 1940s, the high time of the Kōminka Movement, Chen Huoquan’s “Dao” [The Way] (1943)21 was praised highly by the Japanese


21 This short story was first published in Japanese in Wenyi taiwan [Literature of Taiwan], Vol. 6, No. 3 in 1943. The protagonist, Qingnan, a low-ranking technician working for a Japanese camphor company in Taipei, tries his best to embrace Japanese cultural elements. These self-improving Kōmin
government along with Zhou Jinpo’s “Zhiyuanbing” [Volunteer Soldier] (1941)\textsuperscript{22} and Wang Changxiong’s “Benliu” [The Torrent] (1943)\textsuperscript{23}. However, in the post-war literary field, these works were often viewed through the KMT-Chinese perspectives, and thus received negative comments. For example, according to Yang Ziqiao, Zhou Jinpo’s “Shuiai” [Water Cancer] and “Chi de dansheng” [The Birth of Rulers] were deleted by the editors of Guanfuqian taiwan wenxue quanji [Complete Collection of Taiwan Literature before the Restoration] because “according to the editorial principle [in 1979]”, writings carrying strong “imperial-subject overtones” were excluded to demonstrate these editors’ anti-Kōminka attitude. They did not offer

\begin{itemize}
  \item [(imperial subject)-becoming attempts include writing haiku, volunteering to write an essay, “The Way to Become an Imperial Subject”, and redecorating his humble Taiwanese room with Japanese symbols, such as tatami mats, a Shinto shrine, and the Emperor’s photo. However, these cultural and material efforts at becoming a legitimate kōmin fail by the simple fact that he is genetically not a Japanese. Neither does his invention of a new way of extracting camphor bring him promotion. Instead, his expected promotion is turned down by his Japanese superior: “[Taiwanese] islanders are not human beings.” This discriminatory event puts him in a deep depression and destroys his idealised thought of becoming an imperial subject—to be a “real” Japanese through a spiritual way rather than through the criterion of “blood”. Even worse, he is beaten up by a Japanese friend without clear reason. Even though he has been treated unfairly, he still criticises himself, finding he does not fully use Japanese language to speak and to think—as a way to transform him from an islander to a Japanese. Also, to fulfill this Japanese-becoming project, he volunteers to join the imperial army. See Chen Huoquan, “Dao” [The Way].
  \end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{22} This short story was first published in Japanese in Wenyi taiwan [Literature of Taiwan], Vol. 2, No. 6, in 1941.

explicit criticism, but took “silent criticism” by simply excluding.²⁴ (In fact, showing anti-Kōminka attitude, which in a way justified a pro-KMT-government action, was a politically correct gesture in the White-Terror literary field.) However, in 1993, in the post-martial-law period, Yang’s reading of the two short stories of Zhou suggests that they reveal the Taiwanese people’s “holding-out” and “anti-Kōminka” spirit. Yang even compares them with Wu’s Orphan of Asia. Yang also exonerates and justifies the Japanese colonial complex that appears in Zhou’s works, arguing “Chinese and Han-ethnic perspectives should not be used to criticise these works.” Instead, “Taiwanese perspectives should be used to define the works.”²⁵ This shift in the perception of the Kōminka movement, from views of “how the Kōminka ideology fit into” to “how it did not completely apply to” certain authors and works, reveals a more open (more Chinese nationalism-free) treatment of them.²⁶ Chen Houquan, for example, he continued to write essays and novels in Chinese in the post-war period which are not so engaged in politics. However, as mentioned by Tarumi Chie, Chen “adapted” to the post-war literary field quite well.

²⁴ See Yang, [The Tragedy of History and Blind Spots of Identification—A Reflection of Reading Zhou Jinpo’s “Water Cancer” and “The Birth of Rulers”], p. 231.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 234-236.

²⁶ Nationalism, or ethnic politics, certainly plays an important role here. For example, according to Zhou Zhenying (the son of Zhou Jinpo), the writer Chen Yingzhen, has his determined view of Unification between China and Taiwan, argued Zhou’s works did not need to be translated from Japanese into Chinese, because Zhou was a Kōminka writer. Zhou Zhenying and Nakajima Toshiro point out that Chen also refuse to allow the Bureau of Cultural Heritage to store his own works unless the Bureau get rid of Zhou’s works. Although Zhou Zhenying has his own preferences, it is true that Zhou Jinpo’s works were not translated into Chinese to be studied but simply tagged as a “Kōminka writer”, or even worse, a Han-betrayer, in the post-war literary field. See Zhou Jinpo ji [A Collection of Zhou Jinpo’s Works] Eds. Nakajima Toshiro and Zhou Zhenyin, pp. 337, 373-374.
According to Tarumi, in Chen’s post-war prose, “Tan riju shidai jiulian” [Talking About the Lunar Year During the Period of Japanese Occupation] (1982), Chen even argues that “the inner [Chinese] national feelings” have been hidden in the hearts of the Taiwanese people during the strict fifty years of Japanese Rule. Tarumi criticises Chen’s “passive” attitude under the rule of the KMT since Chen is “a literary worker”.27 According to Faye Yuan Kleeman, Chen received the Union Press Award in 1980 for “supporting Chinese culture under the extremely difficult environment of the Japanese occupation.” In 1982, he was awarded Special Contributions to the Creation of a National Literature. Through these national awards, Kleeman observes, “the rehabilitation of Chen Hoquan was complete.”28 Considering the “national” criteria, there exists a quite polarised change in Chen’s writing “performance” before and after the war.

Taiwanese critics now tend to see these Kōminka “performances” in terms of an agent situated within a different political agenda, rather than seeing it with oversimplified political criterion based on who had anti-Kōminka or pro-Kōminka position-taking.29 However, the recent neutral criticism of such Japanese imperial collaborators was itself not completely free from the fluctuation of political fashion.

27 Tarumi, [The Pre-war Writers “Written in Japanese”—A Comparison between Wang Changxiong, Chen Huoquan, and Zhou Jinpo], p. 94.
28 Kleeman, Under an Imperial Sun, p. 217.
29 Such as Ye Shi Tao’s “Kōminka” verdict on Zhou Jinpo in 1987. Ye argues that “When the tides of Kōminka movement grew higher, some writers mentally identified with the policy of the [Japanese] colonial government, and leaned towards pro-Japanese ways, such as Zhou Jinpo’s ‘Zhiyu anbing’ [Volunteer Soldier] and ‘Shui ai’ [Water Cancer].” See Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], p.6.
This shift of criticism of the so-called “Kōminka writers” was associated with the decline in the KMT’s Chinese nationalism in the post-martial-law context. The tolerant “Taiwanese” interpretation of these “Japanese-becoming” works in the 1990s was also related to the “anti-KMT”30 and “pro-Taiwan Independence” stances, which could be announced in public then.31 Kōminka symbols, which had once seemed like scars for the perspectives of Chinese nationalist discourse, became (more) neutral historical assets for Taiwanese discourse, echoing the protesting and de-colonising characteristics of the “Taiwanese” discourse since the 1990s.

Also as regards the issues of the political apparatus, according to Shimomura Sakujirō, “In post-war [KMT-ruled] Taiwan, ‘Literature of Japanese Occupation’ had been seen as the product of the ‘enslaving education’ of Japanese Imperialism, and thus was totally nullified.” Although the literary heritage produced in the period of Japanese Rule was not “totally nullified” as Shimomura suggests (there were still

30 Zhong Zhaozheng suggests to understand Zhou Jinpo’s “Kōminka” disposition with Zhou’s “anti-KMT” stance. See Zhong Zhaozheng, Taiwan wenxue shijiang [Ten Lectures on Taiwanese Literature] (Taipei: Qianwei, 2003), pp. 228-229. It should be noted that Zhou’s sufferings in the 2-28 Incident (being severely tortured and imprisoned for three times) might account for Zhou’s voiceless state in the post-war Chinese literary field. (The rare post-war literary creations of Zhou, such as an essay, a Japanese waka, and scripts of films and plays, are almost in Japanese. In Zhou’s “Waka” [Short (Japanese) Poetry], the 2-28 incident is depicted.) See Zhou, [A Collection of Zhou Jinpo’s Works], pp. 267-272, 273-298, 301-305, 312-314.

31 Yang argues, “after Taiwan Independence, the redefinition of Japanese writers in Taiwan and the Kōminka literature can help historians of Taiwan literature to calmly respond to the position of “Chinese literature in Taiwan” since 1949”. Perhaps in Yang’s thought, when responding to the colonial layers of Taiwan, neutralising Kōminka discourse is a necessary step before neutrally engaging with the Chinese layer since 1949. See Yang, [The Tragedy of History and Blind Spots of Identification—A Reflection of Reading Zhou Jinpo’s “Water Cancer” and “The Birth of Rulers”], p. 236.
rare compilations of Taiwanese writers’ works of the period since the late 1960s\textsuperscript{32}), KMT state power managed to bring its own official perspective to assessing the literary production during “the period of the Japanese Occupation”\textsuperscript{33} In the post-war period, the political taste of Chineseness, and the mono-linguistic policy of Chinese, meant it was difficult to collect documents produced in the period of Japanese rule.\textsuperscript{34} It also meant the over-politicised interpretation of literary production during the period of Japanese Rule and a dependence of Chinese resources.\textsuperscript{35} As a result, a

\textsuperscript{32} Such as the publication of \textit{Shengji zuojia zuopin xuanji} [\textit{A Collection of Works of Provincial Writers}] Ed. Zhong Zhaozheng (Taipei: Wentanshe, 1965) (10 volumes), in which works of many pre-war and first generation of post-war Taiwanese writers were included. According to Zhong Zhaozheng’s review in 1997, the collection was originally named as \textit{[A Collection of Works of Taiwanese Writers]}, called \textit{Taicong [Taiwan Collection]} for short. Because the original name of the collection was rumoured as something related to Taiwan Independence, the name of the collection was changed, and some KMT personnel were soon included in the editorial board in order to allow this collection to publish. See Zhong Zhaozheng, Preface to \textit{Zhong Lihe Quanji} [\textit{A Collection of Zhong Lihe}] (Taipei: Xingzhengyuan kejaweiyuanhui, 2003) (Volume 1), p.3. Pre-war Taiwanese writer Wang Shilang’s works were published in 1979. See \textit{Wang shilang ji} [\textit{A Collection of Wang Shilang’s Works}]; Ed. Zhang Liangze (Kaohsiung: Dexinshi, 1979) (11 Volumns).

\textsuperscript{33} The way that the KMT terms the period of Japanese Rule of Taiwan as the period of Japanese Occupation [\textit{riju shiqi}] rather than the period of Japanese Rule [\textit{rizhi shiqi}] implies that the Japanese colonial government illegally “occupied” Taiwan, rather than legally governing Taiwan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

\textsuperscript{34} Sakujirō, \textit{[Reading Taiwan from Literature]}, pp. 19-20.

\textsuperscript{35} For example, certain Japanese criticism of Zhou Jinpo was not able to appear in public nor to be drawn upon until the 1990s. In 1943, Japanese scholar Tsuji Yoshio had already made a comprehensive criticism of Zhou Jinpo’s works, but this resource was not translated into Chinese and then published until 1993. See Tsuji Yoshio, “Zhou jinpo lun—yi xilie zuopin wei zhongxin” [\textit{Criticism of Zhou Jinpo—Focusing on A Series of Works}]; Trans. Liu Shu-chin, \textit{Wenxue Taiwan [Literary Taiwan]}, Vol. 8, 1993, pp. 237-247. (The article was originally published in the Japanese magazine \textit{Taiwan gonglun} [\textit{Taiwan Public Opinion}] in 1943.)
systematical review of literature in Japanese (both Kōminka literature and criticism included) in the history of literary field of Taiwan, is still to be undertaken.

II. The Palimpsestic Background of Wu Zhuoliu

Wu (1900-1976) was born in Taiwan in the fifth year of the Japanese Rule from the cession of the Qing Empire. He was of the Hakka ethnic group in Taiwan. In his youth, he witnessed the transition from the so-called Han culture to Japanese colonisation in Taiwan. Although he was deeply influenced by his grandfather’s traditional Han philosophy (his grandfather was a Han specialist), and acquired the ability of Han writing (such as his ability to compose Han poetry), he also received a complete modern Japanese education. Then he entered teacher-training college and went to Japan for his graduation travels. This modern Japanese school-education in colonial Taiwan solidified Wu’s mastery of the Japanese language, and cultivated him as a liberalist product of Japanese modernity. However, the Han identification he acquired through his familial education, and the Chinese identification he later envisioned, contradicted the Japaneseness identification,

36 As previously mentioned, the Han ethnic identity was, in fact, the successful workout of Han cultural nationalism from the longue duree of cultural mechanism in Chinese history.

37 The graduation trip to Japan was in 1919. See http://literature.ihakka.net/hakka/year/wu_b1900e1976.html.

38 The Taishō period (1912-1926) of Japan, the time when Wu received his education, was a more liberal period than previously enjoyed in colonial Taiwan. An assimilation policy came into force rather than military crackdowns. See Ye Shitao, Wenzue huiyilu [A Memoir on Literature] (Taipei: Yuanjing, 1983), p. 48.
which might be perceived as “modern” but was also peripheral (In terms of Wu’s Han cultural identification, the Han identification occupied the central and superior position, while Japanese culture—“a culture greatly influenced by Han culture” in Han-centric ideology—was seen as a secondary and inferior influence).

Here we can see Bourdieu’s pedagogy theory in operation with his stress on the familial influence: the Han cultural identification Wu acquired in early life dominated his artistic subjectivity and his sense of self, and created a conflict with his later-acquired modern Japanese education. However, Wu’s “pilgrimages” to the colonial motherland and cultural fatherland—to Japan in 1919, on his graduation trip, and to the Republic of China in 1941—did offer him a space for reflection on his imagined cultural identities.

The trip to Japan brought Wu to consider the concept of colonialism and helped shape an emerging idea of Taiwanese. In Wu’s autobiographical The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot (the original Chinese version Wuhuaguó finished in 1968), the protagonist, Gu Zhīhónɡ says: “Yet in those twelve days I surprised myself by feeling things I had never experienced before.”39 The protagonist and his Taiwanese classmates were treated “equally” by the Japanese: “so unlike that of the Japanese women back home [Taiwan] with their displays of arrogance and prejudice….”40 In a welcoming dinner, a Japanese man addressed them “on the subject of democracy.” The protagonist observes that “I could not believe my ears.

39 Wu, The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot, p. 47.
40 Ibid., p. 48.
To think that there were even Japanese who had these [democratic] sentiments!41

The pilgrimage to Japan delineates what the Taiwanese elite experienced at that period—the gap between the homeland of Taiwan and the colonial “motherland” Japan, and the different treatment of the Taiwanese in Japan and in Taiwan.

Twenty years later, the imprint of Han culture from his childhood also accompanied Wu to China—the Han “fatherland” for Wu and many Taiwanese.42 This trip followed his resignation, after twenty years’ service, as a Japanese common-school teacher. Wu then served as a journalist (1941-1942) in Nanjing in China.43 His new work and the experience of dislocation to China necessitated him learning the “foreign” Mandarin language—the spoken language of his imagined fatherland. (The Chinese writing he learned in childhood was pronounced in the Hoklo dialect.) This Chinese border-crossing experience could also be found on other Taiwanese intellectuals44 who studied, travelled, or stayed in China, such as

41 Ibid., pp. 47-52.
42 The term “fatherland,” instead of “motherland,” is related to the patriarchal hegemony of Han culture.
43 The journal articles which Wu wrote at that time were later published in Taiwan as Nanjing zagan [Nanjing Journals] (1942). They were first published in series in the periodical, Taiwan yishu [Taiwan Art].
44 According to Wang Xuexin, travels between colonial Taiwan and the Qing Empire and later the Republic of China were restricted, in particular in the period of Sino-Japanese War since the 1930s. Nevertheless, Taiwanese students could still stow away to China from Taiwan, or simply transfer in Japan to China. See Wang Xuexin, “Rizhi shiqi taiwan churujing guanli zhidu yu duhang liangan wenti” (The Management of Taiwan’s Entry and Exit control and the Navigation between Taiwan and China during Japanese Colonial Period) in Taiwan wenxian, Vol. 62, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 1-54.
According to Wakabayashi Masahiro, since the 1920s, under the influence of Cultural Association, more Taiwanese students went to China (via Japan, or through stowaway from Taiwan) to study. See
Zhang Wojun, Lian Heng, and Hong Yanqiu.⁴⁵ For a Taiwanese under Japanese Rule, this Chinese experience to some extent challenged Wu’s long-cherished Han-identity, bred in him before he underwent modern Japanese education:⁴⁶ he was seen as a Japanese spy by the Chinese, and as a “Chink” (a discriminatory term used by the Japanese towards the Chinese, and sometimes applied to Taiwanese subjects under Japanese Rule) in the eyes of the Japanese in China.

These national tensions are both reflected in Wu’s travelogue “Nanjing zagan” [Nanjing Journals] (1942) and fiction Yaxiya de guer [Orphan of Asia] (the original Japanese version was completed in 1946).⁴⁷ Hu Taiming, the protagonist of Orphan of Asia, who travels to China to follow the dreamy summons of the “Fatherland,” is later arrested by the Chinese police because of his national identity as a Taiwanese.


⁴⁶ Under Japanese rule, even though travel to China was restricted, there were in fact quite a few Taiwanese writers travelling in China, e.g. Zhang Wojun, Hong Yangqiu, Lian Heng, and Zhong Lihe.

⁴⁷ As Liao Ping-hui argues, part of Wu’s “Nanjing zagan” later became the prototype for the latter part of Orphan of Asia. See Liao Ping-hui, “Luxing yu yiyang xiandaixing: shitan wu zhuoliu de nanjing zagan” [Travel and Alternative Modernity: An Expoloration of Wu Zhuoliu’s “Nanjing zagan”], Chung Wai Literary Quarterly, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (2000), pp. 288-312. In fact, Wu’s impression of China was transitional, as can be seen from his three long works. See later section for detailed discussion.
subject under Japanese Rule. When he escapes prison, he is told by one of his Chinese friends, Mr. Li: “You [Taming] can’t join any of them [the Chinese]… everyone’ll think you’re a spy…you’re a sort of misfit, aren’t you?”48

Aside from the Fatherland identity crisis brought about by these political factors, Wu was also confused by the social difference—in terms of modernity and modernisation—between colonial Taiwan and republican China at that time. Compared with colonial Taiwan’s modern infrastructure, and the “modernity” and “civilising” projects practised in Taiwan by the Japanese colonial regime, China, to Hu Taiming, seems a comparatively degraded and uncivilized fatherland. In fact, this negative yet compassionate impression of the social reality of contemporary China was recorded in Wu’s travelogue, “Nanjing zagan” [Nanjing Journals] (1942). Working as a journalist after his return to Taiwan, Wu observed the defeat of Japan in 1945 and then the take-over of Taiwan by the KMT government. The subsequent 2-28 Incident in 1947 made him again reflect on his imagined Chinese identity. His life was witness to the contemporary history of Taiwan—from the period of Japanese Rule to the KMT regime, and the historicity behind these regimes.

Criticism of Wu Zhuoliu

In Taiwan since the post-war period, the Chinese criticism of Wu in regard to the portrayal of nationalism in his writing, can be mainly divided into two kinds:

48 Wu, Orphan of Asia, p. 152.
China-centric views (adopted mainly by mainlanders) and nativist views.\(^{49}\) (Hsiau A-chin refers to these as “pro-China” and “pro-Taiwan” viewpoints.\(^{50}\) These terms reflect anxiety about locating within a conception of national purity.) This is another example of the way that the works of a writer of a previous generation is redefined and appropriated by subsequent criticism. The China-centric views are mainly adopted by those who immigrated with the KMT government from China (i.e. the “Mainlanders”) to refer to an inclination to identify oneself with the “legitimate” Chinese culture, whilst the nativist views refer to a preference to identify oneself with the hybrid cultures, literatures and colonial history represented by those who were present in Taiwan before the KMT government moved to the island. In my view, the nativist views also include the cultural, historical, and political layer brought in by the KMT as part of a “Taiwanese” palimpsest.

As Lin Pei-yin points out, many of these critics argued about “whether Wu harboured a great China-ism or was a foreseer inclined to Taiwan’s independence.”\(^{51}\) The nativist critics—according to Lin, Zhang Liangze, Peng Ruijin, and Song Dongyang [the pseudonym of Chen Fang-ming]—explore Wu’s Taiwanese sentiments, and consider that Wu’s autobiographical novels magnify the

\(^{49}\) There is certainly a broad spectrum of criticism concerning (or not concerning) the position-taking of Wu’s “nationalism”. However, in terms of nationalism, an understanding through the categorisation of the polarised stance in reading the criticism of Wu’s works can help us understand not only the national struggles embedded in Wu’s literary works but also the politicised context then (e.g. the production of literary criticism).

\(^{50}\) Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, pp. 92-94.

corruption of the Taiwanese people in their nostalgia for China.\(^\text{52}\) This suggests that there is in Wu’s writing an unrealistic identification with Chinese culture whether Wu himself was aware of it or not. It is true that he demonstrates a keen sense of nostalgia and deeply-felt sentiment for China in his work; however, this Han/Chinese cultural identification does not necessarily guarantee a consistent political stance—such as pro-unification (or pro-Taiwan-Independence)—especially given Wu’s negative experiences whilst travelling in China, and his witnessing of the 2-28 Incident.

On the China-centric side, according to Lin, Chen Yingzhen, Chen Zhaoying (the two are critics from the Republic of China\(^\text{53}\)) and the Chinese critic (from the People’s Republic of China, hereafter PRC or China) Gu Jitang, stress Wu’s Chinese sentiment.\(^\text{54}\) Chen Yingzhen (1937-), a “pro-China” ROC writer, who shows a profound leftist and unificationist stance (between China and Taiwan), offers a dichotomous reading of Wu’s *Orphan of Asia*. Hu Taiming’s “orphan consciousness”, which comes from Taiwan’s special situation between Japan and China, is seen by Chen as “nearsighted and pro-imperialist separatism”.\(^\text{55}\) In addition, Chen offers a simplified binary picture of the “savage” Japanese colonisers

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\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Or, the KMT Taiwan, hereafter ROC or Taiwan.

\(^{54}\) Ibid.

and the “brave anti-Japanese Chinese patriots”, in which Taiming’s national struggles between colonial modernity and pre-modern China are dismissed. In Chen’s interpretation, an invocation to Chinese nationalism becomes the identity remedy for Taiming, and the Taiwanese people. Sharing a similar “Chinese” perspective, in Jianming Taiwan wenxueshi [The Concise Taiwanese Literary History] (written by scholars in China), Wu Zhuoliu was portrayed as a “patriotic writer” (of China) by the Chinese PRC scholar Fan Luoping. She asserts that the “orphan identity” in Wu’s Yaxiya de guer [Orphan of Asia] is based on “a great and profound love for the fatherland [China] and the ethnicity [the Han ethnicity],” which “has nothing to do with ‘Taiwanese independence.’”

This patriotic reading of Wu’s work was shared by PRC scholars and by most of the China-centric Mainland writers in Taiwan (since the 1950s). They see Wu as less inclined to allow Taiwaneseness in his writing (or Taiwanese “subjectivity,” since it was politically sensitive, in that context, to use Taiwan-related terms in the 1950s under martial law), and more inclined to display nostalgia for the fatherland, China. Obviously, Wu’s perceived cultural-nationalist identity with Chinese culture was then appropriated politically, in a way in which “Chinese” national discourses both served for the two “Chinese” regimes.

56 Degraded terms such as “savage”, “violent”, “hypocritical”, and “the poisonous paws of Japanese imperialism” are used by Chen to describe Japanese rulers, while heroic terms are used for Chinese patriots, such as “fearless until death” and “a brave martyr to a worthy cause”. Ibid., pp. 47-49.
57 Ibid., pp. 45-62.
58 Gu Jitang, Jianming taiwan wen xueshi [The Concise Taiwanese Literary History] (Taipei: Jenchuan, 2003), pp. 193-200. This is a traditional Chinese version republished in Taiwan, which was originally published in China.
By contrast, the pro-Taiwan side see more Taiwaneseness in Wu’s work, perhaps because the use of the word “Taiwaneseness,” or Taiwan-related terms, in Wu’s writing, can be seen to endorse Taiwan’s political and cultural independence. Ye Shitao argues that Wu has “a special native [Bentu] awareness.”59 According to Lin, Shi Zhengfeng uses political theory to approach The Orphan of Asia and Liao Ping-hui applies cultural theory to revaluate Wu’s Nanjing zagan [Nanjing Journals].60

In fact, Wu’s “Nanjing zagan” (1942) can be seen as a text that entangles different nationalisms—since both the national attitudes displayed in it (which mainly involve a comparison of Wu’s fatherland China and colonial Taiwan, although there is also some comparison of the fatherland China and the colonial Motherland Japan) and the later interpretation of it are quite mixed. After quitting his Japanese teaching job in Taiwan, Wu travelled to Nanjing between January 1941 and March 1942, working as a journalist.61 However, in Wu’s own preface to “Nanjing zagan” (1951), written four years after the 2-28 Incident, the rhetoric of “Fatherland”, China, is quite contradictory, with a mixture of positive and negative impressions. As Wu says, “Ten years [1941-1951] have passed quickly. Because of the fortune of Restoration, even though now the provincials can use the term

60 Lin, “Culture, Colonialism and Identity: Taiwanese Literature During the Japanese Occupation Period,” p.224.
“Fatherland”, we are unfamiliar with the reality of it.”  

This asserted “uncertainty” about the understanding of China, both in “Nanjing zagan” and in this preface written in 1951, may reveal Wu’s actual uncertainty about gaining a coherent understanding of what China is. This is particularly likely after the 2-28 Incident, two years after the warmly-welcomed Restoration, when the violence carried out by the KMT regime was not expected by Wu.

Even with such an asserted uncertain understanding of China, through his position-taking as a journalist, in this essay, Wu provides a phenomenological observation of what China is. The comparisons between “Fatherland” and Taiwan are in fact mixed with Wu’s “Han” and “Japanese/Taiwanese” habitus, and are based on various criteria, ranging from cultural heritage to economic development. To Wu, this pilgrimage to the “cultural Fatherland”, unlike his previous pilgrimage to the “colonial Motherland” (Japan), which invites thinking of colonialism, mainly invokes issues around modernity. This pilgrimage also involves him more in thinking about the politics of “We” and “the Other”. In Chien I-ming’s view, Wu’s comparison between Taiwan and China arises from an epistemological difference—one comes from a Japanese-Taiwanese based context (“the Self”) while the other comes from “the Other” (China). (In support of this, we might note that, in

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62 Ibid., p. 50.
63 Ibid., pp. 51-52, 117-120.
this travel journal, though there still exists an ambiguous boundary between “Chinese people” and “Taiwanese people”, the term “We” mainly refers to a Japanese-Taiwanese locality, while the concept of “the Other” refers to China, rather than the Japanese people. As Chien argues, “the Taiwanese mentality [of Wu], which had been molded by the Japanese colonial government through various systems of education and lifestyle, is the true ideological wellspring that guides the value judgements of the entire text.” Liao Ping-hui also argues, in terms of the cultural difference that Wu might have experienced between Taiwan and China, that there exist four modes of modernity in Wu’s works. At the first site of his visit to China, Wu feels ashamed of his tiny Taiwanese-style winter clothing compared with the popular Western-style suits in Shanghai. However, when he arrives in Nanjing, a city where modern and country flavours are mixed in Wu’s description, his first

64 At the start of the period of Japanese Rule, the concept of “We” mainly referred to “Han” Chinese/Taiwanese, while the concept of “the Other” referred to the Japanese people. While in Wu’s “Nanjing zagan”, the contents of “We” and “the Other” are reconstructed. See the discussion of the development of the “Han” identity in Chapter One, pp. 70-80.


66 According to Liao, the four modes of modernity include alternative modernity (the non-Japanese and non-Chinese colonial modernity of Taiwan), singular modernity (a presumption that Taiwan’s modernity can only be achieved through a return to Chinese culture), multiple modernity (a modernity which enriches itself through Taiwan’s multiple-layer historical heritage, including multi-colonialism, American neo-colonialism, and Japanese popular culture), and repressive modernity (a modernity which is constructed through the control of the dissidents by the state apparatus). See Liao, [Travel and Alternative Modernity: An Expoloration of Wu Zhuoliu’s “Nanjing zagan”], pp. 303-310.

67 Wu, [Nanjing Journals], pp. 52-54.
impression of Nanjing is quite negative in terms of modernity. On the train to
Nanjing, Wu notices the Shanghai girl beside him steps on the seat directly to take
off her luggage, leaving the trace of her shoes. He also learns that he cannot
understand a word of the Beijing dialect on the train, even though he assumed
Taiwanese languages had something in common with Chinese languages before the
trip. However, eye-catching patriotic slogans on the walls showing the
anti-communist and pro-Japanese stance of the Wang Jingwei regime are legible to
Wu.\textsuperscript{68} The class differences in China also strikes Wu. The leisurely and carefree
attitudes towards life of the Chinese people\textsuperscript{69} are seen dearly in the bourgeois class’s
addiction to “modern” forms of entertainment, such as mahjong-playing, banquets,
theatre-going, dancing (these activities are especially favoured by “modern” women),
opium-taking, and bathhouse-going.\textsuperscript{70} For the bourgeois class, who have time and
money, it is possible to live, or escape, life in a circle of entertainment. At the same
time, teahouses are full of opportunists, looking for chances to work as go-betweens
in some sort of business for commission, while tips are often overcharged by the
lower class to smooth the way for all kinds of social activities.\textsuperscript{71}

In the eyes of Wu, these modern lifestyles, in particular the bourgeois tastes,
and feminism (he is particularly critical of \textit{modern} Chinese women in Shanghai and
Nanjing) are in fact an uncompleted \textit{mimicry} of Western thoughts. According to Wu,
the women in Guangdong province are “poisoned by English and American

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., pp. 55-56.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p. 57.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., pp. 59-66.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., pp. 71-73.
thoughts” (because they think it is modern to maintain their virginity before marriage and at the same time to hang out with many boyfriends), while “modern” women in Shanghai and Nanjing are “more than despicable”, displaying remnants of feudalism and following their “shallow feelings”: they instructing their amahs to their work, while they indulge themselves in mahjong and theatre-going. Wu considers this feminist phenomenon the “decline of feudal ethics and rites.” In terms of the modern feminist fashion in China, Wu’s praises for virginity and his harsh judgement on the emancipation of women’s bodily desires demonstrates, in Bourdieu’s terms, a *hysteresis* of habitus in the domain of male-female power, Wu’s *Han* habitus (Confucianism) overrides the newly-acquired (Japanese) modern habitus. Traditional Han values are placed higher than modern views. However, in *Orphan of Asia*, on Taiming’s trip to Japan, the suggestion by the Japanese landlady that Taiming should take a walk with the landlady’s daughter, Tsuruko, is portrayed as “a candor” by the narrator, even though the narrator notes that it “stunned Taiming, who had been raised according to Confucian customs.” Here, Wu clearly distinguishes between a narratorial perspective and the values and views of Taiming. Thus, later in *Orphan of Asia*, Hu Taiming’s Shanghainese wife Shuchun’s dancing with other men is portrayed as “an extreme form of decadence”, and Taiming wonders, “Was this what they [Shanghainese people] called modernity?” However, this time the narratorial perspective is less clearly presented—only

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72 Ibid., pp. 61-63, 87-88.

73 Taiming does not have a walk with Tsuruko on that occasion. But he responds to this suggestion on another day—with both the landlady and her daughter. See Wu, *Orphan of Asia*, pp. 59-60.

74 Ibid., p. 128.
indirectly through Taiming’s use of the word “modernity”. In Wu’s representation, then, modern discourses regarding the subjectivity of Women in the context of Japan and China present quite polarised narratives. The former is normally viewed from the perspective of the Japanese modern habitus as something civilised, while the latter is viewed instead from the Han (Confucian) habitus. In terms of the national imagination, or the national allegory, in which the national schema of a modern Japan and a pre-modern China is embedded in Wu’s narrative as his habitus, it seems, in many cases, despite his de-colonial (against-Japanese) spirit, that Wu seems to reproduce colonial discipline—that is, he applies a modern imagination to the relatively modern object (Japan) and applies a pre-modern imagination to the relatively pre-modern object (China). However, Wu does not completely present the difference between his imaginings and the reality of China, which he found as pre-modern, in derogatory terms. Instead, on many occasions, Wu rather compassionately excused these pre-modern phenomenon as characteristics of Chinese nationality, or, in Chien’s discursive term, the special features of the Other. Moreover, in Liao Ping-hui’s view, despite “these ‘pre-modern phenomena’” (in “Nanjing zagan”, Wu finds that the politics of China in fact remain

75 Wu was aware of this national schema instilled into him by textbooks through Japanese education. The “biased concept” promoted by these textbooks was of China as a nation of opium and bound feet, which will be defeated in war. See Wu, [Nanjing Journals], p. 51.

76 Chien argues, “these ‘Chinese people’ are so different from the Taiwanese ‘Chinese people,’…that the simplest kind of comparative mentality is enough to unsettle his long-standing imaginings about China.” Chien also observes that Wu did not goto China with “an attitude of arrogance” and did not look “askance at everything” but rather “strove for a sympathetic understanding [of China]”. See Chien, “The Eyes of an Orphan”, pp. 210, 213.
feudal even though they give the impression of an “early modern nation”), WU
“intoxicatedly praised the greatness of the Fatherland.” WU’s emotional
inclination towards China is not hard to detect. Take, for example, WU’s
observation about the sports meet held at the Central University in Nanjing: even
though the order of the sports meet was chaotic (compared with WU’s experiences of
Japanese sports meets), because the schedule of the matches was in disorder and the
games were constantly interfered with by the trespassing audience, WU considers
this a “Chinese-style sports meet”, in which the disorder was finally solved by
time—“maintaining a sort of order in disorder, keeping the games going”. WU finds
this event shows “a facet of the characteristics of the Chinese nation.” Overall,
among the interplay of cultural roots (of Han, Japanese, and Taiwanese heritage),
modernity (in the different Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese contexts), and national
identities (of Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese origins), the cross-strait and
multi-layered context and habitus demonstrated by WU through “Nanjing zagan” (in
Bourdieu’s term, the structure and the structuring force) provide a preliminary
microcosm of how an orphan identity is formed (as later WU shows in Orphan of
Asia). The complicated politics of WU’s position-taking, such as his national

77 WU, [Nanjing Journals], p. 117.
78 See Liao, [Travel and Alternative Modernity: An Exploration of Wu Zhuoliu’s “Nanjing zagan”], p. 295.
79 According to Chien, “it is clear that he [WU] inclined toward China on an emotional plane. Yet the
pull of intellect and emotion could not overcome real-life quandaries, and the unique cognitive
experience of being neither insider nor outsider…created a complex interplay between ‘colonialism,
80 WU, [Nanjing Journals], p. 84.
stance(s), and his being a “modern” intellect receiving Han, and modern Japanese education, also make it difficult for critics to define Wu’s place on the spectrum, be it his cultural or political identification.

It is both a danger and a challenge to detect and claim cultural nationalist elements in a cultural text, especially with state power in large-scale operation when the cultural artefact is produced—as was the case with Wu’s work, which was subject to severe censorship in ROC in Taiwan (1950s-1980s) and in PRC China. However, the passion, or anxiety, to detect and to categorise the “real” national intensions of Wu (and other authors) at that time within academic and literary institutions as “anti-Japanese” or “pro-Chinese” was in fact largely motivated by political agendas and bias, and exactly reflects the fact that the literary field was largely penetrated by political field at that time. This highly politicised brand of literary criticism reminds us that explicit political presentation through language should not always be trusted—as well as literary expression by other authors, such as Ye Shitao, who applied “indirect” writing strategies during the martial law period.81 This “indirect” technique makes the pursuit of their “real-intensions” harder to detect and, therefore, more difficult to be censored by the state power. The aim of this chapter—in addition to Wu’s political agenda—is to follow Wu’s trajectory of work and trace its palimpsestic character. Inter-textual referencing of Wu’s Taiwanese consciousness, as well as his nostalgia for Japan and Han culture, will be explored in later sections.

81 See Ye’s “Sanyue de mazu” [March’s Mazu], in which metaphors and vague terms of locations are used in this 2-28 writing.
Aside from politicised literary criticism of Wu, I want to take the Taiwanese historian Yin Zhangyi’s viewpoint as a telling example of how and why Han-ethnic-centric or Chinese-centric historicity has influenced the reading of Wu’s work during the post-war period. Yin claims “there is no literature before Han society was built up in Taiwan.”^82 He explains, “Since the Taiwanese ancient people [the Taiwanese aborigines] have no words, there is no way to produce literature.”^83 Here Yin neglects the fact that oral literature is an essential heritage in indigenous literature, and implies a historicism solely based on words, which is often adopted by Han/Chinese-centric historicity of peripheral culture. Yin also argues the Taiwanese national movements under Japanese Rule come from the “profound sentiment of Fatherland [China] and the common and existing [Chinese] national consciousness.”^84 Although Yin agrees that, in Taiwan, Han society’s Sinonisation and Han immigrants’ Indigenisation developed at the same time, he asserts “Taiwanese consciousness is the product of the high-handed policy of Japanese colonisation,”^85 and Taiwanese consciousness is in nature a continuous but repressed Chinese consciousness.^86 In the light of my argument above, Yin over-simplifies the emergent Taiwanese identification and bases it on a modern

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83 Ibid., p. 205.
84 Ibid., p. 218.
85 Ibid., p. 223.
86 Yin argues that, “under colonial suppression of Japanese rule, since it was impossible for the Taiwanese to call themselves ‘Chinese,’ they had to call themselves ‘Taiwanese’ to be different from the Japanese. This ‘Taiwanese’ awareness is a countering awareness against the ‘Japanese’ awareness.” Ibid., p. 227.
“Chinese” context as a “countering awareness” during the anti-Japanese movements. In terms of his interpretation of Taiwanese literature, Yin takes a similar view and produces a dichotomous categorisation between Chinese literature and Japanese literature over the literature produced in the Taiwanese literary field under Japanese Rule, where Taiwanese literature is seen only as a countering literature towards Japanese literature. Aside from the dualistic roles played (and influenced) by Chinese literature and Japanese literature, in Yin’s thesis—aside from learning from Chinese Literature (as in Zhang Wojun’s case) and rejecting the inclusion of Japanese Literature (as in Nishikawa Mitsuru’s case)—there seems no place for the subjectivity of Taiwanese literature during the period of Japanese rule. Yin’s Chinese-centric ideas are also commonly seen in the works of other China-centric scholars, such as Chen Yingzhen. They tend to neglect the autonomous attempts of native Taiwanese forces in either literary or historical discourses, whilst insisting on reading “native” literature with Han/Chinese-based historicity, and making no difference between Han cultural identification and modern-state nationalism since the period of Japanese governance.

Literary criticism of Wu, issuing from China, perceives the same degree of Chinese patriotism and nationalism in his works as the pro-China camp in Taiwan.

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87 Ibid., 233.
88 Ibid., pp. 227-239.
89 Take Chen Yingzhen for example, even though he is aware of the pitfall of seeing Taiwan through “Han chauvinism”, he still considers that “Taiwanese characteristics should not be exaggerated” and argues that the fighting Taiwanese literature (against “Japanese oppressors”) has already been included in Chinese literature, becoming a glorious and heroic tradition of it. See Chen Yingzhen, [An Attempt to Comment on Orphan of Asia], p. 61.
Both of them see Wu’s writing of colonial Taiwan under Japanese rule as being full of anti-alien-nation (Japan) sentiments. For instance, in Jianming taiwan wenxue shi [The Concise Taiwanesse Literary History], written by PRC Chinese scholars, Wu is defined as a “Patriotic [Chinese] writer,” who has written poetry which “recalls the Fatherland [China] and desires a Fatherland of unification.”\(^\text{90}\) In terms of nationalism, Wu is portrayed as someone who exposed the suppression and enslavement carried out by the [Japanese] colonisers, and described the corruption of the KMT (Chen Yi) government.\(^\text{91}\) These PRC critics argue that the “orphan consciousness”\(^\text{92}\) in Wu’s Orphan of Asia is simply “a superficial and temporary thing,” which belongs to “an intellectual who can not find a way out,”\(^\text{93}\) rather than the national-identity crisis which is often argued by contemporary Taiwanese scholars.\(^\text{94}\) These PRC Chinese scholars also insist that this kind of orphan consciousness is “totally unrelated to ‘Taiwanese Independence.’” Instead, they claim, it is based on “a great and profound love for the Fatherland [China] and the [Chinese] nation.”\(^\text{95}\) It is not hard to see that this critical approach to Wu’s writing by PRC Chinese scholars suggests a particular political agenda: that Wu, and other Taiwanese subjects under Japanese Rule at that time, were part of “We Chinese” and

\(^{\text{90}}\) Gu, [The Concise Taiwanesse Literary History], pp. 193-195.

\(^{\text{91}}\) Ibid., p.195. See also the discussion of Wu’s description of 2-28 in the following sections.

\(^{\text{92}}\) This will be discussed in later section.

\(^{\text{93}}\) Ibid., p.199.


\(^{\text{95}}\) Ibid., p.200.
were reluctant subjects under alien Japanese Rule. Thus the “Taiwanese” national sentiment is dissolved through this Chinese cultural-nationalist reading. The selective and exaggerated reading of the Han nostalgic essence in Wu’s work, which is automatically transformed to “Chinese” patriotism through this approach, and is then shared and appropriated by both ROC (mostly before 1987) and PRC criticism, while Wu’s reflexive and fluctuating anti-colonial position-takings (like his disappointment in his travelling experience in China compared with Japanese modernity, and his disappointment after the 2-28 Event) are largely neglected.

As a result, literary criticism from Japan plays an important role in recognising and interpreting the Taiwaneseness in Wu’s work. Compared to Chinese scholars’ “patriotic” readings of Wu’s writing, based on the national propaganda of the unification of China and Taiwan and the pro-China nationalist criticism of Mainland-ethnic scholars under the KMT regime,96 Japanese criticism and its documents and historical resources provide a comparatively impartial resource for the study of Wu. Due to the shared Chinese nationalism of the governments of the KMT and the PRC, both see Taiwan as an indivisible part of China. In fact, the discourse, concerning the definition of the problematic territory Taiwan, that “Taiwan is an indivisible part of China in Chinese history” has been mutually formulated by ROC and PRC together, and both see Taiwanese nationalism as something rebellious.

Taiwan was of less political importance to post-war Japan than it was to the

96 Generally speaking, these “state-hired” scholars also promoted a national propaganda of unification under the flag of Chinese nationalism, although the KMT’s rightist practice was quite different from the leftist approach of PRC China.
Chinese nationalist governments of PRC and ROC. Taiwan did not form part of the traumatised “national allegory” and was not necessary for the construction of a national myth of a great Japanese empire. At the most, Taiwan represented a lost colonial island (like other Asian countries of the Japanese Empire before its defeat in 1945) rather than part of “an indivisible territory”. Because most of Wu’s works were written in Japanese and had been published in Japan before being translated into Chinese (since Japanese was the language in which he was most fluent), Japanese criticism of Wu’s works seem to provide a less politicised perspective and (at least) is not embedded with in Chinese nationalism. Japanese criticism presents a more “real-time” and “generous” perspective (by which I mean the Japanese criticism provides space for discussion of Taiwanese identity in Wu’s work and does not fear to discuss politically-sensitive issues like the 2-28 Incident in Wu’s Japanese writing). As a result, it offers a more layered interpretation of Wu’s nationalist writing than that offered by crudely politicised or polarised criticism provided by PRC and ROC scholars before the lifting of martial law.

Apart from Japanese criticism of Wu, there is also critical output from Western scholars. Helmut Martin, a German scholar, who finished his Masters degree in

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Taiwan, had been interested in and promoted Taiwanese literary study in Ruhr University in Germany. According to Lin, Martin’s “Wu Zhuoliu’s Autobiographies: Acts of Resistance against Repression and Oblivion” and Christa Gescher’s PhD thesis “Taiwans Literatur während der Japanischen Besatzung: Der Autor Wu Cho-liu und sein Roman Waisenkind Asiens” [Taiwanese Literature during Japanese Occupation: The Writer Wu Zhuoliu and his Novel Orphan of Asia] are important examples of Western criticism.98 In America, Leo T. S. Ching’s Becoming Japanese provides a good discussion of the entangled colonial issues relating to Taiwan, especially for the period under Japanese rule. In its fifth chapter, Ching provides a detailed discussion of what I would describe as the palimpsestic cultural forces operating in Taiwan. Ching argues, in terms of “neonational allegory” (Ching coins the term from Fredric Jameson’s “national allegory”), the protagonist Taiming is syncronically and diachronically entangled in the field of colonialism, imperialism, nationalism of China, Japan, and Taiwan.99 Ching argues that “the process of colonial identity formation presented in The Orphan of Asia” successfully conceptualises “a radical consciousness [orphaned consciousness] that insists on the contradiction and multiplicity of identity formation and refuses a finalised and holistic affirmation of ‘Japaneseness,’ ‘Chineseness,’ or ‘Taiwaneseness.’”100

However, in highly-politicised field, Ching’s positive view of the “refusal” of a

98 See the literature review by Lin, “Culture, Colonialism and Identity: Taiwanese Literature during the Japanese Occupation Period,” p. 224.
100 Ibid., p.209.
stable and essential belonging to cultural and political forces embodied in this 
orphaned consciousness cannot successfully compete with the lure of purity
discourses (i.e. Kōminka discourse, Chen Yingzhen’s Chinese-centric nationalism).

III. The Reaction against Colonial Homogenised Historiography: Wu’s
Layered Writing, and Genre-crossing Writing between Fictional and
Autobiography

In the preface to the Japanese version of *Orphan of Asia*, Wu described how
“politically incorrect” it was and how much pressure he had endured at the time to
write this reality-exposing novel. Wu recalls, “*Yaxiya de guer [Orphan of Asia]* was
written in World War Two, from 1943 to 1945. Some historical facts in Taiwan
under the Japanese rule were used as the background of the novel.” At the height of

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101 *Yaxiya de guer [Orphan of Asia]* was first published in Japanese as *Hu Zhiming* in Taiwan in
1946 in four volumes. This happened to be the same name as the secretary general of the Vietnamese
Communist party, so the protagonist was renamed as Hu Taiming, and the novel was accordingly
renamed as *Yaxiya de guer [Orphan of Asia]* in Chinese (translated by Fu Enrong) for publication in
Taiwan in 1962. The second Chinese version was named *Gu fan [The Lonely Sails]* (translated by
Yang Zhaoqi) for publication in Taiwan in 1965. According to Lin Boyan, the first page of this
version contains two official statements by the KMT party to praise this work. In addition, in Yang
Zhaoqi’s preface, Yang portrays this work as an “anti-Communist” novel. According to Lin, these
political acts might work as “protections” for its publication in that political situation. The second
Japanese version was named *Beinongwai de dao [The Tilted Island]* for publication in Japan in 1957.
The third Japanese version was named *Yaxiya de guer [Orphan of Asia]* for publication in Japan in
1973. See Wu Zhuoliu, “*Zhongwenban zixu*” [Author’s preface to the Chinese Version] in *Yaxiya de
guer [Orphan of Asia]* (Taipei: Caogen, 1998), p. I. See also Lin Boyan’s review of different
Japanese and Chinese versions of Wu’s *Orphan of Asia* in “*Guer xinmao*” [The New Face of the
Orphan] in *Yaxiya de guer [Orphan of Asia]* (Xinzh: The Cultural Bureau of Xinzhu County, 2005),
pp. 18-21.
rightist militarism and nationalism, Wu continues, “No one dared to use such historical facts as the background of a novel by simply recording facts without any adjustment.” For both Japanese and colonial Taiwanese subjects, Wu recalls, “The war in 1943 was a matter of life or death for Japan. It was natural that people were divided into the opportunists and the war-weary, the former were the advocates of war and the latter were mocked as non-civilians.” In colonial Taiwan, “the Taiwanese were also divided into the Kōminka civilians and non-Kōminka civilians.” Wu concludes, “If the authorship [of Orphan of Asia] was found out, either reasonable or not, I would be seen as a betrayer or an anti-war seeker, and I would certainly be put to death.”

Similarly, at the beginning of The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot [Wuhuaguo], Wu’s autobiographical novel, he expresses his eagerness to record history, especially the history of the 2-28 Incident (1947), which had been a forbidden topic during the KMT regime until 1987. Wu states, “an intensive examination of that fifth item [the section of the 2-28 Incident] cannot be avoided.” He goes on, “If someone with a broad perspective does not now record what he knows about the Incident, future commentators may well distort the facts.”

Consequently, a recurring concern for Wu’s modern critics, myself

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102 See “Riwenban zixu” [Author’s preface to the Japanese Version] in Wu. Yaxiya de guer [Orphan of Asia], pp. IV-VI.

103 The first Chinese version, Wuhuaguo, was published in 1968.

104 The 2-28 Incident is not fully described in The Fig Tree. Chapters 9-14 of Taiwan lianqiao, written between 1971-1974, contain a detailed description of the 2-28 Incident. See later sections for the discussion of Wu’s development in his writing of the 2-28 Incident.

105 Wu, The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot, p.2.
included—just as it was a concern for the Japanese and KMT government’s censorship and critical machine—is how to treat and position, and re-treat and re-position, Wu’s sequence of historical novels: *Yaxiya de guer* ([Orphan of Asia](#)) (1946), *Wuhua guo* (1968) ([The Fig Tree](#)), and *Taiwan lianqiao* ([Taiwan Lilacs](#)) (1974). When Wu’s literary narratives respond to historical narratives, should they be treated as autobiographies or historical fictions? Why is there such an unclear division between the two narrative genres in Wu’s long works, which can be seen to blur autobiography and fiction? From a broader perspective, his works can also be seen to cross the boundaries of literature and history. Because of Wu’s unsettling eagerness to record history so as not to “distort the facts,” and his journalistic disposition in writing during that period of extreme political censorship, the borderline between literature and history has been blurred. However, the most haunting question remains: why did Wu Zhuoliu’s position-taking, occupying the role of both novel-writer and historian, place him under severe political pressure (which might have cost him his life on at least two occasions)?

To answer these questions regarding the blending of literature and history in Wu’s writing, it is necessary to understand that, to a very great extent, history was

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106 Regarding Bourdieu’s theory of disposition which is related to *habitus*, the forming and governing internal agency of an agent, Wu’s Han education’s moral stress on the pursuit of truth relates closely to a modern journalist’s disposition which also requires certain qualities such as the seeking for truth through first-hand recording. This moral imperative can be seen to have its effect on Wu.

107 The first occasion is the writing of *Orphan of Asia* during the height of rightist militarism as mentioned above. The second is the writing of the 2-28 Incident in *Taiwan lianqiao*. See later sections for discussion of Wu’s writing of 2-28.
deeply politicised by the state institutions under Japanese rule and under the KMT regime in Wu Zhuoliu’s time. As Hayden White reminds us in his *Metahistory*:

“‘invention’ also plays a part in the historian’s operations [in historical writing].” He points out that historical writing contains the structure of story-telling: “Emplotment is the way by which a sequence of events fashioned into a story is gradually revealed to be a story of a particular kind.”

In his reading of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of history, White comments:

Ricoeur does not erase the distinction between literary fiction and historiography, as I have been accused of doing, but he does scumble the line between them by insisting that both belong to the category of symbolic discourses and share a single “ultimate referent.”…their ultimate referent is the human experience of time or “the structure of temporality.”

For White and Ricoeur, human experience is the basis for both literary and historical writing. In both cases, experiences are narrated and represented as materials in time, before being processed through subjective selections and story-telling. However, it should be noted that the main contexts for both Hayden White and Paul Ricoeur are works of European historiography and Western literature, and that colonising or

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109 White, *The Content of the Form*, p.175.
decolonising strategies towards the manipulation of the time narrative of the colonial state power which emerge through literature and history-making (or both) are not directly mentioned by either. Also, colonialism’s interference with the “ultimate referent”—“the structure of temporality” (by which I suppose White means the way that humans become aware of their own location and position in history)—has yet to be considered in either White’s or Ricoeur’s work. However, what these two critics have proposed—that story-telling is shared by historical writing and fictional writing, and that the boundary between historiography and fictional writing is “scumbled”—can be developed to explore Wu’s writing strategies and, indeed, the techniques deployed by all artists who aim to decolonise disciplined historiography through their politically-engaged texts. This is key when investigating colonial regimes in which historiography is highly politicised and colonisers desire to colonise their subjects through the use of disciplined literature\(^ {111} \)—in short, when human experience is represented and narrated largely through the filtration and shaping of the various state agencies.

Therefore, when factual story-telling grew impossible in public historical narratives, story-telling in fiction became the compromised alternative for Wu Zhuoliu. It is understandable that historical novel writing, in which emplotted historical materials are embedded and coded into fiction, becomes a popular genre, when history (historiography), in the form of journalistic reports, is a forbidden zone. Peng Ruijin argues more specifically that:

\(^{111}\) See the text-analysis section of the fiction *Mei chunniang* in Chapter Four, which shows how the publication of this fiction was sanctioned and supported by the KMT state institutions of the time, and its content embedded with dominant political ideology.
Due to the long period of martial law [1949-1987], Taiwan’s history lacks the space of self-reflection. Taiwanese history is in a situation full of black fog. Thus literature becomes the camouflage for literary writers when they were awakened, which shared the mission of Taiwan’s historical education or reflexive experience.\(^{112}\)

Examples of this strategy can be found either under the Japanese rule, such as *Orphan of Asia*, or under the KMT governmental censorship, such as *[The Fig Tree]*, and *Taiwan lianqiao*. Under the political suppression of these colonial regimes, Wu learned to use literature to engage with history, since impartial historical writings were not allowed at that time. The crossing between autobiographical and fictional writing became an appropriate writing strategy for Wu to record what he had witnessed—which was very different from the dominant version of history represented by the governmental narrative of the period.

Take the 2-28 Incident for example, which had been selectively narrated by the KMT regime for decades (1947-1987). Xu says:

The 2-28 Incident is the biggest tragedy in Taiwanese history. It was like a taboo. Any articles or books related to it were forbidden, and thus there was a lack about its historical material and its causes….He [Wu] had attempted to deal with this event many times, but all turned out to be unaccomplished [Wu only gave a partial description of the 2-28 Incident in *The Fig Tree*]….The period around the 2-28 Incident became a blank space. In Wu’s mind, he must be anxious to find a way to express it

appropriately.\textsuperscript{113}

Like the writers of the first post-war generation,\textsuperscript{114} who witnessed huge historical transitions but had to succumb to the homogenising political oppression of the KMT regime, Wu’s combination of autobiographical and fictional writing became a way to avoid governmental censorship. It is owing to Wu’s sensitivity, and his disposition as a journalist, that he saw his literary writing as a functional operation to record what he himself had witnessed in the transition of political powers. That is, to Wu, fictional writing functioned as a way to historicise and to narrate what was often historicised and narrated differently by the political regimes.

Just as Wu saw fictional writing as having the function of historiography and narrative, his contemporary readers are often made aware of the autobiographical narrative of the writer, which is woven into the plots of Wu’s works. For example, although the protagonists in the fictions 	extit{Wu huagu o} [The Fig Tree] and in 	extit{Taiwan liangqiao} are both named Gu Zhihong, it is obvious that the protagonist carries various autobiographical traits which belong to Wu himself. According to Chu Yuzhi, “What he [Wu] wanted to do was to record the crucial event [the 2-28 Incident] that happened in Taiwan as it has been felt/experienced by a Taiwanese

\textsuperscript{113} Xu Junya, Taiwan wenxuelun: cong xiandai dao dangdai [Essays on Taiwanese Literature: from Modern to Contemporary] (Taipei: Nantian, 1997), pp. 268-269.

\textsuperscript{114} The first generation of writers who were born around 1945, who mainly received KMT-controlled Chinese education (or acquired this education for themselves), used Chinese to create literary works, while the earlier generation of writers received a Japanese education and used Japanese to create literary works.
intellectual [Wu himself].”

Chu explains why the protagonist is represented by Wu himself: “To stress the credibility of the record, it is natural that the mission of ‘the intellectual’ was carried out by Wu himself, with whom Wu was mostly familiar.”

Wu’s striving to preserve historical truth in his lifetime, across the periods of the Japanese rule and the KMT regime, won him praise as “the most articulate eye-witness in Taiwan’s history”. It is through such crossings between fictional and experiential narrative, and literature and history, that we can most easily catch Wu’s insistent criticism of the repeated injustice inherent in oppressive regimes. Furthermore, through his journalistic writing, Wu throws down his challenge to the dominant historiography of his day; his blurring of boundaries, along with his factual and critical style, allows for a “native/Taiwanese” narrative voice very different from the pedagogical version of the foreign colonial regimes. In a letter to Zhong Zhaozheng, Wu writes: “As to writing historical novels, it doesn’t matter whether mainlanders (non-Taiwanese provincials) would like it; instead, it matters if

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115 Chu Yuzhi, “Pinming wenzhang cai kankua—shilun wu zhuoliu de wuahuaguo yu taiwan lianqiao” [It is Only Life-Risking Articles to be Praised: An Attempted Appreciation of Wu Zhuoliu’s The Fig Tree and The Taiwanese Lilacs] Taiwan wenxue guanchazhi, Vol. 7, (1993), p. 72.
116 Ibid.
117 Wu is also seen as “one of the representatives of the Taiwanese intellectuals who keep their conscience in the four hundred years of Taiwanese history”. These praises for Wu, and the anxiety of constructing a Taiwanese history might be the results of the Taiwanese discourse populated in the 1980s Taiwan. Wu’s journalistic characteristics in writing might be glorified in order to compete with the long-established KMT historicity. Ibid.
118 See later discussion of Wu’s 2-28 writing in this Chapter.
119 It is interesting to observer Wu’s identity issues given the national discourses he received from different regimes. See later discussion in this Chapter.
the materials used are factual.”  

From the discussion above, it could be argued that autobiographical elements, or attempts at historical representation, are of more importance to Wu than aesthetic performance. As I have argued, for him, fictional writing functions as a kind of camouflage to protect his real intentions from political censorship. The ways of representing history in Wu’s novels are very different from those used in fictions influenced by modernism, and magical realism in the postmodern context, even though historicity and political elements are their shared motifs. Ye Shitao (1925-2008), another writer and critic in Taiwan who had experienced Japanese Rule like Wu, comments that “Wu’s fictions are full of social awareness, which determines the peculiar style of his fictions—the special native [Bentu] awareness.” However, Ye continues, “this social awareness also to some extent damages the artistic [yishu] characteristics that fictions should have.” Ye does not deny the artistic elements in Wu’s works. What Wu lacks, according to Ye, is the “modernist fashion of realism,” such as that in James Joyce, Marcel Proust, and Franz Kafka. Ye argues that Wu’s realist style, and the realist fashion Wu received,

121 See Ye Shitao, “Wu zhuoliu lun” [A Discussion of Wu Zhuoliu], in [A Collection of Wu Zhuoliu’s Works], p. 274.
122 Ye does not deny the artistic elements in Wu’s works. What Wu lacks, according to Ye, is the “modernist fashion of realism,” such as that in James Joyce, Marcel Proust, and Franz Kafka. Ye argues that Wu’s realist style, and the realist fashion Wu received, were shaped by the naturalist and realist fashion of this formative context, in which the Japanese literary field was greatly influenced by Émile Zola and Gustave Flaubert. As a result, Ye considers that Wu’s “realism” lacks modernist flavour.” See Ye, [A Discussion of Wu Zhuoliu], pp. 274-275.

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were shaped by the naturalist and realist fashion of this formative context, in which the Japanese literary field was greatly influenced by Émile Zola and Gustave Flaubert. As a result, Ye considers that Wu’s “realism” lacks modernist flavour.”

Rather, Wu’s fictions contain elements of a more socially-realistic style, rather than an artistic one in the later modernist context. Similarly, what Wu attempts to do is to get closer to history, while the magical realists attempt to play with historical elements in order to question history and to de-construct the ultimate forces behind it. Nevertheless, it is perhaps a pity that Wu did not go as far as Salman Rushdie and introduce elements of magical realism to his protagonists’ stories. However, Wu was writing mainly under the influence of 19th century realists, who posited there was a real history to get close to, while Rushdie, and other postmodernists stayed with historical narratives and questioned the existence of grand narratives.

Examples of Wu Zhuoliu’s decolonising work and the decolonising strategies it deploys against the forces of pedagogical historiography (both of the Japanese rule and the KMT regime) will be discussed in the subsequent close reading of his work in later sections of this chapter. As noted earlier, his writing against Japanese colonialism can be mostly found in *Yaxiya de guer* [Orphan of Asia], while his writing against KMT historiography can be found in *Wuhuaguo* [The Fig Tree] and *Taiwan liangqiao*.

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123 Ibid.
IV. Against Colonial Historiography: Palimpsestic Language Strategies in Wu Zhuoliu’s Writing

In addition to crossing genres (between fictional writing and autobiographical writing), language is also an issue in relation to Wu Zhuoliu’s decolonising strategies. If we consider the languages of Wu’s three major historical novels, the “Taiwan trilogy”, chronologically, we see that Wu used Japanese, Chinese, and again Japanese successively.\footnote{Wu’s continued Han poetry writing (1912-1976) and his active participation in Han poetry society (such as the famous Han poetry society, \textit{Lishe}), especially in terms of this traditional “Han” literary form, might demonstrate a habitus deeply related to Han cultural education he received. Wu’s consistent creation of Han poetry writing (especially concerning Wu’s prolific Han poetry works, such as \textit{Lanyuan ji [A Collection of the Blue Garden]}, \textit{Fengyu chuangqian [In Front of A Window of Wind and Rain]}, \textit{Zhuoliu qiancao ji [A Collection of A Thousand Han Poetry Drafts of Zhuoliu]}, \textit{Wu Zhuoliu xuanji—Hanshi suibijuan [A Collection of Wu Zhuoliu’s Works—The Volume of Han Poetry and Random Thoughts]}, \textit{Wanxiang [Night Fragrance]}, \textit{Zhuoliu shicao [Poetry Drafts of Zhuoliu]}) should also be mentioned. It is interesting that Wu’s Han poetry creation seems not to be influenced by the changes of political forces. In terms of the interrelationship between politics and the Han poetry field, it should be noted that Han poetry, even with Wu’s seemingly lucrative publications, only occupied a very limited literary market (compared with the genres of modern poetry and fiction) in post-war Taiwan. In terms of language, even though Han poetry can be written by different languages (Hakka, Hoklo, Beijing, or even Japanese), Chinese is the legitimate written form. (As mentioned in Chapter One, this makes it a symbol of Han identification against Japanese occupation). However, Wu’s (and other people’s) use of Chinese to create Han poetry does not necessarily mean a stable identification with Han or Chinese values, as mentioned in Chapter One. Instead, national sentiments, whether sentiments of Han, Chinese, Japanese, or even \textit{Taiwanese} nationalism, can be detected through the lines of Han poetry made by Wu. For example, according to Tu Ruiyi’s study of Wu Zhuoliu’s Han poetry, even though Wu expresses joyful sentiments about Taiwan’s restoration to China, his Han poetry also expresses sympathies for Japanese war victims. See Tu Ruiyi, “Wu zhuoliu de hanshi yanjiu” \textit{[A Study of Wu Zhuoliu’s Han Poetry]} (Masters Dissertation, Graduate Institute of Taiwanese Literature of National Changhua University of Education, 2013), pp. 26-28, 75-80. In terms of poetry, compared with modernist poetry, Wu prefers
It is out of habitus and the Japanese language capital that Wu used Japanese to write *Yaxiya de guer* [*Orphan of Asia*] (originally named *Hu Zhiming*, written in Japanese between 1943-1945, published in Japanese in Taipei between September and December in 1946 in four volumes),\(^\text{125}\) the first long novel he produced, since Wu didn’t have the chance to master spoken-Chinese writing until 1942 when he was employed as a journalist in a Chinese newspaper agency in Nanjing. He had no other option but to write back against Japanese Rule in Japanese, the colonial language, when Taiwan was still under Japanese rule. Considering Wu’s projected readership\(^\text{126}\) and the political context, the popularity and legitimacy of the Japanese language in the literary market in Taiwan (Chinese was forbidden in 1937) might also be reasons for Wu to use Japanese in this work.

One year after Taiwan’s takeover by the KMT regime, “Japanese pages in Chinese newspaper and magazines were banned” in October, 1946.\(^\text{127}\) This was KMT’s “mono-lingualism” policy, whereby Mandarin (or the Beijing dialect) alone...
was legitimised\textsuperscript{128} and became the official speaking language of written Chinese. Hoklo and Hakka, the speaking languages of written Chinese since Qing Rule in Taiwan, were again degraded as peripheral dialects by the KMT regime.\textsuperscript{129}

Although Wu became proficient in spoken Mandarin and Chinese writing through his Chinese experience in 1942, many Taiwanese writers who had been educated in Japanese were effectively silenced. They became members of “The Cursed Literature”—a phrase used by Chen Chien-chung to describe the sudden silencing of Taiwanese writers who were accustomed to writing in Japanese. (The modern Japanese language formed the Taiwanese subjects’ lingual habitus after colonial Japanese schooling). They found it difficult to learn another foreign language, Chinese, and its official spoken dialect Mandarin.\textsuperscript{130} In regard to KMT’s silencing language policy, Wu expressed his sympathy for Taiwanese writers in his article, “The Current Situation of Taiwanese Literature” (published in Japanese \textit{Xiongji [Rooster]} magazine in 1949):

Now some Japanese writers [Taiwanese writers who wrote in Japanese] turn to learn Chinese…which will take a long time to have some achievement. It is difficult for Taiwanese writers to produce good literary works before they can master Chinese.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{128} Hsiau, \textit{Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism}, p. 54.
\item \textsuperscript{129} The first time was during the Kōminka period under Japanese Rule in 1937. See the later section about the lingual perspective of Chineseness for details of the dialectical position-takings of the Chinese language in Taiwan.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Chen Chien-chung, \textit{Bei zuzhou de wenxue: zhanhou chuqi (1945-49) taiwan wenxue lunji} [The Cursed Literature: Essays on Taiwan Literature During the Early Period of Post World War Two (1945-49)] (Taipei, Wunan, 2007), pp. 11-17.
\end{enumerate}
The Mainland writers, although they are active, could not produce good literary works because their eyes cannot see the reality.\footnote{Wu Zhuoliu, “Taiwan wenxue de xianzhuang” [The Current Situation of Taiwanese Literature], http://literature.ihakka.net/hakka/author/wu_zhuo_liu/wo_composition/wo_onlin/com_3.htm (Accessed 24 April, 2012).}

This sentiment towards the change of languages clearly reflects Wu’s observation of the situation of the literary field in Taiwan at that time: namely, the legitimate lingual capital and the symbolic system, is being taken over by Mainland Chinese writers from Taiwanese writers. However, due to the former’s lack of understanding and appreciation of the context of the newly gained literary field, a resulting discrepancy between the produced literary work and its social context is inevitable. On the other hand, although the Taiwanese writers’ eyes can see the reality, their lack of a legitimate lingual capital results in their failure to express their voice in the newly reconfigured literary field.

Although there is no clear evidence to explain why Wu wrote his second long literary work *Wuhuanguo* [*The Fig Tree*] in Chinese, rather than in Japanese which he had mastered for decades, it is most probable that his choice was dictated by the fact that Chinese was the only sanctioned language in the literary market at that period and Japanese was soon to be forbidden by the KMT regime. It is interesting to note that when *Wuhuanguo* [*The Fig Tree*] was published in three series in the periodical *Taiwan wenyi* [*Taiwan Literature & Art*] in 1968, a periodical published by Wu himself, it was not banned by the KMT regime, according to Lin Hengzhe, probably owing to its small circulation which thereby did not attract the attention of the
Garrison Command. In addition, the anti-Japanese elements in Orphan of Asia and in the early parts of The Fig Tree, which were politically correct in the White Terror context, might to some degrees have helped divert the KMT’s censorship from The Fig Tree in these periodical series. It was not until Wuhuaguo [The Fig Tree] was published as an offprint (with larger circulation) in 1970 that the autobiographical novel was banned. This banning was clearly because of its report on the 2-28 incident.

However, in America, the book was freely circulated among Taiwanese. According to Zhang Liangze, one of the editors of the overseas version of Wuhuaguo, the Taiwan-Publisher (organised by Taiwanese people in West America) published Wuhuaguo (in Chinese) in America in 1984, and later, after the lifting of martial law, it was published again in Taiwan in 1988.

**Writing back the Empire with another Colonial Language**


133 White Terror refers to the martial law period of Taiwan (1949-1987). It officially ended in 1991, while the abolishment of the Act for the Control and Punishment of Rebellion [Chengzhi panluan tiaoli] when people’s expressions were finally free from political censorship. During this period, many “communists” (some were real communists, while many were not), intellectuals, workers, and farmers were jailed or killed. According to the official Association of Unjust Rebellious and Communist-Spies Trial Cases of the Martial-law Period, during the White Terror period, there were 808 cases of death penalties and 6,899 victims were jailed. However, from civil resources, there is evidence that at least 8,296 people were arrested, while the largest estimated number of victims exceeds 200,000. See Tai, [The Concise History of Taiwan], pp. 142-177, 190-191.

134 Ibid. Its last (thirteenth) chapter mentions 2-28 Incident directly.
However, after this period of Chinese-writing in *Wuhuaguo [The Fig Tree]*, Wu returned to write in Japanese, the previous colonial language, for his subsequent long work *Taiwan lianqiao*. According to Wu, the writing of this work started in September 1971 and continued to 29 December 1974.\(^{135}\) Wu’s change back to Japanese perhaps was owing to his more extended re-telling of the 2-28 Incident in *Taiwan lianqiao* (chapters 9-13), which occupies a larger space and is recounted in more detail than in *Wuhuaguo [The Fig Tree]*. Chapters 1-8 of *Taiwan lianqiao* were translated by Zhong Zhaozheng and published in the periodical *Taiwan wenyi [Taiwan Literature & Art]* in 1975,\(^ {136}\) while the remainder of the work (chapters 9-13) was not published until 1986, ten years after Wu’s death (1976), in accordance with Wu’s will.\(^ {137}\) Chapters 9-14 in *Taiwan lianqiao* covered mainly the period from Japan’s defeat to the takeover of Taiwan by the KMT regime, and dealt with the 2-28 Incident in detail. The work was quickly banned after its publication in 1986.\(^ {138}\)

According to Wu Zhuoliu’s will: “Chapters 1-8 of *Taiwan lianqiao* have been published in the periodical *Taiwan Literature & Art*, but the rest won’t be published now. It will only be published in 10 or 20 years.”\(^ {139}\) Why should that be? According to Wu himself, it is because:

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\(^{135}\) Wu, Afterword. *Taiwan lianqiao*, p.259.


\(^{137}\) Chen Fang-ming, Afterword. Wu, *Taiwan lianqiao*, p.262; Wu, *Wu Zhuoliu’s Letters to Zhong Zhaozheng*, p. 310. Wu’s will is to publish this work ten years after his death.

\(^{138}\) Wu, *Taiwan lianqiao*, p.3.

\(^{139}\) Wu, Afterword. *Taiwan lianqiao*, p.260. This note was written in 1975.
During the period between 1947 and 1950, the situation of society was complex; it is very hard for the young writers to fully understand its historical background if they don’t experience it by themselves. If older writers don’t write about it, the truth will be lost.¹⁴⁰

This shows Wu’s anxiety that the first-hand witnessing of the older generation writers could be lost owing to the highly-politicised official historiography promoted by the KMT’s state power. Chen Fang-ming, in the Foreword to *Taiwan lianqiao*, describes the transition of historical perspectives of Taiwan—from accepting Chinese-centric historicity, through questioning it, to starting to understand native historical perspectives.¹⁴¹ Chen also provides a more detailed explanation of why Wu insisted on writing this work:

There are too many politicians still active, and too many sensitive political events are involved in the autobiography [*Taiwanese Lilacs*]. The time Wu Zhuoliu was in [the KMT regime] did not allow him to release the truth of the historical facts. …It [*Taiwanese Lilacs*] explains how the KMT in the 2-28 incident accessed a list of the Taiwanese elite. Following the list, KMT special agents arrested, imprisoned, and killed the Taiwanese elite…¹⁴²

Accordingly, although it is difficult to pin down exactly why Wu wrote *Taiwan lianqiao* in Japanese, since Japanese was the written-form of language that Wu was most familiar with in daily expression, he might have felt more comfortable

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p.259.  
¹⁴¹ Chen Fang-ming, “Wei wu zhuoliu de taiwan lianqiao er xie” [Writing for the publication of Wu Zhuoliu’s *Taiwan lianqiao*] in *Taiwan lianqiao*, pp. 6-8.  
returning to it for this important act of witnessing. In addition, there were clearly political issues behind this return to Japanese in writing *Taiwan lianqiao* after he had used Chinese in writing *Wuhuaguo [The Fig Tree]*. It is ironic that only through translation of a previously-colonial language, as well as through fiction, could the Taiwanese access this controversial period of history—a silenced collective memory—in Wu’s writing. And it is deeply ironic that it was only in Japanese—the previous colonial language—that Wu could freely express his thoughts and thus write back against the dominant historiographical narrative of the KMT period.  

At this point, under the KMT regime, the Japanese language no longer represented simply a colonial language to be decolonised but also became a decolonising tool which could be used (by an older generation of writers such as Wu) against the official historicity being produced by the later KMT regime. Wu’s language strategy—to re-adopt the Japanese language as a means of resistance (in addition to the fact that the Japanese language was Wu’s familiar cultural capital and habitus) against the KMT’s governmental homogenising of history—even though his aim was not to directly fight the Sinicisation policy advocated by that regime KMT, can be seen as one of the resources of the later de-Chineseness (de-Sinicisation) movement which was widely operational (with the political movements) in Taiwan from the 1980s. During the 1980s, rather than adopting the Japanese language as a

143 This transfer of the power of explaining historical narrative is similar to the rise of modernism in Taiwan in the 1960s, when the long dominating Combat Literature and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement gradually lost their charisma to the emerging Modernist Movement. However, Wu and the *Bentu* voice he represents can be seen as a more effective force, rather than the Modernist Movement, to wear down the Chinese ideology embedded in Combat Literature and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement. See Chapter Four for a more detailed discussion.
means of resistance, native Hoklo and Hakka dialects, and/or their cultural
elements,\textsuperscript{144} were adopted by nativist [Xiangtu] writers (whether consciously or
unconsciously motivated, in terms of the political context) as a local element to
write against the grand Chinese narrative embedded in the newly-constructed yet
dominant Chinese literature in Taiwan (as seen in the Combat Literature, the
Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, and some Modernists advocating Chinese
nostalgia).\textsuperscript{145}

Therefore, seen from the palimpsestic colonial context of Taiwan, language is
not a stable signifier within a seemingly stable (colonial) power structure—being
either the language of the coloniser or of the oppressed—but keeps changing its
position-taking between dominance and resistance. The Japanese language acquired
under Japanese rule was used by Wu when composing \textit{Yaxiya de guer} [\textit{Orphan of
Asia}] to write back against the colonial historicity. During the KMT’s regime, the
Japanese language, which was once the coloniser’s language, was transformed and
appropriated as the language of the colonised (especially for older generation

\textsuperscript{144} Although Hoklo and Hakka languages were in fact Han languages, localised and Taiwan-ised,
they were appropriated as Nativist symbols since the 1980s. This was especially the case with the
Hoklo language.

\textsuperscript{145} The phenomenon of turning to Hoklo and Hakka languages/elements rather than Japanese in
literary writing to represent a local/Taiwanese awakening in the 1980s could still reveal traces of Han
heritage. This does not deny the fact that Hoklo writing began before the 1980s, e.g. Lin Zongyuan,
Lin Qiyang/Xiang Yang (since the 1970s), Song Zelai, Huang Jinliang, Lin Yangmin (since the
1980s), and other poets belonging to the \textit{Li and Fanshu} poetry society. Also, this does not ignore the
fact that, on many occasions, linguistic choice (either using a specific language, or through a hybrid
use of two or many languages) can be just an expedient choice. However, it is also the case that the
expedient choice of language, or, the habitus of language, that might consciously or unconsciously
reveal the writer’s cultural capital and the ideology behind the language(s).
Taiwanese writers, such as Wu). It was thus possible for these old generation writers, who possessed the Japanese language as their cultural capital, to decolonise the subsequent colonial KMT regime through literary writing. If we treat language from the perspective of national allegory, the resulting rivalry of languages in Wu’s writing strategy reveals the competing tensions of political and cultural nationalism between Chinese-ness and the suppressed locality or Taiwanese-ness. This is the special situation of the colonial palimpsest in Taiwan: the colonial language (the Japanese language) was not only used to write back (against the Japanese rule), but was also used again by the colonised in the subsequent colonial Chinese KMT regime, as a means of writing back in a similar power struggle but a different historical context.

This was different from the language situation in the history of most Anglophone and Francophone colonies, in which English and French often occupied the role of the national language before and even after the autonomy of the colonised (such as the cases in parts of Africa and India). In Taiwan, and especially in the case of Wu, as previously discussed in Chapter One, the Japanese language had long been a cultural symbol of modernity since the time of Japanese rule. As Wu wrote in *Orphan of Asia* [*Yaxiya de guer*]: “Japanese culture is a culture of translation…and their language [the Japanese language] is a gateway to sources from around the

146 The connection between languages (Taiwanese/Hoklo language) and politics (Taiwan nation/independence) was more widely developed in the 1980s by Song Zelai, Chen Mingren, members of *Li, Wenxue jie,* and *Taiwan wenyi* magazines, and by politicians of the Democratic Progressive Party. See Hsiau A-chin, “Zhuiqiu guozu: 1980 niandai taiwan minzu zhuyi de wenhua zhengzhi” [A Search for Nation: The Cultural Politics of Taiwanese Nationalism in the 1980s] *Sixiang,* Vol. 22, 2012, pp. 87-101.
The Japanese language was once a useful means for the Taiwanese intellectuals under Japanese rule to access modern Japanese and Western thoughts, as well as liberal thoughts. But it was also the language of the hegemony which generated decolonising sentiments and attempts to look for Taiwanese subjectivity. In that context, in terms of the relationship between language and subjectivity, *native* Taiwanese language (such as Hoklo) and the Chinese/Han language expeditiously occupied more Taiwanese characteristics than the Japanese language, as seen in the 1920-30s Taiwanese Literary Debate.\(^{148}\) To Wu, the transformation of the role of the Japanese language—from a colonial language whose inherent national ideology was to be deconstructed (as Wu did in *Orphan of Asia*) to a decolonising language in the subsequent colonial regime regime (as Wu did in *Taiwan liangqiao*)—embodies the diachronical politics of the colonial palimpsest, produced through both erosion and absorption, in the special multi-colonial context of Taiwan. That is, the Japanese language, as a crucial signifier of colonial symbols and capital, did not essentially stick to its given or disciplined colonial role. Instead, as time passed, and as the language started to escape the disciplined role, when native thoughts and everyday life narrative was allowed to be expressed, and colonial thoughts were challenged, the Japanese language became a more resistant means of communication. As a result, the colonial Japanese language, like

\(^{147}\) Wu, *Orphan of Asia*, p. 135.

\(^{148}\) Or, compared with Japanese, in the context of a politics of anti-Japanese-assimilation in the 1920s and 1930s, the Hoklo, Hakka, Beijing languages (especially Hoklo, as promoted by Huang Shihui [1900-1945] and Guo Qiusheng [1904-1980] in the 1930s) provided a close resource in the Han cultural heritage for the search for Taiwanese subjectivity.
the following Mandarin language, is precise evidence of the colonial palimpsest.

As we have seen, Japanese in Wu’s case, was used twice as a means to write back (against the Japanese Rule in *Orphan of Asia* and the KMT government in *Taiwan lianqiao* respectively). As mentioned, market issues and the mono-linguistic policy in the post-war literary context might have been factors in why Wu used Chinese to write *The Fig Tree*. At the same time, the post-war Chinese literary field also contributed to the production of a politically correct text—in the early parts of *The Fig Tree*, in particular, Wu presents an image of the period of Japanese rule which corresponds to the portrayal of Japanese “savages” by later Chinese historicity. Wu’s selection of instances of Japanese savages were taken up by cultural critics as evidence of his Chinese patriotism. But, to whom does *The Fig Tree* write back? In terms of the Chinese language it uses (and the potential Chinese readership it projects), regarding the description of both the colonial situation under the Japanese Rule and the 2-28 Incident, it seems *The Fig Tree* has at least two major targets to write back to: first, the colonial Japanese Rule, and second, the KMT regime. It was because of the banning of the off-print of *The Fig Tree* that Wu switched to Japanese in *Taiwan lianqiao* to give a more detailed description of the 2-28 Incident. Since a full publication of *Taiwan lianqiao* would be in 10 or 20 years, market issues thus became not so important. In this context, Japanese, which Wu was mostly familiar with, rather than Chinese, again became the weapon to write back.
The Lingual Palimpsest of Chineseness in Taiwan

The Chinese languages, along with its spoken languages (such as Hoklo, Hakka, and Mandarin), also went through a dialectical and shifting process in Taiwan’s history of palimpsestic colonialism. Thus Chinese/Mandarin occupied a dominant position in post-war Taiwan and again after the KMT returned to power again in 2008. Indeed, Chineseness has palimpsestically evolved throughout Taiwan’s multi-colonial history. From the Ming-zheng Kingdom period to the period of Qing governance, Chinese had been the shared written language in Taiwan among Han immigrants before the occupation by Japan. During this period, different ethnic groups spoke different languages: these included the Hakka dialect spoken by the Hakka people (as in Wu Zhuoliu’s case), and the Hoklo dialect spoken by the Hoklo ethnic group. Hoklo, Hakka, and Mandarin all originated from China. However, after hundreds of years of localisation, in the context of 1980s Taiwan when subjectivity-seeking movements were all over the nation, Hoklo and Hakka (especially the former, because the Hoklo ethnic group had constituted the ethnic majority in Taiwan) were seen as native Taiwanese languages and essential cultural symbols for Taiwanese subjectivity.

Under the Japanese policy of assimilation, both Chinese writing and its spoken dialects were gradually replaced by the official language—Japanese. As mentioned in the Introduction, at the beginning of Japanese rule, Han poetry (traditional Han poems written in Chinese characters, which can be pronounced by Japanese as well as by Han dialects like Hoklo, Hakka, and Mandarin) was highly praised by

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149 It is still controvertial whether to describe Hoklo, Hakka, and Mandarin as dialects or languages.
Japanese ruling officials because the writing of Han poetry was a Japanese literary tradition among the elite class in Japanese culture.\textsuperscript{150} Traditional Han literature had had a great impact on the Japanese and Japanese culture since the period of the Tang dynasty (618-907 AD) in China. However, around the period of the Meji Restoration (1868-1912), the use of kanji began to be seen as an obstacle to achieving modernisation, especially after the Imperial China was defeated by the British in the Opium War (1839-1842) and Japan was forced to establish international relationship with the western powers after the Perry Expedition (1852-1854). Under the influence of Maejima Hisoka’s (1835-1919) proposal of “\textit{kanji gohaishi no gi}” [abolition of using kanji] to the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1866,\textsuperscript{151} Nanbu Yoshikazu’s (1840-1917) adovcation of the use of romannisation,\textsuperscript{152} Fukuzawa Yukichi’s (1835-1901) proposal and practice of a limitation of kanji in his \textit{Moji no oshie}\textsuperscript{153} [Elementary Reader for Children] (1873), and the popular interest in being “Westernised” (such as Fukuzawa Yukichi’s idea of “Datsu-A Ron” [Departure from Asia (for Europe)] in 1885) during the period of the Meji Restoration (1860-1880), some Japanese intellectuals initiated movements to abolish or to decrease the use of Han characters in the Japanese language. These proposals were

\textsuperscript{150} See pp.17-18 for the discussion of the use of Han poetry as part of the language strategy during the period under Japanese Rule.

\textsuperscript{151} According to Chiung Wi-vun, Maejima proposed to abolish the use of kanji, to fully adopt kana instead, and to establish a written from through colloquial language, in order to achieve “\textit{genbun itchi}” [unified spoken and written language]. See Chiung Wi-vun, “Hanzi wenhua quan e tuohan yundong na yuenan hanhuo han riben zuoli” [The Withdrawal Movement of the Kanji Cultural Zone] University of California at Berkeley, May 30-June 1, 1997.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
resisted by conservatives. The reform of the use of kanji in Japan continued in the post-war period and became stable in 1949.154

However, in Taiwan, the remnant Chineseness in Japanese, Han poetry, still turned out to be a bridge for the Japanese ruling officials (who more or less knew how to compose Han poems) and the traditional (Taiwanese) Han elite. The bridging function of Han culture between the Japanese and Taiwanese in the literary field was vividly embodied by the budding Han Poetry societies all over Taiwan and by the Han-poetry awards offered by the Japanese government during the early period of Japanese Rule. In terms of Bourdieu’s theory, these official awards set up by Japanese officials can be seen as consecration—in other words, Taiwanese Han literati were officially credited with their Han cultural capital. On the other hand, it suggests the Han literati also consented to the political intrusion of Japan into (Han) literary field.

It was under such a comparatively soft language policy (compared with the later militarist Kōminka Movement and KMT’s rapid abolition of the Japanese language in 1946) at the beginning of Japanese Rule, that classical Han and Chinese-written language, a taste shaped by the Han elite (such as Wu’s grandfather) and also the Japanese elite, retained their limited autonomous space in the literary field. Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, when a cultural assimilation strategy was practised, the Japanese ruling officials implemented this comparatively soft and fluid language policy, in which Chinese was not seen as the lingual capital of the literary field exclusive to the colonised (the Taiwanese). Also

154 Ibid.
permitted under the terms of such a soft language policy was the writing and speaking of Hoklo, advocated by some Taiwanese intellectuals (such as Huang Shihui, Guo Qiuseng, and Huang Deshi) as not only a way of maintaining their Han identity, but also an anti-colonial way of constructing a Taiwanese nationalism. As mentioned, Huang Shihui and Guo Qiuseng have made a connection between the use of Hoklo and the development of Taiwanese subjectivity.\textsuperscript{155} For example, in light of the 1920s and 1930s literary debates which mainly focused on a written form of literature, Huang Deshi (1909-1999), expanded the contents and forms of \textit{Xiangtu} [nativeness] Literature from classical Han poetry to popular literature, and to “the dance and songs of the indigenes [Xianzhu minzhu],” “Taiwanese people [peoples from Fujian and Guangdong provinces]’s songs,” and “Taiwanese Opera”[\textit{Kua-a-hi}].\textsuperscript{156}

As a result of these policies, members of the (Taiwanese) Han elite at that time did find their position-taking colonially compromised. Some aimed to win Han literary awards offered by the Japanese government (the competing for which was seen as succumbing to the colonial regime in the eyes of both the fundamental Han elite and supporters for New “oral-speaking” Literature), while, at the same time, some still hoped to maintain their Han cultural identity unblemished and intact. If we analyse this issue by using Bourdieu’s concept of the field, the compromised characteristics of most members of this group (especially for traditional Han literati) can be explained and understood, since these official Han literary awards became

\textsuperscript{155} See pp. 82-85 for the discussion of Huang and Guo’s \textit{Taiwan Huawen} proposal.

the sole space in which the Han elite could compete and gain legitimate consecration.

However, with the heightened tensions between China and Japan and the fact that the de-Sino movement in the Japanese language and culture was gaining ground back in Japan during the 1930s, the Japanising Kōminka policy of forced assimilation, whereby Taiwanese were to be transformed into the subjects of the Japanese Emperor, was vigorously imposed. Both written Chinese and spoken Mandarin were seen by the Japanese colonial government as the language of the degraded Qing Empire and with Chinese was finally officially forbidden in 1937 by the Japanese Rule.\(^{157}\) At the peak of the Kōminka Movement, which was in reality mobilised to support the imperial and nationalist discourse of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), Chinese officially became the language of the “enemy” and the “uncivilised” Chinese people. However, as mentioned in the Introduction, exceptions could still be found. In addition, according to Shimomura Sakujirō, Li Xianzhang edited \textit{Taiwan xiaoshuoxuan [A Collection of Taiwanese Novels]} in 1940, although it was forbidden by the Japanese government to publish.\(^{158}\) More interestingly, in the early 1940s, \textit{Fengyuebao} (changed to \textit{Nanfang} in 1941) was still allowed to publish many works of popular literature in Chinese, and even worked as a part of the collaboration during the Sino-Japanese War period.\(^{159}\)

\(^{157}\) Chen, [\textit{The Cursed Literature}], p. 16.

\(^{158}\) See Shimomura, [\textit{Reading Taiwan from Literature}], pp. 62-78.

\(^{159}\) After it changed to \textit{Nanfang}, more advertisement of the Japanese national policy and war-collaboration appeared in this Chinese magazine. See Yang, [\textit{From Fengyue to Nanfang—An Analysis of A Chinese Literary Magazine during the War Period}], pp. 68-150.
However, after the takeover of Taiwan by the KMT regime in 1945, Chinese regained its former position, and Mandarin (the Beijing dialect), replacing Japanese, became the official spoken language of Chinese in Taiwan in 1946, since Mandarin had been decreed the official language of speaking Chinese in ROC China in 1912. The post-war situation in Taiwan, which saw Chinese spoken in different “dialects” (Hoklo and Hakka), and Japanese still used by many people and in publication, was deemed unacceptable by the KMT regime in 1946, and usage of these other languages was strictly forbidden. Mandarin became the official spoken language in Taiwan for all newly-landed Chinese migrants and for all Taiwanese.160 During the martial law period, under KMT’s national-language policy, Hoklo, Hakka, and indigenous languages were treated as dialects, and were forbidden to be used in school. Students were punished if caught speaking these “dialects,” while a legitimate Beijing accent of Mandarin (this is analogous to the “Queen’s English” in English) was officially promoted. For example, national-language (Mandarin) speech contests were regularly held in elementary schools. As a result of this preferential language policy, the “native” Hoklo and Hakka (the localised Han languages) and indigenous languages along with the cultures these languages represent were discriminated against in the public field.

Before and after the lifting of martial law in 1987, as discussed previously in the Introduction, *Dutexing* [Uniqueness], when *Zizhuxing* [Originality/self-determination/autonomy], *Zhuitixing* [Subjectivity/sovereignty], and

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160 Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, p. 54.
Bentuxing [native-ness]\(^{161}\) became one of the resources of the search for Taiwanese subjectivity, the status of native and indigenous languages was also promoted. In 1984, the crucial year in the history of indigenous literature in Taiwan, several Han intellectuals published a special issue of Chunfeng [Spring Breeze] in a poetry magazine, in which three poetry works of an indigenous poet Monaneng [Zeng Shunwang] were included.\(^{162}\) According to Wei Yijun, the establishment of “Taiwan yuanzhumin quanli cujinhui” [Association for the Promotion of the Rights of the Indigenous People in Taiwan] in 1984 formally declares that the postwar Indigenous Cultural Renaissance Movement entered the stage when “cross-tribal forces were collectively organised”. According to Wei, between 1984 and 1996, the indigenous intellectuals, the Yuanyun shidai [indigenous-movement generation] (who were born between 1950s to 1970s), actively created indigenous literature and cultural discourse. Wei points out, these activities laid the foundation for postwar indigenous literature and encouraged different generations of the indigenous people

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\(^{161}\) Similar ideas, though probably phrased in different terms, were already discussed before 1987. By nativeness [Bentuxing or Xiangtuxing], I mean a cultural and political distinctiveness that has been looked for since the late 1970s. This is related to the series of political crisis that Taiwan has confronted since the 1970s. As a result, in relation to the threat of the international One-China situation advocated by PRC China, a political entity, different from the endangered ROC regime in Taiwan, became a possible way out. In the cultural domain, a local approach based on the land (rather than a continuous search for roots in China) also became the possible answer to this anxiety. However, in terms of cultural nationalism, similar ideas can be traced to the literary debates in the 1920s and 1930s. See the following discussion of cultural nationalism.

\(^{162}\) According to Wei Yijun, the series of Spring Breeze were forbidden by the Garrison Command of the KMT government. See Wei Yijun, Zhanhou taiwan yuanzhuminzu wenxue xingcheng de tancha [A Research on the Formation of Postwar Taiwanese Inginenous Literature] (Taipei: Yinke, 2013), pp. 31-34.
to use Han, tribal dialects, or a mixture of them to create literary writing. During the rule of the DPP (2000-2008), the Hoklo, Hakka, and indigenous languages started to be taught in schools. During this period, when “Taiwan” became a more representative term than “China” in describing national-level issues in the everyday life of post-martial-law Taiwan, the content and definitions of Taiwan-related terms, such as Taiwanese nationalism, Taiwanese language, Taiwanese people, and Taiwanese culture, became debatable and a field of power struggle. Since the period of Japanese Rule, because the Hoklo ethnic group had constituted the ethnic majority in Taiwan, the Hoklo dialect was often referred to as the “Taiwanese dialect” or as the “Taiwanese language” from a more Taiwan-based perspective. The Hoklo dialect, which was highly praised by pro-Taiwan scholars in the first Taiwanese Literary Debate in the 1930s, was treated then as an anti-colonial means against Japanese colonisation. It revived again in the public domain during the 1980s, after long suppression and denouncement by both the Japanese and the KMT regimes. In the context of the post-martial-law period (after 1987) and in the eyes of some pro-Taiwan nationalists, the Hoklo dialect was seen as the signifier of authentic Taiwanese-ness, carrying the symbolic meaning of de-Chineseness and de-colonisation (of Chinese), and national symbols for Taiwanese identification, while the Mandarin dialect was perceived as the dialect spoken by the colonial Chinese.

However, the issue of which “dialect” can represent “Taiwanese language,” and the appropriations of terming the Holo dialect as the Taiwanese national language

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163 Ibid.,
are problematic. The promotion of Hoklo is often accused (especially by pro-Chinese cultural and political activists) as “Hoklo Chauvinism.” This raises the question: which language should be the “official” and “national” language in Taiwan? Can it be the Mandarin, the Hoklo, the Hakka, the various indigenous languages, or all of them in some form of multi-culturalism? The issues are getting more complicated when nationalism and identity-crisis are involved in present-day Taiwan.

It is because of the complex palimpsestic language situation in Taiwan that a more thorough understanding of the language(s) used by Wu Zhuoliu is required. However, the straightforward lingual strategy by some Taiwanese scholars of adopting Taiwanese (Hoklo) dialect in writing and in speaking in the First Taiwanese Literary Debate (1930s), which was advocated as a way to decolonise Japanese colonisation, was not present in Wu’s language strategies. Instead, as I have argued, Wu chose to write back against the Japanese colonisation through Japanese. Perhaps this is because, as previously discussed, as a Japanese teacher, Wu distanced himself from social movements; and second, as a Hakka ethnic minority (while Hoklo was the ethnic majority, the New Literature was promoted and practiced mostly by Hoklo writers), he might have felt it would be difficult to write Chinese in Hakka-spelling.

**Palimpsestic Cultural Nationalism in Wu’s Works**

The following sections will discuss how cultural nationalism was involved and

164 See pp. 54-55 in Chapter One.
portrayed in Wu’s work. The term “cultural nationalism” is borrowed from Hsiau A-chin in his *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*:

In non-Western areas, the cultural nationalists’ discourse on cultural distinctness usually involves not only criticising inherited factors which have made their national community lag behind others, especially Western nations, but more often than not, it focuses on discovering or rediscovering cultural elements which are compatible with modernisation and can equip their community for competition with others.\(^{165}\)

As Hsiau observes:

This tendency often produces a distinct tradition of discourse on the relationship between native cultural heritage and modernisation. This ambivalent cultural discourse usually shapes local concepts of nationality…The Taiwanese cultural elite’s reflections upon native cultural distinctiveness and its relationship to modernisation dates back to the 1920s, during the period when Taiwan was under Japanese rule…They sought to reform “backward” Taiwanese culture in order to change the Taiwanese people into a “civilised,” robust nation…\(^{166}\)

The “Taiwanese cultural elite’s reflections upon native cultural distinctiveness and its relationship to modernisation” were the products of the constant conversation between the colonial yet “modern” other (Japanese) and the “pre-modern” or “modern-to-be” Us (Taiwanese). During the period of Japanese Rule, national identification was a critical concern for the Taiwanese cultural elite, because for both old Han literati and new intellectuals, under the governance of the modern state

\(^{165}\) Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, p. 21.

\(^{166}\) Ibid.
institutions, political nationalism (mostly through Repressive State Apparatus) and cultural nationalism (mostly through Ideological State Apparatus) worked together to reshape an identity-to-be for certain Taiwanese subjects. In this context, they re-historicised the past (such as the manufacture of the impression by Japanese education that Han/Taiwanese/Qing culture were degraded forms), the present was full of a simultaneously attractive yet intimidating “modern” flavour, and the future was prescribed (the goal of the Kōminka Movement was to make the Taiwanese become real Japanese). When the sphere of every-day life became the arena of political and cultural nationalism, for cultural intellectuals, it was the cultural ground, rather than the political field, that they could defend.

Between “Pedagogy” and “Performance”

In the following section, I will accordingly focus on the discussion of cultural nationalism in Taiwan rather than political nationalism. Homi Bhabha’s ideas of “pedagogy” and “performance” point to the discrepancy between the narrator and the narrated object within the national discourse—that is, the formed narrative is often an idealised self-projection by the narrator towards the narrated. This is

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167 It should be noted that the effectiveness of these Japanese national-mapping projects may only be particularly applicable to the Taiwanese of a certain generation, class, and educational background (probably in the 1930s onwards), e.g. the intellectuals rather than the common people.

168 The short story “Qiuxin” [The Message of Autumn] (1936) by Zhu Dianren (1903-1949) vividly presents the idea that Japanese modernity is irresistible, after the protagonist, a Han literati, visits the 1935 Japanese Expo in Taipei, where he is surrounded by modern infrastructure and young Taiwanese students speaking fluent Japanese.

called the “pedagogy” of the narrative, when the narrator ideally presumes the existence of a narrated object who totally accepts the ideology instilled (i.e. a perfect model of an imperial-subject, or a *tangtang zhengzheng* de [righteous] Chinese citizen). However, in practice, in terms of the object’s “performance,” the spontaneous actions of the narrated are often unpredictable and beyond the premeditation of the narrator. For example, a national narrative often ideally claims a national unification out of love for the nation, while, in fact, the result is perhaps reached because of the economic benefits to the people. In relation to Taiwan’s special context of multi-colonial layers, Althusser’s theories of the State work well to explain the function of the top-down structure within the literary field (e.g. the Köminka policy, the martial law system). However, the idea of a monolithic State Apparatus does not adequately explain the situation in Taiwan. Homi Bhabha’s use of the theory of “bottom-up” performance is illuminately in relation to these exceptions. In short, it is through a holistic assessment of both the effectiveness and “ineffectiveness” of the state power (especially the latter), that the “performative” acts of the agents in the structure can bring out resistance, autonomy, and even “nativeness.”

In addition, Bhabha’s concept of mimicry can also be used to illuminate the failure of the colonial attempts to produce disciplined subjects. Bhabha suggests a doubling results of “mimicry”—rather than a simple “becoming” from the colonised to the colonizer. For both the colonisers and the colonised, the colonial modality is

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170 See the previous discussion of the “collaborative Köminka writers”. They might still have suppressed Taiwanese ideology even thought they had to work for the totalising Köminka projects.
mutually constructed and deconstructed at the same time. As Bhabha argues, “the menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority.” He continues, there are certainly “appropriate objects of a colonialist chain of command, authorised versions of otherness.” But, as Bhabha argues, “they are also the figures of a doubling, the part-objects of a metonymy of colonial desire which alienates the colonial modality and normality of those dominant discourses in which they emerge as ‘inappropriate’ colonial subjects.” For example, as previously discussed, both of the protagonists in Chen Huoquan’s “Dao” [The Way] and Wang Changxiong’s “Benliu” [The Torrent] demonstrate different degrees of uncertainties under the totalising Kōminka movement.

By adopting the perspectives of cultural rather than political nationalism, I aim, in Homi Bhabha’s words, to catch the “performance” rather than the “pedagogy” of the agents in the cultural field, and to see “how historical agency is in return transformed through the signifying process (by the agents); how the historical event is represented in a discourse that is “somehow beyond control” (for instance, beyond the control of the State Apparatus). In Wu’s case, I try to find how Wu, who received a modern Japanese education, could to some extent resist (rather than totally identify with) the lure of Japanese modernity, and instead, could even cultivate anti-colonising thoughts through the liberal discourse which he learned from Japanese “modernity” and through his “Han” identification.

171 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, p. 126.
172 Ibid., pp.199-226.
173 Ibid., p.18.
Take the protagonist, Hu Taiming, in *Orphan of Asia*, for example. Like other young intellectuals in Taiwan under Japanese rule, Hu Taiming, the autobiographic figure of Wu, receives a modern Japanese education in Taipei, the capital city of colonial Taiwan, and then becomes an elementary school teacher, just like the author Wu himself. In his hometown, with his modern Japanese education, Hu Taiming is regarded highly by his neighbours as a literate gentleman. However, both in fiction and in reality, such highly-prized ideas of modernity or civilisation (introduced by Japan) often contradicted the mood and complexion of Japan’s actual colonial rule—especially in regard to racial discrimination. In Hu Taiming’s case, it also contradicts what he has learned from his Han cultural roots. Although the Japanese government often publicised its modernity in racial policy as in the ideal “hakko ichiu” [the eight corners of the earth, or, the world is home to all people] slogan during the Second World War, Wu Zhuoliu describes the racial inequality which, in fact, existed between the Japanese and the Taiwanese in colonial Taiwan. For example, Hu Taiming’s confession of love for a Japanese colleague Hisako is rebuffed, when Hisako declines Hu by replying: “you [Hu Taiming] and I [Hisako] are different.”\(^\text{174}\) In *The Fig Tree*, Wu ponders more deeply on such inequality in Taiwan’s modern society under Japanese rule:

The slogans were all there: “Equal treatment for all,” “Japanese and Taiwanese in harmonious intermarriage,” but time and time again the authorities would covertly intervene to block any attempt to put them into practice. At the root of it all was racial prejudice, for our Japanese rulers

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\(^{174}\) Wu, *Orphan of Asia*, p. 77.
Yamato blood was far superior to Han.\textsuperscript{175}

Both in reality and in fiction, Wu Zhuoliu, and his protagonists’ Japanese education did not make them become Japanese, nor did their Han cultural tradition made them identify with the Chinese nationality—or, at least, Wu himself has not been identified as Chinese by post-martial-law scholars, especially after Wu’s Chinese experience in 1942. The “pedagogical” propaganda which Wu had learned from his colonial education—teaching Wu how to become a righteous Japanese subject—and the glorious Han identity which Wu had inherited from his grandfather produced unstable national referents, rather than rigid ones. Wu himself, the signifier of such “pedagogical” propagandas, both political and cultural, became an unstable signifier—became “performative.” Similarly, in \textit{Orphan of Asia}, the protagonist Hu Taiming’s cultural identity often fluctuates between cultural China and cultural Japan, in a way which manifests the fluidity of the politics of culture. Here Wu’s \textit{Orphan of Asia} depicts the vacillating cultural identity of Wu as well as the thorny position-taking of the Taiwanese people in general at that period.

In his youth, the protagonist Hu Taiming is the recipient of traditional Han education, which is encouraged by his grandfather, Old Hu. However, the grandson feels all the anxiety of being left behind in a new age:

Old Hu revered the scholar…But Taiming did not want a scholarly or bureaucratic career…rather, he sensed only hell in such a life. Conversely, he was fascinated by Opium Tong’s [one of Hu Taiming’s relatives] son

\textsuperscript{175} Wu, \textit{The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot}, pp. 90-91.
Zhida, who spoke Japanese and was a police deputy…The refreshing, peculiarly cultural smell of soap that Zhida left in his wake the villagers called the “scent of Japan”… Taiming sensed in Zhida’s frivolous airs the harbinger of a new era...\textsuperscript{176}

Painfully aware that there was a world he did not know, he recalled cousin Zhida’s words and felt left behind… “Those who can’t speak Japanese are as good as fools in the civil service today.” Times were changing.\textsuperscript{177}

The “scent of Japan” registered a poised modern ethos, compared to the stale old Han culture. Thus it was no wonder that Taiming becomes anxious that he is being “left behind”, whilst studying at the academy of Han Classics [Shuyuan], Ladder-to-the-Clouds, a remnant from the period of Qing Rule in Taiwan. Its teacher Peng’s “strict pedagogic methods,” his “opium addicts,” his “almost fleshless face” and his “indifference to all worldly matters,” all contribute to the sense of a leftover era, mouldering under modern Japanese rule.\textsuperscript{178}

In this sense, teacher Peng can be seen as a typical representative of the (old) Han culture or of “pre-modern” discourses compared with “modern” Japanese ones. When the academies of Han Classics were finally replaced by modern Japanese common-schools, the traditional route by which the Taiwanese literati achieved consecration through the Imperial Examination System—such as the older generation of students in the Ladder to the Clouds intended to follow—proved outdated and, indeed, impassable. It began to seem “natural” (as an internalised and

\textsuperscript{176} Wu, \textit{Orphan of Asia}, p.11.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., p.15.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., p.7.
collective habitus) that the old Han cultures appeared weaker than the newly-introduced modern ways, once the traditional legitimacy of Han Classics and their “out-dated” capital was gradually replaced by modern Japanese education and by the “modern” political, economic, cultural, and social capital.179

However, even though Taiming is eager to be admitted to a Japanese common-school and immersed himself in the promised modernity, Taiming’s role model Zhida—the representative of Japanese modernity—does not prove an entirely beneficent influence, especially in terms of issues of national identification:

Zhida was not especially popular with the villagers. His own family treated him like a stranger…They bowed incessantly to his face, but while the scent of soap was still fresh – in fact, the moment he turned around – they denigrated him, and not just because he was part of the establishment.180

The deputy policeman, Zhida (a Taiwanese), is “denigrated” both because of his snobbishness towards Taiwanese people and his pride in the Japanese

179 According to Ching, scholar Peng demonstrates a defensive mechanism through his (Han) culturalism, and “insisting on the autonomy of the past and its associated grandeur”, while Zhida’s “opportunism and commercialism signal the arrival of colonial modernity.” Ching argues that the coexistence of and contrast between “symbolic China and colonialist Japan” help shape the conflicts within Taiming. See Ching, Becoming “Japanese”, pp. 174-210. In terms of national allegory, Taiming, or Taiwan, could be seen as the product of both China and Japan. However, with the advancement of “colonial modernity” in Taiwan, and with different “modern” discourse between China and colonial Taiwan perceived by Taiming, the marriage between the Shanghai woman and Taiming seems to suggest a different national allegory. See the following discussion of Hu Taiming’s trip to China.

180 Wu, Orphan of Asia, pp. 11-12.
“establishment” he represents and maintains in the colonial bureaucratic system. This denigration, in the eyes of Zhida’s villagers, also implies that being modern is inevitably a mark of compliance with the dominant taste (or habitus in general), which the Japanese colonialism approves. Obviously, the national difference between Japanese and Taiwanese/Han Chinese cannot be easily reduced by the officially-claimed modern and civilising political and cultural agenda introduced by the Japanese government. This is particularly true regarding the collective memory of trauma of the older generation since that the Japanese colonial regime had caused many deaths in Taiming’s village when the villagers fought against Japan’s invasion of Taiwan.

Thus Taiming’s identification with the “Japanese scent”—and the Taiwanese identification with it, too—is neither totally accepting nor totally resisting. Similarly, Taiming’s complex response to the “Japanese scent” mirrors his complex response to Han culture. For example, to all appearances, Taiming resisted the Chinese philosophies of Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Tao Yuanming, which mainly advocate a “do-nothingism” and an indifferent attitude towards worldly matters. But, in fact, the Lao-Zhuang and Tao Yuanming philosophies follow him through his “trips of retreat” from life from Taiwan to Japan, and from China back to Taiwan.¹⁸¹ In terms of national allegory, the various “inter-national” contexts of Taiming’s

¹⁸¹ In terms of national allegory, the various “inter-national” contexts of Taiming’s national and cross-national movements—between colonial Taiwan and Motherland Japan, between colonial Taiwan and Fatherland China, and finally the one-way trip from Kōminka Taiwan to China (after Taiming goes crazy)—embody the idea of colonial palimpsest. In these trips, for Taiming, Han-Ming ideology acts as the base of his cultural and political layers.
national and cross-national movements—between colonial Taiwan and Motherland Japan, between colonial Taiwan and Fatherland China, and finally the one-way trip from Kōminka Taiwan to China (after Taiming goes crazy)—embody the idea of the colonial palimpsest. In these trips, for Taiming, Han-Ming ideology acts as the base of his cultural and political layers.

When his confession of love for a Japanese girl is unsuccessful, he sets off to Japan to study. (Later, he fails to be a Chinese on his imagined fatherland, China, where he is seen as a Japanese spy.) After his return to Taiwan, he fails to get a job and again turns for consolation to the ideas and lifestyle of Tao Yuanming:

Taiming sighed and settled back into his solitary life, or tried to. How could his grandfather have immersed himself in Tao Yuanming and ignored all else? Taiming envied him and fervently wished to turn into an old man…He was too young to immerse himself in Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi…he was walking on a path of thorns.\(^\text{182}\)

Although Hu is perhaps too young to be a true believer in the philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi, the Han layer seem to be his ideal escape when the colonial modernity becomes intimidating. He can do nothing to improve his discriminated-against life until he receives a letter from China which makes him a job offer, to teach in a Women’s Exemplary National High School in Shanghai.

Before Hu’s journey to China, he and his family members go to a photoshop (run by a Japanese couple) to have a group photo taken. This is the first time Hu’s mother has entered a building where shoes were not permitted; forgetting to take off her

\(^{182}\) Wu, *Orphan of Asia*, p. 89.
shoes, she is shouted at: “stop, you chink!” and then by the shop-runner’s wife:

“You! No shoes!” Hu retreats again to Han philosophies, and is “planning never
to come back to Taiwan.” This racial discrimination in colonial Taiwan fortifies
his positive imagination for modern China. Hu then visits the district headman to
apply for visa. As Taiming turns to leave, the headman says:

Allow me just one question. You’ve been educated. Shouldn’t young men
like you stay in Taiwan and contribute to our island’s culture? China isn’t
heaven, either—I hope you’re aware of that.

The narrator, or the author Wu Zhuoliu, has foreseen Hu’s disappointing trip to
China. However, for Taiming, the joy of setting off to China, his imagined
Fatherland, overrides the thoughts of staying in his native land, Taiwan. (This is
similar to the previous situation when he sets off to Japan, his colonial Motherland,
which also seems to be more attractive than his native Taiwan.) After boarding the
steamer, Taiming composes a Han poem consisting of eight lines of seven syllables.
But, the last line requires revision for political reasons. The final version goes:

\[\begin{align*}
O \text{ thoughts, I’ve aired you ten odd years} \\
\text{Beneath unruly eastern skies;} \\
\text{This fool so scoffed at all careers} \\
\text{Till a nasty fall was no surprise.} \\
\text{These waves that wash my wounded eyes}
\end{align*}\]

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183 Ibid, pp. 91-92.
184 Ibid., p. 91.
185 Ibid., p. 93.
Will likely drown my orphan tears
Before we greet the paradise—

*A continent* for pioneers. (My italics)

Because Taiming has heard political anecdotes (in the Qing dynasty) from his grandfather that an unintended offense through slips of the pen could cost a poet’s life, and “Officially, he was on his way to a foreign people” (that is: ROC China), he replaces the last line which originally reads “Returning to the previous country…” to “*A continent…”* This rearrangement of words by Hu perhaps also reveal Wu Zhuoliu’s own fear of political involvement as a Japanese subject in colonial Taiwan, although the fear also comes from his familiarity with Han culture.

Hu’s marriage to his “modern” Shanghai wife, Shuchun, turns out to be a failure. He is unable to improve the moral character of his wife, “a new woman,” who is addicted to dancing, mah-jong playing, theatre going, and being surrounded by young men. She also refuses to take full responsibility for their children. And so Hu retreats again to his Han layer—to the books of Confucius this time. Hu reflects:

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186 Ibid., p. 95.
187 Ibid.
188 Wu, *Yaxiya de guer [Orphan of Asia]*, pp.141-142. The quote is my translation from the translated Chinese version. Hu’s word selection of “Returing to the previous country” was not translated in the English version of *Orphan of Asia*.
189 Wu, *Orphan of Asia*, p. 122.
190 Ibid., p. 121-130.
“My wife is my wife, and I am I.”… “I must recover the old self that I gave up when married.” For the first time in months, he enjoyed the company of books. He became reacquainted with thinkers from Confucius’s times and with the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, the classic history of that era.\(^{191}\)

Previously, Taiming had retreated from colonial Taiwan to China after he faced unfair racial treatment, albeit well wrapped up in Japanese colonial modernity in Taiwan. At that time the Han culture had proved to be Taiming’s ultimate mental refuge. Again, (in Shanghai) in modern China, Taiming retreats from the “cruelty” of modern times (especially from Taiming’s Han-male perspectives) in ways which Hu’s Chinese wife embodies. Either in colonial Taiwan, or in Shanghai, the Han culture begins to be gradually attracted by the calls for modern ideas and culture. In terms of national allegory, the story of the Taiwanese Hu Taiming’s marriage with the Shanghainese wife, Shuchun, seems to suggest an unfit marriage between two nations, colonial Taiwan and modern China. The spouses share certain Han heritage and newly-introduced modernity. However, Shuchun’s Shanghainese ways of social life suggest a total embrace of modernity.\(^{192}\) By contrast, Hu Taiming’s, or colonial Taiwan’s, respect for Han culture and reflexive resistance to Japanese modernity, suggests “different route is needed for Taiwan.” However, when Hu attempts to “recover the old self” by retreating to the obsolete Han layer, both in the context of modern colonial Taiwan and in capitalist modern Shanghai, he inevitably finds

\(^{191}\) Ibid., p. 129. My italics.

\(^{192}\) As previously discussed, in “Nanjing zagan,” Shanghainese women are criticised by Wu for both a feudal snobbishness and a total embrace of Western fashion.
himself becoming an “orphan” in terms of his cultural and national identity as he compares his feelings with that of his Chinese wife and the Chinese youth around him, who embraced modern culture so closely. His friend Zhang also comments:

Chinese culture had to be abandoned altogether, for even though it was immensely rich, it had an equal number of liabilities…the culture could be appreciated only by aristocrats…it was purposely beyond the appreciation of ordinary people…In this way, the literati had ruled China for many centuries.\(^{193}\)

Zhang’s comment on Chinese, or more precisely, traditional Han culture, especially in terms of the abstruseness of its complicated written language, accurately reflects the modern pursuit during the May-Fourth Movement in China. However, Hu Taiming’s identification with Han culture is of a different breed from Zhang’s. As a Taiwanese who has received his Han education in colonial Taiwan, while experiencing the influence of the dominant modern Japanese education, Taiming’s identification with Han culture, with the modern Chinese national state, and with modern China generally is largely imagined or imaginary. This is obviously a very different experience from that of ordinary Chinese people living in their own country. To Taiming, Chinese culture is a constructed discourse of his own making, a projection of an idealised Fatherland, which serves an anti-colonial function (anti-the-alien-Japanese) for his position-taking as a member of the Han literati. He understands Chinese culture as a loosely-constituted collection of plural cultural ingredients: his Han/Chinese identification is drawn from the diachronical cultural

\(^{193}\) Wu, *Orphan of Asia*, p. 134.
composite of Han, Tang, Song, Ming, and so on. Such a dispersed Chinese cultural reference makes it possible for him to establish a fixed yet fragile Han cultural identity since it is not based in the context of his everyday life. To Taiming, the sheer abundance of the Chinese cultural heritage acts as a palimpsestic mixture, in which different discourses contradict one another (such as the opposition between the Confucianism and Daoism, which Taiming “believes in” when he is in Shanghai and in colonial Taiwan). It becomes obvious that Taiming is not able to decipher a coherent answer from his mixture of Chinese cultural heritage as the narrator observes: “Cruel Lao Zi, whose idealistic teachings did not cool his rhetoric, stern Confucius, who spoke of a way but did not show him where it lay.”

On the other hand, back in colonial Taiwan, Taiming is not satisfied with modern Japanese culture, either:

This university was the headquarters where the rationalisations and the psychological weaponry for colonial exploitation were devised. The professors here were faithful to neither their academic disciplines nor the truth but to policies handed down by the colonial administration.

Taiming begins to criticise the colonial agenda of the institutional education he has received in colonial Taiwan. The great symbol and disseminator of modern culture, elite Japanese education, in the eyes of Hu Taiming, now seems no more than a tool for producing and reproducing colonial propaganda—which certainly contradicts the allure of the “Japanese scent” that had seduced him in his youth. Taiming continues

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194 Ibid., p. 89.
195 Ibid., p. 232.
his criticism of universities which dedicate themselves to Japanese nation-building:

Taking “the nation” as a presupposition had distorted the study of history; textbooks were nothing more than propaganda meant to justify the nation and to protect its power. In short, the curriculum from elementary school to university was nothing more than a continual reiteration of that propaganda. This education had accustomed people to the idea of nationhood until it became a custom and then finally a system unto itself. The purpose of such a system is to cast human beings into one identical mold.196

Taiming is now aware of the mission of nation-building and nationalism-crafting of the colonial Japanese education. Such one-voice propaganda does not work on Hu Taiming anymore, and the idea of “nation” has become problematic.

After returning to Taiwan, Taiming is recruited by the Japanese government as a “Voluntary” soldier during the Second World War (in fact, he was forced to join the military service). He is sent to Guandong province in China to fight. After witnessing and hearing killings and rapes carried out by other Japanese soldiers, he becomes ill physically and mentally, and as a result, he is sent back to Taiwan. Under the war-time mobilisation, the Kōminka Movement is forcibly imposed, including the policy of changing Taiwanese names to Japanese names. Even Hu’s nephew is totally Japanised—devoting himself to becoming an “Emperor’s subject” and committed to the “holy war” for the “liberation of East Asia’s one billion people.”197

196 Ibid., p. 240.
197 Ibid., pp. 238-239.
At the end of *Orphan of Asia*, Taiming goes mad because of the death of his brother in law who is forcibly recruited as a “volunteer” member in the “Laboring Service Team.” But before insanity overtakes him, he thinks to himself: “He had told himself he was living honestly, but hadn’t he just deceived himself? He hadn’t had the courage to take life by the horns; he merely had made compromises with it at every turn.”\(^{198}\) In his madness, he strongly criticises the exploitation of the Japanese colonisation and claims that the “Han spirit never dies” in his Han poetry written on the wall. Then he disappears. It is suggested that Taiming might have gone to China for revolution against Japan. The end of the novel implies that Taiming crosses the strait and is involved in activities against the Japanese invasion to China. This suggests the narrator’s newly-emerged Chinese identity (rather than the Han identity Taiming has kept throughout the narrative). On the other hand, the “Japanese scent” did not ultimately attract him, either.

The title of the novel—*Orphan of Asia*—suggests Taiming’s rootless drifting in terms of both political and cultural nationalism. Colonial Taiwan, colonial-Motherland Japan, imagined Han-Fatherland China, modern China, and the later alienated military Taiwan each serve as one of the metaphors of a national allegory for Taiwan.\(^{199}\) Taiming’s, or colonial Taiwan’s out-moded Han cultural identity finds itself orphan-ised between modern Japanese culture and modern Shanghai capitalism. Taiming’s retreat to an imagined Chinese cultural identity only brings him doubt and uncertainty about the contradictions inherent in a palimpsestic

\(^{198}\) Ibid., p. 243.

\(^{199}\) As the book title was once *Yugamerareta shima* [*The Distorted Island*] in Japanese version (1957), which suggests a national allegorical reading.
and pluralised Chinese culture, which fails to guarantee him a stable cultural identity. Adrift and homeless in the palimpsestic cultures of China and Japan, the Taiwanese, Hu Taiming, registers the “orphan” character of Taiwan, in terms of national allegory, of both cultural and political nationalism. Hu Taiming can be seen not only as an “orphan” himself but also a symbolic representation of Taiwan’s drifting and unstable national and cultural identities which do not fit into the national allegories imposed by the various colonial powers Taiwan has experienced.

**Conclusion**

This chapter demonstrates that Wu’s works are deeply involved with the palimpsestic nature of the colonial history of Taiwan. The social and political context of Wu’s works, during which various grand narratives were imposed either by Qing Rule, Japanese Rule, or the KMT regime, helped to shape Wu’s colonial palimpsestic writing, as well as the vacillating political and cultural nationalism portrayed through these orphanised protagonists. The chapter has also expressed the embedded decolonising discourses in Wu’s writing and his insistence on recording first-hand history (such as his autobiographical writing of the war-time colonial Taiwan and the 2-28 Incident). The chapter has further stressed their relation to Wu’s shifting language strategies.

The consistent protesting spirit in Wu—which enabled him to use his writing to go against the dominant historiographies through the shifting of political regimes—drew on the realist tradition inherited from the New Literature under Japanese rule. Although it is still hard to locate Wu’s national identity—given the fact that Wu’s
political, ethnic, and cultural identification are often mixed up—the constant debates and struggles of nationalism (political, cultural, or both) manifested in Wu’s writing make him a literary figure who dared to engage with everyday life directly. Wu’s refusal to reproduce the dominant historiography in literature, his use of different languages\(^{200}\) (traditional Han Chinese, Japanese, Chinese) and literary forms (autobiography, fiction, Han poetry) for decolonising aims, and his portrayal of a palimpsestic national allegory (the orphaned Taiwanese), present a good example of the colonial palimpsest in Taiwanese literature. In addition, his construction of a Taiwanese literary consecration (the *Taiwan wenyi* magazine and the Wu Zhuoliu Literary Award) provided a way to promote “Taiwanese” [*Bentu*] literature among the Combat and Modernist trends.

\(^{200}\) Even though it appears that Wu conducts a “flexible” language strategy in writing, whether Wu’s use of Chinese is really that “flexible” is doubtful. As previously discussed, Ye Shitao and Peng Ruijin both do not think Wu’s Chinese, at least in the case of novels, was great.
Chapter Three: The Palimpsestic Literary Writing of the 2-28 Incident

In this chapter, I plan to explore the ways in which the 2-28 Incident, as a summoned historical text, has been palimpsestically and dialectically narrated for decades in Taiwanese literature. I have discussed in Chapter One the relationship between national narratives and the colonial palimpsest; I have also discussed what Fredric Jameson’s terms the “national allegorical” reading of third-world texts. I now want to consider the collective but conflicting contextualisations, de-contextualisations, and re-contextualisations of the 2-28 Tragedy. The Incident makes for a history-driving narrative—specifically after the 1970s, and most obviously so after the lifting of martial law in the 1980s. The different literary and historical interpretations the 2-28 Incident engenders have generated various contesting versions of cultural nationalism in Taiwan’s literature.

In his analysis of British colonisation in India, Bernard Cohn points out how a small “alien ruling group” effectively controlled the massive Indian population through its demonstration of force via the brutal military suppression of military and civil revolt in 1857 and 1858.¹ In the same way, the small, alien KMT group effectively controlled the majority of the Taiwanese population through the military suppression of military and civil unrest.

power it deployed during the 2-28 Incident in 1947 and the subsequent Pacification [Suijing] and Town-Cleansing [Qingxiang] suppressions.\(^2\) Cohn argues that the British turned themselves from “outsiders” to “insiders” by “vesting in their monarch the sovereignty of India through the Government of India Act of 2 August 1858.”\(^3\)

Similarly, Taiwan was officially put into the administration of the Chinese Nationalist government from China in 1945 via the “Organisational Regulation of the Administrative Chief Office of Taiwan Province,” which granted the Taiwan Administrative Chief and Garrison Commander-in-Chief of Taiwan Province, Chen Yi, the legal responsibility for administrative and military affairs.\(^4\)

However, the inclusion and legitimisation strategies the British put in place in India and the KMT employed in Taiwan—turning aliens into insiders, and foreign civilians into colonial subjects—not only involved legal change and military suppression, but also a comprehensive change to the cultural and social field,

\(^2\) After troops from Mainland China landed in Taiwan, Chen Yi declared a state of martial law. The “Pacification” refers to the use of military force to crack down on resistance. The “Town-Cleansing” was brought into being to “check out household records,” to “arrest suspects,” and to carry out “self-surrender” operations. Most of the former’s works was complete by the end of March, the latter’s by the end of June, 1947. See The-2-28-Truth-Research-Panel, Ererba shijian zeren guishu baogao [Research Report on the Responsibility for the 2-28 Incident], pp. 66-73.

\(^3\) The Invention of Tradition, p.165.

\(^4\) According to Zheng Zi, the Administrative Chief Office of Taiwan Province bears quite similar colonial characteristics to that of the Taiwan Governor-General Office during the period of Japanese Rule, because of the former’s peculiar administrative system, total economic dominance, and combination of policing and household registration system. See Zheng Zi, “Zhanhou taiwan xingzheng tixi de jieshou yu chongjian” [The Takeover and Reconstruction of Postwar Taiwanese Administrative System] in Taiwanshi lunwen jingxuan [Selected Essays of Taiwanese History] Vol 2, Zhang Yanxian, Li Xiaofeng, and Tai Pao-tsun, Eds. (Taipei: Yushanshe, 2005), pp. 248-266.
including the literary. The rules of the whole field (the long established habitus),
which had been prevalent in Taiwan before 1945, during the period of Japanese Rule,
were replaced by those of KMT-imported (and KMT-invented)\textsuperscript{5} Chinese-ness,
through which the dominance of the Republic of China in Taiwan was legitimised.
Under the sway of the subsequent political and cultural propaganda and the
implementation of martial law (1949-1987), with its emphasis on “becoming
Chinese”, the Taiwanese—who, in fact, remained residual Japanese subjects—were
all forced to adopt “Chinese” national identity.

In order to “become Chinese”—as though free will was an option—the cultural
capital accumulated under Japanese Rule was officially discarded, and Chinese
cultural capital (such as official Chinese writing, mono-lingual Mandarin speaking,

\footnote{Eric Hobsbawm demonstrates that some “traditions” were invented in the last two hundred years, rather than genuinely passed-down. Most of these traditions were invented in order to enhance national cohesion, such as symbols and myths of nationalism. He argues: “Sometimes new traditions could be readily grafted on old ones, sometimes they could be devised by borrowing from the well-supplied warehouses of official ritual, symbolism and moral exhortation—religion and princely pomp, folklore and freemasonry (itself an earlier invented tradition of great symbolic force).” This suggests culture, when nationalism is involved, may be \textit{palimpsestically} appropriated by those who control it. See Hobsbawm’s “Introduction: Inventing Traditions” in \textit{The Invention of Tradition}, p. 6 and pp. 5-8 for more examples of the ways in which tradition has been invented in modern society. Similarly, some of the KMT-imported “Chineseness” in Taiwan has included Chinese traditions, but some have been newly invented or grafted (like some of the later reinforcing of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement) so as to meet the requirements of its claimed \textit{genuine} Chinese heritage. Since the 1950s, the KMT’s political appropriation of Chinese cultural goods (in line with its self-portrayed image as the authentic and genuine Chinese regime after 1949) mainly aimed to establish a contrast to the \textit{fake} PRC China regime. See Chapter Five for more details of the ways in which Chinese culture \textit{became} the heritage of the KMT and how it was made the dominant culture in Taiwan.}
and Chinese education) was introduced and made mainstream. However, even though the Japanese layer was largely erased in this era, its remnants (the internalised habitus and accumulated capital under Japanese Rule, or *hysteresis*\(^6\) in the historical sense) were still visible in everyday life in KMT-dominated Taiwan. In the literary field, for example, Japanese writing was forbidden in 1946 by the Chen Yi Administration, which meant that works written in Japanese were no longer legitimate in the public field. But some of the old-generation writers still wrote privately in Japanese and kept intact the internalised Japanese ethos which had developed under the period of Japanese Rule. The culture, language and mood of the Japanese period were still remembered and expressed, though not publicly, in fiction written in Japanese and in Han poetry (as in Wu Zhuoliu’s case). However, the traces and layerings of the colonial palimpsest are most distinct in the writing and rewriting of the 2-28 Incident. It is a key moment in Taiwan’s history making, as it symbolises the conflicting turning between two colonial and chronically-continuous fields (from the Japanese to the KMT-Chinese), whilst, at the same time, showing a layered erosion and merging of these two.

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\(^6\) The unchanged habitus established in Taiwan under the period of Japanese Rule remained effective in the period of the KMT regime. These characteristics of *hysteresis* are obviously demonstrated in the post-war older generation of Taiwanese who were born and educated under the period of Japanese Rule. They could speak fluent Japanese and often carried the components of the Japanese culture and ethos. They needed quite some time to become adapted to KMT’s rule—and demands such as learning to speak Mandarin.
I. The Layered Historicity of the 2-28 Incident

The 2-28 Incident not only acts as an historical event which has, to a great extent, generated the ways in which Taiwanese and Chinese discourses of nationalism are shaped. It also epitomises the colonial palimpsest, in that 2-28 is an episode which has been palimpsestically narrated in literature and in history from the various viewpoints of different ideological positions. In this sense, the Incident appears as a disciplined and structured agency—especially in the early period of the White Terror—described by the KMT official narratives as something negative (agitated by ambitious Chinese Communist “mobs”) or even something non-existent. However, by the end of the reign of White Terror, in the 1980s, the legitimate Chinese nationalism promoted by the KMT was critically and continuously challenged. These international challenges to the status of the ROC government in Taiwan since 1970 had the effect of generating a vital resistant character in the later-developed Taiwanese nationalism (from the 1970s). These challenges also undermined the long-dominant Chinese nationalism, and the stamp of Chinese nationalism and the stamp of Chinese nationalism.

According to Hsiau A-chin, since 1970, Taiwan experienced a series of diplomatic frustrations after changes in the international situation, mainly related to the USA: “the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) islands Event (1970), the ‘normalisation of relationship between PRC and the USA (1979), the withdrawal [or eviction] of ROC (Taiwan) from the UN (1971), and afterward a series of diplomatic breaking-offs.” Hsiau argues that, although the legitimacy of Chinese nationalism advocated by the KMT was challenged in the 1970s, “the Chinese nationalism taught by the KMT had been largely internalised by young intellectuals,” who received KMT-institutional education, participating in public events (such as the Protect Diaoyutai Movement) with strong Chinese nationalist ideology. This internalised Chinese nationalist discourse in the public field was not questioned until the 1980s. See Hsiau A-chin, “Minzu zhuyi yu taiwan 1970 niandai de xiangtu wenxue: yi ge wenhua jiti jiyi bianqian de tantao” [Nationalism and “Hsiang-Tu” Literature of 1970s Taiwan: A Study of Change, Identity, and Collective Memory] Taiwan Historical Research, 6 (2000), pp. 88-89, 112-117.
nationalism began to lose its imprint on the social fabric. Nonetheless, these two apparently rival forms of nationalism, along with their different views of Taiwan’s past (such as the history of the period of Japanese Rule), interacted in such a way as to produce and reproduce Taiwan’s palimpsestic identities to the present day.

In terms of the development of the social context, the 2-28 Incident can be seen as something being contextualised (contextualised in a hostile and annulling way by the official KMT narratives before the lifting of martial law in 1987), and then can be seen as something undergoing a de-contextualising and also re-contextualising process (especially after 1987). Before the lifting of martial law in 1987, in the private domain, the 2-28 discourses were disseminated under various “disguises” (as in Wu Zhuoliu’s case). Close to the lifting of martial law in 1987, the once forbidden 2-28 discourse re-emerged in the public domain with various historical versions. Hidden memories have been disclosed, 2-28 memorial monuments erected, oral interviews with the relatives of the 2-28 victims or survivors have been carried out, and official secret files have been released. Public memorial ceremonies have been held, the KMT Presidents have apologised, and, gradually, the once silenced collective trauma has found a voice in historical narrative. 2-28 has not stayed where

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8 As discussed in Chapter Two, Wuhuaguo was banned as an off-print in Taiwan because of its description of 2-28 (in its thirteenth chapter). It was then published in America in 1984, and in Taiwan in 1988. Also, according to Wu’s will, the latter part of Taiwan liangqiao would not be published until ten or twenty years after his death. See also the discussion of 2-28 writing in Han poetry and in fiction in the period of White Terror in the later sections of this chapter, where the writing of 2-28 was destroyed by the writers, narrated through metaphors, or expressed through euphemism.
it was put—a closed case in 1947, “a riot agitated by Communist mobs”\(^9\) in textbooks, and a taboo subject in daily conversation before the lifting of martial law. Instead, especially for Taiwanese nationalists, it is now perceived as a “Taiwanese national allegory” (as a break from the Chinese dream and Chinese complex after 1945): it has become a cacophony of different narratives, rather than the single harmony orchestrated by the KMT state institutions in the White Terror period. 2-28 is endlessly recalled by national activists (mainly pro-Taiwanese activists) and regularly discussed by writers and politicians, who are now allowed to (re)associate the Incident with suppressed (Taiwanese and Chinese) ethnic conflicts and the crafting of Taiwan’s nationalist identity.

Among all the various discourses which preoccupy contemporary Taiwan, there is none that is so concerned with the idea of looking-back as that surrounding the 2-28 Incident. As Xu Junya says, “the reason why it has been recalled endlessly for half a century is because: its literary meaning already exceeds its perception as a historical event in social-historical field.”\(^{10}\) It has almost become a species of self-reproducing discourse, or, in other words, a Taiwanese national tragic story, that transcends its previously defined historical meaning and context established by the KMT narrative. This re-imagined story evolves with the ever-changing palimpsestic aspects of writing—for example, the social and academic factors such as national

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\(^{10}\) Xu Junya, Jianshu you jianlin: wenxue kan taiwan [Seeing Both the Trees and the Wood: Seeing Taiwan from Literature] (Taipei: Bohaitang, 2005), p.198.
identity, historiography, and ethnic categorisation established during that authoritarian period have also been changing. Therefore, when dealing with the “re-narrated” 2-28 Event in literary writing, it is important to see it as a diachronic, and, thus, palimpsestic story—changing and developing through the sorting, accumulation, and erosion of time. As a result, wider and more varied social contexts need to be explored in the attempt to interpret literary representations of the Incident, rather than taking a single critical or theoretical viewpoint, such as the de-contextualised approach adopted by New Criticism or the entirely official stance taken during the White Terror.  

More specifically, except for the few writers who personally experienced the 2-28 Incident, this genre of historical writing is actually “imagined” by artists from different periods, from the late 1940s to the present day, and this creative approach is especially significant and inevitable for later generations who try to touch on this topic. On the other hand, even those who experienced 2-28 may only have a blurred recollection of it, since the 2-28 Incident was soon taboo in the media and in everyday life. In particular, for those who only started to recall it after the lifting of martial law in 1987, their personal memory was often hard to recover as an accountable history as authentic as the official narrative of 2-28 by the KMT. Yet, the authenticity of the memory of the survivors of 2-28 and their victims (an

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11 Social contexts, here, refer to large political issues within the martial law social structure, as demonstrated in Wu Zhuoliu’s compromised indirect strategy of writing 2-28 due to the suppression as a result of political censorship rife at that time.
accusation often made by pro-KMT version scholars)\textsuperscript{12} is still a cherished asset for oral history and literature. Inevitably, such narratives of the 2-28 Event are, in part, works of selective imagination, owing to the limited reliable documentary resources available under martial law,\textsuperscript{13} and to the changing social and cultural circumstances after 1947, such as changing ethnic relations (from Chinese-dominant to multi-ethnicism), new political developments (from Chinese identification to Taiwanese identification), and different cultural policies (from Japanese to Chinese). With this understanding, it is easier to answer the questions: why are there so many written versions of the 2-28 Event, why do the pictures they paint differ so much, and what are the various limits of the stories? (e.g. ethnic backgrounds, generational difference, language expression, and cultural and national identification) In response to this, a statement by Wang Fuchang in relation to Taiwan’s ethnic situation, can be helpful:

The necessity of categorisation and ethnic movement now decides the ways in which “the history and culture of the past” are read and interpreted, and this is used to construct the ethnic discourse of how “the current situation” and “the goal in the future” of our ethnic discourse should be.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} For example, scholars such as Huang Zhangjian, Qi Jialin, Zhu Hongyuan, and the amateur historian Wu Zhizhang, with their Chinese nationalist perspective, vigorously advocated the “riot” explanation of the 2-28 Incident. See the later section of this chapter for further details.

\textsuperscript{13} These might well have been restricted or destroyed during the White Terror period; they were only gradually made available to the public after 1987.

Similarly, the palimpsestic writings of the 2-28 Incident dynamically reflect the cultural, ethnic, and political perception of what that discourse was, is, and will be.

Therefore, when exploring writing of the 2-28 Event, it is necessary to consider and clarify the contemporary social and cultural contexts, layer by layer. And it is also important not to presume. I have no intention of judging the past by current ideology, because I do not want to oversimplify the 2-28 Event with a pre-conceived impression. My approach to the Incident as portrayed in literature is, to some extent, close to New Historicism; I understand social context as another kind of text, and a crucial one for contemporary analysis of 2-28.

Since the cultural and social field in the period of Japanese colonisation has been discussed in the previous chapter, in the following sections I will firstly discuss the social and cultural field between 1945 and 1949 (the early post-war period in Taiwan’s history), in which Taiwan’s cultural and social field, after Japanese colonisation for 50 years, was steering, or being steered towards *Chinese-ness* under the KMT regime. To prevent the confusion of current imagination with past imagination in narratives of the 2-28 Incident, I will adopt the same approach as in other chapters of the thesis: I will try to retrieve the contemporary ethos first—the collective feeling and the perceived contextualisation of the time—in the literary works I wish to discuss. I will then go on to give a textual analysis of the only legitimate 2-28 fiction, *Mei chunniang*, sanctioned by the KMT during the White Terror period.
Governmental Versions of the 2-28 Incident

Before 1987:

Some narratives of the 2-28 Incident have already been introduced in Chapter Two, in my discussion of Wu Zhuoliu’s journalistic writing in Wuhuaguo and Taiwan Lianqiao, in which Wu argues that the tragedy was mainly caused by a policy of discrimination against the Taiwanese by the dominant Mainland Chinese officials and by the corrupt governance of the Chief Executive Officer of Taiwan Provincial Government, Chen Yi. The literary (and historical) writing of 2-28 by Wu in Taiwan lianqiao mostly matches the accepted historical account of 2-28 nowadays, which became current after the lifting of martial law in 1987. The once official and authentic KMT version of the Incident clearly does not accept that historical account, and differs substantialy from Wu’s civilian version.

Immediately after the 2-28 event, the “Research Report of the 2-28 Incident”—written jointly by the Examination Deputy of Fujian-Taiwan Provinces, Yang Liangkong, and the member of Examination Yuan, He Hanwen—was reported by the Examination Yuan of the Nationalist Government in April, 1947. This official report was not disclosed until 1988. Nevertheless, this official report demonstrates how the KMT regime at that time set the tone for the public recalling of the 2-28 Event—as a “riot,” provoked mainly by the “infiltration of Chinese Communists” and “the rebellion of mobs and gangsters.” According to Chen Fang-ming, this “so-called research report is simply a continued perspective of Chen Yi and Bai

Chongxi who cracked down on the Taiwanese people”, which represents “the opinions of the government but makes no mention of the injuries and trauma of the Taiwanese people.”

*Taiwan ererba shibian shimoji* [The Notes of the Beginning to Ends of the 2-28 Incident in Taiwan] by the Mopping-up Weekly News Agency of the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense [*Guofangbu xinwenju saodang zhoubaoshe*], published in March 1947, stands as one of many examples of the way the 2-28 Incident was narrated officially by the KMT government. This military newspaper report asserts that the 2-28 Incident was produced by “the maneuver of a clique of traitors, gangsters, and political careerists” rather than by “the political discontent of the Taiwanese people”; it was caused by “the evil legacy left by the fifty-year enslaving education of Japanese Imperialism!” rather than by “their [political] ambition.”

The above was the voice of the official state media. The *Righteous Monthly News*, a quasi-civilian monthly newspaper in appearance, even though it portrayed the 2-28 Incident from a civil position-taking, presented a perspective close to the governmental version of 2-28. In fact, the official and civil voice, were both controlled by the KMT state power. Together they presented an anti-Communist

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stance narrative of the “2-28 Revolt”.\textsuperscript{19} This biased historiography also had a
critical impact on the subsequent academic narrative. Likewise, the official narrative
of the “2-28 Revolt” in Taiwan during the White Terror also impinges substantially
on later interpretations of this Incident, such as in historical narrative, literary
representation, national identity, collective memory, etc.

After 1979:

According to Zhang Yanxian, “the taboo of the 2-28 Event was broken during
this period (1979-1992).” He records that:

The 2-28 Peace Day Promotional Organisation was established in 1987.
After years of promotion, the official 2-28 Research Group published the
2-28 Research Report. The authorities promised to make compensation, to
build memorial monument, and to be responsible to what happened in the
past. It was the same in academia; the taboos became less and less.\textsuperscript{20}

In 1991, the system of \textit{Dongyuan kanluan shiqi linshi tiaokuan} [The Temporary
Provisions of Mobilisation for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion],
founded in 1947, finally ended. In 1992, the Criminal Code Article 100 [\textit{Xingfa
yibaitiao}] was amended.\textsuperscript{21} In the light of the change of political wind, in 1991, the

\textsuperscript{19} The number of causalities of the 2-28 Massacre was relatively minimised in official records, while
it was considerably larger in recently-conducted civil research.

\textsuperscript{20} Zhang Yanxian, “Taiwan zhengzhi yundongshi” [The History of Political Movements of Taiwan]
in \textit{Taiwansi yu taiwan shiliao er} [History and Historical Materials of Taiwan II] Eds. Zhang

\textsuperscript{21} According to Criminal Code Article 100 (before amendment), speech or thoughtful expressions
about the change of the status of the state, or ideas of the usurpation of state territory, could be seen
official Research Group of the 2-28 Event was formed by the Executive Yuan of the government. In 1992, this group published its own Report of the 2-28 Event—*Ererba shijian yanjiu baogao [The Research Report of the 2-28 Incident]*—which was led by the historical scholar Lai Jeh-hang. According to Su Sheng-Hsiung, during this period, many related materials were made public, which contributed to the publication of many 2-28 related archives. Three volumes of *Ererba shijian wenxian jilu [The Historiographical Records of the Taiwan Event of February 28, 1947]* were published by the Historical Research Commission of Taiwan Province between 1991-1994; the Institute of Modern History of Academic Sinica published six volumes of *Ererba shijian ziliao xuanji [The 2-28 Incident: A Documentary Collection]*; and the Academia Historica published three volumes of *Guoshiguan cang ererba dangan ziliao [Archives Materials on the 2-28 Incident in Academic Historica]* in 1997; After 2000, when the DPP became the ruling party (2000-2008), eighteen volumes of *Ererba shijian dangan huibian [Archives Materials on the 2-28 Incident]* were published by the Academia Historica between 2002 and 2008.

In 1989, the first 2-28 memorial monument was erected in Jiayi city in Taiwan. The designer Zhan Sanyuan was sent to prison by the KMT government because of this. However, just three years later, in 1992, the third and fourth issues of the *Koushu lishi [Oral History]* periodicals were published by the Oral History

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Committee of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. These two issues focused on the 2-28 Incident and included oral accounts from 2-28 victims, victims’ relatives and friends, and witnesses.

The Memorial Monument of the 2-28 Incident was erected in the 2-28 Memorial Park in Taipei in 1997, when Chen Shui-bian (later the first DPP Taiwanese president [2000-2008]) was the mayor of Taipei city. It was resonant with political meaning for post-martial-law Taiwan, making a public statement of historical revision—the Incident was no longer perceived as a “riot,” but, instead, a neutral protest (or a justified revolution) against the corrupt Chen-Yi Administrative government. The delicate task of wording the Monument’s inscription was undertaken by the historian Lai Jeh-hang, who was commissioned by the Executive Yuan under the ruling KMT party. Although the resulting inscription was questioned and challenged by the victims’ relatives—and even Lai himself was not content with the “rush project commissioned by the ruling KMT government”—it was still perceived as a more acceptable version of the 2-28 Event than those party-line narratives offered by the KMT before the lifting of martial law.

23 These were published after February 1992, mainly as a by-product of Report of the 2-28 Event by the Executive Yuan.
26 See Appendix for the full content of “The Inscription of the memorial monument of 2-28 in the 2-28 Memorial Park in Taipei.”
However, up until 1997—ten years after the lifting of martial law—the reflexive practices of this once-reversed history still generated numerous criticisms. The compensational ceremonies surrounding this trauma were still considered a delivery of justice for form’s sake rather than any form of genuine reflection. When the Memorial Monument of 2-28 was erected in 2-28 Memorial Park in Taipei in 1997, it finally set an “official” tone contrary to other, previous, official KMT 2-28 narratives. It acted as a lawful and legitimate precedent for various other civilian accounts of the Incident, which had started to emerge from around 1987, and continued right up until the present time.

Between 1987 and 1997, the aims of the 2-28 Reverse Movement were gradually achieved: 2-28-related historical materials were made public, 2-28 memorial monuments were built, a national holiday to remember the 2-28 Incident was established, the Presidents offered public apologies, the 2-28 “mobs” were called victims and received national compensation, and rememberance activities were held every year. It seemed as though the miscarriage of justice surrounding the 2-28 Incident had been successfully reversed.

However, as shown above, Lai himself, and some other historians, were not content with this official version of reconciliation, nor the formality inherent in many of the memorial ceremonies. As argued by the research group in the Foreword to *Ererba shijian zeren guishu baogao [Research Report on the Responsibility for the 2-28 Incident]*, it is “under the fake appearance of forgiveness and ethnic harmony” that “the real responsibility of 2-28” (of who exactly should
be blamed) is neglected. As a matter of fact, up until now, nobody has been convicted for their role in the crime of the Tragedy. The long-distorted and forcefully-instilled indoctrination of a KMT-Chinese ideology of the “older White-Terror generation” cannot be easily reversed in so short a time, especially when ethnic and national-identity factors are added to the historical interpretation of the 2-28 Incident.

These concerns relate to the *habitus* and *pedagogy* issues Bourdieu mentions. For example, some people—including some officials— influenced by the KMT’s national propaganda through state institutions during the period of White Terror (who still believed in a legitimate system of values, such as the KMT-version based on *Chinese nationalism*) saw the 2-28 Incident as triggered in the main by “mobs.” In terms of the dissemination of Chinese nationalism in textbooks, this once legitimate Chinese narrative—“Chinese subjectivity,” according to the historian Peng Ming-hui—had been taught in elementary textbooks from 1945, which were only “slightly changed until 1993.” Peng continues, “when [the editors of the

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28 In relation to the top-down indoctrination through the state power, the term “older White-Terror generation”, as an over-generalised term which I use to refer to the specific generation living in the martial-law state system, should be treated as a group with “performative” acts, as Homi Bhabha suggests, rather than a group totally internalised with designated state values. People probably just did not openly talk about it, but this does not mean they believed in the KMT version.

29 Similar to the “performative” term, “the older White-Terror generation,” those who can be seen as “Chinese nationalists” are not necessarily influenced by the KMT, and there exist different divisions within so-called Chinese nationalism in Taiwan (such as in the case of Chen Yingzhen, who has a leftist stance which is quite different from the KMT’s rightist one, even though both of them supports the Unification of China and Taiwan).
textbooks] narrate Chinese history, it is usually narrated as ‘our national’ history.”

But, in fact, before the lifting of martial law, the issues surrounding Taiwan’s subjectivity were brought forward (e.g. in the Nativist Literary Debate in 1977/78 and the debates on Taiwanese consciousness in 1983/84). In textbooks, according to Peng, it was not until 1987, when martial law was lifted, that Taiwan’s “national stance and subjectivity are rethought,” and “the long-neglected Taiwanese history of the past forty years started to emerge,” initiating “new ideas for both historical study and historical teaching.” And these “Chinese tangles” are still seen in many public fields in the present day, which could be perceived as the hysteresis of the highly politicised education prevalent in the period of the White Terror.

However, as we have seen, the Memorial Monument in 2-28 Memorial Park does mark a new stage of the interpretation of the 2-28 Event, with the “mobs” metamorphosed into “victims,” and the once-forbidden and pedagogical topic

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31 Ibid.
32 According to Peng, the term Chinese refers to the “tangled relationship between Taiwanese historical science and modern Chinese historical science.” Ibid., ii-iii. Regarding the writing and editing of historical textbooks, the term “Chinese tangles” could well refer to the “overstressed national education and the subjectivity of [the Chinese] national stance under the special background of realistic politics and historical experience [the defeated ‘Chinese’ national government in Taiwan]” ibid., p. 257.
33 However, in terms sexual politics, the DPP mayor Chen Shui-bian’s establishment of the 2-28 Memorial Park (which was named Taipei New Park) in 1996 to some extent overwrote the Taipei New Park, which was associated with Taipei’s homosexual movement. This can be seen as a collision between national and sexual equality narratives. See further discussion concerning gay issues and Chinese/Taiwanese nationalism in Bai Xianyong’s *Crystal Boys* in Chapter Four.
transformed into a public, and also a controversial, agent in open space. This was mainly through the representation of the intellectual elite, who often adopt historical discourses and national stances contrary to each other (such as the different interpretations of the 2-28 Incident by pro-China and pro-Taiwan intellectuals).

The Old Narrative of the 2-28 Writes Back

New interpretations of the 2-28 Incident from the 1980s significantly challenged the long-established Chinese historicity, or authorised collective memory, especially in regard to the China-centric activists and the generation who received and steadily internalised their KMT-education during the period of White Terror. However, within that generation and within the group of China-centric activists and scholars, denial of the current historicity of the 2-28 still remains. Different from the process of de-contextualisation of 2-28 adopted by the KMT (that 2-28 was both non-existent and a forbidden topic), these new interpretations mainly adopted a process of re-contextualisation of 2-28—it was accepted that 2-28 did happen, but it was only “a provincial tragedy”, a minor event within the more important civil-war context of China at that time. In other words, this Incident should not be seen as something revolutionary, or national (which would incur the danger of Taiwanese Independence). In their arguments, either the severity of the Incident is downplayed and the Event reduced in scale to that of a minor disturbance, or it is maintained that Chen Yi and his corrupt administration were not the cause of 2-28; it was the
“Communist mobs,” or other parties (such as the Japanese government), who should take responsibility. History scholars, such as Huang Zhangjian, Qi Jialin, Zhu Hongyuan, and the amateur historian Wu Zhizhang are of this camp. In general, they demonstrate strong support for KMT Chinese nationalism, and their allegiance is to the official historical-narrative of the 2-28 “Riot,” produced and reproduced by the KMT. Huang Zhangjian, for example, claimed fewer causalities (only hundreds) in the 2-28 Event than is now generally accepted. According to Chen Cuilian, both Huang Zhangjian and Zhu Hongyuan continuously presented strange and ridiculous arguments—the former, for example, argued that “the motive of 2-28 was for Taiwan Independence, and General Peng’s crack-down was justified,” and the latter argues that only “673 people died in the 2-28 Incident; 174 people disappeared.” Intriguingly, the academician Huang Zhangjian was praised by the KMT President Ma Ying-jou in 2011 for his “endeavour to seek the truth of 2-28.”

35 General Peng Mengqi (1908-1997) was infamous for his crack-down in the 2-28 Incident (when he was the Fortress Commander of Kaohsiung). In his memoir, he argues that the 2-28 Incident was in fact produced by “the incitement and manipulation of (Chinese) Communists,” rather than the disappointment of Taiwanese people in the officers and the government. See Peng Mengqi, “Taiwan sheng ererba shijian huilulu” [Memoir of the 2-28 Event of provincial Taiwan] in Ererba shijian ziliao xuanji [The 2-28 Event: A Documentary Collection Vol. 1] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academic Sinica, 1992), pp. 41-42. See pp. 37-108 for General Peng’s official perspective of this “provincial” Incident.
37 Ibid., p.370.
Without admitting that many official files are distorted or fabricated under the conditions of martial law, these post-martial-law historians tend to give more credit to (older) governmental files as evidence and challenge the credibility of oral interviews carried out by current historians. They also argue that Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Yi, or other generals involved in this Tragedy, should not be seen as the prime culprits responsible for the bloodshed. Instead, blame should fall on the “[Chinese] civil war structure of the KMT and the CCP parties,” “local Taiwanese gangsters,” “American spies’s subversive plots” or the “Japanese government’s conspiracy.”

II. The Reproduction of the Forbidden 2-28 in the Literary Field

The Cultural Field before 2-28: 1945-1947

The cultural field in Taiwan between 1945-1949 was described by Ye Shitao as being rich with different ideologies. There were, for example, the right-wing

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38 Qi Jialin argues the 2-28 “riot” was caused by the Japanese government’s deliberate “non-control policy” in relation to food-shortages in 1945 (pp. 22-34). Qi argues that the American consul George Kerr was in fact a CIA agent, trying to make Taiwan independent from China (pp. 242-251). Qi stresses the fact that some provincial rioters violently killed Chinese Mainlanders (pp. 257-264). Qi praises Chen Yi’s liberal governance (pp. 294-309). See Qi Jialin, Taiwan ererba da jiemi (The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947) (Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 2007).

39 To demonstrate the Japanese literary elements and Chinese ones working together, Ye draws some examples made the period before (and even some made after) the 2-28 Incident “a solid foundation for the later forty years of the Taiwanese Literary History.” Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], pp. 73-81.
“liberal”40 activists from China, like Xu Shoushang (1883-1948)41, Li Wanju (1901-1966), Li Liewen (1904-1972), who, in general, were in favour of the “spirit of realism” advocated by the May-Fourth Movement in China. That is to say, they were looking forward to transforming China into a modern state with modern culture from the West. There were also already right-wing and left-wing ideas forming under Japanese rule in Taiwan before these mainlanders came to the island. Most of these modern ideas were introduced by overseas Taiwanese students studying in Japan, Japanese intellectuals living in colonial Taiwan, and cultural activists from China.

Therefore, the familiar ideas of the May-Fourth Movement, liberal and modern thinking, and left-wing ideology (especially from China and Japan), exemplified in the works of Lu Xun,42 merged into, and produced a bridge between the Chinese cultural and Taiwanese cultural field. This is because the spirit of realism— in fact,

40 The term “liberal” or “liberalist,” when referring to the fashion and mood of Taiwan’s cultural field between 1945-1947, applies to a mixture of leftist and rightist (humanist) ideas, and their shared appreciation of realist description in literature and the pursuit of modernity.

41 It was said Xu Shoushang was assassinated by KMT agents after the 2-28 Incident, because of his truthful description of Lu Xun, which angered the rightist KMT government. See also Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], p. 81.

42 Lu Xun (1881-1936) was a Chinese writer, who studied in Japan, and was famous for his realist style. His best-known works are Kuangren riji [Diary of a Madman] (1918) and A-q zhengzhuan [The True Story of Ah Q] (1921): both works are explored by Fredric Jameson, who uses his theory of “national allegorical” to interpret the texts. Jameson sees the protagonist Ah Q as China itself. See Fredric Jameson, “Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” Social Text, 15 (1986), pp.65-88. Lu Xun’s works were forbidden in post-war Taiwan, because of their realist style and the fact that he was seen to be adopting an anti-KMT and potential pro-CCP stance.
Lu Xun had been already introduced to Taiwan in the 1920s—leftist and communist ideas, and the pursuit of modernity favoured by Chinese intellectuals were also appreciated by Taiwanese intellectuals who had, since the 1920s, experienced life and culture under the Japanese. The 1920s, a more liberal period under Japanese Rule, provided the chance for cultural activists (either Taiwanese or Mainlanders) to promote their own stance. The political power struggle ongoing within the KMT between 1945-1947 allowed a chink of light, and these thoughts were thus able to filter into Taiwan.

However, the “liberalist” complexion of the Taiwanese cultural field between 1945-1947 was not, in fact, free from the involvement of Chen Yi’s Administrative Office, which aimed to impose its Chinese propaganda onto the

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43 Lu Xun’s works had been disseminated in 1920s and 1930s Taiwan through resources translated into Japanese and resources from China. According to Yang Chieh-ming, Lu Xun’s works (translated into Japanese) had been read by the Taiwanese intellectual Huang Deshi in Tokyo in 1929, who later introduced Lu Xun’s works in *Taiwan xinwenxue* [Taiwan New Literature]. According to Yang, since 1929, Zhang Wojun started to introduce and publish Lu Xun’s works in *Taiwan minbao* [Taiwan Civil News]. See Yang Chieh-ming, “Lun rizhishiqi taiwan wenyi yu taiwan xinwenxue zhong luxun sixiang de chuano yu jieshou” (The Dissemination and Acceptance of Lu Xun’s Thoughts in Taiwan’s Literary Circle During the Japanese Reign) in *Academia Historica*, Vol. 26, 2010, pp. 47-74. See also Yang Chieh-ming. “Luxun sixiang zaitai chuanbo yu bianzheng—yige jingshenshi de cemian” (The Dissemination and Dialectic of Lu Xun’s Thoughts (1923-1949) in Taiwan – An Aspect of the Spiritual History) (Masters Dissertation, National Chung-Hsing University, 2009), pp. 33-76.


45 The Chief of the Administrative Office, Chen-Yi, studied in Japan and gained some leftist and liberal ideas there. The famous cultural intellectual, Xu Shoushang, was his good friend. Chen demonstrated a generous attitude toward the cultural field.
newly included literary field. Nevertheless, it was in this seemingly liberalist arena that the Taiwan Cultural Progressive Association [*Taiwan wenhua xiejinhui*] was founded in June 1946. According to Huang Ying-che, this semi-official organisation in fact sought for a close relationship with the Administrative Office, as it claimed the deeply-rooted “germs of fascism” created by Japanese “Imperialism” for fifty one years should be cleaned up. Its manifesto proposed to “Construct a democratically new culture of Taiwan! Construct a scientifically new Taiwan! Purge Taiwan of the evil cultural legacy of the period of the Japanese invaders! Long live the [Dr Sun Yat-sen’s] Three Principles of the People!”  

Similarly, in the light of Chinese national propaganda embedded in the seemingly “liberal” cultural scene, the conception that the Taiwanese were still “mentally enslaved by Japan,” even after World War Two, was popularly circulated by the media and even appeared in governmental speeches. (This Enslaved-Taiwanese-Argument also later justified the KMT Nationalist Government’s military killings during the Town-Cleansing Period after the 2-28 Incident.) Ge Jingen, a military general from China, once said in public, whilst he was in Taiwan, to oversee the “takeover” of Taiwan from Japan: “Taiwan is a secondary territory, and the Taiwanese are secondary citizens.”

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The Cultural Field after 2-28: 1947-1987

The Taiwanese scholar, Xu Junya, offers a description of the political power structure in place in Taiwan after the 2-28 Incident. She says:

In that chaotic/upside-down age, the government machine is as ubiquitous as the tentacles of an octopus. Under the vicious violence of the state apparatus, both provincial and non-provincial people were shocked mentally and spiritually, and that scar had lasted for forty to fifty years.48

Chinese Literature, no matter how heterogeneous it was, was replaced by right-wing literary trends controlled by the KMT state institutions. This immigrant yet dominant KMT-defined Chinese Literature imposed a solid “native” Chinese cultural layer upon Taiwan. To understand the literary field as a context, Bourdieu’s idea of the Cultural Field is particularly useful, since it aims to find a balanced relationship between literary works and their social circumstance, and thereby avoids the danger of literary or social determinism. Ying Feng-huang suggests that the literary “field” [wentan] is “a horizontal spatial concept,” while literary “history” [shi] is “a lineal concept of time.” She argues that Bourdieu’s theory “cleverly combines the two theories together.”49 Althusser’s idea of the state apparatus can be very effectively used here in relation to the special literary production and

reproduction that existed during the martial law period: to analyse the KMT regime’s top-down control of the state through both repressive state apparatus (RSA) and ideological state apparatus (ISA). The main problem with an Althusserian analysis is that it excludes agency. Bottom-up acts in the literary field, or “performative” acts as to use Homi Bhabha’s term, are discussed in the following sections, while the later discussion of Bai Ju’s *Mei chunniang* focuses more on the influence of the state power behind this literary work. From the perspective of an autonomous cultural field, literary production is regarded more as a supply-driven market. Writers’ production is more a case of the individual writer’s interests, rather than the influence of academia, awards, and literary fashion. Originally, Bourdieu’s idea of the cultural field was based on a free-market model. However, the context of the post-2-28 cultural field was that of martial law, where the relationship between literary production (supply) and readership (demand) was almost directly interfered with by the state. After the 2-28 Incident and during the White Terror period, the currents of both literary supply and demand were strongly manipulated and controlled by the state power. Althusser’s approach seems particularly tempting for an analysis of martial law conditions.

For example, in terms of literary production, the once legitimate medium of that production—Japanese—was banned on 25 October 1946, just one year after Taiwan was handed over from Japan to the KMT regime. Although Japanese writing by native Taiwanese authors could be translated and then published, these artists found themselves effectively facing the prospect of “losing language” and were unable to compete with Chinese non-provincial writers who had migrated from
China with the KMT regime. The latter were not only fluent in Chinese (traditional and vernacular) writing and speaking; they were also familiar with the principal, legitimate literary theme and context of the day—China. Most Taiwanese writers were thus in the position of what post-colonial theory has called the subaltern—in this case, those who “could speak but were voiceless” because of the sudden change in national language policy.

In addition to the official language change, the violence and trauma of the 2-28 Event, followed by the White Terror, rendered many Taiwanese writers mute, and a realist description of social and political issues was largely avoided (such as the 2-28 Incident) in literary writing: some died in the Incident (such as Lu Heruo [1914-1951]), some were imprisoned (such as Yang Kui [1906-1985] and Ye Shitao), some were exiled (such as Bo-zi), and many were simply too terrified to continue to write (such as Long Yingzong [1911-1999]). The “absence” of these Taiwanese writers and realist accounts not only left a gap in Taiwanese literary production (or “Chinese” literary production, to fit that context) but also an empty cultural space in the subsequent years. The lack of authorial continuity also resulted in the breaking of the transmission of literary tradition from the period of Japanese Rule. According to Ye Shitao, the 1950s literary field was almost totally dominated by Chinese writers who had migrated to Taiwan. Even though some “provincial” authors such as Zhong Lihe, Liao Qingxiu, Shi Cuifeng, Li Rongchun, and Lin

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50 Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], p. 79.
Haiyin were active in the 1950s and even won national awards—both Zhong and Liao received awards from Zhonghua wenyi jiangjin weiyuanhui [Committee of Chinese Literary Awards]—in public, the provincial writers and their works were still structurally outnumbered by non-provincial writers and their works. However, in spite of the presentation of utopian themes, the association with state literary

51 It is difficult to categorise whether Lin Haiyin should be put in the so-called provincial or non-provincial camp, because her father was from Miaoli County in Taiwan, but she grew up in Beijing in China, and then developed her literary career in post-war Taiwan. According to Ye, the first generation of post-war provincial writers—except Zhong Lihe, Liao Qingxiu, Shi Cuifeng, and Li Rongchun who were associated with Committee of Chinese Literary Awards and Zhongguo wenyi xiehui [Chinese Literary Association]—were still trying to conquer (language and cultural) obstacles. In the late 1950s, the first generation of post-war Taiwanese writers started to publish their works. Ibid., pp. 151, 174-176.

52 Zhong Lihe’s Lishan nongchang [Lishan Farm] (1955) and Liao Qingxiu’s Enchou xieleji [Blood and Tears] were given awards by Committee of Chinese Literary Awards. The reasons for their awardship might not be to do with the shared Japanese setting of the two fictions. Instead, the two pre-war Taiwanese writers’ attempts to use Chinese (rather than quitting writing or secretly continuing to use Japanese) to create long fictions might have set them up as “good and successful examples” for younger Taiwanese writers in the context of Combat Literature.

53 Ye Shitao provides an analysis of provincial and non-provincial writers and their works in the 1950s, and an account of which non-provincial writers and their works occupied the literary field then. See Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], pp. 141-177.

54 For example, the backgroung of Zhong Lihe’s Lishan nongchang [Lishan Farm], a farm set in 1930s Taiwan in the period of Japanese Rule, presents a utopia, in which colonial cruelty and Kōminka struggles are not stressed. Instead, romance between the two protagonists and descriptions of humanity become the themes of this novel. However, Zhong’s other works, such as Jiazhutao [Oleander] (1944) and “Yuanxiangren” [My Native Land] (1956) contain description of social reality, such as people living in poor conditions and ethnic reflections. It is thus suggested that this work’s highlight of a de-political setting and a focus on aesthetic description won him the prize. See Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], p.157.
agency, and the “pure” literary claims in the works of these provincial writers, which were seen as inevitable compromises in that political situation in the eyes of later critics, they found a way to make their voice heard in that period. The most distinguished example is Lin Haiyin. When she was the chief editor of the supplement of Lianhebao [United Daily News] (1953-1963), she encouraged many provincial writers, such as Zhong Lihe, Zhong Zhaozheng, Liao Qingxiu, Chen Huoquan, and Shi Cuifeng, to continue writing and published their works in the supplement of Lianhebao. Even though she lost the editor’s job because of her publishing “Chuan” [The Boat], an ironic poem satirizing the KMT regime’s floating situation in Taiwan, she established the Chunwenxue [Pure Literature] and kept sponsoring the publication of provincial writers such as Zhong Lihe.

55 After attending the Fiction Studying Class organised by Zhongguo wenyi xiehui [Chinese Literary Association], the provincial writer, Liao Qingxiu, became part of a circle of acquaintances which included influential officials who promoted the governmental literary policy, such as Zhao Youpei, Chen Jiyi, and Zhang Daofan (the publisher of Wenyi chuangzuo [Literary Creation]). According to Ying Fenghuang, even though the Japanese-Occupation setting in the context of Taiwan in Liao’s Enchou xieleji [Blood and Tears] is different from the official “Fighting-Japanese themes” in the context of China, [Blood and Tears] were still published in the [Literary Creation] series. Thus Ying considers this work shows a “vivid ideology.” See Ying, [Essays on the 50s Period in Taiwanese Literature], pp.141, 160.


57 According to Ying, only after Zhong’s death could Zhong’s works be published in the form of books, and this took place because of Lin Haiyin’s sponsorship. See Ying, [Essays on the 50s Period in Taiwanese Literature], p.204.
Owing to the KMT control of the state institutions—as demonstrated by the island-wide tragedy of the Taiwanese elite from the end of Feb. 1947 and the crack-down on left-wing ideas—literary writing turned from multi-voiced to monologue: to the patriotic and political propaganda of Oppose Communism, Resist Russia [Fangong kange] Literature and Combat Literature, as it was called. The production of patriotic Oppose Communism Literature rose to its peak during the 1950s when the Korean War (1950-1953) broke out. This kind of deeply ideology-engaged writing was produced mostly by Chinese Mainland writers who had newly migrated to Taiwan. The fluency of their native Chinese writing, along with the KMT’s governmental literary policy, enabled them to occupy a solid ground in the literary field. This grip was not loosened until a few pre-war Taiwanese writers finally familiarised themselves with colloquial Chinese writing, and young provincial Taiwanese writers (like the generation of Zhen Qingwen [1932-]), who grew up under the KMT’s brand of Chinese education, emerged. These native [Benwu] voices finally came to the fore in the 1960s. The publication of the native magazine Taiwan wenyi by Wu Zhuoliu, which was established in 1964, was important, as it signified a (Han-Taiwanese) native and a public Taiwanese voice in the post-war literary market. In the same way, Li poetry magazine, also established in 1964, played an important part in gathering provincial poets such as

58 In particular, from 1949, targeting Communists, when the KMT retreated to Taiwan.

59 So-called native Taiwanese culture is in fact a product of Han ethno-centric cultural hegemony, from the perspective of the indigenous peoples. See Chapter Five for the discussion of the reconsideration of Han-Taiwanese-defined Native discourses, after the rise of the indigenous movement in the 1980s.
Huang Tenghui, Huang Lingzhi, Bai Di, Zhan Bing, and Jin Lian. In the 1950s, provincial poets did not have a platform to communicate with each other, and poets such as Heng Fu, Jin Lian, Zhan Bing, and Luo Lang, who used Japanese to create poetry in the period of Japanese rule, were facing the problem of transition of languages. Even though receiving sponsorship from [Committee of Chinese Literary Awards] for his Zuguo yu tongbao [Fatherland and Countrymen], provincial writer Li Rongchun decided to create and publish his works privately. In short, due to the impact of the KMT’s state institutions—which was apparent in various forms, such as the implementation of martial law (1949-1987), the Cultural Cleansing Movement, the rise of Combat Literature, and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (from 1966)—the Taiwanese literary field became a monopoly, in which both production and supply were firmly controlled and monitored. In addition, newspaper supplements, according to Ying, which had a wider readership than other institutions of cultural production, were also controlled by the government. According to Ying, at that time, many chief editors of literary supplements had a political and military background, such as the chief editors of the supplements of Zhongyang ribao [Central Daily], Xinshengbao [New Life Newspaper], Gonglunbao [Public Opinion Newspaper], Minzu wanbao [National Evening Newspaper], and Zhonghua ribao [Chinese Daily].

The cultural critic, Wang Shilang, witnessed this situation when the Taiwanese literary field was mostly in the hands of the diasporic Chinese writers in the early

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60 Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], pp. 169-170.
61 Ibid., p.174.
62 See Ying, [Essays on the 50s Period in Taiwanese Literature], pp. 204-205.

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1950s. Wang says, “the most important writers in the Taiwanese literary field in the 1980s continuously debuted in public between 1956-1962. Before it [1956-1962], the Taiwanese literary field was mostly possessed by the immigrating Mainland writers.” He continues, “because the first class Mainland writers were left in the Mainland [China], these second and third grade Mainland writers did not produce impressive works in the ten years of the post-war period.” To exacerbate the situation still further, “President Chiang Kei-shek promoted the ‘Taipei Literary Symposium’ (Literature should serve for Nationalist revolution), and publicly advocated ‘Combat literature.’” This resulted in the proliferation and popularity of literary genres such as “Oppose Communist Literature,” “Revolutionary Literature,” and “Nostalgia Literature.” It was under the politicised and propaganda-oriented literary culture of the time, that the writing of 2-28 became polarised, either conforming with the legitimate and official stance, as in Mei Chunniang, which is firmly orthodox—or going underground, like Wu Zhuoliu’s *Taiwan Lianqiao*.

Yang Zhao offers a similar picture of the Taiwanese literary field between 1947 and 1987. According to Yang Zhao, “after 1949, Taiwan officially entered into the ‘age of National Language.’” As we have seen, “Taiwanese writers were silenced during the change of language “even if Taiwanese writers were not scared off by 2-28.” He continues, “It is inarguable historical fact that Taiwanese Literature in the 1950s was dominated by the newly immigrated non-provincial [Chinese] writers.”

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The Cultural Field of 2-28 after 1987:

After the lifting of martial law in 1987, the new versions of the history of the 2-28 Incident in textbooks differed from those that had appeared previously during the years of the White Terror. However, the ruling of the two subsequent political parties (the DPP and the KMT) produced two competing and polarised perspectives on this crucial national narrative—the 2-28 Incident. Under the ruling DPP government, from 2000 to 2008, stress was laid on this idea: “remember the past in order to go for the future.” Criticism of the KMT’s role in, and responsibility for, the 2-28 Incident was inherent in this stance. However, with the KMT’s return to power in 2008, there came a significant shift in emphasis and in the historical explanation of the Incident with President Ma Ying-jeou’s government urging: “forget in order to go for the future.” Attempts were made to re-adjust the narrative of 2-28-related issues in textbooks in order to offer, at the least, extenuating circumstances for the KMT’s actions in and after the 2-28 Incident. For example, as mentioned previously, President Ma bestowed an award on the historian Huang Zhangjian, who had published several 2-28 studies with a pro-KMT historical-perspective.64 Also, in 2012, the former KMT General Hao Bocun wrote an article “Zhengshi shidi keben” [To Face Squarely the Historical and Geographical Textbooks of Junior and Senior High Schools],65 questioning the account of casualities which appeared in the historical textbooks published during the period of DPP rule which suggest that of

64 See Huang, [A Draft of the Textual Research on the Truth of the 2-28 Event]. As mentioned previously, Huang claims fewer causalities (only hundreds) in the 2-28 Event than is now generally accepted.

“more than then thousand people died in 2-28”. Instead, General Hao claims, there were “only about five hundred to one thousand victims in the 2-28 Incident.”66 In 2014, the scholar Wang Xiaopo, who was also the covener of The Panel of the Curriculum-trimming of the Ministry of Education, said, “The family members of the victims of 2-28 argue that there was a 20,000 death toll in 2-28, which is a small case in contrast to the 400,000 death toll [killed by Chiang Kai-shek in China].”67 Both General Hao and Wang belonged to the group who supported a KMT version of historiography of 2-28. They both attempted to justify and to exonerate the killings of the KMT in 2-28. The former played down the number of casualties, while the latter situated 2-28 in relation to various Chinese civil wars and implied that it was the structure (that is, the context of the KMT-CCP civil wars) that was to blame, rather than the officials in charge.

The KMT, in terms of its formula for the historiography of 2-28, seems to appropriate Ernest Renan’s (1823-1892) dictum of nationalism—that we must “forget in order to create a nation.” In the article “What is a Nation,” Renan argued that modern state citizens, with their long, conflicting, cultural history, need to forget [some histories, such as massacres] in order to forge a successful nation. For example, French citizens need to “forget” various killings, and their diversified ethnics in the past in order to build the French nation in the present.68 Renan says, “forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the

66 Ibid.
creation of a nation.” He elaborates: “Yet the essence of a nation is that all
individuals have many things in common, and also they have forgotten many
things.”69 However, “forgetting” and the designation of “historical error” in relation
to a specific national past can still involve engaging with deeply-felt and difficult
issues: which story is to be remembered, and which forgotten; whose story is to be
told, by whom, and whose neglected.

Take some of the right-wing “Chinese nationalists” models for example,70
which were largely shaped by the dominant KMT propaganda which had been
disseminated in the 1950s. In relation to both the political and the cultural field, it
was often stressed that “We” needed to forget the corruption of the KMT party
which led to their defeat by the Chinese Communist party. Also, “We” needed to
remember that the Communist party was neither the righteous nor legitimate regime
in China. This kind of selective national narrative was vividly demonstrated in the
Combat Literature in the 1950s, which is discussed in the next chapter. David
Der-wei Wang terms it “traumatic literature”: “when registering the physical and
psychological consequences of the splitting of China, mid-century Chinese writers
reenacted a typology of scars.”71 However, this Chinese perspective on “trauma,”
either in politics or in literary history, often conveniently neglects the local trauma
and provincial narrative—with the 2-28 tragedy not receiving the same privileged

69 Ibid.
70 As discussed previously in Chapter Two, there were different resources and factions of “Chinese
nationalism.” The KMT’s right-wing nationalism presents only part of it.
71 David Der-wei Wang, The Monster That Is History: History, Violence, and Fictional Writing in
treatment as a national trauma (whether it is a Chinese trauma, or a Taiwanese one).

On the other hand, Taiwanese nationalist writers, to counter this long and deliberate “forgetting” of the subaltern tragedy, and in the light of the lifting of martial law, have chosen to interpret 2-28 as a high national allegory (seeing it as a national trauma in the process of building Taiwan as a modern state). They have seen it as, damaging to all Taiwanese citizens: the non-provincial Chinese people, the Hoklo people, the Hakka people, and the indigenes.

In contrast to the linear, male, official, Han-centred and Chinese national narration of the 2-28 Incident before 1987, heterogeneous narratives of 2-28 have largely emerged after the 1980s. These include new perspectives from minority ethnic groups (written in Hakka dialect, including a few indigenous elements) and narratives characterised by magical realism, feminism, and, most often, Taiwanese nationalism.

**Han-centred 2-28 History and Narrative**

Ethnically speaking, owing to the small numbers of Taiwanese indigenous people involved, it could be argued that the victims of the 2-28 Event and the subsequent political cleansing, were primarily the so-called Han groups. The KMT troops were principally targeting these groups; other casualties were as a result of provincial discrimination between Mainlanders who immigrated into Taiwan and Taiwanese who had been Japanese subjects. However, there were still some Taiwanese indigenous peoples who fought during the Incident, and subsequently offered their narrative of events, such as Gao Yisheng (Uyongu Yatauyungana
[1908-1954])\textsuperscript{72}; however, in terms of the materials and discourses discussed so far, the Taiwanese indigenous peoples are, in effect, historically quasi-absent from the Event. The reasons behind this situation are not hard to identify. The National discourses of both the DPP and KMT often strategically oversimplify the 2-28 Event. For the DPP, the official party line is that 2-28 was a massacre of “Taiwanese” local elites by a foreign regime. While in the KMT’s discourse, 2-28 was only a matter of dissidence, which was mostly ignited by communists, within the KMT-CCP civil-war context. In both narratives, “Han” ethnic groups were the victims, while indigenous peoples were excluded from this history.

However, if we consider the 2-28 Event, as a national allegory or a national myth—especially in terms of the social context under the DPP after 2000, which promoted a multi-cultural Taiwaneseness (rather than Chineseness)—then we also need to note that indigenous discourses started to be appropriated by the Han-dominant Taiwanese nationalism as a genuine “native” element, with the aim of forging a new Taiwanese nation in post-martial-law Taiwan. It was essential and necessary to include the most native Taiwanese of all, the indigenenous people, in order to shape a new Taiwanese nation. In fact, according to Craig A. Smith, the

\[\textsuperscript{72}\text{ Gao was the first indigene (from the Zou tribe) to graduate from the Teacher’s University during the period of Japanese Rule. He responded to the Taiwanese people’s call after the 2-28 Incident and led his tribal fellows to defeat KMT troops. He sheltered escaped Taiwanese, some of whom were communists, in the mountains. Because of this, he was imprisoned in 1952 and killed in 1954 by the KMT regime. According to Craig A. Smith, Gao, “an early aboriginal moderniser”, had proposed an aboriginal autonomous region in 1947. See Smith, “Aboriginal Autonomy and Its Place in Taiwan’s National Trauma Narrative”, pp. 210-214.}\]
indigenous people “were very involved in the events of the 2-28 Incident and played significant roles in the uprising against the Kuomintang.” But their involvement in 2-28 was frequently marginalised or completely ignored. In this reflection of ethnicity and nation, 2-28 literary writing provided a subtle but solid fresh ground—this writing suggested that this collective trauma was shared by all the ethnicities in Taiwan who were to be included in this multi-ethnic Taiwanese nationalism. Such counter-factual narration is also employed by Taiwanese authors. For example, Lin Yaode’s 1947 Lilium Formosanum (2006) introduces a fictionalised indigenous perspective on the 2-28 Incident through the literary method of magical realism. The counter-factual approach works as a reaction to the dominant Han historiography; it forms an attempt to speak for the once-voiceless subaltern, the indigenous citizens-to-be. Their history has always been overwritten by Other narratives, which together formed an inter-contextually palimpsestic narrative but without their voice. This counter-factual approach both challenged and sustained this practice.

III. 2-28 in Literary Texts

Han Poetry by Taiwanese Writers

According to Liao Zhenfu, since classical (Han) poems were popular during the period of Japanese Rule, many new-generation and old-generation intellectuals were still familiar with classical poems and adopted their form as their own writing in the

73 Ibid., 211-212.
early post-war period. As a result, some Han poems provided first-hand witness accounts of the 2-28 Event. These works are gradually being recovered with the lifting of the political ban and the opening-up of academic research. The study of 2-28 through Han poetry, though a rare approach, can be seen in Liao Zhenfu’s study.\(^7\)

Journalistic writing (as in Wu Zhuoliu’s case) and other vernacular (non-verse) forms of writing—such as free-verse poems and fiction, either in Japanese or in Chinese—can clearly demonstrate their political stance because of their use of vernacular and their easy-to-understand nature; however, in regard to 2-28 writing, the genre of Chinese classical poetry is rather different. It is esoteric, and its meaning can be difficult to penetrate. It enjoyed a comparatively small and elite readership at that time, and a correspondingly limited publication. But this cultural difference still did not render Han poetry immune from political censorship or the authors’ own self-censorship. Liao observes that the lifting of martial law in 1987 is an obvious index. Most Han poetry about 2-28 published before 1987 (such as the poetry of Ye Rongzhong [1900-1978], Wu Xinrong [1907-1967], and Jan Zuozhou [1891-1980]) was “either abiding with the official perspective” or using “extremely veiled techniques for publication,” while works that were highly critical of the Incident were almost all unpublished until the death of the authors or the lifting of martial law. This shows “the severe political interference in literary creation,” which

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\(^7\) Liao Chen-fu, *Taiwan gudian wenxue de shidai kehen* [The Ethos of Taiwanese Traditional Literature – from Late Qing to 2-28] (Taipei: National Institute for Compilation and Translation, 2007), pp. 10, 259-260.
resulted in the “lingering [political] worries of the authors.” It was only after 1987 that Han poetry which spoke out against the official narrative could begin to play its part in constituting the genre of 2-28 literature.

Before his death in 1978, the writer and social critic, Ye Rongzhong wrote a Han poem comparing the dominance of Japanese Rule and the KMT nationalist government in Taiwan:

Dogs gone pigs come as years passed,
My overflowing probity still remains.
Daily observation for 33 years,
Green comes from blue, but excels it with fulfillment in both content and form.

According to Liao Zhenfu, Ye borrows the Taiwanese folk phrase “Dogs gone pigs come” to portray, with obvious sarcasm, the respective departure of the Japanese Rule and advent of the KMT Nationalist government. The sentence “Green comes from blue…” suggests, with irony, that the Nationalist government was less democratic than the Japanese government, during the 33 years (1945-1978) that Ye had experienced of it. Significantly, this Han poem, written in 1978, as well as his other Han poem “Weeping for Friend Ruoquan,” written in 1947 (in memory of Chen Xi, who was killed in the 2-28 Incident) were not published until 2000.

According to Liao, many other Han poems by other authors were not published until the lifting of martial law, while some works were even destroyed by the

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75 Ibid., pp. 278-279.
76 Ibid., Photo of Books: 27.
77 Ibid.
those Han poems which were published during the martial law period either conformed with the official stance (such as the poet Lin Fuguo’s praise for General Chang Mutao’s “pacification” of the 2-28 Incident) or full of sentiment but without an obvious critique of the Nationalist government (or if there is criticism, it is often narrated through euphemism). All in all, Liao concludes, these published poems were “extremely restricted in their ways of expression and the content of writing.” For Han poets whose works were published during the martial law period, we can see this publication as a kind of generalised consecration (being admitted by the government), but both their external performance (works) and internalised habitus had to abide by the cultural discipline that the KMT state power regulated.

2-28 Fiction: A General Review

Before discussing the dissemination of 2-28 fictions, it might be useful for the reader to consider the influence of the martial law political institution. This gives a clear picture of the production of 2-28 fiction—some of which remained unpublished because of marketing reasons considered by publishers and editors; or some because of intervention by the state institutions, mostly political in nature, during the post-2-28 White Terror period.

There are some short novels which engage with the situation before and after 2-28 in Taiwan, which were published before the lifting of martial law in 1987

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78 Ibid., Photo of Books: 23 (p. 279).
79 Ibid., pp. 313-319.
(mostly before 1949). Other fiction was published overseas between 1949 and the 1980s. The reason why these narratives found a public readership was because they adopted the leftist and realist style of the Taiwanese literary field between 1945 and 1947—a style which appealed to those magazines which sympathised with so-called leftists or communist ideas, or were directly linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Geographically speaking, these public literary works with civil voices were mostly published outside Taiwan: either in Hong Kong, Japan, or in China. (When the new China was established by the CCP after 1949, writing of 2-28 published in CCP China carried a more justified and politicised sense of anti-KMT propaganda.)

From March 1947, when the Incident came to an end, to the lifting of martial law in 1987, publication of longer fiction about 2-28 was rare in Taiwan under the rule of the KMT. However, there were a few exceptions: Chen Yingzhen’s

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80 Chiou Yonghan’s (1924-2012) Japanese works, Zhuoshuixi [Zhuoshui Stream] (1954), Xianggang [Hong Kong] (1955), and Jianchaguan [The Prosecutor] (1956), are about the 2-28 Event. They were all published in Japan first, where he moved (in 1954) after he fled to Hong Kong in 1948, because of his participation in the Taiwan Independence movement. See Xu Junya, ed., Wuyu de chunqian: ererba xiaoshuoxuan [A Speechless Spring: A Collection of 2-28 Fiction], p. 332.


82 For example, Song Fewo (1916-1992) was born in Taipei. He was arrested by the KMT and released after the 2-28 Event in 1947. He left for the new China in 1949. His drama was published by Fujian provincial cultural department in 1954. He joined the political broadcasting group and broadcast works “critically exposing…the darkness of the Taiwan island under the KMT rule.” See ibid., pp. 459-460.
“Xiangcun lai de jiaoshi” [The Country Village Teacher],83 Bai Ju’s *Mei Chunniang* (1964), Wu Zhuoliu’s *Wuhua guo* [The Fig Tree] (1968),84 *Taiwan lianqiao* (1986),85 Bozitan kezhang [The Potsdam Section Manager] (1977),86 and Lin Wentang’s *Taiwan aishi* [The Sad History of Taiwan] (first published in Japan in 1972).87

Where Wu Zhuoliu had to adopt a writing strategy of compromise, including writing in Japanese, and delayed publishing, Bai Ju’s *Mei Chunniang* was not banned because its content fitted the KMT regime’s version of 2-28. This makes it a good example of the way in which the 2-28 Incident was narrated during the martial law period via the permission of the state power. Otherwise, as have seen, the literary voice was almost silenced about the 2-28 Event between 1948 and 1986. The de-historicising process of erasing 2-28 history, and its related cultural productions, was forcibly carried out by the KMT regime. However, as mentioned earlier, this erasure also came with an official re-historicising in the public field—the KMT’s narrative of the 2-28 Incident—designed to fill the gap left by the silenced history with legitimate discourse, such as the legitimated version of 2-28 in textbooks. In the literary field, the KMT’s official version of 2-28 was appropriated by, and

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84 Its thirteenth chapter is about 2-28, first published in 1968 in *Taiwan wenyi* magazine. It was banned when it was published in 1970 as an off-print.
85 Wu started writing it from 1971 and finished in 1974 in Japanese. Chapters 9-14 about 2-28 were not published until ten year after his death in 1986.
87 It was first published in Japan in 1972.
represented in, Bai Ju’s *Mei Chunniang*.

The act of reclaiming “collective memory”\(^{88}\) in post-martial-law Taiwan (as seen in political movements in 1970s Taiwan—as well as from the accompanying literary writing such as the Nativist Literary movement)—was often undertaken with different and even contradictory nationalistic stances.\(^{89}\) According to Hsiau A-chin, “so-called collective memory tends to be one of the symbolic resources of identity-determination, support-mobilisation, and power-competition.”\(^{90}\) Collective memory is often controlled and appropriated by political and cultural elites. Through their selection and narration, collective memory—the self-experienced or unexperienced story—is represented as something meaningful, and even symbolic, for a specific group. However, this memory-construction project often includes the attempted actions of “exclusion, suppression, and elimination of various kinds of

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\(^{88}\) The term “collective memory” was first coined by Maurice Halbwach. Rather than seeing collective memory as reflecting historical realities, Halbwach argues that collective memories are selectively constructed by different social groups in their own different contexts, and thus should be treated as historical texts. This is the case of 2-28 in Taiwan’s context, where different ethnic and political groups offered different versions of the history of 2-28. See Maurice Halbwach, *On Collective Memory* trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). However, in terms of the idea of the colonial palimpsest, time factors should also be considered. That is, the collective memory of 2-28 shaped in the martial law context would be different from that formed in the post-martial-law context. In addition, in particular cases, the term “collected memory” rather than collective memory would be more appropriate in order to stress to the “selected” process in the literary production in the individual writer and group.

\(^{89}\) The literary situation in the 1950s and 1960s, such as the Combat Literature and Modernist Literature, also demonstrates this polarised stance.

(other) heterogeneous collective memory.” These attempted actions of “exclusion, suppression, and elimination” may be undertaken by an elite, the state power, or civilians.\footnote{Ibid.}

The definition of collective memory also involves issues larger than those of historical interpretation: it concerns special issues of “collective identity” and of “how the perception of the past has influenced that of the present.”\footnote{According to Zhang Yanxian, “‘Collective’ cannot simply and a priori be seen as referring to an ever-existing human group with a clear boundary; while ‘memory’ should be considered a symbolic resource for constructing a certain kind of collective identity, rather than a definite recognition of the past. Collectivity and memory are always ‘mutually constructed.’” See Zhang, [The History of Political Movements of Taiwan] pp. 83-88, 125.} The competition present within “collected” memory (or, the competition of narrative in a general sense)—that is, whose narrative should stand as the legitimate and orthodox story—can be observed vividly in the interpretations of 2-28 history. And since this memory is selective, it also involves ethnic, and national issues: provincial versus non-provincial, Taiwan versus China, for example. In post-martial-law Taiwan, the use of 2-28—or in other words, the manipulation of the collective memory of 2-28—is not only adopted in the political field by parties like the DPP and KMT; it is also represented by different authors (of different generations, gender, ethnic identity, and national attitudes) in the literary field. Its conflated use in politics and in literature can be plainly seen in the genre of the political-fiction.\footnote{Such as the various inter-references of the issues of 2-28, gender, and politics in Li An’s Beigang xianglu renrencha (1997).}
Three Collections of 2-28 Fiction:

The emergence of a collection of 2-28 fictions in 1980s Taiwan shows that the writing of 2-28 was no longer a taboo; furthermore, this collection bore a palimpsestic witness to the accumulated quantity of 2-28 writing. As a result, the term “2-28 literature” can finally find a position in the field of literary production. The three collections (up to the present) of 2-28 fictions occupy different positions in the literary field of production, and they define (or re-define) the boundary of what 2-28 literature is.

Lin Shuangbu’s (1950-) Ererba taiwan xiaoshuoxuan [A Selection of Taiwanese 2-28 Novels] (1989) is the first collection of the 2-28 genre of literature in Taiwan’s literary history. As regards, Wuyu de chuntian: ererba xiaoshuoxuan [A Speechless Spring: A Selection of 2-28 Fiction], the second selection of 2-28 literature, according to Hung Ying-Hsueh, in this work the Incident is for the first time largely explored from a female perspective by the editor Xu Junya. Finally, in Wenzxue ererba [Literature of 2-28], the third collection, newspaper coverage of the 2-28 Event (mainly published in China then) and work representing the leftist Communist perspective (mainly from the People’s Republic of China) is selected. As Hung notes, a pro-Chinese-unification perspective is carried out by one of the

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editors Zeng Jianmin and its publisher, whose anti-KMT and leftist “Chinese Nationalist” perspectives attempt to argue that 2-28 did not cause Taiwanese revolution nor result in the formation of a Taiwanese nation (which is often held by supporters of Taiwan Independence).  

There is a lot of fiction in the current literary field which portrays the 2-28 Event representing different perspectives. 2-28 fiction, as previously discussed, contains characteristics of boundary crossing of narrative genres (i.e. in Wu Zhuoliu’s case), such as the crossing between literature and history, thr use of different languages, and thr crossing between fiction and Han poetry. That is, this work is often hybrid in its form and expression. In relation to the hybridity of 2-28 fiction, Margaret Hillenbrand refers to “a narrative form that crosses borders and borrows freely from other genres or disciplines in its search for potency of meaning and expression”. However, I will focus on Mei chunniang, because it is a good example to demonstrate how a legitimate 2-28 literary work, with its embedded KMT national allegory, was produced in the martial law period, which is a crucial dimension of 2-28 writing.

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97 See Hung, “Yige lishi gezi jiedu—ererba xiaoshuo jichi xiangguan zuopin xuanji de duoyuan lunshu” [One History, Different Perspectives: Multi-Discourses on 228 Fiction and Its Anthologies], pp. 317-318.

98 Hillenbrand, “Trauma and the Politics of Identity: Form and Function in Fictional Narratives of the February 28th Incident”, p. 53.
IV. A Legitimate Literary Production of 2-28 during the White Terror: Mei chunniang (1964)

As mentioned earlier, the ruling ideology of the KMT strove to overpower and replace the once-dominant cultural mind-set of Japanese colonialism, which had been in place in Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. Mei chunniang, an award-winning novel published under the KMT’s rule in Taiwan, epitomises the ways in which the legitimate discourse of the 2-28 Event was represented in the postwar, White-Terror literary field. This literary text, which received official consecration, highly imbedded with political propaganda, also exhibits how an Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) continues to operate after the practice of Repressive State Apparatus (RSA). In Bourdieu’s terms, Mei chunniang, the national text consecrated by the state, shows how the collective habitus is shaped by the “structure” (mostly through the capitals of the political field) and how, in return, the development of the literary field formed the cultural taste, which was reproduced in this special martial law context. In addition, in terms of national allegory, this text also demonstrates how an “Incident,” or the prototype of a national “revolution,” can be transformed into a provincial “riot” through the power of the state cultural institutions in the period of martial law in Taiwan, which disseminated this legitimate text.

There is very little information about the background of the author of Mei chunniang, Bai Ju. However, it can perhaps be surmised that the writer might have originated from a Chinese (non-Taiwanese-provincial) background. Although the long historical work, which covers 655 pages, is mainly situated in Taiwan, the portrayal of the political situation in China—the conflict between the Wan
Zhouming nationalist regime\(^9^9\) and the KMT Chiang Kai-shek nationalist regime, for example—is vivid and detailed. This comprehensive and real-time knowledge of China (especially its political climate) was unlikely to be acquired by a Taiwanese writer, since most Taiwanese provincial writers at that time did not possess this precise Chinese political knowledge. Also, the novel is full of KMT ideology,\(^10^0\) which will be explored in the following sections, especially in relation to its description of the 2-28 Incident. Again it is hard to find this in a Taiwanese writer at that time.

Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and field comes to mind here—competitors in a specific field (here the literary field in the 1950s and the 1960s) require specific capital and habitus (the knowledge of China and a cultivation of Chinese culture) in order to compete with each other. Whether in Combat Literature (1950s), Nostalgia Literature (1950s-), or the Military Literature trend (1950s), themes preoccupied with resisting the Japanese (Combat-Japanese War Literature) and resisting Chinese-communists (Combat-Chinese-communists Literature)—combined with a

\(^{99}\) The Wan Zhaoming or Wang Jingwei Nanjing nationalist government was based in Nanjing during 1940-1945. Its legitimacy was acknowledged and supported by Japan. It has been regarded as a “fake” regime by both KMT nationalist government and by the People’s Republic of China.

\(^{100}\) Although it is hard to define “KMT ideology” within that specific time-space framework, since an ideology is ever-changing and narrated for/by different reasons, this text bears a number of the characteristics associated with the KMT. Politically, KMT ideology sees the KMT as the sole legitimate regime of China (rather than the Chinese Communist Party), and Taiwan as part of Chinese territory. Culturally, the view is that, the Taiwanese should be (re)civilised through the introduction of traditional Chinese culture, especially after the occupation of the Japanese. Ethnically, Han ethnicity is understood to be the glorious origin of the nation—although in the Constitution all ethnicities are equal.
native description of China—are almost exclusive to non-provincial Chinese writers.

The author also uses fluent Chinese oral language in his writing. There is hardly any trace of an influence of the Japanese and Hoklo languages in the work—and, again, this marks the writer out as very different from Taiwanese provincial writers at that time, who were either unable to use fluent Chinese yet in writing, or who were still displaying traces of Japanese and Hoklo in their Chinese writing before transforming to a fluent Chinese writing.

Since the 1980s, 2-28 discourses have amounted to a literary genre and have come to be studied in the academic field. However, Mei chunniang has long been absent from the discussion. It was not selected for inclusion in the three recent collections of 2-28 Literature, the selections and discussions of 2-28 literature, since it was felt that its description (and the ideology behind it) of the Incident was far different from the ways in which the 2-28 Event was perceived after the lifting of martial law in 1987. This example of pro-KMT-Nationalist government fiction—which represents a legitimate example of the White Terror ethos—has, since 1987, been consciously de-canonised by literary editors. Its lack of objective distance from political ideology has resulted in its removal from the cultural rebuilding of 2-28. But, it is because its literary description of history fits so exactly into the mould of KMT political propaganda at that time, that it nonetheless reflects "a literary reality" which epitomises how 2-28 was perceived and represented through consecrated literary means in people’s everyday life during the White Terror.

According to Hung Ying-Hsueh, Bai Ju’s Mei chunniang was awarded a prize
by the *Wentan* magazine, under the award-title of “Fiction that describes the progress of a free China” (its publisher, Mu Zhongnan, was considered to be highly compliant with the official party line; he introduced the Cultural Cleasing Movement and advocated Combat Literature in the magazine). The novel appeared in the magazine from June 1963 to April 1964, and was then first published in book form in 1964 and republished in 1974.\(^{101}\) This award, the serial publication in the magazine, the two occasions of publication in book form, and academic praise for the work,\(^{102}\) examples of what Bourdieu would call true and fake “specific apparatuses of consecration,”\(^{103}\) marked a consecrated version of the 2-28 Event in the literary field. In fact, the award did not stand alone. There were powerful institutions operating in the background (such as the praises by Xu Gaoyuan from *Academic Sinica*), some governmental, some not. It was through this top-down, and

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\(^{102}\) According to Hung, Xu Gaoyuan, from *Academic Sinica*, praised the novel as an “epoch-making work,” and claimed that the achievement of Bai Ju surpassed many famous writers in the period of May-fourth Movement, such as Mao Dun, Qian Zhongshu, and Eileen Chang. See Hung, *One History, Different Perspectives: Multi-Discourses on 228 Fiction and Its Anthologies*, p. 296.

\(^{103}\) By “true specific apparatuses of consecration,” Bourdieu refers to the academic evaluation system in the universities, while by “in the absence of true specific apparatuses of consecration,” Bourdieu refers (in the nineteenth-century French context) to “political authorities and members of the imperial family” which exercise “a direct hold on the literary and artistic field” through “the sanctions which hit newspapers and other publications” and “the material and symbolic profits” such as “pensions,” “access to the opportunity to be performed or to exhibit,” “salaried posts or commissioned offices,” and “honorific distinctions (appointment to the academies and institutes).” Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, pp. 49-50.
also internalised bottom-up, process of social agencies that the individual’s conception of the 2-28 Incident was disciplined by the powerful agency behind the martial state, and thus became internalised and legitimised.

For example, *Mei chunniang* creates negative impressions of left-wing activists. It portrays the protesters in the 2-28 Event as a cruel mob, and employs a literary tone of moral discipline, which can often be found in other literary examples of the White Terror period. As mentioned above, *Mei chunniang* was one of the few novels to touch on the 2-28 Event during the White Terror period in Taiwan (The other example is Wu Zhuoliu’s work. See later discussions.) Apart from other 2-28 works overseas, it was the only novel to deal directly with the 2-28 Event when the White Terror was at its peak. With such restrictive political censorship in place, its plot and content had to be highly politically correct. Its version of the 2-28 Event fits very much the national narration of the 2-28 Event—that the 2-28 “riot” was caused by “treacherous communists” who attempted to throw over the KMT regime. This narrative deliberately ignores the hidden history (accepted after 1987)—that the 2-28 Incident also flared up as a result of the dire economic situation and the dissatisfaction felt among the islanders under the Chen Yi governance. This neglect of alternative historical discourses might explain why *Mei chunniang* has not been included in the genre of 2-28 Literature post-1987 and has not been listed as an important documentary fiction of the 2-28 Event. The limited references to *Mei chunniang* I have found so far are a journal article (originally a Masters dissertation) by Hung Ying-Hsueh (as mentioned above) about the 2-28 Event in Taiwan, in which this novel is shown to portray the wrong version of events, and her PhD thesis
dealing with 2-28 fiction.  

However, I feel it is important to locate the meaning of the novel in its historical place and time, and to investigate the extent and effect of its pedagogy (to use Bourdieu’s term). By juxtaposing Mei chunniang with banned and indirect 2-28 fictions, we can understand why there is a palimpsestic evolution of 2-28 fiction, and why literature is not always and only about literature. With its highly moral and pedagogic tone generated from official and un-official media, Mei chunniang allows us to imagine how the 2-28 Event was narrated, infiltrated, and disseminated by the novel’s contemporaries during the White Terror period. In this way, Mei chunniang acts more as functional pedagogical material serving for governing aims of discipline, than a simple work of literary fiction. 

This bears comparison with Wu Zhuoliu’s politicising and historicising of literary writing, in that Wu found it necessary to record the 2-28 Incident that he actually witnessed, in response to the authorised governmental version. By contrast, Bai Ju, as a Chinese non-provincial writer (as I have argued above), whom I don’t believe experienced 2-28 himself, “created” a historical novel based on KMT-sourced 2-28 evidence, which went on to win him the award from the

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104 Hung Ying-Hsiue’s PhD thesis deals with the production of 2-28 fiction in relation to the changes in historical narratives. Using Bourdieu’s theory of field, in the first section of Chapter three, Hung discusses the political factors behind Mei chunniang. See Hung Ying-Hsiue, “Wenxue lishi zhengzhi yu xinbie ererba xiaoshuo yanjiu” [Literature, History, Politics, and Gender—A Study on 2-28 Fiction] (PhD Thesis, Department of Chinese Literature of Tunghai University, 2006), pp. 121-130. In contrast to her analysis, additional concepts from Bourdieu, such as pedagogy, capital, and consecration are used in this section to demonstrate the relationship between the awarded work and its context. For example, I locate Bai Ju’s background through the analysis of his Chinese cultural capital.
establishment publisher Wentan, when the Cultural Sanitation Movement (or Cultural Cleansing Movement)\(^{105}\) was at its peak.

It is not the intention of the thesis to pass moral judgement on Wu or Bai, but only to explore the ways in which historicity in literary writing is influenced, and then produced, through the conjoining (or non-conjoining, in Wu’s case) of the agent (the individual author) with the dominant organising structure.

*Mei chunniang* begins in the eastern mountains of Taiwan in 1945. Because of Japan’s defeat in 1945, Gao Tianpeng, the son of the illegitimate Nanjing mayor, flees from China to Taiwan to escape from KMT intelligence.\(^{106}\) He changes his name to Wang Zhaochu, finding himself a teaching job in an elementary school in Taidong County in Taiwan, where he hires an indigenous girl, Mei Chunniang, as his housemaid. Mei Chunniang is attracted by Gao Tianpeng’s lies (he claims to be a man of wealth and fortune, and conceals his married past in China). Just at the

\(^{105}\) The Cultural Sanitation Movement (1954-) was a literary self-cleansing collaboration between the Chinese Literary Association and the KMT government. It mainly supported President Chiang Kei-shhek’s “Two Amendment of Education and Entertainment of The Principle for People (1953)” in wanting to cleanse the “poison of redness (communism),” the “harm of yellowness (pornography),” and the “crime of blackness (dirt-digging news).” It was a sign that the literary field fully supported the intrusion of politics—with the result that “the Cultural-Cleansing Movement prepared a convenient social foundation for the subsequent procedures of news-censorship, consensus-control of the authorities concerned.” See Zheng Mingli, ed., *Dangdai taiwan zhengzhi wenxue lun* [Politics and Contemporary Taiwanese Literature] (Taipei: China Times, 1994), pp. 23-33. The most influential literary group in the 1950s, the Chinese Literary Association [*Zhongguo wenyi xiehui*], whose goal was “anti-Communist and anti-Soviet,” was seen as a semi-official organisation because it greatly conformed with the KMT’s cultural policy.

\(^{106}\) The Wang Jingwei regime working with Japan during WWII was seen as illegitimate in the eyes of the KMT regime (ROC). Those who had served for the Wan Regime were treated as national betrayers, as in the case of the fictional character Gao Tianpeng.
moment when the 2-28 Event in Taipei starts to make its impact felt in Taidong—when Chinese non-provincial migrants become the target of hatred by Taiwanese provincial people—Gao Tianpeng abandons Mei Chunniang, leaving her pregnant. The naive Mei Chunniang is then imprisoned by her angry father, an old indigenous chief, Ma Hanhan, for six years as punishment for her stupidity.

Gao Tianpon flees to and settles down in Taipei after the 2-28 Incident, getting married to Jiang Xuefan, the grand-daughter of Jiang Haoru, a senior statesman in the KMT party. Jiang Xuefan soon separates from her husband after she discovers the fact that Gao Tianpeng takes advantage of her rich and powerful family for his business benefits. Gao then heads to the United States, where he stays for years.

Meanwhile, Jiang Xuefan, a lover of literature, immerses herself in a Modernism salon with her friends. At the same time, Mei Chunniang escapes from her father’s imprisonment and becomes a housemaid in Jiang’s family. After years in the United States, Gao Tianpeng returns home and must confront Mei Chunniang. At that time all his lies are exposed. The end of the novel sees Mei Chunniang going back to Taidong to live out her life.

In terms of cultural nationalism, or national allegory, a Han and KMT-centred historiography and a negative portrayal of Taiwanese indigines are both presented in this novel. The old indigenous chief, Ma Hanhan, is introduced to the readers thus: his “eyes look stupid, often shine with cunning…"\textsuperscript{107} He has a habit of stealing from people living in non-mountainous areas, but he never steals from his tribal

people. The reader also learns that when he was young, he was very brave at killing the “evil” Japanese, but now that he has grown old, he has turned cowardly towards them. In short, he is portrayed as kind of savage, but one who still bears an anti-Japanese ideology.

After the introduction of Gao Tianpeng to the scene, the two men are strongly contrasted: the old Ma Hanhan has the look of a monster, but his mental state is as pure as an angel, while the young Gao Tianpeng, “polluted by hell-like civilisation,” is portrayed as a selfish philanderer who flees to Taiwan from China to escape the hunting of the KMT. The “hell-like” description of Gao refers to his illegitimate metropolitan past through his connection with the Wan regime. At this point, there is a positive change in the characterisation of Ma Hanhan, from that of savage to an angelic savage—in contrast to Gao Tianpeng’s “evil” existence—which indicates the KMT stance of the narrator underlying the flat descriptions of these two characters. Guo Tianpeng, the son of an “illegitimate” Mayor (Wang Jingwei), is seen as a “Han betrayer” in the eyes of the KMT propaganda, since in reality, the “illegitimate” Wang Jingwei governance cooperated with Japan. All in all, in the eyes of the narrator, even though the old Ma Hanhan turns coward in his old age, the politically correct elements of his “anti-Japanese” past surpasses Gao’s illegitimate political genealogy. In Bourdieu’s term, this selective judgement could explain the positive change in the characterisation of Ma Hanhan, in which political ideology

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108 Ibid., p. 8.
109 Ibid., p. 8.
110 Ibid. p. 10.
111 Ibid.
comes into the portrayal of the narrative as the “rules of art” in this work.

2-28 in Mei chunniang:

The description of the 2-28 Incident in Mei chunniang—as a “riot,” caused by organised communists who plotted subversively and spread rumors against the government—is a perfect fit with, and a typical reproduction of, the authorised version of events. The novel’s narrator leaves out any mention of the existing troubled situation in Taiwan under Chen Yi’s governance. It is also made abundantly clear that the 2-28 Event is organised by mob and scoundrels. Tianma teahouse, the gathering place for the bourgeoisie in Taipei, and the starting point of the 2-28 Incident, is described as a place for criminals in Mei chunniang: “Drifters come here to play chess and gamble, drug dealers do business here, revenge happens here, gangsters take vows here…”112 Zhu Chizi113 and Zhu Zhengxiong (the former’s nephew), represent respectively the communist leader and a “polluted” follower, as the narrative of 2-28 unfolds over the course of the novel. In the evening of 27th February, when people assemble at Tianma teahouse to discuss how to react to the Incident, Zhu Chizi gathers together an unruly and mutinous mob, thinking to “organise a troop of five thousand people, turning ourselves from slaves to masters.”114 To direct the reader’s response to this, Zhu is described as a walking devil:

112 Ibid., p.124.
113 Chi means “red” in Chinese, a metaphor for communism.
114 Ibid.
He wants to organise a troop, preparing a fight among cities and alleys. He wants to dig out a trench between the provincial and the non-provincial, drowning them into the river of blood, setting them up without chance to turn back.\textsuperscript{115}

It is as though 2-28 takes place as a direct result of Zhu Chizi’s plotting. A communist, Zhu Chizi, a fictional character, is simply demonized. This is most obvious when he orders a mob to tear apart a living baby.\textsuperscript{116} Through these simplified characterisations, the novel is able to ignore the complicated social and economic turmoil under the rule of the Chen Yi governance. By blaming everything on communists, this narrative in \textit{Mei chunniang} helps to exonerate Chen Yi and the KMT from the 2-28 Incident—when, in reality, his corrupt governance led to this uprising, and his biased report to Chiang Kei-shek led to the following crack-down by sending KMT troops to Taiwan.

**The Literary Consecration of \textit{Mei chunniang}**

As mentioned above, the novel won the literary prize awarded by the \textit{Wentan} magazine. We can compare this with Wu Zhuoliu’s forbidden novels: the two authors clearly maintained very different position-taking. This prize won by \textit{Mei chunniang} could be seen as a form of “state patronage.” The production of \textit{Mei chunniang} depicts what Bourdieu describes as “\textit{structural subordination}…which

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 70.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p.124.
acts very unequally on different authors according to their position in the field.\footnote{Bourdieu, \textit{The Rules of Art}, pp. 48-49. \textit{L’Art Industriel} was the official Art Institution in France at that time. Painters, who received the honour of being selected by it in the exhibition, gained the consecration which would guarantee him/her a future in art, and in economics. See also Emile Zola’s \textit{Masterpieces} for another example.}

Each artist, or agent, is not only determined by his/her own free will, but must also interact with his/her environment, where a power relationship sets the tone of the field.

In \textit{The Rules of Art}, Bourdieu takes an example from Flaubert’s \textit{Sentimental Education} to demonstrate how symbolic goods (in this case, art) may exchange its value with political and economic capital:

But \textit{L’Art Industriel} is also an artistic industry capable of economically exploiting the work of artists because it is an authority for the consecration which governs the production of writers and artists.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 3-9. My italics.}

The protagonist, Frederic, is defined as a man of indecision, whilst in fact he is torn between the forces of politics, economics, art, and love. His refusal of \textit{position-taking} in a certain field results in his failure to accumulate enough symbolic goods (capital) to gain success, and thus he becomes a victim of a world run by a power-relationship. The title, \textit{Sentimental Education}, symbolises the education of socialisation, in a period when the art field lost its autonomy and subordinated itself to economics and politics.

Likewise, as depicted in \textit{Mei chunniang}, during the martial law period we find
another “salon,” the Ark Salon, (though this is not an official institution like *L’Art Industriel*). The Ark Salon founded by Jiang Xuefan, whose grandfather is a retired high-ranking KMT officer, is represented as the means whereby Western modernism is transplanted through the reading of the members. Jiang’s literary taste deviates from Chinese traditions (her Chinese diasporic family background contributes to this) in her embrace of American modernism (as most Taiwanese Modernists did). The Ark Salon’s modernism is represented in this fiction as something similar to American modernism rather than European modernism, in which pure aesthetics, expressionism, and Modernist poetry, are promoted, as shown in its manifesto. Even though Mei Chunniang’s indigenous purity and talent for singing (especially Chinese songs) are appreciated by Jiang, her indigenous way of pronunciation is corrected by Jiang’s discipline of Western classical music. Even though the scenes of Mei Chunniang’s learning to sing Chinese songs (rather than singing her own indigenous songs) win her praises from the members of the ark, Mei’s mimicry and this vivid disciplined example of “civilisation” also reveal the discriminatory attitudes of these (Chinese) members—as after Mei’s singing, one of

119 “European” modernism (a term largely later-defined by 1960s academics) refers to the modernism which became popular in the late 19th century, in which social and political contexts still acted as important resources of their modernist aesthetics. On the other hand, American modernism refers to the “de-politicised” aesthetics constructed by American academic in the cold-war setting, in which the political context was largely omitted. See the discussion of European and American modernism in Chapter Four.


121 Ibid., pp. 485-486, 498, 592.

122 Ibid., p. 483.
the members asks, “Do the half-civilised [indigenous] people understand aesthetics?”

Similarly, the “Minnan [Hoklo] dialect” is rejected by Jiang as a way to create literature because “it [the Hoklo language] does not have enough phrases” to express “new concepts and subtle emotion,” and it would result in “spiritual separation across the people in China.” This can be seen as the narrator’s discriminatory appropriation of purity in literature—“pure” indigenous discourse is praised while Taiwanese discourse is despised because, in terms of Chinese nationalism, the former is less threatening than the latter in the White Terror context. Although modernism and related Western disciplines seems to be the criteria for the cultural elite of the Ark Salon, their disciplinary and discriminatory attitudes towards indigenous and Taiwanese culture reinforce the existing power-structure so that these Modernists occupy the position-taking of centre, while the indigenes and the Taiwanese people are banished to the periphery.

In addition, pedagogy in Bourdieu’s term, or discipline, also works within the Ark Salon. Even the liberal trends of the Ark Salon are also “corrected” towards rightist Chinese patriotism. Jiang, because of her naïve character, is taken advantage

123 Ibid., p. 485-486.
124 Ibid., p. 230.
125 Both indigenous and Minan culture are not pure, and both discourses are threatening to ethnic Chinese nationalist discourse. However, as the selective indigenous characterisation of Mei Chunniang shows, even though Mei Chunniang is praised for her beautiful voice, she is still tagged as a “half-civilised” high-mountain. In addition, in the cultural field of the White Terror context, Taiwan-related discourses, such as Minnan culture (rather than indigenous culture), were more structurally threatening in terms of cultural and political mobilisation. The narrator’s hostile attitudes towards Minan culture, in terms of the question whether Hoklo can be used to create literature, also reveal the fact that indigenous discourse was less threatening at that time.
of by the demonized communist, Zhu Chizi in the 2-28 Incident. She is imprisoned and released. After her imprisonment, Jiang’s youthful sympathetic attitude towards leftist literature is corrected, and then redirected by anti-Communist discipline. Jiang’s grandfather, a KMT congressman, and a police agent who investigates Ju Chizi’s case, together represent the just and disciplinary characters in mapping and correcting Jiang’s literary taste. On the other hand, the Ark Salon plays the disciplinary role in relation to Zhu Zhengxiong, the “evil” communist’s nephew. Zhu Zhengxiong, a Taiwanese, becomes a member of the Ark Salon. Being attracted to Jiang and the Ark Salon’s pure pursuit of literature, and under the influence the KMT agent’s patriotic words, he later “realises” the evil of his uncle—and of communism.

The consecrated artists in 1950s and 1960s Taiwan, like Jiang in Mei Chunniang, shared certain characteristics: their Chinese habitus (either by their Chinese ethnic background, or through Chinese education) provided them with Chinese cultural capital. At the same time, as mentioned above, they praise the (American-transplanted) Modernist fashion, under the name of a pure literary approach. The de-politicised modernist approach developed in American academies in the cold-war setting worked well with the right-wing Chinese nationalism. Out of the shared emphasis on aesthetic pursuits rather than on realist social and political contexts (as in 1930s modernists), and on psychological ideas rather than the political engagements of European-American modernists, the members of the Ark Salon do not attend to social and political realities which have happened and are happening in the island. They accept the governmental version of 2-28. Just like the
modernists in the Ark Salon in *Mei chunniang*, some of the modernists in Taiwan developed bourgeois and legitimate literary taste and ignored leftist and native literature, either as a result of self-discipline or national cultural policy. Some of them also neglected the fact that the artistic field was compromised and intruded upon by political force, while this compromised habitus and taste became the dominant rules of art. As Chang Sung-sheng observes of the Taiwanese Modernists:

I think one of the traces—that left on the writers themselves, the cultural institution that they helped to constitute, and the literary ecosystem shaped by the special political environment—are the conservative, self-limited, sophisticated, and compromised characteristics. The writers’ tolerant attitude towards the limitation in reality, and their cooperation with the cultural policy of the government, gradually developed into the characteristics of the dominant culture in the martial law period.\(^{126}\)

We might argue that the artistic field found a way to retain some independence through such a compromise (though deeply de-politicised, at least aesthetic approaches were preserved)—but that compromise was nonetheless internalised into the artistic field in Taiwan from the 1950s. In *Mei chunniang*, the Ark Salon plays an “intermediary” function similar to that fulfilled by Bourdieu’s definition of salons—they “unite at least a portion of the writers to certain sections of high society, and help to determine the direction of the generosities of state patronage.”\(^{127}\)

The Ark Salon, which disciplines the members with Modernist and, ultimately,


KMT nationalist ideas, presents a kind of national allegory based on an idealised KMT nationalist structure. The members who consist of the Ark Salon mostly come from Chinese diaporic families (except the Taiwanese Zhu Zhengxiong). Acting as an example of pedagogy, just like the disciplined case of Mei Chunniang and her indigenous people, the provincial Taiwanese Zhu’s communist ideology is “corrected” by the Chinese professor; In addition, after being questioned by the KMT agent for a number of times, he becomes a believer of Chinese nationalism. Furthermore, at the end of this fiction, the demon-like communist Zhu Chizi turns himself in and provides a list of communist members.

Conclusion: The Palimpsestic Habitus and the Hysteresis of 2-28 Discourse

The transitional, or palimpsestic, characteristics of the 2-28 Event in Taiwan’s history can thus be traced through the transitions of governmental attitudes towards the production of 2-28 discourse in the literary field. In the 1940s and 1950s, 2-28 discourse was almost forbidden, except for some governmental version disseminated through governmental channels. In the 1960s (when the literary field was just turning away from Combat Literature to Modernist Literature)—when Mei

128 Mei Chunniang’s indigenous people highly praise the construction by the Nationalist government. Similarly, the name of Ma Hanhan’s “han” refers to the great Han dynasty. See Bai Ju, Mei chunniang, p. 650.
129 Ibid., p. 511.
130 The questioning is conducted in a gentle way, which was quite impossible in White Terror. Ibid., pp. 267-271.
131 Ibid., p. 308.
132 Ibid., pp. 625-628.
*chunniang* was published in serial form in a magazine, won a literary award, and later, was published in a book form—2-28 seemed to become something utterable, though in fact only the governmental version was permitted, and that mostly was still through government-controlled channels. Through these means, a legitimate narrative of the 2-28 Incident was then constructed and consecrated, from the unspeakable to the speakable, through authorised channels like *Mei chunniang*, and textbooks in state-controlled education. Victims of this Incident, or their relatives, were dead, imprisoned, went overseas, could not write in Chinese, or dared not to write/speak, since their versions of 2-28 were not accepted by the mechanism of consecration of the KMT state agency. This legitimated narrative, widely disseminated, claimed that the cause of the 2-28 Event was unruly communists, and that the subsequent cracking-down was therefore required—thus justifying and reinforcing the dominating relationship between the KMT regime and the Taiwanese people.

When the legitimate version of 2-28 became naturalised in the public field, and such a mechanism became internalised into an individual’s (or agent’s) mind through the working of the state power, there emerged a collective habitus. The KMT governmental version of 2-28 was legitimised in people’s everyday life (externally), and, with the accompanying silent consent (internally), and these thus worked together—at least to some degree. Borrowing Bourdieu’s idea of *illusio*—the illusion which is believed in by those playing a game together—we can argue that the authorised version of 2-28 was one of the illusions produced by the KMT regime, along with its political propaganda, in order to provincialise this
Incident within the Chinese Civil War structure, rather than seeing it as a national trauma for the Taiwanese people. However, to see the 2-28 Incident as a Taiwanese national trauma may lead to a “repression” of other similar events. For example, the Musha Incident (1930), an indigenous uprising against Japanese Rule in Taiwan, could also be seen as a national trauma, though the casualty rate was smaller. In addition, according to Michael Berry, Chinese and Taiwanese characters have intervened in the historical narrative of the even. As a result, this indigenous uprising has been appropriated by later Han nationalists as anti-Japanese, anti-occupation discourses, and a precursor for an indigenous independence movement.  

All in all, the establishment of 2-28, as well as other trauma, as a national trauma still involves unbalanced cultural and political resources in terms of ethnic politics.

In one sense, Japanese colonial rule did introduce modernity and a modern infrastructure to Taiwan, albeit through the forceful legitimising approach which underlay its colonial essence. These resulted in a Japanese ethos, which could be often found in the older generation of Taiwanese. The KMT, with the implementation of martial law for 38 years, created a comparatively homogeneous habitus, wherein the state will was prioritised above individuality. Both these two phases in Taiwan’s history share certain similarities. If we roughly divide Taiwanese history from 1895-2000 as follows—the Japanese rule, the KMT rule, and the post-martial-law period (of course at the risk of homogenising the three periods), we can presume three different (collective) habitus brought about by the massive social

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change inherent in the transition from one period to the other. Joining the idea of *hysteresis* with habitus—that each subsequent habitus carries some legacies left behind by the preceding period—then we can begin to identify a palimpsestic habitus in each period. It might be because of the Kōminka movement that the older Taiwanese generation retained their Japanese habitus during KMT rule; it may be a Chinese-based education during KMT rule that keeps a young Taiwanese loyal towards the imagined China, even after the lifting of martial law. The concept of hysteresis has the power to join different habitus together—as in the case of Wu Zhuoliu for example, who experienced the Qing dynasty, Japanese rule, and the KMT rule, and whose work consequently bears the stamp, if sometimes fragmented, of that palimpsestic habitus.

Before the advent of the KMT regime, the Taiwanese (under Japanese rule) had been accustomed to the modern habitus. In the legal sphere, they were used to expressing their opinions through public channels, even at times when Japanese militarism and ultra-nationalism were at their peak. However, the KMT regime introduced to the Taiwanese another new habitus—a habitus in general possessing less modernity and a less modern infrastructure—which contained less legal-practice in everyday life. The cause of the 2-28 Incident was thus partly due to the conflicting of these two habitus. Under the KMT’s strict rule of martial law, the Taiwanese had to learn to adapt to the new habitus. From being forbidden to talk about 2-28 in public, to being forbidden to utter discourse other than the legitimate and provincialised version of 2-28, the mass actually experienced two layers of silencing. After the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the period of DPP rule
(2000-2008), the genre of 2-28 writing could be seen to prosper. However, with KMT’s return to power from 2008, as mentioned above, old narratives of 2-28 come back re-contextualised. As the historiography of the 2-28 Incident involved politics, it can be expected that literary writing of this story for both KMT and DPP and the wider national identification for Taiwanese and Chinese nationalism, will be appropriated by the ever-changing political field (including the politicised Unification interpretation from China).
Chapter Four: The Palimpsest of Post-war Literature in Bai Xianyong’s Writing

[T]he work *Taipei People* has nevertheless been well accepted within Taiwan’s dominant culture and comfortably consumed as *history under erasure*. Moreover, since the work’s cultural assumption are so highly traditional and characteristically “Chinese,” the *Tales* [*Taipei People*] has [have] not only enjoyed unusual popularity among Taiwan readers, modernists and traditionalists alike, but has [have] also been warmly appreciated by readers on the mainland, unaffected by the ideological difference.¹

Yvonne Sung-sheng Chang

This quotation reflects some of the political tension within the literary field during the 1950s and 1960s in Taiwan. The previous Japanese layer had been largely erased by the succeeding KMT rule, and was replaced with the dominant rightist Chinese culture forcefully imposed by the KMT’s state institutions. Bai Xianyong’s *Taipei People*, a canonised Taiwanese Modernist work, whose production by Bai as a Chinese diasporic writer and whose successful reproduction in the martial law “Chinese” literary market in Taiwan at that time, and still now—the work is well received in post-martial-law Taiwan, China, and the English world—will be taken as a case study in this chapter in order to demonstrate the power structure involved in

the development of Modernism in Taiwan.

In Chapters Two and Three, both realist writing in the period of Japanese rule (such as in Wu Jhou-liou’s work) and realist, documentary concerns (most of which were leftist-oriented) in literary writing (such as in 2-28 writing) have been examined. These Chapters demonstrated Taiwanese literature’s palimpsestic nature with regards to the the multi-faceted realist literary tradition (as a branch of the European Modernist literary movement),\(^2\) which could be traced from the combined geographical and historical perspectives of the Japanese rule’s introduction of European Realism and Modernism, through the Taiwanese nativist elite’s call for de-colonisation, to the literary trend of *Xinxieshi zhuyi* [New Realism] brought in by newly-immigrant (post-1945) Chinese writers to Taiwan.\(^3\) The realist approach, as adopted by many of the older Taiwanese writers, could thus be considered one of the decolonising characteristics inherited during the period of Japanese rule.

During the period 1945-1947, the New Realist literary approach—mainly inherited from the realist literary tradition formed after the May-Fourth Literary Movement (in 1919) in China—was implanted and mostly employed by a number of Chinese writers in Taiwan, such as Luo Tuoying. However, these realist literary approaches, as one of the Modernist literary traditions imported under Japanese Rule, did not pass smoothly on to the post-war literary field because of the KMT

\(^2\) See the following discussion of European Modernism.

\(^3\) See the following discussion of the New Realist trend imported from China. The New Realist trend was based on dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Compared with the Realist trend developed during the period of Japanese Rule, the New Realist trend was far more leftist because of its elements of Marxism. See Ye, *[The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature]*, pp. 76-77.
government’s strict non-leftist and anti-communist literary policy, implemented after its formal retreat to Taiwan in 1949. This intervention can be considered to be the first interruption of the realist literary tradition in the post-war Taiwanese literary field. In addition, after the 2-28 Incident in 1947, the official flight of the Nationalist Government to Taipei in 1949, and the April-Sixth Incident in 1949, the New Realist Literature was sentenced to a short-lived literary life, and it was replaced by the so-called Combat Literary [Zhandou wenyi] movement in the public literary field. This can be seen as the second interruption of the realist approach in Taiwanese post-war literary history.

This chapter aims to demonstrate from a retrospective vantage point, the struggle, or conversation, between these three literary movements: Combat Literature, Modernist Literature, and Nativist Literature. It will also locate each in relation to their corresponding social contexts from the cold war to the post-cold-war period in Taiwan. Firstly I will review the early post-war literary field (1945-1947); then Combat Literature after 1947 and the Cultural Cleansing Movement (from 1954) will be discussed; next, both the “imported” (rather than inherited) American Modernism and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (much of which contains large proportions of re-invented Chineseness through the KMT’s state power), which were both introduced in the 1960s, will be reviewed. Next, the Nativist Literature Movement and its social context in the 1970s will be discussed.

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4 New Realist Literature, the April-Sixth Incident, and Combat Literature will be explained in subsequent sections of this chapter.

5 This chapter roughly encompasses the period 1945-1991, rather than the cold war period 1946-1991.
Finally, the Taiwanese literary field’s palimpsestic characteristics during this period will be exemplified through the textual analysis of Bai Xianyong’s writing—focussing in particular on his collection of short stories, *Taiheiren [Taipei Characters/Taipei People]*, the original Chinese version of which was first published in 1971. This chapter will thus re-contextualise Bai’s writing with reference to this earlier Chinese-diasporic fiction, which was highly praised within the “Liberal China” ethos, when literary production and legitimation were deeply related to the KMT’s control of state cultural institutions. I would also like to explore how the later Taiwanese/Nativist perspectives, such as the Taiwanese nationalist accusation of Bai’s Chinese Mainlander thinking (the accusation that Bai’s work embodies Chinese imperial and colonial perceptions) contributed to the critique of Bai, when situating his writing in the present Taiwan-literary-field (rather than in the Chinese literary field in martial law Taiwan). In addition to the change of external social context, I will also discuss Bai’s own development from *Taiheiren [Taipei People]* (1971) to *Niezi [Crystal Boys]* (1983), as a counter-example to the earlier criticism and a demonstration that the elite Chinese settler may finally have

6 The term “liberal-China” refers to the KMT-dominated Taiwan and surrounding islands. In the cold war setting (more specifically, before 1978, when the KMT still represented the legitimate China in the UN), KMT-dominated Taiwan was seen as the “liberal” zone allied with the anti-communist U.S., while PRC-China was seen as the “illegitimate” and un-free China, from the perspective of the KMT.  
7 The nostalgia for China in Bai’s writing has brought it once again into vogue, especially in China nowadays, when the opposing positions in both the political and cultural field between the KMT and the CCP no longer exist after the lifting of martial law in 1987 and KMT’s re-ruling in 2008. This is equally the case for other Chinese diasporic writers, such as Yu Kwang-chung, whose Chinese-nostalgia writing is highly appreciated in China now. However, his early anti-Communist writing has largely been dismissed so as to fit into the *rules of art* in the Chinese market.
settled in the colonised native land.

I hope, to demonstrate how the canon of contemporary Taiwanese literature has become an autonomous unit in post-war Taiwan—moving from a Japanese literary field to a Chinese literary field—though its genealogy always has conflicts from outside and from within, as well as from its past to the present. I will explore the movement of the literary field in Taiwan from being comparatively leftist and liberal after the retreat of the Japanese (1945-47) (with less governmental control compared with the period after 1949), through the highly politicised White Terror era (1949-1987), to the period when the Bentuhua (Nativist) movement rose (1970s-). Combat Literature (since the 1950s), Modernist Literature (since the 1950s), and Nativist Literature (since the 1970s) have all played their roles in the development of this communal cultural field. The subsequent discussion mainly involves the dialectical relationship of these tripartite forces, in which conflicts between them (and within themselves) can be more easily observed from the present. However, it is the transitional element among them that draws my attention in the main. Post-war Taiwanese literature develops from serving Chinese nationalistic expression during the 1940s and the 1950s, through embodying the symbols of American modernity (through the mediation of the KMT) under the global influence of American power in the 1960s-1970s, to the praise of locality in the 1970s. These changes—and the twists and turns of the literary trajectory—also reflect developments in the external social context. The rise of each new literary movement also indicates the interlocked outcome of some degree of acceptance/continuity and resistance/conflict in the field, rather than a succession of distinct discourses with clear-cut boundaries. These
palimpsestic elements in the cacophonous political and cultural field contribute to the special character of contemporary Taiwanese literature, and each post-war (and pre-war) literary movement still has its own continuing and transformed voice up to the present time.

However, in addition to the tripartite forces described above, which represent a rather mainstream and canonised version of Taiwanese literary history, another layer could also be considered: what might be called the “late-Nativist” camp. In the 1980s, with the political liberation in the post-martial-law context, and with what Ye Shitao calls, the “coming of consumer society and information age”\(^8\), there emerged some native Taiwanese writers whose position-taking was comparatively less central as typical *Xiangtu* writers in the 1970s and 1980s, and whose various writing styles were difficult to be clearly categorised as the Nativist camp. This “late-Nativist” camp consisted largely of two subgroups: the group who focused on the themes of everyday life, and the group who used Hoklo to create their works. According to Ye Shitao, writers such as Huang Fan, Lin Shuangbu, Lu Zezhi, Wang Shixun, Xiao Sa, Yuan Qiongqiong, Kang Yuan, Liao Huiying, Liu Kexiang, Xu Taiying, Zhou Meizhen, Su Weizhen, Han Han, Wang Dingguo, Lu Yu, Xin Dai, Qiu Ronxiang, Zhu Tianwen, Ku Ling, Li Reiteng, Lin Wenyi, Lin Peifen, Dong Nian, Chen Yenqiu, Wang Yupei, A Sheng and the like appeared during this period. They abandoned the heavy burden of “a writer’s mission and historical consciousness”, as seen in the Nativist writers who saw nativist elements as ways to counter Chinese nationalist ideology. Instead, refusing the interference of such politics, these

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\(^8\) Ye, *The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature*, p. 257.
late-Nativist writers turned their concerns to everyday life and social topics such as pollution, environmental protection, television, information, sexual life, etc. In short, according to Ye, they criticised consumer society. At the same time, however, they based their writing in it. In addition, also in the 1980s, between 1986 and 1987, according to Lin Yangmin, the movements of Taiyu wenxue [Literature written in Taiwanese (Hoklo)] started to develop. Various debates followed in 1989 and 1991. After these events, more writers started to accept Taiyu literature and engaged themselves in creating works written in Hoklo. According to Lin Yangmin, these writers include Hu Minxiang, Song Zeliai, Lin Yangmin, Chen Lei. In the 1990s, Chen Minren, Yang Jiafen, Huang Yuanxin, and Zhang Congmin, Zhang Chunhuang, Hung Jintian, Jiang Wi-vun, Wu Guoan, Wang Zhenwen, and Lai Rensheng also joined this camp. Nevertheless, various crossings between the presumed two groups exist. For example, A Sheng uses classical Chinese, Hoklo, and Mandarin together in the form of Xiangtu prose to represent a hybrid reality embodied in both metropolitan and country everyday life. However, because the prolific works of the various writers in this presumed fourth layer are less concerned with the politics of national identity, even though their works were still related to the post-1990s literary context, their relationship with the other three layers will not be discussed in this thesis.

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9 Ibid., p. 251.


11 Lin, [History and Appreciation of Fiction in Taiwanese], pp. 114-141.

12 Prose, rather than fiction, is the form he uses mostly. However, his prose contains large narrative elements of fiction.
I. The Modernist Palimpsest

European Modernism

First of all, it should be noted that so-called European Modernism (which emerged in late-nineteenth-century Europe) is a retrospective construction, bringing together a range of artistic movements which were mainly transatlantic, formed by dialogue between the European and the American continents. These Modernist movements include Futurism, Imagism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Symbolism, and Vorticism. As Tim Armstrong has shown, the artists in these “Modernist” movements, as per their manifestos, did not necessarily define themselves as the “Modernists” we often understand them to be.\(^\text{13}\) They have names like Futurists, Imagists, Dadaists, and Surrealists, but these names, and the artists’ conceptualisations of the terms, were often dependent on their own interpretation of modernity, rather than by any over-arching of “modernist” project as defined by later institutions and critics. According to Armstrong, “‘modernism’ was not a term much used.” He continues: “the object of literary study called ‘modernism’ is a retrospective construction, largely American, post-war and academic: linked to a ‘winner’s history’ associated with the New Criticism and a narrow canon.”\(^\text{14}\)

Secondly, contrary to this post-war academic construction of “Modernism,” the Modernism which originated in late-nineteenth-century Europe and America was in fact deeply politicised. Armstrong proposes a useful mapping of literary modernism


\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 24.
from 1900 to 1940. In his view, the period from 1900 to 1918 encompasses
“politically-engaged, radical avant-garde modernism,” while the 1920s is
represented by “the more conservative ‘high’ modernism (Bürger, 1984).” After that,
comes another form of political engagement through the explicit “politicism of
literature in the 1930s.”

As this suggests, the early Modernist movements in Europe and America before
the 1930s were, in fact, deeply connected with their social and political context. It
was in the 1960s, in the Cold War period, during which American academia largely
possessed the perceived right of interpretation of cultural capital, that the term
“Modernism” was promoted and “Modernist” literature was gradually transformed
from something deeply linked with its social and political context to something
aesthetic, de-socialised and de-politicised. This shows very clearly how the rules of
art are changed when the cultural field is penetrated by the political power. Shih
Shu-mei also shows how politically engaged modernism was—but from a
post-colonial perspective. First, she stresses the long ignored connection between
imperialism and Western modernism and argues that they should be reconnected.
She agrees with Edward Said’s argument that “Western realist literature helped
legitimate and consolidate the empire through a discourse that posited the Orient as
the colonisable, self-consolidating Other. Then she argues, “Western modernism has
been canonised” through the endeavors of New Critics as “a conglomerate of
autonomous textual entities, disconnected from politics and history.” She continues,

15 Armstrong also argues that the American route of early modernism should be noted. This involves
“attending to the periphery rather the centre of Empire,” and “focusing on a turbulent mass culture
and politics, informed by fierce debates on nationhood and slavery.” Ibid., pp. 23-24.
“such a perceived disconnection has been challenged by contemporary Marxian literary critics”, such as Fredric Jameson. Shih points out that imperialism is not only associated with realism, but also with modernism. Indeed, “Western modernism is ineluctably associated not only with imperialism, but also with ‘cultural expansionism’”. Nevertheless, in addition to Shih’s reassociation of imperialism and modernism, the presence of realism underneath imperialism, or in other words, realism underneath colonialism, and its association with modernism should be also addressed. The political contexts between these two literary trends, as argued by Said and Shih, should be extracted. Even though stylistic differences between realism and modernism should not be ignored, their shared context, the political/social reality from which different styles could thus develop, should be stressed. That is, realist and modernist works are to be understood in their own contexts of production. In addition, different from the views of Shih and the points taken from Said, even though Western realist literature in a way helped legitimate and consolidate the empire, it does not mean nativist realist literature and Western nativist literature were correspondingly coerced to imperialism. Instead, decolonising discourses were born through the help of the nativist trend. This writing-back can be also found in the works of modernism and nativist modernism.

For example, the American Modernists’ interpretation of James Joyce’s work,

17 Ibid., p. 7.
18 The link between modernism and realism through their shared concern with political reality will be further explored in the following sections.
through the fashion of New Criticism, ignored his negotiation of Irish nationalism and religious struggle. It was only in the 1990s that some British and Irish scholars started to assert the link between Joyce’s work and its social and political context. The work of Andrew Gibson, Len Platt, Emer Nolan, and Vincent Cheng are notable here. Vincent Cheng’s *Joyce, Race, and Empire* (1995), and Emer Nolan’s *Joyce and Nationalism* (1995) marked a paradigm shift in Joyce studies, which foregrounded a nationalist and post-colonial Joyce. This shift was maintained in the next decade with further publications by Cheng and Gibson. Cheng re-affirmed his politicised reading of “postcolonial Joyce” instead of “canonical Joyce” in his *Inauthentic: The Anxiety over Culture and Identity* (2004), in which Joyce is portrayed as an “anticanonical, anti-imperialist, and even nationalist writer.”

In *Joyce’s Revenge*, Andrew Gibson suggests a historiographical explanation of the nationalistic implications of Joyce’s *Ulysses*. He emphasises “how deep nationalism, Fenianism, sympathies with the Land League, anti-Healyism, pro-Boerism, and anticlericalism all ran in the Joyce family.” He continues: “But the political divisions emerge in the context of what is none the less a profound and shared antagonism towards the coloniser.”

In *Joyce’s Ulysses as National Epic*, Andras Ungar suggests that Joyce’s Irish nationalism is embedded in his work as a challenge to English nationalism: “Ulysses contextualises the prospects of Irish

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nationhood within its compositional frame.”  

By the same token, is there the possibility of challenging the canonical reading of Bai Xianyong (as a result of his involvement with the Modernist circle in White Terror Taiwan in the 1960s) as a Chinese/non-nativist and apolitical Modernist? This is what this chapter aims to explore.

**Modernism in 1960s Taiwan and National Allegory**

In 1960s Taiwan, US Modernism was being imported along with a New Criticism approach to literature. This was a highly-politicised move, although these Taiwanese Modernists (who officially declared themselves “Chinese”)

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22 In Roland Barthes’s “The Death of the Author”, Barthes argues that, “Succeeding the Author, the scribe no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt; life never does more than imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs, an imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred.” Barthes argues that the text that the “scribe” (the Author) creates should be treated independently from readership. Through each re-reading, the text, as a textile, holds the key position in producing layered meanings rather than the Author who could only provide a limited perspective. See Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author”, in *Image, Music, Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1977), pp. 142-148. I agree with the suggestion that a text can be read with different interpretations as a palimpsest, but in the context of martial law, the context of the production of the Author, the structure of literary writing that helped shape the ideology of the authors, and the taste of the readership should also be treated with same importance as the liberated interpretation of texts.

23 This was the politically correct term in that KMT-dominant historical context. However, Bai Xianyong, as well as other diasporic writers from China, are considered as Taiwanese writers from the perspective of Taiwanese literary history, while in the martial law context, for the convenience of
claimed that this movement was de-politicised and aesthetics-oriented. It was in fact precisely because of its de-politicising removal of the social and political context and its embedded anti-Communist position that the KMT government in Taiwan consented to this cultural import from the United States and its consequent development. It was also through these Taiwanese Modernists’ acceptance and self-censorship (the result of the KMT’s control of the state power) that their “Modernist” approach did not touch on social and political issues. First-world “Modernist” literature was thus “transplanted” by the Xiandaipai [Modernist] poets24 to Taiwan—largely through the filtration of both the American academia and the KMT’s state institutions25—as later Nativists argued. Mostly, these imported works were read by the Taiwanese Modernists as non-politicised texts—unrelated to the European or American social context between the end of the Nineteenth Century and the 1930s. (This kind of reading, in its 1960s academic production, was also rendered as unrelated to the context of the American cold war setting). Instead, they

description and the representation of that history, they are addressed as “Chinese” writers and “diasporic writers from China”. As discussed in Introduction (p.35), these confusing namings mark the palimpsestic nature of renarrating literature in Taiwan.

24 The term “transplantation” was used by the Modernists themselves. It was one of the six doctrines proposed by the Xiandaipai [Modernist] poets in 1956, such as Ji Xian, Fang Si, Lin Hengtai, and Zheng Chouyu. See Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], pp. 167-168. The Nativists in 1970s Taiwan often accused the 1960 Modernists of totally importing American Modernism without considering Taiwan’s historical context. The term “transplantation” was adopted by the nativists, in order to demonstrate that these Modernists lacked historical consciousness.

25 The sixth doctrine of Xiandaipai claims, “Love our country and oppose communism; Seek freedom and democracy.” Ibid. Even though this politicised doctrine clearly contradicts the fifth doctrine, “To seek the purity of poetry”, showing a patrotic attitude was an inevitable and necessary gesture in public announcements in 1950s Taiwan.
were read with the focus on the individual psychological domain, and often the
text’s internal aesthetic content was emphasised (such as style, tone, and symbols),
rather than the text’s or its author’s socio-contextual reference. This de-politicised
Modernist literary approach in Taiwan in both literary creation and literary criticism
was related to the White Terror political situation under the KMT rule and the
post-cold war political structure whereby Taiwan was allied with the USA.

The New Criticism approach popularised in 1960s Taiwan paid attention to the
literary texts as end products, rather than how and why they were produced. In this
“apolitical” literary approach, which largely excluded the work’s social context,
literature paradoxically tended to be at the service of politics (which made politics
exclusive to politicians) or at least to a high degree coerced by the doctrines of the
state institutions. As noted in the Introduction, Jameson’s politicised national
allegory reading criticises the seemingly de-politicised “Modernist” literary
approach and the “Modernist” texts correlated with it in the first world. Regarding
the issues of transplanting Modernism from the first world to the third world,
Jameson mainly takes his third-world literary examples from China. (Such as Lu
Xun’s *Diary of a Madman* and *The True Story of Ah Q*.) Nevertheless, this way of
reading could also be used in relation to the transplanted 1960s Taiwan-ised
Modernism (including the imported New Criticism approach and the “Modernist”
literary works which accompanied it). Jameson argues: “Third world texts, even
those which are seemingly private and invested with a properly libidinal
dynamic—necessarily project a political dimension in the form of national
allegory.” He stresses that “the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture and society.”

Borrowing Jameson’s approach, I will attempt to recover the political nature of the cultural-production structure beneath the 1960s Taiwanese Modernist literary fashion (a fashion of both literature creation and academic criticism), in which the dominant diasporic writers from China (either the first generation in the 1950s or the subsequent generation in the 1960s such as Bai Xianyong) and their Chinese-Nostalgia literature together produced and reproduced legitimate goods in the Taiwanese literary field.

From a post-colonial perspective, the alien literature produced mainly by the diasporic writers from China (with the backup of the KMT’s state power) had been the dominant and legitimate literature from 1949 to the 1960s. This is a kind of reverse model of Orientalism, which I call Occidentalism, constructed by the state

27 Ibid. In Chapter Two I discussed the relationship between the colonial palimpsest and national narrative. It was noted there that Fredric Jameson suggests a politicised way of reading third-world literary texts—what he calls a “national allegory.” I find this approach effectively reconstructs the relationship between literary works and politics, especially regarding Taiwan’s deeply politicised history. This approach is expressed in Jameson’s reading of the Chinese writer Lu Xun’s *Diary of a Madman* (1918) and *The True Story of Ah Q* (1921). For example, in *Diary of a Madman*, Jameson reads the protagonist madman as the new China who suffers from the bondage of old Confucius traditions. Jameson’s politicised reading reflects one important approach to the various Modernist traditions.

28 Chinese diasporic writers and their writing occupied the legitimate position in the post-war Taiwanese literary field, largely endorsed by the KMT state control. Their foreign nature—stressing nostalgic feelings towards an imagined China combined with an “unrealistic” approach to writing propaganda-oriented topics in the 1950s, emphasising the individual’s psychological world without
power of the post-1949 KMT, who belatedly produced and reproduced a symbolic and legitimate political and cultural system of the China they left.\(^{29}\) The set perceptions of the re-imagined and re-invented China (seen to have had a glorious cultural past but a reduced political present—as a result of being occupied by the “evil” communists) was projected through the KMT’s state power.\(^ {30}\) The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement could be seen as an “invention” by the KMT state institutions of the so-called Chinese culture, through which not only the question of what constituted Chinese culture was redefined (and then imposed), but “being genuinely Chinese” also became a nationalist moral necessity. That is not to say that all the Chinese diasporic writers consciously conspired together with the KMT’s political agenda. Nevertheless, Chinese diasporic writers in both Combat literature and Modernist literature, did generationally inherit an embedded Chinese nationalism in these two seemingly opposed literary modes. “Being Chinese” (rather than becoming Chinese, since “becoming Chinese” was the political agenda for native Taiwanese people) in literary expressions, however traumatic it appeared to

\(^{29}\) This belated formation of reinvented Chinese culture embodied in dislocated Chinese writers to Taiwan can be explained by *Hysteresis*. See the note above.

\(^{30}\) By contrast, different from my negative concept of Occidentalism, the concept of “Occidentalism” developed by Chen Xiaomei stresses the positive perspective of the appropriation of Western discourse by Chinese intellectuals in post-Mao period. She argues a positive appropriation of Western discourse by Chinese intellectuals in 1980s China aimed to have a politically and ideologically liberating effect on Chinese culture, as Western discourse was often portrayed negatively in official narrative (i.e. Chinese/Maoist official Occidentalism). See Chen Xiaomei, *Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-discourse in Post-Mao China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
be (especially considering the fact that the majority of the Chinese diaspora to Taiwan were in the dire situation of being separated from their relatives in China, feeling dislocated, and living poorly in Taiwan), easily invoked a shared national affection among these immigrants and their descendants. Thus, while these diasporic Chinese feelings were legitimised and disseminated in political and cultural institutions through the KMT’s state power, the “spontaneous overflow”\(^{31}\) of Chinese feelings, or, the internalised collective Chinese habitus, was produced and reproduced as mass products. Younger Taiwan-born Chinese diasporic writers naturally inherited these naturalised Chinese feelings, as did native young Taiwanese writers who received the KMT’s Chinese nationalist education.

Intriguingly, the mass reproduction of politically-engaged “Chinese feelings” in the 1950s Taiwanese literary field (these “Chinese feelings” still occupy a legitimate place in Taiwan to this day, as does China-centric historiography) did not conflict with the popularisation of American Modernism in the 1960s Taiwanese literary field which claimed to be politics-free. The US-imported Modernist approach, with its divorce from political and social perspectives, triggered almost no politically sensitive issues in politics. Its impact was a cultural rather than a political response to the literary field of White-Terror Taiwan. For example, the narrative in Bai’s Modernist *Taibeiren (Taipei People)* is filled with lengthy descriptions of Chinese diasporic characters but contains very little description of native Taiwanese

\(^{31}\) This is a quotation from William Wordsworth: “Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its origin from emotion collected in tranquility” in *Lyrical Ballads*. 

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characters, whose images are always negative. From the perspective of historiography and nationalism, this can be seen as the reproduction of a Chinese historical narrative which carries a strong colonial ideology. Bai himself may not be consciously aware of the strong China-centric ideology (or, in other words, the lack of native perspectives) embodied in his writing, especially in his early work *Taibeiren*. This could be a typical example of what Fredric Jameson refers to as being “political unconscious.” However, ethnically speaking, compared with the post-war generation of native Taiwanese writers who needed to learn Chinese and who *learned* to become Chinese, Bai’s Chinese position-taking and his Chinese cultural capital (as a member of the second-generation of the Chinese diaspora) makes it easier for him to be on top of both writing-about-Chinese and writing-in-Chinese, though at the expense of excluding or denigrating the Taiwanese elements of Taipei.

From the perspective of national allegory, in all three literary movements—Combat literature, Modernist literature, and Nativist literature—national representations in literary narratives are often the ultimate national allegories whether these are to be promoted (as in 1950s Combat Literature), to be escaped from (as in the Modernist Literature of the 1960s), or even to be redefined (as in the Nativist Literature of the 1970s). In a broader sense, they are all similar to the discussions of the “reality” which is contested in the literary practices of the various Modernist traditions (such as Futurism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Symbolism, Vorticism, Expressionism, and Imagism.) The definition, interpretation,

32 See a later section of this chapter for a detailed discussion of *Taibeiren*.
and reproduction of “what reality is” in the Taiwanese literary field, with the involvement of the state power, happened not only in the 1950s, but also in the 1960s, 1970s, and even into the 1980s.

Through the development of literary discourses, and through changes in the domestic and international political situation of Taiwan, the definition of reality in the literary field has shifted from the KMT’s implemented “Chinese” political reality in the 1950s, through the individual’s psychological reality in the 1960s, to a social and Nativist reality in the 1970s. In the 1980s, when martial law was lifted, the political nature of reality became the main concern for literature again, but this time it mainly involved the conversation between the Taiwanese political reality and Chinese political realities. Fredric Jameson notes with approval Georg Lukacs’s critical comparison of modernism and realism: “Lukacs argues modernist art turns narrative into description, and thus stories begin to disappear, while personal mad experiences start to show up.”33 These are, for Lukacs, the characteristics of a material society, or those of a highly capitalised society for Jameson, where stories are no longer disseminated by common people but by specific cultural elites. Following on from Lukacs, Jameson concludes that “modernism only reflects phenomena, while realism aims to reflect various relations; the former is descriptive while the latter narrative.”34 Post-war Taiwan might not exactly be described as a material society. However, Taiwan’s Economic Miracle (1970s to 1980s), and the

34 Ibid.
motives behind the rise of Nativist literature in the 1970s did fit into the materialised picture described by Jameson. The Combat literature period in the 1950s was more “prescriptive,” due to the strong political propaganda behind it: namely fighting against Soviet and Chinese Communism. By contrast, the Modernist literary period was “descriptive”: collective and realist narratives in the public domain were not available; instead, individual psychological “madness” was described through the cultural elite’s condensed and exclusive literary language. The emphasis of the Taiwanese Modernists’ de-politicising of individual psychological description ignored the collective reality and ruled out any literary attempt to look into the larger social reality (such as the economic exploitation of capitalism, political suppression, and the lack of native voices in the cultural field), which had originated in Europe and been pursued by the earlier Taiwanese Modernists in the 1920s and 1930s, whose source of inspiration could also come from Japan. Only in the 1970s, with the looser legitimacy of Chinese nationalism held by the KMT

35 One of the reasons for the rise of the Nativist literature in the 1970s is the demand to see the reality of the poverty of agricultural villages. Yang Zhao argues that the Economic Miracle in the 1970s was a result of the government’s low-price agricultural products policy, which drove human resources from villages to the city. Farmers’ cheap products and workers’ low salaries were at the expense of economic development. See Yang, [Essays on Taiwanese Literary History since 1945], pp. 208-214.

36 Most of the works of Xie Chunmu, Zhang Wojun, Wu Zhi, Yang Yunping, Lei He, Yang Kui, Yang Shouyu, Cai Choudong, Zhu Dianren, Lu Heruo, and Yang Hua explored the social context with naturalist, realist and socialist styles. As previously argued, these authors can be seen as a branch of early Modernism. On the other hand, Yang Chichang, Liu Naou, Wu Yongfu, and Weng Nao (and probably also includes Zhu Dianren) explored inner feelings with approaches of surrealism, stream of consciousness, psychoanalysis, and new-sensation (from Japan). They can be seen as typical Modernists from the perspective of American modernism.
regime in Taiwan, did the “realist narrative” come again. This was advocated by the Nativist writers in the 1970s, who expected literature to show the larger reality—the collective mind, a re-defined national mapping, and the social context.

As discussed in Chapter One, it is also agreed among current Taiwanese scholars that Nativist Taiwanese literary discourses and Modernist discourses started under Japanese rule. However, it is also questioned whether the current Taiwanese Nativist discourses are a remnant of those earlier discourses passed down from the period under Japanese Rule (and continued even after 2-28 and the White Terror) or whether they are simply by-products of the Nativist political awareness of the 1970s, as argued by Hsiau A-Chin. These questions will be discussed in subsequent sections.

**Modernism in 1930s and 1960s Taiwan**

Before the lifting of martial law, the social context of Modernist Taiwanese literature in pre-war Taiwan under Japanese Rule had long been neglected. Instead, post-war scholars often traced a Modernist context from China, rather than from Taiwan and Japan. This is because the prevalence of Chinese cultural nationalism

37 Hsiau argues that the current Taiwan Nationalist discourses of the 1970s and 1980s are in fact the by-products of the political reaction from the 1970s, rather than a continuation from the Nativist literary discourses period of Japanese Rule. See Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, pp. 77-132, and his *Huigui xianshi: taiwan 1970 niandai de zhanho shidai yu wenhua zhengzhi bianqian* [Return to Reality: Political and Cultural Change in 1970s Taiwan and the Postwar Generation] (Taipei: Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, 2010), pp. 201-259.

38 See the following sections for the discussion of Chang Sung-sheng’s epistemology of the roots of Taiwanese modernism.
in post-war Taiwan controlled the literary field in terms of literary production, criticism, and academia. The absence of the Japanese layer in the period of KMT rule also owes something to the fact that Japanese texts were hardly studied in post-war dominant “Chinese Literature” in Taiwan, while Japan was regarded by the KMT regime as alien to the literary history of Taiwan. By contrast, in the period of Japanese rule, according to Ye Shtao, many Taiwanese writers were familiar with early European Modernists such as Gide, James Joyce, and Lawrence, whose works were translated and appreciated through translations into the Japanese language.39

Intriguingly, with regards to the palimpsestic perspective, these Modernist writers were also appreciated highly in the eyes of Bai Xianyong and The Modern Society of the 1960s.40 However, because Japanese was no longer a legitimate language in the public domain of post-war Taiwan, the Modernist heritage as constructed during Japanese rule was considered “lost” to the post-war literary field dominated by diasporic Chinese cultural nationalism. Many older native Taiwanese writers (previously Japanese subjects) had to learn Chinese in order to continue writing (costing them around 10 years before they were able to “write” again, in Chinese), while those who kept writing in Japanese simply disappeared from the post-war literary field. This language-changing, which was a serious structural issue in literary production as well as in the accompanying literary criticism and in

39 [Seeking for the Literary Sovereignty of the Taiwanese—A Seminar on the Subjectivity of Taiwanese Literature], p. 131. However, the realist approach under Japanese rule, as one of the general Modernist approaches then introduced, might also have gone through a “later-defined” and “institution-defined” process by the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan similar to the process that European Modernism went through (being later-defined by the 1950-60s American academia).

40 Ibid.
academia, gave rise to the “The Cursed Generation of Language-loss.” In terms of literary fashion, the rights to Modernist interpretations were in the possession of the 1960s Modernist writers and the intellectuals in academia, who received the American definition of Modernism, and who used Chinese as the official language.

However, whether the Modernist trend was completely lost because of the structural changes of cultural and political systems is debatable. The realist style, a deeply politically engaged practice of early European Modernism, was maintained in the post-war works of Yang Kui, Wu Zhuoliu, and Zhang Shenqie. In the field of modern poetry, the Modernist trend, with both realist and later Modernist-aesthetics such as surrealist technique, were reserved from the pre-war to post-war period. According to Chen Fang-ming, the poetry society Yinling hui [Silver Bell Society] was founded by Zhang Yenxun, Xiao Xiangwen, Jin Lian, Zhan Bin, and Lin Hengtai in 1943, who used Japanese to create works with “both realist criticism and modernist distance”. They continued to publish Japanese poetry magazines until 1949. In addition, pre-war poets such as Jin Lian continued to create surrealist works in Japanese in the post-war period (though these Japanese works were not translated and published until 2002), and changed to use Chinese to create poetry in the 1960s. Li shishe [Li Poetry Society] (1964), founded by Jin Lian, Zhan Bin, Chen Qianwu, and Lin Hengtai, became the gathering place for provincial poets. According to Ye, they continued to use “New Objectivity and Realist”

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41 See Peng, [Forty Years of Taiwanese New Literary Movement], p, 62.
techniques to create works. But the “realist” stance of Li, especially compared with the other more “modernist” Xiandaishi [Modern Poetry Soeciety] and Chuangshiji [Genesis Poetry Society] modernist groups, did not mean these Li poets get rid of modernist styles. In fact, according to Chen Fang-ming’s understanding of Lin Hengtai’s defense for Ji Xian in the 1957-1958 Modern Poetry debate, “Lin Hengtai stressed that Modernism does not completely reject feelings [“national feelings” in this context], nor does it separate itself from society.” Chen considers Lin’s point was the first announcement to connect modernism to Taiwanese society. In short, the modernist practice of Li and other pre-war provincial poets, in which both Modernist approaches and native realist concerns are compatible, can be seen as a continuation of European modernism in the pre-war period.

II. The Early Postwar Literary Field 1945-1949

The Enslaved Taiwanese Discourse

In the early post-war literary field, when evaluating the historical position of

43 See Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], pp. 169, 196.
44 In this debate, Tang Zihao stressed the importance of classical tradition and (Chinese) national stance. He made the accusation that the Modernist Poetry advocated by Ji Xian was not based on the “Chinese” context. Chen, (A History of Modern Taiwanese Literature), p. 336-8.
45 Ibid.
46 Ding Weiren also points out that Li poets did not oppose the use of surrealism in poetic creation, what they opposed was the misuse of the surrealist spirit by Chuangshiji poets (who were accused of emphasising the formal aspects of surrealism). Instead, “reality” was stressed by Li poets in the 1970s. See Ding Weiren, Zhanhou taiwan xiandaishi de yanbian yu tezhi: 1949-2010 [The Development and Characteristics of Post-war Modern Poetry: 1949-2010] (Taipei: Xinrui wenchuang, 2012), pp. 62-63.
Taiwanese Literature inherited from the period of Japanese rule, “provincial” (native Taiwanese) and “non-provincial” (Chinese-immigrant) writers had quite opposing opinions. Many Chinese-immigrant writers stressed that Taiwanese writers bore strong characteristics of locality, in a negative sense, i.e. being on the periphery of Chinese Literature. At the same time, these Chinese writers were eager to spread their Leftist literary belief (under the influence of Chinese Communism advocated by the CCP)—which embraced realism and showed affection for the land and the exploited farmers. However, according to Peng Ruijin, these Chinese non-provincial writers, most of whom published their ideas in the Bridge Supplement (1 August, 1947 to 12 April, 1949), “knew nothing of or only had a smattering of knowledge of the history of the Taiwanese New Literary Movement,” but, “out of benign yet strong subjective willing,” they attempted to “enlighten Taiwan with their New Literature, which was inherited from the May-Fourth Movement and wrapped up with Democracy and Science.”

Gradually, the Taiwanese literary field was absorbed by an external field—the Chinese literary field which had migrated to Taiwan in 1945.

This post-war period saw the development of “The Enslaved Taiwanese Argument” about the national status of Taiwanese literature before 1945.

“Taiwanese Literature under Japanese Rule” was described by Chinese writers (and many Chinese officials of the newly formed Administrative Office) as “being enslaved by the alien nation (the Japanese).” Taiwanese Literature was either

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47 Peng Ruijin, *Taiwan xinwensue yundong sishinian [Forty Years of Taiwanese New Literary Movement]* (Kaohsiung: Chunhui, 2004), p.52.
considered “non-existent” by Chinese nationalists (as simply “blankness”) or, at best, by those who reluctantly recognised its existence, as “a speciality” (enslaved by Japanese rule). These “enslaving” perspectives were taken by KMT officials, such as General Ge Jingen, as discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, the Educational Commissioner of the Administrative Office, Fan Shoukang, also argues that the Taiwanese people were “completely enslaved” in a speech in 1946. For example, they tended to see the use of Japanese in literature as a form of continuation of Kōminka ideology, even though which may contain decolonising spirit of Japanese colonial rule. Japanese language became the absolute criterion for political stance. In response, Taiwanese intellectuals, who carried the “original sin” of using and enjoyed Japanese cultural capital, according to Chen Fang-ming, such as Wang Baiyuan, Zhang Yibu, Yang Yunping, and Su Xin, wrote articles to counter such narrative of “cultural hegemony”. These Taiwanese intellectuals argued that the Japanese language was in fact an access to world thoughts and literature. For example, Yang Yunping argues, it was through the Japanese language that the appreciation of Lu Xun’s works by Taiwanese intellectuals was more accurate than that by Chinese critics. However, in the Enslaving arguments carried out by Chinese-centric habitus, which involved re-defining Taiwanese literature through the national rhetoric of many Chinese intellectuals and officials, we can observe the attempt at homogenisation of the peripheral Taiwanese Literature to a Chinese

49 Ibid., p.216.
50 Ibid., pp. 214-217.
51 Ibid., p. 216-217.
This national pedagogy implied that the “Japan-enslaved Taiwanese Literature,” an illegitimate hybridity, should be freed and civilised by the legitimate and heritage-abundant “Chinese Literature”: both culturally and ethnically, Taiwanese should become Chinese. Further, this also justified the political “restoration of Taiwan from China.” In terms of colonialism and the cultural palimpsest, this Chinese civilising project was quite similar to that undertaken during the period of Japanese rule, in which Taiwanese (New) Literature was seen as something blank, exotic, or at most, peripheral, which should be “civilised” by Japanese Literature under the Kōminka movement.52

Regarding Chinese political nationalism, the harsher form of ideological practice, the political agenda of “the restoration of Taiwan from Japan” advocated by the Nationalist Government and by some Chinese writers also reflected their cultural interpretation of this newly-acquired land and the superior position-taking they took. With the implementation of the official Chinese language policy in 1946 (also the abolishment of Japanese at the same time), the 2-28 Incident in 1947, the April-Sixth Event in 1948 (after these political crack-downs, many of the Taiwanese elite and writers were executed and “silenced”), and the formal implementation of martial law in 1949, it was no surprise that these gradually legitimated Others perceived themselves (and were perceived by the KMT state power) as the rightful literary producers of the legitimate goods—the KMT-defined rightist Chinese Literature. (After 1949, with the rise of Combat literature, leftist literary works such

52 Zhong Zhaozheng recalls that under the Kōminka Movement, when all literary works in the public media were in Japanese, Taiwanese writers’ works were still seen as peripheral literature. See Zhong [Ten Lectures on Taiwanese Literature], p.17.
as those by Lu Xun were attacked by Chinese Rightist writers and were forbidden\textsuperscript{53}). In 1949, as Chinese cultural and political nationalism were officially legitimised, the Taiwanese literary field at this time, from the perspective of Taiwanese subjectivity, according to Peng Ruijin, was like “a general who has lost his battlefield” through surrendering its Japanese language and legitimacy to the foreign Chinese literary field; what was left were a “very few old writers who continued to embrace literature in fear.”\textsuperscript{54} Even so, Peng points out some Taiwanese writers still tried to maintain the autonomy of the Taiwanese literary field. According to Peng, these activities, which aimed to sustain Taiwanese literary subjectivity, included “Yang Kui’s editing of the \textit{Taiwan Literature} magazine, Wu Zhuoliu’s Japanese novel, Zhang Shenqie’s prison-notes, and the Silver-bell Society’s \textit{Yinlinghui} Japanese-Chinese poetry magazines.”\textsuperscript{55}

In short, the resistantance to the Chinese colonial agenda was carried out by some old Taiwanese writers, who were dislocated in their own land, but insisted on writing either in Japanese or newly-learned Chinese. After 1949, the past of Taiwanese literature was more severely and strategically neglected or labelled as peripheral by the KMT regime. Following the Enslaved Taiwanese Discourse in

\textsuperscript{53} Under Japanese rule, Lu Xun’s works were already popular among Taiwanese. Between 1945-1949, Lu Xun’s works were translated and disseminated freely, owing to Chen-yi’s friendship with Lu Xun and Xu Shoushang. After 1949, Lu Xun’s works were forbidden by the KMT regime for its leftist tendency. See Yang Jieming, “\textit{Luxun sixiang zaitai chuanbo yu bianzheng—yige jingshenshi de cemian}” [The Dissemination and Dialectic of Lu Xun’s Thoughts (1923-1949) in Taiwan—An Aspect of the Spiritual History] (Diss, National Chung-Hsing University, 2009), pp. 53-55, 138-144, 146-162, 208-212.

\textsuperscript{54} See Peng, \textit{[Forty Years of Taiwanese New Literary Movement]}, p, 62.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
1945-1949, after 1949, the Japanese colonial modernity of Taiwanese literature (which was co-constructed by the Japanese and the Taiwanese through both resistance and acceptance), was largely erased by Chinese “internal” colonisation this time.

**The Bridging New Realism**

In Chapter Three, I gave a picture of the literary field between 1945-1949, which was largely documented by the dominant Chinese writers, before and after the 2-28 Incident in 1947. This was also the period when left-wing literature still survived, and when the Chinese literary field and the “Taiwanese” writers (the survival literary field of the period of Japanese rule) officially met for the first time. This quite “liberal” period (compared with the later White-Terror period) was often seen as the period of the leftist Realist fashion by critics.56

After the 2-28 Tragedy and the “Town-Cleansing” military actions of 1947, the *Bridge Supplement*, founded on 1 Aug 1947, performed a seemingly post-shellshock appeasing function in the literary field. According to Chen Fang-ming, both the first generation of post-war Taiwanese writers and Chinese non-provincial writers who came to Taiwan after 1945 published their works in the *Bridge Supplement* and thus “for the first time they could officially converse with each other.” As Chen suggests, the *Bridge Supplement* “possesses a critical historical meaning from the perspective

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56 Some see this leftist Realist trend as another version of the Modernist movement in Taiwanese literary history. See the next paragraph.
of literary history.\textsuperscript{57} The post-war “conversation” in the \textit{Bridge Supplement} suggests a cultural interaction between the Chinese literary field and the Taiwanese cultural field, at a time when the latter still carried a strong Japanese flavour. However, underneath this seemingly peaceful cultural conversation was a collision on ethnic and nationalistic issues, mainly embodied in the Enslaved Taiwanese Debate. The \textit{Bridge Supplement}’s chief editor was Ge Le, a Chinese-immigrant writer,\textsuperscript{58} and the supplement literally functioned as a “bridge” between Taiwanese and Chinese writers, by publishing articles from both sides (Japanese language works by Taiwanese writers were translated into Chinese). Following Ge Le’s New Realism literary approach, some non-provincial Chinese writers (such as Luo Tuoying) and Taiwanese writers such as Yang Kui (who had formed leftist literary views during the period of Japanese rule) were given the chance to communicate with each other. New Realism in this period was seen as a positive and a revised realism tradition which went back to the May-Fourth Movement in China in 1919.

This New Realist approach from China—which could be associated with modernist approach since both engaged, to a high degree, with political issues—was like the New Literature which emerged in colonial Taiwan under Japanese Rule, with its abundant nativist and realist approaches and de-colonial implications. The two realist discourses tended to base their literary performance on their own lands,

\textsuperscript{57} Chen, (\textit{A History of Modern Taiwanese Literature}), p. 251.

\textsuperscript{58} Ge Le (?-1994), whose original name is Shi Ximei, was arrested in the April-Sixth Event in 1949 (see the subsequent section). Unlike other “dissidents” arrested, he was soon released because his cousin was the Vice General of Garrison Command Niu Xianzhong. He then almost totally disappeared from the literary field.
post-May-Fourth China and colonial Taiwan respectively.

Even though David Der-wei Wang obviously considers there exists a clear division between modernism and realist approach in terms of their stylistic differences, in his analysis of Yang Chichang and Long Yingzong’s modernist works, he finds their modernist expressions in fact revealed their concerns of politics and reality. According to Wang, he points out that Yang Chichang’s “surrealist escape in fact implies a political unconsciousness.” Wang continues, “the abundant images of nihility and defeats in Yang’s words reflect the sense of loss of the Taiwanese intellectuals who struggled between the colonial and colonised cultures.” Wang concludes, the avant-garde poetry of Yang’s “Huihuai de chengshi” [The Destroyed City] (1936) is “a traumatic confession: inner violence, writing of depression, and the modernist literature of colonisation”. In terms of the influence of Xinganjue [new-sensationalism] in Long Yingzong, Wang argues, the attempts to criticise the reality present in “Zhi you muguashu de xiaozhen” [A Town with Papaya Tree] must be inevitably embedded in the “aesthetic structure of self-indulging and self-deprecating.” In the eyes of Wang, even though Yang Chichang and Long Yingzong would be “lonely” in that realist trend, it should be suggested that it was this awkward native colonial situation that forced the two modernists to represent colonial modernity and national trauma through their

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 131.
esoteric aesthetic language. In short, even with their modernist literary expressions, including new-sensationalism and surrealism, their ultimate concerns were still the reality—the national, colonial, and political contexts. Realism and Modernism were thus compatible to them, rather than contradictory. Therefore, in both of the anti-imperialism and decolonising contexts of post-May-Fourth China and New-Literature colonial Taiwan, in spite of their stylistic differences, realism could be treated as a dialectical reference for modernism (especially the early form of modernism emerged in Europe) for their shared spirit of political engagement.

Here I wish to explain the relationship between the new realist approach from China and the Taiwanese realist trend emerged in the period of Japanese rule. Although new realism was also formed and based on the realist literary approach in order to describe the poverty and exploited situation of Chinese farmers and workers, when it was introduced into the post-war Taiwan province by diasporic Chinese writers with their China-centric ideology, it neglected the historical context of Taiwan. This is because their shared concern—the perceived political reality—was different. Even though both the Chinese new realists and many Taiwanese realists carried leftist thoughts, and together celebrated a Chinese national mapping. As 

62 For example, pre-war modernist poet Jin Lian’s “Wuwei” [Do nothing], “Wenzi lei” [Tears of Mosquitoes], “Duju” [Living alone], and “Tieqiao xia” [Under the iron bridge], which published in early post-war period, could be seen as a veiled testimony to the 2-28 during the transformation of political regimes. His participation in Li society, which embodies a vivid nativist and realist character, in post-war period could be understood that modernist and realist approaches were only differences in styles. In the post-war context, according to Ye Shitao, Song Zelai shifted from modernist to realist style. In the case of Li Qiao, even though he is good at using modernist techniques, he is considered a nativist rather than a modernist by Ye Shitao. See Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], pp. 240, 203-204.
discussed in Chapter Three, after economic inflation, a series of political incidents such as 2-28 and the April-Fourth event, and the Enslavement argument, the Taiwanese realists gradually realised a political reality which was not only disappointing but also threatening to the autonomy of their literary production. As a result, this led to a divergence of their national imaginations.

According to Ye Shitao, another Taiwanese writer who was also active during this period, this “New Realism” literary approach from China excluded literature based on the idea of “art for art’s sake.”63 According to Luo Tuoying, a Chinese diasporic writer to Taiwan, “New Realism [from China] is based on dialectical materialism and historical materialism, its art ideas and expressions are on the side of the class who go in the same direction of history.”64 This view is similar to that of the native Taiwanese writer Yang Kui, who developed leftist Realism under Japanese rule as a way to expose the reality of discrimination between Japanese and Taiwanese subjects, and the dire class-difference between the bourgeois class and the exploited workers (including farmers). Yang advised writers to “go to the people, observe more of the reality, and get in touch with the people more.”65 As a result, the leftist New Realism, which had migrated from China after 1945, provided an effective bridge for Chinese and Taiwanese writers with regard to their shared realist approach and their shared leftist compassion for the exploited class. It is thus not so surprising to see that Ye Shitao’s 2-28 short story, “Sanyue de mazu” [March’s Machu], was published in the Bridge Supplement (12 February 1949). The fact that

63 Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], pp. 129-133.
64 Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], pp. 129-133.
65 Ibid.
he was imprisoned in 1951 for three years because of his involvement with a
communist friend also testifies to the changed political and cultural environment
after the National Government fled to Taiwan, in which the autonomy of the literary
field was severely restricted by the political force. This also shows how the Bridge
Supplement (and this period) corresponded to one aspect of the European Modernist
movement, at least in so far as it leaned towards European Modernism’s realist and
politicising approach rather than to the art-for-art’s-sake emphasis of the later
American Modernism which was popular in 1960s Taiwan.

III. Combat Literature and the Legitimisation of Chinese Literature in Taiwan

In this section, I will consider the post-2-28 period, the 1950s, when the local
Taiwanese literary field was formally absorbed by the alien and dominant Chinese
literary field; within this domination, the rules of art, such as the cultural capital (the
written language, the written objects, and the author’s stance towards them), were
largely replaced by a rightist Chinese literary “taste” controlled by the KMT state
institutions. Combat Literature was the term that later critics used to describe this
deply politicised period. Nevertheless, the Combat Literary discourses were not the
only literary discourses during this period, as Jiang Baochai argues.66

Before the official flight of the KMT regime to Taiwan on 7 December 1949,
after its total defeat by the Chinese Communist Party—which officially established

66 Jiang Baochai, “Chongxing 50 niandai taiwan wenxueshi de quanshi wenti—yige dianji yu
changyu de sikao” [Reflection on the Issues of Interpretation of Taiwanese Literary History of the
319-347.
the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949—the KMT government in Taiwan issued an island-wide martial law on 20 May 1949. This long term authoritarian implementation (1949-1987) had a destructive impact on the KMT’s newly-obtained literary field. After the Town-Cleansing of left-wing intellectuals from the universities (such as the current National Taiwan University and National Taiwan Normal University) in the April-Sixth Incident of 1949, the *Bridge Supplement* was abolished and its editor Ge Le (Shih Ximei) was arrested. As a result, the debates about the Reconstruction of Taiwanese Literature (mainly published in the *Bridge Supplement*) were suddenly terminated. This shows how even maintaining a relatively neutral stance in literary discussion was impossible. Some Taiwanese writers, such as Yang Kui and Ye Shitao, were arrested, while left-wing or less-KMT-leaning Chinese writers either fled or kept silent. As a result, according to Peng Ruijin, after 1949, “the foundation of Taiwanese literature’s development and ideals were completely cleaned up, paving the way before the literary field entered the period of Combat literature and Anti-Communist and Anti-Soviet Literature.”

67 During the post 2-28 period, due to students’ disappointment at the KMT’s ways of dealing with the Tragedy and their discontent about the economic and political disturbance of society, many college students turned to leftist ideas and movements (some of them were involved in the activities held by the Chinese Communist Party). They together conducted a series of student strikes. On 6 April 1949, the police and forces from Garrison Command entered the campus of National Taiwan University. Some college students were arrested and executed. This event is seen as the beginning of the subsequent White Terror Period in the 1950s. See Huang Huizhen, “April 6 Incident,” [http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=2206](http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=2206) (Accessed 6th Aug, 2012).

68 Ibid.

69 Peng, [*Fourty Years of Taiwan New Literature*], p. 70.
the previously relatively neutral and left-wing literary media were replaced by right-wing and explicitly anti-Communist media: “private magazines like Baodao wenyi [Island Literature], Gonglunbao [Public Paper], Banyue wenyi [Half-moon Literature]…, and government-run or KMT-run newspaper supplements like Minzu wanbao [Nation Evening Newspaper], Xinsheng bao [New Life Newspaper], Zhonghua ribao [Chinese Daily]….” Peng concludes, “They not only thoroughly occupied and took over the Taiwanese literary field, but they also controlled the space of thinking and speech in all of Taiwan. The Anti-Communist Literary Movement was officially advocated.”

This top-down political influence through the control of the media embodies Bourdieu’s idea of pedagogy. Richard Jenkins explains Bourdieu’s idea of the relationship between pedagogic work and its “consumers” thus: “Pedagogic work legitimates its product by producing legitimate consumers of that product (be it symbolised by formal credentials or the scarification of initiation).” The pedagogic process of shaping “legitimate cultural goods” in turn produces “legitimate consumers,” because they gradually develop a special taste or habitus in symbolic goods when the production of symbolic goods is controlled. If we see the Combat Literary Movement—endorsed and controlled by the KMT state institutions—as a pedagogic action, then both the authors of the Combat Literature and its readers could be seen as the “legitimate consumers” of the KMT’s political propaganda, because they both accepted the embedded values of these symbolic

70 Ibid., p. 71.
71 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, p. 107.
goods and were willing to “consume” them constantly. However, there were differences among these “consumers”: “consumers” with Chinese backgrounds “consumed” more easily, while native Taiwanese “consumers,” with their Taiwanese/Japanese habitus and the difficulty in understanding the Chinese language, found it harder to “consume” these unfamiliar symbolic goods. This could explain why native Taiwanese writers delayed their (re)appearance in the alienated literary field. In terms of the state agency behind the production line, these Combat-Literature writers, with their ability to fluently reproduce these symbolic goods through writing in the public domain, unlike the common people who simply “consumed” and could neither produce nor reproduce these symbolic goods in the public domain, functioned as the “legitimate (re)producers” of the KMT’s ideologic goods. (Even though in a sense, they were both the victims and reproducers of this authoritarian ideology—which was the exclusive symbolic good in the KMT-controlled market.) In fact, the difference between a “consumer” and a “(re)producer” is not just a difference in degree. If we take the state agency into consideration, the former is more passive, whereas the latter more active for state consecration. For example, the younger Taiwanese generation, though they lacked Chinese cultural capital in the first place, could well become a successful (re)producers of the KMT’s ideology after they had received a school education which caused them to internalise it, and to mimic it, whether consciously or unconsciously.\footnote{See the case of the indigenous writer Chen Yingxiong in Chapter Five. The post-war younger-generation readers who received KMT education (the potential writers of the future)—whether they were diasporic}
Chinese or native Taiwanese in ethnicity—they were more likely to be vulnerable to this comprehensive Chinese national pedagogy than the older Taiwanese who wrote under Japanese rule.73

In the everyday life practice of this national pedagogic project in literature (and in other media), a top-down process, the KMT government’s control of newspaper supplements filtered out those kinds of literary fashion and politics which could not be produced by the literary production-line and thus shaped an expected legitimate taste for authors. However, while the KMT could control what was to be legally published through state institutions, they could not control what was to be written by authors, who could write privately without publication, such as the case of Wu Zhuoliu. Control of the literary supplements was at most an invasion of the literary field from the political field. At the same time, however, the institutionalising of Combat Literary discourses into everyday life through schooling (such as the China-centric historical perspectives in state-published textbooks) and the setting up of literary awards (these often gave consecration to fiction expressing Chinese nostalgia) could actually change the literary field’s autonomy from the inside out, and from bottom-up. These literary institutions, as well as the lure of the consecration of awards under the influence of Combat Literature, could cause the writers to internalise what was to be and what was not to be written. In terms of state

73 As argued by Hsiau A-chin, the post-war-generation writers developed a Chinese nationalist ideology because of this KMT education. As a result, Hsiau argues, the Taiwanese ideology was broken up in the post-war period and redeveloped only in the 1970s. However, contrary to his view, I think the Taiwanese ideology was preserved by some old-generation (born in the period of Japanese rule) Taiwanese writers. See my argument in this chapter and details of the issue of Taiwanese subjectivity in Chapter One.
consecration, Peng Ruijin argues: “In the 1950s, different kinds of literary institutions were formed, founded by official organisations, military units, or by private organisations which received governmental funds—through which literary awards were set up, magazines were published, and so the literary activities were totally controlled.”

The number of these literary institutions working under the KMT’s state power continued to grow into the 1960s. When the literary field’s inner “rules of art” were changed from “art for art’s own sake” to “art should serve the purpose of national propaganda,” literary consecration in the literary field was no longer reached through the aesthetic expression or the free-will of an author’s work, but instead could be achieved only through the political qualities in it.

Therefore, the KMT institution of martial law along with the state institutions controlled what was to be remembered from the past and what was to be expected through controlling what was to be written. As Chen Fang-ming argues, the KMT’s martial law institution, as a colonial institution, resulted in the often-seen cultural phenomenon of “historical amnesia.” Chen takes the example of Bai Xianyong, who founded the influential Xiandai wenxue [Modern Literature] magazine in 1960, which helped reinforce the subsequent modernist fashion in the 1960s (which mainly emerged in the form of modernist poetry in the 1950s). According to Chen’s account of Bai: “These new generational writers had no chance of reading works

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74 Peng, [Forty Years of Taiwan New Literature], p. 76.

75 Such as Wentanshe, which published Mei chuniang and many other literary works. According to Peng, this was the kind of “private organisations which received governmental funds.”

76 Bourdieu provides some examples of how the rules of art, such as “art for art’s sake”—the base for the autonomy of the art field—can be replaced by political, economic benefits. See Bourdieu, The Rules of Art.
from earlier time, because the works of Lu Xun, Mao Dun, and other leftist writers’ works were all forbidden. They could not gain access to the previous generation’s heritage, they had no one to compare with, to imitate, to compete with”.77 As members of a second generation of Chinese diasporic writers, Bai’s generation’s cultural capital (of Chinese Old and New literature) was quite different from the Taiwanese pre-war writers’ cultural capital (literature in the period of Japanese rule). However, from the perspective of the colonial palimpsest, many leftist, realist, and new realist works inherited by native Taiwanese and diasporic Chinese writers were both to a considerable extent deliberately removed by the KMT’s colonial state power. By contrast, many works of more de-politicised, bourgeois, and Chinese nostalgia styles, were preserved.78 For example, works by Liang Shiqiu, Zhu Ziqing and Xu Zhimo were not removed, and were selected in textbooks. Furthermore, the famous classical Chinese literary works, and works of military and combat literature were promoted (i.e. works by Wang Lan, Sima Zhongyuan, Zhu Xining, and Duan Caihua).79 As a result, Chen argues, this is why Taiwanese writers (the “Chinese” writers in Taiwan at that time) readily resorted to (American) Modernism as a way to express their exiled psychological complex in their own land.80

As we have seen, literary discourses were heavily controlled and filtered through the KMT’s state power. Artists (both Chinese and local Taiwanese writers)

77 Chen, [Postcolonial Taiwan], p.31.
79 Ye, [The Historical Outline of Taiwanese Literature], pp. 157-164.
80 Ibid., p.31.
became “exiled” in their artistic field, because of the invasion of political power. Leftist discourses of art were abolished, while Rightist, or more precisely, anti-Communist political discourses, hereafter became the dominant and the only legitimate discourses until the end of the 1960s. It was only in the 1970s that leftist discourses, and the spirit of realism, were vigorously and structurally reincarnated through Nativist discourses. Nevertheless, this does not mean realist techniques and spirit were not practiced before the 1970s. In fact, Bai’s *Taipei Characters* is a realist work for its delicate and vivid description of the setting and the characters, even though several modernist techniques are used too. As discussed previously, Wu Zhuoliu, Liao Qingxiu, Li Rongchun, Zhong Lihe, and some poets in the *Li* group remained quite a realist approach.

**Palimpsestic Taiwanese Modernism Literature**

After the 1960s, rebellion within the legitimate literary field changed the dominant literary fashion: from a period dominated by political issues, to a period when Modernist aesthetics dominated the literary field. However, social issues were still overlooked in both literary creation and criticism. Yu Sheng-kuan points out the similarity of Combat and Modernist literature, “both of the two [Combat and Modernist] literary trends neglected the reality of Taiwan.” You continues, “They did not identify with the nativeness of Taiwan, nor did they reflect the social reality.”

Yu provides a very specific, and to some extent exclusive, version of Taiwan’s reality and nativeness. Yu’s peculiarly Taiwan-centric, or *Bentu*-centric

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81 Yu, *The Rise and Development of Taiwan Nativist Literary Discourse*, p. 141.
perspective can be seen as a counteraction to alien modernist and Combat literature trends. But if we see Modernist and Combat discourses as two layers of cultural heritage of Taiwan, even though political ideology in and underneath these literary works was difficult to be ignored, they at least presented a “literary reality” in that special production structure. In addition, owning to the need to reconfigure Taiwan and its local and native discourses into the Combat and Modernist discourses, many prototypes of 1970s Nativist Literature were thus presented and debated. For example, as discussed in Chapter Three, in Mei Chunniang, indigenous elements were presented (though in a discriminatory way). From Taipei Characters to Cristal Boys, native elements were further developed. In addition, two debates of modern poetry occurred, in which national issues were touched. Especially after the second debate, to seek social concern in poetry could be suggested as the inspiring “literary reality” for the upcoming nativist trend in the late 1970.

According to Yang Zhao, the most successful and influential literary form in 1950s and 1960s Taiwan was poetry. Poetry offered a space to hide ambiguous codes, while fiction, due to its more straight-forward nature, was more strictly censored. Once fiction-writers moved from anti-Communist or nostalgia themes of China and touched on reality, whether on political and social reality in Taiwan (such as the 2-28 Incident or the poverty in agrarian villages), this was very likely to break political taboos and to cause them to be imprisoned.

As a concluding remark of the various modernist discourses, which have been

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82 See the following discussion of this localised development.
83 See the following sections for the discussion of the second modern poetry debate.
84 Yang, [Essays on Taiwanese Literary History since 1945], p. 21.
mentioned in Chapter One and in earlier sections of this chapter, the development of Taiwanese Modernism, mainly included two layers—the 1930s layer led by Yang Chichang and Weng Nao, and the 1950-60s layer under vigorous influence of American modernism. In addition to the internal changes of literary fashion, Taiwanese Modernism involved a palimpsestical (and dialectical) relationship with other literary traditions at that time—from the realist, leftist, and modernist trends introduced by Japanese rule, via the influence of Chinese New Literature (the 1917 Literary Revolution and the May-Fourth Movement in 1919 were influenced by European Modernism) and leftist New Realism in the late 1940s, through the version of modernism mainly defined by the American academy in the post-war Cold-war structure of the 1960s. As discussed, concerns of political context were not only shared by realists, but also by modernists, even though there existed certain stylistic differences, and different degrees and various ways of political engagement. Decolonising and anti-imperial characteristics could thus be associated between the literary field in colonial Taiwan and post-May-Fourth China. In short, the scope of Taiwanese Modernism would have to be associated and discussed with the Taiwanese literary traditions surrounding the development of vernacular literature in 1920-30s, the modernism practiced by Weng Nao, Yang Chichang under Japanese rule (in which some aspects of European Modernism were introduced through Japan). The dialectical tension between nativist/leftist and modernist approaches, or in other words, the differences of political contexts between Taishō democracy and Kōminka period should be explored. In addition, Taiwanese Modernism should be related to the post-May-Fourth Realist tradition the new realist trend in the early
post-war period from China. The cold war setting of American modernism, and the
martial law institution represented by Combat Literature should should be treated
together to discuss the second layer of Taiwanese modernism.

The Once-neglected Japanese Modernist Layer

In Chang’s *Modernism and the Nativist Resistance: Contemporary Chinese
Fiction from Taiwan* (1993), in terms of the epistemology of Taiwanese Modernism,
Chang does not mention the 1920s literature debate, nor the reflection on Modernity
in Taiwanese literary history before 1949. In addition, she does not mention the
cause of the literary breach—Combat Literature in the 1950s. Instead, in this book,
Chang’s focus is more on China-based modernism or Chinese modernist writings in
terms of world modernist literature, rather than a Taiwan-based modernist literary
history.\(^85\) Also, in her view, the 1960s Modernist Literary movement in Taiwan was,
before its engagement with the 1970s Taiwan Nativist literary movement, a part of a
de facto Chinese modernist literary movement. As Chang points out, firstly, it was a
Chinese modernist literary discourse transplanted from China to Taiwan; secondly,
though it was a literary breach from Chinese literature, it was still a cultural
rejuvenation within Chinese writing, in respect to the subjectivity of Taiwanese
literary history. In this sense, the Chinese Modernist literary movement in Taiwan
bore a double meaning: the Chinese literary field was an occidental cultural
hegemony transplanted to Taiwan, while its rebellious offspring, the Modernist
literary movement, tended to fight for its autonomy against the autocratic father, the

Combat literature in the 1950s, with the help of another hegemonic weapon—foreign Western modernism.

However, in Chang’s more recent research, traditions of Taiwanese New Literature and May-Fourth New Literature are increasingly associated with the discussion of the production of post-war literature, including modernism. Joyce Chi-Hui Liu explores the relationship between Japanese surrealist resources and the development of surrealism in Taiwan from 1930s to 1960s. On the other hand, the works of Taiwan-born and Japan-educated Liu Naou, “the founder of the Shanghai modernist literary movement new sensationalism”, are explored by Shih Shu-mei through her “semi-colonial” perspective. In short, the potentially dialectical contexts of Taiwanese modernism—realist and modernist trends in 1920s-1930s Taiwan, Japanese resources (especially new-sensationalism), and post-May-Fourth New Literature in China, and the 1960s (American) modernism in Taiwan—could together contribute to the palimpsestic discussion of Taiwanese modernism.

Nevertheless, if we compare the 1960s Taiwanese Modernists with the Modernists in the May-fourth Movement in China and the following Nativist Literary Debate in Taiwan, we can see that the 1960s Modernists, probably because of the martial law context, relatively focused their concerns on the dimension of the bourgeois class (those modernists’ works do present challenges to the conservative

86 See Chang, *The Transition of Literary Field*, pp. 149-152.
middle-class mentality)\textsuperscript{89} rather than exploring a more political and reflection of “Westernisation” embedded in Western modernism. In the May-fourth Movement, according to Shih Shu-mei, many of the Chinese Modernists, such as Guo Moruo, Yu Dafu, Tian Han, and Tao Jingsun, were Japan-educated.\textsuperscript{90} This “Japanese mediation of the May-Fourth modernists’ construction of the West” is stressed by Shih. Shih argues that the Chinese writers in Japan “perceived that the Taishō Japan (1912-1926) that they witnessed and admired was the logical consequence of its Meji antecedent (1868-1912)”. She also argues there were “many similarities between the Meji and May Fourth enlightenment projects.”\textsuperscript{91} She argues, the inspiration of the Westernisation characteristics of the Meiji period which remained until the Taishō period resulted in the “advocacy of Westernisation in all areas of society”, “the repudiation of tradition”, and “the writer’s turn to interiority due to a crisis of cultural identity” in the May-Fourth movement;\textsuperscript{92} However, the modernists in the 1960s Taiwan did/could not question the tradition, Combat Literature, publicly. Instead, the already-debated topics in the May-Fourth Movement, such as Westernisation and Chinese tradition, again became the topics in the modern poetry debate. Different from the Republican May-Fourth political context, the martial-law context in Taiwan probably largely resulted in the 1960s modernist writers’ “compromised” modernist action.

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\textsuperscript{89} See the following discussion of “anti-bourgeois” and “high-culture” elements of modernism argued by Raymond Williams in p. 316.

\textsuperscript{90} See Shih, \textit{The Lure of the Modern}, pp. 140-144.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., p. 142.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., p. 143.
Chen Fang-ming describes how Modernist discourses in Taiwan have been politicised in the post-war period: when Modernist discourses in 1960s Taiwan began to develop, the Modernists were discredited by KMT conservatists as “Communists”; in the 1970s, when Modernism was at its prime, the Modernists were blackened as “the compradors of (American) Imperialism”; later, in the 1980s, when Taiwanese nationalism rose with the Native parties (the non-KMT groups and the later-established DPP), Modernism was identified as “the school which disconnected from the reality of Taiwan.” As a result, in the Nativist Literature Debate in 1977, Modernism and Nativist Literature were defined as “two aesthetics that could not converse with each other.”

As we have seen, during the post-war period, political suppression led to the pursuit of the psychological aesthetics of the Taiwanese Modernists. Psychological aesthetics, however, as previously discussed, is only one version of Modernism. Modernism is not necessarily simply a matter of psychology. The emphasis on psychological and aesthetic elements in 1960s Taiwanese Modernism was a product of the KMT state power’s attempts to depoliticise and repoliticise the cultural/literary field. Through depoliticising literary appreciation, psychological and aesthetic elements became the decisive criteria for the consecration of literary works. In this way, the internal rules of literature were re-politicised by external factors—in this case, the political requirements of the cultural policy of the KMT state institutions (through the control of newspaper supplements, setting-up and institutionalising of Chinese Literature Departments, and the setting-up of official

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93 Chen, [Postcolonial Taiwan], p.17.
and semi-official literary awards.) These psychological pursuits, which could be seen as an escape from social and political reality, were also a portrait of the reality of the suppressed minds. At the same time, this literature was praised for its “pure” aesthetic achievement. This vividly reflected how the literary field interacted with the political field.

After the Korean War broke out, America started its military and economic aid to the KMT regime as a defence against an invasion by Communist China.\(^94\) This was the period when American Modernism was also imported to KMT-Taiwan. Because of their shared anti-Communist position-taking in politics, the KMT’s Combat Literature policy “collaborated” well with the imported American Modernism. The apolitical elements in the newly imported American Modernism and New Criticism allowed more space for the KMT-controlled literary field to re-politicise the internal rules of art in the cultural field. This demonstrated the import of economic and cultural capitals from America to the Taiwanese literary field.

**The Pure Modernist Literature**

However, in the eyes of Taiwanese Nativist critics such as Peng, such claims of pursuing *pure literature* [*Chunwenxue*] by Modernists like Ji Xian (1913-2013) and Xia Jian (1916-1965) was a compromised camouflage, used to hide from political

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\(^94\) Peng, [*Fourty Years of Taiwan New Literature*], pp. 75-76.
accusations of “attacking Combat Literature” during the White Terror era. As I have argued, taking a neutral stance was almost impossible in this authoritarian political circumstance, nor could an autonomous literary field be achieved in the public domain. When Ji Xian and Xia Jian advocated a pure literature in the early 1960s in order to replace, as it seemed, the highly politicised Combat Literature of the 1950s, the power structure beneath the literary field was not reshaped by these elite Modernists—that literature would still serve the same political aims. It was, so to speak, like the old body just putting on new clothes.

Chang Sung-sheng observes how the term Modernism was accepted or resisted, or both accepted and resisted, by the agents (such as the writers and the scholars) in the contemporary Taiwanese literature field. Chang observes: “Although Modernist fiction in Taiwan bears unmistakable imprints of China’s pre-revolution periods, it must also be considered a product of the unique historical reality of Taiwan over the last forty years.” She claims that though 1960s Modernism in Taiwan had an alien origin—which could be traced back to Realism and Socialism in China in the 1930s—it was largely rooted in the local context of Taiwan. As Chang notes, “Scholars have often attributed the unusually strong influence of Western literature on Taiwanese writers of the post-1949 era to the inaccessibility of

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the literary heritage of their own immediate predecessors.” Chang argues that
Taiwanese Modernism in the 1960s was in fact a by-product of the reception of
American aid and American ideology. According to this argument, through “the
banning of works of most pre-1949 New Literature [the May-Fourth New Literature
in China] [Chinese] writers created a vacuum that forced young writers in Taiwan to
turn to foreign sources for literary inspiration.” This view is similar to my earlier
argument. Thus Chang continues, “The more political interpreters of this
phenomenon … have stressed the effect of the ubiquitous workings of [American]
cultural imperialism, contending that the prominent American presence in post-1949
Taiwan necessarily fostered excessive zeal for American cultural products.”
Chang’s argument helps to demonstrate the connection between 1960s Taiwanese
Modernism and its multifaceted “capital” in both 1930s China (mainly Sinonised
Western Socialism and Realism) and 1960s American Modernism in Taiwan.
However, this also sheds light on the Chinese nationalists’ resistance to Western
Modernism in the 1960s, when the KMT regime aimed to legitimise its authentic
status as China in the world and when the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement
was promoted by the KMT’s state power in Taiwan (after 1966) in opposition to
Mao’s Cultural Revolution in the People’s Republic of China in the same year.
Chang’s analysis of this could explain the cultural struggle between Sinonisation

97 The “heritage” here that Chang mentions could refer to both the literary heritage of the Chinese
literary field and the Taiwanese literary field in the period of Japanese rule; the former is Chiang’s
focus. See Chang, [The Transition of Literary Field], p. 9.
98 Ibid.
and Westernisation when the culturally “imperial” element of American Modernism was stressed against the “traumatic” inheritance of Chinese culture.

Considering the modern elements in the Modernist discourses, Chang argues: “Elitist Western modernist literature has performed another important function for Chinese intellectuals because of its potential to become a substitute for the aristocratic high art in classical Chinese tradition.” She continues, “Nevertheless, for contemporary Chinese intellectuals, the desire to live up to China’s past glory proves to be a common psychological need.”

The Modernist trend in Taiwan, for diasporic Chinese migrants in particular, involved issues of maintaining a Chinese national dignity and identification, which was fortified by the Chinese Cultural Renaissance promoted by the KMT’s with embedded political propaganda.

Raymond Williams has argued that European Modernism could carry both “high-culture” and politically radical characteristics through its anti-Bourgeois bias: “In remaining anti-bourgeois, its representatives either chose the formerly aristocratic valuation of art as a sacred realm above money and commerce,” or “the revolutionary doctrines, promulgated since 1848, of art as the liberating vanguard of popular consciousness.” On the one hand, he cites Mayakovsky, Picasso, and Brecht as examples of those “who moved into direct support of Communism,” and D’Annunzio, Marinetti, Wyndham Lewis, Ezra Pound as examples of those who sided with aristocratism and moved towards Fascism. However, Williams argues, European Modernism, like the American Modernism of the 1950s, soon lost its anti-bourgeois stance, and achieved comfortable integration into the new

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100 Ibid., p. 10.
international capitalism. Williams’s observation of modernism’s rightward development from its pre-war to post-war forms is to some extent similar to the development of modernism in Taiwan—from a discourse compatible with Leftist and Realist discourses in the period of Japanese rule (as seen in the works of Yang Chichang and Long Yingzong) towards a discourse coerced by Rightist and Fascist discourses of Combat Literature under the KMT rule. In terms of the harsh form of the martial-law context, Chang conclusively observes that: “the bulk of Taiwan’s [1960s] Modernist works were only ‘modernist’ in a superficial sense,” in which “the outer mannerisms and traits of the modern are faithfully echoed or mimicked but the animating spirit has disappeared.” The missing “animating spirit” in the 1960s Taiwanese modernism that Chang refers to could correspond to what Williams speaks of as the leftist trend of modernism: the “revolutionary doctrines…of art as the liberating vanguard of popular consciousness.” However, it should be stressed that it was the intrusion of the state power into the literary field, rather than the spontaneous habitus of the literary trend, that shaped the look of modernism in 1960s Taiwan.

The above demonstrates three distinct Modernist trends, which could be referred to as the early Euro-centred radical Modernism, Euro-centred aristocratic Modernism, and American Modernism in the 1950s. American Modernism captured the spirit of the Euro-centred aristocratic Modernism. The rise and development of these versions of Modernism, and their definitions (either by themselves or by late

102 Chang, Modernism and the Nativist Resistance, pp. 11-12.
comers), involved not only the literary text but also the interplay of the literary text and its social context. In 1960s Taiwan, the Modernists were “shaped” in a strong rightist fashion endorsed by the KMT’s anti-Communist state power, working alongside the American Modernism promoted in the 1950s under McCarthyism. As Frances Saunders argues, it was through the CIA’s promotion of an artificial artistic cultural phenomenon produced by national force that American Modernism—in particular works by those such as the Abstract Expressionists—became a universal modern modernism.\(^{103}\) As one of the anti-Communist entities operational since the 1950s, Taiwanese literary trends at that time—or, “Chinese” literary trends to use the governmental term—demonstrated a deeply-politicised de-politicised character. In the following decade, the literary field was still under the control of the KMT state power; however, with the move away from an agricultural society to an industrial society, the imported modern, in the form of American-imperialist modernism, in 1960s Taiwan did to some degree begin to share the social context—of capitalist and materialist tendency—that had shaped American Modernism.

The Alienation of Combat Literature and Resistance in Modernist Literature

Yang Zhao argues that “anti-Communist literature and Modernist Literature are in fact two sides to one coin. Both of them dealt with change, strangeness, and anxiety.” The aesthetic rules of anti-Communist literature were “repetition, extolment, and…” while the rules of Modernist Literature in 1960s Taiwan were “introversion, self-reflection, and a never-ending process of seeking strangeness and

\(^{103}\) See Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper?*, pp. 252-278.
abandoning familiarity.” However, with a country-wide mobilisation of the state power, the former carried more weight—to forcefully control the production of literature through politics, and to make writers alienated from their accustomed liberal writing habitus, either through a prescribed patriotic style or through particular language use. According to Yang, “the basis of [1960s Taiwanese Modernist Literature] was absolutely not the shock of industrialisation or of modern civilisation.” He continues, for the Taiwanese Modernist writers who felt “isolation, agitation and fluctuation” then, the basis of Modernism was more related to “the dislocation resulting from the change of regimes.” Chinese diasporic writers experienced a sense of loss in relation to the China they left behind, which was replaced by the new China—the Communist PRC. They also felt a diasporic dislocation when they migrated to the once Japanese-colonial Taiwan. On the other hand, for native Taiwanese writers and the new post-war Taiwanese generation, Yang continues, it was “the sense of exile carried by the [Taiwanese] non-provincial writers” that enabled their connection with Western Modernism, through which they found a new route to evade inspection and control. These Taiwanese provincial writers were exiled in their own native land, owing to Combat Literature’s immense Chinese flavour—either in its forceful Chinese national ideology or in its emphasis on the Chinese language and Chinese cultural capital as its entry requirement.

Inevitably, as a way of moving away from the patriotic Combat Literature, Modernism in 1960s Taiwan, with its more liberal approach as it claimed, became

104 Yang, [Essays on Taiwanese Literary History since 1945], p. 33.
105 Ibid., p. 32.
106 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
the shared alternative route for the liberal Chinese non-provincial and Taiwanese provincial writers. Resistance was embedded in some Modernist works. Modernist works of Qi Dengsheng and Shi Mingzheng in this period demonstrated how characteristics of Modernist Literature (such as the emphasis in individual’s isolation and nilhilism) were cleverly appropriated by them to expose the ridiculous control of the state power. For example, in Qi Dengsheng’s “Tiaoyuan xuanshou tuixiu le” [The Long Jump Athlete has Retired] (1968), the state is portrayed as the power-structure behind these games. The long jump athelete, refusing to compete for national honour, is warned: “Artists and athletes, who don’t fight for the honour of their homeland and race, are renounced by their own homeland and races.” In “Shengyuefen” [Saint Moon], the people in a small town are dominated by “the teachers and the police with authority”, in the names of education and protection. In “Huanxiang” [Illusion], the narrator reveals his fear of a mechanic and homogeneous metropolitan life: “their steps are so in uniform, one follows another, always maintains the same distance, like there is a invisible rope chaining on their bare ankles.” From these works, it can be understood that Qi Dengsheng portrays a modernist, or more precisely, an existentialist thinking that one should be independent in every way regardless the external doctrines that he situates in, as vividly portrayed in his famous “Wo ai heiyanzhu” [I Love Black Eyes] (1967). However, it can also be understood that Qi Dengsheng reveals his discontents with a

108 Ibid., p. 35.
109 Ibid., p. 166.
totalising “structure,” which refers to the martial law context. On the other hand, Shi Mingzheng’s prison experience (1961-1965, his was accused to involve in his brother Shi Mingde’s insurgent case), along with his modernist style, makes a distinctive contribution to Prison Literature. According to Wang Dewei, Shi Mingzheng’s “Heniaozhe” [One Who Drank his Urine] (1982) and “Kesizhe” [One Who Longed for Death] (1980) forms a dialatical relationship. Wang argues that, the former represents the idea that “the prison for political preisoner is a hotbed for urine-drinkers” (informers). Furthermore, “in the eyes of Shi, in terms of the state apparatus,” everyone could be a urine-drinker.110 On the other hand, the protagonist in [One Who Longed for Death], a non-provincial KMT military-education instructor with characteristics of a poet, commits suicide in the prison. His longing for death might be because of his refusal to be disciplined by the prison. As the narrator describes, “when you live in a space that cannot be completely controlled by you, you forms into a sample from the experiences of being tamed step by step.”111 Wang Dewei thus argues that Shi creates a “peculiarly aesthetic vision” through another poet-like political prisoner’s suffering. Similar to Wang Dewei’s analysis of the 1930s modernists Yang Chichang and Long Yingzong, as previously discussed, the political concerns in both Qi Dengsheng and Shi Mingzheng’s works, though being portrayed in a delicate modernist style, present a form of resistance in

the highly-politicised structure.

Nevertheless, the suppressed alienation (either national or cultural, or both) perceived by Taiwanese writers since the 1950s was to be belatedly expressed in a more direct way later in the 1970s and 1980s, when Nativism was finally permitted by the altered political circumstances to become a public discourse.

IV. The Taiwanese Nativist Literary Debate

As mentioned in Chapter Three, in 1970, the U.S. government decided to return the Diaoyutai (Sankaku) islets to to Japan in 1972. In response, there arose the “Protect Diaoyutai Movement” in Taiwan and in America in 1970. At the same time, according to Zhang Yanxian, “the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations in 1971, and thus the myth that ROC represents China was broken.”\(^{112}\) The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 “decided to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its government as the only legitimate representatives of the United Nations,” and to “expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kei-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.”\(^{113}\)

Since then, Chiang Kei-shek and the KMT government in Taiwan no longer remained a legitimate representative status of China. In 1978, the U.S. officially built up the relationship with the People’s Republic of China and severed its official diplomatic ties with Taiwan. As a result, after a series of diplomatic setbacks in

\(^{112}\) Zhang, *[The History of Political Movements of Taiwan]*, p. 290.

1970s Taiwan, there developed a trend to engage with the realities, either in literature, or in politics. In 1979, Huang Xinjie and some non-KMT activists organised a political magazine, *Formosa [Meilidao]*.\(^\text{114}\) On December 10, a rally was held in Kaohsiung by *Formosa* to promote human rights, which soon developed into a confrontation between participants and the police. Members of *Formosa* and a large number of opposition activists were arrested. This incident was called the Formosa Incident or the Kaohsiung Incident (1979).\(^\text{115}\) This Formosa Incident was the largest political event since the 2-28 Incident in post-war Taiwan.

Literary writing was interacting closely with the socio-political background in this period. In 1972, Guan Jieming published “Zhongguo xiandaishi de huanjin" [The Illusion of Chinese Modern Poetry] and “Zhongguo xiandaishi de kunjing" [The Dilemma of Chinese Modern Poetry], which argued that Chinese modernist poetry (in Taiwan) was too obscure and too difficult to understand and did not carry the spirit of China. From 1972-1973, Tang Wenbiao (1936-1985) published a series of articles, such as “Shemoshihou shemodifang shemoren: lun chuantongshi yu xiandaishi” [When, Where, and Who: A Discussion of Traditional Poetry and Modernist Poetry], “Shi de moluo: taigang xinshi de lishi pipan” [The Declining Poetry: A Historical Judgement of New Poetry in Taiwan and Hong Kong], and “Jiangbi de xiandaishi” [The Paralysed Modern Poetry]\(^\text{116}\) to charge modernist poets, such as Zhou Mengdie (1920-2014), Ye Shan [Yang Mu] (1940-), and Yu Kwang-chung (1928-), with the “avoidance of realities”. In reaction, the

\(^{114}\) Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, p.89.

\(^{115}\) Ibid.

modernist-poetry group wrote a number of articles to defend themselves, including articles by Yan Yuanshu (1933-2012) and Yu Kwang-chung. In Yu’s “Shiren hezui” [Why Place the Blame on Poets?], for example, Yu makes the counter-claim that Tang’s ideas are too leftist and dangerous.¹¹⁷

In April 1977, the Xiangtu [Nativist] Literary Debate officially started. Wang Tuo (1944-) published “Shi xianshi zhuiyi wenxue bu shi xiangtu wenxue” [It is Realist Literature rather than Xiangtu Literature], which praises the development of Xiangtu Literature. In May, Ye shitao published “Taiwan xiangtu wenxueshi dao lun” [An Introduction the History of Taiwanese Nativist Literature]. Ye claims there exists a decolonising characteristic in Taiwanese Nativist Literature: “Taiwanese Nativist Literature reflects shared anti-Imperialist and anti-Feudal experiences…definitely not works based on the ideology of the ruler which would betray the will of the common people.”¹¹⁸ This historical explanation of Taiwanese Nativist Literature by Ye admits the existence of a Taiwanese Literature, whose formation is very different from Chinese literature. The anti-Nativist side returned to the historical debate (initiated by Ye) with the aim of politically discrediting their opponents, with articles by Yin Zhengxiong (1952), Yu Kwang-chung, Zhu Xining (1927-1998) and Chen Yingzhen (1937-). According to Chen Fang-ming, leftist and rightist Chinese political ideology and issues of class gradually came to dominate this literary debate; in particular, these arguments were used to accuse Nativist

¹¹⁸ Chen, [Postcolonial Taiwan], p. 52.
Literature of promoting Taiwanese independence. In Chen Yingzhen’s view, for example, Ye Shitao’s anti-Imperialist and anti-Feudalist explanation of Taiwanese Nativist Literature was an “argument of deliberate separatism,“ which would lead to Taiwanese Independence. The literary debate was further escalated in relation to questions of political stance through attacks by Peng Ge (1926-), the chief editor of Central Daily, on Wang Tuo, Chen Yingzhen, and Wei Tiancong (1935-). Peng, with his obvious rightist Chinese ideology, quoted governmental views in his “Butan renxin heyou wenxue” [Without Humanity, There Would Be No Literature], and asked Chen Yingzhen and all nativists to “be real [Chinese] nationalists and patriots who are united together.” In Yu Kwang-chung’s “Lang laile” [The Wolf has Come] (1977), Yu directly accuses Nativist Literature of having a political agenda by describing it as Gongnongheng wenyi [The Literature of Workers, Farmers, and Soldiers]. According to Yu, the Nativist Literature had its origins in Mao Zedong’s “Zai yanan wenyi zuotanhui de jianghua” [Speech at Yanan Literary Seminar] in 1942. Yu asked the Nativist writers to “inspect their brains.” According to Chen Fang-ming, Yu’s argument turned the literary debate from a discussion of literature to an inspection of political ideas. In January 1978, at the

119 Ibid., pp. 93-103.
123 Chen, [Postcolonial Taiwan], p. 103.
Armed-Forces Literary Assembly [Guojun wényì dàhuì], General Wang Sheng, the Chief Director of the Political Warfare Department, finally called an end to this escalating literary debate. This direct political interference by the state at the end of this literary debate demonstrated that politics still could control the literary field, at least before the coming of the lifting of martial law.

The term Xiangtu [Nativist] Literature has been widely adopted by critics and authors to mark the change of focus of literature in Taiwan in the late 1970s. It was at this point that the literary fashion turned from an elite-led Modernism, when Modernist literature was complicit with political controls, to a Nativist discourse full of social concerns in which the struggles of the common people were explored. As a result, a return to realism and naturalism accompanied this movement. Along with this nativism, more sensitive political issues like Chinese-Taiwanese national identity and the real situation of poor villages were engaged with by a number of authors and intellectuals, who were no longer within their comfort zone. Since art was not only for art’s sake, long-neglected ethnic and national issues finally surfaced, and became the motifs in many Nativist and non-Nativist novels around the time of the lifting of martial law in 1987. According to Peng, this demonstrates that Nativist Literature carried more rebellious characteristics than Modernist Literature.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Peng, [Fourty Years of Taiwan New Literature], pp. 141-146.
V. The Modernist Palimpsest in Bai Xianyong’s Writing

Bai Xianyong, a Chinese immigrant writer, was one of the advocates of Modernist Literature. Bai was born in China in 1937: his father Bai Chongxi (1893-1966) was a famous KMT general. In 1947, after the 2-28 Incident, as the Minister of Defence at that time, Bai Chongxi was sent to Taiwan by Chiang Kei-shek to stabilise the situation. Bai Xianyong moved to Hong Kong with his family in 1948, and then moved to Taiwan in 1952. He graduated from the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures in the National Taiwan University (NTU), and he founded the magazine *Modern Literature* magazine [*Xiandai wenxue*] (1960-1973, 1977-1984) with his NTU friends in 1960. Bai’s writing reflects both his traditional Chinese literary background and Modernist experiments (such as stream of consciousness).

Bai’s most famous work is *Taiheiren* [*Taipei People/Taipei Characters*] (1971, hereafter *Taipei People*), which comprises 14 independent short stories and demonstrates the Modernist influence from the Irish writer James Joyce’s *Dubliners*

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125 Pai Hsien-yuan is another spelling for Bai Xianyong. I take the latter spelling in the thesis.
126 I do not adopt the translation of George Kao, the editor of *Taipei Characters*’s English version, where *Taiheiren* is rendered as *Taipei Characters*. Instead, I take *Taipei People* as the translation into English. Kao argues it is more appropriate to translate it as *Taipei Characters* because this collection is not dealing with “common people.” What Bai has achieved in this collection is to enhance our understanding of the life of “the small circle of men and women who retreated from China to Taiwan in 1950s.” However, in this sense, to represent the Chinese language-context at that time, the translation of *Taipei People* better reflects Bai’s generalisation of members of the Chinese diaspora as the people that comprised the citizens of Taipei. See Bai Xianyong, *Taiheiren* [*Taipei Characters*] (Taipei: Erya, 2002), p. 314. In the following discussion of *Taiheiren*, I directly take the name-spelling of these characters from the English version of this book.
(1914), which is a collection of 15 short stories. Although the name of this collection is *Taipei People*, most of these characters are actually drawn from among the Chinese diaspora who had fled to Taipei city (the capital of Taiwan) with the KMT government around 1949, including traditional Chinese-opera [Kunqu] singers, relatives of military personnel, retired military personnel, and teachers. These characters demonstrate a deep nostalgia for China—a display of sentimental feeling for their lost Homeland. This is one obvious difference from *Dubliners*, where the characters are ethnically Irish living under English colonial rule. Traditional Chinese opera, scenes of China, and glorious and sad episodes of military life are remembered through the narrator’s vivid descriptions (which owes much to Bai’s family’s military background). There is one exception. The story of “A Sky Full of Bright, Twinkling Stars” (first published in 1969) describes a local gay group in Taipei New Park (this can be seen as anticipating his later work *Niezi (Crystal Boys)*, published in 1983). *Taipei People* was first translated into English in 1982, with the book title as *Wandering in the Garden, Waking from a Dream*, taken from its most celebrated story.\(^{127}\) It was subsequently published in a Chinese-English bilingual edition as *Taipei People* in 2000, translated by both Bai himself and Patia Yasin.\(^{128}\)

A more in-depth gay writing appears in his only long fiction *Niezi (Crystal Boys, 1983, hereafter Crystal Boys)*. The protagonist Li Qing and most of the marginalised gay group depicted were born and grew up in Taipei (many of them are

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descendents of Chinese diaspora), and the work shows more evidence of Bai’s settling-in into Taiwan, physically and mentally (such as the revealing of his sexual orientation), than his previous Taipei People. This can be seen as his Chinese nationalism—or in Bourdieu’s term, his Chinese habitus—has become localised, or, Taiwan-ised. My exploration of this work—which argues that this work bears a sort of nativist turn—will be given in a later section of this chapter.

Bai is also an expert on traditional Chinese opera [Kunqu], and able to draw many allusions from Chinese literary classics (such as those in Hongloumeng [Dream of the Red Chamber]) in his work. He successfully combines this Chinese element with a Modernist approach in his work. By adopting Western Modernism as his innovative weapon, he doesn’t relinquish his classical Chinese literary tradition as the following Chen Ruoying maintains: “The most distinguished characteristic of his fiction-writing is the combination of the traditional way of narration and modern techniques.”

In subsequent sections, I will discuss the following questions: What does Modernism mean in the context of Bai’s traditonal-Chinese literature background? In the context of Taiwan’s martial law, does Modernism permit him an escape from the patriotic discourse disciplined by the 1950s Combat Literature, and a break-through in the state-run literary policy? Also, if he does, how does he negotiate the polarised politicised and aesthetic routes in Modernism? Futhermore, to return to a question raised by the ethnic and national-identity issues involved in

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the translation of the book title of *Taipei People*, what is Bai’s position-taking in ethnic politics? Whose Taipei does Bai portray in *Taipei People*—does he portray Taipei city as a space for dynamic (Taiwanese and Chinese) national identities, or simply as a relocation of Chinese diaspora? And what kind of locality do *Taipei People* and *Crystal Boys* represent, and how does Bai’s writing adapt to the rising Nativist [Xiangtu] discourse in 1970s Taiwan?

As these issues are touched on, more questions are to be asked. Even though 1960s Modernism had a more liberal claim than the previous Combat Literature, the literary field was still controlled and regulated by the KMT state power within the White Terror institution. In this regard, was 1960s Taiwanese Modernism a deformed and compromised Modernism—especially when compared with European Modernism? Were the Taiwanese Modernists still conformists with the national machine, like the Combat literary writers? If not, how did they cope with the control of the state power? Was Bai Xianyong’s literary achievement in Taiwan and in China indebted to the Chinese political ideology and the nostalgia of China embedded in his work? In terms of consecration, does Bai’s writing conform with KMT’s cultural policy? Finally, what kind of Modernist is he, a “high-culture” Modernist, a Modernist who obeys the market and martial law, or a radical Modernist following revolutionary doctrines? These issues and questions will be explored in the following discussion.

*Taipei People*—the Politics of Marginalisation

*Taipei People* (1971) consists of fourteen short stories: they are “The Eternal
Snow Beauty,” “A Touch of Green,” “New Year’s Eve,” “The Last Night of Taipei Chin,” “A Sea of Blood-red Azaleas,” “Ode to Bygone Days,” “The Dirge of Liang Fu,” “Love’s Lone Flower,” “Glory’s by Blossom Bridge,” “Autumn Reveries,” “A Sky Full of Bright, Twinkling Stars,” “Winter Night,” and “State Funeral.” Previous criticism of this selection tends to provide positive views of the stories.\textsuperscript{130} I will offer a more critical perspective based on the issue of marginalisation in relation to Bai’s claimed \textit{marginal} position-taking, the imbalanced ethnic politics between the Taiwanese and the Chinese of the portrayal of characters in \textit{Taipei People}, and in terms of a Nativist [\textit{Bentu}] perspective, which criticises the dominant Chinese-ideology embedded in his work.

In terms of the portrayal of ethnicity, Bai’s \textit{Taipei People} represents the imbalanced ethnic politics embedded in the dominant Chinese ideology at that time. Liu Liang-ya points out, in \textit{Taipe People}, “the native characters it portrays are confined to the low-class people, which demonstrates a very limited acknowledgement of nativeness.”\textsuperscript{131} In this work, there are remarkably few \textit{normal} Taiwanese provincial characters. In fact, Taiwanese characters appear in only six out

\textsuperscript{130} Such as the criticism made by Ou Yangzi. According to Jiang Bochai, in Ou Yangzi’s series of criticism of \textit{Taibeiren, Wang xie tangqian de yanzi} \textit{[Swallows in front of Wang and Xie Mansions]} (1976), close reading techniques of New Criticism are used to discuss the “topic, character, mode, irony, symbol, language, tone, and ambiguity” in \textit{Taibeiren}. Jiang argues that this criticism “canolises Taiwane modernist fiction and New Criticism at the same time.” See Jiang Bochai, \textit{Bai xianyong yu taiwan dangdai wenxueshi de goucheng} \textit{[Bai Xianyong and the Constitution of Taiwan Contemporary Literary History]} (Kaohsiung: Luotuo, 2004), pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{131} Liou Liang-ya, “Houxiandai yu houzhimin: lun jieyan yilai de taiwan xiaoshuo” \textit{[Postmodernism and Postcolonialism: A Discussion on Fictions of Post-Martial-Law Taiwan]} in \textit{Taiwan xiaoshuo shilun} \textit{[Essays on Taiwan Literary History]} (Taipei: Maitian, 2007), p. 359.
of the fourteen stories. The taxi dancer, Phoenix Chu, in “The Last Night of Taipan Chin” was an ethnic Taiwanese tea-picker from Miaoli county who has moved to Taipei. Her father is a drunken bum and her stepmother makes life rough for her. Taipan Chin, a famous taxi dancer from Shanghai nicknamed “Jade Goddess of Mercy,” has made efforts to turn Phoenix Chu into a real taxi dancer—“to turn this hayseed into a fetching dancehall flower.” Unexpectedly, Phoenix Chu gets pregnant and this transformation plan is terminated.¹³² Chin Taipan offers realistic suggestion to Phoenix Chu (such as asking Chu to have abortion). However, her transformation plan for Chu, in terms of ethnic politics, cannot help but suggest a kind of national allegory—to make the Taiwanese Chu conform to the rules of taxi dancing club, which has been transplanted from Shanghai, and to make Chu accept the disciplinary structure where Chin Taipan occupies the dominant position-taking while Chu is situated as the dominated.

The story “A Sea of Blood-red Azaleas” describes the age-crossing affection between Little Beauty, a princess-like little girl living in a big house in Taipei, who is the daughter of the brother of the narrator’s mother, and the man-servant, Wang Hsiung, a retired soldier. They are both members of the Chinese-ethnic diaspora, but with remarkably class differences. Wang Hsiung’s love for Little Beauty turns out to be a failure, since Little Beauty starts to despise the company of Wang, who is called “a dog” (in English) and “Big Gorilla” by his princess who reads “aloud in English with great pride.”¹³³ In the end, Wang becomes crazy and commits suicide.

¹³² Pai, Taipei People, pp. 116-117, 126-129.
¹³³ Pai, Taipei People, pp. 164-167.
Before that, he rapes Happy. Wang is often teased by the Taiwanese-ethnic maid, Happy, with her Taiwanese swear words. She is portrayed by the narrator in a grotesque or caricatured way:

She was a big-breasted female who was particularly fond of wearing skintight clothes, so tight you could see her flesh jiggling around in them. She always painted her face oily white, and pencilled her eyebrows heavily. She would ogle people with her small eyes and purse her lips defiantly, fancying herself very seductive.\textsuperscript{134}

The stereotyping of the Taiwanese-ethnic maid, Happy, is similar to that of the Taiwanese-ethnic washerwoman, Spring Maid, in “Glory’s by Blossom Bridge.” Spring Maid, who is “shaked up with” Mr. Lu, is described by the narrator (a member of the Chinese diaspora from Guilin, a county in Guanxi province in China) in a remarkably similar way as a large-breasted woman who swears without any sense of shame:

That female [Spring Maid] had a pair of boobs on her would be bouncing off your face before she was close enough for you to make out who it was behind them. She wasn’t much over twenty and already that rump of hers was puffed out like a drum. When she was scrubbing clothes, there wasn’t a single part of her body that didn’t jiggle; those big melons of hers would be going up and down like a pair of mallet-heads. Whenever she laid eyes on a man, she’d give him the old come-on smile and bedroom eyes. The thing I remember most about her was that day in the market when a young vegetable hawker did something or other to cross her. Before you knew it, those giant knockers of hers were already rammed into that poor man, all

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., pp. 160-161.
he could do was stumble backwards several steps while she sprayed a volley of spit over him and exploded “Fuck your mother’s —!” What a spitfire! What a tramp!135

In the story, the washerwoman, Spring Maid, seduces Mr Lu, a member of the Chinese diaspora from Guilin, who has been presented as “polite, thoughtful, an educated gentleman,” a teacher teaching Chinese at an elementary school. Mrs Ku (another member of the Chinese diaspora, the narrator’s friend) comments on Spring-Maid: “I knew right off that Taiwanese trollop was up to no good.” Mrs Ku also witnesses Mr Lu and Spring Maid make love: “They were there, the pair of them, stark naked in broad daylight! That damn piece was riding on top of Mr. Lu, her hair flying all over the place, she looked just like a lioness.”136 Through this narration, the couple’s sexual desire is made to seem guilty, and the blame is placed on the Taiwanese female. Later, Spring Maid, now called by the narrator “that Taiwanese wench,” is caught by Mr Lu when she is “balling” a shoeshine boy in Mr Lu’s room. After Mr Lu slaps Spring Maid’s face a few times, Spring Maid beats him up and bites half his ear off. According to Mrs Ku:

“Could you imagine a more cruel and vicious female [Spring Maid] in this world? Did you ever see such a thing in your life? She lit into Mr Ku like a hurricane, climed all over him, tearing and clawing. And then, with one bite she bit half his ear off! If it hadn’t been for me running out into the street and screaming for help, that bitch would have finished Mr. Lu off

135 Ibid., pp. 282-283.
The Taiwanese Maid Spring seems to be the incarnation of a monster, in contrast to the gentleman-like Mr Lu. Before migrating to Taiwan, Mr Lu had been engaged to a girl, Miss Lo, also from Kweling. The Guilin girl, according to the narrator, has “the grace of the flowing waters of the river,” and her eyes are “bright and innocent” with the “classic upward tilt.” The contrast between Spring Maid and the couple Mr Lu and Miss Lo is remarkable. The Taiwanese washerwoman is represented as being of low class with a primitive outlook and with powerful sexual appetites, while the Chinese couple are middle-class, with a gentle and civilised quality, and a modest outlook. Even though this short story shows Bai’s attempt at a realistic description of the life of the middle-class of Taipei people, his representation, actually demonstrates a biased Chinese-centric ethnic conception towards the peripheral Taiwanese people, especially towards the Taiwanese women. The fear and hatred of the Chinese diasporic narrator (and the other Chinese characters in this short story) towards the Taiwanese maid, and the overestimated praise for Mr Lu and his Chinese fiancée may reveal the author’s real attitude towards the Taiwanese people—from point of view of the Chinese diaspora. Non-provincial Chinese characters are the norm and are empowered to criticise the monster-like Spring Maid. This polarised bias may have some basis in sympathy for their diasporic nature—even their sorrows are elegantly pitiful. In this sense, this story, and the collection, can be seen a “realist” description of the psychological complex of these

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137 Ibid., pp. 286-289.

138 Ibid., pp. 292-293.
Chinese migrants. However, Bai himself, or the narrator, does not leave space for reflection on this problematic ethnic preference. Instead, the negative description of Taiwanese characters are fortified repeatedly. Some ironic criticism is presented in the story—for example, when the Chinese diasporic characters demonstrate their biased ethnic-preference, that people and things in relation to Guilin, or, China, are generally good, or are at least worthy of elegant nostalgia—but the representation of Taiwanese people and things, with Bai’s flattened portrayal, in this strange Taipei city is generally negative.

The remaining Taiwanese characters are the winehouse girl, Dainty, in “Love’s Lone Flower;” Ah Hsiung the Primitive in “A Sky Full of Bright, Twinkling Stars;” and Professor Yu’s Taiwanese wife (her name is not mentioned by the narrator). These Taiwanese characters are predominantly of lower class (maids, taxi dancers), showing negative personality traits (seductive, spitfire-like, tramp-like), or they are marginalised. The generalised description of Taiwanese characters vividly portrays a negative imagination of the Other—that is, those who are not Chinese. On the other hand, the realistic description of Chinese characters together represents an idealised image of members of the Chinese diaspora. For example, the elegant Yin Hsueh-yen who emigrated from Shanghai, the Snow Beauty in “The Eternal Snow Beauty,” is attractive in outlook, graceful in composition, floating above the common people,

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139 Ou Yangzi agrees with Yan Yuanshu’s comments in “Bai xianyong de yuyan” [Bai Xianyong’s Language] that Bai is an author with “vigorous historical, spetial, and social consciousness.” Ou Yangzi argues that Taibeiren uses “realist techniques to describe the life of the mainlanders after they fled to Taipei”. See Ou Yangzi, Wang xie tangqian de yanzi [Swallows in front of Wang and Xie Mansions] (Taipei: Erya, 2004), p. 7.
and displaying high-class Shanghai taste.

The biased ethnic arrangement of characters in this collection reflects a distorted social demographic. Bai may simply be representing the discriminating view of the Chinese diaspora towards local Taiwanese citizens; however, it is hard to avoid the criticism that his characters in this work are ethnically selected owing to the author’s background and ideology.

As I suggested earlier, Bai’s fiction can be described as a combination of traditional Chinese culture and Western Modernism. By Western Modernism, I mean the influence of both European and American Modernism. This was embodied in the post-May-Fourth Movement and the New Realist Movement in 1930-50s China where Bai grew up to the age of fifteenth, and again by American Modernism when he founded the magazine *Modern Literature* in 1960 in Taiwan. The latter shows more impact on his writing. This is shown explicitly or implicitly throughout his works. When he was in Taiwan, he carried Chinese ideology and was deeply influenced by American Modernism. Significantly, when he was in America, traditional Chinese culture and Chinese themes became his literary inspiration.140 His aesthetic achievement lies much in his position-taking as “being exotic.” As Bai says: “I found ‘being a marginal man’ is most intriguing. I am not good at writing middle-class life of ‘classical’ spouses—maybe I am not good at writing “the majority.””141 Bai’s Chinese diaspora background in Taiwan, his experiences in America, and his homosexuality could well explain why his writing carries this

141 Ibid., p.474.
“marginal,” quality.

However, Bai’s position-taking as “being exotic” and the fact that he “is not good at writing ‘the majority’” does not support the conclusion that his writing is marginalised. In fact, his writing has been popular and canonised as one of the representatives of Chinese Literature since the 1960s, in Taiwan, China, and the world. Instead, his writing should be seen in terms of Taiwan’s ethnic politics during the White Terror, where as noted above, Bai’s focus in Taipei People is not the majority Taiwanese citizens of Taipei, but the diasporic Chinese citizens. Although the diasporic Chinese were far outnumbered by native residents, the Chinese diaspora occupied the dominant position in the political, social, and cultural field. Bai’s writing about the dominant “marginal” (the Chinese diaspora) conforms with the dominant Chinese ideology. This Chinese ideology forms a part of Bai’s habitus in writing.

Although Bai Xianyong is a Chinese writer who has migrated to Taiwan, and is from a ruling-class family, when he faces the pressure of the colonial institution, he acts in a similar way to some local Taiwanese writers (like Wu Zhuoliu’s). These writers did not always resist and criticise the hegemony directly. Instead, they adopted a compromised way against the KMT rule. Chen Fang-ming argues that these Chinese diasporic writers (including Bai) have shown a “passively-exiled way to express their protesting spirit.”142 For example, in the prime of the Combat Literature in the 1950s, they might have conformed with, actively or passively, the norms set by the Cultural Cleansing Movement. However, the ease with which they

142 Chen, [Postcolonial Taiwan], p. 31.
about-turned in order to fit-in with Modernist Literature in the 1960s, in which aesthetical exile elements were valued higher than a return to Chinese culture in their political agenda (there were some exceptions), suggests that they no longer maintained a comprehensive adherence to the artistic norms of the Combat Literary period. American Modernism, with its proclaimed “depoliticising” appearance, provided these Taiwanese literary agents, including Bai and other modernists, with a “de-railment” from the politicising trends of Combat Literature. Thus Chen explains why American Modernism was successfully introduced and accepted within the 1960s Taiwanese field (which was, at that time, dominated by Chinese diasporic writers): “when historical memory was gone, these [Chinese diasporic] writers under colonisation lost their spiritual fortress for resistance, and as a result, their works present ‘rootlessness and exile.’”143 However, although Bai, and other modernists may show their protesting spirits indirectly through the seemingly conforming Modernism, their Chinese disposition, (in Bourdieu’s term, their internalised Chinese cultural literary capital—in terms of its China-centric ideology, its non-native language use and its de-social reality approaches) at the same time detracted this embedded protesting from their works.

Bai’s *Taipei People* maintains this intense Chinese literary disposition, even though it rebels from within. For instance, Bai’s adoption of *Kunqu* elements in his writing, which are expressive of libidinal and individual desire, mark a departure from a dominant Confucian morality. Elsewhere, for example in *Wandering in the Garden*, according to Chang, the setting is nostalgically Chinese—more specifically,

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143 Chen, [*Postcolonial Taiwan*], p. 31.
a Shanghainese representation—rather than a Taiwanese,\textsuperscript{144} but Chang continues: “The splendor of the decadent world of Taipei’s Shanghainese exiles” is constantly overshadowed “by a matter-of-fact account of what history has in store for these characters.”\textsuperscript{145}

In her analysis of \textit{Taipei People}, Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang quotes from Joseph Lau’s “The Concepts of Time and Reality in Modern Chinese Fiction” on “the repression of historical representation”: “Because writings on sensitive topics were easily banned and their authors blacklisted during this period, voluntary or involuntary self-censorship has produced a literature in which contemporary history is strikingly under-represented.”\textsuperscript{146} She goes on: “Although [Chinese] writers of the older generation inherited the pre-1949 realist tradition of Chinese New Literature, their deliberate avoidance of ‘critical realism’ consciously or unconsciously altering the very conventions of this tradition, was largely an effect of the dominant culture’s [KMT Chinese] ideological prescriptions.”\textsuperscript{147} Chang continues, “compared with Chinese writers before the emergence of Modernist vogue, who surrendered to nationalistic ideology—either working with the fighting-literature trend, or producing sentimental romance,” the 1960s Taiwanese modernists tended to produce works which are “more aesthetically motivated” and “usually claimed to be part of universal human history.”\textsuperscript{148} In fact, the Chinese immigrants’ nostalgia for China

\textsuperscript{144} Chang, \textit{Modernism and the Nativist Resistance}, pp. 93-95.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p. 68.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., pp. 88-89.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 89.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
was part of the social “realities” in early post-war Taiwan, just like the pre-war Taiwanese writers’ nostalgia for an imagined China (i.e. before-2-28), and an idealistic colonial Taiwan. Both of them would have had the ability to offer a more Taiwan-centred reality, if state power did not severely intrude literary autonomy. The highly-politicised legitimisation of the former at the same time ruled out the possibilities for both sides to offer their own “literary realities.” Therefore, Chang argues: “Tales [Taipei People] first appeared as a welcome exception to the general lack of historical references in Taiwan’s Modernist fiction.”149 In her reading of it, *Taipei People* was concerned to address “the ostrich mentality of Taipei’s emigres.” However, the collection’s engagement with history actually reveals a twisted and compromised historical reality. The young modernist Bai culturally and politically inherited the Chinese historiography instilled by the KMT government’s Chinese education, and this strong Chinese cultural ideology still predominates in the work. Nevertheless, compared with such pedagogy in *Taibeiren*, “performances” are more easily found in *Crystal Boys*.

**The Localisation of Crystal Boys**

Most of the 1960s Modernist works, with their culturally Chinese characteristics and the influence of the state power, did not deal with the social context and political reality of Taiwan at that time. *Crystal Boys/Cursed Sons* (1977), by comparison, engages more deeply with local Taiwan, rather than foregrounding the nostalgic diasporic remembrance of Chinese nationalism. The main site of the

149 Ibid.
story is the New Park in Taipei, a home to gay people of both Chinese emigré and Taiwanese ethnicity. *Crystal Boys* also carries elements of Chinese literary traditions: such as allusions to *Dream of Red Chamber* (1784) according to which the feminine characteristics of the male protagonist Jia Baoyu are valued highly. Within the Red Chamber, gender stereotypes are very often reversed: this is also like the case in the New Park, where feminine qualities, and according to Chang, “useless” sensuality, become the dominant rules.\(^{150}\)

The first section of *Crystal Boys* is called “Banishment.” After being called “You Scum! You Filthy Scum!,” A-qing (Lee Qing), the narrator, is cast out from the family home by his father, a retired military regiment commander who has migrated to Taiwan. This scene is immediately followed by a public school notice which announces that the protagonist has been expelled from the senior high school (in 1970) because of sexual relations between A-qing and Old Zhou, the middle-aged male school janitor. The second section—“In Our Kingdom”—introduces this “Kingdom” as an unruly nation within the nation:

> There are no days in our kingdom, only nights. As soon as the sun comes up, our kingdom goes into hiding, for it is an unlawful nation; we have no government and no constitution, we are neither recognised nor respected by anyone, our citizenry is little more than rabble…we are a fickle, unruly people [*guozu*, which means nation].\(^{151}\)

This illegitimate territory, where gay people gather, occupies only a part of Taipei


New Park. This gay Kingdom, which has no rules but desire, can be seen as an illegitimate nation within the legitimate KMT state. Margaret Hillenbrand explains this doomed process of home-coming of these cursed boys through a comparison between patriarchal ethics of family and the discipline-oriented KMT rule. The shared “quest for an ersatz home” of these characters, as she suggests,\textsuperscript{152} in terms of national allegory, perhaps can be seen as a metaphor for the KMT’s troubled state-relocation in the 1970s. In terms of national allegory, Hillenbrand argues “many Taiwanese allegories appeal to their readers because they go some way toward capturing the complex contradictory dialectic between past and present, nationalism and counternationalism, that has made these readers what they are.”\textsuperscript{153} When the powerful “father” (Republican China, or the KMT before the 1970s) is absent, would this initiate a search for a “counternationalism,” a paternal surrogate (such as in Little Jade’s case, who looks for a Japanese father) or a maternal-leaning allegory?\textsuperscript{154} The narrator says: “in this kingdom of ours there are no distinctions of social rank, eminence, age, or strength. What we share in common are bodies filled with aching, irrepressible desire and hearts filled with insane loneliness.”\textsuperscript{155} These “tortured hearts” which “burst out of their loneliness” are like “wild animals that have broken out of their cages…”\textsuperscript{156} Grandpa Guo, the owner of the Youth Photo


\textsuperscript{154} See the following discussion of Zhu Weicheng’s idea of a “(Freak) Taiwanese Mother”.


\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
Studio, who has taken photos of the young gay circle and named the album “Birds of Youth," tells A-qing:

“Go on, A-qing, now it’s your turn to fly. All you wild youngsters who’ve grown up on this island have that strain of wildness in your blood, just like the typhoons and earthquakes that are part of this island. You’re a bunch of fledglings who’ve lost your nest… with no idea where you’ll wind up…”¹⁵⁷

Both the portrayal of the desire-following rules of this gay kingdom, and the images of the Birds of Youth present a positive view of wilderness and diaspora, which are embodied in these Taiwanese young gay people, who meet in the Park at night to look for partners. Given the fact that Bai Xianyong started to write Crystal Boys in 1977 and finished it in 1981,¹⁵⁸ this illegitimate nation, the sub-cultural gay group, when read in terms of national allegory, can be seen to represent the illegitimate international status that Taiwan had in the 1970s. That is, the writing period for the novel coincides with the period when Taiwan was cast out of the U. N. (in 1970) and when the U.S. broke with Taiwan in order to develop its relationship with People’s Republic of China (in 1978). After that, Taiwan became the illegitimate representative of China. This embedded nationalist description of the lost Chinese

¹⁵⁸ Niezi [Crystal Boys] was first serialised in 1977 in Modern Literature, and then serialised in Nanyang Business Daily until 1981. It was published as a long novel in 1983. See Bai Xianyong, Niezi [Crystal Boys] (Taipei: Yunchen, 2003), pp 403-404. The story of Crystal Boys is based on the gay protagonist Lee Qing’s exiled adventures in the New Park in Taipei in 1970s Taiwan. He then becomes immersed in the subcultural gay group in Taipei New Park.
legitimacy of Taiwan can thus be seen as a nativist approach within Bai’s modernist writing. In addition, as mentioned, if seeing Chinese national discipline as a failed paternalistic narrative of national allegory, on the other hand, a more “maternalistic” Taiwanese/Nativist narrative could thus be seen as another way out. According to Zhu Weicheng, feminine sexuality represented by characters, such as A-qing and Little Jade, in fact “lead the readers to enter a most ‘nativist Taiwanese world’” whether these Taiwanese attempts by Bai are successful or not, such as the bar girl Moon Beauty’s place, A-qing’s temporary places in Taipei, the local festival in Sanchong City, and the use of the Hoklo language. Zhu argues, “the speciality of Taiwanese-ness” is represented through Bai Xianyong’s delicate arrangements of Taiwanese quality in the plots, such as the typhoon night, the tropical hot weather, the Taiwan-born A-Feng, the painting “The Call of Wildness” (with a local-temple setting). These deeper “nativist” attempts by Bai, can be seen as an advancement compared with the relatively Chinese position-taking in Taipei People. In addition, among the Taiwanese Nativist [Bentu] trend in the 1980s, it could be argued to acknowledge that Bai set an example of becoming a native modernist through Crystal Boys, even with his Chinese diasporic background.

In terms of national allegory, the last short story in Taipei People, “State Funeral” [Guozang], which was written by Bai in California at the end of winter

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160 Ibid.

161 In Chinese, Guo-zang normally means a state funeral for someone important, but in wordplay, it can imply a funeral of the state.
in 1970, is also relevant here. Given the time when it was written, and the pun of the title, this work can be seen as an account of a funeral held for the KMT general, but also as a funeral for the state of the Republic of China, which was cast out of the U.N. in 1970 and forfeited the legitimate representation of China. According to Li Shuangxue, associations between the names of Taipei People and Dubliners have been made; however, Bai Xianyong never openly and directly admitted the association. Nevertheless, regarding the facts that Bai’s English literature discipline in NTU, and the translation and introduction of the works of Western modernists, including Dubliners, by Xiandai wenxue in which Bai was one of the editors, it could be suggested that Joyce’s Dubliners could to some extent influence Bai’s writing of Taipei People. In addition, Bai may be also aware of the Irish nationalist implications of the last story of Dubliners, “The Dead.” As the last story of Taipei People, “State Funeral” corresponds to “The Dead” not only in Bai’s arrangement of the order of stories, but also in signifying the closure of a period and the end of a particular a state of mind. At the end of Joyce’s story, Gabriel looks out the window, where the snow, “general all over Ireland,” is falling “upon all the

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164 According to Bai himself, the complete stories of Dubliners were first translated by [Modern Literature]. See Bai Xianyong, Diliuzhi shouzhi [The Sixth Finger] (Taipei: Erya, 1996), p. 249. According to Li Shuangxue, from Ou Yangzi’s review, a special issue of James Joyce of Xiandai wenxue should be conducted mainly by Bai Xianyong. See Li, [Three Perspectives of Bai Xianyong], pp. 24-25.
living and the dead.” It is time for Gabriel to “set out on his journey westward.”\(^{165}\) In terms of the colonial palimpsest, this “westward” journey implies an occidental return to Irish origins (rather than an oriental identification with English culture, as in Gabriel’s earlier quotation of English poetry by Robert Browning and his writing for an English paper), and a reconnection to an Irish past.

In Bai’s “State Funeral,” old friends of the late General Li Hao-jan are gathered at the state funeral. The narrator Ch’in I-fang, who served as an adjutant to General Li, also attends the funeral with other aged military officers. These aging KMT generals, with their aged and selective memories, are still wrapped up in the history of the glory and defeats in the battles of the Chinese Civil War. These old acquaintances of the late General Li are like Gabriel, or the Irish people more generally in Joyce’s stories, who are paralysed under the burden of English colonisation. The funeral scrolls register the paralysed One-China political ideology (or hysteresis, in Bourdieu’s term), with reminders such as “never to share the same Ground with the Enemy [the Chinese Communist Party]” and “Our Country [China], our Nation is split in two.”\(^{166}\) At the end of this state funeral, a troop of soldiers passed by and salutes the hearse. The narrator also salutes his late commander, by recounting a memory in which he saluted the living commander and other generals in Nanjing in China. This memory is followed by the word “Sa-lute-,” and the story ends. Just like the snow in Joyce’s “The Dead,” the salute in Bai’s “State Funeral” implies a departure from the past of a legitimate China. Compared to the hopeful


meaning of snow in “The Dead,” however, the salute in “The State Funeral” shows compassion for the paralysed memory of these members of the Chinese diaspora, rather than any suggestion of hope for the future.

If we return now to Crystal Boys and consider it in terms of national allegory, Bai’s description of the “fledglings who’ve lost your nest” (like the Orphan image in Wu Zhuoliu’s writing) more obviously registers the Taiwanese locality in this text. The Taiwanese locality, no matter how uncertain it would be, becomes the source of subjectivity in narrative, rather than an object to be looked at as it was in Taipei People. Thus, it is noticeable that Taiwanese characters are given much more personality and description in this work than in the previous work. However, Crystal Boys still maintains a degree of ethnic preference. As in Taipei People, the Taiwanese characters are of low-class, while the Chinese characters occupy the dominant position. Fu Chongshan (Papa Fu), a member of the Chinese diaspora, acts as benefactor to the young gay people in the Park. He is a former general whose gay son committed suicide. With his wealth and good connections in military and police circles, he sponsors the running of the gay bar. Chief Yang, a chubby member of the Chinese diaspora, acts as the leader (and sometimes pimp) of these young “boys of New Park.” The primitive and muscular A-xiong, an “aborigine,” is Chief Yang’s protégé. The narrator has a good friend, Little Jade, who is also a member of the gay group in New Park. He is looking for a lost Japanese-Taiwanese father. Little Jade dreams that his Japanese father is rich and finally he stows away to Japan.167 In terms of national allegory, perhaps Little Jade’s father-seaching can be seen as an

ironic description of another version of Taiwan looking for an identity—in this case, the way some old Taiwanese identify with modern Japan. The legendary love affair between A-feng (Phoenix Boy), a Taiwanese, and Dragon Prince, a descendent of the Chinese diaspora, suggests an in-depth and a more complicated perspective on ethnic politics than those in Taipei People. Dragon Prince incidentally stabs Phoenix to death.

The Taiwanese Phoenix Boy, who is picked up by Fu Chongshan, eagerly desires freedom and has a habit of crying. We can perhaps understand this through recalling Grandpa Guo’s words: “we have a wild streak that’s as much a part of us as typhoons and earthquakes are a part of this island, and just as uncontrollable. That’s why I cry…to wash the poison out of my heart.” Phoenix Box has an unattractive face: “a triangular face with a short, pointy chin that curved slightly upward. Even when he was sleeping his eyebrows were knitted in a straight line, like a canopy over his eyes.” Papa Fu describes this as an “ill-starred look”; Phoenix Boy is “clearly fated for tragedy.” Phoenix Boy is painted by The Master Artist, a gay painter, in the painting—“The Call of Wildness,” which is hung on the wall of the newly-opened gay bar (the Cozy Nest). The painting, with the Dragon Mountain Temple (a famous temple in Taipei) as the background is described as follows:

The radiant eyes [of Phoenix Boy] blazed like two black wildfires glaring down on the people in the Cozy Nest, filled with fury. So in the misty amber lights, with Yang Sanlang’s organic music floating above their

168 Ibid., p. 263.
169 Ibid., p. 262.
haeds as they held their whispered conversations, the customers of the Cozy Nest, this new nest of us, once again began spreading the park legend of Phoenix Boy, lending it more and more mystical airs.\textsuperscript{170}

This painting, like the painting of Aurora in \textit{The Moor’s Last Sigh}, and that in the Cave of Barwa in \textit{She Plays with the Darkness}, has an iconic presence, while the passage as a whole gestures towards the colonial palimpsest. The Taiwanese wilderness is transformed through Phoenix’s blazing eyes, which suggest a national fury which refuses to be understood (or to be tamed). Yang Sanlang ([1919-1989], a musician in real life, who composed popular songs from the period of Japanese rule), represents a Japanese layer which gradually disappears in the “misty amber lights.” Phoenix Boy’s legendary love—a tragic love affair between a Taiwanese and a descendant of the Chinese diaspora—is disseminated through this layered narrative.

These gay characters suggest another kind of palimpsest. (In a sense, these characters can be seen as Bai’s self-incarnation, whose father was a high-ranking KMT general). They have fathers disciplined by traditional Chinese values (this heterosexuality habitus is largely shaped through values inculcated in military service); this is the habitus from which these sons are expelled. Phoenix Boy’s suitor, Wang Kuilong (Dragon Prince), just like the narrator A-qing, is expelled by his father, a high-ranking KMT general who loathes his son until his death (because his son’s gay sexuality brings shame), while Phoenix Boy is forbidden to attend his

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 225.
father’s state funeral. Dragon Prince thus wanders in New York, carrying his father’s loathing, like “a banished exile, scurrying in and out of the dark shadows of New York skyscrapers for ten years.” The curse from his father even produces a palimpsestic image. The curse “burned more and more deeply into my [his] flesh…only he had the power to remove it. But he didn’t leave a single word behind for me before he was lowered into the ground.” His father’s curse is “a curse that will always keep me from transcending this existence…” In terms of national allegory, the son’s curse by his father is like the national trauma carried by the Chinese diaspora to Taiwan. In contrast to the national glories in the past, when Taiwan still represented China, the diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s reduce these now “non-Chinese Chinese” to the status of (or not) identifying with the Taiwanese locality that their elder generation once considered a temporary location.

Conclusion: A Dynamic Palimpsest of the Situation of Post-war Literary Field

In this chapter, the palimpsestic layers of Modernism from the period of Japanese Rule to that of the post cold-war setting are traced. Dialectical and related courses of modernism—the 1930s New Literature and the 1970s Nativist [Xiangtu]

171 According to Yeh Te-hsuan, homophobia, (as the case of the gay boys in Crystal Boys, who are dispised and hated by their fathers) is a moral product of heterosexual system imposed by modern state. This is used to discipline individual bodies, families, and national subjects to achieve a fascist harmony. See Yeh Te-hsuan, “Con Jiating shouxun dao jingju wenxun—niezi zhong fuxi guojia de shenti guixundijing” [From Familial Awardship to Questioning in Police Office—the Disciplinary Topography of Body of a Patriarchal State/Family] Chung-wai Literary Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2. 2001, pp. 124-154.

172 Ibid., p.256.

173 Ibid.
Literature which were based on Realist approach—were discussed too. Through the
texual analysis of Bai’s work, *Taipei People* and *Crystal Boys*, a transformation of
literary subjectivity is found. At the same time, the imbalanced structure of national
allegories of China as “first-world” and Taiwan as “third-world” has gradually
shifted into a space where their shared marginality could refer to each other. That is,
although a biased ethnic preference still exists in *Crystal Boys*, nativist
perspectives—such as the normalised description of Taiwanese characters (they are
no more over-simplified characters, and they start to have more stage and
personality), the localised (rather than Shanghai) setting of the New Park in Taipei,
and the marginal position-taking of both the colonised Taiwan and the diasporic
China—are more often found in the later work. The characters in *Crystal Boys* are
no more people-in-transit as in *Taipei People*. They start to die and return to this
island (such as Dragon Prince’s return from America), and legends are made and to
be remembered in this localised narrative. In a sense, Taipei becomes a palimpsest,
in which layered nationalism (and counter nationalism) and national allegories could
be found. As Bai says, “I have a special feeling for Taipei…it is not a beautiful city,
but it does not matter. What matters are its invisible things, things in the past, things
deeply-rooted, and historical things that have been sedimented in Taipei.” Bai
continues, “That is, what matters are the things in the memory accumulating layer
by layer…This makes Taipei different from other cities.”

174 See Bai Xianyong, “Bai xianyong de wenxue yu yishu guoji yantaohui zhuanti yanjiang”
[Keynote Speech for the International Conference on Bai Xianyong’s Literature and Arts], in
*Kuashiji de liuli bai xianyong de wenxue yu yishu guoji yantaohui lunwenji* [Exile across Two
In Bai’s latest work *New Yorkers* (2007), a collection of six stories (written between 1965 to 2003), a layered cosmopolitan outlook is portrayed through Chinese and Taiwanese immigrants and students who settle in San Francisco, and New York. The global setting of the stories in this collection suggests the possibility to be seen as a prototype of Bai’s third layer. According to Liu Jun, “the stance of creation embodied in *New Yorkers* experienced a shift from (Chinese) nationalism to cosmopolitanism in recent years.”

Liu Jun also stresses that a deeper and wider perspectives of Bai could be found in this collection: from “Zhexianren” [The Banished Immortal] (1965) and “Zhexianyuan” [The Resentment of the Immortal] (1969), which demonstrate cultural colonialism within an inbalanced East and West structure through Bai’s “(Chinese) national stance and oriental consciousness”; through “Yeque” [Nocturne] (1979) and “Guhui” [Ashes] (1986), which portray the absurdity resulted from Chinese political fightings; to “Danny Boy” (2001) and “Tea for Two” (2003), in which a global view is used by Bai to transcend the dualistic China-West structure in [The Banished Immortal] and [The Resentment of the Immortal].

I only partly agree with Liu Jun’s point that there exists a shift from (Chinese) nationalism to cosmopolitanism, because his development from “nationalism” to “cosmopolitan” initiates more questions. First, Liu Jun’s “Chinese nationalism” presumption of Bai’s early stage of writing is too general, in which

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176 Ibid.
geographical politics and time narrative of Taiwan in Bai’s writing is greatly ignored. As I have argued, *Crystal Boys* (1983) can be seen as a localised national discourse for Bai’s Chinese nationalism in *Taipei People*, and its conversation with Taiwanese nationalism (especially in the 1980s) should not be dismissed in this structure.

However, this crucial stage of “national crisis” is dismissed in Liu Jun’s presumption. Liu Jun’s “cosmopolitan” thinking is too easily reached between the two-cities tale, Taipei and New York. Furthermore, he even considers Bai’s Taipei experience as Shanghai experience, and instead, with Liu Jun’s “Chinese orientalism”, the intriguing couplet structures of Taiwanese-Chinese between [The Banished Immortal] and [The Resentment of the Immortal] (the protagonists of the two stories come from 1949 Shanghai and 1968 Taipei), and between [Nocturne] and [Ashes] (the protagonists of the two stories come from post-1937 Shanghai and 1965 Taipei) are not explored. The Taiwanese experiences of the two Taiwanese gay protagonists in “Danny Boy” and “Tea for Two” (the protagonists of the two stories come from 1985 Taipei and 1980 Taipei) are again ignored by Lu Jun, and are treated instead as stories about “not purely a world of Zhongguoren (Chinese) but a world of global dimension.” The dualistic structures of China-the West and (Chinese) nationalism-Metropolitanism may easily lead to reflections of “cultural colonialism” and “a generous love which transcends race, gender, and culture”, as he suggests. However, nuanced local experiences, such as these protagonists’ Shanghai and Taipei layers, could be reduced in these global structures. Nevertheless, I agree with the

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177 Ibid., p.4.
178 Ibid., pp. 6, 12.
point that there exists a shift from nationalism to cosmopolitanism of Bai. However, I would rather see the cosmopolitanist characteristics of Bai’s writing as a byproduct which was produced at the same time with Bai’s engagement with nationalism and counternationalism. In this sense, rather than *New Yorkers*, *Crystal Boys* ought to be seen as the beginning of Bai’s cosmopolitanism shift. In *Crystal Boys*, abundant characterestic of cosmopolitanism could already be found in Wang Kuilong’s (Dragon Prince) exile in New York, Little Jade’s journey to Japan to look for a Japanese father, A-Qing’s coming back to his home with strong Sichuan flavour\(^{179}\), A-Feng and A-Xiong’s Taiwanese tropical disposition, and Fu Chongshan’s Republican experience. Taoyuan Spring, Taipei New Park, and the Cozy Nest, the meeting points for cross-ethnic and cross-generation gay groups suggest not only a reading of multi-national identification, but also cosmopolitan identification.\(^{180}\)

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\(^{180}\) Ying Xiong argues that Liu Naou carried certain cosmopolitan characteristics through a study of Liu’s experiences and his cultural domains of Taiwanese, Japanese, French, and Chinese. The cosmopolitanism in Liu Naou was associated with nationalism in the structure of East Asia at that time. See Ying Xiong, “Between the National and Cosmopolitan: Liu Naou’s Modernist Writings Travelling across East Asia” in *Literature & Aesthetics* Vol. 20, 2010, pp. 120-138.
Chapter Five: The Colonial Palimpsest of Taiwanese Indigenous Literature in Syman Rapongan’s Writing

Fanon argued…Children, both black and white, will have been taught to see history, culture and progress as beginning with the arrival of the Europeans. If the first step towards a postcolonial perspective is to reclaim one’s own past, then the second is to begin to erode the colonialist ideology by which that past had been devalued.¹

For the hearts of the young people of various tribes and villages, which are intoxicated with modernity, moving to the metropolises became a new trend in 1970s and 1980s society of Taiwan. One after another, the sons and daughters of Dong-the-Elder and Syban Umarammu moved to Taiwan during that period. The different understanding between two generations [of Taos] resulted in the chemical reaction of body and mind, which devastated the basis of the primal society of Taos. The emerging new [Tao] generation became another kind of “diaspora” – the women workers moving in different factories and moldboard workers circulating in various construction sites – whose youth and trauma were not experienced by their [Tao] grandfathers and grandmothers…²

The [Tao] tribe where I live, from Japanese rule to the KMT government, has been the place where the foreign nations anchored.³

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¹ In assessing the palimpsestic development of indigenous literary discourse in Taiwan, the dominant “Euro-centric prospect” described by Fanon, can be easily replaced by the dominant “Han-centric prospect” in Taiwan’s literary history. See Peter Barry, *Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p.193.


I. Indigenous Literary Discourse in Taiwan

The Indigenous Diaspora and the Diasporic Term of Native

The indigenes in Taiwan, whose oral tradition has long prevented them from forming a national narrative by criteria such as language and historiography controlled by the Dutch, the Ming-Zheng Kingdom, the Qing Empire, the Japanese Empire, and the KMT regime, are usually narrated rather than self-narrating. They were often treated as *savage* objects to be studied by *civilised* Han, Japanese, Taiwanese researchers, and were to be taught to internalise discipline such as “to see history, culture, and progress as beginning with the arrival of the Japanese or Chinese. The foreign Japanese and Chinese nations had “anchored” Orchid Island through state violence in the name of civilisation. From the perspective of the colonial palimpsest, they are the most native of the nativists in Taiwan, but they are also the most diasporic of the diasporic in Taiwan. Even in contemporary Taiwan, their trauma is often less mentioned than the trauma of the Chinese diaspora whose Nostalgia Literature and Chinese culture were supported by the KMT State power, or than the 2-28 Incident, from which a more legitimate Taiwanese nationalism is extracted after the lifting of martial law in 1987. The glory and trauma seem to belong to Chinese and Taiwanese discourse, rather than the discourse of the indigenous people.

In the previous chapters, the chronological scope (from the period of Japanese Rule to the postmodern phenomenon) and the various geographical aspects (China, Japan, and Taiwan) of the colonial palimpsest are discussed in Taiwanese literary
texts. However, the definition and re-definition of the native voice (be it by Japanese, Chinese, or Taiwanese) consistently appears, especially when the terms such as nation and state are brought up in discussion with modernity. As shown in previous chapters, the position-taking of being native, “returning to the past,” and relative native discourses, which are inevitably a kind of cultural essentialism, have been the usual slogans advocated by cultural intellectuals, whether they are in a dominant or dominated position, with the state power or against it. To Wu Zhuoliu, being native refers to an anti-Japanese position-taking, whilst it also implies a return to Han-identification and Han culture. To some intellectuals involved in the Taiwanese Literary Debate in the 1920-30s, being native could refer to the choice between taking a Taiwan-leaning decolonising position and becoming-Japanese (especially in the high peak of the Kōminka movement). However, to post-war writers such as Bai Xianyong, being native means a slowly process of relocation given his diasporic Chinese background. To the older Taiwanese generation, being native means a return to a pre-war Japanese ethos. While in the Nativist Literary Debate in the late 1970s, being native offers two opposing routes—being a Chinese native or being a Taiwanese native. In 1980s Taiwan, where indigenous intellectuals gathered, indigenous magazines were published, and many literary awards were

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4 In this thesis, the term native normally refers to Xiangtu or Bentu in Chinese, which means local rather than indigenous.

5 By cultural essentialism, I mean the purity pursuits of the native discourses in extreme forms, such as that in the Nativist (Taiwanese) Literary Debate in the 1920s, the Kōminka (Japanese-becoming) movement in the 1930-40s, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (being “pure” Chinese) in the 1960s and the Nativist Literary Debate in the 1970s.
presented to emerging indigenous writers such as Walis Norgan;⁶ being-native in this social context, to both indigenous intellectuals and Han intellectuals, not only suggests a native position-taking of being-Taiwanese within or independent of the Chinese-Taiwanese (Han) duality, but also reflexively suggests a layered being native native meaning. This reflexive aspect of the meaning of native also reciprocally redefines the border of being Chinese and being Taiwanese in the post-martial-law period of Taiwan; that is to say, whether indigenous nativeness should be included in the cultural/political Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism, or whether it should be independent of them. As Chiu Kuei-fen points out, in the late 1990s, the Taiwanese nativist movement “turned to indigenous culture for its quest for ‘genuine’ Taiwanese identity.”⁷ This reflection, at the same time, invites the re-thinking of the layered suppression suffered by the indigenes—the double-suffering situation dating from the Qing-rule period, Ming-Zheng period, Japanese rule, through post-war KMT rule, to post-martial-law Taiwan, in which the indigenes were the suppressed as the subaltern of the subaltern.

Although the idea of indigenous literature and its related discourses is quite modern in world literature, it developed and matured alongside nationalism. However, in Taiwan’s palimpsestic colonial context, it has long been absent, or more precisely, it has long been a deliberately dismissed and suppressed literary


genre. What is worse, indigenous literature and its relative discourses were treated as something more marginal than the Han people’s de-colonial discourses either under the Japanese rule or under the KMT regime, and failed to gain a legitimate status in the Han/Chinese-dominated or Japanese-dominated literary field. Yet, among the decolonising discourses in the period of Japanese Rule, many of the decolonising Han discourses claimed their subjectivity and semi-legitimate position through claiming to be “native” [Bentu, or Xiangtu] or “Taiwanese” so as to go against the alien Japanese (as in the Taiwan Language Debate in the 1930s). Or later, in the late 1970s Nativist [Xiangtu] Literary Debate, the literary nativists claimed their native status so as to go against the dominant immigrant Chinese KMT ideology. In both cases the most native indigenous voice was neglected. Therefore, from the indigenous perspective, although both these literary debates contained much that was anticolonial, they were primarily a Han propagandists’ game played by the Han nativists. Under martial-law, the study of indigenous culture and its genetic links with the Taiwanese people were remarkably neglected. (Even if they existed, they were put under the name of “Chinese study.”) This greatly reduces the chances of border-crossing between defined “Taiwanese” and indigenous identity, and between “Chinese” identity and indigenous identity. During the post-martial-law period, the purity of Chineseness, Taiwaneseess, and even indigenousness (such as the wider acceptance of the Pinpu identity among Taiwanese people) were challenged, and, as a result, these terms have increasingly converged.

Indigenous literature has a formal and semi-legitimate appearance until 1980s Taiwan, in which decade the game of defining “indigenous writing” and
“indigenousness” was finally played mostly by indigenes, rather than by the Han people, or, (as I have explained) the Taiwanese people who internalised Han cultural nationalism and then identified themselves as Han people. Carrying a border-defining nature—refusing the easy inclusion of typical classical Chinese literature, Japanese literature and post-war Chinese literature—the emergence of this Native 1980s indigenous literature allowed a whole new consideration of the (once KMT-dominant) Taiwanese (or Chinese) literary history which gradually gained legitimacy in the 1980s Taiwanese literary field. This re-examination of Taiwanese literary subjectivity reveals that the subjectivity of the indigenous population was inevitably assimilated to mainstream post-war Sinicised Taiwanese culture, consciously or unconsciously, especially when the representation and performance of the original culture has long been at the disposal of the so-called Han people, the Taiwanese, whose political and cultural hegemony defined what kind of legitimate culture was to be learned through the KMT state power. Accordingly, the collective Chinese habitus (produced and controlled by the KMT) was shaped and has been self-reproduced on the marginalised “mountainous” people (a KMT term); the capitalist economic capital and Chinese-dominated cultural capital (such as Chinese writing via the National Mandarin-speaking language policy) are disseminated through national education and have invaded the indigenous society. Thus many indigenous elites (just like the post-war Taiwanese generation) are in a sense the products of the KMT’s Chinese hegemonic education, since they have learned Chinese fluently in order to occupy a place in the literary field. (This could be seen as a form of mimicry from a postcolonial perspective of Homi Bhabha.) For example,
Yubas Naogih’s (Tien Minzhong, 1943-) admits that a “deep-Han” character has manifested in his “mountainous” writing through the delicate choice of Chinese words. This deep-Han elite style reflects the Chinese literary college “training” he received from the National Normal Taiwan University Department of Chinese. To indigenous people, the Chinese language acts as both a barrier and a discipline. For indigenous writers, to make their voice heard in the Taiwanese literary field, especially before the lifting of martial law, it was hard to bypass the process of mimicry of the Chinese language, and the Chinese ideology underneath.

From the perspective of the colonial palimpsest, with regard to the historiography of indigenous-writing, or the historiography of writing-about-“aborigines” (either by the indigenous writers, Han, or Japanese), the layered indigenous-writing in Taiwanese literary history, such as the Qing traditional literati’s travelling Han poetry with its accounts of the “Formosan savages,” the Japanese anthropologists’ categorisation and ethnographies of the “Formosan savages,” and Han writers’ references to the “mountainous writing” of the “mountainous fellows” under the rule of the KMT regime (not to mention the Dutch and English documents of the “Formosan savages” before the 17th century), have generally conformed with the perspectives of the colonisers. Apart from the issues which problematise the purity of the indigenous subjectivity and indigenous writing, however, the emergence and the construction of the belated legitimate indigenous writing still announced that the long-suppressed indigenes finally gained a collective voice to claim an independent subjectivity—whether within or outside the

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Taiwanese literary field. (As some Indigenous scholars argue that the indigenous discourse should be independent of Taiwanese discourse). The contradictory characters of indigenous-writing in relations to its acceptance and resistance of Han cultural hegemony (such as issues related to Han-centred historiography and Chinese language writing in creating indigenous literature) will be explored in this chapter mainly through the critical analysis of the works of the indigenous Tao writer Syman Rapongan (1957-).

The newly-emerged ethnic and national issues within the Bentuhua movement returned during the 1980s, in a different fashion from that in the 1970s. In the 1970s, the division between the Chinese complex and the Taiwanese complex was the main topic to be dealt with, first culturally and then politically (as seen in the Nativist Literary Debate). The Nativist discussions in the 1970s mainly argued for the awakening of a “Taiwanese” identity away from the Chinese complex, which was a debate mostly restricted to the so-called Han writers, while the indigenous perspectives were not included. However, these discussions came with a more detailed and anxious search for a native subjectivity in the 1980s; who makes up the Taiwanese nation? Similar questions were asked after the Chinese complex was partly questioned with the lifting of martial law. In Liu Liang-ya’s words:

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9 Such as Pu Zhongcheng, see the following discussion for more detail.

10 The anxiety of the “Chinese complex” is still present in the post-martial-law Taiwanese culture. The Chinese cultural layer has been treated as a treasure, a burden, or neutrally as simply a cultural heritage. Politics are also involved in this. The resumption of power by the KMT since 2008 has revived the Chinese layer with more positive aspects compared with the DPP’s less Chinese-centric cultural policy from 2000-2008. These differences can be seen clearly in their quite different nationalistic policies in relation to editing historical textbooks.
Since the 1980s…Democracy, progress, and prosperity, along with the military threat of the People’s Republic of China towards Taiwan, resulted in the “Shared Life Community” [Shengming gongtongti]. Bentuhua (Nativist process) brought the suppressed *native history and native culture* to the surface, as well as the ethnic contradiction…

The terms “native history” and “native culture” here refer to the history and culture of local Han Taiwanese, rather than those of the indigenous people. As Liu Liang-ya points out, ethnicity became an inevitable issue when dealing with the newly popular Taiwanese nationalism. However, from an indigenous perspective, the works of authors like Wu Zhuoliu, Bai Ju, Bai Xianyong discussed in previous chapters are more or less foreign and alien with regard to Taiwanese indigenes who have been the *natives* of this country for thousands of years—that is, the works mentioned are more or less Chinese, Japanese, or Han-Taiwanese (they contain versions of Chinese-centred, Japanese-centred, and Han-Taiwanese-centred ideology), and especially after the martial law institution, they are mostly appreciated among scholars who internalised Chinese literary disciplines.

Accordingly, the long-neglected ethnic indigenes and their literary writing act as a unique symbolic production in Taiwan—the most Nativist of native. They became the ultimate icon for the solution of the reconstruction of Taiwanese subjectivity at a time when the Taiwanese were seeking cultural (and to some extent, political)

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independence, especially in the 1980-90s. At this stage, the (re)construction of an independent Taiwanese identity, either in culture or in politics, could not avoid repositioning the indigenes, though this is a belated reflection—a late de-colonisation within/outside the seemingly righteous de-colonial (Taiwanese) discourses.

In the light of these reflections on Taiwanese nationalism and ethnicity after the 1980s, a Hoklo Chauvinism [Fulao shawen zhuyi], to take one example, was named and strongly criticised (particularly by Chinese nationalists) because of its emphasis specifically on the Hoklo ethnic group as the representative ethnic group for all Taiwanese, at the cost of other ethnic groups in Taiwan. This attack on “chauvinism” may partly have resulted from the ethnic anxiety that the Chinese nationalists (mainly made up of Chinese non-provincial ethnic group) experienced, since they were worried that the interpretation of national discourse would no longer be possessed by them as part of Chinese nationalism, but instead, in post-martial-law Taiwan would fall into the hands of native Taiwanese people (mainly made up of the Hoklo ethnic group). Amongst this fighting for the interpretation of Taiwanese discourse, in which “being native” was the motif, the indigenous voice was again dismissed by both Chinese and Taiwanese sides. This was one example of the ways that indigenous discourse has been neglected in Taiwanese Nativist [Bentuhua] discourse, or, in other words, was “structurally” and “habitually” absent from the dominant discourse of Han ethnic groups (Hoklo, Hakka, and Chinese

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12 This indigenous quality, the most Nativist of native, is also appropriated politically by the KMT ROC, and the PRC, who both treat the Taiwanese indigenes as one of the minority tribes of China.
non-provincial ethnic groups) in the Han-dominant cultural field in Taiwan. This shows that the Bentuhua Han discourses since the 1970s have not advanced their scope to converse with the most native natives—the indigenous people.

In reviewing the Bentuhua movement, Liao Hsien-hao argues that political liberation is not enough: “the overthrow of the KMT and the hegemony behind it is not the ultimate goal of Han-centred decolonisation/Bentuhua [Nativist] discourse.” Instead, apart from the political liberation of “the Taiwanese” from “the Chinese” (through actions such as the lifting of Martial Law), a complete cultural and ethnic reflection of the colonial nature of the Han/Chinese dominance over the indigenes should be the ultimate goal:

in the end though the Bentuhua movement claimed to represent all the Taiwanese, what it was concerned with was only issues among the Han people…this nativist discourse more or less appropriated the position of “the colonised” [the Han Taiwanese nativists], and never mentioned the fact that they [the Han nativists] had long been the colonisers [of the indigenes].\(^\text{13}\)

The deconstruction of the layered Han/Chinese dominant aspect of cultural discourse in Taiwan, as well as the Han/Chinese-centred literary discourse discussed here, became the necessary step in making Taiwan a real multi-ethnic nation. This reconsideration of the Han-defined Nativist discourse gradually became a widely

accepted concept in the 1990s, either through internal reflection on Chinese/Han discourse or through the rise of the (external) challenging indigenous discourse (this was also encouraged by the external stimulation of an increase in South-East Asian workers and immigrants to Taiwan.) However, multi-ethnicity remains an ideal concept rather than an everyday life practice in terms of Taiwanese culture, as Yu Sheng-kuan argues:

Even though the Taiwanese stance—each ethnicity is part of the [Taiwanese] subjectivity—was proposed in the 1990s, a “Chinese stance” was still adopted by Chinese-literary-discourse supporters as a way against the “multi-subjectivity Taiwanese stance.”

Although the development of the indigenous literary discourse in the field of Taiwanese literature was/is a struggle, as seen above, the terms “indigenous literature,” along with “indigenes” did finally gain their legitimate status in the late 1980s. For example, Pu Zhongcheng, an indigenous scholar of the Zou peoples, in the preface to his *Taiwan yuanzhuminzu wenxue shi* (The Historical Outline of Literature of the Aborigines in Taiwan), insists that indigenous literature should be independent from Taiwanese literature, rather than being included in it. He argues that “Taiwanese literature” is mainly a Han/Chinese-constructed literary discourse, as discussed above, and that the state power of Japanese Rule and that of the Republic of China (KMT) in Taiwan have played crucial roles (colonial in this context) in positioning the literature of the indigenous population in the Taiwanese

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14 Yu, (The Rise and Development of Taiwan Nativist Literary Discourse), p. 375.
literary field. These indigene-based perspectives not only provide a reflection on Han/Chinese-constructed Taiwanese nationalism, but also a reflection on Han-based post-colonial discourse in Taiwan. These views could be further discussed in respect of how to see so-called Chinese Literature in Taiwan, and the emerging Taiwanese Literary discourses in the world, as they are in general based on either Chinese or Han-Taiwanese perspectives, which almost always neglects the existence of the (Taiwanese) indigenous voice. Returning to the discussions above, it is not until the 1990s, after the rise of indigenous discourse in Taiwan that the issues of the suppression of indigenous peoples and cultures were formally attended to within the Han/Chinese or Taiwanese dominant cultural field. Also, it is only through the efforts of the indigenous elite in the Indigenous Awakening Movement (since the 1980s), that post-colonial discourse from an indigenous perspective on Taiwanese literature, culture and history has finally begun to emerge.

From Third Person to First Person Narrative

In fact, these indigenous terms have gone through a palimpsestic progress in its development, which is closely related to the changes in the social context of 1970s and 1980s Taiwan. As shown in previous chapters, each colonial power ruling Taiwan uses its historiographical method to justify the legitimacy of its rule over the island and its subjects. When it comes to Taiwanese indigenes, the Zou tribal indigenous scholar Pu Zhongcheng points out, in both Qing-Chinese and Japanese

15 Pu Zhongcheng (Pasuya Poiconu), Taiwan yuanzhumin wenxue shigang [Literary History of the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples] (Taipei: Liren, 2009), pp.1-35.
travel notes, there are ethno-centric narratives which give exaggerated accounts of
Taiwanese indigenes, in which ethnic discrimination is embedded.\(^\text{16}\) According to
Chen Long-ting, in the period of Japanese Rule, the field researches into Taiwanese indigenes conducted by Japanese scholars (such as Inō Kanori, Torii Ryūzō, Mori Ushinosuke, and Kano Tadao) provided more reliable information than the official and semi-official materials produced in the Qing governace period.\(^\text{17}\) As Chiu Kuei-fen points out, “In anthropological works, indigenous people often play the role of interviewee or native informant.”\(^\text{18}\)

In the period of Qing governace, Taiwanese indigenes were narrated by Qing officials traveling to Taiwan, in works such as Yu Yonghe’s Bihai jiyou [Small Sea Travel Diaries] (1833). On the other hand, indigenous oral literature, since it was not written in the Han language, was neglected in the Han literary field—it only appeared in anthropological records in the period of Japanese Rule. In post-war Taiwan, there was some of what was called “Mountainous Writing” published during the KMT Martial Law period, such as Chen Yingxiong’s Xuanfeng qizhang—yuanzhumin de gushi [The Whirling Chief: Stories of the Aboriginal People] (2003, reprint), which was originally published in 1971 under the title Yuwai menghen [Dreamy Traces outside the Boundaries]. However, the narratives lack indigenous subjectivity, and are full of the Chinese national discipline, and the

\(^\text{16}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{17}\) Chen Long-ting, “Xiangsixing chayixing yu zaixiang de fuzhi: qingdai shuxie taiwan yuanzhumin xingxiang zhi lunshu” [Discourses on Taiwanese Aborigines from the Qing Dynasty: Resemblances, Differences and Repeated Representations] Museology Quarterly, 17 (3) 2003, pp. 91-111.

pro-Chinese nationalistic assimilating complex. Therefore, according to Chiu Kui-fen, a first person narrative was stressed by the indigenous scholar Sun Dachuan. Chiu explains Sun’s first person narrative that “writing in the form of the autobiographical ‘I’ was a gesture to reclaim the subject position which was denied to aborigines in mainstream discourse.”

A Palimpsestic Colonisation and Becoming Indigenous

Liao Hsien-hao argues that the Taiwanese indigenes’ have suffered from a “double-dominance” situation from the period of Japanese Rule to the period of the KMT regime (by both the Japanese and by the Han people). The indigenous population had historically faced foreign powers such as Han immigrants since the Ming-Zheng Kingdom, Qing dynasty’s rule, Japanese colonisation, KMT regime, and most of all, at present, internalised dominance by the collective Han/Chinese habitus. In fact, what the indigenes face is a palimpsestic colonial past.

As we have seen, with regard to the issue of the subjectivity of indigenous writing, especially focusing on the period of post-1980s Taiwan when indigenous intellectuals have been consciously mobilised, indigenous magazines have been published, and many literary awards have been awarded to indigenous writers (such

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20 Liao, [Why not Carry a Porch to Wander about since the Night of ‘Han’ is not fearful? The New Cultural Discourse of the Indigenes], pp. 253-257.

21 The term Han is no longer the “Sinicised culture,” but “Taiwan-ised” Han culture from the perspective of the indigenes.
as Walis Norgan), the production of the quite new category of “indigenous writing” has brought new form and content to the Han/Chinese-dominant literary field, as well as new problems. Nevertheless, according to Chiu Kui-fen, the year 1984 is seen as a “landmark in the history of indigenous literature in Taiwan.” The first special issue of indigenous literature in a poetry journal called Chunfeng [Spring Breeze] was published. The Association for the Promotion of the Rights of the Indigenous People in Taiwan was also established in 1984. However, in terms of readership, Wei Yijun argues that many of these elite indigenous writers in fact targeted the large Han/Chinese readership instead of the more limited indigenous readership. This demonstrates that the external sinicised cultural layer, as well as the internal Han cultural habitus embedded in the indigenous elite, was an inevitable colonial situation that the indigenous elite had to negotiate.

The legitimate term Indigenous Literature [Yuanzhumin wenxue] has gone through a palimpsestic development, finally becoming what it is. As we have seen, it was named as Mountainous Literature [Shandi wenxue] in the 1980s, a name which was first proposed by Wu Jinfa when he edited Beiqing de shanlin: taiwan shandi xiaoshuoxuan [The Sad Forests: The Collection of Taiwanese Mountainous Fiction] (1987). This naming inevitably carried a discriminatory meaning inherited from the Chinese-centred KMT ideology. In the 1990s, the term Indigenous Literature

22 Wei, [Searching a Fighting Position: Take Examples from Walis Norgan’s Stories], pp. 97-98.
24 Ibid., pp. 97-100.
[Yuanzhumin wensue] finally gave this writing a neutral existence. The definition of Indigenous Literature has also gone through successive stages from ethnic essentialism to a multi-ethnicism. According to Chen Chi-Fan’s review, the successive stages of Indigenous Literature have run from whether the writer has an indigenous identity (a genetic perspective, argued by Wu Jinfà in 1989, Tian Yage and Ye Shitao in 1992, and by Sun Dachuan in 1993), through whether the writer uses indigenous languages to write (as a transitional strategy, argued by Walis Norgan in 1992), to whether the topic is simply about indigenous issues (argued by Pu Zhongcheng in 1996 as a strategy to promote writing about indigenous issues, which was also supported by Shimomura Sakujirō in 2002).²⁶ The expansion of this indigenous genre through time, from a definition by form (identity, language) to that by content (topic), shows some of the dilemma that indigenous writers have to face. That is, given their various indigenous languages with quite limited readership, they have to write back to the dominant culture using Chinese language. Using Romanisation is an option, but limited readership is also the problem.²⁷ However, to maintain their indigenous subjectivity and to write back without being assimilated, this transitional writing strategy based on de-colonial thinking, also developed various compromised writing-back strategies. These de-colonial strategies include: imbedded indigenous syntax (through a distinctively creolised dialogue), the deliberate omission of citations of indigenous myths (to make writing look natural)


²⁷ See the following section for the discussion of Rapongan’s writing back strategy. Romanised Tao is used in [The Myth of Badai Bay].
in the way that Han writers use popular Han allusions in their writing without citations), rearrangement of the presentation of indigenous and Chinese language (such as to place indigenous language before its Chinese translation, or to place the Chinese language in brackets), the replacement of linear time order with circular time narrative (without a specific time in the narrative). These strategies of promoting indigenous subjectivity will be discussed in the following analysis of Syman Rapongan’s writing.

**Island Writing: The Small Island Writes Back**

In the Preface to *Islands in History and Representation*, Rod Edmond says

Islands were often seen as natural colonies or settings for ideal communities, but they were also used as *dumping grounds for the unwanted*, a practice which has continued into the twentieth century and remains evident in recent policy towards refugees.28

In the eyes of Rapongan, as well as in the collective tribal memory of the Taos, it is hard to deny that, during the modern period, Orchid Island has been a “dumping ground for the unwanted”—in this case, in the form of piles of nuclear waste from Taiwan which was dumped in Orchid Island without the inhabitants’ agreement. The Taos have been acculturated by both the Japanese and the Chinese/Taiwanese Han culture. It was not until the 1980s that the Tao intellectuals started to write back—mostly through Chinese writing learned from their education in Taiwan. To

the Taos, the cultural, political, and economical hegemony imposed on modern Taiwan by China and Japan, could be comparable to those imposed on Ireland by the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the dominant Han/Chinese culture among the ethnic groups, Chinese propaganda (especially under martial law), the capitalist mass-production economy, and the state institutions in Taiwan, all contributed to situating the big island, Taiwan, as a colonial power in relation to the Taos (and of course to the other indigenes in Taiwan as well). The unbalanced power structure between the big and the small islands (Taiwan and Orchid Island) seems to mirror that between the continental China and Taiwan. Intriguingly, the once-colonised Taiwan (by China) now plays the part of the coloniser over another island—Orchid Island.

**Palimpsestic Colonialism in Orchid Island:**

According to Daxiwulawan Bima, the early history of the development of the Taos was never influenced by Han culture from China or by that of Taiwan Island. Instead, the Taos have shared more similarities and interacted more frequently with the Ivatan indigenes of the Batan islands of the Philippines.\(^29\) Due to their oceanic culture, continental (Han Chinese and Han Taiwan) knowledge was not to be

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\(^29\) Daxiwulawan Bima, *Taiwan de yuanzhumin: dawuzhu* [Taiwan’s Indigenous Ethnics: The Taos] (Taipei: Taiyuan, 2002), pp. 136-137. See the more detailed discussion of the cross-ethnic relationship between the Taos and the Ivatans in Yang Cheng-hsien’s *Daoguo zhi jian de zuqun: Taiwan lanyu Tao yu Phillipine Batan dao Ivatan guanxishi de dangdai xiangxiang* [Ethnic Group Existing between Islands and States: on Contemporary Imaginations of Historical Relationships among the Tao from Orchid Island, Taiwan and the Ivatan from Batanes Islands, the Philippines] (Hualian: College of Indigenous Studies at National Dong Hwa University, 2012).
introduced to them until the Qing dynasty.

The name of Orchid Island reflects how it was looked upon, and how it was treated, by its name-givers. In Tao language, Orchid Island is called Ponso no Tao, which means “island of Humans.” The island was called “Botel Tabacco” by European travellers. By the Han people in Taiwan, Orchid Island was named Hongtouyu [Red-head islet], and the Taos were named as Hongtoufan [Red-headed savages] in the Investigating Census of Taiwan Huang Shujing’s (a Qing officer) Taihai shicuolu (Historical Anecdotes of Taiwan Straits) (1722). Orchid Island was formally assimilated into the Qing dynasty’s domains in 1877. During the period of Japanese Rule, it was still named Hongtouyu [Red-head islet]. The Taos were named Yami (by a Japanese anthropologist, Torii Ryūzō). Under the rule of the KMT regime, after 1947, it was renamed Orchid Island [lanyu] after the local Phalaenopsis orchids.

In the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, and Orchid Island were ceded to the Japanese Empire from the Qing Empire. Civil registration

30 “Tao” means “human” in Tao language.
31 Orchid Island was called “t Eyl Groot Tabacco” by Dutch missionary Francois Valenly in 1726, and was called as “Botel” or “Botel Tabacco Sima” by French voyager Laperuz. See, Bima, [Taiwan’s Indigenous Ethnicity: The Taos], pp. 20-21.
32 This is probably because at sunrise, the hilltop of the island reflects the red sunlight over the sea, or because the island’s soil contains large amounts of ferric oxide, which makes the hilltop red. See Bima, [Taiwan’s Indigenous Ethnicity: The Taos], p. 13.
33 This historical anthology offers Huang’s observation of Taiwan under Qing Rule—though it is filled with Han-centred historical perspectives and civilising attempts towards the “savages.”
34 Daxiwulawan, [Taiwan’s Indigenous Nations: The Taos], pp. 18-19.
and village names were then set up over the “Red-headed Islet” by the Japanese colonial government. Orchid Island was categorised by the Japanese colonial government as a specific zone for the “research of anthropological samples,” and all except researchers were forbidden from entering the island. As a result, Tao customs were preserved for the research for sociologists and anthropologists. This meant that this island was deliberately secluded from civilisation and modernity and most Tao customs remained intact during the period of Japanese Rule.

Under the period of KMT Rule, a “Mountainous Restriction” was implemented over Orchid Island until 1967. In 1952, under KMT governance, a Commanding Department of Orchid Island [Lanyu zhihui] was set up to rule the Taos.

According to Syman Rapongan’s description of these officers, they “brought the value system transferred from the big island [Taiwan]—the ultimate value, and thus the primal traditional thoughts withdrew from the classrooms in the school.” Rapongan gives a vivid description of the dissemination of this “ultimate” value and how it was internalised by the successive county magistrates:

The native-assigned Tao county magistrate then wore T-shaped trousers [the traditional male Tao clothes] under Western-style clothing trousers, while the tightening of the allocated leather shoes made him panic, the struggle to take them off or not was written on his helpless face. The landing craft finally reached the sand beach, where emerged the low-ranking officer from the big island [Taiwan], who was seen as a high-ranking officer. The county magistrate said: “How are you, Sir?” The officer replied: “Hmmm……”…the Taos cried with same voice: “How are you, Commander?”…when the welcoming lining-up ceremony was

36 Ibid., pp. 14, 21-23.
finished, the history of colonisation had begun, which was recorded in the big island’s contemporary history. The process from “uncultivated barbarians” to “assimilated barbarians.”

This internalisation of the “big island” values by successive magistrates could also imply the social reproduction of the values of the dominant sinicised society of Taiwan. This was not only reproduced in the dominant class but also in the dominated class of the Taos. For example, capitalist values have been accepted in Tao everyday life. As Rapongan observes, “The grocery store [ran by a Han couple] introduced convenient working crafts, and a consuming desire for foreign goods…Finally a few of our tribespeople have learned to open groceries, and their minds have turned complicated.” As a result, he argues that “…the transformation of daily necessities symbolises the change of values.” The discussion of the inbalanced power structure of the theme of “the big and small islands” can be clearly seen in Rapongan’s “Dadao yu xiaodao” [The Big Island and the Small Island].

As a result of the state power introduced by the KMT, military policemen were also sent to Orchid Island to inspect potential communists—who were within the members of the retired soldiers sent to this island. Syman observes “We seem to know the reason of why the young military policemen come to this island, whether two or three shots which break the silence of the serene ocean, are the sounds terminating the life of those who had exposed the identity of ‘standing on the wrong

38 Ibid., p.153.
39 Ibid. 81.
40 Rapongan, [The Face of the Navigator], pp. 133-135.
side.” These pro-communist old soldiers were executed after they expressed their regret at coming to the poor Orchid island, and their resentment at the defeated KMT party who turned them into a reluctant diaspora.\textsuperscript{41} Here we can find not only the invasion of capitalism and Han culture (ISA), but also the invasion of the political field into the fields of the pre-modern Tao island. The KMT’s construction of political legitimacy through state violence (RSA) – such as the fact that Veterans Affairs Commission under Executive Yuan imported prisoners from Taiwan to Orchid island from 1958—also demonstrates the government’s appropriation of native land, where the “land” and “woods” become the primal property of the country.\textsuperscript{42}

Through the legitimising process, administrative institutions from Taiwan obtained whatever land they needed, without the consent of the Taos. These appropriations were in the name of the “mountainous preservative territory,” the “farming land of Orchid Island,” and “the land of national defense.”\textsuperscript{43} The situation in which that traditional tribal territory suddenly becomes national territory was also faced by other indigenous tribes of Taiwan, where the hunting of animals was forbidden and trees could not be cut for tribal use because they were now regulated by the Forestry Bureau. This is the situation described in the short story “Zuihou de lieren” [The Last Hunter] (1986) by another indigenous writer Tuobosi-Tamapima (1960-), whose Han name is Tian Yage, in which the indigenous hunter’s game is

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p.155. In some cases, some Chinese young people were forced to join the KMT troops. They became diaspora after retreating to Taiwan with the KMT.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 158.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 157.
confiscated by a Taiwanese policeman, since it is now illegal to hunt and the animals and the forest all belong to the nation instead of to the indigenes. Therefore, ironically, the law (and the authority behind it), which originally is designed to maintain the welfare of the people, results in the extinction of the hunters in the tribes. At shown above, Orchid Island became Taiwan’s Wasteland, metaphorically, where the Han Taiwanese people dumped their nuclear waste, prisoners, veterans, disqualified teachers, policemen, and low-grade public servants. The Taos endured “the discrimination of Han-centrism and their treatment as secondary citizens.”

At the same time, the civilising project directed towards the Taos by the KMT Han state was seen as a colonising project in the eyes of the Taos. According to Syman:

I am like Taos who were born post-war, “tortured” by education which was injected forcibly deep into our heart: Han symbolises everything bright, while Tao is the root of everything “evil;” it is a lifelong “guilty sense” of not being Sinicised. We must kowtow to the portrait of the deceased Chiang Kai-Shek in school every morning, symbolising “gratitude” and total subjugation to his dominance. More ridiculously, the corridors of all the elementary schools were hung fully with the portraits of “Han national heroes,” educating us to follow them as lifetime models. In fact, is there any relationship between the Han “national heroes” and us Taos? At the same time, fear was deliberately imposed on us, whether spiritually or physically, by soldiers and serious prisoners, growing up since our childhood, which still made me shell-shocked to recall it.

In the recollection by Syman, the KMT’s claimed Han-civilising schooling in fact

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44 Ibid., p. 197.
45 Ibid.
contains much embedded symbolic violence, which itself contains many KMT-produced national symbols of the Republic of China. When these embedded national symbols are internalised and naturalised into the Tao students through schooling and a “modernisation infrastructure” (such as the Han-naming of Tao people in the household registry system), the mixed Han cultural ideology and the KMT national ideology become the dominant habitus, and the Tao habitus becomes the subjugatory one. As a result, the dominant Han habitus could be legitimately produced and reproduced among the Tao society.

The Pre-modern Tao Field

Ranpongan’s literary representation of Tao’s “pre-modern” organic cultural network can be seen as his observation of the collective field of the Taos, which could be treated as a primordial model of the Tao field (in which the Tao habitus operates as the dominant habitus), compared to the ways in which the more “modern” Taiwanese (Han) field intruded on this island:

“The primal and fertile society” means the complete social organisations and the well-regulated production network which have been constructed in one thousand years, responding to all the fluctuations of the solar terms in nature. Nature is the object of the labouring and production of “the primitive,” and the resource of knowledge and economics. The Taos have the belief that all beings have “soul,” which sustains the ecology in the land and in the ocean, generating “mystic” reverence for them.46

The rules of the field of “pre-modern” Taos are largely different from the ones in the

46 Ibid., pp. 163-164.
civilised “Han” field of Taiwan. In the latter KMT-dominated Han field, economic, political, and cultural capital are exchangeable, and nature and labouring production are no longer the primary resources for accumulating social capital. With regards to the Tao people’s production, it is mainly dependant on nature, in terms of the exchange between labouring and cultural and social capital. For example, fishing, farming, and house-building in Tao tradition involve various kinds of Tao traditions. Ceremonies in these activities (such as singing) are often held through the efforts of all the tribal people, rather than counted by capitalist exchange. Fish are caught by themselves in the ocean (as an honour) rather than to be bought in the market. “Uncivilised” as it was, their production doesn’t often involve corresponding capital (whether political or economical capital) in the context of modern and capitalist Taiwanese society.

To write back at the modern centre Taiwan and the political, cultural, and economic hegemony behind it was the aim of Syman Rapongan, a Tao intellectual who received his higher education in Taiwan, as such he had long imbibed the Chinese/Han habitus (such as the Chinese-centric ideology, capitalist values, etc.). Rapongan grew up in the post-war Orchid Island, and inevitably and necessarily adopted the colonial weapon he had acquired against the colonial motherland.

47 It should be noted that the term “native,” other than its local and rooted reference, also bears an inevitable negotiated elite and intellectual meaning in the experience of Rapongan, as the term refers to the experience of the intellectuals in the Nativist Literary Debate in the 1920s-1930s and in the Nativist Literary Movement in the 1977/1978 debate. Enlightening through colonial schooling and the use of the colonial modern device to “write back” contribute to the negotiated characteristics of these native nativists. See, for example, the discussion of Wu Zhuoliu’s indirect language strategy in Chapter Three.
Taiwan—namely the Chinese language, postcolonial and indigenous discourses of being an intellectual in Taiwan, and also being a nativist intellectual in the context of globalisation. What Rapongan has to address is the marginality of his Tao homeland, constructed in a postcolonial situation mostly in relation to Taiwan. In the light of the over-stated capitalist habitus in Taiwan (which also has long intruded into the field of Orchid Island) that he has observed, he stresses the importance of the Tao habitus as a way to counter the collective ideologies which first originated in Han society in Taiwan and were then disseminated among Tao society.

In the introduction to *Islands in History and Representation*, characteristics of oceanic tribes such as “migrancy, liminality, and indeterminacy” are celebrated through both a form of postcolonial theory and by reference to the Tongan writer Epeli Hau’ofa.48 Both Epeli Hau’ofa and Saint Lucian writer Derek Walcott offer an island-based sense “of the contiguity of island and sea, of blurred margins rather than structured oppositions,” and as a result “they open up ways of reintegrating islands back into history from which they have frequently been excluded.” These native island-born intellectuals’ ideas of islands are quite different from the conception of the relationship of islands and sea produced by continent-based western cultures, in which islands (especially oriental and unexplored islands) are often seen as ‘isolated outcrops of meaning in an immense oceanic void.”49

As in the ideas expressed in *Islands in History and Representation*, Rapongan also shows a return to island-focused literary writing based on his (later-reached)

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48 *Islands in History and Representation*, pp. 10-11.

49 Ibid., p. 2.
Tao-based historiographical perspective. In Rapongan’s writing, the potential liminality of the Taos does not just refer to the Han-dominant Taiwan, or the Han-dominant continental China, but refers to Tao culture in relation to the wider Pacific Ocean. In this Tao-based conception, the Han-ideology-dominant Taiwan Island is treated as a continent-based hegemony toward Orchid Island in this postcolonial context. This liminality of a “multiplicity of identities,” an “island-oriented” rather than a “continental-based” philosophy, is best embodied in the protagonist Gigimit of [Black Wings].

To native writers in Taiwan, when using Chinese cultural capital to write back to the Chinese-dominant literary field, very often the adoption of the coloniser’s tools (such as Chinese-writing and inevitably some transplanting of the Chinese ideologies behind it) to represent indigenous terroir becomes necessary. This demonstrates the awkward postcolonial situation that Taiwanese (or Chinese, as they are forcefully included in Han national discourses) indigenous writers have faced in everyday life. It was also hard to break the rules of the literary field. Take the consecration system of the institution of literary awards for example: it was almost impossible to present indigenous literary awards to works written in indigenous language since both the readership/awardship and the (supposedly indigenous) writers had long been using Chinese writing as the legitimate language. However,

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50 See subsequent discussion of this novel of Gigimit. In the following discussion, I directly take Rapongan’s Romanised spelling of the Tao characters in his works, rather than transcribing their names from Chinese.

51 Like the regular literary-awards-winner Tian Yage’s works, whose most famous work “Zuihou de lieren” [The Last Hunter] (1986) and other works are mostly written in Chinese.
since the 1990s, the ministry of Education has tried to propose a standardised writing system for the indigenous languages, and there have been officially-run indigenous-language proficiency tests. Over the past few years, the Ministry of Education has been hosting the Indigenous-language Literary Awards. In some cases, as the result of the forcefully imposed Han habitus during the period of Martial Law, even some indigenous writers might have felt it natural to accept it and thus naturalised this institutionalised discipline. As mentioned above, some indigenous writers might not have been aware of the embedded Chinese-centric ideology in it, such as the case of Chen Yingxiong’s *Yuwai menghen* [Trails of Dreams in the Foreign Land] (1971), which was entitled *Xuanfeng qizhan* [The Whirling Chief] in 2003, in which embedded Chinese-centric ideology and Chen’s mimicry of Chinese-centric writing acted as something natural and were politically correct and necessary in producing a (negotiated) indigenous terroir in that strictly-controlled literary field, especially under Martial Law. Even after Martial Law, in Syman Rapongan’s (and in other indigenous writers’) trajectory of writing, his adoption of Chinese writing, either in form or in content (such as using Chinese writing to represent Tao terroir, and applying linear narrative in re-telling Tao stories) was difficult to be avoided. At the same time, his deliberate “writing-back” could also be

52 In the “mountainous” writer Chen Yingxiong’s writing, probably due to the fact that he served as a policeman for decades, the narrator in [The Whirling Chief] lacks indigenous subjectivity, while in contrast it reproduces Chinese nationalistic ideology and attempts to create scenes of harmony between the “mountainous people” and low-land Sinicised Taiwanese people. This “mountainous” literary text, published before the lifting of martial law, demonstrates the fact that the interpretation of indigenous culture in the literary field was controlled and reproduced in the hands of Chinese cultural elites or “mountainous” elites (such as Chen himself) who identified with Chinese habitus.
easily observed both in form and in content, especially in his first work *The Myths of Badai Bay* (1992). In it, an ethnographical selection of Tao oral myths and his own autobiographical reflections are collected. In the earlier section, the Tao myths are written in both Romanised Tao (which comes first) and in Chinese on the facing page (which comes later). Regarding the form of this work, this kind of deliberate array of Tao-Chinese writing, or simply the gesture of the demonstration of the Tao spoken language (Tao, or other indigenous languages, was rarely seen in print in the 1990s), is strategically speaking, an emphasis on form rather than its content. However, since this is Syman’s first work, and this is not exactly a literary work (the collection of the myths and his rational observations of current Tao society make it more like an ethnographic work in form), his de-colonial attempts through the form, rather than through the literary content can be understood. This array of Tao-Chinese presentation in form also denotes the fact that a total detachment from Chinese writing (either in form or in content) is impossible at that stage (and judging the market-law and readership of publishing, a literary work totally written in a native language is also impossible now). In the later stage of Syman Rapongan’s writing, in works starting from *The Memory of the Waves* (2002), a transformed attachment, and a more flexible writing strategy in both form and in content away from the Chinese/Han cultural habitus can be observed through his adoption of creolised or purely Tao oral language, and through the adoption of a Tao-style oral story-telling narrative (in which it is very common for no specific

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53 This work includes Tao myths (written in Romanised Tao and in Chinese) and some of Rapongan’s reflections (in Chinese), rather than a literary fiction.
date or year to be given for the stories) rather than the linear narrative which is often seen in Chinese/Han writing. However, Syman’s combination of creolised language (Chinese writing with partial Tao syntax) and non-linear oral narrative in his writing strategy also suggests that it seems impossible to remain, or to return to, a pure Tao cultural field, as the spatial and temporal fields of the Taos have been deeply influenced by the foreign and dominant Chinese cultures.

II. Syman Rapongan’s Palimpsestic Profile and His Narration of the Palimpsestic Colonialism

Syman Rapongan was born in 1957. He is of Tao origin—the only oceanic indigenous tribe in Taiwan—and he has grown up in Orchid Island. He left Orchid Island for Taiwan for a high school education, and he finished his BA in the Department of French in Tamkang University. While later doing part-time jobs in Taipei, he was gradually influenced by the Indigenous Movement in the 1980s. He then completed his masters degree in Anthropology (1999-2003?) in the National Tsing Hua University, and is now doing a PhD in the Department of Taiwanese literature in the National Cheng Kung University. His Han name, Shr Nulai, was no longer used after he returned to Orchid Island, except in his first work, Badaiwan de shenhua [The Myths of Badai Bay] (1992).54

Following [The Myths of Badai Bay], he has published Lenghai qingshen [Deep

54 Syman Rapongan, Badaiwan de shenhua [The Myths of Badai Bay] (Taipei: Chenxing, 1992). The book names of his work that follows are translated from Chinese to English by myself except Heise de chibang [Black Wings].
Affection of the Cold Sea] (1997), Heise de chibang [Black Wings] (1999) (which received the Wu Zhuoliu Literary Award in 1999), Hailang de jiyi [The Memory of the Waves] (2002), Hanghaijia de lian [The Face of the Navigator] (2007), Laohairen [The Old Seaman] (2009), and Tiankong de yanjing [The Eyes of the Sky] (2012). His most recent work is Dahai fumeng [Floting Dreams on the Sea] (2014). [The Face of the Navigator] is his first prose narrative, and reflects on the Tao tribe and their historical interaction with foreign powers. His perspectives on this will be used to accompany my account of the history and the palimpsestic colonial situation of the Taos in Orchid Island.

Rapongan’s Return to Orchid Island, and Return to Tao Culture

Guan Xiaorong denotes the internal transformation behind Syman’s change of name—from his Han name Shi Nulai to his Tao name Syman Rapongan. Since 1988, Rapongan has been involved in the Tao political movement, against nuclear waste, the Expel the Hanito [Evil Spirit] Movement, and has acted as the chief commander of this movement in 1988. This shows his political activism based on the local, which is shown in his writing too.

57 Syman Rapongan, Hailang de jiyi [The Memory of the Waves] (Taipei: Lianhewenxue, 2010).
58 Rapongan, [The Face of the Navigator].
59 Syman Rapongan, Laohairen [The Old Seaman] (Taipei, Yinke, 2009).
III. Rapongan’s Palimpsestic Writing

As I have shown, Rapongan was a student in Taiwan’s higher educational institution, the chief commander of Tao’s Anti-nuclear-waste Movement, a traditional Tao man (fisher), and an intellectual and writer (an occupation that is unprecedented in Tao culture). In this way he resembles other indigenous intellectuals who have received a higher education in Taiwan and have then had to translate cultural hegemony in relation to their eroded indigenous culture. At the same time, their learned intellectual distance might often cause them to feel alienated in their own residential relocations in everyday life (geographically and intellectually speaking, this could be seen as their colonised homeland, the starting point for decolonial discourses against Taiwan/KMT-Chinese nationalism). There is, however, an important geographical difference in Rapongan’s case, since Rapongan’s location\(^{62}\) is miles away from the colonial Motherland, Taiwan, while the other indigenous intellectuals’ residential locations are located in Taiwan. Thus his relocation at an early age from Orchid Island to Taiwan, and then later, from the colonial motherland, where he received his higher education, back to his origins where Tao tradition has been dominated by what he calls the “Han” culture, involves a number of distinct experiences of dislocation. The problematic homing-coming does not only bother him when he is, or was, in Taiwan, but also haunts him when

\(^{62}\) Although Rapongan is mostly based on Orchid Island, his position-taking as a writer makes him a modern Tao with enhanced mobility, who travels very often in Taiwan and occasionally in the wider world to give speeches.
he is back on Orchid Island. This poses several questions. Is “indigenous” resistance found among these indigenous intellectuals generally, or simply in Rapongan himself, and is it distinct from the Han-based resistance found within the Han Taiwanese writers discussed in the previous chapters, who also deal with palimpsestic colonialism? What’s Rapongan’s attitude towards Japanese and Han culture (by using the term Han he refers to “Taiwanese Sinocisation” mostly)? How has his adopted position-taking changed (such as the fact that he made the decision to go back to Taos fishing life-style), and how is it reflected in the trajectory of his writing? And how can this be dealt with in terms of Bourdieu’s concept of Field and Habitus? These questions will be raised and answered in the text analysis that follows.

As mentioned above, Rapongan has produced seven works in total from 1992 to 2012. Song Zelai has divided Syman Rapongan’s writing into two stages of rhetoric: Tragic rhetoric and Romantic rhetoric. The Tragic period includes early works like [The Myths of Badai Bay] and [Deep Affection of the Cold Sea] (1997). The later Romantic period includes [The Memory of the Waves] (2002).63

According to my analysis, Rapongan’s transitions of style can be divided into the following three stages. Firstly, there is the stage of ethnographical writing, as exemplified in [The Myths of Badai Bay] (1992). Secondly, there is the phase of protesting reflection, which can be typically found in [Deep Affection of the Cold Sea] (1997). Finally, there is the stage of Tao-style fictional writing. This can be

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seen in [Black Wings] (1999), [The Face of the Navigator] (2007), and [The Old Seaman] (2009), and his later works. If we treat Rapongan’s works together, the Tao philosophy and the embedded tribalism and Tao nationalism reflected in his first work Badaikan de shenhua [The Myths of Badai Bay] can be seen as the foundation of his subsequent writing. Many themes in this work, such as de-colonial enlightenment, reappear in his subsequent works. The reappearance of themes can be seen as a palimpsestic narrative, in which similar de-colonial themes are renarrated through different characters in different works. In “Wo de tongnian” [My Childhood], Rapongan, the narrator, recalls that his tribal people are seen as savages and needed to be “saved” and “civilised” by the Pinpu [the Plain indigenes] teacher from Taiwan. The teacher’s ethnic discrimination mirrors that of a Christian Father who comes to Orchid Island with a missionary agenda, and their disciplinary tools for civilisation are alike: in Rapongan’s narrative, the teacher’s textbooks and whip function in the same way as the Father’s Bible and cross.64 His own childhood experiences of discrimination like this reappear in his subsequent works.65 In “Buyuan bei baosong” [Unwilling to be Recommended for College], Rapongan reflects on the lure of the motorboats from Taiwan, which symbolise a materialistic civilisation, which visits Orchid Island every two or three months. This theme

64 Rapongan, [The Myths of Bai'ai Bay], pp. 151-153.
65 See Rapongan, [The Face of the Navigator], pp.128-132; [Deep Affection of the Cold Sea], pp. 79-87; [The Memory of the Waves], pp. 196-206; [The Old Seaman], pp. 51-57, p.230; [Black Wings], pp, 101, 107.
reappears in his later works. Also in “Buyuan bei baosong” [Unwilling to be Recommended for College], the young narrator, Rapongan, refuses to be recommended for college, because he wants to go to college by his own efforts through examination rather than through recommendation as a “mountainous student.” The educational privilege that mountainous students enjoy is seen as another “civilising tool” in Rapongan’s view. This reflection on how Han civilisation deploys its civilising agenda is elaborated in his later [Deep Affection of the Cold Sea].

Rapongan’s opposition against the palimpsestic and dominant Sinicising, and “modernising” invasion from Taiwan can be seen as a national/tribal war of production between the collective Han habitus and Tao habitus over the field of the everyday life of the Taos. The successful invasion of the foreign Han habitus can be readily observed among the common Tao people, who have internalised these imported dominant values. This generates social problems such as alcoholism and poverty as a result of a collective psychological inferiority complex, as the sociologist Tsai You-yue analyses. This is similar to the psychological complex which happened after the colonisation of Algeria, as observed by Frantz Fanon. The Algerians, had a habitus which was “bleached” as the values of the White colonisers

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66 See Rapongan, [Deep Affection of the Cold Sea], pp. 185-192, and [The Face of the Navigator], p.133-135.
67 Rapongan, [The Myths of Baidai Bay], pp. 163-165.
68 Rapongan, [Deep Affection of the Cold Sea], pp. 45-46.
were successfully embedded and internalised through the colonial apparatus.

The object, Han culture, or the culture of the Han people in Taiwan, that Rapongan opposes is in fact itself, as we have seen, an embodiment of palimpsestic cultures, and through redefinition of the later State Apparatus. The more he engages in defence against multiple objects—such as modernity and Han/Japanese/Chinese/Taiwanese colonisation—the more he needs to make his stance clearer, that is, to clarify what his Tao culture is. In this respect, we find he gradually portrays an ideal Tao culture that could derive its roots from all kinds of Tao production in order to counter the complex of Sinicisation, capitalisation, and modernisation, though not without resistance since he is also, to some extent, a sinicised intellectual. In the early days of his return to Orchid Island, he was ashamed that he could not provide fresh fish for his old father, who only eats fish from his own catch, not fish from the exchange or market. This is the Tao tradition.\(^70\) To (re)gain his social status in Tao society, he practised his fishing skills and in particular tried to catch fish that are difficult to catch. To fit in once again and to be qualified to play the social game in Tao society, and to accumulate consecration in the Tao field in Bourdieu’s term, Rapongan was drawn to specific fish like Arayo, flying fish, and Cilat as the cultural symbols he had to catch to be a respected Tao man. Catching a cilat thus becoming a symbol of abandoning the stigma of sinicisation.\(^71\)

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\(^70\) Rapongan, [Deep Affection of the Cold Sea], pp. 99-100. In Tao tradition, a mature Tao man should be able to catch fish for himself and his family. Fish are not for sale or seen as commercial commodities as in Han capitalist society in Taiwan.

\(^71\) Rapongan, [Black Wings], p. 216.
In *Deep Affection of the Cold Sea*, he depicts precisely his own process of social consecration in Tao culture, though the Tao values are corroded by the palimpsestic foreign cultures—Sinicisation, capitalism, and modernisation. From September 1990 to January 1993, he not only gained *consecration* in the game (if we see his re-socialisation of being a Tao as a game in Bourdieu’s sense) that he has failed to play for 16 years (having stayed in Taiwan for 16 years), but he also re-internalised and then re-identified with the Tao rules of the game, such as the traditional Tao way of production (based on the forms of labouring such as fishing or farming), animism, and Tao customs. However, owing to his previous layer of Sinicisation in Taiwan, his re-location from Han field (Taiwan) to Tao field (Orchid Island) is often riddled with conflicts.

Take *Deep Affection of the Cold Sea* for example, which consists of a collection of proses and short stories. Most of the prose narratives and short stories are about Rapongan’s reflection on his experiences of returning to Tao life. According to the narrator in *Deep Affection of the Cold Sea*, before diving alone into the silent sea, despite “being an atheist and a naturalist,” because of his acculturation in Tao tradition and the re-culturation in Tao experience after his return, the narrator resorts to praying to God as well as the animistic spirits of Tao tradition to dispel the unknown fear: “The spirits that I pray to includes God, Jesus, ancestors, and sea god.”

With regard to the colonial palimpsest, we may find a seemingly polytheistic condition in Rapongan’s religious belief; however, this

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72 Rapongan, *Deep Affection of the Cold Sea*, pp. 99-129. The examples are shown subsequently.

73 Ibid., pp 133-134, 151.
polytheistic appearance is in fact the result of (at the very least) the Tao cultural layer and the subsequent Han, Japanese, and Chinese-KMT cultural layers. In Rapongan’s reflection, the Tao layer is the utopian and ultimate cultural model to which he wishes to return, and the Tao nation is the lost subjectivity to be completed, though under the influence of discourses of colonial modernity there does not seem to exist a genuine Tao culture to return to. In this collection, the later Japanese and KMT-Chinese layers are treated as invading colonial powers in Rapongan’s historical reflection.

In “Taiwan lai de huolun” [The Freighter from Taiwan], Rapongan observes the successful result of the KMT’s colonial disciplining in the conception of the Taos in the 1950s—that Taiwan was the cultural and economic centre while Orchid Island becomes the periphery. The story observes, “For Tao children born in the 50s, Taiwan was like heaven, while Orchid island was like a prison.”74 The cargo ship from Taiwan brought material supplies which were not available on Orchid Island itself. Although the cargo ship frightened the flying fish, the goods that constituted the cargo, which could be seen as symbols of modernity and modernisation, were desired by the Tao people lining up at the bank. Syman recalls the Tao people, “whose puzzled faces were filled with contradictory complex which were both welcoming and resisting.”75

In the last article “Wuyuan ye wuhui” [No Regrets and No Repentance], Rapongan reflects on his experience of re-becoming Tao. One of his indigenous

74 Ibid., p. 189.
75 Ibid.
friends, a hunter of the Tsou tribe, bitterly complains to Rapongan that the once
glorious title of a “hunter” is no longer respected as before because the animals he
hunts are listed as “Protected Animals” by law. Rapongan, luckily, would not be
charged under Taiwanese law since the fish that he hunts are not “protected.”
Syman’s friend sighs, “now in the mind of indigenous children, hunter is a blurred
symbol instead of a living hero.”

In the early days of his return to Tao life, Rapongan fishes everyday to gain
identification from his tribal people, to prove himself as “a Tao whose production is
through his bare hands.” Rapongan’s Tao-re-becoming project aims to
“accumulate his social status through labouring (traditional labouring like fishing
and farming),” to “discuss the civilising progress of his own culture through
labouring,” and to “share food from nature with tribal people.” Through these
traditional Tao production, he can “abolish the stigma of being a Sinicised Tao,” and
“to regain the suppressed pride [of being a Tao].” However, despite this role-play,
Rapongan was often categorised as “a Sinicised Tao” by his parents and his wife
(before he fully became a “real” Tao after his return.)

According to his parents, this is due to the fact that Rapongan spent “16 strange years in Han Taiwan,” which
has left him an indelible “Han/non-Tao imprint.” As a result, he wonders what the
fundamental definition of being a Tao is since apparently his Tao parents and his

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76 Ibid., p. 208.
77 Ibid., p. 209.
78 Ibid., p. 148.
79 According to Rapongan’s mother, the Han/non-Tao imprint found in Rapongan himself and many
of his young Tao people refer to “people with Han craftiness instead of Tao muscles, and people who
are away from trees and without the smell of the soil.” Ibid., pp. 55, 100.
wife do not appreciate his purely primitive Tao way of living (by fishing rather than writing or teaching, which would give Rapongan more economic income), while at the same time they still want Rapongan to remain a real Tao in culture. There seems to exist a “hybrid” balance between Sinicisation and the Tao tradition. Or, in other words, a sinicised Tao habitus has already been internalised and practiced by Rapongan’s Tao people. It seems it is Syman himself, who would rather take a polarised view on Sinicisation and the Tao tradition. As Song Zelai states, Rapongan’s promotion of a Tao traditionalism (fishing is glorified) and a return to a unpolluted-Tao world, and his deliberate ignorance of modern economic issues would risk over-romanticisation and would lead to dangerous “ethnic guidance”.

It is true that Rapongan carries romantic imaginations of his “imagined Tao communities”, and this unpolluted-Tao presumption is quite similar to the nationalist claims in Chinese (and Taiwanese) nationalism that there exists a perfectly pure Chinese model. Accordingly, historical narrative is manipulated for this essentialist conception. Craig A. Smith argues, “Despite its sometimes ugly side effects, nationalism (and possibly a pan-ethnic aboriginal consciousness) has been an important defensive strategy for Taiwan aboriginals in resisting Han hegemony.”

Indeed, when facing irresistible Han hegemony (with its immense structure behind), the combination of cultural and social capital (writing and Tao

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80 See Song, [The Strange Rhetoric and Ethnic Guidance in the Fiction The Memory of Waves of Syman Rapongan], pp. 24-29.

81 This is previously discussed through Bhabha’s idea of mimicry.

tribal consciousness), became the limited resource that Rapongan can resort to. In addition, in terms of the effect of national allegory, the difference between Rapongan’s essentialist presumption of an original Tao imagination and Chinese imagination is the former lacks the top-down state power to mobilise institutions to enhance or reinvent traditions (as previously discussed through Hobsbawm’s idea in the Introduction). On these grounds, to some extent, Song’s accusation of Rapongan (Song even considers that the Tao tribe need to give up Tao belief and to believe in Christianity) seems to be a form of Han-centred ethnic guidance—asking people who lack capital to play an unfamiliar game, and to play fair according to the rules.

Ironically, in terms of the colonial palimpsest, when Rapongan attempted to remove the Han/Taiwanese layer, it was his family members who urged him not to do so. Both Rapongan’s geographical return to Orchid Island and his cultural return to Tao customs turn out to be questioned by his family, mainly because his way of living is way too Tao, or in other words, too pre-modern in the eyes of his family. This highlights the difficult issue of finding balance between modernity and subjectivity that Rapongan, his family, and his tribal fellows face. Rapongan’s methods of Tao “production”—supplying his family with fresh fish he catches—are seen as “un-productive” in comparison with the “modern” Han/Chinese capitalist system.83 His immersion in diving and fishing in the sea, which would allow him to be seen highly as a Tao hero in traditional Tao society in the past, is now seen as an

83 Ibid., p. 216.
avoidance of the economic responsibility of a modern man.\textsuperscript{84} He faces the dilemma of whether to be a traditional Tao who obeys "Tao habitus" through traditional wageless production, or to be a \textit{modern} Tao who follows Taiwanese/Han-KMT habitus in which capitalist rules (such as the alienation between his labouring and his reward, as well as the Han-Tao cultural contradiction he faces in his writing career), and this difficult situation he encounters can be further observed in the subsequent analysis of his writings.

**Tao Hysteresis and Modernity**

The never-ending struggle between modern and traditional discourses is embodied in Rapongan himself. He is placed between two value systems, represented in his writings by the values of his parents and those of his modern wife:

The grandfather and grandmother of the children were born in the Neolithic Age, so it is natural for them to judge my existence with their own values. However, the mother of the children, and I, were both born in the postwar nuclear age, while she judges me with the measurement of the productivity of a Tao man of the ‘Neolithic age.’ I am crashed by their words in the disordered ‘space-time,’ while unable to find some phrases to justify my existence, and unable to console myself that I had ‘escaped’ the chance of being steeled by traditional way of production – labouring. The future of the children is an age aiming for monetary production, while the past of [my] parents is for the production of basic commodities.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{84} The phase of extremely deep-Tao experience can best be seen in some of the articles in \textit{[The Deep Affection of the Cold Sea]} and in the fiction \textit{[The Old Seaman]}.

\textsuperscript{85} Rapongan, \textit{[The Memory of the Waves]}, pp. 213-214.
In Rapongan’s family, after his return to Orchid Island, there is a generationally layered difference of attitude towards Rapongan’s return to an (economically) un-productive Tao lifestyle. Both his Tao parents and his wife encourage Rapongan to earn “real” money by working in Taiwan rather than to fish locally. While Rapongan’s parents are still highly respectful of Tao culture, Rapongan’s wife, who is the second generation in Rapongan’s family, thinks more highly of monetary rewards. For her, money comes before non-economical Tao values such as skill in fishing. On one occasion Rapongan’s wife says to him:

“What’s wrong with you? You have nothing but the vast sea in your head. Such bullshit nonsense like national identity, national consciousness, Taos-should-be-strong are shallow and useless. Tomorrow I will give you money to go to Taiwan.”86

In [The Face of the Navigator], the narrator is again tortured by this dilemma of problematic colonial modernity. He sighs: “It is hard to be an all-round man, especially in the period when modernity is mingled with tradition.” He continues: “When traditional collective values are unprecedentedly challenged, the focus between right and wrong has been lost, as the younger grandfather said before his death in 1978: ‘It has been very murky—the breath of the island of we Taos.’”87 As Rapongan recalls, after his return to Orchid Island, he spent some lonely years diving and fishing, (re)learning the necessary skills of being a real Tao man. Syman recalls, “This way of production is like the way his father raised him when he was

86 Rapongan, [Deep Affection of the Cold Sea], p. 212.
87 Rapongan, [The Face of the Navigator], p. 44.
young. Is his way wrong?"

As discussed previously, an idealised Tao habitus is proposed by Rapongan to solve this generational dilemma. Take the story in *Heise de chibang* [*Black Wings*] for example, when Jyavehai, who returns to Orchid Island to learn fishing from his childhood friend Ngalolog and is trying to catch an Arayo to prove his regained Tao skills, the latter acts as a mentor: “He [Jyavehai] nods his head, as tame as being scolded by the teacher from Taiwan in his youth.”88 Both Jyavehai and Ngalolog catch Arayos in their fishing; however, their heroic return using the Mivaci paddling style (announcing an abundant gain by a dramatic paddling back-and-forth) is faced with the “anxiety that fears the culture of passing down the traditional craft of production—Mataw (catching Arayo)—will be no longer possible.” In the past, children skipped class to welcome Mivaci by the beach, but now Tao children are more attracted to video games in the grocery stores.89 The stories related to the Xinglong grocery store90 (which is run by a Han couple, is the gathering place of some KMT veterans) can be read as symbolic accounts of the KMT process of modernisation, transporting the dominant Han habitus from Taiwan to Orchid island. This involves a change from the Tao favour-exchange/goods-exchange customs to capitalist economics in the economic field, and from a loose tribe-based paternal society to organisational party-politics (established by the KMT) in the political field.

This demonstrates the generational differences of Taos under the influence of

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88 Rapongan, [*Black Wings*], p. 221.
89 Ibid., p. 229.
90 Rapongan, [*The Face of the Navigator*], pp. 81-92.
modernity. The modern habitus is gradually replacing the traditional Tao habitus; Rapongan’s characters represent a generation for whom a return to Tao values was still imaginable. Here it is useful to consider Bourdieu’s idea of Hysteresis. As previously discussed, Rapong presumes an idealised meta-Tao layer to return to. His following everyday life practices (i.e. fishing in traditional Tao ways) are driven by this purified and idealised Tao habitus. While younger generation, such as Rapongan’s wife, identifies with capitalist values and has internalised modern discourses from Taiwan, the older generation of the Taos still maintain traditional ways of life. Nevertheless, Rapongan offers an alternative (a positive) meaning of hysteresis of identification. This kind of hysteresis of identification, which originally signifies a negative meaning in Bourdieu’s analysis, becomes the positive source of Tao subjectivity for Rapongan to reconstruct. As Rapongan reflects, “spirit belief…everyone at the beachhead is conditioned by traditional belief…which comforts me when the world is abused by modernisation, my [Tao] nation still maintains the primal life style of our ancestors.”91 The reversed version of hysteresis offered by Rapongan, that what in the past is better and should be maintained, is in fact strategically made of through Rapongan’s selection of elements of Tao traditions and Rapongan’s own imagination. For example, fishing, which is only one of the Tao traditions for Tao adult males, is greatly highlighted by Syman as an essential step to become a real Tao man. However, it is also through writing and the anthropological knowledge he learned and received in Taiwan, the modern tools that never exist in his “idealised and purified Tao traditions” before, 

91 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
that these heroic descriptions of fishing could be reserved and promoted through his fictional narrative. This reversed hysteresis, as a re-civilising agenda, is inevitably involved a mutually process of mimicry. Inevitably, this to some extent echos Song Zelai’s criticism of “ethnic guidance”, because Rapongan n’s ethnic (or national) imaginations involve a selective process of narrative—to pick up (rather than to mobilise) an idealised layer among those layered national/ethnic allegories. In terms of the colonial palimpsest, through his constant “dialogue” with the suppressed Tao layer and other suppressing discourses, the (idealised) Tao habitus, rather than a degraded form in the eyes of modern discourses, creates a solid ground for Rapongan behind his writing-back project.

*Heise de chibang [Black Wings] (1999)*

The narrator in [Black Wings] (1999) demonstrates a more confident Tao-centred perspective, which is different from that of the sentimental and self-questioning narrator in [Deep Affection of the Cold Sea] in which strong de-colonial characteristics and a “protesting style” can be found. This work embodies a modernised Tao’s (Rapongan’s) palimpsestic trajectory through Tao and Taiwanese habitus. As Hao Yuxiang observes, the story of [Black Wings] seems simple, “but it keeps on presenting comparisons: the comparison between two islands—Taiwan and Orchid island, the comparison between Tao names and Han names, and between the black Tao kids and the ‘white’ bodies of Taiwanese females, and that between oceanic legends and the textbooks in Han school, and even the

92 See previous discussion of Song Zelai’s comment of Rapongan’s works.
comparison of two philosophies of life, and of two world views.” Through this contrast, as Hau notes, “Taiwan…seems more like a mainland.” She continues, “Rapongan sets off from Orchid Island, with his perspective from the periphery [compared to Taiwan as the centre], to expose the stubbornness, xenophobia, and limitation of Han thinking.”

However, the position-taking of Rapongan as a writer is unprecedented in the traditional Tao field. According to Rapongan, “‘literary writing’ is not a traditional profession, the ‘intellectual’ is redundant…in my island and in the collective imagination of my nation.” As a result, Rapongan returned to Taiwan to study in the Anthropology Graduate School in NTHU, and was doing a Taiwanese Literature PhD at NCKU. The aim of these educational undertakings, according to Rapongan, “is definitely not to take off the infamy of ‘the Sinicised Tao,’ or to pursue the mantle of ‘the noble savage.’” Instead, he observes, between “the innocent bringing-up and the complex postmodern society nowadays, the modern flesh and the traditional mind of me is floating back and forth.” Rapongan recalled that, “I have been cursed by my granduncle in my youth: ‘Since the moment I [you] study in Taiwan, you are both a marginalised savage and a civilised person, which is truth.’”

Instead of being caught up in the contradictions between modernity and traditional Tao subjectivity, or by the accusation of the invasion of capitalist values and Han civilisation, as demonstrated in previous works, in this work the narrator positively and assertively promotes the traditional values of Taos. As the narrator

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93 Hao Yuxiang. Preface to [Black Wings], p. ix.
94 See Author’s preface. Ibid., p. xvi.
95 See Author’s preface. Ibid. xviii.
announces, “Men are useless if they cannot build a ship!” The Tao values and customs such as fishing, ship-building, house-building, oral poetry, the oral historiography of the families and tribes, fishing rituals, animism, and its labouring values, become the focus of the narrator’s attention. This fiction presents a world mainly narrated by a Tao narrative and valued by Tao values.

**The Language Strategy of Rapongan**

As I have mentioned in section one, in the ethnographic work, [*The Myths of Badai Bay*], the deliberate array of Romanised Tao language and Chinese, demonstrated Rapongan’s attempt at *writing-back* at the linguistic level. In later works such as [*Black Wings*] (1999), [*The Face of the Navigator*] (2007), and [*The Old Seaman*] (2009), the non-linear Tao oral narrative, the juxtaposition of Tao and Chinese conversations (where the Romanised Tao language always come first), the embedded Tao myths, all show Rapongan’s advanced strategy of writing back through both the use of linguistic level and the content level.

The juxtaposition of the Tao and Chinese languages in conversations in [*Black Wings*] can be seen as the author’s linguistic strategy to present a Tao-centric narrative (as a way of replacing Han-centric narrative), which ranges from traditional myths to Tao culture in everyday life. Rapongan also infiltrates the Han-written system with Tao syntax and Tao expressions. For example, in early spring, the narrator uses the traditional Tao phrase “every piece of muscle of people is evaporating” to describe the shared joy among all the Taos in the flying-fish

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96 Ibid., p. 22.
season between February and June; this is a repeated joy, which has been passed down for many generations. In terms of time, the narrator counts time by natural objects rather than by the scientific 24-hour measurement: “during the time when the setting sun is about two sweet-potato farms to the sea (around 4 o’clock in the afternoon).” Notice how the traditional measuring of time is followed by the Chinese explanation in brackets. In another scene, when counting the time period of singing, the narrator uses the phrase, “singing for ten to twenty boat-paddlings of time,” to describe how long the singing lasts. This Tao-based rhetoric renders this work creolised from the perspective of a Han-centred literary criticism, because this kind of description of time is rarely seen in Chinese writing. But in fact, this naturalised Tao rhetoric reflects how objects relate to each other – measured through a familiar Tao system rather than through an alien scientific system. Similarly, in [The Old Seaman], in conversations, the Tao and Chinese language are no longer in juxtaposition; instead, the Tao language comes first followed by Chinese in brackets. This deliberate arrangement of the “Tao (Chinese)” presentation demonstrates the advanced Tao-centred approach of the author.

**Pedagogy in Schooling and Religion**

After Rapongan’s return to Tao traditions, he has to face the contradiction between animism and Christianity, both the products of habitus and pedagogy, where the latter embodies distinct colonial characteristics underneath the advance of

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97 Ibid., p. 27.
98 Ibid., p. 27.
99 Ibid., p. 37.
economic capitalism. As the Taiwanese indigenous writer, Ahronglong Sakinu, notes, “even God replaces our myths.” It is hard to ignore the fact that indigenous myths are gradually being replaced by Christian belief as a result of missionaries.

Rapongan’s attack on Christianity is similar to the accusations made by Ngugi Wa Thiong’o against Christian missionaries in Africa: that they destroyed indigenous culture as a part of a European “civilising” agenda. According to Ngugi, “while in Kenya the European settler robbed the people of their land and the products of their sweat, the missionaries robbed them of their soul.” He continues, “Thus was the African body and soul bartered for thirty pieces of silver and the promise of a European heaven.”

The narrator in [Black Wings] suggests that the untamed joy of Tao fishing-singing exceeds the pleasure offered by the tamed chorus in the church: “the pleasant atmosphere of singing chorus together in land and on the sea surpasses greatly the singing hymns in church.”

The diachronical story of the four fictional characters—Ngalolog, Gigimit, Jyavehai, and Kaswal, each of whom seems to be the partial incarnation of Syman Rapongan, presents the struggle between sinicisation, modernity, capitalism, and Tao tradition. Ngalolog epitomises the later phase of Rapongan, who returns to Orchid Island to pass down the Tao tradition. Ngalolog says, “Orchid Island is my

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heaven, white Taiwan is my hell.” \textsuperscript{103} His muscles, manhood, knowledge of nature, the products of “long-term labouring” are envied by Jyavehai. Through this character, the novel demonstrates a highly-praised Tao tradition.\textsuperscript{104} Gigimit, who joins the Navy in Taiwan and later becomes a sailor travelling around the world, seems to transform the natural craving for the sea of the Taos into a modern form. He doesn’t like “white flesh”(women from Taiwan) but things black and people who are black.\textsuperscript{105} This character also incarnates Rapongan’s mobility in real life—as a famous indigenous writer travelling around the world to give speeches. The character Jyavehai portrays the young Rapongan’s intellectual desire to study in Taiwan. Like Rapongan in real life, the intellectual, Jyavehai, shows his talent in sinicised schooling in his youth, but returns to Orchid Island from \textit{modern} Taiwan to study fishing and traditional Tao skills from his friend, Ngalolog. This reversed power exchange of modernity and tribalism after twenty years seem to justify Jyavehai’s re-acceptance of Tao habitus, and also the theme of this fiction: “to become a brave Tao man.”\textsuperscript{106} While Kaswal, who is acculturated to Han habitus and marries a “white” Taiwanese girl, acts as the incarnation of the younger generation of the Taos, and derives from the early stage of Rapongan’s life.

In \textit{Black Wings}, Rapongan foregrounds traditional Tao values. Thus, the protagonist Kaswal’s is gloomy because his father is not good at fishing. Under the influence of Tao values, to regain the glory that his father lacks, Kaswal’s dream is

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p.194.
  \item \textsuperscript{104} Ibid., pp. 177-178.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid. 193.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p.178.
\end{itemize}
to be good at fishing in the future. As a result, he dreams of joining the navy in Taiwan (though this dream was destroyed by his Tao father, who thinks spirits would cause misfortune if Kaswal leaves Orchid Island). However, it is made clear that this dream of becoming a “floating sailor” is not influenced by the “[KMT-Chinese] patriotism to kill evil communists” instilled by a Chinese-diasporic teacher, but rather by his “genetic craving for sea.” Indeed, we are told that all his schooling “means nothing to him, has no functions at all.”¹⁰⁷ This demonstrates a crack in the dominant KMT Chinese nationalism. Although the “civilising” agenda within the Chinese education is powerful, it can not fully intrude into every corner of the Tao habitus in Orchid Island.

When Kaswal is punished in school, he is made to face the world atlas in office. The teacher from China deliberately orders him to look at the mainland map carefully, to let him understand, that the Island of Human [Orchid Island is so small that it] doesn’t exist in this world atlas.”¹⁰⁸ Schooling demonstrates both the roles of pedagogy and enlightenment within a colonial-structure. Structurally, schooling constructs and transplants the dominant Han/KMT habitus in Taiwan that Rapongan and his tribal people have no power to resist. However, the fictional young student Kaswal, as the incarnation of the young intellectual Rapongan himself, when facing the atlas, the measurement of both geography and power-mapping by Han people, with the help of their “civilising project” realises his people’s discriminated-against situation. Nevertheless, this “civilising project” of schooling,

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 70.
also gives him the intellectual foundation to go beyond the boundaries of his tribe, culturally and geographically. The gesture of adding a point—Orchid Island—by Kaswal in pencil seems to symbolise that he acknowledges his position-taking in the educational system endowed to him—the petty situation of his tribe which is confined by the conception of mapping of Taiwan. But when Kaswal points his pencil on the map from Orchid Island to Taiwan, Philippines, Polynesia, and South America,\(^{109}\) this gesture suggests an oceanic conception/mapping that is far beyond a China-centred or Taiwan-centred civilisation. Instead, this is a return to the conception of Tao-centred world mapping—the tradition, in Tao history, that the ancient Taos travelled freely across the Pacific Ocean and made their own oral literature through their own “first person narrative”. In fact, some Taiwanese historians (e.g. Cao Yonghe and Chou Wan-yao) offer an oceanic historiography (in which Taiwan is viewed as an important commercial point) vis-à-vis the China-centred continent-based one (in which Taiwan’s significance is usually minimised).\(^{110}\)

The latest layer of Chinese colonisation imposed by the KMT regime invades more extensively into the Tao field than the Japanese colonisation (which preserved Orchid Island as a place for Japanese anthropological researches). However, between Japanese and Chinese colonisation, the Taos (especially the older

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\(^{109}\) Ibid., pp. 79-80.

generations) tend to have a better impression of Japanese colonisation. This is indicated, for example, by Ngalolog’s grandmother’s slip of the tongue, “why should the Japanese leave?” She has a negative view towards the Chinese teachers in school. While she was beaten up occasionally during the period of Japanese Rule, she thinks “the Japanese are more reasonable than the Chinese, and sometimes it is honorable to be beaten up [by Japanese teachers].” Later Ngalolog’s grandmother thinks, “If Ngalolog read Chinese books now, would he become a Chinese when he grows up? And what about the Taos? [I] So wish Ngalolog can stay with his grandfather, to learn how to build a ship and to catch flying fish…to do what men of this island are required to do.” The younger generation also displays a negative attitude towards the Chinese ideology embedded in schooling. For example, Kawal says:

I hate the teacher from China who call us Taos “the lid of the pot”… “the laziest nation in the world”… “silly and dirty”…I hate more when he teaches us to kill the communist bandits when we grow up. If it is necessary to kill, let Chinese themselves kill Chinese, why ask us to kill Chinese? We are not Chinese…While the teachers from Taiwan, either ask us to catch frogs and eels for them, or gather wood for them to cook…”

The Chinese teacher injects China-centric nationalism into the Taos, while the Taiwanese teachers exploit them economically. In terms of national allegory, the teacher from China and the teachers from Taiwan respectively invade the political

111 Ibid., pp. 101-102.
112 Ibid., p. 107.
and economic fields of Orchid Island.

The desire of Kaswal and his friends for the “white flesh” of his Taiwanese teacher’s wife (the skin of Taiwanese is whiter than that of the Taos) demonstrates a shared sexual fantasy directed towards Taiwanese women.  

They are thinking about the future – either “white flesh” or “black wings.” The former is in the [Taiwanese] land while the latter is in the sea…The annual visit of the flying fish with black wings inspires their will to survive…In terms of “white bodies,” will there be Taiwanese women marrying them in the future?  

“White flesh” represents Taiwanese women and the capitalist economic production in Taiwan, while “black wings” represent flying fish and traditional Tao production. The sinicised Kaswal, who can not forget “the lure of white flesh,” finally marries a Taiwanese girl. This mirrors the black-white psychological complex observed in Fantz Fanon’s *Black Skin, White Masks*. However, Fanon argues, “this sexual myth—the quest for white flesh—perpetuated by alienated psyches must no longer be allowed to impede active understanding.” Fanon suggests that “a restructuring of the world” is possible. Through Rapongan’s “restructuring,” the “active understanding” of these grown-up Tao characters witnesses a reversed black-white complex which displays a reflection of the *colonial palimpsest*. At the end of this

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113 Ibid., pp. 137-146.
114 Ibid., pp. 169-170.
115 Ibid., pp. 184, 236.
fiction, they have come to the realisation: “White skins are not necessarily beautiful! Ai! ‘white flesh’ buys our friend’s [Kaswal] ocean and the soul of black wings, and his stars…” On the contrary, Gigimit marries a girl from Western Samoa with pretty “brown-dark skin,” while Ngalolog asserts, “black is the most beautiful colour,” and “Black is like the deepest layer in the vast ocean, which stores the secrets of nature. Black is the most fair colour in the world. Without dark nights, the world would be very dull and boring…”  

Even though these idealised and Tao-nationalist narratives could easily invoke criticism of “ethnic guidance” by Song Zelai, it seems to be a necessary defensive and decolonising step to the reconstruction of Tao subjectivity (against Han hegemony).

**Conclusion**

As mentioned above, these stories show how the Tao habitus is gradually replaced by Han/Taiwanese habitus through education, and how traditional Tao values become abnormal ones after the invasion and the internalisation of “modern” discourses in the younger Tao generations. Various features of the Tao habitus, such as marrying a Tao girl after growing up or building a two-men ship, are the expectation of Kaswal’s father. However, “nowadays, such healthy and normal thoughts, or such a life, are no longer the dreams of the [Tao] youngsters.” The traditional Taos are alienated in their own island, while the young Taos become part

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118 Ibid., p. 203.
of the diaspora in Taiwan.

In response to the invasion of *modern* discourses from Taiwan, Rapongan’s way to decolonise Tao culture and to resist Sinicisation is similar to the decolonising projects adopted by Taiwanese (or Han Taiwanese) against Chinese/Japanese hegemony—mostly through the reconstruction of We and the deconstruction of Others. The reoccurring theme of relearning the traditional (Tao) lifestyle often contains an idealised Tao national allegory. If Taiwan is seen as “the first nation” in Jameson’s term, the stories of Rapongan’s characters work like “national allegories of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture or society.”

As a result of this contradictory position-taking between Tao tradition and (Han/Chinese/Taiwanese) modernity, Rapongan reflects that, “ocean has no periphery or centre, what she has is simply the temper (tides) that the moon gives to her.”

This suggests an idealised return to Tao philosophy, where Manichean binaries of colonial/decolonial, central/peripheral differentiations do not exist. National allegories may even not be needed. However, in everyday life practice of postcolonialism in Orchid Island, in terms of the colonial palimpsest, under the influence of the layers of hegemony of Japanese and KMT Chinese (and Taiwanese) colonisation—and of modernity, capitalism, and the “civilisation” agendas within Christianity—Rapongan’s writings enact an inevitable return to the Tao habitus. Through Rapongan’s language strategy, the reversed power structure between Tao values and elite Chinese pedagogy, and through reversed aesthetic and sexual

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120 Rapongan, Preface to [The Old Seaman], p. 21.
conceptions, a Tao-based Occidentalism is constructed to go against the Orientalist narratives, which used to looked the Taos through asserting a dominant position. From this perspective, Rapongan’s writings, with their distinctive narration of Tao oral myths, represent one of the most Nativist and diasporic voice in the period of post Martial Law Taiwan. Furthermore, in term of the colonial palimpsest, the subjectivity of the Taos is regained through Rapongan’s constant negotiation between his Tao position-taking and other empowered Tao-nationalist narratives.
Epilogue: Zhu Tianxin as an Example of the Colonial Palimpsest

And then those young, intelligent, and radical people suddenly had the strange feeling of having sent out into the world an act that had begun to lead a life of its own, had to ceased to resemble the idea it was based on, and did not care about those who had created it. Those young and intelligent people started to scold their act, they began to call to it, to rebuke it, to pursue it, to give chase to it.\(^1\)

Milan Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*

In this final section of the thesis, I want to use Zhu Tianxin (1958-), one of the “young, intelligent, and radical people” in Kundera’s words, and her writing as another example of the colonial palimpsest. Zhu’s female gender, her situation as the second-generation of a mainlander ethnic family, her childhood background in a military community (*Juancun*)\(^2\), and the “Chinese nationalist” Sansan literary group she joined (and left)\(^3\) together shaped her particular


\(^2\) The compounds mainly formed by middle and low-ranking Chinese soldiers who emigrated to Taiwan with the KMT after 1949.

\(^3\) Sansan jikan [*Three Three Magazine*] (1977) and the literary group Sansan jitian (1979) were established by Zhu Tianwen, Zhu Tianxin, Ma Shuli, Xie Caijun, Ding Yamin, Xianzhi, and Lu Feiyi. The members of the group generally believed in a combination of the Christian faith and Dr Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of People, and had carried an idealised attitude towards traditional Chinese culture. According to Zhu Tianwen, the double “Three” represented the “Three Principles of the People [*Sanmin zhuyi*] and the Trinity (of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit).” She believes the future of the country lies in “restoring the Mainland” [*Guanfu dalu*] with all efforts, and the nation’s will could only be fulfilled with until the return to the Mainland—who “Three Principles of the People could be effectively used to construct China”. She also argues that “Chinese Nation
habitats and her position-taking in the present-day Taiwan literary field. The elements of the young Zhu Tianxin’s Chinese nationalist’s belief—her love for Chinese civilisation and an imagined China, her patriotic belief in the KMT’s Unification and her overidealisation of Dr Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek—(most of which were transformed into disbeliefs later) are reflected and performed in her engagement with writing and politics before and after the period of the annulment of martial law. The “prototype” of Zhu’s Chinese cultural worldview, her shifting of position-takings from being a founding member of the culturally legitimate literary Sansan Jituan [Three Three Group] in the 1970s (“Yuyong wenren” [state-hired writers]) to occupying a marginalised mainlander-ethnic position in the 1980s (“Jiling zuqun” [odd and marginalised ethnic group]),4 as well as the diasporic “home-coming/localising” process of her literary imagination from one based on China to one based on Taiwan in the post martial-law period (this shift of national narratives, from a China-leaning narrative to a Taiwan-leaning narrative, could also be seen as a shift from a paternal narrative to a maternal one, as discussed in Bai Xianyong’s writing) will be the focus of this part of the thesis and will also provide more perspectives for the paradigm of the colonial palimpsest. In addition, I want to focus on the study of Zhu’s early works and early literary

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[Zhonghua minzu] is the only nation picked by God”, and the “leaf of begonia (China) is Noah’s Ark floating in the billowing flood”. See Zhu Tianwen, Danjiang ji [Notes of Tamkang], (Taipei: Yuanliu, 1994), p. 57.

involvements. (Many of Zhu’s critics have focused on Zhu’s famous works such as *Xianwo juancun de xiongdimen* [Thinking about My Juancun Brothers] (1992) and *Gudu* [The Old Capital] (1997), rather than paying attention to her very early work *Jirangge* and her literary activities in the 1970s.) Through this focus, I want to produce a palimpsestic picture of Zhu from the “Young Fascist” in *Jirangge* [The Song of Clog-Throwing] (1977), through the “bitterly sarcastic” [*Yuandu zhushu*] and “exilic” writing styles of the “floating” psychology in *Wo jide* [I Remember] (1989), *Xianwo juancun de xiongdimen* [Thinking about My Juancun Brothers] (1992), *Manyouzhe* [The Flaneur] (1999).

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6 Ng Kim-chu points out that the scholar Shi Shu coined the term, the “Young Fascist,” which means “a psychological state similar to that in juvenile minds—in which a certain kind of (moral) ideal is refined to an absolute standard, and is used unscrupulously to attack and punish others who do not meet that standard. Violence is used in the name of protecting the ideal; others are criticised rather than the Young Fascist”. See Ng Kim-chu, “Cong daguanyuan dao kafeiguan—yuedu/shuxie zhu tianxin” [From The Grand Garden to the Coffee House—Reading and Writing about Zhu Tianxin], in *Gudu* [The Old Capital], ed. Wang Derwei, (Taipei: Maitian, 2002), pp. 235-282, Note. 12.


Flaneur] (2000), and the “flaneur-like” style\(^9\) and “narrative about travel and the political censure”\(^10\) in Gudu [The Old Capital] (1997). (Her latest work Chuxia hehua shiqi de aijing [The Love in the Season of Lotus in Early Summer] (2010), which has a “time-wizard” style as in Jorge Luis Borges’s The Aleph, will not be discussed.)\(^11\) However, my focus will be on her early work Jirangge [The Song of Clog-Throwing] (1977), since this work structured (and was at the same time constructed by) the “old soul’s” green youth. In a sense, this habitus acts like the base layer of Zhu’s later works: the components of it were summoned, justified, abandoned, transformed, and revisited like the young, intelligent, and radical people in Kundera’s words.


\(^11\) Both Lin Junying and Luo Yijun compare this novel to Jorge Luis Borges’s The Aleph. Lin argues that Zhu’s transitional styles of writing over thirty years can be considered in terms of The Aleph, in which “the panther” and “the wizard” (both of them are characters in The Aleph) both exist. The former guards youth and represents beauty (as in Jirangge); the latter summons time and freezes it (as in Gudu and Chuxia hehua shiqi de aijing). Luo argues that Zhu’s writing in Chuxia hehua shiqi de aijing is designed to “fight against the theme of ‘aging/time’”, and is like the angel who again and again “results in the falling of the erosion, twist, and traumatic impression of time until two sides of the scale (the infinite reality and the ‘Aleph’ in Borges’s words) weigh equally.” See Lin Junying, “Wushi yu meizhoubao de jiaoli” [The Wrestling between the Wizard and the Panther], and Luo Yijun, “Dierci” [The Second Time], in Chuxia hehua shiqi de aijing [The Love in the Season of Lotus in Early Summer] (Taipei: Yinke, 2010), pp.160-170, 171-214.
The “Young Fascist” in Jirangge

The second daughter of Zu Xining (a famous émigré military writer from Shandong province, 1927-1998) and Liu Musha (a Japanese-Chinese translator of Taiwanese Hakka ethnic origin, 1935-), Zhu Tianxin, and her elder sister Zhu Tianwen, along with their younger sister, grew up in a Brontës-like family. (The two elder sisters became prolific writers).\textsuperscript{12} Even though Zhu in her childhood might have developed a slight degree of Hakka identification,\textsuperscript{13} this budding Hakka habitus/cultural capital was vigorously removed by the Chinese identification of her family in Taipei, particularly in her youth. According to Ng Kim-chu, in Zhu’s youth, this family where Zhu Tianxin was brought up endowed her with a “Trinity” of three influential Fathers—the Catholic Father,\textsuperscript{14} the Father of China, which includes the founding father of China (Dr Sun Yat-sen) and Chinese Liyue wenming [the Chinese civilization of rites and music], and the enlightening Father, her mentor Hu Lancheng (1906-1980). Under the influence of these father-like figures, she received an education in


\textsuperscript{13} The protagonist in n Jirangge, an autobiographical character based on Zhu herself, learned to speak Hakka in her maternal grandfather’s Hakka family in her childhood and has to learn Mandarin when she goes back to Taipei. See Zhu Tianxin, Jirangge—Beyiunu sannianji [The Song of Clog-Throwing—The Note of the Three-Years in Taipei First Girls High School] (Taipei: Lianhewenxue, 2014), pp. 91-93.

\textsuperscript{14} Zhu’s family members believed in Catholicism.
the Chinese tradition and immersed herself in books of Chinese literature and history from her youth.\textsuperscript{15} As Letty Lingchei Chen points out, Zhu uses “an imaginary China as a necessary anchor for her sense of cultural heritage and identity” and the Zhu sisters’ early works are “consistent with the official, mainstream ideology”.\textsuperscript{16} In terms of political views, in her youth, Zhu developed a strong belief in the need to return (to China) and in the Unification of China led by Chiang Kei-shek as announced in the KMT’s propaganda. Take, for example, her early work \textit{Jirangge—Beiyinu sannianji [The Song of Clog-Throwing—The Note of the Three-Years in Taipei First Girls High School]} (1977): in addition to the romantic description of the protagonist’s senior high school, it overflows with a patriotic pro-unification attitude, in which Chinese culture and KMT leaders such as Dr Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek are elevated and worshipped as high as Heavenly Fathers.\textsuperscript{17} On many occasions, the protagonist, \textit{Xiaoxia [Little Shrimp]}, identifies with KMT-leaning Chinese patriotism and Chinese cultural nationalism, and mixes religious sentiments with political belief. In addition, the KMT’s lost territory, China, and the Chinese people there, also become the objects of her empathy through imagination.\textsuperscript{18} By contrast, feminist thoughts are considered morally wrong in the eyes of the protagonist, who internalises Hu Lancheng’s version

\textsuperscript{15} Ng, [From The Grand Garden to the Coffee House—Reading and Writing about Zhu Tianxin], p.237.


\textsuperscript{17} Zhu, [\textit{The Song of Clog-Throwing—The Note of the Three-Years in Taipei First Girls High School}], pp. 45-46, 137, 139, 154-159, 176, 191, 196-197.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 204.
of paternal morality based on Chinese classics. Some pages of this work are filled with Dr Sun Yat-sen’s thoughts and with Confucianism (she seems to draw her examples directly from her senior-high school’s textbooks). In these pages, Chinese culture is appropriated and associated with Sun Wen’s cultural and political theories. The protagonist’s mother, a Taiwanese who grew up during the period of Japanese “Occupation”, considers herself as Chinese, and develops a vigorous patriotism which often makes the protagonist feel ashamed. All in all, this highly politicised narrative, which represents the KMT agenda promoted by the “young fascist” (this is quite different from the later works of Zhu), suggests that young Zhu Tianxin was not only a consumer of the KMT-version of Chinese cultural nationalism, but also a reproducer of legitimate cultural goods in this Sansan period.

As mentioned earlier in this thesis, a series of diplomatic frustrations after 1970 started to challenge the legitimacy of the governance of the Republic of China in Taiwan. The Sansan Group established in 1977, with the “recurring Chinese elements” it promoted (which could be seen as another layer of the “Chinese culture” forcibly disseminated in the 1950s Combat Literature), encountering the rising call for Xiangtu [Taiwanese nativist] perspectives in 1977 and 1978. The two literary groups demonstrated quite contrasting nationalist versions of the literary (and political) imaginations. However, the Sansan group’s’s promotion of an orthodox Chinese culture (i.e. the classical

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19 Ibid., pp. 134-135.
20 Ibid., pp. 154-159.
21 Ibid., p.165.
Chinese study of *Hongloumeng [Dreams of The Red Chamber]*), its “paternal” nationalist imagination of China, and its

*Waishengren* [non-provincial] ethnic background together resulted in their close association with rightist official KMT propaganda. The difference is the *Waisheng*/*Juancun* literature gradually lost its legitimate position, and became marginalised when the *Bentu* camp took hold of the right of interpretation in both the cultural and the political field in the 1990s. As a result, they were even tagged as “*Yuyong wenren*” [state-hired writers] in the *Xiangtu* literary debate.

In addition, the perception of their “imagined centrism” by *Juncuan* residents, a term coined by Ho Chuen-juei, also strengthened Zhu’s anxiety of being marginalised, when a Hoklo-based *Bentu* discourse dominated the post-martial-law cultural field. The rise of *Juancun* literature could be seen as a

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24 See Ho Chuen-juei. “*Fangzhou zhiwei: lun zhu tianxin de jinqi xiezuo*” [Beyond the Ark: A Discussion of Zhu Tianxin’s Recent Writing] in *China Times Renjian Supplement* (1 January 1994). It should be stressed that the *Juancun*-centred imagined community is neither homogeneous nor unchangeable. Rather, it should be considered a heterogeneous and dynamic identification under the influence of demography and generation differences.
necessary counternationalist act in the light of the growing Taiwanese nationalism in the 1980s. Zhu’s *Weiliao [Not Finished]* (1981), a fiction with large autobiographical elements relating to Zhu’s youth, can be seen as the representative work of the perception of “imagined centrism” developed by *Juncuan* residents. Unlike *Jirangge*, however, in which the romanticism and idealistic patriotism of the protagonist overflows the work, *Weiliao* starts to engage more in “real” *Juancun* life. As a result, sentiments of nostalgia combined with a degree of selfmockery of her romantic youth—to some extent suggest that Zhu attempted to keep a certain distance from her most familiar *Sansan* disciplines, in which societal realities were larged negnected. For example, provincial issues start to appear in this work (in 1981, provincial issues had not become radical identification problems). The provincial character, Mrs Liang, is portrayed in a discriminatory manner and measured by the narrator’s *Sansan* Chinese standards as a talkative ample woman with a lustful disposition who is a “provincial and cannot speak good national language”. Mrs Liang’s third daughter is seen in a similar discriminatory manner through the eyes of the narrator, who identifies her as belonging genetically to “her maternal system.” By contrast, Mr Liang, a non-provincial colonel, is seen as “distinctively gentle and refined”.25 In terms of the construction of a *Juancun* habitus, local Taiwanese elements are associated with negative impressions, while Chinese elements are associated with positive

25 See Zhu, *Weiliao [Not Finished]* (Taipei: Lianhewenxue, 2001), pp. 45-46. As discussed previously in chapter Four, the stereotype of provincial contrast, a modest non-provincial male and a hedonistic provincial woman, also appears in Bai Xianyong’s *Taibeiren*. 
impressions. The utopian habitus of Sansan, or the “imagined centrism”, is also embodied in the everyday life differentiation system of “we” and “the other”. For example, this differentiation of “the other” is expressed in the Xia family members’ calling people who live outside the military village, “Laobaixing” [the common people]”. This term, which has connotations of “contempt, sympathy, and conceit”, makes them feel like “the brave soldiers defending the front”, and it is used by the entire Xia family members, even including Mrs Xia, the protagonists’ mother,26 herself a provincial, who internalises such Juancun-centric perception without a second thought. Intriguingly, the intrusion of state power into their life no more triggers bursting expressions of national sentiments as in Jirangge, rather, the implementation of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, the “withdrawal” of the Republic of China from the UN, the death of Chiang Kei-shek are perceived by the three grown-up daughters of Mr Xia as events which only evoke “serious feelings of sadness”27 followed by a period of relatively calm understanding and bitter self-deprecation. In terms of the national allegory of Taiwan since the 1970s, the relatively cool narrative of Zhu suggests that Zhu had realised the over-idealised element of Sansan identification in the earlier work.

For Zhu, after the publication of the collection of her short stories of Wo Jide [I Remember],28 which were written in the years before and after 1987,

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26 Ibid., p. 133.
the year that the martial law was lifted, the 1980s signaled a stage of memory/identity loss, and memory reconstruction. In terms of space, many military-compound villages, on which her childhood memory relied on, were destroyed. In terms of history, the period between the 1980s and 2000 saw the once legitimate Chinese Nationalism, and its “Chinese” historical perspectives, further dethroned. As a result, we find a “bitterly sarcastic flaneur” phase in Zhu’s writing in this period is thus suggested. This phase includes works such as Wo jide [I Remember] (1989), Xiang wo juancun de xiongdimen [Remembering My Brothers in the Military Village] (1992), Gudu [The Old Capital] (1997) and Manyouzhe [The Flaneur] (2000). Zhu’s belief in Jirangge, that what was needed was “to call together three thousand literati [shi] to save China” (which Zhu and the Sansan group believed in the 1970s) would be seen as naïve and unpractical by those students who started to question the faith in the 1980s. Taiwanese identification was no longer just an emerging slogan, as in the Xiangtu Literary Debate in the late 1970s; it had now become a political reality and part of everyday life. The deconstruction of these material (Juancun) and mental (Rightist Chinese nationalism) states accompanied the marginalised Waishengren [the non-provincial ethnic] identification. Waishengren, from being the legitimate representatives of Chinese culture, in some circumstances (especially in some DPP campaigns), became the scapegoats for the KMT—as representatives of the counter-discourse to the “all-promising” Taiwanese

29 Wang, [Prefatory Remarks: Old Souls Reincarnated—The Novels of Zhu Tianxin]” in Gudu [The Old Capital], p.15.
discourse (at least in the years before and after the DPP came to power in 2000). As a result, what Zhu faced after the 1980s, was a continuously structural annulment of values in which she believed, and the “young fascist” had to re-adjust her position-taking so as to face the reconfiguring of her inner and the outer space.

To express the feelings of identity-loss became her first step in the “project of memory rearrangement” in Wo jide [1989]. In “Danshui de zuihou lieche” [The Last Train from Danshui] (1984), a bored male student, Huang Man, from a vocational high school at seventeen makes friends with Old Shi on the trains between Taipei and Danshui. Old Shi, whose son is a millionaire, with psychopathic tendencies, has the idea that his son is trying to kill him by sending a young “killer” to follow him. (In fact the young “killer” is sent by Old Shi’s son to secretly protect his father.) One night, on the last train to Danshui, Old Shi disappears, leaving traces that suggest he has drowned himself. Huang Man contacts Shi’s son. The family of Old Shi’s son and his family shows a detached attitude towards Old Shi’s disappearance. In fact Shi has swum to the other side of the Danshui river, Bali. Here he is taken care of at a home for the aged, where Old Shi becomes sober and recalls everything. Huang Man bumps into him, but Old Shi refuses to go back to his home in Taipei because he feels “his disappearance does not make any difference.” In terms of the politics of memory, or national allegory, the flaneur-like youngster makes a compatible allegory to the Old Shi, who has abandoned his old memory. The youngster, perhaps could symbolise Zhu herself, walking in the city to construct her memory. On the other hand, the Old Shi might suggest an aged flaneur, whose
merry youth in the city turns out to be a destroyed memory, since things continue to go on with (or without) Old Shi’s disappearance.

Where Girangge pictured a utopia in which the worship of a trinity of fathers can be righteously achieved through paternal morality—a morality that requires that women and bodily desires should be suppressed by traditional Chinese discipline—in “Fomie” [Nirvana] (1989), on the other hand, various forms of impurity appear on the protagonist—an oppositional activist who gradually loses his pure political ideals but indulges himself in bodily pleasure. Zhu’s hostile attitude towards the oppositional activist can be easily detected. According to Chou Ying-Hsiung, strategies of “senses” and “disposition”—through the advantures of human senses (i.e. smell in “Xiongyali zhi shui” [The Water of Hungary]) and invention of a parallel character of the protagonist (i.e. the character, A, in Gudu)—become ways for Zhu to experience “the other” and the other’s feelings, particularly in some stories in Gudu. In “Fomie”, the oppositional activist’s indulgence in sensuous and sensual pleasure can be seen as Zhu’s attempt to understand the realities of “the other”, those who believed in and practiced Bentu discourse. By comparison, in “Chuhang” [Setting out] (1999) in Manyouzhe [The Flaneur], the narrator imitates her dead father’s soul in its wandering around the globe until she finally settles down her soul in Yuanshan, once an island in Taipei.


31 Zhu’s father died in 1998.
Lake thousands of years ago. In terms of national allegory, this plot suggests Zhu’s own envisioned “settling-down” in Taiwan, a settling down that includes both her recently-deceased father and herself—finally finding a response to the questions of her national identity in post-martial-law Taiwan. In “Yuanfang de leisheng” [The Faraway Sound of Thunder], Zhu uses a metafictional device to justify her local position and the legitimacy of her memory. As Liao Hsien-hao argues (in response to Chiu Kuei-fen’s comments on Xiang wo juancun de xiongdimen), Zhu uses the device of “confession” to construct the subjectivity of Juancun in order to counter the oversimplified discourse of Juancun in both KMT and Bentu nationalism. Liao argues that this confessional description of Juancun by Zhu in “Xiāng wo juancun de xiongdimen” aims to confront Juancun with contemporary realities (rather than the “realities” represented through official KMT and Bentu discourses). Thus, the theme of lost identity and memory, the account of the soul’s final settling down in Taipei as the final stop, and the device of “confession” all contribute to the marginalised version of the Taiwanese national allegory, even though it is quite different from the official narratives in Taiwan (and in China).

As discussed in the Introduction, Margaret Hillenbrand indicates that Zhu Tianxin uses her “layered allegorical” Juancun narrative as a metaphorical

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microcosm to portray the overlapping referencing relationship between China, the KMT, the mainlander community on Taiwan, Taiwan itself, and the tension between \textit{Waishengren} identification and Taiwanese nationalism in 1990s Taiwan.\textsuperscript{35} Like the diachronical politics of the colonial palimpsest, in which each layer is produced through both erosion and absorption, in terms of layered national allegories in 1980s Taiwan, different national narratives had also gone through the process of erosion and absorption (as in the ethnic politics and various national imaginations within the Bentu discourse).

Hillebrand argues that \textit{Juancun} in Zhu Tianxin’s prose “not only opens Taiwanese identity up to \textit{waishengren} but also opens \textit{waisheng} identity up to Taiwan.”\textsuperscript{36} Zhu’s stories in \textit{Gudu} (1997) provides the bridge for each side, even though in a “bitterly sarcastic” way. In particular, “Gudu” [The Old Capital] unreservedly shows the protagonist’s condescending contempt for a cacophonous 1990s Taiwan, a dystopia, in contrast to the Japanese colonial period and the post-war period of the KMT rule, which are portrayed as two relatively harmonious utopias. By contrast to the dystopia present, a nostalgia for colonial Taiwan and 1960-70s Taiwan are vividly shown.\textsuperscript{37} The repeated quotations from “Taohuayuan ji” [The Peach Colony], originally a Chinese allegorical tale (written by Tao Yuanming in the Jin dynasty, AD 421) which suggests a utopia free of political struggles, along with material from Taiwan’s historical records in the Qing archives


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p.658.

which represent a vigorous Chinese-centric perspective, national-allegorically,
suggest a Chinese version of utopia that the protagonist can no longer find in
post-martial-law Taiwan/Taipei. This coincides with the period when the opposition
DPP party started to hold power (in the 1990s) and particularly with the period when
Chen Shui-bian became Taipei mayor (1994-1998). The other utopian allegory
comes from Kawabata Yasunari’s “The Old Capital” (1962), which is set in Kyōto,
the capital of Japan for over a millennium.\(^\text{38}\) The abandoned baby, Chieko, is found
by Takichiro and Shige Sada and then registered as their daughter. Chieko gradually
finds out that she has a sister, Naeko. Chieko’s orphanage and her search for Naeko
are used by Zhu as a parallel to the non-provincial protagonist’s search for identity.
An event indicates the resource of the protagonist’s bitterly sarcastic character. After
participating in a promotional event for DPP candidates, in which provincial hatred
was directed at *Waishenren*, the protagonist’s Taiwanese husband made love with
her with unusual excitement that night. Since then, she wants to leave the island.\(^\text{39}\)
In a cultural sense, confronted by the rich Chineseness of [The Peach Colony] and
Qing historical archives and the Japanese of “The Old Capital”, what exists in
Taipei in the 1990s, or the island, is a shallow culture with vicious political struggles
but without much civilisation.\(^\text{40}\) However, the protagonist needs to go back to

\(^{38}\) According to Chen, Zhu creates a “labyrinth of intertextuality and interculturation by weaving
Kawabata’s Kyōto in to her description of Taipei and mixing the city’s colonial past with its
postcolonial present.” Chen, “Mapping Identity in a Postcolonial City: Intertextuality and Cultural
Hybridity in Zhu Tianxin’s *Ancient Capital*”, p. 312.


\(^{40}\) Chen, “Mapping Identity in a Postcolonial City: Intertextuality and Cultural Hybridity in Zhu
Tianxin’s *Ancient Capital*”, p. 314.
Taiwan after her trip to Kyōto. In terms of national allegory, the protagonist’s necessary return from other layers of national allegories (the Peach Colony, the “savage” Taiwan in the official Qing narrative, the Kyōto of Kawabata’s “The Old Capital” and 1990s Kyōto) to 1990s Taiwan in the second part of the story suggests Zhu’s necessary construction of an all-inclusive nationalism for the marginalised Waisheng ethnic group, and for other ethnic groups in Taiwan, as Hillenbrand suggests. In accord with Jameson’s saying, “all third-world texts are necessarily…allegorical,” it is suggested that Zhu also offers a zigzag version of Taiwanese nationalism arrived at through her Juancun background—which positioned her as the post-martial-law orphan of both the KMT and the DPP. In terms of the colonial palimpsest, Zhu’s model of a post-1949 orphanhood based on Juancun can be seen as another national allegory comparable to Wu Zhuoliu’s orphanage in Orphan of Asia.

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Conclusion

The development of the discourses of subjectivity in Taiwanese literature involves a constant redefinition through conversation between a multiple We and Others, rather than between an homogeneous We and Others. Both We and Others, for Taiwanese literature, are plural, and have co-evolved alongside each other. This is because these We-Other discourses are formed in the palimpsestic context of Taiwanese literary field, whose multi-layered colonial cultures blurred the definition of who We are and who They are, and this creates the mobility that this thesis describes, where who We are and who They are are sometimes reversible.

In Chapter Two, Three, Four, Five and the Epilogue, the thesis has presented the performance of national allegories in the Taiwanese literary field. This was one of the most prominent characteristics of post-colonial Taiwanese literature, which featured two protagonists, modernism and colonialism, from the period under Japanese Rule to the KMT Martial Law period, and now on to the post Martial-Law period. On this continuous cacophonous stage, we see both the acceptance and resistance of the various Taiwanese writers, who largely carry the imprints of previous ethos(es), when facing dominant national and/or nationalist narratives in each ethos, be it Han-centred cultural nationalism, Japanese imperialism, Chinese nationalism, or Taiwanese nationalism. The historical tension, the struggle to include and to exclude these tangled narratives, creates self-contradictory
characteristics in themselves, and in their literary performances.

With hindsight, multi-culturalism, or a discourse related to multi-identification, conveniently serves to describe and explain these complicated discourses as postmodern cultural phenomenon—there are various narratives (master narratives or small ones, political or cultural, or something in between) competing with each other up to the present, as the residues of a multi-layered structure of cultural assimilation under the course of various nationalising projects in Taiwan’s multi-colonial history. However, multi-culturalism and the rhetoric of related discourses at most provide a descriptive explanation, while they are in danger of enhancing or even justifying the already constructed narratives which side closely with colonial discourses—such as assimilation projects in the name of nation, civilisation, or modernity. Taiwan’s multi-culturalism, as it appears to be at present, has its special historical developments and pitfalls. It usually maintains a superficial equality which is relatively based on synchronic rather than diachronic reflection of forces behind the power structure. For example, indigenous voice is now equally present in Taiwan, but they are still the dominated group in terms of their cultural, economic, social, and political capital in the structure. This is why I have approached this geography-crossing and multi-layered literature through the figure of the colonial palimpsest.

In both the 1920s and in 1970s Taiwan, when cracks appeared under colonial dominance, anti-colonial discourses such as the farmer-labour movements or the
democratic movement started to emerge and were expressed in the literary field\(^1\) as re-rooting movements. The most prominent (and shared) motif of these movements was the proposal of Taiwanese awareness, as the ultimate resort against colonial repressions. These advocates of Taiwanese-ness constantly adjusted their position-taking in order not to be put down right away by the force of the state power—of the Japanese colonial government and the KMT government respectively. In the literary field, resistance within institutions\(^2\) and by disciplined strategies (language and nationalist-symbol choice expressed in literary writing in these periods) gave both of the resistance and the strategies characteristics of compromise since they required mastery of the coloniser’s rhetoric. The disciplined strategies and coloniser’s rhetoric here refers to language and legitimate literary expression in these periods. For example, it includes strategies of adopting the colonial language to write back (like Wu Zhuoliu’s use of Japanese and Chinese against the Japanese colonial government and the later KMT government, and the \textit{compromised} strategy in 2-28 writing) and the (partial) acceptance of pedagogic courses such as modernity, civilisation, and nationalist narratives. These disguised anti-colonial trajectories enhanced a mutual assimilation. As a result, the current dominant colonial layer is engraved closely on the resistant discourses, while the latter are often inherited and draw resources from the previous layer, such as in the obvious case of Wu Zhuoliu’s

\(^1\) Though in the beginning these resistant discourses did not position themselves and could not mobilise resources as anti-colonial movements.

\(^2\) For example, Wu Zhuoliu had been a teacher under the period of Japanese rule. Rapongan was once a substitute teacher in the (Han) elementary and junior high schools. They both took positions and resisted within the colonial (schooling) structure. This writing-back (within colonial institutions) situation is commonly seen among Taiwanese intellectuals.
writing strategy. Therefore, different from other post-colonial paradigms in the world, the multi-layered colonial context of Taiwan gives the writing-back mission a more complicated role.

Intriguingly, Bourdieu’s concept of *hysteresis*, which originally signified a (negative) fossilisation of habitus in the older generations, is to some extent positively used by these writers to construct, or to fortify, their subjectivity. In the writings of Wu, even though he presents a degree of departure from the Chinese identification in the post-2-28 period, his craving for Han poetry and Han cultural elements in his writings (such as in “Nanjing zagan”) remain distinctive. In *Mei chunniang*, in its confrontation with communism, the trends associated with Modernism are portrayed as useless, compared to traditional Chinese culture which correlates with the patriotism of ROC China. In Bai Xianyong’s writings, apart from the modernist elements, a resort to various forms of “Chinese/Han” values is used to contrast the difference between characters of the Chinese diaspora and the Taiwanese. These Chinese values are also present in the Chinese nostalgia as part of the experience of dislocation. In Rapongan’s writing-back project, an idealised Tao tradition and even an identification with the Japanese layer are revealed. Zhu Tianxin’s writing offers a reposition of Chinese cultural capital in order to find a way out for *Juancun* identification.

The relationship between history writing and national narrative has been demonstrated in the thesis. The contest between different national discourses in each colonial social context and the various attempts at re-writing of the previous ones in order to solidify their subjectivity has been discussed. In Wu Zhuoliu’s writing, a
discursive route of Taiwanese-ness is found through the struggles between Han cultural nationalism, Japanese modernity, and his own experiences in China and in relation to the 2-28 Incident. Both in Mei chunniang, and in related 2-28 writing, the thesis has shown how the palimpsestic production of 2-28 writing is deeply involved with the political context and the State Apparatus. In Bai Sian-yong’s writing, the thesis examined how a Chinese diasporic writer with Chinese habitus negotiated between the migrated Chineseness and suppressed Taiwaneseness (or, Taiwaneseness-to-be)—issues of the dislocated natives (the Chinese diaspora) and the local natives (the Taiwanese people)—through Americanised modernism in the Cold War setting. In Rapongan’s writing, Taiwanese-ness in general is seen as imposing modernity and colonialism through colonial Japanese and KMT-Chinese versions, rather than providing a partner for regaining indigenous subjectivity. The alienated and diasporic Tao subjectivity is reconstructed through Rapongan’s own idealised and distinctive Tao-myth-narrative. Taiwaneseness, even though being treated by Zhu Tianxin’s “bitterly-sarcastic” writing, gradually becomes a necessary part of her own version of Taiwanese nationalism.

To return to the question with which I began, the subjectivity of Taiwanese literature does not fix stably in any discourses, such as the so-called discourse of Taiwaneseness, or Taiwanese nationalism. The related heritage of Chinese nationism, the indigenous tradition, and Japanese identification are not necessarily the opposite of it. Rather, through the dialogue between the present and the past, or, the constant negotiation of acceptance and resistance, the subjectivity of the imagined communities of Who We Are keeps reshaping its look and content. This
does not ignore the fact that this multi-layered colonisation still exerts its influence: we can, for example, find transformed colonial characteristics in the last layer, the KMT’s Chinese nationalism, which still has its distinct influence on modern-day Taiwan. However, the discrepancies in colonial pedagogy within institutions, and the resistant agency of the colonised, all contribute to the project of the structuring of the palimpsestic subjectivity-negotiation of Taiwanese literature.
Appendix

“The Inscription of the Memorial Monument of 2-28 in the 228 Memorial Park in Taipei”:

In 1945, when news of Japan's surrender reached Taiwan, the populace rejoiced, congratulating one another for having finally escaped the injustices of colonial rule. Unexpectedly Chen Yi, Chief Executive Officer of Taiwan Provincial Government, responsible for the takeover and administration of Taiwan but ignorant of public sentiment, governed in a partisan manner, discriminating against the Taiwanese. Combined with bureaucratic corruption, production and distribution imbalances, soaring prices, and severe unemployment, popular dissatisfaction was soon pushed to the boiling point. On February 27, 1947, while confiscating smuggled cigarettes on Yen Ping North Road in Taipei City, Monopoly Bureau personnel injured a female vendor and mistakenly killed a by-stander, inciting popular outrage. The next day, crowds in Taipei demonstrated in protest, marching to the Office of the Chief Executive to demand punishment of the killers. To their surprise, demonstrators were met with gunfire, which killed and injured several participants, thereby igniting a fury of widespread public protest. In order to resolve the conflict and extinguish pent-up resentment toward the government, local Taiwanese leaders organized a seduction committee to mediate the dispute and even presented demands for political reform. Contrary to expectations, Ch'en Yi, haughty and obstinate by nature, entered into public negotiations, while at the same time treated these leaders as rebels and requested military assistance directly from Nan king. Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Nationalist Government, upon hearing reports from Taipei, immediately dispatched military troops to Taiwan. On March 8th, the Twenty-First Army Division, under the command of Liu Yu-chin, landed at Keelung, and on the10th, martial law was declared throughout the island. In the course of suppressing local resistance and pacifying the countryside. K'o Yuan-fen, Chief of Staff of the Garrison Command, Shin Hung-his, Commander of the Keelung Strategic Area, P'eng Mengchi, Commander of the Kaohsiung Strategic Area, and Chang Mu-t'ao,
Chief of the Military Police Corps, implicated numerous innocent citizens. Within months, the number of those killed, injured and missing exceeded ten thousand; residents of Keelung, Taipei, Chiayi and Kaohsiung suffered the greatest losses. This event is known today as the February 28th Incident. During the subsequent half century, under the shadow of long-term martial law, both officials and private citizens have maintained a discreet silence, not daring to mention this taboo subject. Nevertheless, long-suppressed injustice eventually had to be rectified, and the problems of antagonism originating from native place differences and controversy over unification or independence needed to be solved. After the lifting of martial law in 1987, many sectors of the populace truly felt that peace and harmony would be impossible unless these grave afflictions were first cured. Thereupon, an official investigation of the February 28th Incident was undertaken, the head of the state made a public apology, victims and their families were compensated, and a memorial to the incident was erected. However, full recovery from this devastating social wound yet awaits the joint efforts of the entire nation. By engraving this plaque, we seek to comfort the souls of the deceased, to soothe the suffering and resentment of countless victims and their families, and to evoke this event as a lesson to all our compatriots. From this day fort. Let us unite as one with mutual trust, treating one another with love and sincerity while dissolving all enmity and revenge, in the hope of establishing eternal peace. May Heaven bless this beloved island and grant her everlasting life.

Erected this 28th day of February, in the year Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Seven, by the Memorial Foundation of the February 28th Incident.¹

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