



## Annexing New Audit Spaces: Challenges and Adaptations

Journal:	<i>Accounting, Auditing &amp; Accountability Journal</i>
Manuscript ID:	AAAJ-01-2015-1932.R2
Manuscript Type:	Research Paper
Keywords:	New audit spaces, Independence, Audit report, Accreditation, Bourdieu, Accounting profession

SCHOLARONE™  
Manuscripts

Peer Review

## ANNEXING NEW AUDIT SPACES: CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATIONS

## Abstract

**Purpose:** This paper examines attempts at jurisdictional expansion in the audit field. Specifically, we critically analyse the professional implications of ‘new audit spaces’, that is, novel auditing and assurance services that have emerged at intersections between audit and other fields such as the environment, the public sector, sport and education. The purpose is two-fold. First, to better understand the dynamics of new audit spaces, and second, to highlight the major challenges and adaptations prompted by these dynamics.

**Design/methodology/approach:** Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, we highlight and problematise four issues central to the construction of new audit spaces: (1) independence; (2) reporting; (3) professional accreditation; and (4) the nature of the audit role.

**Findings:** The audit profession has experienced mixed success in seeking to annex new audit spaces; in some instances, practices initially located at the margins of auditing have moved towards its centre, while elsewhere projects have been abandoned, colonised by others or remain in flux. In these ventures, the accounting profession is brought into competition with other bodies of expertise and modes of practice. In new audit spaces, core elements of auditing, as conventionally conceived, are transmogrified as they travel.

**Originality/value:** This analysis calls into question some of the ‘sacred cows’ of auditing and challenges the transferability of the capitals and habitus of the accounting profession in other domains. Future research avenues are suggested.

**Keywords:** New audit spaces; Independence; Audit report; Accreditation; Bourdieu; Accounting profession

## 1 Introduction

Professional auditing has long been marked by dynamism and fluidity. Throughout their history, audit firms have been proven to be highly adaptive, responding and innovating amid dynamic and competitive markets. In recent decades, audit markets have experienced substantial change, characterised by a high degree of concentration and ‘tiering’ of firms and expansion into a set of occasionally polemic consulting services, as well as the emergence of a series of ‘new audit spaces’ offered by a combination of different actors and firms. The very nature of auditing has changed as the boundaries have been redrawn (Miller, 1998), with some new audit practices moving into the very core of auditing while others remain at its periphery.

This paper has two key objectives. First, we seek to better understand how the nature of the emergence of *new audit spaces* (Andon *et al.*, 2014), and the key characteristics assigned to them, have reoriented the fundamental features of audit. Second, we explore the implications that this reorientation has had for the efforts of professional accounting elites (e.g., the Big-4 and professional accounting bodies) to expand their jurisdiction into new audit spaces. For the purposes of this paper, new audit spaces is used as an umbrella term to describe novel assurance and auditing services outside of the traditional attest audit domain. In his widely cited *Audit Society* work, Power (1994, 1997) argues that auditing has infiltrated many areas of contemporary Western society, with its terminology and methodologies now applied to other domains such as environmental auditing, value-for-money auditing, and technology auditing. These service offerings have led the audit field to intersect with semi-autonomous fields and brought into question the very definition of auditing.

While Power distinguishes auditing from “supervisory practices of real time inspection” (Power, 1994, p. 300), he intentionally avoids defining the concept clearly,

1  
2  
3 highlighting a lack of consensus within the field itself, and warning that ‘official definitions’  
4  
5 only offer an idealised projection of hopes invested in audit practice (Power, 1997, p. 4). As  
6  
7 such, emphasis is placed on the dispersion of the word ‘audit’ in scoping the field, rather than  
8  
9 on its conceptualisation (Lindberg, 2007). Further, Power (1997) asserts that this ‘fuzziness’  
10  
11 is in fact what enables it to be translated and adapted to an ever growing variety of  
12  
13 organisational and social contexts. The manifestation of “general conceptual ingredients”  
14  
15 (Power, 1997, p. 5)<sup>1</sup> is argued to be contextually dependent, meaning they may not appear as  
16  
17 they are conventionally conceived from the perspective of financial statement auditing.  
18  
19

20  
21 While there are some exceptions, for the most part the accounting literature on  
22  
23 auditing is narrow in scope, focusing almost exclusively on professional accountants,  
24  
25 financial statement audits by licensed auditors and related regulatory regimes (Cooper and  
26  
27 Robson, 2006; Francis, 2011; Nelson and Tan, 2005). Further, research on the expanding  
28  
29 jurisdiction of audit firms has tended to focus on the so-called ‘non-audit services’, primarily  
30  
31 in the form of consulting services, which have raised animated debates about independence  
32  
33 (DeFond, 2002; Kinney Jr, 2004; Schmidt, 2012). The emergence of new audit spaces has  
34  
35 been less explored. This is, however, an important area to study as this refashioning of the  
36  
37 boundaries of auditing has opened markets that are in many instances substantial in their own  
38  
39 right, as well as raising questions that go to the heart of contemporary financial management  
40  
41 and corporate governance.  
42  
43

44  
45 Our focus on the emergence of new audit spaces contributes to the literature by  
46  
47 offering a window into the social construction of expertise and inter-professional rivalry. This  
48  
49 facilitates the development of in-depth insights into how new audit services are created and  
50  
51 developed and who and what is seen as legitimate. As Francis (2011, p. 322) concludes:  
52  
53

54 ... we can benefit from a more expansive view of auditing without borders, one that  
55  
56 considers the commonalities of financial statement audits with other certification  
57  
58 literatures.  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Our study also contributes to the long stream of work in the area of professions that  
4 has investigated the notion of jurisdictional expansion (Greenwood *et al.*, 2002; Muzio *et al.*,  
5 2013; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2001; Suddaby and Viale, 2011). A recurring image in this  
6 work has been the powerful professional elite proactively and strategically commodifying  
7 and colonizing adjacent professional jurisdictions deemed to be commercially significant  
8 (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2001). New audit spaces offer an interesting window into this  
9 phenomenon, reflecting areas where a mature, hierarchical audit field intersects with other  
10 fields such as sport (see Andon and Free (2012) in relation to salary cap auditing),  
11 government (see Radcliffe (1998) in relation to value-for-money auditing), the environment  
12 (see O'Dwyer *et al.* (2011) in relation to sustainability assurance) and higher education (see  
13 Wedlin (2007) in relation to university rankings). In these intersections, new institutional  
14 infrastructure is created that draws heavily on the mature audit field. We demonstrate that  
15 new audit spaces may be primarily driven by actors outside the mature audit field and that the  
16 capacity of professional accounting firms to adapt and colonise new audit spaces is neither  
17 unproblematic nor inevitable (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Muzio *et al.*, 2013; Suddaby  
18 and Viale, 2011). We illustrate that the process of adaptation in new audit spaces has seen  
19 fundamental aspects of audit challenged: the nature of independence conceived differently,  
20 modes of reporting reconsidered, different accreditations emerging, and the very nature of the  
21 role of the audit acquiring new meanings.  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44

45 This paper is structured as follows. The next two sections provide a brief overview of  
46 the history of professional auditing and recent expansion of new audit spaces. This is  
47 followed by the theoretical framework of the paper, informed by the work of Pierre Bourdieu.  
48 The discussion presents a wide-ranging discussion of four different themes raised by the  
49 emerging literature in the area of new audit spaces: (1) independence; (2) reporting; (3)  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 professional accreditation; and (4) the nature of the audit role. The final section concludes the  
4  
5 paper and draws together the implications of the analysis.  
6  
7

## 8 9 **2 Mature but evolving: Developments in audit practice**

10  
11 Reviews of the history of auditing as a practice have consistently underlined its fluid and  
12  
13 dynamic nature. Brown (1962) documents that the objectives, methods and emphasis on  
14  
15 internal controls in auditing have changed dramatically in the past 400 years, shifting from  
16  
17 the detection of fraud to the determination of 'true and fair' financial position. Table 1  
18  
19 illustrates key trends, including an enhanced reliance on internal controls and a decrease in  
20  
21 detailed testing.  
22  
23

24  
25 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]  
26  
27

28  
29 Although Zeff (1987) observes that the relaxing of accountants' code of ethics (which  
30  
31 had previously prohibited direct competition in the supply of services) began as early as the  
32  
33 1970s, diversification escalated throughout the 1990s as accounting firms saw the  
34  
35 profitability of attest auditing decline due to hyper-concentration of the sector, a wave of  
36  
37 corporate mergers, and the role of technology in the audit process (Brock, 2006; Malsch and  
38  
39 Gendron, 2013). In particular, there was a dramatic spike in consulting as firms developed  
40  
41 new areas of business not directly related to traditional audit services. The decade witnessed a  
42  
43 wave of acquisitions, including Deloitte's acquisition of Access Economics, and PwC's  
44  
45 acquisition of PRTM, as each major firm built its advisory and consulting arm, with  
46  
47 particular emphasis on organisational performance improvement capability. In the UK,  
48  
49 Robson *et al.* (2007) illustrate that the ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees for FTSE top 100  
50  
51 companies increased from 0.2:1 in 1992 to 3.7:1 in 2001 (the year before the collapse of  
52  
53 Enron). By expanding service options beyond its original jurisdiction, the accounting  
54  
55 establishment had to expand the scope of recruitment to include experts (in law, IT, strategy,  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 etc.) with different (and sometimes conflicting) social and professional dispositions (Malsch  
4  
5 and Gendron, 2013).  
6

7  
8 Parallel to these developments has been the emergence of a number of novel  
9  
10 assurance services in “new audit spaces”. These initiatives have varied widely in terms of  
11  
12 timing, participating actors, contexts and success. A highly influential case in point is the  
13  
14 development of efficiency auditing,<sup>2</sup> where auditors reinvented auditing methods for  
15  
16 purposes of passing evaluations on the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector  
17  
18 initiatives. Other examples include the so-called “WebTrust” initiative to establish the  
19  
20 profession’s presence in cyberspace (Gendron and Barrett, 2004), the rise of salary cap  
21  
22 auditing in professional sport (Andon *et al.*, 2014), assurance of rankings and league tables  
23  
24 (Free *et al.*, 2009; Jeacle and Carter, 2011), and sustainability reporting assurance (O’Dwyer  
25  
26 and Owen, 2005, 2007; Wallage, 2000). This adding of practices has typically taken place  
27  
28 through a process of problematizing existing practices (Rose and Miller, 1992). Sometimes  
29  
30 this problematizing of existing practices is done by accountants themselves. At other times,  
31  
32 this problematizing of existing modes of auditing is done by outsiders.  
33  
34  
35

36  
37 In summary, profitability concerns and deregulation have structurally supported the  
38  
39 consolidation of commercialism in the audit field, manifested in practices such as ‘low-  
40  
41 balling’, financial incentives for partners and the aggressive pursuit of a consulting market.  
42  
43 Another manifestation has been the cultivation of certain new audit spaces. While research  
44  
45 has focused heavily on the non-audit services in accounting firms (e.g. DeFond, 2002;  
46  
47 Kinney Jr, 2004; Schmidt, 2012), research on the evolution of new audit spaces has been a  
48  
49 more recent and fractured phenomenon. This emergent field provides a useful base to  
50  
51 examine the nature of new audit spaces and offers important insights into the future operation  
52  
53 of auditing firms and auditors more generally.  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

### 3 Theoretical considerations

To critically examine the expanding reach of audit-styled practices into a range of new areas, we draw on key theoretical tenets from the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Broadly speaking, Bourdieu's work is focused on dynamics and struggles for power and how order is maintained within social worlds. It offers a suite of interrelated analytical concepts – social structure (the field), power relations (constructed and exchanged through various forms of capital), and internalised attitudes and behaviours (*habitus*) (Malsch *et al.*, 2011, p. 198) – that aid understanding of a given domain's 'logic of practice', including its dominant structures, prevailing power relations, accepted actions and practices, and struggles to both sustain and disrupt these elements.

Bourdieu conceives of modern society as comprised of *fields* – semi-autonomous spheres of action, distinguished by their own historically-derived power relations, schemes of domination, rules of engagement and legitimating principles – that structure human behaviour. A field is always engaged in a struggle, always under tension. Fields are also characterised by particular stakes, for which field participants compete and collectively value. Important in the competition for stakes in a given field is the relative capacity of participants to acquire, exchange and exploit various forms of *capital*, including economic, cultural (which may be institutionalised, objectified or embodied), social and symbolic capital. Prized forms of capital within particular fields are important resources that can be mobilised to enhance one's power and authority in competing for valued stakes (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). *Habitus* reflects internalised schemes of perception embodied in individuals or groups, manifesting in socially learned values, sensibilities and dispositions acquired, and internalised over time and reproduced through everyday activities and life experiences (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990, 1995).



1  
2  
3 To better understand professional trajectories emerging from new audit spaces  
4 through a Bourdieusian lens, one needs to appreciate the valued stakes, legitimating  
5 principles or ‘rules of the game’, as well as the forms of power that sustain important players.  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 In line with an increased salience in commercial priorities in professional accounting in  
11 recent decades (Anderson-Gough *et al.*, 2000; Kornberger *et al.*, 2011; Spence and Carter,  
12 2014), the name of the game in the audit field is economic capital accumulation. Within  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

To better understand professional trajectories emerging from new audit spaces through a Bourdieusian lens, one needs to appreciate the valued stakes, legitimating principles or ‘rules of the game’, as well as the forms of power that sustain important players. In line with an increased salience in commercial priorities in professional accounting in recent decades (Anderson-Gough *et al.*, 2000; Kornberger *et al.*, 2011; Spence and Carter, 2014), the name of the game in the audit field is economic capital accumulation. Within accounting firms, particularly the Big-4 professional service firms, business activity is animated by the pursuit of new profit sources through winning and retaining clients, and finding new and innovative ways of servicing client needs (Spence and Carter, 2014). This is not to suggest that commercial logics have totally supplanted professional virtues (e.g. public duty, ethical conduct, technical competence). However, as Carter and Spence (2014), Spence and Carter (2014), and Spence *et al.* (2015) evidence through a series of in-depth interviews with Big-4 PSF partners, there is a clear privileging of commercial priorities within the field and concern with what Gouldner (1979, p. 22) calls the “latent function” of cultural capital, whereby those possessing it seek to increase their “income and social control”.<sup>3</sup>

In Bourdieusian terms, audit professionals may be characterised as “cultural intermediaries” (Negus, 2002), being involved in the production and circulation of symbolic materials (e.g., audit reports and opinions) that fulfil an ever-expanding demand for assurance and verification, thus positioning auditors with the power to “exert, from their position within cultural institutions, a certain amount of cultural authority as shapers of opinion” (Andon *et al.*, 2014, p. 78). Many forms of capital are at play in the provision of these of these symbolic goods/services as illustrated in Table 2.

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

In line with the institutionalised commercial logic prevailing in audit field, certain forms of capital are more highly valued than others for their convertibility to economic

1  
2  
3 capital, including social capital (growing and using personal networks and leveraging  
4 colleagues' connections for new clients and business), forms of cultural capital such as  
5 educational capital (educational qualifications) and linguistic capital (a capacity to speak  
6 easily and meaningfully with both existing and potential clients to build social capital), and  
7 symbolic capital (recognition from involvement in philanthropic or charitable activities)  
8 (Carter and Spence, 2014; Spence *et al.*, 2015). Interestingly, within the Big-4 environments  
9 studied by Carter and Spence (2014) and Spence and Carter (2014), partner technical  
10 expertise (e.g. auditing skill and knowledge of relevant standards - a form of cultural capital)  
11 was considered necessary, but of lesser value in the pursuit of economic capital  
12 accumulation. In fact, in the context of Big-4 partner promotions, too much expertise can  
13 convert to negative symbolic capital (being labelled 'too technical' and consequently 'not  
14 partner material') (Spence *et al.*, 2015, p. 10).

15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30 The prevailing habitus inculcating acceptable thinking and conduct within the audit  
31 field is also influenced by the prevailing commercial logic. Successful audit professionals  
32 (i.e. partners and those aspiring to partnership admission) are meant to appear  
33 entrepreneurial, charismatic, and commercially savvy; have a nous for spotting business  
34 opportunities from emerging client concerns; and know how to comport themselves,  
35 including how to dress, speak, listen, set people at ease and generate trust amongst existing  
36 and prospective clients (Spence and Carter, 2014). Professional virtues (ethics and technical  
37 competence) are also inculcated in accounting professionals, but in a limited way, and  
38 subordinated to commercial priorities, framed in a language of risk management and/or  
39 litigation threats (Spence and Carter, 2014). By and large, these dispositions are sustained and  
40 reproduced through graduate selection (Jacobs, 2003), and firm/professional acculturation  
41 and socialisation (Anderson-Gough *et al.*, 1998, 2001; Carter and Spence, 2014; Covaleski *et*  
42 *al.*, 1998). There is also a sense of successful audit professionals transcending their  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 technically-oriented origins and reforming themselves as more commercially-minded as they  
4  
5 progress up the professional hierarchy (Chang and Birkett, 2004), leading Spence and Carter  
6  
7 (2014, p. 14) to conclude that “the habitus is adaptable and professionals within the Big-4  
8  
9 have scope to re-invent themselves, provided that they can inculcate substantially  
10  
11 commercial-professional logics.”  
12

13  
14 It is important to note that presently prized capitals in the audit field are historically  
15  
16 contingent, derived from long standing developments within the accounting profession. In  
17  
18 addition, prevailing habitus can be personally stylised to reflect an individual’s differing  
19  
20 social trajectories and life experiences (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990), or disrupted by change (e.g.,  
21  
22 moves to seize opportunities for new audit services, or the emergence of new players in the  
23  
24 audit field) that exposes it to markedly different conditions and/or competition from opposing  
25  
26 dispositions and values (Malsch and Gendron, 2013). Thus the attributes that sustain the  
27  
28 current hegemonic status of qualified accountants cannot be considered inherent or natural.  
29  
30 They can be subjected to trial and challenge (e.g., in the aftermath of the recent global  
31  
32 financial crisis). They can also be threatened by the emergence of new services and/or  
33  
34 players. Powerful players in the audit field mobilise considerable reserves of economic and  
35  
36 other capital to ensure their own resource strengths remain privileged (Cooper *et al.* (2005, p.  
37  
38 376) call this “the power to name capital”). At the same time, there may be junctures where  
39  
40 new intersections between auditing and other fields demand change and adaptability if  
41  
42 accounting firms are to mount successful jurisdictional claims for new audit services that  
43  
44 emerge.  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51

### 52 3.1 Professional stakes and the emergence of new audit spaces

53

54 Bourdieu’s comments on the notion of professions as sociological constructs are scarce but  
55  
56 highly critical. He largely derides the notion as “a folk concept”, which “has been uncritically  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 smuggled into scientific language and which imports into it a whole social unconscious”  
4  
5 (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 242), preferring to focus instead on the concept of fields.  
6  
7 Following Schinkel and Noordegraaf (2011), we see “professionalism” as a form of symbolic  
8  
9 capital in Bourdieu’s terms, characteristic of a historically constructed field of power. For  
10  
11 Bourdieu, a profession forms “a system of objective relations between ... agents or  
12  
13 institutions and ... the site of the struggles for the monopoly of the power to consecrate”  
14  
15 (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 78); it is the successful claim to professionalism that ensures social  
16  
17 closure of a field. In competing for symbolic status with other occupations, a profession is  
18  
19 structured as one sub-field of the field of power able to be recognised as legitimate. In these  
20  
21 struggles, auditors have been brought into competition with other occupations.  
22  
23

24  
25 Conceiving of professionalism as a form of symbolic capital that is sought and  
26  
27 contested by various social actors draws attention to competitive dynamics in the field. A  
28  
29 range of researchers, commentators and professional organisations have argued that the  
30  
31 accounting profession’s credibility, built from its provision of financial audit, has strong  
32  
33 resonance in emerging audit spaces. Claims of ‘well-developed global standards’,  
34  
35 professional ‘independence and ethical requirements’, ‘quality control mechanisms’, and  
36  
37 ‘reputational capital’ (particularly amongst the big PSFs) have led many to argue for public  
38  
39 accountants as ‘higher quality’ assurance providers (DeAngelo, 1981; Simnett *et al.*, 2009;  
40  
41 Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). As Power (1997) contends, this has led to competency claims  
42  
43 by professional auditors in areas of assurance work “with which it may not be natural or,  
44  
45 from some points of view, desirable to associate them” (p. 124).  
46  
47  
48

49  
50 The most systematic professional attempt to carve out new professional opportunities in  
51  
52 auditing has been *The Special Committee on Assurance Services (The Elliott Committee)*, set  
53  
54 up by the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) in 1994, with a final report appearing in late  
55  
56 1996 (AICPA, 1996). The Elliott Committee defines assurance services as “independent  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 professional services that improve the quality of information, or its context, for decision  
4  
5 makers” (p. 1). It contends that assurance services “help people make better decisions by  
6  
7 improving information available to them” (p. 2). Based on this definition, assurance services  
8  
9 encompass, but are not confined to, attestation services.  
10

11  
12 [INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]  
13

14  
15 The Committee proposed six new services that fall in areas as diverse as risk  
16  
17 assessment, business performance measurement, information systems reliability, electronic  
18  
19 commerce, health care performance measurement and care of the elderly (AICPA, 1996).  
20  
21 Here, the audit profession is trying to realign itself with decision-usefulness approaches  
22  
23 frequently espoused by the accounting standard setters.  
24

25  
26 In spite of their claims to the provision of all forms of assurance service, forays by  
27  
28 both the professional accounting bodies and PSFs into new forms of assurance have proven  
29  
30 neither automatic nor mechanical. They have been successful in certain areas (for example,  
31  
32 value-for-money or efficiency auditing (Radcliffe, 1998, 1999)), failed in others (such as  
33  
34 WebTrust (Barrett and Gendron, 2006; Gendron and Barrett, 2004)), and the status of new  
35  
36 forms of assurance remains contested elsewhere (as has been observed in sustainability report  
37  
38 assurance (Green and Zhou, 2011; Mock *et al.*, 2007; Simnett *et al.*, 2009)). What Power  
39  
40 describes as “audit implosions” (audit-related functions becoming supplanted by the risk  
41  
42 management movement (Power, 2000)) are also evident. And indeed, increasing digitisation  
43  
44 of knowledge has led some to suggest that the audit profession is at risk of being left behind  
45  
46 (D'Adderio and Pollock, 2012; Jeacle and Carter, 2011).  
47  
48  
49

50  
51 As new audit spaces continue to emerge, conventional rules, values, and logics of  
52  
53 practice that characterise financial statement audit practice become more distant. Establishing  
54  
55 the legitimacy of assurance services in new spaces thus requires certain bridging activities –  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 strategic actions and institutional work – that embed and legitimise assurance practices in  
4  
5 novel ways (Andon *et al.*, 2014; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006).  
6

7  
8 Like the phenomenon of new audit spaces itself, the emerging academic literature in  
9  
10 the area is fragmented and divergent in terms of focus, methods and conclusions. Table 3  
11  
12 provides an overview of key studies in the field, broken down by emerging assurance area.  
13

14 [INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]  
15

16  
17 This body of work covers a disparate array of methods and research paradigms, characterised  
18  
19 by bursts of analysis of particular phenomena rather than the steady accumulation of  
20  
21 knowledge. However, as Table 3 shows, there is now a material body of work that has  
22  
23 opened up a variety of different issues inherent in the jurisdictional expansion of the audit  
24  
25 field.  
26

## 27 28 29 30 **4 Analysis** 31

32  
33 In this section we critically examine attempts at jurisdictional expansion in order to identify  
34  
35 major adaptations and transformations at the intersection of financial auditing and other  
36  
37 fields. It is structured around four major themes: (1) independence; (2) reporting; (3)  
38  
39 professional accreditation; and (4) the nature of the audit role. We argue that development of  
40  
41 new audit spaces has important implications for each of these themes, all of which are major  
42  
43 structuring principles in financial auditing.  
44

### 45 46 47 48 *4.1 Independence* 49

50  
51 A long-standing view deeply held by the profession, researchers and regulators, is that  
52  
53 auditor independence is fundamental. Independence may be considered a form of embodied  
54  
55 cultural capital, which can confer symbolic capital, and hence legitimacy on auditors deemed  
56  
57 to possess it. Without independence, audit is seen to have “no value” (Power, 1997, p. 132).  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Lack of audit independence is consistently considered a major contributing factor in high  
4 profile scandals (e.g., Enron, HealthSouth and WorldCom), prompting significant regulator  
5 responses exemplified by the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX henceforth) in 2002. In order to  
6 preserve independence, SOX introduced a number of auditor restrictions, including: (1) a list  
7 of prohibited non-audit services;<sup>4</sup> (2) a requirement for audit committee approval of other  
8 non-audit services from their auditor; (3) audit firm rotation where the audit lead/responsible  
9 audit partner has audited the same company in each of the five previous fiscal years; and (4) a  
10 prohibition on any audit service where the audit firm previously employed any of a  
11 company's key executives within 12 months of audit commencement. Similar regulatory  
12 provisions to SOX are being adopted around the world (e.g., the *Corporations Act* in  
13 Australia, *Regulation No 537/2014* and *Directive 2014/56/EU* recently passed by the EU).

14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28 Over time, there have also been numerous calls for a watering down of independence  
29 to accommodate a broader scope of work. Despite these pragmatic urgings, most professional  
30 accounting bodies have retained a requirement that a professional accountant in public  
31 practice should be *independent in fact* as well as *in appearance*. Wallman (1996) argues for a  
32 retreat to an independence in fact test, claiming that public perception of independence is  
33 confused by focus on independence in appearance "even when there is no tainting in fact"  
34 (Wallman, 1996, p. 79). He argues for a reconceptualisation in terms of 'inappropriate'  
35 dependency and conflict; arguing that this approach "more closely fits the reality of how  
36 people think" (p. 78). As part of an AICPA project taking "a fresh look at independence for a  
37 changing world" (AICPA, 1996), Elliott and Jacobson (1998) argue that independence should  
38 be displaced by the concept of objectivity. Objectivity, it is claimed, is a function of  
39 independence as well as integrity. As such, an auditor may be objective while having interests  
40 in the auditee, provided his/her integrity is high. In this way, independence is transformed  
41 from a general problem of appearance affecting the profession, "to a specific problem  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 affecting the independence in fact of the individual auditor and his firm” (Jeppesen, 1998, p.  
4  
5 533).

6  
7 While rhetoric about independence is a central part of the rules of the game in  
8  
9 financial statement audit, recent research has begun to highlight that “the very meaning of  
10  
11 independence as a presumed [legitimizing] attribute of assurors is much more fluid than we  
12  
13 might realise” (Power, 2011, p. 325). In particular, Everett *et al.* (2005) highlight that the  
14  
15 symbolic value of audit independence is historically and contextually contingent on  
16  
17 developments within the accounting profession. Focusing on the Canadian accounting  
18  
19 profession, Everett *et al.* (2005) reveal that independence has not always been central to the  
20  
21 ethical discourse of the accounting profession. Other ethical notions, more “religious than  
22  
23 scientific” and “character-based than rule-based”, were prevalent in earlier parts of the 20<sup>th</sup>  
24  
25 century (p. 416).<sup>5</sup> According to Everett *et al.* (2005), an ethical shift to independence was  
26  
27 encouraged by events external to the profession that increasingly legitimated scientific  
28  
29 notions like independence and objectivity, along with demographic changes that pluralised  
30  
31 and secularised the accounting profession, and consequently its ethical discourse. This not  
32  
33 only caused the accounting profession to become “colonised” by notions of independence and  
34  
35 objectivity, but for such notions to be “molded and bent by the profession, apparently to fit  
36  
37 the needs of the moment” (Everett *et al.*, 2005, p. 435).

38  
39  
40  
41  
42 The work of Everett *et al.* (2005) raises questions about the symbolic value of  
43  
44 independence across fields of assurance outside of financial statement audit, and recent  
45  
46 research has begun to consider how the notion of independence travels when assurance  
47  
48 services are introduced to new and unfamiliar fields. Knechel *et al.* (2006) find from their  
49  
50 study of desirable attributes of assurance services providers (via a survey of a sample of  
51  
52 senior accounting and financial officers from 350 companies in the Netherlands) that  
53  
54 independence is not an important consideration for engaging assurance services outside of  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 financial statement audit. Overall, expertise (in the context and the performance of the  
4 service) and objectivity (whether conclusions are affected by personal bias) were considered  
5 most important. Jeacle and Carter (2011) demonstrate via a case study of the TripAdvisor  
6 travel website that assurance in the field of travel can sustain legitimacy in the absence of  
7 demonstrated independence. Further, this example demonstrates that democratised processes  
8 of verification can supplant independent expert knowledge with trust in mass lay opinion, as  
9 the latter becomes more valued in an increasingly 'digital age' society. Jamal and Sunder  
10 (2011) demonstrate that in the market for baseball cards, certifiers who are "deeply  
11 immersed" in the market (i.e., they also provide 'for profit' services in the same field) are  
12 seen to provide higher quality service in the form of "being stricter graders, command larger  
13 price premiums, and dominate in market share" (p. 284). In this field, these certifiers are seen  
14 as more credible than their 'independent' contemporaries. Finally, Andon *et al.* (2014) reveal  
15 in the context of salary cap auditing in professional sports fields that priority is placed on a  
16 range of cultural and social capitals and relevant habitus, the configurations of which are  
17 importantly conditioned by contextual influences and the configurations of power evident in  
18 individual sporting leagues.

19  
20  
21 Taken together, these papers provide further empirical support for the idea that  
22 independence as conventionally conceived may not always be as prized as one might think  
23 when audit practices are transplanted into new fields. In financial audit, independence has  
24 been an important form of cultural capital legitimating practice and claims to professionalism  
25 largely seen as beyond reproach. As Big-4 PSFs and other accounting professionals move  
26 into new spaces, they continue to accord independence a privileged position both in  
27 marketing and arguments about the public interest. However, as it is confronted with different  
28 interests and prevailing attitudes, the concept of independence becomes contestable, with  
29 different conceptions and constructions of *what it means to be independent*. How a concept of  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 independence is normalised in the field requires careful unpacking. In financial statement  
4  
5 audit, a client paying an audit firm directly for an audit opinion is not seen to offend the  
6  
7 principle of independence; in the baseball card market, a card seller also undertaking the role  
8  
9 of verification is not seen to offend the field's conception of bias (Jamal and Sunder, 2011).  
10  
11

#### 12 13 14 *4.2 Reporting*

15  
16 Power (2003) opines that audit is valueless unless its results can be clearly communicated to  
17  
18 an appropriate audience. He bemoans the historical prevalence of anodyne and carefully  
19  
20 constructed audit opinions that rarely encompass genuine critique in the name of  
21  
22 accountability (see also Shore and Wright, 2000). While the stylised language in boiler-plate  
23  
24 audit reports is an important part of the stock of linguistic capital within the financial audit  
25  
26 field, audit practitioners and investors have increasingly criticised conventional audit reports  
27  
28 for their opaqueness. A more explicit focus on report users has recently emerged with the  
29  
30 IAASB's recent approval of ISA 700 (Revised) requiring long form audit reports. Audit  
31  
32 reports must now include enhanced disclosure of the risks of material misstatement identified  
33  
34 by auditors, how auditors have applied the materiality concept, and the audit scope.<sup>6</sup> This  
35  
36 explicit shift towards more decision-useful financial audit reports, a prominent feature of the  
37  
38 Elliott Committee's objectives, also reflects the likely future focus for reporting in new audit  
39  
40 spaces.  
41  
42  
43  
44

45  
46 Voluntary developments in some new audit spaces are informative when seeking to  
47  
48 unpack this trend towards decision-usefulness. For example, in sustainability reporting, a  
49  
50 desire for more decision-useful assurance statements has stimulated controversy and driven  
51  
52 innovation in statement content. The contrasting nature of the opinions initially offered by  
53  
54 Big-4 PSFs and many smaller non-accounting 'boutique' consultancies created significant  
55  
56 tensions, with the latter exhibiting greater innovation and a more user-oriented focus in their  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 reporting. O'Dwyer *et al.* (2011) illustrated one Big-4 pioneer's efforts to translate the  
4 cautious wording underlying financial audit reports into sustainability assurance statements.  
5  
6  
7 The non-financial audit trained ('non-accountant') assurers working in these firms were very  
8 frustrated, as these statements failed to communicate the extent to which they felt their  
9 assurance processes addressed perceived user/stakeholder needs. Lacking the cultural and  
10 linguistic capital required to successfully seek changes to these reporting practices, they  
11 mobilised supportive financial auditors to lobby for more user-focused statements which  
12 eventually led to the introduction of more expansive statements comprising commentary  
13 sections, higher levels of assurance and recommendations for improvement offering the more  
14 customised and informative narratives consistently called for by Power (1997; 2003).  
15  
16 However, despite this evolution, the overriding evidence from the cases studied by O'Dwyer  
17 (2011) and O'Dwyer *et al.* (2011) suggests that innovation in the early stages of reporting in  
18 new audit spaces may be stifled if Big-4 PSFs come to colonise them (O'Dwyer, 2011).  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31

32 The heightened attention to user needs in financial audit reports and sustainability  
33 assurance statements highlights again the evolving democratisation of verification processes.  
34 In the sustainability assurance space, some Big-4 firms have even suggested that stakeholders  
35 should select the material issues for assurance in sustainability engagements, and that these  
36 stakeholder views should be included in assurance statements (O'Dwyer, 2011). While these  
37 proposals were fuelled by risk-related concerns, they represent a rare acknowledgment *by the*  
38 *Big-4* of the limited expertise of professional accountants in new assurance spaces; a direct  
39 contrast to Power's (1997) allusion to audit promising more than it can deliver (see also  
40 Pflugrath *et al.*, 2011). These proposals coincide with the approach Royal Dutch Shell (Shell)  
41 adopted for the external assurance of its sustainability report in 2005 when it ceased using  
42 PwC and KPMG, instead enrolling an external review committee (ERC, comprised of non-  
43 accountant experts in social issues) to publicly comment on its reporting 'quality'.<sup>7</sup> While  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Shell contend that the ERC does not seek to provide formal external assurance, its approach  
4 has attracted considerable controversy given that specific (Big-4) professional assurance  
5 expertise has been displaced by a 'stakeholder-focused' reporting mechanism that Shell  
6 claims has more user relevance, despite widespread concerns about the lack of independence  
7 and expertise of the ERC members (Asif *et al.*, 2013).  
8  
9

10  
11  
12  
13  
14 These user-oriented trends in sustainability assurance statements resemble aspects of  
15 TripAdvisor's user engagement. However, while TripAdvisor users primarily confer  
16 reputational benefits on the auditee (Power, 2011), the Big-4's proposals for stakeholder  
17 involvement also produce greater comfort for *assurors* in the sense that stakeholders take  
18 responsibility for issues of reporting completeness and materiality. Power (2011) argues that  
19 Jeacle and Carter's (2011) TripAdvisor study signifies a shift in the originating source of  
20 assurance from certified professional experts to consumers. He argues that this type of  
21 assurance places voice and power in the hands of the consumer/user and that Jeacle and  
22 Carter (2011) indirectly remind us of how professions are hostile to real markets and real  
23 users. This claimed hostility to real users is, however, far from universal in new audit spaces.  
24 Although it is consistent with the Big-4's initial reluctance to identify users of sustainability  
25 assurance, it is challenged by their suggestion that stakeholders should determine and report  
26 on assurance scope and materiality. The audit reporting in the TripAdvisor case is also  
27 distinct in the nature of its attention to users as it *exclusively* represents the voice or rating of  
28 the consumer and is fluid with respect to reporting content. Moreover, while the 'auditors'  
29 who sign off on the integrity and legitimacy of the TripAdvisor rankings may simultaneously  
30 threaten the relevance of their expertise (Power, 2011), Big-4 sustainability assurors  
31 mobilizing stakeholder views explicitly acknowledge their own limited expertise while  
32 concurrently promoting key aspects of this expertise centred on assessing data accuracy  
33 (O'Dwyer, 2011).  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 The likely evolution in user-focused reporting in new audit spaces may coincide with  
4  
5 the view of many sustainability assurers that a natural advisory element is necessary to allow  
6  
7 companies to develop appropriate systems and procedures to facilitate the creation of  
8  
9 auditable environments (O'Dwyer, 2011; Power, 2003). As with sustainability assurance and  
10  
11 efficiency audits, strategic advice may also emerge in new audit/assurance reporting in  
12  
13 response to demands from users less concerned about independence when this advice is seen  
14  
15 to enhance the quality (relevance and reliability) of the information on which they seek to  
16  
17 rely (see also, Andon and Free, 2012). The recent user-focused experiment by KPMG, in its  
18  
19 financial audit report for Rolls Royce Holdings plc, may also signify more openness among  
20  
21 the Big-4 to user-focused innovation in reporting, given the recent changes to ISA 700;<sup>8</sup> a  
22  
23 development that contradicts the observations of O'Dwyer (2011) and O'Dwyer *et al.* (2011).  
24  
25 It will be informative to ascertain if this user-focused reporting trend translates into the  
26  
27 debates on the assurance of Integrated Reports, where the development of assurance is  
28  
29 currently restrained by concerns regarding the auditability of data and the extent and nature of  
30  
31 user demand for assurance in this new domain.  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

### 38 4.3 Accreditation and Institutionalised Cultural Capital

39  
40  
41 In order to position themselves prominently in new audit spaces, emerging or established  
42  
43 professional groups frequently develop accreditation processes designed to attain and  
44  
45 maintain legitimacy in these spaces. These efforts often form part of strategies aimed at  
46  
47 asserting authority and expertise over new or existing practice areas in order to establish  
48  
49 exclusivity in terms of social closure (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 2001). This creates  
50  
51 membership boundaries around professional fields (Abbott, 1988; Covalleski *et al.*, 2003;  
52  
53 Dezalay and Garth, 1995) – where membership describes the bases of legitimate participation  
54  
55 in the field (or a sub-set of it) (Lawrence, 2004). These accreditation strategies commonly  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 produce a number of outcomes, including: the emergence of new professional groups  
4  
5 claiming legitimacy in new spaces; the hybridisation of new and old professional groups into  
6  
7 combined entities operating in new spaces; or the colonisation of new spaces by established  
8  
9 professions (Lawrence, 2004; Suddaby and Viale, 2011). A core component of these  
10  
11 processes is the construction of exclusive social categories or 'titles' that can only be  
12  
13 conferred by certain professional groups requiring adherence to certification criteria  
14  
15 comprising distinctive training, education and behavioural elements (McMurray, 2010).  
16  
17 Accreditation can, over time, help build considerable institutionalised cultural capital, thereby  
18  
19 assigning significant economic, cultural and symbolic resources to those accredited. The  
20  
21 resulting symbolic capital acquired can attain such prominence that the accredited 'title'  
22  
23 becomes institutionalised, thereby ensuring that the economic and cultural rewards deriving  
24  
25 from it are continually maintained whatever changes occur in the nature of the work  
26  
27 underpinning the title (Bourdieu, 1987).  
28  
29  
30  
31

32 In the area of sustainability assurance, accreditation efforts have emerged from the  
33  
34 non-profit body AccountAbility in the face of considerable efforts by the accounting  
35  
36 profession, particularly the Federation of European Accountants (FEE), to lay claim to the  
37  
38 sustainability assurance space (O'Dwyer, 2011). From 1995 onwards, AccountAbility  
39  
40 developed a reputation as a leading international organisation promoting the  
41  
42 professionalisation of ethical, environmental, social and governance accountability among  
43  
44 and within organisations. It developed a series of 'accountability' standards aimed at guiding  
45  
46 assessments of organisational accountability. One of these standards, the AA1000 assurance  
47  
48 standard (AA1000AS), provided guidance for assurance on sustainability reports. The  
49  
50 standard was more content-specific and stakeholder-focused than the IAASB's ISAE3000  
51  
52 standard on non-financial assurance and, while its adoption rate varied, it was often used by  
53  
54 Big-4 PSFs in conjunction with ISAE3000. In 2007, AccountAbility sought to solidify the  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 emerging status of AA1000AS by establishing an exclusive accreditation mechanism for  
4 sustainability assurance practitioners. A practitioner training programme was developed in  
5 conjunction with the IRCA (The International Register of Certificated Auditors), the leading  
6 professional body for management system auditors, which conferred the title of ‘Certified  
7 Sustainability Assurance Practitioner’ (CSAP). The accreditation process was promoted as an  
8 essential response to “a need to professionalize the [sustainability assurance] discipline [and]  
9 to codify what experience [wa]s relevant and how best to judge individual competence”  
10 (AccountAbility, 2012, p. 4). A ‘Competency Framework’ was built on AccountAbility’s  
11 AA1000 assurance standards platform, which aligned accredited assurers with  
12 AccountAbility’s stakeholder-focused conception of sustainability assurance, while  
13 simultaneously stressing the suitability of the accreditation for all sustainability assurers.  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

27 AccountAbility sought to mobilise the symbolic and institutionalised cultural capital  
28 of the accounting profession by persistently stressing how standards in sustainability  
29 assurance were converging through assurers’ adoption of AA1000AS in conjunction with  
30 ISAE3000. While developing the accreditation, AccountAbility involved members of  
31 professional accounting bodies and the Big-4 PSFs in its governance advisory structure. Its  
32 certification requirements underpinning the CSAP designation mimicked standard  
33 professional accounting body guidance to include requirements for continuing professional  
34 development (CPD), annual certification fees, code of practice compliance and a three year  
35 certificate renewal period. In addition to requirements for minimal training in sustainability  
36 assurance and reporting, existing professional accounting body and management systems  
37 auditor qualifications were recognised.  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50

51 Accreditation processes by professional groups frequently take the form of  
52 stratification strategies whereby ‘subject positions’ in a professional field are clearly  
53 differentiated and a hierarchy of subject positions is effected aimed at producing clear status  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 differences (Lawrence, 2004). AccountAbility's accreditation process, however, displayed  
4  
5 elements of what Lawrence (2004) terms "an association strategy" whereby less established  
6  
7 professional groups (AccountAbility) interact with more established groups to construct  
8  
9 'blended' social categories (the CSAP designation) that bring less dominant and dominant  
10  
11 professional groups together. Association strategies tend to succeed when less dominant  
12  
13 groups like AccountAbility can offer dominant groups such as the IRCA (or other  
14  
15 professional accounting bodies) some form of capital not readily available in the field as it is  
16  
17 currently constituted. This can encompass novel expertise, resources or legitimacy in the eyes  
18  
19 of new and valued stakeholders (Lawrence, 2004). In the case of AccountAbility, its  
20  
21 institutionalised cultural capital in the field of corporate social accountability, combined with  
22  
23 the symbolic capital accumulated from its decade-long reputation in the social accountability  
24  
25 field, was influential in attracting the support of IRCA.  
26  
27  
28

29  
30 The CSAP accreditation has been embraced by several ex-employees of Big-4 PSFs  
31  
32 who exited these environments to establish their own 'boutique' consultancies. These  
33  
34 individuals are commonly not financially trained auditors but the accreditation has allowed  
35  
36 them to assign a clear title to, and claim legitimacy for, their type of assurance work. For  
37  
38 example, some 'boutique' assurers clearly designate on their websites that they are AA1000  
39  
40 Licensed Assurance Providers. Hence, while the accreditation embraces traditional financial  
41  
42 auditors who can undertake extra training to become CSAPs, it also enables these non-  
43  
44 financial auditors to compete and claim exclusivity for their specific assurance expertise. It is,  
45  
46 however, too soon to say if the title has attained institutionalised value through its bestowal of  
47  
48 consistent economic and reputational rewards on title holders.  
49  
50

51  
52 One title that has attained this institutionalised value, as a form of institutionalised  
53  
54 cultural capital, is that of Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), a credential offered by the  
55  
56 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). Professional accountants, particularly  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 forensic auditors, have long espoused their exclusive expertise in providing assurance in  
4  
5 respect of fraud or in conducting investigations of potential fraud (see Andon *et al.*, 2014),  
6  
7 despite the fact that financial statement audit dispensed with such ambitions some time ago.  
8  
9 The CFE designation emerged in 1988 when an accountant-turned FBI agent Joseph T. Wells  
10  
11 founded the ACFE to accredit CFEs using a suite of examinations, continuing professional  
12  
13 education, and professional conduct and ethics requirements. The ACFE asserts that  
14  
15 accredited CFEs possess a unique set of skills that are not apparent in any other career or  
16  
17 discipline, and routinely refers to its central role in the ‘anti-fraud’ profession. The CFE  
18  
19 accreditation is underpinned by a distinct body of knowledge purportedly derived from the  
20  
21 field of criminology and collectively christened ‘fraud examination’. This knowledge  
22  
23 underpins the ‘rules of the game’ attached to forensic accounting, which presents a distinct,  
24  
25 individualised perspective on the essence of fraud and how it should be controlled (Morales  
26  
27 *et al.*, 2014). In new audit spaces, such processes simultaneously construct the essence of the  
28  
29 object of audit and the expertise required to audit the object. The CFE accreditation converted  
30  
31 the social and economic capital garnered over time by the ACFE through its extensive  
32  
33 networking efforts (see Morales *et al.*, 2014, p. 179) into significant cultural and symbolic  
34  
35 capital, contributing to its association with higher monetary (and non-monetary) rewards (for  
36  
37 example, the ACFE claims that CFEs earn 25% more than their non-certified colleagues).  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42

43 A unique feature of this process of accreditation is that the CFE is a title independent  
44  
45 of any designated qualification from professional accounting bodies, and CFEs become  
46  
47 members of the ‘Associate’ body representing the distinct ‘anti-fraud’ profession.  
48  
49 Consequently, the CFE accreditation appears to have distanced itself from some of the rules,  
50  
51 values and logics of practice assigned to traditional financial audit. It also reveals the  
52  
53 fluctuating influence of professional accounting bodies over efforts to accredit individuals,  
54  
55 with implications for their capacity to mobilise accreditation as a vehicle to preserve and  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 reproduce important cultural and symbolic capital sustaining the accounting profession in this  
4  
5 new 'forensic' accounting space.  
6

7  
8 In response, some professional accounting bodies such as the AICPA, CPA Canada  
9  
10 and ICAEW, have developed their own certified credentials for their members who wish to  
11  
12 specialise in forensic accounting with the aim of claiming legitimacy for their members  
13  
14 operating in this space. As new audit spaces evolve and diverse professional groups seek to  
15  
16 populate them, we expect that the conceptualisation of these spaces, the identity of the  
17  
18 professional groups who come to populate them, the nature of the audit work undertaken and  
19  
20 the content and form of audit reports will be significantly influenced by a variety of  
21  
22 accreditation efforts. It is likely that these will often be undertaken by established and  
23  
24 emerging professional groups operating either in concert or in competition drawing on  
25  
26 association or stratification-type strategies.  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31

#### 32 *4.4 Reorientations in the mediating roles of auditing*

33  
34 As mentioned earlier, audit professionals have positioned themselves as key cultural  
35  
36 intermediaries between 'producers' and 'consumers' of accounting and other important  
37  
38 business information. Shifting emphases have been observed over time in the character of this  
39  
40 mediating role. Lawrence Dicksee's classic text-book published in 1892, often considered to  
41  
42 be the first major auditing text-book, expressly states that the aim of an audit is the detection  
43  
44 of fraud, technical errors and errors of principle. Chandler *et al.* (1993) and Humphrey and  
45  
46 Owen (2000) note that the nature of the auditors' role and responsibilities has changed  
47  
48 significantly over time. After a strong concern with fraud in the late 19th century, the primary  
49  
50 audit objective retreated to the verification of published financial statements. In the US from  
51  
52 1940 onwards, the prevailing orthodoxy became that fraud detection is not a primary  
53  
54 objective of auditing (Brown, 1962; Power, 1997), effectively repositioning the responsibility  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 for preventing, deterring and detecting fraud as a concern for management. To this end,  
4  
5 section 110.03 of SAS No. 114 in the United States confirms that “[m]anagement is  
6  
7 responsible for adopting sound accounting policies and for establishing and maintaining  
8  
9 internal control that will, among other things, authorise, record, process, and report  
10  
11 transactions (as well as events and conditions) consistent with management’s assertions  
12  
13 embodied in the financial statements”. Chandler *et al.* (1993) argue that audit objectives and  
14  
15 practices tend to follow external events and that the profession has encountered great  
16  
17 difficulty in reconciling public expectations with the practicalities of auditing (the so-called  
18  
19 “expectations gap”<sup>9</sup> (see, Free, 1999; Hassink *et al.*, 2009; Sikka *et al.*, 1998)).  
20  
21  
22

23 With the rise of new audit spaces, a range of novel mediating emphases have emerged,  
24  
25 with divergent styles of control and organisational transparency from that privileged within  
26  
27 financial statement audit. Specifically, three distinct trajectories within new audit spaces are  
28  
29 observed: (1) certifications of practice; (2) normative opinions; and (3) quasi-judicial  
30  
31 investigations.  
32  
33

34 Power (1997) refers at length to the growth in society of demands for certification,  
35  
36 where the particular subject of an audit (e.g., an individual, organisation or some other object)  
37  
38 is declared ‘fit for purpose’ and/or has met certain predetermined standards (e.g., of safety,  
39  
40 quality, teaching, cleanliness, environment efficiency) (p. 124). In a sense, certification  
41  
42 activities bear similarities to financial statement audits, with both intending to communicate  
43  
44 to users something about the achievement of minimum standards (e.g., Generally Accepted  
45  
46 Accounting Principles and prevailing accounting standards). However, unlike a financial  
47  
48 statement audit, which is limited to the provision of a professional opinion that financial  
49  
50 statement users heed at their own discretion, certification practices are more compliance-  
51  
52 focused, and usually produce some form of symbolic accreditation, such as the WebTrust  
53  
54 Seal (Barrett and Gendron, 2006; Gendron and Barrett, 2004), certificates of authenticity for  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 collectibles (Jamal and Sunder, 2011), Green Star environmental certification (Fuerst, 2009)  
4  
5 or ISO certification (Sharma, 2005). Where accreditation is extended, the public is entitled to  
6  
7 trust that the entity in question meets minimum standards of operation. The withholding or  
8  
9 removal of accreditation may have reputational or financial consequences for the subject  
10  
11 entity. Where government bodies are interested in certification outcomes, the withholding or  
12  
13 removal of accreditation may also attract other sanctions (e.g., fines, restraint of trade,  
14  
15 reductions or removal of government funding).  
16  
17

18  
19 Chelimsky (1985) characterises efficiency audits as normative opinions. In the area of  
20  
21 efficiency auditing, auditors have moved beyond statement verification to provide policy  
22  
23 makers and management with a broad-ranging opinion on the program or activity under  
24  
25 review, to ensure that a public sector organisation is actually achieving an intended policy  
26  
27 outcome. Auditors charged with its execution are called to investigate a wide array of  
28  
29 government practice, develop classifications relating to efficiency and effectiveness, and then  
30  
31 publicly report their findings. Specifically, efficiency auditors provide guidance on whether  
32  
33 the delivery of the service provides an outcome commensurate with public sector resources  
34  
35 committed. Elsewhere, Audit Commissions in the UK (Kelly, 2003) and Australia (Colton  
36  
37 and Faunce, 2014) have been established to ensure regulatory regimes implement legislation  
38  
39 properly and/or issue a series of recommendations aimed at cutting public costs.  
40  
41  
42

43  
44 In other new audit spaces, auditing has assumed more a juridical status (Bourdieu,  
45  
46 1986), proactively seeking to uncover instances of failure to comply with rules. Although  
47  
48 auditing does not hold a 'quasi-judicial' status in administrative law, there remains an  
49  
50 undoubted correlation between aspects of the auditing function and judicial processes.<sup>10</sup>  
51  
52 Andon *et al.* (2014) document a salary cap auditor role where the very raison d'être of the  
53  
54 position relates to uncovering attempts at fraudulently manipulating the salary cap  
55  
56 regulations. In their example, the auditor had investigative and sanctioning powers, and was  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 able to compel clubs to produce certain documentation as well as issuing penalties for salary  
4  
5 cap infringements, including fines and the stripping of competition titles and points.  
6  
7 Elsewhere, forensic auditors are concerned with directly applying their financial skills and an  
8  
9 investigative mentality to uncovering instances of fraud. Characterised as “a combination of  
10  
11 auditor and private investigator” (Gray, 2008, p. 115), forensic auditors mobilise specialist  
12  
13 skills, combining competencies rooted in accounting, auditing, finance, quantitative methods,  
14  
15 organisational behaviour, applied psychology and investigatory technique to collect, analyse  
16  
17 and interpret evidence, and communicate findings (Davis *et al.*, 2010; Gray, 2008). Forensic  
18  
19 auditors are also said to rely on experience-based intuition and embody a distinct mindset,  
20  
21 attuned to detecting anomalies, probing the substance behind transactions, and questioning  
22  
23 the authenticity of audit trails and testimony (Singleton and Singleton, 2010). In the salary  
24  
25 cap and forensic auditor examples presented, the emphasis of assurance work is squarely on  
26  
27 revealing illegitimate conduct, rather than on the provision of comfort to capital markets.  
28  
29  
30

31  
32 We believe that as auditing emerges outside its traditional financial statement bounds,  
33  
34 the nature of its mediating role is likely to broaden. What we see in the emergence of these  
35  
36 new roles is the co-production of familiarity (some audit-styled procedures and conventions  
37  
38 remain in play) and newness (approaches and emphases in other audit-related practices shift)  
39  
40 such that audit becomes “recognizably familiar but in a slightly different way” (Negus, 1998,  
41  
42 p. 363). To this end, attempts to retain a narrowly defined scope by established audit  
43  
44 professionals are likely to conflict with user demands in different fields. Limited assurance is  
45  
46 deeply engrained in the way financial auditors work and importantly shapes the habitus of  
47  
48 auditors. The belief system of auditing is underpinned by an innate conservatism, inculcated  
49  
50 in professional training and manifesting in notions of ‘reasonable scope’. However, these  
51  
52 beliefs do not necessarily hold in new audit spaces, requiring new approaches and forms of  
53  
54 practice.  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## 5 Discussion

This paper had two research objectives. First, we aimed to deepen our understanding of how the advent of new audit spaces, and the essential attributes assigned to them, have reoriented the fundamental features of audit. Second, we explored the implications that this reorientation has had for the attempts by professional accounting elites (e.g., the Big-4 and professional accounting bodies) to extend their jurisdiction into new audit spaces. Our analysis unveils how core elements of financial auditing can be clearly distinguished from emerging new audit services. This is true with respect to the nature of the audit role, the operation of independence, participating practitioners and the degree of standardisation of reporting. These differences are summarised in Table 4 (adapted in part from Lindberg (2007, p. 347)). This section elaborates on these differences in terms of issues and challenges they present for attempts by accounting elites (e.g., the Big-4 PSFs and professional accounting bodies) to seize commercial opportunities presented by new audit spaces. We also present some reflections for the accounting profession from the emergence of new audit spaces.

[INSERT TABLE 4]

In line with Spence *et al.* (2015), we expect accounting elites to pursue new opportunities where they believe sufficient opportunities for economic capital accumulation and/or enhancing reputation and thus symbolic capital are on offer. Consequently, Big-4 PSFs and professional accounting bodies hold the potential to influence the emergence, nature and construction of new audit spaces, as they seek to annex new audit spaces by attaching them to their historical expertise in financial audit, as well as to the symbolic characteristics of independence, integrity and ethics (Abbott, 1988; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Muzio *et al.*, 2013). The Big-4 PSFs in particular have proven adaptable and perseverant in this regard, most evidently in sustainability and value-for-money auditing,

1  
2  
3 acquiring new talent and organisations as they attempt to dominate new spaces (see, Etzion  
4 and Ferraro, 2010; Humphrey and Owen, 2000; Power, 1997; Suddaby and Greenwood,  
5 2001; Suddaby and Viale, 2011). Such is the force that the well-resourced Big-4 PSFs can  
6 impose when entering new fields, potential competitors (such as engineering and  
7 environmental experts in the field of sustainability assurance) have sometimes ended up  
8 either abandoning new audit spaces or being subsumed within professional accountants'  
9 ambitions for these spaces (Power, 1997; Power, 2003).

10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19 But despite their potential to influence and colonise, these efforts have not been  
20 straightforward nor automatic, meaning the success of accounting profession attempts to  
21 impose itself in new audit spaces cannot be taken for granted. For instance, in areas such as  
22 online certification and sustainability assurance, accounting firms have been unable to  
23 manoeuvre into a position of dominance. As our analysis demonstrates, attempts at  
24 jurisdictional expansion led by accounting elites can often prove problematic given that the  
25 types and configurations of valued capital and habitus in new audit spaces does not always  
26 accord with those privileged within financial audit.  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35

36  
37 In the case of TripAdvisor and other similar consumer-led assurance processes, the  
38 embodied cultural capital financial auditors derive from claims to independence (which also  
39 emanates from the institutionalised cultural capital arising from their professional training) is  
40 less prominent. Other forms of embodied cultural capital arising from behaviour and conduct,  
41 physical appearance, technical expertise, and social skill (see, Carter and Spence, 2014) are  
42 also largely redundant. Crucial to operating in this space is, however, a democratised form of  
43 social capital focused on *consumers* operating in disparate and distanced networks, facilitated  
44 by recent advancements in digital technologies. These developments represent an important  
45 alternate form of assurance provision, where participants verify or challenge ratings offered  
46 and no face-to-face contact is necessary, in contrast with financial audit where tightly-knit  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 elite networks are frequently established through close interpersonal relations.  
4  
5 Institutionalised cultural capital, in the form of externally validated formal credentials,  
6  
7 appears to have little direct bearing on the trust placed in ratings. For example, the  
8  
9 institutionalised cultural capital attained over time by independent travel agents becomes  
10  
11 largely irrelevant in a context where institutionalised claims are treated with suspicion.  
12

13  
14 Jamal and Sunder (2011) illustrate how *the nature of* institutionalised cultural capital is  
15  
16 what determines its importance in new audit spaces. In the baseball card market space,  
17  
18 institutionalised and embodied cultural capital derived from the provision of non-audit  
19  
20 services (cross-selling) are valued in conjunction with embodied cultural capital arising from  
21  
22 sticking to strict standards of grading. These *specific* forms of cultural capital contribute to  
23  
24 the market dominance of cross-selling auditors and are consequently converted to economic  
25  
26 capital. This represents a clear distinction between the nature of the valued cultural capital in  
27  
28 this space compared to financial audit. Moreover, the habitus of this space is likely to be out  
29  
30 of sync with that of the financial audit space given these apparently divergent norms,  
31  
32 expectations and 'rules of the game'.  
33  
34  
35

36  
37 In the sustainability assurance space, Big-4 financial auditors traditionally mobilise  
38  
39 the social capital derived from their extensive networks, cross partnership contacts, and  
40  
41 existing client portfolios to attract assurance engagements from multinational clients. They  
42  
43 continually invoke their institutionalised and embodied cultural capital – such as, professional  
44  
45 qualifications, advice and technical expertise, and the ability to address client needs – to  
46  
47 claim dominance in this space. However, given the specific content of sustainability reports  
48  
49 and the professional backgrounds of the client contacts producing them, their existing  
50  
51 institutionalised capital is often insufficient. Hence, they seek to access non-financial  
52  
53 auditors' distinct and more relevant institutionalised cultural capital in the form of  
54  
55 qualifications in areas of sustainability expertise and extensive experience of engaging with  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 sustainability experts. These non-financial auditors also bring their distinct social capital to  
4  
5 this domain by accessing their more targeted networks, as well as being crucial to ensuring  
6  
7 that meaningful conversations can be conducted with key client contacts, thereby transporting  
8  
9 distinct linguistic capital to this space. In some instances, such as the Royal Dutch Shell case  
10  
11 outlined earlier, the forms of cultural and social capital valued by *auditees* in auditors may  
12  
13 not reside within Big-4 firms. This can result in auditees seeking out alternative ‘auditors’  
14  
15 who are seen to possess these valued capitals.  
16  
17

18  
19 The introduction of non-financial auditors into Big-4 environments has also aroused  
20  
21 tensions as their “feel for the game” of assurance – or habitus – diverges from that inculcated  
22  
23 in Big-4-trained financial auditors. O’Dwyer (2011) and O’Dwyer *et al.* (2011) have  
24  
25 illustrated how non-financial auditors are often out of sync with the form of sustainability  
26  
27 assurance that Big-4 firms aspire to practice and promote. These studies also reveal how the  
28  
29 nature of the embodied cultural capital of non-financial and financial auditors – such as,  
30  
31 behaviour and conduct, the nature of advice and technical expertise, and the conduct of  
32  
33 meaningful client conversations – can create frictions when financial auditors approach  
34  
35 clients in a more detached manner and place emphasis on a stricter notion of independence  
36  
37 which precludes advising clients; an approach alien to the ‘feel for the game’ among many  
38  
39 non-financial auditors. This tension has proven particularly prominent where Big-4 firms  
40  
41 have mobilised their significant economic capital and acquired boutique consultancies.  
42  
43 Within these combined entities, non-financial auditors’ disposition towards providing  
44  
45 extensive advice while conducting assurance engagements and their desire to offer more  
46  
47 expansive assurance opinions alongside strategic advice, has proven difficult to counter. In  
48  
49 fact, the constraints set by the prevailing Big-4 firm habitus have led some non-financial  
50  
51 auditors, guided by opposing dispositions and values, to leave these environments (O’Dwyer,  
52  
53 2011). Others have, however, thrived in these contexts by stepping back and shaking off their  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 original dispositions (see, Carter and Spence, 2014) and re-inventing themselves so that they  
4  
5 come to embody the ‘rules of the game’ most valued in Big-4 firms (see, Spence and Carter,  
6  
7 2014, pp. 14-15).  
8

9  
10 Overall, our analysis suggests that the accounting profession and PSFs have been  
11  
12 shown to be ‘fish out of water’ in many new audit spaces. In some cases, new audit spaces  
13  
14 have failed to draw PSF interest in line with their commercial drivers. In other cases, limits of  
15  
16 Big-4 PSFs and other accounting elites to compete in these new audit spaces have been  
17  
18 exposed, particularly these players find privileged configurations of capital difficult to  
19  
20 comprise or emulate. In some new audit spaces, a stronger premium has been placed on the  
21  
22 social and cultural capital of the auditor, which may take forms other than conventional  
23  
24 accounting accreditations and honours. In other cases, legitimacy can be embodied in  
25  
26 characteristics of the individual provider – deep experience in the field and extensive social  
27  
28 networking with other powerful actors – rather than a disembodied Big-4 PSF brand. This has  
29  
30 resulted in some new audit spaces such as salary cap audits in professional sport (Andon and  
31  
32 Free, 2012; Andon *et al.*, 2014), and baseball card certification (Jamal and Sunder, 2011)  
33  
34 being marked out, defined and colonised by non-accounting actors.  
35  
36  
37

38  
39 The digitisation of accountability relations (Jeacle and Carter, 2014) has also opened  
40  
41 up important new vistas of assurance and product/service quality verification (Jeacle and  
42  
43 Carter, 2011) such that Big-4 PSF services are not viable. In terms of accountability, recent  
44  
45 years have seen the rise of the user review within the virtual world (Jeacle and Carter, 2014).  
46  
47 User reviews manifest variously in social media, blogs, reviews as well as algorithm-based  
48  
49 quantitative rankings such as those provided by TripAdvisor (Jeacle and Carter, 2011) or the  
50  
51 Financial Times business school rankings (Free *et al.*, 2009). In this way, the Internet has  
52  
53 added further impetus to Power’s (1997) audit society (Jeacle and Carter, 2011). These  
54  
55 developments represent an important alternate form of assurance provision and which is  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 likely to continue to change the face of the audit field in the future (Andon and Free, 2012;  
4  
5 Chapman and Peecher, 2011; Cooper and Morgan, 2013; Jeacle and Carter, 2011).  
6

7 While Spence *et al.* (2015) convincingly demonstrate that economic drivers within the  
8  
9 audit field are more hegemonic than is sometimes presupposed, they also note that “it may be  
10  
11 well be the case that complexity ... reign(s) during times of institutional change” (p. 3). The  
12  
13 intersection of auditing and other domains (e.g., professional sport, travel, government, and  
14  
15 the environment) do introduce unfamiliar norms, expectations and the ‘rules of the game’,  
16  
17 which make jockeying for dominant positioning, even for the highly powerful and influential  
18  
19 PSFs, complex and challenging. In other words, the assumption that large audit firms are  
20  
21 high-status providers of assurance does not necessarily translate as the financial audit field  
22  
23 intersects with other fields.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

## 29 **6 Conclusion**

30  
31 As Miller (1998, p. 605) argues, accounting is most interesting at its margins. In the context  
32  
33 of professional auditing, it is at the margins that we see new practices added to the repertoire  
34  
35 of professional audit firms. It is at these margins that auditing intersects with other semi-  
36  
37 autonomous fields and bodies of expertise. It is also at the margins that auditing comes to be  
38  
39 linked to the demands, expectations, and ideas of diverse social and institutional agencies.  
40  
41 New audit services are not merely oddball relatives in the auditing family, but rather  
42  
43 important growth areas for the profession.  
44  
45  
46

47 Our study contributes to the literature by unveiling the key processes through which  
48  
49 expertise and inter-professional rivalry are socially constructed. This assisted the  
50  
51 development of in-depth insights into how new audit services are created and developed and  
52  
53 who and what is seen as legitimate. We also extend work in the area of professions  
54  
55 examining the concept of jurisdictional expansion (Greenwood *et al.*, 2002; Muzio *et al.*,  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 2013; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2001; Suddaby and Viale, 2011), especially work studying  
4 how powerful professional elites seek to commodify and colonize adjacent professional  
5 jurisdictions deemed to be commercially significant (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2001).  
6  
7  
8

9  
10 Our analysis of this emerging area draws attention to three key points. First, the  
11 development of audit work occurs in multiple fields and, in spite of the undoubted reach and  
12 power of the Big-4 and the major professional bodies, is not the preserve of any single group.  
13  
14 As Miller (1998) argues, the transformation of accounting as a body of expertise takes place  
15 within and through an historically specific ensemble of relations formed between a complex  
16 of actors and agencies, arguments and ideals, calculative devices and mechanisms. Auditing  
17 is best considered as an ad hoc accretion of practices rather than a coherent body of  
18 knowledge, and competition takes the form of ongoing and general contestation rather than  
19 revolutionary upheavals. New audit spaces are largely improvised and adapted rather than  
20 derived from an over-arching body of knowledge. As the rise of efficiency and sustainability  
21 auditing demonstrate, what is outside ‘auditing’ at one time can soon become a central plank  
22 of the discipline. Further unlike some accounts of proactive jurisdictional expansion by  
23 commercially-oriented incumbent elites (see, Suddaby and Viale, 2011), we also illustrate  
24 how parties outside of the audit field such as TripAdvisor, business schools rankings and the  
25 ACFE have appropriated assurance ideals in fashioning new institutional infrastructure  
26 around travel, universities and fraud.  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44

45 Second, our analysis underlines the field-specific nature of prized capitals in the  
46 financial auditing field. In Bourdieu’s conception, a “field” is an area of structured, socially  
47 patterned activity or “practice,” in this case disciplinarily and professionally defined. The  
48 field of financial auditing, like any social field, is organised around a body of internal  
49 protocols and assumptions, characteristic behaviours and self-sustaining values – what we  
50 might informally term an “audit culture” (Strathern, 2000). A review of the emerging  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 literature on new audit spaces reveals that many of the elements that are used to define  
4 financial auditing – standards, professional accreditation, independence, standardised  
5 reporting – have been reconstituted in alternative contexts. This underlines the extent to  
6  
7 which ideals and capitals are circumscribed to fields and how intersecting fields can  
8  
9 introduce important shifts in meaning and new nuances in taken-for-granted rules.  
10  
11  
12

13  
14 Third, successfully moving into intersecting social fields requires attentiveness to the  
15 valued capitals and habitus in these other fields. Bourdieu's power-centred view of  
16 professions underlines that competition is more than an august battle in the realm of ideas  
17 where practitioners seek to arrive at "the truth"; rather professionalism is a scarce symbolic  
18 resource which is both the work of consecration and the source of legitimate forms of acting  
19 (Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 2011). A Bourdieusian approach recognises the constructed  
20 nature of the audit 'profession' and that the struggle for new markets is not between equal  
21 competitors: some enter the conflict with higher cultural or social capital that gives them  
22 more power in the space.  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33

34 Several interesting avenues of future research are suggested by this review.  
35 Professional accounting body involvement in new areas such as sustainability assurance has  
36 often been driven by key individuals exercising considerable agency, but the characteristics  
37 of these processes and their ultimate impact have been underexplored. We identify a need for  
38 more studies examining the role of strategic actions and institutional entrepreneurship in  
39 promoting, developing and continually reconstituting new audit spaces. Moreover, we need a  
40 deeper understanding of the nature of the institutional work required to develop and maintain  
41 the legitimacy of professional accountants and other competing professional groups in new  
42 audit spaces. We also advocate for more studies within PSFs. For example, case studies  
43 examining the socialisation of non-accountants operating in new assurance spaces in Big-4  
44 PSFs could help unveil the processes (both formal and informal) through which these firms  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 seek to socialise practitioners while simultaneously inculcating a specific way of thinking and  
4  
5 'performing' in new audit spaces. These processes and the underlying potential for clashing  
6  
7 professional identities, values and dispositions can have significant implications for both the  
8  
9 nature and extent of the evolution of new audit forms. In a related vein, more focused studies  
10  
11 of the operation of controls over the work and decision-making discretion of non-accountants  
12  
13 working in PSF contexts offering new forms of audit could significantly contribute to our  
14  
15 knowledge of the nature of governance within these firms and how this serves to shape, or  
16  
17 may even be shaped by, the nature of new audit spaces.  
18  
19

20  
21 Given the identified trend towards more decision-useful audit reporting, research that  
22  
23 examines the processes through which users are enrolled to shape new forms of audit  
24  
25 reporting would be especially insightful. In particular, studies could uncover how users in  
26  
27 some new audit spaces have been constructed in order to legitimate new forms of audit and  
28  
29 the approaches and the objectives held out for them (see, Young, 2006). We have highlighted  
30  
31 how core financial audit ideals such as independence may not translate seamlessly to new  
32  
33 audit spaces. The translation of concepts such as materiality to new audit spaces is also ripe  
34  
35 for more in-depth, nuanced examination given the fluid nature of this and many other  
36  
37 underlying concepts of financial audit, as well as their potential to impact on both the nature  
38  
39 of the audit work undertaken and the means through which users are engaged. Finally, we  
40  
41 also call for nuanced studies that can further unpack the nature of the strategies enrolled by  
42  
43 professional accounting bodies, through accreditation efforts or other means, as part of efforts  
44  
45 to establish their legitimacy and membership status in new audit spaces. Of particular interest  
46  
47 would be studies that illustrate and theorise how, and the conditions under which, different  
48  
49 professional bodies seek to collaborate and combine their respective cultural and symbolic  
50  
51 capital as opposed to competing for domination within new audit spaces; with a key focus on  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 the nature and extent of the compromises they make and how these influence the construction  
4  
5 of these new spaces.  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

For Peer Review

## References

- Abbott, A. (1988), *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labour*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL.
- AccountAbility. (2012), *Certification as a Sustainability Assurance Practitioner*, AccountAbility, London.
- Adams, N. (1986), "Efficiency auditing in the Australian Audit Office", *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 45 No. 3, pp. 189-200.
- AICPA. (1996), *Report of the Special Committee on Assurance Services (The Elliott Report)*, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York NY.
- Anderson-Gough, F., Grey, C. and Robson, K. (1998), "'Work hard, play hard': An analysis of the cliché in two accountancy practices", *Organization*, Vol. 5 No. 4, pp. 565-592.
- Anderson-Gough, F., Grey, C. and Robson, K. (2000), "In the name of the client: The service ethic in two professional service firms", *Human Relations*, Vol. 53 No. 9, pp. 1151-1174.
- Anderson-Gough, F., Grey, C. and Robson, K. (2001), "Tests of time: Organizational time-reckoning and the making of accountants in two multi-national accounting firms", *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 99-122.
- Andon, P. and Free, C. (2012), "Auditing and crisis management: The 2010 Melbourne Storm salary cap scandal", *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 37 No. 3, pp. 131-154.
- Andon, P. and Free, C. (2014), "Media coverage of accounting: The NRL salary cap crisis", *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 15-47.
- Andon, P., Free, C. and Sivabalan, P. (2014), "The legitimacy of new assurance providers: Making the cap fit", *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 39 No. 2, pp. 75-96.
- Asif, M., Searcy, C., Santos, P. D. and Kensah, D. (2013), "A review of Dutch corporate sustainable development reports", *Corporate social responsibility and environmental management*, Vol. 20 No. 6, pp. 321-339.
- Barrett, M. and Gendron, Y. (2006), "WebTrust and the 'commercialistic auditor': The unrealized vision of developing auditor trustworthiness in cyberspace", *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal*, Vol. 19 No. 5, pp. 631-662.
- Barzelay, M. (1997), "Central audit institutions and performance auditing: A comparative analysis of organizational strategies in the OECD", *Governance*, Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 235-260.
- Batra, G. S. and Kaur, N. (1993), "Emerging dimensions of audit accountability: A case study of public enterprise management and efficiency audit in India", *Managerial Auditing Journal*, Vol. 8 No. 6, pp. 30-40.
- Boulianne, E. and Cho, C. H. (2009), "The rise and fall of WebTrust", *International Journal of Accounting Information Systems*, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 229-244.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977), *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986), "Force of law: Toward a sociology of the juridical field", *Hastings Journal of Law*, Vol. 38 No. 5, pp. 805-853.
- Bourdieu, P. (1987), "What makes a social class? On the theoretical and practical existence of groups", *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 32 No. 1, pp. 1-18.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990), *The Logic of Practice*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Bourdieu, P. (1993), *The Field of Cultural Production*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Bourdieu, P. (1995), *Sociology in Question (Nice R. Trans.)*, Sage Publications, London.
- Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992), *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL.



- 1  
2  
3 Brock, D. M. (2006), "The changing professional organization: A review of competing  
4 archetypes", *International Journal of Management Reviews*, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 157-  
5 174.
- 6 Brown, R. G. (1962), "Changing audit objectives and techniques", *Accounting Review*, Vol.  
7 37 No. 4, pp. 696-703.
- 8 Carter, C. and Spence, C. (2014), "Being a successful professional: An exploration of who  
9 makes partner in the Big Four", *Contemporary Accounting Research*, Vol. 31 No. 4,  
10 pp. 949-981.
- 11 Chandler, R. A., Edwards, J. R. and Anderson, M. (1993), "Changing perceptions of the role  
12 of the company auditor, 1840–1940", *Accounting and Business Research*, Vol. 23 No.  
13 92, pp. 443-459.
- 14 Chang, L. and Birkett, B. (2004), "Managing intellectual capital in a professional service  
15 firm: Exploring the creativity–productivity paradox", *Management Accounting  
16 Research*, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 7-31.
- 17 Chapman, C. and Peecher, M. E. (2011), "Worlds of Assurance", *Accounting, Organizations  
18 and Society*, Vol. 36 No. 4/5, pp. 267-268.
- 19 Chelimsky, E. (1985), "Comparing and contrasting auditing and evaluation: Some notes on  
20 their relationship", *Evaluation Review*, Vol. 9 No. 4, pp. 483-503.
- 21 Colton, C. and Faunce, T. (2014), "Commissions of audit in Australia: Health system  
22 privatisation directives and civil conscription protections", *Journal of Law and  
23 Medicine*, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 561-571.
- 24 Cooper, D. and Morgan, W. (2013), "Meeting the evolving corporate reporting needs of  
25 government and society: Arguments for a deliberative approach to accounting rule  
26 making", *Accounting and Business Research*, Vol. 43 No. 4, pp. 418-441.
- 27 Cooper, D. and Robson, K. (2006), "Accounting, professions and regulation: locating the  
28 sites of professionalization", *Accounting Organizations and Society*, Vol. 31 No. 4/5,  
29 pp. 415-444.
- 30 Cooper, D. J., Everett, J. and Neu, D. (2005), "Financial scandals, accounting change and the  
31 role of accounting academics: A perspective from North America", *European  
32 Accounting Review*, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 373-382.
- 33 Covaleski, M. A., Dirsmith, M. W., Heian, J. B. and Samuel, S. (1998), "The calculated and  
34 the avowed: Techniques of discipline and struggles over identity in Big Six public  
35 accounting firms", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 43 No. 2, pp. 293–327.
- 36 Covaleski, M. A., Dirsmith, M. W. and Rittenberg, L. (2003), "Jurisdictional disputes over  
37 professional work: The institutionalization of the global knowledge expert",  
38 *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 323–355.
- 39 D'Adderio, L. and Pollock, N. (2012), "Give me a two-by-two matrix and I will create the  
40 market: Rankings, graphic visualisations and sociomateriality", *Accounting,  
41 Organizations and Society*, Vol. 37 No. 8, pp. 565-586.
- 42 Davis, C., Farrell, R. and Ogilby, S. (2010), "Characteristics and Skills of the Forensic  
43 Accountant".
- 44 DeAngelo, L. E. (1981), "Auditor size and audit quality", *Journal of Accounting and  
45 Economics*, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 183-199.
- 46 DeFond, K. (2002), "Do non-audit service fees impair auditor independence? Evidence from  
47 going concern audit opinions", *Journal of Accounting Research*, Vol. 40 No. 4, pp.  
48 1247-1274.
- 49 Dezalay, Y. and Garth, B. (1995), "Merchants of law as moral entrepreneurs: Constructing  
50 international justice from the competition for transnational business disputes", *Law  
51 and Society Review*, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 27-64.
- 52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Elliott, R. K. and Jacobson, P. D. (1998), "Audit independence concepts", *CPA Journal*, Vol.  
4 68 No. 12, pp. 30-33.
- 5 Emirbayer, M. and Johnson, V. (2008), "Bourdieu and organizational analysis", *Theory and*  
6 *Society*, Vol. 37 No. 1, pp. 1-44.
- 7 English, L. M. (2007), "Performance audit of Australian public private partnerships:  
8 Legitimising government policies or providing independent oversight?", *Financial*  
9 *Accountability & Management*, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 313-336.
- 10 Etzion, D. and Ferraro, F. (2010), "The role of analogy in the institutionalization of  
11 sustainability reporting", *Organization Science*, Vol. 21 No. 5, pp. 1092-1107.
- 12 Everett, J., Green, D. and Neu, D. (2005), "Independence, objectivity and the Canadian CA  
13 profession", *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 415-440.
- 14 Francis, J. R. (2011), "Auditing without borders", *Accounting, Organizations and Society*,  
15 Vol. 36 No. 4-5, pp. 318-323.
- 16 Free, C. (1999), "Limiting auditors' liability", *Bond Law Review*, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 118-135.
- 17 Free, C., Salterio, S. and Shearer, T. (2009), "The construction of auditability: MBA rankings  
18 and assurance in practice", *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 34 No. 1, pp.  
19 119-140.
- 20 Freidson, E. (2001), *Professionalism: The Third Logic*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- 21 Fuerst, F. (2009), "Building momentum: An analysis of investment trends in LEED and  
22 energy star-certified properties", *Journal of Retail & Leisure Property*, Vol. 8 No. 4,  
23 pp. 285-297.
- 24 Funnell, W. (1998), "Executive coercion and state audit: A processual analysis of the  
25 responses of the Australian audit office to the dilemmas of efficiency auditing 1978-  
26 84", *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 436-458.
- 27 Gendron, Y. and Barrett, M. (2004), "Professionalization in action: Accountants' attempt at  
28 building a network of support for the WebTrust seal of assurance", *Contemporary*  
29 *Accounting Research*, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 563-602.
- 30 Gendron, Y., Cooper, D. J. and Townley, B. (2007), "The construction of auditing expertise  
31 in measuring government performance", *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol.  
32 32 No. 1, pp. 101-129.
- 33 Gouldner, A. (1979), *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, Continuum,  
34 New York NY.
- 35 Gray, D. (2008), "Forensic accounting and auditing: Compared and contrasted to traditional  
36 accounting and auditing", *American Journal of Business Education*, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp.  
37 115-126.
- 38 Green, W. and Zhou, S. (2011), "Determinants of assurance on carbon emissions: An  
39 international investigation", *Presented at the American Accounting Association*  
40 *Auditing Section Mid-Year Meeting, Albuquerque NM.*
- 41 Greenwood, R. and Suddaby, R. (2006), "Institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields: The  
42 big five accounting firms", *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 49 No. 1, pp. 27-  
43 48.
- 44 Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R. and Hinings, C. R. (2002), "Theorizing change: The role of  
45 professional associations in the transformation of institutionalized fields", *Academy of*  
46 *Management Journal*, Vol. 45 No. 1, pp. 58-80.
- 47 Hamburger, P. (1989), "Efficiency auditing by the Australian Audit Office: Reform and  
48 reaction under three Auditors-General", *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability*  
49 *Journal*, Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 3-21.
- 50 Hassink, H., Bollen, L., Meuwissen, R. and Vries, M. (2009), "Corporate fraud and the audit  
51 expectations gap: A study among business managers", *Journal of International*  
52 *Accounting Auditing & Taxation*, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 85-100.
- 53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60


- 1  
2  
3 Hepworth, N. P. (1995), "The role of performance audit", *Public Money & Management*, Vol.  
4 15 No. 4, pp. 39-42.
- 5 Hodge, K., Subramaniam, N. and Stewart, J. (2009), "Assurance of sustainability reports:  
6 impact on report users' confidence and perceptions of information credibility",  
7 *Australian Accounting Review*, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 178-194.
- 8 Humphrey, C. and Owen, D. (2000), "Debating the 'power' of audit", *International Journal of*  
9 *Auditing*, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 29-50.
- 10 Jacobs, K. (1998), "Value for money auditing in New Zealand: Competing for control in the  
11 public sector", *The British Accounting Review*, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp. 343-360.
- 12 Jacobs, K. (2003), "Class reproduction in professional recruitment: Examining the accounting  
13 profession", *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, Vol. 14 No. 5, pp. 569-596.
- 14 Jamal, K. and Sunder, S. (2011), "Is mandated independence necessary for audit quality?",  
15 *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 36 No. 4/5, pp. 284-292.
- 16 Jeacle, I. (2014), "'And the BAFTA goes to [...]': The assurance role of the auditor in the  
17 film awards ceremony", *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, Vol. 27 No.  
18 5, pp. 778-808.
- 19 Jeacle, I. and Carter, C. (2011), "In TripAdvisor we trust: Rankings, calculative regimes and  
20 abstract systems", *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 36 No. 4/5, pp. 293-  
21 309.
- 22 Jeacle, I. and Carter, C. (2014), "Creative spaces in interdisciplinary accounting research",  
23 *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, Vol. 27 No. 8, pp. 1233-1240.
- 24 Jeppesen, K. K. (1998), "Reinventing auditing, redefining consulting and independence",  
25 *European Accounting Review*, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 517-539.
- 26 Jin'e, Y. and Dunjia, L. (1997), "Performance audit in the service of internal audit",  
27 *Managerial Auditing Journal*, Vol. 12 No. 4/5, pp. 192-195.
- 28 Keen, J. (1999), "On the nature of audit judgements: The case of value for money studies",  
29 *Public Administration*, Vol. 77 No. 3, pp. 509-525.
- 30 Kelly, J. (2003), "The Audit Commission: Guiding, steering and regulating local  
31 government", *Public Administration*, Vol. 81 No. 3, pp. 459-476.
- 32 Kinney Jr, W. R. (2004), "Auditor independence, non-audit services, and restatements: Was  
33 the US Government right?\*", *Journal of Accounting Research*, Vol. 42 No. 3, pp.  
34 561-588.
- 35 Knechel, W. R., Wallage, P., Eilifsen, A. and van Praag, B. (2006), "The demand attributes of  
36 assurance services providers and the role of independent accountants", *International*  
37 *Journal of Auditing*, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 143-162.
- 38 Kolk, A. and Perego, P. (2010), "Determinants of the adoption of sustainability assurance  
39 statements: An international investigation", *Business Strategy and the Environment*,  
40 Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 182-198.
- 41 Kornberger, M., Justensen, L. and Mouritsen, J. (2011), "'When you make manager, we put a  
42 big mountain in front of you': An ethnography of managers in a Big 4 accounting  
43 firm", *Accounting, Organizations & Society*, Vol. 36 No. 8, pp. 514-533.
- 44 Lapsley, I. and Pong, C. K. M. (2000), "Modernization versus problematization: Value-for-  
45 money audit in public services", *European Accounting Review*, Vol. 9 No. 4, pp. 541-  
46 567.
- 47 Lawrence, T. (2004), "Rituals and resistance: Membership dynamics in professional fields",  
48 *Human Relations*, Vol. 57 No. 2, pp. 115-143.
- 49 Levy, R. (1996), "Managing value-for-money audit in the European Union: The challenge of  
50 diversity", *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34 No. 4, pp. 509-529.
- 51 Lindberg, T. (2007), "The ambiguous identity of auditing", *Financial Accountability &*  
52 *Management*, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 337-350.
- 53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Lonsdale, J. (2000), "Developments in value-for-money audit methods: Impacts and  
4 implications", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 66 No. 1, pp. 73-  
5 89.
- 6 Lonsdale, J. (2008), "Balancing independence and responsiveness: A practitioner perspective  
7 on the relationships shaping performance audit", *Evaluation*, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 227-  
8 248.
- 9  
10 Malsch, B. and Gendron, Y. (2013), "Re-theorizing change: Institutional experimentation and  
11 the struggle for domination in the field of public accounting", *Journal of Management  
12 Studies*, Vol. 50 No. 5, pp. 870-899.
- 13 Malsch, B., Gendron, Y. and Grazzini, F. (2011), "Investigating interdisciplinary translations:  
14 The influence of Pierre Bourdieu on accounting literature", *Accounting, Auditing &  
15 Accountability Journal*, Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 194-228.
- 16 Manetti, G. and Becatti, L. (2009), "Assurance services for sustainability reports: Standards  
17 and empirical evidence", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 87 No. 1, pp. 289-298.
- 18 Manetti, G. and Toccafondi, S. (2012), "The role of stakeholders in sustainability reporting  
19 assurance", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 107 No. 3, pp. 363-377.
- 20 McCrae, M. and Vada, H. (1997), "Performance audit scope and the independence of the  
21 Australian Commonwealth Auditor-General", *Financial Accountability &  
22 Management*, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 203-223.
- 23 McMurray, M. (2010), "The struggle to professionalize: An ethnographic account of the  
24 occupational position of Advanced Nurse Practitioners", *Human Relations*, Vol. 64  
25 No. 6, pp. 810-822.
- 26 Miller, P. (1998), "The margins of accounting", *European Accounting Review*, Vol. 7 No. 4,  
27 pp. 605-621.
- 28 Mock, T. J., Strohm, C. and Swartz, K. M. (2007), "An examination of worldwide assured  
29 sustainability reporting", *Australian Accounting Review*, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 67-77.
- 30 Morales, J., Gendron, Y. and Guenin-Paracini, H. (2014), "The construction of the risky and  
31 vigilant organization: A genealogy of the fraud triangle", *Accounting, Organizations  
32 and Society*, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 170-194.
- 33 Morin, D. (2001), "Influence of value for money audit on public administrations: Looking  
34 beyond appearances", *Financial Accountability & Management*, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp.  
35 99-117.
- 36 Muzio, D., Brock, D. M. and Suddaby, R. (2013), "Professions and institutional change:  
37 Towards an institutionalist sociology of the professions", *Journal of Management  
38 Studies*, Vol. 50 No. 5, pp. 699-721.
- 39 Negus, K. (1998), "Cultural production and the corporation: Musical genres and the strategic  
40 management of creativity in the US recording industry", *Media, Culture & Society*,  
41 Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 359-379.
- 42 Negus, K. (2002), "The work of cultural intermediaries and the enduring distance between  
43 production and consumption", *Cultural Studies*, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 501-515.
- 44 Nelson, M. and Tan, H. (2005), "Judgment and decision making research in auditing: A task,  
45 person, and interpersonal interaction perspective", *Auditing: A Journal of Practice &  
46 Theory*, Vol. 24 No. s-1, pp. 41-71.
- 47 Nitkin, D. and Brooks, L. J. (1998), "Sustainability auditing and reporting: The Canadian  
48 experience", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 17 No. 13, pp. 1499-1507.
- 49 O'Dwyer, B. and Owen, D. L. (2005), "Assurance statement practice in environmental, social  
50 and sustainability reporting: A critical evaluation", *The British Accounting Review*,  
51 Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 205-229.
- 52 O'Dwyer, B. and Owen, D. L. (2007), "Seeking stakeholder-centric sustainability assurance",  
53 *Journal of Corporate Citizenship* No. 25, pp. 77-94.
- 54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 O'Dwyer, B. (2011), "The case of sustainability assurance: constructing a new assurance  
4 service", *Contemporary Accounting Research*, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 1230-1266.
- 5 O'Dwyer, B., Owen, D. and Unerman, J. (2011), "Seeking legitimacy for new assurance  
6 forms: The case of assurance on sustainability reporting", *Accounting, Organizations  
7 and Society*, Vol. 36 No. 1, pp. 31-52.
- 8 Pei, B. K., Reed, S. A. and Koch, B. S. (1992), "Auditor belief revisions in a performance  
9 auditing setting: An application of the belief-adjustment model", *Accounting,  
10 Organizations and Society*, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 169-183.
- 11 Perego, P. (2009), "Causes and consequences of choosing different assurance providers: An  
12 international study of sustainability reporting", *International Journal of Management*,  
13 Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 412-425.
- 14 Perego, P. and Kolk, A. (2012), "Multinationals' accountability on sustainability: The  
15 evolution of third-party assurance of sustainability reports", *Journal of Business  
16 Ethics*, Vol. 110 No. 2, pp. 173-190.
- 17 Pflugrath, G., Roebuck, P. and Simnett, R. (2011), "Impact of assurance and assurer's  
18 professional affiliation on financial analysts' assessment of credibility of corporate  
19 social responsibility information", *Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory*, Vol. 30  
20 No. 3, pp. 239-254.
- 21 Pollitt, C. (2003), "Performance audit in Western Europe: trends and choices", *Critical  
22 Perspectives on Accounting*, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 157-170.
- 23 Pollitt, C. and Summa, H. (1996), "Performance audit and evaluation: Similar tools, different  
24 relationships?", *New Directions for Evaluation*, Vol. 1996 No. 71, pp. 29-50.
- 25 Power, M. (1994), *The Audit Explosion*, White Dove Press, London.
- 26 Power, M. (1997), *The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification*, Oxford University Press,  
27 Oxford.
- 28 Power, M. (2000), *The audit implosion: Regulating risk from the inside*, The Institute of  
29 Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, London.
- 30 Power, M. (2003), "Auditing and the production of legitimacy", *Accounting, Organizations  
31 and Society*, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 379-394.
- 32 Power, M. (2011), "Assurance worlds: Consumers, experts and independence", *Accounting,  
33 Organizations and Society*, Vol. 36 No. 4/5, pp. 324-326.
- 34 Pugh, C. (1987), "Efficiency auditing and the Australian Audit Office", *Australian Journal of  
35 Public Administration*, Vol. 46 No. 1, pp. 55-65.
- 36 Radcliffe, V. (1998), "Efficiency audit: An assembly of rationalities and programmes",  
37 *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 377-410.
- 38 Radcliffe, V. (1999), "Knowing efficiency: The enactment of efficiency in efficiency  
39 auditing", *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 333-362.
- 40 Robson, K., Humphrey, C., Khalifa, R. and Jones, J. (2007), "Transforming audit  
41 technologies: Business risk audit methodologies and the audit field", *Accounting,  
42 Organizations and Society*, Vol. 32 No. 5, pp. 409-438.
- 43 Rose, N. and Miller, P. (1992), "Political power beyond the state: Problematics of  
44 government", *British Journal of Sociology*, pp. 173-205.
- 45 Schinkel, W. and Noordegraaf, M. (2011), "Professionalism as symbolic capital: Materials  
46 for a Bourdieusian theory of professionalism", *Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 10 No. 1,  
47 pp. 67-96.
- 48 Schmidt, J. (2012), "Perceived auditor independence and audit litigation: The role of nonaudit  
49 services fees", *The Accounting Review*, Vol. 87 No. 3, pp. 1033-1065.
- 50 Sharma, D. S. (2005), "The association between ISO 9000 certification and financial  
51 performance", *The International Journal of Accounting*, Vol. 40 No. 2, pp. 151-172.
- 52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Shore, C. and Wright, S. (2000), "Coercive accountability", in Strathern, M. (Ed.), *Audit*  
4 *Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the Academy*.  
5 Routledge, London and New York NY, pp. 57-89.
- 6 Sikka, P., Puxty, A., Willmott, H. and Cooper, C. (1998), "The impossibility of eliminating  
7 the expectation gap: Some theory and evidence", *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*,  
8 Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 299-334.
- 9 Simnett, R., Vanstraelen, A. and Chua, W. F. (2009), "Assurance on sustainability reports:  
10 An international comparison", *The Accounting Review*, Vol. 84 No. 3, pp. 937-967.
- 11 Singleton, T. W. and Singleton, A. J. (2010), *Fraud Auditing and Forensic Accounting*, John  
12 Wiley & Sons, Hoboken NJ.
- 13 Spence, C. and Carter, C. (2014), "An exploration of the professional habitus in the Big 4  
14 accounting firms", *Work, employment and society*, Vol. 28 No. 6, pp. 946-962.
- 15 Spence, C., Dambrin, C., Carter, C., Husillos, J. and Archel, P. (2015), "Global ends, local  
16 means: Cross-national homogeneity in professional service firms", *Human Relations*,  
17 Vol. 68 No. 5, pp. 765-788.
- 18 Strathern, M. (2000), *Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and*  
19 *the Academy*, Routledge, Oxford and New York NY.
- 20 Suddaby, R. and Greenwood, R. (2001), "Colonizing knowledge: Commodification as a  
21 dynamic of jurisdictional expansion in professional service firms", *Human Relations*,  
22 Vol. 54 No. 7, pp. 933-953.
- 23 Suddaby, R. and Viale, T. (2011), "Professionals and field-level change: Institutional work  
24 and the professional project", *Current Sociology*, Vol. 59 No. 4, pp. 423-442.
- 25 Wallage, P. (2000), "Assurance on sustainability reporting: an auditor's view", *Auditing: A*  
26 *Journal of Practice & Theory*, Vol. 19 No. s-1, pp. 53-65.
- 27 Wallman, S. M. H. (1996), "The future of accounting, part III: Reliability and auditor  
28 independence", *Accounting Horizons*, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 76-97.
- 29 Watts, R. L. and Zimmerman, J. L. (1986), *Positive Accounting Theory*, Prentice Hall,  
30 Englewood Cliffs NJ.
- 31 Wedlin, L. (2007), "The role of rankings in codifying a business school template:  
32 Classifications, diffusion and mediated isomorphism in organizational fields",  
33 *European Management Review*, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 24-39.
- 34 Young, J. (2006), "Making up users", *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 31 No. 6,  
35 pp. 579-600.
- 36 Zeff, S. (1987), "Does the CPA belong to a profession?", *Accounting Horizons*, Vol. 1 No. 2,  
37 pp. 65-68
- 38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

Figure 1: The difference between assurance and attest services



Source: (Jeppesen, 1998)

**Table 1:** Key phases in the history of auditing

Period	Stated Audit Objectives	Extent of Verification	Importance of Internal Controls
Ancient–1500	Detection of fraud	Detailed	Not recognized
1500–1850	Detection of fraud	Detailed	Not recognized
1850–1905	Detection of fraud Detection of clerical error	Some tests, primarily detailed	Not recognized
1905–1933	Determination of fairness of reported financial position Detection of fraud and errors	Detailed and Testing	Slight recognition
1933–1940	Determination of fairness of reported financial position Detection of fraud and errors	Testing	Awakening of interest
1940–1960	Determination of fairness of reported financial position	Testing	Substantial emphasis

Source: Brown (1962)



**Table 2:** Forms of capital at play in the audit field (adapted from Carter and Spence, 2014)

Capital	Audit Field Examples
Economic	<b>Money:</b> revenue generation; profit-per partner; client billings.
Social	<b>Internal and External Networks:</b> Family background; mentors; work teams; contacts in other partnership offices; client portfolios; contacts with clients and potential clients; business networking events; relationships with politicians and celebrities.
Cultural	<p><b>Institutionalised</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Credentials:</b> CA designation; university degree; executive education; business or civic awards; individual sporting achievements.</li> </ul> <p><b>Objectified</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Physical goods:</b> Office furniture, artwork, personal property (cars, houses, jewelry), standardised items such as audit methodologies or assurance products.</li> </ul> <p><b>Embodied:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Behaviour and conduct:</b> Advice and technical expertise offered; client management; anticipating/creating client needs, maintain good rapport with colleagues and clients; physical appearance, dress sense; social skills.</li> <li>• <b>Linguistic:</b> Knowing when to speak; knowing what to say; conducting meaningful conversations with clients.</li> </ul>
Symbolic	Any form of capital recognised as legitimate and valuable in the audit field (e.g. partner capital portfolios).

**Table 3:** Literature review of research in new audit spaces

New audit and assurance service area	Example Studies
Efficiency Auditing	Adams (1986) Pugh (1987) Funnell (1998) Hamburger (1989) Batra and Kaur (1993) Radcliffe (1998) Radcliffe (1999)
Value for Money Auditing	Levy (1996) Jacobs (1998) Keen (1999) Lapsley and Pong (2000) Lonsdale (2000) Morin (2001)
Performance Auditing	Pei <i>et al.</i> (1992) Hepworth (1995) Pollitt and Summa (1996) Barzelay (1997) McCrae and Vada (1997) Jin'e and Dunjia (1997) Pollitt (2003) English (2007) Gendron <i>et al.</i> (2007) Lonsdale (2008)
Sustainability assurance	Nitkin and Brooks (1998) Casey and Grenier (2015) Cheng <i>et al.</i> (2015) Edgley <i>et al.</i> (2010) Edgley <i>et al.</i> (2015) Wallage (2000) O'Dwyer and Owen (2005) O'Dwyer and Owen (2007) Hodge <i>et al.</i> (2009) Manetti and Becatti (2009) Perego (2009) Kolk and Perego (2010) O'Dwyer (2011) O'Dwyer <i>et al.</i> (2011) Manetti and Toccafondi (2012) Peters and Romi (2015) Perego and Kolk (2012)
Salary cap auditing	Andon and Free (2012) Andon and Free (2014) Andon <i>et al.</i> (2014)
E-commerce assurance	Gendron and Barrett (2004) Barrett and Gendron (2006) Boulianne and Cho (2009)
Rankings and ratings	Jeacle and Carter (2011) Free <i>et al.</i> (2009)
Other	Jamal and Sunder (2011) – collectibles certification Jeacle (2014) – audit of BAFTA voting

**Table 4:** Key differences between financial auditing and new audit services

	<b>Financial Statement Auditing</b>	<b>New Audit Spaces</b>
Practitioners	Certified accounting professionals	Multiple acceptable competences, some certified
Regulation	Corporations laws; professional accounting codes	Multiple possibilities, alternative or no specified laws/codes
Subject Matter	Assertions about financial position, performance, and cash flows.	Multiple possibilities, context dependent (e.g., VFM, environmental performance)
Criteria	Accounting standards	Multiple possibilities, alternative or no specified standards
Evidence Gathering	According to professional auditing standards	Adaptable from the auditing standards, and/or drawn from other fields of expertise
Expertise	Accounting-based (training and socialisation)	Multiple possibilities, depending on context: adaptable from accounting-based expertise; drawn from other fields of expertise and/or lay experience
Auditor Relationship	Separate and independent from the audited party and intended user	Relative emphasis on independence is context specific
Reporting outcome	Standardised opinions; homogenous format and wording	General advice; less standardised; more expansive
Reporting value	Comfort by reducing risk of moral hazard	Comfort (reducing risk of moral hazard) or discomfort (identifying deficiencies, recommending changes/reforms)

## 7 Endnotes

---

<sup>1</sup> Power (1997a) does concede that “not just any practice can be called an audit” (p. 6), and offers the following as a way of delimiting auditing:

“[A]udit is a form of checking which is demanded when agents expose principals to ‘moral hazards’, because they may act against the principals’ interests, and to ‘information asymmetries’, because they know more than the principals. Audit is a risk reduction practice which benefits the principal because it inhibits the value reducing actions by agents.” Power (1997a, p. 5)

Some “general conceptual ingredients” (p. 5) are outlined by Power (1997a) to further map the broad contours of auditing. These include: (1) demands for checking in the context of an accountability or control relation; (2) definable assertion/s to be audited; (3) auditor separation from what is audited (often characterized as independence); (4) evidence gathering procedures; and (5) a view/opinion reported based on the evidence gathered and procedures performed.

<sup>2</sup> The term efficiency audit has a range of synonyms in practice including ‘value-for-money audit’, ‘systems audit’, ‘management audit’ and ‘performance audit’ (sometimes with slight differences in meaning). We use efficiency auditing here in keeping with the balance of prior research.

<sup>3</sup> While Spence and Carter (2014) and Spence *et al.* (2015) focus collectively on the species of capital and embodied habitus consistent with accounting professionals successfully achieving partnership status in Big-4 PSFs, they note that partner promotions should be revelatory about wider dynamics of the field. Following the Bourdieusian notion that “excellence, in most societies, consists in playing according to the rules of the game” (Bourdieu (2012), p. 2, quoted in Spence *et al.* (2015)), Spence and Carter (2014) and Spence *et al.* (2015) conclude that successful elites (Big-4 partners) in their field (auditing) are those who more fully embody species of capital most valued within, and habitus most in tune with, their surrounding field.

<sup>4</sup> Under s201 of SOX, these designated services include bookkeeping, financial information systems design/implementation, appraisal/valuation services, fairness opinions, actuarial services, internal audit, management/human resources services, broker/investment banking services, legal services, and expert services unrelated to the audit.

<sup>5</sup> Such other ethical notions included morality, character, honesty, reliability, virtue, and duty.

<sup>6</sup> See: <https://www.ifac.org/auditing-assurance/auditor-reporting-iaasbs-1-priority>. Accessed 28 November 2014.

<sup>7</sup> See: <http://www.shell.com/global/environment-society/reporting/external-review-committee.html>; and <http://www.criticalfriendsinternational.com/index.php/en/case-studies/47-case-study-shell>. Accessed 3 December 2014.

<sup>8</sup> See: <http://www.kpmg.com/UK/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/PDF/Audit/audit-reports-field-testing-a-bold-idea.pdf>. Accessed 15 November 2014.

<sup>9</sup> There is now considerable evidence of a gap when external auditors’ understanding of their role and duties is compared against the expectations of various user groups and the general public regarding the process and outcome of the external audit.

<sup>10</sup> In any judicial system, there are divided responsibilities, the jury decides questions of fact and the judge questions of law and equity. A judge is also in a position to rely on codified laws provided by legislatures, traditionally the accounting and auditing professions have also carried the burden of developing accounting and auditing standards. Furthermore, the auditor is the ultimate decision maker, there is no system of appellate courts to correct the error — if the auditor makes an error the auditor may be liable, if a lower court judge makes an error, liability does not follow. If a lower court judge errs, the decision is simply reversed by the appellate court. However, “when a court determines where there has been negligence on the part of an auditor, the standard is that of a reasonable professional”. Sterling (1973) highlights the problem as one of the auditor being given a responsibility without concurrent authority. The primary sanction of the auditor is the threat of actual resignation: “no other profession that I know of is put in a position where it must make economic sacrifices in order to enforce the judgments for which it is responsible”.