

When Snitches Corroborate: Effects of Post-Identification Feedback from a Potentially
Compromised Source

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Abstract

Feedback provided to eyewitnesses can influence memory for how confident their previous line-up selections were. Witnesses given confirming feedback remember being more confident than witnesses who are told their selection was incorrect regardless of their accuracy. This can have a powerful impact on judges and juries. In the current paper, we examine the effect of feedback from a snitch. This manipulation often occurs in real cases, despite that fact that snitches could have something to gain from providing information to police. Our participants witnessed a staged crime and then identified the perpetrator from a target-absent line-up. Two days later, participants were provided with feedback and were probed for confidence. Results show that confirming feedback from a snitch has the same effect as a confession made by the actual suspect, and disconfirming feedback reduces confidence. Implications and relation to the extant literature on eyewitness confidence are discussed.

Keywords: Eyewitness Memory; Confidence; Line-up Selection; Informants; Meta-memory;

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In 1992, Roy Brown was found guilty of murdering a social service worker. Although Mr. Brown had spoken with others in the victim's office while trying to obtain custody of his child, he had no previous contact with the victim. As the police were conducting their investigation, they were contacted by a man who had met Mr. Brown briefly while serving a short jail term. The informant claimed that Mr. Brown, after leaving jail, had called him and confessed to the murder. Despite the lack of physical evidence, Mr. Brown was convicted and served 15 years of his 25-to-life sentence before he was granted access to his case files. Mr. Brown requested that DNA found at the scene be compared to the person he thought was the culprit. He was correct about who committed the murder, and was released soon after (InnocenceProject, 2014).

Roy Brown's wrongful conviction was cemented by the false secondary confession provided by the jailhouse informant. A secondary confession is when an informant admits that a suspect confessed their guilt to them, usually including a detailed description of the crime (Neuschatz, Lawson, Swanner, Meissner, & Neuschatz, 2008). In contrast, the more commonly known primary confession is a statement made by a suspect detailing their guilt to authorities (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). A primary confession is given directly to the police, whereas a secondary confession is given to another individual who in turn gives a secondhand account to the police. Secondary confessions are a kind of hearsay evidence, admissible under the 'admission against interest' exception to the general prohibition against hearsay (*On Lee v. United States.*, 1952).

The Innocence Project (InnocenceProject, 2014) estimates that secondary confession evidence accounts for over 15% of wrongful convictions. A Los Angeles County Grand Jury Report (1990) detailed that in the 10 years prior to the report, 233 felony and murder trials in Los Angeles County included jailhouse informant testimony. It was also reported that informants obtained case information by checking local media, impersonating a detective, and even calling the coroner. The report also demonstrated significant breakdowns in several areas of the legal system, allowing known liars to provide testimony. While the dangers of, and precautions against, false secondary confessions have been an issue of debate within legal communities; there is a stark lack of empirical research regarding the subject.

However, a few researchers have started to investigate this underdeveloped field. Swanner, Beike, and Cole (2010) demonstrated that people are willing to provide false secondary confessions. The authors adapted the ALT key paradigm (see Kassin & Kiechel, 1996) to examine whether participants would be likely to provide false secondary confessions. In the original paradigm, one participant would type while a confederate read aloud which keys to hit. Participants were told that striking the ALT key on the computer keyboard would shut down the program and all data would be lost. Unbeknownst to the participants, the program crashes after 60 seconds regardless of which keys are pressed. Swanner et al. replaced the confederate with another participant, and both participants (reader and typist) were interrogated after the computer crash to see whether they would falsely confess (typists providing false primary confessions and readers providing false secondary confessions). The rate of false secondary confession ranged from 65% to 96%, increasing when participants were offered an incentive for their confession and provided with fake evidence (Swanner et al., 2010). The results clearly demonstrate that people will provide a false secondary confession when offered minimal incentives (experimental

credit in the current study). Both the documented accounts of real jailhouse informants and the empirical psychological research agree that secondary confessions can be and often are falsified for personal gain (LA Grand Jury, 1990; Swanner et al., 2010).

Clearly, the probative value of information gleaned from informants is quite low for what should be obvious reasons. It is important to note, however, that although informants falsify the confessions for personal gain, mock jurors are unable to recognize this connection (Neuschatz, et al., 2012). In fact, Neuschatz et al. (2008) investigated the impact of incentives on juror verdict decisions in a case involving informant testimony. They found that mock jurors were not only influenced by the presence of informant testimony but also, unable to recognize the incentive as a motivation for testifying. In two experiments, mock jurors read a criminal trial transcript that included a secondary confession given by an average citizen, a jailhouse informant, or an accomplice witness. In addition, the accomplice witness and jailhouse informant either did or did not receive an incentive for testifying. Regardless of who provided the secondary confession, its presence led to more guilty verdicts than when compared to the no secondary confession control. Additionally, the presence of an incentive had no differential effect on verdict decisions (Neuschatz et al., 2008). Participants were unable to recognize the incentive as an additional motivator for the jailhouse informant or accomplice witness to testify even when the incentive was explicitly stated (e.g., 5-year sentence reduction). More specifically, when asked about why the jailhouse informant or accomplice would testify participants provided personal attributions (e.g., they wanted to help) instead of identifying the incentive as the motivating factor.

Not only are mock jurors insensitive to the contextual constraints (e.g., incentives) that may motivate informants to testify, they rate the secondary confession evidence as more

persuasive than other forms of evidence (Wetmore, Neuschatz, & Gronlund, 2014). More specifically, in Experiment 3, Wetmore et al. (2014) had mock jurors read four trial summaries (murder, rape, theft, assault) each containing only one key piece of evidence (secondary confession, primary confession, eyewitness, or no key evidence control) and were asked to make verdict decisions in each trial. The confession evidence, secondary or primary, provided the highest conviction rates no matter which trial type they were featured in. The two confession conditions consistently provided significantly higher conviction rates than the eyewitness or no key evidence control (Wetmore et al., 2014; Kassin & Neumann, 1997). This demonstrates that not only is a jailhouse informant believable, but their testimony is very powerful and evaluated in much the same way as primary confessions.

Confession evidence is so persuasive that it may infect other forms of evidence. In fact confession evidence has the power to alter an eyewitness's identification (Hasel & Kassin, 2009). Hasel and Kassin had participants witness a live staged crime of a confederate stealing a laptop, provide a description of the perpetrator and make an identification from a perpetrator absent line-up. Two days later, during phase 2, participants returned and were given feedback regarding the accuracy of their decision. If participants made an identification, they were informed that a) the individual they identified had confessed to the crime b) the individual they identified denied any involvement c) all individuals denied any involvement or d) another individual confessed to the crime, not the one identified by the participant. Participants were then given opportunity to change their identification decision. Of particular interest, 60.67% of participants who were told another individual had confessed changed their original identification to the individual who had confessed. Furthermore 50% of the participants who did not make an

identification in phase 1 and were told there was a confession by a specified individual in phase 2 altered their new identifications to the specified confessor.

The type of information received by the eyewitness in Hasel and Kassin (2009) was a form of post-identification feedback. Post-identification feedback occurs when information regarding the identification choice (e.g., good you got the guy or the person you chose confessed) is given to a witness (Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Neuschatz et al., 2005). Previous research has demonstrated that post-identification feedback can have harmful effects on witnesses' retrospective confidence (Lampinen, Scott, Leding, Pratt, & Arnal, 2007; Neuschatz et al., 2005; Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003). The typical post-identification feedback paradigm consists of four stages. First, participants witness a mock crime. Second, witnesses are made to believe a suspect has been caught and they must identify him from a photo line-up, in which the culprit may or may not be present. Third, participants are told one of the following: they picked the true culprit (confirming feedback), they picked the wrong person (disconfirming feedback) or they are given no feedback. Finally, witnesses generally rate their confidence in their decision and answer a series of testimony-relevant questions. Typically, the line-up administrator gives post-identification feedback directly to the witness. As a result, witness's retrospective confidence varies as a function of the feedback received. Confirmatory feedback leads to a more confident witness (Neuschatz et al, 2005Wells and Bradfield, 1998). Confirming feedback not only increases confidence, but can also distort reports of the witnessing experience. For instance, witnesses who receive confirming feedback also indicate that they had a better view of the criminal, paid more attention to the crime, and are more willing to testify (Neuschatz et al, 2005; Wells and Bradfield, 1998). Confirmatory feedback not only increases witness confidence in their identifications, but also make their

testimony seem more believable to jurors, and this occurred independently of the accuracy of the eyewitnesses (Douglass, Neuschatz, Imrich, & Wilkinson, 2010). In this paradigm the line-up administrator's role in the experiment is important because he or she presents the line-up, therefore, participants may believe that the line-up administrator knows the identity of the culprit. Hence, any feedback given from the line-up administrator is likely to be believable and influence a witness's decision as in Hasel & Kassin (2009).

However, a line-up administrator is not the only individual who may potentially provide post-identification feedback (Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Luus & Wells, 1994; Skagerberg, 2007). Confirmatory feedback can affect witnesses even if it comes from a source that has no more credibility than themselves – namely a cowitness (Luus & Wells, 1994). Cowitness information is any information that two or more witnesses exchange regarding an event that they witness together (Luus & Wells, 1994). Participants witnessed a live staged crime in pairs and were then separated, presented with a perpetrator absent line-up, and asked to make an identification. Following the identification, participants were given feedback regarding the cowitness's identification (i.e., the other participant) through the experimenter that the same person or a different person from the photo line-up was chosen. Generally, witnesses reported a higher level of certainty if they were informed that a cowitness identified the same person compared to witnesses who received no feedback. If witnesses were told that the cowitness selected a different person, witness retrospective confidence was reduced. This study was one of the first to establish that the influence of feedback on confidence is bidirectional. That is, depending on the information the witness received, confidence can be inflated or deflated.

The same bidirectional confidence reports occur when the two witnesses directly discuss the identification decisions (Skagerberg, 2007). More specifically, witnesses who agreed were

more likely to report a higher level of confidence that they accurately identified the culprit. The opposite pattern emerged when witnesses disagreed. Additionally, feedback influenced how participants answered testimony-relevant questions. If witnesses agreed they reported having a better view of the culprit, paid more attention to the crime, and were more willing to testify in court. Cowitness information appears to be persuasive across many situations.

Post identification feedback appears to create a host of issues when examining not only eyewitness decision-making but eyewitness confidence. First, positive feedback induces a higher certainty in witnesses, as well as reporting an overall better witnessing experience (Wells et al., 1998; Wells et al., 2003; Neuschatz et al., 2005). This occurs whether feedback is from a line-up administrator (Wells et al., 1998), is from a cowitness (Skagerberg, 2007), or is regarding other evidence (Hasel & Kassin, 2009). The strong effect that post identification feedback has on retrospective eyewitness confidence judgment can be traced to the cues-based inference conceptualization (Charman & Wells, 2012). Within this framework, feedback will serve as a particularly strong external cue when the ephoric experience of the witness is weak. For instance, when witnesses are presented with an innocent suspect line-up then any form of feedback (confirming or disconfirming) will have more weight on confidence than for witnesses with a strong ephoric experience.

The goal of the present study was to test whether or not the effects of post-identification feedback occur when the information is presented by a secondary source (i.e., a jailhouse informant – a snitch). Jailhouse informant research has indicated that informant testimony can be highly influential (Neuschatz et al., 2008). Based on prior post-identification feedback research with cowitnesses we predicted that participants receiving confirming feedback from an informant would elevate confidence, whereas receiving disconfirming feedback would decrease witness

confidence (Skagerberg, 2007). Additionally, confirmatory feedback would lead to responses indicating better witnessing experiences (i.e., indicating higher scores) on testimony-relevant questions whereas disconfirming feedback would lead to poorer witnessing experiences (i.e., lower scores), than would receiving no feedback.

Method

Participants

One hundred and ninety-three undergraduates (males = 70) aged 18 to 42 years ($M = 19.42$, $SD = 2.63$) participated to fulfil a research participation requirement for a general psychology class. Of all participants, 83.4% were Caucasian, 5.2% were African American, 4.7% were Asian, 4.1% were Hispanic, 1% were Middle Eastern/Indian, and 1.6% self-identified as 'other'. Although 200 participants began the experiment, three were removed because they chased the confederate after she stole the laptop and were therefore ineligible to continue on to Phase 2, one admitted to knowing the confederate personally, and two confessed to not looking up at the confederate at all when she entered the laboratory room.

Materials

Line-ups. The experimenter took photographs of two female targets' faces. Twenty images of similar individuals matching the targets' general descriptions were then selected and similarity-rated to the targets using 30 paid workers on Amazon's Mechanical Turk, an online community where requesters pay workers to take online surveys. In our task, targets and potential foil images were presented side by side, and workers were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 7 how similar the two images were to one another, where 1 indicated the least resemblance and 7 indicated the most resemblance. Workers were paid 25 cents for their participation, which lasted on average less than five minutes. The six most similar to Target 1 ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 1.41$)

and Target 2 ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 1.32$) were used to construct two target-absent simultaneous line-ups on 8 1/2" by 11" paper with two rows of photographs numbered '1' through '6' from the top left to the bottom right.

Pre-Identification Interview Questions. A mock 'incident report' resembling one used by actual police investigators was created for the experimenter's use during the pre-identification interview as a simple way to ensure that all pertinent questions were addressed and to render the cover story more convincing. The first question was open-ended, asking, 'Can you tell me in your own words what happened when the person stole the laptop?' This question was followed by more detailed questions designed to retrieve information about the thief's appearance, attire, and actions while in the experiment room in case they were not addressed in the initial description.

Procedure

Phase 1. Participants entered the experiment room one at a time believing they were going to participate in a study about persuasive techniques. The experimenter told the participant that because the current computers in the room were too old to run the experiment, it must be run on a laptop that the experimenter brought in the room and set in front of the participant. The experimenter then claiming to forget bringing a USB drive for the experiment, handed a brief overview of persuasive techniques to the participant, and left the room for two minutes to retrieve the drive. A female confederate entered the room wearing ear buds playing prerecorded spoken instructions from the experimenter mixed in the left channel of audio (facing away from the participant) while a clip of a currently popular song played in the right channel, which dangled freely rather than being placed in the confederate's ear. This helped to lower the possibility of the participant hearing the instructions being given in the left channel. The

prerecorded instructions also ensured that time spent in the room was the same across sessions and between confederates. The instructions were ‘Enter the experiment room,’ and ‘Now take the laptop and leave the room. Don’t turn around, and leave the door open.’ The confederate remained in the room for 15 seconds shuffling through boxes under a desk opposite the participant then turned around, grabbed the laptop, and left the room when instructed. The experimenter returned, feigned distress at the theft of the laptop, and ran out in the direction in which the participant indicated the confederate left.

The experimenter reentered the room and told the participant that she or he was actually a criminal justice student working on a simulated criminal investigation project, and the participant must provide a description of the thief and everything that occurred so that the experimenter may solve the crime using resources and techniques like those of real police investigators. The experimenter then filled out an ‘incident report’ containing detailed questions about the thief and left the room for ten minutes, claiming that she or he needed to enter the information into a profile database to construct a line-up.

The experimenter returned, told the participant, ‘what I am about to show you is a photo line-up. When you see it, I want you to point to the photograph of the person who came in the room and tell me the number underneath that photo,’ and presented a target-absent line-up to the participant. Biased instructions were used to ensure a selection. After the participant chose a photograph from the line-up, the experimenter procured the participant’s telephone number to conduct a follow-up interview two days later. If a participant did not choose a photograph, they were immediately debriefed. Participants were thanked and dismissed.

Phase 2. Two days later, the experimenter called participants, thanked them again for their help in the simulated criminal investigation, and explained that the laptop was tracked

through its wireless card and was found in the possession of a Mr. Tom Armstrong, another student taking part in the mock criminal investigation. Participants were informed that Mr. Armstrong was ‘arrested and booked’ for being in possession of stolen property and that during the course of his interrogation admitted to buying the laptop from someone for \$100.

Participants were then told either (a) that Mr. Armstrong indicated that the person who stole the laptop and sold it to him was a Ms. Janet Pickett, and Ms. Pickett was the person selected from the line-up (i.e., ‘snitch’ confirming feedback), (b) that Mr. Armstrong indicated that the person who stole the laptop and sold it to him was a Ms. Janet Pickett, but Ms. Pickett was not the person selected from the line-up (i.e., “snitch” disconfirming feedback), (c) that Mr. Armstrong refused to identify the person who sold him the laptop but Ms. Janet Pickett, the woman selected from the line-up, admitted to stealing the laptop (i.e., confession), or (d) that Mr. Armstrong refused to identify the person who stole the laptop and sold it to him (i.e., no feedback).

After providing the feedback, the experimenter asked questions from Wells and Bradfield’s (1998) post-identification feedback survey, with one question added at the end measuring whether the feedback influenced responses to any of the previous questions. These questions are shown in Table 1. After collecting demographic information, participants were debriefed and were asked not to disclose any details regarding the experiment to anyone else who might be eligible to participate.

Results

The purpose of the present study was to see whether the classic post-identification feedback effect can occur when feedback comes from a secondary source such as a coconspirator. The questions from the follow-up interview are found in Table 1 along with the means and standard deviations to their raw responses for each of the three feedback conditions.

For data analyses, a z-score for each response was calculated, and questions 7 and 8 were reverse-scored because high scores on these items indicated greater difficulty in identification in contrast to the rest of the questions.

Analysis of Survey Items

A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of feedback condition on retrospective confidence, $F(3, 189) = 4.45$, $MSE = 1.83$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .066$. Tukey's HSD post hoc tests indicated that scores for retrospective confidence were significantly lower in the disconfirming feedback condition than in the confession condition, $p = .003$. Remaining pairwise comparisons were nonsignificant, p 's $> .10$.

Because other items on the survey did not directly measure retrospective confidence, a mean of the z-scores for the remaining 11 questions was calculated and used for the second analysis. A univariate ANOVA revealed a effect of feedback condition on the averaged scores, $F(3, 189) = 5.24$, $MSE = 0.264$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .077$. Honestly significant difference (HSD) post hoc tests revealed that the average of the scores of the remaining items was significantly lower in the disconfirming feedback condition than in the snitch confirming feedback condition, $p = .007$, and confession condition, $p = .002$. Remaining pairwise comparisons were nonsignificant, p 's $> .10$.

A univariate ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of feedback condition on the manipulation check question asking whether the feedback influenced answers to the preceding questions, $F(3, 189) = 5.70$, $MSE = 2.48$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .083$. Tukey's HSD post-hoc tests indicated that feedback in the No Feedback condition was rated as significantly less influential than Snitch Confirming, $p = .008$, Confession, $p = .026$, and Disconfirming, $p = .001$.

Remaining pairwise comparisons were nonsignificant, p 's > .75. This result is expected, given that no feedback would be perceived as less influential than any feedback.

Factor Analysis

We conducted a varimax-rotated principal component analysis on the z-scores for each response to extract components loaded onto the individual items. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure indicated good sampling adequacy at $KMO = .87$, and Bartlett's test of sphericity showed that correlations were sufficiently large for a principal component analysis, $\chi^2 = 677.13$, $p < .001$. The analysis retained only those components with eigenvalues greater than 1, and four components were extracted that together explained 63.85% of the variance (see Table 2). Component 1 included items highly correlated ($>|.5|$) with confidence and explained 35.79% of the variance, Component 2 included items highly correlated with difficulty in line-up selection and explained 10.73% of the variance, and Component 3 contained only the item asking how long the participant looked at the thief and explained 8.93% of the variance, and Component 4 included the items asking about distance from confederate and what method the participant used to reach a line-up decision and explained 8.41% of the variance. Regression scores for the factors were saved for further analyses.

Analysis of Regression Scores

A univariate ANOVA was carried out on Component 1, revealing a significant effect of feedback condition on confidence and its related questions, $F(3, 189) = 7.83$, $MSE = .904$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .111$. HSD post hoc tests showed that the effect was driven by significantly lower confidence in the disconfirming feedback condition than in the snitch confirming feedback condition, $p < .001$, confession condition, $p < .001$, and no feedback condition, $p = .02$.

Remaining pairwise comparisons revealed no further significant differences. Means are displayed in Figure 1.

ANOVAs revealed no significant effects of feedback condition on regression scores from Component 2, $F(3, 189) = 0.82$, $MSE = 1.00$, $p > .45$, $\eta_p^2 = .013$, Component 3, $F(3, 189) = 1.29$, $MSE = .97$, $p > .25$, $\eta_p^2 = .020$, or Component 4, $F(3, 189) = 1.11$, $MSE = 1.00$, $p > .35$, $\eta_p^2 = .017$.

General Discussion

The post-identification feedback effect is a robust phenomenon that has motivated several investigations over the course of the previous 15 years (Stebly, Wells, & Douglass, 2014). We set out to see whether this effect would remain robust if the feedback was given from a secondary source, such as a snitch or coconspirator. Other research has demonstrated the powerful effect that secondary confessions can have on mock jurors (Neuschatz et al., 2008; Wetmore et al., 2013) thus we predicted it would have a similar effect in the present study.

Of particular concern to this study was how feedback from a secondary source would influence the witnessing experience. Contrary to our predictions, confirming feedback given by a snitch did not significantly elevate confidence nor did it influence the rest of the witnessing experience measures. Interestingly, witnesses that received confession (primary or secondary) information were no more confident in their identification decision than those who did not receive any feedback. This finding was unexpected and counters a large body of research examining the influence of confirmatory feedback on retrospective judgements (Stebly et al., 2014). However, in the vein of previous post-identification feedback findings (e.g., Charman & Wells, 2012; Stebly et al., 2014; Wells & Bradfield, 1998), those witnesses who received disconfirming feedback from a snitch (e.g., ‘The person found with the stolen laptop was not the

person you selected from the line-up') were less confident in their identification decision than those receiving primary confession feedback. In addition, this type of disconfirming feedback distorted the witnessing report. Eyewitnesses' retrospective scores were lower when snitches offered disconfirming feedback than they were for eyewitnesses that received confirming snitch and confession feedback. The effects of disconfirming feedback have been more difficult to demonstrate across studies (Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells et al., 2003). These smaller effects have, in part, been thought to depend on how the disconfirming feedback is worded (Charman & Wells, 2012). We used similar methods (i.e., biased instructions) to those used by Charman and Wells (2012) and were also able to demonstrate the deflating effects feedback can have on retrospective confidence. Nevertheless, we were unable to find the typical confirming feedback effects. We explore why this might be below.

The current experiment did not find evidence for the proposed cue-accessibility hypothesis (Charman & Wells, 2011; Wells & Bradfield, 1999) wherein confirming feedback distorts the witnessing report because witnesses' internal memory cues are weak thereby providing evidence of a weak ephoric experience. Thus, it is plausible that our confirming feedback manipulation did not have a potent effect because our eyewitnesses had strong internal memories initially, thus any confirming feedback was not strong enough to inflate confidence. In other words, our witnesses were not reliant on the confirming feedback as an external cue while reflecting on their certainty, attention, and so on. Charman and Wells (2011) have suggested that differences in encoding, retention interval and suspect-foil similarity are likely to contribute to the overall ephoric experience of witnesses and these differences could have driven the current findings.

This study provides a number of interesting research avenues to be explored. Similar to Hasel and Kassin (2009), our witnesses were given various forms of feedback following their identification decision. Our study differs from theirs in that their study was primarily interested in investigating the influence of primary confession evidence and whether witnesses would change their identification decision following feedback one week later, whereas ours was directly concerned with the influence of feedback on retrospective confidence. Hence, it would be worthwhile include a secondary confession condition thereby examining whether this, too, would taint not only their confidence but also their identification decisions.

Implication

To help protect against the effects of feedback on retrospective confidence, a confidence statement should be secured at the time of the identification (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). Obtaining this initial statement could help protect against the effects of any subsequent feedback given by police or a coconspirator. Moreover, this statement would provide a record that could be indexed during the time of trial wherein a witness might display high confidence while being cross-examined despite initially having low confidence at the time of the identification. Feedback given by police and information from coconspirators is unlikely to disappear from the justice system. Thus, it is critical for jurors, lawyers and judges to be informed about the biasing qualities that these two types of information can have on witnesses.

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Table 1: Raw means and standard deviations for followup questions (N = 149).

Survey Question	Feedback			
	Snitch Confirming	Disconfirming	Confession	No Feedback
At the time you made your identification, how certain were you that you were identifying the correct person? (1= not at all certain; 7= absolutely certain)	M = 4.41, SD = 1.24	M = 3.79, SD = 1.52	M = 4.76, SD = 1.32	M = 4.13, SD = 1.33
How good a view did you get of the person who stole the laptop? (1= very poor; 7= very good)	M = 3.98, SD = 1.45	M = 3.47, SD = 1.44	M = 3.89, SD = 1.32	M = 3.94, SD = 1.31
How much time did you spend looking at the face of the person who stole the laptop? (indicate to the nearest second)	M = 5.95, SD = 12.92	M = 6.75, SD = 10.64	M = 7.24, SD = 10.70	M = 6.84, SD = 11.96
How far away from you was the person who stole the laptop (indicate to the nearest inch)?	M = 21.86, SD = 11.24	M = 24.98, SD = 11.49	M = 26.27, SD = 12.11	M = 24.69, SD = 10.63
How much attention were you paying to the face of the person who stole the laptop? (1= none; 7= my total attention)	M = 2.79, SD = 1.29	M = 2.72, SD = 1.47	M = 3.31, SD = 1.61	M = 2.94, SD = 1.16
To what extent do you feel you had enough basis (enough information) to make an identification? (1= no basis at all; 7= a very good basis)	M = 4.33, SD = 1.25	M = 3.26, SD = 1.34	M = 4.33, SD = 1.45	M = 3.90, SD = 1.26
How easy or difficult was it for you to figure out which person in the photos was the person who stole the laptop? (1= extremely easy; 7= extremely difficult)	M = 4.33, SD = 1.52	M = 5.21, SD = 1.38	M = 4.27, SD = 1.72	M = 4.77, SD = 1.48
After you were first shown the photos, how long did it take you to make an identification? (indicate to the nearest second)	M = 36.09, SD = 35.60	M = 56.02, SD = 74.40	M = 42.41, SD = 49.40	M = 51.83, SD = 56.44
How willing would you be to testify in court that the person you identified was the person took the laptop? (1= not at all willing; 7= totally willing)	M = 4.35, SD = 1.95	M = 2.44, SD = 1.48	M = 4.04, SD = 1.88	M = 3.38, SD = 1.96
Generally, how good is your recognition memory for the faces of strangers you have encountered on only one prior occasion? (1= very poor; 7= excellent)	M = 4.78, SD = 1.25	M = 3.78, SD = 1.47	M = 4.55, SD = 1.46	M = 4.38, SD = 1.52
How clear is the image you have in memory of the person who stole the laptop? (1= not at all clear; 7= very clear)	M = 4.04, SD = 1.47	M = 3.15, SD = 1.69	M = 3.80, SD = 1.65	M = 4.02, SD = 1.63
When deciding which photo to pick, did you use a process of elimination or did the photo you picked just 'pop out' at you? (1= process of elimination; 7= just 'popped out' at me)	M = 2.80, SD = 2.35	M = 3.34, SD = 2.74	M = 3.14, SD = 2.65	M = 3.08, SD = 2.66
Did hearing that (condition) influence the way you answered any of the previous questions? (1=no influence; 7=completely influenced)	M = 2.63, SD = 1.52	M = 2.83, SD = 1.75	M = 2.51, SD = 1.78	M = 1.60, SD = 1.16

Table 2: Component loadings based on a varimax rotated principal components analysis on the z-scores for the 12 items on the followup questionnaire (N = 193).

Variable	Component				h^2
	1	2	3	4	
Confidence					
At the time you made your identification, how certain were you that you were identifying the correct person?	.722				.661
How good a view did you get of the person who stole the laptop?	.589				.613
How much attention were you paying to the face of the person who stole the laptop?	.545				.468
To what extent do you feel you had enough basis (enough information) to make an identification?	.801				.765
How willing would you be to testify in court that the person you identified was the person who stole the laptop?	.810				.660
Generally, how good is your recognition memory for the faces of strangers you have encountered on only one prior occasion?	.667				.570
How clear is the image you have in memory of the person who stole the laptop?	.751				.576
Selection Difficulty					
How easy or difficult was it for you to figure out which person in the photos was the person who stole the laptop?		.614			.541
After you were first shown the photos, how long did it take you to make an identification? (indicate to the nearest second)		.878			.785
Distance and Method of Selection					
When deciding which photo to pick, did you use a process of elimination or did the photo you picked just 'pop out' at you?				.692	.625
How far away from you was the person who stole the laptop (indicate to the nearest inch)?				.772	.634
Time Spent Looking at Individual					
How much time did you spend looking at the face of the person who stole the laptop? (indicate to the nearest second)				.868	.762

Note: Component loadings < .5 are suppressed. Bolded loadings are marker variables. h^2 is the communality coefficient.

Figure 1. Average coefficients with standard error bars for Component 1, which captured survey items related to confidence in each feedback condition.

