The BJP’s return to power: Mobilisation, conversion and vote swing in the 2014 Indian elections

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Abstract

Using constituency level data, the article examines the BJP’s vote swing at the State and Constituency level in India. Drawing on theories of electoral realignment I examine the BJP’s performance at the constituency level and investigate the extent to which the party drew voters from other parties (particularly Congress), mobilised new voters (via increased turnout), and appealed to the newly enfranchised (via increases in the size of the electoral roll). The results of the analysis show that the key to the BJP’s success was its ability to mobilise new voters in places where it had previously not fared so well.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the ESRC as part of the Indian-European Research Networking Programme in the Social Sciences (grant number ES/K005936/1). I am grateful to Louise Tillin for comments on an earlier draft and to Sanjay Kumar and the CSDS data unit for sharing the data.
Introduction

The 2014 elections marked an historic return to power for the BJP. Not only was this the first time since 1977 that a non Congress party secured an outright majority on its own, but the BJP managed to do so with an unprecedented vote swing, taking its share of the vote from 18.8 to 31.3 percent. This swing was larger than any of previous ‘waves’ that Congress enjoyed – bigger than the Indira wave of 1980 and bigger than both of the post-assassination waves of 1984 and 1991. From a declining vote share and diminishing electoral returns over the last 3 elections – the BJP staged a remarkable electoral comeback.

The magnitude of the BJP’s victory has unsurprisingly already led some commentators to label 2014 a critical election, ushering in ‘a new phase in the life of the post-Congress polity’ (Palshikar 2014). Although it may be too early to tell whether the 2014 election represents a critical election in the traditional sense, with a durable electoral realignment taking place between the Congress and the BJP, it is clear that major electoral change has occurred. The realignment perspective offers a useful prism through which to view these changes.

In this paper I examine the sources of this change in support for the BJP. I do so with reference to some of the key theories of electoral realignment. The notion of realignment is an “aggregate-level concept that refers to an abrupt, large, and enduring form of change in prevailing electoral patterns, one that is initiated by a critical election and results in a significantly different partisan balance in the electorate” (Nardulli 1995: 11). In contrast to normal voting eras, during critical elections citizens reject their habitual voting behaviours and the pendulum of party competition swings decisively in a new direction (Evans and Norris 1999). Critical realignments are thus periods of dramatic rather than incremental change.
In the Indian context there has been a great deal of research on processes of electoral change that have taken place since Independence (see for example Yadav 1996; Chhibber 1999, Chhibber and Kollman 2004, Heath and Yadav 2009). Since the first elections in 1952 there have been three critical changes in the structure of party competition (see Yadav 1996). First from 1947 to 1967 there was a long period of dominance by the Congress Party. Congress was a secular, catchall party that drew its support from across the social spectrum (Kothari, 1964). Second, following the period of Congress dominance, from 1967 to 1993 there was Yadav terms the Congress-opposition system. Congress remained the most prominent party at the national level but it was no longer straightforwardly dominant. Although it was a key player everywhere, at the state level it faced a range of different but often effective opposition parties, such as the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam: Dravidian Progress Federation) in Tamil Nadu and the TDP (Telugu Desam Party: party of the Telugu land) in Andhra Pradesh. Thirdly, from 1989 onwards India has seen a move towards a genuine competitive multiparty system which can no longer be defined with reference to Congress. In particular we have seen the emergence of the BJP and several Backward Caste parties, such as the SP (Samajwadi Party: Socialist Party), the RJD (Rashtriya Janata Dal: National People’s Party), and the BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party: Popular People’s Party) in North India, and coalition governments became the norm (see Ziegfeld 2012).

Much of the scholarly work on critical realignments is based on the role that ordinary citizens play during these periods of dramatic electoral change. Are citizens producing realignments by converting from one party to the opposition? Are previous non-voters becoming mobilized? Or are new groups of voters eligible to vote and altering the partisan
balance in the process? In this article I examine each of these three possibilities and discuss the implications for the future.

On the face of it there are *a priori* reasons to suspect that each factor may have played an important role in the BJP’s historic return to power. Firstly, with reference to the Conversion hypothesis, the 2014 elections represented not only a triumph for the BJP but also a disaster for the Congress, who recorded their lowest ever share of the vote. Whereas the overall share of the vote by Regional parties remained much the same between 2009 and 2014 (see Tillin, this issue) it was the Congress who appeared to bear the brunt of the BJP’s surge in the polls. The conversion hypothesis contends that partisan change occurred because many supporters of Congress switched their support to the BJP as a response to the unique events of the time. This possibility is the most obvious. After 10 years in power, the Congress administration was weighed down by various corruption scandals, and charges of policy inertia and administrative ineptitude. Without a strong Prime Ministerial candidate the party at times appeared directionless, and if voters were ready for a change after so long with the same party in power, then Congress also often gave the impression it was ready for a break. It may then be that voter’s simply transferred their vote from one national party to the other as they sought to elect a party that could govern from the centre.

Secondly, with reference to the Mobilisation hypothesis, the 2014 elections were notable for the record number of voters who turned up at the polls. At 66.4% turnout was the highest ever recorded in a Lok Sabha election, and was over six points higher than the 59.7% turnout recorded to 2009. The mobilisation hypothesis contends that BJP gains came largely from the mobilization of new voters previously uninvolved in politics. This possibility certainly has credibility. The BJP – and Modi in particular – orchestrated a vigorous and
lively campaign. Modi embarked on a whirlwind tour of the country, speaking at over 400 rallies, and was the focus of media attention everywhere. Estimates of campaign spending vary, and no one knows how much money big business poured in to Modi’s campaign, but there is little doubt that this was the most expensive campaign ever conducted in India. The intensity of the BJP campaign may have helped to boost turnout – which saw an extra 136 million people go to the polls (more than the total number which voted for Congress) and this may in turn have altered the partisan balance of support. According to this perspective the key to the BJP victory was the appeal it had to new voters.

Thirdly, with reference to the Franchise hypothesis, one of the more unusual – and less remarked upon - features of the 2014 election relates to the marked increase in the size of the electorate. Every Lok Sabha election in India sets records for being the largest exercise in democratic decision making in the world, but the scale of the exercise in 2014 was monumental, even by Indian standards. Overall more than 553 million people turned up at the polls; an increase of 136 million people on the 417 million who voted in 2009. In part this increase is due to the increased turnout discussed above – but it is also due to the fact that there were simply many more people on the electoral roll than there had been previously. The size of the electoral roll grew from 717 million in 2009 to 834 million in 2014, equivalent to an average increase of 3% per year. Put in perspective, this increase of 117 million people is equivalent to more than the entire population of Maharashtra. Changes of this scale far exceed what may be expected from normal population growth, which is currently 1.2% per year, down from 1.8% per year 20 years ago.1 Moreover, given that the size of the urban population in India has been steadily growing it is surprising that these increases in the size of the electoral roll are unrelated to the size of the urban

1 World Bank population tables. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW
population in a constituency (r = 0.03). Indeed, the accuracy of electoral rolls in India has long been a cause for concern. Although a great deal of attention has focussed on making sure that eligible voters are included on the lists, rather less attention has been paid to removing the names of voters who should not be there (either because they are dead, have moved away, are duplicates, or never existed in the first place). Recent research carried out by the civil society organisation Janaagraha in conjunction with the Election Commission estimate that as many as 20% of the names on electoral rolls may be redundant, consisting of ‘phantom’ electors who should not be there (Bertorelli 2014).

Given the scale of redundancy in the electoral register, which should serve to depress turnout if none of the ‘phantom’ electors vote, and the EC’s recent attempts to tidy it up (controversially so in Maharashtra) it is surprising that it grew so much in such a short space of time. These changes suggest that an alternative form of mobilisation may have been taking place: either along the lines of a concerted registration drive, or perhaps even along more sinister lines to do with electoral malpractice and the registration of phantom voters.² Although we do not have the means to distinguish between these two possibilities, we can examine whether the addition of new names to the electoral register is associated with the swing to the BJP.

Data

In order to examine the extent to which each of these factors is associated with the swing to the BJP I use constituency level data from the 2009 and 2014 elections. Because we are primarily interested in how support for the BJP changed I only include those constituencies

² For example, there were allegations that former Energy Minister D.K. Shivakumar illegally enrolled over 25,000 residents in the Bangalore Rural Lok Sabha constituency to provide “undue advantage” for his brother and Congress candidate D.K. Suresh (The Hindu, 2014).
where the BJP contested in both 2009 and 2014. Although in both elections the BJP contested a similar number of seats – those seats which they did contest were not exactly the same in each election. Overall the number of seats that were contested in both elections is 385. Constituency level analysis of this type is a far more reliable and valid way to examine electoral change than survey data, which is notoriously unreliable at measuring recall of past voting behaviour from previous elections as people either forget or misremember which party they voted for (see Heath and Johns 2010).

However, as our analysis is based on aggregate, constituency-level data, it rests on a simplifying assumption regarding individual-level behaviour. In line with Darmofal and Nardulli (2010: 264) we employ the ‘simplest movement of the smallest number’ simplifying assumption. This assumption holds that the patterns of electoral change analysed here are the result of the simplest conceivable movement involving the smallest number of voters in the constituency. However plausible the simplest movement of the smallest number assumption is, it is not the only possible interpretation of the data presented. Consider the case in which the size of the electorate and the number of BJP voters in a given constituency both increased by 1,000 voters between 2009 and 2014. The simplest movement of the smallest number assumption attributes these changes to the mobilization of 1,000 new voters who became BJP supporters. However, those increases could also have been generated by 1) 1,000 new voters becoming Congress supporters and 2) 1,000 existing Congress supporters switching their vote to the BJP. While these electoral movements would result in the same aggregate pattern this interpretation is less credible than that provided by the simplest movement of the smallest assumption, for two reasons. First, the more elaborate movements described above require changes in the behaviour of twice as
many voters. And second, these changes require that voters move in opposite directions, whereby the Congress was simultaneously able to both lose existing voters and attract new voters in equal measure.³

Analysis

The first point to address is the extent to which the swing to the BJP represented a national wave. The idea of critical realignments often incorporates a geographical dimension, where the partisan balance changes most dramatically in certain parts of the country. Historically the BJP’s stronghold has been in the Hindi Heartland states of North India (Heath 1999). These were the states where the BJP made its’ initial breakthrough in 1989 and 1991, and by and large have been the states where the party has remained most popular (albeit with some notable exceptions). Did the swing to the BJP take place primarily in these states, where it was already traditionally popular, or did the party break ground in new areas?

In order to get a sense of the BJP’s popularity on the ground, Figure 1 shows the state-wise breakdown of the BJP’s average constituency swing in those states where it contested five or more seats in both 2009 and 2014. In each of these states its average constituency vote share increased, although the magnitude of the swing varied quite considerably. Although a lot of media attention has focussed on the BJP’s performance in Uttar Pradesh, where they won 71 out of 80 seats, it is interesting to note that the swing to the BJP was greatest in Andhra Pradesh, where its average vote share went up by 24 percentage points in those constituencies it contested in 2009 and 2014, though this was probably aided by the BJP’s alliance with the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) this time around. Similarly, the BJP also enjoyed

³ Despite the fact that the simplest movement of the smallest number assumption is more plausible, it is impossible to refute rival hypotheses definitively using only aggregate data. However, more extensive empirical tests carried out by Darmofal and Nardulli (2010) lend validity to the assumption.
a large vote swing in Tamil Nadu – another state where it has historically not had much of a presence and where it has a powerful regional ally. By contrast the swing to the BJP was much less in a number of North Indian Hindi Heartland states, such as Bihar (2 points), Chhattisgarh (4 points) and Madhya Pradesh (10 points) where the party was already popular.

However, although the size of the BJP swing varied a great deal by state, there is also a lot of variation within states. The box plots in Figure 2 show the median swing and inter-quartile range for each state. From these box plots we can see that there is a considerable amount of overlap between the different states in terms of the size of the BJP’s swing at the constituency level. We can get a clearer idea of the extent of this overlap by using a multilevel model to analyse the variance of the swing at the constituency level and the state level (we will come back to this later in the paper). According to the Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC) about 57% of the variation in the BJP’s swing can be attributed to differences between states and the remaining 43% of the variation can be attributed to within-state between-constituency variation. This indicates that local level constituency factors are relatively important for understanding the BJP’s swing – and there is almost as much variation within states as there is between states.

In the remainder of this paper I analyse the sources of this swing at the constituency level, with specific reference to the theories of electoral realignment discussed above. The first

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4 The variance partition coefficient is obtained by running the simplest multilevel model which allows for state effects on vote swing, but without explanatory variables. From the ‘null’ model between-state (level 2) variance in swing is estimated as 68.74, and the within-state between-constituency (level 1) variance is estimated as 50.47. Thus the total variance is 68.74 + 50.47 = 119.22. The variance partition coefficient (VPC) is 68.74/119.22 = 0.58, which indicates that 58% of the variance in the BJP’s swing can be attributed to differences between states and 42% can be attributed to differences between constituencies.
part presents some simple bivariate analysis, and examines the extent to which the swing to
the BJP is associated with conversion, mobilisation and franchise at the constituency level.
The second part of the paper presents the results from a series of multilevel models, and
examines the joint impact of these factors taking into account patterns of state-level
variation.

**Figure 1: BJP’s swing by State**

**Figure 2: BJP’s swing by State, box plots**

As a first step to examining the conversion hypothesis we compare the constituency level
swing away from the Congress with the constituency level swing towards the BJP. As
already noted, the Congress performed very badly in the 2014 elections and recorded its
lowest ever share of the vote. To what extent was the BJP able to capitalise on this popular
dissatisfaction with the ruling party? Was there a seamless transfer of support from one
party to the other as voters made a simple choice about which party they wanted to form
the government?

For ease of comparison the data presented in Figure 3 is based on the results from the 303
constituencies where both the Congress and the BJP competed in 2009 and 2014.
Unsurprisingly there is a strong correlation between how badly the Congress did and how
well the BJP did. In those constituencies where the Congress lost votes the BJP tended to
pick up votes and increase its vote share, as illustrated by the downward slope of the line of
best fit. From the equation of the regression line we can see that for every percentage point
that the Congress lost, on average the BJP did 0.36 percentage points better than it had
done in 2009. Although this is a significant relationship, it does perhaps suggest that the BJP
was not quite as successful in harnessing popular dissatisfaction with the Congress as has
been widely assumed. People deserted the Congress in droves, but out of those voters who moved away from the Congress the BJP was only able to attract the support of about a third of them. This indicates that about two-thirds of those people who abandoned Congress did so in favour of another party, which was not the BJP. Moreover, from the R-square of 0.16 we can see that only 16% of the variation in the swing to the BJP can be attributed to the swing away from Congress. There must therefore be other factors that are important.

**Figure 3: Swing to the BJP and swing away from Congress**

The next factor we consider relates to the mobilisation hypothesis. Turnout increased dramatically in 2014 – and Modi’s energetic and populist campaign is widely seen as being instrumental in re-engaging disillusioned non-voters. To what extent did this upsurge in electoral participation translate into increased support for the BJP? Figure 4 shows the correlation between turnout change and swing to the BJP at the constituency level. As we can see there is only a weak correlation, albeit positive, between the two factors. On average the BJP did do better in constituencies where turnout increased, but not by much. From the equation of the regression line we can see that for every percentage point increase in turnout, on average the BJP did 0.18 percentage points better than it had done in 2009. However, we should note that there is a lot of variation around the line of best fit, and in some constituencies where turnout increased a lot the BJP did do very well, but in others it did not. This suggests that if turnout was important, it was not uniformly so. We will return to this point later.

**Figure 4: Swing to the BJP and turnout change**
The last point that we consider relates to franchise. The number of names on the electoral register increased dramatically between 2009 and 2014, in some constituencies by as much as 40 percent. To what extent did this increase in the supply of voters translate into increased support for the BJP? As we can see from Figure 5, on average the BJP tended to do better in constituencies where the size of the electoral roll increased. We have to be careful how we interpret these findings. Although manipulations of the electoral roll are a common source of electoral fraud, they can also be the result of mobilisation drives. Additions to the electoral roll may come from young people reaching the age of maturity, people moving town, or previously disenfranchised voters finally getting registered. These different sources of registration may explain why the relationship is not very precise.

**Figure 5: Swing to the BJP and electoral roll change**

We should however note that increases in turnout and increases in the electoral roll rarely go hand in hand, perhaps suggesting that they do not have a common cause. Indeed, from figure 6 we can see that turnout tended to increase more in those constituencies which did not experience massive additions to the electoral register. This may reflect different political strategies: parties either focussed their efforts on registering new voters or mobilising existing voters – but, at the very least, it does indicate that these two strategies tended not to be mutually reinforcing.

**Figure 6: Turnout change and electoral roll change**

Of course, we should treat all these bivariate correlations with a certain amount of caution, since the effect of one factor may in part depend upon the presence or absence of another. As we have seen, turnout change tended to be lower in places which experienced
pronounced additions to the electoral roll, so to get an idea of the independent impact of each factor on the BJP swing we must consider them both simultaneously. Moreover, there may be important differences between states which we have so far not taken into account. To this end in the next section we turn our attention to multivariate analysis. In order to do this we specify a multilevel model, where constituencies are nested within states. The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to control for variations in the BJP’s swing across different states and to focus our analysis on the within-state between-constituency variation which we are primarily interested in. This approach also allows us to control for factors that might vary at the state level, such as pre-election alliances. The model that we specify is as follows:

\[ Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_1 X_{1ij} + \beta_2 X_{2ij} + \beta_3 X_{3ij} + \beta_4 X_{4ij} + \beta_5 X_{5ij} + u_j + e_{ij} \]  

(1)

Where:

- \(X_1\) Urban population
- \(X_2\) Congress swing
- \(X_3\) Congress DNC (did not contest)
- \(X_4\) Turnout change
- \(X_5\) Roll change

Table 1 displays the results of three models. In each model the dependent variable is BJP’s vote change. In model 1 we regress BJP’s vote change on urban population of the constituency,\(^5\) Congress vote change, Turnout change, and change in the size of the

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\(^5\) Data comes from the Census and is linked to constituencies by the CSDS data unit.
electoral roll (see appendix for descriptive data). We also use a dummy variable (Congress DNC) to control for constituencies where Congress did not contest.\(^6\) This model allows us to inspect how the *change* in our key variables of interest influenced *change* in support for the BJP. However, as already mentioned, we have reason to suspect that the swing to the BJP was not uniform across all constituencies. In particular, the size of the swing may depend upon the BJP’s starting position in the constituency, and in places where it had done very well in 2009 the pattern may be one more of consolidation than expansion. In model 2 we therefore also control for the strength of support for the BJP in 2009. In Model 3 we specify interactions between how well the BJP did in 2009 and each of our key theoretical variables of interest to see if we can identify which factors, if any, were responsible for helping the BJP go from also-rans to front runners in places where it performed badly in 2009.

From Model 1, when we control for all the change factors simultaneously we can see that the BJP tended to pick up more votes in urban constituencies. It also tended to benefit at the expense of Congress. This result is highly significant and the negative coefficient indicates that for every percentage point of vote share in a constituency that Congress lost, on average the BJP picked up an extra 0.20 points. This is a substantial effect, though is still a long way short of a direct transfer of votes between the two parties. Interestingly we see that when we control for the other variables in the model the effect of turnout change does not have a significant impact on the size of the BJP’s swing. This suggests that the mobilisation of new voters may not have had a uniform impact on success of the BJP. However, the effect of changes to the electoral roll is significant. Controlling for the other

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\(^6\) Because the unobserved values for Congress swing do not exist in constituencies where the party did not stand, dummy variable adjustment is an appropriate technique for addressing missing data (Allison 2001). Missing values are set to the mean for Congress swing, and the dummy variable Congress DNC can be used to see whether the missing cases significantly differ from the non missing cases.
factors in the model the swing to the BJP tended to be greater in those constituencies which saw large additions to the size of the electoral roll.

In Model 2 we also control for how well the BJP did in 2009. The most striking finding is that there is a strong negative relationship between how well the BJP did in 2009 and the size of the swing to the BJP in 2014. This indicates that the BJP swing was not uniform across all constituencies. In places where it had previously done well it tended not to pick up many extra votes. However, in places where it had not performed so strongly in 2009 it tended to make much larger gains. Interestingly, when we control for the BJP’s level of support in 2009, we also see that turnout change is now highly significant in Model 2; whereas it was not in Model 1. This suggests - as we suspected – that the mobilisation of new voters did not have a uniform effect on the swing to the BJP, and was conditional on how well it had performed in 2009. This raises the possibility that the mobilisation of new voters may have had a greater effect on the BJP’s vote in places where it made substantial gains, such as in those constituencies where it was relatively weak in 2009. To test this expectation more formally, in Model 3 we specify an interaction between how well the BJP did in 2009 and turnout change. The result of the interaction is significant and in the expected direction.\textsuperscript{7}

**Table 1: Determinants of the Swing to the BJP, Hierarchical Linear Model**

We can get a clearer sense of the impact of the interaction by plotting the marginal effects. Figure 7 shows the predicted impact of turnout change on the swing to the BJP at different levels of support for the BJP in 2009. The top blue line depicts constituencies where the BJP was relatively weak in 2009 (where it got 20% of the vote). The bottom red line depicts constituencies where the BJP was relatively strong in 2009 (where it got 40% of the vote).

\textsuperscript{7} These results still hold even if we also control for the level of turnout in 2009.
We can clearly see that large increases in turnout had a much bigger impact on the swing to the BJP in constituencies where it had done badly in 2009 than in constituencies where it had done well.

**Figure 7: Predicted swing to the BJP**

This indicates that the key to the BJP increasing its vote share so much in places where it had not done well in 2009 was because it managed to successfully mobilise new groups of voters who were previously not involved in politics rather than convert existing supporters of other parties. This interpretation is further supported by the absence of any significant interaction between BJP’s vote in 2009 and Congress swing (not shown) which shows that conversion (as far as it relates to Congress supporters) was not a disproportionately important factor in constituencies where the BJP made the largest vote gains.

**Conclusion**

Our results indicate that BJP gains tended to come from two main sources. In line with the conversion hypothesis there is fairly robust evidence that a transfer of votes took place from the Congress to the BJP. However, the magnitude of this effect is relatively modest and by itself is ill-equipped to explain why the BJP did so well. Clearly, Congress also lost votes to other parties; and the BJP also picked up votes from non-Congress rivals. Given that the structure of party competition varies so much from state to state and even within states this is no surprise. It would thus be unwise to speak of realignment between the two parties in the traditional sense.

We also find evidence to support the mobilisation hypothesis, though perhaps not in a straightforward way. The key to the BJP victory was the gains that it made in places where it
had not previously been strong. In those constituencies where the BJP performed well in 2009 it managed to hold on to its vote share and even increase it a bit. But in many constituencies where it had performed badly it made dramatic breakthroughs. The key to these gains was the mobilisation of new voters.

In addition to these two main factors we should also note the role that extensions to the franchise played. There is a persistent and non trivial effect on the swing to the BJP due to additions to the electoral roll. This stands up even when we control for constituency size and urban population density. More research is needed to understand both why and how the number of names on the register increased so much in some constituencies and how these additions altered the partisan balance.

In terms of how durable this process of electoral change turns out to be, the BJP has cause for both optimism and caution. Given the fluidity and volatility of Indian elections at the constituency level direct conversions are unlikely to be particularly stable. The idea of a normal or habitual vote has far less currency in the Indian context than it does elsewhere, particularly in the US where the idea of critical realignments was first developed, and given that converted voters have already changed which party they vote for once they may do so again in the future. All other things being equal then the conversion of existing voters is less likely to be stable than the mobilisation of new voters.

In this respect the BJP does have grounds for optimism. It managed to make a breakthrough in places where it had not done well by appealing to voters who tended not to participate in politics. These voters have obviously seen something new that they like about the party, and probably more specifically that they like about Modi, and if their support can be cultivated and developed then the BJP may be in a strong position for years to come.
Bibliography:


Figure 1: BJP’s average constituency swing by State

Notes: Analysis based on states where BJP contested five or more seats in both 2009 and 2014. Total number of constituencies = 359.
Figure 2: BJP’s swing by State, box plots

Notes: Analysis based on states where BJP contested five or more seats in both 2009 and 2014. Total number of constituencies = 359.
Figure 3: Swing to the BJP and swing away from Congress

Notes: Analysis based on constituencies where both BJP and INC contested in 2009 and 2014. N = 303.
Figure 4: Swing to the BJP and turnout change

Figure 5: Swing to the BJP and electoral roll change


\[ y = 0.29x + 7.5 \]
\[ R^2 = 0.05 \]
Figure 6: Turnout change and electoral roll change


\[ y = -0.1446x + 11.211 \]

\[ R^2 = 0.0417 \]
Table 1: Determinants of the Swing to the BJP, Hierarchical Linear Model

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Notes: *** denotes p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. N=385.
Figure 7: Predicted swing to the BJP
## Appendix A  Descriptive statistics

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