“Voices from Slough”

A socio-historic empirical analysis of Somali asylum seekers, refugees and EU Somali compared to Accession Eight (EU8) Polish economic migrants

A thesis submitted towards the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of History

Royal Holloway University of London

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January 2015
I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own.

Signed: Melvin Charles Cox

Date: 4\textsuperscript{th} January 2015
Abstract
This thesis bonds with contemporary debates as regards global migration and settlement in Britain. It investigates aspects of their impact on developing relations in the country’s increasingly expanding multicultural society. Located in the post-2004 controversy generating politics-of-immigration debate, it contributes fresh insight into understanding the notions and issues arising. It does so by way of an empirically focused study of two migrant groups; Somali refugees, asylum seekers and secondary-migrants, and Polish (EU8) economic migrants. It is explicitly cross-disciplinary in nature. Discussion is given over to foremost issues of similarity and difference perpetuating the group’s parallel but also different existences. Assessment is made of empirical testimonies, drawing out understanding of each protagonists interface with each other and their diverse connections with wider British society. This sought to enable enhanced understanding of the complex migration and settlement phenomenon and presents a contemporary socio-historic map of the scrutinized communities in a regional setting. It fills specific knowledge fissures, drawing fresh attention to unresolved debates surrounding multiculturalism, cohesion and exclusion as well as suggesting some new-connections between them.

Its results support the view ‘white’, EU-citizen Christian Europeans remain more tolerated, accommodated and welcome in Britain than ‘black’, refugee/asylum seeker or secondary-migrant, Muslim Africans. The protagonists had cultural histories intersecting appreciably with Britain’s over significant periods of time and each group represented a migratory ‘fourth-wave’ in contemporary Britain. These historic relationships had diverse bearings on degrees of tolerance. The extent to which ‘welcomes’ were extended varied. The protagonists had never been diametrically compared in this way before. Both were newly arrived to Britain in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The protagonists were contrasted in a framework of four material differences, namely black’ and ‘white’ skin-colours, refugee/asylum seeker and European Union (EU) economic migrant legal statuses, Muslim and Christian religious affiliations and lastly African and European countries of origin. Noteworthy cultural similarities, for example the respective transient and commuting natures of the Somali first-wave and the Polish (EU8) fourth-wave, did not straightforwardly unite the groups in any meaningful way or at any level. Importantly, differences and similarities between them presented significant examples of Britain’s predisposition not to truly accept migrant ‘other’ although to be more tolerant of some migrants than others.
In the context of increasing globalisation and the need to accept twenty-first century multicultural, ethnic and religious characters and realities, this thesis focuses on dissimilarity and likeness between the protagonists. This was achieved by exploratory historic, theoretical and contemporary comparisons between them. The histories of Somali and Polish migrants in Britain have remained, by and large, under-researched, the low numbers of Somali ostensibly marginalized in Britain to the point of invisibility, without cohesive representation, and the Poles, until May 2004, under the radar and reasonably well organized, assimilated and self-contained as a relatively small component within British multicultural society. The difference between each protagonist was pertinent in distinguishing and categorizing how they were viewed from broader society perspectives. The Europe-wide unlocking of the British labour market in 2004 once again highlighted the existence of Britain’s ethnic minority hierarchy. Affordable mass transit, Britain’s pull-force as an economic and cultural magnet and the evermore exposed British ‘racist’ character fed into government attempts to recruit essential-workers.

The notion of parallel-lives was examined through each protagonist’s experiences, anecdotal evidence and tangible settlement outcomes witnessed first-hand during the field work. This thesis’ conclusions contribute to the wider community cohesion debate informing policy makers of the significance that material differences have in the lives of lesser investigated ethnic minority groups and communities living and working in Britain.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTENTS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURES</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE OF THE THESIS</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER OUTLINES</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: A LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORETICAL GROUNDING</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration ‘Laws’</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant typologies</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Migration</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Migration</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic v. Forced migration</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CAPITAL</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGRATION PROCESSES, STRUCTURES AND AGENTS</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGRANT CHOICE AND MIGRANT NETWORKS</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE IMPACT OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS, REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGRANT CLASS, PARTICULARITY AND SOCIAL MOBILITY</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: AN ASSET OR A BOUNDARY?</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: AN ADVANTAGE OR A DRAWBACK?</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOVING FORWARD</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY, PEOPLE AND A PLACE</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIMS AND OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATEMENT AND QUERIES</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTRUCTIVE RESEARCH METHODS</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERVIEWEE OUTLINE</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAIN-MIGRATION</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEUTRALITY</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATEKEEPERS</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USING AN INTERPRETER</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“PLACE”</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Location: Slough</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“PROCESS”</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snowball sampling</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insider/Outsider</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY AND FUTURE STUDY ................................................................. 98
“PEOPLE” ............................................................................................. 100
Interviewee Biographic Profiles ............................................................. 100

CHAPTER 3: MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT .............................................. 121

PREAMBLE ............................................................................................. 121
SLough; ‘welcoming incomers’ ............................................................. 122
SOMALI MIGRATION .............................................................................. 125

Introduction .......................................................................................... 125
Clan, identity, cohesion and resources .................................................. 126
First-wave Somali migration ................................................................ 128
Second-wave Somali migration ............................................................. 138
Third-wave Somali migration ............................................................... 141
Fourth-wave Somali migration ............................................................. 142

SOCIAL COHESION ............................................................................. 149
EMPLOYMENT; HEALTH; HOUSING AND EDUCATION; — A ‘SNAP-SHOT’ ..................................................................................... 150
EMPLOYMENT ....................................................................................... 150
HEALTH ................................................................................................ 153
HOUSING .............................................................................................. 154
EDUCATION .......................................................................................... 155
SOMALI: A RÉSUMÉ .............................................................................. 156
POLISH MIGRATION ............................................................................. 157

Introduction .......................................................................................... 157
First-wave migration ............................................................................ 160
SECOND-WAVE MIGRATION ............................................................... 168
THIRD-WAVE MIGRATION, ‘SOLIDARITY EMIGRATION’ ..................... 176
FOURTH-WAVE MIGRATION: EU8-POLES .......................................... 179

Preamble ............................................................................................... 179
Statistical overview ................................................................................ 180
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT ...................... 189
POLISH ACCOMMODATION AND BELONGING IN BRITAIN ................. 192
SUMMARY ........................................................................................... 195

CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH “VOICES FROM SLOUGH” .................. 200

PREAMBLE ............................................................................................. 200
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 201
RACE AND RACISM ............................................................................ 202
IDENTITY, RELIGION AND RELIGIOSITY ............................................. 224
EU-SOMALI .......................................................................................... 251
Somali-clan .......................................................................................... 253

EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, HOUSING AND LIFESTYLE ..................... 259

Employment ........................................................................................ 259
Education ............................................................................................. 263
Housing ................................................................................................. 265
Criminlity ............................................................................................... 273

PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER (EU8-POLES OF THE SOMALI AND THE SOMALI OF EU8-POLES) ......................................................... 280
MYTH OF RETURN ................................................................................ 282
CONCLUDING COMMENTS .................................................................. 285

CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE-ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................... 289

PREAMBLE ............................................................................................. 289
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 291
SOMALI-IN-SLOUGH ............................................................................. 292
SLOUGH’S EU8-POLES ......................................................................... 293

POINTS OF SIMILARITY ....................................................................... 294

Preface ................................................................................................. 294
EU-citizenship/nationality ................................................................. 294
Push and Pull factors ......................................................... 295
Hierarchies/Stratification ..................................................... 295
Education and employment .................................................. 298
Points of difference ............................................................. 299
Preface ............................................................................... 299
Literature and media representation .................................... 300
Lenses ................................................................................. 303
Belonging ............................................................................. 304
Racism ................................................................................ 305
Integration .............................................................................. 306
Networks/identity ................................................................. 306
Institutional-completeness ................................................... 308
Work/unemployment ............................................................. 313
Economics, tenure, choices and freedoms .............................. 314
Women and family ............................................................... 317
Summing-up ......................................................................... 320
Limitations ........................................................................... 323
Conclusion ............................................................................. 324
Recommendations and identified future opportunities ............. 334
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................... 336
Primary sources ..................................................................... 336
Primary Sources: Lectures / Seminars .................................... 337
Secondary sources ............................................................... 338
Secondary Sources: Academic Journals/Journals ..................... 351
Secondary Sources: Reports / Research Papers / Unpublished Material .................................................. 359
Secondary Sources: Newspapers and Magazines .................... 365
Secondary Sources: Audio Visual .......................................... 365
Secondary Sources: On Line .................................................. 366

Figures

Figure 1: Interviewee categories (gender, age and legal status) ........................................ 75
Figure 2: Interview categories: Economic activity ............................................................. 76
Figure 3: Interviewee relationship(s) ................................................................................. 77
Figure 4: Somali interviewee clan membership or affiliation ........................................... 96
Figure 5: Somali men ............................................................................................................ 100
Figure 6: Somali women ...................................................................................................... 103
Figure 7: Polish men ............................................................................................................ 107
Figure 8: Polish women ...................................................................................................... 110
Figure 9: Questions for semi-structured joint-interview with Superintendent Peter Davies (Slough LPA commander) and Kulbir Brar (Slough Community and Diversity Officer) .................................................. 113
Figure 10: Interview questions to Somali (and EU8-Polish) interviewees .......................... 115
Figure 11: Population of Slough in 2011 .......................................................................... 124
Figure 12: Horn of Africa .................................................................................................... 129
Figure 13: Somaliland ........................................................................................................ 130
Figure 14: Somali ‘country-of-birth’ by area in England and Wales .................................. 144
Figure 15: Slough ................................................................................................................. 146
Figure 16: Somalian born residents in Chalvey .................................................................. 147
Figure 17: Country-of-birth: Percentage of residents living in the Slough ward of Chalvey ................................................................. 148
Figure 18: Employment status of select nationalities in England & Wales 2011: % of the total ................................................................. 151

7
For my wife and best friend Sarah
Abbreviations

.v. Versus or against
A8 Accession Eight
AIR British Air Ministry
BA (Hons) Bachelor of Arts Degree with Honours
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BAME Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic
BME Black and Minority Ethnic
BNP British National Party
CAB British Government Cabinet Office
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CD Compact Disc
CITB Construction Industry’s Training Board
CoE Council of Europe
COMECE Commissio Episcopatum Communitatis Europensis
CRONEM Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism
CSIC Council of Somali Islamic Courts*
DfES Department for Education and Skills
DTM Demographic Transition Model
DWP Department of Works and Pensions
ECRI European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
EEC European Economic Community
ESOL English for Speakers of Other Languages
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council
EU European Union
EU8 On 1 May 2004, the European Union welcomed the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia; 8 more countries in the EU, hence EU8
EVW European Voluntary Worker(s)
FGM Female Genital Mutilation
G7 G-7 or Group of Seven was the meeting of the finance ministers from the group of seven industrialized nations of the world, formed in 1976 when Canada joined the Group of Six (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States of America)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>GCSE</td>
<td>General Certificate of Secondary Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>General Practitioner</td>
</tr>
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<td>GROS</td>
<td>General Register Office for Scotland</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>HMSO</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Stationery Office</td>
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<td>HO</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Horn</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>I.T</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<td>ICAR</td>
<td>Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (in the UK)</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Council*</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication(s) Technology</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union*</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person(s)</td>
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<td>IoD</td>
<td>Institute of Directors</td>
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<td>JCWI</td>
<td>Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants</td>
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<td>LFS</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
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<td>LPA</td>
<td>Local Police Area</td>
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<td>LPF</td>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
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<tr>
<td>M.O.D</td>
<td>The alliance of Marrehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante clans</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSN</td>
<td>Microsoft Network (Search Engine)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARIC</td>
<td>The UK National Agency responsible for providing information and advice regarding equivalences of vocational, academic and professional skills and qualifications</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASS</td>
<td>National Asylum Support Service</td>
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<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
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<td>NISRA</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office of National Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Degree of Doctor of Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner(s) of War</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>Polish Resettlement Corps</td>
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<td>SBC</td>
<td>Slough Borough Council</td>
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<td>SCIC</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Islamic Courts*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEN</td>
<td>Special Educational Needs</td>
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<td>SICS</td>
<td>Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia*</td>
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<td>SISP</td>
<td>Slough Islamic Schools Project</td>
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<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Supreme Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>SREC</td>
<td>Slough Race Equality Council</td>
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<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYL</td>
<td>Somalia Youth League</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PESL</td>
<td>Polish Educational Society of London</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVP</td>
<td>Thames Valley Police</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>Union of Islamic Courts*</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UKIP</td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (also known as the Soviet Union)</td>
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<td>USYS</td>
<td>United Somali Youth of Slough</td>
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<td>WRS</td>
<td>Worker(s) Registration Scheme</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War I</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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<td>WWW</td>
<td>World Wide Web</td>
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</table>
7/7 The 7 July 2005 London bombings were a series of coordinated terrorist bomb blasts against London's public transport system during the morning rush hour.

21/7 The failed series of coordinated terrorist bomb blasts in London of 21 July 2005 that sought to replicate those of 7/7.

24/7 24 hours per day / 7 days per week.

9/11 September 11 2001 - a series of coordinated terrorist and suicide attacks on the USA by Islamic extremists.

* N.B: The Courts have undergone a number of name changes. Originally designated the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), since June 2006 when their control was taken over by Jihadists, it designated itself as the Council of Somali Islamic Courts (CSIC), the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) and/or the Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (SICS). Since January 2007 it has been more widely known and reported as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) or the Islamic Courts Council (ICC). Source: Shaw, A. 2007, "Somali Politics and the Washington Perspective", Journal of the Anglo-Somali Society, vol. Autumn 2007, no. 42, Footnote 1 p. 21
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Finally I owe my deepest gratitude to the seventy four people who were prepared to
talk to me as interviewees; to be the ‘Voices from Slough’. Thank you all so very
much.

Mel
Purpose of the thesis
This is a brief introduction to this thesis. It sets out core purposes as well as pinpointing previous works on the topic and materials used.

At its most fundamental, this thesis identifies the unique contemporary non-intersection of two migrant groups in Britain; the Somali and the EU8-Polish. It does so in the post-2004 period. This ethnic minority juncture had not previously been studied in this way before. This originality element underlined this thesis’ individuality as well as highlighting its important and innovative contribution to subject knowledge. In the context of increasing globalisation and the need to accept the multicultural, ethnic and religious characters and realities of twenty-first century Britain, it demonstrates, through a thorough review of the existing, but largely fragmented and incomplete subject literature, that its subject matter (i.e. the topic) is worthy of novel research investigation.

The protagonists under scrutiny in Slough did not engage with each other and had not formed a ‘community’ at their intersection(s) with one another; despite experiential and historic similarities, or, in the case of the Somali, with wider British society. This was despite government rhetoric claiming otherwise with regard to UK-wide community cohesion. In substantiating this, discussion is given over to the main issues of similarity and difference perpetuating and feeding this parallel existence. Further, the study investigated the Somali perceptions and realities that the ‘newly-arrived’ EU8-Polish economic migrants had achieved a greater degree of integration with wider British society and its institutions when compared with the Somali, who had lived across Britain for nearly two decades, (at the time of the fieldwork). It was perceived this integration had allowed the EU8-Poles to surpass the resident and settled Somali with regard to accessing local community resources. This situation was discovered to be true despite the Somali being in Britain for that much longer period of time. The investigation sought to understand and comment why this should have occurred. Earlier works on the specific topic intersection did not exist outside of Maan’s¹ 2007 crime and drug-abuse centred report requested by the Home Office. Previous works regarding each of the protagonists individually or conjoined with other ‘groups’ offered some valuable socio-historic insights however.

¹Maan, A. 2007, Polish and Somali migrant experiences of living in Slough, Slough Borough Council and Safer Slough Partnership, Slough
Regarding the Somali-in-Britain, literature sources were centred on the early 1990’s Somali clanship research by El-Solh,\(^2\) the 2002 socio-anthropological works by Griffiths\(^3\) based on his own 1997 PhD submission comparing Somali and Kurdish Diasporic experiences and the June 2004 ICAR (The Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees in the UK) report by Harris.\(^4\) Harris’s work was the first collection and amalgamated identification and acknowledgement of the disjointed narrative strands surrounding the Somali in the West. Her account validates this thesis’ viewpoint that the body of literature to-date regarding the Somali was fractured and partial. More research remains to be conducted as regards the Somali-in-Britain.

This study contributed by re-highlighting the Somali as a marginalised and under-explored ‘group’ in Britain in a regional context. This especially remains the case with respect to academic research and narrative. The Somali appear too infrequently mentioned in the literature despite their significant contribution to British history over the last one-hundred and sixty-years. In the past, research of this topic-type has frequently focused only on the Irish, Jews, Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis and West Indians. The Somali represented a green-field ‘gap’. Ansari,\(^5\) from a historian’s perspective, has made inroads to in-part address this but this research was a socio-historic investigation. It drew from Ansari,\(^6\) Kershen,\(^7\) Eade et al\(^8\) and other sources for examples of inequalities and anomalies based in ‘race’, religion, origin and legal-status however. In this way it was able to substantiate the contention that embedded prejudices remain in Britain towards non-white, non-Christian, non-citizen ‘other’.

This research was not the sole examination of the relatively ‘new’ phenomenon that was the ‘fourth-wave’ of EU8-Poles in Britain. It remains unique however in its location choice; the regional town of Slough, and as regards its choice of refugee, asylum-seeker and secondary-EU migrant Somali to compare the EU8-Polish migrants with. These two facts alone distinguish it from any prior studies.


\(^4\)Harris, H. 2004, The Somali Community in the UK: What We Know and How We Know It, 1st edn, ICAR [The Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees in the UK], London


\(^6\)Ibid


As discussed in Chapter 1, Jordan\textsuperscript{9} and more latterly Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich\textsuperscript{10} as well as Triandafyllidou et al\textsuperscript{11} have published their informative researches regarding A8 migration and EU8-Poles in Britain in particular, since 2006. In each case there were tangible differences from this contribution as well as between each other. Jordan concentrated his work in the city context of London generally, concentrating primarily in the circumstance of the labour market. Eade et al focused their research on the two ‘ends’ of the EU8-Polish migration process comparing EU8-Polish experiences of ‘class’ and ethnicity in London as well as in Poland. It remains clear London enjoys a very substantial mix of ethnic minority populations and while this is acknowledged, its continued intensive exposure to study lends itself to accusations of ‘research exhaustion’. Regional towns such as Slough remain significantly under-researched and by comparison are ‘green-field’ research opportunities. The Triandafyllidou et al contribution concentrated on patterns of migration and settlement as well as ‘theoretical’ issues of identity, citizenship and boundary constructs. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation added timely weight through its three May 2007 published reports examining effects of contemporary migration in Britain.\textsuperscript{12} Each had Eastern European Union post-2004 focuses. Aside from these and other relevant secondary literature sources (see Bibliography), primary empirical personal testimonies from Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles were augmented with invaluable inputs from Thames Valley Police and Slough Borough Council to inform this novel qualitative resource. These individual and organisation ‘voices’ are heard in Chapter 4, ‘Voices from Slough’.

The largely qualitative nature of this study’s empirical evidence required a particular and appropriate research design based in a proven methodology; one able to withstand rigorous academic scrutiny, but one which was economically viable and manageable for a single researcher. Coleman’s\textsuperscript{13} late-1950’s non-probability ‘Snowball’ sampling method was cautiously adopted to harvest ‘rich’, ‘thick’ and insightful testimonies, using the Eade et al 2006 ESRC report questioning as an

The research herein employs 2011 National Census data, distinguishing it from Eade et al and the now much maligned 2001 National Census records. It remains the case that this investigation’s published findings will hopefully act as a catalyst for positive change(s) with recognition of ethnic minority ‘groups’ as heterogeneous amalgams of different individuals rather than being viewed simply as homogenous ‘other’, and as ‘problems to be ‘managed’. This research seeks to be a ‘wake-up call’ to wider society; not least academia, local and national government and majority groups in communities. The need remains to build and broaden the ‘issues’ for discussion in local terms and to regularly include marginalized ethnic minorities such as the Somali, in any discourse as regards them. Topic discussion and issue resolution need to be inclusive of ‘new’ and traditionally excluded (for whatever reason) ‘groups’. The customary ethnic minority perspectives of the Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi or West Indian protagonists, while still valid and important as components of Britain’s multicultural society, are frequently exclusive. This approach knowingly or unwittingly excludes protagonists such as the Somali and, to a lesser degree, the EU8-Poles.

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14Eade, J., Drinkwater, S. & Garapich, M. 2006
Chapter outlines

Chapter 1: A literature review.

To begin this research journey, the literature review compares and contrasts different viewpoints as regards exploring the impact of contemporary migration. The purpose of the literature review is to critically evaluate what has been written and pre-existed this study’s outcomes within the on-going migration and settlement discourse. This literature review is topic-led, explaining migrant typologies (i.e. economic and forced), transnationalism, globalization, super-diversity and social/cultural capital. In each topic case, the review acted as a guide to developing and monitoring (i.e. keeping on track) the overarching research questions;

- How and why had the fourth-wave EU8-Poles apparently achieved a greater degree of integration with wider twenty-first century British society and its institutions than the Somali?
- What, if any, socio-historic and / or religio-cultural rationale explained how and why the EU8-Poles were able to ‘leap frog’ the ‘Somali with regard to integrating and accessing resources?
- What were the reasons for the lack of ‘community’ cohesion in Slough between the Somali and the EU8-Poles?
- Were the Somali and the EU8-Poles able to successfully co-exist? If so, on what terms?
- What, if any, difference did legal status, skin-colour, religious / faith following and country of origin make in determining migrant integration into mainstream British society?

This appraisal grounds this research theoretically and facilitates relating these concepts to the protagonists (the Somali and EU8-Polish migrants) experiences herein. In each instance, the models, hypotheses and impressions appraised relate to, and were relevant for, the study’s successful conclusion. The literature reviewed is primarily, although not exclusively, situated in the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Use is made of original (to this research) photographs to pictorially familiarize the reader(s) with the subject matter.

Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place.

This chapter is a personalised account, written in the first-person and notably introduces the seventy-four interviewees to the reader(s) by way of biographic profiles. It details the questions referred to throughout the interviews. Interviewee age, gender, occupation, status and length of time in Britain comprised the basis for the comparative analysis herein. This chapter explains how this research represents a ‘point-in-time’ investigation; its cross-sectional nature acknowledged as incomplete, although it remains to be used as the basis of a longitudinal survey. Chapter 2 explains the qualitative research methodology used, particularly the importance of collecting rich, thick and descriptive testimony from semi-structured interviews. This research is characterised by its interpretivist analysis although the information harvested is underpinned with quantitative data where it is appropriate to explain more easily each topic outcome by way of graphical and tabulated representations. Chapter 2 describes and evaluates the limitations and challenges encountered during data collection; (i.e. researcher/interviewee positioning, insider/outsider, power, gender and language). Further, this chapter describes and justifies the geographic
location of the study (i.e. Slough, UK), in the context of it being an unexploited opportunity to compare and contrast two migrant groups that had never been scrutinized collectively in this way before. The snowball methodology employed re-enforces the notion of qualitative research as a process. The overall approach found accord with the standpoint accepting qualitative research is never a perfected product; it is an ever developing schema.

**Chapter 3: Migration and settlement.**

This background chapter is principally a descriptive account, profiling the four waves of Somali and Polish migrations and settlements to, from and in Britain within a historic time-line from the early nineteenth-century to the present day. Where appropriate, critical comparisons are made throughout the chapter to highlight similarity or difference. Specifically, it is not a history of the Somali or Polish peoples nor is it a study or commentary on either Somalia or Poland. Throughout Chapter 3, every effort is made for the themes covered to be specific to, related to, or applicable to Slough and the protagonists herein. The relevance of Slough’s past with regard to migrant-workers arriving and settling is discussed and the contextual bearing this had for this thesis’ protagonists is explored. This chapter sheds light on a number of uncertain knowledge gaps of Somali migrants in Britain and strives to join together previously detached information, thereby seeding new interest in these overlooked and marginalized migrants. It expresses the need to move away from circulatory writing regarding Britain’s Somali. It endeavours to make new connections. The longevity of the Anglo-Somali relationship is illustrated and examined. In doing so, the fourth-wave Somali are historically, sociologically, legally and culturally contextualized. Chapter 3 also presents the case for the uniqueness of the fourth-wave EU8-Polish phenomenon in a post-WWII context. It comments on and highlights the significance of legal citizenship status the EU8-Poles hold compared to the Polish ‘third’, ‘second’ and ‘first-waves’. In presenting a social demographic ‘snap shot’ of the contemporary EU8-Poles it comments on how Polish migrants manage, and have historically managed, their encounters with wider British society to endear themselves to the nation. This chapter leads the reader(s) from the descriptive and comparative ‘scene-setting’ into Chapter 4; the empirical setting of Slough. In Chapter 4 the reader(s) readily ‘hear’ how the town’s Somali and EU8-Polish protagonists actually experience this time and place in their migration histories.

**Chapter 4: Empirical research “Voices from Slough”**.

This chapter is the foremost conduit to ‘listen’ to the testimonies and comments of the Somali and EU8-Polish respondents at the heart of this unique research. The testimonies arranged the significant heterogeneity of peoples within the protagonists. Viewpoints and opinions of spokespersons from Thames Valley Police (TVP) and Slough Borough Council (SBC) are also ‘heard’. Use is again made of essentially original (to this research) photographs to pictorially familiarize the reader(s) with the topics covered. Data is frequently presented in chart format, representing both local and national survey information (e.g. 2011 National Census) as well as that drawn directly from the interviews. Chapter 4 opens with a historic and demographic overview of Chalvey, Slough’s enclave of Somali residents. The chapter is thereafter divided by protagonist, beginning with the Slough-Somali and followed by Slough’s EU8-Poles. Each of the research subject groups has identically structured sub-headed topics, (e.g. ‘Skin-colour’, ‘Religion’, ‘Legal status’ etc) and under each, the
views, beliefs, fears, worries, anxieties, hopes and dreams of representative individuals are articulated. Where feasible, these are overlaid with discussion, counter argument and outcome summaries. Chapter 4 closes with an analysis of the results arising from the empirical interviews and data-trawl findings and draws its conclusion that no single difference (e.g. diverse cultural traditions, nationalism etc) explained the distance and difference between the protagonists despite their historic and experiential similarities.

Chapter 5: Comparative-analysis, conclusion and recommendations.

Chapter 5 builds on, and draws from, other study locations to compare and contrast these with this unique empirical research. It generates its results by representing and presenting critical thinking to evaluate how and why EU8-Poles have been widely ‘accepted’ in Britain, (Slough specifically), whereas Somali refugees/EU-Somali migrants remain essentially isolated. The chapter closes, acknowledging the limitations of the research findings, with a concise inference-led conclusion and recommendations for future research.
Foreword

This thesis bonds with on-going contemporary global migration and settlement debates. Located in the post-2004 controversy generating politics-of-immigration discussion, it contributes fresh insight into understanding the notions and issues arising from it. It does so by way of presenting an empirically focused comparative-study of two migrant groups, Somali refugees/asylum seekers, (including secondary-EU migrants), and Polish economic migrants (EU8-Poles). This investigation was unique in this specific choice of research protagonists to compare and contrast. This research is distinctive in its location choice, the regional town of Slough in Berkshire. These two facts alone set it apart it from prior studies.

The difference between each protagonist was pertinent in distinguishing and categorizing how they were viewed from broader society perspectives, (see Ch.4). In the context of increasing globalisation and the need to accept twenty-first century multicultural, ethnic, and religious characters and realities, this thesis focuses on dissimilarity and likeness between the protagonists. Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles had cultural histories intersecting appreciably with Britain’s over significant periods of time and each group represented a migratory ‘fourth-wave’ in contemporary Britain. The histories of Somali and Polish migrants in Britain illustrated that by-and-large, the low numbers of Somali in Britain had been ostensibly marginalized to the point of invisibility. They had not achieved cohesive representation. For Slough’s Somali, their non-intersection between themselves and any other migrant group or host community appeared by-and-large to present an unambiguous and intended strategy. This study therefore contributes to re-highlighting the Somali as a marginalised and essentially under-explored group in Britain. The Somali remain too infrequently acknowledged in the literature despite their significant contribution to British history; points drawn out in Chapter 1.

In contrast, the EU8-Poles strategy of flexibility and adjustment in the public eye seemingly and in general terms endeared them to the Slough, and wider British population, (see Ch.4). The literature carried greater acknowledgement of the Anglo-Polish accord than the Anglo-Somali. These observations supported the view that the Europe-wide unlocking of the British labour market in 2004 had re-highlighted the existence of Britain’s ethnic minority hierarchy. Affordable mass transit, Britain’s pull-force as an economic and cultural magnet and the evermore-exposed twenty-first
century British ‘racist’ character fed into government attempts to recruit essential-workers from the EU at that time. The outcome of this realised the notion of parallel-lives between migrant types and cultures. This was examined through Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles testimony, experiential witness, anecdotal evidence and tangible settlement outcomes observed first-hand during the fieldwork. The Polish in Britain, until May 2004, were under the radar but reasonably well organized, assimilated, and self-contained as a relatively small component within British multicultural society. The prior waves of Somali and preceding waves of Poles had established historic relationships with Britain and the British people, albeit one different from the other. These relationships had diverse bearings on the degrees of tolerance of the ‘fourth-wave’ Somali and EU8-Poles. The extent to which ‘welcomes’ were extended varied significantly, (see Ch.3).

The protagonists had never been diametrically compared in this way before. Both were newly arrived to Britain in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The Somali and EU8-Poles were contrasted in a framework of four material differences, namely black’ and ‘white’ skin-colours, refugee and European Union (EU) economic migrant legal statuses, Muslim and Christian religious affiliations and lastly African and European countries of origin. Noteworthy cultural similarities, for example the respective transient and commuting natures of the Somali first-wave and the Polish fourth-wave (EU8), did not straightforwardly unite the groups in any meaningful way or at any level. Importantly, differences and similarities between them presented significant examples of Britain’s predisposition not to truly accept migrant ‘other’ although to be more tolerant of some migrants than others did.

The Somali and EU8-Poles did not engage with each other and had not formed a ‘community’ at their intersection(s) with one another, despite experiential and historic similarities. This was despite successive cross-party government rhetoric claiming otherwise regarding UK-wide community cohesion. In substantiating this, discussion is given over herein to the main issues of similarity and difference perpetuating and feeding this parallel existence. This was evident as the research explored the Somali perceptions and realities that the ‘newly-arrived’ EU8-Poles had achieved a greater degree of integration with wider British society and its institutions when compared with their own progress over two decades. It was perceived this integration had allowed the EU8-Poles to surpass the resident and settled Somali with regard to accessing local community resources. This perception was discovered to be true,
despite the Somali being in Britain for a much greater period of time. This study sought to understand and establish why this had occurred.

This thesis’ approach was purposely and explicitly cross-disciplinary, enveloping aspects of history, sociology, economics, and law. It presents a contemporary socio-historic map of the Somali and EU8-Polish communities; specifically in Slough, although some generalizations may be drawn from the findings. Interdisciplinary subject blending was necessary to accommodate the complexities and fluidity that is migration and settlement study. Non-probability ‘snowball’ sampling\(^{16}\) was used to harvest insightful empirical testimony. Assessment of the testimonies draws out understanding of each protagonist’s viewpoint and their diverse connections with wider British society. Presentation of these central sources of individual information is initially made by way of their outline biographies, (see Ch.2). Quantitative data collection and analysis is purposely indicative only. This approach contributes to understanding the complex migration and settlement phenomenon. This research fills specific knowledge fissures, drawing fresh attention to open debates surrounding multiculturalism, cohesion, and exclusion as well as suggesting some new-connections between them. Its outcomes and conclusions contribute to the wider community cohesion debate informing policy makers of the significance that material differences have in the lives of lesser investigated ethnic minority groups and communities living and working in Britain. Importantly, this thesis’ outcomes support the view ‘white’, EU-citizen Christian Europeans remain more tolerated, accommodated, and welcome in Britain than ‘black’, refugee, Muslim Africans.

Chapter 1: A literature review

Introduction
This research began its journey by reviewing the body of literature most likely to be relevant for its successful conclusion.

Agreement was had with Castles viewpoint that ‘disciplinary and paradigmatic closures are the enemy of an effective and sympathetic study of human migration’.\(^\text{17}\) Arango reinforces this stating that ‘limiting enquiry to single disciplines reduces our understanding of the full complexity of migration processes…in particular…the building of theory’.\(^\text{18}\) Because of the considerable variety of migration types (e.g. professional and unskilled, compelled and voluntary, settled and temporary, internal and international, and legal and ‘illegal’), Cohen\(^\text{19}\) rightly stresses that contradictions between them be allowed to be imprecise; what Kershen terms as the ‘grey area’\(^\text{20}\). This theoretical acquiescence ‘not to be bound’ explains how Slough’s EU-Somali have moved ‘internally’ (from one EU state such as France to Britain), and ‘internationally’ (their primary exodus from Somalia). Likewise the ‘open-ended’\(^\text{21}\) nature of the EU8-Poles’ migration intentions may be explained in some cases as ‘temporary’ migration until it is transformed into ‘permanent settlement’. Some EU8-Poles (and other migrants) who intend to stay in Britain for a set period of time delay their return ‘home’ until it never happens. This is a version of the ‘myth of return’\(^\text{22}\).

Borrowing directly from Kershen, this study is ‘about people, place, and a phenomenon’\(^\text{23}\). It is a grass roots approach to two specific migrant groups not previously comparatively studied. The investigation delved into the politics of a ‘community’. This probing underlined its originality, and its findings highlight its novel contribution to knowledge. The peoples were the Somali and the latest wave (the fourth) of Polish migrants (EU8-Poles). The place was Slough in Berkshire, largely (regarding the Somali) although not wholly the Chalvey area of the town adjacent to Junction 6 on the M4 motorway, historically a migrant enclave of the town. (The

\(^{17}\) Castles, S. 2000, Ethnicity and Globalization: From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen, Sage, London, pp.15-25
\(^{21}\) Eade, J., Drinkwater, S. & Garapich, M. 2006
\(^{22}\) Anwar, M. 1979, The Myth Return: Pakistanis in Britain, Heinemann, London
\(^{23}\) Kershen, A. 2005, p.6
economic downturn of the late 1920s-1930s realised the unemployed migrating to Slough from Wales, Scotland, and the North of England in search of work. World War II [WWII] saw Slough made home to resettled (second-wave) Poles. In the 1950s, Irish building workers gravitated to the town in search of work and with Slough’s Trading Estate expanding in the post WWII period West Indians were encouraged to come to work there. The 1970s and the promise of British citizenship realised Indian and Pakistani migrants arriving. Since the 1990s, in addition to the Somali refugees, Slough has become the sanctuary for Afghans and Kosovans fleeing war and political and ethnic hatred). The phenomenon was the dynamics driving migration and settlement processes and strategies.

Earlier comparative works between these specific groups did not exist outside of Maan’s 2007\textsuperscript{24} crime and drug report. Previous works conjoined with other groups offered valuable socio-historic insights however. For the Somali-in-Britain, these centred around the early-1990’s Somali clan research by El-Solh,\textsuperscript{25} the 2002 socio-

\textsuperscript{24}Maan, A. 2007, Polish and Somali migrant experiences living in Slough, Slough Borough Council/Safer Slough Partnership
Chapter 1: A literature review

anthropological works by Griffiths and the 2004 Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR) report by Harris. Harris was the first to amalgamate identification and acknowledgement of the disjointed narratives surrounding the Somali in the West. Her account endorses the view that literature regarding the Somali remains fractured and partial. This review of the subject-based literature revealed the pre-existent research as splintered and incomplete. This is despite recent contributions including Gilliat-Ray and Mellor’s 2010 writings of the Somali first-wave Lascars in Cardiff. This demonstrated the subject was worthy of further analytical study. Pertinent works and materials, particularly in the context of increasing globalisation, transnationalism and the need to step ‘outside the box’ regarding the evermore diverse multicultural, ethnic, and religious characters and realities of contemporary Britain were reviewed.

The examination established that Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles did not essentially engage with each other on any level despite prior assumptions this was probably the case. In the face of Government rhetoric claiming otherwise regarding UK-wide community cohesion, the research probed the main issues of similarity and difference. It ascertained, in line with Kershen’s conjecture, that while each ‘group’ appeared to ‘fit comfortably into specific and separate temporal, typological, and theoretical compartments’, that there were areas of notable similarity as well as significant difference, including within each group.

The EU8-Poles legitimately relocated temporarily or permanently to Britain from May 1st 2004 chiefly for economic reasons, although in fact some were already in Britain illegally as component parts of the ‘third-wave’. The Somali consisted of a mixture of legal statuses, reinforcing the point that as a migrant ‘group’ there can be, ‘in any single locality’, a significant variety of legal statuses. Vervotec accurately listed these as ‘British citizens, refugees, asylum-seekers, persons granted exceptional leave to remain (ILR), undocumented migrants, and people granted refugee status in another European country but who subsequently moved to Britain (the EU-Somali hereinafter). This aspect of Vervotec’s notion of ‘Super-diversity’ supported this

28Harris, H. 2004, The Somali Community in Britain: What We Know and How We Know It, ICAR, London
30Kershen, A. 2005, p.6
31Vertovec, S., 2007 (June), New Complexities Cohesion in Britain: Super-diversity, transnationalism and civil-integration, Commission on Integration and Cohesion, Wetherby, p.4
32Ibid
study’s contentions that multiculturalism, individuality and the limitations of a ‘catch-all’ standardized approach to managing migration and immigrants remains lacking. An example of this was Slough Borough Council (SBC) insufficiently appreciating the legal status variants and perceiving the towns ‘Somali’ as ‘Somali’ only, rather than appreciating the diversity within their number. This thesis’ Somali interviewees were largely asylum-seekers or refugees who had arrived in Britain from 1991 onwards. Some had ILR, some were undocumented and some were secondary EU-Somali. For the EU8-Poles, there were understandable social and employment class variances including in the broadest terms, highly-skilled professionals, skilled-trades people, and the unskilled. From the 2005 research out-set it was obvious to this researcher it would be mistaken to homogenise either group; each ‘group’ was an amalgam of diverse individuals. This approach was taken despite cross-party government preference to seek ‘one authoritative voice’ at that time and since. Four observable binary material differences comparatively positioned the groups to establish a working framework. These were ‘black’ and ‘white’ skin-colours, Muslim and Christian faith allegiances, African and European continent origins and asylum seeking refugee and economic migrant legal statuses. Within these broad dualities were extended diversities. For example, not all the EU8-Poles were practising Catholics, and all put one of the Somali interviewed herein were Sunni Muslims, (as opposed to Sufi, Shiite or Wahhabi Muslims). This further underlines the complexity of super-diversity is returned to later herein to illustrate migrants are individuals.

Customary commentary regarding migrant settlement, integration, and belonging in Britain provided important historic evidence regarding indigenous ‘white-Britons’ approaches towards migrants, new and settled. This genre’s shortfall was its recurrent propensity to stereotype and pathologize migrant groups however. Migrants have repeatedly been written of largely in a culturally ‘racist context’. It remains true in 2013 Britain however, as Endelman writes of the Jews and Britain across eight centuries of history that, ‘toleration [of ‘other’ in Britain]…is never absolute’. Other literary examples included Fryer and Visram. While each of these writers still exemplifies degrees, no matter how tiny, of the ‘traditional’ stereotyping and pathologizing approaches, these seminal works tangibly attempt to empower ‘other’

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33Endelman, T., 2002, The Jews of Britain, 1656 to 2000, University of California, Berkeley, p.262
Chapter 1: A literature review

by offering counter standpoints and challenge the resentment and aggression metered out to ‘other’; whoever their ‘other’ actually refers to.

This study broadened the boundaries of conventional approaches viewing its groups through the lenses of the other. This approach implied no degree of homogeneity. Literature pertaining to Somali in Britain, while contextually relevant, was unquestionably circular in nature. Lack of germane contemporary and interdisciplinary empirical research meant recurrent details featured. Exceptions remained specialist and/or issue-specific, often medically premised and government funded. Examples included Khat (Qat) abuse and female genital mutilation (FGM). While essential in exclusive research fields, such esotericism rendered inclusive Somali study partially explored. Griffiths’ 2002 and Harris’s 2004 contributions remain important to Somali migration story-telling, as does Vervotec's 2007 recognition and inclusion of the Somali as examples with his notion of ‘Super-diversity’.35 Jordan (2002), Eade et al (2006) and Burrell (2007) were the significant contemporary EU8 Polish migrant contributors prior to this adjunct. As with Somali literature however, the majority were particular, for example Jordan’s British Welfare State/A8-Polish concentration.

An integral aspect of this thesis was locating a novel input to increase collective knowledge. Re-examination through a fresh lens provided the means to present a fresh account, synopsis, and brief critical assessment of each work. Explicit topics reviewed centred on theoretical groundings with specific reference to the two research groups and their national migration histories, the migration process, structures and agents, choices, networks, migrant types, the impacts of migrants arriving in a host country, class, particularity, social mobility, identity, the English language, and religious affiliation. Upon reflection, agreement was had with Harris insofar as the character of the collective literature-corpus consulted was concerned. It was both fractured and partial regarding the Somali. For the EU8-Poles, it was partial and somewhat subject particular.

Theoretical grounding
This study was theoretically grounded, essential in exploring impacts of modern-day migration, settlement, and ‘belonging’. It is acknowledged however that migration

35Vertovec, S., 2007(June)
Chapter 1: A literature review

theories remain criticized for their predisposition to lack consistency as well as for falling short of truly explaining the complex interaction between countries of origin, the migrants themselves and migrant destination(s); the hosts. Arango makes this point in stating 'migration is too diverse and multifaceted to be explained by a single theory'. It is also true that 'international migration has accelerated, globalised, feminised, diversified and become increasingly politicised'. Because of these maxims, specific and pinpointed consideration is given over herein to each notional concept following. Each only expresses relevance as far as its relationship to Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles are concerned. Wider migration theory debate is purposely not explored.

Migration ‘Laws’
Ravenstein’s 1885 and 1889 migration ‘laws’ are a case in point regarding theory falling short of absolutely explaining the complex interactions at work in the modern migration process. That stated they were not redundant insofar as this study was concerned. The following table outlines Ravenstein’s ‘laws’; in basic terms illustrating how they relate to one or both of the research groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ravenstein’s ‘Law’</th>
<th>Slough’s Somali</th>
<th>Slough’s post-May 1st 2004 Poles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Most migration is over a short distance</strong></td>
<td><strong>YES and NO</strong> (Some secondary EU-Somali migrants travelled short distances only – e.g. from Holland but since the outbreak of the Civil War migrant Somali have to travel significant inter-continental distances)</td>
<td><strong>YES</strong> (Warsaw to Stansted Airport is just 870 miles and takes 135 minutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration occurs in steps</strong></td>
<td><strong>YES</strong> (From the Horn of Africa to Britain in the wake of Civil War has been managed by)</td>
<td><strong>YES</strong> (The contemporary Poles in Slough are the 4th Wave)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Chapter 1: A literature review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'stepping stones' / The contemporary Somali in Slough are the 4th Wave)</td>
<td>(Even the 1st Wave Somali Lascars moved to the city Ports and then onto Midlands cities)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-range migrants usually move to urban areas</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each migration produces a movement in the opposite direction (although not necessarily of the same volume)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural dwellers are more migratory than urban dwellers</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males are more migratory over long distances</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES and NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most migrants are adults</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large towns grow more by migration than by natural increase</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration increases with economic development</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration is mostly due to economic causes</td>
<td>YES and No</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: The Migration Observatory University of Oxford)
Chapter 1: A literature review

This modestly adds further contemporary weight to the fact that while the term ‘Law’ may be an overstatement, ‘Ravenstein does provide us with a starting point from which to evaluate the causes and consequences of migration’.39

Migrant typologies
For the purposes of this research, migration was broadly defined as,

‘The movement of people from one place in the world to another for the purpose of taking up permanent or semi-permanent residence, usually across a political boundary [for a period of at least a year]’ 40

Acknowledgement must moreover be given to the fullest range of migration categories; namely Internal Migration, External Migration, Emigration, Immigration, Population Transfer, Impelled Migration (also called ‘reluctant’ or ‘imposed’ migration), Step Migration, Chain Migration, Return Migration and Seasonal Migration.41 Each of these technical migration classifications can be enveloped into what Kershen describes as ‘three main typological classifications: voluntary, involuntary and those on the borderline, the grey area’.42 These three types were those adopted hereinafter.

Applying this model, Slough’s EU8-Poles and EU-Somali remain, in broad terms, voluntary (economic) migrants while the non-EU-Somali remain largely involuntary (forced) migrants. Drilling-down further highlighted that the secondary EU-Somali were a mix of both originally ‘forced’ migrants who sought asylum in other EU-states and those who ostensibly had time to plan and voluntarily seek sanctuary. This ‘intragroup’ diversity illustrated well Kershen’s posit of the ‘grey area’. In each case however, they were all transnational migrants in a globalised framework, the nascent ‘changed context for migration’. 43 This should not be interpreted that all of the interviewees maintained identical or indeed similar degrees or types of transnational links however.44 The EU8-Poles and the EU-Somali enjoyed legal status permitting them to travel away from Britain, while the asylum seeking and refugee Somali had no such choice.

39Kershen, A. 2005,p.25
40Xpeditions, 2005, “Human Migration Guide”, No. 6-8, National Geographic Society, Washington DC,pp.1–5
41Ibid.p.2
42Kershen, A. 2005,p.6
44Vertovec, S., 2007 (June).p.5
Chapter 1: A literature review

Castles simply defines globalisation as a ‘proliferation of cross-border flows’ while for Schiller the notion of transnationalism is equally uncomplicated, describing migrants who, ‘live their lives across borders and maintain their ties to home, even when their countries of origin and settlement are geographically distant’. Slough’s EU8-Poles have their country of origin less than one-thousand miles away while the distance to Somalia is nearly four and a half thousand miles. Despite the distance difference for the research groups, the Castles and Schiller definitions accurately explain how, for all but a few of the interviewees, their numbers crossing multiple borders still maintain real, imaginary and ideological contact with ‘home’. These individuals expressed their lives and interests in more than one context. In both instances with their respective countries of origin prior migrant waves establishing long historic connections to Britain, (see Ch.3 and Ch.4). For the majority of EU8-Poles in Britain, and for all of those interviewed in Slough, notions of the ‘myth of return’ were themselves indefinite. With the Somali Civil War continuing in 2014, the ‘myth of return’ was an aspiration for many and an unknown for an entire generation of British born Somali, the off spring of those who still clung to dreams of returning to post-war Somalia. Castles prophetically declared in 2002 that, ‘the future will probably be as messy as the past… but one thing is clear, there is no return to the neat idea of closed off nation-states with homogenous national communities’. The growth in numbers of EU state members saw Poland become one of the twenty-first century countries witnessing, because of its EU accession, the descent of its ‘nation-state sovereignty and autonomy’, while all twenty-seven members appear to be evermore anxious regarding their dwindling power(s) to manage their own border controls. As for the EU8-Poles and the EU-Somali, Castles also forecast,

‘New technologies of communication and transport [would] allow frequent and multi-directional flows of people, ideas and cultural symbols [and the] blurring of boundaries between different categories of migrants’

Globalisation is more than just an increase in the flows of people who live their lives across borders while maintaining their bonds to their home countries however. Neither globalisation nor transnationalism has ‘simple’ outcomes for the migrant, the

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45Castles, S., 2002,p.1145
47Castles, S., 2002,p.1143
48ibid
49ibid,p.1146
50ibid
Chapter 1: A literature review

host society, or indeed the migrants ‘home’ country. Bhugra writes of cultural and ethnic identities forming part of a person’s identity, stating that identity ‘will change with development at a personal as well as at a social level along with migration’. This meant Slough’s EU8-Poles, EU-Somali, and the asylum seeking Somali arrived with pre-formed cultural identities. For many Somali this had been impacted by post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD). For some EU8-Poles brought up in Poland’s monochrome society, the sight of Sloughs ‘non-white’ peoples was a significant shock to them. Some voiced this astonishment during the interviews. For many of the Somali, their sense of a cultural-clash, and lack of interaction, with not only with people of the majority ‘white’ culture but also with other migrants and migrant offspring, both similar (e.g. the Pakistani Muslim community) and disparate cultures (e.g. settled and EU8-Poles), had caused many to struggle with ‘alienation and distress’. Alienation herein does not refer to the Marxian notion regarding the conditions of workers in the capitalist system, rather it describes ‘a state of mind’; alienated by and from others. Seemen’s writing of ‘powerlessness, social isolation, self-estrangement, normlessness, and meaninglessness’, comprehensively describes the perceptions of many of the interviewed Slough-Somali. From the flip-side of the same ‘alienation-coin’, Kelly writes of this meaning living differently ‘to the point of being strange’ regarding notions of wider interaction(s) within a ‘community’. This aspect of alienation is that which has led to the Somali frequently being described as ‘hard to reach’. Certainly in a post 9/11 and 7/7 setting the Somali, as with Muslim’s generally in Britain, Feuerbach’s demonstration that religion may be used to reflect alienation arising from hostile socio-religious relationships fitted with how some Somali believed and stated their Islamic faith was perceived.

The demonization of others’ faith, beliefs and religious following, whether real or perceived, was crucially drawn out from the literature for broader understanding of class and the effects it plays in social mobility. The alienation and distress spoken of confirmed, ‘British society is becoming ever-more diverse’. It also confirmed that there are ‘many other variables interacting to affect integration and cohesion’ beyond simply ethnicity and country of origin. In witnessing these aspects of what diversity meant and how it was perceived in each of the Slough research groups,

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52ibid
53Seeman, M., 1959, On the Meaning of Alienation, American Sociological Review, Iss. 24, No.6, pp. 783-791
55Churchich, N., 1990, Marxism and Alienation, FDU, New Jersey, p. 137
57Vertovec, S., 2007 (June). p 3
58ibid
plainly Vervotec’s notion of ‘Super-diversity’, as well as underscoring a novel degree of complexity showed it appropriately described much of the ‘dynamic interplay of variables’ between them. This included country of origin, migration ‘type’, legal status, human capital value and ‘the usually chequered responses by local authorities, services providers and local residents’. It is little wonder that migration is difficult to define when the myriad of permutations and outcomes it creates are scrutinised. This acknowledged; following is an endeavour, directly relating to the two research ‘groups’, to categorise each.

Economic Migration

‘Economic motives and, by inference, economic grounds explain a large proportion of decisions to migrate and international migration movements’

Since 2004, Slough’s EU8-Poles have been, and remain, explicitly economic migrants. An economic migrant is a person who voluntarily chooses to go to a different (host) country because living conditions and/or employment opportunities are better there than in their home country. The elementary push and pull drivers. The impact of EU8 migration on Britain Labour market in 2004-2007 was in truth varied, and media-hype aside, was noteworthy principally because of the significant number (circa 600,000) of migrants involved. Borjas writing offered a highly considered and objective viewpoint from which to observe this statistical phenomenon. His perception notably enlarges Kershen’s statement of ‘people, place, and a phenomenon’, by adding the variable ‘time’. His simple but significant analysis that the impact of immigration on indigenous workers’ wages and employment per se is ‘always specific to time and place’ permits this empirical research to simply apply to the time and place under consideration; namely Slough 2005-2007. Borjas writes of the effects of immigration on labour markets critically depending on the ‘skills of migrants, the skills of existing workers, and the characteristics of the host economy’, thereby drawing crucial attention to the long standing symbiosis that actually exists between a host’s labour needs and an economic migrants ‘offer’ and circumstances. In this case,

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59Ibid
60Ibid
63BBC, 2006, Tuesday, 22 August 2006-last update, Nearly 600,000 new EU migrants,[2013, 26 August 2013]
64Kershen, A. 2005,p.6
Britain and the Polish work ethic. To what degree hostilities are traditionally aimed at migrant workers in Britain has depended on three things. Firstly, the degree to which the migrants substitute (take the work of) indigenous workers; secondly if migrants have been in addition to them; that is have been complementary and lastly, the ‘otherness’ of the migrant ‘group(s)’ in question. Regarding otherness, this may be the differences between European ‘host’ state norms and their ‘others’, for example in the post 9/11 era Muslims and Arabs have frequently been demonized as threats to EU ‘us’ and the European identity. Poole comments that when the media fuel this fear, threat, and misunderstanding, cultural indicators of the ‘norm’ are reinforced and ‘in and ‘out’ groups created. As recently as August 2013, Labour’s Shadow Immigration Minister Chris Bryant, inaccurately as it transpired and later amended, criticised retailers ‘Tesco’ and ‘Next’ claiming they favoured the created ‘out’ group Eastern European (EU) workers over Britons. He cited ‘Next’ for using a recruitment site ‘entirely in Polish’ . Many of the interviewed EU8-Poles in Slough were either taking work not wanted by indigenous workers or were very highly skilled, experienced, and qualified. Borjas’ counter-argues Britain media-hype by pointing out,

‘If the skills of migrants and existing workers are substitutes, [then] …immigration … in the [UK] labour market …drive[s] down wages. If, on the other hand, the skills of migrants are complementary to those of existing workers, all workers experience increased productivity, which can be expected to lead to a rise in wages’

Slough’s EU8-Poles each offered logical migration rational. Ostensibly they compared the income benefits from migrating to Britain with the economic, cultural, familial and social costs to them of moving; for example, in leaving wider family in Poland. The benefits plainly outweighed the costs although Eade et al’s 2006 classifications invaluably informed this study regarding the diversity of migration strategies employed by the Polish once in Britain. This opened the study to consider migration as a cause of social change. In analysing international migration as a mode of social change, (i.e. an act or instance of making or becoming different), Portes acknowledged that international migration has ‘a diverse set of causes’. He writes,
Portes’ reasoning regarding diverse migration causation was interpreted \textit{herein} to include the Somali Civil War and Poland’s EU-accession. As for the ‘equal opportunity playing-field’ being level, from the Slough-Somali interviewees it was \textit{at best} ‘uneven’ and frequently deemed as being simply disproportionately jagged and rutted when compared to the EU8-Poles. Portes’ preference for the fiscally premised world-system perspective or ‘theory’ to explain migration as a ‘change’ force however essentially \textit{only} really considered economic rationale; specifically the apportionment, movement and/or division of labour. While the EU8-Polish migration was a very good ‘fit’ for Portes’ point of view, world-system theory failed to underpin reasons behind natural disasters that had created humanitarian exodus (the Somali droughts), and held only a tentative fiscal link with the clan-led Somali Civil War outside of Barré’s mis-appropriation of international funding. World-system theory excludes cultural and natural reasoning. For this reason, it was of limited use herein.\footnote{Ibid}

Another of Portes’ hypotheses, this time with Zhou, was also used to ground this research; their combined notion of \textit{segmented assimilation}.\footnote{Wallerstein, I., 1974 (September), The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis, \textit{Comparative Studies in Society and History}, vol.16, Iss.4, p.413} In simple terms this added straight-line assimilation and the ‘racial’/ethnic disadvantage hypothesis model together. This meant combining the view that migrant and indigenous ‘groups’ follow a ‘straight-line’ wherein migrants become more similar over time (i.e. regarding norms, values, behaviours, and characteristics) to the notion that migrant's chances to assimilate into a ‘community’ (host) are 'blocked' because of their ‘race’ or ethnic differences. It also assumes migrants residing the longest in the host country and their off-spring to show greater similarities with the majority group (host) than ‘new’ migrants to the country. This aspect of Portes’ and Zhou’s hypothesis was not seen to be the case in Slough and was \textit{not} verified in this research. In truth, quite the opposite was witnessed to be the case with the Somali appearing \textit{less} assimilated than the EU8-Poles. Furthermore, but this time in keeping with the notion of segmented assimilation, Slough’s Somali complained of there being structural barriers (not in so many words) that created their ‘outsider’ status. These particularly

\footnotetext[71]{Ibid}
Chapter 1: A literature review

included their children not being given a good education (because they were Somali), and them not being able to secure appropriate and secure employment. The Portes and Zhou conclusion that this may lead to ‘stagnant or downward mobility’ appeared proven in this post 9/11 context with the Somali being a Muslim migrant group. The segmented assimilation model also largely explained, regarding the EU8-Poles, how those with advantages in human capital are more easily assimilated in a host country and ‘community’ than those without.

**Forced Migration**

Forced Migration, also known as displacement, forced displacement, and deracination characterised the Slough-Somali. The twenty-five yearlong clan based Somali civil war and a series of droughts has truly uprooted the Somali from Somalia. Largely, Slough’s Somali perceived and stated their migration journey as a survival strategy. This related to both fleeing recurrent natural disasters (including the prolonged Somalian drought in 2011/12) and escaping persecution and possibly death itself. Somalia’s militant group al-Shabab, describing itself as waging jihad against enemies of Islam, has made extreme and violent efforts since 2010/11 to prevent people from leaving Somalia. The situation is further complicated and feelings of alienation heightened in what Vervotec, in explaining further his ‘Super-diversity’ posit draws attention to, namely that Islam as a faith is not made up of a single set of beliefs and/or associated traditions. He makes the point well. There are variations in Islam like all other faiths. He uses as examples the ‘Deobandi, Tablighi, Barelvi and Sufi Orders’ in how Islam is actually practised in Britain. Vervotec points to the fact that when these differences, however slight, are then overlaid with migrant countries of origin, even using the Somali as an example along with Nigerians, Bosnians, Afghans, Iraqis and Malaysians, the ‘variations are multiplied many times’. This grounding went some little way to better understanding Somali alienation from the mainstream Pakistani Sunni Muslim community in Slough.

It was useful to divide the forced migration classification further into *impelled migration* (when migrants retain some power to decide whether or not to leave, e.g. the early Somali migrants and those choosing to stay to fight in the Civil War), and *true forced migration* (when migrants do not have this power, e.g. lesser Somali clan members,

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75 Vertovec, S., 2007 (June),p.15

76 Ibid
women and children). This shows the minutiae of subtleties within variants themselves existing as far as migratory ‘pathways’ are concerned. It was expedient to use the following chronological synopsis of the natural and manmade causations of the on-going fourth-wave Somali migration and the backdrop to the exodus stories of the Slough Somali. This added relevant context to the perceptions, assumptions, suspicions and situations the interviewees described. Forced migration in Somalia is unequivocally related to the armed conflict of the 1977 Ogaden war with Ethiopia over that disputed region. The Somali lost the war. Drought, flooding, and famine combined with the resultant violent clan infighting caused the mass exodus of refugees and large-scale displacement of the Somali inside the country; significant material migration causations returned to in Chapter 3.

**Economic v. Forced migration**

While it appears economic (that is voluntary) migration and forced migration (deracination) are completely opposite, Zetter drew fresh attention to the fact that ‘the complex and often overlapping drivers make it difficult to distinguish and delineate’ between migration ‘types’, as so many factors are interlinked. Zetter states there is always an ‘intricate web of causation’ that decide a person’s migration strategies. Multiple forces are always at work. This was the Slough case.

Despite some Somali interviewees contending with ‘marginalisation [and] experience[ing] institutional and overt ‘racism’, for most these sufferings were nought compared to life in war torn Somalia. This stated, and while Britain has a largely commendable record regarding adherence to international asylum law, dispersal strategies employed in Britain, following the passing of the Asylum Act (1999) under Blair’s Labour government, exacerbated particular traumas suffered by many Somali. While seemingly less striking, but illustrating EU-Poles migration causes using Zetter’s perspective, it was relatively straightforward to use the same citation to explain their migration. Global and regional geopolitics in this case describe Poland’s pre-accession westernization, and its redrawing of itself, as it became an EU State. Patently, the family situations, household characteristics and direction, timing,

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78Africa Watch Committee, 1990 (January), Africa Watch Report: Somalia: A Government at War With Its Own People, Africa Watch Committee
80Ibid
81Ibid
destination, frequency and demography all apply equally to voluntary migrants as much as they are largely considered, even if they cannot be acted upon, by the deracinated. Agreeing with Kershen’s 82 concluding remarks regarding her Huguenot study group then, both the Somali and the EU8-Poles ostensibly had elements and degrees of ‘choice’ in the migratory processes insofar as ‘where’ they fled to.

Social and Cultural Capital
Much, although not all, of the reasons why the two Slough groups did not engage with each other is explained by analysing Somali and Polish settlement power-play strategies. For the EU8-Poles, these were witnessed, as social capital being celebrated, little by little, in the wider-Slough community’s mind-set through what Bourdieu explains is ‘cultural products’. 83 These included ‘systems of education, language, judgements, and values, methods of classification and activities of everyday life’. 84 An example was the town’s new Polish shops and other facilities to service the needs of the incoming EU8-Poles. The following photographs were taken across Slough in September 2013.

82Kershen, A. 2005
84Ibid
Chapter 1: A literature review

Polish ‘Skleps’ (Shop/General store), ‘Fryzjer’ (Hair Salons) and ‘Kuchnia’ (Restaurant/Fast Food) and the Polish ‘OAZA’ (Oasis) bar – Farnham Road, Slough

Polish ‘Delikatesy’ (Delicatessens) Farnham Road, Slough
Other ‘signs’ of cultural products witnessed included Britain household-name supermarket Sainsbury’s welcoming the EU8-Poles with culturally specific signage and merchandise.
Conversely, and as a perceived and/or real direct consequence of the EU8-Poles power-play strategy, Slough’s Somali had ostensibly unconsciously accepted the ‘sense of one’s place’ and had chosen, in general terms, to self-exclude. Bourdieu’s explanation of ‘habitus’ (socialised-norms) explains well the scenario witnessed in Slough: habitus being ‘the way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel and act in determinant ways, which then guide them’. The EU8-Poles had rapidly embraced, and been widely (if not wholly) embraced by, Slough’s habitus building-on local and national post-World War II positive memories created by the two previous Polish waves. This was their disposition. Bourdieun theoretical grounding explained how social order can be ‘progressively inscribed in people’s minds’ through ‘cultural products’ including systems of education, language, judgements, values, methods of classification and activities of everyday life’.

For the Somali, Bourdieu’s view of ‘capital’ fittingly extending beyond the notion of material assets to include social, cultural, or symbolic capital explains significant aspects in their case. Compared with the EU8-Poles who presented, as central to their societal power play, social, historic, legal, and cultural (‘white’) capital, Slough’s Somali presented virtually no capital in any sense of the term. This ostensibly provided the EU8-Poles with the ‘means for a non-economic form of domination and hierarchy’ over the Somali; a view voiced by many Somali. It illustrated that by adopting Bourdieu’s view of ‘capital’, any move away from material capital to the realms of cultural and/or symbolic capital may mask perceptions, and the reality, of inequalities of opportunity; again a point voiced by Slough’s Somali.

\[85\] Ibid, p.141
In addition to theoretically grounding this study, and because this investigation was a flexible exploration of the impact(s) of contemporary migration and settlement, broader consideration was given over to the body of literature regarding it. Specifically, migration processes, structures and agents, migrant choice and networks, the impact of migrants on the host, class, particularity and social mobility, the English language and religious affiliation. In each case, these were related to the two migrant groups under examination. Their explanations are intentionally concise and discourses are brief by design, although each adds necessary depth and essence to this examination.

Migration processes, structures and agents
Slough’s Somali essentially fled Somalia because of their fear of persecution or death. Contemporary Somalia remains ‘a humanitarian and human-rights tragedy’.\textsuperscript{89} One aspect of Somali exodus literature, the emotive issue of human rights, presented candid medical details of torture and cruelty victim testimony.\textsuperscript{90} This specialised literature strand informed this study insofar as how to sensitively and considerately approach the Somali interviewees. This distinct strand fed into investigation of self-marginalisation. The extremism and complexities of the Somali exodus causes were

\textsuperscript{90}McCoy, S. 2000, "Survivors torture and trauma: evaluating the four year experience the Edmonton Centre", Migration World Magazine,vol.28.no.5.pp.27-29
‘knotty’. Echoing this was Nyberg-Sorensen’s 91 posit that migration is never a simple act. Conditions under which migrations take place and the type of migration, whether voluntary or forced was witnessed to directly influence outcomes. Somali migrants arriving in Britain have largely been granted refugee with indefinite leave to remain (ILR) status. Some were bona fide British and EU-citizens. Others were EU-citizens from other EU countries who arrived in Britain as part of secondary migrations. Legal status had significant bearing on contemporary choices made by the Somali. In a post Somali civil war context the legitimate possession of ‘a Western passport not only makes mobility easier…it also ensures…the opportunity to return ….if civil war breaks out again.’92 Nielsen’s contribution is her acknowledgment of the growing numbers of ‘Somali-Dutchmen, Somali-Swedes, and Somali-Danes [who] have obtained EU-citizenship and [have] now move[d] on to (Britain)’.93 Her focal points were the legal status premised notions of choice and host preference being exercised. Kibreab’s contention and literary contribution94 explained the systematic contraction of EU asylum policies since the mid-1990s negatively affecting some Somali migration strategies. EU States have developed notions of the Union being a non-entrée regime. The Somali have been shown to need considerable financial resources to be able to reach the West in the first instance. Thereafter they must have access to funds to survive in Europe while their Western class and legal status are decided and assigned. In Somali culture, clan and clan affiliation determine such fiscal class enabling although there is no definitive graphic-representation of clan.

Empirical findings herein were underpinned by Kibreab’s pragmatic view; Slough’s Somali were almost exclusively noble clan members and affiliates. In Western terms, they predominantly represented their middle-class. There was relational merit with Griffiths’95 literary questioning whether the Somali would comprise a long-term component part of British ethnic minority society. In actuality, legal status would determine longevity and inclusion outcomes for Slough’s Somali. If for example the majority secure British/EU-citizenship and can freely come and go between Europe and Somalia, it is reasonable to assume their permanence is questionable. All the time the Somali remain asylum-seekers or refugees however, they are effectively

95 Griffiths, D.J. 1997,pp.5-24
forced to remain in Britain/the European country of refugeeship application. In each scenario, there are consequential outcomes, not least regarding identity as class. Their settlement permanence is determined on two fronts. Firstly, by the experiences and outcomes in their lives in Britain. Secondly by events in Somalia. The literature agrees the Somali are numerically noteworthy migrants in Britain, although exact numbers are unknown. Migration category differences governed diasporic developmental and settlement outcomes.

Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich’s research credibly and convincingly examined processes, structures, and agents interacting with and determining migratory experiences in Poland and Britain. This included ‘free choices’, an aspect of the Somali experience very differently determined. Eade et al’s 2006 London based research\(^96\) was the vanguard study of British EU8-Polish migrants. Their study classified fourth-wave Poles as consisting of four discernible economic migrant types. Firstly, ‘storks’ low paid commuting migrants who remained in Britain for 2 to 6-months\(^97\). Secondly ‘hamsters’, short-stay capital raisers who returned home to invest in Poland; Thirdly ‘searchers’, hedgers who kept their options open, they may or may not stay in Britain. Finally, ‘stayers’ remaining and settling permanently in Britain.\(^98\) The ‘stork’ and ‘hamster’ ‘types’ spawned the allegory of the cheap Polish plumber. In applying this categorisation, the ‘Searchers’ and ‘Stayers’ were the migrant types many Somali truly feared diverted resources meant for ‘them’; the same EU-migrant ‘types’ the Labour Shadow Immigration Minister Chris Bryant claimed in August 2013 retailers ‘Tesco’ and ‘Next’ actively recruited.\(^99\) Empirical substantiation herein highlighted the reality and perception of this anxiety from the Somali standpoint.

**Migrant choice and migrant networks**

Network types in Slough appeared to distinguish if, how and why the two migrant ‘groups’ engaged, or not, with each other and within the wider community. The broad definition of a migrant-network adopted herein was as,

*Sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin*\(^100\)

\(^{96}\)Eade, J. et al 2006  
\(^{97}\)Ibid, pp.10-11  
\(^{98}\)Ibid, pp.11-12  
\(^{100}\)Massey, D. et al 1993 (September), p.448
This definition encompassed each person involved in the process and was deemed fit for purpose in this examination. It accounted for indigenous peoples and all of the ethnicities that constituted Slough as the host community. Family, economic, social, political, religious, or cultural based networks frequently establish and underpin cohesive ties. For both the EU8-Poles and the Somali, there was a history of migration to Britain. This confirmed that over time there may be culturally explicit ‘beaten path migration-routes’ established, and outcomes of ‘the process of perpetuation migration-routes’. In historically contextualising the EU8-Poles and Somali migrations, Ansari confirmed, ‘networks in Britain are not a new phenomenon’. Goodman’s meritable reasoning located migrants needs to ‘minimize the uncertainty regarding the [migration] destination’ in their choices. Other writers supported the contention wherein free will is brought into play in the decision-making process. Upon reflection, however it appeared the conspicuous failing within this conjecture was its assumption there could be choice. The majority of asylum-seekers will likely not enjoy the luxury of a lucid, studied, and calculated migration approach. This contrary standpoint was fleshed-out by Blaut’s findings of Hispanics in the USA,

...individual choice has no theoretical relevance here. (The decision to migrate in this case is rather like the decision to run from a burning building. So much for migration-theory)

Blaut’s view was caustically correct insofar as this study’s non-EU-Somali were concerned. Evidence suggested judicious choice was limited just to those individuals able to move freely and ‘where rational choice [was] a viable reality’. As far as this investigation was concerned, this option was confined to the EU8-Poles and the EU-Somali. The Somali asylum-seekers and refugees had definite restrictive movement and legal status particularities setting them aside from the EU8-Poles and EU-Somali. This of course does not mean they were without all choice.

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103 Ansari, H. 2005, p.2
105 Ibid
106 Ibid
The impact of asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants

Unfortunately, in 2014 Britain, there is a continuing failure to distinguish between migrants. This is not a new problem. Migrants continue to be ‘tarred with the same brush’ in many ways. The British media has traditionally stated migrants per se believe that ‘Britain is a soft touch’. The truth is asylum-seekers, EU-migrants and non-EU migrants are treated wholly differently. Forced migrants, in this case, the non-EU-Somali in Slough have international legal rights under the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees. (Britain has a duty to provide protection to peoples fleeing persecution). When an asylum-seeker reaches Britain s/he is photographed, has his or her fingerprints taken, is security checked and then issued with an ID card. They are required to report at regular intervals to Immigration Reporting Centres or local Police stations, (in this instance on Windsor Road, Slough – see following).

Asylum-seekers are issued with a letter informing them that they can be detained at any point during the asylum process, heightening their uncertainty and existing fear(s) for their future. Asylum-seekers do not have access to Britain’s mainstream welfare benefit system.

Asylum-seekers have a parallel system of welfare support providing them with just £36.62 per 7-day week. This £5.23 a day ‘places asylum-seekers well below Britain

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108Koksal, I., 2012 (December), Mythbuster: Immigration – the real story, Red Pepper London
poverty line’.109 The poverty line in the 2013 Britain is defined as ‘a household income below 60% of the average’.110 The current poverty line threshold is currently £195.00 per 7-day week for a single parent with two children. Those who are refused asylum to become a refugee, but are too scared to return ‘home’, find themselves destitute, as they cannot access any benefits. Asylum seekers do not have access to social or council housing. They are allocated housing on a ‘no choice’ basis in the euphemistically termed ‘hard to let’ properties. ‘This housing is often of very poor quality’,111 this was witnessed to be the case in Chalvey.

Portes and Shafer write of enclaves such as these showing a ‘…visible manifestation of [negative] change wrought on host societies by migration’,112 when the fact behind the view is actually something altogether different. British law forces asylum-seekers and refugees to be dependent and financially non-contributory to and within wider society. Such peoples remain frequently vilified as ‘spongers’, ‘lazy,’ and ‘good-for-nothing’. In reality, their forced migration status extends into forced dependency. They have no choice, legally.

109Ibid
111Koksal, I., 2012
The literature recorded several examples of the particularity of the state impeded asylum-seeker and refugee experience in the post-WWII period suffered by other ethnic minority groups in Britain. These non-exhaustively included East African Asians\(^{113}\) expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin in 1972, and narratives concerning Bosnian Refugees arriving in Britain as part of the 1992 UNHCR programme.\(^{114}\)

A five-tier points-based immigration system (PBS) is the current means of regulating immigration to Britain from outside of the European Economic Area (EEA). It was phased in between 2008-2010. Rules governing the entry of non-EU immigrants to Britain are rigorous, with the PBS requiring people to show documents such as bank statements and exam results as part of the entry criteria. EU-citizens have free movement across Europe under European law of course, (although it has been regularly stated in the British press since 2012 that Conservative Home Secretary Theresa May M.P has been drawing up plans to curb intra-EU migration).\(^{115}\) This research presented and compared one ‘group’ each from inside and outside of the EEA. One of this study’s objectives was to expand awareness, if not acceptance, of the differences between voluntary and forced migrations, particularly outcomes relative to day-to-day lives. Byrne et al appropriately documented the two-fold status in 2007,

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\text{New migrants from within the enlarged EU [e.g. EU8-Poles and by implication, the EU-Somali]}... \text{tend to be economically active. [This] characteristic...sets them apart...from asylum-seekers [e.g. non-EU-Somali] who are required by immigration rules to be economically inactive while waiting for a decision on refugee-status}...\]^{116}
\]

Considering the unevenness of Britain migration ‘playing surface’, it was unsurprising that Slough’s Somali consistently perceived the EU8-Poles as surpassing them. EU8-Poles were believed to be accessing, and consequently gaining benefit from, the major societal resources of employment, education, housing, and health service entrée because of their EU status. Economic migrations researched and commented upon in varying degrees, further non-exhaustively included West Indian migrants, largely Jamaicans, arriving aboard the S.S. Empire Windrush in 1948 \(^{117}\) as well more


\(^{115}\)Koksal, I., 2012


\(^{117}\)Wambu, O. 1999, Empire Windrush: Fifty Years Writing About Black Britain, NEW edn, Phoenix , Beverly Hills
latterly commentary on the subject of ‘substantial inflows of Irish…and Italians in the 1950s and 1960s’. Glynn and Booth poignantly added, of the Irish and Italians, ‘comparatively little [migration research] attention has been paid to them’. This point remains worthy of note because it assisted this research in better understanding how ‘white’ European migrants to Britain have historically and continuously created less concern in their migrations to Britain than for example ‘non-white’ migrants from the ‘New Commonwealth and Pakistan (NCWP)’. Of the Victorian Irish migrants and their experience in Britain, (echoing many of the EU8-Poles’ experiences), Lees makes important reference to religion acting as an anchoring institution,

‘The Irish...had many cultural resources at their command...beliefs and practice of Roman Catholicism...provided an alternative to assimilation’.

This cultural resource remains available to the Slough EU8-Poles’; a point returned to later in this chapter regarding the Polish Church of Divine Mercy. Further similarities with the EU8-Poles were drawn from Sponza’s examination of Italian economic migrants in nineteenth-century Britain; particularly his distinguishing of three ‘waves’ of Italian migrants from pre-1870 to 1911 adapting to British labour force needs.

The needs of the time were various, in keeping with the diversity of contemporary EU8-Poles skills-bases, although through that period included organ grinders, carpenters, joiners, masons, painters and cabinetmakers and upwards to entrepreneurial ice-cream makers.

It was important to broaden this study’s grounding by establishing the importance of migrants’ constructive social and cultural impacts on Britain, outside of prominently

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119 Ibid
120 Lees, K.H. 1979, Exiles of Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian London, Manchester University, Manchester
121 Ibid, p.164
122 Sponza, L., 1988, Italian Immigrants in Nineteenth-century Britain: Realities and Images, Leicester University, Leicester
124 Sponza, L. 1988, Ch.3
fiscal benefits. It was necessary to consider the perspective to contextualise this study's contribution beyond purely monetary reasoning. In comparison with the quantities of fiscally premised narratives surrounding migration, the literature ostensibly offered far fewer secondary sources outside of assimilation narratives that returned to economic rationale. This was acknowledged in the 2003 Rudiger and Spencer narrative,

“In many European countries, the integration of migrants means their assimilation to a pre-existing, unified social order…and set of values. Integration is…a one-way process, placing the onus for change solely on migrants… The most widely used indicators measure the socio-economic status (of migrants)”

A case in point was Glover et al's narrative for the British Home Office. Tellingly, of the sixty-eight page total report, only a little over one page was dedicated to migratory ‘Social Outcomes’. Measurement of ‘value’ or ‘worth’ to and in Britain remains mainly fiscally expressed. The same may be said of the measurement of success or failure in ‘belonging’ in Britain. Literature recording non-economically related migrant significance or merit was comparatively rudimentary. Reports of the downside fiscal impacts attributed to migration prevailed in accommodating asylum-seekers, refugees, and migrants per se. The meagre, but germane, literature regarding other migration downside impacts outside of the direct references to economic costs in resolving them identified rising crime levels, and pressure in the education, housing, and health sectors. This literary strand led to some investigation of overcrowded, poor quality accommodation, exploitation by unscrupulous property owners and the ‘emerging problem of homelessness’ faced by members from both ‘groups’, although mainly endured by the Somali, both non- and EU-Somali. Upon reflection, it is reasonable to conclude that the pre-existent literature regarding migrant impacts to and in Britain was premised in explicitly economic terms. While narratives varied according to positive or negative bias, they were pecuniary in nature. Reporting of benefits to the nation made by migrants, beyond the fiscal, remains negligible, although some literature strands acknowledge that social interaction such as ‘inter-marriage is…breaking down barriers’ between migrants and host communities.

127Ibid
128Troyna, B. & Williams, J. 1985, Racism, Education and the State, Routledge,Basingstoke,p.24
129Rudiger, A. & Spencer, S. 2003,p.14
Inter-marriage was specifically explored during the interviews with the Somali and EU8 Poles. It is returned to in Chapter 4.

**Migrant class, particularity and social mobility**

Britain implicitly and explicitly distinguishes hierarchically between individuals and groups within its society. The setting apart of categories identifies class as a measure of difference. Allotments of this nature determine social mobility outcomes and life chances. Britain has traditionally been a class-stratified society across *all* difference. 

*All herein means legal status, ethnicity, 'race', ability, gender, age, sexuality, social status, and faith/religion, social and occupational class. In March 2011, Crawford et al for the Department of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) wrote of Britain that ‘*countries with higher income inequality tend to have lower social mobility*’\(^{130}\) importantly adding this has weighty consequences because it is very difficult to ‘*increase social mobility without tackling inequality*’.\(^{131}\) In short, the implication here was social mobility in Britain was held in-check because of nationally and locally unresolved inequalities in many different areas including housing, education, and earnings.\(^{132}\) This was interpreted as agreeing with Crompton’s view that class remains a ‘*systematically structured social and economic disadvantage*’.\(^{133}\)

This investigation’s evidence-based experiential point of view subscribed to the notion of Britain as a class-ridden and closed society rather than an open and plural meritocracy. Social mobility and place in the hierarchy for migrant ‘other’ appeared largely managed by way of immigration legislation, although issues of ‘race’, religion and ‘belonging’ also implicitly influenced ‘where’ the non- and EU-Somali and the EU8-Poles fitted into the town’s ‘community’. Each were subject to formal as well as informal structures, each directly influencing what they could and could not achieve or aspire to. The differences between the ‘groups’ were important. It was only by comparing differences, as Slough’s non- and EU-Somali did in relation to the EU8-Poles, that class, as a difference was actually realisable for them.\(^{134}\) The EU8-Poles interviewed in seemingly unduly low paid employment, relative to their qualifications and experience, frequently viewed the point of entry into the British class hierarchy, as they understood it, as being the threshold of a process of ‘*stepping-stones towards*

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\(^{131}\)Ibid


\(^{134}\)Eade, J. et al 2006,p.9
**Chapter 1: A literature review**

*upward mobility*. This supremely optimistic perspective ran counter to the traditional migrant propensity entering Britain to be subject to ‘downward mobility’ recorded, for example, in Daniel’s 1968 P.E.P report and reiterated by Modood (1997) and Platt (2005). Palpable degrees of EU8-Polish resentment with respect to the demeaning nature of working beneath achieved qualification levels if this continued over protracted timescales were felt. While Eade et al’s research placed considerable importance on ‘the person’s qualities as a worker and ‘how well the job was done’ confirming this emphasis to be placed over and above ‘occupation’ or ‘earnings’ it was apparent from wider literature the anticipation was for progression and equality of opportunity if, for example, suitable skills and/or qualifications were secured. This expectation was not unique to the EU8-Poles however. The same hope was present in talking with a minority of the Somali. Within the wider migratory body of literature, other examples of this equivalence of qualifications and occupational class expectations were readily located. An example was Modood et al writing concerning Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants poor levels of upward mobility and ‘racial’ disadvantage. Their view extended with the more recent Heath and Cheung narrative concerning ethnic penalties. Importantly was their binary use of skin colour, ‘black’ and ‘white’ or ‘white’ and ‘non-white’. This investigation’s Somali experience of Britain labour market echoed Heath and Cheung’s observations. Crucially these well regarded contributors identified ‘other-whites’ faring much better in relative terms than ‘black’ people whether those ‘non-white’ people were indigenous Britons or migrants such as EU8-Poles. Some migrant groups then, such as the EU8-Poles, mostly, make progressive headway in Britain. Other migrant groups do not, for example the Somali. This thesis’ central research precept lay within this contrast.

In comparing the literature from the Eade at al London research with Griffiths’ study of migrant Somali and Kurds in the same area; it was apparent many of the migrants researched distanced themselves from notions of homogeneity. There was agreement between Eade et al and Griffiths in that each of the groups studied was

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135Ibid
137Modood, T., 1997, pp.60-82
138Platt, L. 2005,p.9 / p.11 / p.15
139Eade, J. et al 2006,p.10
140Ibid
astutely aware of the need to affirm their class positions. For Eade et al, the EU8-Polish approach remained part of *the web of social and economic interactions* largely realizing the non-association of EU8-Poles with ‘countrymen’ or women from their own undesirable or lower Polish social-classes. For the ‘professional’ EU8-Poles to strategize otherwise would have impinged on them as individuals to forge ahead and make progress to gain social and economic status in Britain. Eade et al commented on the growing resentment amongst these migrants when their classes are falsely homogenised. Class and individualism remained extremely important aspects of the characteristics of many contemporary EU8-Poles; over and above for example the traditional need for ethnic-based cohesion sought by post-WWII EVW Poles. The notion that Poles per se took exception to being erroneously amassed simply by nationality was empirically pursued and confirmed. Insofar as the Somali were concerned, a similar class division emerged from the literature. At the intersection of the ‘West’ with Somali traditionalism, new societal structures and new identities were being created. An aspect of this Griffiths observation was pursued, and extended in consideration of secondary EU-Somali migrants in Britain. The Westernisation of traditional kinship ties and Somali clan was witnessed, in small part, to have mutated into what was construed as twenty-first century social and occupational class in Britain. Samatar’s narrative made it abundantly clear this was not a new occurrence. The powerful Somali clans such as the Darod have historically proletarianised ‘lesser clans’ to create the Somali middle-class for themselves. Samatar importantly contended the structural instability of historically integrating Somali pastoralism into the international politico-economy, and the tendency for Westernised class differentiation to arise, had irreparably fractured Somali culture. Cultural rupture was visible in the Slough diaspora. Kapteijns succinctly added clarity to this line of conjecture, observing *class differentiation [remains] a significant feature…* of Somali ‘globalized life.’

The most significant aspect of conflating Griffiths and Samatar’s narratives was the appreciation of the complex relationship that existed between the notion of Somali clan and Westernized class. They were realised to be, *in part*, one of the same.

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143 Eade, J. et al 2006, p.17
144 Ibid, p.15
145 Griffiths D. J 2002, p.35
147 Griffiths D. J 2002, pp.12-14
150 Ibid
Conversely, they were dissimilar. El-Solh’s 1991 research,\(^{151}\) bravely grasped the nettle in her attempt to evaluate the resurgent clan consciousness Samatar’s narrative chose to dwell upon. El-Solh highlighted the societal barriers clan created *glocally*, referring to Kapteijn’s observation of global issues recreated locally in diaspora meaning the problems of clan and class being trans-nationally transported and recreated. El-Solh’s plucky contribution to the wider debate offered the opportunity to investigate how Somali cultural-structures restricted their ‘community’ organisation in diaspora. Further, she pointed to how these constraining issues had contributed to the Somali becoming *statistically obscure*,\(^{152}\) as observed in Slough. Griffiths’ narrative placed less importance than El-Solh’s on the significance of clan influence in diaspora. He disagreed that clan had remained the foremost determinant factor in the Somali diasporic culture and day-to-day life problematic.\(^{153}\) Since this literary investigation endeavoured to understand, if not settle, differences between at-variance studies on a particular subject where they were identified this investigation’s empirical research ascertained which of these author’s arguments and conclusions were the most verifiable. It found a good deal of evidence to support El-Solh’s findings and query those of Griffiths’.

The varied literature reviewed indicated transnational class and clan structures from Poland and Somalia ostensibly remained significant in the lives of both groups in Britain. Both explicitly and implicitly influenced their points of entry into Britain’s class hierarchy. This shaped their social identities and respective social motilities. Class remains hugely important in terms of migrant identity, social mobility, and integration. It was erroneous to assume social mobility homogeneity existed between or within this study’s groups experiences however. The individuality of social mobility processes ‘differ by ethnic group,’\(^{154}\) meaning while the causes may be similar they are particularised by ethnic differences. Historic evidence supporting this line of reasoning that class in Britain is an embedded phenomenon included Glass’s\(^{155}\) 1949 study and the 1972 Oxford Family History Study.\(^{156}\) Goldthorpe and Payne in longitudinally assessing these observable trends succinctly framed the British class condition commenting ‘mobility rates have remained essentially constant on the same
pattern that they would appear to have displayed for most of the (20th) century.’ A 2007 study by the London School of Economics (LSE) and Surrey University reported that in Britain ‘young people’s life chances are still so tied to the fortunes of their parents’ pointing out class divide remains cross-generationally in contemporary Britain. From a migrant perspective, class remains ‘particularised by group’.

The English language: An asset or a boundary? Billig’s narrative implied language was ‘essentialist’ as a social categorisation relative to other measures of social status, for example, education, housing, and employment status. Agreeing with Appiah, it may be viewed in the same light as ‘racism’ and ‘sexism’. In these terms it is a distinguishing characteristic in stereotyping processes that include ‘us’ or exclude ‘them’. Vygotsky’s ‘social cognition learning model’ argues culture teaches individuals what and how to think. Language is simply a means to express this. Fenton succinctly wrote of a ‘minority language [being] as an educational and economic disadvantage’. Levels of upward social mobility by migrants in Britain appears, according to cross-party governmental prompting to acquire English language skills, more readily realised through the acquisition of academic and vocational qualifications.

At this study outset, it was rational, if naïve upon reflection, to expect higher levels of immediate employment and social mobility from those non-EU-Somali, EU-Somali and EU8-Poles who undertook such studies or who had arrived in Britain with English language proficiency, qualifications and experience, or so, one may believe. This reasoning was not necessarily born out in practice insofar as Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles were concerned. Initially, there remains a strong likelihood of degrees of downward migration on arrival. In all but the company-relocated EU8-Polish professionals and Polish self-employed trades-people, this was, in part the Slough

158 Sutton Trust funded
160 Ibid
163 The Social Cognition Learning Model asserts that culture is the prime determinant of individual development
164 Fenton, S. 1999,p.14
166 Ibid
167 Platt, L. 2005,p.1
Chapter 1: A literature review

finding. The literature stated educational qualifications too were accepted as positive influences on the Weberian notion of ‘life-chances’. Weber argued class, status, and political affiliation are the three key determinants in life-chances. Qualifications have ‘capital’, meaning value *herein*. The majority language, *herein* English, *could* be measured as an asset in the same terms. In the discourse of ethnic politics, Fenton observed this capital as constituting part of the armoury of the ‘ethnically informed’. This arsenal informs ‘expressions of cultural difference’. English language remains *surrounded by ideas of what is proper…what is pure*. The differences away from this are the basis for discrimination and class hierarchies, although the Slough Somali illustrated a very to excellent command of the English language and yet still spoke of their alienation. Numerous British modern history narratives record supporting notions of difference based around the English language. One notable example is Macaulay's 1835 House of Commons speech robustly and inextricably associating English language with power. The English language adopted as the language of colonial choice over Sanskrit or Arabic in this period. Paraphrasing the lengthy polemic, he commented the English language,

...stands pre-eminent...Whoever knows that language has ready access to all the vast intellectual wealth...English is the language spoken by the ruling class. It is spoken by the higher class of natives...the English tongue is...the most useful....

This continues in contemporary times, a point drawn on by Tonkin in 2004. He writes,

‘Since the early 1980s and 1990s the Internet has undoubtedly accelerated the international use of English, and the processes of internationalization, of globalization, tend to be expressed through English...it seems likely that a majority of the regular users of English are not native speakers’.

The Savage et al narrative illuminated the meaning of English language capital from equally important perspectives, namely resource ownership. Their argument hinged on how resources are potentially ‘accumulate[d] and [are] converted to other resources’. An example is the conversion of English language skills into

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167Fenton, S. 1999, p.23
168Ibid, p.13
169Ibid,p.9
170Tonkin, H., 2004 (July), *Language Equality in International Relations*, Paper at the 89th World Congress Esperanto and the 3rd Nitobe Symposium, Beijing, China, pp.1-3
171Savage, M. et al, 2005, p.31
employment opportunities. This notion is often married to concepts of cultural assimilation and remains the contemporary Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government perspective. It is partnered with the significance of class conveying the importance of a ‘good’ education, particularly by a first-generation ethnic minority to subsequent generations. This last viewpoint potentially transcends physical difference including skin colour variations and was expressed in more than one instance, as the primary reason for individual EU8 Polish migration to Britain. Language appeared to be written of hypothetically bridging ‘racial differences’ although empirically this was not borne out by this research. It was apparent the acquisition of the English language offered no certainty of inclusion or acceptance. This was despite various British governments that have argued proficiency in English is important for upward social mobility. As for full British citizenship, since the advent of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) under Blair’s Labour government, those applying for British citizenship must prove they have,

‘A sufficient knowledge of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic’ [and have] ‘sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom’\textsuperscript{174}

Of the 2007 Goldsmith citizenship review for Brown’s Labour government, Kiwan wrote,

‘English language skills and ‘citizenship’ knowledge of life in Britain are centrally important in achieving economic, civic, and social integration of immigrants settling and making their lives in Britain’\textsuperscript{175}

In 2012, as part of setting an integrationalist context of local government community cohesion and not citizenship dependent, the contemporary Conservative-Liberal Democrat Communities Secretary Eric Pickles reiterated England’s,\textsuperscript{176}

‘Right to ask new migrants to demonstrate a grasp of the English language and an understanding of British traditions’\textsuperscript{177}

Since 2011, there has been intensified British government driven expectation for all non-English speaking migrants who settle in Britain, for any period whatsoever, to display, at the very least, a basic command of the English language. Holmes’

contribution centred on the premise that English as the ‘national language is the language of a political, social and cultural unit…it is a symbol of national unity’. This was interpreted as an explanation of the nationalist based state fervour behind this growing call to multi-culturally bond within the confines of the English language. Echoing Macaulay, Fenton implied the English language defines ‘the people’…the right and proper members of the national society’, meaning it is suggested, that if a person does not, cannot or chooses not to speak English, s(he) is ‘outside’ of British society. The gathering contemporary momentum is, largely, a likely direct response to the challenge of European identity to nation state identity emerging in the post-accession period. The very best summary regarding the importance of language unearthed was Fenton’s 1999 comment that,

Language is undoubtedly a powerful group marker…if the language is unknown to outsiders… it is a means of social exclusion.

The lack of command of a host language frequently creates ‘structural limitations’. These are the constraining force(s) experienced by many migrants entering Britain. Evidence was forthcoming in many history-based narratives used as secondary sources. For example, Fryer regarding ‘black’ people, Visram concerning Indian sub-continent ‘Asians’, Ansari a propos Muslims and Kushner et al on the subject of Jewish migrants. For Searle, the English language remained an imperialist based tool. The literature unquestionably pointed to the veracity of language influencing social status and degrees of inclusion. A lack of English language skills remains ‘a barrier to interaction’ with wider British society as well as hampering migrants ‘efforts to integrate economically and to access the labour market’. This literature strand plainly emphasized negative outcomes for those who did not learn. To ‘belong’ in Britain, migrants are considered, by some, to be forced into forms of linguistic acculturation. Considering English language as an asset however is a contextual concept, a construct. Harris’s contribution justly identified Britain’s Somali community as containing a ‘large number of highly qualified men and

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179 Fenton, S. 1999, p.23
180 ibid, p.9
182 Fryer, P. 1984
183 Visram, R. 2002
184 Ansari, H. 2004
187 ibid, p.79
188 ibid, p.82
women’\textsuperscript{190} who brought a ‘wealth of employment experience’\textsuperscript{191} to Britain but who continually faced difficulties in securing long-term and commensurate employment in Britain.\textsuperscript{192}

**Religious affiliation: an advantage or a drawback?**

In the post 9/11 era, with significant numbers of migrants entering and moving within Europe, consideration was given to the question whether a non-Christian religious following or background, particularly a Muslim allegiance, helped or hindered an individuals or group’s social mobility? There were two relevant opposing views.

Firstly, those who confirmed 9/11 had damaged mobility opportunities for those with Islamic allegiances and secondly those who pointed to Muslim entrepreneurs achieving social mobility, in spite of 9/11. One represented stymied hierarchical societies, the other societies based on individualism and meritocracy. Reflection of this drew the conclusion that contemporary Britain, largely, remains the former. Religion and British society remain inter-twined within the EU member statehood.

Issues surrounding migrants themselves included, for example, country of origin, the dominant religious faith of that country, (assuming it was not principally secularist), and the foremost host country’s religious belief. Plainly too, the migrants age, marital-status, level of education, class and gender were also considered. Each remains a legitimate influence in integration and settlement success or failure. The point made is linkage empirically existed and certainly religious and faith affiliation were hypothesised as being significant determinants of social mobility by Slough’s Somali interviewees. Each case however remains fraught with distinctive complexity. Degrees of uniqueness are such it is unfeasible to generalise.\textsuperscript{193} Migrant religious association remains recognised as a growing factor for state consideration, possibly concern.\textsuperscript{194} Social mobility appeared from the literature and from the Slough fieldwork to be ostensibly ethnic group specific, with some ‘faith communities [being] important sources of social-capital’.\textsuperscript{195} Furbey et al interrogated the state view that its interpretation of social capital is the prospective basis of both social and fiscal benefit to all of British society. The British Labour government’s perspective from 1997 to 2010 failed to truly understand and/or address the notion of the ‘Islam-penalty’. The

\textsuperscript{190}Harris, H. 2004
\textsuperscript{191}Ibid.p.33
\textsuperscript{192}Ibid.p.39
\textsuperscript{193}Platt, L. 2005,pp.30-33
\textsuperscript{194}Kishwer Falkner - Liberal Democrat Peer in the House Lords/Spokesperson for the Department Children, Schools and Families
\textsuperscript{195}Furbey, R., Dinham, A. & Farnel, R. 2006, *Faith as Social-capital: Connecting or Dividing?* Policy,Bristol
discordant nature of politics remains equally meritable of highlighting in this debate because groups and ‘communities’ continue to be corralled into ‘compliance with government agendas [that] may serve to undermine the energy and distinctiveness of faith related networks and enterprise’.

The examination herein interpreted this as the state’s continued homogenisation of ‘other’ as part of an unchanging social-hierarchy. In other words, faith groups appear permitted to have a ‘voice’ or ‘voices’ but how, when, where and by whom they are listened to is largely defined by embedded governmental hegemony. The contemporary Conservative Liberal-Democrat government adopted a similar strategy. In 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron and (former) Faiths Minister Baroness Sayeeda Warsi stressed that their government was committed to tackling anti-Muslim hatred in Britain, supporting the ‘Big Iftar’ programme, to demystify the Islamic faith and connect it to wider communities.

Platt’s 2005 narrative posed the question directly whether religious affiliations influenced social motilities. A voluntary question regarding religious affiliation was first posed in the 2001 National Census, and repeated in the 2011 Census. In the 2011 Census, Christianity was the largest religious group in England and Wales with 33.2 million people identifying with the religion, a decrease of 4.1 million from 2001 (from 72% to 59% of the usual resident population). Muslims made up the second largest religious group with 2.7 million people, an increase of 1.2 million (from 3% to 5% of the population). The number of people who reported that they did not have a religion reached 14.1 million people, an increase of 6.4 million (from 15% to 25% of the population). Upon reflection, the question assisted this research in the ‘understanding of differences within or between groups’.

Furseth’s 2008 work focused specifically on the West’s religious diversity, specifically regarding new migrant populations. This timely secondary source offered focus herein insofar as realising that more ‘studies of immigrant religious communities and their role in society’ are required, not for the understanding of religion, rather to understand

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196 ibid
197 Iftar is the meal eaten by Muslims to break their fasting after sunset every day during Ramadan; originating from the Arabic *iftar* meaning “the breaking the fast”
199 April 2001
200 First statistics available from 16 July 2012
202 Platt, L. 2005,pp.30-33
204 Ibid, p.147
the features and restrictions of religion as a source of social capital. In England and Wales, the 2011 National Census recorded that over 93% of Christians were, ‘white’ and 89% were born in Britain. The majority of people with no religion were also ‘white’ (93%) and born in Britain (93%). According to the ONS, these numbers have increased since 2001. Muslims were more ethnically diverse as a religious grouping. Sixty-eight percent of Muslims were from an ‘Asian’ background, with Pakistanis making up thirty-eight percent of the total Muslim population, a 371,000 increase (from 658,000 to over a million) since 2001. Fifty-three percent of all Muslims in 2011 were born outside Britain. Numbers of non UK-born Muslims have almost doubled from 828,000 in 2001 to 1.4 million in 2011.205

In 2007 Foley and Hoge posited that ‘social capital embedded in religious communities may contribute to social incorporation,’ 206 harking back to the Bourdieuan notion that social inequalities can be directly relatable to socio-economic statuses.207 How well a faith/religion is funded determines what it can/cannot achieve in a ‘community’. Plainly, the nature, consistency, and types of resources available in the various religious communities vary hugely. (In 2012, the Catholic Church was conservatively estimated to have a global wealth of more than $3000 Billion according to Forbes208). Foley and Hoge illustrated the Wood standpoint insofar as Slough’s EU8-Poles and Somali were concerned; namely, that it is the ‘networks of relationships that connect individuals and institutions in society’209 that actually grounds social capital and builds it going forward.

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205 ONS, 2013, What does the Census tell us about religion in 2011?
207 Bourdieu, P., 1986, pp.241-258
This meant making best use of support resources (e.g. the Polish Church of Divine Mercy), mutual aid, and access to other benefits, directly or indirectly, from within all of the Slough community.

Adaptation, networking and flexibility (the EU8-Poles) rather than rigidity and self-isolation, (the Somali – an acknowledged generalisation) appeared to be a general bedrock difference between the studied ‘groups’ before any consideration was given to legal statuses and resources, although of course the Somali experience had been trauma-ridden. Coleman too theoretically, and in contrast to Bourdieu, emphasizes that social capital is a ‘relational phenomenon’ stating that a mind-set, an attitude of ‘social trust’ is required wherein cooperation is central to the integrationist strategy. Each scenario is unique however. Different outcomes and treatments cannot simply be explained by the over simplified reasoning of ethnic difference. Consideration and questions of religious or faith association in the fieldwork illuminated the miscellany of this within each group. Not every Somali self-identified wholeheartedly as Muslim. Not every EU8 Pole claimed to follow Catholicism. Religion was purposely not used to homogenise the Somali and Polish groups.

The issue of religious affiliation affecting social mobility and the literature surrounding it was composite and divergent. Smidt’s study regarding connections between religion and social capital assisted in considering the notion that religion ‘bind together autonomous individuals into communal relationships’. Any notion of absolute religious cohesion in any faith using the literature trawl was found to be mis-placed. Fractures exist in all such alliances. Despite this, Smidt convincingly contended religious institutions per se were ‘among the few institutions that are trusted’ by a great many. For many of Slough’s EU8-Poles this was a day-to-day life style truth.

Muslim-Somali specific literature was a specialised, fragmented, and incomplete corpus. Some of the splintered literary contributions were ambiguous. One such narrative was that by Berns-McGown. Ostensibly supportive of both the Platt and Modood arguments regarding negative outcomes associated to affiliation to Islam, Berns-McGown’s narrative recorded how the Somali in diaspora were embracing the

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210 Coleman, J.S., 1990, Foundations Social Theory, Harvard University, Cambridge, p.311
211 ibid
212 Smidt, C. E., (ed) 2003, Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good, Baylor University, Waco, p.5
213 ibid, p.24
notion of Umma as an ‘anchor’ to achieve unity and cohesion ‘during the experience of displacement and integration into a new society’. Questionably this implied notions of ‘belonging’ outside of the nation-state paradigm and cohesiveness of Umma. While notions of transnational movement of cultural specific/country specific issues and cultures remain unquestionable realities, no explanation of ‘glocal’ out-working was offered. The Umma Berns-McGown described appeared as a singular unchanging monolithic cultural-entity and over simplified, appearing to suggest religious affiliations and practices as immune to regional and/or legal interpretations of them. They were not so in Slough. Berns-McGown’s interpretation of Islam as a single and uniting structure failed to account for the passage of time, geography and the vagaries of interpretations of any religion or faith. Berns-McGown’s writing lacked ‘systematic research’. This was noticeable when compared to Griffiths’ 2002 seminal writing.

Griffiths’ contribution to the germane literary corpus presented largely traditional qualitative ethnographic insight. His comparative analysis had three central aims. Firstly, explaining notions of refugee diaspora, the transnational organisation of a ‘community’ in a host. Secondly, debating the emergence of fledgling identities, and lastly investigating the ability of refugee groups to organise into communities. On the last point, notions of Somali clan and the ‘invisibility’ it propagates, manifest in the noticeable lack of structured political and/or social assemblies in any Somali diasporic ‘community’, was especially relevant insofar as better understanding how the Catholic Poles had surpassed the far longer established Muslim Somali. This aspect of this investigation built on Griffiths’ influential and subject shaping foundation. His research resonated with some of this study’s findings although some did not. Noteworthy points of debate remained; not least, the role that clan continues to have in diasporic contexts. The actuality, verified by empirical research herein, and supported by findings and viewpoints expressed by El-Solh, was clan particular. Clan remains the foremost characteristic in the Somali ‘imagined-community’. In an otherwise decisive literary contribution, Griffith’s fell short of recognising Western inventions of Somali clan cohesive community.

214 The global totality of all Muslims
215 Berns-McGown, R. 1999, Muslims in the Diaspora: The Somali Communities of London and Toronto, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, p.98
216 Ibid
217 Harris 2004,p.13
218 Griffiths, D.J. 2002
219 Ibid,p.29
220 El-Solh, C.F. 1991,pp.539-552
In turning to Catholicism and migration to Britain, the literature recorded, from Panayi’s broad sweep narrative, the ‘influx of the Irish into Britain, especially after the Famine [having] a profound impact on the existing [ill-prepared] Roman Catholic Church [in Nineteenth-century Britain]’. 221 According to Panayi, ‘the number of Catholic-Irish may have totalled 1.2 million’. This point was drawn from the extensive historic literature corpus to contrast with the immediate positive embracing of the half a million plus EU8-Catholic migrants, largely EU8-Poles, by the much better prepared twenty-first century British Catholic Church as an established service provider. In presenting his persuasive viewpoint, Panayi confirmed, as in the nineteenth-century, how the Catholic Church continues as a societal ‘focus’.222 Smidt writes of Catholicism uniting individuals through practical means not simply acting as a spiritual and emotional buttress. The research findings herein attest to this from some EU8-Poles perspectives; faith-based association had improved social-networking, political representation and access to resources, although not in every case. The literature unmistakably conveyed appreciable linkage joining Christian religious affiliation and social mobility albeit confounded by a myriad of social, economic, and political determinants. Contemporarily, Britain’s accommodation of Catholicism appears to remain greater than its tolerance of Islam despite the growth of Islam by 1.2 million (from 3% to 5% of the population) between the 2001 and 2011 National Census’ to 2.7 million people, and Christianity’s statistical decline over the same period

Moving forward
The history of difference is broader than that of any distinct migrant ‘group. Because of this, further study following is presented using a comparative methodology. Borrowing further from Kershen’s study of Huguenots, Jews, and Bangladeshis the approach taken throughout the investigation, including its fieldwork, was ‘flexible’.223 Agreement in terms of her viewpoint that, ‘Irrespective of chronological, cultural and religious differences, each group had something in common with the other, as well as characteristics which set it apart’224 without doubt applied to Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles. There remains the need to move beyond existing narrative boundaries however. More research needs to be undertaken regarding the Somali, as well as EU8-Poles in Britain. Regional towns such as Slough have, to-date, been under-

221 Panayi, P. 1994;p.82
222 Ibid.p.83
223 Kershen, A. 2005 p.35
224 Ibid.pp.35-36
researched as green(er)-field research opportunities. This research seeks to be an aspect of remedying this situation.

Research Methodology following (Ch.2) describes the cross-disciplinary research methods employed to undertake this comparison and for the first time introduces the seventy-four Somali and EU8 Polish interviewees to the reader; thirty-seven from each ‘group’.
Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place

Introduction
This chapter is a personalised account, intentionally written in the first-person, of the cross-disciplinary research methodology and the practices (method and process) I used in interviewing thirty-seven Somali and thirty-seven EU8 Poles (the people) in Slough, Berkshire (the place) from the summer of 2006 to the autumn of 2008. I took literally that ‘migration researchers need to take a holistic approach… (implying the need for) interdisciplinary research’. As the sole researcher I specifically observed and interacted with, and now comment and reflect upon, Somali attitudinal behaviours, feelings, and sentiments towards the EU8-Poles and vice-versa. The two groups constituted my investigation’s research data-frame.

Aims and objectives
My research straightforwardly ‘amalgamated historiographical and sociological methodologies’ and upon reflection, I consider it to be what Kean et al describe as ‘valuable... public history’. It is as Renton points out ‘broad enough to encompass...

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227 Ibid
popular memory... visual sources... or indeed any source’. Distinctively in the post-May 1st 2004 period, my prime research aim was to ascertain whether Slough’s Somali asylum seekers, refugees and EU-Somali implicitly or explicitly engaged with EU8-Poles and/or with the town’s wider multicultural society, and if so on what basis. (I gained insight into this endeavour through, for example, the notion that remains social and community cohesion strategies). Borrowing from Gutmann, I interrogated whether ‘community’ had been created and ‘belonging’ achieved by either or both of my research groups. Further I asked on what basis, if any, community had been sustained at the various potential intersection(s) of the groups. Potential intersection examples included housing, employment and local project funding. I used qualitative research methods (i.e. in-depth one-to-one interviews using semi-structured questions, small focus groups and pair/triplet meetings) to unearth if the EU8-Poles were strategically surpassing the Somali as a tactic to secure supplementary resources and achieve greater degrees of social-mobility and social-status than the Somali.

**Statement and queries**

I asserted that Slough’s Somali had not implicitly or explicitly engaged with EU8-Poles or with the town’s wider multicultural society, other than by exception. I asserted that they were distinct ethnic minority groups, separated culturally, ‘racially’, religiously and by their respective initial legal statuses upon arrival in Britain. I stated they inhabited parallel existences in a single regional town location. I argued the EU8-Poles had achieved a greater degree of integration with wider British society and its institutions than the Somali. I argued this had largely permitted the EU8-Poles to surpass, that is ‘leap frog’, the Somali migrants with regard to accessing local ‘community’ resources in Slough despite the EU8-Poles being in Britain for a far shorter length of time. To answer my hypothesis, my principal research questions were fivefold:

1. How and why had the EU8-Poles apparently achieved a greater degree of integration with wider twenty-first century British society and its institutions than the Somali?

2. What, if any, socio-historic and / or religio-cultural rationale explained how and why the EU8-Poles were able to ‘leap frog’ the ‘Somali with regard to integrating and accessing resources?

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228 Renton, D. 2000, Writing Public History from Within and Without a Group, Ruskin College Public History Conference [May 2000], Oxford

3. What were the reasons for the lack of ‘community’ cohesion in Slough between the Somali and the EU8-Poles?

4. Were the Somali and the EU8-Poles able to successfully co-exist? If so, on what terms?

5. What, if any, difference did legal status, skin colour, religious / faith following and country of origin make in determining migrant integration into mainstream British society?

**Constructive research methods**

My research was an interpretivist study, characterised by its prominence in describing, explaining and seeking to understand often conflated and multifaceted phenomena. Subject examples included the issues of ‘race’, religion and class. Oral histories and testimonies were harvested using tried and tested social science techniques based in and around face-to-face semi-structured interviews. I focussed on interacting with multi-dimensional societal relationships and conducted interviews in the fluid and dynamic context(s) in which these phenomena existed, meaning both in real time and in Slough. This was opposed to undertaking them in ‘staged’ or sterile environments such as the University. Insofar as a practical social research fieldwork observational *modus operandi* was concerned, my methodology adhered to traditional direct observation techniques; to secure feedback and behaviours in normal and non-threatening environments. The Somali and EU8-Poles were interviewed with the full knowledge of the research aims and objectives. While there remains an acknowledged difficulty with this approach; as study subjects may modify their behaviour(s) and responses to portray an ‘ideal’ for example, I favoured this strategy rather than anthropological covert observational research to permit greater and deeper access to each group and individuals within them. Aside from harvesting ‘rich’ and ‘thick’ descriptions of composite experience(s), my research data generated inference as well as testimony to explain, in part or in full, the rationale for the various observable facts uncovered. I employed specific small scale quantitative data to underpin the direct observation practices when appropriate to do so, (e.g. categorizations – see Figures AB and CD).

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Ethical considerations

My research was guided by the ethical principles prescribed by The University of London. These values protect the rights and welfare of the participants. My methodology was designed, and the applied fieldwork conducted, in an ethical and responsible way to ensure that the dignity and welfare of the respondents was upheld, whilst at the same time balancing the need for knowledge advancement. At all stages of the research process on-going privacy, confidentiality and anonymity was guaranteed and all activities were undertaken in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998) embracing me as the academic researcher within its category of data-controllers. For on-going security of the recordings and transcripts, each is kept either in password protected PC files or in a locked metal (fire retardant box). It is anticipated this data will be stored for not less than ten years for reference purposes. As such, consideration for the privacy and anonymity of the participants remains a legal duty herein. The information I collected is presented in such a way that the respondents ’recognise themselves’ while all other readers will ’not be able to identify them’.

Participants...have a right to expect that information they provide will be treated confidentially and, if published, will not be identifiable as theirs.

Exceptions to this did exist. Wherever individuals are acknowledged, quoted and named it was an outcome of my prior discussions with them resulting in a signed and dated surrendering of the participant’s rights to privacy, confidentiality and anonymity. Examples of this included Superintendent Peter Davies and Kulbir Brar of Thames Valley Police as well as Avtar Maan and Sylwia Pazdziorki-Tokarz both employed by Slough Borough Council and Mohad Tarrah, an independent. Ethics Certificate No. 07/2007 was awarded for the lifetime of my research undertaking by Royal Holloway, University of London Ethics Committee only after strict and stringent explanations of the methodology employed had been presented, considered and comprehensively explained. Each respondent received their own copy of the study’s ‘Research Participant Information’ hand-out complete with a listing of research centred definitions. Each respondent was made aware of his or her right to the ‘Freedom to Withdraw Consent’. All respondents received their own copy of a dated and signed

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232 ibid
copy of the ‘Free and Informed Consent’. Importantly this explicitly confirmed no financial inducement had been made, or offered or promised in any form whatsoever at any time for the respondent’s voluntary participation in this academic research. Lastly, as for my own safety in terms of ethical considerations, the times and locations of the interviews were always known by at least one other person and expected ‘return-home' times given.

**Interviewee outline**
Analysis and summary of the categories gender, age range and legal status (at the time of the interviews) revealed the majority of both the Somali and the EU8-Polish interviewees were in the 21-39 years old age range, (see Figure 1). Twenty-four of the total 74 interviewees or 32% being aged 31-39 years and 37 or 50% of the total being in the age range 21-30 years. One-hundred percent of both the male and female EU8-Polish interviewees were EU-economic migrants. This contrasted to 42% or eight of the nineteen Somali men and 33% or six of the eighteen Somali women who were secondary-EU migrants. Both categories shared the same EU-legal status, although chain-migration featured highly in the Somali cases with ‘joining family’ in Slough a major pull force; points drawn through the biographies of each interviewee found at the end of this chapter as well as in chapter five. Chain-migration was not a highlighted feature of the EU8-Polish migration strategy; this issue is returned to later in this chapter. Ten or 27% of the total Somali male and female interviews were refugees while eleven or 30% were asylum seekers. The key point drawn from this categorisation comparison was the dissimilar nature of the two groups’ legal status’.
Drilling-down further into the two data-sets and drawing from the 2011 Census categorizations within ‘Regional Profiles: Economy’, I was able to uncover further difference as regards my two research groups by comparing the types of work undertaken by each; their economic activities at the time of their interviews, (see Figure 2). I added three categories; ‘education / voluntary work’, ‘unemployed’ and ‘declined to answer/not known’ to readily accept my findings.

Figure 1: Interviewee categories (gender, age and legal status)

My examination of the economic activities of the groups revealed none of the thirty-seven male and female EU8-Polish interviewees were either unemployed or declined to answer when asked what they undertook workwise. In contrast five of the eighteen or 28% of the Somali women stated they were unemployed while two or 11% declined to disclose that information. The Somali men were even more guarded with ten of their total nineteen number or 53% choosing not to reveal their economic activities. Only one Somali man revealed he was unemployed. The EU8-Polish men and women proliferated in the professional, managerial, administrative, scientific and technical category; a category populated by just one Somali woman in an administrative capacity and no Somali men whatsoever. Ten of the eighteen or 56% of the EU8-Polish women worked in this category along with eight of the nineteen or 42% of the EU8-Polish men. Drawing from this snap-shot implied the two groups were by and large at different ends of the profiled economic activity spectrum. I drew from this that their disparate legal statuses were manifest in their capability to work in the UK. The
guarded responses from the Somali men thinly veiled the reality that ‘cash-in-hand’ work was frequently undertaken. I again refer the reader to the interviewee biographies at this chapter’s end and chapter five for specific insights into this phenomenon. The greatest clustering of both the Somali and EU8-Polish men and women ostensibly occurred in the very broad manufacturing / manual work category. Significantly, the six Somali women (33% of their total) were employed in part-time capacities usually cleaning on twilight-shifts *after* the day’s work of house-keeping and managing their families (children).

Noteworthy too were the relationships between several of my interviewees. Somali SF10, SF11 and SF12 were all sisters as were SF17 and SF18 although none of the Somali men or women expressed any readiness to share whether or not they were married to one another. In contrast no fewer than eight of my EU8-Polish interviewees were married to one another; PM7 to PF8, PM8 to PF9, PM14 to PF14 and PM16 to PF15 (Figure 3 refers).

![Interviewee relationship(s)](image)

**Figure 3: Interviewee relationship(s)**

### Chain-migration

Insofar as my research was concerned I chose the straightforward MacDonald and MacDonald definition of chain-migration to describe the movement of potential migrants whereby they ‘*learn of opportunities…initial accommodation…and employment by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants*’.

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Chain-migration reasoning featured in certain secondary EU-Somali cases with ‘joining family’ in Slough a foremost pull-force; a point drawn through the individual interviews detailed in chapter five. An example included interviewee SM4, a Dutch-Somali man married with three children living in Chalvey. Straightforward necessity also featured with seventy-two percent of my Somali women interviewees stating their primary motivation in coming to the UK was to ‘join family’; many also testified to feeling safe in the UK. Chain-migration was not a highlighted feature of the EU8-Polish migration strategy although the establishment that is the Catholic Church in Britain was a deciding factor, if not a pull-force in coming to the UK in specific cases. An example included PM15, a devout Roman Catholic.

Neutrality
Moving on, and in keeping with Castles perspective I used ‘a triangulation of methods’ as my methodology employed a range of different methods to collect and then analyse my data and research information. My methodology was both deductive and inductive. Theory guided my research in some process instances; the prime example that of Ravenstein’s nineteenth-century posit regarding traditional, albeit limited, ‘laws’ of migration. In other instances, hypotheses developed inductively as outcomes of my study. An example, in the absence of a single all-encompassing and explanatory theory of migration, was the notion of economic migrants as commuters. This in turn spawned my view that there was academic and social policy need for a series of migration hypotheses to ‘reflect [migration] complexity’. I adopted a cross-disciplinary approach to my method. I did so to illuminate non-nation state migration premised scenarios within the globalisation context. The secondary migration EU-Somali experiences offered a prime example of this. My research and its writing-up always accepted the notion that ‘researchers are never neutral’ as well as the need for me to account for my choices and role in ‘[re]producing accounts of the experience of others’ throughout. My Gatekeepers were ‘key informants’ meaning I acknowledged their social location in their cultural hierarchies, their values and to a good degree their beliefs, priorities, motivations and their understanding of

236Interviewed-11.11.2008
237Interviewed-18.08.2008
238Ibid,p.15
240Lucassen, J. & Lucassen, L. 2005, Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms And New Perspectives, Peter Lang, New York,p.36
242Temple, B. & Edwards, R. 2002, Interpreters/Translators and Cross-Language Research: Reflexivity and Border Crossings, University of Salford & South Bank University (Open Access article),p.4
their relationship to me and the interviewees. I understood this by initially meeting with and informally interviewing them over a coffee or a tea in the neutral location of the Holiday Inn reception in Slough. I made contact initially in the following ways. The Somali individuals known to Slough Borough Council (SBC) as social and cultural ‘movers and shakers’ were contacted and asked if they would be prepared to assist in academic research. My approach to SBC was ‘cold-call’ based – I had no existing contacts at my study outset. Insofar as the gatekeeper(s) for the EU8-Polish community, special thanks here must go to June Jackson for her willingness to permit me to initially use her network of contacts in establishing the gatekeeper(s) in this group. Those who affirmed their interest; in the Somali case just one individual from a potential of four who were invited, I subsequently contacted directly; an early informal introduction and planning meeting was undertaken in each case to outline and discuss the research. The first ever research meeting for my study was between the respondent SM1 and me.\footnote{First meeting with ‘gatekeeper’/respondent SM1: 11 October 2006} The prompt initiation of Ericksonian ‘chain referral’ within the Somali ‘community’ took place in the six-months following the first meeting.\footnote{Interviews conducted with respondents SM2-SM5 and SF1 and SF2 on Saturday 31 March 2007 in Chalvey, Slough} While the number of EU8-Polish ‘gatekeepers’ originally numbered three, but was reduced to two, and there was no Clannist kinship influence, the recruitment pattern was similar to that of the Somali, with PF1 assuming the role of principal ‘gatekeeper’.

\section*{Gatekeepers}

SM1 was the person of Mohad Tarrah (Mo) Tarrah, (pictured left). When interviewed, 38 year-old Mo originally from Mogadishu, said he had fled Somalia and arrived in London in June 1991 where he lived for over five years prior to moving to Leicester where he remained for eight years with his (at the time of meeting) estranged wife and two children who remained there. Mo’s two children were born in the UK. Mo held bone fide Refugee status and embraced ‘global citizenship’. Mo was a founding member of the ‘Somali and Environmental Action Group’ in Slough and was active and very well known in the Chalvey Somali ‘community’. He also worked contractually for the local authority as a Somali-English Language Interpreter. After his Somali national-service Mo entered the Somali
National University in 1988 to study medicine but became involved at that time in Political Sciences. Mo’s eldest brother was a member of the Somali (Transitional National Government) TNG. Mo was articulate in his statements; “I had the luxury of carrying on studying rather than working to support myself” as well as “my upbringing does not represent the majority of the Somali people. I was an exception” referring to his high ranking in the Noble Darod Clan that permitted status and ‘class’ privilege. (I return to the importance and relevance of Somali clan in chapter 3). Mo agreed to be the principle ‘Somali Gatekeeper’ to access the Somali ‘community’ in Slough for this research. Mo currently lives in Leicester. (February 2014).

PF1 was the person of Sylwia Pazdziorki-Tokarz: At the time of meeting, 32 year-old Sylwia agreed to be the principle ‘EU8-Polish Gatekeeper’ to access her community in Slough for my research. Sylwia was the ‘Community-Worker: North Sector’ for Slough Borough Council and also worked for Thames Valley Police as a voluntary ‘Independent Custody Visitor’. Additionally Sylwia was an ‘Independent Advisor’ in a Heathrow based detention-centre for ‘illegal immigrants’.

Sylwia Pazdziorki-Tokarz 245

Sylwia was separated from her husband, had one son and was living with her British-born partner. Sylwia had an excellent command of the English language and was educated to Masters Level having cut short her own PhD studies to come to the UK in 2004 to begin ‘a new life’. I first met and interviewed Sylwia on 18 July 2007.

My two sample-sets pleasingly offered a greater degree of heterogeneity than predicted. The point made here is the importance of the researchers’ responsibility to explain the aims and objectives of the research to ensure the gatekeeper(s) are as objective and unbiased as possible in beginning the referral process. I asked each about aspects of their own lives, their experiences, their prejudices and their relationship with and to the research groups in my data-frame. Importantly I also talked through with them what topics they regarded as important, taboo and/or novel to be addressed when I interviewed their wider communities as aspects of my PhD research project. This did not mean that my Gatekeepers consequently became authorities whose perspectives and viewpoints were over and above those of the

245Health & Safety Executive, 2008 (October), New Community Website for Polish Workers,[2014,18.02.14]
subsequent interviewees, or indeed me. The Gatekeeper interviews were of themselves integral parts of my snowball research data gathering methods. Unlike unstructured interviews frequently used in traditional imagery of ethnic groups, (i.e. in ethnography) where interviewee-subject relationships are advanced over time, it was important I was able to rapidly cultivate interaction(s) to undertake my in-depth semi-structured interviews. Agreeing with Douglas, my almost instantaneous rapport with most of my interviewees was essential. This encompassed trust-building and a respect for each of the interviewees and the information s(he) shared. This aspect of my methodology, virtually above all else, required the most ‘attention and dedication’. I also ensured the interviews took place in safe and comfortable environments (e.g. the Holiday Inn Reception or the homes of the interviewees) in keeping with Warren and Karner’s methodology recommendation. Upon reflection, this was essential for each person to share their personal experiences, attitudes and standpoints on a variety of issues regarding their migration experiences.

Notably, Slough’s Holiday Inn appeared to be staffed and usually had clients of multi-ethnic origin going about their business when I visited it. The truly cosmopolitan character of the hotel was in keeping with Slough as a town. My initial discussions with my two Gatekeepers established me as if not an ‘insider’ then certainly as a ‘to-be trusted’ and welcome ‘outsider’. Borrowing from Voloder, I made, and can make, no claim to ever having been an ‘insider’ as my position in both the Somali and the EU8-Polish communities never realised my field-work being or feeling like ‘home…

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246 Douglas, J.D., 1985, Creative Interviewing, Sage Library, Beverly Hills, USA
site of the familiar and of personal and non-research activities’.\textsuperscript{249} My field-work was always in the area of ‘the unfamiliar’ and was always simply ‘the site of professional and research activities (and very much) in contrast to home’.\textsuperscript{250} Upon reflection the notion of ‘to-be trusted’ and welcome ‘outsider’ was farther pronounced with the Somali interviewees over the EU8-Polish participants. Being a ‘white’, non-Muslim, English-speaking male in a ‘black’, Muslim, (publicly at least) patriarchal, (largely) forced-migrant ‘community’ was far more unfamiliar to me than interacting with the ‘white’, ‘cosmopolitan’, Christian, EU-Poles. I felt this cultural unfamiliarity highlighted my ‘outsider’ status.

**Using an interpreter**

Accepting that I was a part of the environment and interacted with the peoples that I researched as well as being a part of the study through the individual research accounts herein, I also accepted that in addition to social, political, economic, historical, and even intellectual contexts, in the case of both groups I needed to consider language-difference and any necessity for translators to be a part of my methodology. By this I mean I had to consider the structural divisions between me as the researcher and my interviewees as those being researched and how our language differences did or did not permeate into the research process and outcomes. From the research outset I considered Freed’s warning for researchers such as me conducting cross-cultural and cross-linguistic research; any use I made of an interpreter/translator should be with those persons being a ‘conduit linking the interviewer with the interviewee… ideally a neutral party who should not add or subtract from what the primary parties communicate to each other’.\textsuperscript{251} I would only occasionally call on the translation skills of my respective Gatekeepers throughout the interviews and in writing-up. Where necessary, each gatekeeper gave translation of some aspects of some of the interviews as these were always conducted in English, (I speak neither Somali nor Polish). When I used an interpreter I tried to ensure I spoke with my gatekeeper-translators about their perspectives on the issues being discussed to reduce, if not eliminate, their ‘production’ of a different viewpoint to that actually being conveyed to them by any particular interviewee. As Young points out,

\textsuperscript{249}Voloder, L., 2014, “Insiderness in Migration and Mobility Research: Conceptual Considerations”, in Insider Research on Migration and Mobility: International Perspectives on Researcher Positioning, eds. Lejla Voloder & Liudmila Kirpitchenko, Ashgate,Aldershot,pp.1-23

\textsuperscript{250}Ibid.p.5

‘People (i.e. translators) have particular histories and occupy social positions...they do not see the world from another’s standpoint’ 252

My cautious approach to these infrequent occurrences was tested even more when the translator was not the same gender as the interviewee. This was the case because, as Ramsey 253 makes clear, gender communication is an outworking of cultural identity and placement. Consequently males and females understandably mean, interpret, appreciate and judge things from their own gender-cultural standpoints.

“Place”

![Map of Slough](image_url)

**Research Location: Slough**

I undertook my primary empirical qualitative field research in the Thames Valley town of Slough in Berkshire from late 2006 to mid-2008. The 2011 National Census recorded Slough as having a population of 140,205 people; 254 up 16.3% on the 2001 Census, and 6.9% higher than the mid-2010 population estimate. 255 Slough remains a highly diverse area with just 34.5% of residents of White 'British' ethnicity. 256 Slough is a well-established primary light industrialised urban area. The last three-to-four decades, since the 1980s, has witnessed a shift away from manufacturing towards an ICT and service-based economy with corporate offices replacing processing and

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256 Bourner, R. 2012, re: Table QS202EW Multiple ethnic groups (27 March 2011), p.2
production facilities. Slough is situated approximately twenty-two miles west of central London, close to London Heathrow airport and adjacent to the M4 motorway linking London to the south-west of England and onto Wales. *(Further historic and personal insight into Slough from Somali and Polish perspectives are given in Chapters three, four and five).*

**“Process”**
Choosing the most appropriate method to gain access to my interviewees was not simple although it was a crucial consideration. Interpretive analyses sampling is known to be a difficult, oft divergent multi-step iterative process. Interpretive, that is qualitative research is always subject to ‘hard science’ criticism wherein it is derided as unscientific and only ever exploratory or subjective; a perspective held for example by Denzin\(^{257}\) who refers to researchers such as me as ‘journalists’ or ‘soft-scientists’. This acknowledged I chose to deploy a wide-range of interconnected interpretive practices; life-stories (testimonies), interviews and anecdotes, alongside observational and interactional meetings to better understand or appreciate and then describe recollections and meanings in my interviewee’s lives. At the centre I preferred the flexibility, pace and low-costs associated with snowballing. I chose this as my main interdisciplinary research method realising it conceded sample-randomness and would contribute to the unresolvable chasm between ‘hard science’ and interpretive research. That, I concluded was a matter of philosophy outside of the remit of my interdisciplinary research. From Foucault’s definition of the multiplicity of truths, I too suggest that each different truth inevitably requires different means of validation.\(^{258}\) Interdisciplinary meaning herein, ‘interaction between two or more disciplines’;\(^{259}\) i.e. crossing disciplinary boundaries.

**Snowball sampling**
I used a version of Bryman’s interpretation of ‘snowball sampling’;\(^{260}\) gaining introductions to, and forming bonds of trust and friendship over a relatively short period of time with my gatekeepers, Mo (SM1) and Sylwia (PF1) to meet and interview respondents in the Somali and EU8-Polish groups.\(^{261}\) Getting started not only meant

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\(^{257}\) Denzin, N. K. 1997, *Interpretive Ethnography*, Sage, Thou’d Oaks, USA
\(^{258}\) Winter, G. 2000 (March), “Comparative Discussion of the Notion of ‘Validity’ in Qualitative and Quantitative Research”, *The Qualitative Report*, vol.4, No.4(3,4), Manchester, para.58
accessing my interviewees but also deciding how best to collect my data. I opted for both pen and paper for note-taking and mini-disk recorder for pair, triplet and small group interviews. At one point I toyed with the idea of structured questionnaires but rejected these on the basis of not truly engaging with my interviewees. A questionnaire can be expensive and questions are (unwittingly) sometimes biased against certain groups of people. My greatest concern was the ‘non-response’ to questions which on a small sample-set of seventy-four interviewees would have meant extending further the fieldwork time, (and cost). Snowballing offered me the opportunity for open-ended questions and probing. I supplemented my snowballing method by integrating it, especially for comparative statistical data (international, national and local), with what Bryman terms eResearch techniques. This was attractive as it was cost-effective and met the diverse and multi-disciplinary nature of my research by permitting me to literally roam the globe using the web to conduct my secondary research. Snowballing allowed me to observe my interviewees at close quarters in familiar environments. This had several advantages; (I tried to ensure) my interviewees were comfortable and behaved as they normally would have, including offering answers they wanted to give rather than sublimely echoing my viewpoint(s) or what they believed I wanted to hear. Participant observation allowed me to ‘dig-deeper’ into views, beliefs and feelings as regards social interaction and opened-up fresh insights as we (my interviewees and me) were not bound by ‘fixed’-questions.

I realised snowballing is often criticised for being subjective and that it possesses unique potentials for deficiency. I reasoned however that these were significantly minimised by my own research practice controls; my ‘checks and balances’; correct planning, appropriate interview environments; maintaining the boundaries between myself and my interviewees and allowing time for each individual. I agree with Griffiths et al and Faugier and Sergeant, that this methodology required my commitment and investment. Upon reflection, without these it was likely the credibility of my own study may have been called into question. My commitment and time-investment were labour intensive, fraught with potential for failure and were extremely time-consuming. I had to earn trust and this took time to establish. I achieved this by

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262 Bryman, A, 2012, pp.3-96
263 Ibid, pp.231-268
264 Ibid, pp.269-287, pp.430-467
265 Ibid, pp.613-682
my organised and stringent adherence to ethical procedures and practices. This acknowledged, it secured my early and semi-informal right of entry into both migrant sets. My snowballing was from the ‘bottom-up’, meaning it was an ascending investigation from the ‘grass-roots’. This ensured the passing over of ‘isolates’, sometimes called ‘non-joiners’; ‘...those remaining outside the group’, for example women, the disabled, the elderly etc within each set was minimised. It was true I could not eliminate this risk entirely although ostensibly every tier in each group was visible and potentially accessible to my research probing. As for the matter of sample-size I largely arrived at this through a mixture of shrewd judgement, experience and a degree of good fortune. Each of the two sample sets consisted of thirty-seven respondents. Mo assisted in the selection of the Somali group and Sylwia, independently, the EU8-Polish group.

While I acknowledge snowballing challenges a number of traditional assumptions underpinning social science sampling convention, undoubtedly it readily permitted me to access my populations quickly and cheaply. Without this option entrée to both my target populations would have been prolonged and problematic, possibly not forthcoming at all insofar as the ‘closed’ Somali group was concerned. Snowballing undeniably presses the boundaries between the positivist principles of ‘replication’ and ‘representative’ research planning and remains at odds with the theoretically led random probability sampling techniques employed in much qualitative social research design. This latter point was reinforced by Eade et al in their 2006 Tower Hamlets research wherein the team wrote of the ‘care’ taken by them in employing ‘snowballing’. As in the nature and objectives of this thesis, it was not always practical or desirable to be characteristically orthodox if novel knowledge connections were to be made and original contributions to learning secured. The cost effective, resourceful, and effectual nature of snowballing, while less than orthodox, has been very well documented. It has been gathering acceptance momentum over the last half-century to access a variety of difficult and deviant international scenarios. It was introduced originally to the American social science fraternity in 1958 by Coleman as part of his methodological arsenal to explore the complex and often ‘non-standard’

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269 Harris, H. 2004, p.17
270 Berns-McGown, R. 1999, p.10
271 Bryman 2001, pp.75-76
272 Ibid, pp.29-30
273 Ibid, p.31
274 Ibid, pp.88-92
275 Eade, J. Et al 2006, p.6
276 Crosby, D. 2001
277 Coleman, J.S. 1958, pp. 28-36
notion of social organisation. To collect data employing a largely ‘social network’, that is not employing genuinely random selection, as a methodological source and practice can however be, as Anwar correctly states, ‘very slow [and] sometimes….difficult’.  

In accordance with Anwar’s own 1970s Pakistani centred research in Rochdale, selection of the respondents was therefore fundamentally based on ‘persons most relevant to the situation to be studied’. This approach partially overcame the same problems in my research. To compile and compose this individual contribution to cross-disciplinary subject fields it was necessary for me to undertake an ascending non-probability methodological approach to fill gaps in academic and social policy knowledge. Conventional sampling would have taken me an inordinate amount of time and financial resources to undertake. Snowballing generated ‘rich’ in-depth results relatively quickly over two years without significant loss or compromise to data reliability or validity. My choice and use of this method was not ‘accidental, haphazard or [simply] convenient’. It was purposive in nature. My sample sets chosen were as the ‘accessible populations’ and each had specific purposes in being targeted based on the four binary differences highlighted. They had never been subjected to a comparative analysis of this nature before. Upon reflection I recognise how my small-scale study adds to the overall subject that is the migration studies corpus. This was echoed in 2012 by Castles who wrote how the corpus ‘can benefit a great deal from comparative studies’. 

By my use of what Erickson alternatively refers to ‘chain referral sampling’, I operated with a significant degree of autonomy and freedom towards my set of potential respondents. Although my interviews were informal and relaxed, professional discipline was always applied. I drew distinct attention to specific areas of study concern within both the open and scenario setting vignettes. These worked particularly well in the joint interview settings. Each interview question was grounded in relevant theoretical conjecture and formed an important part of the overall research design. Every question was identified for its area of interrogation. Each question was neither too broad nor too narrow to limit or lead the respondent’s answers and replies. The semi-structured approach collected ‘thick qualitative testimonies. The

278Anwar, M. 1979, pp.223-224
279ibid
280Bryman 2001, pp.97-99
281ibid
282Castles, S., 2012, p.22
284ibid
respondents were always encouraged to speak freely and to do so without limits regarding their migration, settlement and diasporic experiences. The information collected was not arbitrary in nature. This stated, what had begun as the feasibility study based solely around respondent SM1 in October 2006, very soon delivered a ‘clear definition of the focus of the study’.286 This swiftly evolved over an eleven-month period and gathered momentum into the full-scale research project presented herein. My experience in Slough in-part supported Holloway’s notion of qualitative approaches often not requiring lengthy separate pilot-studies.287 My choice of semi-structured interviews, joint interviews and informally gathered unstructured ‘focus groups’288 resulted in a welcome degree of interview flexibility. I always sought to ensure sprawling and confusing respondent monologues were avoided or curtailed. There appeared to be greater freedom 'in numbers' to react to my study questions and enhanced appreciation of the lack of predetermination insofar as the boundary of what was shared was concerned. Shared understandings were reinforced and dissimilar views highlighted. My incorporation of easily explained and ‘believable’289 vignettes, (e.g. “You are travelling on a bus in Slough and there are some [Somali or Polish – choose as required] people talking loudly, swearing and making a nuisance of themselves. What do you feel / think?”), into the interviews proved useful in soliciting individual opinions and expressions on potentially sensitive social and moral dilemmas within realistic and specific situational contexts.290 The underlying principle for the inclusion of these291 was primarily to; ‘elicit responses to typical [normative] scenarios’ 292 and to ‘study [the] perceptions, beliefs and attitudes’ 293 of the individuals in a ‘safe’ and constructed, albeit relational environment. My use of this device captured a degree of ‘feeling’ straightforward questioning would have been unlikely to elicit. Undoubtedly, there were risks in this open, occasionally ‘on the edge’ and flexible questioning approach. This acknowledged the rewards significantly and undoubtedly outweighed the risks as rapport was established. Potential risks, none of which were realised, included the possibility of me losing control of interviews and

287 Holloway, I. 1997, Basic Concepts for Qualitative Research, Blackwell Science Ltd, Oxford p.121
289 Bryman 2001, p.154
dominant members of the participant focus groups attempting to usurp control; a point also considered relevant in my joint-interviews.

In summary, my interpretive rationale for choosing snowball/chain referral sampling as my foremost research methodology was its relevant track-record for identifying and contacting hard or harder to reach target populations. Although the loss of meaningful statistical enumeration was always probable by employing this methodology, my small scale local study was generalizable across the Thames Valley town. My research remains expected to offer general inferences and draw attention to common generic issues regarding the Somali and EU8-Poles across other towns in the UK where both ‘communities’ are located.

**Insider/Outsider**

Upon reflection, from the beginning of my research I considered it my responsibility to ‘be accepted’, although I realised I was actually seen as an ‘outsider’ by my two study groups. I have taken the terms ‘insider’ and ‘outsider herein to mean my interviewee’s as well as my own relationship to our respective socio-cultural places, spaces, traditions and ‘norms’. My viewpoint ostensibly reverses Bourdieu’s theory of society; ‘habitus’, wherein the power (in my meeting my interviewees and in our interview scenarios) was in a fluid state rather than as Wacquant writes of habitus of it being, ‘the way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel and act in determinant ways, which then guide them’.294 By this I mean I did not exist within the socialised ‘norms’ or circles of my interviewees, nor they in mine. Each of us, the Somali, the EU8-Poles and I appeared to embody the ability and freedom to state, “I can legitimately speak the ‘we’”295 of our own collective cultural identities but not of each other’s. Because I was unable to do this as regards the Somali or EU8-Polish experiences, I was culturally ‘out of place’,296 an outsider despite how close or trusted I believed or felt I had become. Our values, outlooks and perhaps too our expectations of life had all been acquired in different, real or symbolic cultural ‘spaces’. This was made evermore knotty by overlaying ‘habitus’ with gender, ‘race’, religion, ‘class’ as well as each individuals embedded prejudices. In approaching my study like this however I may have, albeit inadvertently, placed both groups as the ‘outsiders’ from

296Ibid
Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place

the perspective of me researching them and then writing about them for public scrutiny by any reader(s) of my work. My own search for a better understanding of why the Somali and the EU8-Poles were in differing ways and for differing reasons ‘them’ likely added to their ‘outside-ness’ because readers of my thesis may peek, look-in or ‘observe down’ on them as if they were studied objects. This was not, and is not, intended here in however as I delved into social, economic, political, religious and personal matters. The intention remains to offer insight and knowledge of Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles life experiences relative to each other and the wider town population, and to ‘listen’ to their points of view.

I found I continually redefined my own pre-conceived insider/outsider status as well as having it redefined by others as I journeyed through my field-work. This found agreement with Kershen who writes, ‘both migrant and researcher identity and belonging can never be static points on the compass’ expressing the fluid reality of qualitative research. Upon reflection I believe my ‘status’ was wholly contextual and dependent on whom I was interviewing. Each interviewee had their own perspective and preconceived ideas of who I was and what I represented. Agreeing with Corbin-Dwyer and Buckle, I was not actually free to choose my own insider/outsider identity prior to starting my research or maintain one status throughout my fieldwork. Sometimes I was certainly more of an insider, (e.g. with Mo and Sylwia), my Gatekeepers, while in other circumstances I was definitely an outsider (e.g. with SM10 whose status meant he would likely ‘disappear’ and PF12 who was guarded in matters of her simply earning money in Slough and then heading home to Poland).

I was most obviously an outsider (and felt so) insofar as both groups of interviewee women were concerned because of our gender-difference. This distinction was most visible and considered in interviewing some of the Muslim Somali women in comparison with (say) the more sophisticated western-cultured EU8-Polish women. As Oakley writes, ‘feminine and masculine psychology in patriarchal societies (like the Somali culture) is the psychology of subordinate and dominant groups…. (Women are) materially disadvantaged … (for example) in the case of ethnic minorities’. Because of this it was essential I remain as impartial as possible. Initially I sensed,

298Corbin Dwyer, S, & Buckle, J 2009, The Space Between: On being an insider/outsider in qualitative research, International Journal of Qualitative Methods, No.8,pp.54-63
even when chaperoned by either other Somali women or a man, some of the Somali women were, as Finch writes, ‘especially vulnerable’. Again citing Finch, my gender-neutrality through to my research outcomes entering the public domain were never intended to ‘undermine (Somali or EU8-Polish) wives and mothers... (Women generally)’. Anthropologically I considered myself to a contemporary ‘character’ (the fieldworker) interacting with the members of both groups throughout my study in a multicultural setting. At the same time I had forming what Birth writes of as a ‘temporal existence’ role; that of the ‘of the time narrator’ and the thesis writer. Agreeing with Fabians’ criticism of anthropology cited by Birth wherein the study of ‘other’ (the Somali and the E8-Poles herein) frequently places them ‘outside the flow of time’, I acknowledge my contemporary place in it and influence upon it. I was not invisible to my interviewees and my presence and their reactions to it are now intertwined within my thesis. My stance is illustrated by Crapanzano in reviewing Geertz’s ‘Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight’ essay wherein Geertz is both a character in the story as well the writer of it.

**Power**

To reflect on the researcher/participant ‘power’ relationship in my research I considered the foremost traditions, perspectives and variations the literature offered regarding qualitative study per se. These were principally positivist or non-positivist. For example, in positivist terms there was the presupposition that there was clearly defined distribution of power with me (the researcher) more powerful than my interviewees. Bhabha writes of ‘Self’ as the researcher (me in this case) and ‘Other’ as representing (my) research interviewees. In this relationship there are clear-cut roles. In contrast, the non-positivist/postmodern view deems qualitative research as a co-produced endeavour. This is the perspective I had at the foremost of my thoughts in undertaking my study. As Gergen & Gergen point out, “the division between researcher and subject is blurred...control over representation is... shared”. Blurring and alternating power in the interviews best describes my research experience. Reason too refutes any notion of a mutually exclusive relationship

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301 Ibid, p.176
304 Birth, K., 2008, p.3
306 Bhabha, H.K., 2004, *The Location of Culture*, Routledge,Abingdon,pp.61-68
Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place

wherein ‘the researcher alone contributes the thinking that goes into the project and the subjects [interviewees] contribute the action or contents to be studied’. 308 As with my research, Reason writes of ‘research with people’ 309 and not ‘on’ people. In truth however I grappled to fully define the ‘correct’ or optimal relationship between me as the researcher and my interviewees throughout my field-research, and in this, my subsequent reflection and writing. It appeared to me so many variables were ‘at play’. For example my gender, ethnicity, faith beliefs, socio-economic position, personality, my opinions of current affairs and not least the theoretical basis of my research, namely difference. Additionally, I realised my own opinion of the place(s) we met and the role(s) each interviewee appeared to be fulfilling could have subtly biased my views. I mean here, were my interviewees offering access to me, or confirming existing details, or secondary sources, or revealing wholly new information? My wrestle with this matter was made more complex, by all of these points being presented by each interviewee; explicitly or implicitly. Further, there were plainly conflicting interests ‘at play’ that some of my interviewees sought to exploit, (e.g. helping their own causes such as ESOL education or getting a message across; for example the need for community cohesion), despite the rapport and level of trust I rightly or wrongly believed I established. This I realised was not unique. I found similar examples expressed in the literature; for example Berg and Smith write of qualitative research being ‘an expression of the conflicting interests that are being served by the study’, 310 while Scheurich, 311 in stating he has no interest in either the positivist and non-positivist, writes of traditional qualitative interviews always being at risk of being ‘racist’ and rather than solving issues, actually recreating them or perpetuating them. This acknowledged I strived, and judge I achieved, what Denzin and Lincoln write of; namely studying my interviewees in ‘their natural settings’ 312 and ‘attempting to make sense of... phenomena in terms of the meanings’ 313 my interviewees brought to them.

**Gender**

While all of my respondents (male and female) were permitted to freely state their views and expound their standpoints, at no time did I take what they stated to be value neutral or unequivocally correct. In all cases, I sought to independently validate what was said as far as possible. This was either from other interviewees and/or secondary

309Ibid
313Ibid
sources such as the Council, TVP or the media if what I was told related to reported incidents. This not only included on the rare occasions when a translation was required, but also when I interviewed women sans translation(s). I was always aware, as a ‘white’ British man, that what I meant, interpreted, appreciated and how I judged things were from my own gender-cultural standpoint. As Dwyer and Limb observe, ‘research is shaped by the actions and values of the researcher’.\(^{314}\) I accepted and agreed that gender in each person’s case was a social construct, meaning it was taught/learned and because of this carried its own symbolism and dynamic. This was evident especially as regards the Somali women I interviewed. Throughout my fieldwork the Somali women were publically submissive to the men. Initially the Somali women, as research participants, were closely chaperoned by the Somali-men. As trust grew between us all, and I became ‘known of’ in the Somali community, the cultural need for explicit male presence diminished. This stated, understandably for their own cultural comfort and security, the women preferred to be interviewed in pairs, triplets, or small groups. This need for security and chaperoning was never explicitly stated or manifest in any of my interviews with EU8-Polish women. With several of the Somali women implicitly and explicitly echoing their own personal knowledge and experience of Vargas-Silva’s pertinent reference to “gender based persecution...gendered forms of harm...domestic violence...rape...female circumcision....”\(^{315}\) the security they gleaned from pairs, triplets and small groups had unexpected, but welcome outcomes*. Bedford and Burgess point-out, such groups,

“Take on their own dynamic... (Revealing) unexpected findings (such as) brainstorming or loose-word associations (demonstrating)...ways in which identities, ideas, landscapes and images are reproduced, reinforced and reiterated”\(^{316}\)

The noticeable submissive state of the Somali women in Slough was a ‘text-book’ example of Kramerae’s\(^{317}\) explanation of muted-group theory wherein two levels of societal differentiation of gender and its corresponding language development occur. Briefly, the Somali women (publically) were, ostensively, not as free as the Somali men to necessarily say what they wanted to, (although several did behind closed doors*). According to muted-group theory, the reason for this was ‘the words and the norms for their use’\(^{318}\) had been formulated by the Somali men as the dominant gender in

\(^{317}\)Kramerae, C., 1980, Women and men speaking: Frameworks for analysis, Longman,Harlow  
\(^{318}\)Ibid,pp.1-2
their culture. The second muted-group theory level states that women per se, certainly in a (public) patriarchy such at that witnessed in Slough, hold different perceptions to men because their subordination means they experience life differently. In contrast my EU8-Polish women interviewees did not seek any validation from their menfolk. They knew and were self-assured that as individuals they themselves were EU-citizens and did not require Polish men for visa purposes or permissions to experience their lives in the UK. My own unexpected findings of the Somali women speaking together and without Somali men present offered me insight into collective interpretations of notions such as ‘community’, ‘belonging’ and social hierarchies. Notably these ‘groups’ permitted opposing or different viewpoints to confront one another. The joint-interviews included for example that undertaken with SF1 and SF2.319 This unique opportunity collected distinctive information in the form of a conversation between two Somali women as regards their perceptions of the same or similar notions of migration, settlement and diaspora. Shared understandings were reinforced and dissimilar views highlighted on this specific occasion. In many respects the information gleaned from this seemed ‘more complete’ as each of these women, as close friends, appeared to help the other in filling gaps in one another’s memory recall;320 doing so almost as if I was not present in the room.

This more complete observation was replicated, albeit in a more formal and business like environment, by the later conducted semi-structured joint-interview with Superintendent Peter Davies (Slough LPA Commander) and Kulbir Brar (Slough Community and Diversity Officer) of TVP,321 (Figure 9 refers at the end of this chapter). In both instances, I believe I was able to semi-anthropologically observe at very close quarters the interaction between the respondents centred on the research subject and questions. I have no doubt the group-dynamic environment encouraged and permitted the participants to draw upon their own as well as collaborative attitudes, beliefs, feelings and life-experiences. There appeared to be greater freedom ‘in numbers’ to react to the study questions and a greater appreciation of the lack of predetermination insofar as the boundaries of what could be shared were concerned. Upon reflection I felt these settings visibly empowered those taking part and drew out the quieter participants, enabling each person to comment more freely and with less inhibition.

319 Interviews:SF1 and SF2:Saturday 31 March 2007
321 Interviews:Thursday 14 June 2007 @ Slough Police Station
Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place

Clan
Despite this, some Somali women (and some men) were reluctant to specify particular clan membership or affiliation. Sensitivity to this hugely important aspect of Somali culture had to be adopted to prevent alienating sections of the group. Figure 4 following is the extracted statistical details of clan membership or affiliation answers given across my thirty-seven Somali interviewees, where shared. This delicate issue is discussed further in chapter three and especially so in chapter five wherein my interviewees own voices are ‘heard’ underpinning the notion that there was a grouping of noble Somali clans in Slough. This clustering inferred Somali clan as both culture and ‘class’ that had played a role in determining the demography of Slough’s Somali diaspora; insofar as privilege, rights and networks afforded to noble clans was concerned. Problematically for many Somali was their relative lowly social position compared to other ethnic minorities in the town; in the UK. There was tangible resentment of Britain’s embedded social stratification relative to their lowly position in it.

Questions
Figure 10 at the end of this chapter details all of the questions I asked each of the seventy-four interviewees, including for the Somali the direct question asking which clan each Somali-interviewee either belonged too or was affiliated with. I did not necessarily hold fully to the prescribed terms detailed or sequence in which I raised each subject as this was the nature of my semi-structured interview approach to accommodate every individual character. It quickly became apparent my research focus was interpreted by the Somali and EU8-Poles alike that my research was a positive action to assist in drawing attention to their respective marginalization and integration and contribution in Britain. Upon reflection I believe my research, and indeed me as a person, were perceived as both non-threatening and seriously intentioned. As to the methods of collection I employed, none was indiscriminate to the degree they could not be traced back to theoretical foundations, (e.g. snowball-sampling; the identical non-probability methodology used by Vargas-Silva\(^{322}\) in his USA-based gender-based research).

Figure 4: Somali interviewee clan membership or affiliation

Source: Library Photo “We Are Somali” Hussein Kesvani at http://www.vice.com/read/somalis (19.02.14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clan name (Status of the clan)</th>
<th>Somali Women</th>
<th>Somali Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Somali”</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declined</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Somali”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darod (Noble clan)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majeerten (Darod sub-clan)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mareham (Darod sub-clan)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogaden (Darod sub-clan)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsingeli (Darod sub-clan)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbursi (Dir sub-clan)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiwaye (Noble clan)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaaq (Noble clan)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of interviewees
Problems encountered

My cross-disciplinary primary and secondary research was not unproblematic although my overall experience was positive and fruitful. Knowledge outcomes and broader understanding made fresh subject connections, expanded the corpus of knowledge regarding Britain’s multicultural history, its population, and in particular gave valuable insights into contemporary migration, settlement, and diaspora experiences. My empirical fieldwork undoubtedly conformed to the anthropological axiom that field research per se is not a ‘neat, precise, and [wholly] systematic process’.

In truth, from my perspective my fieldwork was ‘messier’ than ‘books and articles reporting on ethnographic research’ frequently and unrealistically report. Both the Somali and EU8-Poles were, in their own cultural forms, ‘closed communities’. I overcame this potential for access problems by using my cultural community gatekeepers. This acknowledged, I enjoyed a very high level of cooperation from all of my respondents once I had made contact with them. There were very few language problems to overcome within either group. Certainly at no point was my study confounded by communication difficulties or obstacles. Where minor understanding issues were encountered, my respective gatekeepers assisted in swiftly overcoming these either through direct translation or by suggesting researcher re-phrasing. For the most part, the obstacles I encountered had been anticipated and talked through with the respective gatekeepers prior to the interviews taking place. While the non-payment ethics issue of the participants was enthusiastically, and on occasions doggedly, pursued by some of the Somali men, none of the issues encountered were insurmountable aside from the statistical data shortfalls.

Insofar as the EU8-Poles were concerned, I felt this same non-threatening and genuinely intentioned interpretation of my work was evident. Questions and issues particularly pertaining to Catholicism, ‘class’ and ‘race’ were the Polish equivalents to the Somali clan based discussion reluctances. As with the Somali clan subject matter, I carefully and sympathetically teased-out information regarding these culturally delicate aspects of Polish history and contemporary way of life. My approach, in both cases, was successful particularly in gaining an intimate familiarity with the actual cultural, attitudinal, and personal beliefs and feelings of the respondents to what remain, potentially at least, emotive issues. This is illustrated in greater depth in chapter five.

324 Ibid
Lastly, I felt my quantitative enumeration was obfuscated by inaccurate official British and Polish immigration and demographic data. While this information deficit had been publicly acknowledged by the ONS, it was an irritant in my knowledge journey to better and more fully understand migrants to Britain and the effects of immigration policy in Britain upon them. I have subsequently over-written and edited 2001 data using the 2011 National Census data.

Interestingly the Slough and South Bucks newspaper for Friday 01 February carried reporter Sophie Flowers 2011 National Census based headline, ‘Sixteen per cent of some Slough households use Polish as main language’. This drilled down into the 2011 census data of the 56.1 million residents of England and Wales, 546,000 of whom reported they spoke Polish, making the Polish language officially England’s second language, (Welsh remains Wales’ second language).

Summary and Future study
I consider the real-time ‘messiness and complexity of everyday life’ I unearthed in Slough was comprehensively explored using my flexible semi-structured research methodology. I ‘did not ignore such complexity but instead engage (d) with it’. My research required thorough planning on my part however. While the selection and recruitment of my interviewees was not random I nevertheless had to consider the composition of each of the groups; in taking the study forward. Further, the questions and topics I put to each of my interviewees were key points for consideration during my planning. Even minutiae such as the suitability of the interview venues, (e.g. the Holiday Inn in Chalvey, respective participant homes and community spaces), and the correctness in the provision of refreshments (especially to the female

325 Source: http://www.sloughexpress.co.uk/News/All-Areas/Slough/Some-44-per-cent-of-households-in-Slough-dont-even-01022013.htm,(18.02.14)
327 Dwyer, C. & Limb, M. 2001,p.1
328 Ibid
Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place

interviewees) were critical to the success of my research. Upon reflection, while not suggesting my planning, preparation and research-execution were flawless, I consider I was well-prepared prior to embarking on my field-work. I was thorough as regards the points I needed to cover in the interview introductions, such as the ethics considerations, anonymity and rights to withdraw. My wording of the key semi-structured questions, the topics and the vignettes were all reviewed on multiple occasions as ‘rehearsals’ prior to engaging with even my two Gatekeepers. I considered for example what watchwords I may encounter; such as ‘Somaliness’ (i.e. expressing the Somali core belief in themselves), triggers (positive as well as negative, such as EU-citizenship) and the types of appropriate prompts (e.g. tell me about an occasion when you…) that I may need to employ to examine a topic further. Deriving from Bedford and Burgess’ explanation of their particular use of focus-groups in social research, I undoubtedly gained greater insight into the ways in which the Somali and EU8-Poles in Slough ‘construct(ed their) environmental and social issues (and) share(d) their knowledge, experiences and prejudices; and argue(d) their different points of view’ through their interaction with me. Certainly both my Somali and EU8-Polish interviewee cohorts brought their notion of habitus with them based on their traditions and their cultural histories in explaining the forces, motivations and contexts in which their migrations and settlements in Slough had taken place.

Chapter three following is explicatory of Somali history; a chronological profile of the ‘four-waves’ of Somali migration, settlement, and diasporic record. It is not however a study of the history of Somalia covered for example in the works by Bradbury, Lewis, and Ahmed although for contextualisation purposes it offers a condensed but necessary account of colonialism and post-colonialism. My profiling is primarily one of migration and settlement. I sketch the socio-economic, humanitarian, educational, and other reasoning for Somali migrations. I review subsequent settlement rational. Examples include employment, housing, economics, and interaction with wider British society. I succinctly map Somali communities across Britain through history. My synopsis contextualises the modern day fourth-wave Somali and makes clear the continuity of migration and settlement linkages with

330Wacquant, L. 2005, p.316
332Lewis, I. M. 1994, Blood and Bone; The Call of Kinship in Somali Society, Red Sea,Lawrenceville
334Griffiths, D.J. 2002,p.77
Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place

Britain over time. Figure 5, immediately following, details the interviewee biographic profiles of my seventy-four interviewees. It is categorised by ethnicity, by gender, and by legal status (e.g. asylum seeker, refugee, economic migrant etc).

“People”

Figure 5: Somali men

Somali Secondary EU migrant

Asylum Seekers (Awaiting status outcome)

SM5 – Single SM5 declined to give his age but appeared to be 20-30 years-old. SM5 grew up and was educated in Kenya. SM5 declined to give details of when he arrived in Britain or Clan association/membership details but was resolutely ‘Somali’ in his views throughout the interview (Group Interview with SM2, SM3, and SM4) (10.02.2007)

SM7: 28 year-old SM7 was single and arrived in the UK in September 2005. His application for ‘full’ Refugee status continued un-resolved and SM7 was renewing his refugee-status annually. Although he felt settled in Slough, work consisted of ‘cash in hand’ payments for largely manual work. SM7 admitted he sought solace in frequent Qat usage. He hoped to return to Somalia after the Civil War (09.04.2007)

SM10: Single 28 year-old SM10 arrived in the UK to ‘visit family’ in February 2008 and has been denied asylum in the UK. He was unable to work or study or plan for the future. He would not discuss the reasons for this. SM10 expected to be deported

335Library Photo:UNHCR (R.Nuri), 2009 (03 September), UNHCR distributes aid from UAE to refugees in Yemen, http://www.unhcr.org/4a9fd6b96.html,(19.02.14)
at some time in the future but was living with various friends in Chalvey and believed he may have to 'disappear' to avoid deportation (29.09.2008)

**SM12:** Single 25 year-old SM12 arrived in Slough from Libya in September 2007 to join extended family. He lived with an uncle and aunt in Chalvey. His application for Refugee status was being dealt with by his solicitor. He was not legally able to work or study. SM12 involved himself as a ‘Community Volunteer’ and hoped to study further in the future both to improve his English language skills and to become a ‘Manager’ (29.09.2008)

**SM13:** 45 year-old SM13 fled to Ethiopia after escaping wrongful imprisonment and torture in Somalia in 2006 leaving his wife, five children and his aging parents still in Somalia. SM13 admitted to being ‘politically active’. He sent home what financial remittances he could. SM13 arrived in the UK via Italy in late-2007. He was held in detention by the Italian authorities for 6-months until his status was decided upon and an interim visa to work issued. SM13 decided to remain in Europe but felt the UK offered more ‘economic prospects’ than Italy. His application for Refugee status in Britain had been rejected and he remained without permission to work legally. It was likely he would be returned to Italy (23.10.2008)

**SM15:** 43 year-old separated SM15 arrived in Britain in 2006 (Sheffield). His wife and three children remained in Sheffield with members of her family. SM15’s application for Refugee status was being considered by the Home Office. He shared a private rented house with extended Somali family in Chalvey. SM15 felt forced to be unemployed. SM15 was happy not to be involved in the Civil War in Somalia but wanted to return ‘home’. He felt the Somali in Britain were discriminated against and even if/when he was allowed to work he would not get a job easily because he was ‘black’ and a Muslim (Group Interview with SM14 / SM15 / SM16 / SM17 / SM18 / SM19) (04.11.2008)

**SM16:** 37 year-old single SM16 like SM15 was forced by his legal-status uncertainty as an asylum-seeker to be unemployed but accepted ‘cash in hand’ work as it arose. SM16 fled Somalia to the UK after escaping torture in Somalia in 2007. Like SM7, SM16 admitted to frequent Qat usage and stayed in a variety of houses (couch-hopping) within the Somali ‘community’ (Group Interview with SM14 / SM15 / SM16 / SM17 / SM18 / SM19) (04.11.2008)

**Refugees (Status granted)**

**SM11:** SM11 was a single 26 year-old originally from Hargeisa who fled to Ethiopia in 1998 and lived in a refugee camp for 4 years before ‘leaving’ Africa for Europe. SM11 arrived in the UK in 2003. He was a third-year Mechanical Engineering Undergraduate at a local University, held refugee status and lived with friends of his father’s brother (uncle) in Slough. SM11’s parents remained in Hargeisa (29.09.2008)

**SM14:** 33 year-old SM14 arrived in Slough from ‘Lawrence Hill’ in Bristol with his wife and five children in autumn 2005 to take up work in a Slough supermarket as a Warehouseman. The family had arrived in Bristol in 2001 to join friends and family in the Bristol Diaspora but could not find work there. SM14 lived in private rented accommodation and expected to remain in Britain as it was safe’ (Group Interview with SM14 / SM15 / SM16 / SM17 / SM18 / SM19) (04.11.2008)

**SM17:** 36 year-old SM17 had been in the UK for ‘about three years’ (arrived 2005?). SM17 was generally ‘vague’ and separated from his wife who lived in London but
acknowledged he had four children aged nine to fifteen years of age who he rarely saw. SM17 was angry that he has not been able to work regularly since arriving in Britain and claimed to have bone fide refugee status. (Group Interview with SM14 / SM15 / SM16 / SM17 / SM18 / SM19) (04.11.2008)

**Secondary/Economic Migrants**

SM2 - 39-year old SM2 was the Chair of the SWA (Somali Welfare Association) He was married with five children and lived in Chalvey. A secondary migrant from The Netherlands arriving in Slough via London in the summer of 2006; SM2 was of the Majeerteen Clan (*of the Harti Clan – an aspect of the ‘Noble’ Darod Clan in N.E. Somalia*) (Group Interview with SM3, SM4, and SM5) (10.02.2007)

SM3 - SM3 was 35-years old, married with one child and grew up in Denmark; he and his family were secondary-EU migrants to Britain arriving in Slough in 2000. SM3 was a qualified Electrical Engineer and worked as a subcontractor locally around Slough. SM3 was staunchly Somali and declined to give Clan association/membership details (Group Interview with SM2, SM4, and SM5) (10.02.2007)

SM4 - 40-year old SM4 was married with three children and lived in Chalvey. SM4 was of the Majeerteen Clan, (*an aspect of the ‘Noble’ Darod Clan in N.E. Somalia*). He grew up and was educated in Ethiopia before migrating to The Netherlands in 1986. SM4 and his family lived there for seventeen-years and were secondary EU-migrants to Britain arriving in Slough in 2003 (Group Interview with SM2, SM3, and SM5) (10.02.2007)

SM6: 40 year-old SM6 had begun training as a Teacher in Mogadishu, but fled the Civil War with his family to Italy in 1995. SM6 re-trained as a Plumber in 1999 and was employed by a local heating company in Slough. SM6 was married with four children. The family were bone fide Refugees. He regretted not being a teacher and longed to return ‘home’ to Somalia after the Civil War (31.03.2007)

SM8: Single 35 year-old SM8 fled Somalia in 1992 and arrived in Malta where he was held in detention for nearly two-years as an asylum-seeker before moving on to Italy to find work. SM8 was an EU citizen; a Somali-Italian ‘secondary migrant’. He arrived in the UK (London) in April 2006 and remained in Slough, staying with friends, working for an Employment Agency on mainly manual labouring / factory work contracts. SM8 hoped to return to Somalia after the Civil War (Joint Interview with SM9) (09.08.2008)

SM9: Single 37 year-old SM9 fled Somalia in November 2001 and was trafficked to Libya. He paid an ‘agent’ $US 750.00 to deliver him to the Italian island of Lampedusa and sought asylum in Italy. As a qualified and experienced Civil Engineer he gained Italian/EU citizenship in May 2006 moving to Birmingham as a ‘secondary migrant’ in search of work in the summer of 2007. Since arriving in the UK, SM9 had encountered resistance from potential employers who are reluctant to accept his qualifications. SM9 hoped to re-study for a UK equivalent; a B.Eng. In the meantime he was working in a retail warehouse on minimum wage to rent a small flat and make financial remittances to his family remaining in Somalia (Joint Interview with SM8) (09.08.2008)

SM18: Single 23 year-old SM18 arrived in Slough in March 2007 via London from France as a secondary EU-migrant. SM18’s use of the English language was limited. He had attended some ESOL classes in Slough but did not continue with them; SM18 was unemployed and said he may try to find labouring work in London or Manchester.
SM18 was clear the UK was not ‘home’ and wanted to return to Somalia to rejoin his family after the Civil War. (Group Interview with SM14 / SM15 / SM16 / SM17 / SM18 / SM19) (04.11.2008)

SM19: Married 29 year-old SM19 had two sons aged four and two years of age. SM19 and his family were secondary-EU migrants to Britain arriving in Slough in 2002 from Denmark. SM19 was a qualified Electrician and was content to remain in the UK to ensure his children had a good education before he and his wife ever considered returning to Somalia. SM19 was a devout Muslim. (Group Interview with SM14 / SM15 / SM16 / SM17 / SM18 / SM19) (04.11.2008)

SF6: Arrived in London seeking asylum in 2005; granted Refugee status. Single 28 year-old SF6 was a Teacher in Somalia but now works with women’s groups in the Somali ‘community’ in Chalvey on a voluntary basis. She hopes one-day to return to teaching (Joint Interview with SF7) (21.06.2007)

SF14: 25 year-old SF14 was widowed in August 2005; she has a seven year-old son. Her husband, a successful Somali businessman in Mogadishu before 2002 was shot by renegade militia. SF14 and her son fled Somalia into Ethiopia arriving in the UK via Italy and France in 2007. They lived with her late-husbands extended family in Slough. SF14 could not legally work. Her application for asylum remained under consideration by the Home Office (Small Group Interview with SF13, SF15 and SF16) (11.11.2008)

SF15: Degree educated 28 year-old SF15 was a Public Administration Teacher at the Amoud University in her home town of Borama before she was forced to flee the

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Civil War in 2004 to the Aisha Refugee Camp in Ethiopia where she remained for two years before arriving in the UK (London) in July 2006. Single SF15 lived with an uncle, aunt and cousins in Slough. Her command of the English language was very good and her application for Refugee status remained under consideration by the Home Office. SF15 ‘works’ as a community volunteer; in particular as a Somali-English translator for Somali women (Small Group Interview with SF13, SF14 and SF16) (11.11.2008)

**SF16:** 28 year-old SF16, like SF14 was a widow. She had no children and lived with a cousin and her family in Chalvey. SF16’s husband was killed in Jasira near Mogadishu fighting in the Civil War in 2005. Both her father and mother have ‘disappeared’ in Somalia. SF16 was brought to the UK by an ‘agent’ paid for by her extended family in January 2006. She has been offered, but has declined, TLR (Temporary Leave to Remain) in Britain for one-year. SF16’s Solicitor was dealing with her application to the Home Office to grant her full Refugee status. SF16 was consequently unemployed (Small Group Interview with SF13, SF14 and SF15) (11.11.2008)

**Refugees (Status granted)**

**SF4:** SF4 was 31 years-old, married and has three children. SF4 works part-time as a Cleaner for an agency based in Slough and arrived in the UK in 2000; she held refugee status. SF4 found it challenging to settle in the UK as her husband remained fighting in Somalia. She hoped to return permanently to Somalia (Joint Interview with SF3 and SF5) (04.06.2007)

**SF7:** Arriving in the UK from a Kenyan Refugee camp in 2002 aged just 14 years-old as an unaccompanied-minor to join her cousins at her Aunt and Uncle’s home in London, when interviewed 19 year-old SF7 was single. SF7 lived with another aunt and uncle in Slough and held refugee status. She worked part-time as a Cleaner for an agency based in Slough along with SF4. SF7’s parents and older siblings remained in Kenya (Joint Interview with SF6) (21.06.2007)

**SF8:** 26 year-old SF8 was married with a nine year-old daughter. Her husband remained in Somalia fighting in the Civil War. SF8 arrived with her daughter in London in 2005 and sought asylum. She had little education in Somalia and spoke virtually no English when she arrived. She now lives in Chalvey with an aunt and cousins; her daughter was performing very well at school. SF8 was unemployed but was learning English at a Slough college and wished to train as an Interpreter to help the Somali community (Joint Interview with SF9) (01.09.2008)

**SF10:** Married with four children, SF10’s husband remains fighting in Somalia. SF10, SF11 and SF12 were sisters; all born in Baraawi. SF10 was 28 years old and arrived in London with her children in 2006 fleeing the Somali Civil War. SF10 was unemployed and considered her role as a mother to be the most important job she had. SF10’s command of the English language remained poor. She hoped to return to Somalia after the Civil War to re-join her husband (Joint Interview with SF11 and SF12) (02.10.2008)

**SF11:** Married with five children, 27 year-old SF11’s husband remains ‘missing’ in Somalia. SF11 arrived in the UK in the summer of 2004 and moved from Leicester to Slough in 2005. She works part-time as a cleaner and she had a reasonable command of the English language. Like her sister SF10, SF11 hoped to return to Somalia after the Civil War. (Joint Interview with SF10 and SF12) (02.10.2008)
**Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place**

**SF12:** Single 21 year-old SF12 joined her two elder-sisters in Slough in January 2007 having originally stayed with relatives in Leicester. SF12’s command of the English language remained poor. She attended evening ESOL classes in the town and was unemployed. Like her sisters, SF10 and SF11, she considered her stay in the UK as ‘exile’ and wanted to return ‘home’ to Somalia. (Joint Interview with SF10 and SF11) (02.10.2008)

**SF13:** SF13 was 34 years-old, married and has five children. Her English language was poor. SF13’s husband was in full-time local employment as a labourer. Prior to coming to the UK as asylum-seekers in 2006, the family were in the Dabaab refugee camp in Kenya for nearly 2 years. They had had their own farm in Somalia growing pumpkins and corn. The family held full-Refugee status. SF13 was proud to be a housewife and mother and supplemented the family income with an evening cleaning job (Small Group Interview with SF14, SF15 and SF16) (11.11.2008)

**Secondary/Economic Migrants**

**SF1** - Married with four children aged between 12 and 6 years of age, 38 year-old SF1 was from the Hawiye Clan and was a housewife and mother. SF1 and her family arrived in Slough in July 2005 from Italy as EU-secondary migrants. (Joint Interview with SF2) (31.03.2007)

**SF2** - Married with eight children aged between 21 and 4 years of age, 43 year-old SF2 was from the Hawiye Clan and was a housewife and mother. An EU-secondary migrant from Sweden, SF2 and her family arrived in Slough in January 2005 (Joint Interview with SF1) (31.03.2007)

**SF3:** 35 year-old SF3 fled the Civil War in Somalia with her husband and three children to Holland in 1998. The family endured a long asylum procedure and were finally granted refugee status in Holland in 2002 and EU-citizenship in 2005. The family joined extended family in Slough (Chalvey) in 2005 as bone-fide EU Citizens; i.e. secondary-migrants. SF3 was a Housewife and Mother (Joint Interview with SF4 and SF5) (04.06.2007)

**SF5:** SF5 arrived in the South-of-France as a 20 year-old asylum seeking Refugee in 1991, escaping the Civil War after her husband was imprisoned and killed for his political / Clannist views. SF5 entered the UK in 1998 as a French EU-citizen, (i.e. a secondary-migrant). She remains single and was unemployed (Joint Interview with SF3 and SF4) (04.06.2007)

**SF17:** Single 29 year-old SF17 was a UK/EU Citizen and works as an Administration Assistant / Receptionist for a hotel in London. She arrived in Slough in August 1996 with her mother and younger sister (SF18) having been resettled as part of a UNHCR programme organised in Mombasa (Kenya) where the family lived in a Refugee camp from 1991-1996. SF17 fled the Civil War with her mother and sister after her father was killed in an attack on their home in Mogadishu. The UK, not Somalia was ‘home’ for SF17 (Joint Interview with sister SF18) (21.11.2008)

**SF18:** Single 27 year-old SF18, SF17’s younger sister, was currently unemployed having worked in a local factory assembling electronic devices before it relocated abroad. Like SF17, SF18 was a UK/EU Citizen, living with their mother in a rented house in Slough. SF18 was keen to find alternative work and was registered with several employment agencies in the area. As with SF17, SF18 calls Britain and not
Somalia ‘home’ although the family has many relatives remaining in Somalia  (Joint Interview with sister SF17)  (21.11.2008)

**UK born (UK citizen)**

**SF9:** Single 18 year-old SF9 was a confident second-generation ‘fourth-wave’-British-Somali, born and bred in Slough. She has never been to Somalia although she cherished her Somali heritage. Her mother and father fled Somalia in 1991. SF9 was a University Undergraduate attending TVU (Thames Valley University). She was undertaking a Business Studies degree. She hoped to marry and have a large family (Joint Interview with SF8) (01.09.2008)
Specific technical skills and work ethic were cited as key reasons for employers’ perceptions of EU migrant workers as better candidates for low-skilled roles than UK-born candidates.

Bartłomiej Bankowski
[Bartek]
Veterinary Surgeon (Slough)

‘Professional’ EU8

Figure 7: Polish men

Secondary/Economic Migrants

PM1 – Single 26 year-old PM1 was a qualified car mechanic, stalwartly ‘Polish’ and a robust Roman Catholic. PM1 arrived in the UK in 2004 to work. He did not consider Slough or Britain ‘home’ and considered Britain to be too moderate in the way it dealt with ‘non-white’ / ‘non-Christian’ ‘other’ (08.08.2007)

PM2 - Married 33 year-old PM2 was born in Bodgoszcz. He and his wife had one son. PM2 held a science degree and worked with an international company in Slough (Joint Interview PM2/PM3) 20.08.2007

PM3 - Married with one daughter 34 year-old PM3 was born in Nowicz. Very highly qualified; holding no less than three Masters Degrees, PM3 was a DTP Specialist for an international company in Slough. He planned to return to Poland with his family in the future (Joint Interview PM2/PM3) 20.08.2007

PM4: 29 year-old PM4 was an experienced Coach Driver for a private transport company based in Windsor. He was single and arrived in the UK in July 2004. PM4 was only in Slough (Britain) to earn money prior to returning at some point to Poland where he wished to buy a house and open his own transport company. He did not consider Slough was ‘home’ (Joint Interview with PM5) (12.09.2007)

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338 Eccleston, J. 2013 (14 March), CIPD highlights reasons behind growth in use of migrant labour, Personnel Today, Reed Business Industries, London
339 Source: Companion Care Vets (Farnham Road), Our Team at http://www.companioncare.co.uk/slough-meet-our-team.htm, (19.02.14)
PM5: A Central-Heating Engineer, 31 year-old PM5 enjoyed his family’s successful June 2004 relocation and resettlement in Slough. Self-employed, he, his wife and 3 year old son rented a private flat in Slough. PM5 was proud he owned a car and a van for his work (mainly in London). Work was plentiful and pay was x4 what he could have earned in Warsaw as an employee. PM5 was unsure how long he and his family would remain in the UK (Joint Interview with PM4) (12.09.2007)

PM6: Single 30 year-old PM6 first arrived in the UK (London) illegally in 2001 as part of the ‘third-wave’ working as a Stonemason for a family contact for 6-months. He returned legally (as part of the fourth-wave) in June 2004 to assist in running the same business. Family contacts in Slough have determined where PM6 lives. PM6 was very proud of being ‘Polish’ (21.09.2007)

PM7: 33 year-old PM7 from Przemysl in Poland secured a home for him and his wife (PF8) and two young children as a School Caretaker in a private school on the outskirts of Slough in August 2005. PM7 has found settling into the UK easy although he had few friends outside of the EU8-Polish community (Joint Interview with wife PF8) (24.11.2007)

PM8: 35 year-old Precision Tool Maker PM8 and his 34 year-old Credit Insurance Specialist wife (PF9) were in no doubts they will return to Poland and do not consider Britain (Slough) as a permanent home. Arriving in December 2004 PM8 and PF9 are lucid their stay in the UK was to earn money, build professional experience and have ‘fun’ before they settle down and start a family in Poland (Joint Interview with wife PF9) (09.12.2007)

PM9: A 29 year-old General Builder, PM9 lived in Slough with his long term girlfriend PF10. PM9 arrived in May 2004 to work on a specific contract in the Thames Valley but decided to stay as work was plentiful. PF10 joined PM9 in the UK in February 2006 and they were in private rented accommodation in Slough. PM9 worked for PM10. (Joint Interview with PF10 and PM10) (04.03.2008)

PM10: A 42 year-old Building Contractor, PM10 was already working ‘illegally’ in the S.E of the UK on May 1st 2004 when Poland officially joined the EU although when interviewed he was legally working as an EU8-Polish worker/employer. In reality he was a part of the ‘third-wave’. PM10 had spent a total of six years working and earning money in Britain. PM9 was employed by PM10. PM10 owned a house in Slough but his wife and two teenage children remained at the family home in Poland (Krakow).PM10 intended to return permanently to Poland and resume his business there. He was aware of the likelihood of an economic down-turn in Britain (Joint Interview with PF10 and PM9) (04.03.2008)

PM11: A single 26 year-old from near Gdansk, PM11 was a Postman in Slough with ambitions to remain in the UK all the while the work he undertook was regular, interesting and helped him better his standard of living. PM11 arrived in Slough in the summer of 2006. He rented a room in a boarding-house in the town. PM11 was staunchly ‘Polish’ and rejected notions of being ‘European’ (09.08.2008)

PM12: A 44 year-old Butcher and small-business owner who arrived from Warsaw with his wife (PF11) and son (PM13) in the UK in January 2005 opening his store specializing in imported Polish delicacies in June 2005. PM12 employs both PF11 and PM13. Overall PM12’s experiences of the UK had been positive although he was aware ‘some’ British people did not accept their success and resented them. The family has been subjected to incidents of ‘racist’ verbal abuse (Joint Interview with wife PF11 and son PM13) (09.08.2008)
PM13: Single 21 year-old PM13 worked in his father’s food-shop and had many ‘twenty-something’ EU8-Polish friends in and around Slough. PM13 hoped to ‘learn the trade’ from his parents and eventually expand the business in the UK. He saw Britain as more positive and accepting of ‘business’ than Poland (Joint Interview with mother PF11 and father PM12) (09.08.2008)

PM14: A 30 year-old English Teacher in the Private Education sector PM14 and his wife (PF14) and their 2 children (9 and 7 years old) moved to Slough in June 2006. PM14 hoped their children take full advantage of the British education system and they would be able to buy their own home in the UK. (Joint Interview with wife PF14) (17.08.2008)

PM15: 46 year-old PM15 was divorced, without children, and chose to come to the UK as a direct result of his divorce in February 2007. His ex-wife remains in Krakow, Poland. A committed Roman Catholic and fervently ‘Polish ’, PM15 was an International Interpreter for a major multinational company. PM15 enjoyed his involvement in Slough’s Polish Catholic ‘faith-community’ and lived in a rented house in the town. He had no idea what his future held or how long he would remain in Slough or the UK (18.08.2008)

PM16: 29 year-old PM16, an I.T Consultant, took relocation with his international employer to Slough along with his Staff Nurse wife (PF15) arriving in the town in May 2007. This professional couple intended to permanently remain in the UK. They rented a small flat, but intended to purchase a larger home and start a family (Joint Interview with wife PF15) (24.08.2008)

PM17: Despite his Degree in Management and Economics and a very good command of English, 31 year-old PM17 worked on the ‘Shop-Floor’ at a major retail outlet in Slough. He was pragmatic and intended to return to Dlugoleka in Poland to purchase a house with the money he had saved. PM17 hoped to marry and use his qualifications in the Polish financial sector thereafter. (04.09.2008)

PM18: 34-year-old PM18 from Wroclaw was single and was a Van Driver for an Electrical Distributor. He arrived in London in April 2005. Staunchly ‘Polish’ and in the UK to earn money prior to returning permanently to Poland, PM18 believed Britain was ‘too lenient’ with migrants. PM18 earned nearly x5 what he was able to earn in Poland. He lived with other Polish friends in rented accommodation in Slough (a town he dislikes) (18.10.2008)

PM19: A 27 year-old qualified Electronics Test-Engineer from Warsaw who left Poland with his wife and two children in June 2004. PM20 was employed by an international company in Slough and had settled well in the UK although he felt continued alienation from the existing second and third waves of the Polish ‘community’ of the town. The family lived in private rented accommodation in Slough (17.11.2008)
“I have my own goals and nothing will get in the way”
Joanna Solska (Slough)\textsuperscript{340}

Pharmacy Assistant of the Year 2012
- Iwona Garncarek (Slough)\textsuperscript{341}

Figure 8: Polish women

\textbf{PF2}: 33 year-old PF2 was married with one three year-old son. Born in Bydgoszcz in 1974, PF2 attended University in Dansk and was a Child Psychologist registered with the British Psychological Society. PF2 was a EU8-Polish professional. PF2 was due to take up a SEN Learning Assistant post at a Slough Primary School from September 2007 to both work as well as improve her own English Language skills. PF2 arrived in the UK with her family in 2006 (04.08.2007)

\textbf{PF3}: Single 24 year-old University Graduate (Languages) PF3 from Poznan was employed as an Interpreter for an international freight company in Slough. PF3 speaks six languages fluently. PF3 rents a flat in the private sector in Slough and has many friends in the ‘fourth-wave’-Polish community. PF3 hopes to build her career internationally (16.10.2007)

\textbf{PF4}: Single 27 year-old PF4 was an English Teacher from Gdansk who arrived in London in July 2004 to stay with Polish friends, find a permanent teaching post and to save money to buy her own house back in Poland. She started temporary teaching work in Slough in April 2005. PF4 wanted to return to Poland eventually but was concerned work will not be easy to find at the income level she will seek to maintain her standard of living (16.10.2007)

\textbf{PF5}: 24 year-old PF5 from Krakow was single and holds a Degree in Business Studies. PF5 arrived in the UK in March 2007. She lives in private rented


\textsuperscript{341}\textit{Trainis, N. 2012 (23 April), Profile: Overcoming the odds}, Pharmacy Business, Garavi Gujarat Publications
accommodation in Slough with PF6, although both work in London. PF5 was employed as a Management Trainee by a major Integrated Energy organization as part of a ‘Fast-Track’ Management Programme. She intends to remain in the UK and secure a long-term well-paid post in the Energy industry (Joint Interview with PF6) (05.11.2007)

PF6: 25 year-old PF6 also from Krakow was, like PF5, single and holds a Degree in Business Studies. Like PF5, PF6 arrived in the UK in March 2007. She too was employed as a Management Trainee by the same major Integrated Energy organization based in London and was part of the same Fast-Track’ Management Programme. PF6 hopes to travel internationally with her career but expects to return to Poland at some point in the future to possibly settle (Joint Interview with PF5) (05.11.2007)

PF7: Employing her significant Recruitment Agency experience in Poland, her Business Degree and excellent English Language skills 28 year-old PF7 was the Manager of a Polish Recruitment Agency; specifically placing ‘fourth-wave’ Poles in the Building, Hospitality and Leisure industry sectors, (i.e. Manual Workers and Trades-persons). PF7 arrived in London in May 2004 and relocated to Slough in late-2005 to further her career. PF7 rents a house on the outskirts of Slough. PF7 acknowledges ‘some’ ‘fourth-wave’-Poles have very poor English language skills to match their tradesmanship talents. PF7 will remain in the UK as long as it ‘pays’ to do so (19.11.2007)

PF8: 28 year-old PF8 and her husband (PM7) and two young children live and work at a private school near Slough. Arriving in August 2005, PF8 works as a Cleaning-Supervisor at the school. As with her husband PM7, PF8 has found settling into the UK easy although she has few friends outside of the EU8-Polish ‘community’ (Joint Interview with husband PM7) (24.11.2007)

PF9: 34 year-old International Credit Insurance Specialist PF9, along with her 35 year-old Precision Tool Maker husband (PM8) – both from Warsaw, are in no doubts they will return to Poland and do not consider Britain (Slough) as a permanent home / place of work. Arriving in December 2004 PF9 and PM8 are lucid their stay in the UK was to earn money, build professional experience and have ‘fun’ before they settle down and start a family in Poland (Joint Interview with husband PM8) (09.12.2007)

PF10: 28 year-old PF10 was an Estate Agent Manager in Wroclaw in Poland but now works as a Waitress in a fast-food outlet in Slough for more money and to better her English-language skills. Arriving in Slough in February 2006 to join her long-term boyfriend PM9, a Builder, who arrived in May 2004, PF10 hopes to return to Poland with PM9 to marry and settle down but cannot state ‘when’ (Joint Interview with PM9 and PM10) (04.03.2008)

PF11: 41 year-old PF11 runs the family business with her husband (PM12) and son (PM13). PF11 enjoys the rewards of the family's hard work. She was active in the local ‘fourth-wave’-Polish community and has made many friends via the business and the Polish Catholic Church (Joint Interview with husband PM12 and son PM13) (09.08.2008)

PF12: Divorced 44 year-old PF12 from Warsaw works in a Residential Care Home for the elderly on the outskirts of Slough; she arrived in the town in June 2005. PF12 was clear her motivation to work in the UK remains to better her life and secure her future financially. She rents a room in a private house owned by a Polish family and
intends to return to Poland to open her own care home (Joint Interview with PF13) (10.08.2008)

**PF13:** Single 29 year-old PF13 from Warsaw worked alongside PF12 in a Slough Residential Care Home for the elderly. PF12 recommended PF13 travel to Slough to work at the home with a position guaranteed. PF13 arrived in the town in August 2007. As for PF12, PF13’s principle rationale to work in the UK remains to earn as much money as possible before returning to Poland. PF13 rents a room in a private house owned by the same Polish family as PF12 (Joint Interview with PF12) (10.08.2008)

**PF14:** A 31 year-old Psychology Teacher in Secondary Education PF14 and her husband (PM14) visited her brother and his family in London in late-2005 and decided to seek a teaching post in ‘southern’ Britain. PF14 and her family, a son aged 9 years and a daughter aged 7 years moved to Slough in June 2006 and live in private rented accommodation on the outskirts of the town. PF14 was settled in the UK and hopes they remain in Britain until the children finish their schooling. (Joint Interview with husband PM14) (17.08.2008)

**PF15:** 27 year-old PF15, a Staff Nurse in a local NHS hospital, and her 29 year-old husband – I.T Consultant PM16 arrived in Slough in May 2007. This professional couple intends to permanently remain in the UK. Currently renting a small flat, they intend to purchase a larger home and start a family (Joint Interview with husband PM16) (24.08.2008)

**PF16:** Single 25 year-old PF16 arrived in the UK (London) in April 2006 and worked as a minimum wage Waitress prior to securing a more appropriate post as a Laboratory Technician, using her Biology Degree in a Private-sector school. PF16 lives in a rented one-bedroom flat in Slough; she hopes to gain valuable work experience before returning to Poland (21.10.2008)

**PF17:** Single 28 year-old PF17 was considering returning to Poland as the recession bites in the UK although she was concerned how she will be received in Warsaw and questions whether the economic situation will be better or worse there. She moved to Slough in July 2004, lives in a rented flat with PF18 and has been employed by a local Marketing Company designing and producing advertising flyers (Joint Interview with PF18) (24.11.2008)

**PF18:** PF18 was 30 years-old, single, and moved to Slough in June 2004 to take up a Personal Assistant post with an International Marketing Company in the town and intends to remain in the UK in the medium term. (Joint Interview with PF17) (24.11.2008)

The following questions detailed in Figure 9 were those I posed in the semi-structured joint-interview with Superintendent Peter Davies (Slough LPA Commander) and Kulbir Brar (Slough Community and Diversity Officer) of TVP at Slough Police Station on Thursday 14 June 2007.
1. The Government defines community cohesion as “...the existence of a common vision and sense of belonging; appreciating and valuing of the diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances, and their having similar life opportunities”.

- What are your views?
- Do you agree with this definition?
- What is your definition?
- What factors do you see as important for practically achieving community cohesion?

2. How does Thames Valley Police contribute to empowering local people in Slough to participate in local decision making?

3. How important, in your opinion, is improving the teaching of English for non-native speakers in Slough?

4. The Government believes that community cohesion involves promoting racial equality and widespread social participation. Is this realistic or simply an unachievable aim?

5. Please provide any specific examples of conflict between the Somali and the A8 Poles in Slough since 2004

6. Please provide any specific examples of community cohesion between the Somali and the EU8-Poles in Slough since 2004

7. Please provide any specific examples of extremism (racial violence, religious zealotry etc) expressed to TVP by the Somali and / or the EU8-Poles in Slough since 2004

Figure 9: Questions for semi-structured joint-interview with Superintendent Peter Davies (Slough LPA Commander) and Kulbir Brar (Slough Community and Diversity Officer)

(continues on next page)
8. What are your views on the Commission for Equality and Human Rights providing help on all discrimination issues at one site and covering areas exempt by the existing Commissions?
   - Will this help or hinder your work in Slough?

9. What are, in your opinion, the TOP 3 positive steps being taken towards community cohesion and racial equality in Slough?
   - Do any or all of these involve either the Somali or the EU8 Polish communities?

10. What are, in your opinion, the TOP 3 negative issues confronting the Somali community (i.e. that are hindering their steps towards community cohesion and racial equality) in Slough?

11. What are, in your opinion, the TOP 3 negative issues confronting the EU8-Polish community (i.e. that are hindering their steps towards community cohesion and racial equality) in Slough?

12. Please provide any specific examples of positive work that you have seen in the borough towards community cohesion and racial equality that specifically relate to either the Somali or the EU8-Polish communities?

13. Would you like to comment on any other positive specific issues concerning either group?
   - Local initiatives?
   - Cross-cultural organisations?
   - Outreach programmes?
   - Other?

14. Would you like to comment on any other negative specific issues concerning either group?
   - Gangs?
   - Prostitution?
   - Drugs?
   - Other?

15. Do you, as Thames Valley Police, feel involved in the decision making process of the local authority?
   - How are you (TVP) involved?

16. Please provide any specific examples of issues of concern that you have seen locally which could undermine community cohesion and racial equality?
   - Generally?
   - Specific to the Somali and / or EU8-Polish communities?

17. Please comment on any further suggestions of community cohesion ‘good practice’ that you may have or issues that you would like to raise regarding either the Somali or the A8 Polish communities in Slough (any subject area)
Figure 10: Interview questions to Somali (and EU8-Polish) interviewees

Identical questions to EU8-Polish interviewees were asked substituting issues on Islam with those of Christianity and Catholicism. In each case the concepts of 'class', 'race' and skin-colour were explicitly or implicitly addressed. These questions are continued across the following five pages.
Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place

**Question outline: Somali Interviewees cont. 1**

- Have you had to change / alter your identity since coming to Britain? How? – Please explain.
- How important is it to you that you acknowledge your Somali identity and heritage?
- Somali people have lived in Britain for 150 years – What do you think about the early settlers – the Lascars? Do you associate yourself with this history?
  - If ‘Yes’ – How?
  - If ‘No’ – Why?
- How many Somali people do you think / know / believe are in the UK today?
- How many Polish people do you think / know / believe are in the UK today?
- Do you feel you belong in Slough / Britain? - Why? How? Please explain
- Is Slough / the UK ‘home’? Please explain.
- In your opinion is there a good network of Somali society / culture in Britain? Please tell me about this / your experiences of it
- Why do you think that ‘black’ people are treated differently to ‘white’ people?
- Would you prefer to work for:
  - A ‘black’ or ‘Asian’ employer?
  - A Polish Migrant employer?
  - A ‘white’ British born employer? Why?

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**Question on perception of Social & Occupational Class / Inequalities / Divisions in Britain #1 (Slough in particular)**

[Rationale – National hierarchy / identity self-assessment]

I would like to discuss with you your ideas of social divisions.

- In your opinion is Britain (Slough in particular) a socially divided society?
- What does your occupational and educational career/history tell you about social divisions in this country? (Slough in particular)?
- Do you ever think of Britain as a class society?
- What is necessary in Britain do you think to climb socially?
- Where in all these divisions do you see yourself?
- Why do you see yourself at this point?
Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place

**Motivations, Migration Path, Networks:**

- **[Rationale – Knowledge of own heritage / histories – local context – migratory patterns?]**
  - You are in Slough now, why did you decide to live here?
  - How long have you been here?
  - What jobs have you done in Slough?
  - What are you doing now?
  - How much do you earn?
  - Why did you choose this type of work?
  - What are your plans for the future?
  - Do you believe that people should be allowed to move around the globe as they please? Why?
  - Do you think you will ever return / go to Somalia to live?

**Question on perception of Social & Occupational Class / Inequalities / Divisions in Britain #2 (Slough in particular)**

- **[Rationale – Introduction of racism / discrimination]**
  - Britain is said to be a very class oriented society. Do you think so? Why?
  - Do you see yourself as a part of this society? (In Britain? / In Slough?) How?
  - I believe Britain is a socially, economically and ethnically divided country. Can you tell me what you think about this?
  - Have you ever suffered racism in Britain / Slough? Where and when did this happen?
  - How did this make you feel?
  - Do you think / believe that Somali people are not assertive enough to ensure they are given equal chances? (e.g. in education, work, housing, healthcare etc) Please explain.

**Invitation to compare Britain / Slough with living in Somalia (ONLY ASK IF THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT BORN IN BRITAIN – BORN IN SOMALIA)**

- **[Rationale – Comparison of Somalia and Britain]**
  - Given your experience in Britain (Slough in particular) I would like you to reflect on the differences and similarities between here and Somalia
  - Do you think there are any differences between social divisions in Somalia and Britain?
  - Are there any differences in the workplace?
  - Are there any differences in the schools?
  - Are there any differences in the way the police deal with people?
  - What are the differences in ‘life chances’? Do you have more or less opportunities in Britain/Slough? – tell me your experiences.
Question on perception of Social & Occupational Class / Inequalities / Divisions in Britain #3 (Slough in particular)

[Rationale – Racism / introduction of binary concept of racism / introduction of Eastern European migrants / local context / leap-frogging / Somali relative to other ethnic minority groups]

- Do you think because you are ‘black’ that you are treated differently in Britain / Slough?
- Tell me what you think about the ‘white’ migrants in Britain / Slough
- Research in London states that ‘white’ Polish migrants believe they are treated better than ‘non-white’ ethnic minority groups because they are ‘white’. How does this make you feel?
- Does it worry you that the ‘white’ Eastern Europeans coming to Britain / Slough might LEAP-FROG over existing non-white migrants living here (e.g. getting better jobs / houses / education and health)? Tell me about how this makes you feel?

Lifestyle Data:

[Rationale – ‘Ease off the interview pressure’ – more personal data relevant to gender comparison]

- Could you please tell me something about your lifestyle, what do you do after work or on weekends?
- Do you rent/own a house/flat/room?
- Do you have mostly British-Somali / Somali friends or non-British-Somali / Somali? Why?

Connection with Somalia:

[Rationale – Networking / Notion of Return / Nationality Identity]

- How often have you been to Somalia in the last 12 months?
- Do you ever help friends and relatives in Somalia get a job or house/flat/room or somehow tell them about coming to Britain / Slough?
- Would you encourage or discourage people to come to Britain / Slough? Why?
- Are you ever planning to return / migrate (IF BORN IN BRITAIN) to Somalia? Why?

Please tell me about your national identity. Do you think of yourself as?

- British-Somali
- Somali-British
- Somali
- British
- English-Somali
- Somali-English
- English
- European
- Other? – Please explain
Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place

Identity, Ethnicity and Relations to other Somali peoples:

[Rationale – Cultural Entitlement / 'Britishness' / Assimilation / History of Somali culture]
- How would you describe being a person with Somali heritage in Britain / Slough from your own experience?
- Has living / being born in Britain changed your attitudes to other Somali peoples?
- What do you think of Somali people in Britain who arrived and settled in Britain as lascars/seamen from the C19?
- Can you tell me what you know of these early British-Somali people?
- Do you think living in a place for a long time gives you rights over people who have only just arrived? Why?

Identity, Ethnicity and Relations with 'Other':

[Rationale – Multiculturalism / 'Race' / Tolerance / Media / Eastern European migrants as people]
- What do you think about Britain's / Slough's cultural diversity? Do you like it or not? Why?
- Do you think it is working? Why?
- How would you change it if you could?
- Do you think British-Somali / Somali people in Britain are treated better/worse because of their skin colour than 'white' ethnic minority peoples? Why?
- Are British-Somali / Somali people in Britain tolerant to other ethnic minority groups (e.g. Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshi's, Chinese, etc) including 'white' people? Please tell me about this?
- Do you think British-Somali / Somali people in Britain are treated well / badly by the British media? Why? How?
- Do you know / work with and/or have friends from Poland? Tell me about them as personalities.

Religion:

[Rationale – Identity / Connection / Intolerance]

How religiously observant are you?
- I believe and practice (Scale: 1)
- I believe but do not practice (Scale 2)
- I do not believe (Scale 3)

IF the person IS religiously observant ask what religion / faith they observe
- Is following your religion / faith any different here in Britain / Slough than in Somalia? Why? How?
- Most Polish migrants in Britain follow Roman Catholicism. Tell me what you think about this? / Please tell me your views (if any) regarding Christianity / Catholicism?
Chapter 2: Methodology, people and a place

Real-life scenarios:

[Vignette Rationale – ‘Soft landing’ / Prejudices / Stereotyping]

Interviewee asked to respond what does (s) he feels in particular situations

Scenario 1:
- You are travelling on a bus in Slough and there are some British-Somali people talking loudly, swearing and making a nuisance of themselves. What do you feel / think?

Scenario 2:
- You hear an offensive joke about Somali people when you are at work/college. Do you feel offended or tell another one? Why?

Scenario 3:
- You meet someone whose parents were born in Somalia, but who was born in Britain, s/he does not speak any of the Somali dialects, only English – is (s) he a Somali to you? Why?

Scenario 4:
- You are offered a good job / house but have to work / live closely with a Polish person / family who has/have arrived in Slough. How would you feel about this? Why?

Scenario 5:
- Your daughter / son / brother / sister goes out with a Polish migrant on a ‘date’. How would you feel about this? Why?
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

Preamble
This background chapter is explicatory; an intentionally concise profile of the four waves of Somali and Polish migrations and settlements to, from and in Britain. Where feasible it is specific to, related to or could be applied to Slough and this researches protagonists. It explains the continuity of Somali and Polish migration and settlement linkages with Britain from the mid-to-late nineteenth-century to the present-day. It is neither a study of Somali nor Polish history; considerably revealed in works by Bradbury, Lewis, Ahmed, or Roos and Leslie respectively. This chapter outlines migratory forces, motivations and contexts; sketching socio-economic, humanitarian, educational, and other migratory reasoning. It paints a picture of migration and settlement rational over time; blending and harmonizing with elements of Slough’s own history of economic prosperity and accommodating migrant communities. The relevance of Slough’s past with regard to migrant-workers arriving and settling in the town had a contextual bearing on establishing migratory and settlement patterns for this thesis’ protagonists. Slough’s positive absorption of migrants has defined the town for centuries.

Slough; ‘welcoming incomers’
In 1973, Fraser wrote of Slough’s, ‘long history of welcoming incomers, going right back to the days of stagecoaches’ referencing Slough as a stopping-off point for London to Bath carriages. She described the town’s character to this day as, ‘one of the towns’ chief strengths is its diversity - a community made up of smaller communities’. By the late eighteenth-century, the famous London-brickworks augmented the area’s agricultural output. ‘London Brick’ employed the majority of the local population. Road, rail, and canal transport links secured the town’s long-term future. Slough ‘has a successful history of accepting large numbers and great varieties of people from other places’. Post-WWI realised significant developments of Slough’s industrial basis, through the contribution of the successful employment and integration of a multi-ethnic workforce; the point of historic note and contemporary

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343 Lewis, I. M. 1994, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society, Red Sea, Lawrenceville
347 Fraser, M. (Pen name of Dorothy Phillips), 1973, The History of Slough, Slough Observer,[2014,06 May 2014]
348 Ibid
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

relevance herein. The passing of the Slough Trading Company Act (1925) secured Slough’s economic future, establishing ‘…the world’s first industrial estate’; run and managed as Slough Trading Estate. ‘Europe’s largest trading estate in single ownership’. The estates locally distinctive logo is shown below,

As a secure and well invested-in manufacturing base this Estate has protected Slough from the vagaries of fiscal recessions over the last century. Slough’s story is not just one of good business acumen and financial astuteness however; it contains the multicultural societal root of the town, offering significant contextual bearing on this investigation. Because of Slough’s comprehensive communication and transport links, when the Great Depression bit in 1929 it was more readily able to commercially adapt. Slough became an elementary destination for internally-displaced economic migrants, primarily the Welsh. Slough achieved, ‘extremely rapid industrial growth’. This should not be interpreted as being without degrees of prejudice however. The Welsh frequently experienced exclusion; based on their ‘Welshness’. Slough was dubbed ‘little Rhondda’. This societal and cultural process was repeated in the town in the immediate post-WWII period by the EVW-Poles as political

350 Fraser, M. 1973, History of Slough, Slough Corporation, Slough, p.109
352 7.5 million square feet of commercial property
353 Endpoint, London - http://www.endpoint.co.uk/contact/(23.02.14)
354 Ibid
355 Fraser, M. 1973
356 Ibid, p.352
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

refugees,358 in the 1950s/60s/70s/80s by Commonwealth migrants; (e.g. During the 1950s, the Trading Estate expanded rapidly; Slough experienced a labour shortage. ‘Adverts went out encouraging West Indians to come here…establishing another community in the town’.359 The 1970s British national, ‘shortage of doctors’ for the NHS realised Indian (and later Pakistani) migrants arriving, ‘many of whom chose to settle in Slough’ 360 - 2011 data recorded 17.7% of Slough residents being Pakistani, (the second highest proportion for that ethnic group across England and Wales), and 15.6% of Slough residents were Indian),361 by Somali refugees from the early-90s, and in the post-2004 period by the EU8-Polish economic migrants. Slough remains a culturally heterogeneous community built on difference. The 2011 Census reported, ‘Slough could arguably claim to be the most diverse area (in the UK outside of Greater London)’.362 Only Slough, Luton, Leicester and Birmingham were outside of the capital.363 2011 Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) data supports this viewpoint; 30,550 new migrant National Insurance (NI) Registrations were processed to Slough residents from January 2004 to December 2011.364

In 2014, Slough Borough Council (SBC) acknowledged the, ‘shortage of social housing to meet need and demand’365 with a growing requirement for privately rented housing. Only 18.7% of Slough’s dwellings were owned outright by the inhabitants, (34.0% on a mortgage; 20.6% social-rented, 13.1% council-rented and 7.5% from other landlords). Pointedly 24.4% of dwellings were privately rented. This compared to just 16.3% across the South East of England.366 The 2011 Census highlighted Slough’s elevated levels of household overcrowding. 20.8% of Slough households had one room too few, (compared to 8.5% in England, and 7.5% in the South East), and 12.8% of Slough households had one bedroom too few, (compared to 5% of households in England, and 3.8% in the South East). In 2013 SBC Chief Executive Ruth Bagley commented on Slough’s large private rental sector and pointedly some ‘unscrupulous landlords’367 building and converting ‘sheds with beds’, 368 (illegal dormitories built in Slough gardens for migrant-workers to rent). The data implies the

359 Fraser, M. 1973
360 Ibid
361 Bourner, R. 2012 (Dec). p.2
363 Ibid
364 Slough Borough Council, 2014, ‘Housing and homelessness’,[2014, 06 May 2014]
365 Ibid
366 Ibid
367 Ibid
368 McVeigh, T. 2013
369 Ibid
catalyst for Slough’s propensity for privately rented housing remains the social housing shortage; seemingly exploited by some.

As for national identity;\textsuperscript{369} also noteworthy in illustrating Slough’s multi-ethnic composition, 60.5\% (91835) of its residents revealed they believed they had no connection to a British identity whatsoever,\textsuperscript{370} (Figure 11). While it is acknowledged here that this is not necessarily an accurate indication of ethnicity, the national census sought a person’s assessment of their own identity with respect to the country or countries with which they felt affiliated.

\textbf{Figure 11: Population of Slough in 2011}

Determined by National Census 2011 Residents classification: 'White British' and 'Non-White' / Non-British [2011 Census response rate for Slough was 92.1\% for individuals].

Source: http://www.slough.gov.uk/council/key-statistics-and-data

\textsuperscript{369}2011 Census: National identity, local authorities in England and Wales: Table-KS202EW
\textsuperscript{370}Bourner, R. 2012, p.2
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

Of the 60.5% with no British identity connection, 7.0% of Slough’s residents stated they were born in ‘Accession-EU’ states. The 2011 Census confirmed this made Slough the UK-area with the 9th highest proportion of ‘Accession EU’ migrants. 5.9% of its settled (2011 residents were born in Poland (the 2nd highest proportion of EU8-Poles across England and Wales).371 6.5% of Slough’s residents stated they were born in Africa with 20.2% of residents declaring they were born in the Middle East or Asia.372 Significantly too, 20.7% (i.e. one-fifth) of Slough’s usual (settled) residents declared they had arrived in the UK from 2001-2011.374

Despite this multiculturally buoyant quantitative assessment however, during the process of this research, perceptions of an ethnic minority ‘pecking-order’ were tangible - the reality of the town with ‘a long history of welcoming incomers’.375 Following are the essential backgrounds of both this thesis’ protagonists. For ease of reader understanding of each of the protagonist’s migratory reasoning, their migratory histories and those of the previous waves from their countries-of-birth are presented separately and chronologically.

Somali migration

Introduction

Over approximately one-hundred and seventy-years to the present day, four waves of Somali migrants migrated to, or emigrated from, Britain. Three waves are noted as arrivals: one, an economically premised emigration. Economic need has been the paramount ‘push’ and ‘pull’ motivation. This was true of the first-wave of ‘early transient communities (Lascars)376 from the late nineteenth-century to the early-1920s. Writing in 1901 Vivian likened the Somali through Port Aden in Yemen to ‘the Irish of Africa’.377 Notions of the Somali being ‘on the move’, as nomads or migrants, is not new.378 For Lewis379, the status of being a migrant appeared inextricably related to the concept of Somaliness; referred to by Slough’s Somali. This characteristic was

371Ibid,pp.2-3
3722011 Census: Country-of-birth,England and Wales:Table-QS203EW
3732011 Census: Year of arrival in the UK,England and Wales:Table-QS801EW
374Bourner, R. 2012,p.3
375Fraser, M. 1973
376Griffiths, D.J. 2002,p. 77
379Lewis, I. M. 2002, A Modern History of the Somali Nation and State in the Horn of Africa Ohio University, Athens OH, pp.18-19
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

The magnitude of clan,\(^{380}\) - the primary causative driver in the Somali civil-war,\(^{381}\) Somali migration was initially economic, but in the past twenty-five years has been driven by clan generated civil-war and natural disasters.\(^{382}\) Fiscally determined Somali migration choices only changed in the very late 1980s with forced migrations; the nascent fourth-wave, *this* thesis' Somali protagonists in all but one case.

**Clan, identity, cohesion and resources**

Before presenting a concise chronological history of Somali migration and settlement, it is essential 'clan', and its significance, are outlined.

Somali clan remains the most distinctive feature of Somali social, political, and economic life. Clan remains the potent symbol\(^{383}\) of Somaliness, personal identity and partisan allegiance. ‘It represents the social divisions of people into corporate political groups’.\(^{384}\) Clan culture exhibits its own unique ethnocentric and xenophobic behaviours. The Somali not only originate from different clans but from diverse geographical locations in Somalia. As with any nationality, the Somali ‘must not be lumped together as ‘one community’’.\(^{385}\) Each has various tribal, cultural, and political differences. Aside from Somali peoples discriminating amongst themselves and being clan-prejudiced towards each other, in Slough they appeared to exhibit the same traits in relation to other migrants and ethnic groups. They were not broadly accommodating. This was apparent in their attitudes toward the EU8-Poles; largely without it appeared, ever speaking to, or ever knowing a Polish person. Conversations with the Slough-Somali gave the impression, by way of tone and content that they discriminated against the EU8-Poles because of the Poles rationale for migrating to Britain - that is for financial gain, by working. That many of the Somali were unable to legitimately work for legal reasons or could not find secure employment had plainly fed into this resentment. It would also be reasonable to assume that some had adverse personal experiences with EU8-Poles or those they believed were Polish, as

\(^{380}\)Somali clans are patrilineal networks. The majority of Somali people belong to four patrilineal clan families: the Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and Rahanweyn. The clans are then divided into sub-clans. The Somali clan system is highly complex and fluid. The clan system constantly fluctuates and changes; intra/inter-clan fighting is common. Clan membership is about power, participation and governance. The ‘black’ minority Somali are in distinct social groups: Bantu and Benadiri (See:Lewis, I.M. 1961, 1965, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2002)

\(^{381}\)This subject is returned to later in Ch.3


\(^{383}\)Harris, H. 2004,p.69


\(^{385}\)Inward, E. & Chaudhary, S, 2006,p.20
well as self-fueling conversations with friends and family about their real or imagined bad experiences of EU8-Poles. It was also realistic to accept that for many, media coverage (negative and positive) of the EU8-Poles would have fed into their thinking and subsequent reasoning.

Clan offers operational and workable points of identification and patronage but, its model appeared contradictory; being both ‘a source of unity [and] division’.\(^{386}\) This contradiction was seen to challenge British notions of community-cohesion. Multiple meanings and influences of clan were evident in conversations with the Somali. These echoed Banton’s\(^{387}\) 1950s study of Stepney’s ‘black’ population, as it was clear in speaking with the Somali that structural and cultural divisions existed between Slough’s different migrant groups. In agreeing with Banton, some migrants had been ‘accommodated’ by the dominant British society, such as the established Pakistani community. Others still, including the EU8-Poles, were tangibly adapting, publicly at least, to be allowed to fit in. In many ways, the Somali appeared to self-exclude.

Because the Somali believed they were excluded; since they were Somali, Muslims and in many cases asylum-seekers, there remained difficulty in accepting the concept of a ‘universal British national identity’ called for by the coalition government in 2011. \(^{388}\) This would have collided with aspects of transient Somali daily life. In many respects, there was similarity between P.M. Cameron’s call, fundamentally targeting Muslims, and the principles Anwar wrote of as regards the early 1960s ‘Asian’ migrants to Britain. At that time, Anwar coined the phrase ‘myth-of-return’ in describing the goal of Indian sub-continent ‘Asians’ making money, (a strategy many EU8-Poles have adopted) - then believing they would return home.\(^{389}\) Truthfully, the majority did not or could not. The fact the myth endured undermined the concept of assimilation at that time. Many of the Somali subscribed to the same myth in an imagined post-civil war context. This not only negated concepts of assimilation and belonging it may well be construed as undermining the Cameron et al national identity schema. The Somali interviewees resented questioning regarding their genuineness as asylum-seekers, refugees or even as EU-secondary migrants, taking exception to their legality being questioned and to being labelled as economic burdens on the welfare system.\(^{390}\) Their self-imposed segregation did little to allay these charges.

\(^{386}\)ibid.p.33  
\(^{387}\)Banton, M. 1955, The Coloured Quarter: Negro Immigrants in an English City, Jonathan Cape,London  
\(^{388}\)IN-Munich Security Conference:05.02.2011  
\(^{389}\)Anwar, M. 1979,p.ix  
\(^{390}\)Institute for Public Policy Research 2010
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

however and unquestionably ascribed largely negative meaning to them. Their interests appeared to remain in the politics of Somalia, echoing Eade’s late-1980s East London Bangladeshis findings of, ‘the articulation of a primordial…identity (linking the Somali in this case)…to political struggles…within their country of origin’. For those born in Somalia, each held an opinion regarding their own myth-of-return.

Clan was conclusively the primary identity marker within Slough’s Somali culture, although alliances frequently shifted. Impressions of unity or equality were ill-placed - the key to Somali politics lay in kinship. In appreciating the fragmented nature and accepting the veracity of transnational-clan influence, significant illumination regarding Somali migration and settlement choices in Britain was possible. Clan when hypothetically equated to Western thinking of ‘nation’ could be understood as ‘extensions of kinship’. In the context of the civil-war, the Somali peoples could be understood as an assorted ‘nation-of-nations’ at war. Some ‘nations’ were powerful; some were not. Some were allied; some were not. Some ruled, some never had, can or will. Clan was contradictory; it amalgamated and it separated. It appeared uncertain and unpredictable. The Somali resisted notions of alignment with British mainstream society or even, broadly speaking, to ‘fitting in’ with other ethnic minority Muslim groups such as the majoritarian Pakistani Muslims in Slough. Most Somali interviewees manifestly resisted any such processes.

First-wave Somali migration

Migratory outcomes of imperialist Britain’s 1839 forceful annexation of Aden’s anchorage when Port Aden ‘became a crucial refuelling station for steamships en route to East Africa, India, East Asia and Australasia’ is crucial in understanding Somali transnationalism and the complex cultural divisions emigrating from Somalia. It offered some Somali, (the Isaaq initially), the first economically premised stepping-stone away from

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392 Anwar, M. 1979
393 Bradley, H. 2000, Fractured Identities: Changing Patterns of Inequality, Polity,Cambridge,p.123
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

‘black’-Africa into the service of the ‘white’ West. Aden for the Somali was the, ‘vital link’ (to their)...emigration’. 395 The Isaaq held the view its clan members were, ‘...superior to ...other East Africans’. 396 (The Isaaq) bitterly resented being categorised along with the ... (‘black’ African-Somali) Bantu who they pejoratively referred to as ‘slaves’. 397 The Isaaq refused to be called Africans, or even Somali...they emphasised they had either resided in or were born at Aden’ 398 The collaborative trade affiliation between Egypt, Britain and Somalia in the late-nineteenth/early-twentieth centuries permitted Isaaq clan 399 members, as British allies, to hold close their newly self-ascribed ‘Arab-identities’. They distanced themselves further from any ‘black’-African Bantu-Somali and Benadiri-Somali yoking; perceiving ‘black’ association would restrict their search for betterment, power, wealth and ultimately clan governance. The Isaaq (and later the Darod) worked extremely hard to free themselves of any perceptions or public associations with Africa, preferring to be known as Arabs.400

Between 1860 and 1960, what is now called the Horn of Africa (see Figure 12) was subject to western colonial dissection, invasion, colonization, annexation and post-WWII territory occupation. At the Berlin-Conference 401 in 1884-1885, it was agreed France would colonise French Somaliland (now Djibouti); Britain took over British Somaliland, (now Somalia) and Italy took Eritrea and Italian Somaliland (now Somalia).

Figure 12: Horn of Africa
Source: http://www.fragilestates.org [2014, 07 May 2014]

395 Ibid
396 Ibid
397 Ibid
398 Turton, E. 1974,pp.325-327
399 See Footnote 39
400 Ansari, H. 2004,p.37
401 Also known as the ‘Congo Conference’ or ‘West Africa Conference’. Its purpose was to regulate colonization/trade
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

In truth, as part of the 1876-1912 ‘scramble for Africa’, Europe’s imperialist powers divided up that portion of Africa among themselves. In 1870, ten-percent of Africa was under European control; by 1914 it was ninety-percent. It was from this scramble that the first-wave Somali migrants, ‘from the end of the nineteenth century’, emigrated. Their migration was an outcome of a threefold rationale. Firstly, the opening of the Suez Canal created a Western need for localised knowledge, language skills, and a workforce. Secondly, 1886 realised the establishment of ‘British Agents...on the Somali coast’. Northern Somalia formally became a British Protectorate as part of Britain’s aspirations to build a north-south transcontinental railway along Africa’s eastern coast linking key ports along its crucial Red Sea shipping lane to India. Thirdly, the segmented character of Somali society with its sub-ethnic loyalties saw the Isaaq clan, for the most part, side with the British military against the Somali nationalist forces in the 1899-1920 Jihad led by Seyyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, the ‘Mad Mullah’ of the Darod clan. It was a significant example of the constantly shifting alliances and loyalties that remain a common feature of Somali culture.

The most likely explanation is one based in education, economics and pragmatism. Since Britain’s 1839 annexation Port Aden and the period until the Suez Canal was opened in 1869 linking the Mediterranean with the Red Sea and onto the Gulf of Aden, (the northern coast Somali), the Isaaq clan had worked for Britain, had been educated by Britain and were fulfilling their own distancing from ‘black’-Africa. The Isaaq were the largest clan in what is now Somaliland, (Figure 13 opposite).

Figure 13: Somaliland
Source: http://www.fragilestates.org [2014, 07 May 2014]

404 Ibid.p.325
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

Britain’s British East India Company had signed a succession of treaties dating from February 1827 when elders of the Isaaq sub-clan, the Habr Awal 406 signed four articles of ‘friendship and commerce’ 407 with Britain at Berbera in Northern Somalia. In the context of the period in Britain’s history when the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act [1807] had yet to be underpinned by the Slavery Abolition Act [1833], the Isaaq, and particularly the Habr-Wal maintained their fervency for being known as Arabs; not ‘black’ Africans (and so linked to slavery). 408 This ‘non-black’ stance accommodated Britain’s embedded ‘white’ establishment well. (Several of the Slough-Somali interviewed retained this viewpoint because of their appearance - ‘oval faces, very regular handsome features…rather light skin’). 409 The nineteenth-century sixty-year long entente had culminated in Britain making Somaliland a British Protectorate in 1888; protecting it and its peoples from its Port Aden garrison in Yemen.410 At this point Britain was considered a ‘guest’ of the Isaaq; a totally different and pragmatic view of colonization. (The mutual respect between Somaliland and Britain remained firm and Britain finally left Somaliland to its independence in 1960 – a subject returned to later in this chapter).

For clarity and purpose herein, the period 1860-1960 is that termed the first-wave Somali migration; harmonizing it with the Horn of Africa period of colonization to Somali independence in 1960. To avoid ambiguity, this period is sub-divided into phases. Phase-one; 1860-1914, phase-two; World War I (1914-1919), phase-three; 1919-1939, phase-four; World War II (1939-1945) and phase-five (1945-1960). Following are brief summaries of these phases containing relevant events in Britain and Somalia within them.

**Phase-one; 1860-1914**
The repeatedly harsh realities confronting phase-one Somali migrants in the late-nineteenth/early-twentieth centuries was lucid in Pankhurst’s 411 ‘*The Life and Adventures of a Somali.*’ 412 These migrants appeared to subscribe to notions of ‘easier’ lives with higher wages 413 if they worked and possibly settled across Europe.

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407 Ibid
408 Ibid
409 Ibid
413 Section125: Agreements with lascars. Saving for 4 Geo.4 c.80 ss.25, 26, &c.,[2014, 07 May 2014]
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

They were, ‘tempted by high wages, (taking) employment…on board coal vessels’.\(^{414}\)

This typified the economically premised migratory ‘pull’ mechanism. When the Suez Canal opened in 1869 and shipping increased; many companies employed the Somali as ships-firemen. The Somali were hired on 'coolie' wages often twenty-five percent lower\(^{415}\) than ‘white’ British seamen’s pay. The Somali were not free to work and live where they pleased however; restrictions were imposed. The UK *Merchant Shipping Act (1894)*\(^{416}\) made it illegal for Somali men to work in any other British industry other than seafaring. Isaaq clansmen ostensibly embraced roles and status as favoured British collaborators however. Many worked as ships ‘stokers’. \(^{417}\) Others were employed as trusted ‘gun-bearers’. \(^{418}\) Some worked directly for the British Government in Port Aden as ‘clerks and interpreters’. \(^{419}\) Their willingness and ability to act as interpreters highlighted Somali linguistic aptitude. Others journeyed aboard British naval vessels successfully assisting the Royal Navy in its ‘anti-slavery campaign in eastern Africa’. \(^{420}\) Descriptions of first-wave Somali’s engaging in European-Somali migrant networks and their adoption of ‘European clothes’\(^{421}\) and Europeanized appearances with their hair ‘cut at the back of the head [to] conform to the (European) custom’,\(^{422}\) offered this research early insight into Somali views on assimilation over time, and how the Somali sought to benefit from their ‘Caucasian caste of features’. \(^{423}\)

**Phase-two; World War I (1914-1919)**

Prior to the outbreak of WWI,\(^{424}\) and working under the confines of the Merchant Shipping Act (1894), many Somali Lascars \(^{425}\) made their first point of settlement in the Spitalfields area of London; thereafter permanently settling in and around the dockland-areas of London, Cardiff, Bristol, Liverpool, Hull and South Shields. On the eve of WWI, there were 51,616 Lascars (not all Somali) in Britain.\(^{426}\) (WWI erupted in Europe against the backdrop in Somalia of the ‘Mad Mullah’s Jihad against British

\(^{414}\) Playfair, R.L., 1859, *A History of Arabia Felix Or Yemen*, Education Society, Bombay, India, p.15


\(^{415}\) Pankhurst, R. 1977 Part II (3), p.368


\(^{416}\) Ibid

\(^{416}\) Ibid

\(^{416}\) Somaliland Times 2007 *New Opportunities*, [Issue 286]

\(^{416}\) Ibid, p.370

\(^{416}\) Ibid

\(^{416}\) Playfair, R.L., 1859, p.15

\(^{416}\) PortCities London 2007

\(^{416}\) European name to describe the non-European sailors - the Somali, although not sailors from India/South East Asia are frequently referred to as Lascars

\(^{416}\) Ansari, H. 2004, p.37
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

colonisation; a situation exploited by the German High Command in 1916 with Germany supplying Seyyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan [the ‘Mad Mullah] weapons in the hopes of drawing allied ‘troops from other theatres’\(^{427}\) of WWI. A hopeful strategy but one that only realised propaganda value for Germany).

Prior to WWI, some Somali Lascars in Britain had opened their own Husseini Houses, (Somali hotels for Somali seamen to live at when not at sea or if stranded then for them to live at seeking work at the docks). Somalis hired in Port Aden served on Royal Navy ships in WWI,\(^{428}\) with Aden becoming the ‘vital link (to Somali)…emigration’.\(^{429}\) At that time Port Aden was a coaling station\(^{430}\) and the Somali were needed to unload British coal and transfer it to Royal Navy ships. The Somali were recognized as ‘being one of the few local communities willing to work as dockhands and firemen on board Royal Navy vessels’.\(^{431}\) The cost in lives to Somali and other Indian and S.E Asian Lascars in WWI was high. The National Archives records Lascars in the British Merchant Navy enduring ‘harsh conditions’\(^{432}\) with twenty-percent (3,000) of the total estimate 15,000 merchant-seamen killed by German submarine attacks alone being a Lascar. The total number of Lascar lives lost in WWI is unknown.

**Phase-three; 1919-1939**

Throughout the 1919-1939 inter-war period, the Somali-in-Britain were embattled by Britain’s immigration policies. Examples of ethnocentrism from the period were readily accessible although not Slough specific as the Somali and other Lascar settlements predominated across Britain’s port cities and towns. The major industrial pull factor that remains Slough Trading Estate was not realised until 1925.\(^{433}\)

Much has been written of the 1919-1939 inter-war period of British history; not least regarding the lives of ‘non-white’ migrants and Britain, (perhaps acknowledging, albeit retrospectively, the essential part ‘black’ history is to British history). Ansari and others

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\(^{428}\) PortCities London 2007,p.1

\(^{429}\) Ansari, H. 2004,


\(^{431}\) PortCities London 2007,p.1


\(^{433}\) Cassell, M.1991
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

(e.g. Ray, Visram, and Tabili), write of the 1919-1939 period in terms of social Darwinism and Eugenicism regarding how Britons perceived ‘them’ (i.e. ‘non-white’, ‘non-Christian’ immigrants); This shaped political policy across the two decades. A direct outcome for the Somali and other Lascars was ostracization and discreditation. Even the National Union of Seamen (NUS) – their own trades union, described them as ‘dole aspirants’.

Despite the Lascars service to king and country, Britain dismissed peacetime need for them, devaluing their weighty contributions to Empire. The call for their repatriation was widespread. Resentment against them was extensive; rationale for it broad.

The irrational antipathy was fear-based. Miscegenation, unemployment, poverty, perceptions of undercut-wages, religion and housing, to name just some motivations. Local councils, the police and central government vilified ‘non-white’ migrant ‘other’ in any way they could. Some Lascars were not passive to this however. In seeking legal rights, many were ‘an irritation’. Indirect and direct confrontations the ‘white’ establishment predictably led to state metered-out consequences. Baldwin’s 1925 Conservative Government undertook austere ‘racist’ legislative immigration measures issuing the unambiguously ‘racist’ 1925 Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order building on the Aliens Registration Act [1914] introduced by Asquith’s Liberals wherein, ‘any ‘coloured’ seaman who could not produce documentary evidence of his national identity, could be either registered as an alien or refused entry [to Britain].

Officious deceptions to delay; in the longer term deny, the seamen British passports.
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

‘Lascars were reclassified from their previous status as British passport holding workers to unwelcome and problematic ‘aliens’, their rights as British subjects deliberately and callously stripped away’

The restrictive 1925 Order was augmented in 1935 by the Ramsay MacDonald National Coalition government instruction to British authorities in Aden to ‘refuse to issue... (Somali, Yemeni, and other ‘black’ Lascars with) Certificates of Nationality and Identity (Thereby disabling their attempts to travel to Britain) …in search of work’.

In the port cities across Britain, Somali and other Lascars were pressed into starvation and destitution as direct results of policy, practice, and procedure during the interwar years. Lascars and their families were deemed a, ‘social menace’.

‘Increasing numbers [of Lascars - including unknown numbers of Somali] looked for jobs ashore and formed permanent relationships with [‘white’] local women…’

Pernicious references to the mixed-heritage offspring arising from these unions include children described as the, ‘misfit’ offspring of the ‘primitive’ man of colour (and) the ‘white’ woman of a ‘low type’;

Unfounded and ridiculous allegations of ‘black’ men stealing ‘whites’ womenfolk re-ignited latent ‘white’ miscegenation fears.

The Times for the 14 June 1919 reported ‘an intimate association between a ‘black’ or ‘coloured’ man and ‘white’ women (being) a thing of horror’.

The Chronicle, on the 15 June 1919, had published a letter stating ‘There can never be any question of equality between ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’.

In 1919, the British Eugenics Society had called for ‘a thorough scientific study of the mental and physical characteristics of mixed races’.

Outcomes of these and other ‘racist’ feelings fuelled the violent and ‘racialized’ riots across Britain’s port cities during this period.

Unhappily, reports of this nature were rampant from the end of WWI into the late nineteen-thirties.

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447 Mahamdallie, H. 2007, Muslim working class struggles in International Socialism, Iss.113
448 HO.45 / 14299 Part II / 562898/54 (21.11.1930) / The Nationality Act 1981 meant only British born citizens were free of immigration control on entering Britain. Children born in Britain to non-British citizens no longer automatically became British citizens unless they could demonstrate that a parent or grandparent was born in Britain. Source: Home Office, Immigration Acts.
449 Coalition of British Political parties established in 1931 to govern Britain following the Great Depression
450 Ibid, p.13
451 Ibid, p.3
452 Ibid
453 Ibid
457 Ibid
459 Sherwood, M. 2003
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

The media of the day in Britain’s 1919-1939 inter-war period fuelled the creation of ‘other’ physical spaces across Britain’s ports. Post-WWI Cardiff had its ‘black neighbourhood’; ‘Nigger Town’. The Liverpool Echo for 6 June 1919 reported parts of its port-city becoming ‘distinct foreign colonies’. The propensity, for like people to settle in the same space or place, attempted to ensure they retained their own identities and particularisms, outside of the British-host majority. A point returned to regarding the fourth-wave Somali-in-Slough later in this chapter. In the 1919-1939 inter-war period ‘non-white’ working-class communities ostensibly occupied an ‘underclass netherworld’. In early-1939, 75% of ‘white’ seamen and dockworkers were in full employment compared to just 40% of their ‘non-white’ counterparts.

Unsurprisingly, and predictably, Britain’s September 3 1939 declaration of war on Germany, following Hitler’s invasion of Poland two days earlier, witnessed an upturn in ‘non-white others’ circumstances across Britain. ‘Suddenly ‘Asian’ and ‘black’ British were needed for the imperial defence’. Britain’s labour necessity realised ‘the number of settling Lascars’ grow. This period was significant for every ‘non-white’ migrant community across Britain; including the phase-three Somali, pre-partition Indians, Bengali Muslims, and Punjabi (both Sikh and Muslim) migrants - a subject written extensively of by Visram.

Phase-four; World War II (1939-1945)

Nationwide labour-force shortages with needs to redeploy workers across Britain not only significantly strengthened the Lascar’s (all nationalities) position; it gave them vent to demand, ‘in some cases, a two-hundred percent wage rise, including essential provisions like soap, warm clothing and bedding’. Lascar numbers continued to grow through domestic and transnational chain-migration, despite restrictive British government immigration/employment policies. ‘Factories and war-related industries in London, Glasgow…the Midlands, needed labour…demand was so high that even (the) lack of (proficient) English language was…no longer…a handicap’. Lascars

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460 Heritage and Destiny 1982, pp.6-8
461 Rich, P. 1986, pp.120-122
462 Ibid
463 Ibid
464 Ibid
465 Ibid, p.15
466 Visram, R. 2002, pp.267-268
467 Asians in Britain: 400 Years of History
468 Visram, R. 2002, p.239
469 Ibid, pp.267-268
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

were, ‘absolutely critical to the manning of Britain’s wartime merchant fleet’.\textsuperscript{470} Lascar militancy paid no heed to contemptuous governmental demands for them to, ‘unite behind the war against fascism’,\textsuperscript{471} reflecting how, at the end of WWI, they had been thrown-aside, ostracized and subject to relentless discreditation. If the British government ever doubted the Lascar’s resolve, ‘an unprecedented wave of (Lascar) strikes in 1939, 1941 and 1943 quickly showed the indispensability of the sons of empire…’\textsuperscript{472} To mitigate this however, Wrenn writes that, ‘despite the approximate 500% increase in Lascar wages between 1939 and 1945 these seamen were still only paid half the wages of a European by the end of the war’\textsuperscript{473} As for Somalia at the outbreak of WWII; it was essentially divided into two. A British protectorate in the north and an Italian protectorate in the south. Siding with Germany, Italy entered WWII on 10 June 1940, invading northern-Somalia on 03 August 1940;\textsuperscript{474} ousting the British from the Horn of Africa and occupying it until March 1941,\textsuperscript{475} when the British counterattacked and reoccupied northern-Somalia. Thereafter Britain retook the whole region from Italy, placing Somalia as one country under British military administration.

**Phase-five (1945-1960)**

Very little acknowledgement in the literature, or elsewhere, is given to the Somali for their part in Britain’s WWII war effort or its post-war rebuilding. Post-WWII reconstruction pulled significant numbers of migrant-workers into Western Europe; into Britain. While statistical-data remains unreliable to verify the claim Britain hosts ‘one of the largest…Somali communities in Europe’,\textsuperscript{476} there is adequate evidence substantiating the statement Somali migrants are amongst the ‘longest established’,\textsuperscript{477} if the transient Lascar lifestyle is reasoned as their foundation.

Not all Somali-in-Britain settlement remained in the seafaring related industries. Somalis took advantage of redeployment opportunities in WWII, especially in the

\textsuperscript{470}Choudhury, Y, 1995, *Sons of the Empire: Oral history from the Bangladeshi seamen who served on British ships during the 1939-45 war*, Sylheti Social History,Birmingham

\textsuperscript{471}Visram, R. 2002, p.239

\textsuperscript{472}Choudhury, Y. 1995


\textsuperscript{475}Ibid

\textsuperscript{476}Ibid


\textsuperscript{477}Ibid
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

early-1950s. In 1953 approximately six-hundred Somalis lived across the UK, (This compares with the 99,484 Somali-born residents in England in the 2011 census). Many Somali ex-seamen were known as ‘Fortune-Men’, this colloquialism intent-based, in line with Anwar’s ‘myth-of-return’ - to work, save money and permanently return to Somalia, (echoing aspects of some EU8-Polish strategy). Slough’s local-history offers no indication Somali-in-Britain – Lascars or Fortune-Men settled in the town. Somali settlement in Slough did not begin until the late 1980s, when, ‘the outbreak of Civil-war in 1991 (realized) increased migration from Somalia’.

Perhaps ‘white’, British, immediate post-WWII history records little of the Somali because Attlee’s post-WWII British social solidarity model was one of a, ‘specifically white and British workforce… addressed to an image of a better Britain, (not) a better Empire, (wherein) the sailor is not imagined as an Indian or a Somali’. Britain’s post-WWII/1950s immigration debate was conducted in terms of ‘black’ people representing ‘a problem’; ‘black’ as ‘other’ was racially homogenized.

‘Mass immigration continued in the 1950s, so did…racial violence and prejudice…Birmingham, Nottingham and west London experienced rioting…‘white’ people feared…a ‘black’ community’.

Britain’s 1958 Notting Hill ‘race-riots’ saw Macmillan’s Conservative government pander ‘to the hostility…by introducing immigration-laws…restricting the number of [‘non-white’] people coming into the country’. Tacit consensus prevailed between the State and the trades union movement refusing to acknowledge ‘racism’ existed. Restrictive immigration policy was forthcoming in the Commonwealth Immigration Act (1962). The 1962 Act structured the ‘race’ and immigration debate in a context of ‘controlling’ and managing the ‘race-problem’; meaning ‘non-white’ migration. In

481 Anwar, M. 1979
482 Slough Museum, 2014, Migration from Somalia.[2014, 09 May 2014]
484 BBC News, 2005, Short History of Immigration,[2014, 08 May 2014]
486 Home Office, Immigration Acts,[03.04.2008]
487 Brown, B. 2003, p.3
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

contrast, 1950s and 1960s ‘white’ Irish immigration ‘ran at roughly twice the level of immigration from the New Commonwealth’ but was ‘not politicised in the same way’. On June 26, 1960, the northern protectorate of Somaliland gained independence from Britain. On July 01, 1960, the Italian (south) and British (north) Somali colonies united to form the United Republic of Somalia under President Aden Abdullah Osman Daar, Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, and a one-hundred and twenty-three member National Assembly.

Second-wave Somali migration

Mid-1960s British Merchant Navy streamlining and Aden’s 1967 independence financially required; obliged even, many temporary-resident Lascars to remain in Britain, calling their families to join them and ending their notions of Anwar’s myth-of-return.

These economic migrants, in broad terms, could no longer financially sustain being settled on two continents without regular incomes to support both. Migration of ‘Somali seamen…effectively stopped in the 1960s due to a shortage in jobs’ and because of the restrictive Commonwealth Immigration Act (1962). The second-wave was based in the economic necessity of reunification. This ushered in the ‘first major influx of Somali women [to Britain]’. This was the second-wave – distinctive, being largely gender specific. Somali women, children, and extended families were pulled to Britain in the wake of the men realising their chances of return to Somalia were delusions. This wave realised Somali men and women both working and attempting to build the, ‘social support’ that remain, ‘essential migration structures’ to ensure a future. In many ways this replicated the 1960-61 Indian and Pakistani female immigration to Britain, although Somali women realised they had to assist in both securing an income to sustain themselves, their husbands and family in Britain as

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489 Ibid
491 Zapata, M, 2012, Somalia: Colonialism to Independence to Dictatorship, 1840-1976, Centre for American Progress, Washington DC
492 30 November 1967
493 Anwar, M, 1979
494 Sporton, D. et al, 2005
496 El-Silh, C.F. 1993, pp. 21-46
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

well as supporting wider-family in Somalia. ‘Many Somali seamen moved to…Sheffield, Manchester and Birmingham (to the) steel industry (where) labour was in great demand’. Slough’s local-history offers no indication that Somali couples and/or families settled in the town during the 1960s/1970s.

The second-wave importantly highlighted the specific experiences of migrant women; the psychological and social effects on them being decisively made accountable for many of the settlement processes of adaptation in Britain. These significant responsibilities were exacerbated by family housing, healthcare provision, schooling and neighbourhood and ‘community’ integration. Contemporary evidence herein supported the notion these same responsibilities continue for Somali women in Slough.

Between 1965-1967 British passport-holding East African ‘Asians’ from Kenya and Uganda migrated to Britain. This ‘Asian’ migrant-flow prompted calls for additional immigration controls. The *Commonwealth Immigration Act (1968)* was enacted under Wilson’s Labour government. The 1968 Act withdrew automatic rights of entry to Britain for remaining ‘non-white’ Kenyan and Ugandan ‘Asian’ passport-holders and, for the first time distinguished between British citizens who were ‘Patrials’, those who possessed identifiable ancestors in Britain, and those who were not. It was transparent then, as it is now, Patrials were metaphorically, exclusively ‘white’. Enoch Powell, Conservative Shadow Minister of Defence caused a ‘racial’ storm across Britain calling for an end to ‘non-white’ immigration into Britain. To many ‘white’ nationalists Powell candidly defended ‘white-Britishness’. Powell emotively suggested ‘white’ Britons were ‘strangers in their own country’ while for ‘the (non-white) immigrant, entry to this country was admission to privileges and opportunities eagerly sought’. He claimed the arrangement offered only ‘one-way privilege’.

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500 Sporton, D. et al, 2005
503Home Office/Immigration Acts [03.04.2008]
504 Birmingham: 20 April 1968
507Ibid
508 Ibid
Third-wave Somali migration

Britain’s early-1970s protracted economic depression, observable in the three-day working week, the 1973-74 oil price rise, ‘double-digit inflation’ exceeding 20% more than once after 1973, and ‘massive unemployment’, created significant British Merchant Navy cutbacks. For the Somali merchant-seamen who had not relocated to work in the steel industry, ‘the period was particularly bleak’. Their “West is best” dictum became jaundiced. Many reconsidered their notion of the ‘myth-of-return’. Many returned their wives and families to Somalia attempting to ‘increase (the family) property (holdings) and herds (of camels)’. This was Somali third-wave migration - emigration from Britain; a counter-wave to the Somali second-wave. 1970s Britain could no longer sustain Somali migrant financial needs, resonating with some EU8-Poles’ experiences following Britain’s 2008 economic recession. The Somali men remaining weathered 1970s Britain, dependent on two income-sources, ‘the dole or state [Navy] pensions’. 1970s Britain was a bleak decade. Against this backdrop the decision for many Somali families to return to Somalia was possibly made easier. This stated, Somalia’s domestic situation was embryonic following the 21 October 1969 assassination of its President and the subsequent coup d’état launching the new Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) government led by the (would be) dictator, President General Siad Barré.

Barré would launch Somalia into a new phase of internal instability with violent ‘disagreements and factionalism between and among the major branches of the Somali lineage system’. These in turn realised the, ‘emergence of clan-based dissident and insurgent movements’. It was into the fledgling days of this volatile Somali revolutionary situation that the third-wave returned. Barré’s refusal to initiate political reform, his nepotistic concentration of national power within his own Mareehaan sub-clan and his ‘reign of terror against the country’s citizenry’ each combined to create the 1988-1991 civil-war and the January 1991 collapse of Somalia. In the resultant power-vacuum, opposing clan-based rebels and guerrillas
remain the driving forces of the contemporary Somali civil-war; founded originally to collectively oppose Barré but now fighting each other for dominance and power.

Fourth-wave Somali migration

Introduction

According to the 2011 Census, representing less than 0.001% of Britain’s total population, the Somali-in-Britain embodied a minute percentage of the total fourth-wave Somali exodus. Nevertheless, Slough’s community of their diminutive number constituted one of this study’s protagonists. They were imperative to the research, making invaluable contributions in comparing them, and previous Somali migratory-waves, to the EU8-Polish wave enormity. With specific 2011 reference to Somali-in-Slough, there were officially only 1247 in the town (Figure 14). This represented under 0.01% of the total 140,205 Slough population recorded. It remained true,

One of the chief difficulties for research on Somali’s is the wide variety of estimates as to the size of the Somali population in the U.K…it is difficult to establish a solid base on which to construct a sampling-frame from which conclusions can be extrapolated to a wider population.

Acknowledging Harris’ truism, but employing 2011 census data, there were 101370 self-identified ‘born in Somalia’ Somali in England and Wales, with England reporting 99484 of the total (over 98%). Slough had a recorded 0.013% of the total Somali population in England.

Cause and effect

Somalia’s 1974-75 drought permanently destroyed pastoralism for many Somali. Pastoralists fled en-masse to relatives in cities; aggravating urban food shortages. Somalia losing the 1977 Ogaden war with Ethiopia over that disputed region had an immediate effect in terms of refugee flows into Somalia. By 1979, there were officially 1.3 million refugees in Somalia. Refugee arrivals drained Somalia’s meagre resources, creating violent tensions between the local Somali and Somali refugees;

524Ibid
525Harris, H. 2004,p.16
exacerbated by clan division. Barré forced many refugees into his government’s militia. From being a major 1970s refugee-receiving country, refugee streams out of Somalia gained pace from 1988 with the outbreak of the civil-war. By ‘1992 some 800,000 Somalis (from a then 9.2million total population) were refugees in neighbouring countries (e.g. Kenya and Ethiopia), and 2million were internally displaced...Flooding and drought (throughout the 1990’s) produced famine and (subsequent)...population displacement on a massive scale’, 527 exacerbating the situation. The nascent Somali fourth-wave developed against this backcloth. Another drought affected central/southern Somalia during 2011/12. 528 In 2013, internally displaced persons figures for Somali’s in Somalia reached over 1.1million with a similar number (1.075million) thought to have become asylum-seekers and refugees outside of the country.529

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527 Griffiths, D., 2003 (July), Somalia, [Forced Migration online].[2014,11 May 2014]
529 IDMC, 2013, Somalia: New displacement and worsening humanitarian and protection crisis for IDPs,[2013,13 August 2013]
Figure 14: Somali ‘country-of-birth’ by area in England and Wales

Source: Table QS203EW 2011 Census
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

Over twenty-five percent of all Somali people were displaced. Griffiths writes of Somalia being one of the ‘principal refugee-producing countries in the world’.530

Migration(s) to Britain and other European countries was largely responsible for the regionalized clan dimension of migration; 531 Isaaq and Darod clan members predominate in Britain. Their location acted as pull-forces for other Isaaq and Darod clan associates. An example being Slough’s Mo Tarrah of the Darod clan, and the Somali gatekeeper for this research, who arrived in London in June 1991. In contrast, the socio-economically disadvantaged, ‘despised’, 532 ‘descendent of slaves’533 minority status clan members; the ‘Benadir’534 (a generic term) had neither the clan-status nor financial means to seek refuge outside of Somalia, significantly affecting their real chances of civil-war survival. 535 From 1972-1988 Barré’s overtly public attempts to moderate clan in Somali daily life536 hid the truth his politics were tacitly clan-based; securing greater power for himself 537 and his Marehan538 clan affiliates. His totalitarian regime and economic mismanagement realised Somalia’s falling foreign-aid and economic decline. Barré’s tyrannical administration remains notable for its displacement and forced migratory outcomes. Insofar as specific relevance to Slough, many of the Somali women interviewed had left their husbands fighting in the civil war while others were widows of it.

Settlement ‘place’ and ‘space’
In returning to the phase-three Somali first-wave (1919-1939) and the notion of ostracized Somali in specific physical ‘places’ and ‘spaces’, it was noticeable in Slough’s Chalvey district that same-clan members, (those that were willing to share this detail), and their affiliates choose to live close to each other. Security, protection and to preserve their cultural identity seemingly central to this, as private shared rented-accommodation was available throughout Slough, (e.g. in the nearby and neighbouring wards of Baylis, Central and Cippenham Meadows - Figure 15).

530Ibid
531El-Solh, C. F. 1991,pp.539–552
532Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A., 1997(October), Minorities and Discrimination: Exodus and Reconstruction of Identities: the Case of Somali Refugees in Mombasa, ORSTOM, Paris,pp.17-18
533Ibid
534Ibid
535Ibid
538A sub-Clan of the noble Darod
According to the 2011 census, Slough’s Chalvey ward total population was 12,117 of which 303 people described themselves as being ‘born in Somalia’, (i.e. 2.5% of the total) - the highest concentration of Somali migrants in any of Slough’s wards with stated one-percent or greater Somali populations, (Figure 16).

QPZM, 2014, Local Stats UK: Chalvey Demographics,(Slough, England)
Three of Slough’s fourteen wards, Baylis, Britwell and Chalvey, were amongst the 10% most deprived wards in South East England and 20% nationally.\(^{541}\) (In 2011, Baylis had 51% ‘born in Britain’ and 18% ‘born in Pakistan’ residents. Britwell was a predominantly ‘born in Britain’ ward with over 76% of the residents choosing this classification).\(^{542}\) A comparison was drawn, in part, between post-WWI ‘Nigger Town’ in Cardiff and aspects of modern-day Chalvey; a subject returned to later herein. There were similarities; not least that in both cases the ‘spaces’ looked economically poor with a large number of run-down properties, and both were inhabited by significant numbers of migrants; high ‘spatial concentrations’.\(^{543}\) Perhaps regarding the second point this is understandable for Slough; a town boasting of its ethnically plural history of accommodating migrant-workers. In the 2011 census, Chalvey was home to over ten different classifications of country-of-birth dwellers including this study’s Somali protagonists (Figure 17).

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\(^{540}\)Ibid
\(^{541}\)SBC, 2011, ‘The index of multiple deprivation 2010: a Slough analysis’
\(^{542}\)QPZM, 2014
In contrast to Chalvey, Baylis and Britwell, Slough’s Langley St Mary’s and Cippenham Green districts ranked in the top-20% most affluent wards nationally. Both areas have predominantly ‘born in Britain’ residents (66% and 72% respectively) and notably for this research each had over 3% ‘born in Poland’ residents. This implied the Polish residents were either very elderly second-wave Polish or more likely EU8-Poles. This inferred division; ‘us and them’ was seemingly a tangible barrier to social cohesion in the town; witnessed during the field-work. It reinforced the need for the Local Strategic Partnership-(LSP) to address deprivation, poverty, unemployment, crime and inequality in areas like Chalvey;\(^{545}\) crime in Chalvey is returned to later in this chapter. Damaging identity assignment of ‘place’, such as Chalvey, was observed to have negatively influenced life-chances for people living there. Labelling of place

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\(^{544}\)Ibid

\(^{545}\) Slough Local Strategic Partnership, 2010 (March), Community-cohesion Strategy2010-2011 (Draft) LSP, Slough, p.11
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

or people as ‘problems’, ‘carries widespread consequences’. Notions of migrants from these ‘places’ un-problematically ‘fitting-in’, for example, the Somali children (and/or their parents), seamlessly embracing Britain’s national curriculum, was naïve.

The Somali-in-Slough feeling of not being accepted as equals by other ‘communities’, such as the Pakistani, was also witnessed as problematic. Although the Somali ‘community’ plainly had its own unresolved internal issues, it seemingly required ongoing and explicit understanding by the wider community to facilitate its own trusting of others. Somali experiences of ‘leap-frogging’ that is, being surpassed by later arriving migrant groups, specifically EU8-Poles exacerbated their feelings of marginalization. Leap frogging was perceived by the Somali to be negatively affecting their representation and access to localized resources including project-funding, housing, education and employment. This acknowledged, Somali heterogeneity appeared to cause local service providers such as SBC to struggle to see why there should be different Somali ‘groups’ vying for the same funding-streams. Preferably, from these institutional standpoints, the Somali themselves needed to see where they duplicated their efforts. The Somali perception of them being ‘leap-frogged’ appeared to have been curiously legitimized however because of their self-imposed social, political, and economic exclusion.

Social cohesion
In 2014, national identity/national security are inextricably linked in post-9/11 and 7/7 Britain. Economic downturns, austerity; recession even, need to be blamed on someone or something. As modern history records, in periods of economic austerity, mainstream society seeks ‘scapegoats’. Society does so because by identifying ‘other’ as the culprit, it of itself creates greater internal cohesion for itself. Cohesion and integration have become the publicly ‘shared aspirations of all mainstream (political) parties’ although British anti-migration legislation is its antithesis. The Somali were on the receiving end of a negative ‘double-whammy’, being both Muslim and for the most part economically inactive or in receipt of welfare benefits. In contrast the EU8-Poles were ‘Christian’ and had the right to work in the UK.

\[546\]Ibid, p.22
\[547\]Inward, E. & Chaudhary, S, 2006 (March) Guiding Hands in a Foreign Land Slough Race Equality Council, Slough, p.30
\[548\]Ibid, p.38
\[549\]Ibid, p.20
\[551\]Ibid
Employment; Health; Housing and Education: – a ‘snap-shot’

Legal-status and clan influence were consistently fundamental determinants in Slough’s Somali-specific demographic issues of employment, health, housing and education. In 2013 The Economist magazine journalistically posed the question, ‘why do Somalis do so badly in a country where other refugees have flourished?’ It commented the Somali ‘are among the poorest, worst-educated and least-employed in Britain’. From this research perspective the Somali-in-Slough were poor, and found secure employment elusive not least because of their uncertain legal-statuses. The, ‘cocktail of poverty and unemployment dogged (Slough’s) Somalis’.

Employment

Literature generalizes that ‘professional’ Somali men, (qualified, experienced with transferable skills and possessing good English language skills.), secure in their legal-status; with Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR); or already naturalized British citizens/EU-citizens and in Britain as secondary-migrants, likely performed the best in Britain’s labour-market. Such generalization acknowledged, it remained the case many Somali-in-Slough who met these criteria were invariably told that they were ‘overqualified’, (assuming legal-status was not a barrier). For the ‘non-professional’ Somali asylum-seeker or refugee, the mounting emphasis on ‘Britishness’ and the acquisition of English language skill-sets by migrants generally, linking ‘race’ with citizenship and degrees of legal-status premised notions of ‘belonging, continued to pressurise an already (self or otherwise) marginalized ‘group’. Labour-market prejudice towards the Somali-in-Slough was attested to with some experiencing ‘non-recognition of (their) pre-migration qualifications’. Others confirmed to being subject to ‘employer discrimination’, in short, ‘racism’, (see ‘Voices from Slough’ chapter). The boundary between ‘professional’ and ‘non-professional’ Somali-in-Britain, should not be construed as reasoned.
Late twentieth-century London research evidenced, ‘Somalis with PhD’s (working) in warehouses,’ while a lack of transferable-skills and the clan-created closed society were identified as cultural impediments to employment. Many Slough-Somali were seen to have relevant skill-sets and qualifications although were found, largely, to be ‘working in low-skilled jobs with earnings far below the average.’ Using 2011 ONS data, Figure 18 (above) highlights how 42% of the Somali in England and Wales were ‘inactive’ in the UK labour-market and 10% were unemployed. This compared

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563 Olden, A. 1999, pp.220-221
adversely with the Polish employment statuses that recorded just 13% inactive and 2% unemployed; suggesting EU8-Poles are nearly three times as likely as Somali migrants to be employed.

Further statistics illustrate the economic plight of the Somali-in-Britain. Figure 19 details February 2011 DWP-data suggesting that at that time over twenty-five thousand Somali were claiming welfare benefits; twenty-three thousands (91%) of these work related, (Jobseekers-Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance [ESA]/Incapacity and Lone Parent Allowance).

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jobseeker</td>
<td>ESA &amp; Incapacity</td>
<td>Lone Parent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>13.94</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>7.66</td>
<td>7.37</td>
<td>7.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>371.1</td>
<td>121.7</td>
<td>130.4</td>
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**Figure 19: Somali and Polish non-UK national @ NINO registration: DWP February 2011 – The Working Age Benefits (published Jan 2012)**

Once more this data compared unfavourably with the EU8-Polish employment data, both numerically and in percentage terms. For the EU8-Poles, a little under fourteen-thousands of their number were claiming welfare benefits; eleven-thousands plus of these work related (83%). It was true in Chalvey that, *many Somali households* (were) *headed by women who came to Britain without their husbands…fitting work around*
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

child care (was) a struggle’. Each of these scenarios exacerbated the actual and perceived feelings of being excluded from sufficient legal income, other resources and wider social relationships.

Health

Echoing Hassan et al, it seemed the Somali-in-Slough, ran ‘the risk of being subsumed into broader statistics’. This was because they were very often simply classified as ‘Black African’. Their especially distinct migratory circumstances seemingly, ‘averaged up in terms of income, health, wellbeing and integration indices (that may well have led to the)…failure to identify and target the most acutely needed welfare interventions’. This stated, since this thesis’ field-study, the 2011 Care Quality Commission (CQC) report, including Slough’s walk-in Health Centre, established that the centre had by that time employed ‘dedicated staff to work with Somali women’. As regards Somali health per se, early acknowledgement must be given to the Somali propensity for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) resulting from their civil-war experiences and escapes from them.

Further, physical and emotional side effects resulting from the prolonged use and misuse of the naturally occurring amphetamine Khat (Qat) including depression, anxiety and insomnia undermined day-to-day Somali lives not least in creating domestic frictions leading to domestic abuse. Last, but by no means least, Somali women and pubescent girls continue to suffer the effects of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). Ninety-eight percent (98%) of all Somali women in the world undergo this procedure. While it is illegal to carry out or undergo this cultural practice in Britain under the provisions of the U.K. Female Genital Mutilation Act [2003], its widespread practice remains defended. The 01 April 2014 Slough & South Bucks Observer stated it had, ‘anecdotal evidence of more than 200 FGM victims in Slough’s

565 The Economist, 2013,(17 August)
567 Ibid
569 Warfa, N., Bhiu, K., & Craig, T., 2006, “Post-migration geographical mobility, mental health and health service utilisation among Somali refugees in the UK in Health Place,vol.12 Iss.4,p.504
570 Healthwatch Slough, 2013 (April), The Slough LINk Legacy for Slough Healthwatch, Slough CVS,Slough,p.12
571 Havell, C. 2004, Qat use in Somali, Ethiopian and Yemeni communities in England:issues and solutions [09.08.2007]
572 Maan, A. 2007
573 Toubia, N. 1995, Female Genital Mutilation: A Call for Global Action, Women Ink,New York,p.11
Somalian community. The 2011 CQC report had also stated focus groups for the young Somali had been launched to culturally address issues relating to their sexual health practices, (e.g. sexual exploitation, FGM, sexually transmitted diseases) as well as substance misuse including Khat use. According to the CQC, Slough’s walk-in Health Centre could offer ‘preventative services’.

Housing
Chalvey's Somali typically inhabited, ‘…cramped, poorly-repaired housing, existing on minimal income… barred from employment until cases are heard… encountering discrimination, immigration-related bureaucracy, education / literacy and employment difficulties, with numerous concomitant health and wellbeing effects’.

Secondary Somali specific housing-needs research from traditional Somali ‘city habitats’, notably Ealing and Tower Hamlets in London and Bristol, Liverpool and Sheffield, reported Somali populations remain in clustered-areas. These designated ‘spaces’ harked back to Cardiff’s post-WWI ‘Nigger Town’. Slough’s Somali lived mainly in Chalvey although some resided in Farnham Road, Manor Park, Cippenham, and the outskirts of Langley and Baylis. Tenure was expensive, unstable and largely on a private tenancy basis. In 2009 the EHRC reported that 10.8% of Somalia-born British households had five plus children, compared with just 0.3% of the British-born population, supporting cramped housing observations. Chalvey was characterized by ‘high levels of unemployment, crime, depravation, poor quality services and limited local amenities’. In 2013, it was reported that Slough’s housing was ‘under considerable pressure’ with SBC having 7,000 people on its waiting list.

Slough Race Equality Council reported the rate of Somali illegal evictions was very high. Returning to crime and criminal activities previously mentioned in ‘Settlement ‘place’ and ‘space’, in 2013, The Observer reported, ‘Slough has a large private rental sector and unscrupulous landlords are a major headache for the local authority’,

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576 Slough & South Bucks Observer, 2014 (01 April), 'We must wipe out barbaric practice’ - council vows to stop female genital mutilation’ Berkshire Media, Reading
577 Welford, T., 2011, s.6.11
578 Hassan, M. et al, 2009,Summary
579 Cole, I. & Robinson, D. 2003, Somali Housing Experiences in England [08.08.2007], p.1
580 Inward, E. & Chaudhary, S, 2006,p.35
582 Cole, I. & Robinson, D. 2003,p.2
583 McVeigh, T., 2013
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

584 echoing this research finding. Hand-in-hand with this were reports of assaults committed by property owners against Somali tenants. 585 Slough’s Somali protagonists attested to these findings throughout Chalvey. In 2009, TVP launched ‘Operation Crook’ attempting to reduce rising violence in Chalvey - at that time a ‘corridor of violence from Chalvey High Street to Ledger’s Road’. 586 Chalvey was reported as being among the most dangerous neighbourhoods in the Thames Valley...‘including murder, wounding and racial attacks’. 587 The overall crime rate in Chalvey at that time was more than double the regional average. Almost one attack a day or 16 attacks per-1000 people - three times the regional average. 588

Upon reflection, the Chalvey environment generally, and the restricted housing particularly, likely made engaging with education even more challenging for the young Somali. In was evident on entering the various Somali homes that creating ‘dedicated spaces for learning… to keep noise levels down…in severely overcrowded conditions’ 589 was extremely difficult; if not unworkable.

Education
In late-2013, The Economist published a melancholy outlook for the young Somali in Britain from the economic, cultural and social marginalisation space the Somali ‘community’ occupied. It stated that in its opinion, ‘education (looked) an unlikely escape route’ 590 The magazine cited poverty, over-crowded housing and relying on free school-meals for the comparatively poor 2010-11 GCSE results with only 33% of Somali children earning five ‘good’ GCSEs, compared with 59% of Bangladeshi and 78% of Nigerian pupils. 591 Interestingly the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) reported that in the same period there were a total of seventy, ‘Somali domicile higher education students at UK higher education institutions in 2010/11… (15 Postgraduate/55 Undergraduate)’. 592 The point made here being the Somali were not simply victims - so frequently the misconception settled for. The Somali have been, and are, journeying forward with the young Somali especially seeking out their

584 Ibid
586 Slough & South Bucks Observer, 2009 (09 January), ‘Corridor of violence’, Berkshire Media,Reading
587 Ibid
588 Ibid
590 The Economist, 2013(17 August)
591 Ibid
592 Kemp, S. 2013 (08 January), Somalis in UK Higher Education, HESA,Cheltenham
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

‘s’pace’ and place in Britain. It was tangible in Slough that Somali parents were highly aspirational for their children, although many were not familiar with the UK education system and often tussled with ‘how to support their children’s education’. They were determined however for their sons (especially) and daughters (before marriage) to gain a good education in what was, in truth, the face of multiple-adversities. Many of the Slough-Somali parents were well educated and, ‘had lived and worked in different countries (the secondary EU-Somali)…understood, spoke and read English, but struggled with the difficulties of adapting to (British) culture and society’. Some of the Slough-Somali mothers were not totally satisfied with the standard of education their offspring received. This too supported the finding that Somali mothers ‘complain that communications with schools in England are comparatively poor, incomplete and reactive’.

Somali: a résumé
Over the last century-and-a-half, British legislation has sought to manufacture restricted citizenship models using unrefined immigration legislation and controls. This has largely determined the waxing and waning Anglo-Somali relationship. Britain’s citizenship modelling has variously shaped political and social responses to the Somali as economic migrants, as ‘brothers in arms’, as asylum-seekers, as refugees and as EU-citizens. The experiences of the four Somali-waves have illustrated the resilient relationship that exists between ‘race’, migration, specific economic and political agendas, the State and importantly, the individual. This part of the chapter has sought to give an account of this potholed continuum, ‘given the intensity and extent of contemporary clan and socio-political hitches of Somali society’.

593 Strand, S. et al, 2010,p.16
594 Ibid,p.177
595 Ibid,p.23
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

Polish migration

Introduction
Polish migration history is, ‘characterized largely by emigration’, 597 Throughout the four-waves, excepting the EU8-Poles, and perhaps the very early arriving Polish-Jews 598 in the mid-to-late nineteenth-century, Poles have been forced to move as part of encroaching imperial aspirations, political industrializations, religious zealotry, and ethnic cleansing. 599

Poland became a European Union (EU) Member-State on 1 May 2004; one of eight accession countries (A8) - the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland (EU8), Slovakia and Slovenia. At the accession, Polish nationals represented just 2.3% of the total non-British nationals living in Britain.

The reasoning behind EU8-Polish distinctiveness is pursued herein; specifically in Slough, not simply because of the wave-size, momentum, or its unrestricted nature in Britain’s labour-market, significant though each of these characteristics are, but because of the well-defined classes of Poles constituting the wave and the individualism conveyed by them. On one hand ‘professionals’, particularly medical and information and communication (ICT) specialists alongside highly-skilled and experienced trades-people from within the broad construction industry spectrum. On the other, poorly educated, unskilled workers; subject to exploitation, abuse and in parts of Britain, homelessness and destitution.

The extremely ‘high level of immigration from the A8 to Britain after accession (713,000 for the 2004-2012 period)’ 600 was not predicted. The growth equated to, ‘an increase of 631,000 Polish nationals residing in Britain (from) 2004-2012’. 601 In 2012, ‘Polish was the most common non-British nationality...700,000 Polish nationals...14.4% of the total number of non-British nationals resident in Britain’ 602 Figure 20 charts the linear increase from 2008-2012 using ONS Annual Population Survey (APS) data.

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597 Alscher, S. 2005, Country Profile, Poland (No.3 July 2005), Netzwerk Migration (Europa), Warsaw,Poland,p.1
599 Panayi, P. 1994, Immigration, Ethnicity and Racism in Britain, 1815-1945, Manchester University,Manchester,p.34
601 Ibid
602 Office of National Statistics, 2013 (29 August), ‘1 in 8 of the usually resident UK population were born abroad’, Part of Population by Country of Birth and Nationality, 2012 Release, ONS,London
It is argued herein that the fourth-wave is unique. It has not relied on Slough’s existing Polish ‘community’ for traditional chain-migration network support. It is true some of its number immediately gravitated towards the Catholic Church as an established service provider, although certainly not all. The wave arrived independently and the people who constitute it make their own way; ‘ploughing their own furrows’ in terms of their livelihoods. They were staunchly independent and any notion of British welfare dependency was rejected. As EU-citizens, they did not need a work-permit or a visa to work, live and settle in Britain. EU-membership permitted them, for example, to open a bank account, buy property and settle. They were, subject to their ‘class’, able to hit the road running in Britain. In unpacking their distinctiveness (in Slough), there were seemingly variable degrees of importance placed on the need for, and use of, the English language. Standards of education and subsequent employment aspirations and achievements also varied.
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

According to 2011 Census data, just under five-hundred and fifteen-thousand Polish-born people were resident in England and Wales, (Figure 21). Four-hundred and ninety-eight-thousands, (97%), of these resided in England of which 7696, (0.015%) of that number lived in Slough. Many of the EU8-Poles have chosen small to medium sized regional towns such as Slough and its neighbouring Thames Valley towns, where their work ethic can more easily be appreciated and competition for work is perceived by them to be less, to live.

Figure 21: Total Polish-born residents in Slough Unitary Authority compared to the total number of Polish-born residents in England & Wales and England in 2011

Source: ONS 2011 National Census (England & Wales) Table CT0010EW

Slough’s EU8-Poles were seen to advocate the Borjas theoretical perspective that, ‘individuals migrate because it is in their benefit (in this case fiscally) to do so’. Kershen’s point being Borjas rightly or wrongly, ‘assumes that individuals regard potential host societies as existing in a market place where they, the would-be migrants, shop around in order to maximize their utility’. In this research case, Borjas could not be more accurate. Upon reflection all the EU8-Poles interviewees unreservedly agreed they had ‘expected destination earnings’ in migrating to

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604 Kershen, A. 2005, p.27
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

Britain. Borrowing from Endelman, some of the EU8-Poles also importantly embraced the prominence of religion, language and lifestyle expectations in choosing Britain as their host. Those EU8-Poles in Slough have been able to replicate ‘home’ in Britain with the Catholic Church, the Polish language and a specific degree of acceptance of ‘Polishness’ – an important point returned to later in this chapter.

Following is a purposely concise, chronologically presented, history of Polish migration and settlement in Britain. Where possible it is specifically related directly or indirectly to Slough and this researches Polish protagonists. It is particularly so from the immediate post-WWII period to the present-day with Free Poles and European Voluntary Workers (EVW) settling in the town as beneficiaries of the Polish Resettlement Act (1947) - the first UK immigration legislation enacted offering over 200,000 displaced Polish troops (on British soil), British citizenship for their contribution in defeating Nazi Germany. As in the Somali section of this chapter, for clarity and purpose herein, the period 1860-1945 is that called the first-wave Polish migration. To avoid unnecessary complexity, this period is sub-divided into phases. Phase-one; 1870s-1913 (‘for bread’ [za chlebem] Poles), phase-two; World War I (1914-1919), phase-three; 1919-1939 and phase-four; World War II (1939-1945).

First-wave migration

Prelude

Following three late eighteenth-century annexations, at the turn of the nineteenth-century Poland had been geographically, culturally and politically divided between Russia, Austria and Prussia. The Polish people, 'no longer had a sovereign state of their own'. Poland was entirely under foreign rule. In 1815, following the Napoleonic wars and the sitting of the Congress of Vienna, Poland’s ‘three despoilers’ were sanctioned to keep the territories each had seized in their partitioning of Poland. The region around Warsaw was renamed the Kingdom of Poland and was technically independent, but in truth was bonded to Russia as the Tsar was crowned the Polish king. This was Congress Poland. From 1815-1830

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Endelman, T.M., 2002, pp.129-130

Tannahill, J. 1958, European Volunteer Workers in Britain, Manchester University, Manchester

Chastain, J. 2004, ‘Great’ Polish political Emigration (1831 - 1870) [University of Ohio], [2014,15 May 2014]

Fisher, C., 2009, Poland/Poles: Development of a Nation, [Worldology], [2014,15 May 2014]

Following Napoleon’s defeat, from September 1814 - June 1815. Congress redrew the political and cultural landscape in Europe to restore the balance of power

Ibid

the annexed-Poles sought, by fair means or foul, to regain their independence. Their 1830 November Insurrection\textsuperscript{614} was quashed however, ‘10,000 leading members of the Polish community’\textsuperscript{615} exiled. This event was known as the ‘Great Emigration’ and it is widely accepted this lasted from 1831 – 1870\textsuperscript{616} in which time, ‘at least thirty-thousand… Poles were in exile’\textsuperscript{617}

\textit{The numerous and often bloody Polish uprisings commanded the attention and admiration of Europe, while Polish exiles and refugees wandered over the world and found welcoming havens in France and England}\textsuperscript{618}

The majority of the ten-thousand expelled Poles, ‘settled in France… (The) spiritual and intellectual centre of the Polish struggle for independence’\textsuperscript{619} although some arrived in Britain and others went to the USA, Belgium, Switzerland, Algeria and Germany. Chastain writes of, ‘a total of about 6000 émigrés (arriving) in France from 1831 – 1837’\textsuperscript{620} Britain ‘became a refuge for Polish politicians and soldiers who were anxious to acquire British support in defence of their country’s right to freedom’\textsuperscript{621} In 1835, the most radical post-November Insurrection faction of Polish migrants; the \textit{Assemblies of Polish People} arrived in Britain opposing all forms of nobility,\textsuperscript{622} and upper classes in Poland. From an early-to-mid nineteenth-century British perspective, and as important background contextualisation of what and who Polish migrants were to Britons, Polish-Jews across Britain were already attracting disapproving attention; even in their small numbers, as the ‘Great Emigration’ continued to produce migrant-Poles across Europe. Endelman writes of, ‘Polish and Russian Jews (being) considered a major burden on communal funds in London, Liverpool and Manchester’\textsuperscript{623} There was growing anti-Semitism in Britain at this time; exacerbated in 1871, when the fullest Jewish emancipation in Britain was realised.

It was against this backcloth that from the 1870’s the ‘first large-scale migrations from Poland took place’\textsuperscript{625} This largely economic-migrant first-wave phase came

\textsuperscript{614}Gnorowski, S.J.B, 2012 (Reprint), \textit{Insurrection of Poland in 1830-31: And the Russian Rule Preceding it Since 1815, Forgotten, London,pp.113-162}
\textsuperscript{615}Ibid
\textsuperscript{616}Chastain, J. 2004
\textsuperscript{617}Ibid
\textsuperscript{619}Lerski, G. et al 1996,pp.176-177
\textsuperscript{620}Chastain, J. 2004
\textsuperscript{622}Endelman, T.M., 2002,p.128
\textsuperscript{623}Ibid.pp.101-107
\textsuperscript{624}Dustmann, C., Frattini, T. & Rosso, A. 2012 (Oct), The Effect of Emigration from Poland on Polish Wages, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM) Discussion Paper No 29/12, London/Milan,p.5
about as a result of, ‘sluggish economic development and large population growth’ in Poland. Not unlike the contemporary EU8-Polish fourth-wave, this Polish migrant-phase sought ‘better opportunities in other (host) countries’ including Britain and America.

**Phase-one; 1870s-1913 (‘for bread’ migration - za chlebem)**

‘Eighty-per cent of all Polish immigrants’ in the period 1900-1930; (overlapping this thesis’ initial three phases of the Polish first-wave), ‘originated from Poland’s rural areas and were economic migrants’ – migrationarily motivated by chronic unemployment, Imperialist-repression and in many cases, because of the land shortages, hunger.

![Figure 22: 'Foreigners' from Russia and Russian-Poland enumerated in England and Wales at each of the five census; 1861-1901](image)

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626 Ibid
627 Ibid
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

This fiscal premised 'push' started because of the 'poor harvests in 1902-03'. Poles literally came to Britain to work; to eat; and to live — 'for bread' although as with the EU8-Poles, many it seems arrived in Britain with the intention of making money to buy land in Russian-Poland and return 'home'. Figure 22 illustrates the decade-on-decade numerical growth in 'foreigners' from Russia and Russian-Poland enumerated in England and Wales at each of the five census; 1861-1901. (None could be traced to Slough or even another Berkshire town). The 1891 census recorded that of the 168,814 ‘European-foreigners’ enumerated, the Russians and Russian-Poles, ‘together numbered 45,074, of whom 23,626 were Russians and 21,448 were Poles’. In 1901, the census realised a total of 82844 ‘foreigners’ from Russia and Russian-Poland; 61789 Russian/21055 Russian-Poles – a reduction of nearly four-hundred Russian-Poles over the decade. The 1911 census recorded 95541 foreigners born in ‘Russia (including Russian Poland)’; 33.5% of all ‘foreigners’ in England and Wales. This upward data trend is seen to be replicated, as a whole, regarding ‘foreign born’ persons in England and Wales in the period 1851-1911, (Figure 23).

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6301901 Census of England and Wales, General Report with Appendices (1904 CVIII:(Cd. 2174)-1)
6321911 Census of England and Wales: Table 108: "Number of Foreigners of Various Nationalities and Proportion of Total Foreigners"
633Ibid
Despite the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth-century British immigration furore, especially regarding Jewish immigration, ‘during the intercensal period 1901-1911 there was a net loss to the population; an excess of emigrants over immigrants, amounting to 502,219 persons’. The most likely reason for this however, at its most fundamental, were the xenophobic and anti-Semitic calls for immigration control that had led to the 1902 Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, resulting in the Aliens Act (1905), affecting ‘undesirable’ immigration to Britain ‘unless they (migrants) could prove…they were entering (Britain) solely to avoid persecution or punishment on religious or political grounds or for an offence of a political nature’. In reality immigration exclusions were ‘relatively small’ in number. Of the prior 1850-1905 period,

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634 1851 Census was the first to record those born abroad; ‘foreigners’
635 Census of England and Wales, General Report with Appendices, Table 96: ‘Gain and Loss by Migration in registration Counties: 1901-1911’
636 National Archives, Moving to Britain: Events of 1901. [National Archives]. [2014, 16 May 2014]
638 Immigration controls and registration to prevent the poor and criminals entering Britain, with powers to deport. One of its main objectives was to control Jewish immigration from E. Europe
639 Moving to Britain: Events of 1901
640 Ibid
‘There was nothing on the (UK) Statute book (until the 1905 Aliens Act) to enable (the government) to prevent aliens from coming and staying in Britain as they liked’ 641

The pre-existent literature covering events for phase-one Polish immigration fails to differentiate between Russian, Polish-Russian, Jewish or Christian Poles regarding numbers of ‘foreign’ immigrants to Britain. Much is written of the Jewish immigrant community in Britain by respected authors such as Endelman and Kershen, but accurately teasing out nationalities was not viable herein. Moving forward, the decade preceding WWI saw the British ‘Empire at its peak, covering one-fifth of the world’s land surface… with-by far-the biggest navy in the world. 642 Health and unemployment benefits, pensions and higher taxes for the country’s wealthiest were all introduced by Campbell-Bannerman’s and then Asquith’s Liberal governments from 1906-1914.643

**Phase-two; World War I (1914-1919)**

Britain’s 4 August 1914 declaration of war against Germany brought, ‘immigration (to Britain) to an abrupt halt’. 644 In just three days, the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act (1914) 645 and the Aliens Registration Act (1914) were enacted. These legislations required all ‘foreigners’ - aliens, ‘over sixteen-years of age, to register with the local police, providing details of their name, address, marital status and employment…demonstrate a good character and have knowledge of the English language’. 646 (In 1917 the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was to send shock-waves through the Allies; ‘many of the serving Russian-Poles (in the British army) were viewed with much suspicion’ 647 – they were given the choice to remain serving in the British army, or return to Russia and serve in the Russian army).

As for Poland, it did not exist as an independent country at the outbreak of WWI; remaining the annexed territory of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. 648 Initially the Poles appeared pro-Russian, ambivalent towards the

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643Ibid
644National Archives, Migration Histories; [2014, 16 May 2014]
645BBC, 2014, History: Migration; [2014, 16 May 2014]
646Ibid
647Duncan, J., 2013 (Sept.), *Scottish based Lithuanians and Ukrainians in HM Forces during World War One*, [Newbattle at War]; [2014, 18 May 2014]
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

Austrian-Hungarians and anti-German. Over three-million Poles were conscripted into the armed forces of the three occupying powers during WWI, a further 300,000 were conscripted for forced-labour by the Germans. Clodfelter writes of 1,080,000 Polish WWI war-dead; ‘870,000 (being) men serving in the German, Austrian and Russian armies’. WWI was ‘the turning-point for Poland’ insofar as its independence and national identity was concerned. The Russian Provisional Government proclaimed Polish independence on 29 March 1917, confirmed by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. It was against this back-cloth that phase-three, covering the inter-war period 1919-1939 commenced.

Phase-two; inter-war (1919-1939)
The 11 November 1918 officially realised the furtherance of Poland as an independent country following one-hundred and twenty-three partition years. It was legitimately recognized as the ‘Republic of Poland’ (aka) the Second Polish Republic. Apparently ‘the regaining of (Poland’s) independence was the comparatively easy part’ as ‘seven years of conflict had left the countryside and the economy in a shambles’. As if that was insufficient to contend with, during the 1920’s, the Poles had to withstand a 1926 Coup d’état that placed the authoritarian Sanacja regime in power and, ‘withstand the crisis of hyperinflation and the Depression’ created by the global economic crisis of the period. Issues affecting the Poles and feeding into the first-wave emigration strategy of many Poles included high levels of, ‘unemployment, restriction of remuneration, lack of demand, decreased industrial production, a slowdown in investments and the outflow of foreign capital’. During 1918-1939 over two-million emigrants left Poland (mainly for America) although the accuracy of this data is acknowledged as being potentially erroneous. Distinguishing between Christian and Jewish emigrants was consequently
unattainable *herein*, although Poland’s history of anti-Semitism should not be bypassed for more relaxed reading. This would have had a bearing on Jewish emigrant numbers. From 1936 Poland *officially-sanctioned* anti-Semitism – ‘the open espousal of anti-Semitism as a social, cultural, economic policy.’

This same hostility towards Jews was witnessed in Slough; embraced by a minority of EU8-Poles - an important, if objectionable, cultural point returned to in the ‘Voices from Slough’ chapter.

**Phase-four; World War II (1939-1945)**

This phase is not reviewed *herein* as a history of Poland in WWII. However for contextualisation purposes a key event backcloth follows. On 1 September 1939, without a formal declaration of war, Hitler’s Nazi Germany invaded Poland. Britain declared war on Nazi Germany on 3 September 1939 in response. On 8 October and 12 October 1939, two decrees by Hitler saw large areas of western-Poland annexed to Germany and Poland again partitioned. (By the end of 1941, *‘all of Poland lay under Nazi occupation’*).

Nearly twenty-five percent of Poland’s population was killed and ‘hundreds of thousands of its citizens were dispersed across the globe’, because of WWII. ‘5-million (Poles) left or were forced to move (from Poland) by the Germans or the Soviets’.

In early-1940, what had remained of the Polish Free Army in Western Europe, following the Nazi invasion, headed initially to France, but following the French surrender on 22 June 1940, it retreated to Britain, to regroup - joining the Polish government-in-exile in London, as well as coming under British military command for the first time. Initial Polish soldiers and aircrew mustering in Britain numbered 19,000. By March 1944 that number was significantly greater; ‘195,000’. By July 1945 the Polish forces in Western Europe had increased to 228,000, (including 20,000 in the Polish Air Force and 3,000 in the Polish Navy) - most of the newcomers
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

being either released POW’s (Prisoners-of-war) or ex-labour camp inmates wishing to take the fight to Germany.\textsuperscript{668}

Importantly, in regard to this thesis and its Slough investigation, the Polish armed forces seared a lasting memory into the British psyche for the invaluable contribution they made to the Allied victory in WWII. As a Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs commentator wrote in 2005, ‘the most important features of the Polish contribution to the defeat of Germany are determination and perseverance’.\textsuperscript{669} This point is referenced particularly as regards the contemporary EU8 fourth-wave later in this chapter.

**Second-wave migration**
The end of WWII in Europe (V.E Day - 08 May 1945) signals the beginning of this thesis’ Polish second-wave, lasting until 1976; the advent of ‘Solidarity Emigration’, and the third-wave. In 1945, the Polish UK diaspora numbered ninety-thousand strong, increasing to ‘162,000’\textsuperscript{670} by 1951. From this thesis’ perspective Pacyga importantly distinguishes between Christian and Jewish-Poles. The 1945 and 1951 Polish population(s) in Britain being, in his view, predominantly Christian-Poles.\textsuperscript{671}

In the immediate post-WWII period, official British statistics recorded the number of alien Polish civilians in Britain as 22,704;\textsuperscript{672} (Figure 24) approximately eight-percent of the total 287,118 civilian aliens in Britain at that time.

In 1948 Hansard makes reference to, ‘100,000 displaced persons or European Volunteer Workers’ (EVWs) arriving in Britain in 1947 in addition to, ‘80,000 Poles from the Polish Resettlement Corps’ in the same year. In May 1946, the British War Office and the Air Ministry had formed the Polish Resettlement Corps (PRC) - 114,000 second-wave Polish service personnel enrolled in the PRC with an additional 30,000 families and dependants. The approximation of ‘100,000’ EVWs was later verified as 91,151. Of this number, 14,018 were Polish (9351 men / 4667 women); (Figure 24). They represented almost 16% of the total 91,151 EVWs from Eastern Europe, outnumbered only by the 29250 Ukrainian-EVWs. 1947 Hansard records crudely substantiate the number of Poles-in-Britain with the PRC men totalling 114,000; the 22,000 civilians and the 14,000 EVW’s equalling 150,000. Atlee’s Labour government Minister for Labour, George Isaacs stated,

‘There is a widespread impression that because there is a labour shortage and because there are 140,000 Poles available, it is simply a question of putting them into jobs which are vacant’.

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673 Hansard:(HoC) 1948, PD on Emigration – 18 June 1948 [vol.452 cc880-916]
674 Ibid
675 Sword, K.et al., 1989,p.247
676 Hansard:(HoC) 1948, PD on Polish Resettlement Corps – 12 May 1948 [vol.450 cc216-9W]
677 Isaac, J. 1954,p.176
678 Tannahill, J. 1958,p.139
679 Ibid
680 Hansard:(HoC) 1947, PD on Poles, United Kingdom (Employment) – 11 February 1947, [vol. 433 cc325-36]
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

In 1931, there were 44,642 Polish-born people in Britain; continuing the upward trend of Poles-in-Britain from the turn of the twentieth-century, (Figure 25). Whether this number were Russian-Poland Jews or Russian-Poland/Polish (post-1918) Christian-Poles or both, is uncertain. Certainly, the 1906-1914 period (i.e. post the 1905 Aliens Act), saw a ‘decline in alien admissions…most Jews (preferring)…the USA’. The 1911 census for England & Wales is silent on religion and WWI effectively stopped Jewish immigration in Britain.

Figure 25: 'Born in Poland' nationals in England & Wales: National Censuses 1901/1911/1921
The figures for 1901 and 1911 refer to the area then described as Russian Poland - i.e. Russian citizens with Polish ancestry

1931 census records for England & Wales were completely destroyed by fire on 19 December 1942
Data Source: 1921 Census of England and Wales, General Report with Appendices:Table 64-'Birthplaces of persons of Foreign Nationality', 1901/1911/1921
By 1951 the Polish-born people in Britain numbered 162,339. Britain’s first mass immigration legislation officially responded to the second-wave problem that would not go away. In the immediate post-war period, it had been Britain’s intention to persuade Poles to return to Poland. That call was vehemently resisted for a number of reasons. Firstly, in February 1945 Prime Minister Churchill had given undertakings to the Polish armed forces offering, in effect, settlement in Britain and the Empire to those who could not return home. (This pledge overshadowed subsequent departmental efforts to limit Britain’s Polish settlement). Secondly, Stalin had viciously suppressed the Poles throughout WWII. The 1947 Act offered British citizenship to approximately 250,000 displaced Polish troops. Poles had fought against Germany and contested the Soviet Union’s installation of a puppet Communist government in Poland, (the result of Stalin reneging on his Yalta Conference promises). Sword wrote of the irony; Poles being on the winning side militarily but being defeated politically. Despite any misplaced ‘feel good’ myth regarding EVWs/PRCs being commonly well-received into Britain, in addition to them being publicly depicted as ‘suitable immigrants’, EVWs occupied an awkward in-between status - flanked on one side by other migrants considered undesirable and indigenous ‘white’ Britons on the other. The 1949 Royal Commission on Population implied, in retrospect, ‘non-white’ immigration was an unsatisfactory resolution to Britain’s immediate labour shortage or its longer term population decline concerns, describing suitable ‘sources of supply (as)...limited’. This verified the notion of ‘undesirables’ within the hierarchy of desirability context of ‘non-white’ Commonwealth. The Polish second-wave was in short, better than ‘undesirable races’ but nevertheless a compromise on the government’s ‘racist’ ideals. Despite WWII allegiances, second-wave Poles were not considered Western.

685There was no census taken in 1941 because of WWII
687Polish Resettlement Act 1947, The National Archives,[2011,15.03.11]
691Sword, K. 1986 (July),p.367
692Royal Commission 1949 (June), Report of The Royal Commission on Population [Command No. 7695];Chairman Sir Hubert Douglas Henderson MBE,HMSO,London,p.130
693Ibid
As for the media, ‘racist’ premised character assassinations included the EVW-Poles being accused of ‘strutting around as if they owned the place’, while anti-Polish rallies were accompanied by ‘Poles go home’ graffiti. Migrant labour recruitment was deemed essential for (Britain’s) economic recovery however. Of the total aliens recruited by 1951, Paul writes,

‘A conservative tally of the total number of (all – not just Polish) aliens recruited under the Attlee government (July 1945-October 1951) yields around 345,000’

The majority of post-1945 second-wave Poles fled, or did not return to, Poland primarily to escape Stalinism. Inclusive Allied triumph and exclusionary (Soviet) political defeat realized, ‘the first really significant settlement of Polish citizens in Britain’. (The opposing taxonomy between these political migrants and the EU8-Poles remains, ten years after EU-accession, a point of contention between them and a point returned to later in this chapter). As regards Slough or Berkshire, there were no records found of PRC resettlement camps in either the town or the county. Seemingly, the very nearest camp was just 8-miles away from Slough however; the Hodgemoor-camp near Beaconsfield in Buckinghamshire. Here, from 1946 until its 1962 closure, ‘Polish soldiers of the (3rd Carpathian Rifle Division had) arrived from Italy (with their families).

‘There were 180 dwellings some of which were sub-divided into smaller units, and in all, the population of Hodgemoor Camp reached approximately 600 at its peak during the 1950s’

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696 van Lierop, C. 2008, BBC3 ‘Exploring Polish community history in Coventry’ (02 October 2002),[22.03.11]
697 Ibid
702 Wizgier, H, Hodgemoor
A direct link between the second-wave Poles and Slough was established as being Slough’s Mars factory;\(^{703}\) ‘renowned for its high wages and excellent conditions’.\(^{704}\) Both Polish men and women worked at the factory with, ‘many families…able to afford cars or motorbikes…so commuting (from Hodgemoor)…did not present a great problem’.\(^{705}\) From solely working in Slough, in 1951-52, ‘many Polish families decided to settle in Slough…a chance to own homes’.\(^{706}\) There had always been resignation the PRC and EVW schemes would, for the most part, result in ‘permanent settlement’,\(^{707}\) although this had been resisted. State ‘tension’\(^{708}\) resulted from the conflict between pressing economic need and long term ‘humanitarian considerations’.\(^{709}\) The Foreign Office had made its standpoint clear,

> ‘We are anxious to encourage as many as possible of these people to return and to prevent any risk of their being led to prefer to remain in exile’\(^{710}\)

Although alien workers across Britain were regularly barred from positions of responsibility or skilled work,\(^{711}\) they often, ‘found their entry into the British labour-market smoothed by UK politicians and civil servants’;\(^{712}\) (e.g. Atlee’s government decision included allowing EVW-Poles to work in some of Britain’s coalmines),\(^{713}\) a characteristic resonant with the contemporary EU8-Poles. This stated, as Britain settled back into peacetime, second-wave Poles were described as ‘difficult people to assimilate’.\(^{714}\) Contrary to the popular notion of amenable ‘Polishness’ and Britain’s contemporary high regard for Poles, second-wave Poles were depicted as ‘poor quality’\(^{715}\) in respect of their work-ethnic and ‘racial-stock’ value. Implicit ‘racism’ was

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\(^{703}\) Opened 17 May 1932  
\(^{704}\) Wizgier, H, Hodgemoor  
\(^{705}\) Ibid  
\(^{707}\) Ibid,p.233  
\(^{708}\) Ibid,p.215  
\(^{709}\) Webster, W. 2000, ‘Defining boundaries, European Volunteer Worker women in Britain and narratives of community’, Women’s History Review,vol.9,no.2,p.257  
\(^{710}\) Foreign Office 28 January 1946, Clarification of Refugee and displaced persons problem with reference to U.N. debate [FO 371/57700-0017], Foreign Office/Political Departments, General Correspondence:1906-1968, National Archives,London,p.4  
\(^{711}\) Krawec, R. 2010,[2011,17.05.2011]  
\(^{713}\) Royal Commission 1949,pp.226-227  
\(^{714}\) Royal Commission 1949,pp.226-227  
\(^{715}\) Krawec, R. 2010,[2011,17.05.2011]  
\(^{717}\) Ibid
discernible in the notion of human ‘stock’ and references to the ‘distinct biological types of human being…’ preferred. Shrouded ‘racist’ terminology was evident throughout 1945-50, with government insisting on immigrants being of, ‘good human-stock and…not prevented by their religion or ‘race’ from intermarrying with the host [British] population…becoming merged in it’. The turning point for the second-wave EVW/PRC Poles as ‘good human-stock’ may be pinpointed as 22 June 1948. This date marked by the arrival at Tilbury docks of 492 Jamaican British citizen workers aboard the SS Empire Windrush. ‘Black’ colonial workers legitimately utilized their British citizenship to seek work and settle in Britain.

By 1949, second-wave Poles were deemed adequate specimens, dramatically contrasting with the original prejudiced ‘poor stock’ view of them. By March 1950, aspects of Atlee’s Labour Cabinet cited the newly arrived ‘blacks’ as creating ‘racial friction’ regarding employment, training, and housing. In June 1950, the government acknowledged there was a ‘colour problem’, and original notions of EVW/PRC Poles as, ‘young, strong-looking and healthy’, said to be made up of, ‘first-class workers who were both ‘keen and enthusiastic’, were re-adopted. (Under Churchill’s Conservative administration, 1953 realised ‘black’ British citizen immigration from the West Indies at around 3,000 people per year. Large-scale immigration did not begin until 1954. From 1954-1961, when Macmillan’s Conservative government first introduced a bill to control Commonwealth immigration that would become the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962), it was estimated circa 200,000 ‘black’ British citizen migrants entered Britain from the West Indies, Africa, India and Pakistan).

Initially the Polish second-wave encounter with Britain was nothing short of contemptible. The wave was, as a whole, perceived to create ‘very considerable political and social difficulties’ for Britain. Regarding their abilities to contribute to the nation’s post-war rebuilding programme, they were described as ‘poor quality’. Their human stock value and suitability to breed with Britons was demeaned. Anti-Polish sentiment was an on-going issue with the broadsheet media, in particular The

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716 Kent, D. & Miles, R. 1988, p.233
717 Ibid
718 Ibid
719 Ibid
720 Ibid, p.220
721 Manchester Guardian; 21.10.1946
722 Ibid
723 Foot, P. 1965
724 Cabinet Office 1946 CAB 134/301 Foreign Labour Committee [14 March 1946]; National Archives, London
725 Ibid
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

Times, feeding into Trades Union concerns about the second-wave Poles, Watson’s May 1952 research commented on fears arising amongst indigenous populations as regards negative effects ‘other’ migrant workers were perceived to be posing them. This perception re-occurs throughout British history, (e.g. seventeenth-century Huguenot weavers, eighteenth-century German-Jewish bakers, and late-nineteenth and twentieth-century Indian, West Indian and African migrants-to-Britain in numerous low skilled, ‘undesirable’ and poorly paid industries).

In summing up the compared receptions of Polish EVW/PRCs and New Commonwealth migrants in 1940s/50s Britain, there were unmistakable experiential similarities between them - their recruitment by Britain, the restricted nature of work they were permitted to undertake and how they were initially perceived as ‘other’. One patent difference however was the, ‘wages of whiteness’, with Britain-of-the-day classifying ‘white-other’ as superior to ‘non-white other’. This was, ‘racism born out of Empire’, and it assisted in the propagation of a sense of ‘white’ British working-class superiority. The significance skin-colour played in terms of citizenship, belonging and accommodation, in the post-WWII context of British immigration policy, illustrates that ‘white’ was a hierarchical construct. The second-wave Poles were very differentially positioned in that construct to indigenous ‘white’ Britons, but nevertheless were ‘above’ ‘non-white other’ from the New Commonwealth. The ‘non-white’ migrants of the period ‘suffered…the racialized discourse of difference’, a viewpoint echoed by the Slough-Somali in this research.

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730 Gwynn, R. 2000, Huguenot Heritage, The History and Contribution of the Huguenots in Britain ,Sussex Academic Brighton,Ch.4&5
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

It remains the wages of whiteness; the WWII bravery and loyalty of the Polish military personnel (PRC) and the diligence, hard work and efforts (to integrate into Britain) shown by Poles working at the Mars factory in Slough (for example) that established the second-wave model of ‘Polishness’ - now embedded in Britons memories. It was this representation that EU8-Poles successfully evoked in Slough, further enabling their rapid integration into contemporary British society. By way of introducing the Polish third-wave - ‘Solidarity Emigration’, Fassmann writes of the total number of ethnic Polish migrants involuntarily displaced by post-WWII Communism being 1,496,000. Even beyond Stalin’s death in 1953, the Polish Communist regime discouraged any form of ‘free’ international travel. Poland’s borders were frequently sealed with ‘restrictive passport and exit-visa policies’. The complex phenomenon that was emigration was not ‘officially’ acknowledged. ‘The extension of the Soviet sphere of influence virtually debarred [Soviet-bloc] inhabitants from emigration’. ‘The Cold-War and the Iron Curtain significantly reduced European East-West migration’. Many ethnic Poles managed to flow into West Germany under the umbrella of ‘ethnic migrations’ with Aussiedler (German) status however. Germany’s compassionate policy for Poles claiming German ethnicity lasted until 1991.

Third-wave migration, ‘Solidarity Emigration’
The third-wave is generally accepted as covering emigration from Poland from 1976-2004. It gained significant momentum from the end of the 1980s with what is colloquially referred to as ‘Solidarity Emigration’ following Communisms’ 1989 collapse. The Soviet Union’s disintegration, ‘not only transformed Poland’s political and economic structure, it also changed the country’s ethnic makeup and…established emigration trends’. Poles witnessed new partitions across Europe; again they needed to ‘adjust’. After 1989, Poland actively placed emphasis on its ‘new-found cartographic position in Europe’, issuing maps depicting Poland with close geo-political ties to Europe; not Eastern or Soviet Europe - the mental map

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736 McDowell, L. 2007
737 Fassmann, H. & Munz, R. 1994,p.523
738 Iglicka, K., & Ziolek-Skrzypczak, M, 2010 (September), ‘EU Membership Highlights Poland's Migration Challenges’, Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Washington D.C
740 Fassmann, H. & Munz, R. 1994,p.523
742 Ibid
743 Ibid,p.5
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

it wished to sear into the world’s collective consciousness. From this point forwards, Poland referred to the term ‘Mitteleuropa’ or ‘Central Europe’, as a means to redefining its Westernized positioning, and the ‘physical embodiment of the joining of ‘East’ and ‘West’. From 1950–1992, the total number of East to West migrants from Eastern European countries to the West was estimated at over 12 million, with ‘about 15% …from Poland’. This remains statistically significant. The Eastern-bloc build up to the 1989 Communist collapse, specifically that in Poland, remains absolutely linked to significant third-wave migration. In 1981 the Polish Roman Catholic Church, in estimating itself as the custodian of Polish sovereignty, criticized and sought to distance itself from Polish dissidents. It claimed their actions could ‘raise the danger of a threat to the freedom and statehood of the fatherland’. This was despite on 16 December 1980 Walesa publicly calling for any such threat to be avoided. For many Poles, this was an example of Church-State complicity and created distrust of the Church thereafter; a suspicion expressed by several Slough EU8-Poles. Interestingly, Solidarity as an anti-communism ideology allowed the third-wave intelligentsia to collaborate with, but not embrace, the Polish working-classes.

Throughout the 1980s the number of emigrating Poles was estimated at 850,000 to 1.1 million. Unknown numbers of Polish Solidarity dissidents fled to Britain as an outcome of Jaruzelski’s martial laws. Their choice of Britain premised on two second-wave facts. Firstly, the existence of the post-WWII Polish EVW diasporic ‘community’ in Britain. Secondly, London had been the seat of Poland’s exiled Government in WWII. Martial law ended in 1983, (although elements of it remained in force throughout the 1980s). From 1986-2004, Poland built a reputation as being a ‘country

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747 Burrell, K. 2009, p. 5
749 Ibid, p. 529
750 Korcelli, P. 1994, ‘Emigration from Poland after 1945’ in European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century, Historical Patterns, Actual Trends and Social Implications, eds. H. Fassmann & R. Munz, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 171-186
751 Curry, J.A. & Felice, L.G. 1981, Notes on Church State Affairs, Journal of Church and State, vol. 23, Iss. 1, Baylor University, Texas, pp. 165-184
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

of origin of new and partly irregular flows of labour-migration’ to the West’. 754 Third-wave Poles lived and worked illegally in Britain with their subsistence, for the most part, possible because they engaged with the networks and socio-economic structures established by the second-wave. That stated there was an implicit expectation by the British that these illicit migrants add to ‘the wealth and prosperity of Britain’ 755 and that those who failed to do so ‘should leave’. 756 It appears those who were economically active were ‘accepted’ as ‘unofficial refugees’ 757 and a ‘blind-eye’ turned to them by Britain’s authorities. This was not a universal ‘blind-eye’ however. The Socialist Party of Great Britain openly opposed Solidarity accusing it of being a political party and not a Trades Union movement. Many in the wave would become self-employed entrepreneurs setting up new restaurants and shops and importing Polish goods from ‘home’. 758 The third-wave is remembered because it was made up of largely illegally employed and/or overstayed Poles in terms of their visas. Accession Monitoring Reports (AMR) for 2004, 2005, and 2006 suggested 30% of the EU8-Poles registering to work in Britain in the period May-November 2004 were already illegally resident in Britain prior to Poland’s EU-accession. They were in actuality part of the third-wave. 759

The significant similarity in all four Polish migratory waves remains their tangible ‘passionate national consciousness’s’. 760 Polish nationalist fervour remains an integral aspect of Polish disposition within Europeanization-identity discourse, although it was recognizable in Slough there were degrees of division and hierarchy in, as well as between, the Polish migrant cohorts, not least across time. 761 A fundamental opposing taxonomy existed.

The dichotomous distinguishing between economically and politically grounded migrations has created a tangible émigrés class-hierarchy. Joly’s 762 wording ‘Odyssean Refugees’ expressed very well the explicit identity, ideological and generational difference between second and third-wave Polish political refugees and

754 Ibid
756 Ibid
757 Lachowicz, M. 2007, Polish Migration to London, A drama in three acts, Untold London,[17.03.11]
759 Duvell, F. 2004, Highly Skilled, Self-employed and Illegal Immigrants from Poland in the United Kingdom, Centre for Migration Studies,Warsaw,Poland
761 Korcelli, P. 1994,pp.171-186
the economic EU8-fourth. The global Polish émigré is unquestionably not unified. More fervently, economic-migration remains considered by some as a ‘manifestation of weakness…an ambiguous act of turning away from the fate of the nation’. 763 This opinion was ostensibly the resentment root preventing repair of much generational-fracture. This rupture was manifest in ‘complex cultural, generational, social, and structural differences’. 764 Distinctive characteristics included perceptions and out-workings of ‘class’, the need or desire for inclusion in Britain and abilities to independently access resources.

Fourth-wave migration: EU8-Poles

Preamble

The distinctive EU8-Poles are an aspect of the twenty-first century EU wherein,

‘Borders are coming down, and a new European migration system is being established…Internal European migrants can now be considered as ‘free movers’, rather than immigrants’. 765

Broadly speaking, even after ten years in Britain, the EU8-Poles remain idiosyncratic and indefinite in their migratory intent. It remains a fact in 2014, despite the vagaries of the British and Polish economies since 2007/08 that, ‘their numbers may come and go but the Polish community has, and will continue to have, an enduring collective impact on British society’. 766 There is no comprehensive EU-data on return-migration between the EU-member States. 767 Statistically however, according to the 2011 census, there were 579,000 Polish-born residents 768 in England and Wales; 86% of whom arrived ‘in 2004 or later…’ 769 – the EU8-Poles. In 2001 Britain, Polish-born residents numbered just 58,000. 770 The accession A8-migrations to Britain are described as, ‘the largest ever in-migration to Britain…the EU8-) Poles the largest ever single ethnic group’. 771
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

The EU8-Polish fourth-wave is significant in many respects; not least its overall size, distribution and the fact it is not a forced-migration, being economically premised. In Poland, the EU8-phenomenon was called, ‘The Biggest Resettlement’. This makes comparative reference to the 1831-1870 émigré-migration – the ‘Great Emigration’,\footnote{Ibid} (wielka emigracja), that realised ‘Polish political life played by people who carried out their activities outside the country’,\footnote{Chastain, J. 2004} to avoid imprisonment or execution. An important difference between these two migrations, and an important difference to Poles themselves, was their ideological gulf between politically and economically grounded migrations; a significant point reoccurring later in this chapter. The absolute size of the EU8-Polish immigration into Britain demands a measured, if concise statistical overview of its enormity and meaning. Following are national statistical benchmarks that lead into Slough specific EU8-Polish data.

**Statistical overview**

Britain’s Worker Registration Scheme (WRS); initially allowing A8-nationals to work in Britain,\footnote{No longer in place as of April 2011 as per EU rules of accession; transitional arrangements under which the WRS were based expired after 7 years. Source: Hughes, B. 2003, House of Commons Hansard Debate-5 June 2003 [Column 365-Part 21], Hansard.London} placed the total A8-inflow at 1,134,711 persons with 705,890, (62% of the total A8) being Polish nationals, (Figure 26).
Figure 26: A8 immigration 2004-2011 by Worker Registration (WRS) Application by A8 EU Member State

Source: Immigration statistics Table ee.03 - Worker Registration Scheme
https://www.gov.uk/government/.../system/...data/file/.../eea-q2-11-tabs [www.15.04.14]

This WRS data excluded the self-employed and those working in the ‘grey’ and ‘black’-markets thereby avoiding Worker Registration Fees, income tax and national insurance payments. EU8-Polish migration to Britain peaked in 2006 with over 150,000 Polish nationals registering. (Figure 27). The subsequent numerical decline was broadly in line with the beginning of Britain’s economic downturn in late-2007/early-2008. This implies a statistical relationship between the EU8-Polish numbers initially arriving into Britain immediately after accession, staying to earn money and then returning to Poland and/or the power of networking conveying the message Britain was not in truth ‘paved with gold’. Opportunities did not abound for everyone.

The largely strong work ethic, self-sufficient character, and transient nature of commuting EU8-Poles in Britain was illustrated in the Home Office comment, ‘the numbers [of ‘A8’ migrants] who have sought benefits and housing support have been
Although not exclusively relating to the EU8-Polish contingent, only ‘5,943 [‘A8’] people have applied for Income Support and the Jobseekers Allowance [of which]… Only 768 were deemed eligible for consideration’.

Figure 27: EU8-Polish migration to Britain according to WRS Date of Application data in the period May 2004 to April 2011 inclusive

Source: Immigration statistics Table ee.03 - Worker Registration Scheme

https://www.gov.uk/government/.../system/...data/file/.../eea-q2-11-tabs [www.15.04.14]

775Home Office, 2006,pp.22-23
776Ibid
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

There remains merit in the argument for overt recognition of the ‘important social, cultural, and political…benefits’ A8-migration produced for Britain. Insofar as official Polish statistics (Figure 28) were concerned, data implied emigration from Poland began to rise year-on-year in the post-2004/05 period.

Figure 28: Emigration from Poland 1996-2006
Source: Dmochowska, H. 2007,p.132/Table 23(18)

The data partially mirrored the 2006 WRS peaking of EU8-Polish migration to Britain. In 2005, 22000 people were recorded as emigrating from Poland as part of the EU8, compared to approximately 47000* in 2006. Of the officially recorded 46,900* outward

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migrants shown in Figure 28, more than 30% of the EU8-Poles chose Britain as their host destination, (Figure 29 refers).

Figure 29: 2006 Polish Emigration by Destination (Host) Country
Source: Dmochowska, H. 2007,p.132/Table 23(18)

In 2007, recording the 2006 height of the EU8-Polish migration to Britain data, the Department for Works and Pensions (DWP) reported the ‘Top-5’ categories of employment as varying from food-processing jobs (8%) through to the largest category (50%) in the ‘white-collar’ business and administration occupations (Figure
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

30). The cumulative total of Poles *registered to work* in Britain from May 2004-June 2007 was approximately 431,000 persons.\textsuperscript{778}

Figure 30: Percentage of the employed EU8-Polish cohort by UK Labour-market Category 2007

Source: McGill, M. 2007, Table 11 p.21

\textsuperscript{778}McGill, M. 2007, National Insurance Number Allocations to Overseas Nationals Entering Britain 2006/07,DWP–Information Directorate (IAD),Newcastle-upon-Tyne,p.21
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

In 2008 Poland’s unemployment rate dropped to 11.4%. In 2006 it was 14.9% - having peaked at 15.1% in 2000. Much of the reduction was attributed to EU membership and the unofficial reckoning that, ‘more than a million Poles left the country seeking work abroad’.\(^{779}\) Polityka estimated ‘one million Poles (had) moved to Britain (since 2004, with) some 83% of them (being) under 34 (years old)’.\(^{781}\) Unofficial reckonings did bear some resemblance to corrected ONS data of ‘somewhere around 660,000’.\(^{782}\)

Reports of EU8-Poles returning en-masse to Poland since 2009/10, in light of Britain’s economic recession and the traditional fiscal gap between the two countries narrowing, have been assuaged by the fact Poland also continued to experience its own economic slowdown, albeit not a recession, into 2011. According to Polish Migrants UK, many Poles reversed earlier decisions to return to Poland because of the situation there. Britain still appeared a ‘better bet’ than Poland under these circumstances. The organisation also commented on the ‘inconsistencies with official figures’\(^{783}\) meaning ‘it is difficult to say with any precision, not only how many Polish people are in Britain at any one time but also how many Poles are leaving to return (to Poland)’.\(^{784}\) Despite cosmopolitan characteristics exhibited by the Poles, there remains determined maintenance of ‘Polishness’\(^{785}\) acknowledged by Roos and witnessed by this research. Certainly after a decade as an EU member-state, it is apparent Poland is no longer the, ‘immature European country’\(^{786}\) it was, nor are EU8-Poles uninformed citizens.

In early-2014, Polish and British Prime Ministers Donald Tusk and David Cameron were in what the Financial Times (FT) termed a ‘war or words’.\(^{787}\) The confrontation being premised on, ‘the tensions over EU-laws that guarantee citizens the right to seek work across national borders’.\(^{788}\) EU8-Poles enjoy rights to ‘move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’ under Article 18 of the EU-Treaty. In 2002,
0.2% of the UK-workforce was from (what would become) the A8-states. From 2004-2012 this increased to 2%. (In 2013) Polish migrants (accounted) for 10% of all recent migrants to the UK. During this research, many of Slough’s EU8-Polish protagonists specifically based their ‘new’ cosmopolitanism on their EU-citizenship. In 2012, employment rates of EU8-Poles across Britain was a healthy eighty-eight percent. The legitimacy of the Poles’ EU-status remains incontestable; even if Britain, this time under the Cameron-Clegg coalition government, now take what the FT call the ‘neo-colonial view’, echoing many of the prejudices faced by the Polish second-wave regarding EU8-Polish immigration and their remaining in Britain.

In addition to their EU-citizenship assuredness, another characteristic difference, compared to previous Polish-waves, of the many EU8-Poles, was that they were married or with partners; with some bringing families with them. Others choose to leave grandparents and other relatives in Poland to child-mind while they travelled to Britain to work. Several EU8-Poles were single women. The estimated period of time EU8-Poles remained in Britain was also hugely variable as were the livelihood strategies, gender roles, migration-networks, notions of transnational belonging, integration and return migration intentions. Also setting the EU8-Poles aside from previous waves, a 2007 ONS analysis suggested the distribution of A8-workers extended more broadly and to different geographic ‘areas than have traditionally received a relatively large proportion of immigrants’. The ONS based its comments on the bone-fide WRS employer’s addresses across Britain in the post-May 2004 to December 2006 period.

With this change of settlement pattern came recognition of what, in 2008, Shelter called the ‘darker side’ of migration. Specifically referencing Slough, the housing and homelessness charity reported on twenty EU8-Polish workers discovered to be living in a three-bedroom house by SBC; an exceptional incident for Slough it appeared from this research finding but nevertheless disquieting. Figure 31 following shows the
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

2011 Census recorded 7,696 Polish-born residents living in Slough. This equated to 0.055% of the total 140,205 population of the town.

Figure 31: Number of Polish-born people living in Slough Unitary Authority (UA) area in 2011 compared to other Thames Valley UA’s

Source: ONS 2011 National Census (England & Wales) Table CT0010EW
Figure 32: Percentage of Polish-born residents in six Thames Valley Unitary Authorities (UA) in 2011 expressed as a % of each UA’s Total Population Count at the 2011 National Census

Source: ONS 2011 National Census (England & Wales) Table CT0010EW

Numerically the 2011 data suggests Slough had the largest Polish-born migrant population in the Thames Valley area, equating to 51% of the total 15020 Polish-born migrant population. Figure 32 above shows Slough also had the largest percentage of Polish-born migrants when extrapolated from its own total population and compared with each of the other Thames Valley towns in the same manner.

**English language, education and employment**

A further EU8-Polish characteristic, used as a weapon in some media to deride them as a ‘group’, was the importance of the English language as a feature of belonging and integrating in Britain. This linguistic emphasis resonated and contrasted particularly with second-wave experiences. One viewpoint held it “inherently reasonable” for Britain to expect all migrants to acquire English language skills. In 2009, it was a generally accepted, if not universal, conviction that proficiency in

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798 Ibid
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

English was ‘the single most important factor in the process of immigrants’ economic-assimilation and social-integration’. In April 2014, The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government announced a raft of measures, effective from 01 July 2014, for migrants arriving in the UK to, ‘face tougher scrutiny of their English skills in return for benefits’, continuing Britain’s immigration, citizenship, and national identity legislation over the last three-decades.

As EU-citizens EU8-Poles do not in truth need, legally, to avail themselves of any particular English language standard unless they so choose, (the same applied to the EU-Somali). Likewise the choice to integrate or not into wider British society was/is also theirs. Of course, their stay in Britain may be more difficult depending on what they do and with whom they live and work if there is a language barrier. In 2011, a British government cross-departmental report stated, ‘Migrants who speak functional English are more likely to find work…’ continuing, ‘Stronger [English]… language skills [assist migrants]…finding a job that better fits their skill levels.’ This perspective portrays just one side of the debate. Some international employers, international banks, specialist language-recruitment agencies, and other employers with businesses in mainland-Europe acknowledged significant numbers of economic benefits to them and their business coming from ‘workers’ knowledge of foreign languages rather than English’. From this viewpoint an excellent ‘foreign’ mother tongue is more important than the English language in securing UK-based employment. Further, many EU8-Poles securing work in Britain did so in the first instance in jobs ‘for which they are over-qualified’, to learn more of the cultural aspects of the country and to allow themselves time to learn English at their pace before taking up roles more suitable to their skills, experience and qualifications. Recompense for learning the English language remains influenced positively and negatively by ‘education, age, and years of residence in the host country’.

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801 Morgan, N., 2014 (08 April), Further curbs to migrant access to benefits announced, [H.M Treasury][2014, 28 May 2014]
802 By the force:01 January 1983
803 Byrne, D., Tankard, J., Cantle, T., Range, D. & Agnew, D. 2007, p.28
804 Secretary of State for Home Department: Section 5.5.1/p.29
805 Ibid, 5.5.2/p.29
806 Ibid, 5.5.2/p.29
807 Secret of State, 5.5.1/p.29
808 Ibid, 5.5.2/p.29
809 ibid, 5.5.2/p.29
810 Ibid, 5.5.2/p.29
811 Ibid, 5.5.2/p.29
813 House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry (09.10.2007), Conclusions & Recommendations, No.4
814 Ibid
State provision of English language instruction with either full or partial fee reductions has, since mid-2007, for the most part been curtailed on cost grounds in Britain. Responsibility for provision in 2014 remains primarily situated in the migrants' own personal-schema and that of their employers. ESOL funding remains only available for those with refugee status, whose claim for asylum has been recognised, and who are in receipt of income based benefits, or are unemployed. Lack of English skills means more reliance on support services and the welfare state. Of course, independent learning-methods have coexisted with State provision for many years. Some quarters of British society doggedly believe in a 'legitimate expectation…migrants will gain proficiency in English'. Unless such a view is fully realized however, ostensibly there remains a need for local service delivery of costly signage and literature in multiple languages. It was true some of Slough's professional EU8-Poles interviewed did require a good command of the English language, while for others it was questionable whether there was the need for the proficiency levels being called for by the State. In April 2011, in accusing the previous Brown Labour administration of allowing immigration to become 'too high', the Coalition Prime Minister David Cameron announced that people who are unable to speak English had created 'a kind of discomfort and disjointedness' in communities across Britain intimating some migrants were 'unwilling to integrate'. Insofar as education generally, an identifiable link has been presented by the successive Governments between improved EU8-Polish English language skills and indications some of the Poles progressed to British Further Education (FE) and Higher Education (HE) study. According to Nugent, they did so 'as they became competent in English'. This was borne out, in part, within these Slough findings. It also remains true however that, 'labour-market outcomes of migrants vary massively from one group to another'. Migrants are not a homogeneous 'group', or even 'groups'. Employment rates of 'white' migrants may be higher because they hail from Western industrialized countries with relatively high rates of employment, as well as possessing English language knowledge. Attempts to regulate, manage, compartmentalize, and/or

Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

‘standardize’ migrants in Britain remains fraught with over generalizations. In reality they are only ever indicators.

It remains appropriate to acknowledge contemporary evidence suggesting EU8-Poles remain being used as comparators insofar as the citizenship ‘value’ to the State is concerned. The BBC’s 2008 ‘White’, Is ‘white’ working-class Britain becoming invisible? – The Poles Are Coming!’ report exemplified a contrast between EU8-Polish fruit pickers willing to work for £7.00 per hour over a ten hour day and a young British man who commented ‘Nah, I’d rather sign on than do that’. It is in this context that, since 2004, EU8-Poles have been criticized for ‘taking’ jobs, houses, school places and all manner of other resources away from Britons. This selfsame precipitant created the 2014 ‘war or words’ between Poland and Britain. Work-types actually remain essentially highly skilled and specialized or low paid; these characteristics being shared with much of the work undertaken by migrant labour in the post-WWII era.

‘The history of immigration to [Britain] shows it is often [migrants who] …do the jobs that native Britons turn down’.

Polish accommodation and belonging in Britain
Anglo-Polish linkage was, to a considerable extent, established by the PRC/EVW second-wave. As previously stated however, events surrounding that wave were not unproblematic. Echoing today’s EU8-Polish experience for many, the EVW-Poles discovered their qualifications and experience were neither recognised nor valued. Also mirroring some EU8-Polish experiences, EVW-Poles were depicted in the media as stealing British jobs and housing. Although writing as a fictional novelist Francis’ description summarises the period of tensions many EVW-Poles were confronted with describing it as a time of, ‘mistrust (and) accusation’, ‘impatience and suspicion’. Although EU8-Poles are not gravitating en-masse or cross-generationally towards ‘settled’ British-Poles and their offspring, they have adopted

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819 Ibid
820 Ibid, p.28
821 Cienski, J & Barker, A, 2014
823 Ibid, p.28
824 Smith, T. & Winslow, M. 2000, p.77
825 Francis, C. 2005, Homeland, Pan, Basingstoke, Back Cover
and/or employed an entitlement notion of ‘belonging’ in Britain; the status achieved by numerous positive impacts of the second-wave, and to a lesser degree the third-wave.

Slough’s EU8-Poles were engaging with historical linkages to Britain despite not overtly relying on ‘social networks created by earlier waves.’\textsuperscript{826} EU8-Poles were evoking and calling upon memories and imagery of shared social heritage and cultural entitlements. Their gravitation towards Britain was not unproblematic or unified however\textsuperscript{827} – their experience is not homogenized. They were not, predictably, immune to ‘racism’,\textsuperscript{828} discrimination, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and stereotypical bigotry, for example in some media. Broster’s 2006 Daily Express polemic, ‘Britain To Use Polish Police’\textsuperscript{829} for example, issued a vitriolic attack for suggesting Polish migrant recruitment into police forces nationally to assist ‘some Polish people [who] don’t speak English very well’. EU8-Polish legal status meant/means Poles were/are not debarred from entering service of this nature, further reinforcing their belonging. It was British jingoism that refuted the common sense and legality of that sensible proposal, although it highlighted once again that integration for the post-WWII second, third and EU8-Poles were not unproblematic.

As well as degrees of political disconnection and fracture, ‘racism’, homophobia and anti-Semitism, EU8-Polish migration brought to the fore the role Catholicism plays in Polish social, cultural and generational processes amongst the 95%\textsuperscript{830} of Poles who assert to follow it. Blending the Polish Catholic Church (as an established service-provider in Britain) with the experiences, needs, wants and expectations of every EU8-Pole was evidently not trouble-free in Slough. On one hand the Catholic Church has embraced and implicitly influenced the EU-agenda\textsuperscript{831} from the outset.\textsuperscript{832} Some EU8-Polish Catholic faith manifestations have been described as ‘so vibrant you can chew it’.\textsuperscript{833} On the other hand, the reality of twenty-first century EU-Polish life and the cultural ‘racism’ sometimes evident in Slough, presented an alternative perspective.

\textsuperscript{826}Massey, D. & Taylor, J. (eds) 2004,p.ix
\textsuperscript{827}Burrell, K. 2007,p.1
\textsuperscript{828}Staniewicz, T. 2006, ‘60 Years On, Polish Migration to Britain’, London’s Polish Borders, New Patterns Of Migration Between Poland and Britain Two Years After the EU Enlargement, ed. J. Eade, University of Warwick/CRONEM, 17.05.2006,London
\textsuperscript{829}Broster, P. 2006,[26.11.2006]
\textsuperscript{831}European Economic Community (EEC): 25 March 1957
\textsuperscript{832}1957 Treaty of Rome - Signed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands and West Germany
\textsuperscript{833}Ibid.p.12
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

The reason for this was revealed, in part at least, by the candour of the *Amnesty International Report 2006*, 834

‘(Polish) authorities rarely (investigate and prosecute) cases of racial hatred… anti-Semitic material…freely circulate(s) … (In) investigating violent attacks against ethnic minorities (no consideration is given to) the racist motivation of crimes…’ 835

An example of this ‘racism’, in its explicit form, was brought to the attention of ‘The Polish Educational Society of London’ (TPESL) in 2007 by reports of ‘Polish children and their parents’ 836 being ‘racist’ towards ‘non-white’ pupils and their parents. Polish children were reported as ‘moving their desks away from ‘Asian’ and ‘black’ children in fear [of them]’. This, unpalatable though it reads, remains the ‘racist-face’ of EU8-Polish migration. Despite this, twenty-first century Britons largely describe the EU8-Poles as ‘hard working model migrants’. 837 The feel good factor created by this feeds the view ‘the British nation has ‘fallen in love’ with Polish-workers’. 838 Insinuation in these remarks harks back to notions of pre-WWI ‘international sympathy’, 839 eventual post-WWII second-wave affinity and ‘loveable-rogue’ third-wave bonding. Expectedly this view is not universally held. Elements of right-of-centre British society wring their ‘hands over the number of immigrants’. 840 Widespread expressed affection and fondness however legitimizes, in the minds of many ‘white’ Britons and the EU8-Poles themselves, the EU8-Poles ‘rights’ over and above ‘non-white’ peoples, seemingly making reasonable, the notions of leap-frogging being expressed by the likes of the Somali in the Poles access to resources arising from this accommodation. Outside of notions of psychological acceptance or otherwise however, lies the reality of approval and legal-acceptance by way of EU-citizenship. British citizenship is unnecessary for EU8-Polish acceptance.

When compared to the previous three-waves, another EU8-Polish distinction was the notion of ‘free-choice’. While it is *incorrect* to readily apply the notion of commuter-

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835 Ibid
837 Eade, J. 2006
838 Ibid
migrant to the wave as a homogenous descriptive term, some Poles really did commute. They had/have that choice, that discretion. Others remain working in Britain before permanently re-settling in Poland while others-still choose to legitimately work and settle in Britain as EU-citizens. EU8-Poles in truth can ‘have their cake and eat it’.841 Ten years after accession it remains true that many still, ‘present themselves as ‘in-transit’…with open-ended migration in mind’. 842 Migration away from Poland may or may not be a permanent venture.843

Summary
This chapter has presented a case for both Somali and EU8-Polish migration distinctiveness, showing twenty-first century Slough remains a, ‘community made up of smaller communities’,844 two being this thesis’ protagonists.

The Somali and EU8-Polish cases presented have been made in an historical context. For the EU8-Poles, primarily in comparison with experiences established in the immediate post-WWII period by the PRC/EVW second-wave; for the Somali as the first humanitarian-based wave compared to the three previous economic-premised waves. The chapter has explained the blurring of the end of the Polish third-wave and the beginning of the fourth. In this regard, it has acknowledged the unknown number of ‘illegal’ migrant Poles in Britain prior to 1 May 2004 actually counted as EU8-Polish migrants. The EU8-Polish wave has been interpreted as a significant component part of the construct that is a return to a ‘real’, or conceivably an ‘imagined’, Europe-wide ‘unity’. The overall British reception of the previous waves in the minds of the EU8-Poles has been perceived as wholly positive and a solid foundation on which to establish themselves. This is despite the documented and anecdotal negative experiences of the Polish second and third-waves. Britain has a post-WWII record of accommodating Polish migrants. EU8-Poles rights-of-passage were effectively secured in the British national memory and, by their watertight EU-citizenship status. They knowingly or unknowingly ‘traded-on’ historic linkages between Poland and Britain to ‘leap-frog’ over other more settled ethnic-minority groups, including the Somali. Notions of EU8-Polish identity ‘belonging’ were both

841Ibid
842Eade, J. 2006
843Secretary of State for The Home Department (Home Secretary: Jacqui Smith MP.) 2007 [October], The Economic and Fiscal Impact of Immigration – Cm7237 [House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs], HMSO, London, Section 5.2.5/p.22
844Fraser, M. (Pen name of Dorothy Phillips), 1973, The History of Slough, Slough Observer.[2014,06 May 2014]
complex and contradictory; being situated as ‘ally’; located as ‘white’; as Christian; as EU-citizen. Garapich’s comment, ‘in the enlarged EU, Poles … (have become) heroes or anti-heroes of public opinion debates about immigration’ \(^{845}\) remains an accurate overview.

For the fourth-wave Somali; as refugees, asylum-seekers and EU-secondary migrants, apparently there had been no such recognition of the important roles Somali Lascars performed in the two World Wars for Britain and its allies. The Slough-Somali had no sanctuary or ‘home’ in British national memory; even the EU-Somali appeared unable or unwilling to ‘trade-on’ their watertight EU-citizenship status. Until the late 1980s, the Somali-in-Britain were largely economic migrants. Since then, aside from EU-secondary migrants, for the most part, the Somali have become asylum-seeking refugees. The mixed migratory practices and strategies echo the reality of the Somali not being homogenous peoples. ‘Race’, ‘class’, clan-affiliation and legal status each intersect in infinite permutations determining outcomes. Somali dis-unity and fragmentation was perceived by Slough’s institutions, including the Council (SBC) and Thames Valley Police (TVP), to largely characterize their Somali ‘community’.

Generally, EU8-Poles had not relied on the existing Polish ‘community’ in Slough for traditional chain-migration support, although some Poles had used the Polish Catholic Church in the town as a point of institutional reference to ‘home’ and their personal notion of ‘Polishness’. The same could be said in part of the Somali. Slough’s fourth-wave had not relied on the existing Somali ‘community’ across Britain for traditional chain-migration support, although in their case they had ostensibly not found the Slough Mosques to be points of institutional reference to their home either. Even the EU-Somali, by-and-large, felt excluded from any notion of EU-unity, despite their legal right to claim it.

The concept of ‘race’; \(^{846}\) as the relationship of many different social dynamics operating at different times, at multiple levels and with variable influence, \(^{847}\) was recognizable comparing this thesis’ protagonists as well as looking within each ‘group’. These interacting forces included, for example, but were not limited to, what

\(^{845}\) Garapich, M. 2007, ‘Odyssean Refugees, Migrants and Power – Construction of ‘Other’ within the Polish ‘Community’ in Britain’ in Citizenship, Political Engagement, and Belonging, Immigrants in Europe and the United States, eds. D. Reed-Danahay & C. Brettell, Rutgers University, Piscataway, p. 4

\(^{846}\) Race is a Relationship, and not a Thing’, Journal of Social History, vol.37, no.1, Fall (Autumn), pp. 125-130

\(^{847}\) Miles, R. 1989, Racism, Routledge, London
are categorised as ‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’, ‘gender’, ‘history’ and in the case of this thesis’ protagonists, legal-status. In accepting, employing, and summarising the detail in this chapter in terms of Tabili’s interpretation of structural ‘racism’, it was feasible to better understand the British hierarchical system of cumulative inequalities based on ‘race’. Internal and external forms of Tabili’s ‘racism’ were witnessed to constrain a good many of Slough’s Somali. For example, heterogeneity manifest in their displays of ethnocentric and xenophobic behaviours towards one another; other migrants; and ethnic groups was witnessed. This approach has been illustrated in this chapter as culturally and historically reoccurring.

It would be mistaken however to assume that simply by establishing an accord for funding and other resource applications in Slough for example, that internal and entrenched division within the Somali ‘community’ would evaporate. While clan identity remained a significant but fluid process within the town; affecting social, economic; political, gender, and generational relationships, it could not be assumed it guaranteed affinity between individuals or sub-groups at any time. The Somali situation was seemingly that fragile; that tenuous. It was very likely this was a motivator for the Somali who still bought into their own myth-of-return. These individuals for whatever reasons, appeared acutely aware of the need to protect their communities ‘at home’; in Somalia, as well as survive and defend themselves in Slough. This acknowledged, alliances in Slough were not guaranteed to travel back to Somalia and likewise clan ties in Somalia may not have transmitted in-full or even in-part into Slough. Resentments vis-à-vis material self-interest, angst as regards not ‘belonging’ and notions of self-inflicted marginalization founded largely, but not wholly in clan, were evident throughout the entire field-work.

Notable distinctive EU8-Polish features were ‘class’, cosmopolitanism, ‘belonging’, ‘white’ historical affinity with Britons, the size of the migratory ‘group’, its indefatigable momentum and the unrestricted nature of its access to Britain’s labour-market. Since 2004 the EU8-Poles appear to have been, by-and-large, shedding the historic ‘skins’ of personal and national shame originating from widespread poverty under Communism. Slough’s EU8-Poles appeared very conscious of their social position in relation to other ‘others’ as well as to Britons, extending this to insights of how we as

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848 Tabili, L. 2003
849 Ibid
850 Anwar, M. 1979
Britons perceive Poland as an EU-State. There was undoubtedly a tangible ‘new Polish’ and European ‘self-confidence’ about these peoples. This assurance underlined the uniqueness of their overall circumstances as economic migrants to Britain in their novel EU-context and their legitimacy in occupying that particular demographic space. It was EU-citizen legal status that cemented each of the distinguishing EU8-Poles strands into a truly inimitable phenomenon compared to previous waves. The significance of EU8 legal-citizenship status compared to the third, second and first-waves cannot be over-emphasised.

In the Somali case, ‘clan’, provincialism, alienation, indifference, their relatively small number and the legal, social and economic constraints they faced distinguished them as a ‘group’. Albeit largely at the farthest end away from the EU8-Poles, Slough’s Somali too were mindful of their social position in relation to other ‘others’ as well as to Britons. They believed themselves to be ‘at the bottom of the pile’ - extending this to insights of how we as Britons perceived Somalia and the Somali people; meaning that the West had failed them and that until the Civil War was over, there was little hope of their situation improving. The Somali have contributed significantly to Britain’s history, cultural wealth, and economic prosperities but were subject to both imposed and self-inflicted segregation. As far as imposed segregation and marginalization were concerned, this account has used relevant historic and contemporary examples to underpin the argument the British state ‘deliberately or inadvertently, willingly or unwillingly’ continues to sustain ‘race’ segregation. For example the lessening of Somali British subject status in the post-WWI period by way of the Coloured Alien Seaman Order (1925). Its transparent ‘racist’ objective foretold of other twentieth-century efforts to codify the association between ‘race’, nationality, and citizenship rights; not least the British Nationality Act (1981). Despite this the Somali peoples have doggedly journeyed and weathered the storms created to dissuade them and others from coming to Britain. In these terms it appeared, in the post-9/11 and 7/7 era that their following of Islam had also negatively influenced ‘public attitudes toward (their EU) integration’, either as EU-citizens or as refugees/asylum-seekers. Religion, particularly Christianity, implicitly and explicitly has been a key determinant in deciding migrant desirability in Britain, not least in the Polish second, third and EU8-

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852 Tabili, L. 1994, p.125
Chapter 3: Migration and settlement

Polish experiences. In 2014, the EU, while officially secular, remains dominated by Christianity, particularly Catholicism. It is arguable this influenced perceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ from this researches’ protagonists perspectives. Whether ‘self’ recognises a European common cultural heritage, as the EU8-Poles undoubtedly did, had a significant positive influence on their self-perception. They seemingly adopted this interpretation of ‘self’ whether or not they were active followers of Catholicism. Conversely, largely, Somali ‘self’, as EU-citizen or as refugee/asylum-seeker, appeared unable or unwilling to recognise any such shared cultural heritage. Consequently, ignoring legal status, they self-identified as ‘other’. In closing, and based on empirical findings in Slough, the Somali migration and settlement experience was seen to be subject to highly complex forces, motivations and socio-economic and humanitarian contexts; none of which showed any signs of easing or becoming more straightforward.
Chapter 4: Empirical research “Voices from Slough”

Preamble
Wilson’s 1870 description of Chalvey as a ‘Chapelry in Upton parish… adjacent to the Great Western railway, 1 mile W of Slough. Pop., 674… in the early decorated English style’ could not be more different to twenty-first century Chalvey; home for the majority Slough-Somali and a number of EU8-Poles. The circa 1910 photograph of the High Street (below) bears only a passing resemblance to its contemporary (inset).

In 2011 Chalvey had 12,117 residents (47% female/53% male) - average age: thirty-one years. Demographically, Chalvey was distinctly multi-ethnic; more ethnically diverse than the 86% UK ‘white’ population, recording 32% of the residents as ‘white’. Only 37% of Chalvey’s residents were born in England compared to 83.5% of the whole resident population of England. Chalvey unquestionably had ‘a significant immigrant population’. Chalvey’s religious make-up was 37% Muslim, 35% Christian, 8.5% ‘No religion’, 7% Hindu, 6% Sikh and 0.5% Buddhist. Fifty-eight percent of Chalvey residents spoke English. Other top languages spoken were

854 Ecclesiastical parish subdivision
856 SBC, 2009 (Wed 02.12.10), Neighbourhoods and Renewal Scrutiny Panel (Minutes) Council Chamber, Town Hall, Bath Road, Slough - Agenda Item 26: Private Sector Housing Update and SBC Policy on Outbuildings (Slough Sheds)
857 National Census 2011: Table:National Identity KS202FW
858 StreetCheck, 2014, Chalvey:[Homepage:StreetCheck],[Online],[2014,12 August 2014]
859 Ibid
860 Ibid
861 Ibid
Chapter 4: Empirical research: "Voices from Slough"

12% Polish, 8% Urdu, 7% Panjabi, 2% Somali, 1% Hindi, 1% Persian/Farsi, 1% Tamil, 1% Arabic and 1% Swahili/Kiswahili.\textsuperscript{862}

Introduction
Chapter-four is the conduit for the reader(s) to ‘hear’ expressed perspectives from Slough’s Somali and EU8-Polish protagonists. It reveals interchangeable characters, but ever present influences, of the four binary differences in every aspect of their lives. It presents insight into some fundamental roots of discord between and within each group. It contributes to the greater understanding of the scale and nature of Britain’s contemporary ethnic-minority hierarchies; going some way to explain the protagonist’s integration-strategies. It draws on a range of protagonist and other stakeholder testimony offering an explanation of Slough specific migrant lives. The semi-structured interview questions invited broad comments regarding community-cohesion, occupational hierarchy, attitudes to work and education, social-class, migrant motivations, ‘race’ and ‘racialization’, lifestyles, and identity in the context of connections with ‘home’.

Responses were captured and categorized, where feasible, under six thematic-headings; ‘Race and racism’, ‘Identity, religion and religiosity’, ‘Employment, education, housing and lifestyle’, ‘Criminality’, ‘Perceptions of other’ and finally the ‘Myth of return’.\textsuperscript{863} In each thematic-instance both protagonists’ perspectives are illustrated. In the Somali case, two wholly unique categorizations are included; ‘EU-Somali’ and ‘clan’. These are associate themes to ‘Identity, religion and religiosity’. Some remarks included resulted directly from the interviewees responding to the five-vignettes, (Ch.2); included to better explore each person’s own feelings, beliefs and prejudices. While discussions in-part centred on the staple indicators of education, employment, housing and socio-cultural connections, it proved mistaken to believe these issues fully explained the tensions. Tensions existed particularly between Slough’s Somali and the indigenous ‘Asian’\textsuperscript{864} community and EU8-Poles and the native ‘Asian’ population on one hand, and the Somali and EU8-Poles on the other. Resentment, frustration and feelings of exploitation were interwoven throughout many testimonies. Local labour-market dynamics and housing pressures proved weighty aspects regarding integration. Legal-

\textsuperscript{862} Ibid
\textsuperscript{863} Anwar, M. 1979
\textsuperscript{864} Asian herein means people with Indian subcontinent heritage (i.e. South Asian: Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sikh)
status, ‘race’, religion and continent of origin were reflectively identified to underpin ‘fitting-in’ strategies and outcomes. Varying degrees of disadvantage, discrimination, marginalisation and social-exclusion were witnessed first-hand. Conclusions were drawn and inferences made on a number of connected and disconnected issues. Articulating the participant views, the testimonies presented illustrate the range of viewpoints expressed. These revealed different levels of subaltern perspective on wider British (Slough) society and the varying levels of awareness of Britain’s social-structures with which the individuals interacted. Personal comments, statements, and ad-hoc responses reflected some of the outcomes of practices exercised by governmental, corporate and institutional policies. These influenced and were instrumental in determining, why the protagonists arrived in Slough. Experiences of social-interaction and relations to and with wider-society, some as migrant survival strategies, were communicated. Some offered insight into future strategies and goals. Official institutions in Slough are included; notably, Thames Valley Police (TVP), and Slough Borough Council (SBC). These organisations were especially informative regarding community-cohesion and manners in which the protagonists came to the attention of wider-society.

Race and racism
‘Racism’ herein is not a ‘static phenomenon’. Racism is a socially generated and perpetuated ‘process of racialization’ and ‘race’. Its pernicious nature as a signifier of difference is employed to erect ‘racialized boundaries’. It is spawned by many things including, but not exclusively limited to, ignorance, politics, power-seeking, moral-panic, fear, education, natural disaster and but by no means least, malevolent human nature. A Slough example was noted in 2013. Representing ‘white-English’ nationalist ‘racism’, Slough resident-blogger, (using the tag ‘English nobody’), responded to PM Cameron’s, ‘Britain must say ‘no’ to eastern European immigrants’ call by posting Slough-specific narrow-mindedness,

“I am grateful to the (EU8-) Poles in Slough... they have made my neighbourhood more ‘white’...it feels nice. I see (EU8-) Polish women with pushchairs...they are out-breeding the South Asians

865 Solomos, J. 1993, p.9
866 Ibid, p.5
868 Swinford, S., 2013 (28 October), Britain must say ‘no’ to eastern European workers, says Cameron,[Homepage: Telegraph] [Online], [2014, 09 September 2014]
and Africans. Slough could one day be majority ‘white’ again. Anglo-Slavic is better than being Pakistani and Islamic… That’s the only good thing about the European Union mass ‘white’ immigration”

Comparable ‘racist’ viewpoints migrated to Slough with some EU8-Poles interviewed, who made clear they neither belonged nor felt ‘at home’ in multicultural-Britain. Although representing the minority-voice, PM1 and PM18 respectively typified the ‘deep rooted ‘race’ based prejudice’ of some EU8-Poles. PM1 commented,

*This place* (Slough) *is for ‘Asian’ people...we Polish people are ‘white’ and English people are ‘white’...British are very tolerant... You (Britons) shouldn’t be that tolerant...Some (non-European/non-Western?) countries people are uncivilised...If we ‘white’...I mean us (EU8-)Polish are ‘white’...it means ‘we’ (i.e. EU8-Poles and ‘white’ Britons) are the same ...Yeah...‘black’...people are ...They are not that good ... (unequal to ‘white’ people?)* 

Echoing this bigoted perspective, PM18 independently stated,

“(Shall) I tell you? There you (the British?) Have here...in (the) UK too many ‘black’ people... ‘Mixed’ people...here (Britain?) is like (a?) charity? You understand Mel? British charity... (The) UK shouldn’t be charity (so charitable?)...Slough (is) not (no longer?) for ‘white’ people...‘Asians’...‘Niggers’... Muslims ...for ‘these’... Slough is not home for me!”

The difference between ‘black’ and ‘white’ skin-colour was the prime factor in this racialization-process, representing Brah’s description (and accurate rejection) of it embodying ‘inherent and immutable difference(s).’ It was expressed by Slough’s EU8-Poles and Somali. Sixty-three percent (12 of 19) of the EU8-Polish men and 77% (14 of 18) of the EU8-Polish women attested to this. Each interviewee from both protagonists carried histories and identities inscribed by their own life-experiences, but they also brought, consciously or sub-consciously, ‘race’ as ranking and material-difference. The EU8-Poles were expectant of success; the majority anticipated a

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869 Stormfront, 2013, Britain must say ‘no’ to eastern European immigrants says PM, [Homepage:Stormfront], [Online],[2014, 09 September 2014]
870 Byrne, D. et al 2007, p.28
871 Interview:08.08.2007
872 Interview:18.10.2008
better way of life for themselves than Britain’s ‘black’ people, despite any initial furore that had defined their migration as problematic. For Child Psychologist PF2, her sense of ‘belonging’ in Britain was primarily based in her ‘whiteness’,

“Being ‘white’ in Britain affects me ...I think (EU8-)Polish (people) are perceived by (‘white’-) British (people) as better than ‘black’ people because (EU8-)Polish are ‘white’...

A hard core of Slough’s EU8-Poles, (no Somali), claimed they would absolutely refuse to live beside, or even near the ‘black’ Somali, (Ch.2 vignette 4). In 2014 Britain, ‘skin colour (remains) connected with attitudes and life-outcomes’. In this instance, it would have be mistaken to presume that only the ‘whites’ (EU8-Poles and other ‘whites’) were capable of conveying ‘racist’ attitudes and behaviours. Yes, the Slough-Somali were (compared to me) ‘black’; and to the interviewed EU8-Poles; those who commented, ‘black’. To the Somali themselves, they were not ‘black’ and nor were they ‘white’, (Ch.3). It was essential during the fieldwork to sensitively differentiate between ‘black’, ‘white’ and ‘neither black nor white’ skin-colours. The Slough-Somali were extremely conscious of their skin-colour relative to ‘black’ people, (i.e. the Southern-Somali Bantu, West Indians or other Africans) although they accepted, by comparison with ‘white’, that they may be, albeit wrongly in their opinion, perceived as ‘black’. It was evident Slough’s Somali advocated ‘colourism’, readily equating status with skin-colour; a hierarchical system, supporting ‘scientific-racism’ wherein the outrageous claim remains that some ‘racial-groups’ are naturally superior. For the Slough-Somali ‘black’ was positioned at the ‘bottom’ and ‘white’ at the ‘top’. This echoed some EU8-Polish beliefs. PM18 was explicitly prejudiced,

“In (the) UK...there are too many ‘black’ people...they ‘act’ ‘white’ ...‘black’ people are the same (have equal rights?) in England just like
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

‘white’...you (‘white’-Britons) be careful...‘they’ (‘non-white’ people?) lower standards ...‘fuck them!’

Insight of the basis for PM18’s racialized view was independently expressed by PF18 although dismissed by PM6,

PF18: “I know ‘race’ is used to tell people apart at home (in Poland)...here? (Britain)...maybe it’s different?”

And

PM6: “Class...no...it is not important...to me”

Attempting to ignore ‘racism’s’ existence, regardless of agreement with the fact that ‘races’ do not exist may have hindered the study. Of the total 74 interviewees, analysis revealed 57 made reference to ‘black’ in largely negative, subordinate and marginalized contexts. Ranking of individual worth according to skin-colour was pervasive. ‘Race’ was undoubtedly recognized to be of social and cultural significance to both protagonists. This view was, for the most part, circumspectly expressed as PF7 stated,

“Different skin-colour means people are treated differently ...of course! ...it’s just the way things are.”

For some EU8-Poles, astonishment was expressed at the spectrum of skin-colours in Britain. (Poland remains a monochromic society). For both protagonists this ‘racist’ theme reoccurred. It appeared a form of cultural shock for the EU8-Poles and the Somali. Each expressed degrees of shock ranging from EU8-Polish surprise to Somali alarm. Degrees of confusion existed regarding Britain’s embedded hierarchies on one hand and its liberalism on the other. The EU8-Poles, as ‘white’, seemingly realised and took advantage of their higher places in Britain’s skin-colour hierarchy. They readily accepted subordination to ‘white’ Britons but expected ‘non-whites’, migrants or natives, to hold subordinate positions to them. Some were critical of British ‘racial-liberalism’. Stratification of enhanced entitlement and favoured treatment based on skin-colour shed light on an underlying cause of the reigning ‘leap frogging’ notions. Slough-Somali concern was expressed by SM1,

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878 Interview: 18.10.2008
879 Joint-Interview: 24.11.2008
880 Interview: 21.09.2007
882 Interview: 19.11.2007
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

“I think ‘we’ (Somali) might not admit it… but in our head we feel the (EU8-)Polish have a massive advantage over us. I believe… from (a) distance it’s very difficult to tell a (EU8-)Polish person from a ‘white’ British (Briton). Skin-colour is (a) visible thing”

The viewpoint that ‘white’ Britain held a ‘racialized understanding of the world’s population’ resonated with SM1’s opinion; as well as with PM1 who positioned himself and his ‘whiteness’ atop of Slough’s ‘settled groups of Africans and Asians’.

“We are ‘white’… the Polish and British… are the same … ‘black’ people … They are always and will (always) be at the ‘bottom’

Some EU8-Poles readily located ‘black’ people as less intelligent than ‘Asians’ who in turn were less intelligent than ‘whites’. Although rightly refuted by Rex, it was a view articulated by PM15,

“Skin-colour… ‘race’…have been with us since creation… Poland’s history shows everyone what ‘we’ (EU8-Poles) think of ‘negroes’ … ‘black’ people…”

Some Somali appeared bewildered, visibly upset or angered that their ‘blackness’ determined how they were treated by wider British society and how it impacted their life-chances. Although Somali-clan remains of itself ‘racist’ (by Western understanding) and hierarchical in nature, there was a distinct, almost physical resentment that separated that socio-cultural differentiation from Britain’s categorisations of ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups. A particularly negative standpoint accepted and understood ‘blackness’ predetermining aspects of Britain’s social-status hierarchy. For many Slough-Somali, this meant they shouldered what seemed painfully inferior self-identities regardless of their previous lives. Several seemed resigned to remaining at the relative bottom of the human social ladder, not just Britain’s, as a result. For example, SF11 stated, “We (‘black’/Somali people?) are on (the) ‘bottom’…sitting on (the) floor here”. Pointedly making reference to her skin-colour as a determinant factor of her social-class, SF7, spoke of her experience(s),

883 Interviews:11.10.2006/03.11.2006
884 Paul, K. 1997,p.13
886 Interview:08.08.2007
887 Rex, J. 1992
888 Interview:18.08.2008
889 Joint-Interview:02.10.2008
“(The) UK is (has) class... I hear him (wider-society/’white’ people?) Say ‘he (she) is (a) foreigner’... I (am) not accepted here (in Britain)... I try (to ‘fit-in’/not be noticed?)... my skin is not ‘white” 890

SF15 summarised the main characteristics of class ascribed to migrants from her perspective - compared with the EU8-Poles,

“The colour of your skin...your sex...your religion...your passport all of these things means we are treated in different ways...Some Somali people are European (secondary-migrants)...most are asylum-seekers...refugees...like me...The (EU8-) Polish are citizens of Europe...this gives them (legal) advantage over ‘us’” 891

The impression created by Slough’s Somali was that they perceived themselves to be located on the lowest rungs of the town’s ethnic-minority pecking order, essentially unable or unwilling to ‘short-circuit’ 892 their situation(s) and progress. An insurmountable array of factors combined in their mind-set preventing their development. These included enforced exile, uncertain legal-status, few British social-networks, a lack of positive role models and traditional Somali-clan pressure. The need for safety above almost every other aspect manifested itself as not being willing to push the necessary boundaries to further their group or individual interests. Despite many Slough-Somali being in work when they could, substantial levels of unemployment and long-term economic inactivity disabled the group. These were their tangible barriers to social-mobility. EU-Somali SM8, was penetrating in his viewpoint regarding ‘race’, culture - life; literally ‘black and white’, to the point of being binary. He harked back, in Western terms, to the self-destructive and limiting notions of ‘knowing your station’ 893

“Keep with your own people…’whites’ with ‘white’...’blacks’ should stick with ‘black’, ‘Asian’ with ‘Asian’...Somali with Somali...If (whether) you agree or not... we are different’ 894

Upon reflection SM8’s response; his attitude, captured some of the melancholic flavour evident throughout the research. The expectation that his, and others, talents,
abilities, knowledge and experience(s) would count for nothing in Britain and he should ‘accept his lot’ was an unexpected outcome of the questioning. SM8 was aspiring to nothing, other than hoping to return to a post-Civil War Somalia. SM5’s resignatory interpretation, while adding ‘race’ into the mixture, was equally accepting of ‘his lot’. He ranked ‘white’ and ‘Asian’ above ‘Somali’ in Britain, although he made it clear ‘Somali’ was above ‘black’,

“Being a Somali means…things are always going to be out…out of reach...better to understand that...better to make the most of what I have already... ‘Asians’ and ‘whites’ are never going to let us ‘in’... good jobs are kept for ‘white’ people”

Contextualizing the relative position of ‘black’ to ‘white’, SM14 independently echoed the same sentiment, “…black’...he is nowhere...nowhere...really Mel’ As the research developed it was clear few Slough-Somali felt publicly able to rail against Britain’s implicit colour-based classification system socially stratifying groups. Their irritation was tangible. Several made it clear this was an aspect of their own survival strategy, but that come peacetime in Somalia, they would return ‘home’. There were perceived expectations of favoured treatment of ‘white’ in some of the interviews within both protagonists, implying a mutuality of ‘racist-assumption’. A sense of ‘racial’ Somali-fatalism ostensibly existed. Such a structural advantage, if proven would certainly have facilitated the EU8-Poles to more readily ‘access … a wide range of benefits and services’ not least full-time employment, housing and education. While ‘English nobody’ has boasted of his own ‘racial hierarchy’, it was evident from listening to the protagonists that different ethnic-groups across Slough were ‘racing’ competing. Enmity between the EU8-Poles and Slough’s ‘Asian’ community had an unexpected positive element however; one widely hoped that would bridge their cultural and ‘race’ divides and contribute towards the town’s community-cohesion strategy. SBC described this encouraging resolution as the ‘interrelationships between ‘Asian’ men and (EU8-) Polish women’;

“There’s a big aspiration amongst the (EU8-) Polish females to marry a ‘white’ British man….do that you’ve hit the jackpot! To find a British

895 Interview:10.02.2007
896 Interview:04.11.2008
897 Kay, D. & Miles, R. 1988,p.214
898 Stormfront, 2013
899 Interview:09.10.2007
man from the upper-class...that’s the perception of what England’s like basically... But what they are finding is ...It’s not like that

Adding,

“A lot of mixed-relationships between (EU8-)Polish females and ‘Asian’ men...Hindu and Sikh. ‘Asian’s’ are quite established...There are quite a few middle class ‘Asian’s’ now... and...they are almost like the ‘second-best’. ...We are finding a lot of ‘Asian’ men are sexually attracted to the (EU8-)Polish females

Considering the strength and longevity of Poland’s monochromic outlook this finding was significant, especially when placed alongside evidence of Polish neo-Nazism in Slough. PM4 gave his perspective,

“Pakis’ saying (that EU8-)Polish girls only happy with Pakis’... lies... some (EU8-)Polish women go with Pakis’....they think they will have a better life...more money. Face it...life in Poland? ...is tough

Overlapping this with miscegenist dogma, PM9 drew strict ‘racist’ boundaries. He accepted ‘non-white’ as work-colleagues but absolutely rejected inter-racial sexual relationships, drawing miscegenist perspective parallels with post-WWI Cardiff,

“When it comes from (to) mixing with different nationalities you’ve (Britain) got lots of relationship(s)...but (EU8-)Polish girls with ‘Asian’ men...is wrong...this is the problem...to mix with other nationalities...okay to work...(with other ethnicities?)”

The notion of relationships between ‘Asian’ men and EU8-Polish women drew out a seemingly ‘knowing’, although very stereotypical, response from PF13, “I’ve never seen a Paki’ in Poland... We know exactly what they’re after...” giving the impression that in her view ‘Asian’ men only wanted the EU8-Polish women for sex. Regarding the concept of cultural inter-marriage, vignette-five (Ch.2) drew out several explicit ‘racist’ responses. Traditions, familial hierarchies, expectations, hopes, primeval beliefs and generational tensions all evident in the responses. The replies

900 Ibid
901 Ibid
902 Joint-Interview:12.09.2007
903 Joint-Interview:04.03.2008
904 Joint-Interview:10.08.2008
were categorised as ‘conditional’, ‘unacceptable’ and ‘out of the question’. Sixty-seven percent of the whole research population (EU8-Polish and Somali) believed mixed-relationships were either ‘unacceptable’ or ‘out of the question’. Upon reflection, the voice of non-racist reason and acceptance of this setting was slightly louder amongst the EU8-Polish interviewees than Slough’s Somali, although PM15’s mis-use of Roman Catholic dissuasions of inter-faith marriage was surprising.

“It is totally wrong for different ‘races’ to inter-marry...Totally wrong” 905

(For staunch Catholic PM15, upon reflection it appeared he had unilaterally chosen to apply Catholic dissuasions of inter-faith marriage to ‘race’?).

Twenty-four percent (18) of the total research population of 74 laid down conditions for any consideration to be given to this accommodation. Thirty-percent (22) stated it was unacceptable and 32.5% (24) regarded the situation as out of the question. Two EU8-Poles (5%), one man and one woman, ‘insisted’ on any future son or daughter-in-law(s) converting to Catholicism to be permitted to marry their daughter(s) or son(s). Highly emotive and unfailingly explicit PM18 was consistent in expressing his embedded ‘white-racist’ views,

“No way Mel! No fucking way! ‘we’ (‘white-Poles’) can’t mix our blood” 906

Framing this issue in miscegenist terms, PF12 commented, “We should not mix ‘black’ men and ‘white’ women... (It is) not right” 907 PM19 was alarmed at the suggestion,

“I am shocked for (at the?) question... for ‘white’ to breed with ‘black’... not give your children’s our (‘white’?) traditions and heritage? No...no... there would be problem for my family...why would you do that?” 908

Suggestive of a more reasoned and laissez faire attitude to the knotty issue, PF15 pragmatically commented, “Our children will choose” 909 Similarly PF14 remarked,
“It wouldn’t bother me… Why consider the colour of the skin? I don’t care what other people do … (think of me?)… My children will think (choose? Decide?) …for themselves”

As for Slough’s Somali, SBC contended,

“There is a lot of generational tension within the Somali’s…not only culturally but what the young Somali men and girls want…what the older generation think …is different…they the conditions laid down by their parents or their grand-parents as restrictive”

SM2’s response was essentially representative of the Slough-Somali men’s standpoint,

“If my children have (had a) girlfriend or boyfriend…something like that… I will be happy to merge (cultures) if he is comes over (converts to Islam) …if my daughter wants to marry a (EU8-)Polish man. (If)…my son wants to marry a (EU8-)Polish girl I don’t mind (if) she is Christian (Roman Catholic) …but after that he (the son) convert her (his future wife’s) religion (to Islam)…So I am happy with conversion (from Catholicism) to Islam and marriage but…No relation outside marriage”

Another EU-Somali, SM4 held the traditional viewpoint but acknowledged the notion of his children’s choice. He commented,

“Marriage…I would not like it at all…I have no contact (with) or relation (to) or know Poland… (Or) Polish person (people and culture)...I would not welcome it…though I am considering (would consider) the right of every individual…including my daughter…If she wants that (to marry a non-Somali) I would respect it…But my internal feeling is that I would not welcome it…Somali culture does not allow a couple going (to go) out together without being married”

Characteristic of the Somali women’s position and pointing to differential treatment of males and females in the Somali community, SF6 confirmed,
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

“(Somali) men they can meet with other women…not Muslim women…it is very strict for us (Somali) women…we cannot ‘date’ a friend…even the (a) Somali man …without permission”\textsuperscript{914}

EU-Somali SF3 realistically commented,

“Somali women …she (they) are starting to date … be with boys because of living in (the) EU (the West?)”

Although she stated her cultural preferences for her own children,

“We are Muslim…family is important…better to marry Somali or (non-Somali?) Muslim”\textsuperscript{915}

SF4, still hoping to return permanently to a post-war Somalia adamantly rejected the notion,

“No dating…Somali husbands (for her daughters) …marry first”\textsuperscript{916}

Single EU-Somali SF5 lamented traditional views on intermarriage and expressed her opinion if/when she had her own family,

“Many Somali parents have (a) problem with this… not even (allowing a son/daughter to) marry a Somali from another clan! (They) keep the marriages strict…My children? In the future yes…to be happy…marry the people (person) they love”\textsuperscript{917}

Where Slough-Somali conditional agreement was a possibility, religious conversion to Islam was the primary qualification. The insistence/preference was for sons and daughters-in-law to be culturally the same. Differences in the treatment and expectation of sons and daughters was most noticeable in the Somali interviews where ‘boys’ enjoyed far greater freedoms than ‘girls’ in dating, mixing with other cultures and marriage choices. EU8-Pole PM19’s right-of-centre viewpoint regarding ‘white’ breeding with ‘black’ would not have had to have travelled that far to conjoin with causal suggestions for the ‘far right’ showing and the patent ‘racist-sexist’ views voiced in Slough; echoing in many ways 1919 Cardiff.\textsuperscript{918} TVP explained,

\textsuperscript{914}Joint-Interview:21.06.2007
\textsuperscript{915}Group-interview:04.06.2007
\textsuperscript{916}Ibid
\textsuperscript{917}Ibid
“We found Neo-Nazi stickers on the High Street (written) in Polish…..it originated from a town in Poland… we removed the stickers immediately”

SBC commented, “The national Nazi sign within a circle…there is ‘racism’…some ‘racial’ tension within the Polish community”. Slough continues to be the target of right-wing extremism, disrupting the passage of attempts to build on its community-cohesion programmes. Business-woman PF11 had experienced a degree of Pakistani-EU8-Polish enmity first-hand, although it was business, rather than miscegenist premised, commenting,

“This it seemed made the notion of community-cohesion in Slough ever more aspirational. Anecdotal evidence from TVP and SBC supported suggestions both Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles suffered degrees of discrimination. Both were victims. Conversely subjective evidence described both as perpetrators. This research frequently scratched the surface to reveal supporting evidence, (e.g. during the interviews with PM18 who made derisory and ‘racially’ inflammable reference regarding Muslims and Jews, and SM6 who recalled being discriminated against during his vocational training because he was ‘black’). Interestingly, PF14 compared the outcomes of ‘racialization’ and prejudice with Communism in Poland. She reaffirmed the Slough-Somali view that ‘black’ and Muslim were frequently pariahs in Britain; perhaps shedding fresh and objective light on why so few Slough-Somali held aspirations,
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

“Race’ is used all the time to segregate and control...like ‘Communism’...here (in Britain) like in Poland since 9/11 ‘black’...is blamed...’Muslim’ is blamed...’They’ are...blamed...For terrorism...for all the bad things” 925

Independently, PF7 critically commented on the day-to-day impact of ‘race’ bringing into play gender926 as a social-class difference in Slough (in Britain),

“Different skin-colour means people are treated differently...Same as sex...women earn less than men”927

In attempting to unpack the paradox the protagonists were victims and perpetrators of discrimination, further tangible issues, including work, ‘class’ and language were used as the basis for interview questions. It was anticipated these would solicit insights into the groups' lives to understand which key issues fed these contradictions. SM6’s testimony confirmed the observation that ‘race’ confronted perceptions of equality and meritocracy, doing so from a victim’s perspective,

“In my (plumbing) training in 1999...I was the only (non-white) ethnic-minority person.... (The) rest (of the trainees)....all were ‘white’...The ‘manager’ always called me the ‘black-guy’ instead of calling (me) by my name”928

The Slough-Somali appreciated ‘black’ was a social difference signifier in Britain’s ‘racialization’ process. It was perceptible that they did not come into the interview conversations on an equal footing in their own minds. It was manifest as pressure. They appeared burdened, strained and anxious because they were ‘black’. Upon reflection, this was separating and marginalizing them at a fundamental level. In many interviews, ‘othering’ of ‘black’, and importantly its perception by the Somali, was material. For example, SM14, speaking experientially, highlighted his frustration at being treated differently during his work-search,

“Black’...he is nowhere I tell you...the Government doesn’t want to help ‘us’ (Somali)”929

925 Interview: 17.08.2008
927 Interview: 19.11.2007
928 Interview: 31.03.2007
929 Group Interview: 04.11.2008
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

It was discernible that some of the Slough-Somali’s day-to-day lives were continually placed within ‘racial’/ethnicised contexts. They were constantly subjected to the ‘racialization’ process. It was no comfort to them as ‘black’ to be informed, ‘migrants from Eastern Europe (have) had little contact with some BAME communities before coming to Britain’,\textsuperscript{930} as a way of explaining away, or excusing, EU8-Polish ‘racism’. For several Somali it was resentfully plain to them that the EU8-Poles benefitted from ‘white-racism’. Accusations that EU8-Poles enjoyed relative power in exploiting their ‘whiteness’, even in the face of degrees of prejudice against them as economic-migrants were common-place. SM13 was plain that, in his opinion, his ‘blackness’ and his religion underpinned his experience,

\begin{quote}
\textit{“Skin-colour......’White’ it is on top...’Black’ at the bottom...He (Somali migrants)...becomes westernized... But ‘white’...You (‘white’ Westerners) don’t see that”}\textsuperscript{931}
\end{quote}

SM10’s perspective was echoed by EU8-Pole PM17’s first-hand experience of distinct treatment of different peoples premised, initially at least, around ‘black’ and ‘white’. This was a reminder of the matter of fact way in which ‘race’ continues to challenge notions of equality and meritocracy across Britain, regardless of Slough’s long multicultural history,

\begin{quote}
\textit{“White’ people are treated differently to ‘black’ people in Slough...’we’ (EU8-Poles) are treated better because ‘we’ are ‘white’...we look the ‘same’ as you (‘white’-British)”}\textsuperscript{932}
\end{quote}

SM10 conveyed considerable disappointment in Britain; recalling and echoing the immediate post-WWII disenchantment with the ‘Mother Country’ by many West Indian migrants,

\begin{quote}
\textit{“I was happy to come here (to Britain)...thought (I would be)...at home? ...But (the) Somali ...he is (we are) isolated...no interaction between ‘us’ and ‘them’...‘other’ communities here (in Slough) ...’Black’ peoples are not liked here”}\textsuperscript{933}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{930}Byrne, D.et al, 2007,p.28
\textsuperscript{931}Interview:23.10.2008
\textsuperscript{932}Interview:04.09.2008
\textsuperscript{933}Interview:29.09.2008
On the matter of segregation, forced or otherwise, PF3 remarked on ethnic-clustering as a ‘racialization’ outcome,

“White’ people in Britain are treated differently...much better than ‘black’ and ‘Asian’ people...I see it at work...Everyone sticks together in their own (ethnic) groups...(EU8-)Polish people like us are seen by ‘white’ British people as better than ‘them’ (‘black’ and ‘Asian’) because like you we’re ‘white’

The majority of the Slough-Somali perceived, experienced and offered anecdotal evidence of their ‘racialized’ existences. SF11 introduced the dual characteristics of ‘black’ and religion as ‘racialized’ difference in the post 9/11 era as ‘racializing’ her day-to-day life, “Colour of skin and religion... ‘Stop and Search’ ...it separate(s) ‘us’”. Conjoining ‘racism’ and religious intolerance highlighted the phenomenon of multiple-discrimination. It was inferred this was a feature of British-Somali life. Evidently Slough’s Somali appeared to have experienced significantly greater ‘racialized’ lifestyles than the town’s EU8-Poles. Figure 33 following statistically outlines the reasoning expressed regarding this; whether as a perpetrator or as a victim. The protagonists overwhelmingly illustrated that ‘black’ remained a predominant signifier in Slough’s demeaning ‘racialization’ processes. As far as ‘race’ expressed as a joke; in terms of nationality, heritage, and culture, was concerned, 20 (54%) of the EU8-Poles stated they would not be offended by put-ons about Polish people. Only 5 (13.5%) of the Slough-Somali responded in the same way. SF4 responded angrily at the prospect of jokes about Somalia or the Somali,

“Somali he is not to joke about... our country is the (at) War”.

Somali Welfare Association Chair SM2 offered his no-nonsense forth-right appraisal of his feeling offended by jokes about his culture and his country,

“Let me tell you something about my people... we are proud... My country... (It) is in ruins for so long now... They (Other people? Non-Somali?) Call us names....joking... we are better people (than they are?)... this is the truth... they are not ones to talk...they are ignorant... it is unbelievable”

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934 Interview: 16.10.2007
935 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), 1984: Police powers to ‘stop and search’ persons and vehicles (without arrest)
936 Joint-Interview: 02.10.2008
937 Group-Interview: 04.06.2007
938 Group-Interview: 10.02.2007
Both protagonists essentially believed that jokes should not be ‘racist’, sexist, anti-religious, rude or offensive to their families. PM9 distinguished between work and non-work situations regarding acceptable boundaries; calling on his construction industry background; “At work...it is in (part of/an aspect of)...the work (building trade)...you know... ‘piss-taking’...’wind-up...yeah” 939 PM5 responded prudently, “It’s just a bit of fun... in our case... We (EU8-) Polish can laugh at ourself (selves)... its life”. 940 PM4 took the issue a great deal more seriously and personally however,

“No, It’s not fair... it is ignorant... (Non-Polish?) People pick on us to...upset (insult?) us...like bullying...not joke” 941

PF11, in frequent contact through the family business with the wider-Slough community reflected that witticisms “can be hurtful” 942 but made the important point that the EU8-Poles were industrious and intelligent;

“We don’t hear jokes about us (EU8-Poles) as stupid here (in Slough? Britain?)...we are working every day... Jokes won’t be (shouldn’t be? / aren’t?) ...so nasty”. 943

939 Group-Interview:04.03.2008
940 Joint-Interview:12.09.2007
941 Ibid
942 Family-Interview:09.08.2008
943 Ibid
Figure 33: Factors of ‘racialization’
Sixteen percent (12) of the total interviewees stated they would find any joke pertaining to their nationality, culture or religion offensive. This revealed similarities between the protagonists insofar as what was acceptable as a ‘joke’ and the common boundaries over which a joke became offensive and unacceptable. Evidently any flippancy regarding ‘Somaliness’ was essentially viewed as a cultural assault borne against the backdrop of the civil war. Whatever language was used, it was unmistakable the Slough-Somali, being ‘black’, perceived that as a group, they were being prejudiced against. Their differences from ‘white’ society intensified their ‘othernesses in not just their minds, but in the beliefs and attitudes expressed by some EU8-Poles too. Many Somali were aware of this and the reinforcement of their overall marginalization it created. Of her own significantly changed circumstances since fleeing Somali, SF14 offered valuable insight into UK ‘place’ and hierarchy,

“Skin-colour says a lot about who you are... your background... family... we all have places (rankings?)...in ‘society’... when you leave...Must leave (forced exile)...you change your place”, 944

Upon reflection, SF14’s comments drew to the fore the mind-set that, ‘certain identities are (seemingly) not negotiable’, 945 becoming instead just, ‘axes of political and cultural belonging’, or degrees of them. This Somali was aware of the fundamental part her ‘blackness’ played in her conditional ‘belonging’ in Britain, but nevertheless expressed gratitude for the safety her limited assimilation granted her. SF14 knew she was a ‘black’-African in a majority ‘white’-European society; a society historically and economically grounded in colonialism that ‘devalued ‘black’’. 946 For SF8 her own comparison between conditions in Somalia and Britain as ‘home’ implied much about the dire situation in Somalia and the relative acceptance and perhaps more importantly the safety Britain offered compared to, for example, Italy, Poland and France,

“As (a) ‘black’ person I am happy of being in (the) UK... Better than in Somalia...I believe with my little experience if you have an ethnic-minority background ...You cannot get (a) better place than Britain... a lot of (Somali) people come here from Europe”947

944 Interview:11.11.2008
946 Hogan, P.C, 2000, Colonialism and Cultural Identity: Crises of Tradition in the Anglophone Literatures of India, Africa, and the Caribbean, State University of New York, USA,p.46
947 Interview:01.09.2008
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

Amidst this study’s predominantly ‘racist’ negativism, there was also a genuine call for authentic equality to arise from this research, in the context of Britain’s multiracial population reality, and that of Poland’s monochromist actuality. PF18 commented,

“I wish the world …could accept each other...’Race’...it’s just where we’re born …skin-colour isn’t important...no…at home (in Poland) there are no ‘black’ people...if there are…they just visit”\footnote{Joint-Interview:24.11.2008}

Further, PM7 apologised for any ‘racialization’ the EU8-Polish presence had created,

“We are sorry for this but... (if) we weren’t Polish-citizens...in (the) EU...’we’ (would be) the same as ‘they’ (Somali) are at the moment”\footnote{Joint-Interview:24.11.2007}

Despite this contrition some EU8-Poles, (e.g. PM1) had readily exhibited ‘intolerance of something different’\footnote{Asthana, A. & Fitzgerald, M. 2007,p.11} - in this instance, the notion of interacting with ‘Asian’ and/or ‘black’ people. This was the ugly and real manifestation of a ‘difficult social and cultural problem’\footnote{Ibid} affecting day-to-day Slough. These findings embodied this entire theme’s ambiguity and contradiction. On one hand, ‘racist’ bigotry of some individuals and on the other a willingness to mix. In summary, ‘race’ and ‘racialization’ as ‘problems’ appeared not to be going away anytime soon in Slough. Ironically however, the protagonists had knowingly or unknowingly migrated to the most ‘ethnically composite’\footnote{Holmes, C. 1988,p.3} EU-State of all twenty-seven and to the most ethnically diverse town in England and Wales. Statistical analysis supporting the existence of ‘race’ and ‘racialization’ in Slough was attested to by 58% (11 of 19) of the Slough-Somali men (SM), 50% (9 of 18) of the Slough-Somali women (SF), 63% (12 of 19) of the EU8-Polish men (PM) and 77% (14 of 18) of the EU8-Polish women (PF) interviewed, (Figure 33). By contrast, nationality, legal-status and religion were not considered as significant ‘racialization’ catalysts despite the reality of them being the currency of
modern day ‘racism’. This finding was confirmatory of Reeves’s view that ‘black’, while couched in politically correct language and phraseology, remains the principle driver in maintaining Britain’s ‘racially’ premised social structure. This supports the idea of ‘class-by-colour’ and a ‘pecking order’ determined by ‘race’. It was clear some respondents subscribed to Reeves’ notion of ‘de-racialized’ language while others felt more able to be ‘racially explicit’ in the knowledge their anonymity was assured.

Modern-day characteristics and descriptions of ‘racism’ intersected with a range of other discourses. These included religion, nationality and ethnicity; not strictly harnessed with ‘race’ but nevertheless drawing on stereotypes and generalizations about groups of people, in particular their cultural particularities. For the EU8-Poles the range of ‘racialization’ issues exhibited by them ranged from explicit ‘racist’ viewpoints to apologetic testimony of not being aware of ‘racialization’ occurring to any significant degree. There were simple implicit references made to ‘racialization’ experienced by the EU8-Poles themselves and while this was noted, it was inferred from the negligible references that the Slough-Somali experienced significantly greater ‘racialized’ lifestyles than them. While much of the Slough-Somali testimony attested to their perceptions and experiences of ‘racism’ and ‘racialization’, for the most part the EU8-Poles were accepting of the comparably minor ‘othering’ of them. Acutely different degrees of testimony regarding ‘racialization’ revealed the Somali, including the EU-Somali, suffered multiple-discriminations; Islamophobia’, ‘racism’ and xenophobia.

Regardless of the actuality of an ever more globalised society, the interviews revealed no indication the two protagonists were connecting on any level. ‘Racism’ was just one of the identifiable aspects feeding this non-association. No proof was forthcoming however that ‘black’ was an aspect of official categorization although it was possibly an unconscious determinant. Insofar as wider Slough resident perspectives, the affront that is ‘racism’ continues to be seen and heard. Since the 2011 Census, Slough has been highlighted as having the highest proportion of foreign-born residents in S.E England with just 34.5% of the town’s residents of ‘White-British’ ethnicity; (17.7% were Pakistani, the second highest proportion for this ethnic-

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954 ONS, 2011, Tables:KS201EW/QS202EW
group across England and Wales, and 15.6% were Indian).\textsuperscript{955} It is against this backcloth that the following comments are set. The remarks, already in the public domain at the point of this refection, were included herein to establish a sense of the reactions of Slough’s ‘white-British’ and ‘Asian’ residents to the protagonists arrival(s) and settlement(s) in the town. In a 2007 Slough public meeting regarding immigration numbers and SBC’s lack of funding from central government, ‘white’ second-wave Polish resident ‘PS’, who arrived in Slough “\textit{60 years ago}”\textsuperscript{956}, stated of immigrants arriving in the town since 2004 (i.e. including the Somali and EU8-Poles),

\begin{quote}
\textit{“Everything has gone to pot. They come here in droves. There is no control”}.\textsuperscript{957}
\end{quote}

At the same meeting, according to (the then) Strategic Director of Education and Children's Services at SBC, Janet Tomlinson; (a ‘white’ middle-aged woman), in the period from mid-2005 to January 2007, SBC had “\textit{772 new arrivals from other countries}”\textsuperscript{958} including “\textit{60 Somalian refugees}”. She went on record as stating,

\begin{quote}
\textit{“Extra pupils mean extra costs. It is all about the numbers…counting the …immigrants that are arriving”}.\textsuperscript{959}
\end{quote}

Of the secondary migrant EU-Somali in the town, Panorama’s ‘white-male’ interviewer Bilton commented that because they held EU-passports SBC could not “\textit{claim the extra cash it gets for refugees}”.\textsuperscript{960} He continued, perhaps unwisely insofar as inflaming the situation, by saying this was, “\textit{not good for the town…not good for the Somalis}”.\textsuperscript{961} British-Pakistani resident ‘MC’ proposed an emotively over-simplified resolution,

\begin{quote}
\textit{“Chuck these people out then… Don't let them come in”}.\textsuperscript{962}
\end{quote}

Two Slough-Somali women were present at that meeting; ‘IF’ and ‘NH’ pointed out the reality of their enforced-exiles,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{955}Ibid
\textsuperscript{956} Bilton, R. 2007(a) “Immigration: How we lost count” Transcript: BBC OnePanorama,[Homepage:BBC],[Online],[2014, 09 September 2014]
\textsuperscript{957} Ibid
\textsuperscript{958} Ibid
\textsuperscript{959} Ibid
\textsuperscript{960} Ibid
\textsuperscript{961} Ibid
\textsuperscript{962} Ibid
\end{flushright}
‘IF’:
“I couldn’t go back to Somalia, it’s a civil war, day after day it’s getting worse” 963

‘NH’:
“I wish that I can go back. Sometimes I want to go, but I can’t” 964

Pakistan-born ‘SH’ had this to say in 2010,

“Slough is very, very full... There are so many people here now that I can’t even get an appointment with my GP. The children will get n, but I am expected to turn up every morning and hope I can get treatment” 965

‘White-Britons’, 88 year-old ‘RJ’ and 65 year-old ‘JR’ commented,

‘RJ’:
“Enough is enough...I've lived in Slough for 40-years and I hardly recognize the place. The High Street is full of shops run by other nationalities who don’t speak our language. I’m not a racist (but) ...the numbers of new people coming here are making me feel like a stranger in my own town” 966

‘JR’:
“Slough... There are so many people from so many backgrounds...when I look around I can see I’m part of a minority” 967

In 2012, in EU8-Polish specific terms, ‘white-British’ female Slough based blogger ‘DM’ wrote to the Slough & South Bucks Express newspaper,

“I had to literally run from my last home to get away from violent (EU8-) Poles who beat my brother in law after he refused to accept their drugs and drinks ...I really don't care how hard working they are...” 968

963Ibid
964Ibid
965Woods, J., 2010(24 February)
966Ibid
967Ibid
968Mayo, N. 2012, (27 February), Illegal immigrants found working at Slough takeaways, [Homepage:Slough & South Bucks Express][Online][2014, 05 September 2014] Blog:16/03/2012@11:59hrs
In complete contrast, ‘white-British’ Slough based blogger ‘DS’ wrote of his dealings with the EU8-Poles,

“\textit{In regards to the (EU8-)Poles coming to Slough…I have a number of properties let to (EU8-)Polish people. I have found them to be hardworking and ALWAYS pay their rent on time! I have been dealing with one particular family for over 7-years…they are very hospitable people…all the (EU8-)Poles keep my properties clean and are all paying to live…They’re not claiming off the government like other foreigners}”

Continuing, and acknowledging nationality as a conduit to convey contemporary ‘racism’ led the research to seek insight into how each person identified themselves and what, if any, connection existed between them and the notions of personal, social and national identity as aspects of their self-identity.

\textbf{Identity, religion and religiosity}

In the context that ‘modern (or postmodern) societies such as Britain have experienced a process of individualisation (with) …people …more weakly attached to traditional social identities such as religion’,\textsuperscript{970} drilling down into Slough’s Somali and EU8-Polish communities to more fully understand both protagonists’ perspectives, outlooks, attitudes and values was crucial. It was essential to enter into the lives of the respondents, as far as was possible, to appreciate their identities and characters. To a large extent this meant recognizing the value of aspects of their day-to-day lifestyles and not assuming to know or equate them to those of an indigenous Briton. For example, a range of understandings existed amongst the Slough-Somali interviewees insofar as how their individual legal-statuses fed into their characterisations by wider-society. Importance attributed to legal-status varied, as did its positioning in a hierarchy of personal signifiers. Slough’s Somali appeared generally unaware, or indifferent, of British cultural expectations of them. Local issues, the law, beliefs and rights had escaped many of them, culminating in a resignation to not ‘fit in’, be understood or belong. Tangible alienation and disaffection had resulted. The knotty and ambiguous nature of legal-status significantly determined life-chances and was readily exposed by the few EU-Somali respondents.

\textsuperscript{969}Ibid-Blog:07/03/2012@22:10hrs
\textsuperscript{970}NatCen Social Research, 2013, \textit{British Social Attitudes 30} [Homepage:NatCen],[Online],[2014,23 September 2014]
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

These people held identical EU civil, legal and political rights as the EU8-Poles. The EU-Somali had more in common legally with the EU8-Poles than with the asylum-seeking Somali, despite other cultural differences between them. In spite of this, the tendency of the EU-Somali, national government and the local authority remained to cluster ‘the Somali’ together. The rationale behind the EU-Somali choosing to cluster, is explained in the following ‘Somali-clan’ subsection.

Largely subjective; in cases emotive, the interviews realised personal, social and national identity meaning different things to different people. They did not have specific meanings. They were not of generalizable definite importance although some expressed them as that; either as realities or aspirations. Western notions of social-class, wherein circumstances are largely and frequently only determined by occupation/income could not be compared precisely to Somali-clan. Clan was not occupationally determined. For this reason clan and ‘class’ were addressed herein as similar forms of ‘social capital’. Social-capital herein was context-dependent and acknowledged from the outset that it could, and did, assume different forms. It was also acknowledged that individual aspirations regarding ‘social-class’ tied in with both Somali-clan and every protagonists individual identity. The personal perspectives expressed recognized how individuals viewed themselves in multifaceted hierarchical contexts, comparing themselves to other people’s circumstances. The breadth of interpretation of what constituted ‘class’ was extraordinary. Both protagonists, whether referencing clan/class, legal-status, economics or ‘race’, actively engaged hierarchies. From these came a broad range of thinking of ‘where’ they were consequently positioned in Britain and where they aspired to be. An extensive aspirational range existed throughout the protagonists. Individual ambitions had each been influenced by life-experiences including the migration process. In some cases middle-class backgrounds clashed with present-day humble circumstances. In others this appeared not to be the case. Preparedness to undertake ‘working-class’ jobs, unemployment, insecurity, self-confidence issues, contempt and even exaggerated deference were each seen to be positive and negative responses to circumstances.

Examples included widowed Somali mother SF15,

“In Somalia I am ‘middle-class’...educated... respected... Here? ...in Britain...it is very different... I think the (EU8-) Polish are being very clever in dealing with this...they are considering themselves the same class as the English... European”

In contrast, British-born SF9 commented,

“Everyone here knows about ‘upper-class’...‘middle-class’ or ‘working-class’...I myself as ‘working-class’... but when I’ve got my (Business Studies) degree...I’ll be middle-class...(Equating ‘social-class’ with educational qualifications)"

As well as educationally premised responses, some respondents spoke of the impact money had on social-class; their public identity. Several subscribed to, while others questioned, the relationship between money and class. SM8 aligned himself with the narrow view that money alone could assign or change an individual’s social-class,

“Money can make you climb (Britain’s class ladder)...if you have money here...you can climb-up!

In contrast SF9 and SM1 spoke in terms of their aspirations being fulfilled,

SF9:
“I’ll work wherever I want...Slough is the place I grew up... I know what I want to be...to have my university degree... make the right choices. My education will give me a good job...a good life"

SM1:
“I’m here in this (British) culture and I like every good thing for (about my?) life... at the end of the day it’s up to me...It’s my life. I tell them (other Slough-Somali) to think about good jobs for their life... very challenging (giving this advice?)... I think I’ve done well...no house yet though Mel... lack of space... at the end of the day I’m happy here”
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

EU-Somali SF17 openly scorned Britain’s class-system, ‘racist’ premised or otherwise, voicing an upbeat assessment of her identity,

“We are European-Somali so British class...is not so important to us”.978

Her perspective surprisingly resonated with Ballard’s notion of migrants who are ‘skilled cultural navigators’, 979 able to ‘manoeuvre their way...inside and outside’ of their ethnic-groups, and not simply linguistically. SF17s outlook echoed EU8-Polish respondents, illustrating some similarities between the protagonists in resolving ‘stepping back and forth across (cultural and class) boundaries’.980 Theirs was a largely minority voice in an often very challenging environment. Upon reflection, only British-born SF9 seemed absolutely resolute in her aspirations; totally sure of her identity, although wide-ranging aspirational characteristics existed in both protagonists. Somali SM1’s comments were tinged with resignation of his circumstances, while EU8-Pole PM7 acknowledged and appeared to have readily acquiesced to Britain’s social-stratification hierarchy,

“We are happy to have work Mel...to be here...working...we are ‘working-class’...but the Head...the teachers he is (they are) ‘middle-class’... (Ascribing status based upon education/qualifications)"981

Disentangling ‘self-inflicted’ pessimistic/negative Somali viewpoints from undisputable externally created barriers, such as Britain’s restrictive migration legislation creating welfare-dependency, meant each Slough-Somali protagonist, whether or not they had particularly high levels of need, essentially appeared to come from a ‘closed-minded’ perspective - self-identifying as ‘inferior’, subordinate. The connection between work and social-class unsurprisingly led into the importance (or not) that money had on social-class. Intelligently questioning the exact impact money may have on class, PM3 had sought to better understand the British relationship or non-relationship between the two,

“I didn't see something (a ‘class’ structure) like this before (arriving in Britain). I have only heard who is ‘posh’ and who is not...I don't know (how you decide what is ‘posh’)...There is a woman who won a lottery

978 Joint-Interview:21.11.2008
979 Ballard, R. 1994, p.31
980 Ibid, p.32
981 Joint-Interview:24.11.2007
PM8 independently drew out the reality of the 'non-relationship' between money, rather than wealth, and 'class',

“We were told about British ‘class...we read about it...We don’t understand how (the British) upper-class’ is the upper-class if there is no money!”

It was evident from within both protagonists that Britain’s class system subtleties and the divisions that existed within it were poorly understood. The position taken by the interviewees commonly returned the conversations to economic reasoning. Slough’s EU8-Poles had accessed an extensive range of financial means enabling their upward mobility. Education appeared to be one of the most important factors in the minds of both protagonists to achieve their expressed goals, although it was perceptible that ‘blackness’, legal-status and religious affiliation were also acknowledged as influential. This was not to state there was extensive uniformity within the groups, although certain reoccurring themes where identified. Slough’s EU8-Poles were essentially sure of their own identities; personally, socially and nationally/internationally. It was perceptible that they felt widely acknowledged as EU-citizens and essentially ‘belonged’; that ‘home’ was no longer, in migratory terms, a singular ‘fixed-place’.

Slough’s EU8-Poles revealed three goals; their aspirations, in migrating to Britain - fast-track career progression, money earning potential and English-language opportunities. This stated any suggestion of them adopting hyphenated-identities drew out some robust denials. PM4 vociferously commented,

“Polish! Polish man always! Not European…not British! (Being) Polish is important to me…really”
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

As with Somali SM1’s open mindedness, pragmatism was also present amongst the EU8-Poles. For example PM13, who remarked, “I say I am (a) Polish-European”.

Elements within both groups expressed nationalist identities, meaning here ‘Somaliness’ and ‘Polishness’. Each held exclusive characteristics distinguishing their identity from other nationalities. The EU8-Poles used their EU legal-status more than the British and/or EU-citizen Somali, (Figure 34).

**Figure 34: Acceptance and use of EU Legal-status**

Even the most nationalist EU8-Pole seemed to have the savvy to accept being recognized as European, primarily to achieve economic and lifestyle goals (e.g. home ownership). Some privately retained strong ‘Polish’ reasoning. This perception was affirmed by PM15 who commented, “I am here in Britain working…so ‘when in Rome’…”

The self-awareness savvy exhibited by 28% of the EU8-Poles and 14%

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987 Interview:09.08.2008
988 Ibid
of the Somali in accepting and employing their EU legal-status to some degree distinguished both from their previous waves and each other. The EU8-Poles self-awareness shrewdness was not as broadly made use of by the Slough-Somali who were less willing, or able, to adopt a 'when in Rome' approach. This stated some EU8-Poles were equally resistant to notions of 'Europeaness'.

For some, the notion of EU-citizenship, certainly in private discussion, was a challenge to their national identity; who they were. Approximately the same number of Polish men accepted and employed their EU legal-status as did those who ignored it, (26% and 24%, Figure 34).

Figure 35 shows that approximately one and a half times the number of EU8-Polish women accepted and used their EU legal-status as did those who ignored it, (31% and 19%). Many interviewees from both protagonists moreover indicated that rather than weakening their sense of national identity, migration had reinforced their nationalism. Many of the EU8-Poles were evidently transmigrants. Transnationalism over distance was interpreted herein to be the frequently heard and unshakable claim to national identity (e.g. ‘Polishness’) despite that individual living away from their ‘home’ country (in Britain) for a long period of time. EU-citizenship was embraced, explicitly or implicitly as a ‘licence’ by the EU8-Poles. They were observed to be easily exercising their civil, legal and political rights to participate in Slough’s public life and affairs.

Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

Figure 35: Women ‘Accepting and Employing’ their EU Legal-status

Their practicality largely permitted them to recognize their EU-citizenship as both an aspect of their privileged-identity and an obligation to use it accordingly. PF1 commented,

“I feel very nice because before we (the Polish peoples) weren’t European- citizen(s)…we had lots of problems on (the) English boarder and lots of people had to go back to Poland…”  

Figure 36 infers 84% of EU8-Polish males (PM) and 89% of EU8-Polish females (PF) voiced their principal reason for migrating to Britain as being economically determined. PF12 illustrated this,

“I come (came) to work...in Slough...Stay here (in Britain) for (a)...better life (standard of living)...to make money”.

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990 Interview:18.07.2007
991 Joint-Interview:10.08.2008
While this meant the EU8-Poles chiefly came to Britain to ‘make money’, their intentions in relation to settling in the short, medium or long term, commuting indefinitely, ‘moving-on’ within the EU, moving to other countries outside the EU or permanently returning to Poland was varied. This echoed the Eade et al. 2005/06 findings in relation to ‘open-ended’ migratory choices and Burrell’s ‘have their cake and eat it’ findings. It was concluded that motivations and incentives, while broadly generalizable, included distinct and individual experiences. This confirmed the heterogeneous nature of each protagonist. PM2 explained,

“I see opportunities to advance…my career…I see opportunities for myself…my qualifications have helped me in Britain…this is something that caused me to move over here (Britain)… I have future plans to stay in this country”

PM2’s assertion was built on by PM3 who introduced the English-language as a further motivator to migrate, adamant that learning English for himself in Britain and facilitating the same for his wife and daughter was vitally important,

“I have a private (English-language) teacher…and I learn a lot every day…I work…that is the point we are here…I think it…advantageous…for me…for my daughter…she learn this language as well and she will have…easier in her life than me. This is the point of us being here…salary is the same…on the same level like in Poland"

Continuing, PF15, in a joint interview with husband PM16, confirmed their motivations,

“We… we want to stay here (Britain)…buy a house… have (a) family here…Yes …work is good but life (standard of living) is good also here… he is (PF15 refers to husband PM16 (an) I.T Consultant… I am (a) Staff Nurse"
Secure well-paid employment and the acquisition of a good command of the English language were the primary grounds for the EU8-Poles interviewed. Well-paid career progression, or the prospect of it, was enabling this group to feel, and to actually be, financially secure. Because of this self-sufficiency, most believed as EU-citizens in the reality they should be identified by the rest of British society as positively contributing to Britain. Clearly however, the established Catholic Church in Britain as well as the historic Anglo-Polish accord made choosing Britain an uncomplicated option with post-2004 social and cultural integration largely unproblematic compared to other minorities (e.g. the Slough-Somali). This is not to state a degree of resentment and hostility from aspects of Slough’s local indigenous population had not been encountered by the EU8-Poles although compared with Somali experiences, these appeared marginal.

Evidence of politically motivated EU8-Polish migration was unexpectedly unearthed too. The 2004 EU-accession enabled self-identifying secularists and politically dissatisfied liberal minded EU8-Poles, such as PF2, to leave the country to escape right wing religio-political dogma. This right of centre ideology remained resolute in Poland despite changes in government at that time,

“We left Poland...because of (the) political situation...the very ‘right-wing’ is (was) in power and there are big influences of (the Catholic) church...I don’t respect those people that are in power...they are kind of ‘sick’...it’s not a good picture of Poland in Europe...it is (was) so embarrassing (although) part of Polish society still think(s) it was a good choice!”

Interview: 04.08.2007
Figure 36: Primary Rationales for Migration to Britain by fourth-wave Somali males and females, and EU8-Polish males and females
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

Also telling of ‘who’ the EU8-Poles were and how they identified with wider Slough/British society, in themselves and essentially in contrast with the Slough-Somali responses, were EU8-Polish leisure activities. On the whole these involved activities that cost money - many sports membership based and/or requiring entrance payments. For example PF7 commented, “I go to the gym...swimming”,998 while PM6 pointed out, “I play golf at (the) weekend”.999 Pursuing religion was PM15’s principal leisure activity,

“My Church... Devine Mercy takes most of my free-time... I have good friends at Church”.1000

The EU8-Poles freedom to work and make choices regarding where to live and what to do with their free-time and disposable incomes were in striking contrast to the Slough-Somali positions. The EU8-Poles uniqueness appeared unrestricted. Conversely, the Slough-Somali identities appeared constricted. (This theme is pursued later in this chapter in the ‘Lifestyle’ subsection). Moving on, 40.5% (15) of this study’s 37 EU8-Poles pointed to the importance of ‘Polishness’ ‘in the blood’. PF6 exemplified this perspective, “If (your) father and mother is (are) Polish...you are Polish!”1001 Thirty-two percent (12) held the view ‘to be Polish’; a Polish person must be able to speak Polish and be born to Polish parents; the point made by PF9, “...not to speak Polish means they can’t communicate... (In Polish with other Polish people)”.1002 PM11 believed it essential for Poles or people with Polish heritage to be able to communicate in Polish, placing family ties and loyalty at the centre of his rationale,

“He (British-Poles?) speaking Polish...yes...Family first,...our (Polish) traditions...history...customs. He (they?) should talk (in the) Polish language. Just English? (Language?)... two-faced”1003

In hindsight, PM11’s ‘two-faced’ comment was puzzling. It was interpreted to mean that in his view British-Poles literally faced in two directions; in other words they had dual allegiances, to Britain and Poland The implication could have been that he believed British-born Poles who spoke no Polish were disloyal. Had this been the
case, it *could* have been interpreted as completely turning on its head the outcomes of the dichotomous distinguishing between economically and politically grounded migrations.\textsuperscript{1004} PM11 as an economically determined EU8-Pole *may* have been assuming a moral high ground over and above the British-born second generations arising from the second and third political waves premised on his pre-requisite for the Polish language to be spoken to qualify as ‘Polish’. This line of thinking would certainly have been reinforced by Holmes’ centring on the premise that the English-language ‘*is a symbol of national unity*,’ \textsuperscript{1005}(Ch.3), and as such a British-born Pole unable to speak Polish would have allegiance with Britain, not Poland. Relating and distilling down the scenario to the legal framework in which it could certainly be perceived, PF7 added a small but essential legal-status and citizenship based requirement to the pre-conditions of ‘being’ Polish, stating it depended on, “…*what it says on their passport*”.\textsuperscript{1006} Reflection on the outcomes arising from this suggested both protagonists were subject to internal social and cultural hierarchies but that in a global context views diverged insofar as nationality was concerned. To *some* it was immaterial where a person was born, their heritage was paramount. To others, in the EU8-Polish group, there was a purist national requirement including parental necessities to be met to qualify as ‘being Polish’. PF7’s pithy citizenship reference pertinently reminded the research however its core meaning was legally premised whereas nationality *may* also refer to cultural, ethnic and historic community. While citizenship can and does have broader sociological meaning, the EU8-Poles plainly knew their legal-status was paramount in how they could robustly and individually respond to the presented scenario.

In contrast to the explicitly pro-Polish statistical outcomes from the EU8-Poles, the Somali were almost entirely (89%) accepting of Somali peoples whether or not they could speak any Somali dialect and regardless of where they were born. This unexpected pro-Somali statistic did not offer any explicit insight into the prejudiced nuances and meanings of Somali-clan however. In 2014, the statistic remains anomalous given the on-going civil war. At the time however, this vignette appeared to authenticate the ‘Somali is Somali’ mind-set wherein there was broad acceptance of each other; the very point SF6 made; “*There is a saying ‘Somali is Somali’… being Somali is in your blood*”.\textsuperscript{1007} SM1, always seeking greater Somali community

\textsuperscript{1004}Joly, D. 2002,p.9
\textsuperscript{1005}Holmes, J. 2001,p.105
\textsuperscript{1006}Interview:19.11.2007
\textsuperscript{1007}Joint-Interview:21.06.2007
cohesion, attempted to offer his broad vision calling for the Slough-Somali to, ‘Pull together’.\textsuperscript{1008} He continued,

\begin{quote}
Mel, we are the lucky ones...what about our families? In Somalia...dying in the thousands. We (Slough's Somali? All Somali?) Need to stop fighting...stop the suffering.... Somalia was a better place....before the (clan?) division\textsuperscript{1009}
\end{quote}

SM1’s levelheadedness was a minority perspective and aspirational; perhaps recalling the Mogadishu of his youth compared to the reality of it in the twenty-first century (?) – A point pictorially made in Figure 37 below.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure37.jpg}
\caption{(Main) Mogadishu 2012\textsuperscript{1010} : (Inset) Mogadishu pre: 1989 / Civil War\textsuperscript{1011}}
\end{figure}

For SM1’s vision to become a reality, centuries of Somali tribalism would need to end. Recalling the atmosphere of the time in Chalvey, ‘burying the hatchet’, notions of ‘forgiveness’ and ‘Somali is Somali’ when juxtaposed were patently diametrically
opposed. As Nuh points out, “Many Somali’s approach one another by asking ‘Yaad Teheey?’ (What are you? Or what tribe are you?)… They will judge you based on your tribe instead of your personality and who you really are”. SF9 pointed out that from her perspective, as a second-generation Slough-Somali, that she was proud of her situation; unaffected by where she was actually born and the amount of Somali she did or did not speak,

“I’m proud of being British-Somali but I’ve never been to Somalia…My first language is English. I was born here…of course it is. My heritage is Somali though…Mum and Dad…it’s not a problem for me…we speak both (Somali and English) at home”.

Upon reflection however, Nuh’s comment regarding the explicit nature of the ‘What tribe are you?’ question brought the entire impression of ‘Somali is Somali’ in Chalvey into question. Questioning clan affiliation appears to be more in keeping with the reality of contemporary Somalia, and why returning home remains mythical for many of the Slough-Somali interviewed, than the accord ‘Somali is Somali’ conjured up, (See ‘Somali-clan’ subsection).

Studying reactions and responses to the vignettes (Ch.2) assisted greatly in peeling away veneers to reveal identities and individual characteristics. Insofar as vignette one and the notion of being identified with unsociable behaviour predicated by a ‘same’ national was concerned, this elicited a broad spectrum of responses. Forty-four point five percent (44.5%) of all respondents were unhappy but would say nothing for a number of reasons. Ten of the 74, (13.5%), 6 Polish men and 4 Somali men, believed they would say something. A total of 8 people (11%) stated they would feel ashamed or embarrassed while 5 people (7%) would disassociate themselves from the problem and ignore it. PM18 commented,

“These (type of people)…are fucking idiots… (EU8-) Polish idiots… I tell them to fucking shut up! …I don’t like this…it cause(s) trouble for us all (EU8-Poles)”.

Representative examples of the 44% of all interviewees who would be ‘unhappy’ to be identified with this but who would not intervene for a number of reasons, including fear of repercussions and gender difference, included PM13,
“We see this in town (Slough)...it is wrong but people are frightened to say things in case there is ‘trouble’”

Typical of the 11% of total respondents who stated they would feel ashamed or embarrassed by the situation, and the 7% who would disassociate from the problem and ignore it, was PF2 who remarked,

“We okay...I would feel embarrassed and ashamed of them....I would try to ignore them but I would feel very bad”

Characteristic of the views of the 13.5% of men, who believed they would intervene in such circumstances SM13 commented,

“I would not be happy to witness Somali people behaving this way...I would tell them... (To) stop”

SF11 echoed the view of all the Somali women who sought safety for their families and themselves above and beyond all else,

“We want to be (in)... a safe place...this (these) people (have) no place in our family (we disown them?).... problems and fighting... (This causes the Somali) big problems”

Although her English was poor, SF10 clearly agreed with this sentiment commenting “He shout... to fight... cause problem(s)...big problem for me”. It was plain using this hypothetical scenario essentially suggested the Slough-Somali and the EU8-Poles, both men and women, preferred their presence in Britain to be ‘low-key’ and as conflict free as possible. SF11’s comments highlighted how problematic troublesome Somali behaviour was and how the perpetrators were not welcome in the Somali community. While SF10 and SF11 were (typically, in public) subdued Somali-woman, it was clear the prospect of any of their countrymen/women embarrassing or highlighting negative traits in their culture; their identities, that reflected badly on them caused them to be scornful. Obviously there were exceptions

1016 Family-Interview:09.08.2008
1017 Interview:04.08.2007
1018 Interview:23.10.2008
1019 Group-Interview:02.10.2008
1020 Ibid
(e.g. PM18), but the thought of countrymen/women embarrassing or highlighting negative traits in their culture that could reflect on them was entirely rejected. Emotions expressing this standpoint varied from the highly emotive to the subdued; depending on the individual. These findings, and the notion of professional-class EU8-Poles viewing some of their own lesser educated wave as ‘sources of embarrassment’ was more recently confirmed by Bobek in 2009 in Ireland and in 2011 by White with Polish women in Poland and Britain.

Maintaining self-identity was largely achieved by the individuals themselves through their own affirming narratives on one hand and on the other by expanding and contracting the importance in their lives of overlapping social structures and categories. These included identity defining issues such as history, clan (for the Somali), religion, language, ‘place and space’, physical appearance and legal-status. Legal-status difference between, and within, the protagonists was complex and often ambiguous. Every person, including those Somali who related to the contextual identity of ‘immigrant’, appeared mindful of belonging to a particular and pre-eminent group however, distinctive, although with the distinctions judged, measured and ranked in a multitude of different ways. The views expressed illustrated that individuals were continually adapting to circumstances. This included how obvious they were in expressing or admitting to identifying with particular affiliations, (e.g. being a Muslim or a Roman Catholic).

Religion as contrast essentially differentiated the protagonists. Religious association in the broad context of material-difference was relevant and consequential to this research. It featured as one of the complexities of migrant identity; of personal identity. It was crucial not to dismiss disparities between and within both protagonists in this regard. The spectrum of views expressed was wide; the Somali viewed the EU8-Poles as immoral with some Somali disdainful of Catholicism; Christianity per se. Similarities and differences between the religions existed beyond doctrine however. Muslim or Catholic religious identity presented individuals in both groups with degrees of social-identity. Through contrasting each protagonists approach to their religion; for some their religiosity, and their viewpoints towards others, it was anticipated some fresh insight into how each group was integrated, or not, into other

\[1021\] Bobek, A., 2011(June), Polish Migrants in Ireland: Migration Patterns, Social Networks and ‘Community’, Unpublished Dissertation, Trinity College:Dublin,Ireland p.160

\[1022\] White, A., 2011, Polish Families and Migration since EU Accession, PolicyPress,Bristol
main features of their life-experience would be forthcoming. Examples included employment, education, housing, health and wider-society socialisation. Catholicism was a tangible social-identity for most EU8-Poles and perceived to be a positive attribute to them in Britain. Relationships between, and the functions of, individuals in forming communities within wider-society such as in the Catholic Church was pivotal in settling in Britain. The notion of the Polish Catholic Church being an important aspect of community-cohesion was commented on by TVP pointing out its own strategy of engaging with EU8-Poles,

“That's the place we know they go to on a daily basis and on a weekly basis...speaking to people... speaking to the elders...trying to essentially gain their trust...gain their confidence... finding out what the issues were ...within the 'community'...”

SBC echoed the importance of the Church, acknowledging,

“The Polish Catholic Church (Divine Mercy)...is very well attended...It works very well as a 'community' service...providing guidance and advice to many Polish females and men who are victims of crime and (with) other social issues to discuss... such as pregnancy outside the marriage”

As an existing and powerful institutional UK service-provider, the Catholic Church stood central to many EU8-Poles enabling them to speedily integrate and function. The consequences of their different levels of religious observance however (Figure 38) could have meant disunity for the EU8-Poles although with 95% of Poland’s 38million population attesting to being practicing Catholics and the religion largely culturally embedded, many confirmed regular Church attendance. The Church of Divine Mercy contributed significantly to creating a largely integrated community. Compared to Slough’s Somali the EU8-Poles exhibited a more broad minded approach to religion, doing so for a variety of reasons including disillusionment with Polish Catholicism, although they largely expressed personal Christian belief beyond religious dogma. Resentments and hostilities were never far from the surface however. PM18’s direct opinions being one example,

“I believe in my religion...I am a Polish-Catholic...I go to church...‘They’ ...Muslims... they act like the world owes

1023 Interview: 31.03.2007
1024 Ibid
them…their religion…something…it doesn’t…they’re like the ‘fucking Jews’… Everywhere!  

Both protagonists contained significant numbers of individuals who privately practised their faiths. Religious observance was significant in appreciating aspects of the character of each group regarding ‘belonging’ in Britain. The EU8-Poles grasped Britain’s increasingly secular nature and some resented the fact that Catholicism had become more and more disempowered across time; marginalised even. PM15’s response illustrated an aspect of staunch Catholic attitudes, and his own right of centre view of Islam,

“I am Roman Catholic…Somali’s in Britain being Muslim. There is ‘Islamization’ all over the world”  

Slough-Somali religious identity appeared not to function in the same way as EU8-Polish Catholicism, even amongst Slough’s wider Muslim community; wherein the Somali also believed they were marginalised. While religious observance amongst Slough’s Somali was almost absolute, their non-unified association and involvement with the local Mosques insofar as leadership was concerned added to their disempowerment. How much of this service non-provision was actually created by the Somali’s own unwillingness to engage with the wider Muslim community could not truly be gauged. When combined with clan fracture and entrenched suspicion, it was plain that wider unity had not been achieved. This is not to suggest there should have been any form of social or religious engineering to establish uniformity of organisation by either protagonist. It rather meant the outcomes of actively using religion and its institutions as a hub was highly successful for the EU8-Poles compared to the Somali. Individual and private Somali observance of Islam had ostensibly failed to achieve similar outcomes. SF14 voiced some accord with Berns McGown’s insofar as employing Islam as an ‘anchor’ during her own ‘displacement’.  

“I believe and practice… Islam considers human nature and complex human society…it is important to have this in my situation…as an asylum-seeker”  

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1025 Interview: 18.10.2008  
1026 Interview: 18.08.2008  
1027 Berns-McGown 1999, p.98  
1028 ibid  
1029 Interview: 11.11.2008
Closer analysis of what SF14 actually said offered a clue as to why proportionally the Somali practiced their faith in such a disciplined way, albeit on the margins of Slough’s Muslim community. Islam provided SF14 with security, a degree of calm and order in her life. Islam was being drawn on to ground individual, and likely wider Somali group identity to help withstand the reality of her contested legitimacy as an asylum-seeker and to assemble a sense of cohesion to withstand prejudice, discrimination and marginalisation. Notably none of the seventy-four individuals said they did not believe in a religion and none expressed religiosity outside of their ethnic mainstream religion. Each Somali ascribed to Islam, each EU8-Pole to Catholicism. In the context of religious intermingling, each group lived separately. For Slough’s Somali, in the post-9/11 context, they perceived their Muslim identity negatively affecting them. SM6 highlighted the disunity within Islam regarding Sunni and Shia fracture and brought into play Britain’s anti-terror stop-and-search policy in the post-9/11 period. He was clear this disproportionate response discriminated against Muslims,

“You wouldn’t want to be a Somali today or a Muslim (post 9/11) would you? …‘stop-and-search’ policy discriminates (against) people”

SF9 pointed out how Islam remained misrepresented in the West,

“Don’t judge Islam by maniacs who call themselves Muslim”

It was conspicuous amongst the Slough-Somali that they held the view that many people in the West, not least its governments, consciously or unconsciously held this prejudiced viewpoint. SM13 commented,

“I face deportation right? ...of course religion...I am Muslim...Is important...since 9/11 the West suspect(s) us (Muslims) all”

SM6 independently agreed,

“After 9/11 the issue was… about being Muslim”
Figure 38 following illustrates Slough’s Somali generally being well ordered in formally following their religion/faith across both genders, or at least stating they did, when compared to the EU8-Poles.

Beyond religious-identity, SM1 shared the outcome of his identity re-evaluation process after fifteen-years in Britain, “I am ‘Somali-English’”, unusual insofar as for most ‘non-white’-migrants the propensity to use the adjective ‘English’ has been predominantly limited to describing ‘white’-Britons with ‘British’ more generally chosen to describe Britain’s multicultural indigenous population. ‘Somaliness’ and Islam remained firmly as key identity-markers. ‘Somaliness’, in its multiple guises, also featured as very important aspects of Somali identity; as expressed by SF15,

“Most Somali people identify with Somalia...‘Somali identity’...it doesn’t matter if we are Refugees or European-citizens... Being Somali is important Mel (addressing me directly)...to all of us...I am Somali...Even though we are spread all over (the world)”

For Slough’s Somali, their identities were largely defined by religion and nation. Being Muslim and being Somali, (their ‘Somaliness’) made imperative statements, not just about their religious belief, but about belonging to a particular community and doing so in the context of clan. In several cases, affiliation to Islam defined identity more strongly than many other attributes including ethnicity, nationality, legal-status or clan.

By entering into the lives of the EU8-Polish protagonists, as far as was feasible, it was possible to better fathom how many of them were constantly adjusting to their circumstances in Britain. This included how they were in expressing particular affiliations, showing intent, interests and possibly embedded prejudices. PM17 commented,

“I’m willing to...adapt... you have to change to fit circumstances.... you know. I’m ‘me’ but I don’t have to let everybody see that... Depends where I am... who I’m with”

Slough’s EU8-Poles were compellingly determined to exhibit a strong sub-conscious affinity with people with whom they shared ideas, values, beliefs and experiences,
even if they did not verbalise it. For them, this seemed tangible in setting them aside from the previous Polish waves. It offered an illustration of their ‘ploughing their own furrow’. Some EU8-Poles suggested their professional life and EU-citizenship, not nationality, was central to their self-identification. Most EU8-Polish women attested to cosmopolitanism in their identification with EU-citizenship expressing the desire for greater career choice and the freedom to earn their own money at rates only dreamed of in Poland. Many sought liberation as individuals compared to ‘home’. It was not simply, as some stated, how individuals or groups saw and defined themselves, but plainly how they had their identities fashioned through the socialization process and the influence of the State, the law, the education system and the media. Venturing further to more comprehensively understand, or at least appreciate, each person’s character and identity as a migrant in Britain, actual and perceived connections with ‘home’ were investigated to ascertain how or indeed if this influenced their self-identity perspectives and interactions. Polarisation was apparent. This important theme is investigated in the following ‘Myth of Return’ subsection.

Due regard was paid to the intersection of gender and national identity, particularly the complex representation and role of women, in understanding notions of nationality and identity. Women are, factually and through imagery, brought into play around the world as central to efforts to construct or destroy national identities, for example, ‘woman as mother’ and women raped and killed in war to culturally oppress. Because of this transparency, the notion of national identity was viewed as a social construct. Of the Slough-Somali and EU8-Polish experiences of the numerous mixed effects of globalization and broadening European integration on one hand and evermore restrictive British immigration policies on the other, it was predictable the woman’s sub-groups would offer differing perspectives.
Figure 38: Religion/Faith Adherence
For *many* Slough-Somali women, their self-identity had been for the most part overwhelmed. *Some* bewilderment was apparent. Their traditional caring relationship, while in some EU-Somali situations made clearer because of EU-citizenship, was subject to the complex mis-matches of Somali traditionalism and the ways of the West conflicting. In view of this, the question of nationality and identity beyond staying alive, their ‘*Somaliness*’ and being Muslim appeared moot. It was evident their self-identity protection strategies, such as clinging to *Somaliness* and the fervent religious conviction of many of the Somali interviewees was, for the most part, flawed however insofar as the identity of individuals and groups were concerned. Identity must involve both elements of personal choice and the responses and attitudes of others, of wider-society.

Such distinguishing fed into notions of community-cohesion, fitting-in, home and belonging. This structure positively and negatively impacted the protagonist’s opportunities. SF17 spoke of her *“fresh start”* although SM10 reflected sorrowfully, *“Somali ...he is (we are) isolated”* Community-cohesion is not simply a matter of achieving a consensus; bonding (glue-like) by disparate members of a group of people to create a community that holds together, it is far more involved. Upon reflection it may however have been a necessary first-step towards achieving *‘institutional-completeness’*, improved degrees of self-sufficiency and independence for Slough’s Somali. Institutional completeness would be said to have been realised by measuring and determining availability and access to *‘ethnic-services’*, including *‘religious and educational facilities, vernacular newspapers, voluntary associations and other services such as shops, cinemas and so on, catering for (specific)…ethnic tastes and needs’*. In contrast with the EU8-Poles’ facilities, Slough’s Somali were deficient, despite their settlement longevity in the town. It was apparent the Somali did not, for example, enjoy culturally specific places of worship.

Figure 39 following shows the Slough-Somali interpretation of their own identity; 23 of the 37 Somali respondents (62%) self-identified as ‘Somali’, 5 (14%) as ‘European’ and 3 (8%) as ‘British-Somali’. Sixteen percent (16%) self-identified as immigrants.

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1039 Interview:21.11.2008
1040 Interview:29.09.2008
1041 Breton, R. 1964, *“Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants”*, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol.70(Sept.),no.1,p.194
1042 Anwar, M. 1979,p.12
1043 ibid pp.12-13
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

while in Britain. Twenty-seven of the 37 Polish respondents (73%) identified themselves as ‘Polish’ with the remaining 10 (27%) self-classifying as European.
Figure 39: Research participant self-identification labels
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

Because of their inability to achieve significant functional institutional unity, tensions continued to be created and exacerbated by perceived, and possibly, but unlikely ‘unfairness’ of the distribution or allocation of resources. Pragmatically, TVP questioned the credibility of such bonding and pointed to a gradual on-going building process,

“Community-cohesion’...is it a realistic aim? You’re almost looking for a utopia... there aren’t often ‘quick wins’...its bite size chunks”

SBC explained one of its strategic ‘bite size chunks’ to achieve community-cohesion,

“One of the positives of Slough is the focus on equality and diversity... a Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) called ‘Slough Focus’...We work...together...are not afraid to stand-up and be counted”

TVP refreshingly and realistically pointed out,

“Community-cohesion’ is about people living together in reasonable harmony...but we all have conflict... so it’s ‘reasonableness’... and about living together within that... forms understanding... We (Slough) have a BAME (‘Black’, Asian, Minority Ethnic) make-up of probably 36-38%...that’s changing. Demographics over the (EU8- )Poles coming in"

At the time this field-research was undertaken, the actual numbers of EU8-Poles in Slough was unknown; an important stumbling block for the ‘Slough Focus’ strategy.

“We smile when we think back to the original government estimation of fifteen-thousand (‘A8’-migrants) in Britain...we know it's something like six-fifty, (650,000). We see headline news from the Daily Express or the Daily Mail of over nine-thousand, but we (Thames Valley Police) put a figure somewhere between eight to fifteen thousand (EU8-)Poles (in Slough)"

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1046 Interview:14.06.2007
1047 Ibid
1048 Ibid
1049 The actual number of Polish-born residents in the Slough Unitary Authority area at the 2011 census was 7696; very close to the lower TVP estimated figure four-years prior. Ref: ONS,2011.National Census-(England & Wales):Table CT0010EW
1050 Interview:14.06.2007
It was this researches’ secondary EU-Somali interviewees whose novel contribution to the identity topic offered weightier understanding of what it meant to be a Somali in twenty-first century Slough. This concise sub-section is included to acknowledge EU-Somali specificity.

**EU-Somali**

This research unearthed a planned and evolving intricacy regarding the exit strategies and onward migration plans regarding those Slough-Somali who arrived into Britain via other EU-countries, as secondary-migrants. While their secondary-migration was not unique, this ‘form of onward movement…as EU-citizens, able to move and settle freely within the EU…rarely receives attention.’\(^{1051}\) The ‘decision to [secondarily] migrate [to Britain was]…based on information about life in Britain disseminated transnationally among the Somalis in exile (in Slough)’.\(^{1052}\) Information sources were ‘through…friends and family already living in the country and short visits to Britain [to plan their longer stays or even permanent settlement]’.\(^{1053}\) Slough’s EU-Somali had each undertaken individual journeys to reach Britain and was aware of his/her EU-citizen legal-status, but chose to identify with Slough’s non-EU Somali; not with other EU-migrants. (This perhaps vindicated the national government and local authority categorization of all Somali as a ‘group’). SBC raised the (then) fledgling issue of generational differences regarding Somali identity however, importantly bringing into focus a British/European-Somali ‘Somaliness’,

> “Young Somali people…going through the local education system…are beginning to find their own kinds of conflict of identity… They do not consider themselves Somali… they are…in between’…”\(^{1054}\)

While Slough’s EU-Somali had expressed a range of rational for migrating to Britain, with the most prevalent being to join family, the suggestion of them having hyphenated-identities\(^ {1055}\) evoked some strong rejections; vigorous rebuttals. Representative of these was Dutch-Somali SM2,

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\(^{1051}\)Bang-Nielsen, K. 2004 [March], Next Stop Britain: The Influence of Transnational Networks on the Secondary Movement of Danish Somalis, Working Paper:No.22, University of Aarhus,Denmark,p.10

\(^{1052}\)ibid,p.3

\(^{1053}\)Interview:14.06.2007

Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

“I am not British-Somali...I would like to be considered a (Somali) immigrant in Britain”.

In analysing data regarding the Somali men, over double their number ignored their EU legal-status in favour of their ‘Somaliness’; (Figure 40). It remains unknown whether or not the EU-Somali actually gleaned benefit from their EU legal-statuses, although it was their Somali heritage, ('Somaliness') that appeared to most rival their religiosity regarding their self-identification. Aware of his enforced exile, SM14 had already begun to re-evaluate his own identity,

“I am Somali-British... we cannot (return to) Somalia...maybe we can never go...three of my kids (were) born here (in Britain) ...they (‘ve) never know(n) Somalia”

SM14’s comment enveloped both the principal counterpart to both Somaliness and Islam, namely the kinship bonds of Somali-clan (following), and drew out his response to the ‘myth of return’; another significant theme discussed later in this chapter.

Figure 40: Men ’Accepting and Employing’ their EU Legal-status

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1056 Interview: 10.02.2007
1057 Interview: 04.11.2008
1058 Anwar, M. 1979
Somali-clan

Somali-clan hierarchy influenced notions of individual and group identity in Slough. This biased choices including exit-strategy directions taken towards particular host countries. Somali fourth-wave forced migrations, combined with EU-law, had made choices more complex. Reflection on the composite and fluid reality of some of the Slough-Somali experiences drew attention to evidence a minority were ‘evolving’; establishing identities outside of traditional Somali-clan kinship confines and the ‘invisibility’ it propagated. For example SM1 and SF9, who were striving to create very different EU-Somali ‘fledgling identities’ striking-out for unified relationships with other Somali regardless of clan, seemingly wanting to wholly integrate. They were no longer accepting that their ‘Somaliness’, their cultural heritage, would determine relationships within or beyond Britain’s Somali community. These individuals were examples of heeding national calls from various public figures, to ‘concentrate on the issues that face them here [in Britain] and not to become embroiled in the clan and tribal divisions that persist in Somalia’.1061

SBC confirmed the EU-Somali were also drawn to Slough because, in comparative terms, they felt ‘safe’ and secure; “Somali’s feel very safe in Chalvey”.1062 This fundamental reasoning when placed alongside equally important reasons for them fleeing Somalia in the first instance, (e.g. clan allegiances and influences, torture and separation), went some way to explain how personally safe the Somali felt in Britain. The Slough-Somali frequently spoke of choosing Britain as the safest and most accommodating European country for their exile and/or fresh start. That acknowledged, in most cases whether or not dual citizenship status was held, ‘Somaliness’ like ‘Polishness’ was more than national identity. While political-nationalism may have been weakened in exile and a return ‘home’1063 not a foreseeable option in the non EU-Somali case, in each Slough instance there appeared to be a tangible cultural-nationalism at work. Clan and family ties were the principal rationale for Slough’s Somali migrating to the town.

Slough-Somali group dynamics were captivated in clan affiliation as the major cultural identifier, (Figure 41). Clan presented a specific aspect of Somali social-class.

1059 Griffiths, D.J. 2002, p.29
1060bid
1061Harris, H. 2004, p.5
1062Interview:09.10.2007
Evidence of this came from those of noble-clan status/with noble-clan association. This connection was largely readily expressed with pride, often with a measure of superiority in the tone of voice. Noble-clan members exhibited high standards of education, knowledge and the ability to speak foreign languages including English. The majority of Slough-Somali were either noble-clan/sub-noble clan affiliates. Chalvey was a clan enclave benefiting its specific clans. It appeared largely self-policing in that regard, a point echoed by TVP,

“We know that there are different clans...we've never picked up on anything...problems... happening because of clan difference”

This acknowledged, it was obvious friction existed as a direct result of clan. Outcomes of tacit hierarchies including gender issues, religious liberalism and generational divide were each eluded too by SBC,

“Somali have clan issues...Somali women are very isolated... There's not much in terms of religious (Islamic) extremism with the Somali population... I think...Somali people will (eventually?) put aside their clan factor...”

Clan was a significantly adverse tap root partially explaining why Slough’s Somali remained largely disadvantaged and marginalised compared with for example, the Pakistani and EU8-Polish communities. Clan has traditionally perpetuated hierarchic fracture and it is inconsistent with Western multi-ethnic notions of community-cohesion. A manifestation of this, by way of self-segregation and fracture, was unearthed by discovering Somali resource and grant funding applications were frequently duplicated. Wariness had arisen within SBC and the town’s voluntary sector organizations as a result. This meant representation, for funding for example, had largely failed.

Somali turmoil had been compounded by the arrival of the EU8-Poles as another issue for them to deal with. It had increased tensions amongst themselves and their perceptions of other ethnic-minorities because of increasing non-budgeted costs to SBC. The Somali perceived they would receive even fewer resources as a result. Many resented this likelihood and voiced their concerns. Importantly an example of

1064 Interview:14.06.2007
1065 Ibid
the intersection of resource allocation and clan was found in Chalvey’s housing scenario. There were invisible but nevertheless substantial clan hierarchical divisions of physical space. These ensured ‘personal security…residing in the ‘home areas’ of their clan [and its allies], where they are assured full status and protection by their kin group’.1066 It was also true that some Slough-Somali were re-examining who they were, what they wanted and puzzling how they could achieve their goals, aims and dreams away from the divisive aspects of clan. In their defence, Slough’s Somali were largely without readymade or accessible options except to continue to self-identify with clan until a peaceable consensus in Somalia is achieved; not if they wished to retain their ‘Somaliness’.

Clan readily acknowledged difference in Slough. It did not celebrate diversity - it scrutinised dissimilarity. Somali individuals, who sought to remedy this, who aspired to achieve greater cross-clan cultural cohesion to compete for resources for example were met with scepticism. Somali disunity was witnessed to be a glocal manifestation of ‘traditional clan politics’.1067 Attempts to assimilate ‘clan particularism’1068 into a contemporary sovereign state framework were fittingly described as ‘futile’.1069 Clan kinship was ‘…fundamental and (of) natural importance’1070 in Slough-Somali life. This acknowledged, there were fledgling examples of Somali ‘continental…new national [and]…local ethnic’1071 identities witnessed emerging however. SM1 sought liberation from the negative aspects, and outcomes of ‘the language of clan’1072 despite complex mixtures of globalised determinants. In highlighting the social structures that were important to the Somali, SM10 distinguished between the importance of clan, Xeer (customary Somali law differentiated by clan) and kinship/family networks; and UK/EU legal-status, and the privileges, ethnic ‘legal-rights’ or EU legal-rights and networks each afforded or should afford the Slough-Somali – from the Slough-Somali perspective. He pointed out Britain’s Somali were annoyingly homogenised despite clan and legal-status differences, for example the EU-Somali and refugee Somali,

1068Lewis, I.M. 1995, p.144
1071Ibid

1073Lewis, I.M. 1961, p.6
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

“People here (in Britain)...don’t know the difference between us”.1074

Clan drew further attention to the hostility frequently manifest when clan hierarchy and the power it imbued was discussed,

“Do you know Mel...many Somali when you ask about their clan...they are not at ease...they (clans) really destroy our relation(ships)...Here (in Britain) when you ask them their clan you are...it’s not something that makes us feel nice...My clan is the (noble) Darod Clan...it’s one of the ‘big’ (powerful) ones...I had the luxury of carrying on studying rather than working to support myself...my upbringing does not represent the majority of the Somali people”1075

The prickliness of raising clan questions was widespread amongst Slough’s Somali. Some categorically refused to name their clan/sub-clan when asked; perhaps embarrassed to either admit their relative good fortune or for whatever reason not to disclose their affiliations to ‘outsiders’. Others chose to call themselves ‘Somali’ although it could not be presumed this was a call for, or identification with, Somali irredentism.1076 Several of the Somali were from the privileged class with migratory exit strategies planned and financed through noble-clan networks. This fact should not imply their migrations and settlements were unproblematic however or that those suffering post-trauma illnesses and hardships were not genuine; rather to point out without their noble class status, it was unlikely they could have ever fled the African continent at all. Slough’s relatively narrow Somali-clan-base, (differentiated by gender) is statistically represented in Figure 41 following. Data analysis implied there was a statistical grouping of noble-clan Somali in Slough. This inferred Somali-clan played a role in determining the demography of Slough’s Somali – i.e. regarding privilege, rights and networks afforded to noble-clans. Problematically for many in this group however was their relative lowly social position compared to other ethnic-minorities here in Britain; specifically Slough herein. There was an air of resentment in SM13’s criticism of Britain’s embedded social stratification and his lowly position in it although it may be

1074Interview:29.09.2008
1075Interviews:11.10.2006/03.11.2006
1076Lewis, I. M. 2002,p.248
said to be representative of the Somali majority; certainly in Slough – if not across Britain as a whole,

“In Somalia…I am ‘at the top’…here I am very low”

Notions of community-cohesion for the Somali would, it appeared during the fieldwork, remain fictitious while imported clan fracture retained its powerful influence, and asylum-seeker and refugee legal-statuses effectively disabled integration possibilities at their outset. Somali community stability could suddenly turn to instability based on events in Somalia. In view of the overriding language of clan and the raging civil war however it had not been anticipated that Slough’s Somali would seemingly emerge as accepting of each other and their ‘Somaliness’ under any circumstances. Overall, Slough’s Somali, whatever their real number, had (at the time) permitted nearly two decades in Britain to pass without addressing identity autonomy in any form. They had not established a cohesive community and were not adequately represented with other ethnic-minorities in the town. This fact alone had meant issues such as employment, education, housing and health had not been adequately directed; feeding into realities of EU8-Polish ‘leap-frogging’ regarding representation and resources.
Figure 41: Somali-Males and Females by Clan Membership/Affiliation
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

Employment, education, housing and lifestyle

Employment
Drilling-down into the SBC statement that Slough’s ‘Asian’ community had “control of the employment market in Slough”1078 from unskilled manual to professional-class work, long-term unemployed Somali SM17 bitterly resented this ‘closed-shop’ situation. He commented,

“Work? For me in Slough... the Pakistani look after themself (selves) in this...here (in Slough/Britain?) I am hard work(ing) and honest…not regular work here for me”1079

Unemployed SM18, in the same interview group, added,

“Just let these Pakistanis all (remain?) together ... they keep work (for themselves?)….jobs away from our friends (the Somali?)”1080

Across the EU, it is common practice for member States to allow refugees the right to work, and with asylum-seekers; usually granted after certain lengths of time. The Council for Europe (CfE) acknowledges that refugees do not only need the ‘legal authorisation to work’,1081 but importantly they must also be ‘able to execute this right’.1082 Slough’s Somali – a mixture of EU-citizens, refugees, asylum-seekers and ‘others’ (non-declared during this research) had an assortment of legal-statuses. These directly impacted their legal-rights insofar as paid employment was concerned. They appeared hamstrung insofar as executing their right (if it had been granted) to work. Ignoring the socio-political, economic and humanitarian circumstances of his arrival in Britain, SM7 sought to rationalise why he was not able to secure work despite, in his mind, ‘similarities’ with post-WWII Indian and Pakistani migrants. The blame lay, from his perspective, with Slough’s Indian and Pakistani employers,

“Indians and Pakistani(s)...they are (the) most prejudiced...to themselves (each other?) And everyone... at some time their family come (came) here (to Slough/Britain) from (India and) Pakistan... the same as us (Somali)”1083
International law recognises the right to work as enhancing ‘dignity, self-respect and self-worth’ as well as ‘independence and financial self-sufficiency’. To a very large extent, all five elements of this quintet eluded most Somali protagonists and consequently hindered further notions, if they existed, of their integration into Slough’s/Britain’s wider community. As with the Slough EU8-Poles, the Somali made a conscious or unconscious connection between work and social-class. Types of work were important; not just of themselves but in respect of the kudos they conveyed. Some of the Somali, particularly SM1 and SF15, shared similar perspectives to those of the EU8-Poles, meaning professionals (e.g. Doctors, Lawyers, Engineers and Craftspeople) at the ‘top’ with unskilled labour at the bottom, although social-class for the Somali was fundamentally clan-based. The reader(s) will recall SM1 and SF15 were of the Noble (high-status) Darod clan and highly educated, (see Ch.2 biographies).

Slough’s established ‘Asian’/British-Asian’ communities, while still (albeit it wrongly), considered minorities compared to ‘white’ residents, were particularly occupationally mobile and ranked very highly in the town’s employment hierarchy. This was true whether they worked in the town in lower paid capacities or as middle-managers, or commuted out, as professionals, into London for example. Slough had a reputation in the mid-noughties for ‘sucking in professionals…from outside the area’ and there was no evidence to suggest this did not include an element of EU8-Poles; PM2, PF9, PF15 and PM3 being examples of that ‘professional-class’. Commenting on how Slough’s EU8-Poles, (and the Somali) did not fully appreciate ‘Asian’ as encompassing different ethnic, social and occupational strands and the effects this had on Slough’s economy, SBC pointed out,

“(Sloughs) economy is completely ‘Asian’...If you go to Job Centre Plus...jobs are very low wage...low skilled jobs...Higher Management jobs in Slough are a lot different...You will find a high representation of (‘Asian’ professionals in) Slough...36% ‘Asian’...they (the EU8-Poles and Somali) don’t understand...A lot of people commute-in to Slough every day for employment and the ‘Asian’ population...the well-educated...they commute-out... So you walk into Tesco you will find an ‘Asian’ there...doesn’t matter if they are

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1084 Chope, C, 2012,p.3
1085 ibid
1086 Interviews:11.10.2006/03.11.2006
1087 Group-Interview:11.11.2008
1088 GWE Research, 2006 (Feb), Slough Economic Assessment, GWE Research,Trowbridge,p.3
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

first or second generations…they have all got a job…This is what is contributing to the (differential) community-cohesion issues”

By unpacking these points it was evident SBC’s aim was to point out the high ‘Asian’ employment rates across the work-spectrum. This interview was confirmatory of Slough’s dual economy,

“Go to Job Centre Plus...you will mainly come across ‘Asian’ populations finding work and supplying work...the perception (by the EU8-Poles and Somali) is they (‘Asians’) have even got control of the employment market in Slough...There (were) a lot of tensions and resentments (from the Somali and some EU8-Poles) coming out of those perceptions”

This perception of Slough’s ‘Asian’ communities, mainly Pakistanis, occupying virtually every aspect of the town’s employment-spectrum was the principle catalyst for the some EU8-Poles to voice a degree of umbrage towards them PF12, although guarded, commented,

“My boss she is ‘Asian’… (a) Pakistani…Many…Most (people) in my work... they are the same...I don’t care but I don’t understand what they say (their language?) all the time. They are friends…different for (to?) me”

Conversely, PM9 commented,

“I’m not worry (worried)... (About undercutting wages/job costs)...I come here for work... Polish get job first thing is (a) story (untrue?)….. Britain it (has) let Polish (EU8-Poles) in. If British (builders? /workers generally?) They are willing (to do the) same work for me...same money...they would have work

PM9’s employer PM10 did not see any problem,

“We have been here several years...build close links with the town...community. I prefer to have (employ a) Polish worker. Why?

1089 Interview:09.10.2007
1090 ibid
1091 Interview:10.08.2008
1092 Joint-Interview:04.03.2008
He is hard worker...good timekeeper. I have Pakistani customer(s)...They (Pakistanis) are not problem for me.

Adding an essential piece to this jigsaw, TVP made the point that anecdotally the EU8-Poles, in the building trades, had sought to overcome Pakistani domination by slashing hourly work rates to ‘buy’ contracts, creating “some tension”. In actuality the ‘Asians’ and the EU8-Poles were competing with one another for work, and with every other ethnic-group. As with the Pakistani ‘community’ it was apparent two distinct types of EU8-Pole were in the town. This was recognised, acknowledged and chronologized by their arrival dates, at SBC,

“After...1st May (2004) the (EU8-) Polish that came into Britain were well educated...many managed to get into the middle-manager jobs... they had good English (language skills)...were well educated...The next ‘set’ (post-2005 were) not very well educated...so couldn’t find those kinds of jobs”

How every individual faired employment-wise consistently returned the research to the issues of their education and English-language proficiencies. Both were important constituent parts of Slough’s multi-ethnic occupational hierarchy. The notion of Slough’s occupational hierarchy intuitively interested and engaged both the EU8-Poles and the Somali. Both influenced perceptions of migrant acceptance and belonging. English-language and foreign language translation were knotty issues. SBC commented how costly language translation was to provide,

“How is the English language provision?... (Learnt) through their own educational system in Poland... Others.....Slightly older (felt) left out... (The) biggest obstacle to community-cohesion, employment and accommodation is their lack of English ...they are really frustrated with the lack of English-language (provision) in Slough... the Government (withdrew) funding for ESOL... they are trying to teach existing Polish teachers (in Britain) to teach English (ESOL)... we need to stop translation provision. If you provide literature in their own language(s) then there’s no incentive for whoever... whether the language is Polish or Somali...they are never going to learn English!”

1093 ibid
1094 Interview:14.06.2007
1095 Interview:09.10.2007
1096 ibid
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

EU8-Polish anecdotal testimony fed into reasoning that, as with Slough’s Somali, there was an intentional or instinctive connection made between work and social-class. Types of employment were significant (in the medium to long term, even if initial sacrifices were undertaken – e.g. PF2,\textsuperscript{1097} starting ‘at the bottom’ to improve her own English-language skills), in respect of their cachet. For Slough’s EU8-Poles, despite Poland’s agricultural tradition, theirs was a very Western understanding; professionals at the ‘top’, with unskilled labour at the bottom. For them, income and prestige were essential components of ‘getting on’ and climbing the social-class ladder. Their legal-status, combined with their ‘can-do’ approach – unlike the majority of the Somali, was essentially enabling this ascent. SM14 voiced his grievances regarding his perception of EU8-Poles and the local labour market injustices,

“(EU8-)Polish who come here...they walk into jobs straight away!” \textsuperscript{1098}

Education
The role education played in preparing for, and securing, well-paid permanent work for the protagonists, and the connection it had to social-class climbing in Britain, or its aspiration, highlighted a real or perceived ‘inequality of opportunity’ between them. A year before Poland’s 2004 EU-Accession, the Department for Education and Skills reported,

\textit{Socio-economic factors are paramount in affecting the educational attainment of certain minority ethnic-groups. Poverty and/or low occupational status of parents will impact on children’s progress} \textsuperscript{1099}

Echoing the DfES and representative of many Slough-Somali women with children, EU-Somali SF2 (a mother of eight; see Ch.2) spoke of her children being ‘\textit{side-lined}’\textsuperscript{1100} in school,

\textit{Our kids in school... they don’t get as much attention as the other ethnic minority kids...education is the key to climbing up} (in Britain)... \textit{I finished intermediate school} (in Somalia)... \textit{I left school at}

\textsuperscript{1097}Interview:04.08.2007
\textsuperscript{1098}Group-Interview:04.11.2008
\textsuperscript{1100}Joint-Interview:31.03.2007
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

*about fifteen (years old)…education is more important than work to me for my children”* \(^{1101}\)

SF2’s 2007 illustrative perspective also echoed the 2004 Education Commission statement that the,

‘English schooling system has produced dismal academic results for a high percentage of ‘black’ pupils for the best part of 50 years’. \(^{1102}\)

It became apparent during the fieldwork that it was not just the contemporary school-children who parents felt were neglected educationally. The adult Slough-Somali with a good education arriving in Britain with a ‘wealth of employment experience’, \(^{1103}\) and claiming to hold certificated qualifications; for example SM2 and SM3, continued to face ‘difficulties’ in securing long-term and commensurate employment in Slough. SM2 recounted how his education was interrupted by the outbreak of the Civil War,

*“About 1982…that year…I am for education in my country (Somalia)...I start for University for a couple of months...the war it break out...I come in Holland...no education... I educate for welfare job....train....I also train for I.T....no work”* \(^{1104}\)

EU-Somali SM3 spoke of his employment difficulties,

*“I grew up and was educated in Denmark…I left Somalia because of the war...yeah no work”* \(^{1105}\)

From EU8-Poles perspectives, who valued education equally, if not more highly, it was apparent that each sought to maximise their own and their children’s potentials. It seemed education and training around acquiring both English-language and professional skill-sets were at the core of their aims. This zealousness included those already holding high level multiple qualifications, such as PM3,
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

“I am eager...want to learn...develop new skills. For my family, I want her...my daughter to attend the best schools...the best English...This is key to her future success”

Illustrative of many EU8-Polish views, PF15 stated her and her husband PM16 wished for their future children to,

“Attend English schools...have a(n) English education”

The overall impression left by the EU8-Polish viewpoint(s) expressed in Slough was that their situation; their positive socio-economic factors, were enabling them to effect the educational developments they sought. Their relative wealth and largely high(er) occupational status compared to Slough’s Somali was pronouncedly visible.

Housing

Another central aspect of each of the individuals’ day-to-day lives presented itself as a first-rate visible comparator in terms of a societal measure; housing. Tenure differences and similarities were each evident between, and in-part within, the protagonists. Three basic characteristics underpinned this lifestyle-measure. Firstly, all but two of the investigations’ seventy-four respondents lived in forms of private rented accommodation or with relatives and friends. (Friendships and pastimes are addressed later in this section as an aspect of ‘lifestyle’). Secondly, no respondent lived in either a Council or Housing Association property. Lastly, no one stated they were homeless although some admitted to being transient. Generally, the EU8-Poles lived in modern, spacious and well serviced private rented accommodation. PM3 commented, “I am renting...I will never buy a house or flat here...It’s too expensive”. In contrast, PM16 and his wife PF15 rented a flat but intended buy a British property, “We rent our flat at the moment but one day we will buy a house here”. PF1 was already looking to sell her flat and buy a house, “We own the flat but we are looking for a house”. PM10 was a house owner and PM7 a tied-housing tenant. PF1 owned a flat/apartment with her partner.

106 Joint-Interview:20.08.2007
107 Joint-Interview:24.08.2008
108 Joint-Interview:20.08.2007
109 Joint-Interview:24.08.2008
110 Interview:18.07.2007
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

In contrast the Somali lived in ageing, cramped and poorly maintained accommodation. Representative of many Somali experiences was SM1,

“After living here (Britain) for fifteen-years I still do not have (own) a property...I rent...My landlord is Latvian and I had a massive row with him and he told me that he will remove me out (eviction)”1111

Also illustrative was SF7’s situation. Several Somali women, unsurprisingly, lived in Slough with wider family. This was largely, although not exclusively, an outcome of them leaving Somalia without the traditional security of a husband. SF7 confirmed, “I live with uncle and aunt and cousin”.1112 In investigating Slough’s Somali, this research added to recurrent post-WWII episodes, particularly of ‘non-white’ ethnic-minorities becoming segregated in deprived inner settlement areas across Britain. This was the case in Chalvey regarding the Somali circumstance. It was a tangible indicator and reminder, if one was needed, of the failure of, and by, the marginalized Somali to integrate into wider Slough society. Their settlement conditions and practice appeared, in many ways to replicate the very worst of the 1960s onwards ‘Asian’ migrant pattern of ‘other’ clustering together in a bid to keep safe and make a living. As with these migrant forerunners, day-to-day living was about overcoming structural barriers placed before them, not least legal-status uncertainty feeding into non-contributory lifestyles. Figure 42 following unpacks the detail of this observation.

Applying vignette 4 (Ch.2) to investigate each group’s prejudices towards each other regarding housing proximity, statistically there was a high degree of tolerance expressed by both protagonists. Fifty-seven percent (42 of the total 74 interviewees) confirmed, at least in public, that they had ‘no problem’ with living near to one another (i.e. Somali and EU8-Poles living in the same vicinity). Although stereotypical concerns were expressed by 10 (27%) of the Slough-Somali, as a group they were seemingly more concerned with the potential for noise and ‘trouble’ from the EU8-Poles than issues created by or concerning ‘race’, religion or cultural characteristics. Warehouse worker SM14’s comments broadly summarised these apprehensions,

“Polish neighbours will be okay but not ‘trouble makers”’.1113

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1111| Interviews: 11.10.2006/03.11.2006
1112| Joint-Interview: 21.06.2007
1113| Group-Interview: 04.11.2008
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

Not every Slough-Somali was accepting or tolerant however. SM16 complained about the noise and the manner in which he had observed, and heard it seemed, EU8-Poles communicate. He was particularly intolerant of the EU8-Poles, not so much because of the noise but because they legally worked in Britain and he did not. SM16 was intent on criticism,

“They (EU8-Poles) don’t keep still (quiet?)…. Talk…talk…talk…all the time…too much (loud?) for me…no good. They (EU8-Poles) are very ….no good. I wish not to live with (near?) them… (EU8-Poles)….but for me…for work they take priority…where do my rights come (what about my right to work?) playing music loudly and talk …talk…talk”\textsuperscript{1114}

Insofar as the two protagonists mixing, just 3 (8%), of the Somali women interviewed pointed out they had already experienced EU8-Polish neighbours. One of the women, SF15 complained of EU8-Poles next door to her uncle and aunts, ‘slamming doors and banging on the walls’,\textsuperscript{1115} tempering her evaluation by pointing to the EU8-Polish men and \textit{not the women} for being at fault,

\textit{The (EU8-Polish) women are mostly okay…friendly, but the men think they are better than us (Somali? Women?)…they (EU8-Polish men) always parked their cars…vans on the…in the front of my family house… I think they (EU8-Polish men) want others to be scared of them}”\textsuperscript{1116}

\textsuperscript{1114}ibid
\textsuperscript{1115}Group-Interview:11.11.2008
\textsuperscript{1116}ibid
Figure 42: Accommodation Type / Tenure Status
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

SF16 pointed out that EU8-Poles were ‘hard working’ but also, in part, agreed with SF15 in commenting on the EU8-Polish men being,

“Clever…good to do anything … (Good at everything? Over-confident?) And… noisy…having too much (many) drink(s)" 1117

Representative of a considered perspective, PM16 commented,

“To live by (a) Somali family… I (would) feel very normal… I (would) feel nothing unusual…People are people" 1119

PM3 voiced concerns however,

“I don't care as long as they speak (the) English (language) correctly…And if not then I wouldn't want to speak to someone with broken English because mine is broken…I wouldn't be friends with them" 1120

Eight (22%) of all EU8-Polish respondents expressed concerns either working alongside or living next door to a Somali. They cited Islam, depreciated property values and cooking-smells as problematic. Tactless and ‘racist’ comments were expressed by a minority of EU8-Poles, including PM4,

“I (would) not like to live by ‘black’ persons…cooking smells…at home (Poland?) …this is no(t) the (a) problem... (In Poland) everyone is ‘white’" 1121

Ten (27%) of the EU8-Poles refused to even consider living by or next door to Somali neighbours. PM18 vehemently commented, “You are kidding me no? …no way!” 1122 PM10, who throughout the research claimed he got along with everyone showed his embedded prejudice by surprisingly commenting,

1117 Ibid
1118 Ibid
1119 Joint-Interview:24.08.2008
1120 Group-Interview:20.08.2007
1121 Joint-Interview:12.09.2007
1122 Interview:18.10.2008
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

“These people spoil neighbourhood(s)…cooking smells…lots of children” \(^{1123}\)

These provocative points of view sought ‘whiteness’ as the ‘norm’; replicating monochromatic Poland. Further examples of tactlessness, superiority even, were expressed by PF7. Her choice of neighbour was economically determined; a matter of social-class and relative wealth,

“From what I know…I don’t think ‘Somalians’ can afford to live where I live”. \(^{1124}\)

The protagonists housing situation illustrated the frequently cavernous differences between and within the groups. It acted as a conduit for their self-assessment and self-confidence and was a further instrument to hear the embedded prejudices of a minority. Stereotyping, despite the protagonists rarely coming into contact with one another was prevalent. Some of the EU8-Poles were able; because of the security their EU-citizenship legal-status afforded them and their professional social-class (e.g.PF7), to offer solitary, haughty ‘throw away’ comments while less educated, lower class EU8-Poles who were equally sure of their EU-rights were derisory of Slough’s Somali, (e.g.PM4). This contempt was unpleasant to witness. In truth, vignette-four drew out prejudices and hackneyed presumptions from facets within both protagonists although commendably more than 50% of all respondents claimed not to have any problem with having neighbours from different cultures. There were of course those who expressed ‘mixed’ emotions and uncertainties although these were felt, for the most part, to be concerns of unknown quantities rather than prejudices. A hard core of EU8-Poles, no Somali, claimed they would absolutely refuse to live beside or even near to the Somali because of their ‘blackness’, religion and cultural differences.

Overall, reasonableness appeared to win out although embedded ‘racist’ views were quick to come to the surface in some cases. The economic realities and differences visibly manifest in housing between the protagonists extended into other tangible lifestyle differences.

\(^{1123}\) Joint-interview:04.03.2008
\(^{1124}\) Interview:19.11.2007
Lifestyle differences

Disposable income, access to resources such as entertainment, cultural differences, age, and in the case of Slough’s Somali especially, gender, combined to show very different lifestyles between the protagonists. Conduits to observe these included leisure and free-time pursuits. Essentially sedentary and requiring no membership fees, special equipment or admission costs, Somali women’s pastimes revolved around domestic activities. Cooking, ‘taking tea’, sewing and regularly meeting to talk featured highly. Examples of the comments arising from pursuing this theme included SF11’s list of her free-time pursuits,

“Cook(ing)...you try ‘Sambussi’? Good Somali food! ...talking of clothes... fashion...diet...drinking tea”.

Representative of the interviewed Slough-Somali men’s responses, SM14 explained, “I go to (the) Mosque”. Not that all of Slough’s Somali, or indeed the EU8-Poles, subscribed to such peaceable pursuits. Members of both protagonists confirmed ‘clubbing’, drinking, recreational drug use, (discussed in the following thematic subsection, ‘Criminality’) and seeking out the opposite sex for short, medium or long term relationships were features of their leisure choices - albeit in different venues and through different means. Much of this was possible for Slough’s EU8-Poles because of the Polish-specific ethnic-services across Slough. These were the services and resources outside of institutional organisations such as the Church. They included local access to culturally specific foods, newspapers and cinema’s. PF1 confirmed Slough provided an extensive range of Polish specific ethnic-services. Her perspective was representative of the EU8-Poles general satisfaction in that regard,

“Polish food is now available almost everywhere in Slough...with Polish shop assistants and service in Polish...is called "Malinka"...As far as I know there are more "Malinka" shops in other towns in Britain...for example in Reading ...Even in Tesco there is a stall with Polish products”.

Note from Mel Cox: I was later given some small meat/onion Sambussi to eat – A very tasty triangular shaped Cornish Pasty/Indian Samosas dish

Joint-Interview:02.10.2008
Group-Interview:04.11.2008
Anwar, M. 2001
MSN Conversation:22.06.2007
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

She had added,

“In Malinka one can get all kinds of newspapers and magazines which are edited in Poland weekly or monthly…from tabloid kinds (such as) "Z życia wziête" (and) "Chwila dla Ciebie" to broadsheets (such as) "Gazeta wyborcza“.

The availability and breadth of distribution of Polish-specific media was also of note,

“In London there are at least four main Polish publishers…”Polish Express”, “Cultura” “Goniec Polski” and “Nowy czas” …those papers are available for free… (they are also available)…in Slough in some local shops with Polish food and in Polish church…”

PF1 had lamented however that Slough had not (at that time) established its own Polish cinema although pointed out that such ethnic-services were readily accessible along the M4 motorway in London,

“I am quite sure that you cannot watch any Polish films in Slough cinema… but on Hammersmith for example there is a big Polish Centre…”POSK, Polski Ośrodek Społeczno – Kulturalny where concerts…theatre plays and other cultural meetings are organized…"

Upon reflection, the generalizable positive points expressed by PF1 were clearly conveying the feeling the EU8-Polish experience of the Polish particularisms met in Slough were sources of wellbeing, self-assurance and aspects of ‘who’ the EU8-Poles were – their migrated ‘Polishness’.

At the time of the fieldwork, Slough did not offer, and had no plans to offer any Somali-specific services. Analysis of why this was the case was thorny. National and local policy appeared to be working against service providers, from the 3rd Sector and Somali community itself, which sought to fill the gaps and to fully understand the involved cultural issues of concern and provide appropriate services to engage with them. Readily understood local information, better conveyed and more frequent

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1130 Translated from Polish by PF1 (27.06.2007) meaning “Taken from Life”
1131 Ibid – Trans: “A Moment For You”
1132 Ibid – Trans: “Electoral Newspaper”
1133 Translated from Polish by PF1 by email (27.06.2007) meaning “Culture”
1134 Ibid – Trans: “Polish Messenger”
1136 MSN Conversation:22.06.2007
1137 Translated from Polish by PF1 by email (27.06.07) meaning “The Polish Socio-Cultural Centre”
1138 MSN Conversation:22.06.2007
communication, culturally relevant education, (by way of workshops to promote the preservation of Somali culture, language and traditions), free ESOL classes and leadership and skill development instruction were not specifically available for the Somali to engage with despite apparent need(s). Outwardly there was no perceptible active or consistent relationship building between Slough’s wider community and the Slough-Somali. This was of course, in part, because of the Somali’s mis-trust of, and resentment towards, other ethnic-minorities in the town. The lack of town-wide Somali inclusive and specific partnership working, Somali suspicion, clan fractiousness and the enclave mentally of the Chalvey district fed into their tangible feeling of marginalisation. To try to establish the authenticity of this, the Somali were questioned regarding the nationality or country of birth of their friends compared to the EU8-Poles. This line of investigation gained insight into the degrees of cross-cultural friendships and associations established as a snap-shot of greater town wide integration by each protagonist. Figure 43 following shows 22 of the 37 Slough-Somali respondents (59.5%) stated their principal friendships were with other Somali peoples. Upon reflection (at the time of writing), this statistical finding may have pointed to Somali, not wider-Slough, community intransigence and their unwillingness to engage with cohesive programmes in the town. This stated, 20 of the 37 EU8-Polish respondents (54%) remarked their principal friendships were with other EU8-Polish peoples, although their residency in Slough had been considerably shorter than the Somali and as time has now shown, it has taken time to establish their representation and presence, while for the Somali, changes to their circumstances and representations have been modest. Ten of the 37 Somali respondents (27%) and 12 of the 37 Poles (32%) elected not to give details of friendships. Drawing on nationalist and ‘racist’ comments made in other parts of the interviews, the respondents who chose not to comment on their friendship profile may have refrained from doing so for fear of making further prejudiced remarks. Conversely they may have enjoyed a multicultural friendship base but were not willing to divulge the same in front of others. Similarly, the basis for friendships and associations may not have been legal. Both protagonists had criminally-based reputations in Slough.

Criminality
Legal-status difference between, and importantly within, the protagonists was complex and often ambiguous. In particular, the EU-Somali/Somali asylum-seekers choices compared with each other as well as with the EU8-Poles and other ethnic-
minorities across Slough. Criminality was investigated on the basis of the distinct differences between the material ‘haves’ and ‘have not’s’; the divide between those who were legally able to work and earn money to purchase things and those who were ‘in’ or ‘out’ migrants; individually or collectively. Unpacking this complicated area unearthed a spectrum of issues including conflicts with wider Slough society, petty-crime, domestic violence, drug abuse, alienation, and prostitution. According to SBC, degrees of criminality, or its perception, when linked to impressions of what is acceptable citizenship and the notion of belonging meant migrant legal-status was continually being scrutinised by the wider Slough community and its agencies. This applied to both protagonists. The formation of ‘groups’ or ‘gangs’ of Somali and EU8-Poles was exacerbating this concern at the time. There had been several occasions in which Slough’s, ‘Somali youth (had) been involved in incidents with other groups of youth/ethnic-groups’,\textsuperscript{1139} leading to questions of whether the Somali per se were tolerable in the town.

\textsuperscript{1139}Inward, E. & Chaudhary, S, 2006, pp.40-41
Figure 43: Dominant Friendships by Nationality / 'Country-of-Birth'
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

In both groups cases these issues appeared neither explicit nor widespread, representing exceptions and not rules. Cultural difference was witnessed to intersect with criminality and its perception and what was and was not acceptable. It was not known whether the Somali youth involved were EU-Somali or Somali asylum-seekers or both; again highlighting the homogenised framework in which they are viewed. While general anti-social behaviour too was clearly disrupting LSP attempts to make any significant community-cohesion headway, the need to contextualize notions of group and ‘gang’ situations was apparent; in particular regarding young Somali men being labelled as ‘problems’. TVP used the interview to make a valuable point of distinction; one relevant to ‘certain identities (being seemingly non-) negotiable’ insofar as the Somali were concerned,

“We’ve got lots of groups …one of the groups we’ve got is the Somali group which tends to congregate around the Central Park area… There were robberies…so there was a link made… an uncomfortable feeling. Add in the word ‘Somali’ and it just emphasizes the negative press around Somali groups…’gangs’…they go from being called a group to a ‘gang’…”

These incidents and perceptions were interpreted as aspects of a ‘gang-problem’ by some people, but the observed discord herein between Slough’s Somali and the EU8-Poles was essentially economically premised; centred around work and housing. Generally, Slough’s ‘gang-problem’ has continued since the fieldwork. In 2009, referring to Salt Hill Park in Slough, less than a mile from Chalvey, TVP and SBC reported “(EU8-)Polish and Somali males gathering…consuming alcohol…intimidating the public (and) causing criminal damage”.

In 2012 Slough, a drive-by EU8-Polish gang attack fated one person to suffer a fractured skull. SBC usefully suggested this issue be viewed in a town-wide context of broader inter-ethnic migrant discord, to include groups, particularly the Hindu, Sikh and wider Muslim communities. Of specific note in this line of questioning was the exposure of the ill-feeling between Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles towards

1141Interview:14.06.2007
1143Slough & South Bucks Observer, 2012 (03 July),Man fractures skull after gang attack in Slough town centre,[Homepage: Slough & South Bucks Observer],[Online],[2014 24 September 2014]
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

Slough’s ‘Asian’ community. Both believed ‘Asians’ were given preferential treatment above all other ethnic-minorities in the town. SBC confirmed that at times it felt as if this animosity could, given the right conditions, create violent conflict, stating,

“(EU8-Poles and Somali) have been abused and taken advantage of...The landlords are Pakistanis or Indians and some of them are employers...especially in the ‘black-markets’ like construction and farming”\(^\text{1144}\)

EU8-Polish legal-rights had fed into some civil disturbance however, drawing negative attention by Slough’s wider community, especially to some single, young EU8-Polish males. Examples included testimony that Slough had ‘intimidating groups of foreign youths hanging around (creating an) atmosphere (that was) quite threatening’;\(^\text{1145}\) causing some people to be ‘afraid to go out at night’.\(^\text{1146}\) Refuting the number and scope of criminally motivated problems created by EU8-Poles, Moszczynski for the British Federation of Poles had stated the EU8-Poles were subject to ‘Polonophobic racism’.\(^\text{1147}\) With money to spend, not least on alcohol, some of these young EU8-Polish men appeared to have been difficult to cope with and had come to the attention of TVP for minor infringements. This point was voiced by SBC comparing the characteristics of the EU8-Poles with those of Slough’s established post-WWII second and the later third-wave, in the wider context of overall community-cohesion in the town,

“The problems with the younger generation of Polish people is they are a different generation of migration... they suddenly earn a good amount of money... they have good fortune and the freedoms in this country present them with new opportunity...The money that they earn... they spend in drinking. New found wealth does pose some worries...how to spend the money...They are... drinking, they've got nice cars, but the issue is their (driving) license, drinking while driving”\(^\text{1148}\)

The excesses created by money and alcohol fed into anecdotes of, reports and inferences regarding EU8-Poles involvement in on-going petty crime, illegal drug

\(^{1144}\text{Interview:09.10.2007}\)
\(^{1145}\text{Woods, J. 2010, We can’t take any more people [Homepage:Daily Telegraph], [Online],[2011,26 October 2011]}\)
\(^{1146}\text{bid}\)
\(^{1147}\text{Moszczynski, W. 2008, Poles are not leaving Britain [Homepage:The Polish Express], [Online],[2011,26 October 2011]}\)
\(^{1148}\text{Interview:09.10.2007}\)
use, rowdy unsocial behaviour, gang culture, organised crime including prostitution and stories of gang master led sex worker trafficking. SBC commented,

“Most of the drugs are recreational. The source...Poland...they’ve got their own ...economy guideline...their own kind of market ...Because it’s just a Polish market their supply is very hard for us to infiltrate” 1149

Adding,

“Prostitution... it's not a big issue compared to London...There are some street-walkers (sex-workers) in Slough...most of them have.... prolific drug-needs” 1150

Widening the female prostitution discussion, TVP had commented,

“Certainly East European girls... in brothels have ‘been a story’...in the last few years... prostitution tends to be organized sex-slaves as opposed to girls working for a living” 1151 1152

Since the information-gathering, criminality within the Slough-Somali community may likely have increased significantly. At the time the fieldwork was undertaken, the buying, selling and consumption of Qat was legal in Britain. Since 24 June 2014, it has been banned and classified as a ‘Class-C’ drug. Qat abuse, alcohol dependency and domestic violence; the darker side of Slough-Somali life was sought to be hidden from research prying. Substance misuse was clearly present in the Somali community during field visits; seen and smelt. Privet-like Qat leafs were visible and available to

1149 Ibid
1150 Ibid
1151 Bagley, R. (SBC) & Humphrey, R. (TVP), 2012, Community Safety in Slough, Safer Slough Partnership, p.4
1152 Interview: 14.06.2007
view and scrutinize upon request, (inset). The substantial negative outcomes of both Qat and other substance abuse was exacerbating the already significant Somali financial hardships, with money meant for food, clothing or rents likely diverted to buy alcohol and Qat, and illegal drugs (e.g. cannabis). During the fieldwork SM7 admitted to need to experience Qat induced euphoria,

“I am chilled when I chew (Qat)...alcohol and smoking too”\textsuperscript{153}

Worryingly, and feeding further into wider social alienation and disaffection SBC was concerned regarding reports of some Somali dealing in Class ‘A’ drugs,

“There is definitely a link with the older Somali men (and) ... Qat... the impact...is...horrific on Somali women...not just the community...money spent on Qat...as opposed to food! The inflexibility it brings in terms of employment... The inability to integrate with other members of the house... and other communities... Because it’s (Qat) socially acceptable it’s very difficult to make an impact... The money we (SBC and the Drugs Awareness Team) have for these (awareness programmes) has to go towards class ‘A’ or ‘B’ drug (awareness). (Qat)...it’s making a big (negative) impact in Slough. There is an issue with Class-‘A’ drugs within the (older age-group) Somali ‘community’ as well...it hasn’t been quantified as yet”\textsuperscript{154}

These substances had created the dangerous problem, beyond worsening health - domestic violence against women; acknowledged and recognised by SBC and referred to on several occasions by Somali respondents,

“Domestic violence within the Somali community is huge... a real big problem...we are ing...horrific injuries coming through...Mutilation for example (FGM) ...and really good (harsh) beatings... it’s a big issue in Slough...we are struggling to deal with (it)...Somali men were like ‘yeah yeah we beat our wife and kids...it’s a form of control...’it’s no big deal we can do it’... it’s almost like ...acceptable...some of the families in Slough in theory and on paper are headed by a female...those who have sons...the son actually heads’ the household... and we...have sons beating their parents...their mothers...Somali women are victims in all sorts of angles (ways)”\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{153} Interview:09.04.2007
\textsuperscript{154} Interview:09.10.2007
\textsuperscript{155} Interview:09.10.2007
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

This life-threatening issue was drawn out over a period of nearly 12-months. It was evident in what was not said or admitted to as much as what was disclosed. Qat dependency, alcohol and other drug abuse were central catalysts for domestic violence. Combinations of one or all of these substances, in the already volatile context of many Somali men witnessed as suffering displacement was fuelling perceptible and commonplace household brutality. SF9 commented on her own observations of the younger Slough-Somali men,

“There are some problems in Slough with ‘gangs’ of boys...Somali boys I mean...causing trouble...they drink strong lager...can’t take it and chew Qat as well ...they get out of their heads”\(^{1156}\)

Sadly, the ban on and reclassification of Qat will very likely ‘increase communal tensions’\(^{1157}\) and ultimately fail to ‘terminate use of the banned substance’.\(^{1158}\) The outcome is likely that its use will simply go underground. This ‘risks further alienating... (Britain’s) Somali’\(^{1159}\) an outcome that will marginalise and criminalise them further. The Somali-in-Britain already, ‘handily combine racial and religious marginality in one neat package’.\(^{1160}\) While domestic violence in the Somali communities must be confronted, the Qat ban was a very blunt tool with which to begin its demise. Focus on Qat use/mis-use however unintentionally drew out a passing flavour of how EU8-Poles had subjectively perceived ‘the Somali’ and vice versa during the fieldwork. The following theme, ‘Perceptions of the other’, is by its nature concise and arbitrary. This acknowledged, its inclusion importantly highlights the assumptive nature of how each protagonist perceived the other.

Perceptions of the other (EU8-Poles of the Somali and the Somali of EU8-Poles)

As long as people are in a position to perceive themselves and to perceive others, differences in those perceptions will exist and will engender disagreement, misunderstanding, and conflict\(^{1161}\)

\(^{1156}\)Interview:01.09.2008
\(^{1157}\)Birrell, I, 2014(26 June), This ban on khat is another idiotic salvo in the UK’s disastrous war on drugs, [Homepage:Guardian Online][Online],[2014, 25 September 2014]
\(^{1158}\)Ibid
\(^{1159}\)Ibid
\(^{1161}\)Pronin, E, 2008, ‘How We See Ourselves and How We See Others’, Science,vol.320,Iss.May 30,p.1180
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

How each protagonist formed their impressions of the other groups’ situation and the different conclusions they drew appeared somewhat haphazard; likely in many cases, drawing from media reports and the partiality that imbued, rather than first-hand interactions. EU8-Pole PF9 acknowledged her limited knowledge regarding Slough’s Somali,

“The situation in their country (Somalia) is very difficult... (Somalia is) a war zone with drug dealers ... I know a little bit about the situation”1162

PM19 critically highlighted Slough-Somali invisibility,

“I am not aware of Somalian people here (Slough)...I don’t know them...don’t see them...I am embarrassed if ‘we’ (EU8-Poles) are taking (resources) away from them”1163

Both PF9 and PM19 had mentally categorized ‘the Somali’ although each in their own way actually knew very little. Likewise Slough-Somali SF15 pointed out that the EU8-Poles had,

“Brought problems...coming here (to Britain) without knowing the (English) language ... (Suggesting?)... There is not (no EU8-Polish) respect that (Britain) it is not their country”1164

SM1 admitted he knew “Very little about Poland”1165 while SM16 commented the EU8-Poles, “can do everything here (in Britain/Slough) ...beat their women”,1166 practically implying they were above the law as well as conceivably assuming a misplaced moral high-ground regarding domestic violence.

Pronin’s1167 quotation opening this short subsection is an important reminder that migrant integration is, a ‘multidimensional phenomenon with socio-economic, legal-political and cultural dimensions’;1168 in short a ‘two-way street’.1169 For the protagonists herein, the few ad-hoc perceptions recorded illustrated the inequality felt, consciously (i.e.SM15 and SM16) or unconsciously (i.e. PM19) with mutual ignorance.

1162 Interview:09.12.2007
1163 Interview:17.11.2008
1164 Group-Interview:11.11.2008
1165 Interviews:11.10.2006/03.11.2006
1166 Group-Interview:04.11.2008
1167 Pronin, E, 2008
1169 Ibid
and/or dismissiveness of the other, (i.e. PF9 and SM1) a foundation for friction and resentment between them, or certainly from the Slough-Somali towards Slough’s EU8-Poles. Ignorance and/or dismissiveness was an aspect of Slough British-Pakistani resident ‘MC’s “Chuck these people out…”\textsuperscript{1170} comment (see ‘Race and racism’) regarding Slough’s non EU-Somali and drew into focus the final theme for this chapter – ‘Myth of return’.\textsuperscript{1171}

**Myth of return**

At first sight the Slough-Somali case was essentially different to Slough’s EU8-Poles insofar as their enforced exile not being the same as the EU8-Poles exercising choice to return back-and-forth to Poland. The back-and-forth option did of course extend to the EU-Somali and their initial EU-country of citizenship (e.g. Denmark). Acceptance and perceptions of belonging as aspects of material difference were evident between the protagonists. This difference was perceived to be rooted in multiple inequalities however, the religious context exacerbating to the degree it did because of 9/11, 7/7 and the high profile religious based terrorism has in the global media. Academia has acknowledged that migrants, such as the EU8-Poles, returning to their country of origin (Poland) is now understood as being of ‘an increasingly less permanent nature’.\textsuperscript{1172} In other words, the ‘transnational movement itself is conceived as a form of return’.\textsuperscript{1173} For several EU8-Poles, living at ‘home’ in Poland and in Britain was unproblematic. PF1 commented,

\emph{“I like being a European-citizen...I don’t have to queue at the border and being (or be)….asked lots of strict questions … so it’s nice to come and go”}\textsuperscript{1174}

\textsuperscript{1170}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1171}Anwar, M. 1979
\textsuperscript{1172}Sinatti, G, 2011, “Mobile transmigrants’ or ‘unsettled returnees’? Myth of return and permanent resettlement among Senegalese migrants”, \textit{Population, Space and Place}, vol.175,no 2, pp.153-166
\textsuperscript{1173}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1174}Interview:18.07.2007
Slough’s EU8-Poles appeared well organised ‘across (the EU) borders… maintaining significant connections’ to ‘home’ in both Britain and Poland. This exemplified the rationale behind, for example, some of Joppke’s unease regarding ‘national citizenship… being undermined by migration’, but contra wise redrew attention to Solomos’ recognition of the ‘changing forms of national identity’ in the context of maturing multiculturalism(s); in this case across EU-borders in an expanding Union.

As for the Slough-Somali, the myth of return and the need to uphold rivalries of pro-nationalist clan traditions in their chosen host country was ever-present. The myth of return perpetuated the need for them to essentially retain clan boundaries on the basis they would be required when returning to Somalia. Many first-generation Somali had their children born in Britain however. These children and young people, for example SF9, knew nothing of the reality of living in Somalia as ‘home’. Some parents and guardians attested to the reality of their longing to go ‘home’ now likely never to be realized. Somalia would be a ‘foreign-country’ to their offspring. As an ‘on the move’ people physically, perhaps a move onwards ideologically may have greatly enhanced their life-chances. The results of not doing so were witnessed as the perceptions and realities of exclusion, marginalization and invisibility, (See ‘Identity, religion and religiousity’). Migrant acceptance, measures of toleration, belonging, and degrees of ‘othering’ upon arrival and whilst in Britain remain affected by a migrant’s placement into Britain’s ‘racial’, legal and ethnic hierarchies. Country of origin as a binary difference significantly, albeit subtly, nuances perceptions of ‘other’. This was the case in this instance despite, or as well as, the complex and ‘continued bonds’ that saw many of Slough’s first-generation Somali wishing to return to their country of origin if only to be ‘buried in the land of their ancestors’. SM19 expressed the reality of this perspective,

\[1178\] Anwar, M. 1979
\[1180\] Besteman, C & Cassanelli, L 1996,pp.3-4
\[1182\] Ibid
Chapter 4: Empirical research: “Voices from Slough”

“Most Somali people identify with Somalia...Even though we are spread all over ...deep down most Somali want to return ‘home’...”

Returning to Somalia was essentially a hope however, despite the vital remittances links to family in Somalia. Without exception and unsurprisingly, Slough’s Somali always contextualized their return in a post-civil war framework. It was obvious as the fieldwork continued that for many the realization of returning home after nearly two decades of civil war became more and more of a dream - agreeing with Anwar’s ‘myth of return’.

Aspirational for most, a myth for some and a lost hope for others. Exploring the mythical nature of return, SM19 made clear he knew it to be an illusion in his case,

“(Our) children they are born here...in (the) UK...We stay here in (the) UK...this (is) our home now”

Sixty-five percent (65%) of Slough’s Somali expressed a desire to ‘return home’ permanently compared to 46% of Slough’s EU8-Poles. Some statistical uniformity was implied between the Polish men and women and the Somali men with 3 people or 8% of each category expressing an intention to settle permanently in Britain. This doubled to 6 (16%) in the case of the Somali women. This acknowledged the single and widowed Somali women who had chosen to remain with wider family in Britain. Somalia as their country of origin held no such ‘return-home’ draw for sisters SF17 and SF18 agreeing,

“(We) don’t want to go back there (Somalia)…you can’t go back...it’s too painful…our life is here (Britain) now”

For the EU-Somali/EU8-Poles and second-generation Somali born in Britain, their legal EU-citizenship rights effectively made redundant issues pertaining to country of origin. Despite this, and in line with the Slough-Somali asylum-seekers, Slough’s EU-Somali largely assumed they were also seen to be arriving from ‘somewhere in Africa’ regardless of their EU-country of origin and legal citizenship rights. The EU-Somali

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1183 Interview: 11.11.2008
1184 Gibson, H, 2014 (27 January), Somali remittances: 10 things you need to know, Africa Research Institute, London
1185 Anwar, M. 1979
1186 Interview: 11.11.2008
1187 Joint-Interview: 21.11.2008
were homogenised as a group with the asylum-seeking Somali, largely willingly, but also routinely. For Slough’s asylum-seeking Somali however, Grillo’s notion of being ‘betwixt and between’\textsuperscript{1188} describes extremely well their physical situation, legal scenario and the psychological boundaries witnessed in Slough. In closing, the following concluding comments address the stated themes and highlight the contrasts that emerged between the protagonists.

\section*{Concluding comments}
Several conclusions were drawn from the interviews that embraced the use of the five-vignettes, (Ch.2), within them. Upon reflection, scenario-five unearthed the extreme, traditional, liberal and the ethnic-centred embedded views of individuals. Both protagonists were aware of their difference(s) and although distinct one from the other, shared safety concerns as immigrants in a host-country. Most interviewees did not wish to be publicly identified, as a migrant, with peoples from their own countries causing public disturbances. While some anger was manifest, it was suppressed for largely real or perceived personal well-being reasons. In general, most of the EU8-Poles and Somali were good humoured, although there was an invisible line drawn at any notion of coarse or vulgar joking or mocking interpreted to be ‘racist’, sexist, anti-religious, rude or offensive to the interviewee’s friends, families or culture. Interview outcomes reinforced the notion that the migration process and heterogeneity of the peoples involved in it at any one time is multidimensional and complex. Discussions reaffirmed the EU8-Poles and Slough-Somali were not each homogenous groups or a consortium of ‘other’ groups. They predictably demonstrated there were no hard and fast ‘rules’ in force during the interview process, theoretically or otherwise. This acknowledged, it was evident throughout the procedure, implicitly and explicitly, that the four binary differences of legal-status, religious affiliation, continent of origin and ‘race’ underpinned the responses given, almost regardless of the subject discussion. This included identity and the important notions of self-identity and other’s perceptions. As conduits for the viewpoints, beliefs and feelings expressed, it was reasonably concluded the protagonists had dissonant and unequal lives. The cultural discord between the protagonists was plain through examination of the range of viewpoints expressed. Legal-status as difference was a contradictory comparator. In some cases testimony appeared to express it as a

merging influence (e.g. EU-citizenship) but conversely it was spoken of a force for greater division (i.e. as exclusive and superior in the case of some EU8-Poles regarding the Somali). The EU-Somali proved to be enigmatic insofar as being identical to the EU8-Poles in legal-status and consequential legal-rights terms, but ethnically, religiously and wholly inclined towards the less-entitled, more socially, economically and politically disempowered Somali asylum-seekers. Both protagonists comprised individuals who made frequent historic references to garner greater acceptance and ‘belonging’ in Britain by talking of Anglo-Somali or Anglo-Polish connections.

‘Racism’ was a significant distinguishable aspect feeding the non-association between the protagonists. The contrast of ‘black’ and ‘white’ recognized the ‘racialized’ boundary between them; provoking a minority of strong reactions to this signifier. It was evident that different ethnic-groups across Slough were ‘racially’ competing. Subjective evidence suggested the existence of simmering ‘racist’ attitudes between Slough’s ethnic-minorities. Anecdotally, the Pakistani community had exhibited prejudice towards the Somali, according to some Somali. This added weight to the Somali view (of themselves) as ‘doubly’ or in the case of Somali-women ‘triply’ discriminated against. Only a very small number of Slough-Somali actually confirmed to having personal experience of EU8-Poles making their generalizations questionable. Direct exchanges between Slough’s Somali and its EU8-Poles were established as being extremely limited. Some viewpoints were most likely based on hearsay and/or were fuelled by the media. Somali intolerance of EU8-Poles revolved around noise, ‘anti-social behaviour(s)’ including drunkenness, and being inconsiderate/poor neighbours. EU8-Polish intolerance of the Somali was unequivocally based on the Somali ‘blackness’ and their miscegenist threat to the ‘Polishness’ bloodline.

Both protagonists conveyed levels of anxiety and/or feelings of not being genuinely engaged with wider British society during the interviews. Identity was investigated as nationality and by way of connections with home. Each defended their respective Polishness or Somaliness, although upon reflection it was reasonable to conclude the EU8-Poles conveyed a greater degree of liberalism and willingness to ‘fit in’ than Slough’s Somali. It was surprising to be met head-on with a far greater level of outward acceptance by the Somali of ‘all’ Somali than by the limited and conditional acceptance of EU8-Poles by EU8-Poles. For the Somali no amount of mixing with
different people could or would change their publicly expressed belief that ‘Somali is Somali’, whereas the EU8-Poles were largely insistent of ‘proofs’, such as bloodline and language, before being willing to embrace other Polish heritages as Polish. The Slough-Somali ‘Somali is Somali’ mantra remains questionable. Religion as difference largely polarized the protagonists, even more so than their socio-economic and socio-political polarizations. That stated, Islam and Catholicism were effectively opposite ends of a circular spectrum; infinitely apart but also in concert in their respective binding characteristics. In most cases, their religious followings were non-negotiable aspects of the protagonist’s cultures.

Opinions sought regarding occupational and social-class hierarchies, purposely enveloping Somali-clan as a ‘class’ revealed an extraordinary breadth of interpretation as to what constituted ‘class’ while the protagonists were clearly dissimilar in their migratory and settlement motivations. The EU8-Poles were explicitly economically motivated while the Somali frequently spoke of choosing Britain as the safest and most accommodating European country for their essentially enforced exile. The eclectic responses fashioning the informal questioning framework illustrated heterogeneity within the protagonists and the lack of mixing between them. It exposed an assortment of largely indefinable feelings and beliefs. Capturing these was difficult other than subjectively, although they were made clearer through the responses to the vignettes. This particular theme highlighted the material ‘haves’ and ‘have not’s’, the reasons for this and as a consequence why some had resorted to criminal activity to either redress a balance or to escape their realities by way of substance abuse(s).

Crime and its perception were consciously and unconsciously linked to citizenship in terms of the protagonists themselves, other ethnic communities and official agencies in Slough. Criminality was continually being scrutinised by ‘migrant group’. This applied to both protagonists; both of which had been drawn to the attention of TVP and SBC because of their reluctance and/or inability to adhere to the law. Petty-crime, domestic violence, drug abuse, alienation, and prostitution all featured as thematic aspects of both protagonists identities in Slough. Polarization was also evident regarding EU8-Polish and Somali lifestyle choices. Probing had revealed housing, religious activities and leisure pursuits varied enormously between the protagonists because of the ethnically appropriate services available to them and each person’s ability to access them. Slough met virtually every EU8-Polish ethnic-service need. In
contrast it did not offer, nor had plans to offer, any Somali specific ethnic-services at the time of the field-work. One of the foremost findings was that the protagonists had not instituted friendships even as individuals other than by exception. In each case, individuals in both groups choose to only essentially associate with, and make friendships within, their own distinct cultures and not venture towards each other’s cultures. There was no particular tangible rationale for this non-association although it was perceptible that emotional tension existed and simmered just under the surface when the questioning was directed towards mixing beyond informal meeting, for example in dating or inter-racial marriage. Inter-ethnic mixing between Somali and EU8-Poles was unlikely if, as witnessed, there were no relationships, far less interpersonal relationships, between them. Despite the reality of an increasingly globalised society, these interviews revealed no indication that the two cultures were informally or formally connecting. Religious dissimilarity, diverse cultural traditions, ignorance, stereotyping, nationalism and fear of diluting their ‘race’ were all identifiable aspects feeding into non-association. The EU8-Poles enjoyed the reality and realisation of multiple choices with visiting home (Poland) an actuality. In contrast, for the Somali, while ‘Somaliness’ remained an imperative, returning home after nearly two-decades (at that time) of civil war continued to be aspirational for most, a myth for some and a lost hope for others. The EU8-Poles appeared to have fruitfully integrated to the degree that essentially there was cohesion between them and the wider-Slough population. The EU8-Poles had a ‘voice’ and had staked their claim to a ‘place’ in Slough. It was likely this had lessened the likelihood of disagreements with other communities, such as the indigenous ‘white’ and Pakistani-British, and reinforced community-cohesion as far as they were concerned across the town. By its nature, this chapter conclusion remains like the settlement intentions of many of the respondents: ‘open ended’. It was not possible to neatly package every interview outcome, no more than it was to parcel together, in any objective sense, the individuals constituting the research-population. Combining personal comments with informed opinions from local officials definitely helped to illuminate a variety of wider issues however and made possible some outcome-generalization. For example regarding community-cohesion and the manner in which the EU8-Poles and Somali came to the attention of, and represented themselves to and in Slough’s wider-society.

The interviews confirmed a migrant ‘pecking order’ of national ‘type’ existed. Where ethnic and cultural ‘other’ was positioned or permitted to locate by the host had set
and shaped the course of each experience. For example, EU legal-status defined ‘belonging’, rights and entitlements. The exception to this absolute was the EU-Somali who chose Somali nationality, kinship and culture over EU/British-citizenship to disprove the notion of this as a ‘rule’. In confirming this more or less absolute condition, the evidence herein was able to more fully expose the importance of perception; particularly the Somali reading of the EU8-Poles unfairly leap-frogging them in status, integration, service provision and ‘belonging’ terms. While a good deal of the seeming inequality between the protagonists was witnessed as tangible, (e.g. housing type, condition and tenure status), much of the emotion expressed conveying this, despair or contentment, related to perception of circumstances and attitudes of mind.

Following, the final Chapter 5 builds on, and draws from, other research locations to compare and contrast these with this empirical study. Chapter 5 generates its conclusion with suggestions for future research.

Chapter 5: Comparative-analysis, conclusion and recommendations

Preamble
This chapter presents fresh critical thinking, evaluating how and why EU8-Poles have been widely ‘accepted’ in Britain, (specifically Slough), whereas Somali refugees/EU-Somali migrants remain essentially isolated. This position confidently builds on previous research-knowledge for comparison purposes; (e.g. Griffiths’ Somali and Kurdish research, Eade’s Polish research, and Begum and Eade’s Muslim-Britain research). It opens up different avenues, previously un-researched, insofar as comparing the protagonists – Somali and EU8-Poles. Binary differences between them represented an original opportunity for comparative-analysis revealing similarities and

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1189 Griffiths, D.J. 2002
1190 Eade, J. 2006
contrasts. The chapter closes with a concise inference-led conclusion and recommendations for future research.

The Slough findings supported the contention the protagonists did not engage with each other and had wholly different relationships with Slough’s indigenous multicultural population. The protagonists were distinct; differently perceived ethnic-minorities. What prevented their union and integration was pursued on several different levels; (e.g. in Chalvey the finding that aspects of the protagonists co-existed, seemingly in cultural parallel, despite occupying close physical ‘place’. This should not suggest there was never interaction, although contact was limited to socially structured scenarios, e.g. ESOL class situations).

This chapter is unapologetically reflective; particularly insofar as figuratively questioning whether ‘the cup is half-full or empty’ behind issues raised; doing so in the context of the protagonist’s migrant-statuses. Readers are asked to determine how each protagonist’s outlook had been influenced across history and to decide for themselves whether ‘the cup is half-full or empty’ by considering the points of similarity and difference presented. Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles were significantly influenced by binary difference(s). Citizenship-status and the rights and duties these imbued in Britain essentially governed the natures of their migration and settlement experience(s). Notions of national/international identity were resultantly drawn into the debate alongside Britain’s broadening multicultural-framework of migrant hierarchies. These were summarized in the question (to myself as the researcher), ‘why do some migrant ‘groups’ progress in Britain while others do not?’ throughout. This methodology sought to run hand-in-hand with existing theoretical canons and perspectives. It revealed whether or not the group’s natures, characters and experiences were what expectations led one to believe linked or divided them. Outcomes captured distinctive characteristics of non-interaction between them. It did so purposely and in an adaptive manner. Empirical field-work drew out similarities, for example in hitherto unmade or pursued experiential and historic similarity connections that could, theoretically, form the basis of positive social-cohesion between the groups, (e.g. ESOL groups). Differences were also observed and arrant inequalities within and between them, across such examples as tenure and citizenship-rights and entitlements. Expanding the scope of theoretical discussion through analysis, the research contemporarily built on existing knowledge and theory.
Introduction
Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles initially represented some comparable historic associations with Britain insofar as prior migrant-waves were concerned, (Ch.3). The protagonists nevertheless offered essential differences between and within them, (e.g. their legal-statuses in Britain as EU/non-EU citizens). Upon reflection, while each had rudimentary commonalities, (i.e. Maslow’esque (opposite) needs for food, shelter and safety – See Ch.3/Ch.4), meeting their higher needs; ‘belonging’, self-esteem and self-actualization (i.e. fulfilling potentials/having purpose), illustrated how essentially dissimilar they were, (Ch.4). The EU8-Poles had these met in Slough; for the Somali they remained largely aspirational.

“What a man can be, he must be. This need we may call self-actualization”

Slough’s EU8-Poles were confident, were achieving their goals, and were earning respect and their place in the town’s wider-community. Its Somali community had not. This chapter probes, critiques, compares and challenges this. As a comparative-analysis, the raw anecdotal information/data were drawn from chapters three and four. The frame of reference was that since 2004, Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles had not engaged with each other despite experiential and historic similarities. The grounds for the comparison were the visible and significant socio-economic and local representation disparities between them and the need to understand the cause(s).

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1192 Maslow, A.H, 2013, A Theory of Human Motivation, Wilder, Radford, USA
1193 Ibid, p.10
The research-findings frequently conflicted. Some obscured and challenged; others substantiated, remedied and questioned. Focus was given over to similarity and difference. Protagonist analysis revealed speculative focal points regarding their differences/similarities. The main themes identified were, EU8-Polish cohesion; Somali clan-fracture/alienation; community-representation; employment; media; institutional-completeness; religion; education; choices and freedoms, and women/family, (wherein original points were harvested regarding female-migration).

**Somali-in-Slough**

Visibly insular regarding trusting, mixing and forming relationships with the town’s other ethnic groups, (i.e. the indigenous ‘white’-British, Pakistani-British, Indian-British and other immigrants including the EU8-Poles – see Ch.2/Ch.4), Slough’s Somali ‘community’ was neither cohesive nor homogeneous. Its fractures many-fold; manifest in gender, generation, clan hierarchy and levels of choice in determining the direction of their lives. Its heterogeneity seemingly internally restrained by clan and the ‘myth-of-return’.\(^{1194}\) Externally the restrictions were ‘local constraints and social moorings’.\(^{1195}\) Many Slough-Somali eulogised the primacy of Arabic heredity over ‘black’ African inheritance. As the 2014 JRF health-based research also discovered; echoing this research, the Somali were unlikely ‘to be involved in existing ‘black’ and minority ethnic network(s)’.\(^{1196}\) Many Slough-Somali interviewees imagined rank and privilege over and above other ethnic minority groups because of the Anglo-Somali historic connection(s). Legal-status uncertainties and the predilection to largely identify self as ‘other’ and/or ‘immigrant’ challenged these notions. Several Somali protagonists professed to not belong in Britain. Some sought to belong. A few believed they belonged. Others still, fought to come to terms with their uncertainties, living with one foot in their Somali past and with the other stymied insofar as their present and future were concerned. Drug addiction, alcohol abuse and domestic violence frequently combined, offering some Somali forms of temporary diversion from reality. For the most part, even the majority of secondary EU-Somali migrants failed to embrace EU-citizenship and develop it for their own advancement.

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\(^{1194}\)Anwar, M. 1979  
Chapter 5: Comparative-analysis, conclusion and recommendations

Slough’s EU8-Poles

The structure and character of Slough’s EU8-Polish community was based on Poland’s EU-membership. The significance of EU-citizenship status compared to the third/second/first-waves cannot be over-emphasised. Whether on a temporary, semi-permanent or permanent footing, their principal objective was to prove themselves part of Britain’s cosmopolitan EU-society. From the 2004 outset, EU8-Poles were active in Britain’s employment, education, local political and socio-economic structures. While their international mobility is not unique, any uncertainty as to whether arriving in Britain was a positive choice, remained softened by the knowledge these protagonists could easily and cheaply return to Poland. Structurally, Slough’s EU8-Poles were characterised by a professional-class, although skilled trade’s people augmented the community. There were also some unskilled manual-working EU8-Poles. Social-class and social capital were important and highly prized. Association(s) across the classes was avoided with degrees of embarrassment, anger even, expressed by the professionals regarding the ‘lower’ classes and their often poor public behaviour. Some EU8-Poles extolled their professed supremacy as non-Jewish ‘whites’ over ‘black’ and ‘Asian’. Polish history presents multiple proofs of dispositions towards anti-Semitism. To most Slough-Poles, the Somali were ‘black’, despite the Somali holding a different ‘Arab’ viewpoint. ‘Polishness’ too was being redefined not just within this wave but by this wave regarding the existing UK-Polish community and the ‘cultural differentiation and symbolic conflict between the old and the newcomer population’.

Although the EU8-Poles shared ‘ethnicity, cultural traits (and) language’ with Slough’s existing UK-Poles, their presence; their ‘intrusion’, was anecdotally the basis for some animosity. Some links had been established however, largely through the Polish Catholic Church. Slough’s EU8-Poles essentially viewed themselves as autonomous; self-sufficient regarding politics, religious affiliation, fiscal motivation and adaptability. The tangible structural and characteristic differences witnessed between Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles provided robust support for the premise that ‘white’, ‘Christian’, EU-citizen migrants remain perceived as essentially the ‘same as us’ (Anglo-Saxon Britons). The reader(s) will recall this relationship was advocated by Britain’s government in 1948, specifically regarding Polish-migrants, when the second-wave EVW/PRC Poles were deemed to be ‘good human-stock’ to breed with Britons by Atlee’s Labour government, (Ch.3). This same ‘racist’ endorsement was verbalised by several EU8-Polish interviewees, (Ch.4). EU8-Poles

appeared to be largely perceived as being more cohesive as a group, certainly in the media (Ch.3/Ch.4) and identified themselves as such. Conversely, the Somali as ‘them’ were essentially understood to be ‘non-white’, ‘non-Christian’ and ‘non-EU’, with this same unconstructive understanding frequently applied by themselves; further alienating them.

As for similarities, the Somali and EU8-Poles held views regarding their own superior standing; each assuming cultural, national and ethnic high-grounds. Both retained high ‘racial’ self-perceptions. Both were widely intolerant towards, and maligned, ‘black’ and ‘Asian’. Overlaying notions of pan-European identity onto these traits was seen by some as an affront to national identities. Several EU8-Poles vigorously asserted this belief in conjunction with brazenly upholding ‘white’ superiority; ‘the natural course of things’. Several EU-Somali secondary-migrants, when pressed, attested to their ‘Somaliness’ being paramount in their self-identification over and above their ascribed EU-citizen status or Muslim beliefs. The Somali and EU8-Poles were to some degree, victims as well as perpetrators of ‘racism’.

**Points of similarity**

**Preface**
Not every aspect of Slough’s protagonist’s histories and contemporary experiences could be realistically investigated and compared herein. The following facets were the most notable and the reader is asked to consider it as a patchwork of similarities. Some catalogued points have been researched and written of at length by others (e.g. WWII Polish displaced persons [DP’s] by Kochanski\(^{1198}\)); others, for example EU-Somali experiences in Britain, deserve further research.

**EU-citizenship/nationality**
All people holding nationality in any of the twenty-seven EU Member-States are EU-citizens. Across Somali and Polish migration histories, each nationality has known what it means to be refugees, forced political migrants and ‘commuting’ or transitory economic migrants. Every migrant wave arriving in Britain, directly or indirectly, from Somalia and Poland was subjected to various forms of British prejudice and media generated moral panic.\(^{1199}\) Their experiences represent Britain’s predisposition not to

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\(^{1199}\) Cohen, S. 2011, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, Routledge, Abingdon
sincerely accept ‘other’ and to continually agonise over whether the nationality values and principles it upholds are being jeopardised.

**Push and Pull factors**
Somalia and Poland have both been subjected to forms of imperialism and hegemonic control, imposed border annexations and forced boundary redefinitions. These impositions feed notions the Somali and Poles were/are constantly ‘on the move’. Somalia and Poland remain strategically and economically important; physically placed to influence globalized oil and gas-supplies. The Somali and Poles have been subjected to migratory ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors resulting in four definable migratory-waves over one hundred and fifty years. Neither are homogenous populations; each originating from heterogeneous ethnic roots. There are notable resemblances between second-wave Poles escaping post-WWII Stalinism and the fourth-wave Somali fleeing clan-driven Civil War. In both cases mass exodus was, and is respectively, politically forced and fear propelled. Other examples of migration likeness include the gender-specific natures of the Somali second-wave and Polish fourth-wave wherein women have featured significantly, and likewise the commuting or transient natures of Somali first-wave Lascars and the EU8-Poles. Somali and Polish migrations to America and Canada have historically resulted in Britain being a migration stepping-stone - ‘two-step migration’. Acknowledging Somalia and Poland have broad associative histories with Britain, in each case, wartime allegiances with Britain have realized degrees of greater British informal, and formally sanctioned, tolerance. This similarity highlights the nature of British self-interest over time, place and migrant group. Somali and Polish use of, and engagement with, social, cultural and religious migratory networks has varied across time. Slough’s protagonists similarly rejected allegiances to immigrant forerunners and their offspring. Depending upon perspective, this could be interpreted as the protagonists being autonomous or discouragingly of being culturally alienated from loyalties or commitments to their migrant-forebears with whom they simply did not relate. (Also see: Points of Difference - Networks/Multiple identities).

**Hierarchies/Stratification**
Recognizing racial hierarchy in Slough was outwardly straightforward; it was visible and audible. In 2011, it was enumerated. Slough had (outside London), the lowest

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proportion of ‘white’ English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish residents in England and Wales; just 35%. Slough also had the highest Sikh representation in England and Wales; 11%, the second-highest Pakistani representation; 18%, and seventh-highest Indian representation; 16%. Some ethnic minority ‘groups’; whether migrants or British-born offer the impression they advance in British society quicker than others, but did they, and if they did (in Slough), was their momentum racially/ethnically premised? Miles introduces the notion of racialization of everyday issues such as education, employment, housing, religion and resource-based concerns, and it was this that largely explained the ‘where’ in the racial/ethnic hierarchy the protagonists situated themselves and each other. Although an imperfect explanation, the protagonists pecking-order positioning was, in Miles’ patterning, ethnically/racially premised. The protagonist’s similarity was in unconsciously identifying with this model. Some EU8-Poles, (e.g. PM1), explicitly positioned themselves and their ‘whiteness’ above indigenous, migrant or refugee ‘non-white’ people; using ‘race’ to emphasize their belonging, entitlement and rights in Britain. In post-9/11 and 7/7 contexts, there was, and in 2014 remains, innate hostility across Britain regarding Islam; stirring numbers of people against Muslim ‘them’. Some Slough-Somali reasoned this for their stymied occupational and social mobility. Nevertheless it was evident both protagonists employed similar tactics to highlight their circumstances. Occupational and social mobility varied between them however. Despite these observable tenets, both protagonists embraced the British education system to influence their socialisation in Britain, and that of their children, developing job search opportunities and enriching the quality of their lives. Unsurprisingly, both parent-protagonists sought the very best education and life-chances for their children.

Housing as a physical gauge of social-class stratification was instrumental in assessing socio-economic similarities/divisions. Negligible elements of Slough’s EU8-Poles had similar rented-housing conditions and resultant marginalized ‘class consciousness’s’ as Slough’s Somali. ‘There was not a question in the 2011

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1201 Slough & South Bucks Observer, 2012, (14 Dec), Census: Slough confirmed as one of the most ethnically diverse towns in country.Berkshire Media,Reading
1207 Ibid
Census which asked about nationality', Census which asked about nationality’, and the number of EU8-Poles resident in Chalvey at the 2011 census were included in that ward’s 34.6% (of the total 2011 population of 9874) ‘Not born in UK’ data. Drilling down into the 2012 Annual Labour Force Survey (LFS) simply revealed the estimated Slough Unitary Authority (UA) ‘born in Poland’ residents as 8,000 +/- 3,000 with the estimated ‘resident by nationality’ data for Slough UA recorded as 9,000 +/- 3,000. (“In 2011 Slough had the highest number of non-UK born residents recorded as 54,652 foreign-born inhabitants; Slough was the locality with the highest population share of non-UK born residents in the South East with 39% of its residents born outside of the UK. Slough’s foreign-born population accounted for over 5% of the total foreign-born population of the South East.” Between 2001 and 2011, Slough’s total non-UK born population grew by 26,075 additional residents).

Chalvey’s reported EU8-Poles seemed similarly socially positioned in the inferior hierarchic strata as the Somali, (who considered themselves ‘middle-class’). Economically, these EU8-Poles were left with few, if no, options but to inhabit both identical housing ‘place’ and accommodation ‘type’ as the Somali; occupying the poorly maintained, private-sector, often over-crowded and generally undesirable housing predominating Chalvey. In addition they were contemporarily reported as being victims of ‘the “Slough Shed” phenomenon’ (i.e. landlords accommodating tenants in outhouses and garages in the gardens of properties that they owned. This was not witnessed during this fieldwork: it being a more recent phenomenon). The mutual experience of being disregarded by society and ‘place/space’ identity-ascription was perceptibly shared in Chalvey; a point made in the 2007 Slough-based Panorama documentary. Throughout this research, both protagonists were pronouncedly self-conscious of social-positioning.

FOI request: Data on Polish people living in the UK from Census 2011:11.01.2013
ONS 2011 Ward Reference:00MDMT
ONS 2011 Area Classification Wards Datafile:TCM77-221614
ONS 2013 Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2012
Ibid, Table C: January 2012-December 2012 - Estimated population resident in the UK, by country-of-birth: Selected UA’s/LA’s/Metropolitan and London boroughs/Counties of the United Kingdom (S to Z)
Ibid, Table F: Estimated population resident in the United Kingdom, by nationality
Idries, N. & Chowdhury, S, 2013(April), The Slough Story, [Homepage:SBC], [2014, 29 April 2014]
Bilton, R. 2007
Education and employment

Education was one of the most important factors in the protagonist’s minds to achieve expressed goals, including work, although elements in each - particularly the Somali, believed that skin colour, legal-status and religion influenced the quality and equity of education. Several Somali mothers were critical of the perceived differences in education standards, believing their children received poorer standards of British schooling. Truthfully, some Somali-women, (e.g. SF14), had very ‘complex educational and social needs’ including PTSD. Particular Slough-Somali referred to a good British education as a ‘gift’ to their children; a view echoed by many EU8-Poles, (Ch.4). Disquietingly, through western eyes, some Somali-men and women stated education was more important for sons than daughters. A tangible degree of uneasiness regarding western role-models was also aired. Somali male children; teenagers and young men’s anti-social behaviour, low regard for education and ‘racial’ prejudice were blamed on two things. Firstly ‘westernization’ creating, ‘conflict(s) of identity’ with young Somali-males not considering themselves as Somali; feeling ‘in between’ - a direct reference to holding wholly new hybrid-identities, and not allowing themselves to be constrained by, or enclosed in, Somali traditions. Secondly, the relative dearth of older males to direct and discipline the young males and the fact for some, including SF14’s son, interrupted schooling.

Slough-Somali with a high-quality education, work-experience, life-skills and excellent English-language proficiency, testified to confronting disappointment and discrimination in Britain’s labour-market; in securing work in the first instance, contract pay, and duration. Uncertain legal-statuses had led to, ‘very high levels of worklessness’. Evidence supporting this came from SBC; confirming Slough’s economy remained predominantly ‘Asian’. SBC stated the Pakistani and Indian communities were ranked highest in Slough’s occupational hierarchy, (Ch.4).

For a number of EU8-Poles their excellent tertiary-education and experience was knowingly and strategically under-deployed. They deliberately and purposefully sought lesser work upon arrival in Britain; choosing this to enable them to have more opportunity to acquire weightier English-language skills. Such self-imposition was preparation to more confidently launch themselves into careers, higher-education or

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1218 Rutter, J. 2006, Refugee Children in the UK, OUP, Maidenhead
1219 Ibid, p.6
1220 Ibid
1221 Ibid
1222 Rutter, J. 2006
1223 Interview: 09.10.2007
new professions. TVP’s Kulbir Brar highlighted the generalisation that migrants are empowered by learning and using the English-language.\(^{1224}\) SBC upheld this view pointing out it needed to stop translation provision to incentivise all Slough’s migrants to learn English.\(^{1225}\) Most EU8-Polish women interviewed felt their skill-sets, experience and educational qualifications were appreciated significantly more in gender-equal Britain than in Poland, (Ch.4). From a Somali perspective however, SM13 stated that despite his very good English-language command he was very low in Britain’s social strata; resenting his deferential position. ‘Race’, ‘class’, education and employment were not easily teased apart, drawing points of similarity and subtle difference from seemingly comparable circumstances for both protagonists.

**Points of difference**

**Preface**

Pronounced differences existed between Slough’s Somali and EU8-Poles. Differences were observable not simply in terms of ‘race’, religion, country of origin and homeland political circumstances. They were strikingly so regarding the consequences resulting from their different legal citizenship statuses and the interpretation of and reaction to them. Some, in terms of cultural practices and attitudes, have been widely written about, (e.g. Somali female genital mutilation [FGM],\(^{1227}\) Polish Anti-Semitism,\(^{1228}\) and Polish ‘anti-black’\(^{1229}\) dogma). This section presents a further patchwork; the reader is asked to consider it as ‘many laid out’ shapes (the issues) - with none of the profiles described sewn together; it is a difference-patchwork. Homogenizing either group; oversimplifying the extent that all EU8-Poles are exemplary workers or all Somali are disaffected\(^{1230}\) ‘offenders’\(^{1231}\) remains erroneous. Differences meant internal protagonist inconsistencies and external dissimilarities between them; beginning with literature and media.

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\(^{1224}\) Interview:14.06.2007
\(^{1225}\) Interview:09.10.2007
\(^{1226}\) Interview:23.10.2008
\(^{1229}\) E.g. Mikulska, A, 2010 (October), Racism in Poland: Report on Research Among Victims of Violence with Reference to National, Racial, or Ethnic Origin, Warsaw, Poland
\(^{1230}\) Razaq, R. 2009, *Suicide Bomber from Ealing is First in a New Wave Islamic Terror*,[27.02.2009]
\(^{1231}\) Omaar, R. 2008, “Immigration: The Inconvenient Truth”,[Channel 4 broadcast:Dispatches-Monday 07 April 2008 @ 20:00hrs]: Lost Boys: (Part I ‘Witness’/Part II ‘Somali Gang’), Channel 4, London
**Literature and media representation**

Significant contrast between the Somali and EU8-Polish in Britain and their positions in Britain's migrant hierarchy has been illustrated in Britain's media; frequently in racialized reporting. Substantially more Polish migration secondary-research information was obtainable than that relating to Somali migration(s). The majority of Somali-centred literature related to Somali culture in Somalia or was written from Western-colonialist perspectives. Considerable contemporary media casts ‘Somali’ as non-contributory and problematic, (e.g. as ‘gang members’), and professional-literature concentrates on wholly negative aspects of Somali lifestyle; for example ‘drug-abuse’. Generally, reporting and historic literature regarding the Somali demeans, demonizes and excludes them as threats or drains on resources. In contrast, despite incidents of ‘racist’ xenophobia exhibited towards them, literature and reporting is seemingly encouraging and complimentary regarding the EU8-Poles; particularly concerning their causative work ethic; illustrating British inclusive-leanings towards them.

Notions of British multiculturalism being accepting of difference and embracing mutuality were observed not to be wholly true in Slough; multiculturalism was consistently linked with 9/11 and 7/7 terrorism. Slough’s Somali spoke of the media depicting them as problematic to Britain; they were Muslim; they were Somali and they were asylum-seekers, (Ch.4). The Times accurately summarised these stereotypical views of Somalia and Somali-in-Britain reporting consistent linkages with, ‘violence, anarchy, knife-crime, Qat and piracy’. It reminded readers however that the Somali experience was also, ‘helplessness, voicelessness (and) invisibility’. Slough’s Somali expressed similar viewpoints; ever-aware of their fragile situation. Not every Somali was/is a murderer, defrauder, ‘scrounger’ or a terrorist despite media stereotyping them as troublesome and non-contributory. Unsurprisingly, Somali media-misrepresentation has continued largely unchallenged; the historic lack of local/national Somali political representation in Britain perpetuating this.

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1237 Hamilton, F. & O’Neill, S. 2009, (17 July), *Somalis in Britain find their voice at last*. [Homepage:Times Online],[www.22.05.2010]
1238 Ibid
Positive Somali British media representations remain rare; a point expressed in interviews with Slough’s Somali and TVP, (Ch.4). Rarer still are positive Somali role models and media-depicted images. Somali-born British journalist/writer Rageh Omaar (inset) and Somali-born British athlete and world champion Mo Farah (inset) appear to be the only two readily identifiable examples. Aspects of Britain’s media continue to report crime, terrorism and deviant actions involving ‘non-white other’ with disproportionate coverage.\(^{1239}\) The Somali remain aspects of that unbalanced reporting. An example of positive-news marginalization was the £150,000 raised by British-Somalis in 2009/10 to help release the Chandler’s from their 388-day captivity by Somali pirates.\(^{1240}\) Seemingly, very little was made of this contribution. Upbeat Somali reporting and the Somali contribution to Britain barely feature at the furthest edges of British media; only Farah’s 2012 double Olympic Gold success for Britain (inset) and him becoming the ‘first British man to win the Great North Run since 1985’\(^ {1241} \) have seemingly challenged this, although there was no mention of his Somali heritage in Great North Run Guardian report. In 2014, Somali across the globe would have been knowingly or unwittingly associated with the damning UN and World Bank report that stated Somali-pirate plundering, ‘shipping and humanitarian aid routes…netted more than $400m (£251m) in ransom money between 2005 and 2012’\(^ {1242} \). Also in 2014, the Somali were described as coming from a ‘textbook …failed state’\(^ {1243} \) with pirate testimony justifying Somali-piracy on the basis of it funding, ‘a new car and home… big parties…girls…lots to drink…plenty of Qat’.\(^ {1244} \)

EU8-Poles have not been exempt from negative British media coverage. Impressions of exceptional treatment for ‘white’ migrant EU-Citizens in Britain remain flawed; despite the 2011 post-census financial view that the 400,000 EU8-Poles in the British

\(^ {1240} \) Pflanz, M. 2010,(14 November 2010), Paul and Rachel Chandler released by Somali pirates after 388 days,[Homepage: Telegraph Media],[Online],[2014, 11 June 2014]
\(^ {1241} \) Ingle, S, 2014 (07 September), Mo Farah becomes first British man to win Great North Run since 1985,[Homepage: Guardian],[Online],[2014, 30 September 2014]
\(^ {1242} \) BBC Africa, 2014(15 January), Drop in sea piracy helped by big Somali improvement, says watchdog,[Homepage: BBC],[Online],[2014, 30 September 2014]
\(^ {1243} \) Freeman, C. 2014, Piracy and terrorism: why Somalia?[Homepage: Daily Telegraph],[Online],[2014, 30 September 2014]
\(^ {1244} \) Ibid
labour-force had, ‘a positive economic impact’.\textsuperscript{1245} Developing a 2008 quotation in \textit{The Independent}, it described EU8-Poles as ‘very punctual… very hard-working’,\textsuperscript{1246} while three-years later \textit{The Guardian} reported them as working hard and ‘pull(ing) their weight’.\textsuperscript{1247} Nevertheless, since 2006, EU8-Poles have been on-and-off British-media vilified for their majority role in the, ‘influx of cheap labour…forcing British workers to take pay cuts’.\textsuperscript{1248} Not for the first time in British history, migrants, (EU8-Poles herein) were exploited as scapegoats for Britain’s socio-economic ills. Sections of the British media powerfully problematized A8 ‘migrant-issues’\textsuperscript{1249} - creating moral panic\textsuperscript{1250} by calling for tougher immigration restrictions and citing EU8-Poles, ‘as the causes of (most) social, economic or public problems’\textsuperscript{1251} at that time. The dormant fears displayed in 1919 Cardiff and 1958 Notting Hill were rekindled then to drive a blame-culture nationalist ideology; the blame resting with ‘other’. (In 2014\textsuperscript{1252} the British government continues with this strategy in its effort to win back voters from the UK Independence Party (UKIP) at the 2015 elections). During this greenfield-research the EU8-Poles were, ‘the de facto face of post-accession migration (with) the ‘Polish plumber’ (in the British) daily lexicon (conveying) negative notions about ‘foreigners’.\textsuperscript{1253} Omaar for Channel4’s \textit{Dispatches} reported these xenophobic sentiments were not, ‘restricted to the ‘white’ (British) working-class but expressed across Britain’s middle-class too’,\textsuperscript{1254} including earlier migrants from the Indian subcontinent such as Pakistani ‘MC’ in Slough, (Ch.4). Notions of migrant transience were, and remain, unacceptable; whether economic migrants or asylum-seekers. British assimilated migrants may eventually be tolerated but ‘temporary belonging’ remains abhorrent to Britain’s model of multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{1255}

On one hand Slough’s EU8-Poles were stoic regarding Britain’s media; on the other they were angered when confronted with reported news that brought shame on them - not least when it is caused by the actions and attitudes of ‘lower-class’ EU8-Poles. Compared to the Somali, EU8-Polish negative media coverage has been

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1245}Ernst & Young. 2011, \textit{Diversely Digital},[2014, 09 June 2014]
\item \textsuperscript{1246}The Independent. 2008 (Tuesday 29 April 2008) \textit{The drain: What if all the Poles went home},[Homepage:Independent on-line],[18.06.2010]
\item \textsuperscript{1247}Pidd, H. 2011 (Friday 08 April) \textit{Debunking stereotypes: Poles are hardworking},[Homepage:Guardian News and Media],[17.05.2011]
\item \textsuperscript{1248}Walters, S. 2006 (31 July), \textit{Secret report warns migration meltdown in Britain},[27.09.11]
\item \textsuperscript{1249}Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{1250}Cohen, S. 2011, \textit{Folk Devils and Moral Panics}, Routledge,Abingdon
\item \textsuperscript{1252}Smith, N, 2014 (29 July), \textit{Cameron outlines immigration curbs 'to put Britain first'}, [Homepage: BBC],[Online],[2014, 31 July 2014]
\item \textsuperscript{1253}Foggio, D. & Habershon, E. 2006, \textit{Invasion by Poles hits 'lazy' Britain},[17.04.2009],p.18
\item \textsuperscript{1254}Omaar, R. 2008, \textit{'Immigration:The Inconvenient Truth'},[First Broadcast: Channel4 Dispatches-Monday 07 April 2008-20:00hrs], Channel4, London
\item \textsuperscript{1255}Smith, N. 2014 (29 July)
\end{itemize}
comparatively infrequent - their sheer numbers and the sudden impact they had on British ‘cultural, social and economic life’, \footnote{Fomina, J. & Frelak, J., 2008, \textit{Next Stopski London}, Institute Public Affairs,Warsaw,p.71} were reported as threats; especially as regards employment.\footnote{Ibid} In truth they have offered opportunity.\footnote{Bagehot Notebook, 2011, (14 April), ‘To please Tories, make a mainstream immigration policy sound tougher than it is’, Economist Newspaper On-Line,[05.06.2011]} Adverse reporting of EU8-Poles has been tangibly offset and balanced by complementary and positive media affirmations. Essentially, no such balance is given to the Somali. Even the \textit{Guardian} described the Somali in downbeat terms as ‘an impenetrable and uncommunicative people’.\footnote{Benedictus, L. 2005, ‘There won’t be another place for us. We’ve lost a whole community’,[Guardian Online],[2011 22 September 2011]} Through the same lens, but also by using insights gleaned from interviews, (Ch.4), EU8-Poles were identified, regardless of individualities, as ‘white’, Catholic, Europeans. EU8-Poles ‘us’, embraced in Britain’s selective memory, results from both ‘an on-going …social (migration) process’ \footnote{Casciani, D. 2006, \textit{Somalis’ struggle in the UK} [Homepage: BBC],[09.05.2008]} with Britain, as well as ‘periods with specific causes and conditions’, such as the post-WWII EVW experience. This summation unconsciously fed into the Slough-Somali perceptions EU8-Poles were ‘you’.

**Lenses**

Historic contrasts were important in grappling with migration as a contradictory phenomenon. It was inaccurate to rely on what the law of the day stated to determine prerogatives. Tangibly, interpretation(s), political expedience, Britain’s socio-economic hierarchy and its colonial history had each, and collectively, contributed to defining difference(s) between the protagonists. Characterized through a ‘white-Western lens’, Slough’s Somali were identified, regardless of their actual legal-status, nationality, personal identity or religious following by Slough’s EU8-Poles as ‘black’, Muslim, African refugees. This homogenization was essentially generalizable, (and reasonably accurate), but it was a stereotypical assessment. Slough’s Somali were ‘other’, ‘foreign’, ‘outsiders’; different to Western ‘us’ through EU8-Polish eyes.\footnote{Duvell, F. & Garapich, M. 2011, \textit{Polish Migration to the UK: Continuities and Discontinuities},(WP-11-84), Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford,p.3} Through the same lens, but also by using insights gleaned from interviews, (Ch.4), EU8-Poles were identified, regardless of individualities, as ‘white’, Catholic, Europeans. EU8-Poles ‘us’, embraced in Britain’s selective memory, results from both ‘an on-going …social (migration) process’ \footnote{Duvell, F. & Garapich, M. 2011, \textit{Polish Migration to the UK: Continuities and Discontinuities},(WP-11-84), Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford,p.3} with Britain, as well as ‘periods with specific causes and conditions’, such as the post-WWII EVW experience. This summation unconsciously fed into the Slough-Somali perceptions EU8-Poles were ‘you’.
Belonging

Some Slough EU8-Poles (e.g. PM10) bridged life in Britain with frequent travel ‘home’ to Poland; White found accord with this ‘tooning and froing’ in her 2011 Bristol-based research.\textsuperscript{1262}

The home-connection was important in retaining their essence of ‘Polishness’; of belonging. (International migrant commuting is not a new phenomenon, nor is it exclusively Polish).\textsuperscript{1263} Slough’s professional class EU8-Poles more readily identified with Britain; others appeared ambivalent or voiced no sense of belonging - others still did not wish to. All of the EU8-Polish protagonists knew, and expressed, they belonged as EU-citizens. Statham’s 2011 Bristol University research reported that on average Britain’s EU8-Poles took, ‘three trips back home to Poland every year’.\textsuperscript{1264} This statistic was indicative that rather than being wholly transnational-migrants, (i.e. ‘who migrated from one nation-state to another, living their lives across borders, participating simultaneously in social-relations that embed them in more than one nation-state\textsuperscript{1265}’), EU8-Poles as a ‘group’ also included circular-migrants; who remain ‘temporary -(undertaking repetitive journeys) between home and host areas - typically for the purpose of employment’\textsuperscript{1266} and in Slough determined to build financial, human and social capital, (Ch.4).

As for Slough’s Somali, broadly their feelings of not belonging; of exclusion, were discernible - whether imposed or self-inflicted. Only SM1 and British-born SF9 embraced the fundamental privileges and obligations of national belonging in Britain; not fearing a loss of their ‘Somaliness’: The need for maintaining homeland links appeared virtually indistinguishable between the protagonists. Every respondent attested to the importance of regular contact with home and family; in person and/or electronically. This is statistically borne-out; UK-Somali remittances of £100million per year are transferred to Somalia for, ‘food, healthcare and education’\textsuperscript{1267} and £4billion sent by EU8-Poles to their families in Poland\textsuperscript{1268}.  

\textsuperscript{1262}White, A., 2011,\textit{The mobility of Polish families in the West of England: Translocalism and attitudes to return. Studia Migracyjne (Migration Studies): Przegląd Polonijny (Polish Expatriate Overview)} – No.1 (Spring)/2011 pp.11-32
\textsuperscript{1263}Ballard, R. 1990
\textsuperscript{1264}Statham, P, 2011,p.1
\textsuperscript{1266}Newland, K. 2009(September), \textit{Circular Migration and Human Development. HDRP Series:2009/42(#19225)}, Migration Policy Institute(UNDP), Munich, Germany
\textsuperscript{1268}Statham, P, 2011
Chapter 5: Comparative-analysis, conclusion and recommendations

The belonging’ difference between the protagonists was the EU8-Poles acknowledgement of their entitlement to the privileges of citizenship. This contrasted considerably with those Somali refused/denied them, (although did not account for the EU-Somali apparently self-excluding).

Racism
Racism herein was sociologically benchmarked to mean processes producing and perpetuating ‘boundaries’. The boundaries were not simplistically confined to ‘skin-colour’ difference. Restrictive outcomes testified to by the interviewees included; religion, gender, legal-status, education, policing, stereotyping and identity – agreeing that ‘racism’ is frequently manifest as a range of exclusionary practices.

Most people claim not to be ‘racist’ although commonly ‘white’ people obliquely accept ‘racist’ ideology because it garners the benefits, rights and privileges their biological colour and characteristics imbue. This couched viewpoint was expressed by several EU8-Poles. A minority went further, explicitly expressing ‘white supremacist’ beliefs (PM1). Most Slough-Somali recognised their position as ‘black’ reaped them fewer advantages, rights and opportunities. Most Somali expressed ‘black’ as being ‘lower’ than ‘white’ as ‘one of those things’, a ‘fact of life’; despite actual legal-status, although they ascribed to colourism. The Somali memories of status were, broadly, assigned by ‘race’ in and of the past. This influenced their notions of ‘belonging’, but often excluded legal citizenship-status realities. The EU-Somali were legally EU-citizens but felt lesser than the EU8-Poles. Degrees of historic prejudiced mixed-receptions metered out by host-countries played important roles in determining where both protagonists chose to migrate. At one end of the gamut, the EU8-Poles, and for family reconnections, the EU-Somali - looking for a ‘better life’, believed Britain had a higher standard of living, (education, work and healthcare). At the other end, Somali exiles somewhere safe from the Civil War. Many Slough-Somali expressed the view they are ‘more welcome’ and ‘safer in Britain’ than in other EU-states, acknowledging Britain’s higher standards of education and healthcare. Conversely, some Somali-women expressed feeling marginalized in both education and

1270 Ibid
1271 Fanon, F. 1986, Black Skin, White Masks, Pluto, London
1272 Gilbertson, G. 2006, Citizenship in a Globalized World,[23.03.2009]
1273 Massey, D. & Taylor, J. (eds),2004,p.ix
healthcare. Overall, findings implied there were far less hospitable and/or accessible migrant-hosts than Britain.

Integration
Slough’s EU8-Poles, along with a minority of Slough-Somali, fostered ‘can-do’ and ‘will-do’ attitudes insofar as Britain’s demand for considerable measures of cultural integration;\(^{1275}\) **publicly at least.** These interviewee’s acknowledged their need to acclimate their own cultural expressions. For some, not to do so would threaten their livelihoods or safety. Others did not; notably Slough’s Somali, who essentially self-identified as Muslim and/or simply as ‘immigrants’. Feasibly, this self-derision had emerged because Britain remains modelled and governed by ‘white’, ‘Christian’, ‘English’ characteristics. The consequences of the ‘can-do’/‘will-do’ approach versus the self-deriding/self-exclusionary offered-up significant areas of comparison. Foremost were community-representation, employment, institutional-completeness, religion, education, economic choices and freedoms, political-wholeness and women and family, (Ch.4).

Networks/Identity
Slough’s EU8-Poles had established their own ‘social networks and communicative patterns’;\(^ {1276}\) They had instituted new networks or to a lesser extent adapted and Europeanized relationships with the town’s existing British/Polish community; notably regarding Catholic Church involvements. Contrastingly, the Somali appeared thwarted by their own conflicting clan-based ethnic-hierarchies. EU8-Poles generally embraced; publicly at least, the suspension of notions of any traditional nationalist based Polish ‘collectiveness’. They accepted a multiplicity of identities to achieve social ‘belonging’ and represent themselves in a positive ‘can-do’/‘will-do’ manner. They held the view that the more numbers of ‘you’s’ on offer’\(^ {1277}\) the greater the sense of ‘belonging’ and inclusion’ realised; a ‘when in Rome’ approach, (Ch.4). This engaging attitude and their rapid settlement and integration may have alarmed Somali perspectives. Slough’s Somali did not embrace multiplicity; reluctant or culturally unable to live ‘lives with a variety of… contradictory identities’.\(^ {1278}\) This incapacity had outwardly negatively affected their representation abilities in Slough.

\(^{1275}\)Home Office: UK Border Agency 2004, *Citizenship Ceremonies*[30.03.2009]
\(^{1277}\)Bocock, R. 1998, ‘Consumption and Lifestyles’ in *Social And Cultural Forms of Modernity*, eds. S. Hall et al, Polity, Cambridge,p.120
In both protagonists’ cases, there were fundamental aspects of their encapsulation(s); ‘Polishness’ and ‘Somaliness’, although the EU8-Polish expression of theirs appeared more cutting-edge. EU8-Poles illustrated an encapsulated community could have an ‘open, changing and fluid’\textsuperscript{1279} cultural approach. This is not to state there was evidence of response conformity. Some EU8-Poles blatantly dismissed their Polish obligations, values and traditions, or gave that impression of discharging the same; while still publicly embracing their EU-identities. The EU8-Poles presented no fixed-limits to encapsulation evolution; ‘ever-changing’\textsuperscript{1280} This explained how they had been able to essentially ‘interpenetrate and cross-cut’\textsuperscript{1281} the wealth of Slough’s cultures. Adopting multiple-identities had empowered them situationally; whether testifying to this regarding work and career, educational aspirations, open-ended plans or what they expected as EU-Poles in Britain. This contrasted with the preliminary Polish second-wave, and contemporary Slough-Somali strategies. In both cases, Anwar’s myth-of-return\textsuperscript{1282} featured in early encapsulation processes; each holding earnest beliefs their British-exile was temporary. Initially the second-wave Poles encapsulated their ‘Polishness’ in their ‘own socio-cultural activities’\textsuperscript{1283} actively extricating themselves from post-WWII Britons where feasible. As political exiles, they believed patronage of their own ‘Polishness’ was essential; an ‘obligation’,\textsuperscript{1284} in defiance of imposed Polish-Communism. Their initial disengagement stance lessened over time – evidenced herein in their 1951-52 relocation from Hodgemoor to Slough,\textsuperscript{1285} (Ch.3).

Slough’s Somali encapsulation in Chalvey was exclusive; remaining so since the late-1980s, and Slough’s first Somali arrivals, ostracising others – in some ways similar to the second-wave Poles initial strategy. Some British-born second generation Somali were initiating choices\textsuperscript{1286} regarding their integration/non-integration with an Anglo-Somali hybridized interpretation of their ‘open, changing and fluid’\textsuperscript{1287} encapsulated community, (Ch.4). This symbolised a Somali generational shift without loss of cultural heritage. University-educated young Somali woman SF9 illustrated how age and gender too were altering the dynamics of her encapsulation. Upon reflection, this

\textsuperscript{1279}Werbner, P. 2005,p.752
\textsuperscript{1280}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1281}Ibid,p.748
\textsuperscript{1282}Anwar, M. 1979
\textsuperscript{1283}Werbner, P. 2005,p.752
\textsuperscript{1284}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1285}Jasnikowski, E. 2006
\textsuperscript{1286}Breton, R. 1964
\textsuperscript{1287}Werbner, P. 2005,p.752
unique research witnessed an example of the completion-cycle in realising ‘home’ was Britain; an event that had already occurred in the lives of Slough’s second-generation Pakistani community. Slough’s Pakistani community appeared to be the Somali benchmark of ‘success’, high-status - and angst. Some EU8-Poles ranked themselves ‘above’ the Pakistani in ‘racial’ terms. The Pakistani community however had achieved localized political-wholeness; one-voice representation. As a group Slough’s Pakistani had involvement in and influence of political institutions, such as SBC. 1288

Contrast between the protagonists continued in their respective abilities to achieve cultural solidity, although the atypical EU-Somali scenario made this only partially true. The principally differing legal-statuses conspicuously determined outcomes; community identities, cohesive representations, and ‘belonging’ abilities. Their respective expectations appeared, ‘always in process’ however. Talking with SBC, TVP and the protagonists, publicly perceived group-identity was unmistakably recognizable. Slough’s Pakistani community was referenced by both protagonists as comparators of success. The Pakistani had overcome isolation, offered one another material assistance, defended group interests and legal-rights, promoted their ‘own’ culture and maintained homeland links. 1290 These principles had also been virtually satisfied by Slough’s EU8-Poles; in a comparatively short period of time. No such similarity existed with Slough’s Somali. Their cohesive strategies to achieve local aims by way of community representation varied enormously, from EU8-Polish ‘belonging’ to Somali alienation.

Institutional-completeness
Slough’s protagonists were each party to the town’s disparities of culturally specific ‘places’ and ‘spaces’; not least regarding their respective religious and education needs. Cultural specificity had aggravated, if not created, aspects of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality - particularly from the Somali viewpoint. Culturally specific and inclusive reference points met by ethnically apt understanding and appreciation, for example by SBC, meant services, help and advice were included in community agendas. EU8-Poles maintained their own ethnic boundaries but were very able to integrate and interact within Slough’s wider multicultural-community, through and with...

1288 Lopata, H.Z. 1993, Polish Americans, Transaction, University of New Jersey, Piscataway, p.67
1290 Rex, J. & Moore, R. 1967, Race, Community And Conflict: A Study Sparkbrook, Institute Race Relations, OUP, Oxford
SBC or autonomously, (e.g. the Polish Church of Divine Mercy). Conversely, the casual impression given by Slough’s guarded Somali had created greater wariness and further division between them and the wider town population. Frequent Somali resource funding application duplication, (by competing Somali groups), prompted wariness within SBC/Voluntary-organizations in dealing with any single aspect of the Somali community. Somali representations had largely failed because of their disunity. A minority of Somali (SM1), appreciated that to compete with EU8-Poles, Pakistani’s, Indian’s or any of Slough’s other ethnic groups, the cohesive EU8-Polish model, while not faultless, could reap tangible benefits.

The twin notions of Institutional-completeness,¹²⁹¹ (e.g. Slough’s EU8-Polish reproduction of ‘home’ in Slough with Polish shops, church, recruitment agencies, restaurants, Doctors, Dentists etc.), and social-encapsulation,¹²⁹² (e.g. Slough’s Somali [generally] self-containing their social/economic/political/religious relationships in the Somali community), assisted in better understanding each of the protagonists insofar as assimilation, acculturation, integration and marginalization were concerned. Assimilation herein meant scenarios whereby ‘the minority and majority (cultures) become socially and residentially intermixed’,¹²⁹³ and multiculturalism or integration meant scenarios whereby ‘concentrations (and) separation (of ethnic groups)’¹²⁹⁴ likely remain, but do so in an accepting plural society. In other words assimilation implies coercion and multiculturalism or integration degrees of plurality, (i.e. different ethnic groups/cultural traditions all being represented). The Slough-Somali encapsulation was seemingly, although not wholly, ‘enforced’.¹²⁹⁵ It had resulted from clan influence and tradition, their asylum-seeker legal-statuses and the outcomes arising from them, (e.g. welfare dependency). In the case of the EU-Somali, it was deliberate choice that created their Somali ‘self-contained world’.¹²⁹⁶ Generally, the Slough-Somali explicitly rejected assimilation, vehemently rejected acculturation – interpreted herein as protecting their ‘Somaliness’, and grudgingly accepted a degree of integration enabling them to live in Britain.

¹²⁹² Knippenberg, H. & Doomernik, J.(eds),2003, Migration and Immigrants: Between Policy and Reality, Aksant,Amsterdam
¹²⁹³bid,p.102
¹²⁹⁴bid
¹²⁹⁶Lewis, P. 2002,p.217
As for Slough's EU8-Poles, their institutional-completeness was ‘there to see’ across the Slough landscape – multiple Polish shops, restaurants, sports events etc with signage written in Polish. EU8-Polish encapsulation was voluntary although it appeared as another aspect of multicultural-Slough. The EU8-Poles were neither disconnecting with the wider Slough community nor were they being assimilated by it. They were integrating - on their EU-citizen terms. In keeping with the Somali responses regarding rejecting the suggestion of British acculturation, the EU8-Poles absolutely, some vehemently, defended their ‘Polishness’ in eschewing these social models, (Ch.4). In different ways, both protagonists strove to meet Anwar’s reference to ‘obligations, values, traditions [to reflect their] home culture’,1297 influencing their Institutional-completeness. Tangible evidence, both visible and expressed, (Ch.4), demonstrated the EU8-Poles were significantly advanced beyond Slough’s Somali in accomplishing this. ‘It would be possible to say that (while) Somalis lived in (Slough, they were) not (wholly) part(s) of (Slough)’1298 – many Somali interviewees expressed they were ‘at the bottom of (Slough’s economic/Muslim) pile’.1299 This truism signposted ascribed boundaries from the Pakistani community.1300 Lewis’ Bradford research resonated with the Slough-Somali in several ways. For example, the ‘cultural and religious norms’1301 of traditional (non-Westernized) Muslims ‘render socializing in conformity with British norms problematic’.1302 This was witnessed during several Slough-Somali interviews, although ‘variation by generation’,1303 was noticeable. Not every Somali was conformist. There was religious-founded and parental unease expressed regarding alcohol, drug-taking and concerns regarding boys and girls dating un-chaperoned or even being alone pre-marriage. Slough’s Somali needed to reproduce their own ‘particular social-contexts, cultural and religious traditions’.1304 Regardless of any willingness to contextually adapt however, most Somali protagonists remained forced welfare-dependents. Conversely, Slough’s EU8-Poles, in swiftly achieving their considerable level of Institutional-completeness were recognizably more adaptable than the Somali insofar as expressing multiple-identities, enabling their particular public expressions of integration, (Ch.4).

Slough’s EU8-Poles had not had to start from scratch. Their EU-citizenship status and the presence of second/third-wave and British-Poles in Slough presented

1297 Anwar, M. 1979,p.13
1299 Lewis, P. 2007,pp.18-19
1300 Ibid
1301 Ibid,p.217
1302 Ibid
1303 Glick-Schiller et al, 2004,p.8
1304 Lewis, P. 2002,p.217
advantages, (Ch.4). It was clear they had no problems with engaging; culturally fitting-in with many pre-existent, *intellectual and imaginative resources* (including) *religious, intellectual and cultural traditions* previously introduced from Poland; directly or over time.\(^\text{1305}\) Those interviewees who confirmed they regularly attended the Church of Devine Mercy appeared to view, expect even, their Catholicism to be an accepted norm, as indeed it is, within British culture, (Ch.4). Religion/Faith/Religion (RFB) ‘will always exist… (Performing) an indispensable function… (but its nature) will vary…to achieve an appropriate ‘fit’ (in the) prevailing social-order’.\(^\text{1307}\) Each protagonists’ recognition and integration within their own religious encapsulations and networks were viewed herein as component parts of their institutional-completeness. RFB was seen to play important and specific roles in both Slough cases; satisfying individual needs and preserving ‘Polishness’ or ‘Somaliness’ characteristics. EU8-Polish Catholicism and Somali Islam revealed varying levels of dependency on the Church and Mosque respectively.

Some EU8-Poles (Ch.4) entirely naturally used Slough’s Polish Church of Divine Mercy as a nationality parish church,\(^\text{1308}\) although not every EU8-Pole embraced Catholicism. Dissenter voices openly criticised the Catholic Church - reproaching Poland’s Church-State complicity. For some, this religio-political collusion was the principal reason for their migration, (Ch.4). The Church bridged Polish-Polishness and British-Polishness however; its social-structuring including familiar artefacts, the Polish language and Polish Priests. Many EU8-Poles eased their own adjustments; living and working in Britain, by using their RFB alongside the amenities offered by the Church making it a hub to access social and welfare-services. This included cross-wave and cross-generational grouping, and embryonic sub-groups (e.g. children’s play groups) - making it a centre of community for themselves. Several of the EU8-Poles were zealous regarding their Catholic RFB; it being an integral aspect of their personal identity, (Ch.4). Slough’s Somali were all Sunni Muslims, although clan frictions, political differences and personal alliances gave the impression that Islam did not absolutely unite them. Notions of a Slough Muslim *Umma*\(^\text{1309}\) (global-community) including the Somali protagonists was empirically seen and described as imaginary, (Ch.4). The Somali perception was that while their majority confirmed their practising of Islam, they believed they were not integrated into the town’s mainstream

\(^{1305}\) Ibid
\(^{1309}\) Ansari, H. 2004, pp.2-4
Muslim community. Support for this view was inferred from nine Mosques that were more or less culturally exclusive for the town’s majority Pakistani community. Only the 1992-converted house Al-Nasr Centre in Ledgers Road had a diverse management team; Pakistani, Somali and Yemeni elders. (Ch.4).

Education and Catholicism were conjoined in the minds of most of the EU8-Polish protagonists. (Ninety-five percent of all Poles were believed to be Catholic).\textsuperscript{1310} EU8-Poles with children, or plans to have them, expressed a preference to educate them in Catholic ‘faith-schools’.\textsuperscript{1311} The seamless overlapping age ranges of Slough’s Catholic faith-school cohorts from 3-years to 18 years-of-age\textsuperscript{1312} accommodated this. Polish-specific Catholic education in Slough is not novel. It dates back to the early 1950s and the institutional-completeness strategies of the second-wave. In 1951-1952, ‘a Saturday Polish school was started at St Anthony’s Catholic School to teach Polish to youngsters’.\textsuperscript{1313} In 2014, Catholic specific general schooling in Slough is a mainstream convention. In contrast, the first publicly maintained (State) Islamic faith-school for Slough opened in September 2008. The £8.7 million 670-pupil Iqra Slough Islamic Primary School in Grasmere Avenue, (off Wexham Road) met the needs of the 4 to 11-year-old age range of, first and foremost, Muslim Primary-School pupils.\textsuperscript{1314} This was a potentially positive outcome to the troubled and on occasions highly-controversial four-year Slough Islamic School Project (SISP),\textsuperscript{1315} for all Slough’s Muslims. In 2012 Ofsted rated the school overall ‘good’ with the Board of Governors publicly confirming the school undertook ‘no brain-washing, no militancy (and had) no problems’.\textsuperscript{1316} In 2014, still more work needs to be done to achieve Muslim equity in their RFB education aspirations; not just in Slough but across Britain. This cause was not helped by spurious allegations in Birmingham of Islam being forced on students ‘as part of a Muslim plot’\textsuperscript{1317} - reigniting nationalist representations of Islamic ‘them’. (Christian faith-schools significantly out-number Islamic and other non-Christian establishments\textsuperscript{1318} across Britain despite Britain’s multi-ethnic population).

\textsuperscript{1310}ibid
\textsuperscript{1311} Asthana, A. & Fitzgerald, M. 2007, Multiracial Britain confuses Poles, [Sunday 15 April 2007],The Observer,London,p.11
\textsuperscript{1312} Slough Borough Council, 2009, A-Z Listing All Schools in Slough,[29.04.2009]
\textsuperscript{1313} Jastrunikowski, E. 2006
\textsuperscript{1314} Slough Borough Council 2008, Closure Lea Infant and Junior schools, opening a new Islamic faith school,[29.04.2009]
\textsuperscript{1315} Slough & Langley Observer 2009, MP’s row over Muslim school, [Wednesday 25 February 2009],[27.04.2009]
\textsuperscript{1316} Parsons, C, 2012(01 May), The Home Counties primary school where less than 1% of pupils speak English as their first language,[Homepage:Daily Mail],[Online] [2014, 05 October 2014]
\textsuperscript{1318} Bolton, P. & Gillie, C. 2009 (10 March) Faith schools: admissions and performance, House Commons Library (Standard Note: SN/SG/4405), London
Comparing the protagonists RFBs in religio-ethnocentric discourse, the Catholic EU8-Poles were elements of the Western Christian ‘norm’. The EU8-Poles consciously or unconsciously used their RFB-affinity as another dimension of their Institutional-completeness to engage with Britain. Conversely, the Somali were religious ‘other’ – elements and representations of Islamic ‘them’ in the volatile post-9/11 ‘populist English nationalism’ era,\textsuperscript{1319} wrongly broad-brushed as scheming to subvert ‘our’ lives and undermine Britain’s ‘traditional values’.\textsuperscript{1320} In a post-9/11 context, the realities of Islamophobia and the outcomes of the ‘war on terror’ were attested to by Slough’s Somali regardless of their citizenship statuses and legal rights, (Ch.4). Muslims in Britain, of whatever heritage, still strive to have Islam accepted as a Western ‘norm’. It is arguable that until such a time arrives, none will be truly institutionally-complete. In 2014, the advent of radical Islamic State (IS)\textsuperscript{1321} atrocities in Iraq and Syria has further (wrongly) demonized innocent and peaceable Muslims and Islam – unquestionably extending this timescale further.

Work/unemployment
SBC confirmed the, ‘local economy (was) completely Asian’;\textsuperscript{1322} meaning that although 45.7% of the town was ‘white’,\textsuperscript{1323} it was the 39.7% of Asian/Asian British\textsuperscript{1324} who were dominant in the local economy; particularly the 17.7% Asian/Asian British: Pakistani,\textsuperscript{1325} and the 15.6% Asian/Asian British: Indian residents.\textsuperscript{1326} Professional highly-educated ‘Asians’ were said to have generally commuted-out of Slough\textsuperscript{1327} but EU8-Poles such as Credit Insurance Specialist PF9 were in-part meeting that Slough sector need. This narrow labour-market dynamic had contributed directly to differential community-cohesion issues and created division between ‘groups' across Slough. Slough-Somali labour-market experience testimonies, including for several interviewees, their total lack of it, compared with EU8-Poles’, illustrated the substantial work-related divide that existed between the protagonists, (Ch.4). According to SBC this had created on-going discord. While the Somali and EU8-Poles (correctly) perceived ‘Asians’ dominated Slough’s labour-market, SBC

\textsuperscript{1319}Ebaugh, H.R. & Chafetz, J.S., 2000, p.140
\textsuperscript{1320}Milland, G. 2008, Muslims can Claim Benefits for Several Wives, say Ministers,[Homepage:Daily Express],[2009, 2 March 2009]
\textsuperscript{1321}BBC, 2014(26 September), What is Islamic State?[Homepage:BBC],[Online],[2014, 05 October 2014]
\textsuperscript{1322}Interview:09.10.2007
\textsuperscript{1323}2011 Census
\textsuperscript{1324}Idries, N. & Chowdhury, S., 2013, p.14
\textsuperscript{1325}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1326}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1327}Interview:09.10.2007
Chapter 5: Comparative-analysis, conclusion and recommendations

acknowledged Somali angst because EU8-Poles regularly undercut wage rates to increase ‘their own employment prospects’. Some Slough-Somali implied the hopelessness they felt and others poignantly shared how they spent their non-working days. Older Somali-men took drugs (Qat and western ‘A’ and ‘B’ class drugs) – these exacerbated the numerous social, economic and domestic violence problems. Younger Somali-men, SBC reported, resorted to theft to buy iPods, clothes and other items they simply could not afford to buy.

Many Slough-Somali women arrived in Britain alone or with their children; their husbands either dead or fighting in Somalia. Most worked (legally or illegally) to support themselves with multiple low paid part-time jobs. Seventy-two per cent of the Somali-women interviewed stated their primary reason for coming to Britain was not for work, but to join extended family. Nevertheless it was evident that several Somali-men were displaced; forced to step aside in favour of necessary labour-market matriarchy - Slough’s Somali-women appeared to be ‘getting on with it’. Most Somali held Islam and their ‘Somaliness’ close to them in their exile experiences. It was not a clear ‘working’ or ‘unemployed’ situation. Day-to-day life, including prospects of work, was frequently obscured and chaotic; conditions largely created by the trauma many had suffered, losses of loved ones, clan issues in Somalia and uncertain futures. Slough’s Somali community appeared governed by combinations of unpromising circumstances.

**Economics, tenure, choices and freedoms**

Choice distinguished Slough’s protagonists. EU-citizen options; to migrate or not, were entirely different to Somali forced-migrations. Each individual’s migration experience was unique; impacted by significant life-chance determinants including gender, age, and class/clan. Slough’s Somali (excluding the EU-Somali) were ‘blocked asylum-seekers’, unable to return home/relocate/travel. Markedly, Slough’s EU-Somali with equivalent EU legal-status to the EU8-Poles were socially and economically comparable (at best) to the very lowest echelon of non-skilled EU8-Poles regarding employment, housing and life-chances. While none of Slough’s EU-Somali were sleeping rough, many relied on Chalvey’s Somali family-networks to eke

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1328 Ibid
1329 Interview:14.06.2007
1330 Ibid

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out day-to-day livelihoods. Their EU legal-status ostensibly held little currency for them.

Economic status differentiated the protagonists in virtually every interview instance too. This disparity existed because of enduring differing legal-status; particularly regarding abilities to legally work. Legal freedoms were manifest as enabling economic and lifestyle choices. Even the employed EU-Somali were not achieving the same levels of freedoms and lifestyle choices as the lowest occupational status EU8-Poles interviewed. Economic choices and lifestyle liberties aligned to notions of Institutional-completeness for both protagonists. Slough’s EU8-Poles had ‘easily gained a foothold in the…economy’ with Slough ‘renamed’ Mala Polska (‘Little Poland’) by some Poles. Contrastingly, welfare-dependent, on poor salaries or unable to secure work, asylum-seeker Somali and EU-Somali were homogenised as ‘Somali’ in Slough. Despite actual differing legal-statuses they were all priced-out of the middle-class EU8-Polish housing experience. Somali frustration; on occasion bitterness, at their lack of social status and progress after two decades in Britain was partly understandable. They knew they were powerless, acknowledging their culturally fractured ‘styles of life’ in Britain.

Slough’s housing and tenure were conduits to locate and philosophically assess stratification(s) between the protagonists. Property tenure, employment security and occupation type remain principal British social-class drivers; measures of relative success or failure – enabling or disabling social-status. Out and out difference existed in their housing, choices, decisions and arrangements. Every Somali lived in poor-quality, defectively maintained rented housing, (much of it unexpectedly owned, it emerged, by Eastern European entrepreneurs although not it seemed EU8-Poles). In opportunely interviewing in the respondents’ homes, these conditions were witnessed first-hand. Their interpretations of ‘class’ were different although legal-status’ and the outcomes arising from them perpetuated disparities. Every Somali was myopic to, or was choosing not to acknowledge, less affluent EU8-Poles and their social-status’, (Ch.4). The Somali only looked upwards in the status hierarchy. None realised or acknowledged there was tangible class hierarchy within the EU8-Polish group.

1332 Bukowczyk, J.J. 2008, A History the Polish Americans, Transaction, New Jersey, p.36
1333 Thomas, D. & Whittingham, S. 2006, People Investigation: Slough Torture [Homepage:Mirror Group][Online][08.04.2008]
1335 Ibid
Several of the EU8-Polish professional-class were lucid in their assertions, judging themselves ‘above’ un-skilled and ill-educated Poles. The veracity of deeply embedded Polish cultural heterogeneity and entrenched class-stratification in many ways mirrored Somali-clan at its divisive worst. In both cases choices and freedoms were variable and subject to change. For several Somali, the EU8-Poles had already achieved ‘white-British’ middle-classness. This was not the EU8-Poles perception. Several professional-Poles stated that until they owned property in Britain; commanded very well-paid and respected careers, and could express fluency in the English-language, that British ‘middle-classness’ eluded them. Professional and trades-based EU8-Poles predominated in private-sector rented accommodation, including parts of Chalvey, but in particular, on new or relatively new estates in middle-class ‘white’ areas.

Inadvertent or deliberate ‘racial’ exclusivity was manifest in the tripartite accommodation mechanisms at work; high house prices, high rental costs and differing abilities to pay, exposing an expression of ‘class’ in Britain. Plainly, Somali middle-class housing did not equate to the standards of EU8-Polish middle-class housing. The lack of housing equality and parity of choice between the protagonists was not founded in ‘racism’, xenophobia or ethnocentrism however. The primary cause was the conflation of Britain’s restricting immigration legislation, and the propensity to cluster (i.e. ‘races’) of people, whether or not they are actually equivalent to one another, (e.g. Somali asylum-seekers and the EU-Somali). Housing market stratification suggested Slough’s Somali remained, for the foreseeable future, largely powerless in ‘Western’ terms. They were not property-owners nor did they have the possibility to buy them. They had little or no financial capital, performing poorly in the labour-market despite educational qualifications and experience. They possessed few, if any, Western desirable social status-symbols. Somali ethnic clothing, food and music were not sought after; not even measuring up to cultural-tokenism echoing - ‘Saris, Samosas, and Steel Bands’. No positive recognition was readily identifiable from within Slough’s Somali culture; they appeared lacking in notable social and cultural identity markers akin to the EU8-Poles. They were not known as hard-workers. They were not readily understood by wider multi-cultural British society. Clan fracture and suspicion aggravated their marginalization, and few individuals, (Ch.4) appeared willing to investigate change. Under these

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1336 Ibid, p.47
1337 Ibid, p.24
1338 Troyna, B. & Williams, J. 1985, Racism, Education and the State, Routledge, Basingstoke, p.24
circumstances it was predictable perceptions and realities of Slough-Somali segregation would doggedly remain.

Contrastingly, EU8-Poles had normally secured employment and other visible social status symbols: particularly desirable housing, (largely privately rented). Professional EU8-Poles enjoyed communicating their own prestige, (Ch.4). Many were building accomplished, first-rate and enduring, ‘communal relations’. Middle-class EU8-Poles had high employment-status, desirable occupations and were marketable. These characteristics appeal to Britain. EU8-Poles enjoyed kudos and presented further cachet to British capitalism; Slough’s EU8-Poles ‘fitted’ Britain’s ‘normative and economic paradigm’. Their professional, skilled and career-centred life-style appeared conducive with, if not identical to, the metaphors indigenous Britons base their own class identities and life-aspirations upon - the same middle-classness largely protected as ‘ours’.

Women and family
This distinctive research delved beyond the physical makeup of the protagonists families. It sought to glean some understanding(s) of motivations, roles and functions; explicitly from the perspective of the numerically majority common denominator - women. Types of family structures varied between and amongst them. There was ‘no single’ EU8-Polish or Somali family ‘type’. Somali family structures did not conform to traditional nuclear family models. Many households were vastly-extended family units. Likewise, some EU8-Polish couples were keenly working to reverse, ‘Poland’s fertility rates...the lowest in the EU’ by gaining skills, experience and earning money to return to Poland to then raise a family. Poland’s traditional high unemployment-rates and low household income levels had apparently, ‘not (been) conducive to family formation’. Some would-be EU8-Polish parents maintained their nationalist vigour defending the importance of returning to Poland to ensure a family would be started and raised within their own ‘ethnic group’. Suggestions of EU cultural-hybridization was robustly and consistently rejected, (Ch.4).

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1339 Scott, J. 2000, p.25
1341 Lopata, H.Z. 1993
1343 Ibid
1344 Lopata, H.Z. 1993, p.74
EU8-Polish women migrated to Slough to earn money, accompany husbands/partners and characteristically satisfy personal cosmopolitan-EU needs by being occupationally and socially mobile as individuals. Several highly qualified professional Polish women testified to using their tertiary education to better effects, with greater financial and familial rewards outside of Poland, (Ch.4). When Slough’s EU8-Polish women assumed de-skilling roles, (e.g. cleaning and child-minding), it was essentially to allow time to improve their English-language skills. Acknowledging it was poorly paid, the women testified to earning more than they did in Poland.

Expectedly, EU8-Polish women’s experiences were varied. For several EU8-Polish women they were wholly autonomous economic-actors; independent of male-partners or family members. Self-sufficient and refreshingly forthright EU8-Polish women appeared particularly able to offer no specific pattern of assurances of settlement-outcomes. Timeframes were open-ended, embodying Poland’s post-Communist EU-accession individual freedoms.

For many Somali-women, particularly those whose husbands remained in Somalia or had been killed, leaving them as single-mothers supporting a child or children, they too yearned to be occupationally, educationally, and socially mobile. This echoed the EU8-Polish women’s personal needs. Some Somali-women shared the novel experience of being altogether independent economic-actors rather than male reliant, although they were largely reliant on extended family support, (Ch.4). Civil war, trauma, loss of family, home, status and consistent uncertain legal-status meant these Somali-women had borne, ‘the brunt of subsequent difficulties’. By comparison with the EU8-Polish women interviewed, the Somali-women’s aspirations were likely to remain just that, long-term hopes rather than the short-term achievable goals the EU8-Polish women were fulfilling. Only in-part echoing Harris’ 2004 research, Slough’s Somali-women had ‘less of a public voice than men’, although diminutive changes were afoot. These were evidenced in conversations with undergraduate SF9; a single 18 year-old Slough born and bred second-generation British-Somali. Her opinions were well articulated, her aims well-defined and her ‘voice’ more fluent than the most confident Somali man interviewed. Harris’ findings were echoed regarding the first-generation Somali women’s life journeys however. In the

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1346 Anderson, B., Ruhs, M., Rogaly, B. & Spencer, S. 2006, Central and East European Migrants in Low Wage Employment in the UK, JRF,[08.05.2009]
1347 Central Statistical Office:Poland 2005, Men and Women Employment: (GUS) – Polish Central Statistical Office,[08.05.2009]
1349 Harris, H. 2004,p.59
immediate post-1991 period, ‘the majority of Somalis reaching England were single-mothers with... children’,\textsuperscript{1350} Their ‘generation and date of arrival crucially affected (their) experience(s)’.\textsuperscript{1351} Although not identical, Slough’s first-generation Somali-women illustrated the existent notion of the myth-of-return.\textsuperscript{1352} The myth appeared to permit clan and oppressive patriarchy to control and direct many of them, reaffirming Somali-women hold ‘depreciatory image(s) of themselves’.\textsuperscript{1353} Slough’s first-generation placed great importance on gender-based hierarchies; women remained, publicly at least, subservient to men.

It became indirectly apparent the Slough-Somali hid the prevalence of domestic violence against women and continued illegal FGM-practices. Several of the Somali-men spoke of marital breakdowns, admitting (off the record) that their misuse of Qat and alcohol often created family problems. SBC\textsuperscript{1354} acknowledged these problematic tacit practices. Some Somali-men employed patriarchal religious-based reasoning to subjugate Somali-women; several considered Somali-women’s embracing Westernization/Europeanization as ‘abandoning Islam’.\textsuperscript{1355} The contrary ‘when in Rome’ perspective was voiced by some Somali-women (Ch.4). Loss of male-status through low-pay, unemployment, legal-status uncertainty, wider-marginalization and addictions was contributing to domestic-violence, separation and divorce. Unemployment exacerbated gender-based resentments, especially as many women had secured some work with their preparedness ‘to undertake...menial work, cleaning or low paid work’.\textsuperscript{1356} The balance of gender-power had observably changed. Many Slough-Somali women were in ‘control (of) family finances...social-welfare payments... (Altering) the relationship between them and their partners, particularly (when the men were) out of work’.\textsuperscript{1357} Unfortunately much of the secondary-literature remained inclined to view migration as a male occurrence.\textsuperscript{1358} This well-defined research unearthed that Slough’s Somali-women were not simply dependents; secondary-family, secondary-labour migrants,\textsuperscript{1359} secondary asylum-seekers. They were frequently principal actors, (e.g. Teacher SF6; Businesswoman: SF14 and Administrator: SF15 – see Ch.4).

\textsuperscript{1350} Ibid, p.60
\textsuperscript{1351} Ibid
\textsuperscript{1352} Anwar, M. 1979
\textsuperscript{1353} Harris, H. 2004, p.60
\textsuperscript{1354} Maan, A. 2007
\textsuperscript{1355} Hassan, H. 2002, ‘Not Housekeepers Anymore’- Somali-women the Diaspora,Open Democracy,[11.05.2009]
\textsuperscript{1356} Harris, H. 2004, pp.60-61
\textsuperscript{1357} Olden, A. 1999, ‘Somali Refugees in London:Oral-culture in a Western Information Environment’ Libri,vol.49,no.1,p.220
\textsuperscript{1358} UN Secretariat, 2006, Gender, Migration, Remittances and Development (Report:UN/POP/MIG-SCM/2006/02), UN INSTRAW, New York,p.2
\textsuperscript{1359} Mitter, S. 1988, Common Fate, Common Bond: Women in the Global Economy, Pluto,London
Both protagonists shared some patriarchal and familial ideological ‘similarities’ however; largely those subjugating women, although most Slough EU8-Poles were single/newly-married and childless whereas Slough’s Somali were ‘large’ families, older, married or separated/divorced/widowed. Outwardly restrictive Somali patriarchal and matriarchal perspectives regarding the acceptability of daughters, female-teenagers or young women ‘dating’ or marrying outside the Muslim faith was tangible. This same interfaith constraining view was similarly voiced by some EU8-Poles regarding, daughters and Catholicism, (Ch.4). Formal educational expectation for the Somali protagonist’s children was genderized; learning more important for boys than girls. No such genderization was apparent in the EU8-Polish cohort. Both protagonists gave the impression that sons, whether born or to be born, would enjoy greater freedoms however, although the young Somali-males were creating concern by their use of western ‘role-models’, anti-social behaviour and disengagement from education because of racial-prejudice, (Ch.4).

Both protagonists held veins of inter-generational disagreement regarding gender-freedoms expected and/or permitted. Both had commented their sons, male-teenagers or young men could ‘date’ and even marry outside of family faiths. The Slough-Somali preferred sons to marry Somali-women but were not insistent, as they unquestionably were for daughters and female relatives marrying Somali-Muslim men. For the EU8-Poles, an equivalent cultural preference was apparent regarding Polish-heritage for their off-spring’s spouses and in some cases Catholicism. Pragmatism however largely ruled that choices ultimately belonged to their children, (Ch.4).

**Summing-up**

In identifying tangible differences between and within the protagonist groups, the reviewed secondary literature evidenced the need to move beyond pre-existent narrative and geographic boundaries. The need for more regional locations as research settings was evidenced by the literature’s city-landscapes concentration and

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1362 Sultana, A, 2010, p.7
1363 Ridgeway, C.L. & Kricheli-Katz, T, 2013, *Intersecting Cultural Beliefs in Social Relations: Gender, Race, and Class Binds and Freedoms*, Sage, Stanford-USA/Tel Aviv-Israel
1364 Murray, D, 2014, (14 June), *It’s not just schools – Britain has let Islamists run riot*, The Spectator, London
1365 Ridgeway, C.L. & Kricheli-Katz, T, 2013
1366 Berns-McGown, R, 1999
1367 See Bibliography
dearth of regional towns (e.g. Slough). In recommending this however, recognition is
given to the convincing and objective points broached by each reviewed contributor.
Their works, in various ways and to varying degrees, supplied noteworthy background
information/data. Generally, each writer objectively and rationally justified points of
view in reaching their diverse conclusions. Methodologically, this original research
lent itself to future longitudinal study to provide greater insight and understanding of
the relationship between the Somali and the EU8-Poles in Slough and other regional-
town settings. It is hoped that (my) interaction with the protagonists will prove to be a
catalyst to draw them closer based on mutual interests and the similarities shared.
The semi-structured interviews produced the most significant outcomes and while it
is acknowledged each straightforwardly provided anecdotal evidence, (Ch.4), they
were, at the time of writing, alongside 2011 National Census data, the freshest
outcomes resulting.

Historic contextualization of the protagonist’s situations was essential to illustrate
relationships between ‘race’, migration, specific economic/political agendas, and the
State over time. For both protagonists it was historically evident that their respective
forerunner ‘waves’ had known what it was to be economic/political migrants, asylum-
seekers, and/or refugees. Moreover, it drew attention to recurring cultural and
historical displays of ethnocentric and xenophobic behaviours by the protagonists
towards other migrants/ethnic groups, and in the case of the Somali, one another.
These novel findings revealed Slough’s ‘growing complexity of identities’ within
each protagonist group. Historic contextualization fed into identifying contemporary
internal and entrenched divisions; frequently based around social, economic, political,
gender and generational relationships. For Slough’s Somali, the myth-of-return, clan-
identity and clan-politics in Somalia repeatedly fractured their unity. On one hand clan
offered solidarity; a ‘survival mechanism’. On the other hand it promoted,
‘spitefulness, discrimination and negativity’. It was empirically apparent the
powerful but frequently insidious global web-like grip of clan consistently thwarted
effort(s) to achieve community-cohesion. This was the Slough-case despite the
evident need to compete for resources, within a structural framework, that vied for
degrees of institutional-completeness. Once this research probing stripped away the
wafer-thin veneer of Slough’s Somali ‘sameness’, it revealed that very strong links to
‘home’, to Somalia, were heavily influencing social interactions and hierarchy in

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1368 McNair, S. 2009, *Migration, Communities and Lifelong Learning*, Paper 3. NIACE, Leicester, p.34
1370 Ibid
Slough. It was conversationally evident that these issues added to Somali insecurities and anxiety regarding their perception of not ‘belonging’ and marginalization in the wider community.

As with all migrant cohorts to Britain, Slough’s Somali had encountered prejudice, xenophobia, and stereotyping. Their ‘blackness’ and more latterly, in the post-9/11, 7/7 and 21/7 periods, their Islamic religious beliefs had emphasized their ‘otherness’. They plainly experienced degrees of imposed and self-rejection, marginalization, restriction and exclusion. Structural-racism had, and continues to, confront all migrants to Britain but impacts some, like the Somali, more than others. This multiplicity dynamic has historically privileged ‘white’ people over ‘black’ people in the first instance and soon thereafter fostered countless filtering processes, subject to such variables as majority cultural expectations and diverse ethnic characteristics: for example ‘class’ and religion. This filtering cultivates the nation’s social, political, and economic hierarchies. The importance of reviewing the Slough-Somali experience through this lens was that by conceptually inflating the process it allowed the Somali struggle(s) throughout Anglo-Somali history to be visible afresh. This lens bestowed fresh empowerment illuminating a number of unresolved or debatable knowledge gaps and seeded new emphasis and acknowledgement to a marginalized peoples. The Somali have therefore not been portrayed herein only as ‘victims and objects…of popular racism’1372, but as resourceful contributors to this country’s historic fortunes, (Ch.3).

Slough’s EU8-Poles had successfully evoked positive British post-war memories of the Polish ‘race’. Notions of the stereotypical EU8-‘Polish plumber’ as being hard working had added further currency to positive recollections. For some EU8-Poles their ‘Polishness’ was paramount; for others it was ‘being replaced… by more complex and flexible identities based on locality and nation, history and religion, profession and classes’.1373 These individuals publicly spoke of being European and embracing their EU-citizenship rights, (Ch.4).

Whether Slough’s protagonists were figuratively experiencing ‘half-full or half-empty cups’ as migrants in Britain was a ‘knotty’ matter; complicated because determining each issue was dependent on multiple-perspectives. In addition to drawing on secondary research assessments, every interviewee had a bearing on determining

1371Tabili, L. 2003, pp.41-68  
1372Ibid,p.127  
1373McNair, S. 2009,p.34
multiple personal conclusions. Did being an asylum-seeker in Britain, being ‘black’ and/or being a Muslim in post-9/11 Britain always mean ‘the cup is half-empty’? It was too straightforward, and wrong, to automatically answer ‘yes’ to these questions. Each characteristic may only have contributed towards making a person, or a group, ‘vulnerable’; their ‘cups half-empty’. Publicly manifest vulnerability and tangible exposure were witnessed in the Slough-Somali circumstance however, contrasting with the equally perceptible and publicly manifest EU8-Polish ‘resilience’, although this was this researcher’s (my) evaluation. They fostered the memory of ‘homogenous-us’ (Britons and Poles) based in second-wave Polish migration; underpinned by their secure EU-citizen status. Publicly at least, most EU8-Poles embraced assimilative discourse. Slough’s Somali, legally encapsulated by the State as well as essentially self-encapsulated had done virtually nothing thus far to assuage impressions that as a ‘group’ they were self-isolating and wanted little integration; far less assimilation, into British society. Upon reflection, while much of the protagonist’s histories, natures, characters, and migratory experiences could be described as similar, as groups they essentially had not, could not, and chose not to engage with one another. They were distinct and differently perceived ethnic-minorities; internally heterogeneous in nature. Distinguishing binary socially constructed grounds of contrast was central to appreciating why the protagonists seemingly existed in cultural-parallel, (e.g. schooling, employment and ‘place’ – i.e. Chalvey/Slough herein) despite occupying many similarly ascribed (and prejudiced) migrant categories. Much of the history researched evidenced British State-determined reasoning for aspects of the protagonist’s diverse migratory trajectories and experiences. Some were unearthed as being based in and around ‘racial’ preference and others, more latterly, in non-Christian religious based suspicion and ignorance. Others still were grounded-in European colonial, humanitarian, economic, legal, political, and kinship issues.

Limitations
Having critically considered the research premise, read the relevant literature published around it, and, upon reflection, concluded the most appropriate research methodology was chosen, this research had limitations. Limitations were defined as

1374 Ingram, R. & Price, J. (eds.) 2010, Vulnerability to Psychopathology: Risk Across the Lifespan, Guildford , New York,p.147(Culture)/pp.300-301(Socio-economic)/pp.342-347(PTSD)
design and/or methodology characteristics that impacted and/or influenced the application or interpretation of the results of the study.

The choice of snowball-sampling required a great deal of relationship building to reduce, if not remove completely, potential sources of bias both from the gatekeepers as well as (me) the researcher. It remains the case ‘snowballing’ was a purposeful sampling strategy for this research. Truthfully, the subjectivity of any qualitative research leaves itself open to questioning regarding its validity by verification. These limitations included exaggeration of events in the experiences and lives of the interviewees to present the answers to the research questions posed that each person construed the study sought to glean. They also included interviewee ‘telescoping’ where interviewees could have recalled events that occurred at one time as if they occurred at another time, for greater impact and even kudos. Both exaggeration and telescoping could also have been researcher generated although every effort not to emphasize or time shift was analytically made. Acknowledgement is given here regarding the generalizability of the findings and sample size employed being, in part, a limitation, although explanation is required why it is included. This predominantly qualitative research gleaned ‘rich’, ‘deep’, ‘thick’ and at times (very) ‘raw’ data. Because the inductive nature of the analysis itself defines qualitative inquiry per se, the generalizability of conclusions drawn from the seventy-four interviewees could not be guaranteed, although there are commonalities from Slough with other EU8-Polish and Somali reporting in other areas. Examples include, Eade’s 1377 Tower Hamlets and White’s 1378 Bristol research regarding EU8-Poles; El-Solh’s 1379 East End of London, Berns-McGown’s 1380 London/Toronto, Griffiths’ 1381 London and Harris’ 1382 UK-wide studies regarding Somali-in-Britain. The sample size remains viewed as credible, and a sound basis for future research.

Conclusion
The specific relationship between the protagonists had not previously been studied. 1383 This original research explored the ‘rhythms and realities of everyday life of both the long-term settled (Somali) and new-arrival (EU8-Poles)’, 1384 confirming

1377Eade, J. 2006
1378White, A., 2011
1379El-Solh, C.F. 1991
1380Berns-McGown, R. 1999
1381Griffiths, D.J. 2002
1382Harris, H. 2004
1383Beyond a specialized investigation into substance-misuse by Maan, A. 2007
1384Hickman, M, Crowley, H & Mai, N. 2008, Immigration and social-cohesion in the UK, JRF/London Metropolitan University, London
the pre-investigation claim that the protagonists had not engaged with each other; despite Slough’s long-standing multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious character. The protagonists were conspicuously distinguished ethnic-minority groups. The research was considered therefore to have achieved its principle corroborative aim and to be a new contribution to the existing body of global migration and settlement literature. These novel findings have enriched understanding of migration and settlement as a cross-disciplinary subject, contributing illustrative material and empirical evidence in a contemporary regional British setting. This original research achieved this by especially observed original anecdotal evidence supported by National Census 2011 data.

This chapter concludes by teasing-out evidence; engaging with wider debates for the reader(s) to ponder. Contextually, the points raised echo the protagonist’s perceptions of themselves, each other and wider Slough communities, (Ch.4), emphasising the major points unearthed. For example, the tensions witnessed in Chalvey, particularly Somali anxieties, were not solely predicated on the high numbers and activities of Slough’s EU8-Poles. These stresses were conjoined with ‘other forms of social exclusion like poverty, poor housing and unemployment’. While acknowledging the arrival of new migrants may emphasise degrees of resilience within dispossessed communities, Slough’s Somali appeared unable or unwilling to rely on, or call upon Slough’s wider Muslim community hardiness to sustain them. Slough-Somali resilience was predicated on clan. Slough’s Somali were not characterised by ‘flexibility and adaptability’. Pre-existent angst expressed by many of the Somali was exacerbated by the EU8-Poles arrival; another challenge to the already unstable Somali status quo. This perceived confrontation probably led to the intensified perception that as a community Slough’s Somali faced weightier ‘discrimination and disadvantage’ in having their socio-economic needs met. (Not every Somali interviewed subscribed to this negative assessment, although anything other than this was a minority standpoint).

By comparison, Slough’s EU8-Poles were essentially exemplified by ‘flexibility and adaptability’ and had importantly taken ownership of ‘full and equal

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1385 McNair, S. 2009, p.34
1387 McNair, S. 2009, p.41
1388 Pickett et al, 2004, p.370
1389 McNair, S. 2009
1390 Pickett et al, 2004, p.370
Chapter 5: Comparative-analysis, conclusion and recommendations

membership’ of their place(s) in Slough. (Their sense of ‘membership of community’, by way of British public memory, borrowed from the second-wave, the Polish Catholic church and their EU legal-status was noteworthy). EU8-Polish resilience was demonstrable in what they shared during the interviews; ‘social capital, physical infrastructure… new growth’. Although heterogeneous, Slough’s EU8-Poles projected culturally embedded self-dependence and assuredness. Internal tensions were manifest however; particularly regarding class and religion. Professional EU8-Poles utilized the interview opportunities to besmirch and criticize. Qualified and skilled EU8-Poles were unequivocal in disparaging the lower Polish class if they publicly embarrassed them with poor behaviour and/or criminal activities, (Ch.4). Many professional EU8-Poles were outspoken as regards Polish Church-State complicity damaging Poland and being partly the cause of the EU8-Polish exodus. In both protagonist cases, ‘gender, age…qualifications, employment status and migration (legal) status’ repeatedly, although non-exhaustively, contributed to internal and external tensions.

In conjunction with ‘Voices from Slough’, (Ch.4), attention following is given over to specific ‘underlying values, experiences, (and) expectations’ arising from the (my) conversations with the protagonists. These dialogues sign-posted understanding and appreciation of the protagonists ‘neighbourhoods, diversity, community-involvement and (their) associated constraints and opportunities’ importantly and distinctively focusing on broader incidental issues. Considerations therefore are given to the themes of migration, dominant narratives, (meaning ‘whose voice’), the characteristics of majority and minority ethnic community relationships, identity, multiculturalism, Islamophobia, ‘new-racism’ and community-cohesion. This chapter ends with recommendations and identified future opportunities.

Slough’s first-generation Somali asserted their ‘invisibility’ and lack of voice in the wider community; not a unique finding, rather an example of a UK-wide Somali

1392 McNair, S. 2009,p.41
1394 McNair, S. 2009,p.41
1396 Ibid
phenomenon resonating with Harris’, Berns-McGowan’s and Hack-Polay’s research-topics. In Slough, it originated in the post-1989 context against the backdrop of Slough’s dominant Pakistani (Asian-British) community. This issue was acknowledged by SBC echoing the perspective that it was the ‘dominant narratives and practices (of Slough’s Pakistani in this instance, that were) key to understanding how new immigrants (i.e. the Somali) were perceived and addressed’. More latterly SBC, TVP and community groups have publicly acknowledged that the ‘exchange (of) ideas and sharing experiences do not happen by themselves’ as the town seeks to ‘improve cross cultural, interfaith and community understanding’ – addressing perhaps, in part at least, Slough-Somali invisibility.

From the Pakistani perspective, according to SBC, Slough’s Somali had always set themselves apart, perpetuating their invisibility and voicelessness. This evaluation was not helped by Chalvey’s growing unsafe reputation. The 2013 Hunt et al community-cohesion research for SBC reported this perception as continuing. A 24-35 year old female ‘Asian-British’ Hunt et al participant stated,

“I don’t go to Chalvey…someone will snatch my jewellery. There are always people shouting and they let their children play on the road…People will come up to you for your phone or your wallet”.

Another 16-24 year old ‘Asian-British’ female made the important point that minority ethnic ‘communities’ were not wholly homogenous,

“There are lots of Asians and Pakistanis...If you’re not part of those groups then you don’t belong...even people from within our community can make us feel like we don’t belong”.

As for Slough’s spacial-segregation; “you’ve got Somali people in one place and Pakistanis in another...people don’t understand each other’s culture”. This is not to suggest that only the ‘Asian-British’ / Pakistani narrative was being heard in the

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1397 Harris, H. 2004
1398 Berns-McGowan, R. 1999
1401 Ibid
1402 Ibid,p.13
1403 Ibid,p.18
town or that the Pakistani, Indian or Sikh communities were always homogenous to onlookers although the dominance of the Asian-British in Slough was summed up by a 16-24 ‘Asian-British’ male,

“When you’re not in Slough you realise you’re an Asian person in a different area but in Slough you wouldn’t think like that”1407

It was noteworthy that notions of ‘community’ differed between and within the protagonists. The internal perception of what a community was, or should be, was particularly delineated by generation and gender. The younger second-generation British-born Somali, (Ch.4), readily ‘identified with the majority (multicultural British) population and felt integrated’.1408 This drew attention to emerging Somali hybrid-identities, and drew out a strong vein of first-generation Somali belief that as an ethnic minority group, they were made to feel different. These views represented the two ends of the same migrant identity-spectrum. Both protagonist’s migration experiences, and those of prior waves, appeared to not only have brought about transfers of all aspects of their respective cultures into diaspora, but to have also acted as catalysts for the embryonic hybridised-identities. Some were temporary, while others were permanent. In each case, albeit to different degrees, a European identity was apparent. In the Somali case, this was manifest in its second-generation, (i.e. SF9) - the greatest observable challenge to the Somali first generation’s myth-of-return.

In 2008 Fiona Mactaggart, Slough’s Labour’s MP, wrote of there being ‘tensions between the Polish and Pakistani communities’1409 in the town. She cited the EU8-Poles resenting Pakistani landlords for high rents and young British-Pakistani’s blaming the ‘discrimination they faced in the job market on the readily available supply of (EU8-) Polish labour’.1410 Housing was an issue highlighting stark difference between the protagonists; tangible and highly visible. In the Somali case, private rental clustering in Slough’s deprived urbanised areas contrasted with the town’s open green spaces; the suburban outskirts where many EU8-Poles lived in rented-homes. The high proportion of privately rented multi-occupancy accommodation in Chalvey visibly lacked investment. Most properties visited as Somali interview venues desperately needed internal and external repairs. This observed, Chalvey would
surely have benefitted from ‘sustained investment (by landlords) in the infrastructure’\textsuperscript{1411} to improve its reputation and status as a ‘place’ and ‘space’; conceivably addressing the downbeat label that discriminated against those living there.

This research witnessed the EU8-Poles, although different and not ‘the same or like us’\textsuperscript{1412} regarding the Pakistani community, confidently challenging notions of there being a ‘privileged claim’\textsuperscript{1413} (by Asian-Britons) to who’s voice was civically heard in Slough. The EU8-Poles knew their legal rights as EU-citizens and were ‘in the ascendancy’.\textsuperscript{1414} This research unearthed a number of important issues in the day-to-day lives of Slough’s Somali and EU8-Polish communities illuminating over-arching themes regarding the nature of relations among and between them, and the majority Slough communities. For example, the aforementioned Chalvey perceptions and realities were also manifest regarding access to services and their cultural appropriateness, exposure to discrimination based on legal-status, nationality, skin-colour and religion and no less important, cultural and identity differences. Each needed to be overcome as ‘barriers (intended and accidental) to integration’,\textsuperscript{1415} to embrace, publicly at least, Britain’s majority ‘values and expectations’.\textsuperscript{1416} In this uneven relationship remains the host/settled migrant community’s feelings of being ‘threatened by incomers with unfamiliar expectations and attitudes’.\textsuperscript{1417} Slough’s Somali appeared to have shouldered both of these responsibilities; being settled and incoming-migrants.

The nature of relationships within and between the protagonists and the wider community was complex and frequently clouded. Neither group was homogenous. Not every Somali was a ‘friend’ to another; likewise with the EU8-Poles. Throughout the interviews however it was implicitly and explicitly apparent the Somali and EU8-Poles had similar expectations. Both wanted ‘safe, secure and convenient’\textsuperscript{1418} places to live and work and expected ‘reasonable neighbours…And) good public services…especially in housing and schools’.\textsuperscript{1419} A notable difference between them was the EU8-Poles had largely achieved this expectation; the Somali still strove to achieve it.

\textsuperscript{1411}Hickman et al 2008,p.6
\textsuperscript{1412}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1413}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1414}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1415}McNair, S. 2009,p.6
\textsuperscript{1416}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1417}Ibid
\textsuperscript{1418}Hickman et al 2008
\textsuperscript{1419}Ibid
Post A8-accession Britain-wide pressures on welfare-services are well documented, and much of the hostility towards migrants generally lies with central-government and its ‘failure to institute policies and programmes quickly enough to facilitate …provision of public services in areas that are receiving new arrivals’.\textsuperscript{1420} SBCs funding dispute with central-government was just one example of this. Fears that migrants make disproportionate demands on welfare-services have been a consistent post-WWII feature of cross-party immigration policy making and decision taking. Some of the Somali-women particularly complained regarding the poor service levels they received in respect of health care and their children’s education. They laid the blame for this however on prejudice against them and the costs associated with accommodating the EU8-Poles, (Ch.4). Other out-workings of this dissatisfaction included protagonist focus on areas including the cultural appropriateness of local care, (e.g. female doctors for the Somali-women). As for education it was the Somali call for Islam to feature more highly on the curriculum. The Somali women who complained, genuinely felt Britain’s general school curriculum did not reflect Britain’s cultural diversity; substantiating Williams’ observation that ‘social-policy is dominated …by the dominant values of society’.\textsuperscript{1421} As regards translation and interpretation services being offered there was little complaint at what was available. The Somali implied that ‘race’, religion and legal-status primarily differentiated the ‘haves’ and ‘have not’s’. They positioned themselves firmly in the ‘have not’s’ while the EU8-Poles, for the most part, accepted their situational economic realities. An area of convergence defining the protagonists as minorities was the interlinked employment-education question. Many non-professional EU8-Poles and most of the Somali spoke of being subjected to degrees of discrimination in Britain’s labour-market, (Ch.4). The Somali’s often uncertain legal-status and consequential labour-market disqualification assigned them to welfare-dependency. For both protagonists, educational qualifications were frequently down-graded, (e.g. a Polish Master’s degree was deemed to equal a British Bachelor’s degree). There are good arguments against this differentiation,

\textquote{Policy development (should be) based on acknowledging …immigrants are a constituent element of the settled population with equivalent …rights and entitlements}\textsuperscript{1422}

\textsuperscript{1420}\textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{1421}\textit{Williams, F. 1989, ‘Social-policy: A Critical Introduction - Issues Race, Gender and Class’, Polity, Oxford}
\textsuperscript{1422}\textit{Hickman et al 2008, p.6}
Challenging tradition, some EU8-Poles appeared willing, publicly and temporarily at least, to rise above notions of their national ‘Polishness’ while in Britain enabling themselves to ‘fit in’ more easily. Their chameleon-like ability served them well insofar as enabling them to shake off memories of personal and national embarrassment originating from their widespread poverty under Communism, and to be European, (Ch.4). There was a perceptible self-confidence about these peoples underlining the uniqueness of their overall circumstances in an EU context. It highlighted their legitimacy in occupying that particular demographic space. The EU8-Poles’ confidence in their belonging in Britain was ‘strongly rooted in their sense of (themselves as a) community’, 1423 while conversely many of the Somali felt ‘threatened by (the EU8-Poles as) new arrivals’. 1424 The EU8-Poles influx had shaken Slough-Somali notions of belonging; many Somali experienced heightened insecurities - certainly those with uncertain legal-status. When combined with their tangible concerns regarding preserving traditional Somali value-systems and adopting those they were confronted with, many were plagued by anxieties and guilt about those left behind (alive or dead) in Somalia. 1425

Since 2004, SBC had been financially constrained in materially engaging in its ‘role in the management of community-cohesion’ 1426 by the significant inflow of EU8-Poles into Slough. This singularity had drawn glaring attention to the reactions of, and between, the existing population, (particularly the Somali herein) and the EU8-Poles. While the Somali had muted expectations of ‘commonalities’ 1427 with the EU8-Poles, conversations with them revealed many blamed the EU8-Poles for explicitly contributing to Slough’s lack of community-cohesion. Acknowledging the axiom that ‘most people do not live with an expectation (of) being surrounded by people who have (exactly) the same values as themselves’, 1428 Slough’s first-generation Somali generally viewed any other ethnic group, and clan differences in their community, as cause to isolate. The EU8-Polish approach walked the fine line that exists between any new migration and social-cohesion. There was an implicit homogeneity expressed in them being ‘white’ and EU-citizens that linked them with Britain’s majority ethnic group, ‘white’ Britons. Several EU8-Poles inferred this connection, hinting at their belonging in Britain being ‘reinforced (by) the idea that ethnicity was

1423 McNair, S. 2009, p.7
1424 Ibid
1425 Ibid,p.28
1426 Ibid,p.47
1427 Hickman et al 2008, p.6
1428 Ibid
the property of historical immigrations and not of the majority ethnic group’. Herein, this meant ‘white-Britons’ and the post-WWII second and third Polish-waves settled in Britain. Several EU8-Poles struggled with Britain’s super-diverse multiculture reality, believing Britain too liberal in its approach to immigration. Some expressed neither the inclination nor the capacity to navigate the difficult line between community-cohesion and ethnic disjuncture; making living in Slough problematic on a day-to-day basis. As well as skin-colour differences, Islam in a post-9/11 context was an audible source of anger and used as a weapon against Britain’s largely broad-minded attitude to its form of multiculturalism. In 2014, international migration continues to be a ‘politically sensitive issue…during (this latest) time of economic contraction’ with coalition Prime Minister David Cameron, visiting Slough on 29 July, stating of newly arriving EU-migrants claiming UK welfare-benefits that the, ‘magnetic pull of UK benefits has to be addressed so (EU-migrants) come for the right reasons… (To) put Britain first’. Britain has been at various levels of ‘dip’ and ‘double-dip’ fiscal downturn since 2008 and subject to the Eurozone fallout vagaries since 2010. The spectre of Islamic radical violent extremism, masquerading as religious fervour, is presently yoked with another political ‘get tough on EU immigration’ mantra; this time in an effort to placate the right of the UK Conservative party and win back voters from the UK Independence Party. This contemporary moral panic recalls many of the features of 1919 Cardiff and 1958 Notting Hill - the latest ‘racism’ and recession conduit between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Truthfully however, UK economic sustainability remains heavily dependent on immigration. Slough’s EU8-Poles and Somali alike testified to being subjected to forms and degrees of ‘new racism’; meaning ‘racist’ public discourse portraying migrants as threats to the cultural and economic status quo. This was manifest, particularly from Somali perspectives, as ‘segregation in everyday life’, insofar as largely not being able to work and/or lacking employment-security. Ethnically diverse communities across Britain cannot be blamed for the erosion of social-cohesion in Britain. ‘Deprivation, disadvantage and long-term marginalisation’; migration related or not, must also be considered. This research has captured elements of their argument in how the protagonists have approached connecting with Britain’s structures (e.g.

1429 ibid
1431 ibid
1432 Smith, N, 2014
1434 Cohen, S. 2011
1436 Hickman, M, Crowley, H & Mai, N. 2008
education, employment, welfare-benefits) and its multicultural population. Slough’s unique super-diverse\textsuperscript{1437} community offered an ideal backcloth illuminating this; the EU8-Poles typically embraced and adapted to circumstances whereas the Somali had succumbed to the notion that ‘the greater the diversity in a community the greater the civic desolation’.\textsuperscript{1438}

An example of the EU8-Poles’ swift migratory-integration was via religion; specifically their active and visible, or passive embedded, following of Catholicism. For many, ‘religion (and their) religious values and religious organisations’ were often an important source of support’.\textsuperscript{1439} The Church of Devine Mercy met some of the interviewees differing needs. Conversely, notions of Somali ‘acceptance of cultural pluralism’\textsuperscript{1440} and the requirement for them to ‘adapt to…social changes’\textsuperscript{1441} in Slough were witnessed as minority-held views. Many Slough-Somali spoke directly of, and others alluded to, their perception of ‘resource conflicts… (and problems with) access to facilities, services (and) housing’;\textsuperscript{1442} especially since the EU8-Poles’ arrival. Many Somali even voiced that they were subject to ‘unfair treatment’;\textsuperscript{1443} in education and housing provision, (Ch.4). Their perception context appeared set in alleged local authority neglect and alienation. In fairness to SBC however, the 2004/05 influx of EU8-Poles placed its resources under unyielding pressure. It was ‘understandable (if) unfortunate (that SBC had to) prioritise…immediate policy challenges (the EU8-Poles arrival)’,\textsuperscript{1444} at the expense of existing migrant groups in Slough. A ‘damned if they did or damned if they didn’t’\textsuperscript{1445} scenario.

This original empirical study has shown how resource allocation(s), and/or their perception, had affected the community-cohesion dynamic for the protagonists, and their awareness of it. It was anticipated that given the passage of time and Slough’s unique multicultural benchmarking that greater, ‘social-cohesion... (would) be generated by this research’.\textsuperscript{1446} Empirically however, legal-status, ‘class’, gender, long-term marginalisation, alienation, imposed benefit-dependency and religion were each seen to play noteworthy roles in whether or not the Somali and EU8-Poles had

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Vervotec} Vervotec, S. 2006, Working paper: No.25(WP-06-25)
\bibitem{McNair} McNair, S. 2009,p.38
\bibitem{ibid} ibid p.48
\bibitem{1440} ibid
\bibitem{1441} ibid
\bibitem{1442} ibid
\bibitem{1443} ibid,p.47
\bibitem{1444} ibid
\bibitem{1445} Cress, F, 2005, Damned If I Do...Damned If I Don’t. Reflections a Conservative Atheist, Fultus, Palo Alto,USA,pp.30-31
\bibitem{Putnam} Putnam, R 2001,p.184
\end{thebibliography}
adapted and attempted to integrate with their respective new circumstances. This research offers the reader(s) an appreciation of some of the nuances and individualities of each of the protagonists through its circumstantial approach and regional setting. Some experiential and historic similarities were unearthed as part of secondary research herein but these had played no part in assisting tangible interconnection between the protagonists on any level. Somali resentment(s) towards the EU8-Poles being more readily accepted and enabled to integrate more easily into wider British society than they were was perceptible. The Somali were suspicious of the EU8-Poles; perceiving the EU8-Poles to have surpassed them with regard to accessing local community resources - a point robustly refuted by SBC and deemed an aspect of the ‘settled backlash’ phenomenon.

**Recommendations and identified future opportunities**

This research be seen as a starting point to respond to the investigation openings presented over its course. Its findings suggest potential courses of action for academia. Thereafter it prompts contemporary social-policy makers to use its findings to make or influence evidence-based policies; particularly, although not exclusively as regards migrant employment, housing and multicultural education. It is hoped these outcomes are catalysts for UK-wide regional town studies that collectively benchmark existing works in and around cities. This research demonstrates the need for comparative ethnic research at a regional level to engage with broader issues that have emerged in Britain in the new Millennium. These have been specifically highlighted as greater insights into provisional dominant narratives and updating and adding to research regarding the nature and characters of relations among majority and minority ethnic communities within a super-diversity framework; such as Slough. It is anticipated this should lead to spin-off investigation(s) into contextual identities; specifically how these impact the notion of a ‘national’ identity when politically, economically and culturally, ‘nation’ has been superseded. New-racism as segregation in everyday life should be investigated on socio-economic levels as well as cultural and religious platforms. The findings herein revealed occupational and social-class directly influenced exit-strategies for the Somali that, despite legal-status (the EU-Somali), were not guarantees of migrant ‘belonging’.

Both protagonists were incorrectly homogenised as ‘groups’, (e.g. in Britain’s media).

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1447Hickman et al,2008,p.185
1448Markova, E. & Black, R. 2007,p.71
1449Vervotec, S. 2006,(WP-06-25)
Each were tiered by class and largely distinguished from one another by legal-status; the exception(s) being the EU-Somali. Age, gender, ability, education, and work experience further defined every individual. Because Britain’s future economic sustainability remains reliant on migrant labour, migration and difference will remain a focus of new-racism concern(s); especially in terms of Islamophobia\textsuperscript{1450} and events that may exacerbate or diminish it. An identified research opportunity is investigation into the stalling EU-accession of Turkey - a Muslim nation, and how upon accession the EU legal-status hierarchy of entitlements/restrictions and religion would fuse on an \textit{international scale} across the Union. If politically manufactured community-cohesion is to be successful, new empirical information is constantly required to formulate workable solutions to ‘super-diverse’ harmony as multiculturalism is displaced by a \textit{‘dynamic interplay of variables’}\textsuperscript{1451} Another research opportunity is a detailed longitudinal investigation of the relationship/non-relationship of EU8-Poles, EU8-Somali and non-EU Somali migrants, in Slough and other comparative regional areas. In 2014 it remains true, a decade after Harris, that greater \textit{‘understanding of the socio-political aspect of Somali UK-based diaspora’}\textsuperscript{1452} is needed. This research has drawn out the veracity of Somali angst and tension at their perception of not being treated equally with other migrant-groups, (Ch.4). Legal-status has been demonstrated as paramount in understanding many key differences in diasporic experience between and within different groups. UK social-policy makers need to fathom and resolve the embedded array of complex causes and rationale for Somali marginalization. Many of these are acknowledged as being rooted in traditional Somali clan and kinship and this thesis’ explanation has added to the background appreciation of Britain’s Somali ‘community’; refreshing important points of debate regarding Somali self-marginalization, in particular introducing their non-relationship with EU8-Poles in Slough.

\textsuperscript{1451} Vertovec, S., 2007,p.3
\textsuperscript{1452} Harris, H. June 2004
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