ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS AND PHILOSOPHY

**Reconsidering the Concept of *Daimôn***

**in Homer: A Revised Interpretation of the Term and Evaluation of its Role in the Poems**

**Eleni Katsae**

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**Declaration of Authorship**

I, Eleni Katsae, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed:

Date:

**ABSTRACT**

The thesis focuses on the concept of the term *daimôn* in Homer. It offers a new interpretation of the term and an evaluation of its role in the poems. The aim of my research is to build upon the three ways in which the term was used: first, in a general sense; second, as a term whose meaning depended on specific literary context; and, third, as a purposefully ‘ambiguous’ symbol. While the term *daimôn* is certainly associated with several distinct aspects of the superhuman ‘other’ in epic, I argue that the term functions in two principle ways: first, as a means by which mortals represent forces beyond their control and understanding; and, second, as an ‘identifiable sign’ of the ‘mysterious’ and the ‘unknown’ in the epics. The term *daimôn*s hows that, regardless of what is ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ in human experience, the ‘unknown’ part of the world of gods and men has real consequences for humanity. This divine influence over mortal life is the essential supernatural characteristic of those forces associated with the term *daimôn*.

The thesis contains an Introduction, followed by four main chapters.

**Chapter one** provides a review of scholarship; it analyses the term’s uncertain etymology and examines the history of the scholarly tradition about the word. This discussion is divided into two parts. The first considers the basic, divergent etymological explanations for the term *daimôn* and its derivatives: the vocative δαιμόνιε and the formula δαίμονι ἶσος. One explanation offers the meaning of the word as ‘allotter of one’s lot’, while the other with the signification of the ‘disruptor of man’s life’). The second part shows how the widely divergent usage, etymological variants and different readings of the term *daimôn* generated different general interpretations that led to wide differences of opinion among scholars of Greek religion. Specifically, some scholars associated the term with the anthropomorphic gods while others associated it with an unspecified supernatural power. This chapter argues such conflicting and incompatible positions problematise the term in such a way as to merit a reevaluation of its meaning and significance in the Homeric epics.

**Chapter two** applies narratological theory, particularly the notion of focalization, to examine the term multiple meanings the term *daimôn* has when read in the context of its various uses through the poems. That is to say, depending on the context, the term *daimôn* can refer to three different concepts: (1) a specific god, (2) the Olympian gods as a group, (3) fate and (4) a mysterious supernatural power. This narratological analysis will reveal that, behind these varying applications lies a consistent understanding of ther term as representing some power beyond mortal comprehension. In line with my main argument, chapter two ultimately uses focalization to highlight the term’s qualification as a ‘single’ ‘complex’ signifier that maintains a unified yet multi-faceted supernatural dimension to the human world.

**Chapter three** considers three aspects of the term’s function within Homeric poetic language and style, specifically its function as (1) a narrative device, (2) a formula within epic discourse, and (3) an element within Homeric type-scenes. This stylistic analysis demonstrates how this single word can be associated with a number of diverse entities, mortal, divine and superhuman. The word is used in two particularly significant ways: first, in the formulaic phrase δαίμονι ἶσος and, second, in the vocative form δαιμόνιε. These uses highlight the role of the term as a ‘spoken sign’ of the mysterious, the non-rational and the excessive as it relates to both gods and mortals in the epics. An understanding of its function in these different contexts points to the complicated relationship between the gods and mortals.

**Chapter four** argues that the complicated significations of *daimôn* can, in fact, be reconfigured as the key to a revised interpretation of the ‘epistemic experience’ within the world of Homeric epic. This chapter suggests that, alongside the existential constructs of ‘men’ and ‘gods’ in Homer, we should also consider an essential, possibly simpler distinction, between ‘what is known and is understood in experience’ and the phenomenological ‘unknown’. From this perspective, the concept of *daimôn* can be seen as a ‘typical expression’, a ‘phraseological byte’ and as the label for a broad range of ‘the unknown’. From this, I conclude that the use of the term is how the poem’s deal with the conceptual problem of understanding actions and forces beyond man’s control. The term is a verbal device that allows the ‘beyond’ to be organised and expressed while nevertheless maintaining the different ways this unknowability is manifested in the complex but coherent world of Homeric epic.

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‘*When you set out on your journey to Ithaca, pray that the road is long, full of adventure, full of knowledge’,* Konstantinos P. Kavafis, *Ithaca*. Long was the road to the completion of this thesis; longer than I ever expected. The benefits were undoubtly many and of great value. They will accompany me for the rest of my life. The idea of writing this thesis originated with an essay entitled ‘The History of Daemon from Homer to Christianity’, written many years ago during my MA studies at the University of Leeds. Versions of chapters of this thesis were presented in Glasgow, Manchester, Birmingham, London, Edinburgh, Cyprus; the comments I received from the audiences of these presentations were very beneficial.

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I am ending these acknowledgements with one strong belief: that, in fact, Ithaca did not trick me after all…*‘Wise as you have become, with so much experience, you must have understood what Ithacas mean.’ (Ithaca)* I leave the rest to you…

E.K.

*London, 2014*

**ABBREVIATIONS**

Abbreviations of technical narratological terms are those used by De Jong, I. J. F.

(2004) *Narrators and Focalizers: the Presentation of the Story in the Iliad,* London:

Bristol Classical Press. In addition, I have used the following abbreviations.

N Narrator

F Focalizer

NF1 Primary Narrator-Focalizer

F2 Secondary Focalizer

NF2 Secondary Narrator-Focalizer

Ne Narratee

Fe Focalizee

NeFe Primary Narratee-Focalizee

Fe2 Secondary Focalizee

NeFe2 Secondary Narratee-Focalizee

C Character

Other abbreviations used in this thesis are the following.

*LSJ7* Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R. (1890) *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 7th edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press

*LSJ9* Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R. (1925-40) *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 1-2, new edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press

Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R. (1967) *A Greek- English Lexicon*, 9th edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press

Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R. (1996) *A Greek- English Lexicon*. 9th edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press

*OCD3* Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (1996) *The Oxford Classical Dictionary.* 3rd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press

**LIST OF TABLES**

1. The Frequency of the Term *daimôn* in Homer
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**To my husband**

**Yiannis Pettemerides**

**INTRODUCTION**

**In Search of the Term *Daimôn*’s Identification and Positioning in the Homeric World**

The devil [the demon] is the name for a body politic in which there are very different orders and degrees of spirits and perhaps as much variety of place and state as among ourselves.

(J. Glanville, “Saducismus Triumphatus”)[[1]](#footnote-1)

The purpose of the present thesis is to examine the role of the term *daimôn* as a conceptual device that contributes to Homer’s representation of forces beyond man’s control and understanding. This study focuses on role of the term as an ‘identifiable sign’ of the inexplicable and the mysterious (terms which I will define further) in the interaction of gods and men. This role is important because it offers insight into what has so far remained unknown and mysterious concerning the many different and sometimes incompatible aspects of divine manifestation in Homer. As we shall see, the term as a concept for expressing the unknowability of the divine is reinforced by its quality as a term denoting diversity and, at the same time, as what I call ‘a point of convergence’, by which I mean, the term refers to a variety of different manifestations of the supernatural. Specifically, the term can refer to five different but associated concepts: (1) a specific but unnamed superhuman agent, (2) a named god or goddess, (3) a collective divine force, (4) a chthonic power or (5) an unaccountable strain in mortal behaviour. In the past, scholars have perceived this diversity of denotation as a problem. There have been various (often unsuccessful or partly reductive) attempts to reconcile these different aspects of the term.[[2]](#footnote-2) These differences are indeed significant, and it is not surprising that this term presented a scholarly problem. In what follows, I take a different approach which relies, on the one hand, on the frequent usage of the word in various contexts and by various focalizers, and on the other, on the usage of the term as a narrative device (i.e. as a formula within epic narrative and as an element within Homeric type-scenes) to point to the term’s diverse meanings and functions. My goal is to demonstrate how this single term serves as a referent for a variety of representations of the unknown depending on the narratological context in which it is used. This is important, I argue, not only because the term’s function as a point of convergence is what keeps together all these diverse entities (i.e. specific gods, fate, Zeus and other divine entities), but also because it associates the term *daimôn* with a positive function referring to those powers which can equally bring good as well as bad. What unites all these entities and functions is the mysterious and irrational nature of the superhuman ‘other’. The term thus allows the ‘unknowable’ and the ‘beyond’ to be organised and expressed while nevertheless maintaining the polymorphic but structured world of the epics.

**The Term *Daimôn,* ‘the Known’ and ‘the Unknown’**

We are accustomed to the idea of an omniscient narrator-focalizer that possesses knowledge of almost everything in Homer. Often we become witnesses of that fascinating and external presenter of the epic story who claims to give a reliable account of the events he presents by invoking the Muses as his eyewitnesses.[[3]](#footnote-3) Most amazing of all is the ease with which the primary narrator-focalizer moves across the world, from narrating events at the Trojan camp to events at the Greek camp, from earth to Olympus and from the mythical Scheria to Ithaca. His privileged knowledge and the ease with which he can read the minds of his characters provides him with the ability to know from the very start or even before the narration of the events how the epic story will end.[[4]](#footnote-4) He is aware of the intention behind every action of every character in the poems. He is also privileged with the ability of identifying even the names of the gods who remain unknown to the mortal characters even as the set in motion chains of events which have significant consequences for humanity. Most of the time, from our privileged perspective as the readers and/or audience of Homer, we too have the opportunity to know things that have so far remained unknown and mysterious to us; this knowledge very often derives from the descriptions offered to us by the omniscient narrator-focalizer. In fact, it is the omniscient narrator-focalizer who introduces us to the term *daimôn* as an important Homeric device. This term reveals much about the unknown and (to mortals) unknowable in the Homeric world. The term functions to reveal the characters’ our ignorance of the true identity of the power that lies behind the unknowable forces which are the causes of action in Homer. For example, the omniscient narrator-focalizer’s use of the term *daimôn* is what helps Odysseus realise that Athena has been his unknown benefactor, that she is the one responsible for this sudden and favourable intervention in his life. In a similar way, during his conversation with Athena, Diomedes (i.e. a character in the plot) uses the term *daimôn* to reveal his ignorance of the true identity of the god that lies behind the events which affect him. In sum, what this thesis demonstrates is the importance of the term *daimôn* as a conceptual device in Homer; this is a quality, I suggest, that may in fact question the significant role of the gods in the epics. In fact, it is no wonder that in the recent past, the study of Greek religion has experienced an across the board renaissance. The new data collected, much of which come from hugely important works in the field of Greek religion, fill important gaps in our knowledge of the nature of the divine and its existence in the epics. The gods were at the centre of scholarly attention mainly for two reasons: firstly, for their prominent role in both the investigation of this complicated polytheistic world of Homer and secondly, for their role as a plot deviceused to propel the action along. The gods intervene in both physically and psychologically in human action to steer events in the direction they want and to prompt characters to behave in ways necessary to the forward movement of plot. Therefore, it is no surprise that the gods as a major aspect of the divine apparatus have attracted sustained interest from scholars. This even justifies to some extent the reason why the spiritual concepts contained in the term *daimôn* and other similar supernatural entities have often been overshadowed by the role of the gods as the primary focus of research this specific field. However, this thesis in part challenges this tradition by emphasizing the role of the term *daimôn* in the poems. In so doing, it elevates its position in the supernatural hierarchy in the epics, giving it nearly equal weight as the gods as important supernatural concepts and literary devices.

What follows constitutes an analysis of the ideas of the ‘mysterious’, ‘unpredictable’ and the ‘unknown’, which are the basic qualities of a*daimôn* and which make it a ‘sign of the mysterious’. The next sections examines the related functions of the term as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ and as a conceptual device. They point to the term’s signifying function of what is ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ with regards to the gods and mortals and the various aspects of the superhuman ‘other’ in Homer.

**Defining the ‘Mysterious’ in Homer’s Use of the Term *Daimôn***

This part of my argument constitutes an attempt to define the ‘mysterious’ aspects which are evoked by the term *daimôn*. The purpose of such an attempt is twofold: first, to demonstrate how the term’s mysterious nature, as identified by the reaction of men towards their external reality,[[5]](#footnote-5) may in fact become a common element between the term *daimôn* and related concepts. It also highlights the term’s characterisation as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ related to these powers and to what so far remained ‘unknown’ in their nature. Second, it demonstrates how the term may be used to refer to those aspects of the divine which are incomprehensible or unknowable to mortals. Such an analysis will contribute to a better understanding the nature of the activities and the constructed relationships of the various entities that constitute significant aspects of both the concept of *daimôn* and that of the superhuman ‘other’ in Homer. This is closely related to their equal claim to what is named after the ‘mysterious nature’ of those things referred to by the term *daimôn*.

 Above I have noted the existence of the divide between ‘what is known’ and ‘what remains unknown’ in man’s understanding and perception of the world. I have further suggested that this divide exists beyond the usual binary of ‘mortal’ – ‘immortal’. At this point, I suggest that what ‘remains unknown’ is associated with the ‘mysterious’, the ‘non-rational’ and the ‘ambiguous’. These aspects are part of an invisible and unexplained divine prompting by a god whose identity is known to both the narrator and the audience, but not to thecharacter in the text who is the recipient of such prompting. This anonymous divine force might be held responsible – not he or she as such, but this ‘mysterious’ aspect of his or her nature – for an irrational impulse or for a stroke of unusual luck.[[6]](#footnote-6) Even more, the above might be closely related to the human perception of a *daimôn* and which also, as I will further explain, relates the term to everything ‘mysterious’, ‘unexplained’ and ‘irrational.’

In what follows, I shall use an example from the *Iliad* (15.468), which presents different speakers’ perceptions of the supernatural manifestations which they refer to by the term *daimôn*, and of the way these speakers understand/feel the impact of such manifestations in their lives. Such an analysis will demonstrate how different perceptions/feelings/understandings may in fact help us identify the shared ‘mysterious’ aspect represented by the term *daimôn* and these other supernatural powers. *Il*. 15.468 provides strong evidence for the hypothesis that the best way of approaching the ‘mysterious’ aspects of the divine realm, including those represented by the term *daimôn*, is through an examination of the agents’ feelings/perceptions of it. The ‘unknown’ and the ‘non-rational’ can thus be understood as the mysterious element of those experiences referred to by the term *daimôn*. The significance of this is closely associated with the term’s role as an identifiable sign of what has so far remained unknown and unexpressed concerning the various aspects of the superhuman ‘other’ in Homer.

 To begin with, Teucer, Aias and Hector, the three characters involved in the specific scene, witness an unexpected and unexplained event taking place in the middle of a fight between Hector and Teucer, an event that the Greeks attribute to a mysterious supernatural power which they refert to by the term *daimôn* (identified with some god or with an unspecified supernatural power). By contrast, the omniscient-narrator focalizer and Hector, from his privileged position as the protégé of Zeus, perceive this event differently. Although the same scene is already described by the narrator in the preceding lines (15.460-65), we get to know the mysterious nature of the unidentified supernatural forces/god represented by the term *daimôn* only when we come to the descriptions of the reactions of the characters involved in that specific scene (e.g. Teucer, Aias and Hector). Teucer shuddering from fear (ἐρρίγησεν), and full of awe, anguish and despair cries out: ‘See now, how hard the divinity (δαίμων) cuts across the intention in all our battle (ὢπόποι, ἦ δὴ πάγχυ μάχης ... δαίμων ἡμετέρης) …who has broken the fresh-twisted sinew of the bowstring I bound on this morning (468ff.).[[7]](#footnote-7) Teucer experiences this specific event in a way that highlights his great fear of and astonishment before an action that, from his limited perspective, leaves him ignorant of the true identity of the god responsible. For this very reason, Teucer attributes to an un-named, unspecified divine agent a form of responsibility that could otherwise be characterised as a non-rational activity beyond logical explanation. Teucer even claims that the *daimôn* ‘has broken it’ (468), whereas, only a few lines earlier, the primary narrator-focalizer (NF1) mentions that the ‘the bow dropped out of his hands’ (465) and that Zeus was responsible for this unexpected event.[[8]](#footnote-8) In fact, Teucer’s experience of the ‘mysterious’ element suggested by the term *daimôn* has to do with shuddering, a more than natural or ordinary fear. Such a fear can be likened to ‘daemonic dread’ or the feeling of primeval man when he imagines the presence of daemons and gods acting like daemons.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Aias refers to this incident in a very similar manner: he registers the same astonishment, awe and admitration, though with less trembling. Although the cause of the event has not been explained to him, Aias does not ascribe it to any known god; instead, he ascribes it to what seems to be the non-rational and unexpected element in the activity of the ‘begrudging’ god (473). Although Hector recognises the presence of Zeus behind this *daimonic* manifestation*,* he confronts the same event with similar awe and wonder (since Zeus did not reveal his true identity either to him or to the rest of the characters involved in the scene). This manifestation of the supernatural elements termed *daimonic* can best be understood through our experience as the audience/readers of Homer and, in the specific scene from *Il*. 15.468, through the experiences of the characters in the plot, helping us see what is unique about this aspect of the supernatural.

 At this point two questions must be answered: ‘what is so unique about the ‘mysterious’ elements of a *daimôn*?’ and ‘why is it so important to learn how to identify it?’ The answer is simple: behind what seems to be the identification of the mysterious elements of a *daimôn* lies man’s inability to grasp and express the ‘unknown’ in his consciousness. Such experiences of the unknown, the unknowable and the ambiguous had a unique significance for Homeric man. Responsibility for such events was attributed to a projection of their own unconscious or, more often, the unknown and mysterious *daimôn*.[[10]](#footnote-10) What seems to be related to the ‘mysterious’ in man’s perception of the *daimonic* can be identified with the terms originally employed by Rudolf Otto in an attempt to locate the main aspects of the *numinous* (the Holy, the Sacred): namely, the *tremendum*[[11]](#footnote-11)and the *fascinans*.[[12]](#footnote-12) The use of Otto’s concepts here will serve as a useful foundation for understanding my own interprestation of the term. What Otto calls the mysterious (or the *mysterium*) is that which is ‘wholly other’, that which lies outside the sphere of human experience and, most importantly, that which generates in human consciousness a feeling of tremor (*tremendum*) and that which creates fascination/ stupor/amazement (*fascinans*).

In the preceding discussion of *Iliad* 14, we have analysed certain reactions that derive from the characters’ awareness of the effects of the mysterious aspect of a *daimôn*, particularly their feelings of awe and wonder. Using Otto’s model as a frame for understanding the working of the supernatural elements of a *daimôn* will enable us to get a clearer understanding of its mysterious aspect.[[13]](#footnote-13)That is, following Otto, the mysterious (*mysterium*) cannot exist without the accompanying aspect of the awful (*tremendum*); with regards to the daimonic, one can hardly observe the former without catching an echo of the latter as well. As has been already seen in our analysis of the characters’ feelings (*Il*. 15.468), ‘awe’ is not the only mental reaction that is associated with the ‘mysterium’; the word ‘stupor’ (the Greek θάμβος), which signifiesthe blanking of the mind in wonder and amazement, also becomes a term of awe and, thus, an equally important aspect of the mysterious. As such, the experience of the *daimonic* contains the mysterious and the associated aspects of ‘awfulness’ and ‘majestas’. The last two in turn are identified by the feelings they produce as the ‘mysterious awe’, the ‘mysterious stupor’ and θάμβος.

Using Otto’s model to identify Homeric man’s emotional response towards experiencing a reality influenced by a variety of supernatural powers[[14]](#footnote-14) and to identify the effects of such powers upon Homeric man is important for the following two reasons. First, it is only through the identification of the feelings that result from the experience of the mysterious thatthe mysterious can be understood of as of ‘a secret or a mystery in the sense of that which is alien to us, uncomprehended and unexplained’.[[15]](#footnote-15) Further, our awareness of the mysterious may not be traced “in the presence of curious entities, called ‘souls’ or ‘spirits’, which happen to be invisible”, but only in the form of what may be called an ‘unclear stirring of feelings’[[16]](#footnote-16) - or as “a peculiar ‘moment’ of consciousness: the tremor and the stupor before something ‘wholly other’ (*mysterium*), whether such an other be named spirit or daemon or be left without any name”.[[17]](#footnote-17)At *Il.* 15. 468, the Greeks experience this as an unspecified angry god.

Second, an application of Otto’s model suggests that it is only after we become aware of the mysterious and of the ‘wholly other’ inherent in a *daimôn* that we will be able to usefully analyse its nature in the Homeric texts. In this way, we can come as close as possible to the reality depicted in the epic. It also enables us to come closer to a truth that has so far remained hidden beneath the mysterious side of the term *daimôn* and various aspects of the divine in Homer. This study argues that there is a distinction between the mysterious aspect of the term *daimôn* and the positive and negative results its intervention manifests in mortal affarirs. The use of the term *daimôn* as ‘a sign of the mysterious’ will enable us to better understand the ‘unknown’ aspects of the various entities of the superhuman ‘other’.

**The Term *Daimôn* as a ‘Sign of the Mysterious’**

At this point, the following inquiries remain unanswered: how does the term *daimôn* function as an identifiable ‘sign of the mysterious’? How could a better understanding of this aspect challenge the current scholarly understanding of the term as having a negative connotation? I will argue that when the term *daimôn* is examined in the context of the characters’ emotional responses and withing a narratological frame, the supernatural aspects represented by the term will come to have a positive connotation which, in Otto’s phrasing, designates a “unique ‘wholly other’”.

For example, the reactions of Teucer and Aias revealed a unique and previously unexamined referent for the term *daimôn*as either an unidentifiable angry god or some other unknown supernatural power. This supernatural force was held responsible for an otherwise inexplicable event in their lives. Although in this instance the effect of the power was both hostile and unknowable, the characters could still sense the mysterious presence of a supernatural entity at work. By articulating their emotional response to this event (i.e. awe, admiration, stupor), they were able to recognize for themselves the supernatural aspect of the events and describe it to each other. This thesis argues that Homeric man uses the term *daimôn*, as an ‘identifiable sign’ of the mysterious, to describe such events. The term *daimôn*is used to describe that aspect of the superhuman ‘other’ which remains inexplicable to mortals even after they have recognized some divine manifestation. Their acknowledgment of what remains unknown after such an occurrence – represented by the term *daimôn –* is as central to their experience as that which is known to them – the presence of the divine itself.

This insight is central to our revised interpretation of the operation of the divine in the mortal sphere and how it is understood by the mortals themselves.The mysterious aspect of the divine encoded in the term *daimôn* represents the essential unknowability of the divine when it is observed and experienced by mortals.

**The Role of the Term *Daimôn* as a Concept: the Combined Effects of the Divine in Homer**

**The Concept of the *Daimonic*; the Implications of Focalization; the Term *Daimôn* as a Sign of the Mysterious and as a Point of Convergence between the Various Aspects of theSuperhuman ‘Other’; the Term *Daimôn* as a Concept**

That the term *daimôn* contains the element of the mysterious does not suggest that the term should be associated with everything inexpressible. On the contrary, the current study emphasizes how a better understanding of the term can also shed light on those activities and beliefs with which it is associated. In what follows, I shall first examine how the term *daimôn* is used by different focalizers, thus highlighting its quality as a concept which refers to those aspects of the supernatural world which are unknowable, incomprehensible or inexplicable to mortals. Then, I shall demonstrate how a more precise understanding of the term based on its narratological context can also increase our understanding ofrelated manifestations of the divine. Whether as a specific god, the gods in general or the gods as the alloters of fate to men, these different manifestations of the divineaffect men in the epics in the sameway as a *daimôn*: mysterious and unpredictable. Like a *daimôn*, these associated manifestations can similarly be both benevolent and malevolent and have effects both mental and physical. This is importantfor two reasons. First, the term *daimôn* represents a variety of supernatural entities. Second, because the term *daimôn* can be used to refer to such a diverse range of supernatural entities, it isan important aspect of Greek religion. As a concept, the term *daimôn* is used by mortals to explain aspects of divine intervention in human affairs which are otherwise inexplicable. Thus, the role of the *daimonic* as a point of convergence may be used to illustrate the existence of a strong relationship between the supernatural events referred to by the term *daimôn* and the various aspects of the superhuman ‘other’. Indeed, this is what allows them to be found concentrated inthe context of the same universe of the Homeric world, as they converge in the single figure of *daimôn*.

**The Implications of Focalization and the Term *Daimôn* as a Conceptual Device: the Diversity of the Term’s Usage Combined with the Diversity of its Associated Concepts**

The gods and other powers of the divine world had a variety of different ways of engaging with the world of the mortals. Mortals referred to all of these several related yet distinct kinds of interactions with the term *daimôn.* Two methods of inquiry developed in this study’s two main chapters (chapters two and three) can help us understand this diverse set of functions subsumed under the term *daimôn*. The first method draws on the narratological concept of focalization. According to Irene de Jong, the focalizer is ‘the person (the narrator or a character) through whose eyes the events and persons of a narrative event are “seen”’.[[18]](#footnote-18) With regard to the term *daimôn*, focalization allows us to see how the word’s meanig depends on the perception of the speaker who uses it. The second conceives of the term *daimôn* as a rhetorical or literary device.

 To begin with the narratological perspective, we suggest that the meaning of the term *daimôn* depends on point of view; that is, the word can refer to different types of divine manifestations in the mortal world depending on who the focalizer of that event is. Different points of view *inside the text of the epics* (e.g. of the narrator, mortals and gods) can guide our understanding of the different divine aspects to which the term can be applied, such as, for instance, the divine world as a whole, a specific and identifiable god, or more general concepts such as fate or some unknowable supernatural power. Similarly, focalization can shape the perception of the function of these divine manifestions, that is, whether they are benevolent or malevolent activities or whether they have physical or mental effects. The use of the term *daimôn* by different focalizers or each time the term is used in a different discursive context (i.e. in the context of embedded focalization in direct discourse or in the omniscient narrator-focalizer’s own voice) show that each use of the term refers to a common mysterious nature. For example, the omniscient narrator-focalizer uses the term *daimôn* to refer to Aphrodite (*Il.* 3.420) and Helen (i.e. in *Il.* 3.339) reacts in wonder and astonishment, an emotional response closely associated with the mysterious nature of Aphrodite’s activities. This perception is shared by Hector (*Il*. 8.166), who is also struck with great awe and wonder at the sight of a divine manifestation but which he ascribes to Zeus. These activities are similarly mysterious and present no trace of personality.

The same happens when the gods as a whole are described: the same mysterious nature which is a basic aspect of their character is suggested by the use of the plural of the term by a mortal character in the plot (i.e. Hector in *Il*. 6.115) and by the narrator (i.e. *Il.* 1.222) when referring to the gods or even to a specific god. In the previous instances, this goddess is Athena, whose nature must remain unknown to the characters, in this case Achilles, involved in the specific scenes. If he had to confront Athena in this scene, he would most probably be described as feeling the same amazement and wonder as he did in a similar exchange with the goddess at*Il*.1.188, or even as the Trojans wereat *Il*. 6.115. Although the true identity of Athena is concealed by the reference to the collective gods and thus remains unknown to the Trojan people, it is likely that they would react the same way when confronted with the goddess.

This same mysterious and unspecified nature lies behind the use of the term by Menelaus in *Od*. 4.276 and Telemachus in *Od*. 16.194 to refer to an unspecified supernatural power. In great despair, Telemachus uses the term *daimôn* to mean an unspecified power that is held responsible for his father’s sudden and unexpected appearance. Similarly, Menelaus associates the term twice to refer to an unspecified supernatural power. First, he uses it to mean the supernatural force that he holds responsible for his and his wife’s unpleasant experience and, second, the force that drove Helen against her will to beguile the Greek warriors in the wooden horse (*Od*. 4.276).

What is more, when two different mortal speakers in the plot (i.e. Hector in *Il.* 8.166 and Menelaus in *Il.* 17.98) associate *daimôn* with a variety of different divine manisfestations (i.e. as some unknown god, Zeus, or some other specific god as the agents of fate and death in Homer, they do so in a way which emphasises their shared unpredictable and mysterious nature. This produces the same feeling of astonishment in the characters (i.e. Hector in *Il.* 17.94 and Diomedes in *Il.* 8.166) who had to face the same impact of the divine forces represtented by the term *daimôn*, that is, the divine as the allotters of fate and death in their lives.

 Because the term functions conceptually in this way and because of the common mysterious quality that it shares with other unkonwn manifestations of the divine, it demonstrates that these other functions are similarly endowed with the same unknowable quality. A narratological analysis suggests thatwhen various focalizers use the term *daimôn* to refer to the activities of a specific god or when its meaning is derived from the characters’ reactions to what seems to be an unexplained activity of a mysterious agent, they are actually identifying a specific god acting in a complex way. The divine in such cases can be both benevolent and malevolent, and effect mortals both mentally and physically. An example of the diverse uses of the term *daimôn* can be seen at *Il*. 15.468. In this single scene, we find different perspectives on the same divine manifestation, which is equally attributed to the term *daimôn* and Zeus. Thus, what to the narrator, Teucer and Aias (in the great astonishment of the two characters) seemed to be a malevolent activity, for Hector (even if he shares their astonishment became a benevolent one.

Similarly, different focalizers perceive the physical and mental effects of divine intervention differently as well. For instance, both Lycaon (*Il*. 21.93) and Odysseus (*Il.*14.488) use the term *daimôn* and the gods as its references in the aforementioned scenes to describe divine effects on both the mind and body of mortals which would otherwise be inexplicable. Odysseus, in great anguish and amazement, uses the term to allege that the gods beguiled him by inflicting him with mental blindness in order to stay out in the open at night without his cloak. Similarly, Lycaon, in great stupor and full of fear, uses the term *daimôn* to complain that the gods have driven him back to face Achilles for the second time.

The second assumption demonstrates how the term’s usage as a formula, as an element of Homeric type-scenes andas a vocative with a fixed meaning highlights the different ways in which the term is used by different focalizers. The term’s meaning can be associated with diverse kinds of divine intervention depending on form in the text, that is, as the vocative δαιμόνιε or as part of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος.

These uses of the term all describe a combination of excessive and mysterious/unaccountable attributes. This meaning of the term can be applied to a certain god, such as a goddess who is addressed as δαιμονίη, or to a mortal, such as when a terribly powerful warrior is referred to with the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος. This last usage suggests a type of mortal behaviour which has the power of divine intervention, as when a hero’s actions in battle resemble the frenzied and malicious behaviour of a god who has already been described by the term., Hera, who has already been characterised as δαιμονίη, a pattern found at *Il*. 4.31. A mortal character called by the vocative δαιμόνιε/ίη is another key marker which, gives it a positive connotation.

 The consistency with which the vocative δαιμόνιε has a substantive meaning which exceeds its roleas a metrical filler[[19]](#footnote-19) its continuing importance for defining the relationship between human and divine in the poems. As such, the term *daimôn* offers some insight into what has thus far remained unknown and unexplained in this relationship. The Homeric *daimôn*, contrary to what a significant scholar, Walter Burkert, defined as ‘the embarrassing remainder [of the gods] which eludes characterization and naming,’[[20]](#footnote-20) is not, as he claims, ‘the left overs of the gods’, but, rather, expresses that part of the divine sphere which lacked a name and identity.Usage of the vocative δαιμόνιε in dialogue points to the existence of a new side of the nature of the gods that complements their divine and anthropomorphic characteristics.

This time, however, it goes beyond the well-known idea that the gods are immortal, invisible and that ‘their knowledge surpasses the human measure by far, and [that] their plans are directed to distant ends and generally find fulfillment.’[[21]](#footnote-21) It has nothing to do with the individually recognisable gods who inhabit both Olympus and earth. Instead, the way people perceived and reacted to this kind of ferocious, vengeful and cunning divine behaviour marks it as representing a different aspect of the divine which comes closer to the demonic. For example, the usage of the vocative by Zeus[[22]](#footnote-22) to address Hera’s malicious behavior, which goes even beyond the traditionally configured identity of Hera as a deceptive goddess,[[23]](#footnote-23) becomes the sign of the goddess’s demonic character. The implication is the same when Helen[[24]](#footnote-24) uses the same vocative to register her great astonishment at the cunning and vengeful behaviour of Aphrodite, which, as in the case of Hera, goes beyond her traditional depiction as the goddess of love and sexuality.[[25]](#footnote-25) Usage of the same vocative[[26]](#footnote-26) by a mortal husband, Odysseus, to show his astonishment at his wife’s behaviour offers an example of a mortal woman possessed by the same mysterious bearing which differentiates her actions in this instance from her normal ones,[[27]](#footnote-27) and thus brings her closer to the behaviour of the two divinities, Hera and Aphrodite.

As such, the usage of the vocative to address all foul female personae[[28]](#footnote-28) analysed in this thesis and of the term *daimôn* as a sign of the mysterious also highlights the closeness between the two worlds; usage in reference to both mortals and immortals reflects abnormal and demonic behaviour. Usage of the vocative also highlights the role of the term as a point of convergence; the malicious quality which it implies in relation to both mortals and immortals decreases the seemingly identifiable distance between gods and men. But still, as analysis of the usage of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος will further suggest, there are more things dividing than connecting the two worlds.

**The Complexity of the term *Daimôn* in the Complicated Relationship of Gods and Mortals**

The formula δαίμονι ἶσος occurs in a number of type-scenes. In each, it has a specific meaning and function[[29]](#footnote-29) which mark it as an important rhetorical device in the Homeric epics. The formula is used to address the recurring theme of a mortal character’s superhuman behaviour, a kind of behaviour that shows a hero overstepping his mortal limits to such an extent that he puts his life at risk from divine rage. It derives from either of two meants of the term *daimôn*: from a comparison to a specific god’s supernatural powers or from the term’s general meaning as some indistinct excessive power. As such, it primarily becomes the means of explaining the striking divergence of the character contained within the meaning of the term *daimôn*. It then explains how the term’s complexity may be extended first to the relationship between gods and a *daimôn* and, secondly, the relationship between gods and men. This formula reproduces the complex nature of the concept, that is, its ability to combine multiple human and superhuman qualities and the existence of a dividing line between the acceptable behavior for gods and for men. This can be seen in the case of Hector, presented in this thesis as a peculiar form of a warrior referred to by the phrase δαίμονι ἶσος.Usage of the term as a sign of the superhuman in the human which causes uncontrollable mortal behaviour suggests that multiple differences between gods and men, such as how ‘divine blood is of a different sort from human blood, just as the food and drink of the gods are different, divine substances,’[[30]](#footnote-30) and how the gods stand at a distance from and in a position of power over the world of mortals, which again shows how the gods will always remain the Stronger Ones.[[31]](#footnote-31) It even goes beyond the well-known similarities between them, which again shows how the anthropomorphic gods may not always be omnipresent and omniscient, how divine wounds areas painful as mortal wounds, and how the gods cry, lament and suffer just like mortals do.[[32]](#footnote-32)

For example, the case of Diomedes, a warrior referred to by the formula δαίμονι ἶσος,[[33]](#footnote-33) gives a spectacular performance in the battle when he is assisted by both a god and some other supernatural entity referred to by the term *daimôn*, signifying in this context Zeus. When it describing the same ferocious warrior’s superhuman frenzy and excessive power, responsibility is attributed to the term *daimôn* as that mysterious concept which represents a certain closeness created between gods and men. As such, from our privileged perspective as the audience and/or readers of Homer, we may use our ability to decode the role of the termas a sign of excessive and supernatural force. It is what may be responsible for the kind of complicated relationship between gods and men. In the same way that mortals manage to identify the presence of a *daimôn* which may be held responsible for the interaction between these two worlds, readers too can understand the term as a link between these two most important aspects of the Homeric universe.

Because, as the following section argues, had it not been for the supernatural forces represented by the term *daimôn*,had there only been the two seemingly antithetical parts of the world of the epics being in constant conflict, then the whole constitution of the Homeric world might be impossible to understand. However, this becomes possible because of the term’s contribution as the unknowable part of a world constituting only gods and men.

**The Term *Daimôn* a Unifying Concept: What really happens in the Homeric World?**

Previously, I have referred to the term *daimôn* as a concept representing those parts of the world which are inexplicable to gods and men. This is important, I believe, because it enables what has so far remained unknown in the Homeric world to become known and to be expressed. Different focalizations of the term also point to the existence of a common mysterious power among the supernatural forces to which the term *daimôn* refers. This is also important, moreover, because it makes the term a unified concept. As a unified concept, it enables the various entities of the supernatural to be organised and still maintain their diversity in the context of the same universe of Homeric divinities. It offers us insight into how the totality of the Homeric world, including its divine and human elements, is constructed.

Greek religion was above all a polytheistic one, and thus seemed both disorganised and disunited. This was attributed to the sheer distance between man and gods; it derived from Plato (*Symp.* 203) who was the first to articulate the distinction that ‘god and man do not mix.’ This polytheistic religion was further expanded due to a variety of other superhuman and mysterious entities, which were left functioning on their own and in ways independent from those of the gods and the mortals. In the epic pantheon, for instance, winds, rivers, *Eos*, *Erinyes* and *Eileithyia* are venerated as gods in addition the Olympian ones. Various collective divine powers were also part of this world. They were worshipped collectively in a variety of local forms (the Graces, the Muses and the Nymphs, which were invisible and ‘indissociable’).[[34]](#footnote-34) Various personifications were found in the epics as well. They represent harmful demonological powers: *Phobos* (fear), *Deimos* (terror), *Eris* (discord), *Ossa* (rumour) or *Ate* (infatuation, folly) do not belong to the sphere of the gods.[[35]](#footnote-35)

More powerful than the gods on Olympus, ‘a dark indeterminate force is at work, in the face of which Zeus himself is impotent: *Moira*.’[[36]](#footnote-36) The Greeks also recognised the existence of ‘mysterious forms of divine powers, both beneficent and maleficent, with the capacity to intervene in human affairs.’[[37]](#footnote-37) But still, this study argues that a world with a complicated religious system does not have to be totally unorganised. The belief, I argue, that the Homeric world is a world in total and potential chaos may be attributed to the fact that Homer did not have a unified conception of the world he was describing.[[38]](#footnote-38) Because if he had, Homer would most certainly apply some sort of structure to it, since a world without a structure could not have any existence either. If, then, the Homeric world had managed theoretically to exist, this means that there must have been some sort of structure within it. Some attributed this order to Greek religion,[[39]](#footnote-39) and the Greek gods were also organised into a vast family tree which explained how each fit into the structure of the pantheon and in which some were presented as older or younger, higher or lower in the rank, or tied to specific natural domains. We are also aware of Zeus was the father and the highest of all gods and was thus responsible for establishing order in the divine pantheon; he made sure that each god and divine power occupied and acted within its own domain. Zeus made decisions that determined the course of this world, and none of the other gods or lesser divinities could compel Zeus without overturning the established order on Olympus. Therefore, it is no wonder that it never rains or snows on Olympus, the dwelling place of the gods where Zeus rules and where the justice of his laws preserves order.[[40]](#footnote-40)

However, this thesis demonstrates that *daimôn* as a unified concept and as an organisational device can offer us insights into the gods’ and the rest of the supernatural powers’ organisation in a world reinforced with a more advanced system of organisation. Dowden (2007) describes the Homeric world as a ‘remarkably varied and yet unified amalgam’.[[41]](#footnote-41) This thesis proceeds a step further and proposes the existence of a single universe in the Homeric world. This unity occurs because of the unifying power of the term *daimôn*. In fact, the term *daimôn* maintains and also reinforces this organisation in the Homeric world. In other words, the term *daimôn* most significant quality as a ‘single’, ‘complex’ ‘receptacle’ contributes to the existence of a different system of organisation.

This is due to thefunction of the term in the texts: it is used to maintain a single yet multifaceted universe within the Homeric world. In fact, we learn of the multiple related spiritual powers which are represented by the term as a smaller and much more structured part of the much larger Homeric world. We also learn that the ‘demonic world’ manages to remain a single and much more structured world because of the links that it creates between the various components to which it can refer. As this thesis demonstrates, the term’s mysterious nature constitutes a link between between various manifestations of the supernatural: (1) an unspecified supernatural power, (2) the gods as a collective, (3) a specific gods, (4) a chthonic power and (5) extraordinary mortals. In fact, given the existence of a seemingly huge gap between gods and men and also given that their relationship has been the subject of manifold interpretations by previous interpreters of the epics, my previous analysis of the use of the mysterious nature of the term *daimôn* as a link between the two worlds has already informed us that their relationship is more complicated, though still strong enough to maintain within the Homeric world. The vocative δαιμόνιε and the formula δαίμονι ἶσος, for instance, show that the mysterious and forceful nature of the gods both connects and separates them from mortals.

This thesis, moreover, proposes that we see the mysterious nature of the term *daimôn* as linking together various types of supernatual.[[42]](#footnote-42) This is how all of the diverse entities that already belong to the bigger picture of the Homeric world appear to be incorporated into the ‘demonic world’ before they are even situated in the larger spectrum of the Homeric world.[[43]](#footnote-43)This is also how the term *daimôn* as a sign of the mysterious allows us to understand the mysterious aspect of the divine world and how it is interpreted by mortals as giving structure to the world.

**An Overview of Recent Research on the term *Daimôn*: the Ambiguity of theTerm**

Since the current study attempts to redefine the meaning and overall significance of the term *daimôn* in Homer, I intend to use insights which have emerged from research on the term in the last few decades. At this point, I will offer a short overview[[44]](#footnote-44) of the most crucial scholarly works on Homeric religion in general and on the Homeric use of the term *daimôn* in particular and the ways these works have affected our perception as modern readers and/or audience of Homer (a more elaborate analysis will be offered in Chapter One dealing with a review of scholarship). After that I will move to the use of the term throughout Greek history. It is both important and useful for the reader to become acquainted with the divergence in use and meaning of the term as presented in the most significant scholarly works and in texts by ancient thinkers. This, I believe, is the easiest and most useful way for the reader to understand debates about the term’s meaning and function.

 Until the late twentieth century, the vast majority of scholarly works on the term *daimôn* examined the juxtaposition between its two main qualities of *daimôn* (i.e. the one that connects itwith the gods and the other that shows it as an incomprehensible supernatural power) without much interest in its overall interpretation and its position in the Homeric world. Scholars often suggest that the meaning of the Homeric term *daimôn* still remains ‘complicated’ and ‘hard to be defined’.[[45]](#footnote-45) They often describe itas ‘an extremely ambiguous term’, ‘as an absurd force within man’ and as the ‘symbol of the mysterious.’[[46]](#footnote-46)

Scholarly opinion can be divided into three different groups. First were those that identified the term with the anthropomorphic gods and their functions (cf. e.g. Tsagarakis 1977; Dietrich 1985). Second were the scholars who saw its meaning as completely detached from that of the Homeric gods. They affirmed that it stands in for ‘an impersonal force or power; an occult power, responsible for the inexplicable and unworthy in human lives’ (cf. e.g. M. P. Nilsson 1964; Burkert 1985; Wilford 1965). In addition to these two diametrically opposed ideas, there was a third more neutral approach. This new category of ideas presented the term *daimôn* in a neutral light (cf. e.g. Brunius-Nilsson 1955). It showed that the term might occasionally have some similarities with the gods. However, it is sharply differentiated from gods when it comes to its tendency to be evil or even when it is held responsible for something evil in Homeric man’s life (cf. e.g. Burkert 1985; Brenk 1986).

 In considering the ideas of previous scholars, one might conclude that their interpretations did not manage to fill the gap that over the years was created between the worlds of the ‘personal’ gods and this ‘impersonal force’.[[47]](#footnote-47) The continuation of the existence of this gap between these two kinds of power has prevented scholars from offering a uniform interpretation of the term. This might be due to the following two reasons. First, it seems that the classicists of the past ‘were linguistically innocent’.[[48]](#footnote-48) They were unfamiliar with the twentieth century’s linguistic theories and the different approaches of lexical semantics. Instead, they had an ‘intuition that meaning is ultimately bound up with individual words; indeed, this, *par excellence*, is what words are for.’[[49]](#footnote-49) Although such an intuition is not, in and of itself, wrong, it underestimates the other aspects of meaning. In the case of the term *daimôn*, it leaves largely unanalysed the rest of the factors that influence its meaning (i.e. its usage in different contexts; its split into different semantic components). It neglects the impact that usage of the term in different contexts has on its meaning each time it was used. It also underestimates the impact of different narratological contexts (i.e. focalization by the narrator of various characters). This, I think, has a negative impact on the overall understanding of the term, since scholars were unable to acknowledge that they are dealing with a term with multiple meanings.

The second reason might be that scholars were ignorant of the ‘conceptual usage’ of *daimôn*. They did not attempt to ‘identify the meaning of [the] word (or at least a major part of it) with the concepts or concept it gives access in the cognitive system.’[[50]](#footnote-50) In other words, scholars used only the specific and personalised features of the term (i.e. either as a synonym for the gods or as a mysterious and evil power) in order to establish the meaning of the term. As a result, they neglected the various properties associated with this concept (i.e. divinity, general deity, chthonic power (fate), and unspecified power).[[51]](#footnote-51) In and of itself this approach is incomplete, because it neglects the two most important qualities of the term: its quality as a concept in Greek religious thought and as a narrative device in the Homeric texts. It also diminishes its significance as a useful concept. Scholars have generally underestimated the role of the term *daimôn* in offering a wider understanding of the unknown and mysterious side of the various entities that comprise its complicated nature. They most of all misjudge the role of the term *daimôn* in offering us insight into the complicated mechanisms that characterise the nature of the gods and their relationship with mortals, and also of the developed relationships between the various divine entities of the Homeric world.

 In what follows, I shall briefly refer to the various meanings that the term *daimôn* adopted through its usage in different periods of Greek thought. This is important because it will inform the reader that this is one of the main reasons scholars characterised the term *daimôn*as ‘ambiguous’ or with a ‘negative’, almost ‘evil’, connotation. This, in combination with the scholarly tendency to desperately try to associate the term with one and only one signification, is what eventually led to the confusion that surrounds both the term and its usage in Homer.

**Does the Term *Daimôn* Signify Ambiguity or Malevolence?**

To begin with, perhaps the most puzzling difference in the use of the term is found in the Homeric usage of the term *daimôn*, which presented it as a component of the inexplicable. In Homer, widely considered the ‘starting point’ of ancient literature and its canonical centre almost throughout the whole of antiquity, the term seems to be associated with a complicated meaning, which when viewed as a whole, is irreducible to a single compact definition. The Homeric term *daimôn* seems to be frequently used as the equivalent term for a god; it corresponds to the supernatural power, ‘the *mana* in its special manifestations,’[[52]](#footnote-52) and always with the ‘overtones of a personal agent;’[[53]](#footnote-53) it is often used to denote the operator of intrusive events in human life.[[54]](#footnote-54) After Homer, the term was generally held to refer to a spiritual being inferior to a god. In Hesiod, the men of the Golden Age, when their race had died out, were called *daimones*.[[55]](#footnote-55) They were guardians over mortals, good beings who dispensed riches (e.g. *Erga* 122-6). This resulted in the meaning of ‘personal protective spirits’[[56]](#footnote-56) who accompany each man’s life and bring either good luck or harm.[[57]](#footnote-57) In a similar manner, the term *daimôn* was widely used by the tragedians to indicate fortune or an agent dispensing fortune. This fortune may be good (e.g. A. *Suppl*. 691-693; S. *El*. 999; E. *Med*. 966), but, more often, is mostly bad (e.g. A. *Pers*. 345-346; E. *Ph*. 888; *Med*. 127-130).[[58]](#footnote-58) The term *daimôn* then may be personified as ‘the good or evil genius of a family or a person.’[[59]](#footnote-59) Especially in Aeschylus, the termoften refers to an ‘independent, individual fiend that ‘falls hard upon the house’ and gorges itself on murder - though this, too, is ‘wrought by the gods’ (e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 1468; 1486-8).[[60]](#footnote-60) The individual then could speak of it as ‘his *daimôn*’, just as he would of ‘his bad fortune’ (e.g. S. *Aj.* 534; E. *Andr*. 98-99).[[61]](#footnote-61) Plato accepted all of the previous meanings and introduced a new one. Each individual has a special being watching over him, a *daimôn* assigned to the person at his birth by lot[[62]](#footnote-62) (*Phd*. 107d, *Lys*. 223a, *Resp*. 617d, 620d, *Leg*. 877a, *Lysias* 2.78). Hence, guardian-*daimones* accompaning a man during his life and after his death function as ‘prosecutor or advocate.’[[63]](#footnote-63) Plato’s writing seems to introduce a new concept of *daimones* as intermediate beings between gods and men (*Symp*. 202d-203a).[[64]](#footnote-64) *Daimones* then belong to air and *aither*, and they are entirely invisible (*TheEpinomis*).[[65]](#footnote-65) Corresponding to this intermediate dwelling place is their intermediate nature: they are superior to men and inferior to gods and, as such, Plato states, ‘every *daimonion* is something in between a god and a mortal’ (*Symp*. 202e.).[[66]](#footnote-66) Plato shows that a god might be morally perfect, but a *daimôn* is not necessarily so; he might be then, good or bad; he is subject to passions (as men are) and capable of unreasonable things (e.g. of being angry or amorous, departing from justice to serve some personal end).[[67]](#footnote-67)

 The term’s shift from ambiguous to evil was still incomplete at the time of Socrates, whose guiding spirit[[68]](#footnote-68) was a ‘*daimôn*’ (and as such, could be viewed as an evil spirit or even a strange god, as Socrates’ accusers chose to call it),[[69]](#footnote-69) but it was, later on, adapted by Plato’s pupil Xenocrates.[[70]](#footnote-70) The latter distinguished the good gods from the evil demons and shifted all the evil qualities of the gods onto *daimones*.[[71]](#footnote-71) The term, then, came to denote the evil spirits to which we also apply the term ‘demon’.[[72]](#footnote-72) The Stoics and Plutarch, in whose works we find the fullest exposition of demonology of this period,[[73]](#footnote-73) followed Xenocrates. In fact, Plutarch (i.e. *Dio* 2.3) and the early Stoics (i.e. Chrysipp. *SVF* 2.338) even thought it necessary to add the adjective *phaulos* (i.e. bad) if they wanted to make it clear that they were referring to an evil influence of *daimôn*.[[74]](#footnote-74) Plutarch, then, places special emphasis on the existence of evil demons. Some of them appear to be the equivalent of the ‘fallen angels’ of pagan antiquity; others seem to be evil by nature (e.g. Typhon, *Isis and Osiris*, 361a-e).[[75]](#footnote-75) Plutarch even goes so far as to argue that if in literature we see Apollo (or any other god) destroying a city, then this must have been a demon taking the form of Apollo (or any other god responsible for the destruction).[[76]](#footnote-76) It was not until the beginning of the late Hellenistic period that the term *daimonion* had acquired an almost universally bad connotation.[[77]](#footnote-77)

What is most amazing is the fact that the definition of the term *daimôn* differs so much from one period to another, so much so that a definition valid for one period might not be valid for another. The difference in the meaning of the term might be traced toits Christian meaning, which was developed many decades after the term’s first appearance in early Greek thought. Evidently, the term undertook radical changes and thus came to denote evil-working spirits, unclean spirits that produce some evil effect in people’s lives,[[78]](#footnote-78) and are the cause of sin against the will of God.[[79]](#footnote-79)Arguably, this drastic difference between the meaning of early Greek term *daimôn* and the Christian term daemon shows the radical potential for change in the concept and the term. Looking at all of the above significations held by the term, there remains no doubt that its meaning has undergone drastic change.

**The Term *Daimôn* as a Single Term with a Complicated Meaning**

The present thesis picks up on these developmentsas well as previous hermeneutic frames;[[80]](#footnote-80) it aspires to create a background from which future research on Homeric religion may profit. More specifically – and given previous discussion on the diversity of nature and functions of the Homeric term *daimôn* – this thesis demonstrates that there is no ambiguity or mystery surrounding the meaning of the term, just as there is no single or simple way to define the term. The fact that the term is connected with many and often incompatible and negative significations does not justify the assumption that itis used to denote a bad entity. This is the reason scholars of Greek religion, in their attempts to define the term, created a false and negative impression of its nature.

Homeric usage of the term is the best way to show that, although the term does not have an easily defined character, it does not necessarily carry a negative connotation; as a religious term, it is more than that. At this point, the question ‘why does Homer become the best frame for a treatment of thetermand its diverse signification?’ is a valid one. The answer is quite simple: the epics depict a world in which the divine manifests itself in diverse ways, each of which are referred to with a variety of terms. The term *daimôn*, as part of the universe of Homeric divinities and as a reference of the divine, similarly contains the complicated and diverse nature of the divine. Consequently, Homeric usage of the term demonstrates that itsassociations with all of these entities, which in fact are part of its composite character, make it a ‘complex’, ‘controversial’ and even ‘polyvalent’ term, but in no way a ‘problematic’ one.

The choice of these terms to describe the nature of the term is the most suitable one to demonstrate that it combines several divine, mortal and superhuman characteristics. This very idea may be already traced in the epigraph from Glanville’s book ‘Saducismus Triumphatus’, which marks the beginning of this introductory argument. The reason I have chosen this specific epigram is because I wanted to show that, although this was not a widely read book on witchcraft in the early 17th century, it still manages to capture the essence of a demonic character. Thus, it rightly treats the word ‘demon’ (devil) as a term of ‘multiple’ significations, as a term that is composed of many different and uneven elements (i.e. ‘there are very different orders and degrees of spirits’), and as a word which encloses many and ‘divers’ mechanisms.[[81]](#footnote-81) However, we have to admit that this idea of the demonic contradicts the established view of the meaning of the term. It coincides with the difficulty of offering a uniform interpretation of the term *daimôn*. In fact, it is no wonder that the word ‘demon’, the modern cognate of the ancient word *daimôn*, is commonly used today and has been used for a long time in a negative sense: synonymous with Devil.[[82]](#footnote-82)

This usage is present already in the later Hellenistic period, when the distinction between *theos* (god) and *daimôn* (evil spirit) had become fairly common and the term *daimôn* acquired an almost universally bad overtone.[[83]](#footnote-83) ‘Evil spirit’ is the meaning that the term *daimôn* has in *Matthew* 8:31. The term *daimôn* was qualified with adjectives (e.g. *kakos*, *ponēros*) that stressed an ‘evil’ or ‘bad’ aspect (Iambl., *Myst*. 3.31.15) which differentiated it from the term *theos*. The two words seem to signify ‘highest divine beings’ and ‘various lower species’ respectively.[[84]](#footnote-84) In earlier Greek literature, however, it is sometimes much more difficult to make a clear distinction between the terms ‘*theos*’ and ‘*daimôn*’ in terms of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, and it seems even more difficult to reach a uniform interpretation of the concept. On the contrary, in the case of the Homeric usage of the term, there must be no simple distinction between what seems to be good and evil (concerning the character of the term) or between the signification of the term *daimôn* as similar to either *theos* or a lower spiritual. The term *daimôn*, as part of a complicated divine universe is a single term with a complicated character formed with various diversities, and this is how we must perceive it if we want to decode the significant role of the term in the epics. Because the term has multiple supernatural referents and also explains ambiguous aspects of supernatural, a deeper analysis will demonstrate the diverse entities that constitute the divine world in the Homeric epics.

**Theoretical Approach: Material and Methodology**

The material used in this study comes from both the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of Homer. In the present study, the arguments related to the concept of the term *daimôn* are based on an extensive analysis of all instances of the term in all its forms in both epics. The study preserves a complete representation of each instance of the term in Homer; each case is examined based on a number of common coordinates: a) divine status, b) ethical status, c) effect, d) material attributes, and e) the point of view.[[85]](#footnote-85) I have closely examined the passages from each book of both epics, trying to make sense of the term’s usage in similar and different narrative and rhetorical contexts. As a general principle, I have allowed the text to lead my understanding of it and of the particular usage of the term *daimôn* in it, trying to minimise the effect of previous scholarship and all of the previously attributed meanings of *daimôn* found in translations and commentaries. Instead, I considered already existing interpretations of the term only in cases where the text alone does not otherwise make adequate sense. My extended analysis of the usage of term in both epics has resulted in a new interpretation of its mysterious quality that sets it in a more positive light; it is a link between the various entities in Homer’s divine realm.[[86]](#footnote-86) Further discussion of the complicated relationships developed between those entities represented by the term *daimôn*, the other gods and mortals was also used as evidence of their concentration in the same structured universe.[[87]](#footnote-87)

 Different theoretical perspectives and linguistic theories have been used in different chapters. In each case, the theoretical perspective chosen was the one best suited to a thorough interrogation of *daimôn* and its significance in offering a new perspective on the problem of the chaotic structure of the Homeric world. Based on this perspective and with new insights gained from this new definition of the term *daimôn*, which, as the only unifying element in the history of Greek religion, creates certain expectations of unity, I apply a new methodology. It is based on the term’s conceptual use as representing both the ‘unifying and diverse’. More specifically, I use the term as a unifying signifier that leaves diverse entities unchanged. This enables me to address this thesis’ important task of finding a way to keep together all supernatural entities, not unified, but still in the same diverse universe.

While testing this method, I paid special attention to the usage of the term *daimôn* in Homer as a single word which manages to combine diverse qualities; it gives the impression that we are dealing with a wholly different term each time it is situated in a different semantic context, when we are really dealing with the same term. The drawing of parallels between the usage of the term *daimôn* and the nature of oral poetry also serves as evidence for the same purpose. Paul Zumthor, an important critic of orality, helped me trace some useful associations between the form of oral poetry and the Homeric usage of the term *daimôn*.[[88]](#footnote-88) Zumthor’s theory on the variations of an oral poem, when transmitted by a different performer, may be easily related to the term’s diverse semantic connotations when situated in different contextual frameworks.[[89]](#footnote-89) While there could be many performances, the audience could still identify the existence of an original poem. It also emerged that, though the term *daimôn* could refer to many different characters*,* the Homeric audience managed to identify the existence of one solid term. Finally, the general hermeneutic framework of each chapter was used to situate every use of the termand related concepts within a broader context in order to make sense of it. For this purpose, my thesis’s main discussion was distributed among the following chapters.

The first chapter of this thesis provides a review of scholarship, which, combined with the uncertain etymology of the term, explains how the term *daimôn* has been interpreted by previous commenters. In an attempt to understand the history of the problems relating to the usage of the term, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first one is related to the divergent etymology of the term *daimôn* and its derivatives (i.e. the vocative δαιμόνιε and the formula δαίμονι ἶσος). The one etymological explanation of the term *daimôn* is that it derives from the root dai (from which δαίομαι, δαίς are formed) that means ‘tear up’, and as such, the noun derived from the verb δαίομαι, *daimôn*, must be explained as the ‘disruptor’ and the one with the tendency to harm or destroy mortals. The other etymology of the term asserts that, based on the same derivation – δαίομαι – the word would mean ‘allotting’, and it signifies the distributor of one’s lot.

The second part of this chapter shows how these differing etymological explanations led to two different and almost antithetical perceptions of the term and its use in Homer. The first, linked to the etymology that perceives *daimôn* as the ‘disruptor’, argues that the term functions as a substitute for a specific Olympian or other anthropomorphic god or for the gods in general. The second, linked to the etymology that explains the term as the ‘allotter’, suggests that the term functions as an unspecified power which controls the destiny of an individual and is superior to human power. In this chapter, my intention is to examine the different and incompatible views on the Homeric term *daimôn*.

 The second chapter examines the implications of focalization for the term’s many and diverse meanings. The methodological assumption of this chapter is that different points of view inside the narrative (e.g. of the narrator, the characters in the plot, the gods) can lead to different readings of the term outside the narrative. Focalization can thus aid us in understanding the different aspects of the term (i.e. as referring to a specific god, to the Olympian gods as a group, or to more general understandings of the divine such as fate) and the nature of divine activities (i.e. they are associated with both unexplained benevolent and malevolent activities, and with both a mysterious mental and physical effect on mortals). The chapter further explores how behind the term’s various uses by different focalizers lies the same mysterious, unpredictable, irrational power. This is important not only because it makes the term *daimôn* a ‘sign of the mysterious’, thus helping us unravel unknown aspects of these entities, but also because it makes the terma point of convergence between them. My intention is to demonstrate how the term as a point of convergence and as a useful concept which contributes to the existence of a Homeric world that is organised even as it is composed of many kinds of beings.

The third chapter examines the role of the term *daimôn* as a narrative device (i.e. in the form of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος and the vocative δαιμόνιε) to demonstrate how a single term may be associated with so manydiverse beings (i.e. divine, human and superhuman). The guiding assumption of this chapter is that specific verse-making contexts played a role in generating the diversity of the term’s meanings. They also help demonstrate how the consistency with which the term reproduces its complex nature increases our understanding of the relationship among the gods, mortals and beings represented by the term *daimôn* in the poems. Therefore, the use of the vocative δαιμόνιε in reference to the gods’ equal share in the mysterious nature of the *daimonic* points to the existence of a new side of the gods (i.e. the demonic side).

Likewise, the use of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος demonstrates how the complicated relationship that is often constructed between the gods and a *daimôn*, when both become the source from which superhuman power derives, is also traced in the complicated relationship of gods and mortals. Along with divine and human characteristics, the term’s mysterious and excessive connotations both connect and separate gods from gods from mortals. Through the usage of both the vocative and the formula, I intend to show how the term *daimôn* as a narrative device and as a term of diverse divine references (i.e. it is associated with both mysterious and excessive characteristics) reveals not only a new side of divine nature, but also a new side of the gods’ complicated relationship with mortals.

The last chapter of my thesis revaluates the role of the term *daimôn* and redefines its presence in the general framework of the Homeric epics. It proposes that the term’s many incompatible meanings express what has so far remained ‘unknown’ and beyond man’s experience concerning the nature and the activities of the various divine entities in the epics. Many readings of the Homeric world, and certainly those that interpret Homeric religion focus on the fundamental dichotomy between men and gods. This dichotomy is also essential to the epics’ central concerns with mortality, the short span of human life and the preservation of fame in the form of song. However, within this framework, it is almost inevitable that the term *daimôn,* used in the narrative by a wide range of mortal and immortal speakers, should generate incompatible meanings. This chapter suggests that beyond the divide between gods and us, there is also the divide between what is ‘known’ and the ‘phenomenical unknown’. The importance of this chapter lies in the fact that it uses the term *daimôn* and its role as a ‘typical expression’ and as an ‘unspoken sign of the mysterious’ to explain what has so far constituted the ‘unknown’ and the ‘beyond’ aspects of the superhuman ‘other’. This new understanding of the word enables us to understand how these entities are concentrated and connected in the same Homeric world.

 Turning now to the linguistic theories used in each chapter: they were applied specifically to address a separate part of my research question. I used two theoretical approaches: the ‘compositional’ and the ‘conceptual’. Based on the ‘compositional’ approach, I suggested that the meaning of *daimôn* is ‘compositional’; therefore, its meaning is determined by the meaning of its component parts and in the way these are combined. I followed this theory throughout the second section of my thesis and appliedto the term *daimôn* a number of different semantic components, such as a divine power (god), of a chthonic power (fate), or an unspecified supernatural power (demon). Thesesemantic significations found concentrated in the term *daimôn* complicate its meanings.

I also considered the implications of focalization on the term’s attribution as a concept. The use of the term by a mortal and an immortal character explains why *daimôn* is associated with so many and different significations. This study also includes an analysis of three types of presentation/narrative situations (i.e. simple narrator – text, character – text (speeches) and complex narrator– text (embedded focalization).[[90]](#footnote-90)I used previous analysis to present the focalizations of the narrator and of the characters (among them the gods) and to demonstrate that the differences in the focalization of the narrator, of the characters and even more interestingly, of the gods may in fact offer us different and yet useful insights into the Homeric usage of *daimôn*. Both the use of the compositional approach and the analysis of the different points of view on *daimôn* were used to shed further light on the term’s quality as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ and as a point of convergence between a number of diversities, which not only reveals the unknown side of their nature, but also enables their coexistence in the same contexts of the Homeric world. While the ‘compositional approach’ helped me unravel the actual the multiple meanings of the term *daimôn*, the ‘conceptual approach’ enabled me to examine its function in the Greek polytheistic system. I have therefore considered the term *daimôn* as a structured category of meaning and as *polysemantic*.The term *daimôn* may be used as to emphasise to the distinction between the worlds of mortals and immortals. The formula δαίμονι ἶσος and the vocative δαιμόνιε are thus not merely metrical deocrations, but functional: they represent the polysemous nature of the term *daimôn* and the diverse entities to which it can refer.[[91]](#footnote-91) More specifically, the formula δαίμονι ἶσος characterises specific warriors in the *Iliad*, and thus also contribute to the composition of type-scenes. The formula as a standard narrative pattern was used to produce important information concerning a mortal character in the narrative. It was used to evoke a specific kind of mortal behaviour that included superhuman and excessive demonic characteristics familiar to the reader.

 In order to contain some of the risks which inevitably attend the interpretation of a term like *daimôn*, this study is loyal to three linguistic principles. The one is related to the dictum, first defined by J.L. Austin, a British philosopher of language, that there is no such a thing as the ‘meaning of a word.’[[92]](#footnote-92) Therefore, this study does not pursue the one absolute meaning of the word *daimôn*; instead, it attempts to trace its multiple, significations.[[93]](#footnote-93) This brings me to the next principle that this research has adopted; that one must search for ‘the meaning’ of a term in its usage in a number of different contexts rather than as an abstraction taken out of context, which inevitably isolates the term from the semantic significations that may be adopted through its interaction with the terms in which it situated. This means that there is never any objective meaning to a word, which is the final principle of this study. No one has ever denied that there is usage in meaning, and in fact, meaning is distributed in as many usages as possible, but meaning is, and must always be subject to interpretation, as any one given instance might be influenced by other instances. It might also be the result of the consideration of particular situations and can result from the close examination of the speaker’s and the writer’s real intentions.[[94]](#footnote-94)

The contrary happens with dictionary entries, where meaning can be objective, since it is rarely the full story in actual usage; dictionaries mention the most common denotations or main meanings associated with words and therefore risk ignoring many others. Meaning is associated with only one instance which may be found divorced from related contexts. The application of such a method would have definitely led to a false and incomplete ‘meaning’ of the term, whereas the principles identified above assure that the term’s multiple, contextually based meanings are investigated thoroughly. I have followed these specific aforementioned principles throughout this study and, according to them, I have chosen not to press the evidence beyond what is reasonable in a misguided attempt to find answers to every problem: for example, the complete reconstruction of basic religious ideas in Homer and in the general field of Greek religion. Finally, due to the limitations of time and space I have not dealt extensively with all of the instances of the term *daimôn* in the texts, but only with a representative set of examples.

This thesis does notclaim that there could ever be any concrete answers on both the nature and function of the term *daimôn* in Homer. In order to gain even the smallest piece of the truth that hides behind the term, we must always keep in mind that here we are faced with a term which the poet chose merely as a way to sing about the miraculous designs of the supernatural. The poet did not actually know that there could ever be any distinction between the various terms he used to express this idea of the divine, because this was, again, dependent on ‘his memory of an infinite number of details.’[[95]](#footnote-95) Indeed, Homer invites us to read the term *daimôn* based on its use in the various contexts of the poems. It is up to us and our experience as the readers of Homer to decipher some of the multiple strands of meaning hidden in the term *daimôn*, and to interpret its use and significance. Indeed, having all of this in mind, we shall attempt to offer as consistent an interpretation of *daimôn* in Homer as possible and we will go as far as the poet and the poem itself allows us to go.

**CHAPTER ONE**

**Controversies on the Concept of the Term Δαίμων*:* its Nature and Usage in Homer**

**Introduction**

By the start of the 20th century, there was a steady stream of arguments, modifications and revisions of the term *daimôn* in Greek religion. As I have already explained in the introduction, the initial scholarly debate centered on two different conceptions of the term *daimôn*: is it another name for a specific god or the Olympian gods collectively, or is it used to refer to some vague and non-specific supernatural power? In this chapter, we shall try to understand how this debate developed by means of a survey of scholarship.

We begin with a consideration of divergent etymological explanations for the term δαίμων and its derivatives, the vocative δαιμόνιε and the formula δαίμονι ἶσος.

**Etymology of the Term *Daimôn***

This part of my thesis elaborates on the divergent etymology of the term *daimôn*.[[96]](#footnote-96) Already in the earlier stages of its history, we find the same divergent meanings with which it is connected today. Etymological explanations for the term fell into our two familiar categories: a) the one that links the term *daimôn* to the anthropomorphic gods, and b) the other that associates the term *daimôn* with a mysterious and unspecified power that controls the destiny of individuals.

**The Term *Daimôn* Associated with the Gods**

The scholars[[97]](#footnote-97) who who belong in this first category agree on the following: first, that the etymology of the term *daimôn* is uncertain, and second, that the term derives from the root *dai*, an ambiguous root (Burkert 1985:420) from which words such as δαίομαι and δαίς are formed. The Greek term daio means to divide and (in the middle) to distribute; thus the term daimon is etymologically that which distributes something to you – whether you are looking for it or not. Scholars who believe the etymology is uncertain explain that the root dai actually means ‘tear up’, ‘cut up’, (and thus does not mean divide or distribute). According to this view, *daimôn*, the noun derived from the verb δαίομαι, must be taken to mean the ‘disruptor’ (rather than something like distributor). Bruno Snell, Porzig, Walter Burkert and Nilsson are among those scholars who follow the above derivation.[[98]](#footnote-98) Hence, as Porzig explains, *dai* does not mean ‘divide’, but ‘cut up’, ‘tear up’. For him, the term *daimôn* means the ‘Zerreisser’ (i.e. the disruptor), while δάσσασθαι may, at times, bear this sense of ‘tear up’.[[99]](#footnote-99) Similarly, Burkert suggests that although the most common interpretation of dai ‘is that which distributes’- dianemei), the Greek daio means to divide –xwrizw-tear up-diamelizw (Burkert 1985: 384), therefore, the term *daimôn* must mean ‘tear up’ and not ‘divide’.[[100]](#footnote-100) Nilsson supports this view, suggesting that, based on this derivation, the word would mean ‘dividing’ rather than ‘allotting.’[[101]](#footnote-101) In this respect, the term *daimôn* may be identified with the anthropomorphic gods’ intervention in the human world in order to disrupt the lives of mortals.[[102]](#footnote-102)

**The Term *Daimôn* Associated with an Unspecified Power and with ‘the Allotter of Fate’**

The second category of scholars[[103]](#footnote-103) goes against these previous ideas. Instead, they (e.g. Dietrich, Snelland Chantraine) assert that based on this derivation - δαίομαι – the word would mean ‘allotting.’ This theory attempts to connect the term *daimôn* with an unspecified supernatural power (i.e. Fate or Death) that distributes one’s lot. Notably, Dietrich (1965) explains that any other interpretation beyond the one that shows the term *daimôn* to be an unspecified power ‘does not agree with the figure of *daimôn* in popular belief and in Homer.’[[104]](#footnote-104) The term *daimôn* corresponds to a supernatural power in its unpredictable, anonymous, and often frightful manifestations, rather than referring to personal anthropomorphic aspects. It acquires the connotation of Fate;[[105]](#footnote-105) it stands for ‘the power controlling the destiny of individuals: hence, one’s lot or fortune (*Od.* 5.396, cf. 10.64).’[[106]](#footnote-106)

Chantraine and Frisk were among those who saw the term *daimôn* as the ‘allotter’ and as the signifier of a supernatural power, usually associated with Fate. In this respect, the term *daimôn* is etymologically explained as ‘the divider’ or ‘the allotter’.[[107]](#footnote-107) Snell argues that the term *daimôn* refers to an anonymous supernatural power and not to the personal anthropomorphic gods. It stands for the power that allots destinies because this is the quality of the gods; the term *daimôn* signifies god or the gods in some abstract or nonspecific way, such as the Fates.[[108]](#footnote-108) It is often found in the oblique cases when it has to do with what is fated. It can, at other times, refer to minor gods or death.[[109]](#footnote-109) Chantraine[[110]](#footnote-110) and Frisk[[111]](#footnote-111), in a similar way, define the term δαίμων to signify an unexplained divine power; Chantraine, for instance, calls it ‘a divine power, which cannot be named; on one part, it has the sense of the divinity and on the other part, it has the sense of fate.’[[112]](#footnote-112)

The term’s different etymological explanations resonate with the sensibilities of many different historical periods.[[113]](#footnote-113) Its etymology and the various changes in both its meaning and functions during different periods in Greek thought were the subjects of a number of contradictory theories on its nature in Homer.

**Contradictory Theories of the Term *Daimôn* in Homer**

There was not much scholarly work on the Homeric term *daimôn* in the twentieth century, while contemporary treatments are sometimes overly psychological (i.e. Dodds) or literary. Over the course of their studies, scholars such as.Tsagarakis (1977) and François 1957 ackonwledged this confusion. Tsagarakis originally confessed that ‘*Daimôn* religion is competing with anthropomorphic religion and there is some confusion.’[[114]](#footnote-114) I argue that this confusion is what distributed the interpretation of the term *daimôn* into the two camps outlined above. In the next part of this study, we shall see how this dichotomy was already pervasive in the frameworks of previous scholarship.

**The Term *Daimôn* Signifying the Anthropomorphic Gods**

The following sections analyse the term *daimôn*’sassociation with a specific god or with the Olympian collectively.

**The Term *Daimôn* Associated with a Specific God**

The term *daimôn* occurs in the singular 59 times in all, but only 11 times in the third person narrative; and of those 11 instances, 7 are accounted for by the use of a single formula.[[115]](#footnote-115) Only the nominative of the term occurs in the *Odyssey*, but this does not apply to the *Iliad*.[[116]](#footnote-116) More precisely, the term *daimôn* is identified with a specific god ten times in the *Odyssey* (3.27: Athena; 9.381: Zeus[[117]](#footnote-117); 4.275: Aphrodite; 5.421: Poseidon; 6.172: Poseidon; 15.261: Athena; 16.370: Athena; 19.10, 19.138 and 20.87: Athena). In the *Iliad*, the term is used to refer to a specific god thirteentimes (3.420: Aphrodite; 7.291: Zeus; 7.377: Zeus; 7.396: Zeus; 9.600: Zeus; 11:480: Athena; 15.418: Apollo;[[118]](#footnote-118) 15.468: Zeus;[[119]](#footnote-119) 17.98 and 17.104: Zeus and Apollo; 19.138: Athena; 19.188: Zeus; 20.87: Athena).[[120]](#footnote-120) Out of thirteen cases, the poet uses the term in three instances to refer to an anthropomorphic god (3.420, 15.418, and 11.480), while the term δαίμων is not used by the poet in the *Odyssey* even once to refer to a specific god. In most of the cases where a specific god is identified by the term *daimôn*, the person involved in the situation is ignorant of the true identity of the god (e.g. *Od*.15.261; see also *Od.* 15.461; 9.411 and 5.396). There are only three instances in the *Iliad* in which a particular Olympian deity isreferred to by the term *daimôn* by a person who clearly recognises the god’s identity: in 3.420 (Helen recognises the true identity of Aphrodite); in 15.418 (Hector knows well that the god referred to by the term *daimôn* that drives Ajax back (ἐπέλασσέ γε δαίμων) is Apollo)[[121]](#footnote-121) and in 15.468 (Hector realises that Zeus was responsible for breaking Teucer’s bowstring).[[122]](#footnote-122)

Tsagarakis establishes two contentious assumptions: that the term *daimôn* could be synonymous with the anthropomorphic gods and that, consequently, it takes on all of their functions. He shows that both the functions of an inspiring/helping or harmful god referred to by the term *daimôn* can be identical to those of the personal gods.[[123]](#footnote-123) Tsagarakis objects to any idea which presents the supernatural force referred to by the term *daimôn* as a ‘vague spiritual force.’[[124]](#footnote-124)

 Gilbert François (1957) placed his discussions on the Homeric term δαίμων into the general framework of his book, which examined the ‘meaning of words connoting ‘god’ or “divinity” in the singular without reference to a particular god.’[[125]](#footnote-125) Although François thinks that the term *daimôn* is used in this way, generally as θεός or θεοί, he also presents a number of instances where the same idea of the term *daimôn* and an anthropomorphic god are used interchangeably.[[126]](#footnote-126) He thus lists the following seven cases where the term *daimôn* refers to a specific god: in *Il.* 3.420[[127]](#footnote-127) it designates Athena (cf. *Il.* 3.385 and *Od.* 19.34, *Od*. 9.142, *Od*. 10.141), Apollo in *Il.* 15.418 (cf. v. 220-262, 307, 326, 355-366),[[128]](#footnote-128) Zeus in *Il*. 19.188 (cf. scholia T and v. 197, 254ff.), and in *Il*. 21.93 (cf. v. 83); Athena (cf. v. 135ff. and 145ff.) and not Zeus (cf. v. 132, a52 and 160ff.) in *Od*.3.166, the god Sun in *Od*.12.295 (cf. v. 320ff. and 11.112f.), Athena in *Od*.15.261 (cf. v. 222).

**The Term *Daimôn* as a Synonym for the Olympian Family**

The plural of the term *daimôn* occurs three times in the *Iliad* (and never in the Odyssey), where it is synonymous with the Olympian family.[[129]](#footnote-129) Athena goes to Olympus to the other gods, (μετά δαίμονας ἂλλους, 1.222); Hector bids the counsellors and the Trojan wives to pray to the Olympian gods (δαίμοσι ἀρήσασθαι, 6.115); and Antilochus surrenders his prize to Menelaus, lest he sins against the Olympians (δαίμοσι εἶναι ἀλιτρός, 23.595.)

Several ideas have also been expressed about the plural of the term *daimôn*. Hedén (1912), judging by Homeric practice and by the later literary use of δαίμονες to signify the Olympians, believes that this plural was a general designation of the gods.[[130]](#footnote-130) Many years later, Elisabeth Brunius-Nilsson (1955) and Odysseus Tsagarakis (1977) consider the term *daimones* as a ‘collective indicating the Olympic deities.’[[131]](#footnote-131) Brenk (1986) finds that it may mean simply all divine beings (*Il.*1.222; 6.115; 23.595)*.* However, the author does not regard the term *daimones* as signifying departed spirits, nor do the Greeks who associate it predominantly with psychic phenomena.[[132]](#footnote-132) Brenk considers this a possible common ground between ‘the belief in the voice and angels or devils,’[[133]](#footnote-133) in the Hebrew Scripture and the New Testament. Dietrich (1965), however, regards this usage as a late one invented by the poets. He thus affirms that the plural of the term *daimôn*, in this respect, was not long standing, but was rather a convenient expression that did not coincide with popular belief. As such, the plural of the term δαίμων might be regarded as ‘a poetic coinage.’[[134]](#footnote-134) Chantraine (1952) opposes Dietrich’s idea (1965).[[135]](#footnote-135) He maintains that the poet replaces the term *daimones*, as the general and vague gods, with ‘the clearly defined anthropomorphic gods.’[[136]](#footnote-136)

**The Term *Daimôn* as Parallel to a Deity or Deities (θεός, θεoί, τὶς θεός) and Ζεύς**

The problem of the generalised expressions θεός, θεοί, δαίμων and Ζεύς, as seen in relation to the manner in which the poet treats various gods and divine concepts, has been dealt with by various scholars. Jörgensen (1904) was the first one, and he was later followed by both Hedén (1912) and Ehnmark (1935).[[137]](#footnote-137)In fact, Jörgensen (1904) was the first one to associate the characters’ limited knowledge of the true identity of the god responsible for a particular event and the poet’s unlimited knowledge with the division of divinity into two different camps.[[138]](#footnote-138) Therefore, on the one hand, we have the poet’s Olympian gods, and on the other, the characters’ general divinity (i.e. called τὶς θεός, θεός, δαίμων and the generalised Zeus.[[139]](#footnote-139))[[140]](#footnote-140) The poet does not generally use expressions like θεός, nor do the gods in Homer, except when addressing men.[[141]](#footnote-141) In the same way, the gods do not speak of a daemon (apart from phrases like δαίμονι ἶσος, ἦρχε δὲ δαίμων etc.),[[142]](#footnote-142) so that the general terms like θεός and δαίμων belong to the vocabulary of the Homeric character, and they reflect the religious belief of the Homeric audience and to some extent probably that of even earlier generations, as has been pointed out by Calhoun[[143]](#footnote-143) and Else.[[144]](#footnote-144)

Else also compared the term *daimôn*’s different metrical shape to that of *theos* to show that beyond similarity in meaning shared by *daemon* and the generalised *theos*, the formercould be used as the standing alternative for *theos* as well.[[145]](#footnote-145)Hence, we may find *daimôn* standing in the last foot of a hexameter line and is there very often preceded by a verb of dactylic shape, and in other places where *theos* and *theoi* cannot.[[146]](#footnote-146) In his detailed treatment (1965) of the usage of the general θεός, θεός τις and their association with the Homeric term δαίμων, Dietrich responds to Else’s earlier argument. He objects to the idea of the wordbeing ‘reduced to a formula since the term could also be situated in the beginning of a line’.[[147]](#footnote-147) Dietrich goes even further with his argument; he doubts whether one could ‘truthfully say that a Homeric audience would consciously distinguish between a θεός, a τὶς θεός, or δαίμων.’[[148]](#footnote-148) He uses some passages from both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (i.e. *Il*. 24. 525ff. and *Od*. 3.130-183) to suggest that the mortal characters in the poems did not distinguish among ‘god’ (θεός), ‘gods’ (θεοί), ‘Ζeus’ (Ζεύς) and ‘daemon’ (δαίμων).[[149]](#footnote-149) Furthermore, Dietrich (1965) admits that the term *daimôn* in Homer may be associated with the whole Olympian family or with a definite god (in the *Iliad*) as well as with the deities of popular belief: the general deity, or deities, θεός, θεοί and the supreme Zeus (mostly in the *Odyssey*). The above terms cannot always be carefully separated because often ‘θεός, θεοί etc., and even the term δαίμων refer to one particular Olympian god or gods.’[[150]](#footnote-150) Dietrich even suggests that while the θεός and δαίμων, and occasionally Zeus, represent a deity of popular belief in Homer, the collective Olympian family does not.[[151]](#footnote-151) Finally, Dietrich reaches the conclusion that: ‘so far […] neither epic shows functions of a daemon which could not be exercised by another general deity, so that it seems impossible to separate the sphere of the δαίμων from that of the θεός.’[[152]](#footnote-152) Twelve years later, Tsagarakis (1977) similarlydeclared that both the singular and the plural of the term (i.e. *daimôn* and sometimes *daimones*) may be found situated in the same contexts and thus be attributed with similar ideas as did *theos*, *theoi* or personal gods.[[153]](#footnote-153)

Even before Dietrich (1965) and Tsagarakis (1977), Elisabeth Brunius-Nilsson (1955) was one of the strongest supporters of the idea that the term δαίμων was associated in most cases with the general terms θεός, θεοί, Ζεύς: ‘We should note that δαίμων has this implication in thirty-nine of the sixty examples of the word in Homer. Of these, only one example is found in the poet’s own description (Ο 418), and two in similes (ε 396 and Λ 480). All the other examples occur in speeches made by the characters.’[[154]](#footnote-154) Brunius- Nilsson also refers to all but eight of the examples that occur in the *Odyssey*. She explains that this is closely related to the fact that narration in the *Odyssey* is more often done by the characters, such as Odysseus telling his own story.[[155]](#footnote-155)

 Gilbert François (1957) finds that the term *daimôn* is sometimes situated in place of θεός, θεοί in Homer. He further attributes the juxtaposition of these agents in Homer to the poet’s effort to create a ‘variety of poetic technique’[[156]](#footnote-156) by placing these originally independent concepts side by side. H.J. Rose (1984) does not find any truth behind the idea that θεός was ever used as the equivalent of δαίμων. Δαίμων could only be comparable to θεός τις.[[157]](#footnote-157) Rose explains that the term *daimôn* could not be situated as a parallel to θεός, since it is too vague and too popular. The only similarity between the two terms might be found in the fact that ‘*daimôn* originally designated an unidentified power, and θεός could be employed in the same way.’[[158]](#footnote-158) Chantraine (1952) uses Rose’s idea of *daimôn* as a term of no definite meaning to suggest that in the singular it ‘indicates an indefinite mode of expression, a supernatural power that it is not designated by its name.’[[159]](#footnote-159) As such, in the *Odyssey*, the term *daimôn* is employed by the characters to designate a vague divinity with no trace of personality, or more generally, it designates a power that intervenes in the affairs of humans. It then becomes the equivalent of the terms θεός, θεός τις, θεοί in Homer.[[160]](#footnote-160)

 In recent years, scholars have stressed the necessity of conceiving the term *daimôn* as equivalent to θεός (god). Jan Bremmer (1994) suggests that it must have been substituted for *theos*.[[161]](#footnote-161) This happened, Bremmer explains, because ‘whenever … [the Greeks] felt that a god intervened for a short time, directly and concretely in their life, they spoke of *daimôn*, which only later acquired its unfavourable meaning.’[[162]](#footnote-162) Similarly, Simon Price (1999) associated *daimôn* with the notion of a divine being. He argues that *daimôn* is responsible for divine interventions as a substitute for the named and anthropomorphic gods.[[163]](#footnote-163) What is more, in Price’s opinion, we might even trace the notions of much older theories on divine interventions such as those that were superficially discussed first by Jörgensen and later by Chantraine in the 1950s. In other words, Price formulated these old theses into a more modern one and revisited the same old idea that when ‘characters in Homer talk of divine interventions, they use not the names of specific deities, which the narrator uses, but intermediate terms like a god (*theos*) or divine being (*daimôn*).’[[164]](#footnote-164) Thisis related to the poet’s tendency to ascribe to his characters minimum knowledge of what really happens in the poems, whereas he himself and the gods possess absolute power and knowledge of every event and action in the poems.

**The Term *Daimôn* Signifying a Mysterious Supernatural Power**

Beyond the general meaning of θεός, θεός τις, Ζεύς and the more specialised meaning of the Olympian gods as a whole or a specific god, scholars have also attributed the meaning of an unspecified supernatural power to the term *daimôn*. They perceived it as ‘some vaguely personal, usually hostile and always uncanny force at large in the world, alien and external to human personality.’[[165]](#footnote-165)As an unspecified power, it was often held responsible for ‘sudden interventions commonly of disagreeable kind’[[166]](#footnote-166) in a man’s life.

The term appears in this form 23times in Homer. Thirteen of these cases appear in the *Odyssey* (5.396, 7.248, 10.64, 11.587, 12.169, 14.386, 14.448, 16.194, 17.243, 17.446, 19.201, 19.519, 24.306) and ten in the *Iliad* (out of 10 cases, eight are associated with the expression δαίμονι ἶσος: 5.438, 5.459, 5.884, 16.705, 16.786, 20.447, 20.493, 21.18, and the other two cases are from 11.792 and 15.403). Appendix V and Table 1 from chapter two of this study gives a more detailed exposition of these instances, which show the term *daimôn* used to mean an impersonal supernatural power.

 Kullmann (1985) rejected Tsagarakis’ idea of the term *daimôn*as being the equivalent of the anthropomorphic gods in Homer. Kullmann found Taplin’s idea of the ‘distorted evidence’[[167]](#footnote-167) very useful, because it enabled him to suggest that Tsagarakis’ notion of the term *daimôn* gained life only because he deliberately chose to neglect the evidence that would have prevented him from forming his own theories on its use. In this reading, Tsagarakis did not take into account the established theories that it was ‘the ‘innovation of the poet of the *Iliad* to let the Olympians, and not the *daimones* of popular belief intervene in human affairs, with the result that *daimones* and Olympian deities sometimes get identical functions.’[[168]](#footnote-168) He suggests that Tsagarakis also neglected another equally important part of this theory which could alter his findings considerably: that, contrary to the *Iliad*, in the *Odyssey* a *daimôn* carries the older original function; that is, an impersonal and anonymous supernatural power. Scholars (Nilsson, Bianchi, Dietrich, Wilford) later used this specific theory to support their interpretation of the term as an ‘impersonal power’ with no ‘real individuality’ and, more importantly, as the opposite of θεός, which stands for the ‘individual and personal’.[[169]](#footnote-169)

 One of the most significant and powerful ideas, which had a great impact on the scholars of this second category, was Nilsson’s (1918 and, later, 1964) conception of the term *daimôn* and his identification of it with an unidentified power. According to Nilsson, instead of using the names of specific gods, the poet uses general terms such as: the term *daimôn*, ‘the gods’, ‘some god’ and ‘Zeus’.[[170]](#footnote-170) The words *daimôn* (δαίμων) and god (θεός), Nilsson suggests, are often interchangable; they can refer to any of the anthropomorphic gods, but the term *daimôn* ‘has its centre in the undefined in power, whereas the θεός centres in the personal and individual.’[[171]](#footnote-171) It is a supernatural power associated with those events, which may be characterised as incomprehensible or irrational.[[172]](#footnote-172)

Bianchi (1953), building on Nilsson’s earlier insights (1918), had offered a possible alternative definition of the term *daimôn*. He showed that the term did not represent an older stratum of Greek religion, one that is different from the more recent anthropomorphic and personal gods,[[173]](#footnote-173) but rather that the gods possess and can exert power, and that ‘the intervention of *daimôn* at times gives evidence of definite purpose, which postulates a certain personality in him.’[[174]](#footnote-174) Still, Bianchi and Nilsson (in both 1918 and 1964) agree that the term’s nature, which makes it responsible for sudden interventions in human life, is a quality that was already firmly established in Homer.[[175]](#footnote-175)

 Dietrich (1965) agrees with most of Bianchi’s ideas, except for a *daimôn* possessing a personality. Dietrich confirms that Bianchi is correct in denying that the Homeric term *daimôn* represents an impersonal force or power in Homer, for the simple reason that he has become identical with the general *theos*, which is in no way the equivalent of ‘an abstract concept of divinity-τό θεῖον.’[[176]](#footnote-176) Yet, Dietrich believes that Bianchi has failed to interpret accurately the personal factor in the nature of daemon. Although in popular belief the daemon possesses a real personality, in Homer, it does not display any personality of its own, for the simple reason that its functions in Homer are in most of the cases the same as those of Zeus, an unspecified god, or the gods as a collective whole.[[177]](#footnote-177)

 Nilsson’s idea of a *daimôn* as impersonal was more influential on Wilford (1965). In his article ‘*Daimôn* in Homer’, which was once characterised as one of the most satisfactory treatments of the term in the ancient epics, Wilford conceives of the term as a force with no personal attributes and as a force that was highly irrational.[[178]](#footnote-178) As for it being either a personal or an impersonal force, Wilford just chooses to name it as a ‘living unknown’,[[179]](#footnote-179) alive but with no traces of personality of its own.[[180]](#footnote-180) As for the association between the gods and the *daimonic,* Wilford finds the term refers to ‘the early experience of the undifferentiated numinous.’[[181]](#footnote-181) Wilford’s theory of the ‘numinous’, overall positioned the term *daimôn* in opposition to the gods. He argues that it must refer to something that was distinct from the anthropomorphised and the personified. [[182]](#footnote-182)

 While Nilsson’s ideas may be found in arguments (e.g. Ehnmark; Chantraine, Burkert) that were formed many decades before Nilsson’s study, they are still relevant to recent scholarly debate. To begin with the earliest, Erlannd Ehnmark (1935) was the scholar who originally referred to Nilsson’s previous idea of the term *daimôn* signifying an ‘undefined power.’[[183]](#footnote-183) According to Ehnmark, a *daimôn* has no ‘real individuality’; ‘it represents a portion, adapted to the accidental manifestations of the moment, of the supernormal power recognised by man in phenomena which he believes himself unable to explain from his ordinary experience.’[[184]](#footnote-184)

 In a similar manner, Chantraine, in *Entretiens Foundation*,[[185]](#footnote-185) provides explanations of divine epiphanies and he revisits Jörgensen’s idea of the termbeing merely used by the characters and not by the poet. As he further explains, it is often used by the characters to designate ‘a power with a harmful character’, an indefinite power with no specific naming and functions.[[186]](#footnote-186) Based on this idea, Chantraine mentions the possibility that the indefinite *daimôn* might belong to the uneducated lower classes, while the named and anthropomorphised gods belong to the educated class.[[187]](#footnote-187)

 In more recent years, Walter Burkert (1985)[[188]](#footnote-188) has described the divinity as ‘an occult power’ with undefined character. It drives man forward without being identified with any specific agent in the poems; this makes it‘a peculiar mode of activity.’[[189]](#footnote-189) Burkert opposes Tsagarakis’ idea of δαίμων and θεός simply being two interchangeable terms. Although Burkert admits that the gods do sometimes act like a *daimonic* power, he concludes that neither the character nor the status of the *daimonic* power may be associated with the gods; it can therefore be defined.[[190]](#footnote-190) This is when Burkert expresses the idea by now familiar to us and to this study, that the term covered the territory of the divine that was ‘left unoccupied’ by the gods, since it was associated with everything uncanny and unspecified.[[191]](#footnote-191)

**Intermediate Theories Concerning the Term *Daimôn* and the Gods**

Some intermediate theories appeared between the extremes represented by the previous two schools. Among those theories were the ideas of F. E. Brenk (1986), Elisabeth Brunius-Nilsson (1955), and the more recent work of Irene De Jong (2004). They all admit that there are some common aspects between the divine power of a *daimôn* and the gods in Homer.

Though de Jong (2004) is aware of the scholarly disagreement about the term, she primarily adheres to the first approach. She explains how, for most scholars, the words (i.e. *daimôn* and *theos*) are synonyms, with θεοί and Ζεύς: ‘they are used by characters whenever they do not know or do not wish to say whoever of the individual gods is responsible.’[[192]](#footnote-192) De Jong also nods in the other direction, referring to scholars’ claim that there is ‘an ontological difference between (Olympic) gods and *daimones*.’[[193]](#footnote-193) Still, her view, together with that of N. van der Ben (1984), may be placed in the middle of the two extreme approaches of *daimôn*. Although they acknowledge the existence of possible similarities between the terms δαίμων and θεός (i.e. both words can refer to Olympic gods), they admit that there is still a functional difference between them.[[194]](#footnote-194) For them, the term is ‘almost exclusively used by human speakers, whenever they feel that a god interferes for a short time, directly and concretely in their life.’[[195]](#footnote-195) God (θεός), on the other hand, is ‘used both by human and divine speakers, often in reference to situations and qualities, i.e. to the divine influence over a longer period, or in general contexts.’[[196]](#footnote-196)

Even before them, Brenk (1986) presented a number of cases where the term *daimôn* and the gods had identical functions. However, he later on used the epithet ‘mysterious’ to characterise the term *daimôn* and to distinguish it from the gods.[[197]](#footnote-197) He found the term *daimôn*’s mysterious and evil nature to be the only aspects, which differentiated it from the gods.[[198]](#footnote-198) To him, it signified that part of the divine which is unpredictable, unspecified and often possessing negative connotations.

 Earlier still, and even before Brenk and De Jong, in 1955, Elisabeth Brunius-Nilsson (in her monograph: *Δαιμόνιε: An Inquiry into a Mode of Apostrophe in Old Greek Literature*) attempted to present the termin an even more neutral light. She tried to avoid any distinct characterisation of both its evil nature and harmful intentions, similar to the ones that Brenk used before. This book’s thematic structure, comprehensive scope and impetus for originality are among its main virtues.[[199]](#footnote-199) Brunius-Nilsson focuses all of her interest on the discovery of the basic meaning (if any, of course) of the term *daimôn* in Homer by examining every occurrence of the term in the epics. She admits that the noun (δαίμων), like the vocative of the adjective (δαιμόνιε), has neither a good nor a bad connotation.[[200]](#footnote-200) Then, she makes a distinction between the terms *daimôn* and θεός based on the assumption that ‘whereas a θεός no doubt possesses power, a δαίμων is thought to intervene only when it is plain that *numen* of some sort is actively present.’[[201]](#footnote-201) Much less convincing, of course, is her following inference that ‘δαίμων implies the actual power exerted, as opposed to θεός implies the carrier of the power.’[[202]](#footnote-202) Despite its merits, Brunius-Nilsson’s study is unavoidably outdated and inadequate, as represented in Hudson-William’s critique: ‘One of its major shortcomings is its lack of clear and consistent methodology, which is responsible for its excessive use of unspecified and more generalised conclusions which often end up to unjustified speculations.’[[203]](#footnote-203)Brunius-Nilsson’s (1955) idea of *daimôn* as a ‘neutral word’ appears many decades later, in the recent study of Larson (2007) on the ancient Greeks’ relationship with the many supernatural beings (gods, goddesses, heroes, heroines, and assorted *daimones*) and of their pantheon(s). Larson similarly explains the term *daimôn* as ‘a neutral word for a deity that does not carry the negative connotations of English ‘demon.’’[[204]](#footnote-204)

**A Critical Evaluation of Previous Scholarship**

Although significant contributions have been made in the area of *daimôn*, a focus on narratology can further refine the term’s meaning and usage in the Homeric epics. Attention to who is using the term and to whom they are speaking when they use it will show how its meaning changes from speaker to speaker and from one moment to the next, thus suggesting a polysemousness which has been overlooked by previous scholars. On the one hand, for instance, the term *daimôn*, based on its popular characteristics, seems to have a personality of its own; it gains the characteristics of a daemon or devil from popular belief; this usage is primarily found in the *Odyssey.* A *daimôn* might also be the recipient of offerings and prayers,[[205]](#footnote-205) and even though ‘a δαίμων is a much vaguer divine being than a θεός,’[[206]](#footnote-206) it might still be perceived as a personality. Hence, in *Iliad* 6.115,[[207]](#footnote-207) Hector announces to his troops thathe will ‘go back again to *Ilion*, and there tell the elder men who sit as counsellors, and our own wives, to make their prayer to the immortals (*δαίμοσιν*) and promise them hecatombs’ (6.113-115);[[208]](#footnote-208) and in *Odyssey* 15.261, Theoclymenus finds Telemachus ‘making sacrifice’[[209]](#footnote-209) and thus, addresses him with the following: ‘I entreat you, first by these rites and spirit (*δαίμονος*).’[[210]](#footnote-210) This again, opposes Else’s and other scholars’ claims thatthe term ‘[*daimôn*] is not a religious word,’ and as such it ‘is not a personality; [and that] one does not pray to a, or the, *daimôn.*’[[211]](#footnote-211)

On the other hand, and if we take into consideration those functions which are identical to those of Zeus or some other god, we might then suggest that it cannot possess any personality of its own. The term *daimôn* is thus *polysemantic*, and its meaning is contextually dependent on wherewhen and by whom it is used. The term can be applied to both personal and impersonal divinities, the daemon from popular belief, the Olympian gods, some other unspecified supernatural power.[[212]](#footnote-212) This is a part of the term’s usage and significance that scholars up to now have failed to take into account.

**Competing Theories about the Vocative δαιμόνιε and the Formula δαίμονι ἶσος**

The following sections will present various scholarly ideas concerning the vocative δαιμόνιε and the formula δαίμονι ἶσος. More specifically, we shall present the interpretations of δαιμόνιε that show a) the vocative to be associated with the term *daimôn* and its mysterious nature, b) δαιμόνιε to be attributed with a neutral meaning, c) the lexical interpretations of δαιμόνιε, and d) the vocative’s usage in classical antiquity. As far as the formula δαίμονι ἶσος and its variously given interpretations are concerned, I shall analyse scholars’ opinions that show the formula to signify a) one equal to δαίμων, and b) one equal to a θεός.

**The Vocative Δαιμόνιε**

In Homeric epic, the term δαιμόνιε has a highly restricted distribution and appears only in the vocative case.[[213]](#footnote-213) The term has a very clear derivation: it is the adjective derived from the n-stem noun, δαίμων.[[214]](#footnote-214) In the past, most interpretive problems with this adjective seemed to arise from a lexically based understanding of its use and the assumption that this must reflect its derivational history. The adjective δαιμόνιος, then, is said to have gained all of the meanings that were originally attached to its stem-word. If we assume that originally δαίμων meant ‘a mysterious’ or and ‘incomprehensible supernatural power’, it follows that the adjective δαιμόνιος would have the same meaning). The term is understood to have a fixed meaning,[[215]](#footnote-215) which also refers to a specific person and defines his/her character.

Opposing this definitionare those scholars who seem unwilling to offer the same range of meanings to the adjective δαιμόνιος as to the word δαίμων. They choose to offer a neutral word to explain the meaning of the adjective, each time taking into consideration the situation and the context in which the adjective was placed (e.g. “my dear”, “good sir”).

 In the case of Homer, all of the above theories are associated with the term δαίμων and its semantic connection (if any) with the vocative δαιμόνιε, since this is the only form in which δαιμόνιος occurs in Homer. More specifically, this part of the thesis deals with a more detailed analysis of the semantic ranges of the adjective δαιμόνιος. First, I will present those scholarly ideas that show δαιμόνιος as having the same meaning as δαίμων.

**Δαιμόνιε Associated with the Term *Daimôn*’s Mysterious Nature**

To begin with the earliest interpretations of δαιμόνιε, Nägelsbach infers the different variations of the vocative δαιμόνιεin Homer from the different shades of meaning forthe term δαίμων in Homer. He finds the term δαίμων to signify an evil and harmful divine power. The adjective δαιμόνιος, in his opinion, could not have been used in a good sense (hence e.g. “fool”, “madman”).[[216]](#footnote-216) Wilamowitz suggested the term δαίμων signified a “Zuteiler” (allocator) and attributes to the adjective δαιμόνιος derogatory interpretations such as “madman”, “persecuted by bad fortune.”[[217]](#footnote-217) Chantraine attributes a derogatory meaning to the term δαίμων and offers the same derogatory sense to the adjective δαιμόνιος: ‘The adjective is generally applied for a man, frequently in a manner of reproach and it indicates that the person addressed is misguided by a *daimon*.’[[218]](#footnote-218) M.P. Nilsson in a similar way, views it as the ‘cause of bringing upon man something that is contrary to his will, purpose, or expectations [i.e. a sudden inspiration is often attributed to the *daimon*.][[219]](#footnote-219)

In an attempt to examine the association between the vocative δαιμόνιε and the noun δαίμων, he similarly thought the adjective δαιμόνιος derived from the word to have ‘always an idea of blame more or less prominently attached to it and [to denote] something wonderful, incomprehensible, irrational.’[[220]](#footnote-220) Walter Burkert also uses the etymological relationship between the vocative and the noun to demonstrate that the words δαίμων and θεός are never simply interchangeable terms.[[221]](#footnote-221) Therefore, he explains that δαιμόνιε ‘is more reproach than praise, and therefore certainly does not mean divine; it is used when the speaker does not understand what the addressee is doing and why he is doing it.’[[222]](#footnote-222) In his view, this is closely related to the meaning of the term δαίμων and not of a god, since the term δαίμων is used in Homer in the sense of ‘an occult power, a force that drives man forward where no agent can be named.’[[223]](#footnote-223)

**Δαιμόνιε Attributed with a Neutral Meaning**

Brunius-Nilsson belongs to the second group of scholars who attribute to the adjective δαιμόνιος no semantic connection with δαίμων. She does not take for granted that the adjective δαιμόνιος must necessarily correspond to the stem-word δαίμων even when they are both used by the same poet.[[224]](#footnote-224) Brunius-Nilsson finds another difficulty in connecting the adjective δαιμόνιος with the term δαίμων: the adjective cannot borrow any meanings from its root-term, since the word δαίμων is not clearly defined. Brunius-Nilsson then lists the different meanings attributed to the term *daimôn* throughout various decades, which makes it even more difficult to define the term’s meaning. She even refers to the fact that already in Homer ‘δαίμων is assigned meanings varying considerably according to the contexts in which it occurs: god, deity, devil, “Zuteiler” (allocator), the divine power, heaven’s will, fate, etc.’.[[225]](#footnote-225) The same confusion, she claims, is combined with scholars’ attempts to ascertain the meaning of the term and to distinguish it from that of θεός. More specifically, she suggests: ‘on one hand, [earlier scholars] emphasised the “divine activity“ in the term and, on the other hand, [they] held that ‘the god in person’ was indicated by θεός [...], later on scholars singled out the activity common to θεός, θεοί, δαίμων, and Ζεύς in “the indefinite mode of expression”.’[[226]](#footnote-226) She even identifies the same differentiation in the meaning and the usage of the derivatives of both terms, the adjectives δαιμόνιος and θεῖος.[[227]](#footnote-227) All the previous confusion and disagreements about the term’s meaning is what, according to Brunius-Nilsson, must have prevented us from making any semantic associations between it and its derivatives.

**The Lexical Interpretations of the Vocative Δαιμόνιε**

All of the above suggest that the adjective δαιμόνιος is associated with many different concepts, and this once again shows its association with the term *daimôn*. The uncertain etymological connotations of the adjective and its vocative reflect the variety of meanings given in the lexica as well. Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon, for instance, alters the meaning of the word between earlier and later editions. Hudson-Williams attributes this modification to modern scholars’ reluctance to commit themselves to any specific meaning of the adjective δαιμόνιος found in the earlier editions of Liddell and Scott. Thus, they have been replaced by the more general ones (“good sir or lady”) found in the most recent editions.[[228]](#footnote-228) In Liddell and Scott (1890) we find the adjective δαιμόνιος ‘implying that the person addressed is in some astonishing or strange condition, mostly used in the way of reproach[[229]](#footnote-229) (thou luckless Wight! Thou wretch! Sirrah! Madam!). The adjective was more rarely used by way of admiration (noble sir! Excellent man!) and by way of pity (poor wretch!).[[230]](#footnote-230) In Liddell and Scott (1925-40), however, we find a more general meaning attached to the vocative: ‘good sir or lady’;[[231]](#footnote-231) addressed to chiefs or commoners.[[232]](#footnote-232) In the Oxford Classical Dictionary the term seems to be used mainly in “the sense of performer of more or less unexpected, and intrusive events in human life. In early authors, gods, even Olympians, could be referred to as δαίμονες. Rather than referring to personal anthropomorphic aspects, however, the term δαίμων appears to correspond to supernatural power in its unpredictable, anonymous, and often frightful manifestations. So the adjective δαιμόνιος means ‘strange’, ‘incomprehensible’, ‘uncanny’”.[[233]](#footnote-233) Chantraine shows how the term δαίμων designates ‘a divine power, which cannot be named; on one part it has the sense of the divinity and on the other part it has the sense of fate.’[[234]](#footnote-234) The adjective δαιμόνιος, Chantraine explains, “shows someone which is connected with δαίμων. It means ‘wonderful’, ‘marvellous’, ‘to be possessed by a god’”.[[235]](#footnote-235) Frisk in a similar way associates the term with ‘a divine power, fate, god’, and he shows δαιμόνιος to mean ‘the one that belongs to *daimon*, the one sent by fate, from a god.’[[236]](#footnote-236) Snell associates the term δαίμων with ‘μοῖρα, θεός, θεοί, Ζεύς.’[[237]](#footnote-237) According to Snell, it does not refer to the personal anthropomorphic aspects of a god, but to an anonymous supernatural power. The adjective δαιμόνιος shows someone under the effect of a *daimôn*.[[238]](#footnote-238)

**Δαιμόνιε and its Usage in Classical Antiquity**

The adjective δαιμόνιος appears to have had various usages in later Classical authors.[[239]](#footnote-239) Starting with Hesiod (the term occurs twice, once in the *Theogony* and once in the *Works and Days*), δαιμόνιος was said to be the one belonging to a δαίμων, pertaining to the divine nature - sent by the divinity, the Gods, or Fate; meaning “miraculous or marvellous”, “divine one”, “misfortune”. The term is used twice in an unfriendly sense in the Homeric Hymns, and in Herodotus it is used (three times) in polite argumentation, in appeals between opponents and friendly parties, and exhortations to soldiers. It carries the meanings of “heaven-sent”, “miraculous”, “marvellous”. In comedy (it occurs fifteen timesin Aristophanes), δαιμόνιος is used in an ironic sense in appeals between fathers and sons, as a term of persuasion between husbands and wives, in rebuke between women and as a term of reproach, meaning “madman”, “good sir”, “good friend”. In Plato, δαιμόνιος is used in inserted scenes of relief with human appeals. It appears in the context of dialogues and disputes to express reproach, as a means of persuasion, to convey a derogatory opinion of the opponent or to express astonishment. It acquires the meanings of “divine”, “devil man”, “and strange”, “good sir”.[[240]](#footnote-240)

**Conclusion**

The limitations of attributing to the term *daimôn* only one specific meaning in Homer has been well known for many decades. In attempting to offer a general understanding of this background, I presented different ideas, contradictions and criticisms to show how the significant studies of many scholars dealt with this issue.

 We have seen how the problem of a single meaning was often developed in various philosophical and philological discussions. Hence, the term δαίμων appeared in the studies based on principles of Homeric technique (cf. Jörgensen), in terms of metrical issues (cf. Else) andin the general framework of indispensable studies on Homeric religion (cf. Chantraine, Nilsson, Burkert). Elsewhere, it was also perceived in ‘terms of a ‘psychological projection’ (cf. Wilford), as part of more general studies on other religious aspects such as Fate or divinity, in discussions of Greek religion (cf. Dietrich, François, Tsagarakis), and, finally, in a fully developed lexical exposition (cf. Snell, Frisk, Chantraine).

In what follows, I will build upon this scholarly tradition to offer a more detailed examination of the term *daimôn* by tracing its various meanings and semantic affinity and disaffinity with the other words (i.e. the gods, a specific named god, fate, etc.) in the passage with which ‘it is capable of contrasting semantic relations.’[[241]](#footnote-241) I will further show its use in different narrative contexts and by different characters (focalizers) are as important as the lexical semantics of the term in understanding the meaning and significance of the term in the Homeric epics.

**CHAPTER TWO**

**The Concept of *Daimôn* in Homer:**

***Daimôn* as a Concept and as a Point of Convergence between the Various Aspects of the Superhuman ‘Other’**

**Introduction**

This chapter examines the concept of *daimôn* in Homer and evaluates the term’s role as a point of convergence between the various aspects of the superhuman ‘other’ in Homer. The chapter accomplishes this methodologically by analysing it in terms of focalization, that is, how the word’s use and meaning derive from its usage by different speakers in the narrative, namely the narrator and the mortal and immortal characters. Most specifically, various points of view in the narrative demonstrate how the term *daimôn* may be used to refer to a specific god,[[242]](#footnote-242) the Olympian gods,[[243]](#footnote-243) an abstract concept such as fate,[[244]](#footnote-244) or some unpredictable mysterious power.[[245]](#footnote-245) Regardless of which supernatural entity to which it refers, it is the narratological context in which the term is used that determines its function. Some times, the *daimonic* is considered benevolent,[[246]](#footnote-246) serving, for instance, as the source of inspiration or good fortune to mortals,[[247]](#footnote-247) while at other times is is the source of misfortune[[248]](#footnote-248) and the production of negative physical effects on mortals.[[249]](#footnote-249)

Over the years, scholars have accounted for *daimôn*’s various meaningsto itsfunctional ambiguity. Scholars have attributed this ambiguity to the debates about its beneficial or malevolent function and the frequent attempts to opt for only one or the other.[[250]](#footnote-250) By contrast, this chapter approaches what previous scholars have called the ambiguity of the term in a different way. It presents the term as complex but unambiguous: based on the many instances of the term in the Homeric epics, it argues for a positive association of the term as a conceptual device and as ‘a sign of the mysterious.’

In contrast to the tendency of scholars to highlight the usage of the term mostly by the characters and not so much by the poet,[[251]](#footnote-251) who only refers to the gods as the main cause of events and who rarely uses *daimôn*,[[252]](#footnote-252) this chapter demonstrates that even when the narrator embeds the term in his characters’ speeches, he intends to associate the term with its significant role as a concept; this is a role already ascribed by the narrator to the anthropomorphic gods.[[253]](#footnote-253) This enables us, Homer’s audience, to better understand the previously unexplained and ‘unknown’ supernatural entities in the epics.

Even more,the awe and fear which characters experience in the presence of the *daimonic* highlights the attribution of the term’s role as a ‘sign of the mysterious’. Based on the term *daimôn* as a conceptual device, we learn that individual gods, the gods as a whole, and abstract supernatural entities such as fate all share the same mysterious nature and unknowability in the eyes of mortals. This shared perception sheds further light on a new conception of *daimonic* beings, which were treated as separate and distinct entities in previous scholarship. These qualities suggest a unified conception of the divine by mortals, even as the term itself signifies a diverse set of supernatural forces.

**Methodology**

I shall use a number of linguistic theories to analyse the meaning of the term *daimôn* to better understand its function as a concept in Greek religion, that is to say, as a point of convergence among the various aspects of the superhuman ‘other’. First, I shall suggest that ‘contextual variation’ plays an important role in the ‘semantic import’ of the term: different contexts require different understandings of the meaning of the word.[[254]](#footnote-254)

This brings us to Haas and to his idiosyncratic view of meaning.[[255]](#footnote-255) It derives from an aspect of the work of the great twentieth-century philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein; namely his ‘use’ theory of meaning. It is encapsulated in the dictum: ‘don’t look for the meaning - look for the use.’[[256]](#footnote-256) In other words, the meaning of an expression is the use in which it is put.’[[257]](#footnote-257) Haas further gives a personal twist to the above, inspired by J. R. Firth’s dictum: ‘words shall be known by the company they keep.’[[258]](#footnote-258) This interprets ‘use’ as the contexts, actual and potential, in which the expression occurs normally.[[259]](#footnote-259) In the case of the term *daimôn*, its multiple meanings can best be seen by looking at the context in which it is used; that is to say, it gains its meaning from ‘its participation in the meaning of every other word.’[[260]](#footnote-260)

One of the most important narratological elements of this contextual approach is to examine how various focalizers (the narrator, humans and the gods)[[261]](#footnote-261) mean different things even when using the same word. The focalizers’ perception enables us to see what aspects of the word’s meaning are constant and which change depending on who is using it.

This approach draws much from the work of the great French linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.[[262]](#footnote-262) He was fond of drawing an analogy between language and the game of chess. Just as the various chess-pieces and their moves can only be understood in terms of how they function together and in contrast with one another, so too the various parts of language can only be understood in relation to each other parts in the sequence: ‘To understand the meaning of a word, for instance, we have to understand how it functions together with and in contrast to other, related words.’[[263]](#footnote-263) According to a fully Structuralist theory of meaning, ‘meanings do not exist “themselves”’; ‘the meaning of any word is actually constituted by the totality of relationships this word has with the other words in the language,’[[264]](#footnote-264) and as ‘part of an overall system of cross-cutting contrasts and similarities.’[[265]](#footnote-265) Thus, the meaning of the term *daimôn* is constituted on comparison to other aspects of the supernatural (i.e. gods, fate, demonic powers) in the Homeric universe.

Another way to think of this issue is through Wittgenstein’s theory of ‘family resemblance’ in word:[[266]](#footnote-266) ‘The members of a large family typically resemble one another in a variety of ways, but there are no features which they all have, and there may be members who share no features, but these will none the less be linked to others by a chain of resemblance.’[[267]](#footnote-267) The term *daimôn*, as one word among the large family of words which signify one or another aspect of the polytheistic world of Homer, resembles the rest of the members of the family (i.e. gods, fate, inhuman powers) in a number of ways (i.e. nature, activities, effect on mortals). The near synonymous nature of these terms suggest what aspects of the supernatural are contained in the term *daimôn*, but also show how *daimôn* stands alone in being used to represent the unkwnown and the mysterious in the divine world.

Application of the componential approach[[268]](#footnote-268) will affirm that it is in the sum of the meanings of all the different supernatural entities that the term *daimôn* derives its meaning. This approach is one of the earliest and still most widespread ways of approaching the construction of word meaning. Advocates of the componential approach argue that the most efficient way to approach the meaning of a word is ‘to think of the meaning of a word as being constructed out of smaller, more elementary, invariant units of meaning, somewhat on the analogy of the atomic structure of atom […]. These ‘semantic atoms’ are variously known as semes, semantic features, semantic components, semantic markers, semantic primes.’[[269]](#footnote-269)

A last theoretical framework for thinking about meaning is the ‘conceptual approach,’[[270]](#footnote-270) which takes into consideration the various ‘components’ and ‘atoms’ of *daimôn.* Used in conjunction with these other approaches, it offers a way of understanding the term as a conceptual category related to and yet distinct from other conceptions of the supernatural. Conceptually, the term is a ‘sign of the mysterious’, a meaning derived from the analysis of the characters’ emotional responses towards the divine interventions they witness and yet are unable to explain or understand.

**The Implications of Focalization: The Many Meanings of the Term *Daimôn***

A narratological analysis of focalization in relation to the use of the term complements the application of the previous theoretical and methodological concerns by demonstrating that each time the term *daimôn* is used by a different speaker, itsmeaning changes. Focalization by the narrator in the context of a simple narrator-text[[271]](#footnote-271) as well as the usage of the focalization by both mortal and immortal characters brings out the term’s *polysemantic* nature. The narrator possesses the capacity to manipulate the perceptions, feelings and thoughts of his audience through narrative technique. One of many such techniques is the sophisticated deployment of secondary focalization through a character to represent that character’s perceptions and emotions.[[272]](#footnote-272) Thus, primary and secondary focalization must considered important parts of the narratological machinery contributing to the narrative[[273]](#footnote-273) and may be analysed to better understand the term’s diverse meanings. As seen in the table that follows,[[274]](#footnote-274) the term *daimôn* is used mostly by the characters (more often by mortals than immortals) and more rarely by the poet (eight times in the *Iliad* and only once in the *Odyssey*).

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| --- |
| **Table 3: Point of View Regarding the Term *Daimôn* in Homer** |
| **Point of View: Characters Gods Poet**  |
| **Frequency** 24 4 8***Iliad:***  |
| **Frequency** 40 1 1 ***Odyssey*:** |

Also worthy of closer consideration is that a term characterised by such multiplicity significations and a term that can have a different meaning each time it is used by a different focalizer must not be considered *ex nihilo*. On the contrary, the term *daimôn*, as part of the epic narrative must always be examined in association with the rest of the terms found situated either by the narrator himself or by the characters in the same context of their narration. This will aid us, as the primary narratee-focalizee (NeFe1), to recognise and understand the already developed semantic relations that exist between the term *daimôn* and the terms with which it shares a family and semantic resemblance.[[275]](#footnote-275) Therefore, as an amalgamated term, as depicted in the next table, *daimôn* is used as a reference to a specific god. This occurs mostly in the singular and plural nominative case both (forty times in both epics), with the instances of the term in the dative singular (thirteen times in the *Iliad*) as the second most frequent ones, though these are often formulaic rather than independent uses.[[276]](#footnote-276) It refers twenty-three times to a specific god three times to the Olympic gods, twenty-two times to the Definite gods and thirty-five times to an unspecified power.[[277]](#footnote-277)

|  |
| --- |
| **Table 1: The Frequency of the Term *Daimôn* in Homer** |
| **Definition: Specific God Olympic Gods Definite Gods Fate Unspecified Power\***  |
| **Frequency** ***Iliad:***13 3 8 2 10 |
| **Frequency**10 ----- 144 25***Odyssey*:** |

* *Daimôn* as an unaccountable power may be also associated with the meanings of the gods, the definite gods, fate, the supernormal powers of a mortal (i.e. a warrior referred to by the formula δαίμονιἶσος), which at the specific moment have undertaken the overtones of an unbridled supernatural power.

Most precisely, usage of the term by the narrator and by one of the mortal or immortal characters shows the term to be associated with supernatural attributes (i.e. it is associated with a specific god (cf*.Il.* 3.420, 11.480; *Od*. 3.27, 5.421); usage of the term by a different mortal character associates the term *daimôn* with fate as the distributor of man’s lot and death (cf. *Il*. 8.166, 21.93; 16.64).

Some other times the characters and the narrator perceive the term in such a way that it regains its mysterious and unpredictable characteristics (i.e. it gets closer to the notion of an unbridled supernatural power (cf. *Il.* 11.792, 15.403; *Od*. 5.396, 7.248)). In a similar manner, the implications of focalization and the usage of the term in a different contextual family demonstrate its association with the functions and moral prominence of all sorts of entities (i.e. the gods, some god, Zeus and of an unspecified supernatural power) in Homer.

Usage of the term by different focalizers also shows that it could refer to either a benevolent or a malevolent god; it appears to be equally responsible for the welfare of an individual (cf. *Od*. 16.370) and for giving him extra strength (cf. *Il.* 15.418) as for being the source of a mortal’s misfortunes and inflicting suffering and grief upon him (cf. *Od*. 5.421). Both the primary and secondary narrators of the epics conceive of the term as representing the benficial and malicious aspects of the divine.

Multiple meanings are similarly suggested for the term’s association with psychic and corporal phenomena. Different usage of the term by the narrator and by the characters shows how the term can refer to a variety of powers which affect mortals. Consideration of both points of view show that a *daimôn*, just like the gods, is considered to be the cause of both physical (cf. *Il*. 15.468: the breaking of a bow) and a mental activity (cf. *Od*. 19.10: inspire a plan). No matter how it is used or by whom, the one constant among all of these instances is the term’s inherent mysterious: when no one knows the cause of a divine manifestation, be it for good or ill, be it physical or mental, the attribute it to a *daimôn.*

**The Term *Daimôn* as ‘a Sign of the Mysterious’**

This part of the discussion coincides with this thesis’ attempt to define the mysterious element in man’s experience which he refers to by the term *daimôn*. Thus, the *daimonic* is a concept which explains the unknown and the unexplained in man’s life; it is the term men use to explain the unknown and unknowable aspects of supernatural intervention in mortal affairs. Through the application of narratological theory about focalization, the feelings of awe, admiration and terror which are expressed at the manifestion of the *daimonic* become important elements for considering the mysterious nature of various entities in the Homeric world. As such, we learn that the various entities to which the term can refer are characterised by the same diversity of activities and with the same mysterious nature as a *daimôn*.

The common mysterious aspect that composes the nature and the activities of these powers is what enables these different entities to be referred to by a single word. It is what also makesthe terma ‘single’, ‘complex’ ‘receptacle’ and a point of convergence between them, and it is what also enables these entities to be found concentrated under the same contexts not only of the demonic, but also of the Homeric world.[[278]](#footnote-278)

 However, as in every attempt to define the mysterious and the unknown in Homer, the term *daimôn* can also be understood as a category containing a variety of different supernatural forces, all of which share the common factor of their mysteriousness from the mortal perspective.

**The Implications of Focalization, the Feelings of the Mysterious: the Term *Daimôn* as a Conceptual Device and as a ‘Sign of its Own Mysterious Nature’**

As is demonstrated by an analysis of the differing perceptions of the supernatural by Menelaus and Telemachus and the feelings of awe, admiration and terror that accompany both characters’ reactions towards this intervention, the most significant quality of the *daimôn* is its mysteriousness.[[279]](#footnote-279) More specifically, the information gained from the narration of two characters in the *Odyssey* (4.275, 16.194) working as secondary narrator-focalizers (NF2) and the speeches of the characters embedded in the primary text may be used either to offer important information to the audience of the texts (NeFe1) or for other characters in the narrative, who functioning as secondary narratee-focalizees (NeFe2).[[280]](#footnote-280) For instance, we witnesses Menelaus’ awe and admiration when he describes the intrusive intervention of a mysterious power, represented by the term *daimôn* and its inexplicable effect on Helen’s behaviour. Helen’s behaviour, as Tsagarakis also suggests, becomes ‘irrational’,[[281]](#footnote-281) because some mysterious supernatural power was working through her.’[[282]](#footnote-282) It was also irrational for Menelaus because, as he describes, a *daimonic power* commanded Helen (κελευσέμεναι δέ σ’ἔμελλε δαίμων, 275) and drove her against her will to approach the wooden horse in which the Greek warriors lay concealed (275) to try to beguile them.[[283]](#footnote-283) At this point, both the perception of a mortal character towards the *daimonic power* and its effect on Helen highlights the term’s basic quality as an unspecified, mysterious, irrational power responsible for inexplicable events in human life.[[284]](#footnote-284)

Similarly, Telemachus’s awe atperceiving the ‘sudden and unexpected appearance’[[285]](#footnote-285) of Odysseus mingle with his terror that some *daimonic power* has beguilded him (ἀλλά με δαίμων θέλγει, ὄφρ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀδυρόμενος στεναχίζω, 194-95) demonstrate the *daimonic* powers’ association with the mysterious;[[286]](#footnote-286) they are the source of Telemachus’ inexplicable and sudden experience.[[287]](#footnote-287) The differing narratological context enables us, as the readers of Homer, and the narrator, through the focalization of his characters, to pin down the specific characteristics of the term. They highlight its quality both as an unexplained power and an identifiable sign for everything intrusive and unexpected. As such, a broader investigation of the term *daimôn* can help illuminate the *daimonic* elements in the Homeric universe.

**The Implications of Focalization on the Concept of the *Daimonic***

This part of the discussion involves analysis of the usage of the term by various focalizers (i.e. men and gods) in a variety of contexts to demonstrate the term’s association with several different entities (i.e. a specific god (i.e.*Od*. 3.27), the gods as a whole (i.e. *Il.* 6.115), and fate more generally (*Il.* 8.166, *Il*. 17.98, *Od*. 16.64). It also shows how the term may be used to demonstrate thatsemantically connected terms share the qualities of being an unspecified and mysterious power, the cause of unexpected events and the source of misfortune. I will divide analysis of the instances into two subsections. In the first subsection, I will discuss the instances that show the term to be the equivalent of a specific god (i.e. *Od*. 3.27), and the gods as a whole (i.e. *Il*. 6.115). The second subsection will involve those instances that show howthe term *daimôn* is used to refer to that which is fated (i.e. *Il*. 8.166, *Il*. 17.98, *Od*. 16.64). They show how the concept of *daimôn* may be more or less specific depending on who the speaker is and how they describe the event.

***Daimôn* Associated with the Mysterious Nature of a Specific God**

To begin with the first category of instances, I shall analyse how different focalizersassociate the term different supernatural entities. In the first example, from book 3.27, the term *daimôn* is used in a deceptive way.[[288]](#footnote-288) The narrator embeds in his narrator-text the speech of a goddess, Athena. The goddess uses the term *daimôn* to indicate her own mysterious actions and hidden purposes (i.e. favourite actions) towards a mortal (Telemachus). This is complicated, however, because Athena herself has taken the guise of a mortal: both the audience and Athena know who the divinity is. Thus, the only time in the *Odyssey* that the term *daimôn* is found in the speech of a god is actually an instance of its use by a god impersonating a mortal to fool another mortal. In the *Iliad*, it is found in the speech of a god four times (see Appendix VI). The gods use the term in their conversation with each other (e.g. *Il*. 5.459, 5.884). They also use it to refer/characterise each other in the form of a vocative (e.g. *Il*. 1.561, 4.31).[[289]](#footnote-289)

Telemachus is uncertain as to what to say to the aged Nestor when Athena, in the guise of Mentor,[[290]](#footnote-290) consoles him[[291]](#footnote-291) in the following way: ‘Telemachos some of it you yourself will see in your own heart, and some the divinity (δαίμων) will put in your mind. I do not think you could have been born and reared without the gods’ will (3.26-28).’[[292]](#footnote-292) There is no doubt that the ‘δαίμων in the mouth of a goddess is well worth observing.’[[293]](#footnote-293) It is even more astonishing that a mortal (Telemachus) receives the inspiration of a δαίμων because he is under the protection of the gods. This comparison demonstrates the term’s complexity regarding its semantic association with different terms (i.e. with a specific god: Athena here (i.e. *Od*. 3.27) and with the gods as a whole or an unspecific grouping of several gods in the passage that follows (i.e. *Il*. 6.115)) and not the ambivalent nature of the term *daimôn*, as Brunius-Nilsson suggested.[[294]](#footnote-294) Also behind this comparison lies the intention of the poet to use the term as an indication of everything strange and ambiguous about the gods.[[295]](#footnote-295) Mysterious and unspecified features were among the common aspects that enabled individual gods to be joined together in the same divine universe.

**The Term *Daimôn* in the Plural Signifying the Unexplained Behaviour of the Gods as a Whole and Specific Gods in Particular**

In the second example, taken from *Iliad* book 6, we shall examine how the narrator embeds Hector’s focalization in his own narration to highlight the usage of the term in the plural (*Il*.6.115: δαίμοσιν ἀρήσασθαι, ὑποσχέσθαι δ’ ἑκατόμβα*ς*) to refer directly to the collective gods (δαίμοσιν) and indirectly to a specific god (i.e. Athena). What remains for us to examine here I show the term *daimôn*, when situated in a different narrative context (i.e. the conversation of Hector with his troops and with his mother) is associated with a different signification.

In the scene in question, Hector is about to set out for Troy at his brother’s request (6.86ff.) to see that Athena is properly petitioned to help the Trojans.[[296]](#footnote-296) He declares to his men that he will urge the women to pray to the gods (δαίμοσιν ἀρήσασθαι, 115). It seems that when Hector talks to his troops he does not say anything specific about Athena. Instead, he says that he will advocate the Trojan women to pray to *daimones*. However, if only the gods and not *daimones* were the receipients of prayers and sacrifices,[[297]](#footnote-297) then we may affirm that δαίμοσιν here (115) stands for the personal gods. For this reason, in verse 240f. we are told instead that: ‘ὁδ’ ἔπειτα θεοῖς εὔχεσθαι ἀνώγει πάσας ἑξείης∙’ (and he told them to pray to the immortals, all, in turn). But still, if the poet really uses δαίμοσιν to refer to the gods, this means that *daimones* could do whatever the gods do. *Daimones* could be the recipients of sacrifices just as the gods are. All these highlight the term’s polysemous and ambiguous nature. In this case, the *daimonic powers* resemble the anthropomorphic gods. Even more, the way both the terms δαίμοσιν and the gods are used interchangeably in the context of the same scene by a mortal character[[298]](#footnote-298) demonstrates that both terms were related in the language of Greek religion.

Δαίμοσιν, however, may be associated with Athena too. Athena, just like the gods, receives prayers from her worshippers, but Hector does not say anything about Athena at the beginning of his speech; he does not ask the Trojan matrons to pray to *daimones*. Only later, he conveys to his mother the right message: to go with burnt offerings to Athena’s temple (269-80). It seems as if Athena is the one that Hector really had in mind when he was speaking to his men. However, he chooses not to mention her name directly to his troops – or can’t be bothered to mention her name in a general explanation of religious obligations tha tneed to be met. If we accept the first interpretation, however, Athena’s name must remain hidden and unknown to his men because this is ‘the natural condition [...] under which a man acts when he appeals to his god.’[[299]](#footnote-299) That is, Hector prefers to usea more general term when he refers to the specific divine power that needs to be worshipped. Hence, he substitutes the name of the gods by using a less specific term (i.e. δαίμοσιν). He even generalises his intentions to his troops by replacing the name of Athena with the more general ‘gods’ (δαίμοσιν).[[300]](#footnote-300)

 Usage of the term also shows that *daimones*, *theoi* and Athena may indeed share the same characteristics. Therefore, related to their quality as religious terms with regard to cult practice and worship, Athena and the gods (*theoi*) come to possess the term *daimôn*’s more general and nonspecific character. Athena’s name remains unidentified to the rest of the Trojans. It becomes known only to the few characters involved (i.e. Hector, Hecabe and the Trojan women) and to us as the audience.

These examples highlight the importance of understanding the role of the specific speaker in the narrative and of his choice to use term *daimôn* (or one of its other forms) to achieve his rhetorical goals in front of a specific audience.[[301]](#footnote-301) We learn how the narrator uses the focalization of one of his characters to highlight the *polysemantic* nature ofthe term *daimôn*. The term *daimôn* gains the various features of its complex character from its association with the gods as a whole, with a specific god’s individual attributes,[[302]](#footnote-302) and the relation between god(s) and the mortal involved. These vary considerably in each instance. The term *daimôn* works as an identifiable sign so that we, as the primary external narratee-focalizee, understand what aspect of the *daimonic* each speaker wants to convey[[303]](#footnote-303) and whether he is referring to the mysterious activities of a specific god or the gods as a whole. In either case, the partial anonymity of a certain divine persona, recognised by the narrator but not always by the characters, has been closely associated with the the term *daimôn*.[[304]](#footnote-304)

The second category of instances (i.e. *Il*. 8.166, *Il*. 17.98, *Od*. 16.64) demonstrate how the usage of the term *daimôn* by different mortal characters (i.e. Hector, Menelaus, and Eumaeus) in the narrative associates the term with a number of different entities that, like a *daimôn*, may become the agents of fate. This once more suggests that the term *daimôn* is *polysemantic*. Significantly, the concept of *daimôn* might sometimes look abstract[[305]](#footnote-305) and other times it specific. The number of instances that will be analysed (i.e. *Il*. 8.166, *Il*. 17.98, *Od*. 16.64) and, as will be demonstrated by Table 2 below, may indeed show the term *daimôn* to be used: a) in a more general manner that brings the term closer to the idea of *moira*, the general *theos* (θεός τις)[[306]](#footnote-306) and death;[[307]](#footnote-307) b) in a more personalised way and with more specialised anthropomorphic figures that makes the term *daimôn* interchangeable with the gods as a whole, a specific god,[[308]](#footnote-308) or Zeus, which could also become the agents of fate, of someone’s lot or share (ἄτη, μοῖρα, μόρος, αἶσα).

|  |
| --- |
| **Table 2: The Term *Daimôn* Incorporating all Concepts of Fate** |
| *Daimôn \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_→generalised daimôn →general theos* (allotter of fate) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_→*personalised daimôn*→ *specific god, the gods*cause of unexpected& cause of unexpected&unchanged events unchanged evens |

The term can thus be associated with what is fated, and our analysis here will demonstrate that the term *daimôn*, based on its direct or indirect relation with what the end of a mortal’s allotted time, may indeed combine two different aspects. It can simultaneously be the reference of the gods and of an unspecified supernatural power as the equivalents of fate. Previously, I examined how the term *daimôn*, when used either by the narrator or by mortal and immortal characters, highlights the affinity of a specific god and of the gods as a whole with the mysterious nature of the *daimonic* powers. In this case, the following instances will show how the terms grammatically connected to the term *daimôn* may similarly work as the equivalents of a fated and mysterious activity. As I shall further suggest, all different points of view highlight these terms’ shared quality as the agents of an unanticipated misfortune.

**The Term *Daimôn* Representing a Specific God (Poseidon), the Gods and Zeus as the Allotters of Fate**

At *Od*. 16.64 (ὣς γάρ οἱ ἐπέκλωσεν τά γε δαίμων), the term *daimôn* adopts the more personalised nature of Zeus as the dispenser of fate and Poseidon as one of the main gods responsible for Odysseus’ allotted misfortunes. The term *daimôn*, the gods, *moira* and *aisa*[[309]](#footnote-309)weave a life of wandering for Odysseus.[[310]](#footnote-310) Eumaeus tells Telemachus about the fate of the beggar (Odysseus): ‘…he says that he has wandered roaming through many cities of mortals; so has a god spun for him this lot.’[[311]](#footnote-311) The term δαίμων here (64) spins[[312]](#footnote-312) the thread of Odysseus’ fatejust like the gods.[[313]](#footnote-313) It must be noted that the imagery of κλώθειν was extended to the gods, Zeus and the term *daimôn* (cf. *Il*. 24.525; *Od*. 20.196; 16.64; 4.207f.).[[314]](#footnote-314) Thus, the gods wove misery for man (*Il*. 24.525; *Od*. 20 196: for kings)[[315]](#footnote-315) and the return of Odysseus (*Od*. 1.17)[[316]](#footnote-316) even as they wove no such ὄλβος for Telemachus (*Od*. 3.208),[[317]](#footnote-317) doomed Troy (*Od*. 8.579)[[318]](#footnote-318) and forced Odysseus to wander (*Od*. 11.139).[[319]](#footnote-319) Only once a δαίμων weaves Odysseus’ wanderings (and this happens in the present passage: *Od*. 16.64). Finally, Zeus is once described as weaving ὄλβος at marriage and birth (*Od*. 4.207f.).[[320]](#footnote-320) Going back to *Od*. 16.64, δαίμων weaves a life of wanderings [just like the gods] for Odysseus.[[321]](#footnote-321) The term *daimôn* here might be easily associated with Poseidon as well. He, like Zeus, ultimately directs Odysseus’ destiny.

Poseidon is the one responsible for every misfortune that Odysseus has to face as a consequence of Odysseus’ wrongdoings against Poseidon and his son, Polyphemus. Given the above, scholars’ opinions were divided concerning the relation, if any, between what the terms*daimôn*, *moira*, *aisa* and the gods weave. Nilsson[[322]](#footnote-322) makes a distinction between the above terms as weaving a life of wanderings for Odysseus, whereas Dietrich suggests that something like that does not always apply.[[323]](#footnote-323) However, Tsagarakis finds Dietrich’s objections to Nilsson’s view superficial. He even suggests that the term *daimôn* in this passage and in Eumaeus’ later speech (16.64) ‘does not “weave a life of wandering for Odysseus’ in the same sense as *moira* or *moirae* may be said to weave […] [whereas, there is] notion here of a spinning Zeus.”[[324]](#footnote-324) Still, I believe that Eumaeus’ speech suggests that what really matters here is the fact that δαίμων once again in this passage is associated with fate. More precisely, only once here (16.64) *daimôn* just like the gods (Zeus, Poseidon), spins someone’s lot: it weaves Odysseus’ fate. *Daimôn* is indeed ‘weaving Odysseus’ wandering.”[[325]](#footnote-325) It is not an easy task to ascertain Odysseus’ misfortunes from Eumaeus’ speech (e.g. ‘he has wandered roaming through many cities of mortals’[[326]](#footnote-326)) nor whether the termδαίμωνmight be held responsible for weaving a whole life of wanderings for Odysseus or whether he might be held responsible for the weaving of specific unfortunate events during his wandering. However, if we consider that almost the whole of Odysseus’ life was characterised by endless wandering, Eumaeus’ speech is enough evidence for us to affirm that a δαίμων weaves the life of Odysseus in the same way as *moira*, *moirae* and *aisa*.[[327]](#footnote-327) Significantly, a *daimôn* ‘weaves a life of wandering for Odysseus’[[328]](#footnote-328) or it weaves only ‘the sorrowful events of the stranger’s life’;[[329]](#footnote-329) this does not, however, avert its association with fate or with the weaving of someone’s lot. This is the common attribute that fate shares with the gods (i.e. Zeus and Poseidon) as the allotters of someone’s *moira.*

The implications of the term *daimôn* may be better understood through attention to focalization. These powers and those associated with the term *daimôn* aredefined by their mysteriousness. They are the sources of unexplained misfortune. From what can be derived from the analysis of both the concept of *daimôn* and the feelings associated with its mysterious aspect, we may suggest that in fact the term might be used as an identifiable sign of this newly added and shared aspect of their nature. The significance of this conclusion is important for the readers of Homer because due to the polysemous nature of the term *daimôn*, we become aware of the existence and the development of strong organisational bonds and other semantic relations between these entities.

**The Implications of Focalization, the Feelings of the Mysterious: The Term *Daimôn* as a ‘Sign of the Mysterious’**

This part of the discussion attempts to define the mysterious nature of the terms’ associated concepts. More specifically, we shall analyse of the feelings of the characters in two instances from the *Iliad* (1.222, 3.420). It will enable us, as with analysis of the concept of the *daimonic* before, to suggest that the feelings of different demonstrate that the gods as a whole or a specific god might be associated with its inexplicable and mysterious nature. As such, we shall refer to the feelings of a character as these are presented by the character himself (in the context of a character-text) as a secondary narrator-focalizer or as embedded speech. We shall also refer to the feelings of a character towards an unexplained power in his own narrator-text (in a complex narrator-text).[[330]](#footnote-330)

*Il*. 3.420 (σιγῇ, πάσας δέ Τρῳὰς λάθεν· ἦρχε δὲ δαίμων) shows the term *daimôn* referring to a specific god, Aphrodite, one of the rare instances where the poet uses the term to refer to an anthropomorphic god who is physically present in her own form and with her identity already familiar to the characters. This passage is even more important because it includes a character’s reaction as presented by the poet some verses before (396-398) towards the incomprehensible behaviour of the goddess. This will enable us to demonstrate that the term *daimôn*, as used by the narrator to refer to a specific anthropomorphic god, may aid usin attributing to this specific god this *daimonic* nature.

Many scholars (i.e. Leaf and Bayfield,[[331]](#footnote-331) Hooker[[332]](#footnote-332)) have previously argued that the expression ἦρχε δέ shows the presence of an anthropomorphic god in her own person in the specific scene; Aphrodite is the only goddess involved with Helen in the specific verses. Thus, we read that when Aphrodite rescued Paris, her *protégé*, from death, she goes off to bring Helen back to him (380-383).[[333]](#footnote-333) Helen, faced with such an ultimatum, obeys the goddess. We are then informed that Aphrodite, represented here by the term *daimôn*, led the way (ἦρχε δὲ δαίμων, 418-420).[[334]](#footnote-334) Aphrodite is the only goddess who has a reason for wanting Helen to return to Paris.[[335]](#footnote-335) She is the one who eventually leads Helen back to the chambers of Paris and she even remains in Paris’ room, where she lifts and places a chair in front of both him and Helen.

Kirk, by contrast, argues that he cannot find any particular significance behind the association of the term δαίμων here with a specific Olympian. He explains that elsewhere the term is applied to an unnamed god and not to a particular one. The term Δαίμων, he argues, ‘replaces θεός or θεά in order to pack the thought into the last colon.’[[336]](#footnote-336) However, Kirk’s previous explanation seems to be incomplete for two reasons. First, it seems he did not consider the possibility that the term might be used in the place of the anthropomorphic god to emphasise her mysterious nature. Second, he was unaware of the term *polysemous* nature, because of which it can refer to Aphrodite in particular and, at the same time, an amorphous mysterious divine agent.

Wilford, Brunius-Nilsson and Tsagarakis suggest that this is almost certainly the only passage where the term *daimôn* refers back to Aphrodite, thus offering a rebuttal to Kirk’s position.[[337]](#footnote-337) They assert that the expression ἦρχεδέis always found in conjunction with the name of a specific anthropomorphic god.[[338]](#footnote-338) Although there is no doubt that the term *daimôn* is used here by the narrator to refer to Aphrodite ‘what remains even more exceptional is the fact that this is one of the rare instances where the particular deity, called daemon in the context, is recognised by a person.’[[339]](#footnote-339) The narrator uses the involvement of Helen, a mortal character, to highlight Aphrodite’s affinity with the *daimonic* powers, as depicted in the way she affects Helen. The narrator uses of two of his most characteristic stylistic techniques: first, he embeds in his narration the description of the reaction of Helen, who in great astonishment and full of fear, recognises the true identity of the goddess (‘She, as she recognized the round, sweet throat of the goddess and her desirable breast and her eyes that were full of shining, she wondered’, 396-398; 403-405; 410-412).[[340]](#footnote-340) Second, he composes the scene so that Helen herself becomes the internal secondary narrator-focalizer (NF2) thus allowing us direct access to her perception of the events. He uses a character’s focalization (i.e. Helen in her speech uses the vocative δαιμονίη, 399)[[341]](#footnote-341) as he did with the description of her reactions before, and he informs us, as the external primary narrate-focalizee, of Helen’s confusionat the goddess’s desire to deceive her and cause her more shame and suffering.

Analysis of the above shows that Helen’s reaction to Aphrodite’s inexplicable behaviour and *daimonic* nature is the same as that of Menelaus and Odysseus. The choice of the term *daimôn* to refer to an anthropomorphic god demonstrates the intentions of the narrator to emphasise the mysterious and incomprehensible nature of Aphrodite’s intervention and the *daimonic* power by which the goddess caused such suffering for Helen.[[342]](#footnote-342)

 Analysis of the second instance from the *Iliad* (1.222: δώματ’ ἐς αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς μετὰ δαίμονας ἄλλους) shows how the narrator uses the term *daimôn* in the plural to refer to the Olympian deities and to Athena as the goddess that lies behind the usage of the term in the plural.[[343]](#footnote-343) Athena goes to Olympus to the other gods, μετὰ δαίμονας ἄλλους (1.222). In this instance, as before (*Il*. 3.420), we may identify the intention of the narrator by analysing the emotions and the reaction of Achilles towards Athena and by the use of embedded focalization in Achilles’ speech after he recognises the goddess. This highlights once more the affinity of the term *daimôn* with its associated concepts (i.e. the gods as a whole and a specific god) when it comes to their common mysterious nature.[[344]](#footnote-344)

Once *daimôn* was associated with a particular Olympian (e.g. *Il*.3.420; *Od.* 3.27; *Od*. 15.261), the transition to the plural, that is, the entire Olympian family, is a comparatively easy step.’[[345]](#footnote-345) If we look closer at the above instances, we will see that behind the general and unspecified identity of the collective gods lies the name of a specific god. It is hidden behind the general activities of the entire Olympian family where it belongs. Specifically, in the first two instances (i.e. *Od*. 3.27, 15.261), the name of Athena is implied behind the term *daimôn* in the singular. Her real identity is recognised only Achilles (*Il.* 1.222). Still, Athena is presented as part of the rest of the Olympians; her name is again found behind the usage of the term in the plural: δαίμονες, δαίμοσιν, δαίμονας as the entire Olympian family (*Il*. 1.222, 6.115). Athena undertakes the form of an inspiration to help her favourite mortal, and after she has helped Achilles, she returns to Olympus.

 We must also consider whetherthe Olympian gods were the only divinities living in Olympus. Guthrie and Dietrich write that only Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, Demeter, Apollo, Artemis, Ares, Aphrodite, Hermes, Athena, Hephaestus and Hestia belonged to the family of the twelve gods whose dwelling was Olympus.[[346]](#footnote-346) Lesser divinities were allowed to visit Olympus but were not allowed to stay.[[347]](#footnote-347) Thetis, for example, visits Zeus to ask for help for her son, but eventually returns to her own dwelling in the depths of Ocean (*Il.* 1.531-2). Similarly, Iris visits Olympus to receivethe orders of Zeus but then departs (*Il.* 2.780-815). Only once does the *Iliad* describe an unspecified number of gods, including all the rivers and all the nymphs, coming to the assembly in Olympus (20.4-9). Elsewhere, in Homer and indeed in Greek literature as a whole, only the twelve Olympian gods reside there.[[348]](#footnote-348) If this is the case, then it seems likely that in this passage at least, if Athena belongs to the family of the twelve, and if she returns to Olympus and to them, then δαίμονας denotes the twelve Olympian gods.[[349]](#footnote-349)

Yet, the most crucial inquiry of this part of the discussion remains unanswered: How exactly do Achilles’ reactions and feelings towards Athena’s intervention associate Athena’s inexplicable behaviour with the unspecified nature of *daimones* in this scene? Athena’s actions remain hidden and recognised only by Achilles. She remains invisible and even unknown to the rest of the characters. The mysterious and inexplicable nature of her intervention may be identified in Achilles’ reaction when he expresses his astonishment at the goddess’s actions (θάμβησεν δ’ Ἀχιλλεύς, 199). The same wonder and astonishment is depicted in Achilles’ own speech, when he asks Athena of her real intentions (“τίπτ’ αὖτ’, αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος, εἰλήλουθας; 202). Both Achilles expression of feelings and his speech demonstrate that her appearance is both inexplicable and strange. Achilles is mostly astonished by the goddess’s choice to reveal her true identity to him without undertaking any form of a disguise. Thus, he immediately and with great wonder recognises her (θάμβησεν δ’ Ἀχιλλεύς, […] αὐτίκα δ’ ἔγνω Παλλάδ’ Ἀθηναίην, 1.198-200).[[350]](#footnote-350) Achilles’ astonishment and wonder at Athena’s mysterious and incomprehensible behaviour resembles the mysterious activities which the term *daimôn* signifies. This kind of behaviour has nothing to do with her expected behaviour as a protecting divinity when she meets with her favourite mortal (i.e. gods normally undertake the form of a mortal character already familiar to their favourite mortal). Similarly, Achilles’ reaction reminds us (as we have already suggested above) of a mortal’s unease (as with Helen after her confrontation with Aphrodite), when he comes face to face with the unexplained activities suggested by the term *daimôn* and after his awareness of ‘the mysterious’ and ‘the unknown’. Even more, Athena here (1.222) belongs to the gods as depicted in their unspecifiednature. Hence, even though δαίμονας here is used as the alternative of the gods, Athena is also connected with *daimones*. She is identified with them (i.e. ἄλλους δαίμονας); she belongs to the same family of the Olympians that, like the term *daimôn*, may be identified by the poet; and similarly evokes astonishmentat the intrusive and mysterious nature of intervention in mortals’ lives.

**The Term *Daimôn*: a ‘Complex’,‘Single’, ‘Receptacle’ and a Concept**

I have previously referred to the narrator’s tendency to extensively expose the speeches of his characters as part of his narrative technique for presenting important aspects of his narrative.[[351]](#footnote-351) More specifically, I demonstrated that the way the narrator puts the term *daimôn* into the speech of both mortal and divine characters highlights the intentions of the narrator to invite his audience to decipher how the termreally functions. Even more, I have argued in favour of our ability as the audience of the epic[[352]](#footnote-352) to recognise and decode the signs that both the narrator and his characters reveal to us concerning the term *daimôn* and its associated aspects. By signs, I mean the information gained from the way the narrator occasionally adapted the emotionally colourful reactions of his characters towards the unknown and the mysterious in their lives. These are important signs of the mysterious nature of the term *daimôn* and a way to unravel its usefulness in the epics.

I have spoken of a possible usefulness regarding the basic quality of the term *daimôn* as representing a mysterious power. Once we learn how to identify the basic mysterious nature of *daimôn*, we can use it as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ and the unknown. The existence of a common mysterious nature between the term *daimôn* and the various kinds of supernatural entities to which the term refers, we suggested, makes it a ‘unified concept’. I have also emphasised the mysterious nature of the gods which emerges from understanding their relationship to the *daimonic* as one among the basic aspects of the term’s polysemous nature. Usage of the term *daimôn* as a concept for explaining this mysterious side of the gods permits the gods and the rest of the entities to be categorized withing the ‘unified concept’ of *daimôn*. It is what also enables us, when we refer to the term *daimôn*, to conceive of it as a ‘complex’, yet ‘single’, ‘receptacle’.

The term *daimôn* as a ‘complex’ term is ‘a matter of perception’. The consideration of different perceptions inside the text is what eventually presented *daimôn* in a different light. Analysis of the differing perspectives of different focalizers in the narrative enables us to associate the term with the same entities with which scholars used to associate the term *daimôn*. However, this thesis differentiated from previous scholarly works by offering a uniform interpretation of the term. Thus, this thesis perceives the various interpretations of *daimôn* as the collective qualities of a term with a ‘polyvalent’, a ‘complex’ and even with a ‘controversial’ meaning, but in no way a term full of inconsistencies or with a hard to be defined character. Most specifically, we utilised the implications of various focalizers. We attributed the same significance to the focalization of a mortal and of a divine character as we did with the focalization of the narrator to gain insight into the variously given significations of *daimôn* in the epics. We re-evaluated the intentions of the narrator[[353]](#footnote-353) to attribute to the term *daimôn* a significant role as a concept and as a term that manages to connote a number of diverse qualities, and then, as a conceptual device. We considered the choice of the narrator to use the term *daimôn* in the speech of his characters (and more frequently in the speech of his mortal than his immortal characters)[[354]](#footnote-354) to highlight what in his own narration he would not have normally pursued:[[355]](#footnote-355) the usage of the term to refer to the mysterious nature of the gods. As such, usage of the term by a different focalizer to refer to a different entity demonstrated how in fact the concept of *daimôn* could refer to either a specific god or the gods as a whole. More specifically, we attributed the same emphasis on the usage of the term by the narrator to refer to the unexplained nature of the intervention of a specific god, (e.g. Aphrodite in *Il*. 3.420 and Athena in *Il*. 1.222), and to the gods as a whole (in *Il*. 1.222), and to the way that a goddess, Athena, uses the term *daimôn* in her own speech to refer to her own mysterious and hidden purposes towards Telemachus (in *Od*. 3.27). We have already analysed speeches by Menelaus[[356]](#footnote-356) and Telemachus[[357]](#footnote-357)which use the term *daimôn* to refer to the unexplained intervention of an unspecified supernatural power in their lives.

Based on the usage of the term *daimôn* by another mortal character in the plot, Hector (in *Il*. 6.115), we demonstrated how contextual variation and how the audience has a radical impact on the variously attributed significations of the term. Therefore, when the usage of the term by Hector was situated in the context of his conversation with his troops, the term was attributed with the signification of the gods as a whole, whereas usage of the term in a different context during Hector’s speech to his mother associated δαίμοσιν with the more personal attributes of a specific god, Athena.

Finally, we examined how different focalizers such as Hector,[[358]](#footnote-358) Menelaus[[359]](#footnote-359) and Eumaeus,[[360]](#footnote-360) used the term to mean what is fated; the term *daimôn* was associated with *moira*, the general *theos* and with death, and in a more personalised way, with the more specified anthropomorphic figures of the gods or a specific god or Zeus as the agents of fate or of someone’s lot. The different meaning of the term each time it was used by a different focalizer aided us in demonstrating what constituted one among this thesis’ basic conclusions: that ‘different points of view inside the narrative associate the term with a different signification outside the narrative.’ It is what also highlights the complex quality of the term.

 Identification of the feelings that accompany man’s reaction when he faces the mysterious and still incomprehensible intervention of a supernatural power helped us, in the first place, to identify the basic quality of *daimôn* as a mysterious power. It also aided us in demonstrating the equally significant role of the term as ‘an identifiable sign’ not only of its own mysterious nature but also of what constituted the mysterious and the unknown related to the gods and the various entities that compose its polyvalent character. More specifically, the narrator[[361]](#footnote-361) and divine characters[[362]](#footnote-362) used the term to refer to the mysterious nature of the collective gods, a specific god, an unidentified god and an unspecified power. We saw, for instance, in *Il*. 17.98, how Menelaus expressed his great anguish at having to fight against Hector, ‘against the will of heaven (πρὸς δαίμονα), and against all the powers (namely a man’s *moira*, θεός τις and Zeus) associated with the term *daimôn* and which might be equally perceived as the sources of Menelaus’ unexpected and unchanged misfortune if he fights πρὸς δαίμονα.[[363]](#footnote-363) Likewise, when both Helen[[364]](#footnote-364) and Achilles[[365]](#footnote-365) expressed their fear and great astonishment when they recognised the true identity of both Aphrodite and Athena[[366]](#footnote-366) respectively, we suggested that the same mysterious and inexplicable nature characterised both the term *daimôn* and its associated concepts, namely a specific god and the gods as a whole. In fact, we identified the same feelings in the reactions of both Menelaus[[367]](#footnote-367) and Telemachus,[[368]](#footnote-368) when both mortals had to face the unexplained and intrusive effect of the *daimonic* as an unspecified, mysterious, and non-rational power. These were in fact the common attributes that characterised the term’s associated concepts and these are also the characteristics, as we shall further below discuss, that constitute the newly perceived nature of the anthropomorphic gods. *Daimôn* is the term which Homer as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ to reveal the importance of the mysterious powers of the divine.[[369]](#footnote-369) It is also the only term whichrepresents a divinity of equal importance to the gods.[[370]](#footnote-370).

What remains for us to do is first to refer to mortal characters’ experience of the *daimonic* in embedded focalization.[[371]](#footnote-371) Then, we shall demonstrate how these instances may be used to shed further light on this newly perceived and so far unknown side of the gods. Particular emphasis was attributed to the feelings of fear, wonder, awe and astonishment when a man was experiencing the mysterious presence of a specific god or the gods as a whole. These feelings had nothing to do with the common expression of the mortals’ fear in the presence of an unknown god or in the realisation of some god being responsible for an event in their lives, even when this event turned to be negative. Instead, we suggested that the feelings of fear and great wonder were mostly related to this side of the gods’ nature that derived from their association with the *daimonic*. This new side of the gods was also when the gods interevened suddenly, coming in disguise to a favourite mortal.

Analysis of both Helen’s[[372]](#footnote-372) and Achilles’ feelings[[373]](#footnote-373) are important evidence of this newly perceived side of the gods. It had nothing to do with the normal and expected behaviour of the gods, when either in an invisible form or under a human disguise - although there is no consistency in the most often cited of all these forms of appearance of the gods - were deceiving their favoured ones in their attempt to help them.[[374]](#footnote-374) It had also nothing to do with the way mortals reacted when they recognised the true identity of the gods or even in the more remote cases when a Homeric epiphany was under the form of a physical intervention.[[375]](#footnote-375) Therefore, the way Helen expressed her great fear and wonder towards the unexplained, non-rational intentions of Aphrodite and which was associated with Aphrodite’s disguise and with the incomprehensible for Helen nature of her intervention and desire to deceit her, reinforces the idea of Aphrodite here[[376]](#footnote-376) not acting in the normal and expected divine way towards her favourite mortal. It in fact goes beyond the divinity’s clear and personal motives to bring Helen to Paris.[[377]](#footnote-377)

Analysis of Aphrodite’s behaviour in this scene of Achilles’ reactions towards the unexplained and intrusive intervention of Athena, - which goes even beyond Athena’s intention to calm down Achilles - enables us attribute a specific god and the gods as a whole as the mysterious supernatural entities to which the term *daimôn* refers.[[378]](#footnote-378)

We have also already referred to the usage of focalization through Athena by the narrator in the context of her conversation with her favourite mortal, Telemachus.[[379]](#footnote-379) Athena’s speech offered useful information for both Telemachus as the internal secondary narrate-focalizee (NeFe2) and for us as the primary narrate-focalizee (NeFe1). On the one hand, Telemachus was informed of the forthcoming benevolent but unexpected intervention of a *daimonic* power. On the other hand, after we had associated the term *daimôn* with the name of Athena, we were informed by Athena herself, of the mysterious, sudden, and intrusive nature of her intervention, which emphasizes her *daimonic* nature over her more usual approach to dealing with mortals.

 The usage of the term *daimôn* as a conceptual device and consideration of man’s reactions towards the intervention of a supernatural *daimonic* power, when the term was used as a reference of what is fated and of death itself, highlighted the existence of an added signification for the gods. It demonstrated that the gods, just like the *daimonic* powers and the rest of the terms connected to fate were similarly the cause events that man is powerless to alter.[[380]](#footnote-380) This is important because the term *daimôn* as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ and as a *polysemantic* term added even more to our knowledge concerning the relationship of two of its associated concepts: the gods and fate. Given the many antithetical ideas concerning the terms *daimôn* and *theos*, scholars (and especially those of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century) tried to answer a seemingly insoluble problem: whether the gods in Homer had the upper hand, since they were the higher power that was ultimately responsible for all happenings.[[381]](#footnote-381)The fundamental task of assembling the passages that bear on the question was carried out by Nägelsbach.[[382]](#footnote-382) Accordingly, scholars held two main conceptions which added even more antinomies about the relationship of the gods and fate. They even contributed to the existence of similar controversies concerning the gods, fate and the term *daimôn*. To begin with, Nägelsbach was the initiator of the two conceptions and, following the trend of his time (e.g. O. Gruppe;[[383]](#footnote-383) A. Lang[[384]](#footnote-384) and R.C. Jebb,[[385]](#footnote-385) Finsler[[386]](#footnote-386)), pointed to the superiority of fate.[[387]](#footnote-387) Others pointed in the exact opposite direction: *moira* was gradually pushed to the back by the supreme power of Zeus and the gods, who under the guidance of Zeus, became the guardians of justice and watched over the balance of fate.[[388]](#footnote-388) In between these opposing perceptions, a new one was developed that showed the gods and fate existing side by side (cf. Welcker, Jebb).[[389]](#footnote-389) Notably, after Adkins,[[390]](#footnote-390) Lloyd-Jones,[[391]](#footnote-391) and Nilsson,[[392]](#footnote-392) Walter Burkert brought to the surface once more the conflict of the gods and fate; this time, however, the problem resulted from the opposition between pre-determination and divine freedom.

Burkert’s realisation led to a new perception that the already ‘problematic' relationship between the gods and fate was transferred to the relationship of fate, the term *daimôn* and the gods. One of the most popular perceptions regarding the term *daimôn*, fate and the gods is the one that shows all three terms to be different from each other (Bianchi).[[393]](#footnote-393) In fact, *moira*, a *daimôn*, Zeus and the gods were differentiated when it came to the nature of a supernatural intervention that they all produced.[[394]](#footnote-394) On the contrary, there was also a totally different view which showed fate to be equally exercised by m*oira*, the general *theos,* some god or Zeus when it came to the nature of a higher power (Nilsson, Dodds).[[395]](#footnote-395) However, usage of the insights that the term *daimôn* offered us about the relationship between it and fate demonstrated that their relationship is more complicated than some scholars in the past liked to believe. There is no wonder, then, that consideration of all previously mentioned scholarly ideas makes it difficult for us to deny the existence of the negative connotation that linked the gods’ relation to fate and which eventually connected it with the term *daimôn*.

Still, all these controversies were not strong enough to create such a distance between all of the above terms. On the contrary, as previous analysis suggests, there is no essential conflict, as many scholars in the past have argued, between fate and the *daimonic* since, there is no real conflict between fate and the gods, between the power of fate and the will of Zeus (and the other gods), between remote power and immediate agency in Homer. Instead, all of the above terms have more aspects joining than separating them. All the above terms are equally the sources of misfortune; they differ only in the nature of their activities. In this respect, the term *daimôn* and a specific god might equally be seen as the source of the mysterious supernatural action.

It could also have a positive effect on Homeric man too, whereas the term *daimôn* and a god (i.e. Zeus) or the gods as the equivalents of a fated mysterious activity, mostly had a negative and an unwanted effect. Significantly, it seems that while the gods were differentiated from fate when it came to a mysterious activity, they were almost identical with fate when they were both associated with the term *daimôn* and with unwanted activity, unexpected misfortune and inevitable death.[[396]](#footnote-396) Furthermore, although this is not a study on the relationship of the gods and fate, analysis of the previous instances[[397]](#footnote-397) demonstrated that the fine distinctions between the gods, fate and the term *daimôn* as the sources of misfortune ‘are impossible to make’.[[398]](#footnote-398)

The term *daimôn*’s ability to create special bonds among all the terms related to fate and the way it can signify different and often even antithetical entities supports our next suggestion of the term being not only ‘complex’, but also a ‘single’ ‘receptacle’. Its function as a sign of both its own and of its various references’ mysterious nature makes it a ‘unifying concept’. The term *daimôn* as a ‘unifying concept’ and as a ‘receptacle’ is what also highlights its role of *daimôn* as a ‘single’ yet structured word situated into the larger scope of the Homeric world. The characterisation of the term *daimôn* as part of the creation of a ‘single world’ is further supported by its function as a linking point between variouskinds of supernatural entities: unspecified supernatural powers, the gods as a whole, specific gods, fate and other related terms. The term *daimôn*, moreover, as a ‘unified concept’ and as a ‘receptacle’ also pointed to the usage of the term and its mysterious nature as a point of convergence linking together the various apsects of the term’s complex character.[[399]](#footnote-399) It is what also enabled all the diverse entities that already constituted parts of the Homeric world to be *held together* within the ‘*daimonic* world’.[[400]](#footnote-400)

**The Role of the Term *Daimôn* as a Concept and as a Point of Convergence: Its Nature and the Nature of its Associated Concepts**

This part of my discussion demonstrates how the concept of the *daimonic* and the role of the term *daimôn* may be used to offer us important information on the way that the term’s associated concepts function. Analysis of the various focalizations of the term and of the characters’ reactions towards the incomprehensible activities represented by it will demonstrate that the term *daimôn* reflects the inexplicable and mysterious nature of divine intervention in mortal affairs as well as they uncertainty of the actor; humans can’t tell whether the intervention is caused by the gods as a whole, an unkonwn god, a specific god, Zeus, fate/death or an unspecified supernatural power is associated with a diverse, complex but still mysterious nature of activities.

The following analysis of the term *daimôn* will also demonstrate that the term may be associated with a double morality, that is, it has the capacity to benefit as well as harm mortals.[[401]](#footnote-401) In the *Odyssey*, the term *daimôn* represents both benevolent and malevolent functions mostly similar to those in the *Iliad*. The term *daimôn* represents a benevolent intervention sixteen times in Homer (twelve times in the *Odyssey,* and four times in the *Iliad*). Of these, in the *Odyssey*, eleven are by a mortal speaker and once by a divinity; in the *Iliad*, twice by a mortal character and twice by the narrator.

By contrast, the term *daimôn* is associated with a malevolent activity fifty-five times in Homer: twenty-eight times in the *Odyssey* and twenty-seven times in the *Iliad*.Of these, twenty-seven times are by a mortal character and only once by the narrator in the *Odyssey*; sixteen times are by a character, seven times by the narrator and four times by the gods in the *Iliad*

The term *daimôn* can also refer to a benevolent and a malevolent activity: eleven times in Homer (two times in the *Odyssey*, and nine times in the *Iliad*). Of these, three are by a mortal character in the *Odyssey*; out of nine times, six times are by a mortal speaker, and three times by the narrator in the *Iliad*. All of these can be seen in the table below:

|  |
| --- |
| **Table 4: Frequency of the Benevolent and Malevolent Apects of the Term *Daimôn*in Homer[[402]](#footnote-402)** |
| **Definition Benevolent Malevolent Benevolent and Malevolent****Of Activity**:  |
| **Frequency** ***Iliad:***  4 27 9  |
| **Frequency** ***Odyssey***: 12 28\* 3 |
| **Total of****Frequencies**: 16 55 12 |

\* Out of the 28 instances, 5 refer to the term *daimôn*’s evil nature with the adjectives κακός, στυγερός, χαλεπός.

**The Implications of Focalization, the Feelings of the Mysterious, *Daimôn* as a Conceptual Device and as a ‘Sign of the Mysterious’: *Daimôn*’s, the Gods’, a Specific God’s, the General God’s and Zeus’ Evil Activities**

This part of the argument deals with analysis of two instances from the *Odyssey*.[[403]](#footnote-403) It shows how use of the term *daimôn* by a different focalizer (i.e. a lesser divinity[[404]](#footnote-404) and a mortal character[[405]](#footnote-405)) highlights that the term *daimôn* may be associated not only with positive and negative, but also with evil connotations. In the following analysis, particular emphasis will be placed on the intentions of the narrator when he attributes to the term a number of pejorative adjectives (e.g. κακός,[[406]](#footnote-406) στυγερός,[[407]](#footnote-407) χαλεπός[[408]](#footnote-408)) to refer to its evil nature.[[409]](#footnote-409) Most specifically, I shall present the way that the narrator uses theseto complement both the term *daimôn* and, at other times, the gods. I shall also show how the term is placed in the speech of a different character when it refers to the gods. All the above will be used to highlight that the gods, like the term *daimôn* are associated with evil activities.[[410]](#footnote-410)

However, the adjectives κακός, στυγερός and χαλεπός are directly connected with the term *daimôn* and not with the gods; this neither suggests that only the term *daimôn* and not the gods are associated with destructive activities, nor that both the gods and *daimôn* have a basic evil character.[[411]](#footnote-411) At *Odyssey* 10.64, for instance, the narrator uses the reactions and the focalization Aeolus to highlight the evil activities of *daimôn*. My intention here is to show that once more focalization, the term *daimôn* as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ and ‘family resemblance’[[412]](#footnote-412) might be used to highlight the term *daimôn*’s association with the gods.

 The winds released from Aeolus’ bag drive Odysseus and his companions back to the island of Aeolus. Aeolus and his sons, astonished by the incident, ask Odysseus: ‘Πῶς ἦλθες, Ὀδυσεῦ; τίς τοι κακὸς ἔχραε δαίμων; (10.64)’ Odysseus replies: ‘Bane did my evil comrades work me, and therewith sleep accursed; (10.68)’[[413]](#footnote-413) (‘Ἄασάν μ’ ἕταροί τε κακοὶ πρὸς τοῖσί τε ὕπνος σχέτλιος,’ 10.68). Before Aeolus sends him away, he comments on Odysseus’ added sufferings as follows: ‘In no wise may I help or send upon his way that man who is hated of the blessed gods (10.73).’[[414]](#footnote-414) It is interesting to note here that ‘Aeolus, who as it would seem receives confirmation of his belief that Odysseus is pursued by an evil δαίμων, draws the conclusion that Odysseus is hated by the gods.’[[415]](#footnote-415) The poet’s elaboration of the harmful intervention of Poseidon is expected (64).[[416]](#footnote-416) Yet, the poet elaborates on the evil intervention[[417]](#footnote-417) of an unspecified power (i.e. *daimôn*)*.*[[418]](#footnote-418)

He even associates the term *daimôn* with the weather (he drives Odysseus back to Aeolus’ island, 64), as happens in a number of other instances in the *Odyssey*,[[419]](#footnote-419) to show the term undertaking ‘identical functions with the general god,’[[420]](#footnote-420) which most commonly correspond to ‘the office of Zeus as the weather god.’[[421]](#footnote-421) In the specific scene, we may once more identify the intentions of the narrator to associate *daimôn* with the gods when he puts the term into the speech of one of his characters. In fact, the narrator almost deliberately attributes, via a character (Aeolus) and not directly in his own narration, Odysseus’ suffering to both a κακὸς δαίμων and to the deathless gods. In fact, the way the narrator has used the adjective κακός with to describe a number of gods demonstrates the term’s (and all the above entities’) association with the same evil activities. As a term with a complex character, the term *daimôn* here is associated with both a variety of entities and with an added activity which goes beyond the term’s harmful[[422]](#footnote-422) and benevolent activities. Given the reaction of both Aeolus and his sons, their expressions of astonishment and awe – a kind of reaction that demonstrates the mysterious nature of an activity in the epics – towards the sudden and unexplained return of Odysseus due to a κακός *daimôn*, due to the destructive activities of the gods demonstrates that all the above entities and a *daimôn* are connected by their participation in the same kinds of activities. They are similar not only as the causes of every misfortune normally associated with Odysseus, but also as the sources of a mysterious and evil effect on Odysseus.

 The second instance taken from the *Odyssey* (19.201: εἴα ἵστασθαι, χαλεπὸς δέ τις ὤρορε δαίμων) is also good evidence of the term *daimôn* being associated with an evil activity, which again, brings the term closer to the destructive and evil activities of the gods. In fact, we identify the intentions of the narrator once more when he situates the term *daimôn* with the adjective χαλεπὸς and with the north winds in one of his character’s speeches (the speech of Odysseus), to show that a χαλεπὸς δαίμων is responsible for raising an adverse wind.[[423]](#footnote-423)

Odysseus, in his role as a beggar, tells Penelope the fictitious story that Odysseus and his men visited him in Crete and were forced by the north wind to stay long upon the coast: χαλεπὸς δέ τις ὤρορε δαίμων (some harsh divinity must have roused it). In this case, it seems that the narrator places the supreme *daimonic* power behind the forces of nature,[[424]](#footnote-424) and he once more uses the persuasive words of Odysseus towards Penelope to demonstrate that the term *daimôn* here (19.201) gains similar functions to Zeus in his role as the weather god.’[[425]](#footnote-425) Even more, and although we are dealing with the fictitious story of a disguised character well known for his lies, we would have expected a falsified reaction from Odysseus in his attempt to persuade Penelope of the story that he narrates. Therefore, we become witnesses of his feelings of awe, and even of his emotions of great fear when he had to face the fictitious unexpected, sudden and evil effect of an adverse *daimonic* power. Odysseus’ feelings are identifiable signs of the *daimonic* association with evil activities.

Tsagarakis and Dietrich[[426]](#footnote-426) have suggested that the κακὸς δαίμων was already known to the poet in the *Odyssey* and that this he deliberately put it in his characters’ speech[[427]](#footnote-427) (and more rarely in his own narration[[428]](#footnote-428).) He wanted to recall the term’s popular characteristics and indicate that it is mostly evil. However, from what can be depicted from the analysis of the above instances, what scholars suggested about the κακὸς δαίμων is not entirely true. On the contrary, the evil and destructive effect of a κακός, στυγερός or χαλεπός δαίμων may be also associated with the destructive activities of a god/the gods.[[429]](#footnote-429) This is what the narrator showed when he was using the term *daimôn* and the above epithets in the same context of conversation. He wanted to show that the term *daimôn* and the gods – and whenever the narrator and one of his characters was not witnessing a different quality/activity of the gods[[430]](#footnote-430) - may work side by side to reach to an evil end.[[431]](#footnote-431) Even more, the identification of the reactions of the characters towards the unexplained, mysterious, sudden intervention of a κακός, στυγερός, or χαλεπός δαίμων shows how the term might be used to shed further light on its and the gods’ complex activities.

**The Implications of Focalization, the Feelings of the Mysterious, *Daimôn* as a Conceptual Device and as a ‘Sign of the Mysterious’: *Daimôn*’s and a Specific God’s Association with a Benevolent Mental Effect**

The focalization of both Odysseus and Penelope and the way that the narrator presents their reactions towards an unexplained and unexpected mental effect derived from a *daimonic* power demonstrate that behind the mental effect caused by the term lies the term’s substance and essential attribute as a mysterious power.[[432]](#footnote-432) Each time the term *daimôn* is situated by the narrator in the speech of a character and is placed side by side in the narrative with the name of a specific god to refer to a person’s inspiration or good thought, then both the term *daimôn* and a specific god (i.e. Athena) may be associated with the same mysterious and benevolent mental effect on mortals. This is important because it once more highlights the term’s equally significant roles as a conceptual device, a ‘sign of the mysterious’ and as a point of convergence. As a conceptual device and as a ‘sign of the mysterious’, the term *daimôn* will enable us gain knowledge of the mysterious nature of the gods’ benevolent mental activities that derives from their relationship with the *daimonic*.

 The analysis of the following two instances,[[433]](#footnote-433) which shows the term *daimôn*’s and the gods’ or a specific god’s association with a benevolent mental effect on specific mortal characters in the *Odyssey*, is situated in the context of the scholarly discussions on heroic decision-makingin Homer. Among the most advanced theories concerning heroic-decision making in Homer are those which affirm that a) either the gods (or other forces affecting man mentally) alone, or man alone are exclusively responsible for what happens in human lives,[[434]](#footnote-434) and b) those that suggest that ‘a double aspect’ is usually involved for almost every event that has to do with mortals in Homer.[[435]](#footnote-435)

Regarding both the gods’ and man’s responsibility as the cause of inspiration in Homer, scholars were divided into two categories. In the first category belonged Bruno Snell[[436]](#footnote-436) and his followers (i.e. Herman Fränkel[[437]](#footnote-437)) and even before Snell, Christian Voigt,[[438]](#footnote-438) who attempted to show that ‘Homer has no cognisance of any concept denoting the psychic whole [capable of making a decision], of any notion that might correspond to our word ‘soul’,’[[439]](#footnote-439) as ‘Homer had no coherent, articulated concept of the self.’[[440]](#footnote-440) Therefore, Homer does not realise that decisions of will/impulses/emotions have their origin in man himself; they are inextricably linked with the gods,[[441]](#footnote-441)who constitute a well-ordered and meaningful world[[442]](#footnote-442) or by forces (i.e. *daimôn*) acting mentally on the agent and over which he has no control.[[443]](#footnote-443) Thus, Homeric ‘man still possesses no consciousness of personal freedom and of deciding for himself.’[[444]](#footnote-444) Dodds links daemon with ‘god’ or ‘gods’ when it comes to the Homeric characters’ tendency to ascribe all sorts of events to a ‘force’ which exists outside themselves.[[445]](#footnote-445)

A number of different scholars (i.e. Harrison,[[446]](#footnote-446) Lloyd-Jones,[[447]](#footnote-447)Kirk,[[448]](#footnote-448) Williams,[[449]](#footnote-449) Gaskin,[[450]](#footnote-450) Sharples[[451]](#footnote-451)) comprise the second category, which presented Homeric man emerging as an ‘independent agent capable of spontaneous acts: he is no mere plaything of the gods.’[[452]](#footnote-452) Homeric characters are free to decide and are responsible for their decisions,’[[453]](#footnote-453) and not all or most human actions, even heroic ones and even in the *Iliad,* must be envisaged as due to the direct actions of the gods.[[454]](#footnote-454) Instead, ‘Homer does know genuine personal decisions’[[455]](#footnote-455) and the interventions of the gods operate in a way that ascribes actions to human characters and deliberation as a result of their actions.[[456]](#footnote-456) Homeric heroes are in fact capable of making proper decisions and ‘acting with full self-consciousness.’[[457]](#footnote-457) Even more, the fact that Homer does not have any word for the self,[[458]](#footnote-458) they suggested[[459]](#footnote-459), this does not mean that Homer does not think of his characters as unitary agents.[[460]](#footnote-460) As for the gods’ intervention in a decision-making process, this ‘does not derogate from the individual’s autonomy or responsibility for the action.’[[461]](#footnote-461)

All the previously mentioned theories are closely related to the assertion in this thesis that the term *daimôn* can be the source of sudden inspiration and an unexpected brilliant idea or thought. For the purposes of this discussion, I shall use Lesky’s motif of ‘double motivation and responsibility’[[462]](#footnote-462) and Dodds’ theory of ‘monitions,’[[463]](#footnote-463) which also share many similarities with Wilford’s idea of the ‘unconscious.’[[464]](#footnote-464) This on the one hand will aid us in demonstrating, in a similar way that Dodds, Lesky and Wilford suggested, that any inexplicable spiritual experience may be equally attributed to man’s unconscious and to the term *daimôn* and to the gods. On the other, consideration of Wilford’s theory on the way that man was experiencing an event, not directly, but as reflected from the environment, and which for Homeric man constituted an inexplicable and ambiguous experience,[[465]](#footnote-465) will similarly aid us unravel the mysterious nature of the effect; of the mental experience for which both the term *daimôn* and the gods as its references were often held responsible. This again is closely related to the way that Homeric man often laid responsibility for everything unexplained and mysterious and of all sorts of mental (or even of any sort of physical) events in his life on the intervention of an unspecified *daimôn* or ‘god’ or ‘gods’.[[466]](#footnote-466) Analysis of the following two instances (*Od.* 19.10, 19.138) will aid us in demonstrating that Homeric characters (i.e. Odysseus and Penelope) and their own intelligence are held responsible for a specific mental activity. Both characters attribute the same mental activity to the intentions of the *daimonic* poweror an unnamed god.[[467]](#footnote-467)All the above may be used to highlight the fact that the gods and the term *daimôn* are equally responsible for a sudden, unexplained inspiration of a plan as the man who has the thought himself.

This part of my discussion comes as an answer to scholars’ suggestion that a *daimôn* influences the thoughts of characters in the same manner as the general god or gods. They denied any association of the term *daimôn* with a specific god and of the way it affects the mind[[468]](#footnote-468) of an individual.[[469]](#footnote-469) They presented the instances when the termwas often considered capable of producing mental blindness, a similar effect that was also produced by *ate* in Homer.[[470]](#footnote-470) They also referred to the more rare cases when it was associated with a good thought or an inspiration, or even when it came to a mysterious thought or mental activity in man. Therefore, scholars suggested that the term *daimôn* was then associated with ‘a nameless and indeterminate daemon or god or gods’[[471]](#footnote-471) and not with a specific god.

In contrast to what previous scholars suggested, I will use analysis of the two instances from the *Odyssey* to demonstrate that the term *daimôn* may also be used when a mortal is inspired by a good idea. For instance, in *Odyssey* 19.10, the idea of the arms’ removal from the hall may be equally said to have been inspired by a *daimôn* (in the form of Athena) or Odysseus’ own intelligence. I shall also refer to *Odyssey* 19.138, where the plan of the web was attributed to the term *daimôn* and to Penelope’s own actions (her cunning and deceitful character).[[472]](#footnote-472)The narrator puts the term *daimôn* and the name of a specific god, Athena, in the same conversation as Penelope and Odysseus, two characterswell known for their intelligence and cunning (*mêtis*).[[473]](#footnote-473) Emphasis will be placed on the important information that derives from the speeches of the characters already involved in the events they refer to and to these characters’ choice of particular words (i.e. *daimôn*) in order to communicate the right message (for example of a specific god’s and of the term *daimôn*’s association with an unexplained thought) to their respective audiences.[[474]](#footnote-474) As presented in the following table (5), use of the above narrative techniques enables the narrator to connect the term *daimôn* and a specific god under the same unexpected mental activity.

The way that the characters use the term *daimôn* to describe a mysterious thought or inspiration is similar to how they see these eventsas the result of divine intervention. This highlights the affinity of the personal gods to a *daimonic* power. The term *daimôn* is associated with the anthropomorphic gods and the general deity when it came to mental blindness or when a moment of inspiration has negative outcomes. In *Od.* 19.10 and 19.138, the presentation of Odysseus’s and Penelope’s awe at encountering the unknownenables us to recognise that a specific god, the term *daimôn* and the general god[[475]](#footnote-475) share the same mysterious nature when it comes to their mental effect on mortals.[[476]](#footnote-476)

 The first instance (*Od*. 19.10: πρὸς δ’ ἔτι καὶ τό δε μεῖζον ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἔμβαλε δαίμων) shows the mental effect to be equally the result of both a man’s inner self (i.e. Odysseus’ ego) and of *daimôn* (or a god: Athena). Odysseus advises Telemachus to tell the suitors in soothing and cunning words why the weapons have been removed. Odysseus’ excuse to the suitors for removing the weapons from the hall is that a δαίμων had cast this thought into his mind (ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἔμβαλε δαίμων, 10), lest in their cups the suitors should quarrel.

 At this point, if we choose to accept Dodds’ theory of the ‘monitions’[[477]](#footnote-477) credited to a nameless *daimôn* or ‘god’ or ‘gods’ whenever someone has a brilliant (or even a foolish) idea, we may affirm that what we have here is a ‘psychic intervention’[[478]](#footnote-478) by a *daimôn*. This is due tothe Homeric characters, rather than the poet, using the term *daimôn* to refer to mysterious thoughts and actions.[[479]](#footnote-479) But still, if the plan of the removal of the arms goes back to Athena’s initial purpose, then it may be inferred that the *daimôn*, which inspired this idea, may be identified with Athena. This inference is based on the fact that Athena, earlier on in *Od*. 19.2, helped Odysseus find a plan to kill the suitors, while even before that in *Od*. 16.282, Odysseus, in his conversation with Telemachus, refers to Athena as the one who inspired him to remove the weapons at the right moment.[[480]](#footnote-480) After all, Athena appears to bear a golden lamp and she sheds light on Odysseus and Telemachus when they remove the arms from the hall (33-4).[[481]](#footnote-481)

Although Athena may be easily held responsible for the whole event here, her name is not used; rather, the term *daimôn* is substituted for it. This is because here we are dealing with a sudden inspiration. Notably, if it were not for a *daimôn*’*s* sudden intervention, Odysseus would not have been able to remove the weapons from the hall. In this respect, divine intervention (Athena’s or *daimôn*’s) is credited with the responsibility of decision-making and without any specific reference to the hero’s activities. However, if we recall Wilford’s idea that “δαίμων here might suggest ‘the intervention of the unconscious’ and if ‘any psychic element is unconscious because the conscious mind cannot accept it” then, we might affirm that the term δαίμων might be associated with Odysseus’ intelligence. We could also relate Odysseus’ situation here, with what happens with the warriors described as δαίμονι ἶσος. Those cases deal with physical power, however, while these deal with intelligence. Odysseus does not seem to be able to acknowledge the existence of ‘these mental forces’ as being part of his own intelligence.

Thus, when a brilliant idea or a great thought comes into his head in a case of extreme danger (e.g. his fight with the suitors), he ascribes all of the above to the intervention of a supernatural power, represented by the term *daimôn*. Indeed, we have already experienced Odysseus’ ability to come along with great plans in cases of need. After all, this may be revealed by the epithet ‘πολύτροπος’, already ascribed to Odysseus by Homer.[[482]](#footnote-482) It is no surprise, then, that Odysseus might be equally associated with the term because of the brilliant idea of the removal of the arms. Odysseus even prefaces this instruction to his son with the advice that he must lull with ‘gentle words’[[483]](#footnote-483) (μαλακοῖς ἐπέεσσι, 5) any suspicion the suitors may have about the removal of the weapons.

Tsagarakis believes that: ‘It is not *daimon* who put the idea into Telemachus’ head but his own father; yet he is not to say that for obvious reasons.’[[484]](#footnote-484) Significantly, Tsagarakis recognises that the phrase ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἔμβαλε δαίμων (10) might be understood in terms of a ‘brilliant idea’, which ‘means that it must have a religious force.’[[485]](#footnote-485) ‘Odysseus is counting upon the effect of this phrase upon those who hear it,’[[486]](#footnote-486) Tsagarakis affirms, since ‘a man could feel this type of divine intervention [that of course, reminds us of Dodds’ theory of ‘monitions’], and the suitors had no reason to doubt Telemachus’ feelings, though there was always that possibility as his resourceful father indicates.’[[487]](#footnote-487) Dietrich finds that this (19.10) belongs to one of the instances where δαίμων, like θεός, may be involved with the individual.[[488]](#footnote-488) In this respect, a δαίμων‘can give a thought or inspire a thought’,[[489]](#footnote-489) and if we may use Brenk’s terminology, ‘the *daimon* [in this case as in the previous one] acts very much like the gods do at times.’[[490]](#footnote-490) Hence, Athena or even Zeus[[491]](#footnote-491) may be associated with the term *daimôn* and the plan of the removal of the arms.[[492]](#footnote-492)

Either we believe that the term δαίμων here is used by the cunning Odysseus as a camouflage in order to manipulate the suitors’ minds and let them believe that the removal of the arms was due to divine intervention or we believe that the specific plan may be attributed only to the mental effect of a god or *daimôn*. In either case, we are once again led to Lesky’s theory of ‘double motivation and responsibility’.[[493]](#footnote-493) We are faced with a spiritual event equally attributed to both divine and human factors.[[494]](#footnote-494) On the one hand, this derives from the focalization of a mortal character well known for the many plots that he spins and the stories he narrates. As such, Odysseus attributes his sudden inspiration to a mysterious *daimôn*. On the other hand, it derives from the narrator’s choice to put the term *daimôn* in the same context as the name of Athena to show that a specific god and *daimôn* are related to the same mysterious kind of psychological intervention.

Similarly, when it comes to the second example (*Od.* 19.138), we shall emphasise the use of the term *daimôn* by Penelope, a *polytropos* wife of a *polytropos* husband, to demonstrate that responsibility for inspiration of a brilliant idea may be attributed to both *daimôn* (or a named god) and to Penelope’s intelligence. We suggest that family resemblance and the situation of both *daimôn* and the name of Athena in the same semantic family plays a role in attributing both term’s with the same effect on Penelope. Penelope confides to the stranger – Odysseus – that it was a *daimôn* who ‘inspired her’ with the crafty scheme of delaying the wedding by weaving the cloak for Laertes (φᾶρος μέν μοι πρῶτον ἐνέπνευσε φρεσὶ δαίμων, 19.138). Penelope mentions that Athena as the one responsible for inspiring her to appear in front of the suitors (19.158). But even before that, Athena ‘brings sleep upon Penelope’ and beautifies her in her sleep (18.164-65) so that she will manage to lure the suitors with her outstanding beauty.[[495]](#footnote-495)

At first glance, all of the above suggest that *daimôn*’*s* effect on human psychology (e.g. his ability to inspire a thought or an idea) is associated with the functions of the anthropomorphic gods.[[496]](#footnote-496) This time, however, the term *daimôn* is mentioned instead of the name of Athena.[[497]](#footnote-497) Although we are dealing with a less expected inspiration for Penelope, she belongs to the category of characters in the *Odyssey* who credit one of these anonymous supernatural beings (gods/*daimôn*) with “a wide range of what may be called loosely ‘monitions.’”[[498]](#footnote-498) If this is the same *daimôn* that a few lines back (v. 129) gave her *kaka*, and if it is still possible that the same *daimôn* can give both *kaka* and *kala*,[[499]](#footnote-499) then, *daimôn* may be attributed with the same capacity for psychic intervention[[500]](#footnote-500) as the gods.[[501]](#footnote-501)

But Penelope cannot but share part of the responsibility for her deceitful and brilliant plan.[[502]](#footnote-502) She, just like Odysseus, possesses the quality of *mêtis*.[[503]](#footnote-503) This is again where we see Lesky’s theory of ‘double motivation’ or ‘overdetermination’ in action.[[504]](#footnote-504) ‘Athene (here and elsewhere associated with *daimôn*) places the wish in Penelope and Penelope claims the desire as her own; Athena’s purpose, planted in Penelope’s heart, is also Penelope’s.’[[505]](#footnote-505) Both mortal and divine (Athena-*daimôn*) activity (‘double aspect’) may be held responsible for the outcome of Penelope’s plots and more generally, for the outcome of the events in the poem. Both *daimôn* and a specific god are associated with a less expected inspiration for Penelope, and if indeed what remains behind both a god’s and *daimôn*’s mental effect on Penelope is a mysterious, unexplained and unnamed power, then both *daimôn* and a god are connected under the same mysterious mental activity.

**Conclusion**

Given the extensive exposition of the Homeric narrative in speeches[[506]](#footnote-506) and based on the audiences’ familiarity with some basic Homeric techniques, we know how to identify a sign when we see one, especially when it is displayed by the poet in his epics in order to make them accessible for his audience in as many ways as possible.[[507]](#footnote-507) The term *daimôn* is among the signs that the narrator has placed at our disposal in order to help us clear up any misconceptions related to the nature of the gods and the various other supernatural entities in the Homeric world. This chapter’s analysis of the term *daimôn* led us to a reconsideration of the term’s ambiguity.

We also differentiated our own view from the views that pointed to the term as the exact synonym either of the gods or of an unspecified supernatural power. To the contrary, we demonstrated that everything is a matter of perception. The perception of both the narrator and of his characters enabled us to come as close as possible to the preceise meaning of the term *daimôn* and to its unique role in the Homeric epics. We demonstrated that consideration of different perspectives in the narrative offered a different approach to the term *daimôn*. Such a realisation aided us in acknowledging the significant qualities of the term *daimôn* as a point of convergence among the various entities of the Homeric world.

Consideration of the perspective of both the narrator and his characters has led us to realise that, regardless of what we recognised as the mysterious and the unknown, it was not impossible for it to be harmonically concentrated and to be organised, maintaining its diversity, under the contexts of the same universe. As we demonstrated, what so far constituted the mysterious and the unknown in man’s experience with the *daimonic* is what also led to the organisation of the term and of its many references in the same Homeric world, which due to its *polymorphy*, did not necessarily have to be a chaotic one. In the same way, the term *daimôn*, due to its *polymorphic* nature, did not have to be a term with many inconsistencies either.

**CHAPTER THREE**

**The Term *Daimôn* as a Narrative Device and as a Term of Diversities: Redefining Homer’s Presentation of the Gods and their Relationship to Mortals**

**Introduction**

This chapter approaches the term *daimôn*’s diversity from the point of view of Homeric verse-making technique. It demonstrates how usage of the term as a narrative device (i.e. in the form of the vocative δαιμόνιε and the formula δαίμονι ἶσος), as an element constructing type-scenes, as a term with a fixed meaning, and as a term situated in a specific verse context in the epic discourse might be used to highlight once more and from a different perspective the term’sdiversity/complexity of significations.

We have already witnessed the persistent and long-term disagreements among scholars, which aided us in suggesting that, in fact, usage of the term is both inherently polysemous and complex. With this in mind, the discussion in this chapter demonstrates several aspects of the word. First, it points to the usage of the vocative and the adjective in witnessing the mysterious behaviour of both mortal and immortal characters. Further, if the formulae in Homer may be given a fixed meaning related to the the term *daimôn* as signifying a superhuman power determining mortal behaviour, the formula δαίμονι ἶσος demonstrates how the term contains a number of diverse attributes (i.e. both divine and anthropomorphic qualities and both mysterious superhuman and excessive mortal characteristics). Because of the way that the term reproduces its complex nature, its previously praised qualities as aconcept and as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ enables us to gain further knowledge of its associated concepts. It sheds further light on the nature of the gods and mortals and of their complicated relationship, which in fact derives from the gods’complicated relationship with the term.

 In order to get as close as possible to the relationship between gods and mortals, this chapter is divided into two subsections which involve the analysis of the two distinct and instructive segments of the general semantic field of the term *daimôn*: the adjectival vocative δαιμόνιε and the formula δαίμονι ἶσος. The first subsection focuses on the vocative adjective and its usage by various focalizers and in different contexts to address both a mortal and a divine character.[[508]](#footnote-508) Some scholars[[509]](#footnote-509) read the meaning of the adjectival form as derivative from its noun, *daimôn*; it describes, they suggest, a person acting inexplicably or perhaps under the influence of a δαίμων. In this sense, usage of the vocative is given a strong critical tone. Other scholars[[510]](#footnote-510) argue that the semantics of δαιμόνιε must be kept separate from those of the noun. The vocative, they claim, is “neutral” in tone, and essentially creates an intimate relationship between the speaker and the addressee. The present chapter shows that a well-rounded understanding of the term requires a synthesis of both views. It suggests that δαιμόνιε appears in the context of a conversation with the speaker’s emphasis on the addressee’s mysterious behaviour. This kind of acting might be the result of a person’s association with and influence by the mysterious power, *daimôn*. The adjectival vocative as the derivative of the term *daimôn* is closely related to its basic quality as a mysterious power, and as such, we shall suggest that it helps us to unravel the gods’ and mortals’ equal share in themysterious character of supernatural intervention represented by the term.

The findings from the analysis of the vocative δαιμόνιε and of *daimôn* as a sign of the mysterious and as a term of diversities, moreover, will demonstrate that the term’s controversy extends to both gods and mortals. Because the term *daimôn* is a concept that aids us in analysing the phenomenon of the gods as experienced by Homeric man. We can prove that both terms, beyond their anthropomorphic and divine characteristics, present a demonic side of their character This will also highlight the term’s quality as a point of convergence between the gods and mortals.

 The second subsection of this chapter considers how the formula δαίμονι ἶσος is used to demonstrate the complicated relationship between the terms for the gods and *daimôn.* Both terms are used to represent the sources of a superhuman mortal power. Here the term *daimôn* is associated with a mysterious supernatural power sometimes equal to the gods. Yet, by nature, due to the sharp division between mortals and immortals, the expression also implies excessive and irrational/reckless mortal behaviour.

Scholars offer different explanations for the formula δαίμονι ἶσος. On the one hand, there are those[[511]](#footnote-511) who find the comparison to be the same as though to a god. On the other hand, there are those[[512]](#footnote-512) who argue that the comparison of a warrior to the term *daimôn* is different from the comparison to a word representing the gods, since in the first case the warrior is associated with a reckless and excessive assault. I combine both views in order to offer a more coherent understanding of the formula and then to use it as a rhetorical device that will enable us to get as close as possible to the gods and their relationship to mortals. This part of the chapter shows that δαίμονι ἶσος is used to refer to the warrior’s superhuman characteristics, which derive from both his comparison to the term *daimôn* and a god (e.g. Ares). However, when it comes to the warrior’s supernatural powers, it is the result of the warrior’s comparison to the irrational and *daimonic*.

 All in all, this chapter uses the qualities of the term *daimôn* as a narrative device and as a concept to inform us that it is due to the reshaped and no longer clear-cut relationship between gods and mortals and the capacity of the term *daimôn* to link these realms is important. The *daimonic* powers of men and gods is where their two worlds overlap.

**Methodology**

The idea that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were the products of an oral tradition of heroic song composed in a *formulaic* system is a conclusion accepted by nearly all-Homeric scholars.[[513]](#footnote-513) The American Homerist Milman Parry[[514]](#footnote-514) and his assistant Albert Lord,[[515]](#footnote-515) which included a close comparative analysis of the Homeric epics and the heroic songs of Serbian bards, concluded that epics were composed with the aid of ‘an elaborate stock of prefabricated building blocks’.[[516]](#footnote-516) The process of composition in performance they observed among the Serbian bards lead to the creation of a parallel idea about composition by the Homeric bards. It also pointed to the idea of both the Serbian and the Homeric epics being the products of oral –formulaic composition.[[517]](#footnote-517)

After recognising that the system of ‘formulaic building-blocks’ operates at all levels of the process of composition, from a single word (stock epithets, formula) to stock phrases, type-scenes,[[518]](#footnote-518) and to large-scales of story patterns,[[519]](#footnote-519) we shall demonstrate that the term *daimôn* in the form of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος and the adjectival vocative δαιμόνιε, is an important element in the written text of the Homeric epics. It is also an important device in the repertoire of the poet which enables him to transfer and to adapt a fixed meaning to specific scenes and to attach a recognisable meaning to various elements (i.e. men, gods, and other superhuman powers). This chapter demonstrates that the term *daimôn* and its derivatives are important devices for the poet and his audience in the same way that formulae and type-scenes – due to their quality as ‘prefabricated building blocks’ – would have helped the Homeric bards in the oral composition of their heroic songs.

The phrase δαίμονι ἶσος is clearly defined by Parry’s conception of the formula; it is central to his theory of oral-formulaic compositon.[[520]](#footnote-520) Therefore, based on Parry’s definition of the formula, δαίμονι ἶσος is used formulaically in the *Iliad*; it always occurs in the same metrical conditions (i.e. at the end of the line following a bucolic diaeresis and in the narrator’s own voice except for the two instances at *Il.* 5.459, 884) and to express the behaviour of certain Iliadic warriors (Diomedes, Patroclus and Achilles) which derive from the term *daimôn* and the excessive power which the word suggests.

The scenes that include the description of a warrior referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος have the same structure, are all characterised by the same sequence of events, and all include the repetitive use of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος. Use of the formula demonstrates that we are dealing with a kind of type-scene[[521]](#footnote-521) where the recurring situation of a warrior’s impetuous charge towards one of the gods is ‘narrated according to a more or less fixed pattern’:[[522]](#footnote-522) in addition to the repetition of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος, we have the repetition of the oustanding characteristics of those warriors referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος, i.e. the impetuous onslaught (ἐπορούσε… ἐπέσσυτο), the loud battle-cry (σμερδαλέ αἰάχων), and the desire to kill (κακά φρονέων ἐνορούσεν; κατακτόμεναι μενεαίνων), whereas in the case of Diomedes and Patroclus, the formula is repeated in the line ‘ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος’, which is always followed by the appearance of Apollo.

Although the τέταρτον line is missing when Achilles is referred to with the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος, all three scenes follow the same pattern: each includes the description of the wild charge of a warrior, his attack against one of the gods (*hybris*) and the gods fighting back and putting an end (in some of the cases by producing the death of the warrior) to the warrior’s berserk behaviour.[[523]](#footnote-523) Use of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος (although situated in a shorter-scale structural pattern[[524]](#footnote-524)) and the technique of type-scenes works well with the audience’s foreknowledge of this pattern of the warrior referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος as demonstrating berserk behaviour.

When it comes to the adjectival vocative and taking into consideration the fact that one of the oldest problems in Homeric criticism is the question of the meaning of the epithets,[[525]](#footnote-525) this chapter will analyse the term δαιμόνιε. Among the most prominent perceptions of ancient scholars were those that showed many of the epithets being irrelevant to their context and some of them even being misapplied.[[526]](#footnote-526) Some even noted that an epithet may be ornamental:[[527]](#footnote-527) it may be used not because of its meaning, but because it was metrically useful. However, discussion in this chapter demonstrates that the adjectival vocative δαιμόνιε does not fall in either category. Based on the various renderings of its meaning, it may enclose important information concerning the nature and the actitivites of its associated concepts. As chapter two has already demonstrated, the term *daimôn* signifiedfor everything mysterious and unpredictable regarding a supernatural power. As such, the vocative δαιμόνιε as a narrative device and as a derivative of *daimôn* will be used to indicate the mysterious and unexplained (demonic) aspect of divine and mortal characters in the narrative.

Δαιμόνιε as a term semantically connected with the term *daimôn* has a derogatory meaning. As such, it is striking to see the vocative used in intense and emotionally intimate scenes between a divine and mortal character (e.g. the scene between Helen and Aphrodite),[[528]](#footnote-528) and in conversations between husbands and wives (both mortals[[529]](#footnote-529) and immortals.[[530]](#footnote-530)) Consideration of the speaker’s psychological reactions – for example, the speaker’s astonishment, or protestations towards his listener’s strange behaviour may be used as an indication of the latter’s demonic behaviour. Together with the above consideration of the various focalizations of the vocative δαιμόνιε, the social context of the utterance and the relationship of the speaker and the listener also play a role in enabling us to see the vocative as a narrative device that uses its fixed meaning to charaterise the person who speaks it as being surprised at the behaviour of his addressee. The association of the vocative with a fixed meaning shows the poet is not merely the ‘slave of his formulas’,[[531]](#footnote-531) but also reveals its own and the vocative’s quality as a concept for understanding the relationship between the divine and the mortal worlds.

 Both usage of the vocative and the δαίμονι ἶσος formula suggests that the term *daimôn* and its qualities as a sign and as a symbol of a mysterious and excessive power both connects and separates the gods from mortals. The choice of the vocative and the formula as the poet’s useful devices is what exposes this kind of relationship between the gods and mortals.

**Δαιμόνιε in Homer as a Derivative of the Term Δαίμων and its Association with Both Divine and Mortal Attributes**

This part of the chapter refers to the vocative δαιμόνιε and demonstrates how different focalizations of the term and its usage in various contexts associate the vocative with different meanings. It further demonstrates how the usage of a different speaker’s reactions and intentions when he uses the vocative to address both a divinity and a mortal character highlights the term *daimôn*’s diverse associations with other supernatural entities. Both attributes are aspects of the term’s controversial and complex nature. Δαιμόνιε occurs in twenty-one instances in both the *Iliad* (twelve times) and the *Odyssey* (nine times). It is used in different contexts to address people of different rank, sex, status and familiarity, but never in conversations between children and parents. It is always found in the singular, save for two cases in the *Odyssey* where the term is in plural.[[532]](#footnote-532)

 However, this chapter will be focused only on a representative number of instances which show the vocative as the derivative of the term *daimôn*, a point rejected by several scholars, and of it being associated with the meanings originally attached to this stem-word. The following section deals with a more systematic overview of the instances where the vocative δαιμόνιε is used as a form of address between husbands and wives (both mortals (*Od*. 23.166, 264; *Il*. 24.194) and immortals (*Il.* 4.31)). It also deals with the instance (*Il*. 3.399) that occurs between a mortal and an immortal. It demonstrates that the term *daimôn* can refer to the mysterious behaviour of both mortal and divine characters. Analysis of the aforementioned instances shows the speaker expressing either his pity for the addressee’s inexplicable behaviour when under the influence of a δαίμων or other supernatural entity acting in a *daimonic* way. As a term borrowing its meanings from its stem-word δαίμων, δαιμόνιε will once more be used to refer to the diverse kinds of beings to which it can refer.

**Δαιμόνιε as a Term with a Fixed Meaning, the Term *Daimôn* as a Concept and the Gods’ Relation to Mortals**

This part of the discussion is based on the analysis of a number of instances that include the use of the vocative δαιμόνιε. It demonstates that the adjectival vocative as possessing a fixed meaning, despite scholars’ tendency to question or misapply Parry’s theory on the significance and usefulness of epithets, a tendency which derives from the way that Parry himself was developing his ideas.[[533]](#footnote-533) This analysis will highlight how the term *daimôn* modifies the meaning of related concepts. We shall demonstrate that δαιμόνιε as the derivative of the term *daimôn* and as a mysterious and unpredictable power reveals a new aspect of divine behaviour.

It is the development of what in chapter two we termed the extra-mysterious side of the gods and is identified in each speaker’s reactions when faced with inexplicable and malevolent divine intervention; the choice of the vocative by the speakers indicates that this kind of behaviour seems to go even beyond the mysterious nature of activities far connected to the term *daimôn* and its associated concepts. It has to do with what this thesis terms the demonic side of the gods; it is related to the kind of attributes that show the gods to be separated for a while from their typical divine characteristics and to be connected with the incomprehensible and ferocious attributes of a *daimôn*. Analysis of the instances that show the vocative adjective to be used to refer to certain mortal characters’ abnormal behaviour, which shares some similarities to that of the gods, highlights once more the role of the term *daimôn* as a useful concept. As such, the term sheds further light on the existence of the so far unknown and overlapping aspects of the gods and mortals.

 The following section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection includes the analysis of two instances[[534]](#footnote-534) that show the vocative adjective in the speech of both a god (i.e. Zeus) and a mortal (i.e. Helen) to highlight the existence of this new *daimonic* side of the gods. The second subsection refers to usage of δαιμόνιε to highlight the existence of a similar demonic/abnormal behaviour of certain mortal characters[[535]](#footnote-535) - which for reasons of clarity and in order to show the affinity of both a mortal and an immortal character to *daimôn* are all female - that also derives from their association with or influence from the *daimonic*.

 The first instance includes the vocative δαιμονίη as it occurs in the conversation of Zeus and Hera (*Il*. 4.31: δαιμονίη, τί νύ σε Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες). We witness Zeus’ astonishement at Hera’s malicious behaviour, which seems to be much greater than it was in book one (561),[[536]](#footnote-536) where Zeus addressed Hera with the same vocative.[[537]](#footnote-537) The gods are gathered together for their first council (4.1-67) after the duel between Paris and Menelaus. Zeus ‘speaking deviously’ (4.6) asks the question: ‘Should grim warfare resume, or should the gods impose friendship upon the two armies, to save Priam’s town and to render Helen to Menelaus? (4.14-19).’ Both Athena and Hera react furiously to the thought of peace, but Hera does not manage to contain the anger in her breast (Ἣρῃ δ’ οὐκ ἒχαδε στῆθος χόλον, ἀλλὰ προσηύδα· 24). ‘Athena’s lust for vengeance, though savage, is contained (she says nothing) and external in origin. Hera’s, however, is internal in origin and unaccountable, as the unique metaphor ‘οὐκ ἒχαδε στῆθος χόλον’ suggests.’[[538]](#footnote-538) Hera’s rage and great hatred for Troy becomes more evident in her first reaction towards Zeus (4.26-28), when she refers to all her efforts to destroy Priam and his sons. For this reason, behind the usage of the vocative δαιμονίη (4.31) lies Zeus’ intention to rebuke Hera for her rage (4.31-36), which is described as incessant (ἀπερχὲς μενεαίνεις, 32), bestial (Hera would “raw-eat Priam…and all the Trojans”)[[539]](#footnote-539) and incurable (‘the verb ἐξακεῖσθαι “to heal completely”,[[540]](#footnote-540) used in the optative of an unreal condition, indicates that even after her triumphal entry into Troy her disease will remain. A cure would demand that the goddess, who by nature eats no human food, eat the raw meat of Priam and sons. Then only would her fury be contained’).[[541]](#footnote-541)

 At first glance, Hera’s demonic character seems to be closely associated with her own nature as a deceptive and vengeful goddess. Hera does not hesitate to deceive even the father and ruler of the gods, Zeus (Book 14). Hera, with the help of Aphrodite and Sleep, manages to deceive Zeus so she, with Poseidon and their allies, can countermand Zeus’ solemn promise to Thetis to make the Achaians suffer because of their attitude towards Achilles. Hera accomplishes her sinister plan with a great degree of craftiness (14.161-65, this and Hera’s characterisation as δολοφρονέουσα (329) show her as a deceitful goddess).[[542]](#footnote-542) She is ‘the female armed with Aphrodite’s magic girdle’, the ‘irresistible sexual object’ that deceives Zeus.[[543]](#footnote-543) Hera’s craftiness may be also compared with a wife’s use of sex as a weapon for selfish ends.[[544]](#footnote-544) Hera not only deceives Zeus, she also deceives Aphrodite (she tells an elaborate lie to the goddess about her wish to reconcile Okeanos and Tethys, 14.197-202) and Sleep (she offers him a bride and she arouses his sexual desires for the charms of one of the younger Graces, 14.328-40) to win them over and enlist their help.[[545]](#footnote-545) Agamemnon’s story is far more informative about Hera’s deceitful nature: her uncontrolled jealousy leads her against Heracles as well. She interferes with his birth and consigns him to serve King Eurystheus of Mycenae for his entire life; she raises the Nemean lion and the Lernean hydra against him; finally, she has his wife and children killed in Thebes during a state of madness (19.96-133, cf. 14.249-61; 15.25-30).[[546]](#footnote-546)At another time, she even hurled Hephaestus in fury from Olympus into the sea (18.395-9), while her priestess Io, on whom Zeus had cast his eye, was driven in a frenzy (caused by Hera) across the world in the shape of a cow (*HN* 178f.).[[547]](#footnote-547)

 However, upon closer inspection, Hera’s demonic rage, as it appears in book four and elsewhere in the poem, seems to be separated from her traditionally configured appearance in the poems. ‘Hera’s unremitting lust for vengeance and rage (χόλος and μένος)’ are closely associated with ‘the demonic rage’ of heroes described by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος.[[548]](#footnote-548) Like Hera, these characters are known for their inhuman excesses and eagerness to kill their opponents (e.g. Diomedes’ *aristeia*: 5.438, Patroclus’ *aristeia*: 16.705, 786 and Achilles *aristeia*: 20.447, 493, 21.18, 227).[[549]](#footnote-549) Their great fury and abnormal power are reflected in a comparison which uses the term *daimôn*.[[550]](#footnote-550)

Parallels may also be drawn between Hera’s and Achilles’ demonic rage: the formula ἀπερχὲς μενεαίνεις ‘you rage ceaselessly’ occurs only once again in the *Iliad* to describe Achilles’ rage[[551]](#footnote-551) against Hector and once in the *Odyssey* (1.20).[[552]](#footnote-552) But still, Hera’s demonic rage goes beyond Achilles’ fury. Hence, even though Achilles’ wrath arises from his heroic honor (t*imê*),[[553]](#footnote-553) he ends in sharing a meal with his enemy; Hera’s rage, ‘arising from a trivial slight to her beauty’ (as we finally find out in 24.25-30), is ‘a permanent demonic imbalance without end’.[[554]](#footnote-554) In order to cease her fury she must eat Priam and his sons raw.[[555]](#footnote-555) For this reason, Hera is addressed with the vocative δαιμονίη (31) by Zeus as a way to rebuke her for her malicious and demonic behaviour.[[556]](#footnote-556) This rage is closely related to Hera’s hatred for Troy, a hatred so violent and passionate that ‘Zeus himself can liken it only to cannibalism.’[[557]](#footnote-557) Her hatred and destructive obsession with Troy is so radical and uncontrolled that in order to satisfy it, Hera will even abandon her favourite cities of Argos, Mycenae and Sparta,[[558]](#footnote-558) something she would not normally do.

 Given all the above, usage of the vocative δαιμονίη here and analysis of the reactions of Zeus shows ‘someone whose actions are unaccountable or ill-omened; one who is under the influence of a *daimôn*’[[559]](#footnote-559) – and if we wonder what sense it makes to think of the Olympians as possessed, it should be noted that there are indeed instances where Zeus himself is said to fall victim to external supernatural influences (e.g. ἄτη, 19. 91-95; ὕπνος, 14.353-54)’.[[560]](#footnote-560)

 The second instance of the first subsection refers to Aphrodite’s association with the vocative δαιμονίη; part of the discussion involved with this example (*Il.* 3.399) has been already included in the contexts of our previous discussion of a specific goddess (i.e. Aphrodite in *Il*. 3.420) and her association with the unexplained and mysterious character of the term *daimôn* in chapter two. My intention at this point is not to repeat what I have already suggested on the existence of an extra-mysterious power of a specific god. Rather, this part will be a development of the previous discussion of the gods’ demonic side.

The vocative δαιμονίη is used in the contexts of a scene (i.e. *Il*. 3.399: δαιμονίη, τί με ταῦτα λιλαίεαι ἠπεροπεύειν;) that involves the presence of a goddess (Aphrodite) in the guise of a mortal (in the form of an old wool-comber from Sparta). Unlike the previous instance (the dialogue between Zeus and Hera), the dialogue does not occur between gods,[[561]](#footnote-561) The vocative, however, is used in a similarly unfriendly sense and illustrates how Aphrodite, like Hera, acts in inexplicable and malicious ways. When Aphrodite has rescued her *protégé*[[562]](#footnote-562)Paris from death, she deposits him in his bedroom and goes off, disguised as an old maidservant, to bring Helen from the walls of Ilium back to her room (380-83). Helen recognises Aphrodite (when she observed the beauty of her neck and her lovely breasts and flashing eyes, she was stuck with awe, 396-98). She defends herself stubbornly: ‘δαιμονίη, τί με ταῦτα λιλαίεαι ἠπεροπεύειν; 399’). In chapter two, we referred to Helen’s feelings (i.e. her awe, astonishment and great fear) as indications of Aphrodite’s *daimonic* behaviour.[[563]](#footnote-563) Helen’s intentions when she chooses to use the vocative δαιμονίη to address Aphrodite (399) with the same vocative that Zeus had already used to address Hera in verse 31 to characterise Hera’s malicious and vengeful behaviour characterises Aphrodite as similarly malevolenet. At first glance, Aphrodite’s activities seem to be closely related to her traditionally configured depiction as ‘the joyous consummation of sexuality.’[[564]](#footnote-564) This even coincides with scholars’ attempts to describe Helen’s behaviour based on Aphrodite’s connection with Helen’s own sexuality.[[565]](#footnote-565) In this respect, some scholars suggest, Helen does not actually argue with the goddess herself, but rather with her own erotic impulses, which urge her to be with Paris instead of Menelaus, her legitimate husband.[[566]](#footnote-566) Helen, dragged by these erotic impulses, is also affected by Aphrodite’s detailed and erotic description of Paris waiting for her in his room: ‘Ὣς φάτο, τῇδ’ ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε, 395). Others scholars go a step further and attribute Helen’s reluctance to join Paris as being due to her sense of shame,[[567]](#footnote-567) which in epic poetry is frequently attributed to characters under the influence of sexual desire.[[568]](#footnote-568) In this sense, if indeed Aphrodite is connected with Helen’s sexual desire, then Helen is not fighting against Aphrodite, but against her own personal feelings as she tries to control her erotic impulses.

However, the choice of such a powerful and totally negative adjective goes even beyond Aphrodite’s association with Helen’s sexual desire and of Helen arguing with her own erotic impulses. If we accept that Helen has managed to identify Aphrodite as the source of all her ‘shameful’ erotic impulses, and if this is the only reason why Helen should be angry at Aphrodite - because of the latter’s role as ‘an effeminate and debasing love goddess’[[569]](#footnote-569) - are these reasons enough to make Helen address Aphrodite with the vocative δαιμονίη (a powerful and a totally negative adjective[[570]](#footnote-570)) and not with another epithet (e.g. Διὸς θυγάτηρ, 128)? To the contrary, usage of the vocative δαιμονίη suggests Aphrodite’s characterisation as a deceitful goddess.[[571]](#footnote-571) This is exactly what Helen intends to express when she sees the goddess trying to deceive her with the lure of a beautiful and radiant Paris waiting for her in bed (δαιμονίη, τί με ταῦτα λιλαίεαι ἠπεροπεύειν; 399). Helen is confused by Aphrodite’s desire to deceive her and cause her more shame and suffering (οὕνεκα δὴ νῦν δῖον Ἀλέξανδρον Μενέλαος νικήσας ἐθέλει στυγερὴν ἐμὲ οἴκαδ’ ἄγεσθαι. τοὔνεκα δὴ νῦν δεῦρο δολοφρονέουσα παρέστης; 403-05). This characteristic is what separates Iris’ behaviour from Aphrodite’s. Earlier in the poem (191-97), Iris urged Helen to go to the wall to witness the duel between Menelaus and Paris.[[572]](#footnote-572) What makes the two visits seem different is the intention that lies behind the two divine appearances. In the case of Iris, judging from her disguise (she took the guise of her husband’s sister, Laodice, 3.121), her intention is only to bring the message of Menelaus’ and Paris’ duel and urge Helen to watch it. Aphrodite, by contrsast, deliberately undertakes the guise of someone whom Helen loves dearly (a wool-comber from Sparta) because she wants to deceive her and convince her to do something that would otherwise be against her will. Cunning and deceitful behaviour then might make Aphrodite more fit to be described as δαιμονίη than Iris.[[573]](#footnote-573)

In this respect, the vocative δαιμονίη here and Helen’s intentions show that ‘the speaker (Helen) is baffled by the motives of the person addressed (Aphrodite’s attempt to deceive her).’[[574]](#footnote-574) It further signifies someone (a goddess) whose actions are unaccountable and ill-omened or someone who acts in a malicious way.[[575]](#footnote-575) A closer look at the conversation between Helen and Aphrodite confirms that this is not a ‘normal form’ of divine deception towards one of the gods’ favourites.[[576]](#footnote-576)As such, it is similar to Hera’s hatred for Troy, which was also not normal behaviour for a goddess. This suggests that both mortals and immortals could easily be turned away from their usual behaviours when under the influence of the malicious or vengeful supernatural forces referred to by the term *daimôn*. Indeed, Aphrodite’s irresistible power, as we have already suggested in Chapter Two, was emphasised in line 420[[577]](#footnote-577) where she was called a δαίμων[[578]](#footnote-578) when she led Helen to Paris.[[579]](#footnote-579) However, because the poet does not want to associate Aphrodite only with this mysterious *daimonic* nature (which, as we demonstrated, indicates the extra-mysterious nature of the gods, or, as Chantraine observes, because *daimôn* ‘il souligne la pouissance mystérieuse de la divinité’[[580]](#footnote-580)), he also qualifies the vocative δαιμονίη in his narrative and in Helen’s powerful speech to demonstrate that Aphrodite’s case is identical to that of Hera earlier. Malignant, ill-omened, irrestistable and unaccountable qualities separate the divine from the demonic in the Homeric epics. This demonic character explicitly connects both Aphrodite and Hera.

 The use of the adjectival vocative δαιμονίη in the second subsection to address the behaviour of two mortal women (i.e. Hecabe and Penelope) and the same vocative employed before to address two goddesses highlights the tendency of the narrator to use an epithet (i.e. δαιμόνιος) with a fixed and recognisable meaning - since the social context of the utterances and the similar reactions/intentions of the speaker each time can attribute the vocative with the same meaning. It shows that both mortals and immortals may act in a similarly inexplicable way that is fundametally different from their normal behaviour.

 In the first instance of the second subsection, the vocative adjective is used in the contexts of the conversation of a mortal husband and wife: both Priam (24.160-65) and Hecabe (22.430-36) are said to be distressed mourning for Hector’s death. Iris delivers a message from Zeus to Priam that he is to go alone to the Achaean camp, taking with him gifts for Achilles to ransom Hector’s body (169-93). Priam orders his sons to harness the mules and then calls for his wife Hecabe and says to her: ‘δαιμονίη, a messenger came to me from Zeus on Olympos (δαιμονίη, Διόθεν μοι Ὀλύμπιος ἄγγελος ἦλθε, 24.194) that I must go to the ships of the Achaians and ransom my dear son, bringing gifts to Achilleus which may soften his anger. Come then, tell me. What does it seem best to your own mind for me to do? My heart, my strength are terribly urgent that I go there to the ships to the wide army of the Achaians.’[[581]](#footnote-581) Priam seems to have already decided to go to Achilles and offer him ransom for his dead son’s body. In the last lines of his speech, he reveals his decision to Hecabe: both his heart and his strength urge him to go to Achilles (αἰνῶς γάρ μ’ αὐτόν γε μένος καὶ θυμὸς ἄνω γε κεῖσ’ ἰέναι ἐπὶνῆας ἔσω στρατὸν εὐρὺν Ἀχαιῶν, 198-99).

 Usage of the vocative discloses the intentions of Priam to attribute specific qualities to Hecabe. As happened with the term *daimôn* before, the scene between Priam and Hecabe attributes a double, or even a contradictory, meaning to the vocative δαιμονίη, which produces Priam’s contradictory emotions. In fact, Priam’s use of δαιμονίη blends behaviour and instincts that by nature are unrelated. As such, the vocative goes beyond Priam’s pity for Hecabe being a tragic persona and for her impending malediction caused by a δαίμων (Zeus and Fate); it also expresses Priam’s great rebuke at what seems to be Hecabe’s expected reaction (i.e. her desire to take revenge for Hector’s death.)[[582]](#footnote-582) It is a kind of reaction that reveals Hecabe’s association with the same ferocious and vengeful behaviour as Hera (4.31), as both characters are under the influence of a malicious *daimôn*.

 To begin with the first part of the vocative implying ‘pity for Hecabe under the heaven-inflicted misfortunes and in view of the blow which is about to fall,’[[583]](#footnote-583) it is no wonder that Hecabe is a tragic figure placed in a tragic situation. Priam is aware of all the suffering that Hector’s death has brought upon Hecabe; he witnessed Hecabe on the walls pleading with Hector. Priam must also remember Hecabe’s great despair when she stood on the walls trying to persuade Hector not to fight with Achilles.[[584]](#footnote-584) Hecabe has no reason to live after the loss of her son. During her first lament for Hector’s death, she wishes to die since she has lost the most precious thing in her life: Hector (22.431-36).[[585]](#footnote-585) She even refers to the deaths of many of her sons by Achilles, while she fears that she will have to endure the death of her husband by Achilles as well (204-08). Priam shares the same belief of his impending doom with Hecabe, but he is ready to sacrifice his life in order to hold his son in his arms for the last time (224-27). Hecabe appears to be a tragic persona (this is what is implied by Priam’s intentions when addressing Hecabe as δαιμονίη), since she does not manage to prevent either her children’s or her husband’s impending death. Her opposition to Priam’s decision had no effect on him.[[586]](#footnote-586) In this respect, in the first place the vocative is used to imply Priam’s pity for the sufferings that those powers referred to by the term *daimôn* (i.e. Zeus and Fate[[587]](#footnote-587)) has brought upon his wife, and for all the suffering that his decision might cause her.

 However, the vocative is mainly used to attribute to Hecabe the same ferocity and vengeful behaviour as Hera (4.31), which derives from the influence of a malicious and vengeful *daimonic* power upon them. The vocative here (24.194) seems to have its usual functions as aremonstrance or rebuke.[[588]](#footnote-588) This is evidenced by Priam’s intention to rebuke Hecabe in advance for what seemed to be an expected reaction from her. Priam predicted the reaction that his decision to visit Achilles would have on Hecabe. Achilles is, after all, the murderer of her children and the possible killer of her husband. Although Priam does not pay particular attention to his wife’s advice and in the end refuses to listen to her[[589]](#footnote-589) and even though his ‘account of his vision is extremely brief, repeating only the crucial message’,[[590]](#footnote-590) he pays enough attention to what seems to be the abnormal and malicious behaviour which is closer to the way a *daimôn* would have acted.

The part of Hecabe’s behaviour that Priam wanted to put more emphasis on is the one depicted in Hecabe’s wish that she ‘could sink her teeth in that man’s (Achilles) liver and eat it!’ (212-13). In fact, ‘Her epithet ὠμηστής (savage) is a reminder of Achilles’ wish that he could eat Hector raw (22. 345ff.),’[[591]](#footnote-591) and the same ‘inhuman vindictiveness that Achilles has yet to renounce.’[[592]](#footnote-592) More specifically, Hecabe’s wish to eat Achilles’ liver raw reminds us of Hera’s ferocity in Book Four, when she also expressed her desire to eat Priam raw. This pattern of eating people raw and the desire for vengeance which it suggests is, already recognisable by its recurrence in prophecies and wishes (i.e. Priam, Achilles, and Hera in the early theodicy (4.34ff.) all lust to eat someone raw)[[593]](#footnote-593). This desire seems related to the use of the vocative δαιμονίη; it enables the audience to recognise the ferocious and vengeful nature of both mortals and immortals.

 The second and last example of this subjection shows how a mortal woman under the infuence of a *daimôn* takes on the same cunning and deceitful behaviour with as a goddess. Once more, use of the adjective vocative δαιμονίη in a conversation between a mortal husband and wife demonstrates how the vocative – as the derivative of the term *daimôn* and of all its derogatory significations - may be associated with the fixed meaning of a mortal wife acting unexpectedly and differently than usual. Odysseus, just like Priam and Zeus before him, shows his reaction (astonishment and anger) towards his partner’s behaviour, which seems to be the result of the negative effect of the *daimonic* power (i.e. Athena influences the behaviour of Penelope) upon her.

 The vocative occurs here in an emotional and intimate scene: the recognition scene between Penelope and Odysseus. The vocative δαιμόνιε (-ίη) occurs in the above scene between husband (Odysseus) and wife (Penelope). It occurs in the same scene in two succeeding speeches (i.e. the dialogue between Penelope and Odysseus: 23.166: “Δαιμονίη, περὶ σοί γε γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων κῆρ ἀτέραμνον ἔθηκαν Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχοντες·/ 23.174: “Δαιμόνι’, οὔτ’ ἄρ’ τι μεγαλίζομαι οὔτ’ ἀθερίζω/ 23.264: “Δαιμονίη, τίτ’ ἄρ’ αὖ με μάλ’ ὀτρύνουσα κελεύεις), and occurs again in the scene between Dionysus and the Tyrrhenian pirates, in the *Hymn of Dionysus*.[[594]](#footnote-594) However, this part of the discussion deals only with Penelope’s characterisation by the adjective δαιμονίη (23.166; 264) and with Odysseus’ intentions when addressing Penelope with that vocative.

 Eurykleia, the old nurse, presents Penelope with evidence (23.73-74) that Odysseus has at last returned after twenty years of absence. Penelope does not seem to be fully convinced by Eurykleia’s words and does not run to welcome him. ‘Instead she reminds Eurykleia that “it would be hard for you to baffle the purposes / of the everlasting gods, although you are very clever” (23.81-82), apparently believing that a pseudo-Odysseus could have been fabricated by the gods to trick her.’[[595]](#footnote-595) Penelope’s initial response to Odysseus is not enthusiastic at all: she descends to the *megaron* and sits in silence, neither acknowledging nor embracing her husband (23.93-95). Odysseus, having washed and put on beautiful clothes, had clearly expected to be recognised (cf. 114-115; 90-91: ‘Odysseus waits the moment that his wife will first talk to him’). However, when nothing happens, Odysseus’ patience, which he still displayed in 113-14, comes to an end. Odysseus now comes to agree with Telemachus that Penelope is cruel and unfeeling (166-170, 172; cf.97, 100-3). Odysseus then, in great disappointment, addresses Penelope: ‘δαιμονίη, 166’: (‘strange woman’, the immortals of Olympos made you hard, harder than any. Who else in the world would keep aloof as you do from her husband if he returned to her from years of trouble, cast on his own land in the twentieth year? 166- 191).[[596]](#footnote-596) Penelope ‘first addresses the earlier part of Odysseus’ speech (166-70), and then (177-80) continues from Odysseus’ instructions to the maid (171-72), turning the situation to her advantage, so now she provokes him. Addressing him as δαιμόνιε (‘strange man’ 174)[[597]](#footnote-597) she throws back at him the same reproach he had made against her (166): he is no less δαιμόνιος than she.’[[598]](#footnote-598) ‘Defending her behaviour, Penelope reacts both to the speech Odysseus has just uttered and to his earlier one (113-116): she does not feel superior to him or dishonour him (cf. 116: ‘she dishonours me’) nor does she generally admire him (as he apparently had expected after his bath), because she knows how he looked when he left for Troy (he now looks like that again).[[599]](#footnote-599) Odysseus, having passed the test with their marital bed, believes the time has come for both of them to go to bed. However, he is once again astonished by Penelope’s strange behaviour and her insistence to hear Teiresias’ prophesy about Odysseus’ future. Odysseus, in ‘an emotional preamble’ addresses his wife, says: ‘Strange woman (δαιμονίη, 264),[[600]](#footnote-600) why do you want to hear this? I will tell you, but you will not be pleased 264-66.’[[601]](#footnote-601)

 Behind the usage of the vocative δαιμονίη lies Odysseus’ intention to show his reaction (i.e. disapointment and anger)[[602]](#footnote-602) towards the unexpected behaviour of his wife, whom he addresses as δαιμονίη (i.e ‘strange queen’).[[603]](#footnote-603) In fact, Odysseus uses this specific vocative twice (*Od*. 23.66, 264) because he wants to comment on both Penelope’s actions (i.e. as a deceitful and cunning wife), and on her character/nature and inexplicable behaviour.[[604]](#footnote-604) To begin with, Penelope’s strange behaviour has already been depicted in her first meeting with Odysseus. During her conversation with the beggar-Odysseus, Penelope asks twice about the stranger’s identity (19.104-105; 162-63). She admits that she wants to test the stranger and find out whether he had entertained her husband and his comrades.[[605]](#footnote-605) Penelope asks for the same indications (*sêmata*) during the recognition scene with Odysseus (23.166-230) in order to confirm his true identity.

When it comes to the vocative disclosing the meaning of an address towards Penelope’s cunning and deceitful behaviour, Penelope appears to trick Odysseus with their marriage bed when she asks Eurycleia to prepare the bed outside her chamber. Penelope’s trick of the bed forces Odysseus to reveal the *sêmata* that only he and Penelope know: how he constructed the bed and how no human could remove it (187-204).[[606]](#footnote-606) Penelope also describes her treatment of the suitors (19.130-61) to the stranger/Odysseus. Over three years, she was devising the ruse (*dolos*) of the web. Penelope recalls how some *daimôn* has ‘put the idea of the web in her mind, 138’ (by day she kept weaving Laertes’ shroud and kept unravelling it by night).[[607]](#footnote-607) In a similar way, at 18.158, Athena urges Penelope to show herself to the suitors. The goddess beautifies Penelope during a deep sleep and, as she enters the hall, the suitors’ passions are aroused.[[608]](#footnote-608) Odysseus, who has been sitting in the hall observing the scene, rejoices watching Penelope beguiling them into giving her gifts while ‘her mind had other intentions’ (281-83).[[609]](#footnote-609) Penelope even informs the stranger of her new plan of preparing a bow-contest for the suitors (19.576-80).[[610]](#footnote-610) Penelope announces the contest to the suitors (21. 67-79) and insists that the stranger is given the bow to try (21.336).

Penelope returns to her quarters (21.350-53), where she weeps until Athena casts ‘sweet slumber over her eyelids’ (354-58).[[611]](#footnote-611) In a closer look at the above, it seems that we are faced with ‘a *periphrôn Pênelopeia* [wise Penelope] [that] finally emerges as a character aware of the plots she spins, and like Odysseus, cunning in securing her own interest in survival and duty and pleasure.’[[612]](#footnote-612) Still, from *periphrôn*, Penelope becomes δαιμονίη. Penelope’s transformation from *periphrôn* (wise) to δαιμονίη (strange, cunning) is closely connected with a *daimôn*, which enables her to ‘weave her own wiles’ against the suitors. A woman that would spend her time mourning for her king’s loss and her tragic fortune has managed, under the influence of a *daimôn*, to deceive the suitors for three years (19.138).[[613]](#footnote-613) Of course, a δαίμων is not the only source of Penelope’s inspiration for her tricks against the suitors. As we have already mentioned, Athena places the idea of appearing in front of the suitors (18.158) in Penelope’s head. What is more, although Penelope rejects Eurynome’s advice to wash herself and anoint her face, Athena puts her to sleep and beautifies her. Penelope confesses to Eurynome: ‘Eurynome, my heart longs, though it has never longed before to show myself to the wooers, hateful though they are’ (18.164-65). Penelope, in her first speech (19.138), not knowing the source of her inspiration, ascribes it to the mysterious *daimôn.*[[614]](#footnote-614)We may thus infer that if Athena is the goddess who helps Penelope find another plan to deceive the suitors and if the inspiring and helpful *daimôn* is identified with the personal gods,[[615]](#footnote-615) then the term *daimôn* (138) and Athena (an anthropomorphic god) are the main sources of Penelope’s inspiration and psychological prompting.[[616]](#footnote-616) We are already aware of the scholarly debate on Athena’s involvement in Penelope’s activities and as the main source of Penelope’s strange character.[[617]](#footnote-617)

We are already informed about scholars’ attempts to decide whether or not Penelope is able to understand and control the consequences of her actions and as the possessor of *mêtis*.[[618]](#footnote-618) What really matters here, however, is how the use of the vocative δαιμονίη may in fact inform us about this new side of the character of Penelope. From the above analysis of the vocative δαιμονίη, ‘Athena could only influence Penelope in accord with Penelope’s own character and disposition,’[[619]](#footnote-619) since Penelope is a character aware of the plots she spins.[[620]](#footnote-620) The important thing remains that we are able to decode a new side of Penelope: the demonic side of her character derived from a *daimonic* influence.

Previous scholars have suggested that the meaning of the epithets may be misapplied and may be only metrical fillers rather than conveyors of meaning, a view most famously proposed by Parry, who noted that the function of the epithets may be restricted simply to ‘accomodate a noun to the metrical requirments of the verse’.[[621]](#footnote-621) However, previous analysis has demonstrated that the adjective vocative δαιμόνιε has a specific/fixed meaning and is always related to its context. Although most scholars tend to approach the vocative by examining the effect it might produce on the relationship between the speaker and the hearer, they seemed to have paid no attention to the intention of the speaker to attribute specific qualitites to the addressee through the use of the vocative. They even neglected the importance of the vocative as the bearer of the meanings of its stem-word δαίμων (as a mysterious, vengeful and malignant power), which seemed to have been transferred to the addressee, who is perceived to be under a *daimonic* influence. This thesis differs from previous research when it comes to the meaning it attributes to the term *daimôn* and to its derivatives (both the vocative δαιμόνιε and the formula δαίμονι ἶσος); as we demonstrated, the vocative adjective δαιμόνιε is associated with a fixed meaning related to the god’s demonic side. Instead, δαιμόνιε also enables us to approach from a different scope already Homeric themes and patterns. These involve the activities of the gods alone or the gods and their interraction with mortals.

For instance, we get the opportunity to reapproach the recognisable pattern of gods and mortals wanting to eat their enemies raw and the reversed form of the relationship between a god and his or her favourite mortal, which highlighted the existence of the demonic behaviour of the gods and the similar behaviour of some mortals. It marks a change from their normal behaviour and emphasises their *daimonic* nature. Because the use of the term *daimôn* is neither ornamental nor simply metrical filler. Instead, the word δαιμόνιε refers beyond the context of the conversation in which it is situated; its meaning extends to the rest of the poem, as the meaning of a word must do.[[622]](#footnote-622)

Penelope’s characterisation as δαιμονίη in book 23[[623]](#footnote-623) recalls some verses in Book 19, where she was associated with the same cunning and deceitful behaviour.[[624]](#footnote-624) This again enabled us to understand better her present behaviour as a wife whose behavior merits her being referred to by the term δαιμονίη. All of the above in their turn also provide us with knowledge of the events that are about to come. For example, both the characterisation of Hera as δαιμονίη[[625]](#footnote-625) and her ferocious behaviour which lead her sacrifice her favourite cities provides us with foreknowledge of the impending destruction of Troy as part of the fulfilment of the will of Zeus. Similalry, when referred to by the vocative δαιμονίη,[[626]](#footnote-626) Aphrodite eventually forces Helen to go back to Paris.

**The Formulaic Expression Δαίμονι ἶσος**

We are all aware of the significant role of formulaic expressions in the oral composition of the Homeric epics and of the different scholarly arguments about their function: that the poet composed his formulae as stylistic flourish, that the formulae do not bear on the meaning of the text but are simple metrical filler, or that each one is used to create meaning in its specific context.[[627]](#footnote-627) We follow Clark’s theory which suggests that the ‘oral poet composes with formulas in the way a literate poet composes with words’.[[628]](#footnote-628) An analysis of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος within this framework will demonstrate that it is neither metrical filler, not stylistic flourish, but rather a way of conveying a complex comparison between mortals and immortals.[[629]](#footnote-629) As we will demonstrate, the formula δαίμονι ἶσος can offer us insights about the character ad behaviour of the three specific warriors with whom the formula is used and, more generally, about the term *daimôn* as in the human and divine relationship.

The formula δαίμονι ἶσος constitutes an important aspect of the type-scenes that refer to the descripiton of the excessive behaviour of a ferocious Iliadic warrior. As we shall demonstrate, the presence and repetition of the formula in the context of all three scenes not only puts more emphasis on the specific events described, it also highlights the role of the formula, like its etymological relative *daimôn* and the vocative δαιμόνιε before, as an identifiable sign of the superhuman and the excessive.

 As such, the following analysis deals with all instances of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος in Homer. The data in Appendix IX show that it is used mainly in the narrator’s own description (except from 5.459, 884), when a hero is described as making a particularly furious assault in battle.[[630]](#footnote-630) We shall try to modify and restructure existing interpretations, which connect both the expression δαίμονι ἶσος and the term *daimôn* either to the gods in general, to a specific god, or to an unidentified supernatural power.

The formula is used only for the heroes Diomedes, Patroclus, and Achilles. We have to ask: Why are only these heroes characterised as δαίμονι ἶσος? What separates and connects other heroes such as Hector with those warriors referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος? It will be argued that the expression is used mainly to compare a hero to the superhuman/excessive power represented by the term *daimôn* and not to a specific god. Above all, I will attempt to associate this expression with the notion of an irrational and excessive power[[631]](#footnote-631) which can drive heroes to their doom. I will also compare the characterisation of heroeswho are not favoured by a god and situations in which a hero is compared to a specific god rather than as δαίμονι ἶσος. Instances of the former mark mortal excess. Instances of the latter generally allow for benevolent divine intervention. Here, at least, we will find both an important dividing line between the term *daimôn* and the gods, and a further complexity that forms the relationship of gods and mortals.

**The Formula δαίμονι ἶσος, the Complexity of the Term *Daimôn* and the Complicated Relationship Between it and the Gods: Diomedes’, Patroclus’ and Achilles’ *aristeia***

The following discussion falls into the context of the repeated scenes that refer to the description of the *aristeia* or/and the excessive behaviour of the three Iliadic heroes. Indeed, important information can be derived from the repeated use of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος in association with the excessive and irrational behaviour of all three warriors: first, the appearance of a specific god highlights the fact that these heroes are indeed associated with a kind of power that goes even beyond the gods’ own sphere of activities. Second, use of the formula highilights the complexity of the term *daimôn* in relation to the gods. When it comes to the term *daimôn*, we shall demonstrate that it has a double meaning: while associated with a specific set of behaviours of both mortals and immortals, it nevertheless retains its ambiguous position as a power that is both possessed and yet uncontrollable. The term *daimôn* is used to refer to heroes like Diomedes, Patroclus and Achilles, who are said ‘to be equal to *daimôn*’ (δαίμονι ἶσος) when their prowess in combat becomes so great that it is no longer, in some fundamental sense, even human. We shall also discuss the term’s implications for understanding the power of the gods. As we shall see, the above heroes are assisted by a specific god or by the supernatural entity representd by the term *daimôn* (that is, an unknown god or the gods in general). This shows the term *daimôn* to be synonymous with the gods: both have some share of and can bestow supernatural power onto otherwise unexceptional mortals. When they receive such power, they are no longer compared to a god, but to the excessive and irrational *daimôn.* This is important because it shows that the term *daimôn* represents some power even beyond the divine: what seems to separate two otherwise synonymous terms for the divine, δαίμων from θεός, is the former’s indication of a power that is both excessive and irrational.

 In what follows, the analysis of the elements that shows the gods and the supernatural entities represented by the term *daimôn* to be the sources of mortals’ powers. This will highlight the complexity of the termuse and meaning and its semantic relation with a term with similar signification, θεός.

**Diomedes’ *aristeia***

 *5.438: ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος*

 *5.459: αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ αὐτῷ μοι ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος*

 *5.884: αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ αὐτῷ μοι ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος*

The formula δαίμονι ἶσος occurs for the first time in verses 438 to characterise Diomedes during his attack against Aeneas. But even before that, right from the mustering of the army in book 4, Diomedes is depicted with all the attributes of a terrifying warrior: ‘terribly rang the bronze upon the chieftain’s breast as he moved’ (4.420).[[632]](#footnote-632) Diomedes is characterised by even greater rage when he fights against the Trojans (136-43): Athena gives him power (121-132); he wounds Aphrodite’s hand, resulting in her leaving her son Aeneas in Apollo’s hands.

 Yet Diomedes goes even beyond Athena’s help and advice. The formula δαίμονι ἶσος occurs for the first time at this critical point in Diomedes’ attack on Aeneas, who at the time is under the protection of Apollo himself (438). Eager to kill Aeneas (ἵετο δ’ αἰεὶ δ’αἰεὶ Αἰνείαν κτεῖναι) he rushes forward and even goes against Apollo. This is the first time that the climactic τρίς ... τρίς... τὸ τέταρτον pattern appears for the first time: Diomedes rushes three times fearlessly against the god, and he stops only at the fourth time when Apollo threatens him furiously (τρὶς μὲν ἔπειτ’ ἐπόρουσε κατακτάμεναι μενεαίνων … θεῶν χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων τ’ ἀνθρώπων, 436-42).[[633]](#footnote-633) The god has to warn him off and remind him that men are not the equals of gods.

 Given the above, different opinions have been expressed regarding Diomedes’ supernatural powers. Some scholars conceive of Diomedes’ ferocity, physical prowess and good judgement to be the result of Athena’s intervention.[[634]](#footnote-634) Some also give Athena responsibility for Diomedes’ wounding of Ares and Aphrodite.[[635]](#footnote-635) However, other scholars[[636]](#footnote-636) argued that his irrationality and mortal excess is reflected in his comparison with δαίμων. Among them, François suggests that the formula δαίμονι ἶσος shows Diomedes fighting like a δαίμων when he attacks Apollo for the fourth time. His excess is visible when Apollo asks Ares to remove him from the battle (455ff).[[637]](#footnote-637) It seems that a hero’s superhuman physical activities must be considered to be the work of a *daimonic power.* Hence, Diomedes’ superhuman powers are attributed to Athena’s intervention, but when it comes to the hero’s irrational intention to fight for the fourth time against the gods, he is compared to a *daimôn*. Indeed, Diomedes cannot be seen as behaving as a ‘normal hero’ on the battlefield (and especially during his *aristeia*): his superhuman and irrational behaviour make him go beyond what is normal, and as such, he fights against Aphrodite and Ares.[[638]](#footnote-638) Diomedes’ uncontrollable behaviour is also depicted in his attack against Apollo (even after he recognises the god’s true identity, 436-39). The hero goes even further when, for the fourth time, he attacks the god, even after Athena’s warning. Diomedes did not consider his limitations as a mortal; he was said to be equal to a *daimôn* and ultimately Apollo’s threat was needed to put an end to his behaviour. However, when in two other cases (5.596-606; 6.123) Diomedes is reluctant to fight in strength against the gods because he knows how far humans may go,[[639]](#footnote-639) he is no longer said to be δαίμονι ἶσος.

Δαίμονι ἶσος appears for the second time in Apollo’s speech (v. 459), where the formula is used for the first time in direct discourse. Apollo asks for Ares’ assistance to send Diomedes away from the battle. In his speech, Apollo verbalises his own perception of Diomedes’ behaviour. He employs the expression to show Diomedes’ wild valour which allowed him to fight even against the gods (both Aphrodite and Apollo). He then attributes it to Diomedes’ influence by some superhuman power, which he references by using the term *daimôn*.

Ares uses the same expression, δαίμονι ἶσος (884), in his speech to Zeus describing his wounding by Diomedes.[[640]](#footnote-640) The primary narrator-focalizer (NF1) employs another character-speech, this time the speech of a god, Ares, to present Diomedes’ wild fury. He needs to justify Diomedes’ characterisation as δαίμονι ἶσος.[[641]](#footnote-641) Ares, as a secondary narrator (N2), verbalises his emotions about both his and Aphrodite’s wound by a mortal, Diomedes. Zeus, as the audience of Ares’ speech, must receive the correct message concerning the main source (*daimôn*) of Diomedes’ irresistible power. Ares, as a secondary narrator-focalizer (NF2), first presents Athena as the main cause of Diomedes’ assault against the gods. In what comes next, Ares adds more to Diomedes’ characterisation. He calls Diomedes ‘high of heart to vent his rage against the immortal gods’ (ἣ νῦν Τυδέος υἱόν, ὑπερφίαλον Διομήδεα μαργαίνειν ἀνέηκεν ἐπ’ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, 881-82). Ares first compares him to a *daimôn* because of his wild charge (ἐπέσσυτο) and the enormous rage and eagerness to kill his opponent[[642]](#footnote-642) which allowed him first to wound Aphrodite on the wrist and then to ‘rush upon Ares as he had been a *daimôn*’ (αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' αὐτῷ μοι ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος, 884). In fact, the description of the wounded Ares to Zeus (884) allows the audience to gain a more detailed description of Diomedes’ great fury and uncontrollable behaviour (885-86). As such, the audience (as the primary narratee-focalizee (NeFe1)) infers that this uncontrollable superhuman behaviour is what makes Diomedes the equal of *daimôn*. In a similar way, the use of the formula also shows a man who has gone berserk: he persists for the fourth time in an action that will destroy him; he is not his normal self and is said to resemble some supernatural power.[[643]](#footnote-643) Presumably, Diomedes’ irrational behaviour was said to be *daimonic* as a way to show his irrational and excessive power, which in the end threatened him with the loss of his own life.[[644]](#footnote-644)

 So far, we have argued that Diomedes’ immense power is due to both a *daimôn* and to a divinity (Athena). When a *daimôn* appears to have the same influence on Diomedes as a god (Athena), the outcome is the same. Diomedes is portrayed as ‘a terrifying warrior’ possessed by his great vehemence and desire to kill the Trojans. He even attacks a goddess, Aphrodite, but of course, under the permission of his protecting deity, Athena. In fact, Athena represents both Diomedes’ valour and the limits of that valour, which prevented him from fighting with gods that he cannot overcome.[[645]](#footnote-645) The *daimonic* effect is differentiated from the divine (Athena’s) when it comes to Diomedes’ excessive behaviour. When Diomedes starts fighting for the fourth time against the mightiest of the gods (both Apollo and Ares), herisks his own life and is no longer driven by Athena’s influence. Instead, he is under the influence of a mysterious and irrational force (*daimôn*). Adding to the above, it seems that whatever goes beyond those limits of heroic valour is not ascribed into the sphere of Athena’s influence; whatever exceeds a mortal’s normal behaviour, belongs to the sphere represented by the term *daimôn*.

**Patroclus’ *aristeia***

*16.705: ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος*

*16.786: ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος*

The narrator uses the formula δαίμονι ἶσος (705) to show that Patroclus’ rage and great desire to kill the Trojans primarily derives from his comparison to other forces referred to by the term *daimôn*.[[646]](#footnote-646) But even before Patroclus’ association with the term *daimôn*, he is said to be urged on by Zeus, and he leads the Myrmidons in pursuit of the Trojan men (684-90). Zeus is the one that puts such a fury in Patroclus’ breast (ὅς οἱ καὶ τότε θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἀνῆκεν, 691) that he killed seven men (692-97). Zeus filled Patroclus with great courage to ‘rage with the spear’ (699). This is when the τρίς ... τρίς... τὸ τέταρτον pattern reoccurs for the second time and shows how Patroclus rushed three times against the Trojan wall and tried to ‘mount the angle of the towering wall’ (τρὶς μὲν ἐπ’ ἀγκῶνος βῆ τείχεος ὑψηλοῖο Πάτροκλος, 703-4). He does not even hesitate to fight against Apollo who ‘battered him backward with the immortal hands, beating back the bright shield (703-4)’. Later on (783-85), Patroclus is compared to Ares when he rushes furiously three times against the Trojans ‘screaming a terrible cry’ (τρὶς μὲν ἔπειτ’ ἐπόρουσε θοῷ ἀτάλαντος ῎Αρηϊ σμερδαλέα ἰάχων, 783-84).[[647]](#footnote-647) The result of Patroclus’ furious assault was spectacular: ‘screaming a terrible cry, three times he cut down nine men’ (τρὶς δ' ἐννέα φῶτας ἔπεφνεν 785).[[648]](#footnote-648) As δαίμονι ἶσος Patroclus rushed against Apollo for the fourth time, the god had to threaten him in a terrifying voice to go away from the Trojan wall (ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος, δεινὰ δ’ ὁμοκλήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα, 705-6).[[649]](#footnote-649)

So far, we have come across the two equally important rhetorical gestures which emphasize Patroclus’ immense power and impetuous fury: first, the comparison with *daimôn* and, second, the comparison with Ares. But what exactly distinguishes Patroclus’ powers as a warrior referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος from his powers as a warrior equal to Ares? How different were these powers from the ones attributed to him by Zeus? More specifically, why did the poet use the term *daimôn* to describe Patroclus? Is it because he wanted to show that there is a difference between the kind of power which merits comparison to a god and that which merits comparison with the term *daimôn*? All the above inquiries are closely related to the scholarly[[650]](#footnote-650) tendency to associate the terms *daimôn* and δαίμονι ἶσος with the gods. This has led to some misinterprtations by scholars[[651]](#footnote-651) who believed that supernatural powers and excessive behaviour were derived from the same source, that is, that the term *daimôn* was synonymous with the term *theos*. Janko, for instance, based his observation on the usage of patternsthat begin with ‘τρὶς μὲν ἔπειτ’ ἐπόρουσε’, with ‘τρὶς δ’’ in the next verse, and then ‘ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος (but 20.447 is spurious)’[[652]](#footnote-652) to show the comparison of a hero to a god. In attempting to show his loyalty to the traditions of Homeric religion, Janko associates the δαίμονι ἶσος formula with a hero’s comparison to a god and not to a daimôn. He even highlights how, because of the hierarchical nature of the immortal-mortal relationship, men were forbidden from fighting against the gods.[[653]](#footnote-653) In the Homeric world, mortals are punished for their hybris, and thus Patroclus had to be punished for overstepping the limits set by the gods. Even Apollo warns mortals (e.g. Diomedes, Achilles) who are fighting against one of the gods as if they were equals.[[654]](#footnote-654) Patroclus (705, 786), as in the case of Diomedes is driven by his great desire to destroy his enemies and rushes against one of the gods (Apollo). However, in so doing, their abnormal and unlimited heroic desire and excessive power seem to have surpassed the bounds of acceptable human action. The narrator – the Muse(s) – even calls Patroclus a fool (680) driven by *ate* (685).[[655]](#footnote-655) Their *hybris*, represented by their comparison with the *daimonic*, must be punished (*ate*). This is when Apollo, Zeus and the rest of the gods decided to punish Patroclus with death (the gods called him deathward: ‘δή σε θεοὶ θάνατον δὲ κάλεσσαν’, 693) for overstepping the divine limits imposed on mortals.[[656]](#footnote-656) Indeed, at the moment when both heroes exceed their mortal limits they are fighting against the god. This is when the term *daimôn*, rather than another word for the supernatural, is attributed to them; this shows the formula δαίμονι ἶσος to be closely related not only to human excessive behaviour but to *hybristic* behaviour as well.

Thus, though previous scholarship has argued that the same powers are attributed to Patroclus when he is referred to with the term *daimôn* and compared to Ares,[[657]](#footnote-657) these two appelations rather suggest two different powers are at work.[[658]](#footnote-658) During the three first attacks both the term *daimôn* and the gods (Zeus and Ares) may be perceived to have had the same effect on Patroclus. The warrior appears to have had the same remarkable results in the battle when Zeus first filled him with courage, when he was compared to the powers of Ares, and when he was labelled with the term *daimôn.* However, during the fourth attack and when Patroclus went on ‘to make an even more reckless assault he is no longer compared to a god, not even to Ares, but this time is said to be *δαίμονι ἶσος*’.[[659]](#footnote-659) The term *daimôn* acquires a distinct character only when Patroclus, a warrior referred to by the epithet, goes berserk and the comparison thus goes even beyond martial prowess.[[660]](#footnote-660) Patroclus exceeds his normal physical powers as he fights against one of the gods. This marks mortal excess, which indeed derives from *daimôn*’s influence upon him; it is what eventually causes his death.

**3.5.1.3 Achilles’ *aristeia***

*20.447: ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος*

*20.493: ὣς ὅ γε πἀντῃ θῦνε σὺν ἔγχεϊ δαίμονι ἶσος*

*21.18-19: ὁ δ’ ἔσθορε δαίμονι ἶσος, φάσγανον οἶον ἔχων*

*21.227: Ὣς εἰπὼν Τρώεσσιν ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος·*

Achilles, like Diomedes and Patroclus, is also addressed with the formula δαίμονι ἶσος*.*[[661]](#footnote-661)This formula is applied to him because of his wild assault on the Trojans and his great eagerness to destroy them.[[662]](#footnote-662) The hero is called δαίμονι ἶσος (447). His wild assault is depicted as awe-inspiring: ‘the swift-footed son of Peleus shining in all his armour, a man like the murderous war god’ (τεύχεσι λαμπόμενον, βροτο λοιγῷ ἶσον Ἄρηϊ, 46).[[663]](#footnote-663) He was ‘gathering the fury upon him, sprang on the Trojans with a glastly cry’ (ταρβήσας…εἰ μένος ἀλκὴν σμερδαλέ αἰάχων, 380-2). The first time when Achilles was associated with δαίμονι ἶσος was during his combat with Hector (447). Although Apollo protects Hector and wraps him in thick mist, Achilles ‘swept in against him and struck three times against the deep mist’ (445-6). Yet Achilles rushes against Hector for the fourth time, δαίμονι ἶσος, and threatens him with death. Here (447), too, it is Apollo who puts an end to the mad onrush and saves Hector.[[664]](#footnote-664) This type of scene follows a recognisable pattern, as outlined in the foregoing examples the outstanding characteristics of which are the impetuous onslaught of *δαίμονι ἶσος* (ἐπορούσε… ἐπέσσυτο), the loud battle-cry (σμερδαλέ αἰάχων) and the desire to kill (κακά φρονέων ἐνορούσεν; κατακτόμεναι μενεαίνων, 442-3). Here, at least, we may suggest that Achilles appears to be compared to both a *daimôn* and Ares himself: ‘[…] Achilles relentlessly like a god (δαίμονι ἶσος) sets upon the Trojans. Thus, the river god Xanthus (later on in 21.315) says of him that he thinks himself equal to the gods (ἶσος θεοῖσι).’[[665]](#footnote-665) This shows that both terms (δαίμων and θεός) may have had the same effect on mortals. Achilles shining in his armour and his furious fighting seem to be the result of both his comparison to a *daimôn* and the war god Ares. The impetuous fury which drives him to fight even against one of the gods, Apollo, is the *daimonic* fury rather than any aspect of Ares.

The formulaic expression *δαίμονι ἶσος* reoccurs in 20.493 to characterise Achilles’ wild assault against the Trojans. Achilles is compared to a fire which rages in a forest and increases because of the wind.[[666]](#footnote-666) He “swept everywhere with his spear like something more than a mortal (*δαίμονι ἶσος*) harrying them as they died; and the black earth ran blood” (ὣς ὅ γε πάντῃ θῦνε σὺν ἔγχεϊ δαίμονι ἶσος, 493).[[667]](#footnote-667) Achilles, just like Diomedes and Patroclus, is described as ‘fighting like a daemon’ because of his great fury and eagerness to kill his enemies. Although in the case of Diomedes and Patroclus the formula δαίμονι ἶσος is used in the line ‘ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος’, the whole line is not used for Achilles. In the case of Diomedes, the line is followed by the appearance of Apollo to ward off the hero. In the second case, it is used to kill the hero. In the case of Achilles, the passage does not contain the characteristic verse form suggesting that his death is not imminent, though it may nevertheless hint at Achilles’ future death and its link to Patroclus. Diomedes presumably would have died if he continued fighting as awarrior who was truly δαίμονι ἶσος whose actions violated the separation between mortals and immortals.[[668]](#footnote-668) The τέταρτον line is used only when a warrior encounters Apollo, and the δαίμονι ἶσος phrase is restricted to three warriors, all Achaeans. It is also used more often to refer to Achilles than to any other hero.[[669]](#footnote-669) In fact, use of the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος coincides with ‘the climax of ritual antagonism between the god and the hero.’[[670]](#footnote-670) The moment that each of the three heroes (Diomedes, Patroclus and Achilles) make their fourth attempt against Apollo, ‘… [their] stance of antagonism towards Apollo is ominously clear’[[671]](#footnote-671) and this is when they are characterised as δαίμονι ἶσος.

 In the same scene, Achilles is again compared with *daimôn*; he is characterised by an impetuous ferocity: ‘the murmuring waters of Xanthos the deep-whirling were filled with confusion of men and of horses’ who fell in front of Achilles’ wild charge (15-6). Achilles rushes against the Trojans, ‘like some immortal (*δαίμονι ἶσος*) (18), only with his sword.[[672]](#footnote-672)This use of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος here (18) shows the hero to be ‘like one more than mortal or [like one] possessed of preternatural power.’[[673]](#footnote-673) The Trojans’ groaning then is said to have risen ‘as they were stuck with his sword, and the water was reddened with blood’ (20-1).[[674]](#footnote-674) Even after that, Achilles is once more (i.e. 21.227) described as δαίμονι ἶσος.

 Scamander shows his great astonishment at Achilles’ ferocity against the Trojans and asks him to stop killing the Trojan men so brutally and leave their dead bodies in his waters (220). However, Achilles does not follow Scamander’s orders and ‘swept down the Trojans δαίμονι ἶσος’ (227). Later on, Scamander must at last call upon Apollo for help to stave off the onrush of Achilles.

As expected, scholarly opinionis divided regarding the source of Achilles’ immense powers and ferocity. Some suggest that the formula here (as in the previous scenes with Diomedes and Patroclus) shows Achilles’ comparison to a god. Xanthus’ words (*Il*. 21.315) are interpreted as evidence of this.[[675]](#footnote-675) Other scholars attribute Achilles’ unique power and success in the battle slaughtering so many Trojans to his own superhuman and semi-divine power. All this allows him to have gods (i.e. he was threatened by the river god Scamander) and not other mortals as his opponents. They also attribute it to Achilles’ multiple divine helpers: ‘Achilles was reassured by Athena and Poseidon, and rescued by Hephaestos at Hera’s request.’[[676]](#footnote-676) That Achilles’ superhuman powers derive from the gods’ (Apollo, Athena and Zeus) favour and are due to Achilles’ superhuman and semi-divine powersmeans that they do not derive from the same *daimonic* source as his predecessors*.* At first glance, the idea that the poet would have never used a river god (i.e. a lesser deity) to make the distinction between comparison to a god and to a *daimôn* and as such the words of Xanthus must not be taken literally,[[677]](#footnote-677) seems a justifiable one. However, if we want to take Xanthus’ words literally, then Achilles’ actions (i.e. his ability to kill so many Trojans) might be equally attributed to both his comparison to a god and to a *daimôn*. What really suggests Achilles close affiliation with the *daimonic* is his disobedience to Scamander’s orders. Apollo’s (as the god of light and reasoning) involvement in the fight may be perceived as the poet’s way to place more emphasis on the god’s desperation[[678]](#footnote-678) to stop Achilles’ irrational fury. It also proves that the hero’s behaviour and powers derive from a *daimonic* source.

**Demonic (Excessive) vs. Divine (Supernatural) Characteristics: The Case of Hector as a Peculiar Form of aWarrior Referred to by the Epithet δαίμονι ἶσος**

The Homeric usage of the formulaic expression δαίμονι ἶσος to characterise the excessive behaviour of warriors referred to by the epithet explains in part at least the striking divergence between the nature of the gods and *daimôn.* In fact, this divergence is mostly ascribed to *daimôn*’s exclusive association with irrational and excessive characteristics, whereas the gods are mostly related to unexplained and superhuman attributes. Hector as a warrior of a ferocious behaviour whose disassociation from any excessive characteristics eventually excludes him from this category of warriorsis a perfect example pointing to this antinomy regarding the gods and *daimôn.* So we find a range of heroic activities, both destructive and fiercer characteristics that may well resemble Hector to other warriors referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος; he is depicted as a man that has gone berserk and acquires the symptoms of frenzy.[[679]](#footnote-679) Foam came from Hector’s mouth[[680]](#footnote-680) his fiery eyes blazed[[681]](#footnote-681) and his flashing helmet was flashing as he fought (15.607-10).[[682]](#footnote-682) Scholars, speaking of Hector’s frenzy, called it ‘self-destructive excess’; which describes the ‘descent of the hero to the reckless and bestial fury that we know by the Northern name of *berserk*.’[[683]](#footnote-683) This is closely associated with *lussa* (‘fighting rage’) that characterises both Hector (‘κρατερή δέ ἑ λύσσα δέδυκεν’, for mighty madness hath possesses him, 9.239) and Achilles (21.542) as a warrior referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος.[[684]](#footnote-684) Hector’s frenzy appears elsewhere in the poem; he is associated with ‘personifications of terror’,[[685]](#footnote-685) to have the same stark eyes as those of Gorgon or Ares (‘Γοργοῦς ὄμματ’ ἔχων ἠδὲ βροτολοιγοῦ Ἄρηος,’ 8.348).[[686]](#footnote-686) Later on, Hera, in her conversation with Athena, has pity on the Achaeans who were to be killed by Hector. Hera presents Hector as: ‘[the warrior] now that is possessed by fury/rage (μαίνεται), and who has brought so much evil already (8.355-56).’[[687]](#footnote-687) We normally hear of gods that rage (Zeus, Athena, and Hera rage once apiece, while Ares rages four times),[[688]](#footnote-688) whereas this is one among the basic characteristics of the ‘excessively aggressive warriors [Achilles, Diomedes, Patroclus and amongst them Hector].’[[689]](#footnote-689) However, it is apparent that mortal rage is parallel to divine rage only with regards to frenzy, whereas when it comes to excessive frenzy or any kind of excess, the comparison is to a *daimôn* power rather than a god.

Since Hector is neither said to be driven by ‘excessive rage’, nor to consider himself the equal of the gods, it is peculiar that he is referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος. Hector does not even fight against Athena, his ritual antagonist and the goddess who brings about his death.[[690]](#footnote-690) Hector remains a ferocious and terribly powerful warrior, but one who eventually obeys the will of Zeus[[691]](#footnote-691) and the rest of the gods. The same death that the other warriors referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος suffer as a punishment from the gods for committing *hybris* against them comes upon Hector as the fulfilment of the will of the same unpredictable gods. But even that does not make him comparable to the other warriors referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος.

**Conclusion**

‘Is the poet really a slave to his formulas?’,[[692]](#footnote-692) ‘is it really true that oral-formulaic theory had nothing to offer the interpretation of the epics?’,[[693]](#footnote-693)are the function of the epithets restricted to ‘accomodating a noun to the metrical requirements of the verse?’[[694]](#footnote-694): these were among the questions that many critics applied over the years related to the use of both the formula and the epithets in the oral composition of the epics. The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate, based on the use of the vocative δαιμόνιε and the formula δαίμονι ἶσος as formulaic expressions which, used in different contexts, shape the reading of specific kinds of type-scenes and the characterisation of both gods and mortals.

Given the controversies that shaped the attempts by scholars to define the meaning of the term *daimôn* and and its relation to the gods and ways of speaking about the divine world, we demonstrated how the term *daimôn* can refer to both anthropomorphic deities and abstract powers. As such, we showed how the term can signify the vengeful and cunning sides of both divine and mortal behaviour. We did this by careful attention to the contextual use of the term, i.e. whether it is narrator or character speech, whether it is used by a mortal or a god and to whom it is addressed. Through this investigation, we demonstrated that the gods were associated with the malicious, ferocious and vengeful attributes of the term *daimôn*, which pointed to a previously underexamined demonic side of their character. The use of the same vocative to address the similarly abnormal and demonic behaviour of a female mortal character suggested that the poet himself was relactant to include such characterisation with by his own authoritative narrative voice, instead using the speeches of the gods and mortalsto depict characters as possessingt these demonic attributes.

Use of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος as a compound term showed us a kind of behaviour that involved a dinstict category of warriors (the warriors referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος), which also came to shed further light on the relationship between gods and mortals. This analysis derived from the division between typical human behaviour and the kind of excessively violent behaviour which men displayed under the influence of a *daimonic* power and which then created an overlap between the two worlds. The term *daimôn* thus became a linking point between the gods and mortals. This stood in contrast to the quality of the *daimonic* as the only source of excessive mortal behaviour, which pointed to the association of specific warriors with the *daimonic.* These associations created a different charaterisation than similar comparisons made to a specific god, which also served to emphasise the term as ‘a device for exploring the universal realities of man’s struggle [to combit with] the immortal and carefree gods’.[[695]](#footnote-695)

All in all, this was a kind of a relationship that was by no means based on the inferiority of the mortals to the deathless gods, but to the contrary - and from what the term *daimôn* as a useful concept and as a narrative device has taught us - was the kind of a relationship that was based on an interchange of constucted differences and similarities between these two worlds.

**CHAPTER FOUR**

**Concluding Remarks: An Evaluation of the Significant Role of the Term *Daimôn* in the Epics**

‘...the extra layer of meaning is not the singular creation of a particular event or context,
but a traditional harmonic that adds resonance of its occurrences.’

(John Miles Foley, *Homer’s Traditional Art*, University Park, 1999, 20)

**A General Estimation of the Concept of *Daimôn* in the Polytheistic**

**World of Homer**

This thesis has taken a different approach than previous researchers examining the meaning of the term *daimôn*. This approach has revealed the term’s close relation to words describing the other supernatural elements that compose the polymorphic world of Homer. The term *daimôn* as a signifier of other supernatural entities and as a concept with its own unique meaning offers us knowledge about the nature and relationships of the other anthropomorphic gods and abstract powers (such as fate) which populate the Homeric universe. The term’s ability to refer to any of these entities suggests the mystery of the divine world when viewed from the mortal perspective; it also reinforces the perception of the links between the mortal and divine spheres. But still, as important as the findings of a comprehensive analysis of Homer’s use ofthe term *daimôn* might be, it would have been unrealistic for us to use them in order to reconstruct some vital religious aspects and some aspects of world-order in Homer or attitudes towards mortality and the gods (the gods’ and humans’ composed relation). Instead, as we demonstrated, this thesis’ findings on the term *daimôn* might be used to consider the wider picture of the world of Homer. Because the notion of world-order implies totality,[[696]](#footnote-696) as Kahane suggests, whatever pointed arguments one puts forward, it is also important to keep an eye on the picture as a whole.[[697]](#footnote-697)At the same time, however, discussions of the ‘wholeness’ of the Homeric world-order are important and desirable. I have suggested that it is important to approach the term *daimôn* as part of the process of structuring this world. Thus, approachingthe *daimonic* from a more positive angle has consequences for our understanding of the world at large. It will allow us to understand that which has, until now, remained unknown and thus mysterious and inexplicable concerning the various entities of the superhuman ‘other’ and thestructure of the Homeric world in which they operate.

**The Term *Daimôn* as a ‘Concept’ Signifying Different Aspects of the Divine: a ‘Complex’, yet ‘Single’, World**

Previously, we referred to the term’s many referents, all of which, however, shared a similar association with the inexplicable and mysterious manifestation of the divine in the mortal world.Use of the term by a wide range of mortal and immortal speakers in different narratological contexts almost inevitably generated incompatible interpretations. The scholarly debate about the term’s meaning in the Homeric epics andin different periods of Greek thought as well as disagreement over etymology has led to a reconsideration of the term’s meaning and function. By this, I mean to point to the kind of complex polysemy which characterises its use. If we choose to follow previous scholars, who understood the termto refer both to the anthropomorphic gods and to some unspecified supernatural power, we must be ready to accept that remains an ‘extremely ambiguous and hard to be defined term.’[[698]](#footnote-698)Any attempt to assert a fixed and unchanging meaning to the term in all its uses is hopelessly reductive and can’t be result in misleading oversimplification.

If we choose to follow this thesis’ approach, however, and examine the use of the term in different contexts and by different focalizers, we can understand how eachuse offers insight into one aspect of the meaning of this polysemous term. Its meaning, then, can only be seen by interpreting the totality of such uses. The term’s ability to gain its meaning from thediverse instances of its use is what originally led me to speak of a ‘complex’, yet ‘single’ term that nevertheless manages to signify a variety of different types of supernatural entities. The unique complexity and diverse significations characterise the term *daimôn* in opposition to other worlds for describing the divine world and the beings that inhabit it. On the one hand, it is a kind of diversity that matches the world of the epics perfectly: it is a world composed of a variety of powers–not only different gods, named and unnamed,[[699]](#footnote-699) but also of various forms of mysterious divine, semi-divine and superhuman powers which are often perceived as working independently towards their own ends.[[700]](#footnote-700) It is also a world in which *daimôn* as a term with a complicated and diverse character is perfectly situated. On the other hand, the diversity of referents that comprise the term *daimôn* as a structured category of meaning and which reflects the diversity of powers of the Homeric world also perfectly matches the diversity which we associate with the poems as products of oral-formulaic composition.

**The Diversity of the Term *Daimôn*’s Meaning and the Diversity of the Homeric Texts**

Considering Nagy’s note on ‘the archaic accentuation preserved by rhapsodes’,[[701]](#footnote-701) and that ‘Homer’s own text is a case in point, preserved fixed in an oral tradition’,[[702]](#footnote-702) it seems possible that each time this ‘fixed poem’[[703]](#footnote-703) was performed orally by rhapsodes/performers, many different variants were recognised by Homer’s audience.[[704]](#footnote-704) This variability in the texts themselves and of the style and idiolect of various rhapsodes perhaps points to the variability in meaning of one of its key words. Furthermore, in the case of an ‘architecturally accomplished poem’[[705]](#footnote-705) like the Homeric epics, a ‘degree of premeditation and planning, a sense of text,’[[706]](#footnote-706) is implied, and suggests ‘something which in principle is capable of being repeated’.[[707]](#footnote-707) As this thesis has shown, something similar happens in the case of the term *daimôn*. In this respect, we are dealing with a term that connotes different shades of meaning each time it is used in a different narratological situation or by a different speaker. Since there could be many performances of the same text of Homer and since the audience could still not have identified the existence of an original and fixed poem, the meaning of the term *daimôn* could similarly have suggested different aspects of the divine to different members of the audience (whom narratologists call addressees). This insight suggests that the meaning of the term *daimôn* must be determined by these various uses. As chapter two has shown, the term *daimôn* can also signify a smaller and more structured world (‘the demonic world’ as we named it) which is distinct from both the mortal and divine worlds even though it overlaps and interacts with both.

Ultimately, the two most significant uses of the term are as a reference to this part of the world which, along with the mortal and divine spheres, comprise the totality of the Homeric universe and its use as by various speakers and the poet himself to refer to the mysterious and inexplicable in their lives. In other words, as the seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke writes, ‘Words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them.’[[708]](#footnote-708) Therefore, *daimôn* is interpreted according to the idea we carry in our minds as students of Greek religion.

**The Term *Daimôn* as a Sign in the Homeric Epics**

Based on the term *daimôn*’s previously praised quality of possessing certain complexity of divine powers that comprise significant parts of the *polytheistic* Homeric world, we might suggest that the term could be a sign - to use the terminology of the contemporary linguistic and literary approach called semiotics.[[709]](#footnote-709) It might be used as a ‘dedicated medium for expression’ and as a *polysemantic* term in ancient Greek epic poetry;[[710]](#footnote-710) the term could be used to refer to a variety of different kinds of beings: divine, mortal and superhuman. As previous analysis of the term as a component of the mysterious and the unknown has taught us, behind the identification of the mysterious element in our experience lies what seemed to be the ‘unknown’ in man’s consciousness. Because the mysterious element might become a reference and/or a medium of expression of what had previously remained unknown or unknowable in Homeric man’s experience with divine power.[[711]](#footnote-711) It is often related to an activity that remains unconscious because the conscious mind cannot explain it[[712]](#footnote-712) and, as such, responsibility is attributed to a man’s subconscious or a projection of, as Dodds suggest, ‘man’s ego’.[[713]](#footnote-713)

However, the term *daimôn* as an identifiable sign of the unknown and the unexplained prompts us to identify first the mysterious aspects of the term of the feelings (terror, stupor and awe) that accompany the mysterious element in man’s experience with those divine beings referred to by the term *daimôn*.[[714]](#footnote-714) Then and only thencan Homeric man manage to identify and express the unknown in his consciousness. It is then that the role of the term *daimôn* as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ can be fully examined.

What I have just suggested here coincides with John Foley’s idea of ‘traditional referentiality’[[715]](#footnote-715) and the way it works in Homer:

‘Within the marked idiomatic language of the *epos*, and of other traditional oral works as well, many such signs or units - whether actually labelled as *sêmata* or not - are specially licensed to bear more than their individual, unmarked lexical or semantic burdens. Enriched within the augmented discourse, these “bytes” of phraseology and narrative pattern serve to index traditional ideas, characters, and situations, standing by prior negotiation for much more than a literary reading alone can decode.’[[716]](#footnote-716)

At first glance, Foley’s suggestion might seem either too broad too specialised. It is mostly derived from the role of *sêmata* or traditional signs in Homeric narrative. Although the term *daimôn* does not fall directly in the category of *sêmata*,[[717]](#footnote-717) it may still function as a sign in Homeric epic. This term may indeed go beyond its lexical or semantic associations (i.e. primarily indicating a hostile and evil power). It can enclose traditional ideas of the epics regarding the structure of the Homeric pantheon, or the way the gods, fate and various chthonic powers operate in the poems. The concept of the *daimonic* is a defining conceptin the poems; it sheds light on what seem to be the unknown and the mysterious behaviour of the gods and, as such, must be derived from a better understanding of the gods’ relationship with fate and other important aspects of the superhuman other (i.e. mortals).[[718]](#footnote-718) The term *daimôn* helps us to identify a new side of the character of the gods that has previously remained unknown to us. It suggests the kind of ferocious and cunning divine behaviour which shows the gods as possessing *daimonic* impulses which lead them to inflict evil upon mortals. This aspect of divine character links them to Fate and to the term as mysterious and inexplicable sources of misfortune, characteristics which are distinct from their traditional rendering in Greek literature.[[719]](#footnote-719)

 Despite this association with the divine, the term *daimôn* is also used in reference to mortals. It becomes an ‘idiomatic way’ (as in the formula δαίμονι ἶσος) of expressing a certain sort (i.e. both mysterious, superhuman and excessive) of mortal behaviour (as in the vocative δαιμόνιε).[[720]](#footnote-720) It shows how mortal characters may also behave in mysterious, unexpected and abnormal ways that put them in some intermediate position between ordinary mortals and the gods themselves.

**The Term *Daimôn*: Another Type of a Silent Sign in Homer?**

Indeed, it seems that the poem itself refuses to describe the term *daimôn* as one of its most silent signs. It refuses to reveal the true nature of the term, even though it hints at several possible intereprations.[[721]](#footnote-721) However, the term does reveal itself to be originally identified with a kind of complexity that already forms the various aspects of the divine in the Homeric world. Therefore, as the audience and/or readers of Homer, we understand its significance as a signifier of a variety of powers and functions which also coincide with the mysterious nature of the activities of other divine entities. This might suggest that the term *daimôn* itself has no inherent meaning and that, as other scholars have suggested, its use is merely metrical rather than interpretive.[[722]](#footnote-722) We suggest, however, that the term *daimôn* might be capable of denoting a specific meaning in a specific context – if indeed ‘the meaning’ of any part of the poem is inherent in atype-scene or other formulaic structure.[[723]](#footnote-723)

The complex nature of this discussion can be seen in the contrasting types activities to which the term can be applied. For instance, it can apply to both both benevolent and malevolent activities as well as both mental and physical divine manifestations. Unlike the characters in the poems themselves, from our privileged perspective as audiences and/or readers who stand outside the text, we are in a position to evaluate the totality of the terms’ uses.

 Even more, it is due to our ability to interpret each instance in its own light and in light of all the other meanings that we manage to see beyond the various perceptions of any given character; we thus manage to acknowledge that behind each use of the term *daimôn* lies the same mysterious nature. This aspect is shared across all uses and all contexts: by the narrator, by mortals, by gods, in type-scenes and direct discourse, in the vocative and in formulae. This is importantbecause it highlights another of the term’s equally significant qualities. It shows how a diverse cast of characters, separated by gender, social status, mortality and divinity all share a certain essential characteristic.

**The Term *Daimôn* as a Concept and a Unifying Reference among the Otherwise Contradictory Elements of the Homeric World**

 As discussion of chapter two has already demonstrated, the term *daimôn*’s basic mysterious power, which in previous interpretations of the epics had caused the term to be seen as separate from other supernatural entities, may in fact work as aunifying aspect of these powers. The term *daimôn* as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ links together all the aforementioned divine entities which share this central aspect of the supernatural; as such, they are now part of what may be seen as a structured and separate demonic world (so called the ‘demonic world’),[[724]](#footnote-724) before they are even placed in the contexts of the world so far perceived as a world of total chaos, Homeric world.[[725]](#footnote-725) The term *daimôn* as a ‘unified concept’ offers these insights it demonstrates that the unknown and the mysterious, either as part of the ‘demonic’ or as part of the Homeric world can not only be organised but it also offer the structure for such an organisation.

 Before, however, we proceed with the discussion that shows how the term *daimôn* as a point of convergence and as a concept may be used to offer us a clearer impression on the Homeric world, we shall first examine the linking role of the termas such: how, in other words, its mysterious nature may work as a unified reference between the various aspects of its polysemous character.

**The Term *Daimôn*’s Mysterious Nature as the Linking Point between Specific Gods**

Amongst the many creations of Greek culture, the Olympian gods are of particular interest both because, as with those rare cases in the ancient world, we have an abundance of information about them and because important information about their nature still remains unknown to us. The only thing that is certain is the fact that the gods are not real - this is at least a general assumption of the Greeks - and what we have of the gods is, as Dowden puts it, ‘pictures that peoples created in their minds and shared in their imaginations.’[[726]](#footnote-726) Nevertheless, if we prefer to think of the gods as parts of an imaginary world and if the gods often behave in ways that are hard to understand, this suggests that their nature is even harder to understand. In fact, there are many aspects of their nature that still remain unknown to us, particularly those that go beyond their divine and anthropomorphic attributes. As unusual as this might sound, they are related to the mysterious and unknowable elements that shape the inexplicable interventions in human life in addition to their role as mediators between the immortals themselves.

The gods, for instance, often visit their favourite mortals in disguise, thus representing the same mysteriousness as that represented by the term *daimôn*. Analysis of Helen’s feelings of great fear and astonishment (*Il.*3.420) demonstrated that many elements of Aphrodite’s incomprehensible actions towards Helen (*Il*. 3.420) resemble Athena’s unexpected and unexplained favouritism of towards Telemachus in the *Odyssey* (3.27). Later on, another scene from the *Odyssey* (15.261) shows Athena demonstrating the same mysterious intentions towards Telemachus. The closeness of the above scenes with regards to the activities of the gods goes even beyond the well-known model of divine intervention towards a favourite mortal – which is indeed well justified in the case of Athena as the ‘Goddess of Nearness’[[727]](#footnote-727) and as agoddess who is ‘intellectual and active in the community’.[[728]](#footnote-728)As has already been discussed in chapter two, this dimension suggests that the gods’ engage inthe same mysterious and inexplicable behaviour as a *daimôn* or other similar power. It makes their activities, which are situated in different times, places and narratological contexts if not identical, at least very similar.

 All in all, this newly attributed characteristic was as much a common feature among the gods as a whole as among specific gods individually.

**The Collective Gods Sharing the Same Inexplicable Characteristics**

So far, it has been a common belief that ‘the set of gods that any individual culture possesses’[[729]](#footnote-729) forms a pantheon, and since they are personal gods they will most probably form a family.[[730]](#footnote-730) In modern treatments - and although the Greek gods of cult and mythology were numerous - these gods tend to be formalised as the twelve Olympian gods.[[731]](#footnote-731) However, since this leaves out later and important additions and other deities of Olympus (e.g. Heracles, Dionysus, the Muses and Graces) it is not straightforward whether there were only twelve Olympian deities. However, this is not the only ambiguity related to the gods; there is a similar ambiguity even about Olympus as the residence of the gods. Our first impression that the gods live as an extended (and rather unusual) family on Olympus is ‘to an extent modified in the course of the epic’;[[732]](#footnote-732) the gods spend time in other places where sacrifices are offered to them as well.[[733]](#footnote-733) These and other similar controversies tend to suggest a chaotic situation around the world of the gods.

 Nonetheless, a chaotic situation like this, as we have repeatedly suggested, cannot justify knowledge of the existence of these gods; it requires the existence of some kind of order in the chaos of the pantheon. Some attributed this order to Greek religion;[[734]](#footnote-734) the gods as a group, then, were fitted into the family tree of heaven. This solution, however, is still not sufficient for the organisation of the gods. Indeed, the passages where the plural *daimones* is used to indicate the gods reveal that what enables their coexistence - either on Olympus or in another place, either as twelve or more - in the same organised pantheon, is their common inexplicable behaviour. A close interrogation of the focalization of the narrator and of both divine and mortal characters in *Il.* 1.222 and 6.115) shows the plural of the term to be used to indicate the gods. It further reveals that behind the use of the term for the gods as a whole lies the single god, Athena. She (Athena) was already connected with the same inexplicable and strange behaviour when she was found behind the usage of the term in the singular (*Od*. 3.27, 15.261). The examples from *Iliad* (15.418, 23.595) show Apollo being equally attributed with an unexplained behaviour as the equivalent of *daimôn* in the singular (*Il*. 15.418) and in the plural (*Il*. 23.595). Apollo’s name lies behind the gods, collectively named *daimone*s. Consideration of the characters’ common feelings of great astonishment and terror when faced with the unexplained, intrusive and inexplicable intervention of a *daimôn* or associated concepts (i.e. the collective gods or a specific god) points to the term’s linking quality. A *daimôn* is a mysterious andirrational power, something is shareswith the gods in general.

**Fate, Zeus and the Gods Linked with the Inexplicable Nature of the Powers of a *Daimôn***

We suggest[[735]](#footnote-735) that the power of fate, Zeus and the gods are not in fact, opposite terms but they are not totally the same either. Beyond their similarities and differences, which are most familiar to us (as discussed in chapter two), they share one further common attribute: they all cause events which man is powerless to alter. Their relevance to unwanted activities when they work as the referents of the term *daimôn* is what, after all, enables them to construct a relationship that, until now, has been misinterpreted. The clear sense of Zeus’ influence over events was pervasive among Greeks.[[736]](#footnote-736) Solon (c.600BC) complains that men do not think long enough about acts of violence ‘but Zeus oversees the *telos* of everything’ (*fr*. 13.17 West). Zeus is most often associated with *telos* (end, completion, fulfilment); we are also familiar with the two *pithoi* (massive storage jars) on Zeus’ threshold which embody the worlds of possible evils and possible successes from which he draws and gives man a mixture of the two things. In a similar manner, Menelaus, for instance, presents Zeus as being equale to fate when he shows his unwillingness to fight ‘against heaven’s will’ or ‘against fate’ (πρὸς δαίμονα φωτὶ μάχεσθαι, *Il*. 17.98). Both terms are used to signify the intervention of an unpredictable higher power (i.e. a *daimôn*) that is equally responsible for an unexplained and unwanted event. However, these passages, as Dowden remarks, “‘like many portraits of how the gods work and what they do, [are not] parts of a ‘systematic theology’,[[737]](#footnote-737) but instead, they constitute a ‘snapshot from the world as it seems at some moments’”.[[738]](#footnote-738) Therefore, Dowden suggests, these passages could not in fact lead to what ‘the Greeks believed’, ‘that your destiny was assigned to you at birth by Zeus, king of the gods’.[[739]](#footnote-739) Although there is much truth in Dowden’s words, and even if these passages might simply be one way of viewing it, they might still be important sources pointing to a certain type of closeness between Zeus and one’s destiny.

 More precisely, the term *daimôn* was used on the one hand, in a more general manner to signify the idea of *moira*, and death, and on the other, in a more personalised way to be associated with either the gods in general, a specific god or Zeus; all of them are agents of fate. In such cases, the different ways the characters reacted (i.e. their feelings of terror and awe) towards the unspecified impact of a higher and supernatural power highlighted their affinity as the cause of an unexpected and unchanged event that came contrary to man’s will. Significantly, analysis of the reactions of a mortal character, Diomedes, when the fate of death was allotted to him (*Il.*8.166) by an unexpected source showed a god, in this case Zeus, being referred as a *daimôn* capable of bringing death upon Diomedes and every mortal. Patroclus (*Il*. 16.703-704) had to face the same threat and, as a consequence of his failure to take into consideration the threats of the god, he was killed. All of the above reveal both fate’s close relation to the gods and Zeus as the agents of fate and inevitable death and the term *daimôn* and with everything inexplicable. It further suggests that there is not an easy way for mortals to distinguish between the activities of fate, the gods, Zeus and a *daimôn*. Beyond that, however, these entities still enable us to look at them from a different perspective and as inseparable parts of the *daimonic*: the gods’ and fate’s near synonymity with the term *daimôn*[[740]](#footnote-740) makes them part of the same etymological[[741]](#footnote-741) and religious framework.

**The Term *Daimôn*’s Linking Role and the Existence of a Newly Organised World**

The previous discussion has demonstrated that when all these entities appear individually in the polytheistic world of Homer, they seem vastly different and disassociated from each other. However, when they appear as the collective qualities of the *daimôn* world, they seem not so different after all.

 They thus, all point to the existence of a whole new ‘*daimonic* world’ which contains all the supernatural entities which share a common mysterious behaviour. More specifically, analysis of the use of the term *daimôn* by different focalizers and of the termas a ‘sign of the mysterious’ demonstrated how the divine in its various manifestations –a specific god, the gods as a whole, an unidentified god, fate, etc. –were linked by this shared mysteriousness.

 Even more, we have described the term as a ‘unified concept’ and as a ‘point of convergence’ between the various aspects of the divine world. As an organisational device, interpretation of the term *daimôn* suggests the existence of a more advanced and different kind of organisation in the Homeric world: it shows a *polytheistic* but unified world in which different types of divinities have distinct if often overlapping spheres of influence and capabilities.[[742]](#footnote-742) Those divinities which share some capability to act in mysterious ways and to alter the course of human events in unexpected ways can be termed *daimonic*.

**The Term *Daimôn* Linked with a Positive Complexity**

In any attempt to present the constitution of the Homeric world, the term *daimôn*’s polymorphic nature acts as a frame.[[743]](#footnote-743) We are, however, used to perceiving the *daimonic* in a negative sense, as a mysterious term. The Homeric term *daimôn* is far more interesting than the mystery it carries. The term *daimôn*, which contains in its framework all sorts of elements, both divine and mortal, uses its mysterious nature as a linking quality and it mediates between the two worlds.

 For the Greeks of all periods this was a controversial term, especially in the context of the polytheistic religion represented in the epics, it could be a term of mediation and a term formed by a certain sort of diversity/complexity of significations as well.[[744]](#footnote-744) This thesis’ methodology demonstrates how in fact use of the term *daimôn* as a narrative device generates the term’s diversity of significations. Use of the vocative δαιμόνιε, as a term with a fixed meaning and as a term used to address the mysterious, vengeful and malicious behaviour of both a god and a mortal character in the narrative, shows how itmay be associated with two antithetical and controversial qualities (i.e. both mortal and divine). Use of the formulaic expression δαίμονι ἶσος, as a recurring theme in a number of type-scenes, shows how the term may characterise the superhuman, excessive and self-destructive actions of certain *Iliadic* warriors.

***Δαιμόνιε*: Overlapping Aspects of Divine and Mortal Characters**

Given the uncertain relationship between gods and mortals, the poem uses the vocative δαιμόνιε to demonstrate how the behaviour of a certain divine and a mortal character may underscore the connection that is often created between their two worlds.

The Homeric epic conjures up a total world and the gathering of its conflicts, contradictions and values– both human and divine.[[745]](#footnote-745)Although it was far from unusual to ‘have many gods (“polytheism”) or to think of them anthropomorphically,’[[746]](#footnote-746) when scholars have referred to the gods’ imaginary closeness to mortals, they paid particular attention to the fact that the “Greek gods were exceptionally anthropomorphic – they were ‘shaped like people.”’[[747]](#footnote-747) Each god was thought to possess his/her particular identity and each was perceived as being an individual. As such, the ‘hectic story in which they play their part, move about, live their lives’,[[748]](#footnote-748) their ranges of passions, squabbles, intrigues and dealings, both with each other and with mortals,’[[749]](#footnote-749) place them in a setting remarkably similar to that of humankind. But still, there was the pervasive idea of the existence of a gap between man and the Olympian gods. One aspect of Greek religion was how to understand and, where necessary, to bridge this space.

One way of doing this – among special rites or mystery religions – was to acknowledge the existence of demons as intermediary beings or *daimôn* as a term of mediation between gods and mortals. Both the conversations – having taken place on Olympus and in Troy- and the expression ‘δαιμονίη’ that both Priam[[750]](#footnote-750) and Zeus[[751]](#footnote-751) used to address their wives (Hecabe and Hera) point to the vocative as the bearer of a fixed meaning to address the malignant, vengeful and demonic attributes that both Hera and Hecabe share; it also shows how a goddess and a mortal woman, due to their equal association with the term *daimôn* and with all its derogatory significations, may mark off what seems to be their normal characteristics from their demonic side. The closeness of the behaviour between the two aforementioned women points to a certain affinity that exists between the two couples, whereas particular emphasis is also placed on the similarity between the structures of domestic life in both the human and divin worlds.[[752]](#footnote-752) On the other hand, the vocative alsoshow the similarity in the behaviour of both Hera and Hecabe contradicts the already existing and pervasive idea that while women and goddesses, as female beings, share certain emotions, anger - most precisely *demonic* fury - is not among them.[[753]](#footnote-753) Nevertheless, as discussion of the three scenes from the *Iliad*[[754]](#footnote-754)has shown, there are indeed active angry δαιμόνιαι women as there are active angry δαιμόνιαι goddesses in the epic. As we have seen at 3.413-17, a δαιμονίη Aphrodite being enraged with Helen is similar to Zeus’ claim at 4.34-36 that a δαιμονίη Hera would eat the Trojans rawfrom her rage. This is echoed by Hecuba’s (an already δαιμονίη woman) wish, at 24.212-214, –and from Priam’s reaction at 24.194 - that she sink her teeth into Achilles’ liver for what he has done to her son.[[755]](#footnote-755) Hecabe’s wish underscores – besides being an extraordinary expression of fury on the part of a (mortal) female - the existence of a certain affinity in the behaviour of a mortal woman to the behaviour of the two aforementioned goddesses when it comes to a common mysterious, malicious and demonic way of acting. Use of the same vocative by Odysseus to address Penelope’s unexpected, cunning and vengeful behaviour,[[756]](#footnote-756) which differ from her traditional display of *mêtis*, and use of the same vocative by Helen[[757]](#footnote-757) to address the cunning and vengeful behaviour of Aphrodite, which also goes beyond the expected behaviour of a goddess towards her favourite mortal, highlights once more how a mortal and an immortal character in the narrative may be connected under the same demonic attributes.

 Therefore, as can be derived from the usage of the vocative and of the term’s qualities as a point of convergence, the mysterious and the demonic may be perceived as the two most important elements shared between the two worlds; in fact, man’s experience with the *daimonic* as the source of inexplicable and irrational supernatural intervention or superhuman transcendence into the divine spherebring the two worlds even closer together.

 Still, the term’s complexity goes beyond that. As discussion of the formulaic expression δαίμονι ἶσος has shown[[758]](#footnote-758) - beyond the similarities that both mortals and immortals share with the mysterious *daimonic* - an even greater division is created among them.

***Δαίμονι ἶσος* Stressing the Division Between the Mortal and the Immortal Worlds**

‘We ourselves [as students of classical antiquity] are accustomed to think of the divine being as preoccupied with man and his needs and are little concerned with his existence beyond humanity. But here the spiritual eye seeks a higher world which is no longer troubled for man’s sake; and it stands enthralled before the vision of its perfection.’[[759]](#footnote-759)

This is part of Otto’s (1954) comment pointing to a very different religious sense and highlighting the general perception that gods indeed watch with eyes that are not ours. So free are the gods from men that according to a famous Homeric phrase, the gods are routinely described as ‘gods who exist always’ whereas the generations of men are like leaves (e.g. *Il*. 6.146, 21.464; Simonides fr. 8.2 West; Aristophanes *Birds* 685) that come and go.[[760]](#footnote-760) This sense that the gods, and above all Zeus, are far from the concerns of men was pervasive among poets, particularly of the Archaic period.[[761]](#footnote-761) Gods were aware of the gulf between them and men and, looking upon mortals, feel ‘disdain mingled with slight pity.’[[762]](#footnote-762) This antinomy that has been created between the two worlds goes even beyond the gods’ superiority to humans, because they were immortals (*athanatoi*) and *makares* (‘the blessed ones’), contrary to the inevitability of death for humans.[[763]](#footnote-763) In fact, analysis of the formula δαίμονι ἶσος and of various aspects of the term *daimôn* has shown that the division that exists between gods and humans may derive from their association with the *daimonic*, specifially the excessive and irrational behaviour of mortals and immortals alike.

The complex relationship between gods and mortals is closely related to the complicated relationship between gods and the *daimonic* as the two sources from which mortal superhuman power derives. It is also associated with *daimôn*’s complexity of significations. Indeed, use of the term *daimôn* helps us to unravel what has so far remained unknown and mysterious about those warriors referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος as well as to decipher the essence of the two sources from where this behaviour derived. A sour discussion of warriors referred to by the epithet δαίμονι ἶσος and the term *daimôn* as a ‘sign of the mysterious and the excessive’ has shown,[[764]](#footnote-764) when it comes to a spectacular performance in battle, responsibility could be attributed to a specific god (e.g. Diomedes was assisted by Athena at 5. 121-132 and Achilles by Poseidon and Athena at 21.18-227) or to the term *daimôn* with the signification of a specific god (Zeus). Nevertheless, when it came to human frenzy and excessive behaviour, then responsibility was attributed to a *daimôn* alone. This reveals the existence of a distinction and closeness between the *daimonic* and the divine.

 All in all, the meanings attributed to the term *daimôn* suggest that in a world full of divine manifestations whose meaning and significance is hard for mortals to discern, any simple explanation about the interaction of gods and menwill be insufficient; one’s insistence on the gods’ anthropomorphism and immortality as the only criteria of defining the relationship of these two constituent elements of the Homeric world misjudges its nature. It similarly misjudges the nature of the *daimonic*, which is also not as simple as previously held.

**Conclusion**

This thesis began as an attempt to offer a uniform understanding of the term *daimôn* as used in Homer. Much was revealed about the complicated and multi-faceted meaning and usage of the term. The most significant contribution of this study its use of the ‘problem *daimôn*’ as the basic premise for a revised interpretation of the distinction between ‘what is known and is understood in experience’ and the phenomenological ‘unknown’. This intuition is useful because it refers to the role of a *daimôn* as a ‘phraseological byte’, as a ‘sign of the mysterious’ and as a concept. As such, understanding how the term is used provides information about some as yet unknown aspects of the supernatural in Homer, including its affinity with the mysterious, the unknowable and the demonic. It also informs us about *daimôn*’s qualities as a ‘point of convergence’, as a ‘unified concept’ and as such, of its role in the production of a ‘remarkably varied and yet unified amalgam’[[765]](#footnote-765) displayed by the gods and the rest of the supernatural entities of the Homeric world.

From the literary perspective, the term also functions as a narrative device which, when understood from the perspective of the focalizer, reveals the attitude of mortals towards the most important organizing principle of the Homeric world: the relationship between mortals and the immortals. The mortals’ perspective of the divine is reflected in the term’s varied and often oppositional meanings. The term thus functions as a ‘spoken sign’ of the mysterious, informing us that the mysterious and unknown parts of the world of gods and men can be expressed and understood. It is also due to the term’s functionas a ‘single’ ‘complex’ ‘receptacle’ that the ‘beyond’ can also be organised under the structured, but still *polymorphic*, world of the Homeric epic.

 Virtually each and every detail of the nature and function of a *daimôn* could be explored further. Every mystery or ambiguity concerning the term’s use and meaning the Homeric epics cannot be unlocked here. This and further research can, however, demonstrate what the poet meant when he used the term *daimôn* in the variety of contexts in which it appears in his *polytropic* tales. If this sounds like a rather limited aim, then it is rightly so, for, as Kahane once observed, ‘making claims, fixed or otherwise, about Homer [and about the various elements of his poetry], is first and foremost the act of an interpreter.’[[766]](#footnote-766)As interpreters then, and more importantly, students of Homer, we would be overstepping the limitations of our scholarly pursuit if we claimed to possess the ‘real meaning’ of almost any aspect of Homer and his poems. Nevertheless, what we can do, as Homer’s audience, is to attempt to recognise a sign when we come across one. Indeed, the term *daimôn* has ceased to be an unspoken sign. It has become not only an identifiable sign of the inexplicable and the unknowable elements of the relationship between the mortal and immortal realms, but also a spoken sign of what so far has remained unknown concerning the wide variety of ways in which the divine manifests itself to mankind in the polytheistic world of Homer.

**APPENDICES**

**Appendix I**

**Diagram A: The Structure of the Homeric World**

gods

fate

mortals

 Other supernatural powers

*daimôn*

specific god

Definite god

**Diagram B: The Structure of the ‘Demonic World’: A Newly Developed Homeric World**

gods

mortals

fate

**DemonicWorld**

definite

gods

specific

god

other supernatural powers

**Homeric World**

**Appendix II: *Daimôn* Acquiring a Linking Role: *Daimôn* as a Structured World and as a Linking Point Between a Number of Controversies**

***Daimôn***

gods

mortals

fate

definite

gods

specific

god

other supernatural powers

**Appendix III: Theoretical Approach**

Unaccountable, excessive, unpredictable, character

=The term *daimôn*’s basic attributes

**MEANING**

**OF A**

**WORD**

**WORD’S USAGE IN**

**VARIOUS CONTEXTS**

**FAMILY RESEMBLANCE**

**(i.e. Its relationship to similar words in the same context)**

**NOT STRICTLY ON ITS**

**LEXICAL**

**DEFINITION**

**Appendix IV: An Analysis of Instances of the Term *Daimôn* in Homer**

|  |
| --- |
| **TABLE II *The Term Daimôn in the Iliad*** |
|
|   |   |   |   |   |   |
| **Examples** | **Divine Status** | **Ethical Status** | **Effect** | **Material Attributes** | **Point of View** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **1.222** | Gods | Benevolent | physical& psychological | Invisible | poet |
| **3.420** | Aphrodite | benevolent& malevolent | psychological | Visible | poet |
| **4.31** | Hera | Malevolent | psychological | Visible | Zeus |
| **5.438** | Unaccountable power/ Diomedes | Malevolent | uncertain | Invisible | poet |
| **5.459** | Unaccountable power/ Diomedes | Malevolent | uncertain | Invisible | Apollo |
| **5.884** | Unaccountable power/ Diomedes | Malevolent | uncertain | Invisible | Ares |
| **6.115** | Gods (Athena) | Malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Hector |
| **7.291** | Zeus/Def. Gods | benevolent& malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Hector |
| **7.377** | Zeus/Definite Gods | benevolent& malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Priam |
| **7.396** | Zeus/Definite Gods | benevolent& malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Idaeus |
| **8.166** | fate/ death | Malevolent | uncertain | Uncertain | Hector |
| **9.600** | Zeus/Definite Gods | benevolent& malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Poet |
| **11.480** | Athena | Benevolent | psychological | Invisible | Poet |
| **11.792** | Gods/heaven/unac.power | benevolent | psychological | Invisible | Nestor |
| **15.403** | Gods/heaven/unac.power | Benevolent | psychological | Invisible | Patroclus |
| **15.418** | Apollo | benevolent& malevolent | physical& psychological | Invisible | Poet |
| **15.468** | Zeus/Definite Gods | benevolent& malevolent | physical& psychological | Invisible | Teucer |
| **16.705** | Unaccountable power/ Patroclus | Malevolent | uncertain | Invisible | Poet |
| **16.768** | Unaccountable power/ Patroclus | malevolent | uncertain | Invisible | Poet |
| **17.98** | Zeus& Apollo | benevolent& malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Menelaus |
| **17.104** | Zeus & Apollo | benevolent& malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Menelaus |
| **19.188** | Zeus/Definite Gods | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Agamemnon |
| **20.447** | Unaccountable power/ Achilles | malevolent | uncertain | Invisible | poet |
| **20.493** | Unaccountable power/Achilles | malevolent | uncertain | Invisible | poet |
| **21.18** | Unaccountable power/Achilles | malevolent | uncertain | Invisible | poet |
| **21.93** | Fate/ death | malevolent | uncertain | Uncertain | Lycaon |
| **21.227** | Unac. power/Achilles | malevolent | uncertain | Invisible | poet |
| **23.595** | Gods | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Antilochus |
| **1.561 (adj)** | Hera | malevolent | psychological | Visible | Zeus |
| **2.190 (adj)** | Achaean kings | malevolent | psychological | Visible | Odysseus |
| **2.200 (adj)** | Achaean men | malevolent | psychological | Visible | Odysseus |
| **3.399 (adj)** | Aphrodite | malevolent | psychological | Visible | Helen |
| **6.326 (adj)** | Paris | malevolent | psychological | Visible | Hector |
| **6.407 (adj)** | Hector | malevolent | psychological | visible | Andromache |
| **6.486 (adj)** | Andromache | malevolent | psychological | visible | Hector |
| **6.521 (adj)** | Paris | malevolent | psychological | visible | Hector |
| **9.40 (adj)** | Agamemnon | malevolent | psychological | visible | Diomedes |
| **13.448 (adj)** | Deiphobus | malevolent | psychological | visible | Idomeneus |
| **13.810 (adj)** | Hector | malevolent | psychological | visible | Aias |
| **4.194 (adj)** | Hecabe | malevolent | psychological | visible | Priam |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |

|  |
| --- |
| **TABLE I. *The Term Daimôn in the Odyssey*** |
|
|   |   |   |   |   |   |
| **Examples** | **Divine Status** | **Ethical Status** | **Effect** | **Material Attributes** | **Point of View** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **2.134** | Furies/pop.daem. | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Telemachus |
| **3.27** | Athena | benevolent | psychological | Visible | Athena |
| **3.166** | Zeus/definite gods | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Nestor |
| **4.275** | Aphrodite | benevolent and malevolent | Psychological | Invisible | Menelaus |
| **5.396** | Fate/unac.power/pop.daem. | Malevolent/evil | physical | Invisible | Poet |
| **5.421** | Poseidon | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **6.172** | Poseidon | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **7.248** | Def. gods/unac.power | benevolent | physical | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **9.381** | Zeus/definite gods | benevolent | psychological | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **10.64** | Fate/unac.power | Malevolent/evil | psychological and physical | Invisible | Aeolus/ sons |
| **11.61** | Fate/doom | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Elpenor |
| **11.587** | Def. gods/unac.power | malevolent | physical | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **12.169** | Def. gods/unac.power | benevolent | physical | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **12.295** | Def. gods/Zeus | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **14.386** | Def. gods/unac.power | benevolent | uncertain | Invisible | Eumaeus |
| **14.488** | Unac.power/pop.daem. | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **15.261** | Athena | benevolent | psychological | Invisible | Theoclymenus |
| **16.64** | Fate | malevolent | uncertain | uncertain | Eumaeus |
| **16.194** | Unac.power/pop.daem. | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Telemachus |
| **16.370** | Athena | benevolent | psychological | Invisible | Antinous |
| **17.243** | Def. gods/unac.power | benevolent | uncertain | Invisible | Eumaeus |
| **17.446** | Def. gods/unac.power | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Antinous |
| **18.146** | Definite gods | benevolent | physical | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **18.256** | Definite gods | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Penelope |
| **19.10** | Athena | benevolent | psychological | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **19.129** | Definite gods | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Penelope |
| **19.138** | Athena | benevolent | psychological | Invisible | Penelope |
| **19.201** | Unac.power/pop.daem. | Malevolent/evil | physical | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **19.512** | Def. gods/unac.power | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Penelope |
| **20.87** | Athena | malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Penelope |
| **21.201** | Definite gods | benevolent | uncertain | Invisible | Philoetius |
| **24.149** | Unac. Power/pop.daem. | benevolent and malevolent/evil | physical | Invisible | Amphimedon |
| **24.306** | Poseidon/unac.power | Malevolent | physical | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **4.774 (adj.)** | Antinous' companions | Malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Antinous |
| **10.472 (adj.)** | Odysseus | Malevolent | psychological | Visible | Od.Companios |
| **14.443 (adj)** | Odysseus | Malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Eumaeus |
| **18.15 (adj)** | Arnaeus | Malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **18.406 (adj.)** | Suitors | Malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Telemachus |
| **19.71 (adj)** | Melentho | Malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **23.166 (adj)** | Penelope | Malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Odysseus |
| **23.174 (adj)** | Odysseus | Malevolent | psychological | Invisible | Penelope |
| **23.264 (adj)** | Penelope | Malevolent | psychological | invisible | Odysseus |
|  |   |   |   |   |   |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |

**Appendix V: The Term *Daimôn* in Homer: Its Semantic Components**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Anthropomorphic Gods** | **Olympic Gods** | **Definite Gods** | **Fate** | **Unaccountable Power** |
| **Athena:***Od*. 3.27, 15.261, 16.370, 19.10; *Il.*11.480, 19.138, 20.87  |  |  |  |  |
| **Zeus:***Il*.7.291,7.377,7.396, 9.600,15.468,19.188; *Od*.3.166,9.381 | ***Iliad:***1.222,6.115,23.595 | ***Iliad:***7.291,7.377,7.396,9.600,11.792,15.403,15.468,19.188 | ***Iliad:***8.166,21.93 | ***Iliad:***11.792,15.403,(it has to do with the δαίμονιἶσος instances: 5.438,5.459, 5.884,16.705,16.786,20.447,20.493,21.18) |
| **Aphrodite:** *Il*.3.420, *Od*.4.275 |  |  |  |  |
| **Poseidon:***Od*.5.421,6.172, 24.306 | ***Odyssey:***(not applicable) | ***Odyssey:***3.166,7.248,9.381,11.587,12.169,12.295,14.386,17.243,17.446,18.146,18.256,19.129,19.512,21.201 | ***Odyssey:***5.39610.64,11.61,16.64 | ***Odyssey:***5.396,7.248,10.64,11.587,12.169,14.386,14.448,16.194,17.243,17.446,19.201,19.512,24.306(it has to do with pop. daemon instances: 2.134, 5.396, 14.488, 16.194, 19.201, 24.149) |
| **Apollo:***Il*.15.418 |  |  |  |  |
| **Apollo and Zeus:***Il*.17.98,17.104 |  |  |  |  |

**Appendix VI: Point of View Regarding the Homeric Term *Daimôn***

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| ***TABLE IV. Point of View*** |
|
|   |   |   |   |
| **Homer** | **Characters** | **Gods\*** | **Poet** |
|  |  |   |  |
| ***Iliad*** | 6.115, 7291, 7377, 7.396, 8.166, 11.792, 15.403 | 5.459 (Apollo) | 1.222, 3.420,  |
|  | 15.486, 17.98, 17.104, 19.188, 21.93, 23.595 | 5.884 (Ares) | 5.438, 9.600 |
|  |   |  | 11.480, 15.418 |
|  |   |   | 21.18, 21.227 |
|  |   |   |   |
| **Adjectival** | 2.190, 2.220, 3.399, 6.326, 6.407, 6.486, 6.521, 9.40 | 1.561 (Zeus) |   |
|  | 13.448, 13.810, 24.194 |  4.31 (Zeus) |   |
|  |   |   |   |
|  |   |   |   |
| ***Odyssey*** | 2.134, 3.166, 4.275, 5.421, 6.172, 7.248, 9.381, 10.64 | 3.27 (Athena) | 5.396 |
|  | 11.61, 11.587, 12.169, 12.295, 14.386, 14. 488, 15.261 |   |   |
|  | 16.64, 16.194, 16.370, 17.243, 17.446, 18.146, 18.256 |   |   |
|  | 19.10, 19.129, 19.138, 19.201, 19.512, 20.87, 21.201 |   |   |
|  | 24.149, 24.306 |   |   |
|  |   |   |   |
|  |   |   |   |
| **Adjectival** | 4.774, 10.472, 14.443, 18.15, 18.406, 19.71 |   |   |
|  | 23.166, 23.174, 23.264 |   |   |
|  |   |   |   |
| \* All 4 instances refer to *daimôn*'s emotional effect on mortals. |  |  |

**Appendix VII: Forms in which the Term *Daimôn* Appears in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey***

|  |
| --- |
| ***Table V. Daimôn in the Iliad and the Odyssey*** |
|
|   |   |   |   |   |   |
|  **Homer** | **Nominative** | **Genitive** | **Accusative** | **Dative** | **Vocative** |
|  |  |  |  |   |  |
|  ***Iliad*** |  |  |   |   |   |
|  |  |  |   |   |   |
|  **Singular** | 3.420, 7.291, 7.377, 7.396, 9.600 | 19.188 | 8.166, 17.98, 17.104 | 5.438, 5.459, 5.884, 11.792 | 4.31 |
|  | 11.480, 15.418, 15.468, 21.93 |  |   | 15.403, 16.705, 16.786, |   |
|  |   |  |   | 20.447, 20.493, 21.18, 21.227 |   |
|  |  |  |   |   |   |
|  |  |  |   |   |   |
|  **Plural** |  |  | 1.222 | 6.115, 23.595 |   |
|  |  |  |   |   |   |
|  |  |  |   |   |   |
|  ***Odyssey*** |  |  |   |   |   |
|  |  |  |   |   |   |
|  **Singular** | 2.134, 3.27, 3.166, 4.275, 5.396, 5.421 | 11.61, 15.261 |   |   |   |
|  | 6.172, 7.248, 9.381, 10.64, 11.587 |  |   |   |   |
|  | 12.169, 12.295, 14.386, 14.448, 16.64 |  |   |   |   |
|  | 16.194, 16.370, 17.243, 17.446, 18.146 |  |   |   |   |
|  | 18.256, 19.10, 19.129, 19.138, 19.201 |  |   |   |   |
|  | 19.512, 20.87, 21.201, 24.149, 24.306 |  |   |   |   |
|  |   |  |   |   |   |
|  |   |  |   |   |   |
|  **Plural** |  No Plural Forms |  |   |   |   |
|  |   |  |   |   |   |
|  |  |  |   |   |   |

**Appendix VIII: Δαιμόνιε in Homer**



**Appendix IX: Δαίμονιἶσος in the *Iliad***



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**Thesis**

Burton, D.H. (1996) *The Search of Immortality in Archaic Greek Myth*, PhD Thesis University of London

**Translations**

Mazon, P. (The *Iliad*, 1937-38), Bryand, W.C. (The *Iliad*, 1873), Lagerlöf, E. (The *Iliad,* 1912-20), Lang, A. -Leaf, W. - Myers, E. (The *Iliad*, 1914), Rieu, E. V. (The *Iliad,*1946-50), Murray, A.T. (The *Iliad*, 1924-25), Pope, A. (The *Iliad*, 1815), Butler, S. (The *Iliad*, 1898), Marris, W. (The *Iliad,* 1934), Hobbes, T. (The *Iliad*, 2008), Chapman, G. (The *Iliad*, 1898), Rieu, E.V. (The *Iliad,* 2003), Green, W.C. (The *Iliad*, 1884), Murray, A.T. (The *Odyssey*, 1960-66), Murray, A.T. (The *Odyssey (9-12)*, 1995), Lombardo, S. (The *Iliad*, 2000), Butcher, S.H.- Lang, A. (The *Odyssey*, 1903), Chapman, G. (The *Iliad*, 1884), Fagles, R. (The *Iliad*, 1990), Fagles, R. (The*Odyssey*, 1996), Hammond, M. (The *Iliad*, 1987),Fitzgerald, R. (The *Odyssey* 1961), Lattimore, R. (The *Iliad*, 1951), McCrorie, E. (The *Odyssey*, 2004), Rieu, E.V. (The*Odyssey*, 1989), Lattimore, R. (The *Odyssey,* 1967), Murray, A.T. (The *Odyssey*, 1995), Marris, W. (The *Odyssey*, 1925), Hammond, M. (The *Odyssey*, 2000), Butcher, S.H. and Lang, A. (The *Odyssey*, 1898), Cook, A. (The *Odyssey*, 1993), Fitzgerald, R. (The *Odyssey*, 1961), Lombardo, S. (The *Odyssey*, 2000), Dowe, L. (The *Odyssey*, 1993), Shewring, W. (The *Odyssey*, 1980), Murray, A.T. (The *Odyssey*, 1999), West, M. (The *Hymn to Dionysus*, 2003).

1. Glanville 1681: 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See further Tsagarakis (1977); François (1957); Dietrich (1965); Nilsson (1964); Burkert (1985), Brenk (1986). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. De Jong 2004: 97. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Richardson 1990: 109-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Otto 1923: 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. This is closely related to *ate* as it was definined by Dodds (1951: 5): ‘as a state of mind – a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal consciousness [...] apartial and temporary insanity’, but it is mostly identified, I believe, with the nature of the agent to which this specific state of mind is ascribed, and which is no other than an “external ‘daemonic’ agency”. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. All translations from the *Iliad* are from Lattimore. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. De Jong 2004: 158. See further my discussion in chapter two. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Otto 1923: 28-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Wilford 1965: 223. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Otto 1923: 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Ibid. 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Contra Otto (1923: 39-40) who suggests that the elements of mind implied in ‘awefulness’ and ‘mysteriousness’ are definitely different, the ‘tremendum’ may, in fact, occupy the mind without the ‘mysterium’. At this point, I have no intention of disqualifying what constitutes a significant contribution derived from a significant scholar. I will just attempt to present it from a slightly different angle. I suggest that the frequent juxtaposition of the mysterious with the associated feelings of terror, something that I believe happens most of the time, is what most commonlyenables us to decode the mysterious when we see it. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. This thesis uses Otto’s (1923: 9-10) terminology of feeling, which is more in the sense of ‘I am not sure I feel (apprehend, sense, understand) that there is something watching me’, and not in the sense of stirrings of emotions. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Otto 1923: 39-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Otto 1923: 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Otto 1923: 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. de Jong 2001: xiv. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Parry 1971. See also Clark 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Burkert 1985: 180. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Burkert 1985: 183. See further Snell 1953: 40f. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *Il*. 4.31. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See further O’ Brien 1991. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. *Il.* 3.399. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See Burkert 1985; Snell 1953. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. *Od*. 23.166. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. See Murnaghan 1987. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Two goddesses (Hera and Aphrodite) and two mortal women (Penelope and Hecabe). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See Bakker 1988: 189f.; Clark 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Burkert 1985: 183. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Ibid. See Snell 1953: 23-42. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Burkert 1985: 182ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. *Il.* 5.438. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Trypanis 1977: 93. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Ibid. See also *Il.* 2.209-213, where Zeus asks *Moira* what her will is since he has to abandon Hector, who ultimately faces death. Cf. Lloyd-Jones 1971, on *The Justice of Zeus*. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Zaidmann and Pantel 1992: 178f. Cf. Larson 2007: 1f. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. This is part of the more general idea that, according to Snell, Homer does not realise that decisions of will/impulses/emotions have their origin in man himself, but insteadare linked with gods who give thoughts to mortals over which they have no control. See further Snell 1982: 22; 30f. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Dowden 2007: 44-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Burkert 1987: 129-131. See Dowden’s (2006) compact study, *Zeus*. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Dowden 2007: 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. See Appendix II. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. See Appendix I, Diagram B. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Chapter one analyses in a more detailed way the term’s uncertain etymology and explains how different usage, etymological variants and different readings of the term led to differences of opinion among scholars of Greek religion. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Wilford 1965: 217. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. These were mostly Brenk’s (1986: 2068) characterisations of the term. They were based on Untersteiner’s (1939: 95-134) much earlier treatment. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. On the different nature of gods and *daimones* see Ehnmark 1935: 58-74; Nilsson 1964: 104; 105; Frazer 1993: 169. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Cruse 2000: 87. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Cruse 2000: 100f. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Cruse 2000: 127f. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. *OCD3* s.v. daimon. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. The Oxford Dictionary of the Classical World 1996: 426. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Brenk 1986: 2071-2082. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. See Langton 1949: 80-103;*OCD3* s.v. daimon. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. The Oxford Dictionary of the Classical World 2005: 201; Dover 1980: 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Hence, a lucky, fortunate person was εὐδαίμων (‘with a good *daimôn* already in Hesiod’); an unlucky one was κακοδαίμων (‘with a bad *daimôn*: from the 5th century B.C.’) See further *OCD3* s.v. daimon; Rose 1984:28. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Note especially that in Classical Greek usage (e.g. E. *Bacch*. v. 894) it could simply designate ‘a divine being’, but the tendency to differentiate it from *theos* is apparent in the charge made against Socrates that he introduced ‘strange [new] *daimonia*’ in Athens (Xen., Mem. 1.1.1). See Luck 1985: 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. See further Mikalson 1991: 240-241; 17ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. See further Burkert 1985: 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. See further Mikalson 1991: 17ff.; 241-242; Burkert 1985: 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Langton 1949: 80-103. Cf. Heraclitus went against such a view: ‘character is for man his *daimôn*’. See further Burkert 1985: 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. *OCD3* s.v. daimon. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Burkert 1985: 179-181; *OCD3* s.v.daimon; Denniston 1939: 202. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. See further Walter Burkert’s (1985: 331-332) argument on how the *Epinomis* develops the theory of *daimones* into a system. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. See further Luck 1985: 163f. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Rose 1984: 109-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. See for example Plutarch’s dialogue *On the Daimonion of Socrates* (591 D ff). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. See Dillon 1997: 219; contra Luck 1985: 163f., who suggests that Socrates’ *daimonion* could not be simply considered ‘an evil power,’ since Socrates himself described his *daimonion* as ‘an inner voice that warned him whenever he was about to do something wrong.’ Admittedly, Socrates’ *daimonion* could not be understood simply as ‘an evil power’ and this might be easily perceived from what can be found in later Platonism as the interpretation of Socrates’ *daimonion* and as a kind of ‘a guardian angel or spiritual guide’. Indeed, against the evil nature of Socrates’ *daimonion* comes Dodd’s modern view, in which *daimonion* is seen as possessing the function of the ‘suprarational personality that controls the whole of our lives, including involuntary functions such as dreaming.’ See further Dodds 1973: 192. Cf. also Apuleius (*De Genio Socr*. 154) where Plato’s ‘guardian daemons’ are linked with Socr. *daimonion*. (*Phaedo* 107d-e; *Republic* 617d, 620d-e). See further Luck 1985: 171f. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. See further Russell 1977: 142f. See also Clarke 1998: 334-340. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. See further Russell 1977: 142; Burkert 1985: 179-181; Pétrement 1947: 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Coulter 1976: 57-59. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. For the most comprehensive exposition of Plutarch’s demonology, see further Brenk 1986: 2118ff.; Dillon 2003: 89-98; Hani 1976: 225-232. Plutarch even had the tendency to assign to daemons some of the functions which were traditionally assigned to the gods (esp. in his essay *On the Cessation of Oracles* 419b). However, unlike the gods, daemons grow old and, after many centuries, die. Because daemons were in charge of the oracles, some of the great ones of the ancient world have declined. On Plutarch’s demonology see further Luck 1985: 172f. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Luck 1985: 163f. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. See further Luck 1985: 207f. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. See Russell 1977: 142; Luck 1985: 204-211; 165-169. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Luck 1985: 163-174; Russell 1977: 142f. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. See Langton 1942: 53-63 on demonical possession. Cf. Bruno de Jesus Marie, Father 1951: 163-177; Eitherm 1966: 3-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. See Russell on the Devil (Satan) as the prince of demons. See also Hull 1974: 98; Bruno de Jesus Marie, Father 1951: 1-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Especially Burkert (1985), Brenk (1986), Wilford (1977), François (1957), Snell (1953), Dietrich (1965). [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Glanville 1681: 35f. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Of course, this is a recent understanding of the term*daimôn* and it by no means suggests that this is its true meaning. (See further Richard H. Hiers 1974: 35-47). Actually, in Homer, as we shall see later on, the term has a completely different meaning from all of the above. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. See Luck 1985: 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Of course, these higher gods could not always be considered uniformly ‘good’; could also be persistently ‘evil’. Cf. Sissa (2000) on the ambiguity of the gods. The most authoritative book on Greek religion, which includes the gods as well, is Burkert 1985 and a briefer but remarkably more powerful one is that of Bremmer 1994. Susan Deacy, the general editor of a new series on Greek Gods and Heroes, covers both the ancient information of the gods but also their tradition in modern times. On the evidence for the origins of the pantheon of twelve, see Long 1987. For the synthesis of myth and religion see Otto 1954, and more specifically 1965. Although many consider Farnell 1896-1909 to be an old reference for recent research on the gods, it is worth going back to him for detailed information on the cults of particular gods. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Appendix IV, Tables I, II. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. See Appendix I, Diagrams A&B. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. See Appendix II. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. In his study of oral poetry (*Oral Poetry: An Introduction*, 1990),Paul Zumthor has identified the specificities of oral texts and analysed their inherently social function. He discusses the development of oral poetry from antiquity to the present. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Zumthor 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. De Jong 2004: 36-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Edwards 2009: 307-309. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. The most comprehensive exposition of Austin’s theory can be acquired from his philosophical paper ‘The meaning of a word’, in Austin, *Philosophical Papers,* 1961, pp. 23-43. It constitutes a polemic against doing philosophy by attempting to pin down the *meaning* of the words used. Austin warns us to take care when removing words from their ordinary usage, giving numerous examples of how this can lead to error. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. See Appendix III. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. See further Hayakawa (1962) on the use and the misuse of language. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Parry 1971: 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Elisabeth Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Snell 1991; Porzig 1923; Burkert 1977; Nilsson 1955. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Snell 1991: 98-100. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Porzig 1923: 169ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Burkert 1977: 279. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Nilsson 1955: 218. Cf. Chantraine (1968-1970: 247) on the meaning of δαίομαι: ‘partager’, ‘deviser’. See also Wilamowitz’s idea that δαίμων is taken from the verb δαίω and thus, δαίμων be interpreted as ‘Zuteiler’ (vol. 1: 369). [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. On the role of the gods in Homer see Otto 1954. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Snell 1991; Chantraine 1968-70; Frisk 1954. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Dietrich 1965: 14-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. The Oxford Dictionary of the Classical World 2005: 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. *LSJ7* s.v. δαίμων. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Dietrich 1985: 14-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Snell 1991: 198. See also Rudhardt 1992: 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. ‘After Hesiod the term was ready to designate a semi-god, a daemon; in the end it is employed to designate an evil spirit and finally in the vocabulary it came to signify an evil spirit.’ See Chantraine 1968-70: 246-47. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Frisk 1954: 340. See further chapter three; see esp. discussion further below. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Chantraine 1968-70: 246-47. On the meaning of the term *daimôn* in association with its derivative adjective δαιμόνιος, see chapter three and discussion further below. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. On the radical changes in the meaning of the term *daimôn* during different periods in Greek thought, see the discussion in the introduction to this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Tsagarakis (1977) *Nature and Background of Major Concepts of Divine Power in Homer*. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. See also Wilford 1965: 218-219. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. See further Leitzke 1930: 48. See further Appendix III for a summary of arguments [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. On the contrary, François finds that the term *daimôn* is identified with Athena and not Zeus in *Od*. 3.166. See further François 1957: 334f. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Héden 1912: 86 believes this daemon to be Zeus (*Il*. 15.254ff.). Cf. Jörgensen 1904: 364. Dietrich, bycontrast, shows that daemon here is identified with Apollo. The latter justifies Héden’s choice of Zeus, since Apollo had originally been commanded by Zeus to help Hector (i.e. *Il*. 231, 255). However, Apollo is the one that appears to the Trojan hero and reveals himself, so for Hector, he was the driving force which the poet describes as a daemon. Cf. the schol. Ven. B, which is noncommittal on this question: ἢ ὁ Ἀπόλλων ἢ ὁ Ζεύς. See further Dietrich 1965: 308. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. The passage of Teucer from *Il.* 15.458ff is a good example of the overlap that existed between the two areas. It contains three levels of religious apprehension, ‘moving from that of the merely supernatural to that of some god who cannot be named, and thence to a god who can be named.’ See Dietrich 1965: 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. See Appendix V and chapter two: table 1 for a more detailed exposition of the term’s meanings in Homer. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. This is a fact that Hector knows well, for Apollo had announced himself when he had given Hector courage for the contest. See further Dietrich 1965: 307f. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. See further Appendix VI on Point of View Regarding the Homeric *Daimôn*. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Tsagarakis 1977: 98-116. Of course, this is an old thesis rejected by E.R. Dodds (1951) and Chantraine (1952). [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. This is an idea which would later be presented by Wilford 1965. Cf. Dodds’ 1951 and Nilsson’s 1964 suggestion that the term *daimôn* be used whenever ‘the author is faced with vagueness or ignorance as to the exact spiritual force’. See further Brenk 1980: 511. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Guthrie 1959: 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. François 1957: 334f. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. For Usener (1896: 292) δαίμων designates ‘an instant god’ behind which we find Aphrodite. See further François 1957: 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. This identification is already admitted by Jörgensen 1904: 365; Basset 1919: 135 and Kullmann 1956: 54. It is rejected by Hedén 1912: 86, Leipzig 1922: 110 and Untersteiner 1939: 111. Cf. my own explanation in chapter two of the term *daimôn*’s meaning in the above verses. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. See further Appendices V and VII for a more detailed discussion of the plural of the term. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Hedén (1912: 16; 93) examined in further detail the indefinite mode of direct speech. He was also the scholar who advanced the view of a ‘general deity’ and argued that it reflected the popular belief of the poet’s contemporaries (cf. also J. Duffy, *A Comparative Study of the Religion of the Iliad and Odyssey*, pp.67ff. See also Dietrich’s (1985: 182) criticism of this view. More specifically, Dietrich finds that Hedén’s idea errs mainly in his strict separation of popular belief from his ‘epic’ sphere; he declares that ‘such a clear-cut distinction can never be maintained.’ See further, Kullmann 1965: 9.) Odysseus Tsagarakis (1977: IX-X) also criticises Hedén’s previous idea, suggesting that ‘aside from the fact that “theos”, “theoi” and “daimon” are often identified with personal gods by the characters themselves (cf. E. Ehnmark, *The Idea of God in Homer*, p.67, *Anthropomorphism and Miracle*, p.38. Cf. also Dodds (1950), p.12f.)’; Hedén has not managed to show that Homeric characters are indeed aware of a ‘general deity’ that is distinct from the anthropomorphic gods they worship. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Tsagarakis 1977: 98f.; Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Brenk 1986: 2075. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Dietrich 1965: 308f. Contra Hedén (1912: 23) and Chantraine (1952: 66) [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Similarly, Hedén (1912: 23), as I have already mentioned above, conceives of *daimones* as the ‘general designation of the gods’. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Chantraine 1952: 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. See for instance M. P. Nilsson 1949: 162-179. Even before them, Nägelsbach (1861) argued that the term *daimôn* was synonymous with the general god (θεός). [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Dietrich 1965: 300; see further Jörgensen 1904. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. This was an addition made by Else (1949). [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Dietrich 1965: 300f. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Else 1949: 28; cf. Ehnmark 1935: 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Else 1949: 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Calhoun 1937: 16. Dietrich 1965: 299, 300, rightly opposes Calhoun’s (1937: 20) belief that the general θεός or θεοί were the impersonal agencies or simply the expressions of chance because, as Dietrich previously showed, the θεός can often be readily identified with a particular deity. This is exactly what happens in the case of δαίμων, Ι shall suggest (see esp. chapter two below). This is another way of showing how exactly δαίμων is related to the general θεός. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Else 1949: 32. For a discussion of the usage of θεός and τὸ θεῑον in subsequent literature and philosophy, see also Else 1949: 32ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Else 1949: 30f. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Else 1949: 30f. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Dietrich 1965: 321. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Dietrich 1965: 300. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Dietrich 1965: 300ff.; cf. my discussion of the cases where δαίμων refers to the general θεός, τὶς θεός, Ζεύς in chapter two. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. Dietrich 1965: 297-337. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Dietrich 1965: 316; 314. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. Tsagarakis 1977: 98. Cf. François 1957, who also suggested that the term *daimôn* is used in a general way as θεός, θεοί. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Brunius- Nilsson 1955: 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. François 1957: 334f. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. See further Rose in Chantraine 1952: 80. In a similar way, Rose 1984: 28f; 119-120 attributed the existence of the *daimônic* to mortals’ tendency to believe that they were living in a world full of supernatural powers; they considered them to be responsible for everything happening in their life. Rose, then, perceived this word (*daimôn*) as the ‘vaguer equivalent of the gods.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Chantraine 1952: 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Chantraine 1952: 50-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Bremmer 1994: 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. Bremmer 1994: 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. Price 1999: 13f. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. Price 1999: 13f. Cf. Mikalson (1983: 18f.; 50; 60f.; 66) who also refers to the relation between gods and *daimôn* and their intervention in human affairs. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. Wilford 1965: 217. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. Bianchi 1953: 186ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. See further Taplin’s review (1981: 103-104) of Tsagarakis’ book. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. In his review of Tsagarakis, Vos (1985: 2-5) attributes this statement to Kullmann. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. Nilsson 1964: 164-166. [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. Nilsson 1964: 164-165. Cf. Usener’s (1896: 291) idea of a *daimôn* as a momentary god. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. Bianchi 1953: 115ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. Ibid. Nilsson would object to the use of the word ‘personal’, preferring to compare the term *daimôn* to some impersonal force such as *mana.* Rose (1952: 81), on the other hand, rightlysees it as personal (just like Bianchi does) on the strength of the suffix -μων, which always implies a personal agent; Dodds (1951: 23) inclines to Rose’s view. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. Bianchi 1953: 115ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. Dietrich 1985: 297-337. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. Wilford 1965: 218-220. See also Brenk 1986: 2076. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. Wilford 1965: 218-220. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. Ehnmark 1935: 59-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. Ibid. See further Nilsson 1964: 104-105. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. Which, as Brenk (1986: 2080) suggested, ‘for all its brevity remains as good as anything written on religion in Homer and filled with pregnant ideas.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. Chantraine 1952: 50-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. Chantraine 1952: 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. Burkert incorporates his discussion of the term *daimôn* in the general framework of his discussion of ‘Greek Religion’, where he genuinely reconstructs what we want to know about ancient Greek polytheism. See further Rexine’s (186: 58-59) review of Burkert’s book. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. Burkert 1985: 179-180. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. Burkert 1985: 179-180. Cf. Rexine’s (1986: 188) review of Burkert’s book and especially of Burkert’s argument about ‘the remarkably organised and orderly Olympic pantheon’ in contrast to the undefined term *daimôn*. See also Emily Kearns’ (1987: 215-216) review. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. Burkert 1985: 180. Cf. Wilford’s (1965: 219) idea of the term *daimôn* as referring to everything uncanny and unspecified. Contra my own ideas on the subject first laid out in the introduction. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. De Jong 2004: 158; 239. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. See further N. van der Ben & I.J.F. de Jong 1984: 301-316. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. De Jong 2004: 158; 239. [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. Brenk 1986: 2073. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. In Brenk’s (1986: 2073) own words: ‘a thin line separates these gods from the mysterious *daimôn* which appears in poems, generally, though not invariably responsible for something evil’. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. See further, Hudson-Williams’ (1957: 76) and Rose’s (1956: 149) reviews of Brunius- Nilsson’s monograph. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 115-123. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. Ibid. Cf. Rose (1965: 149), who in his review of Brunius-Nilsson’s monograph, rightly expresses his great disagreement on the above explanation of the term *daimôn*. [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 115-223. See further the review of Hudson-Williams (1957: 76) of Brunius-Nilsson’s monograph. [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. Hudson-Williams 1957: 76; Rose 1956: 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. Larson 2007: 1f. See also, Sarah Johnston 2004: 408. She refers to the same existing connection between gods and demons; she rightly suggests that there has never been any obvious separation between gods and demons in traditional Greek religious thinking. [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. This, of course, should not surprise us since the term, as we shall see, is used in place of a specific god (Aphrodite in *Il.* 3.420). See further Heubeck and Hoekstra 1989: 249; Hoekstra 1984: 255; Eustathius 1829-30: 99; Dindorf 1855: 613, who offer further evidence on *daimôn* being the reference of a specific god in the epics. [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. Wilamowitz, *Glaube*, I 356 ff. Cf. Nilsson, *Geschichte* I 216ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. On *daimones* in these verses see further Kirk 1990: 165; Willcock 1978: 243; Eustathius 1971-1987: 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. This is my translation and emphasis. Cf. *Il*. 6.269-280 and Hector’s advice to Hecabe to go with offerings to Athena’s temple and pray to her to protect the Achaeans from Diomedes’ fury (6.286-310). See Kirk’s (1990: 165) explanation of Hector’s choice to substitute ‘the gods’, δαίμοσιν, for Athena. This is an indication, according to Kirk, that he is generalising his intentions. Kakridis (1949: 62) agrees with this idea because, as he says, this is the natural condition under which a man acts when he appeals to his god. See further Erbse 1969: 1969: 150; Dindorf 1951: 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. All translations of the *Odyssey* from Lattimore. [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. Emphasis my own. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. Else 1935: 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. This might be due to the fact, as Dietrich (1985: 208) very correctly suggests, the term ‘*daimôn* is often a convenient term to refer to one god or to all of them collectively; thus, a man may quite generally refer to a god as a daemon, even though the name of the particular god is known to him.’ We often come across the terms ‘heaven’ (for *Il*. 11.792 see Butler 1892; and for *Il* 23.595 see Green 1898; Marris 1934) and ‘divinity/ies’ (for *Il*. 23.595 see Lattimore 1951) or ‘some divine help.’ See further, Dietrich 1965: 297-337. [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. Brunius-Nilsson’s study (*Δαιμόνιε: An Inquiry into a Mode of Apostrophe in Old Greek Literature*) is a thorough treatment of the use of this form. On the usage of the vocative δαιμόνιε in Homer, see my discussion in chapter three below. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. Chantraine 1968-70: 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. On the epithets’ meaning see Clark 2004; Parry 1971; Bowra 1962; Edwards 1987. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. Nägelsbach 1861: 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. Wilamowitz 1931: 362ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. Chantraine 1952: 50-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. M. P. Nilsson 1949: 165. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. M. P. Nilsson 1949: 165. [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. Burkert 1985: 180. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. Burkert 1985: 180. [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. Hudson-Williams1957: 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. See *Il.*2.190, 200, 4.31, 9.40; *Od.*18.15; plural δαιμόνιοι in *Od.*4.774, 23.174. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. *LSJ7* s.v. δαιμόνιος. [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. *LSJ9*  s.v. δαιμόνιος. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. See *Il*. 2.190, 200; especially in addressing strangers (*Il.* 23.166, 174); in addresses made by husbands and wives (e.g. *Il*. 6.407, 468; *Il.* 24.194). [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. *OCD3* s.v. δαιμόνιος. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. Chantraine 1968-70: 246-47. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. Frisk 1954: 340. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. Snell 1991: 197-200. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 64-114) offers a detailed analysis of the use of δαιμόνιε in post-Homeric authors. However, she omits the vocative’s relationship with its root-term δαίμων. Cf. Eleanor Dickey’s (1996) treatment of ‘the Usage of Greek Forms of Address from Herodotus to Lucian’. She shows the term gaining its meaning from the developed relationship between the speaker and the addressee. [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. See Brunius- Nilsson 1955: 64-114; *LSJ9*s.v. δαιμόνιος; Snell 1991: 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. Cruse 1986: 15f. [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. *Il. 3*.420. [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. *Il.* 1.222. [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. *Il.*8.166, 21.93; *Od*. 16.64. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. *Od*. 5.396; *Il.* 15.403. [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. *Il.* 16.370. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. *Od*. 19.10. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. *Od*. 5.421. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. *Il.* 15.468 and *Od*. 10.64. [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. Scholars’ definition of the term *daimôn*’s ambiguity reflects what Cruse (2000: 108) called the defining criterion for the ambiguity of an expression: ‘We shall take antagonism between readings as a defining criterion for the ambiguity of a linguistic expression; where the ambiguous expression is a word, like [*daimôn*], we shall say that it has more than one sense.’ See also Pustejovsky and Boguraev 1995: 1-13; Saeed 2009: 59f., on the problem of lexical ambiguity. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. This thesis uses both the terms: ‘the poet’ and ‘the narrator’ to refer to the primary narrator-focalizer. (NF1). In general, this thesis uses narratological terms as were originally used by de Jong (2004). On the different usage of the terms ‘the poet’ and ‘the narrator’ see further de Jong (1977). [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. This is a view first argued by the Jörgensen 1904. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. See further Burkert (1985) who makes a clear distinction between the anthropomorphic gods and the unnamed *daimônic power*. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. Cruse 2000: 96. [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. Cruse 2000: 99f.; Haas: 1962, 1964, on Haas’s contextual approach. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. Cruse 2000: 99f. Cf. Goddard: 1998: 6f., who mistakenly rejected the theory that ‘the meaning is use.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. Cruse 2000: 99f. [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. Cruse 2000: 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. De Jong 2004: 97. [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. Goddard 1998: 9f. See also Harris 1983: 118, on Saussure’s *Course in General Linguistics*. Cf. Lepschy (1982) on the influence of the ideas of Saussure on modern linguistics. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. Goddard 1998: 9f. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. Goddard 1998: 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. Goddard 1998: 13f.; Wittgenstein 1953: 31f.; Cruse 2000: 101f. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. Goddard 1998: 101. [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. Cruse 2000: 98f. An extreme version of componential semantics is found in the works of Jackendoff (1983, 1990, 1996); Wierzbicka (1996) and Leibniz (1903). See also Saeed 2009: 1-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. Cruse 2000: 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. On the term *daimôn*’s association with the terms with which it develops semantic relations, see further Goddard (1998) and Cruse (2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. De Jong 2004: 41-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. De Jong 2004: 41-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. De Jong 2004: 149-160. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. See further Appendix VI. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. Goddard 1998: 13f.; Wittgenstein 1953: 31f.; Cruse 2000: 101f. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. See further Appendix III. [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. See also Appendix IV on the term *daimôn*’ssemantic components. [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. See further Appendix I, Diagrams A and B. [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. The term *daimôn* refers to an unspecified, invisible, non-rational and impersonal power twenty-three times (see Appendix V) in both the *Iliad* (ten times, out of which eight use the formula δαίμονι ἶσος) the *Odyssey* (thirteen times). [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. De Jong 2004: 148-149. [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. Tsagarakis 1977: 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. Contra Dietrich (1965: 315) and (Tsagarakis 1977: 101f.), who suggested that the term *daimôn* here (275) might be associated with the harmful interventions (against the Achaeans) of a god who was protecting the Trojans. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. Wilford 1965: 217. On the use of the term *daimôn* here (275) see further Merry 1989: 164; Stanford 1961: 276; Eustathius 1829-30: 165. [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. Bianchi 1953: 186ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. Cf. Tsagarakis 1977: 109; Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 124. However, Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 124) suggests that the term might take the form of ‘an actual divinity to Telemachus’ when it comes to its ability to beguile Telemachus and thus increase his pain (195). But still, I suggest that if no specific god appeared to be responsible for this sudden and unwelcome event, then all this can only be attributed to the unspecified and mysterious *daimônic power*. See further Heubeck 1989: 221; 274; Stanford 1948: 270-1; Jones 1988: 151; Eustathius 1829-30: 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. Bianchi 1953: 186ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. On the term *daimôn*’s association with Athena here (3.27) see Jones 1988: 27; Morrison 2003: 49-51; François (1957: 334). [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. See further Jørgensen 1904: 357ff.; Brenk 1986: 2074f.; Ehnmark 1903: 59-73; Hedén 1912: 16f.; 21; 66; Nilsson 1964: 162ff.; Else 1949: 26-27. Contra Else (1949:30), who argues that the gods themselves do not use the term to address each other. It is frequently found on the lips of men to refer to the operation of a divine power on the fortunes of a particular man or men in general. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. On the gods’ tendency to remain invisible to their favourite mortals, see Kearns 2004: 64-67. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. On Telemachus’ inspiration by Athena, see Lesky 1961: 393-95; Tsagarakis 1977: 94f. On Athena’s benevolent activities towards Telemachus see Griffin 2004: 77; Winterbottom 1989: 38-39. See also Austin 1975: 208ff. on Athena’s favourable behaviour towards both Odysseus and Telemachus (*Od*. 19.18). [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. Murray’s translation. The same identification between Athena and the term *daimôn* is also suggested in the *Od*. 15.261. See further Dietrich 1965: 1965:311ff.; Kearns 2004: 64-67. The power represented by the term adopts some of Athena’s attributes as a god; it becomes the recipient of prayers and sacrifices. Cf. *Il*. 6.115; See further Heubeck 1989: 249; Hoekstra 1984: 255; Eustathius 1829-30: 99; Dindorf 1855: 613. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 124. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 124. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. See further Appendix VI on Point of View. [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. Schadewaldt (1965: 155) says that ‘Hector had to go himself to Troy because of the religious character of the mission’. G. Jachmann, *Symb. Col*. 1949:2 objected that Hector’s brother, Helenus, was more suitable for the job, especially since Hector was needed in the battlefield. Tsagarakis (1977: 98) combines both views. He correctly explains that the mission to Troy was the responsibility of a leader, making Hector the most suitable candidate (B 816f.). It was not just a matter of conveying a religious message, but instead Hector had to brief the elders (v. 113ff.). [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. Considering that *daimones* have no cult, people do not pray to *daimones*, but to the gods. For more see Tsagarakis 1977: 99f. [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. The same opinion was also expressed by Héden (1912: 93), who maintained that this plural (*daimones*) was a general designation of the gods. [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. Kakridis 1949: 62. As Kakridis (1962: 62) also adds: ‘[When a man appeals to his god] nobody must hear to what god he appeals, what he asks of him and by what means, for another person might try to counteract the possible consequences of his prayer.’ See also Erbse 1969: 150; Dindorf 1951: 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. Kirk 1990: 165. In fact, Kirk (1990: 165) offers the following convincing explanation: ‘Hector is adjusting the definition of his mission to make it more palatable to his troops. He is in any case generalizing his intentions, as is shown by the substitution of “the gods” δαίμοσιν for Athene.’ See further Willcock 1978: 273; Eustathius 1971-1987: 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. De Jong (2004: 150), ‘[because] the words spoken by characters have a different meaning for the NeFe1 than they have for the characters that speak and hear.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. See further Appendix I, Diagrams A&B, on the term *daimôn*’s semantic components. [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. De Jong 2004: 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. All previously mentioned ideas are reflected in the following two dicta: a) the one as expressed by Chantraine (1952: 57f.), ‘δαίμονες = general, vague gods, come to be replaced by Homer by the clearly defined anthropomorphic gods,’ and b) the other as derived from this thesis’ discussion of the term *daimôn*referring to both the collective gods and of a specific god: ‘δαίμονες = the Olympian gods, come to be associated with the unidentified name of a specific god.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. See further Nilsson 1964: 167-171. [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. See further Nilsson 1964: 167f; 170f. Cf. Dietrich 1965: 186. [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. On the nature of daemon from popular belief see Dietrich 1965: 19f., 51. Cf. Rohde 1925: 119f. See further Dietrich (1965: 258) on the usage of the term *daimôn* in *Odyssey* book 11.61 (i.e. Elpenor’s words addressed to Odysseus in Hades: ‘ἆσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος’) and its association with *aisa* and death and with daemon from popular belief, which are equally held responsible for taking a person’s senses away. See also Heubeck and Hoekstra 1989: 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. Leitzke 1930: 56f. [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. *LSJ9*s.v. αἶσα : ‘αἶσα like Μοῖρα is the divinity who dispenses to every one his lot or destiny.’ In *Od*. 11.61 αἶσα is associated with the ‘decree, dispensation of a god.’ Cf. *Il.* 9.608: τετιμῆσθαι αἶσα κακή; 17.321: ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἶσαν. Cf. also 6.487: ὑπὲρ αἶσαν ἀνήρ;*Od*. 11.61: δαίμονος αἶσα κακή. [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. See further Dietrich 1965: 292f. Cf. Tsagarakis 1977: 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. This is Murray’s translation. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. Ἐπέκλωσεν shows ‘the function of deities who were part of a ‘very ancient stratum’ of popular religion’ (on this subject see Rose 1945: 24). Here it has already been taken over by the much more abstract δαίμων (xv 261n.).’ Heubeck and Hoekstra 1989: 268. Hainswoth also comments on *Od*. 7.197: ‘κλῶθες is a personification of κλώθειν, ‘spin’. Κλωθώ along with Ἄτροπος and Λάχεσις, first appears at Hes. *Th.* 218 and 905. [The] plural μοῖραι, common in cult and later literature, occurs elsewhere in Homer, and questionably at that, only at *Il*. Xxiv 49.’ Hainsworth comments on *Od*. 7.198: ‘the use of spinning as an image of the decrees of fate seems to be a product of a poetic tradition.’ Hainsworth in the same way refers to the instances that show that both the gods and δαίμων ‘issue their decrees by spinning.’ For more see Heubeck, West and Hainsworth 1988: 333-334. See also Dietrich 1962: 86-101. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 20), ‘[this] clearly demonstrates the element of predestination in δαίμων.’ For more see Eustathius 1929-30: 114; Dindorf 1855: 623. [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. Tsagarakis 1977: 121f. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. Cf. *Od*. 14.39; *Od*. 5.169. [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. Cf. *Od*. 5.169; 23.258; 24.401; 4.480 etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. Cf. *Od*. 8.413 etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. Cf. *Il.* 9. 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. Cf. with the above cited examples of Odysseus’ return, and *Od*. 23.258ff.; 286; cf. *Od*. 5.286. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. Cf. *Il*. 24.534. For more see Dietrich 1965: 289ff. See especially pp. 292-294. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. Dietrich 1965: 292. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. Nilsson 1923-24: 387. [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. Dietrich (1965: 292), ‘*moira* in *Il.* 24.209 does not save the life of Hector, but a special experience after death. The μοῖρα κραταιή may be an echo of the popular *moira* […] of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The spinning αἶσα on the other hand, as mentioned above, recalls the αἶσα= a condition, expectation […]. Nor does the addition to γιγνομένῳ in the three αἶσα and μοῖρα passages prove Nilsson’s point conclusively, because Zeus once weaves ὄλβος at birth and marriage in *Od*. 4.207.’ Cf. Nilsson 1923-24: 387. [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. Tsagarakis 1977: 121. Cf. Dietrich 1965: 292; Nilsson 1923-24: 387. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. Dietrich 1965: 292. See also Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 120; Tsagarakis 1977: 121; Nilsson 1923-24: 387. [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. This is Murray’s translation of 16.63-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. See further Nilsson 1923-24: 387; Tsagarakis 1977: 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. Dietrich 1965: 292. [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. Tsagarakis 1977: 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. De Jong 2004: 29-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. Leaf and Bayfield 1962: 338. [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. Hooker (1979: 69) even translated the expression ἦρχε δέ δαίμων: ‘and her protecting divinity [in this case, Aphrodite] led the way.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. For more about the beauty contest between Hera, Athena and Aphrodite, see *Il*. 24.28-30. Aristarchus athetised these verses. On the judgement of Paris, see Walcot 1976: 31-36; Dindorf 1951: 447-48. See also Kullmann 1985: 2-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. On Aphrodite as a leading goddess see Brenk 1986: 2073. Cf. Leaf (1900). [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. On the relationship between Aphrodite, Helen and Paris, see further my discussion in Chapter Three. [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. Kirk 1985: 325. [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. See further Wilford 1965: 218f.; Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 117f.; Tsagarakis 1977: 100f. Cf. François (1957: 334), who also shows that the term *daimôn* referrs to a specific god, Athena and not Aphrodite. [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. Tsagarakis (1977: 100f.) rightly suggests that the ‘active verb (ἤγαγε) points to an anthropomorphic god as it does elsewhere in the *Iliad*; the expression (ἤγαγε δαίμων) is formulaic and occurs often in this verse position.’ Cf. Snell’s interpretation, EntretiensHardt I, 82. Cf. *Od.*2.416 and 3.12 where ἦρχε δέ is followed by the name of Athena. [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. Dietrich 1965: 307f. [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
340. Helen’s reaction may be similar but not identical, as I shall suggest, to Achilles’ reaction when he recognises Athena (*Il*. 1.188). For more, see Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 31f. [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
341. Tsagarakis (1977: 100f.) and Chantraine (1952: 50-55) list this passage as ‘an exceptional case in which a divinity very well recognised is named daimon […] [and] signifies the mysterious power of the divinity.’ On δαιμονίη here (3.399), as a reference to the unaccountable behaviour of Aphrodite, see Willcock 1970: 114; Leaf and Bayfield 1962: 337; Pierron 1896: 122. Cf. Monro 1896: 260; Jones 2003: 92. Contra Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 31f.) who does not find any connection between the vocative δαιμονίη (3.399) and ἦρχε δὲ δαίμων that follows (3.420). See further my discussion in Chapter Three on Aphrodite’s address as δαιμονίη. [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
342. Snell 1953: 82; cf. Wilford 1965: 218-219. [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
343. The plural of δαίμων occurs only three times in Homer, and always in the *Iliad* and it is synonymous with the Olympian family. [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
344. Cf. *Il.* 23. 595: the narrator embeds the speech of Antilochus in his narration, while he puts further emphasis on the terror and great anguish of a mortal character lest he sin against the Olympians (δαίμοσιν ἀρήσασθαι, 595) and against Apollo as the god who was already perceived as the punisher of sinners earlier in the *Iliad* (cf.1.8ff.: he sent great punishment upon Agamemnon and his army due to Agamemnon’s disrespect towards Chryses, the god’s priest. See further Burkert 1985; Price 1999; Otto 1954 on Apollo and his relation to the Greeks). In this scene as before (i.e. *Il*.1.222), we may identify that behind the usage of a character’s emotions and speech lies the intention of the narrator to show how the plural δαίμοσιν may be used to signify the Olympian gods and a specific god, Apollo (i.e. he was already and once (*Il*. 15.418) associated with *daimôn*, and as such, his association with *daimones* here (23.595) is a natural consequence of his previous usage). See further Dietrich 1985: 308ff. Cf. Brenk 1986: 2075; Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 116; Tsagarakis 1977: 98f. See Gunliffe 1924: 82. Cf. *Il.*1.222, 6.115. See also Edwards 1906: 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
345. Dietrich 1965: 308f. Homer’s example was followed by later poets as well (e.g. Soph. *OT*34; Pind. *Ol*. I, 35.) [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
346. Guthrie 1950: 110-11; Dietrich 1979: 147. Cf. Pulleyn 2000: 188. [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
347. For more see Burkert 1985: 119-131. [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
348. Burkert 1985: 218-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
349. Erbse 1969: 71. Cf. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 116; Tsagarakis 1977: 98f. similarly consider *daimones* as ‘a collective indicating the Olympic deities’. [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
350. See further Dietrich’s (1983) article on the gods’ various forms of disguise when they reveal themselves to their favourites. [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
351. Scodel 2004: 48-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
352. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
353. See further de Jong (2004: 60-99) on the interaction between primary narrator-focalizer and primary narratee-focalizee and on the way that the primary narrator chooses to pass information to his audience. [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
354. See further Table 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
355. Except from the one oblique case in *Iliad* 3.420. See further Table 1 and 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
356. *Od.* 4.275. [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
357. *Od*. 16.194. [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
358. *Il*. 8.166. [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
359. *Il.* 17.98. [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
360. *Od*. 16.64. [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
361. *Il*. 3.420. [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
362. Athena, in *Od*. 3.27. [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
363. *Il*. 17.98. [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
364. *Il.* 3.420. [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
365. *Il.* 1.222. [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
366. The name of Athena lies behind the use of the term in the plural in *Il.* 1.222. [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
367. *Od.* 4.275. [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
368. *Od.* 16.194. [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
369. *Od.* 4.275, 16.194. [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
370. Contra Burkert (1985: 152) who argued that the term *daimôn* represents ‘the left overs’ of the anthropomorphic gods. See further Snell (1953: 30f.) on ‘divine apparatus’. [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
371. See further Dowden 2007: 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
372. *Il.* 3.420. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
373. *Il.* 1.222. [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
374. It has nothing to do with either the intentions of Hera to help Agamemnon and the Achaeans when she, in an invisible form, puts it into Agamemnon’s mind to encourage the Achaeans (*Il*. 8.218-9) nor with the intentions of Aphrodite when, in the form of a physical intervention, she removes Paris from the battlefield in a cloud of mist in order to save him (*Il*. 3.380-382). [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
375. In fact, we learn nothing about Aenaeas’ reaction when Apollo snatches him from Diomedes and takes him to recover in his temple (*Il.* 5.438-450) or from Paris when Aphrodite removes him from the battle in a cloud mist (3.380-382) and brings him to his bedchambers. [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
376. *Il*. 3.420. [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
377. On the way the gods intervene in human affairs, see further Kearns 2004: 65-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. See further chapter three on Aphrodite, and her not ‘expected behaviour’ towards her favourite mortal Helen. [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. *Od*. 3.27. [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. Green (1963: 14-16) suggested that ‘it was only in the poets who followed Homer that Fate was at times definitely separated from the gods and sometimes even set above them. It was in the post-Homeric period that *moira*, a single order, gave place to the *Moirai*, the Fates. Only once in Homer (*Il*. 24.49) do we find the plural; but in Hesiod (*Theog*. 217ff.) we find not only the three *Moirai* and their pedigree but their familiar names (Clotho, “the Spinner”, Lachesis, “the Dispenser of Lot”, and Atropos, “She who cannot be turned”). In Homer it is sometimes the gods who “spin men’s destiny”, sometimes Moira or “Aisa and the stern of spinning women.”’ [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. Dietrich 1965: 179-180. [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. *Homer. Theologie,*3 1884, see especially pp. 116ff., cf. also his *Nachhomer. Theol*., 1857. [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. Gruppe 1906: 987ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. Lang 1897: 2ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. Jebb 1882: 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. Bohse 1983: 22. Heden 1912: 18f.; 26. Cf. Jörgensen 1904: 357ff; Causer 1921: 376ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. Nägelsbach 1884: 116ff. Cf. Bowra 1930: 133-215; Schmid 1929: 124f., 10ff., 175ff. on the amoral gods being subjected to the impersonal *moira*. [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. Ehnmark 1935: 86-103; Dietrich 1965: 183f. Cf. Green 1948: 10f. Cf. Otto’s (1954: 263-268) belief in the existence of an evil fate (i.e. the *daimôn* of doom and death; *moros*) opposing the good gods coincides with DeSanctis, 1940, i: pp.248-73. See also Schmid 1929: 124f.; 110ff., 175ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. Dietrich 1965: 179-180. Jebb (1882: 51) takes the gods and fate as ‘concurrent and usually harmonious agencies.’ See also Welcker 1857: 183ff., 698. [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. He conceived that fate (especially fate of death) was superior to the gods. See further Adkins 1960: 17f. Contra (Lloyd-Jones 1971: 5), who posits Zeus’ will as identical to *moira.* [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. Lloyd-Jones 1971: 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. Nilsson (1964: 171-172) correctly affirmed that fate and the gods are placed side by side. [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. Bianchi 1953: 119ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. Nilsson’s classification follows Hedén, who separates ‘epic gods’ and popular belief. He even perceived the daemon as one among the agents of fate. For more, see Dietrich 1965: 186; Nilsson 1964: 167f; 170f. [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. *Il*. 17.98, 8.166; *Od*. 16.64. [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. Dietrich 1965: 321. See further Bianchi 1953: 119ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. See Appendix II. [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. See further Appendix I, Diagram B, and discussion further below in chapter two. [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. See Appendix IV, Tables I&II [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. See further Appendix VI. [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. *Od.*10.64, 19.201. [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. Aeolus in *Od.* 10.64. [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. Odysseus in *Od*. 19.201. [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. *Od.*10.64, 24.149. [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. *Od*. 5.396. [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. *Od*. 19.201. [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. Dietrich 1965: 314. See further Appendices I&IV. [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. Contra Tsagarakis 1977: 111. In the past, scholars (i.e. Dietrich 1965: 317f.) highlighted that the adjectives κακός, στυγερός and χαλεπός are used four times in the *Odyssey* (10.64; 24.149, 5.396, 19.201) and not at all in the *Iliad* to signify the popular nature of daemon. Thus, the term *daimôn* as a reference of daemon from popular belief was often responsible for causing madness and illness. However, I suggest that even in the oblique cases in which the term *daimôn* is identified with the evil activities of the popular daemon, the term may be also used as a reference to the malicious behaviour of other kinds of supernatural entities. See Appendices I&IV. [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. On the contrary, I believe that the poet had no intention of attributing the term *daimôn* with negative connotations and with the negative sense that the word demon has acquired today. For this reason, the poet never used the term to denote hostile supernatural beings in the *Odyssey*, which include the Cyclops, Scylla, Charybdis, the Sirens, Circe, Calypso and other kinds of non-human non-divine monsters. Cf. Tsagarakis (1977: 111), who suggests the adjectives κακός, στυγερός, χαλεπός may be in fact used to highlighht the evil intetnions of *daimôn*. Contra Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 119f.), who suggests that the usage of the pejorative epithets κακός στυγερός, and χαλεπός demonstrate that the term *daimôn* does not have an evil connotation. Instead, in some cases (i.e. *Od.* 24.149), it is nothing more than ‘a mode of an expression.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. By this I mean the use of a κακός *daimôn*, and the gods in the same context of conversation between Aeolus and Odysseus. [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. Murray translation. [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. Murray translation. [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. Cf. *Od*. 6.172: ‘Odysseus in order to arouse Nausicaa’s sympathy, tells her how δαίμων cast him upon the shore so that he should suffer more evil from the spite of the gods (‘νῦν δ’ ἐνθάδε κάββαλε δαίμων, ...ἀλλ’ ἔτι πολλὰ θεοὶ τελέουσι πάροιθεν, 172-174). On *daimôn*’s association to the gods here, see Eustathius 1829-30: 244-5; Merry and Riddell 1931: 267; Jones 1988: 59; Nilsson 1955: 119-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. The evil nature of the term *daimôn* here (64) can be confirmed by both the adjective κακὸς (= evil) and by the verb ἔχραε (= hurt, attacked). For more see Stanford 1961: 367; Dindorf 1952: 451; Merry and Riddell 1931: 404; Eustathius 1829-30: 367. [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. On the use of the term *daimôn* here (64) see Heubeck 1989: 46; Eustathius 1829-30: 367; Nilsson 1955: 120. On the usage of the verb ἔχραε here (64), see Edwards 1920: 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. For instance, a *daimôn* casts Odysseus ashore at Scheria in *Od*. 6.172; he raises an adverse wind in *Od*. 19.201 and calms the waves in *Od*. 12.169 [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. Dietrich 1965: 314. On the identical functions of the general god and the term *daimôn*, see Dietrich 1965: 305-306. [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. Dietrich 1965: 314. See also Heden 1912: 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. For more see Brunius-Nilsson 1959: 119f. [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. On the use of the term *daimôn* here, see Eustathius 1829-30: 198; Stanford 1962: 324; Snell 1896: 21-22; Mueller 1984: 126-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 120) has already suggested that behind the forces of nature ‘there is a supreme power (δαίμων) which is the primus motor.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. Dietrich 1965: 314. [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. Tsagarakis 1997: 111f.; cf. Dietrich 1965: 312f.; 314. [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. *Od*. 10.64, 19.201. [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. The narrator uses the term in a simile (i.e. *Od*. 5.396): the term *daimôn* is associated with death and with the chthonic *daimôn* that causes death. For more, see Tsagarakis 1977: 111. Cf. *Il.* 8.166; see further Tsagarakis 1977: 103. Contra Dietrich (1965: 314), who opposes the idea of a malicious *daimôn* being identified with ‘the agency of a chthonic δαίμων. Yet cf. Dietrich 1965: 50ff. In this context see also Gurthrie 1959: 217ff. Cf. Plut. *Caes*. 69 ὁ σὸς δαίμων κακός (on the question of personal *daimôn* cf. Tsagarakis 1977: 105 n.33). [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. Contra Tsagarakis (1977: 111), who suggests that these kinds of pejorative epithets (e.g. κακός, στυγερός, χαλεπός) are only found in the *Odyssey* and are used to recall, at least in this case (149), the term *daimôn*’s popular characteristics. [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. This happened only once in the *Odyssey* (5.396): the poet in a simile presents the idea of a στυγερόςδαίμων that recalls the δαίμων from popular belief who assails a person with sickness and it stands in direct opposition to the gods who save the person. See further Dietrich (1965: 35; 318). Generally, in Homer the δαίμων performs functions identical to those of the general deity. Contra Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 119), who affirms that the term *daimôn* does not stand in opposition to the gods. [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. E.g. *Od*. 6. 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. See further Wilford 1965: 220-223. [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. *Od*. 19.10, 19.138. [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. Snell 1982; Voigt 1934; cf. Harrison 1960; Dodds 1951. [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. Lesky 1961. [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. Snell 1982. [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. Fränkel 1962. [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. Voigt 1934. [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. Lloyd-Jones 1971: 1-28. [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. Fränkel 1962: 83f. [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. Snell 1982: 30-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. Snell 1982: 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. Snell 1982: 30f. Cf. Gaskin 1990: 1f. [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. Voigt 1934: 103. [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. Dodds 1951: 10-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. Harrison 1960. [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. Lloyd-Jones 1962. [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. Kirk 1962. [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. Williams 1983. [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. Gaskin 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. Sharples 1983. [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. Harrison 1960: 63-81. [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. Lloyd-Jones 1982: 8-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. As Kirk (1962: 405) explains: ‘the gods had established independent existence for themselves outside the events of nature and the psychology of men.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. Williams 1983: 28-29. [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. Williams 1983: 34. Even more, Williams (1983: 28-29) suggests that if Homeric man does not ‘decide for himself’, this is not because he has no self to decide for, or from. It is because something seems to be missing from the Homeric notions of deliberation and action; something called ‘the will’. [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. Gaskin 1990: 1f. [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. Cf. Sharples (1983: 3-4), who opposes Snell’s argument that ‘Homeric man is not a single self, but an assemblage of more or less independent psychic forces.’ Although Snell finds that there is no term for this self in Homer, Sharples points to the first person pronoun, which serves to indicate it. [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. See Gaskin 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. Gaskin 1990: 2f. [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. Gaskin 1990: 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. Regarding Lesky’s (1961) theory of the ‘double aspect’: ‘we should not think of human and divine realms as each possessing its own integrity, but was also capable of working together; so that the actions can acquire a “double aspect.”’Gaskin (1990: 5f.) suggests that ‘Homeric heroes do not make proper decisions because their decisions are made for them, either by gods, or by forces internal to the agents themselves.’ See also Snell 1896: 31. Cf. Schmitt (1992: 23), who also affirms that ‘divine interventions rarely affect agents in an arbitrary way [and as such does not remove responsibility), but tend to match capabilities and propensities autonomously present in the agents affected’. Cf. Plutarch, *Coriolanus,*ch.32 on defence of the thesis that divine intervention in Homer does not detract from human freedom. On Homeric man’s equal responsibility for a specific action with the gods and of men choosing courses of action in a self-controlled way, see Gaskin 1990: 7, 8ff., 11-14. Rosenmeyer 1989-1990: 188f. Snell (1896: 31) also affirms that Homeric heroes do not make decisions reflectively, because they are not capable of *akrasia.* Cf. Stuart Lawrence (2002: 1ff.) on Homeric characters’ deliberation and on ‘self-control or on the problem of incontinence,’ which arises when ‘irrational desire resists the implementation of a rational decision.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. Dodds 1951. [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. Wilford 1965. [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. See further Wilford 1965: 222f. [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. In a similar way, these vaguely conceived beings, as Dodds (1951: 10-11) suggested, are also credited with a wide range of what may be called loosely ‘monitions’. Of course, they are not expected to be taken literally. [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
467. See Dodds (1951: 11), who suggests that it is the poet’s characters that talk like this, and not the poet. He operates, like the author of the *Iliad*, with clear-cut anthropomorphic gods such as Athena and Poseidon, not with anonymous daemons. [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
468. A *daimôn* might send a good thought or an inspiration to man, but most of the times, its mental effect might become negative. See further Appendix IV, Tables I and II; Dietrich 1965: 313ff.; Wilford 1965: 221f.; Brenk 1984: 2073f. [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
469. See further Dietrich 1965: 314ff.; Brunius-Nilsson 1955:123f. [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
470. On daemon’s popular characteristics see Dietrich 1965: 18-58; 318f. On demon’s psychological effect on mortals see Russell 1997: 240; Hull 1974: 100; Langton 1949: 150-155. [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
471. Dodds 1951: 20f. [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
472. Cf. *Od*. 9.381: Odysseus and his men trapped in the Cyclops’ cave find themselves in extraordinary danger. In this case, it was not only a *daimôn* (here associated with Zeus; cf. v. 288ff. where the companions pray to Zeus) that ‘inspired courage’ in Odysseus’ terrified (see Dietrich 1965: 315, who finds δαίμων here to ‘impart strength to a person, like a θεός’) but also Odysseus’ encouragement (or the ‘intervention of the unconscious’) that affected his companions. Contra Tsagarakis (1977: 114), who without sufficient evidence suggests that ‘it was not his own [Odysseus’] encouragement [or any inexplicable strength from inner sources] that brought them there; it must have been given by *daimôn*.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
473. See further (Fulson- Rubin 1944: 144), on both Penelope’s and Odysseus’ association with *mêtis.* See further my discussion in chaptersthree and four. [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
474. On the presence of an audience, of its influence on the presentation of the speaking character and on the way that characters use their speeches to become the narrators of their own focalization, see de Jong 2004: 151ff. See also Doherty (2009: 247-264) on the presentation of internal audiences in the *Odyssey* (i.e. Odysseus and Penelope are among the characters used as audiences in the poem) and on Odysseus portrayed as ‘breaking a pattern by including women [among them Penelope] in his audience.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
475. Cf. *Od.* 14.488. See further Dietrich 1965: 318. [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
476. Tsagarakis (1977: 115f.) similarly suggested that ‘the inspiring *daimon* is helpful for the most part and in this function we see his affinity to the personal gods, and his epic concept.’ Contra Dietrich (1965: 316), who associates mental effect in Homer with daemon and with the general deity. Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 123-124) also uses the examples of a *daimôn*’*s* mental effect to stress its ambivalent character. She prefers to perceive the term *daimôn* as a ‘mode of expression’; it is used to suggest that a specific mortal is under supernatural influence, whereas she shows the term *daimôn* to be associated with a divinity only in the *Od*. 16.194. [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
477. Dodds 1951: 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
478. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
479. Brenk 1984: 2074f. [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
480. For more see Eustathius 1829-30: 187. On Athena’s benevolent mental effect on Odysseus and Telemachus see Griffin 2004: 77-78; Winterbottom 1989: 38-40. See also Lesky 1961: 393-94; Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 124) on Athena’s psychic effect on Telemachus and Odysseus. Dodds (1951: 12) also points to Athena’s role as Telemachus’ teacher. Cf. Dietrich (1965: 313), who also suggests that ‘the plan of the removal of the weapons goes back to Athena’s purpose or possibly to that of Zeus.’ Cf. *Od*. 16.291. [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
481. On the gods’/a *daimôn*’*s* intervention in human affairs without revealing their true identity to the mortals involved in the situation see Kearns 2004: 64-67. [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
482. Felson-Rubin (1944: 144) attributed to both Penelope and Odysseus the epithet ‘*polytropoi*’. For more, see Byre 1988: 168-169; my discussion in Chapter Three. [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
483. This is Murray’s translation on μαλακοῖς ἐπέεσσι. [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
484. Tsagarakis 1977: 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
485. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
486. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
487. Tsagarakis 1977: 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
488. Dietrich 1965: 313. [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
489. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
490. Brenk 1984: 2074. [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
491. See Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 124) on the term *daimôn*’sassociation here with Zeus. Cf. *Od*. 16.291. [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
492. Dietrich 1965: 313. [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
493. Lesky 1961. [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
494. For more see Lesky’s (1961) theory on the ‘double aspect’. [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
495. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
496. On the gods’ or a *daimôn*’s effect on the individual’s thoughts (*phrenes*) and feelings (*thumos*) see Lloyd-Jones 1971: 16-64. See also Kearns 2004: 64-67 on god’s or a *daimôn*’s intervention in human affairs without revealing his true identity to the human involved. [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
497. Emlyn-Jones 1987: 109; 133-134; Byre 1988: 163. Cf. Murnaghan 1987: 109 who sees Penelope’s behaviour as part of Athena’s (and Odysseus’) plot. [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
498. Dodds 1951: 11. Cf. Tsagarakis (1977: 115) on Penelope wishing to believe that a *daimôn* was on her side. See also Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 123) on Penelope’s feeling of being under supernatural influence. [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
499. Tsagarakis 1977: 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
500. Dodds 1951: 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
501. Cf. Dietrich 1965: 313f. and Brenk 1984: 2074. [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
502. Felson-Rubin 1987: 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
503. Murnaghan 1987: 104. Cf. Wilkler 1990: 129-161; Felson- Rubin 1944: 144; Byre 1988: 163f. [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
504. Lesky 1961; see also Dodds 1951:2ff, Whitman 1958: 248, Chantraine 1954: 77, and Janko 1992: 3-4. Cf. Byre 1988: 160-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
505. Felson-Rubin 1987: 28-29. Cf. Fredricksmeyer’s (1997: 486-95) analysis of the Penelope’s speech at 23.218-24 based on the typically Homeric concept of ‘double motivation’. [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
506. Scodel 2004: 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
507. Scodel 2004: 48f. [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
508. Comparison of the function of δαιμόνιε and other Homeric vocative or the vocative’s usage in Post-Homeric authors is not discussed in this study. Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 38-114) offers an interesting examination on both the above subjects related to the vocative δαιμόνιε. Cf. also Eleanor Dickey’s (1996) detailed exposition of the vocative’s usage in ancient authors from Herodotus to Lucian. [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
509. Nägalsbach 1861; Wilamowitz 1931; Chantraine 1952; Nilsson 1949; Burkert 1985. [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
510. Brunius-Nilsson 1955. [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
511. Cunliffe 1924; Basset 1919; Hedén 1912. [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
512. François 1957; Wilford 1965. [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
513. Clark 2004: 117-137. [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
514. Parry 1971. [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
515. Lord 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
516. I am using Nick Lowe’s phrase related to the formulaic system of the epics as it was expressed during one of his very enlightening seminars on the Homeric epics. [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
517. On the theory of oral-formulaic composition see Edwards 1966 and Russo 1967. [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
518. Arend 1933; Edwards 1987. [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
519. Clark 2004: 128-137. [↑](#footnote-ref-519)
520. Clark 2004: 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-520)
521. See further Edwards (1992) on type-scenes and their division in five categories. See also Arend 1933 and Lord 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-521)
522. Clark 2004: 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-522)
523. See further Edwards (1987: 95-103) on type-scenes following the same structure, but being different in length and context. [↑](#footnote-ref-523)
524. See further Bowra (1962) on the three categories of formula in Homer. See also Clark (1997: 5-19) on the models of formula. [↑](#footnote-ref-524)
525. Clark 2004; Bowra 1962; Edwards 1987. [↑](#footnote-ref-525)
526. Clark 2004: 128. Bowra 1962: 19-37. Kirk 1985: 18-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-526)
527. Clark 2004: 128-130; Bowra 1962: 30f.; Edwards 1987: 65-74. See also Parry (1971: 169, 145), who suggests that epithets are merely metrical fillers which do not have a specific signification. Cf. Vivante (1982: 173) on the epithets not being just ornamental but as adding significantly to the meaning of the things or the persons to which they are attached. [↑](#footnote-ref-527)
528. *Il*. 3.399. [↑](#footnote-ref-528)
529. *Od.*23.166, 264; *Il*. 24.194. [↑](#footnote-ref-529)
530. *Il*. 4.31. [↑](#footnote-ref-530)
531. Clark 2004: 139. [↑](#footnote-ref-531)
532. See Appendix VIII for a summary of arguments. [↑](#footnote-ref-532)
533. Russo 1997: 253f. [↑](#footnote-ref-533)
534. *Il.*4.31, *Il*. 3.399. [↑](#footnote-ref-534)
535. Of both Penelope in *Odyssey* 23.166, 264 and of Hecabe in *Il*. 24.194. [↑](#footnote-ref-535)
536. Kirk 1985: 111; 331. [↑](#footnote-ref-536)
537. See further Willcock 1970: 122; Leaf and Bayfield 1962: 396; Pulleyn 2000: 263-264; Brunius-Nilsson, 1955: 30. Contra Kirk (1985: 111) and Paley (1866: 37), who find the vocative here (1.561), possessing a tender and a more affectionate sense. [↑](#footnote-ref-537)
538. O’Brien 1991: 81-82. See also Kullmann 1985: 4-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-538)
539. O’Brien 1991: 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-539)
540. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-540)
541. O’Brien 1991: 83. Cf. Simon (1978: 65-71) for a detailed discussion on madness in Homer. [↑](#footnote-ref-541)
542. Hera here shows the same craftiness as Penelope and Odysseus in Book 23. Their cunning and deceptive behaviour was directed by a *daimôn* (Athena). [↑](#footnote-ref-542)
543. T.R.M.E. Nelson 1997: 183. See also Burkert 1985: 134-35; Atchity 1978: 102-07. [↑](#footnote-ref-543)
544. As Atchity (1978: 102) argued: ‘As the symbol of sacred marriage, her selfishness undercuts her own mythic character-so furious is her selfishness that it blinds her even as she means to blind all-seeing Zeus.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-544)
545. There seems to be a diversity of opinions when it comes to Aphrodite’s involvement in Hera’s deceitful plan. On the one hand, T.R.M.E. Nelson (1997: 184) argues that Aphrodite as a female is impervious to deception and thus is fully aware of Hera’s intentions. On the other hand, Atchity (1978:105) claims that Aphrodite’s knowledge in this scene is limited, especially since she is the goddess of love. However, one thing seems to matter here: Hera uses Aphrodite’s love potions (either with her approval or not) as the main instrument for her craftiness. [↑](#footnote-ref-545)
546. For more see Burkert 1985: 134. Cf. O’Brien 1991: 84-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-546)
547. Burkert 1985: 134-35; T.R.M.E. Nelson 1997: 182-83. [↑](#footnote-ref-547)
548. See discussion further below. [↑](#footnote-ref-548)
549. O’Brien 1991: 77. Cf. Fineberg (1999: 18-19) on a number and similarly to Hera ‘raging women’. On the three heroes’ *aristeia* and their characterisation with the formula δαίμονι ἶσος see Wilford 1965: 221; Frazer 1993: 63-70, 164-71, 219-23; Mueller 1984: 49-60; 136-8; Instone 1999: 107-08; Whitman 1958: 21-2, 206-09 Kirk 1987: 87-96; Morrison 1997: 280-83; Schein 1984: 80-82. [↑](#footnote-ref-549)
550. On the warriors’ excessive power as the result of their comparison with *daimôn* see François 1957: 327. [↑](#footnote-ref-550)
551. See further O’Brien (1991: 82-83), who also suggests that ‘the verb *meneainein* ‘to be in rage’ is formed from the noun *menos*; two of the three other uses of the rare *asperkhes* ‘ceaselessly’ describe Achilles’ persistent rage (16.61; 22.188).’ See also Nagy (1979: 73) on menos as ‘a state of mind’ or ‘anger’; and on meneainô ‘be angry, furious, in a rage.’ Cf. Seaford1993: 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-551)
552. Poseidon’s relationship with Odysseus in *Od*. 1.20 is analogous to Hera’s rage against the Trojans. [↑](#footnote-ref-552)
553. Nagy 1979: 72-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-553)
554. O’Brien 1991: 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-554)
555. As O’Brien (1991: 83) argues: ‘whereas human *menos* usually designates the essence of a man’s strength, the divine *menos* of Hera has as its persistent omophagia of a whole race.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-555)
556. Similarly, Snell (1991: 198) explains the vocative δαιμόνιος to show the speaker’s reaction towards the addressee’s inexplicable behaviour. Cf. Kirk (1985: 331) suggests that the vocative here (31) implies stronger rebuke. Cf. Brunius-Nilsson’s (1955) suggestion on the usage of the vocative here (31) to show Zeus’ intention to frighten Hera. [↑](#footnote-ref-556)
557. Atchity 1978: 10-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-557)
558. Mueller 1984: 140. On Hera’s sacred cities see Kerényi 1976: 57-59; 114- 147. Cf. Larson 2007 on both Hera’s warship and sacred cities. [↑](#footnote-ref-558)
559. Willcock 1970: 122; Leaf and Bayfield 1962: 396. [↑](#footnote-ref-559)
560. Pulleyn 2000: 263-64. Cf. Kirk (1985: 331), who finds the vocative ‘to accord with the irony of the question that is to follow: “What are the many evils they do you that you vehemently desire to ravage *Ilios*?”’ Also and Postlethwaite (2000: 122) explains: ‘Zeus’ question is heavily ironical, because he is well aware that the reason for Hera’s hatred of Troy is the judgement of Paris.’ See also O’Brien 1991: 91-92; Van Erp Taalman Kip 2000: 392-94. Cf. Chantraine (1952: 50-54), who shows the vocative δαιμονίη to be used humorously by Zeus to address Hera. [↑](#footnote-ref-560)
561. Although Homer’s Helen is pictured as ‘the Spartan princess with divine paternity, as Bettany Hughes (2005: 10f.) so vividly portrays her, and although the Trojan leaders in book 3.158f. have expressed their admiration, describing Helen’s beauty as ‘terrible’ – like that of a goddess (‘wondrously like is she to the immortal goddesses to look upon, 158), still there is no hint that here (399) Helen managed to recognise Aphrodite’s real nature because of her being a goddess as well. See further Hughes’ (2005: 11f.) where Helen is presented as ‘a goddess’; ‘a princess’ and a ‘whore’. [↑](#footnote-ref-561)
562. On Paris as Aphrodite’s favourite mortal see Walcot 1967: 31-36; Dindorf 1951: 447-48; Kullmann 1985: 2-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-562)
563. *Il*. 3.420. [↑](#footnote-ref-563)
564. Burkert 1985: 152. In a similar way, Hera says to Aphrodite, “Give me the love and desire with which you overpower all immortals and mortal men (14.198-99).” Cf. 14.216, where Zeus also refers to the magic of Aphrodite’s embroidered girdle. [↑](#footnote-ref-564)
565. Farron 1978; Powell 2007; Boedeker 1974; Austin 1994. [↑](#footnote-ref-565)
566. Farron 1978: 18,19. Cf. Dodds’ (1951: 15-16) idea that the poet: ‘would represent an internal conflict either as a division between the person and an internal organ or between the person and a god who personified the emotional drive against which he was fighting.’ See also Snell’s (1953: 20; 31) idea that ‘divine intervention is necessary because Homeric characters are incapable of making decisions.’ See also Powell (2007: 110), who characterises the goddess as ‘that irresistible destructive force of “sexual desire.” [↑](#footnote-ref-566)
567. As Norman Austin (1994: 37) argued: ‘Helen, after witnessing her lover’s disgrace on the battlefield, which is also her disgrace, she will be returned to her own greater shame, to the bed of the man without shame.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-567)
568. Boedeker 1974: 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-568)
569. Boedeker 1974: 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-569)
570. Willcock 1970: 114; Leaf and Bayfield 1962: 337; Pierron 1869: 122, offered a negative explanation to the vocative. [↑](#footnote-ref-570)
571. Cf. T. R. M. E. Nelson (1997: 186-187), who offers enough reasons to suggest that Helen could not have been deceived by Aphrodite. Cf. Aphrodite not actually being deceived by Hera in book 1.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-571)
572. When it comes to an evaluation of Aphrodite’s role in the specific scene, Calhoun (1937: 24-25) suggests that Helen was motivated by the goddess. On the contrary, according to Kennedy (1986: 6), Iris’ appearance did not offer any motivation to Helen at all. The episode she introduces should be considered as something apart from the action of the poem. Cf. *Il*. 24.74. [↑](#footnote-ref-572)
573. At this point, I must thank Dr. Bella Vivante for her truly useful comments and ideas on the above scenes. [↑](#footnote-ref-573)
574. Hooker 1975: 68. Contra Kirk (1985: 323-24), who explains the vocative as a ‘traditional form of address’. [↑](#footnote-ref-574)
575. Willcock 1970: 114; Leaf and Bayfield 1962: 337; Pierron (1869: 122). The term is also used to suggest ‘the particular kind of strangeness in the speaker’s mind’ (Leaf and Bayfield 1962: 337) and ‘it is used by a person remonstrating with another’ (Willcock 1970:114). Scholars translated the term as ‘unaccountable’, ‘infatuated’, implying a blindness or perversity caused by a god’ (Monro 1896: 260); ‘mysterious, strange goddess’ (Peter Jones 2003: 92); ‘improbable, cruel’ (Pierron 1869: 122). Contra Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 31), who suggests that Helen here seems to address a mortal woman, whereas the interrogative and the imperatives suggest the strong emotions that colour the speech. Cf. Groten (1968: 36), who treats the scene between Helen and Aphrodite as a dramatic device that reminds us of all those circumstances that many years ago made Helen take the fateful decision to follow Paris and abandon her home. Aphrodite was an influential factor then too (cf. *Od*. 4.261-4). [↑](#footnote-ref-575)
576. T. R. M. E. Nelson 1997: 186-87. [↑](#footnote-ref-576)
577. Contra Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 31-32), who rejects any possibility of the vocative δαιμονίη being associated with the phrase ἦρχε δὲ δαίμων that follows (420). As such, the vocative, she claims, expresses only Helen’s strong emotions and opposition towards Aphrodite. [↑](#footnote-ref-577)
578. Farron 1978: 20. Wilford 1965: 218. Cf. Leaf’s (1960: 150) crucially important observation that if it were not for the presence of Aphrodite in the following lines, it would indeed, by Homeric usage, be necessary to translate ‘her destiny, the divine power, led her on’, as in *ἀγάγοι δὲ ἑ δαίμων* 21.201’. Leaf 1960: 150. See also, Monro 1980: 338; Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 116-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-578)
579. On the scene between Aphrodite and Helen see Willcock 1976: 44; Hooker 1979: 67; Kirk 1985: 325-26. [↑](#footnote-ref-579)
580. Chantraine 1952: 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-580)
581. Lattimore’s translation on verses 24.194-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-581)
582. On a *daimôn*’s harmful behaviour, see Tsagarakis 1977: 105-112; Brenk and Rome 1986: 2073-75. [↑](#footnote-ref-582)
583. Leaf and Bayfield 1897: 582. [↑](#footnote-ref-583)
584. Kakridis 1971: 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-584)
585. See Pantelia 2002: 21-26; Frazer 1993: 233-36, on both Helen and Hecabe’s lamentations. Cf. Macleod 1982: 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-585)
586. Farron 1978: 26-27. See also Macleod 1999 (edited by de Jong): 53-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-586)
587. Cf. v.209 where Hecabe attributes Hector’s death to fate as well. [↑](#footnote-ref-587)
588. Contra Willcock 1984: 196; Pulleyn 2000: 263-64. See also Snell 1991: 198. Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 14) finds the vocative to be ‘an intimate word’. Macleod (1982:104-105) similarly suggests that ‘δαιμονίη does not ascribe any particular quality, or express any particular attitude, to the person addressed, rather it puts the speaker in a certain relation to the hearer, adding warmth to appeals, challenges, protests, invitations. So here to Priam’s request for advice to Hecuba.’ See also Leaf (1888: 448), who suggests that: ‘the usual tone of remonstrance is absent here, unless we may suppose that it is assumed in view of the opposition which Priam is sure of meeting.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-588)
589. As Macleod (1982: 107) suggests: ‘Though Priam asked for Hecuba’s advice, it emerges here that his mind was already made up. That he should consult his wife all the same is natural in a husband; it also makes possible Hecuba’s bitter and moving speech.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-589)
590. Richardson 1993: 294. See also Farron 1978: 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-590)
591. Taplin 1992: 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-591)
592. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-592)
593. As Beye (1974: 91) suggested: ‘Achilles’ lust to eat the raw flesh of Hector (2.346ff.) is ironically foreshadowed in the lamentations of Priam and Hecabe over their fates (22.42, 67, 82-89) and is crudely aped by Hecabe’s lust to raw-eat her son’s would-be raw-eater (*ômêstês* 24.207, 213-140).’ [↑](#footnote-ref-593)
594. This is an occurrence of the vocative δαιμόνιε which is not repeated in any of the Post-Homeric authors, except for the *Hymn of Dionysus*(see further Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 67f.). The hymn is a powerful treatment of what would become one of the classic plotlines of tragedy: the vengeance of the wine-god Dionysus on his human abusers (Rayor 2004: 138-139; Allen and Sikes 1904: 232); this is the framework where the vocative δαιμόνιε occurs; it is actually repeated in the short dialogue of the two pirates. On the Homeric impact on the *Hymns* see Allen, Halliday, and Sikes (1936: 375-379) on the frequent occurrence of this scene of Dionysus and the Tyrrhenian pirates in literature. On this scene, see also the *Anthology of Classical Myth* (2004) edited by Trzaksoma, Scott-Smith, and Brunet; Rayor 2004: 138. On the epiphany of Dionysus (cf. the very similar scene of Euripides *Bacchae*) see Angier-Sowa 1984: 236-272. [↑](#footnote-ref-594)
595. Gregory 1996: 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-595)
596. Fitzgerald’s translation. [↑](#footnote-ref-596)
597. Fitzgerald’s translation. Cf. Andromache’s address to Hector as δαιμόνιε (*Il*. 6.407): in a tender remonstrance Andromache address Hector with the specific vocative because she wants to show to him that his actions are either unaccountable or ill-omened (Snell 1991:198; Willcock 1970: 33; Leaf 1886: 222). This kind of behaviour may be the result of a *daimôn*’s influence or psychological effect on a mortal’s *phrenes* or *thumos* (Tsagarakis 1977: 112-15; Wilford 1965: 221-3; Adkins 1960: 16-7; Mueller 1984: 126-7. Cf. with Hector’s characterisation as a hero of social oblications and responsibilities see Schein 1984: 173-74; Redfield 1975 (1994): 119; Grotty 1994: 50; Cairns 1993: 78-83; Owen 1978: 102; Taplin 1992: 124. On the scene between Hector and Andromache see Farron 1978: 22-26; Vivante 1985: 52-54; Griffin 1980: 6-7; Kakridis 1971: 71-74; Braun 2002: 95-7; Edwards 1987: 208-09; Kakridis 1949: 51; Schein 1984: 172-73. On Andromache’s address to Hector see Alden 2000: 312-16; Crotty 1994: 50; Vivante 1970: 164. On Andromache as a tragic figure see Segal 1971: 55; E. T. Owen 1978: 100-102. [↑](#footnote-ref-597)
598. Analysis of the reactions of astonishment and the rebuke of Penelope (Stanford 1954: 396), the development of the relationship between a husband and wife and the context of the conversation at the recognition scene of Penelope and Odysseus showed the vocative δαιμόνιε to be applied to address Odysseus’ specific cunning behaviour and appearance. See further Roisman 1987: 65f.; Gregory 1996: 11, on a*daimôn*’s and Athena’s role in directing Odysseus’ plan of disguise. See further Murnaghan 1987: 105; 109; Amory 1966: 55; Emlyn-Jones 1984: 9-12; Byre 1988: 168-69. On the usage of the vocative δαιμόνιε here (174) see Russo, Fernández-Galiano, Heubeck 1992: 330. [↑](#footnote-ref-598)
599. De Jong 2001: 556-7. ‘This is the only such recognition scene, and the sole example in which the *knowledge* of who Odysseus is, is separated from the *acknowledgment* of his identity’: Katz 1991: 175. [↑](#footnote-ref-599)
600. Russo, Fernández-Galiano, Heubeck 1992: 330. Cf. Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 28-29), who attributes a less intimate connotation to the vocative; she also suggests that the reproaches of Telemachus to his mother (97ff. μῆτερ ἐμή, δύσμητερ) reoccur in a similar way with Odysseus’ way of addressing Penelope with the vocative δαιμονίη (166, 264). [↑](#footnote-ref-600)
601. De Jong 2001: 560. Murnaghan (1987: 141); 145-47 also shows the vocative δαιμονίη (264) to mean ‘strange one’. [↑](#footnote-ref-601)
602. Cf. usage of the vocative δαιμονίη by Hector to address Andromache (*Il*. 6.486): he wants to show both his tender reaction/remonstrance towards Andromaches’s request to stay away from the battle, and his pity and tendency to console Andromache for the tragic consequence his death caused by a *daimôn* (Taplin 1992: 122; Kirk 1985: 111; Leaf 1886: 222; Kirk 1990: 224. Cf. Brunius-Nilsson: 1955: 16), Zeus’ will (Redfield 1994: 139; M. P. Nilsson 1964: 165; Griffin 1978: 7. Cf. Pucci 1997: 171ff.) and by his personal destiny alloted to him from his birth (Pucci 1994: 32; Pucci 2002: 32; Cf. Morrison 1997: 286; Redfield 1994: 271; Taplin 1992: 139; Adkins 1960: 17-25) will have upon her. On *daimôn*’s association with Zeus’will and fate see M. P. Nilsson 1964: 165f. On Hector’s order to Andromache to return to her household see Farron 1978: 24; Scully 1990: 68. See also Kahane (2005: 168) on the sharp division of the roles of men and women in Homer and the ‘so-called heroic code’ to be ‘largely or wholly exclusive to men.’ Cf. Schein 1984: 173-74; Lohmann 1988: 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-602)
603. Some possible translations on the vocative δαιμονίη (166, 264) are: ‘Cruel dame’ (Chapman 1992); ‘mysterious woman’ (Lombardo 2000); ‘strange lady’ (Butcher and Lang 1903); ‘strange woman’ (Fagles 1996); ‘you are a strange woman’ (Hammond 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-603)
604. Cf. Snell 1991: 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-604)
605. On Penelope’s conversation with the stranger see Felson-Rubin 1994: 23-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-605)
606. Felson-Rubin 1994: 38-39. On Penelope’s trick with the marital bed and Odysseus’ wounded honor evoked by Penelope’s suggestion (of another man removing their bed), see Murnaghan 1987: 139-143. [↑](#footnote-ref-606)
607. See Felson-Rubin 1987: 68-69. On Penelope as the weaver of *metis*, see Clayton 2004: 32-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-607)
608. Byre 1988: 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-608)
609. Emlyn-Jones 1984: 10; Felson-Rubin 1994: 22-23. On Penelope’s appearance in front of the suitors see Byre 1988:159-173. Hölscher (1996: 133-140) pays much attention and separates Athena’s and Penelope’s roles from those of the suitors. [↑](#footnote-ref-609)
610. On Penelope’s decision to set the contest, see Emlyn-Jones 1984: 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-610)
611. Felson-Rubin 1994: 23-25. See also Murnaghan 1987: 109-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-611)
612. Felson-Rubin 1987: 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-612)
613. Tsagarakis (1977: 115) finds Penelope’s aspiration that *daimôn* was on her side in her struggle with the suitors, as a way to impress the stranger-Odysseus. [↑](#footnote-ref-613)
614. On Penelope’s ‘uncertainty and perplexity to react to an impulse that is inexplicable’ see Byre 1988: 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-614)
615. Tsagarakis 1977: 115. On the idea of a *daimôn* offering a sudden inspiration to mortals, see Nilsson 1964: 165. [↑](#footnote-ref-615)
616. On god or *daimôn*’s intervention through the individual’s thoughts (*phrenes*) and feelings (*thumos*), see Lloyd-Jones 1971: 16-24. See also Kearns (2004: 64-7) on god or *daimôn*’s intervention in human affairs without actually revealing his true identity to the human involved. [↑](#footnote-ref-616)
617. Emlyn-Jones 1984: 9-11; Amory 1966: 55; Murnaghan (1987: 109) on Penelope’s behaviour as ‘part of the plot that Odysseus and (mostly) Athena control’. Cf. Felson (1994: 36-37) on the interchange of both Artemis and Aphrodite in the character of Penelope. [↑](#footnote-ref-617)
618. Murnaghan (1987: 104) suggests that Penelope as the possessor of *mêtis* is ‘able to say one thing while thinking another and to overcome his enemies through deceit.’ Winkler (1990: 129-161) also views Penelope as a woman of active mind and as an equal partner of Odysseus, who understands and exercises substantial control over events and not as a simple victim of circumstances. Cf. Byre 1988: 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-618)
619. Felson-Rubin 1987: 70. Felson-Rubin (1987: 28-29) identifies Lesky’s (1961) ‘double motivation or over determination’ within Athena’s involvement (and real intentions) in inspiring Penelope to appear in front of the suitors, and Penelope’s own desire to show herself to the suitors (θυμός μοι ἐέλδεται, 18.164). See also Dodds 1951: 2ff, Whitman 1958: 248, Chantraine 1954: 77, and Janko 1992: 3-4. Cf. Byre 1988: 160-61). In this respect, it might well be that Athena’s purpose, planned in Penelope’s heart, is also Penelope’s. Cf. Fredricksmeyer’s (1997: 486-95) analysis of Penelope’s speech at 23.218-24 based on the typically Homeric concept of ‘double motivation’. Cf. Levine (1983: 172-178), who explains Penelope’s action of laughing (ἀχρεῖον ἐγέλασσεν, 18.163) ‘as an expression, in part at least of Penelope’s anticipation of her success in manipulating the suitors and regard her motives concerning them as similar to Athena’s.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-619)
620. Felson-Rubin 1987: 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-620)
621. Clark 2004: 128f. [↑](#footnote-ref-621)
622. Clark 2004: 130f. [↑](#footnote-ref-622)
623. *Od.*23.166, 264. [↑](#footnote-ref-623)
624. *Od.*19.130-61; 18.158; 19.576-80; 21.67-79, 336. [↑](#footnote-ref-624)
625. *Il.* 4.31. [↑](#footnote-ref-625)
626. *Il.* 3.399. [↑](#footnote-ref-626)
627. See further Bowra 1962: 19-37; Clark 2004: 127f. [↑](#footnote-ref-627)
628. Clark 2004: 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-628)
629. See further Bakker 1988: 189f. [↑](#footnote-ref-629)
630. The formula *δαίμονι ἶσος* is found nine times in the *Iliad*. However, the term has never been found in the *Odyssey*. It always occurs at the end of the line following the bucolic dieresis (whence it appears to belong to the most primitive level of the Epic). See further Wilford 1965: 221; Brenk 1986: 2078-79. [↑](#footnote-ref-630)
631. Although Otto (1917: 9-10) in his attempt not to promote the tendency of his times towards an ‘extravagant and fantastic irrationalism’ went against everyone using the ‘irrational’ as a theme; I shall still use the term in order to define everything reckless and excessive and in order to distinguish it from what I named after the ‘non-rational’ (i.e. meaning everything unexplained, unaccountable and unexpected.) [↑](#footnote-ref-631)
632. See Kirk 1985: 376. [↑](#footnote-ref-632)
633. It reoccurs three times more, at 16.702-6, 16.784-6 and 20.445-9, to show that a warrior hurls himself against the god and is thrice repulsed. A fourth attempt leads to a dramatic rebuke, which often ends up with the warrior’s death. See Kirk 1985: 106. Cf. Willcock 1978: 236. [↑](#footnote-ref-633)
634. Instone 1999: 107-111. Cf. Alden (2000: 112ff.) who treats the subject of divine patronage (e.g. Athena’s favour to Diomedes) as a recurrent theme in a number of para-narratives (e.g. a whole series of para-narratives clustered round the figure of Diomedes are introduced through an exploit of Tydeus’ while fighting against the Thebans). See further Erbse (1961: 161-64), on Diomedes as the instrument of Athena. [↑](#footnote-ref-634)
635. Gaisser 1969: 166; Andersen 1997: 32-34; Scodel 1992: 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-635)
636. François 1957; Frazer 1993. [↑](#footnote-ref-636)
637. François 1957: 327-28. [↑](#footnote-ref-637)
638. Frazer 1993: 63-70. On Diomedes’ *aristeia* and Athena’s benevolent intervention as the main cause of Diomedes’ prowess see also Mueller 1984: 136-38; Whitman 1958: 221-2 [↑](#footnote-ref-638)
639. Andersen 1997: 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-639)
640. On Diomedes’ *aristeia* see Frazer 1993: 63-70; Mueller 1984: 136-8; Instone 1999: 107-08; Whitman 1958: 221-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-640)
641. On the *Iliad*’s narrative techniques see de Jong 2004: 102- 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-641)
642. Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 128. [↑](#footnote-ref-642)
643. Wilford 1965: 221; see also Brenk 1986: 2076. [↑](#footnote-ref-643)
644. It is most possible for Diomedes to have lost his life if he had not taken into consideration Apollo’s threat during his fourth assault against the god. On this point, see further the discussion of Maureen Alden (2000: 149-50), who shows Diomedes to be punished by both Ares and Aphrodite and of his wound by Paris to be understood as the working of divine vengeance in retribution for Diomedes’ attacks on both gods. Yet, Diomedes’ wound could also be seen as a kind of punishment (*ate*) attributed to mortals by the gods for fighting against them (θεόμαχοι). [↑](#footnote-ref-644)
645. Whitman 1958: 221-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-645)
646. In contrast to Diomedes’ *aristeia,* where the formula *δαίμονι ἶσος* is used by both the primary narrator- focalizer (NF1) and by a character who functions as a secondary narrator- focalizer (NF2); here the formula *δαίμονι ἶσος* is only used by the narrator to describe Patroclus’ superhuman and irrational prowess. [↑](#footnote-ref-646)
647. Janko 1992: 441 finds the comparison between Patroclus and Ares successful, since Patroclus is ‘filled with frenzy like Ares.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-647)
648. Willcock (1984: 253) finds that there is an association between the unreal attack of Patroclus and the supernatural actions of Apollo, which follow. Cf. Paley 1871: 161. [↑](#footnote-ref-648)
649. On Patroclus’ *aristeia* see Mueller 1984: 49-60; Frazer 1993: 164-171. [↑](#footnote-ref-649)
650. Dietrich 1965; Basset 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-650)
651. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-651)
652. Janko 1992: 400. Cf. Brunius-Nilsson (1955: 128) who makes the important realisation on the usage of this specific narrative technique by the formula (τρὶς μὲν... τρὶς δὲ... ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον), as well as the reference to the protective power of Apollo. As we shall see further below, these are common features to Patroclus’ *aristeia* (*Il*. 16.705) and death (*Il.* 16.786) and to Achilles’ *aristeia* after the death of Patroclus (*Il*. 20.447). [↑](#footnote-ref-652)
653. Janko 1992: 400. [↑](#footnote-ref-653)
654. Postlethwaite (2000: 216-218) points to the similarity of Apollo’s warnings towards both Diomedes and Patroclus. Cf. Mueller 1984: 49-60: Apollo shows Patroclus that not even the power of *daimôn* can work against the will of the gods and against what is fated. On both Patroclus’ and Diomedes’ superhuman powers derived from *daimôn* and their dramatic death, see Jones 2003: 234. [↑](#footnote-ref-654)
655. Rabel 1997: 161-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-655)
656. On Patroclus’ death see Alden 2000: 256-57. Cf. William Allan (2005: 4) who similarly shows Patroclus’ overconfidence to be punished by ἄτη (‘destruction’). [↑](#footnote-ref-656)
657. Dietrich 1965: 310; Basset 1919: 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-657)
658. François 1957: 327. [↑](#footnote-ref-658)
659. Wilford 1965: 224. On a mortal’s comparisons with a god see Brunius-Nilsson 1955: 130-134. [↑](#footnote-ref-659)
660. Wilford 1965: 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-660)
661. Leaf (1902: 210) pays sufficient attention to all three passages (16.784-86; 702-05 and 5.436-38) and claims that they ‘compose a fine climax in preparation for the catastrophe.’ Cf. *Il*. 5.436-9, 16.703-7, 784-6. See further Leaf &Bayfield 1898: 498. [↑](#footnote-ref-661)
662. On Achilles’ *aristeia* see Schein 1984: 143-53; Frazer 1993: 216-23. See also Moulton (1977: 108-11) on a number of similes describing Achilles’ immense powers. [↑](#footnote-ref-662)
663. On Achilles’ *aristeia* see Kirk 1987: 87-96; Morrison 1997: 280-83; Whitman 1958: 206-09; Frazer 1993: 219-23; Schein 1984: 80-82. [↑](#footnote-ref-663)
664. Achilles recognises Apollo’s protection towards Hector, but this does not seem to stop his fury. Apollo does not reveal himself to Achilles; his divine power is simply present and it may be conceived as an extension of Hector’s power. On divine epiphanies in Homer see Dietrich 1983: 53-78. [↑](#footnote-ref-664)
665. Dietrich 1965: 310. [↑](#footnote-ref-665)
666. On Achilles’ association with the forces of nature (e.g. fire) see Bowra 1952: 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-666)
667. See Edwards (1991: 343) on Achilles’ association with fire. [↑](#footnote-ref-667)
668. The τέταρτον line occurs in 5.438 where Diomedes fights against Apollo; in 16.705, 786 where Patroclus fights against Apollo. The phrase outside the line is used by Apollo reporting to Ares (5.459) and Ares to Zeus (5.884) when the danger for Diomedes has already passed. It is used for Achilles in his *aristeia* at 20.447, 493; 21.18, 227. On this point, see further Brenk 1986: 2078-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-668)
669. Brenk 1986: 2078-79. [↑](#footnote-ref-669)
670. Nagy 1999: 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-670)
671. Nagy 1999: 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-671)
672. On Achilles’ *aristeia* see Kirk 1987: 87-96; Morrison 1997: 280-83; Whitman 1958: 206-09; Frazer 1993: 219-23; Schein 1984: 80-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-672)
673. Paley 1871: 299. [↑](#footnote-ref-673)
674. This is my own and Murray’s translation. [↑](#footnote-ref-674)
675. Dietrich 1965: 310. [↑](#footnote-ref-675)
676. Schein 1984: 81. See also Richardson (1993: 70) on the scene between Achilles and Scamander (see mostly the river god’s appeal to Apollo in 224-6). [↑](#footnote-ref-676)
677. Dietrich 1965: 310. [↑](#footnote-ref-677)
678. Richardson 1993: 72. Apollo was last seen rescuing Hector from Achilles at 20.443-54, and he is not mentioned again until 435. [↑](#footnote-ref-678)
679. Whitman 1985: 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-679)
680. Hector’s signs of madness (*lussa*) here might be conceived to be similar to the symptoms of demon possession in the New Testament. More specifically, in *Luke* 9.42, a father describes to Jesus the symptoms of his son who was possessed by a demon: ‘He (the son) suddenly cries out; it convulses him till he foams, and shatters him, and will hardly leave him.’ On this passage (*Luke* 9.42) see further Morris 1974: 174-5; Johnson 1991: 157-58; Caird 1963: 134-35; Evans 1990: 422-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-680)
681. Cf. 19.365-366 and 16-17: ‘[Achilles] his eyes blazed forth in terrible wise from beneath their lids, as it had been flame’; and two times in the *Odyssey.* See also the remarkable description of Hector at 15.605-10 (his two eyes blazed beneath his dreadful brows). See Kirk 1993: 365. [↑](#footnote-ref-681)
682. The narrator presents Hector’s armour blazing in 15.623-9 just like Diomedes’ and Achilles’ did in 5.4, 19.374ff. and 22.134f. See further Kirk 1992: 296-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-682)
683. Fowler 2004: 84-86. [↑](#footnote-ref-683)
684. Padel 1946: 17-18. See especially pages 18-21 on *lussa’s* various representations. Cf. Dowden’s (1996: 54) perception of Hector encapsulating the ‘new realm in which man is son and husband and father and citizen as well as fighter in contrast to the brutal heroic world that is one aspect of Achilles.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-684)
685. Mueller 1984: 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-685)
686. Hector here is like the Gorgon or Ares in his glance. Cf. 11.37 and 15.605-08. See further Kirk 1990: 326-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-686)
687. My translation. See Kirk 1990: 327-328 on Hector’s aggression. [↑](#footnote-ref-687)
688. In *Iliad* Book 8, Athena accuses Zeus of such rage (360), and Zeus, via Iris, makes the same accusation about Athena and Hera (413). Ares is so described four times (*Il.* 5.717 and 831; *Il.* 15.128 and 606, and Dionysus once (*Il*. 6.132). See Fineberg 1999: 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-688)
689. Fineberg 1999: 18-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-689)
690. Nagy 1999: 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-690)
691. See also Owen (1946: 182-183) who similarly attributes Hector’s strange ideas and death to his belief in Zeus. Cf. Schadewaldt (1966: 108, 156) and Alden (2000: 276) who present Hector being the victim of ἄτη (delusion) as part of Zeus’ plan and will. Contra Dawe (1967: 99); Finkelberg (1995: 23, see esp. pp. 16-21) and Stallmach (1968: 58) ascribe Hector’s death to his ἀτασθαλία (folly, 22.104) making a fine distinction between the errors ascribed to ἀτασθαλία (folly) and those ascribed to ἄτη (delusion). [↑](#footnote-ref-691)
692. See Clark 2004: 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-692)
693. Griffin 1980: xiii-xiv. [↑](#footnote-ref-693)
694. Clark 2004: 128f. [↑](#footnote-ref-694)
695. Clarke 2004: 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-695)
696. Kahane 2005: 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-696)
697. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-697)
698. See further Wilford 1965; Brenk 1986. [↑](#footnote-ref-698)
699. Burkert 1985. [↑](#footnote-ref-699)
700. See Zaidmann and Pantel 1992: 176f. See further discussion in Chapter Two. [↑](#footnote-ref-700)
701. Dowden 1996: 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-701)
702. Yet the assumption that fixity and writing is the same thing remains prevalent. See further Ford 1992: 132. Cf. Finnegan (1988: 95) on fixed preservation in other traditions. [↑](#footnote-ref-702)
703. A term used by Ken Dowden (*Homer’s Sense of Text*, 1996) to refer to text. [↑](#footnote-ref-703)
704. This idea reminds us of what Chris Carey (2003: 502) very concisely described in tragedy; that in fact, ‘the tragic world is recreated by negotiation between the poet and his audience from play to play.’ Cf. Zumthor 1990 on oral poetry. [↑](#footnote-ref-704)
705. Dowden 1996: 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-705)
706. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-706)
707. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-707)
708. Locke 1976 [1690]: 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-708)
709. Foley 1997: 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-709)
710. See further Ford 1992: 56. On semiotics see Goddard 1998: 10f.; Cruse 2000: 5ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-710)
711. See further Snell 1953. [↑](#footnote-ref-711)
712. See further Wilford 1965: 220ff. See also discussion in Chapter Two. [↑](#footnote-ref-712)
713. See Dodds 1951 and his theory on ‘monitions’. [↑](#footnote-ref-713)
714. See further Otto 1917: 40f. [↑](#footnote-ref-714)
715. For a thorough discussion of traditional referentiality, see Foley 1991: espec. Chs. 1, 2, 5 and 1995a: Chs. 1-2; clearly distinguished from literary allusion in Bradbury 1998; cf. also McDowell 1995. [↑](#footnote-ref-715)
716. Foley 1999: 13-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-716)
717. Significantly, Foley (1999: 13f.), explains that: ‘*sêma* both names and is the tangible, concrete part that stands by contractual agreement for a larger, immanent whole, and as such it mimics a central expressive strategy of Homeric poetry: traditional referentiality.’ On *sêmata* see Nagy 1990a: 202; Ford 1992: 131-172; Holmberg 1997: 30; Saussy 1996. Cf. my discussion in Chapter Three, on the role of *sêmata* in the recognition scene between Odysseus and Penelope (*Od*. 23.166; 174; 264). See also Kahane 2005; espec. Section IV on Homeric signs; Foley (1999: 278) for further bibliography on *sêmata.* [↑](#footnote-ref-717)
718. See analysis further below and in Chapter Three where *daimôn* is perceived as a useful narrative device of the relationship of gods and mortals. [↑](#footnote-ref-718)
719. See further Chapters Two and Three. [↑](#footnote-ref-719)
720. See discussion further below and in Chapter Three. [↑](#footnote-ref-720)
721. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-721)
722. Dowden 1996: 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-722)
723. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-723)
724. See further Appendix I. [↑](#footnote-ref-724)
725. See further Appendix II, Diagram B. [↑](#footnote-ref-725)
726. Dowden 2007: 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-726)
727. See Otto 1929: 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-727)
728. Snell 1953: 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-728)
729. Dowden 2007: 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-729)
730. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-730)
731. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-731)
732. Kearns 2004: 62-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-732)
733. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-733)
734. Dowden 2007: 44-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-734)
735. See further Chapter Two. [↑](#footnote-ref-735)
736. It is also underlined, a generation later, by Alcaeus, in a papyrus scrap (fr. 39 Lobel-Page), that “it is not possible for mortal men to escape what is determined and that it was a wise man who said that ‘contrary to the fate laid down by Zeus [the *moira* of Zeus] not even a hair could be moved.” This was already embedded in the *Iliad* (1.5), where Zeus’ plan was accomplished (ἐτελείετο). See further Dowden’s (2006) compact study*Zeus*, where Zeus as the Father of Gods and Men is presented as a unique member of the divine collectivity. Zeus is not only superior to the other gods in degree, he is also distinct in kind; he stands above the rest of the pantheon. [↑](#footnote-ref-736)
737. Dowden 2006: 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-737)
738. Dowden 2006: 88-89. [↑](#footnote-ref-738)
739. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-739)
740. See discussion in Chapter Two. [↑](#footnote-ref-740)
741. See discussion in Chapter One of the term *daimôn*’s etymologies which points to its equal association with the gods and what is fated. [↑](#footnote-ref-741)
742. Cf. Dowden 2007: 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-742)
743. See further the way that Carey (2003: 481-502) originally made a reference to present acting as a frame, in an attempt to represent the past. I suggest that the same parallelism can be applied to a *daimôn*. [↑](#footnote-ref-743)
744. See further Chapters Two and Three. [↑](#footnote-ref-744)
745. Felson and Slatkin 2004: 92. [↑](#footnote-ref-745)
746. Dowden 2007: 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-746)
747. Dowden 2007: 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-747)
748. Sissa 2000: 5f. [↑](#footnote-ref-748)
749. Burton 1996: 32f. On a god’s supremacy over mortals see also Ehnmark 1935: 13f. [↑](#footnote-ref-749)
750. *Il.* 4.31. [↑](#footnote-ref-750)
751. *Il*. 24.194. [↑](#footnote-ref-751)
752. Felson and Slatkin 2004: 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-752)
753. Felson and Slatkin 2004: 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-753)
754. 3.399, 4.31.and 24.194. [↑](#footnote-ref-754)
755. The only possibility for the gods to consume human flesh was in the remote cases when the gods were deceived by mortals. After the deception was revealed, the gods used to impose a severe punishment on the wrongdoers (e.g. in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, Lycaon was turned into a wolf by Zeus after he had tried to feed the god human flesh). See further *OCD3*: 1134. [↑](#footnote-ref-755)
756. *Od*. 23.166. [↑](#footnote-ref-756)
757. *Il.* 3.399. [↑](#footnote-ref-757)
758. See Chapter Three. [↑](#footnote-ref-758)
759. Otto 1954: 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-759)
760. The difference between gods and mortals is brought out with brutal clarity by Apollo’s words to Poseidon, in *Il.* 21.462-467. See further Burton 1996: 31f. [↑](#footnote-ref-760)
761. This is what led scholars to talk of ‘an archaic world view’; a kind of thinking characterised by Lloyd-Jones 1971: 36. See further Dowden 2006: 88-89. [↑](#footnote-ref-761)
762. Lloyd-Jones 1971:3. Cf. *Il*. 17.441-7: Homer puts in the centre of the scene Achilles’ pair of horses inherited from his father Peleus and lent to the now dead Patroclus. They are immortal and, standing bereft on the battlefield, serve to expose the gulf that separates men and gods. [↑](#footnote-ref-762)
763. See Dowden (2007: 54), who uses a number of images as references to the immortality of the gods vs. the inevitability of death for mortals. See also Snell 1953: 34f. [↑](#footnote-ref-763)
764. See Chapter Three of this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-764)
765. Dowden 2007: 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-765)
766. Kahane 2005: 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-766)