Subversive Sovereignty:
Parodic Representations of Micropatrias
Enclaved by the United Kingdom

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Dedication Page

There are three dedications that must take place.

First, to my family, friends, and husband who were always there to help me in any and every way possible; especially to my muse and playmate, Princessa Madelin (aka Bodhi Anjali Moreau).

Second, to S. Garrett Nelson who opened my eyes to the wonderful world I never knew existed, that of micropatrias.

Third, to the micropatrial practitioners, I dedicate this work based on their realities.
I would like to acknowledge some persons, institutions, and practitioners which made the thesis possible.

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Declaration of Authorship

I, terri ann moreau, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.
Signed: __terri ann moreau____

Date: __21 September 2014_____________________
Abstract

The thesis is an exploration in breadth of the micropatrial phenomenon; the practice of creating self-declared nations outside of hegemonic convention. Positioning micropatrias as geopolitical anomalies, the thesis aims to critically examine micropatrias and their practitioners existing within territory claimed by the United Kingdom. The thesis investigates the approaches of micropatrial practitioners and highlights how their practices make visible for intervention the exclusionary strategies of sovereign hegemony. There is an explicit interest in contributing to debates within political and cultural geography pertaining to sovereignty, diplomacy, and the politics of transgression/subversion. More specifically, the aims are to interrogate micropatrial practices and representations in terms of subversion and liminality, symbols, and diplomacy. In particular, the focus is on how micropatrias parodically represent, to insiders and outsiders alike, a cultural and national presence. In doing so, the thesis, through a consideration of the apparent, absurd, or exceptional, offers critical insights into geopolitical norms, which might be described as hegemonic, especially those related to sovereignty and sovereign power.
# Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis .......................................................... 13

Research Questions ....................................................................................... 19

Progression of Thesis .................................................................................... 22

Chapter 2: Sovereignty, Statehood, and Nationalism ................................... 30

Sovereignty .................................................................................................... 30

Theories of Statehood .................................................................................... 33

*The Declarative Theory of Statehood* ......................................................... 34

*The Constitutive Theory of Statehood* ....................................................... 35

Nationalism .................................................................................................. 39

Political Norms, Legitimation, and Micropatrias ......................................... 43

Chapter 3: Micropatrology ........................................................................... 51

Fantastic Geographies .................................................................................. 55

Subversion, Symbols, and Diplomacy .......................................................... 59

Enclaves ........................................................................................................ 61

Micropatrial Types ......................................................................................... 64

Representation, Culture and Identity ............................................................ 76

Chapter 4 Methods ......................................................................................... 82

Data Collection .............................................................................................. 83

The ‘Field’ ..................................................................................................... 95

*Contact* ..................................................................................................... 100

*Unstructured Interviews* ........................................................................... 103

*Virtual Relationships* ................................................................................ 107

*Failed Diplomacy* ....................................................................................... 110

*The Value of the Insider* .......................................................................... 112

*The Nation of Heliotrope* .......................................................................... 115
# Chapter 5: Subversion and Micropatrial Liminality

- Representing Subversion: The Micropatrial Niche .................................................. 130
  - Power of Resistance and Transgression .................................................................. 132
  - National Enclaves, Sovereign Hosts, and International Liminality .................... 138
- Creating a ‘dangerous’ nation? .................................................................................. 142
- Micropatrial liminality .............................................................................................. 149
- Remarks .................................................................................................................... 158

# Chapter 6: Subversive Symbols of Nationalism

- 3 Kings: The Presence of a Leader ........................................................................... 162
  - Fashion and Serious Fun ......................................................................................... 163
- Opportunities for National Narratives ..................................................................... 169
  - Postage ..................................................................................................................... 170
  - Currency ................................................................................................................... 172
- The Triad .................................................................................................................... 178
  - Emblems ................................................................................................................... 178
  - Anthems .................................................................................................................... 181
  - National Flags .......................................................................................................... 190
- Practicing the Nation ................................................................................................. 200
- ‘Paraphernalia of Ideology’ ....................................................................................... 202
- Heterotopic Subversion ............................................................................................. 204
- Heterodox Subversion ............................................................................................... 206
- Waving Subversion .................................................................................................... 209
- Micropatrial Digital Embassies ............................................................................... 211
- Micropatrial Territory and Mimesis ......................................................................... 213
- Remarks .................................................................................................................... 215
Chapter 7: Diplomacy and Subversive Sovereignty ............................................. 217

The Alternative Diplomacy of Micropatrias ....................................................... 225

Micropatrias and Power ...................................................................................... 225

Inter-diplomacy: alternative diplomatic performances with the host .......... 228

Intra-diplomacy: embassies and organizations and forums ....................... 231

A Means to Subvert .......................................................................................... 247

Conclusion - Playing with Diplomacy .............................................................. 254

Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks ..................................................................... 256

National Identity ............................................................................................... 257

National Symbols .............................................................................................. 257

International Diplomacy ................................................................................... 260

Micropatrial Representation ............................................................................. 261

Final Remarks .................................................................................................. 262

Possible Research Paths .................................................................................... 266

References ......................................................................................................... 268

Appendix A ........................................................................................................ 299
Figure 1.1: Google images of Forvik (Forewick Holm), Shetland, and the United Kingdom. Source: Google maps at http://maps.google.co.uk/maps?hl=en&tab=wl.

Figure 1.2: UK Ordnance Survey map including Forvik (Forewick Holm). Source: http://getamap.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/getamap/frames.htm?mapAction=gaz&gazName=g&gazString=HU187595.

Figure 1.3: Profile view of Forvik (Forewick Holm). Source: http://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/1780521.

Figure 1.4: Contract of ownership of Forewick Holm. Source: http://www.forvik.com/index.php/about-forvik/who-owns-forvik.

Figure 4.1: Original Flag for Declaration. Source: https://sites.google.com/site/thenationofheliotrope/home/flag.

Figure 4.2: Hit Counter and ClustrMaps Program. Source: http://www.nationofheliotrope.com/History.html.

Figure 4.3: The Flag of Heliotrope. Source: http://www.nationofheliotrope.com/History.html.

Figure 4.4: Official Stamp of Heliotrope. Source: http://www.nationofheliotrope.com/Government.html.

Figure 4.5: The National Seal of Heliotrope. Source: http://www.nationofheliotrope.com/Government.html.

Figure 4.6: Screenshots of my website. Source: http://www.nationofheliotrope.com/.

Figure 4.7: Audience with Princess Anne. Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/international_students_house/sets/721576696574905/.

Figure 5.1: Application from Frestonia to join the United Nations. Source: Document scan sent to me from Tony Sleep.

Figure 5.2: Article about Frestonia in the Daily Mirror. Source: Document scan sent to me from Tony Sleep.

Figure 6.1: King Danny I of the Kingdom of Lovely. Source: http://www.citizensrequired.com/unit/bk_home/bk_home.shtml.
Figure 6.2: King Nicholas I of the Copeman Empire. Source: http://www.kingnicholas.com/kingnicholas/. ......................................................... 166

Figure 6.3: King Richard de Coeur de Livre of the Independent Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye. Source: http://www.richardbooth.demon.co.uk/haypeerage/otheritems.htm. .................................................................................................................. 168

Figure 6.4: Micropatrial postage stamps, examples from the Copeman Empire, the Kingdom of Lovely, the Principality of Sealand, and the Principality of Paulovia. Sources: http://www.kingnicholas.com/; http://www.citizensrequired.com/unit/sn_home/sn_home.shtml; http://www.sealandgov.org/Stamps.html; and http://www.store.paulovia.org/index.html.................................................................................................................. 172

Figure 6.5: Micropatrial currency notes and coins, examples from the Kingdom of Lovely, the Kingdom of TwoChairs, the Principality of Sealand, the Democratic Republic of Bobalania, and the Grand Duchy of the Lagoan Isles. Sources: http://www.citizensrequired.com/unit/iou_time/time.shtml; http://kingdomoftwochairs.blogspot.com/2009/01/dusty-next-king.html; http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?pid=1296336&id=42469203122; http://www.bobalania.com/ExtraStuff.html; and http://lagoan-isles-gov.tripod.com/id39.html. .................................................................................................................. 175

Figure 6.6: Mondcivitan Mondo. Source: http://www.schonfield.org/12466.html. .................................................................................................................. 177

Figure 6.7: Arms of the Kingdom of New Brittania, the Ibrosian Protectorate, and the Principality of Sealand, respectively. Sources: http://www.freewebs.com/newbrittania/; http://novabritannia.tripod.com/national_symbols.htm; and http://www.sealandgov.org/. .................................................................................................................. 179

Figure 6.8: Arms of the Grand Duchy of the Lagoan Isles, the Peoples Republic of K-Marx, and the Principality of Paulovia, respectively. Sources: http://lagoan-isles-gov.tripod.com/id20.html; http://www.angelfire.com/planet/k-marx/Facts.htm; and http://www.paulovia.org/emblems.html. .................................................................................................................. 180

Figure 6.9: Arms of the Kingdom of Lovely and the Kingdom of TwoChairs, respectively. Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Lovelycoatofarms.jpg and http://kingdomoftwochairs.blogspot.com/2008/07/signs-and-symbols-of-twochairs.html. .................................................................................................................. 181
Figure 6.10: Flag of the United Kingdom. Source:

Figure 6.11: Flags of England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, respectively. Sources:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Scotland.svg; and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:St_Patrick's_saltire.svg.............................................. 192

Figure 6.12: The 1606 Union Flag. Source:

Figure 6.13: Flag of the Democratic Republic of Bobalania. Source:
http://www.bobalania.com/symbols.html......................................................................... 194

Figure 6.14: Flags of the Independent Kingdom Hay-on-Wye and Wales, respectively. Sources:
http://www.richardbooth.demon.co.uk/haypeerage/anthem.htm; and

Figure 6.15: Flags of the Crown Dependency of Forvik and Shetland and the Coat-of-Arms of Norway, respectively. Sources:

Figure 6.16: Flags of the Mondcivitan Republic and the Principality of Paulovia, respectively. Sources: http://www.schonfield.org/12462.html and
http://www.paulovia.org/flags_and_emblems.html.......................................................... 198

Figure 6.17: New and old flags of the Sovereign Kingdom of Kemetia, respectively. Sources: http://www.facebook.com/album.php?profile=1&id=17332994660 and http://www.angelfire.com/nv/micronations/missingnewcountry.html............... 199

Figure 6.18: Flag of the Peoples Republic of K-Marx and Cuba, respectively. Source:
http://www.angelfire.com/planet/k-marx/index.html and

Figure 7.1: Example of Consulates for the Principality of Paulovia, European Region. Source: http://www.paulovia.org/consulates_directory.html..................................................... 234

Figure 7.2: Citizen applications for the Democratic Republic of Bobalania, the Principality of Paulovia, and the Sovereign State of Forvik. Sources:
www.bobalania.com (no longer active link);

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis

Off the north coast, and slightly a bit east, of the sovereign state of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) is the Sovereign State of Forvik. It is not surprising if you have never heard of it. This nation is not visible on any standard or widely reproduced map of the British and Irish Isles you may choose to look for it on. No busy thoroughfares grace its landscape, nor do any skyscrapers mark out a symbolic skyline of power. It has no airport, no hospital, and no police station. Neither does it have a grocer, school, or local pub. In fact, it has only one dwelling, a house. To illustrate, take a look on Google Maps and find the United Kingdom (http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl). Look to the north and locate the Shetland Islands, just a bit off the tip of Scotland. Now, zoom in to the Shetland mainland. Off the west coast of the mainland, almost directly opposite of Whalsay, is Papa Stour. Zoom in to Papa Stour Island so that you can see Sandness on the mainland and the channel that runs between Papa Stour and Sandness. Continue to zoom in to this spot on the screen and you will find a small island, originally labeled Forewick Holm, but the label has been dropped from Google Maps (fig. 1.1). However, the label is available on UK Ordnance Survey maps (fig. 1.2). The point of this exercise is to illustrate how, in ‘popular’ map environments, while the physical land is visible on Google Maps and labeled on Ordnance Survey maps, the Sovereign State of Forvik does not appear, while the sovereign state of the United Kingdom does. Even switching between the lower case descriptor of ‘sovereign

\footnote{While micropatrias blend features of nations and states and use these and related terms interchangeably, they will be referred to in the thesis as nations.}
state’ for the United Kingdom and the upper case descriptor of ‘Sovereign State’ for Forvik is telling of the accepted banality of the former title and the active marketing of the latter.

Figure 1.1: Google images of Forvik (Forewick Holm), Shetland, and the United Kingdom. Source: Google maps at http://maps.google.co.uk/maps?hl=en&tab=wl.
The Island of Forewick Holm, located at 60°19’7.47"N, 1°39’49.29"W (SSFa 2011, np; fig. 1.3), was transferred in title to Stuart Hill on 29th April 2008 (fig. 1.4).

As the ‘Steward’ of the Sovereign State of Forvik (since 21 June 2008-originally named the Crown Dependency of Forvik), Stuart Hill claims independence and freedom from foreign rule for Forvik, meaning freedom from (in ascending order of political scale) Scotland, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. In June of 2010, Mr. Hill branched out his claim by founding a second nation—the Sovereign Nation State of Shetland, encompassing all the Shetland Isles. Mr. Hill argues that...
the United Kingdom has no right to the Shetland Isles, no right to tax the citizens of the Shetlands, and no right to take resources from the Shetlands, especially in regards to oil resources (a debate that was first heard of in the 1970s—for example, the 1975 port blockades (Cohen 1982) and more recent financial channeling to central government (Church 1990)). Mr. Hill wants the United Kingdom to admit it has no valid claim to the Shetland territory and to relinquish its hold on these resources, as well as financial repatriation from the resources already taken. On his website, Mr. Hill declares that “The purpose is to challenge the UK government to explain where their perceived authority in Shetland comes from” (SSFb 2011, np).

This situation is not a one-off, but only an example of a practice (or a set of subversive practices involving declarations, ‘micro’-nationalism, and parallel networks of diplomacy) that is proliferating in the United Kingdom and across the globe. This is an instance of a micropatria – and it is not unique.

Figure 1.3: Profile view of Forvik (Forewick Holm). Source: http://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/1780521.
Figure 1.4: Contract of ownership of Forewick Holm. Source: http://www.forvik.com/index.php/about-forvik/who-owns-forvik.

The thesis aims to critically examine micropatrias existing within UK territory with an explicit interest in contributing to debates within political and cultural geography (and allied intellectual fields within International Relations (IR) for example) pertaining to sovereignty, diplomacy, and the politics of transgression/subversion. Especially intriguing here is the idea of practices of...
subversive sovereignties from individuals and groups that play at and with hegemonic sovereign norms. By subverting hegemonic sovereign reality through such creative acts, embedded norms are made transparent and the divide between reality and fantasy is blurred. More specifically, the objectives of the thesis are to interrogate such micropatrial practices and representations in terms of subversion and liminality, symbols, and diplomacy as opposed to earlier studies that have addressed the ‘amusing and bizarre’ actions of individuals and groups to brand nations (see for instance Pop 2006), personal and group exercises in imagination and civics (see for instance Steinberg and Chapman 2009), and Do-It-Yourself (DIY) approaches to creating your own country to bypass national and local laws and restrictions (see for instance Lattas 2005). In particular, the focus is on how micropatrias parodically and subversively represent, to insiders and outsiders alike, a cultural and national presence. In doing so, the thesis, through a consideration of the apparent, absurd, or exceptional, offers critical insights into geopolitical norms, which might be described as hegemonic, especially those related to sovereignty and sovereign power. With this in mind, the intentions of the thesis are to tease out how subversion and liminality, symbols, and diplomacy are tactical approaches taken by micropatrias as playful interventions with such norms.

Micropatrias operate on a fairly transparent level with the aid of ‘friendly’ computer programs for personal website development which assist in terms of access to information about the nations, calls for dialogue to aid the growth of these ‘micro’-nations, and the ease of use with updated postings and forums. With the research taking place in the United Kingdom, a Western context, access to
computers and the Internet is fairly common. The research presented here can help scholars to reflect on the more hidden and exclusionary processes within established, especially Western, sovereigns, such as the often trite legalistic and political jargon, overly complex legislative procedures, aggressive and emotional discourses embedded in national symbols, the purpose of diplomatic action and inaction, and stagnating responses to citizen concerns. The remainder of Chapter 1 outlines the research questions addressed by the thesis, and then highlights the organizing framework for the subsequent chapters.

**Research Questions**

Micropatrias are in essence micro-nations that prefer a variety of political tags such as nations, states, territories, countries, and/or world orders. Unlike microstates, like Lichtenstein, and displaced nations, like Tibet, micropatrias lack both legitimate sovereignty and wider international legal recognition by sovereign nations. They are micro-nations (micronations) that work, not to achieve sovereignty through constitution from sovereign nations, but to subversively use the concept of sovereignty as a parodic template for socio-political critique, which begins through their declarations of independence. Any one individual or group of people can make a declaration of independence, but, in practice, legitimated sovereigns must recognize, and through their recognition constitute (an acceptance of the declaration), the declared sovereignty in order to legitimate the declaration, whether by peaceful or non-peaceful means. This legitimation does not occur with micropatrias thereby suspending them as geopolitical anomalies. For micropatrias,
this recognition/constitution is unnecessary to micropatrial practices. For micropatrial practitioners, the sovereignty manifests in the declaration, and the sovereign template becomes a board upon which to play.

The existing literature, directly about or touching on these geopolitical anomalies, is limited, but varied. Academic papers and reports are produced on and around the topic (Kelly 2003; Hague et al. 2005; Keighren 2005; Lattas 2005; 2009; Pop 2006; Stenhouse 2007; Hedreen et al. 2008; Steinberg and Chapman 2009; and Steinberg et al. 2011), enthusiasts compile encyclopedic guides (Strauss [1984] 1999; Fuligni 1997; O’Driscoll 2000; and Ryan et al. 2006), popular magazines and newspapers contain articles (such as Wired 2000; Cabinet 2005; BBC News 2007; The Southern Reporter 2007; and The Sunday Herald 2007), practitioners write books, make DVD’s, record audio clips, post videos, and create websites (see for example Booth 1999; Copeman 2005; Casley nd; and Wallace 2005), and authors and filmmakers produce popular works on the subject (such as the ‘Mouse’ series by Leonard Wibberley (1955-1981), and films such as Passport to Pimlico (1949), the Mouse that Roared (1959), the Mouse on the Moon (1963), Moon over Parador (1988), and Heavenly Creatures(1994)). While there is a growing literature on related themes to draw from, such as enclave socio-political entities, contestation over sovereignty, and geopolitical humor (see for instance Dodds 1996; 2007a; Suleiman 1999; Sanyal 2008; McConnell 2009a; 2009b; and Purcell et al. 2010), the limited attention given to micropatarias by social scientists creates opportunities for further academic engagement precisely because they offer us opportunities to better understand prevailing norms and values of the
inter-state system. There are many geographical elements of micropatrias that have yet to be examined, but I have nonetheless drawn out some particularly powerful themes for closer examination. Since the existing academic articles are typically written with an interest in a single micropatria, I feel that a broad examination of the practice adds to disciplinary knowledge.

As a starting point for thinking about the research project, the most visually tangible micropatrial representations (material, virtual, and textual) became the focus for initial interventions into the topic. At first, I wanted to know what creating and maintaining a micropatria involved, the more technical aspects, and followed this line of thinking for some time in my encounters with practitioners: practitioners being individuals involved in micropatrial practices. Practitioner engagement can range from posting occasionally on websites (limited) to actively shaping micropatrial representations (active). As I learned, there are no hard and fast rules for practitioners, just levels of involvement, which in themselves can disrupt and break apart micropatrial practitioner relationships. As time passed, what was being revealed through examination were practices of ‘subversive sovereignty’ (meaning sovereignty created by transgressing constitutive sovereign norms and subverting hegemonic sovereign reality, in this case artificially blurring reality and fantasy to produce ‘sovereignty’) and the positioning of the micropatria as not sacred or profane, but in a liminal state as a parallel reality mimicking and parodying sovereign hegemony from the outside.

The thesis research consists of micropatrias enclaved within the boundaries of the United Kingdom. This allows for a consideration of micropatrial declarations
and concurrent spatial claims. The research questions listed below were an anchor from which to position my research.

1. How do micropatrias represent themselves and why does this matter?
2. Why might micropatrias be considered subversive sovereignties?
3. How, and with what spatial consequences, do liminality, symbols, and diplomacy play a serious role in these subversive representations?

The scarce history of micropatrial practices from the past (to be discussed at greater length in Chapter 3), the ephemerality of digital data in the present (to be highlighted experientially in Chapter 4), and the precarious future of ageing practitioners and enthusiasts (due to a wave of practitioner growth in the 1960’s and 1970’s, some of whom are in their late years and not in the best of health) provided a very real sense of impetus throughout the research for this thesis.

**Progression of Thesis**

Chapter 2: Sovereignty, Statehood, and Nationalism, in considering the process of micropatrial declarations of sovereignty, is an interrogation into ambiguous yet commonly used territorial concepts, such as sovereignty, statehood, and nationalism. Micropatrial practitioners play with these concepts, making the familiar unfamiliar and therefore open for interrogation. In the chapter I consider each of these major concepts in turn. First, sovereignty is discussed as an idea that has shifted power from people to territories. It is also something that different forms of geopolitical anomalies hope to achieve, even when lacking territorial control. Second, I attempt to draw out the ideas of the two competing theories of statehood and how each plays a role in the thesis and the international politics of sovereignty. The declarative theory of statehood based on the 1933 Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States is a tool whereby a state, for the most part, just needs to make a declaration of sovereignty to be deemed sovereign. On the other hand, the constitutive theory of statehood, being a more internationally realistic practice, deems sovereignty based on constitution from already recognized and legitimated states. Third, in the contemporary geopolitical climate, nationalism plays an important role in the maintenance, or downfall, of states. Linking the state to important historical events, figures, and dates is a strategy meant to strengthen a state internally. Micropatrial practitioners declare sovereignty based on the declarative theory of statehood and create national symbols in the process of inventing new nations, new identities, and new realities. These national materialities become the forms of representing the micropatria to others.

Subsequent, Chapter 3: *Micropatrology*, briefly outlines the disciplinary history of micropatrology as a field of study. I reimagine the field of study for the purpose of the thesis; considering what makes a micropatria and what is it they do. In reflecting on micropatrialism, I am forced to reflect on the gendered dynamics of the practice. After this reflection, I break down micropatrias to define them as anomalous (and by all means not legitimated) nations for the purpose of discussion throughout the thesis. Micropatrial practitioners turn their geographic fantasy into fantastic geography by way of their actions, claims, and declarations. This is accomplished by their subversive and liminal positioning, the creation and representation of national symbols, and their practices of international diplomacy. However, as parallel realities, it is important to remember the hegemonic reality of
legitimate sovereigns and the layered claim by micropatrias on this established
sovereign territory. Here, micropatrias can be considered as enclaves spatially
layered within and on top of sovereign hegemony—the preexisting nation-states
that define contemporary political borders; in this case the United Kingdom. The
chapter moves on to highlight a selection of existing micropatrial types created by
enthusiasts. Enthusiasts are those persons that promote micropatrial endeavors by
way of printed guides, encyclopedic books, and online lists with links to various
micropatrial websites. After compiling these types, I discuss various micropatrial
types to reflect the variety of representations that I have seen worldwide during my
investigations. Then, I discuss the micropatrias that are the case studies for the
research. To end the chapter, a consideration on representation, culture, and
identity, and what these concepts mean in terms of micropatrial expressions, takes
place. The chapter uses current sovereign and international practices of
sovereignty to inform an understanding of the apparently fantastical qualities of
micropatrias and the politics of micropatrial representations, including the role of
subversion and liminality, symbols, and diplomacy. These themes construct the
main body of the thesis in my examination of micropatrial representations.

Following, Chapter 4: Methods highlights the various approaches taken
during the research, as well as the difficulties and experiences with the methods
used. The research employs a multi-method strategy which includes data
collection, considerations of the field, contacting participants, unstructured
interviews, virtual relationships, failed diplomacy, positionality, and the creation of
a micropatria to participate in the practice. This mixed method approach allows for
a deeper interrogation of micropatrial representations as forms of subversive sovereignties. The important first step was data collection, so the idea of collecting the data, the case study restrictions, and how I went about obtaining the data is discussed at some length in the chapter. In terms of beginning fieldwork, I had to define what and where the field was for this research and how I went about my fieldwork. Contact took on various forms including emails, postal mail, in person interviews, and virtual sharing. I think it is important to understand the failures of research and I give some examples of my own failures while trying to gather information and recruit participants. Lastly, I discuss my own positionality and experiences as a new practitioner, including some of the trials and errors of creating a nation. Taking on this role was a simultaneously challenging and rewarding aspect of the research process.

Chapter 5: Subversion and Liminality investigates micropatrial liminality as positioned outside the ruling order (sacred) and the everyday (profane). Micropatrias, as subversive entities, use their liminal perch to critique, challenge, and play with notions of sovereignty and society. Representing subversion through the creation of a niche, an enclave within a legitimated host, involves practicing resistance and transgression, as well as, a consideration of the relationship between national enclaves, sovereign hosts, and international liminality. If power can be manifested through agency, for instance, through resistant and transgressive practices (see Scott 1987), through subversive representations (see Oncu 2000), then micropatrias are expressions of power, represented through declarations of sovereignty. Therefore, representation is power and enclavic
representation is the appropriation of power through practice. Power, in this sense, is the “relational effect of social interaction” of a different spatial ‘modality’ of power (Allen 2004, 19, 20). The purpose of this power then is to represent dissatisfaction, transgression of norms, and challenges to the status quo; breaking open the hidden construction of everyday imposed realities (Cresswell 1996). The triumvirate relationship between the micropatria, the host, and the international places micropatrias as geopolitical anomalies, hence the liminal position from where norms and exclusions are made transparent. Yet, while liminality can work to expose norms and exclusions, such designations are constructed and reified through the practices of hegemonic sovereignty, diplomacy, and international law.

After, Chapter 6: Subversive Symbols of Nationalism investigates micropatrial national symbols displayed on international embassy websites. In this chapter there is a consideration of the notion of ‘practicing the nation’ in terms of creating a national identity and sharing this identity with others, whether they are micropatrial practitioners, legitimated sovereigns, or popular media. This sharing is done through the representation of symbols, the ‘paraphernalia of ideology’ (Cresswell 2004), lending a pseudo–legitimacy (pseudo—as judged by the wider international community and legitimacy—as judged within the micropatrial community) to the micropatria. As digital representations, these subversive symbols display heterotopic spaces and heterodox practices. As is shown in the chapter, heterodox practices and heterotopic representations of national symbols reflect the embedded and territorial location of each micropatrial enclave exampled. These types of images are displayed on the international embassy
websites of many micropatrias. The chosen symbols for the analysis are broken into three groups. First, kingly portraits are examined to emphasize the presence of a leader as well as their ‘right’ to rule. Second, the chosen symbols of currency and postage as everyday symbols of national narrative are considered. Third, the ‘Triad’ of power is examined (Gilboa and Bodner 2009). The Triad is a set of symbols meant to be the power icons of a nation and are a nation’s emblems, anthems, and national flags. These symbols are meant to draw on the emotions of insiders and to represent to outsiders the existence of the nation. Symbols are used as legitimating power brokers between micropatrial practitioners; and as a means of expressed sovereignty to host nations and the international community.

The penultimate chapter, Chapter 7: *Diplomacy and Subversive Sovereignty* expands examination beyond micropatrial borders. While there are no internationally agreed upon by all rules, regulations, or norms for micropatrias, practitioners diplomatically communicate across borders. There is an intertextuality present in micropatrial declarations, referring back to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. There is also an interrelationality present, not only in sovereignty as a foundation, but in recognition among micropatrial practitioners (even when this recognition leads to warring) and in recognition of legitimated sovereigns by micropatrias. Forms of national representation within an international environment are investigated to see how micropatrias are subversive sovereigns that challenge their legitimated hosts. Chapter 7 highlights the ways in which micropatrias communicate internationally through embassies, leagues, forums, and treaties and, in turn, the types of
responses they receive from legitimated sovereigns. Specifically, what language is used and actions are taken to spread the identity of the micropatria abroad. By going beyond their borders, micropatrial practitioners develop parallel international ‘sovereign’ networks. This chapter highlights the ways in which micropatrias communicate internationally with the elites of other nations, as well as with the citizens of these other nations. Another aspect considered is how micropatrial leaders draw others into conversation attracting dialogue through international forums and how micropatrial members, such as ambassadors, represent their micropatrias to outsiders from foreign embassies. By way of diplomacy, two types are examined: inter-diplomacy (between enclave and host) and intra-diplomacy (between micropatrial practitioners). Inter-diplomacy is examined through the lens of host reactions and micropatrial responses to host reactions. Such reactions are regularly non-reactions, but both elicit micropatrial responses. On the other hand, intra-diplomacy is a mechanism of constitution and recognition within these parallel sovereign networks. For the purposes here, I mean the creation and practices involved in embassies and consulates, international organizations, and international forums.

Last is Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks. In this chapter I try to answer a question, ‘What are micropatrias’? I consider their positionality as subversive, parallel, and creative. Micropatrias are expressed through symbolic national representation and this can take on a variety of forms such as currency, postage, and flags. They mimic sovereign practices to create new nationalisms. They also practice international diplomacy among micropatrias and with established states.
While they may be critical of sovereign hegemony, they reinforce the sovereign doxa. Micropatrias tactically employ subversive expressions of sovereignty to represent individual agency amongst imposed norms. They are socio-political entities, geopolitical anomalies, and creative interventions that mimic hegemonic national and international systems. By way of their playfulness, they pose challenges to and question the status quo of hegemonic sovereign realities. They are complex and consuming nations to create and run. The leaders can be witty, legally savvy, politically conscious, and globally aware. While the enclaves in the United Kingdom could be dismissed as mere hobby or eccentric expressions, they are able to garner agency through rhetoric, parody, and communication. I think what micropatrias achieve is a move that makes more transparent the socio-political constructions of the lived realities of sovereign hegemony. These lived realities are the overarching everydayness that is often accepted, taken for granted, and unchallenged. To end the thesis, I offer three possibilities for future examination of these types of entities.
Chapter 2: Sovereignty, Statehood, and Nationalism

The thesis explores the phenomenon of the micropatria. This exploration considers micropatrias as creating parallel realities vis-à-vis geopolitical norms. Such overarching hegemonic norms include concepts such as sovereignty, statehood, and nationalism. These concepts are specifically and concomitantly important to the micropatria and the orthodox world. For this reason, Chapter 2 considers these themes before proceeding to a discussion of micropatrias more specifically.

**Sovereignty**

Sovereignty has evolved from a perception of power over people by a ruler to the idea of the nation-state and the governing of territory as the power behind the state (Sharp et al. 2000; see also Akerman 1995; Agnew 2005). Contemporary hegemonic sovereignty weds power and space within discrete territory (Hudson 2008). At the heart of the thesis is the conviction that geopolitical anomalies, including de facto sovereignties, provide a window on hegemonic sovereign norms, conventions, and processes (McConnell 2010).

In reconsidering John Agnew’s (1994) work on the concept of the ‘territorial trap’ (the simplification by which states are bounded to discrete territory and the foreign and domestic are made into strict binaries), Fiona McConnell, in regards to her research on the Tibetan-Government-in-Exile, finds that examination of geopolitical anomalies reveals a “potential conceptual escape from this territorial trap” (2010, 763). I bring this up, not to attempt to rehash Agnew’s concept, but to
consider another potential beyond it, that of going beyond the fixed sovereign
space of states (Agnew 1994). Agnew argues that total sovereignty over territorial
space creates the concept of the state and, hence, its fixed quality (1994). The idea
of total sovereignty over territorial space is what I want to move beyond.
Geopolitical anomalies have the potential to offer a window into the processes that
continually work to reify this concept of fixed territory. In addition, another
potential allows for the reconsideration of how a multiplicity of sovereignties work
within a territorial space to create, not only a state, but parallel layers of counter-
hegemonic sovereignties, in a sense a ‘re-pluralising’ of political space (McConnell
2010).

In International Relations, political power is bundled with territorial
sovereignty (Agnew 1999). The claims of territoriality and citizenry by states create
a sense of this sovereignty (Agnew 1999). Demarcating the world as a map and
claiming spaces within the map offers the illusion of legitimacy (Akerman 1995).
Further controlling bounded space through territorial bureaucracy and monopoly
reinforces this legitimacy (Sharp et al. 2000) with multiple actors and authorities
complicit in this reification (Sidaway 2010). Sovereignty is then bundled with claim
and control over space, a discrete geography. Simply put, sovereignty can be
defined as “supreme authority within a territory” (SEP 2003, np), which is domestic
sovereignty (Agnew 2005). In appearance, this straightforward and well packaged
definition, while confirming the perceived importance of absolute control for
sovereignty as an internal territorial process, completely ignores external
recognition of sovereignty and the interplay of an international community of
sovereigns. Beyond absolute authority within the claimed space, independence from without is necessary to achieve a popularly constituted sovereign status (Weber 2001, 14). Sovereignty is “the cornerstone of international rhetoric about state independence and freedom of action” and is the most ‘controversial’ term to define a discrete or concrete meaning (Hannum 1990, 14).

In its pure absolutist state sovereignty does not exist, further emphasizing the realities and entanglements of an international community of sovereigns and constitution from beyond claimed territory (Hannum 1990). Absolute sovereignty is made a myth, due to the norms and values imposed on a sovereign by an international community of sovereigns and the diplomatic negotiations which limit a sovereign’s external power (see Hannum 1990; Eccardt 2005). Sovereigns maintain the sanctity of the state while practising (or maybe a better word is performing) interventions in the global (Jeffrey 2009, 46). Furthermore, sovereignty as a concept of ‘contested representation’ is a social construct where ‘arbitrariness reigns’ (Sidaway 2003, 174, 157). Sidaway calls for investigations into the unorthodox as a step towards deconstructing colonial sovereignty and its problematics.

Rather than simply declaring sovereignty and attaining absolute authority over a claimed space, Thomas Eccardt (2005) accentuates the give and take relationship to being constituted a sovereign. He puts forth the idea of niche sovereignties; and, how as niche sovereignties, micro-states are independent “tiny notches of territory” inclusive of external constitutive relations (Eccardt 2005, 323). If being a sovereign includes external relationships, but means not being subject to
the laws and customs outside of the state, and is a fundamental attribute of
statehood, as argued by Hurst Hannum (1990, 15), then we need to consider what
the state is. Maybe a state is governing an externally “recognized political entity”
(Hannum 1990, 3; emphasis added) and/or maybe it is a “political process in
motion” (Goodwin et al. 2005, 425). Being considered a state and, therefore,
sovereign relies upon how the idea of statehood is constructed and reified in
international discourse.

Theories of Statehood

The shift from royal to popular sovereignty required the replacement of the
traditional grounds of political legitimacy with a new source of authority and
this was provided by the myth of a nation, i.e. a community whose members
had the right to govern themselves through their representatives assembled
in legislative bodies at many levels. The tangible evidence of membership in a
"nation" was citizenship in a "state," leading to the powerful idea of a nation state, i.e. a state in which it was the nation rather than the king (as in
traditional monarchic states) that could legitimate governance (Riggs 1997b,
np).

The two antonymic and competing political conventions employed when
discussing the issues of statehood and sovereignty are the declarative theory and
the constitutive theory. One or both of these theories are drawn into conversation
when the question of sovereignty, or lack thereof, becomes an issue. As a point of
understanding to proceed upon, the recognized and therefore legitimated
(conventional) states within the international community of sovereigns are
considered in the thesis as the members of the United Nations Organization. There
are currently 192 United Nations members. Adding the Vatican (the Holy See), as a
non-member state and permanent observer, brings the total to 193 recognized
state entities. (Palestine is listed as an entity with permanent observer status, but not as a state.)

**The Declarative Theory of Statehood**

The declarative theory of statehood arose from the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States held in Montevideo, Uruguay December 26, 1933 and was attended by twenty American nation-states including: Honduras, USA, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Cuba. The convention was ratified in 1934 and proclaimed in 1935 by President Franklin Roosevelt (at the time the USA president), and it is archived at the Yale Law School for further referencing (YLS 2008). The Montevideo Convention determines that nation-states do not need recognition from other nation-states to be real and independent sovereigns. Using the terms independent and sovereign together may seem redundant, yet Eccardt (2005) reminds us that pragmatically sovereignty is conditional and dependent.

The convention decrees that “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states” (YLS Archive 2008, Article 3). As exampled, Article 3 of the convention assures that constitutive practices are superfluous to independence and sovereignty. While Article 3 addresses the nature of independence as declared, realistically nation-states are unequal in power, size, and international presence. To ensure a more equal footing for states, the convention’s participating states adopted the idea that “The federal state shall
constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law” (YLS Archive 2008, Article 2), therefore each state counts as one vote, and one only, in the international community. Article 4 supports the declaration and equalizing powers of Article 2 and Article 3: “States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law” (YLS Archive 2008, Article 4). While the rest of the, in total, 16 Articles of the convention deal mostly with issues of protection, independent rights, and peace, Article 1 is very clear about the requirements for declaration, and is as follows: “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states” (YLS Archive 2008, Article 1).

The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States puts forth an apolitical and, somewhat, utopian guideline, not accounting for the reality that the creation of new states, the reinvigoration of old ones, or the sub-national becoming the national would conflict with the desires of the currently recognized states to retain territory. This retention of territory becomes part of the argument against new states by constitutive theorists and practitioners.

The Constitutive Theory of Statehood

The constitutive theory of statehood requires that acknowledgement from other recognized states is necessary before statehood and, hence, sovereignty can
be achieved. While the idea of self-determination and sovereignty is supported by international organizations like the United Nations, the notion of the right of an already formed state to retain its territory and thereby retain its identity and ability to continue as a state is a point of contention (Hannum 1990). This turns into a circular and contradictory constitutive tool of deterring new states from forming and being recognized, yet remaining seemingly benevolent to and supportive of the desires of those wishing to break away and form new sovereign states. For instance, in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, signed December 14, 1960, paragraph 6 states that “Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (UN 1960; see also Hannum 1990, 34). Often, colonial nations are the only entities where independence is considered viable or possible by the international community. The practice afforded by such international organizations is that the maintenance of established “territorial integrity and national unity” is more important than the rights of self-determination (Hannum 1990, 47). In the end, the only consideration for recognition that is explicitly given is freedom from foreign rule (Hannum 1990).

Constitutive theory relies heavily on recognition from state entities within an international community for a state to be considered an international and sovereign subject (Oppenheim 1920). In thinking through the pragmatics of constitutive theory, focus is on how entities constitute each other thereby recognizing, and to a point, legitimating existence (Frost 1996). A closer inspection
of what the constitutive theory is aiming for is needed to understand why this
practice of recognition is maintained. Trita Parsi (2000) breaks down Mervyn
Frost’s work on normative constitutive theory and practices while working on more
current issues of international crises. Knowing how important international norms
and constitutive theory are, Parsi works with these norms to understand better the
‘case of Iraq’. Running themes throughout these norms are fear of international
anarchy and a powerful maintenance of the status quo sustaining states as
sovereign and discretely bounded (rigid borders). Basically, these norms mean that
the job of the state is to protect its people, and the role of the people is to
strengthen the state internally; and for the state to maintain external power while
not intervening in the internal affairs of other states. What Parsi does offer is the
reassurance that norms evolve and transform over time to meet the needs of those
practicing them. Such a perspective offers a space for change.

After spending much time searching the United Nations website, since this is
where the international community of sovereigns, as far as the thesis is concerned,
is located and where international recognition is fully achieved in the sense of the
UN member states, I was unable to find a definition for sovereignty. The Charter of
the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice signed on 26
June 1945 in San Francisco does not venture into this controversial territory (UN
1945). It only mentions the word sovereignty twice. Article 2 of Chapter I states
that “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.” And Article 78 of Chapter XII states that “The trusteeship system shall
not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations,
relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.” Even in the *Multilateral Conferences and Diplomacy Glossary of Terms for United Nations Delegates*, the term sovereignty is not defined. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1997-2007, wrote an article about *Two Concepts of Sovereignty* in the Economist published September 8, 1999. Annan’s article tip-toes around defining sovereignty, yet calls upon some imagined notion of what sovereignty must be and how it should evolve. “[I]t is clear that traditional notions of sovereignty alone are not the only obstacle to effective action in humanitarian crises” (Annan 1999, np). Besides the title and this recall of traditional notions, the only other time he mentions sovereignty is in comparing state sovereignty to individual sovereignty (Annan 1999, np).

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights.

The implicit notion of sovereignty seems to be pulling from a medieval etymology where sovereign did mean absolute and divine rule of an individual over a people (Akerman 1995; see also Hannum 1990). But this still does not give us a working definition of sovereignty from where it is administered in a current international forum.
Nationalism

In contemporary political discussions, when talking about states, sovereignty, and internationalism, the ideas of the nation and nationalism also become important. A nation can be considered to be “a cultural or social grouping with certain shared characteristics” (Hannum 1990, 3). In expressing the nation, nationalism is important to identity; in that nationalism is a community-oriented protective and offensive ‘reaction’ to governing entities such as states and empires that are apathetic to their needs (Hannum 1990). This conflicts with constitutive practitioners as they enforce international norms to deter anarchic moves by nations. Here, the tension between the motives of a state and the motives of a nation are made clearer. The nation then becomes a political tool of power for a ‘homogenous’ group, whereas the state is based on a political territory (Hannum 1990).

The notions of nation, nationality, and nationalism are just as difficult to pin down as the term sovereignty. Yet, Benedict Anderson offers this definition of a nation as “an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” ([1983] 1991, 6). While Anderson follows the creation of nationalism from the spread of capitalism, printed materials, and the use of vernacular languages, as well as the fall of dynasties and religions, the most useful concept is the idea of the imagined community. This creative trait imagines limits as boundaries, and sovereignty as a rebellion against previous forms of governance (Anderson [1983] 1991). This imagining comes from a believed connection of sharing with others an identity, even when individual persons may be unknown to
each other (Anderson [1983] 1991). This idea makes transparent nationalism as a
social construct through identification of the self and other, harking back to the
work of the generalized other (Mead 1967) and the foreign other (Said [1978]
2003).

The (re)production of national identity is simultaneously geographical and
imaginative, as Klaus Dodds reaffirms, in the way identity and territory “enrich one
another” in the production of national identity, and in how territory is the platform
for this production (2007a, 94). The practicing of nationalism draws upon
genealogic and geographic ancient connections to place (Hague et al. 2005)
simultaneously with a reinvigoration of produced and reproduced identities (Ingram
1999). Yet, Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson further belie the ‘naturalness’ of
nations as invented and unnatural by remarking that (2002, 526):

...nations and nationalism typically have a contradictory relationship with
history: National movements are of thoroughly modern origin, but their
political coherence and social power rest on historical events and figures. To
motivate political action and to create a sense of solidarity, nationalists self-
consciously create the myth of an ancient, timeless nation, and may even
come to believe in it themselves.

While many conceptions and practices of nationalism do stem from these
connections to the past, by creating a new culture a nascent history is being formed
that can display nationalism in many similar ways to long established cultures. A
move by the state has been to adopt nationalism as a marker of nation-state
identity (Roberts 2009). When nationalism and statehood are entangled, an
imagined nation-state celebrates specific identifiable attributes. Governments can
use nationalism as an internal strategy, rather than receiving it as an external
pressure, through mapping territory (spatial) and honoring dates (temporal) (Dodds
National representation “weaves” together the national narrative with a socio-political identity through an entanglement of such historical mechanisms as myths, persons, and events (Forest and Johnson 2002, 539). The acts of creating culture make each culture unique in its celebrations, rituals, and everyday materialities.

As Euan Hague et al. conclude in their analysis of nationalist representations, “Articulating cultural distinction is, therefore, one of the symbolic and discursive strategies through which nationalist activists recruit followers and demand the power to control certain demarcated territories” (2005, 153). Cultural distinction can be achieved through types of banal nationalism (Billig 1995). Banal nationalisms are the building blocks, or methods, to producing and reproducing a national identity (Raento 2009, 125). Banal forms of nationalistic representation exist like currency, postage stamps, flags, emblems, anthems, government run newspapers and radio stations, passports, and so on.

There are times when the ideas of nationalism and sovereignty fall outside the container of a physical territorial state (Akerman 1995). McConnell’s (2009a; 2009b) work on the Tibetan-Government-in-Exile (TGiE) exemplifies such comment since the TGiE is without territory or statehood and, yet, it is a nation that works towards recognition and ‘fuller’ sovereignty. In addressing the tensions between de facto and de jure states, de facto states, such as the TGiE, fall in line with the declarative theory while de jure states, such as any member of the United Nations, fall in line with the constitutive theory. De jure sovereignty (sovereignty that is considered legal, conventional, and constituted) is normalized and de facto
sovereignty (sovereignty as it is practiced in place without the legal, conventional, and/or constituted support) becomes the anomaly. This is where expressions of de facto versus de jure territorial and sovereign claims complicate space, especially when considering ideas of discrete geographies and legitimate authorities. We can borrow from McConnell (2009b, 344) here as she further teases out some ideas on de facto style political entities:

...the formation of political entities which do not fit the nation-state model...often the product of the same geopolitical processes and principles of international law: processes of decolonisation and secession; and principles of self-determination and territorial integrity. Crucially, however, these political entities are often the ad hoc manifestation of failures or incompletion of these processes, or the material outcome of tensions between these legal principles and prevailing international norms. Diverse in size and rationale, such polities include dependencies, microstates, internationalised and leased territories, non-state nations and de facto states.

From her analysis of the TGiE’s anomic state of being, McConnell offers three solutions to these tensions. One solution is that “a territorial approach granting independent statehood results in the creation of new microstates” (McConnell 2009a, 1905). A second approach which she suggests is “to keep existing (multi-ethnic) nation-states intact, but to accommodate secessionist demands through consociational forms of power-sharing” (McConnell 2009a, 1905). The last solution offers a more radical and progressive movement towards the idea of what she discusses as the “post-sovereign” era, “the continued existence of non-state entities in their current form, but with significant shifts in the interpretation and implementation of international norms so that these polities are accommodated within a heterogeneous international system... a multi-tiered system of sovereignty” (McConnell 2009a, 1905).
Political Norms, Legitimation, and Micropatrias

Within geopolitical language and rhetoric, many conceptual words are bandied around as facts of reality rather than determining social constructions. This includes the key terms introduced above. Such words as constructions need clarification, and, in the world of political jargon, this clarification can be controversial with crossovers and contradictions. Practitioners manipulate and disrupt these notions via their playful parodies. In the end, while these terms hold little sway over the existence and claims of micropatrias, they are powerful tools of more ‘conventional’ political practices. Following is a concise look at defining these terms for the purpose of the thesis. To summarize then, a nation exists as an imagined community, often attached to a specific geographic landscape (Sparke 2009, 486-487). Within a delineated border, a state is a central governing authority made up of institutions (Flint 2009a, 722-724). The domination of and control over space creates a territory (Agnew 2009, 746-7). A country is a bordered political unit (Hyndman 2009, 628). Sovereignty is “a claim to final and ultimate authority over a political community” (Flint 2009b, 706-707). While this attempt at untangling and defining these concepts is brief, it is meant to aid in showing the different ways these commonly used and, in popular use, sometimes seemingly interchangeable terms have a greater depth and room for interpretation. Bearing this in mind, from here on, micropatrias will be discussed as nations to simplify a complex web of words, and as sovereigns, by way of their declared status, that have not been legitimated.
What micropatrias reveal under examination is not whether the importance of the sovereign status of a nation is real or perceived, but how the importance of recognition strategically and tactically constructs hegemonic sovereignty. The profane functioning of some political entities does not require such legitimation, such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for instance. The republic remains in a position of liminality through the denial of recognition by legitimate sovereigns. This shutting out denies the republic voice and visibility, illustrating the discursive construction of the republic as illegal ‘occupiers’ of territory. Other examples of geopolitical anomalies that function but do not have the hegemonic sovereign stamp can include the TGiE (McConnell 2009a; 2009b), as well as various other social groups and political entities, especially in terms of spaces and rights. Even recognition by a legitimate sovereign does not guarantee legitimacy as is with the case of the republic mentioned above, receiving recognition only by Turkey. One legitimate sovereign may give recognition, while another does not. This is exemplified by the cases of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and how during World War II the United States continued to recognize them as sovereign nations after they were annexed by the Soviet Union (Strauss [1984] 1999). This shows that even legitimate sovereign nations can disagree, sometimes violently, about hegemonic sovereignty. This particular example, involving the so-called Baltic States, creates a moment where the notion of sovereignty becomes more complicated and, yet, at the same time more transparent as a socially produced process, in this instance of wartime and, subsequently, Cold War geopolitics. The three countries became meaningfully sovereign in 1991.
The above example of disputed sovereignty for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia was a political game of power played between two legitimate sovereign giants. Nations legitimated as sovereigns may not want to add ‘players’ to the international ‘game’ (Strauss [1984] 1999). This not only highlights the geopolitical processes in creating known nations, but also shows the liminal, interstitial nation-spaces created through ignoring, or othering, nations seeking recognition. Through such exclusionary processes, geopolitical anomalies develop and take up a liminal residence. Traditionally, liminality is discussed in literature as a temporary state or zone of socio-political transitioning for individuals and groups within society – much like political geographical discussions of frontiers for example as opposed to borders. As a transitional zone, liminality is the space of separation for individuals and groups from the everyday roles and expectations, but not yet a re-incorporation, or acceptance, as a changed individual or group with new roles and expectations (van Gennep 1960). It is a state of being in flux. The best description of the role of liminally placed individuals and groups asks us to consider that, “if liminality is regarded as a time and place of withdrawal from normal modes of social action, it can [then] be seen as potentially a period of scrutinization of the central values and axioms of the culture in which it occurs” (Turner [1969] 1977, 167). If we expand the idea of groups to include those of a society rather than those only within one, we can then use the idea of liminality to understand how geopolitical anomalies fit within the concept. For instance, David Campbell writes about how borders are shifting due to “those who are ambiguous and liminal” and how the liminal is discursively produced as such by being cast out by the authority
Micropatrias are a rich source for academic investigation, which aids understanding of what is defined as acceptable in the geopolitical game by showing what is considered unacceptable, that which is cast out (McConnell 2009a; 2009b).

Micropatrias are self-declared, parodic ‘sovereigns’. As such, they lack recognition by legitimate sovereigns. As a result, they create liminal national spaces and can be considered as geopolitical anomalies that challenge hegemonic understandings of sovereignty (as well as statehood and nationhood). Research on anomalous entities is not new. Geographers have investigated enclaves and exclaves in terms of their anomalous positions and contested sovereignty (see for instance Robinson 1953; 1959; Griffiths 1994; Jones 2009; Berger 2010; and McConnell 2010). In addition, Dodds discusses how geopolitics “provides ways of looking at the world” and “offers for many a reliable guide of the global landscape” (2007a, 4).

By delving into the entanglements of space, people, and government, one can apprehend that sovereigns are socio-political spaces, with governments representing the expressions of such relationships (Weber 2001). Micropatrias, as forms of DIY nations (Lattas 2005; DIY is a popular term meaning Do-It-Yourself), represent their own expressions of socio-political relationships. These expressions or representations of DIY nations, through created national symbols, make more transparent the processes we are all embedded in. The value of such DIY nations is that they can be seen as creative geopolitical interventions in that they “allow us to see shifts that we might not otherwise see in our ‘fixed worlds’, as these are

46
popularly produced in everyday life” (Lattas 2005, 2). Perhaps, these are in part represented expressions of what Louis Marin (1993) theoretically delineates in the deconstruction of imaginary utopias; that one would end up with autonomous, and what he considers ethical and political, sovereigns. Whether accomplished through written declaration, verbal proclamation, or just plain protest, micropatrias declare their existence and, consequently, their ‘right’ to sovereignty. Within the scope of the thesis, this ‘right’ boils down to a claim since these nations are parodically enacting notions of what sovereignty is and are forming enclaves within territory concurrently claimed by the United Kingdom.

Here we can think of hegemonic political perceptions as that of the governing (the sacred) removed from the everyday (the profane), a concept counter to examinations of the blurring of the everyday and the state (on this blurring see Jones and Merriman 2009). In a move away from McConnell’s potential of de facto sovereignty as “articulated at the scale of the everyday, the mundane and undramatic” (2010, 764), the micropatria as geopolitical anomaly transgresses both state conventions (the sacred) and the everyday (the profane) to liminally distance through the production of counter and parallel networks, at times colliding with the sacred and at times bypassing sovereign hegemony entirely.

Micropatrias, aware of the different theories of statehood discussed above, rely, not surprisingly, on the declarative theory when announcing their sovereign status. This is especially true when the status of a micropatria is questioned or a leader puts forth a declaration of independence. While micropatrial leaders devoutly cite the declarative theory of statehood, the leaders of legitimated states
just as devoutly practice the basic tenets of the constitutive theory of statehood. *Article 1* of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States is by far the most cited by micropatrias that declare independence and ‘seek’ international acceptance. The four requirements, as mentioned earlier, are a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states (YLS Archive 2008, Article 1). The *Articles* in the convention are written using clear and concise language. This language use has a utopian simplicity that perhaps draws micropatrial practitioners to it. Thomas More’s work in *Utopia* stresses the importance of clear and simple language in law so that the populace can understand and follow these written guides. Micropatrial leaders tick the declarative boxes and consider themselves leaders of a sovereign entity.

Micropatrias, at least the ones in this manuscript, fulfill the convention’s requirements. The case studies all have a permanent population (even if it may be just one person), a defined territory (that may be just their house), a government (all of them create a system of rules, symbols, and forms of governance), and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (many of the leaders practice international diplomacy, even if it is with other micropatrial leaders). By fulfilling the convention’s requirements, micropatrias play with statehood and sovereignty. Their actions illustrate the exclusivity of sovereignty in terms of hegemonic political norms derived from the political power of dominant actors (i.e. states or groups; see Agnew 1999) and highlight the complicated relationship of recognition and power. Micropatrias play with the tension between the two competing theories of
statehood and the ambiguous handling of sovereignty by elite persons and organizations. This playfulness by such geopolitical anomalies (or maybe here it is better to say geopolitical interventions) works to make visible geopolitical norms.

What is really seen with the constitutive theory of statehood are its exclusionary practices and how micropatrias, subversive sovereign nations, are parodically toying with this arena of exclusion to make statements about current affairs and political dissatisfaction.

Whether realized or not, people are connected to the world as political actors (Frost 1996), and “can engage in new transnational networks of empowerment” (Desforges et al. 2005, 445). Opportunistically and pragmatically, micropatrial leaders can be seen then taking a more active role in this agency of involvement and literally creating themselves into geopolitical actors that challenge accepted sovereign norms. Practitioners invent new nationalisms as tactics to express their activist goals and statements of dissatisfaction. They, alongside political convention, create myths of their nations and date important events in their nation’s history. Part of this myth making and national memory is developed through the culture of a micropatria, whether it is celebrating an independence day, a leader’s birthday, cookie dough day, or an exploration hunting for East Germans. They mimic the processes of contemporary nation-states. Included in this mimicking is the creation of the tools of banal nationalism, like currency, postage, and flags. Practitioners use these representations to further enhance their parodic approaches. Rather than non-state nations working to achieve recognition, statehood, and sovereignty, micropatrias subversively play around with these ideas,
reminding us of the socio-political status of a geopolitically constructed and exclusively controlled world; and how there are political entities like the TGiE that are locked out due to such political exclusionary practices that decide which nations are worthy of sovereign (and state) legitimation.

Chapter 2 is meant to superficially untangle complex concepts while simultaneously tangling their practices and implications. These concepts of sovereignty, statehood, and nationalism are the very norms on which micropatrias build their parodies to mimic, disrupt, and play with the arbitrary foundations of international hegemonic conventions. Up to this point glimpses have been given about the micropatrial phenomenon, but not much depth as to what it is or how it came to be. Chapter 3 will give insight into the world of Micropatrology.
Chapter 3: Micropatrology

While sitting in a geography lab and working on my master’s thesis at East Carolina University in the United States, a friend asked me if I had ever heard of Sealand. Now this friend, a Mr. Garrett Nelson, is well aware of my penchant for the strange, the subversive, and the rebellious. I answered back with a resounding ‘no’, but my curiosity was already piqued. Garrett always had a way of finding oddities for me to enjoy. I then began to explore Sealand through their webpage on the Internet and was captivated by the adventurous and bizarre story of this created nation. I decided then and there that ‘this’ was my PhD research, whatever ‘this’ was. ‘What this was’ is an example of a micropatria. What I am doing is something called micropatrology.

In 1973, the International Micropatrological Society (IMS) was formed to begin a study of small nations, regardless of their sovereign status (personal communication with IMS member, August 2009). For the IMS, the term micropatrology means “the study of small countries”, with an inclusion of both the legitimated and the declared types (Strauss [1984] 1999, 162). A closer inspection of the meanings wound up in the term reveals some fluctuation of word definition. Micro is a variation of the ancient Greek word mikros meaning “small, little, trivial” (CGLS 2009, np) and/or “small, little ... of size: hence of stature...of rank or influence” (NTGL 2009, np). And patria is a Latin word meaning “fatherland, one’s native home, homeland” (UND 2008, np). The term micropatria translates roughly to small fatherland. Micropatrology was, and still is, not a well-defined field. The
IMS parameters of interests were ambiguous in regards to sovereignty and the resulting taxonomy itself a blurring of reality and fantasy by accepting all ‘countries’ as such. As a reinvigoration of the practices of the now defunct IMS with an added geographical lens, micropatrias are re-imagined here as self-declared ‘sovereign’ phenomena, such that they take on the position of being geopolitical anomalies. In particular, through their declarative efforts, these entities subversively and parodically use the idea of sovereignty as a template for socio-political critique.

These types of entities can be termed, in a loose sense, nations, states, territories, countries, or projects. For example, as George Pendle (British author and journalist) declares, “Call them micronations, model countries, ephemeral states, or new country projects, the world is surprisingly full of entities that display all the trappings of established independent states, yet garner none of the respect” (2005, 65). The respect mentioned by Pendle being sovereignty, meaning the constitutive sovereignty among states as discussed in Chapter 2. Yet, he misses the point of micropatrial representation. It is not to gain a foothold as a legitimate sovereign, but to play with such notions as sovereignty, the nation, and identity, and to make more transparent through internal rhetoric the national and international processes that have been naturalized and are, in a hegemonic sense, taken for granted. While practitioners sort their micropatrias into the different labels above, in the thesis they are tagged as nations.

Micropatrias are spatially and culturally subversive forms of sovereignty. The term sovereignty in the singular is meant to elicit the concept of hegemonic sovereignty in contrast to the subversion of it, while using the term sovereignties in
the plural is meant to express the differing and actual micropatrial representations as a reminder of the multiplicities of the practice. It is the subversive activity that is important to remember throughout the thesis; and how the various subversive activities are represented by micropatrial practitioners. Rather than working with or within an existing system (that of sovereign hegemony) to promote change through legislation, protest, or revolution, some individuals choose to create new nations; to create micropatrias as a form of pushing the boundaries of orthodox convention and hegemonic acceptance. These new nations range in form from grounded territorial articulations to virtual imaginings. The motivations behind their creations run the gamut from ideological protests stemming from dissatisfaction with governments to artistic expressions, media stunts, and virtual pastimes.

Interestingly, the micropatria moniker accurately reflects the gendered demographics of micropatrias since they are created and governed, almost entirely, by men. The international political is masculine (Murphy 1998) and international politics, including war and diplomacy, are inscribed as the masculine realm; as Charlotte Hooper notes “When men publicly identify with hegemonic masculinity or otherwise collaborate with such public images, they boost their own position” (1998, 34). Hence, the masculine paternal sovereign figure contains a “concentration of political power” (Gunn 2008, 19; on masculine sovereignty see also Dittmer et al. 2011). The access to an online audience, moreover, allows for playing with a masculine route of power through representation and dominance
(Corneliussen 2008, 80). Such power enhancing qualities are conflated with masculinism (Hooper 1998).

Patriarchy is an intrinsic aspect of micropatrias, historically and presently. We can draw from Robert Hanke, in his analysis of ‘mock-macho’ parody, that masculine parody and parody of hegemonic patriarchy by men allow for a masculine reflexivity to “(re)act and (re)affirm the force relations between masculinity and femininity” (1998, 91). Even with shifts in governing practices from government to more local governance, males still dominate these roles as political leaders and representatives (Tickell and Peck 1996; on political shift see Jones et al. 2005). This dominance extends beyond political agents to the everyday realities of work environments (McDowell 2001; 2004). High-technology employment in research and design is predominantly male, stemming from constructed beliefs of masculine abilities in logic and reason (Massey 1995). The high-tech materialities transform into toys, expressing a connection with masculinity and play (Massey 1995). According to Nancy Dowd (2010), play is an intrinsic element of relationship involvement for men.

In terms of masculine dominance, the same is true of power relations and constructed traditions within academic knowledge (Rose 1995). This gender dominance privileges “masculinist forms of decision-making and agenda-setting” (Tickell and Peck 1996, 596). Masculinities metonymically represent the idea of ‘the nation’ and reinforce hegemonic patriarchy (Radcliffe 1999). Under Hooper’s investigation into the four types of Western masculinity inherited by men (the Greek citizen-warrior model, the patriarchal Judeo-Christian, the honor-patronage,
and the Protestant bourgeois rationalist), micropatrial practitioners unsurprisingly display elements of the Greek citizen-warrior model: “The Greek model combined militarism with rationalism and equated manliness with citizenship in a masculine arena of free speech and politics” (1998, 33). Such glorification and heroism of the male warrior is “projected onto the behavior of states” (Hooper 1998, 42); hence, micropatrial practitioners, especially leaders, embodying the state are embodying the Greek warrior, and by their political rhetoric are embodying the Greek citizen. This model calls for male courage and responsibility which are “fundamental ‘masculine’ attributes” (Murphy 1998, 95). Micropatrial practitioners can take on the role, through such calls to courage and responsibility, of being a mediator whereby changes and impact are possible (Murphy 1998). Such mediators often charitably aid others or fight for the rights of others through their practitioner activities, as exampled by the Steward of Forvik in Chapter 1.

**Fantastic Geographies**

Historically, territories have been claimed in the name of empires, such as the growth of the British Empire during colonialism. Some territories though have been claimed by declared nations (such as the historical examples of the Kingdom of Sedang in 1888; the Kingdom of Redonda in 1865; or the Kingdom of Araucania and Patagonia in 1860). Contemporary micropatrias stem from a mimicking of the early 1800’s practice of land grabbing and claiming (see for example Collis 2004). Micropatrias did exist, and some still do exist, from times earlier than the 1800’s, such as declared by Seborga since 955 A.D. Unfortunately, little information can be
found about many earlier micropatrias. Often they were annexed by other nations that did not see their claim as legitimate. Besides being a time when documentation of micropatrias started building, the nineteenth century is also important since this is when the practice began to proliferate. The proliferation mimics imperial practices taking place during this time in connection with the development of the idea of nation-states (Akerman 1995; see also Anderson [1983] 1991).

One approach to studying the historical implications of micropatrias is to examine how some geopolitical anomalies transitioned to a macropatria. The term macropatria is in use in the micropatrial community and refers to nations that grew into what are now known as the legitimate sovereign nations. Using such terminology emphasizes the idea of the nation ‘becoming’ and the ‘making’ of sovereignty rather than traditionally fixed and rigid notions of these concepts. This division aids micropatrial practitioners in drawing out the differences between the two. A quick caveat is needed to distinguish what the micro/macro terms mean here. Rather than a constrictive moniker of size, micro can also refer to a ranking of a non-legitimated sovereign status. Hence, this simple dichotomy used by micropatrial members is not beyond critical engagement. The prefix macro employed by micropatrial practitioners refers to a recognized and constituted sovereign status, therefore, flagging out the geopolitical norms. By some micropatrial members using this dichotomy in their language, a possible complication of multiple definitions of sovereignty adds to the tensions between norms and anomalies and, in turn, processes of recognition. For instance, some
micropatrial members talk about macropatrias, therefore adding another layer of questionable sovereignty to their own ‘sovereign’ statuses, further illustrating the micropatrial ambiguity and playfulness with the term sovereign. This type of dialogue could undermine their presumptive sovereignty. Beginning with the declaration of sovereignty, practitioners give various reasons for creating and participating in micropatrias.

Micropatrias are illustrative of how geographies of fantasy can physically manifest into fantastic geographies. To define micropatrias by territorial size limits or population caps is, firstly, arbitrary and, secondly, missing the point. Some claim large territories. The Northern Forest Archipelago (located in the New England area of the United States) claims 110,000 sq km, larger than Portugal or Iceland (figures from Ryan et al. 2006 and the UN 2007 respectively). Some have more citizens than small countries. The Kingdom of Lovely (located in a flat in the Bow area in London, England) has more citizens than Greenland or Liechtenstein (figures from Wallace 2005 and the UN 2004 respectively). Some are nations arising out of protest (like the Maritime Republic of Eastport located in the Eastport area of Annapolis, Maryland in the United States or Waveland, renamed from Rockall in the North Atlantic Ocean north of the United Kingdom), some media and tourist born (like the Kingdom of Lovely or the Independent Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye, which is the town of Hay-on-Wye in Wales), others are squatted locations (like Freetown Christiania in the Christiania area of Copenhagen, Denmark or the Free Independent Republic of Frestonia located on Freston Road in London, England), or locations seceded to be free of “host” requirements (like the Principality of Hutt River which is a farm near
Northampton, Western Australia, Australia or Snake Hill which is a house in Baulkham Hills, New South Wales, Australia), and even more are connections of similar interests (like the Empire of Atlantium located in Potts Point, New South Wales, Australia or the Kingdom of the Coral Sea Islands which is in fact Cato Island, off the northeast coast of Australia). Some people live in micropatrial territory without their knowledge. For example, most of the New England population of the United States lives in the Northern Forest Archipelago (Ryan et al. 2006). Beginning as fantasy, micropatrias can quickly manifest into a lived reality.

In fantasy, the fantastic is “an uneasy mixing of the real and the unreal” (Kneale and Kitchen 2002, 4). This mixing makes the familiar unfamiliar and the fantastic strange. The fantastic then produces a ‘gap’, “a zone of tension”, making room for ‘thought experiments’ while remaining ‘ordered and contained’ (Kneale and Kitchin 2002, 4-7). Through constructing ‘spatial realms’ the fantastic ‘makes power visible’ which is useful for analysis in unpacking geographies and their entangled powers (Kneale and Kitchin 2002, 8-9). Upon divulging experiments of the fantastic, it is often found that these same fantasies are shared with others (Cohen and Taylor 1976). This is illustrated by the plethora of micropatrias in existence. Also, on a shared level, attempts are made to network via the creation of international leagues and unions, analogous to the United Nations. Politically, micropatrias represent nationalistic identity constructed from the ground up, or really from the micropatria out. Paradoxically though, while constructing a nation from the ground up, the creators, who are at the same time often the leaders, kings, and presidents, are building nationalism from the top down. As a point to
begin to understand micropatrias, intertextuality plays a large role in their identities and representations. The three main intertextual nodes of connections for practitioners between the ‘real’ world and the ‘fantasy’ world are subversion of hegemony and liminal positioning, national symbols, and international diplomacy. These three practices are spaces of blurring and bridging reality with fantasy.

Subversion, Symbols, and Diplomacy

Micropatrial practices of intertextuality work to challenge hegemonic social constructions and blur the reality/fantasy divide. Three of these practices consist of subversion of norms through liminal positioning, national symbols, and international diplomacy. For example, the Free Independent Republic of Frestonia is liminally positioned by its ‘citizens’ through declarations of sovereignty and an application to join the United Nations as a member state, therefore subverting hegemonic sovereign norms. Another example is how the Sovereign State of Forvik also makes claims for independence and is growing its paraphernalia of national symbols in an attempt to link to the area’s history before it was brought into the UK fold, especially seen in its flag. A third example here is the Independent Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye and how it uses soft diplomacy through letters, travels, and press conferences in an effort to impress upon the public the importance of rural towns and how contemporary bureaucracy leaves behind rural towns in support of urban centers. Each of these micropatrias, along with others, will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, specifically 4, 5, and 6.
Other practices of representation include, but are not limited to, citizenship rights and procedures, legislation and amendments, government structures and organization, court systems and cases, conflicts and wars. The three thematic investigations I have focused on were the most compelling, meaning implicitly and explicitly apparent and generally adopted in micropatrial practices. Subversion and liminal positioning, national symbols, and international diplomacy elementally create a triumvirate platform on a ‘sovereign’ foundation for producing the parody, for producing the ‘nation’. These three themes compose the heart of the thesis. First, subversion and liminal positioning, and the accompanied use of humor, as tactical tools offer micropatrias the ability to challenge hosts and international communities. Humor is a great indicator of sentiment within society and has been studied for its many effects through expressions from above and below, as levers of release and catharsis, and of playfulness (see for example Hobbes 1839, 1840; Baudelaire [1855] 1972; Spencer 1860; Freud [1922] 1966; Bergson 1956; and Morreall 2009). Humor is implicitly and explicitly present in the micropatrial endeavor as a tool of subversion and a reflection of micropatrial liminal positionings as parodies of sovereign hegemony. Second, the processes that create the symbols of national identity (anthems, flags, currency, etc.) lend much to understanding how individuals reflect national discourses (Webster and Webster 1994; Raento 2009). By investigating micropatrias as instruments of this process, a much less entangled and more transparent examination can occur; compared to investigating an already established sovereign nation. Third, diplomacy reinforces an international system and externally reifies legitimated sovereignty. Micropatrias
practice internal diplomacy within micropatrial communities and external diplomacy with host nations and international organizations. Diplomatic outcomes and processes are revealing of sovereign and international agendas and ideologies.

Micropatrial parodying of these processes illustrates the exclusionary practices of legitimated sovereigns and the subversive practices of micropatrias by circumventing the ‘official’ and practicing their own forms of formal diplomacy. According to Erwin Strauss ([1984] 1999), the first ‘new country’ was born with the first split of the original hunter-gatherer tribe. Following this line of thinking then all nations at one time could be considered to have been anomalies and with time, and conquest, they have grown into the sovereign nations we live with and within today. This calls attention to important geopolitical aspects of how nations and national/international discourses began/begin, evolve/become, and the possibilities for future transformations.

**Enclaves**

In terms of political value, enclaves are possibly the current “main contenders for independence” (Riggs 1997a, np). Micropatrias producing enclavic nations can use this spatial/political positioning, through their parody, to implicitly highlight the struggles of other nations; to ‘make power visible’ (Kneale and Kitchin 2002). Geographers tend not to engage with the more unusual and odd political variations, such as enclaves and even exclaves, often leaving such messy political entities out of spatial investigations, literature, and textbooks. But there are those who have and do find that the unusual, odd, and anomalous are points from which
to converse about the social norms and political hegemonies. First, let me
differentiate between an enclave and an exclave. An exclave is a territory
separated from its country like Hong Kong was from Britain before it was returned
to Chinese control (Riggs 1997a). Exclaves highlight how states internationally
interact (Robinson 1953; 1959) and the precarious, often ephemeral, positions
exclaves hold (Griffiths 1994). Antonymic to exclave, an enclave is “a territory
belonging to one country or state but lying entirely within the boundaries of
another” (OED 2005, 336). Enclaves act as socio-political barriers within sovereign
states and make transparent the myth of clear, defined borders (Berger 2010).
Thus, they offer spaces from which to be critical of sovereignty and borders (Jones
2009). Of course, an enclave can also be an exclave, but for the thesis this is not
the case.

For the research, I will use the word enclave to mean territory claimed by
‘declared’ nations, by micropatrias, but lying within a larger territorial claim by a
legitimate sovereign, hence micropatrias as enclaves. Generally, micropatrias are
enclaved by sovereign nations, furthering their liminal existence. For an example of
how other types of enclaves reside in liminal spaces, the Basque territory can be
considered an enclave that is within territory claimed by Spain and territory claimed
by France. The civil unrest, injustice towards the Basque culture, and ‘terrorist’
activity from the Basque front highlights very threatening actions and reactions
between unhappy enclave and begrudging host. Another example of an enclave is
the Lakota Nation in the United States, located mainly in the states of North
Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Montana. In 2007, the Republic of
Lakotah declared independence from the United States, claiming the above mentioned territory for their nation (RL 2009). In response, nothing is done by the United States. The non-response by the United States illustrates exclusionary practices in an attempt not to officially engage the Lakota. By not engaging them, by ignoring them, the US government does not inadvertently lend any legitimacy to their efforts at independence.

Ignoring the needs and demands of enclaves is a common approach by legitimate sovereign nations and international agencies like the United Nations. This very tension between reaction/non-reaction by legitimate sovereign and the resulting perceptions by the enclave is an element of diplomacy that is developed in Chapter 7. When the legitimate sovereign feels no threat from the enclave, the enclave remains invisible through strategic ignoring. But, when the legitimate sovereign feels threatened, the enclave becomes visible through developed discourses of terror or criminality. More specifically, the times these enclavic entities are confronted by the ‘host’ sovereign is either in times of aggressive tactics by the enclave, when the host feels culturally/territorially threatened by the enclave, or when the host feels the enclave is not following the laws put in effect by the host nation. At these times, the citizens of enclaves can be, and often are, termed ‘terrorists’ or ‘criminals’ by the host nation, allowing for their arrests and trials through the host’s legal system (Raento 1997). While not ignoring the enclave in these extreme circumstances of legal cases, their rights as members of an enclave nation are still ignored.
I use the word *host* here loosely, not meant as a happy and willing nation ready to make sure the enclave is thriving, but as Fiona McConnell (2009a; 2009b) uses the word, ‘host’ as the sovereign nation in which the enclave is located. While McConnell studies governments-in-exile whereby these enclaves are given certain rights and specific territory in which to inhabit, often meant as a short term hosting, micropatrias ‘permanently’ claim territory of the ‘host’ without political negotiations; often just a declaration sent by post. The liminal or interstitial spaces created through ignoring, or othering, enclaved nations seeking recognition are often quite telling of a larger international and geopolitical story. In essence, if we think about the counter-responses of the micropatria to the legitimate sovereign, then micropatrial practitioners at times employ the same techniques of ignoring the demands of the host, othering the host as not important or valid in claims, or eradicating the host by not bothering to even acknowledge the existence of the host in some instances.

**Micropatrial Types**

Micropatrias are as diverse as legitimate sovereigns. I want to show some examples of the types of micropatrias created by enthusiasts. These types of micropatrias demonstrate some of the nuances and varieties within the practice and are promoted by way of guide books, encyclopedic volumes, popular magazine articles, and online lists. Below will be an example of each group. These types are not set in stone, but are a way of considering shared themes across the practice. Enthusiasts are considered here as those who compile types of bibliographic or
encyclopedic information about micropatrial practices, including books publications, popular magazines, and digital media. For example the following shows how some enthusiasts have thematically categorized the practice:

*Ryan et al.: Lonely Planet Guide (2006; Book)*

Lonely Planet is the “largest guidebook company in the world” (Lisle 2008, 155; see also Tegelberg 2010) with the first book published in 1973, *Across Asia on the Cheap* (LP 2011, np). *Micronations: The Lonely Planet Guide to Home-made Nations*, a compilation of micropatrias, is part of the Lonely Planet Travel Guide series. It is designed as a revealing guide to “those DIY pioneers who reject traditional methods of attaining power” (Ryan et al. 2006, 4). The guide is intended as a foray into fantastic geographies for those travelers who wish to experience a different sort of vacation. It highlights the eccentric practices of micropatrias throughout the ages and throughout the globe, and takes a broad look at three main categories: serious business, backyard nations, and dreams of grandeur.

The *Serious Business* category is grouped by micropatrias that are more developed, lasting in time, and a bit more on the serious political side, including such nations as the Principality of Sealand, Christiania, the Hutt River Province, the Kingdom of Lovely, the Gay and Lesbian Kingdom of the Coral Sea Islands, the Northern Forest Archipelago, and Seborga.

The *My Backyard, My Nation* category is grouped by micropatrias that have captured the practice in spirit and choose to take personal control over their lives, including such nations as the Republic of Molossia, the Copeman Empire, the
Empire of Atlantium, the Grand Duchy of the Lagoan Isles, the Ibrosian Protectorate, and the Principality of Vikesland.

The *Grand Dreams* category is grouped by micropatrias that ‘take a stand’ and have progressive hopes for the future, including such nations as Westarctica, the Maritime Republic of Eastport, the Conch Republic, Snake Hill, the Dominion of British West Florida, the Republic of Saugeais, and the Grand Duchy of Elsanor.

By creating a travel guide book on micropatrias that is part of their larger series of travel guide books to legitimate nations, Lonely Planet conflates, even if only superficially, these liminal entities with hegemonic sovereigns.

*Strauss: How to Start your own Country ([1979] 1984; Book)*

With access to the IMS archives, Strauss went on to create a more methodical book on how to start a country, taking into account war and casualties as part of the serious venture. From his archival research, he has put together a compilation that is very broad and one of the best that I have encountered in terms of capturing as many micropatrias as possible. While he does not specifically point out which micropatrias fall under which category he has organized (traditional sovereignty, flags of convenience, litigation, vonu, or model country), I will add in a couple of examples for each where relevant. This is of course my interpretation of his themes.

*Traditional Sovereignty* is the approach of territorial claiming resulting in weapons, wars, and casualties. This is the way of legitimated sovereigns and is generally irrelevant to the micropatrial approach. If a micropatria were to go this route then, as will be discussed later, they lose their liminal distance and critical
platform and fall apart, perhaps transforming into something else, like a micro-state or a militia.

The *Flags of Convenience* category falls more under the idea of enterprises. Ships are required by laws to fly national flags, or otherwise be considered pirates. Ships can purchase the rights to fly national flags without regulation from small nations, such as Panama, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and pay a tax to the nations for these rights. After payment, ships can fly these flags of convenience with the freedom to do as they please, often by having offshore financial businesses such as gambling, banking, or clinics. While micropatrias fly their own flags and do not come under this category, Strauss lists the Jolly Roger project as an example.

The theme of *Litigation* is rather straightforward. A nation declares independence and follows this belief which results in a refusal to follow host laws, an embracing of conflict that follows from the declaration, and takes the contested sovereignty into the court systems. Such nations can include the Principality of Sealand and the Sovereign State of Forvik.

The idea of the *Vonu* is a form of dropping out of sight and society. Strauss lists groups that choose to live in remote areas like mountain ranges or bush areas, uninhabited islands as in the Pacific, and forms of nomadism. These lifestyles allow more freedom from imposed societal rules and the ability to become invisible through non-payment of taxes and home schooling of children. Such nations can include the Gay and Lesbian Kingdom of the Coral Sea Islands and Whangamomona.

The *Model Country* here is meant to convey micropatrialism as hobby. Approaches include creating flags, passports, currency, postage, visa stamps,
‘government to government’ transfer of funds (such as paying taxes) and so on. Such nations could include the Republic of Molossia and Westarctica.

What is apparent between the approaches taken by Lonely Planet and Strauss is the differing motivations for the publications and the attached attitudes to these motivations. Both can be considered productions by enthusiasts, but book publications are not the only material forms produced by enthusiasts.

**Cabinet Magazine: Fictional States Issue (2005; Magazine)**

*Cabinet Magazine* is a popular, non-profit, ‘award winning’ magazine of art and culture which was founded in 2000 (CM 2011, np). The special issue on *Fictional Nations* talks about practices such as micropatrial postage construction (Cinderella stamps), historical practices of fiction, and new ways to conceive of authority. The four categories below are from a portfolio section on self-declared nations. It is an introduction into the ideas of micropatrias.

*Protesting unfair tax and quota systems* is a common reason behind many micropatrial formations: protesting tax systems, protesting government inefficiencies, and protesting sovereign liberties with public spaces and resources. Anti-government protest, in some form or another and for a multitude of reasons, is common among micropatrias. An example from the magazine is the Hutt River Province Principality.

*Colonizing virgin territory and reclaiming lands disdained by other countries* in the past was a popular activity among sovereigns with ambitious of increased power, especially during the colonization of Africa and the New World. Even today
with Russia’s annexation of Crimea away Ukraine some of these ideas ring true. Taking unclaimed territory, if such a thing exists, or reclaiming territory from the sovereign that took it is also a practice among many micropatrial communities and nations. Whether mimicking colonial practices or opposing them, micropatrias, through their parodying, bring to light a system, supposedly post-colonial, yet remaining stuck in the mire of colonialism. This is an example of how the ‘colonial past’ is “reaffirmed and reactivated in the colonial present” (Gregory 2004, 7); accomplished through a reification of the ‘other’. Kymaerica is an example of a reclaiming of US claimed territory and the New Free State of Caroline is an example of claiming ‘unclaimed’ land.

While the Kingdom of Fusa, enclaved by Norway, as a monarchy is on the surface not really exploring new models of governance, Norwegian experimentation with Norway and Fusa as two governments with equal control over the same space and territory might be. The dual leadership experiment can offer multiple voices in often overwhelmingly closed systems and allow for micropatrial agency to be maximized vis-a-vis the state.

Asserting the right to practice one’s own brand of authority is where the provocative experiments of artists create micropatrias to defy hegemonic discourses of territory and sovereignty. Neue Slowenische Kunst State in Time claims the territory of time rather than space as that which to anchor our identities. It is about virtual and spiritual identities instead of territorial and border identities. The Kingdom of Elgaland-Vargaland, another artistic experiment, practices its own forms of authority by looking beyond orthodox sovereignty and standard
micropatrial heterodox practices to claim interstitial spaces as the spaces of habitation and mobility. The kingdom claims that the spaces on the Earth between borders and the ocean spaces beyond borders as belonging to it. These types of micropatrias are reminders of the sovereign doxa and challenge people to conceive of even different ways to perceive space and authority.

Cabinet, as a more liberal leaning art and culture magazine, not surprisingly illustrates micropatrias as either anti-government, reclaiming what can be termed as taken territory, experimenting with new forms for government, or breaking apart the sovereign doxa to provoke contemplation beyond it. Beyond material publications of books and magazines is the digital realm. The Internet, a popular tool for practitioners, is also a popular tool for enthusiasts.

Wikipedia: Micronations (Wiki 2011a; Internet Site)

Wikipedia is a user-generated, free access encyclopedia that was created in 2001 and now has over nineteen million articles in over two hundred seventy languages (Wiki 2011b, np). It is listed as the top 6th website in the world (Alexa 2011, np). It was, and may still be, the “world’s largest Open Content project” (Voss 2005, 1).

Wikipedia has numerous categories for micropatrias to fall into. I will give the briefest of descriptions for each. Social, economic, or political simulations is the category for micropatrias that are listed as having serious intent in regards to the political and the social; and include Freetown Christiania and Nova Roma. Exercises in personal entertainment or self-aggrandisement is a category similar to Strauss’
model countries where titles are bestowed and materials created to reinforce existence, yet they add internet-based as an element of these nations; and include the Kingdom of Lovely and Republic of Molossia. *Exercises in fantasy or creative fiction* is a category for micropatrias that are artistic projects; such as the Republic of Kugelmugel and San Serriffe. *Vehicles for the promotion of an agenda* is an umbrella for micropatrias that are media stunts or practices in representation to the public; and include the Conch Republic and Akhizivland. *Entities created for fraudulent purposes* is a category for micropatrias that are created specifically for illegal activities; and include the Dominion of Melchizedek and the Kingdom of EnenKio. *Historical anomalies and aspirant states* is for those micropatrias that are able to find loopholes in the legal systems; such as Seborga and the Hutt River Province Principality. *New-country projects* alludes to micropatrias that are projects to physically separate from sovereign rule, often through ocean based or island based claims; such as the Republic of Minerva and Oceania. *Exercises in historical revisionism* is where the idea of the *status quo ante bellum* comes into play with micropatrias that maintain socio-political notions connected with a past history; such as the League of the South or Aryana.

This is just a selection of guides created by enthusiasts (who are often authors, journalists, academics, and popular reference sites). The purpose of using these guides for my work is that they are popular forms of information (i.e. books and web pages). This is some of the information that will be widely available and accessible to micropatrial practitioners. Also at times, practitioners collaborate with enthusiasts, and are given some form of notoriety by mention in enthusiast
guides. There are many ways to categorize, or characterize, micropatrias, but from my experiences during the research process, the reasons for creation across the board are varied and each example has the possibility to fall under multiple classifications.

If I created my own enthusiast guide to micropatrias, I would have over twenty categories to include: Arctic/Antarctic for claiming polar spaces; Art for art collectives and projects; Charitable for those micropatrias founded to donate funds and time; Colonial for those with colonial ambitions; Communal for micropatrias creating societies based on communal living; Economic for those creating tourist industries; Education for micropatrias created as educational experiments; Extra-terrestrial for claims based on outer space or celestial bodies; Global for claims on the world without borders; Hobby for practitioners just having fun; Illegal for frauds and scams; Interstitial for micropatrias that claim the spaces in between; Lost micropatrias that were destroyed; Media for those that are media stunts; Mobile for micropatrias that are on ships as floating cities; Oceans for claims of water space; Opportunistic for claiming unclaimed territory; Protectorates for micropatrias that have been annexed; Protest for those that arise out of protest; Right Wing for practitioners with Neo-Nazi motives; Squatter for those that put claims on abandoned property; Time for micropatrias that claim time as territory; Tribal for indigenous groups attempting to reclaim territory; and Virtual for nations that are solely Internet nations.

Lists can only offer a glimpse into a topic and this is no exception. As shown in the lists above, there are many reasons that individuals and groups create and
become involved in the micropatrial practice. Micropatrias within territory claimed by the United Kingdom are a reflection of the more global list above. There were, at the time of the research, perhaps fifty that I found in various stages, forms, and concepts spread throughout the territory claimed by the United Kingdom.

Generally, UK enclaved micropatrias express either forms of pure subversive play, international civic agency, or protest. Perhaps a closer look at an example of each of these types of micropatrias within the territory claimed by the United Kingdom might offer greater insight into these practices (see Appendix A for a table of UK micropatrias).

The Copeman Empire, established 2003, is the epitome of pure subversive play. Nick Copeman changed his name by deed poll to HM King Nicholas I. In response to questions regarding the name change King Nicholas muses, “I suppose I just thought it’d be cool to be a king” (Copeman 2005, 3). He goes on to state how, “There was something about being called King Nicholas that slowly started to have an effect on me” (Copeman 2005, 3). The deed poll shenanigans were just the beginning for Nick Copeman and his best mate Baby Face. From that point on they began to transform from jobless youth to noble rulers. They used their empire to gain notoriety in their town, spending their days playing at ruling, and as a way to raise money for subsistence purposes and entertainment. For example, the duo stood outside one of their local town’s pharmacies on a Saturday morning with a donation cup, identification badges, and donation stickers. The cup label had the emblem of the Copeman Empire. Below the emblem were the word’s King’s Trust Please Give Generously. That morning the two collected £49.65 for the ‘King’s
Trust’ which covered the costs of their drinks, candy, breakfast, working wages, operating costs, and left them with some spare change. The history of the Copeman Empire is one of concocted ideas from two mates sitting around in a caravan trying to find ways to supplement their welfare income. They accomplish this through playing at being a king and an archbishop of the created Copeman Empire.

The Principality of Paulovia, established 1998, is a good example of a micropatria expressing a form of international civic agency. It is a ‘charitable’ micropatria, meaning the nation claims to be driven for the purpose of charitable, educational, and environmental causes. The nation donates income from the sales of paraphernalia, such as postage stamps, postcards, and citizenship, to certain campaigns including Medecins Sans Frontieres, WaterAid, Ethiopia Hope, and micro-financing through Kiva. As of December 2013, the Principality of Paulovia has donated $1572.90 USD to Kiva and £501.06 GBP to other charitable organizations. The webpage of the international embassy highlights in red lettering that all official documents are for ‘entertainment and amusement only’. Like other micropatrias, this development includes citizenship, a plethora of flags that include various territories, emblems, a national anthem, a monarchical government structure, a bank, a court of justice, a welfare system, diplomatic acts, national aid to developing nations, a history from 1730 to present, a variety of government institutions such as the University of Paulovia, the Paulovia Environment Ecology and Parks Service, and the Paulovia Institute for Science, Research, and Exploration (just three examples of many). And like other micropatrias, as well as various
member states of the United Nations, the Principality of Paulovia has been a target of counterfeiters creating bogus Paulovian documents for purchase.

The Independent Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye, established April 1977, is a great example of a protest style nation. Richard Booth declared himself King of Hay-on-Wye, a real town in Wales, at a ceremony on his castle grounds located in the center of town. Upon this declaration then all residents of Hay-on-Wye became impromptu subjects of the kingdom, whether they accept this act or not is an entirely different story. For example, when I asked the local taxi driver (the only taxi driver in town) to take me to Richard Booth’s house and did he happen to know where it was, his response was to laugh a bit derisively and respond that yes he did know where it was. As a bit of a rural celebrity, or nuisance depending on your perspective, Richard Booth created his kingdom to protest centralized government, political bureaucracy, and the death of rural towns. He has spent his days since fighting for agricultural, educational, and economic rural growth. His approach of creating a kingdom was to garner media attention to his causes and create a tourist industry to pump money back into the town of Hay-on-Wye. As a business man himself, he promotes the circulation of used books and is part of the book commerce of the small town which boasts thirty secondhand and antiquarian bookshops. As a fundraiser to bring money back to Hay-on-Wye, he approaches the kingdom as a business by selling peerages, passports, car stickers, books (including his autobiography), and accommodation. Some of his own works for sale include titles such as Abolish the Wales Tourist Board, Bring Back Horses, and God save us from the Development Board for Rural Wales.
Such expressions work to challenge, in some ways, the embedded national realities we are entrenched in. Micropatrial representation, culture, and identity offer an avenue for participation alongside such challenges. Participation can be expressed through forms of subversive play, international civic agency, or just plain protest against government bureaucracy. Representation, culture, and identity are important in the sense that, whether through play or the everyday, these expressions and understandings are how we come to know the world and our place in it.

**Representation, Culture and Identity**

Alan Ingram and Dodds recognize that “the geopolitical present is constituted by multiple temporalities and multiple spatialities that exceed the states and security apparatuses, even as they are shaped by them” (2009, 3). As fantastic geographies, micropatrias are subversive representations of sovereignty. Their representations of subversion through liminal positioning, national symbols, and international diplomacy create heterodox cultures and identities. These enclavic creations lead to alternate knowledges that challenge social norms and sovereign hegemony. Such knowledge is produced by means of imagination (Tuan 1998), alternative lifestyle (Hetherington 1998), or representation (Skelton 2000). Bound up with and a reflection of identity and culture, representation is a form of agency and power, conveying meaning (Skelton 2000), defining the self through defining others (Sibley 1995; Hetherington 1998), and creating place and filling space by way of ‘material artefacts’ and ‘social networks’ (Sharp et al. 2000, 25).
Practitioners, enthusiasts, and micropatrologists all reify micropatrial representations. They produce materialities and networks which create liminal gaps that transgress hegemonic norms and dominant orthodoxies. Understanding such representations, in a sense of self and other, draws attention to socially produced and reproduced notions of identity, culture, and sovereignty. Edward Said, well known for his work on otherness and the construction of identity from what is other, notes how the mundane reifications of culture, ‘the common’, is not a ‘truth’ of discourse and exchange, but a representation of it ([1978] 2003, 21). Hence, the other, that which is different, is “produced and reproduced by people through their thoughts and actions” (Jones and Phillips 2005, 147). Thus, representations of the other create a boundary dividing the other from the self (Sibley 1995). This spatial identification is representation and constitution (Walker 2003). The spaces consequently created stem from imagination which shapes how space is understood and how that meaning is shared, a type of “dominant ideology of space” (Hetherington 1998, 66). Micropatrias challenge this dominant ideology of space by claiming land, and in turn sovereignty, over territory already claimed by a legitimate sovereign. This, whether acknowledged or not by the legitimate sovereign, creates a contestation over space, over the dominance and hegemony of space. The contestation of unsanctioned representations of space creates “opposing regimes of truth” (Skelton 2000, 187). Historically, with visible contestation over land wars often ensue, but paradoxically, while for the most part ‘invisible’, micropatrias create a transparent process of national action often through peaceful protest or a desire to share space. Micropatrial practices inscribe
non-hegemonic place layered onto hegemonic place, an enclave nation counter to or parallel with and within the host nation. Micropatrias weave narratives of the nation, create histories, and spin myths. They are the non-legitimate, playful nations. Creating new cultures with liminal rhetoric, symbolic materialities, and diplomatic actions, micropatrias become part of the individual identities and shared representations of practitioners.

Micropatrias produce imagery that intertextually relies on practitioners’ cultures, their familial cultures being the ‘profane’ (everyday) cultures they live in—such as the United Kingdom for the purposes of the thesis. Geographers deconstruct such cultural images to illustrate how “class, national or gendered consciousness” are (re)produced and how culture is (re)created (Sharp 2000, 328). Micropatrias (re)produce and (re)create culture by appropriating host symbols and transforming them into nascent representations that reflect a new yet recycled identity. For if “[c]ontext-specific histories and geographies lie behind new cultural formations” (Radcliffe 2000, 165), then the United Kingdom is exploding with such cultures. Culture is not a simple clear thing, but a concept with various meanings and complexities (Skelton 2000), a set of stories that are myths (Weber 2001), given meaning through the practice of perception, production, and exchange (Hall 1997; Skelton 2000; Weber 2001). These academic understandings illustrate how discourse is created and maintained through shared meanings. Through ideology, culture is naturalized and depoliticized (Weber 2001). Appearing as ‘truth’, culture “is a product of imagination and fantasy” (Tuan 1990, 443). Imagination and fantasy have a tangible impact upon reality through the creation, reification, and
transformation of culture. Culture is humanity’s escape from nature and animality via the promotion of ‘order and stability’ (Tuan 1998). Culture is more than imagination and fantasy manifesting in a concrete and tangible form. Through the imaginative process, and especially with this materialization, politics is embedded in culture (Weber 2001, 134). Since culture takes on a naturalized appearance, politics seems to be separate and often outside the realm of culture. This naturalization is a political transformation of power, the hidden politics and myths of culture seeming as “apparent truths” making culture ‘apolitical’ (Weber 2001, 8). These myths are ‘successful’ when they are ‘invisible’ (Weber 2001, 8). The myths of culture become a part of individual identity and how the world is perceived from that individual viewpoint. Yet, micropatrias denaturalize cultural creation and make transparent the constructive processes of mundane materialities, textualities, virtualities, and seriousness.

Beyond playing a role in the representation of culture, space and place play into identity formation as well. The tension between reality and identity which fuels individual anxiety is the difference between the place of the “solid buildings of the world” and the space of “personal identity resid[ing] in the cracks” (Cohen and Taylor 1976, 23; see also Erving Goffman 1961) or between established order and alternative group lifestyles (Hetherington 1998). The self is juxtaposed to structural order (Cohen and Taylor 1976). This juxtaposition is practiced by micropatrial leaders by setting themselves outside of the established structure of existing nations. Going beyond existing in the cracks, this separation creates liminal gaps (Marin 1993). These rulers, in creating new cultures and identities, have a reflexive
attitude towards nationhood and identity. Such reflexivity is a way of separating
the self from the structure, a form of agency (Cohen and Taylor 1976). This agency
can be seen as a breaking away from embedded impositions to journey on “a
politicised quest for an authentic sense of self” (Hetherington 1998, 54). In
investigating the spatial relationship between politics, identity, and agency, Kevin
Hetherington expresses this relationship as the creation of ‘symbolic space’: “It is,
however, about creating symbolic spaces rather than always adopting established
ones” (1998, 17). The creation of symbolic space as a type of space of play: “the
playful tactics of identity and the ordering strategies of identification and
recognition” (Hetherington 1998, 28; see also Mead 1967; Cohen and Taylor 1976).
Here, the ideas draw from how liminality and the spatial performance of liminal
characters create and reinforce identity (van Gennep 1960; Turner [1969] 1977);
and how the generalized other (Mead 1967) and the foreign other (Said [1978]
2003) aid in forming individual and group identity.

While for Yi-Fu Tuan (1998) imagination is the path to knowledge, for
Hetherington (1998) forms of alternative lifestyles and nascent identity create this
path and are indicative of change. This expressive form, or alternate expression,
becomes a spatial play of resistance through an entanglement of everyday reality,
politics, and identity (Hetherington 1998). Micropatrias are definitely an expressive
and political representation of identity through practices, beliefs, and newly formed
traditions. These traditions are the stories and myths transparently formed and
shared with any willing audience to solidify the presence of a history. Whether
‘waystations’ for progressive change (Wright 2005) or utopic ‘micro-physics of
resistance’ (Hetherington 1998, 67), given that both terms elicit ideas of places and spaces of societal improvement, micropatrias represent such notions. No matter which moniker is used, this type of representation “does not take the form of building barricades but of a creative set of practices that do not conform to the norms and institutionalised practices of society” (Hetherington 1998, 67).

Micropatrial practitioners are subversive mischief makers against social norms and sovereign hegemony. Micropatrias are the fantastic geographies that have manifested and produce parallel alternate sovereign networks. These actions, through the use of subversion and liminality, symbols, and diplomacy, highlight geopolitical understandings, constructions, norms, and exclusions. Sovereign hegemony is made all the more transparent by the micropatrial enclavic form and by way of the variety of micropatrial nations. Through producing heterodox representations, cultures, and identities, micropatrias illustrate the politics in the profane.
Chapter 4 Methods

Micropatrias, being the result of practitioner activity, can be created and run by only one person. In turn, practitioners inspire others to join in the practice through citizenship application or micropatrial creation. As a result, new micropatrias can then begin diplomatic communications with other micropatrias. The development is a transformation of the world, to some extent, for practitioners. Parallel ‘sovereign’ networks (realities) are produced and new forms of citizenship and government are tested. While the role of the researcher is to unveil the hidden, to make transparent naturalized processes, the micropatrial practitioner plays an active role in this process. I found the practice and the practitioners equally intriguing. As time progressed, my fascination only escalated and eventually I became a practitioner. The involvement was created through a need to access micropatrial practitioners. This need demanded my status as one as well. Hence, the research took place from my dual identity as a researcher and as a practitioner.

Chapter 4 is divided into two main sections. The first section pertains to data collection during the research. The second section pertains to the ‘field’ and the fieldwork undertaken during the research. The section on fieldwork is the bulk of the chapter. Thinking about what the field is and what field work is required me to go beyond disciplinary traditions and consider the importance of digital space, and how that space is given meaning by individuals; and furthermore, how that space can become subversive. The digital field became the place where I looked to
see how the subversion was being displayed and how it was being shared. After investigating the digital spaces used by micropatrias, I started contacting potential participants in the hopes of establishing research relationships for the thesis. Once I had received responses from my initial contacts, I then began developing and setting up the in-person interviews. During the writing up period, I began reflecting on what types of relationships aided the research and what failures came out of the research approaches I took when attempting to engage practitioners. I also reflect on what the value of the insider can be to the research and illustrate some of my own experiences in setting up a micropatria.

Data Collection

As academics, and in particular human geographers, we investigate in-place dynamics, we are voyeurs of practices, we are curious about spatial expressions, we analytically unpack socio-political relationships, but most of all we collect. Through the collecting activity, a collection of information is gathered. The collection represents a “unique bastion against the deluge of time” (Elsner and Cardinal 1994, 1). The bastion reflects human narratives of appropriation, knowledge creation, and social order (Elsner and Cardinal 1994). We collect data just as the explorers in the past did (particularly the forerunners of colonialization), arguably in a more sensitive vain, yet still we collect; and often from that which is exotic to us, other experiences, other realities, other worlds. This fascination with the ‘other’ can be overtly exemplified by anthropological tradition, psychological investigation, or contemporary tourism literature, yet is still evident across scholarly research. But
we do more than just collect data, either to be squirreled away for nefarious means or showcased as museums of information. We ‘add value’ to the information collected through analysis, examination, and rumination (Johnston 2000, 31). We collect knowledge through textual documents and material artifacts, we collect imagery and branding, we collect expressions of discourses and counter-discourses, we collect representations of social patterns and political powers, and we collect manifestations of spatial injustices and utopic processes. These collections become the materialities of qualitative research whereby value is added. Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln explain the qualitative approach (2003, 4-5):

Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.

While being “epistemologically and ontologically interpretivist”, the personal (stories, anecdotes, and even fictional experiences) is a “legitimate research tool” (Pettman 1998, 171). The personal gives us a sense of what “happens when people play” (Pettman 1998, 171). Therefore, play is a concept worth investigating that can give us insight into constructed identities, imposed norms and subversions of them, and a platform for interpretation of the personal.

My own spatial query led down this well trodden route of seeking out and collecting, and then trying to make sense of the collection. So in commencing the project, I began searching for information on micropatrias. Since I needed to
familiarize myself with micropatrial practices, I cast a global net to see the range of places and practices spatially inscribed as micropatrial space, virtual and real. The bulk of the initial searches took place online. The reason for this excessive need for online activity is simply the heavy digital representations of contemporary micropatrias. The Internet, as a form of media, becomes a tool for (re)producing meaning (Skelton 2000). For micropatrias, the Internet is heavily used as a source of dissemination and is a tool to create, sustain, and grow networks of diplomacy, citizenry, and sometimes tourism. Having an internet location allows practitioners to create and share a national brand. As with any nation, with internet sites, the uniqueness of place and cultural traditions are a main topic. The materiality and textuality of the nations are how they represent themselves to the micropatrial community and curious onlookers. I examined how micropatrial practitioners create their brand and share this with people inside and outside of their nation. The divide between the internal and external representation is quite blurry, since citizens often access the same information as non-citizens; and occasionally access is only limited by registering an email address. In addition, I investigated how they use these sites for diplomacy and citizen promotion.

In the digital realm I was able to locate a variety of micropatrias. Some were mere mentions with no other tangible traces, some were defunct entities—victims of the ephemerality that plagues the practice or the cessation of an agenda through either success or failure—yet with accessible remnants from which to piece together their histories, and some were jewels that shone bright as micropatrias maintaining their subversive vigils. What these initial searches and collection
patrols highlighted are the vast array of micropatrial ‘places’ and practices that occur, as well as the clustering of the practices within three hubs: the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. As a caveat, this collection is based off of what is available in the English language and the hubs are a reflection of various enthusiast guides in English and French and my own searches. In addition, the research missions led to the knowledge of how the individual nations take shape and highlighted the plethora of reasons and ideologies embedded within micropatrial practices.

Setting the parameters provided a case selection process by which I decided which micropatrias would be included in the research (Tellis 1997). The selection process aids the research agenda, highlighting the entanglement between selection and analysis (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Narrowing the case studies down through a selection process was a “challenging endeavor” but worked to illustrate through examination how the chosen cases are “about something larger than the case itself” (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 294). My choices echo Jason Seawright and John Gerring’s arguments for the objectives of selection to include ‘a representative sample’ and ‘useful variation’ (2008, 296). By selecting micropatrial cases through keeping in mind variation, I was able to tease out meanings and commonalities in representative practices (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 382). Hence, the following parameters offered a selection of cases for an exploratory investigation into micropatrial representation (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 301). Therefore, the cases are meant to represent the variety of micropatrial practitioners (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 307). In defining what I mean by the
term ‘case’, I borrow from Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan Beasley in their definition of ‘case study’ as “a method of obtaining a ‘case’ or a number of ‘cases’ through an empirical examination of a real-world phenomenon within its naturally occurring context” (1999, 372).

Here, cases are used for their abilities through analysis to describe the phenomenon (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999), which is accomplished in the thesis through micropatrial representations. Since micropatrias are enclaves within many legitimate sovereign nations, a spatial frame was set to the ‘United Kingdom as host’ which allowed for the consideration of how multiple enclaves represent themselves within one sovereign ‘host’ nation. Setting this limitation allowed for a deeper investigation of micropatrial place representations, symbolic attachments to place, and the varying relationships drawn within a discrete space. Also, a time frame for initial creation stretching over roughly the last fifty years (originally I included the last century in my investigations, but narrowed down to approximately 1960-present during the research process) maintains focus on more recent micropatrial developments within the UK hub and aids in my access to information. Initial information access, mainly some form of internet presence, became the main avenue for searching out micropatrias and was a particularly helpful route considering the commonly current micropatrial practices involving the use of the Internet to post information and to communicate globally. Files were created on each UK enclaved micropatria encountered during the planning stages of the thesis to include personal communications and online representations. Since having located and chosen the more viable case studies, I began researching print and
digital literature, archives, and compilations for further information from academic, popular, and micropatrial community sources such as journal articles, books, magazines, newspapers, films, presentations, court cases, forums, and websites. This broad unfiltered search allowed me to gather a collection of specialized information.

Since contemporary micropatrias tend to operate via a digital world, it is not surprising that the majority of information available is online. As an outlet for eccentricity, micropatrial practitioners themselves are of a fickle stock and many nations rise and fall within a short stretch of time. Not all micropatrias rely on digital dissemination of information through the Internet. Some micropatrias lack access to, or desire for, online outlets for representation. These micropatrias may have been known by only a select few and will possibly pass as quietly from the world as is/was their existence in it. Some of the quick turnaround time and disappearance of micropatrias is due to the end of an agenda, such as is seen with many protest style nations that have either successfully or un成功fully come to the end of the need to protest, such as Frestonia or Pollok Free State. Others find their way to a swift end when practitioners tire of the time invested in the micropatria and, inevitably, they also tire of the, at times, irritating involvement of others. When creating a nation, some practitioners find opinions and quarrels laborious and discard their micropatrial robes and identities for less stressful time-fillers. The data then vanishes at the click of a button and the practitioner drops out of the forged parallel existence and network to return back to society and a profane everyday reality. A quick caveat about micropatrias is that they did exist.
before the Internet and they did (and still do) create networks that require various forms of offline interaction such as handwritten letters and face-to-face meetings. Being a digital nation or using digital tools as a form of communication is not necessary for the practice, yet, just like many parts of ‘western’ life, using digital tools is increasingly popular and the creation of nations is no exception to this increased digital communication.

The practice quickly becomes a haven for socio-political complexity and unsteady protocol with some practitioners easily offended. The deaths of nations can be spurned by the fatigue of demands on leaders, the refusal to renew domain and hosting subscriptions either for lack of funds, interest, or time, or the apathy to salvage a website before the wrecking ball of commodity shuts down free hosting sites. Some are allowed to perish with the closing down of services such as the end of Geocities on Yahoo or Hometown on AOL that hosted a vast array of ‘micronations’. The maintenance and growth of micropatrias eerily begins to consume practitioners, creeping on free time till the ‘hobby’ or ‘statement’ becomes everything you do outside of work and sometimes completely everything you do when retirement and funds allow for the luxury of living in another world.

The micropatria disrupts life in terms of norms, yet infuses life with new meanings, new goals, and new challenges to look forward to. So as the, at times, ephemeral nature of micropatrias continues its course, I have found myself in emergency status trying to download information before it is lost to forces beyond my control. The worst, or best, example of living the state of emergency is when Geocities announced the closing of their free hosting. When I saw the
announcement, I went into overdrive trying to download as much information as possible before the server was switched off. There were so many micropatrias on this host...dotting the world...subverting their sovereign hosts...inscribing space with their socio-political comments and ideologies. Not only will micropatrias be lost to this ephemeral abyss, but enthusiasts also used the site for compiling information on the practices. This is just one of many examples of the perils of micropatrial digital representation, and the ever changing ‘field’ a researcher must accept. Yet while ephemerality is common, the practice is ever growing on a worldwide basis and some practitioners stick it out and maintain their micropatrias for many years, inspiring others to participate in micropatrial practices.

In contrast to the seemingly stop and go nature of a hobby that ignites and then dies out, the practice remains global and proliferating. As nations fall, new ones quickly rise to take their place, like the hydra, new nations are born as the practice gains momentum. This is especially propelled with the increasing ease of internet access, user-friendly ways to create personal websites, and many sites that can be gained for free offering an inexpensive format for staking a claim. Of course the caveat is that these propelling forces for proliferation remain as statements of the Western World. This caveat is backed by the presence of micropatrial enclavic clusters in Western hubs. The Western hubs of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia are the very exemplars of this proliferation. These hubs are hotbeds for micropatrial nations; so much that I constantly stumble across new ones formed since my research began.
While there may be numerous micropatrias that I cannot find through the Internet, my research approaches have primarily led me to those nations that are internet-based or at least have information available online. Therefore, my research reflects a bias towards those individuals, groups, and nations that use digital communication. I sense data overload when I look at one micropatrial forum for the Kingdom of Lovely with over 200,000 posts. With micropatrial forum conversations alone, thousands upon thousands of posts pervade the Internet. Another example of growth is when nations are divided in two as factions form and tear nations apart only adding to the vast and increasing practice of micropatrialism. Such an outcome not only adds to the practice in general, but exponentially creates dialogue about and between these factions.

The Internet not only offers the ability to represent a nation, but the use of a national forum or international forum keeps the fires stoked and acts as a bellows for active and international participation in the practice. As Dodds notes on what he terms as fan-based activism, but what we can consider here as practitioner engagement, how such groups “point to the growth of virtual communities that monitor, critique and engage with popular culture and capitalism” (2006, 121). Practitioners are engaging with culture, and I would say they are engaging with the popular culture of the Internet, as well as engaging with the capitalist systems they are embedded in. Dodds considers such engagements to “have immense significance for the development of popular geopolitics” (2006, 121). Again we can import this idea to that of practitioner activity as having geopolitical agency.
Slowly other areas of the world have gained increasing numbers of micropatrial practitioners, but are far from the hubs mentioned above. Every time I go to my field site, my HP laptop, and spend time searching for information to refresh my memory of previous searches, I encounter new nations. Many do not make their way into the thesis because choices had to be made and at some point, at times frustratingly so, I had to stop initial searches and start examining what I had already found. The nature of these practices offers researchers an ever-changing field of investigation and pool of participants. The ubiquity proffers rich and fertile grounds for examining current trends and following the future evolutions and expressions of these parallel sovereign networks. Clare Madge and Henrietta O’Connor discuss how the coexistence of geographical and cyber space creates a ‘hybrid space’ whereby “the virtually real and the actually real” (2005, 83) are combined. In support of this idea, we can look to Sarah Holloway and Gill Valentine’s previous work with the Internet and children where they conclude that ‘online space’ is heavily influenced by its ‘off-line place’ (2001, 158). A reflection on these expressions can offer a reflection of a sentiment larger than the practitioners, one of dissatisfaction with specific elements of the status quo.

Data was collected on these micropatrias through personal contact via emails and interviews, through printed and digital compilations on these entities, and through the practitioners own shared words (books and DVDs) and virtual presences. I will go more into detail on the personal contacts through emails and interviews below. In regards to the compilations created by micropatrial enthusiasts, I began documenting the types of lists they were creating. I made
simplified versions of lists in order to see how they were categorizing this phenomenon. These lists are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. This categorizing allowed me to see the different themes and approaches being drawn out in these guides, as well as the shared characteristics of different micropatrias. Each compilation was drafted with a different set of categories and different placement of micropatrias within the categories. Also, I was able to use these lists to search the internet for websites for any written or digital information on these micropatrias.

The meat of the data was collected from micropatrial virtual presences and practitioner autobiographies. I read the autobiographies and watched the DVDs in search of information relevant to the research on how certain concepts and issues were addressed such as their goals, political positions, national symbols, declarations, and diplomatic approaches. For example, in My Kingdom of Books by Richard Booth (1999, 31), he states that “There is no class war now...There is only war against the officials.” Booth is staunchly against government bureaucracy, favoring a return to more monarchical and traditional values, and hence his creation of his own monarchy is part of his subversive practices against the current democratic government style, priority focus on urban affairs, and the entire higher education system in the United Kingdom today.

Practitioner websites also offered a lot of information for collection. I started using Back Street Browser 3.1 alongside Hermetic Word Frequency Counter 9.34, but quickly stopped using these tools. I found these tools useful in previous research where I wanted to examine verbal and written discourses by government
agencies, non-government organizations, and public persons to show the strength of shared discourses. However, in this research I found the information had to be teased out more carefully. I then began copying the websites of micropatrias that I had decided to use in the research. I created documents of each one and used the document maps to access information quickly. I focused particularly on how their symbolism, diplomacy, declarations, goals, created histories, and such were displayed and discussed on their websites. I also created an Excel file containing general fields where I could see the similarities and differences between the micropatrias. From this, I observed how, as a practice, certain concepts like sovereignty, statehood, and international diplomacy were being appropriated by these creative geopolitical interventions. The next step was examining, considering the micropatria as a parallel practice, how they represented themselves vis-à-vis sovereign hegemony. And from this investigation I discerned how they borrowed and transformed British symbols, both contemporary and historical.

As the research progressed, I began to comprehend the complexity of how subversion plays an important social role through control, release, liminality, humor, and play; how national symbols are both subversion and reification; and how diplomatic practices rely on response and how that response is measured from different perspectives; in essence, I was “taking the text on its own terms” (Sharp 2000, 331). I began to see the shared discourses that run through the various micropatrias (Alderman and Modlin 2008; Hannam and Knox 2005). Discourses, the ways in which people make sense of their world and their places and positions within that world, register agendas and effects through representation, politics,
power, and identity, and as such offer the opportunity to study such agendas and effects (Skelton 2000) within a “space of power-knowledge” (Hetherington 1998, 24; see also Dittmer et al. 2011). Such space is the place of our stories, our identities, and how we identify with the world (Hetherington 1998). Beyond information gathering, I looked at the representational practices of micropatrias including the main themes of subversion and liminality, national symbols, and international diplomacy available through various outlets, such as the internet, books, and guides. I considered the stories created around their subversive acts, national symbols, and diplomatic actions; how these things were discussed and represented by practitioners. I compared such representations to similar UK representations to understand how the practitioners were borrowing from their off-line and real world surroundings; and I considered how such surroundings bled into the new identities portrayed by practitioners. The outcomes of which are the following three chapters. Through this analysis, I am able to see the role subversion and liminality play in micropatrias (Chapter 5), how representation takes place via national symbols (Chapter 6), and notions of what representation and host responses mean to the practitioners (Chapter 7).

The ‘Field’

After building the collection, it was time to begin field work. I use the term ‘field’ loosely since the majority of my field consisted, not of physically, but virtually travelling to destinations. Felix Driver, reflecting on the field, notes (2000, 267):

...the ‘field’ may be understood as a region which is always in the process of being constructed, and not just in the eye of the beholder; and ‘field-work’ as
necessarily involving a variety of spatial practices—movement, performance, passages and encounters.

While this reflection considers the field in a more traditional sense of physical (re)placement, the passage above can be appropriated to consider a virtual (re)placement. The region of becoming captures the space of the Internet. A space that is digitally contained, yet globally present. It is a space that is ever becoming; and the spatial practices of fieldwork resemble movement through digital space, performance with other users of that space, passages marked by gatekeepers into communities, and encounters with various dwellers of digital space. The field becomes the “accounts of fieldwork and the fieldworker” (Dewsbury and Naylor 2002, 256). Fieldwork contains more than time in the ‘field’. As Jennifer Hyndman argues, researchers are “always in the field”, meaning that fieldwork is not “geographically or temporally bound” (2001, 262, 270). For Hyndman, the field is not a particular place, but a “network of power relations” in an attempt to avoid a “static space” (2001, 263). These power relations include the positionality of the researcher. The researcher’s positionality influences participant involvement, reaction, and the generation of data. My positionality is that of a white, western (American), older, female, geography student. Although entering a practice dominated by white (often middle-class) men (and for the purposes of the study, British men), I felt my gender position did not hamper my successful communications. Although as an afterthought, it may have resulted in being a determining factor in my unsuccessful ones. My position as a researcher may have been more impactful on my research, since during one interview a micropatrial leader told me, in regards to communicating and learning about micropatrias, that
they are “exhibitionists”. By researching micropatrias, I am creating an outlet for their agendas and bringing them some form of attention, albeit very limited. In a sense, I become their participant by the very nature of being their audience. And by virtue of my online research and interaction with them, I have privileged the Internet as a place for such information gathering and communication. As Hugh Mackay notes, “Crucially, the Internet facilitates new patterns of connection, new and global networks” (2005, 140). Through various connections and interactions with practitioners, I was creating a new and global network that has in a sense now come full circle with an invitation to be present at a meeting of micronations in London by an Emperor whose micropatria is enclaved by Australia and attended by a Presidential Dictator whose Republic is enclaved by the United States.

My field methods molded to each day and each instance of contact; even to the point where I became a part of the community, a micropatrial practitioner. Holly Hapke and Devan Ayyankeril (2001) note how their positions as researcher and assistant, respectively, impacted their research in Kerala, India. They stress how research and positionality are entangled in the production of geographic knowledge (2001, 342):

Geographical research is not an innocent, objective process. Rather, it is constantly mediated by gender, class, ethnicity, identity, and relations of power-each and all inscribed on the bodies of researchers and research subjects. The identities they etch on our bodies and our own counterconstructions heavily influence how we relate to our research subjects, which then influences the generation of knowledge.

This knowledge is the ‘stories’ we tell about our experiences in the ‘field’, including the relationship between the researcher and the field (Hyndman 2001, 262). Knowledge from research is not a fact acquired at a distance, it is “messy, and
sometimes compromised and compromising practices” (Dewsbury and Naylor 2002, 254; stress original). Engaging in the field required me to engage digitally. The Internet offers a place to build relationships that are ‘geographically dispersed’ (Toral et al. 2009). Micropatrial practitioners can be considered to create ‘communities of practice’ that engage in their own world making (Toral et al. 2009; see also Hine 2011). Constance Porter and Naven Donthu offer a definition of a virtual community as “comprised of members who share an interest, interact repeatedly, generate shared resources, develop governance policies, demonstrate reciprocity, and share cultural norms” (2008, 114). Maybe the worlds created by these communities and practitioners are the ‘nonmaterial geographic place’ (Taylor 1997). I log on to the Internet and am transported to these other worlds where I practice as a researcher my craft and as a practitioner my nation. I find I am in the field at all hours of the day and night. I cannot extricate myself from the field, shut myself off and be done with it through simply travelling away by plane, boat, or car. The field seeps into my everyday identity by way of practices, such as social networking through Facebook which holds a mix of friends, family, academic peers, and micropatrial practitioners. Similar in ways to Hyndman’s (2001) return from Kenya to Canada to later be contacted by a research participant—a Somali refugee—who had moved to where she lived to be near a friend—her. Similar, not in physical terms, but similar in the bleeding between the traditional notion of the ‘field’ and ‘out of the field’. The field as fieldworker illustrates an active involvement in the research by not seeing only participants as embodied agents, but the researcher as well. Both researcher and participants are entangled
embodied agents “that space and renegotiate the world through their convictions, emotional doubts and physical involvement” (Dewsbury and Naylor 2002, 257).

The identities of the practitioners that are part of the thesis straddle two worlds with two radically different identities: one leader or citizen of a micropatria, the other an everyday UK citizen. The nascent identity may work to alleviate ‘real-world’ dissatisfaction (Fang et al. 2009). I myself took on two identities and at times realized that these merged and separated as needs arose. My bipolar personality followed me online, in conversation, even to academic events. I found it difficult at times to separate the two identities. When one participates in whatever phenomenon one studies, one takes on the qualities of their participants, even if it is only for a short time. As I study a phenomenon and embed myself within the rituals that legitimate my participation, for a time I embody a participant in the phenomenon. Being a participant in a community is a form of “conscious and systematic sharing” (Jackson 1983, 39). I, at least superficially, become a part of that which I research. I become my research. I found I could not so methodically separate myself from my research and be two solidly separate people. This entanglement of researcher as observer and researcher melding into what he (or in my case she) researches is not novel. Barbara Tedlock recounts how other researchers became what they researched, whether it was a poker player or a geisha or a war priest. The research was more than scientific observation from a distance, it was about the “lived-reality of the field experience” and is at the center of “intellectual and emotional missions” (Tedlock 1991, 71). This approach taps into ‘human intersubjectivity’ and according to Tedlock, separates the human from
the natural sciences as well as shatters traditional binaries of research and researcher (self and other).

**Contact**

After collecting data on micropatral practices and micropatrology, I then began compiling my initial lists on micropatrias including a general list of types and a closer inspection on the micropatrias enclaved within the United Kingdom. These lists indicated many facets of the micropatrias including, but in no way limited to, characteristics like year established, current status (being active or defunct), heads of state, government type, documents, forums, embassies, diplomacy, material objects, and such. I considered the best approach to initial contact with these nations. Since all had some form of digital address readily available, I planned on sending out emails. In their examination of parents’ use of online social networks, Madge and O’Connor (2002) found that through emailing participants they were able to create relationships; and that participants found this form of contact convenient. I wrote a standard letter of introduction to my research, where and with whom I am studying, and some of the main focuses I am looking at including representation, materiality, and sovereignty; reflecting an openness about my positionality (Madge and O’Connor 2002). This openness through email contact was meant as an aid in relationship and trust building between me and the potential participants. As Madge and O’Conner note for them this approach, “did build up trust and aided candid and honest exchanges in our on-line inter actions” (2002, 97). This introductory letter was included as an attachment in the initial
emails and contained five questions within its composition as an ice-breaker. I created the questions with the aim of becoming familiar with broad concepts in regards to the practitioners, to get a better feel for the motivations behind creating a nation, and the meanings embedded within a new nation. Below are the questions as sent in the initial contact letters:

Below are only 5 short questions to help me understand why others choose to create a nation and what this means to them.

1. What is/was the reason for creating your own nation?
2. How much time does/did the nation take up?
3. What have you experienced from running your own nation?
4. How do you see your nation evolving in the future, if at all?
5. Do you see anyone taking over the nation after you are no longer able to or choose to rule?

Broad questions allow participants to ‘define their own space’ and, through response, taps into issues of individual concern (Geer 1991). The questions considered themes such as reasons for creation, amount of time involved in practice, experiences, and future evolutions. I sent out these ice-breaker surveys, included in initial introductory emails, to also get a sense of which cases would be willing to actively participate in the research. The surveys went out to practitioners from the Democratic Republic of Bobalania, the Kingdom of New Brittania, the Copeman Empire, the Crown Dependency of Forvik (now known as the Sovereign State of Forvik in conjunction with the Sovereign Nation of Shetland), the Free Independent Republic of Frestonia, the Independent Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye, the Great Commonwealth of the Ibrosian Democracy, Free Kelso High, the Sovereign
Kingdom of Kemetia, the Peoples Republic of K-Marx, the Grand Duchy of the
Lagoan Isles, the Kingdom of Lovely, the Mondcivitan Republic, the Principality of
Paulovia, Pollok Free State, San Serriffe, the Principality of Sealand, the Realm of
Strathclyde, and the Kingdom of TwoChairs. Some micropatrias responded kindly
by answering the questions and beginning a research-participant relationship with
me, some ignored the email completely such as defunct nations, while others
responded to inform me that they were finished with the practice and I could look
to their nation’s websites or collective micropatrial practice forums and find the
information needed there. Overall, I was pleased with the effects of the
introductory letter and questions. In the end, I was able to start developing
relationships with participants based on this initial contact. After this initial
contact, I gained a more enlightened grasp of each particular micropatria. The
responses gave me insights into the broad concepts I was thinking about regarding
the practice. The next step was to push the relationship beyond mere polite
acquaintance. I then attempted to gain an ‘audience’ with the national leaders.
Originally, the above nineteen cases (plus the Kingdom of Heaven) were considered
viable. Four of the remaining nineteen are in a state of abandonment or limbo so I
was unable to successfully gain contact (the Great Commonwealth of the Ibrosian
Democracy-defunct; the Grand Duchy of the Lagoan Isles-defunct during research,
but recently revived on a different web server; the Kingdom of Lovely-state of limbo
from King’s inactivity; and the Kingdom of TwoChairs-temporarily defunct due to
infighting). In terms of contact, this leaves a total of fifteen viable cases. I received
some form of response from the remaining fifteen.
Unstructured Interviews

To further expand my comprehension of micropatrial practices, interviews became the next step of engagement with practitioners. In deciding to do in-person interviews, I began to formulate an interview guide, in hopes of gaining access to micropatrial leaders. Three experiences resulted from the process of preparing, scheduling, and enacting interviews.

First, the guide went through many formulations until finally I had a set of questions for the participants that I prematurely thought would answer all of my questions for the thesis. In the end, even though I carried the interview guide with me, I found it to be useless. I felt uncomfortable with such a structured agenda, and, when sitting in the interviews, the guide felt unnatural, like a foreign object that I could not identify. The conversations with practitioners required a much more open and fluid design, allowing them to rant and ramble through their stories, experiences, and agendas. Only when conversation ebbed and a lengthy pause yawned would I prompt the leader with a question, not from the guide, but from a query to some earlier comment (Zhang and Wildemuth 2009). The interviews were unstructured lending ‘agency’ to the participants (ESDS 2007). Unstructured interviews lend participants the “freedom to tell their biographical stories in their own way, although there may be some gentle guidance offered by the interviewer in order to keep the narrative going” (ESDS 2007, np). The method of unstructured interviews attempts to find meanings through personal narratives by listening to the biographies and stories that can be “personal, intimate and emotional” for
participants (ESDS 2007, np). The purpose through listening to participants by way of unstructured interviews is to “expose the researcher to unanticipated themes and to help him or her to develop a better understanding of the interviewees’ social reality from the interviewees’ perspectives” and is a common method used as a secondary source to support participation with and observation of research participants and their social realities (Zhang and Wildemuth 2009, 223). I found this strategy most useful and very much a part of listening to the participants rather than ticking off my guide. My interests in their conversations fed into tangents, anecdotes, and their own reflexive thinking.

Second, after I asked all the micropatrias that responded to meet with me in person, I found that very few agreed to such a meeting. Getting leaders to agree to meet in person was not as successful as getting them to participate online. Many practitioners prefer only to communicate via a digital world. This is where the majority of micropatrias live, even when they claim physical land. While these in-person meetings would be memorable gems of fieldwork that add a source of complementary data, I have recognized that my main fieldwork site lies in logging in. So while traditionally going to the field involves a physical replacement of the self, this digital practice of national construction and representation involves a placement of the self in a virtual environment. While this was immensely difficult at first and a bit discouraging, again the nature of the practice shone through and enlightened me from this failure to secure more traditional meetings.

Third, the interviews, five in total, took place with the King of the Independent Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye (in Hay-on-Wye, Wales), the Steward of the
Crown Dependency of Forvik (now known as the Sovereign State of Forvik, who is also now the Steward of the Sovereign Nation of Shetland in Shetland, Scotland), a Minister of the Free Independent Republic of Frestonia (in London, England), a citizen of Pollok Free State (in Glasgow, Scotland), and a creator of San Serriffe (in London, England). These five made up one-third of the total cases I had successful contact with.

The interviews were held in locations that the participants felt comfortable in. I did not attempt to sway the locations of the interviews. I brought myself to the participants. I wanted the participants to feel that they were participants in my research rather than research subjects. When asked by a participant where I would like to meet, I asked them to offer suggestions and agreed to whatever location they chose. Locations were changed, for more than one interview, when a participant seemed uncomfortable or wanted different surroundings.

Once settled in a location, the participant inevitably asked what is it that I wanted to know, so they could gear their discussion towards this goal. I reiterated that my research was about the creation, experiences, and goals of micropatrias, something I had discussed in my initial contact with the practitioners. I openly stated that I wanted to hear their stories, almost as if I was collecting an oral history; an approach used by some geographers (George and Stratford 2005).

Some asked me where to begin with their stories. I would then reply “with the beginning”. When ready to start, I would test the digital recorder I purchased for the research to ensure the machine was working properly. I placed the device between myself and the participant and then prompted their story. When a
participant would pause or stop telling their story, I would wait a few minutes before saying anything. This interlude of silence was a time for me to catch up on my handwritten notes that were supplementary to the digital recorder, as well as a backup in case something were to happen to the digital file. Many times, they would continue on their own without an interruption from me. Sometimes, after waiting to the point of uncomfortable silence, I would ask a question pulled from something they would have mentioned earlier. This would bring them back to storytelling and kept the interview more natural.

Once I had the interviews stored on the machine, I would then transfer the files to my external hard drive upon my return home. The files downloaded as Windows Media Audio Files. Subsequently I was able to play them as audio files on the Windows Media Player that I have installed on my laptop. At the bottom of the screen on this application is a running time of the file, displaying where along the audio file you are listening to with the smallest time increment being seconds. This application allows one to access the audio file anywhere along the timeline. With this capability I was able to repeatedly listen to specific sections of the interviews. All the interview files were placed together in a folder.

Once secured on my hard drive, I would then listen to the interviews repeatedly. I considered doing a full transcription, but then realized that by having the digital files I was able to be, at least audibly, transported back to the interview. Rather than transcribing every word, pause, chuckle, and anecdote, I chose to take selective notes by interview time. Meaning, as I would listen to the interview, when I heard comments or stories relevant to what I was thinking about, whether it
was sovereignty, humor, activism, creativity and so on, I would selectively transcribe that particular section of the interview along with a note of what time, how many minutes into the interview, that particular story or comment took place. This way, when I was going over a particular topic, I could look at these selectively transcribed notes and access this information quickly. This process did not stop me from fully listening to the interviews repeatedly and adding comments and information to my notes as the writing process progressed. As I began to compare my selective transcriptions across the interviews I was able to see the similarities, and differences, among the practitioners and their experiences. What I specifically zeroed in on was how certain concepts were appropriated by practitioners as a means towards their goals or to make statements of power.

**Virtual Relationships**

Beyond the ability to interview, many leaders, including those who did not wish to interview, were keen on digital communication. Building these relationships online creates opportunities for “highly potent ways of conducting research” (Hine 2005, 19; see also Hine 2000). This relationship building can nurture personalized encounters between researchers and participants, and the possibilities for ‘candid’ sharing (Joinson 2005, 21; see also Kivits 2005). The personal encounters online became imperative to the relationship building and the qualitative research (Kivits 2005). Most of the contact has taken place via private emails, but has also extended to messages through Facebook, posted mail, and notations on websites. Hence, where attempts to meet in person seemed to have
failed, the very bottoming out of the research methods, the very same participants
who refused such meetings were more than gracious with their time in other ways
which in fact enriched the communication process and my understanding of
micropatrias. I have maintained open conversation with a set of five other
practitioners beyond those I ‘officially interviewed’, such as the Prince of the
Principality of Paulovia, the President of the Democratic Republic of Bobalania, the
President of the Sovereign Kingdom of Kemetia, the King of the Realm of
Strathclyde, and the Head of State of the Peoples Republic of K-Marx. These five
make up another one-third of the cases I had successful contact with.

My virtual diplomatic relationships gained me honorary citizenship in the
Principality of Paulovia, as well as an exchange of symbolic consulates with
Paulovia. There is talk of a symbolic exchange of consulates with the Realm of
Strathclyde as well. And the Peoples Republic of K-Marx has broached the topic of
an international treaty between our two nations. These digital communications
offered cross references on international embassy sites, including sanctioned links
on my own ‘national’ website. This exchanging of the right to bear links is an
acknowledgement of my acceptance in the micropatrial community by these
practitioners and an acknowledgement of active networking. It is also an
agreement of border crossing, whereby digitally sharing links creates an open
border between nations (Forte 2005, 103). Such diplomatic relationships illustrate
relations development through ‘resource exchange’ (Kozinets 2010, 52).

The primary concern in diplomacy for these micropatrias is a sharing of
ideals, such as equal rights, humanitarian efforts, foreign aid, sustainability
practices, freedom from oppression, and more; a ‘suspended meaning’ that alludes to “patterns of exchange, information distribution, dialogue and revision” (Forte 2005, 93). These ideals are typically similar, progressive, and positive agendas. Included in diplomacy is the acknowledgement of a shared goal of continuing to promote micropatrias through practice and networking. The creation of these ‘social ties, networks, and exchanges’ illustrates cultural practice (Forte 2005, 93). I have learned through the communicative experience with my participants how viable a tool the Internet is for sharing ideas, creating communities, and expanding networks. The digital component increases the social-ness of the practice and adds a greater and far reaching audience for feedback.

Beyond opening up dialogue with other nations, the virtual relationships promote new citizenship within a nation. The international embassy is a tool for increasing the ranks and many offer citizenship with minimal effort. Unlike possible experiences in dealing with legitimated sovereigns, micropatrias do not concern themselves with previous or multiple citizenships. Allegiance is not defined by how many citizenships one has, but by the oaths one takes to promote the nation, in particular, and micropatrialism, in general. These types of virtual relationships can have their downfalls when personal politics get involved or when it is obvious that a citizen is purposefully causing trouble within or between nations. In the end, this is part of the practice, for better or for worse.
Failed Diplomacy

Failures in research can be instructive, possibly even more so than achievements (Osgood 1985). One of Cornelius Osgood’s failures was in not realizing that ‘ethnographic reconstruction’ was different than working with cultures (1985, 383). In the spirit of Osgood’s listing of his seven failures throughout his anthropological career, I list three that have instructed me during the thesis. These three are examples of types of failed diplomacy between me and other micropatrial citizens and leaders. For instance, originally I was in communication with King Nicholas I of the Copeman Empire. He came across in his communications as very interested in the research and enthusiastic about meeting in person. As time passed he ceased responding to my emails. Occasionally throughout the research process I have sent emails in hopes of receiving response and rekindling our relationship, but this had not occurred. In addition, King Nicholas I has dismantled his internet presence which strips online users of access to his nation’s information. All that currently remains is a place holder page. From this failure, I realize that, while I was purposefully slowly developing relationships with practitioners, this approach does not work with all research participants. Because of this failure, I lost out on the ‘possible’ opportunity to conduct an in-person interview.

Another example of failed diplomacy rests with my relationship, or lack thereof, with the Principality of Sealand. Originally, the Principality of Sealand was open to communication and agreed to be involved as a participant in the research. Being one of the very first micropatrias I contacted, I was thrilled to have such a
well-known case in my research. They never accepted in-person meetings, but were willing to answer questions and participate digitally. After not hearing back from them in response to my emailed questions, I sent an email to ask if they were still willing to participate. I received in response to my prompting a curt email that implied I was wasting their time. In the end they never answered any questions. Interestingly, through my research I have realized that they are an anomaly within a system of anomalies as they do not interact with other micropatrias. So I gather that initial responses from them stemmed from my research interests and not my practicing interests. My failure here was a result of my decision to be a part of the micropatral community rather than solely the academic researcher. Each research approach chosen has an impact on the outcome of the research, as well as the (non)participation of possible participants. While I was disheartened not to have more contact with the Principality of Sealand, I stand behind my choice to be involved as a practitioner in the community.

A third example that tenuously can be considered failed diplomacy, but one that I feel is worthy of note and telling of the research experience, involves the Kingdom of TwoChairs. While being temporarily defunct, the Kingdom of TwoChairs never responded to any of my emails. They have now locked their website so I can no longer gain access to their data. Only “invited users” may gain access to this recently privatized information. I feel that this locking out was not due to my interests, but due to the recent defuncting and disagreements within the kingdom. I noticed occasions where they locked out citizens during arguments. While retrieving and archiving websites for my own database is laborious and has
taken place on a sporadic and selective basis, fortunately, for my research I had chosen to download the entire websites of the Copeman Empire and the Kingdom of TwoChairs. These fortuitous choices have given me an archive from which I can continue to include them in my investigations. This final failure rests on my inability to gain access to the Kingdom of TwoChairs, as well as serving as a reminder of the ephemerality and capriciousness of the micropatrial practice.

**The Value of the Insider**

Individuals use the digital realm to create ‘cultural and heritage content’ (Terras 2011, 687). Increasingly, the Internet as a source for communication and dissemination has become more user-friendly (Terras 2011). The Internet as a field site allows fluid, mobile, connective engagement between various practitioners (Hine 2011, 570; see also Hine 2000, 2005; Kozinets 2010). With the second year of my research in full swing, I began to struggle as an outsider in my own assumptions about the practice, as well as access to the time of various practitioners. Some of the practitioners suggested I create my own nation to begin a formal communicative process between “our nations”; and for awhile I considered the implications of taking on such an identity and immersing myself within the community. If I transformed myself to an insider, then I would have to consider my role in the process of the research and how to ‘negotiate challenges’ that would arise from such a dual positioning (DeLyser 2001).

Dydia DeLyser (2001) relays academic consideration of the insider researcher from the perspective of the researcher as already an embedded
member (a preexisting insider), and the hardships of criticality, contradicting positionality, ethics of power, participation overwhelming observation, etc. Going beyond such constraints, she considers how researchers can be part of the community researched, “home fieldwork”, and how this requires “multiple axes of commitment” (2001, 444). DeLyser found during research in Bodie (a gold-mining ghost town in California that has been converted to a state park where she worked numerous summers) that being an insider researcher requires examination of the self as well as others. Just as DeLyser found herself, by being an insider, as a ‘participant’ in the “ongoing constructions of the mythic West” (2001, 448), I find myself, by being an insider, as a ‘participant’ in the construction and (re)production of subversive sovereignties and subversive networks. I am a complicit partner in their counter-hegemonic representations. And just as DeLyser attempted to “be sensitive to, and critical of” her role as insider researcher (2001, 451), I also try to balance sensitivity with criticality. This may be my biggest challenge; and therefore, I want to be completely transparent as to my position as insider and my insider experience.

Being an insider, a participant observer, for me is not being one of the preexisting members, but being a researcher that has then joined the community to deepen research access, enlightenment, and relationships. In Peter Jackson’s account of academic definitions of participant observation, important points are made clear, one being that participant observation is not a ‘technique’, but an ‘approach’, as well as a form of sharing (1983) that requires balancing ‘familiarity’ with ‘detachment’ (1983, 41); and the concept of presenting the results as a
‘natural history’ of progression (42). Some of the main issues with such an approach that Jackson notes include: when the research participants are of a lower status, such as ethnic minorities or the poor; when participants are not aware of the research; and the outcome of research impact. While the first two are moot points for the thesis, the third I cannot gauge, except to say that the power play between me and the participants is one of mutual benefit to some extent. While I use them for my research, they in turn use me to promote their aims.

What participant observation does do is give the researcher an approach to data collection “within the mediums, symbols and experiential worlds which have meaning for his respondents” whereby the “boundaries of inquiry are as little predetermined as possible” (Jackson 1983 44, 45). In promoting participant observation as a research approach, Richard Wood et al. find in their study of online gamers that online research is ‘subjective’ and ‘interpretive’, and that (2004, 514):

“The behaviors in question cannot be observed from outside of the framework within which it exists. That is, by going online, the researcher becomes a part of the phenomenon that is being studied. Furthermore, personal experience of the domain of investigation can be a distinct advantage in many ways”.

And by the act of the researcher as participant, research participants can be ‘reassured’ that the researcher has some ‘understanding’ and an ‘appreciation’ for their practices, therefore lessening the possibility for ‘misrepresentation’ (Wood et al. 2004).

A major problem I continually encountered in examining micropatrias as an outsider to the practice is that this approach only opens up a small amount of the micropatrial world. The hidden world behind the representation of these
subversive practices remained elusive. Penetrating this community of micropatrias and their networks became crucial to develop trust and a working relationship. Therefore, to open up this hidden world and become a member of this community, I decided that creating my own micropatria would enrich the research and my experience with my participants. Approaching the community from an observation of participation, whereby the self and other become entangled, enriched dialogue between the research participants and myself (Tedlock 1991). This participation allowed me to understand how the relationships and practitioner practices are made meaningful (Hine 2011). I realized that I needed to join the community of practitioners to gain a rich understanding of the investment a micropatria required, the complexity of the representations, and the communicative processes along networks. The goal then of creating a nation was to gain greater access to the experience of the practitioners, as well as gain more of the practitioners’ time. I know each micropatria is different, but to have a better appreciation for the process and meaning, I went through this development myself, the birth of a new nation. Also, I diplomatically networked with micropatrias to see how they function ‘internationally’. All in all, this process aids in my understanding of the effort put into creating a nation and gives me greater access to the micropatrial community.

The Nation of Heliotrope

Now, I recall creating a nation and the steps I had to take in order to make this geographic fantasy manifest into a fantastic geography. Once my decision had been made, I fantasized about the nation: what would it be like, what would it be
called, what would it mean, what would be important, and where to begin. Then, I placed my nation in space, digital space, by uploading a picture of a planted flag onto a free hosting website. Next, with the ‘official’ flag planting online, I declared sovereignty, independence for my nation; the Nation of Heliotrope was born.

Afterwards, I worked on representing my nation, a reinforcement of its existence, by creating various material elements that legitimate a nation. Through this process of transforming into a practitioner, I began to subversively play with the status quo, inverting reality, thinking of myself as a micropatrial leader. Creating the nation allowed me to be a participant/observer/practitioner and to reflect upon my own experiences, my delights, and my frustrations. These approaches have aided in granting me access and giving me insight into the parallel reality of micropatrias, as well as insight into the effort put in by practitioners. Micropatrias are more than flights of fancy; requiring massive amounts of time, input, and networking to maintain. Below I recount some of my experiences of ‘becoming’ a practitioner:

Having decided to join the micropatrial ranks, I began thinking ‘how do I start a country’? The answer seemed obvious. Unlike the Kingdom of Lovely where the name was chosen last, I could not proceed until I had a name. The name of a country lends meaning and I could not tell what type of nation I was creating without the name to propel me forward. I thought back to an evening out with friends where we created a country called Epiphany...but epiphany already has a calendar day and just seemed unoriginal and lackluster. Then I considered the nation simulation game I played online where I had created the Nation of Enlightened Geography...but that too seemed long, boring, and unimaginative. Then I thought about the elements that I was seeing across the board with the micropatrias I was investigating. I
thought, ‘hey what about the Nation of Hope?’...but was informed by a friend that it was rather presumptuous...I agreed. Then...like lightening...while walking to the train station one day...it came to me; Heliotrope! The Nation of Heliotrope! Yeah. Heliotrope is funny and hopeful and reminds me of micropatrial representations. Heliotrope literally means turning into the sun or way of the sun. Heliotrope is also a flower that turns to face into the sun during the day. The idea of turning into the light symbolized the idea of hope, hope for a better future, a utopic agenda. As well, there is an animated short film called ‘Boundin’ where a jackalope sings in rhyme and includes the word heliotrope into his melodic poetry. The film reminded me of a modern Dr. Seuss tale and incorporated humor and wondrous creatures into a point, a serious message. Is this not what micropatrias do, create myths, share their utopic aspirations, spin tales, give a reason to chuckle all while displaying their dissatisfaction with the government, their lot in life, norms, or whatever? Now that I had a name... a way forward...I had to figure out who I was.

Who am I? I spent way too much time considering different titles, each one giving a different feel to the representation of the nation. I found it awkward and at times a bit embarrassing trying to find ‘my title’. Am I a president, prime minister, dictator, potentate, queen, or czar? How do you just give yourself a title and believe it without being chemically unbalanced? Well, that is what I thought then, now I enjoy it. Does that mean I am chemically unbalanced...not sure. I finally decided that Lady would be nice. What girl would not want to be called Lady? So for a while I was Lady moreau of Heliotrope. Yet others, peers, friends, and family continued to comment on my position, what kind of government would I have. Eventually the decision was removed from me. So many friends and family jokingly called me queen that I finally accepted that as my title and officially became HM Lady moreau, Queen of the Nation of Heliotrope. Ok, so I have a monarchy, which I have also been told is unimaginative and dull. In a way, a monarchy as my “starter nation” makes things a bit easier since what I say goes and
that’s the end of it; well that is what I thought before the complaints. I have a
title for myself, a form of government, and a name for my nation. This set me
in motion for the next steps: declaring sovereignty and placing the nation in
space.

At first I just wanted to get the nation launched and created a website
on Google’s free sites server. This would not be the final home, but at the
time I was naive enough to be satisfied with the digital location. Following
the advice of other practitioners, I posted a picture of a temporary flag on the
site and claimed independence. A moment of truth...the flag was a fishing
pole with a white pillow case tied to it and stuck in the ground in my parent’s
front yard (fig. 4.1). I figured it worked.

![Figure 4.1: Original Flag for Declaration. Source: https://sites.google.com/site/thenationofheliotrope/home/flag.](https://sites.google.com/site/thenationofheliotrope/home/flag)

The date of declaration took some thinking. For the sunny hopeful
disposition, I wanted a summery day of independence for celebrating. July is
the most summery of months in my mind. Well the 4th is already taken by the
United States and the 14th is already claimed by the French. I finally decided
to split the month and chose the 15th as the day. It was fun to sit down on
the 15th of July 2009 and officially declare the Nation of Heliotrope in
existence and independent. Unfortunately, my first digital attempt went bust
as I became wholly dissatisfied with the site host. The site’s downfalls
outweighed any usability: the website address was awkward, the site
ridiculously enough was not easily locatable on Google’s search engine, and
when viewing the site as a visitor advertisements for ‘hot women’ would pop
up. I thought that it would be hard for other micropatrial practitioners to
take me seriously as a researcher or a practitioner when such advertisements
would suddenly appear on screen. I was not sure exactly how ads for hot
women would affect my virtual relationships or what new ads may pop up
that I am not aware of or have no control over...maybe ads for Viagra or
Levitra would soon follow. Being that my participants are all male and many
of an aging generation I imagined unknown offences. Control over my virtual
environment was direly needed.

The point of having a digital location is for representing the nation and
my nation was buried and littered with risqué advertisements. I began
learning a new language...that of computers and programming. This was a
massive learning curve. I spent a lot of time trying to understand how to
create a website and even took a programming class. There are servers,
hosting, domains, security licenses, platform programs, and so much more to
figure out that there were times I thought my head would explode.
Eventually, after much effort and wasted financial aid, I was able to create the
website with the optioned tools that I needed. After accidentally blowing a
few hundred dollars and somehow having my site disappear from space for a
while, I have a location that is stable as long as my monthly payment comes
out.

I decided to add a mapping program to my website in order to capture
the numbers of visitors and their general locations across the globe (fig. 4.2).
Well, the first hit counter disappeared when I tried to upgrade my ClustrMaps
program, but I have successfully installed a second hit counter with a more
advanced ClustrMaps and dedicated it as a memorial to the first one. Not only has my hit counter disappeared, but I have had experiences where my entire website went missing. I was alerted to this situation when another practitioner emailed me to inform me that the website was gone. What! While I had access to the site for building purposes, I had somehow taken the site offline. I promptly figured out how to remedy this situation and was back online immediately. Success! Sorted!

![Image of ClustrMaps](http://www.nationofheliotrope.com/History.html)

Now that I had a name, a title, a declaration, and a place to call my own, I needed some symbols of my nation. A flag would be a good start. I let the name of the nation guide the flag design. I looked at flags from around the world and found the ones I liked the best were simple and easily replicable, such as Japan’s flag. I borrowed the Japanese design, but made the sun gold to represent a sun shining on a summer day and made the background a purple color meant to represent the heliotrope flower which is often a purple hue (fig. 4.3). I even gave the flag a name, the Trope, in similar fashion to the Union Jack in the UK. I pondered whether to create a pledge to the flag. This is done as a symbol of patriotism in the United States. The act itself is rigid, requiring one to face the flag and stand at attention (meaning upright and stiff as a soldier does) and place your right hand over your heart. Once in this position one repeats a pledge specifically giving allegiance to the flag as a symbol of the United States. The flag then transforms into a sacred
object that has laws and procedures surrounding the proper handling of the flag. As a U.S. citizen I was required to pledge my allegiance to this flag every Monday through Friday from the age of four to eighteen. Rather than allegiance to an object, I decided to write a haiku as a form of allegiance to the nation.

O Heliotrope!
Beloved and united
Under shining sun

That sums it up; short, sweet, and patriotic.

![Figure 4.3: The Flag of Heliotrope. Source: http://www.nationofheliotrope.com/History.html.](image)

Then other symbols of the nation followed in due course...national symbols such as the liger (the national predator – a cross between a lion and a tiger), the jackalope (the national prey – a cross between a jack rabbit and an antelope), national dishes (like snozberries), the national sport (ostrich races), the national dance (the wango – a cross between a waltz and a tango), the newspaper (The Helios), a postage stamp (fig 4.4), the motto (ex nihilo nihil fit- Latin for out of nothing, nothing comes), the national seal (fig. 4.5), anthem, honors and orders, a calendar with national holidays and notable persons of interests, and all the accoutrements of the nation. The stamp is one of my favorite symbols of Heliotrope. The image was taken during a
protest in London. I decided to pull my daughter out of school and bring her to the protest to teach her about civic duty and tactics of the people, the importance of the voice of the people being seen and heard by governments. We, along with fellow citizens of Heliotrope, spent the day marching and protesting educations cuts and tuition raises alongside many international students and British citizens. I decided to turn the image into a symbol for my country. It represents the rebellious and subversive nature of the practice.

Figure 4.4: Official Stamp of Heliotrope. Source: http://www.nationofheliotrope.com/Government.html.
Creating and dreaming up these items began to take up a large amount of time. Designing official images, objects, and text to go on the website (fig. 4.6), along with learning how to create the website, was such a consumer of my time that my supervisor began to question the time I was spending on it. He just did not understand what it took to create a nation and represent it online. In the end, I went from ignorant technophobe to managing an online nation. Would I do it all over again...create a country...talk with other leaders...imagine ways to represent it...ponder over the meaning of trivial yet momentous decisions for my nation...have an audience with Princess Anne (fig. 4.7)\(^2\)...yes I would...I enjoyed the thesis research, my participants, and being a micropatrial practitioner...

\(^2\) I competed to enter a program on leadership fully funded by the University of Westminster and in conjunction with the International Students House in London. My entry was based on my method of running a country for the thesis research. Out of hundreds of applicants to the program, only a small group of students were chosen to learn and improve their leadership skills. As a program participant, I was invited to meet Princess Anne. When I met Princess Anne, we discussed my thesis research at Royal Holloway University of London.
Figure 4.6: Screenshots of my website  Source: http://www.nationofheliotrope.com/.
Upon creating my own micropatria, I started to join the ranks of practitioners. Immediately, I commenced sending and receiving emails as a head of state to other heads of states. I began to play my role, began to add substance to my new identity through performance. I became a leader practicing diplomacy with other leaders. Through joining in, I gained greater insight into the process, better access and information from current and past practitioners, and I become a part of the micropatrial network. This has gained me gifts of national objects, peer consideration as a fellow practitioner, and even honorary citizenship as mentioned earlier. This participatory approach continually grants me greater access to micropatrial leaders. Also, through this reflexivity of analyzing my own actions, I have gained great insight already into the consumption of time, effort, and financial investment involved in creating and running a micropatria. While naively stating that my nation and my international embassy is a hodgepodge reflection representative of what I have seen, I also must admit, that as time has passed, it is so much more. The nation is representative of me, who I am, subjective and
interpretive; and as such it would be completely different if created by one of my peers.

The thesis, while possibly traditional in setup and with the requisite chapters, is not traditional in the sense of the approaches I had to take in order to understand and investigate micropatrias as phenomena in a sense. I used multiple methods, as many as I felt would benefit the research, and remained loose and open to changes due to the ever changing nature of micropatrias as practice. Now that the introduction, some thematic literature, and methods have been discussed, the thesis will now move into its heart: the three themes of subversion and liminality, symbols, and diplomacy, respectively. These will be followed by a brief concluding chapter.
Chapter 5: Subversion and Micropatial Liminality

To begin I will start with an account of my research experience. Then I will stress the importance of the positioning and realities of micropatrias, not as political entities vying for legitimation, but as playful nations working from outside of hegemonic sovereignty, subversively toying with it, to achieve whatever goals that motivate each one. Within this section, I will discuss political power and the power of agency garnered by those seen as powerless. Next, agency being enacted from a liminal position is considered. The conversation then is on whether micropatrias are dangerous nations and their liminal positions. To end the chapter is some closing remarks.

Tony Sleep, one of the original squatters of Freston Road and one of the former ministers of the Free Independent Republic of Frestonia, picks me up at the train station and brings me to his house in West London. I spend the next three hours drinking coffee, smoking cigarettes, and talking with Tony. He relays the history of how the squatters moved into Freston Road and refused to leave the area. In an attempt to not be thwarted from Freston Road by the Greater London Council for development purposes, the Bramleys (the surname the squatters adopted in an attempt to remain united as a ‘family’ in case of relocation) declared the squatted row of housing the Free Independent Republic of Frestonia. In the autumn of 1977, the Frestonians sent an application to join the United Nations as an autonomous nation (fig. 5.1). Their micropatral liminal positioning and subversive nationalism brought Frestonia some limited notoriety.
(fig. 5.2) as well as a period of rampant crime against Freston Road and the inhabiting Frestonians. By declaring independence ‘citizens’ of the Free Independent Republic of Frestonia are carving out a liminal niche for their squatted territory. They are playing with the idea of sovereignty to garner media attention for their cause of retaining the squatted property. Here, the Free Independent Republic of Frestonia uses the very same maneuvers of some nations to gain more power and independence by submitting an application to join the United Nations as a member state. The subversive use of this tactic is not surprisingly ignored by the United Nations.

Figure 5.1: Application from Frestonia to join the United Nations. Source: Document scan sent to me from Tony Sleep.
By creating my own micropatria, I carved out a liminal niche for my nation. I produced my nation, not to one day achieve sovereignty through recognition from legitimate sovereigns, but to play with the idea of sovereignty, to create my own subversive version of it. Just like the practices of my participants, I organized my own form of government and appointed officials to government positions. My sovereignty was declared on July 15, 2009 and as far as my nation was concerned, I was on equal footing with the United Kingdom. My townhouse in Englefield Green became my embassy and this is where I stayed while considering my nation to be solidifying relations with the United Kingdom. I recruited citizens to my nation from my embassy location. I played with conventional understandings of sovereignty and the accoutrements associated with it. My website, my international embassy, became the localized and liminal niche from where I represented my brand of subversion.
Representing Subversion: The Micropatrial Niche

It is easy to think of individual actions and shared cultures as performances of apolitical choices and natural practices, respectively, but politics is invested in our everyday lives. For example, art can be considered just a form of play and creativity, but art has been shown by numerous academics to be a heavily contested form of representation (see Hein 1976, 1996; Deutsche 1992; Doss 1992, 1995; Murray 2004). Culture, as well, can seem to be a natural part of one’s existence, one’s everyday practices, but the formation and identification of culture is not a natural thing, it is a naturalized process through political performances (Mitchell 1995). Especially in regards to larger shared identifications, such as nationality and the active maintenance of nationalism, culture is imagined (Anderson [1983] 1991). Nationalism then can be said to be fantasy manifesting into geography, residing within (and arguably outside of) sovereign boundaries, and represented via symbols. National representations can be strategic hegemonic norms or subversive counter-hegemonic tactics. Hegemonic norms are part of the everyday, while arguably counter-hegemonic tactics can also be considered part of the everyday for some people.

Micropatrias separate themselves from the everyday. They do not require acceptance into the mundane, but thrive on playing at and with hegemonic norms. While micro-states are niche sovereignties (Eccardt 2005) that blend into geopolitical awareness and settle into accepted roles, micropatrias reside in their own political niche, not of sovereignty, but of liminality, of subversion. This political
niche develops thorough tensions between hegemonic power and subversive power; tensions of (non)reaction and (non)recognition from other states and nations; and tensions between the relationships of enclaves, hosts, and the international community. All these elements of micropatrial existence place these nations in a liminal arena. As geopolitical anomalies, they remind us of, and make conspicuous, the geopolitical norms and, furthermore, the geopolitical anomalies existing beyond the norms (the ‘ad hoc failures’ or ‘incomplete’ entities; see McConnell 2009a).

While the achievement of sovereignty appears at first glance as the goal of micropatrias, and existing in a liminal form may seem as the only disheartening outcome in the micropatrial endeavor to attain legitimated sovereignty, this view is romantic and frankly missing the point. Specifically, if a micropatria were to be legitimated through international sovereign recognition, then it would transform from a micropatria (a type of nation) into one of Eccardt’s legitimate micro-states. It would disappear, fall apart, and die. This is not the purpose or the possibility of micropatrias. They require separation from the orthodox system of sovereigns and flourish in their subversion to it. They play. A deeper inspection reveals that micropatrial declarations liminally separate them to create a platform from which to play with sovereignty; to mimic, parody, and comment upon hegemonic norms; and to put forth their voices, agency, and agendas during the process of weaving new nations. As emerging geopolitical actors they operate on a parallel, but alternate, network and make transparent, yet reify, the very core of sovereignty. Their goal is not to fight for recognition from legitimated sovereigns, but, from their
declared pulpits, they open up alternate realities, poke fun at hegemonic realities, and internationally construct parallel diplomatic sovereign networks. In a sense, they spatially appropriate through layered occupation and bring a form of political (and ironically national) agency back to the individual and groups of people, creating subversive geopolitical actors. This growth opens up a gap where micropatrial practitioners can reflect upon and comment on contemporary international and national affairs. This reflection and commentary allows them to make a way, as Marin (1993) would say. The political tensions mentioned above need further discussion to illuminate their importance for micropatrial life that gives these leaders their vocal, visual, material, textual, and aural niche.

**Power of Resistance and Transgression**

It was on September 2 of 1967 that former ‘pirate’ radio broadcaster of Radio Essex ‘Paddy’ Roy Bates and his family occupied and declared an abandoned UK World War II anti-aircraft ocean platform (known as HM Fort Roughs, or Roughs Tower) a nation—the Principality of Sealand. They chose Roughs Tower after having trouble with British authorities for operating a radio without a license on Knock John Tower, which was located within the three mile territorial water limit. Roughs Tower, located six miles off the coast of the United Kingdom and therefore outside of UK territorial waters, became the territory of the Principality of Sealand. After firing over the bow of a British ship that came near the tower, Bates (born a British citizen) was summoned to court. On October 25 of 1968, the UK court ruled Sealand outside of territorial waters (at that time). Added to this, after a failed
coup by a Sealand citizen with dual German citizenship in conjunction with some Dutch businessmen, the German government negotiated with Roy Bates the release of the citizen. Another possible acknowledgement of Sealand’s declared status of sovereignty. This insight into the Principality of Sealand is just one of many examples of resistance to UK sovereign conventions and transgression of such norms for citizens of Sealand. Sealand is the most aggressive example, possibly due to its location originally outside of UK waters coupled with the charisma of Roy Bates. Many other micropatrial practitioners practice resistance to UK laws and transgression of them. What makes these acts unique is that they interlaced with the subversive representations of the micropatria.

Representation is a form of agency and power; and politics is power. Power is socio-political relationships, resources, forces, practices, and processes (Sharp et al. 2000, 20). Nationalism, through the practice and representation of ideologies and symbols, is a demonstration of this power from the authority and the people. This relationship is displayed not only for a domestic audience, but an international one as well (Morgenthaler 1993, 50). While displays of state sponsored nationalism and, as a result, patriotism are meant to further unite and solidify a nation, they are also meant to represent, on an international level, a solid and legitimate front. This representation is a declaration in itself of independence and sovereignty, whether constituted by others or not. An alternately constructed sovereignty challenges hegemonic norms of sovereignty. While micropatrias are challenging conventional notions of sovereignty, they are concomitantly creating windows of opportunity and occasions for resistance, reversal, and the power of claiming power. This
resistance then subversively questions dominant authority (Sharp et al. 2000, 8).

David Sibley considers the power of liminal inversion in terms of challenging the state and hegemonic norms (1995, 44):

The occasions when inversions assume a centre—periphery form, when the dominant society is relegated to the spatial margins and oppressed minorities command the centre, may represent a challenge to established power relations and, thus, be subject to the attention of the state. There may be attempts to control or suppress such events because they harness the energies of groups which challenge mainstream values.

As shown in the examples above, power is not only the domain of authority (Sharp et al. 2000). Power is also enlisted and expressed by those individuals and groups traditionally seen as powerless. Everyone has the ability to ‘exercise’ power and power is “at the heart of all social relations” (Cresswell 2000, 261). The point is that the conceptual dichotomy of the powerful versus the powerless is misguided and aims to take agency and power away from those who would be seen as ‘powerless’ and give a notion of insurmountable power to those considered ‘powerful’. The work of Michel de Certeau (1984) exemplifies the idea of the ‘powerless’ as actuality having power. His two concepts of power are strategies and tactics. Strategies become the hegemonic tool of those ‘in power’. Tactics become the transgressive tool of those who consciously or unconsciously question the authority and norms set by the aforementioned group. In deconstructing the power relations in the film Falling Down, Tim Cresswell discusses de Certeau’s concepts as “strategies of the powerful (based on a powerful space of the proper)” and “tactics of the weak (based on myriad movements through these spaces)” (2000, 265). Or maybe another way to term de Certeau’s concepts is one of dominating versus resisting power (Sharp et al. 2000). Leonard Baer (2005) also
examines how these two manifestations of power play out in the world of prisons. The extreme example of prison life makes more transparent the power divisions between the authority (the guards) and the people (the prisoners). He discusses at length how inmates use tactics to flex power rather than being seen as a powerless population. Power as a set of relations and representations has an innate inequality (Robinson 2000, 68) and the prison example clearly shows this relationship to exist. This conceptual divide between strategies and tactics not only shows power as an implement of expression and representation for a variety of groups, but that power is always in flux and power is the struggle for the appearance of power. Strauss ([1984] 1999), in his methodical book on nation construction, stresses that power, or at least the appearance of power, is necessary for new nations attempting to achieve sovereignty. But, as I said earlier, micropatrias are not attempting legitimate sovereignty; they playfully have achieved subversive sovereignty. However, power is not only by strong arm and weaponry, but also through representation. Micropatrial leaders flex their representative muscles to reverse order and give agency through mimetic practices.

Power can be used in a variety of ways by a variety of groups and individuals. Representationally, power can be used to dominate or resist. Rather than relying on notions of the powerful and powerless, power is a tool to be employed. Power transforms space and place (Cresswell 2000). This highlights how conceptions of power are truly entangled and not as straightforward as they may seem. These types of entanglements are spatial and therefore geographical (Sharp et al. 2000). An example of this entanglement can be drawn from John Bale’s work
on sport (2000). In highlighting the representation of nationalism through athletic sport, Bale notes that “Transgression is dependent on the dominance through which it is achieved” and that through transgression “‘masters’ [may] be defeated at their own game... [and] in so doing, national identity and place-pride may be forged” (2000, 161, 152). While Bale may have only literally meant the game as the athletic sport, there is an undertone present that the game is more. Various academics in discussing international politics refer to the “game” played by sovereign nations (Wendt 1992; Farnsworth-Alvear 1997; Bale 2000; Hinchliffe 2000; Sharp et al. 2000; Ammon 2001; Chapman and Reiter 2004; Cross 2007; McConnell 2009b).

Micropatrias, existing in a liminal zone, an interstitial space, represent a break from the formal structures of governance and flex their own form of power. When power is outside of official channels of control and diffused through networks, Joanne Sharp et al. (2000) call for researchers to examine these nuances of power and representations in space (see also Smith, 2000). Resistance, transgression, subversion (all as expressions of power), aim at a transformation of space (Cresswell 2000), whether the goal is temporary, permanent, or parallel. Power is struggle whether in the home, at work, in urban or rural space, in national space, or in school, and it is spatially and temporally ‘universal’ and ‘undeniable’ in the everyday (Morganthau 1993, 36). Representation is accomplished through agency and practice, and individuals are “active agents in its [power’s] articulation” (Cresswell 2000, 262). In talking about how culture is affected through the powers of practice, Steve Hinchliffe stresses that “human agency does not...emanate from
within, but is an effect of a complex of relations and practices” (2000, 221-222). On top of this he adds that “power is not the cause of action, but an effect of action” (Hinchliffe 2000, 223). While finding action and practices to be a catalyst for effect, he notes that power and objects are constituted through “acts of arranging, ordering, organising and delegating” (Hinchliffe 2000, 223). By representing their nation, micropatrial leaders become agents representing power, yet retain an interstitial national location.

Micropatrial leaders use tactical power to manifest fantasies of constructed cultural and spatial governance. This was exampled by the discussion of the Principality of Sealand above. As well, Pollok Free State, enclaved by Scotland, used its claims for independence while squatting a public park. Citizens of Pollok overtook the park and began inhabiting it in order to stop the development of a motorway through park land. They used this power to decide who had a right to be in the park and who were outsiders of Pollok (such as developmental and local authorities). This subversion became a battle between official government desires and local resident desires. Through their spatial claims, micropatrias, in a way similar to the prison example, make power relations more transparent. There is the danger in resistance that a reproduction of dominant power occurs rather than a challenge to it (Sharp et al. 2000). In terms of such a contradiction, opposition against dominant powers is selective and piecemeal and only certain elements are rallied against while others remain supported (Sharp et al. 2000, 24). This suggests that it is unavoidable to escape a state of what seems to be a contradiction.
Micropatrias, while breaking from the socially constructed norms of society and nationality, also support the inner workings and representations of this order.

Individuals, friends, and families develop new nations for various reasons from dissatisfaction with current governments to experimental projects to imaginative creations. These geopolitical anomalies create a “parallel global sovereignty” that steps outside of traditional channels of representing and expressing dissatisfaction (EOA 2011, np; see also Lattas 2005). For its practitioners, perhaps the draw of subversive sovereignty lies in the “subtle vicariousness of a pleasure” (Cresswell 2001, 165) - a subversive pleasure such as that gained in resisting elite bureaucracy or the pleasure of practice a subversive sovereign gets in a “regathering and reworking of that anti-government feeling” (Lattas 2005, 2).

National Enclaves, Sovereign Hosts, and International Liminality

Hegemonically and dominantly, de facto states and stateless nations “are perceived as discrepant forms of political practice which are systemically disruptive to the established ‘order of things’” (McConnell 2009b, 2). These ‘polities’ are often ignored because of this fear; and remain outside the traditional sovereign realm involving recognition and territory (McConnell 2009b). Representing a de facto status, micropatrias are often ignored by their respective host sovereigns, even when declarations of independence are sent to the host. For example, Stuart Hill of the Sovereign State of Forvik continually sends out letters to his local and national government meant to prompt response and denial of his claims. Many micropatrial
leaders discuss how they never receive a response from their declarations, therefore playfully accepting the silence as confirmation of their declaration. Interestingly, the host sovereign might consider the same silence to be a denial of the micropatrial declaration. Even at times when there are legal issues with the hosts, these entities eventually are left to their own devices. Usually, the most aggressive interaction is done through the local councils and court systems of the host sovereign. And the majority of these cases are centered on issues of tax evasion or non-compliance of some particular host law or order, as for example when the Steward of the Sovereign State of Forvik received numerous letters of threat from the Shetland local council for unpaid taxes and MOT registration, although typically it is the Australian cases that are more likely to deal with these types of legal issues. Except for in the more extreme cases like Rose Island, which was an offshore platform that was literally blown up by the Italian government, generally, as long as the micropatrias meet the demands of the host sovereign’s legal system, or sometimes find loopholes around it, they are not acknowledged and left to their own will. Possibly, since the major sovereign hosts (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia) tend to be more ‘stable’ and democratically centered, the micropatrias are not seen as threats to the host governments.

Micropatrias are liminal entities in terms of sovereignty and recognition. Dodds illustrates how labels "generate particular understandings of places, communities, and accompanying identities" (2007a, 4). He stresses the importance of geopolitics as a “pathway for critical analysis” (2007a, 3). This research then
locates the importance of micropatrias within the ‘global’ context as illustrative of what lack of legitimation means about larger geopolitical processes; and how these anomalies, these global parallel sovereigns, make transparent the geopolitical norms that regulate legitimacy. McConnell’s (2009a; 2009b) investigation into these same issues in regards to the TGiE finds that this lack is truly an important indicator of larger geopolitical processes. Micropatrias, while creating an inclusive identity, are positioned within a greater geopolitical discourse of ordering, no matter where the locale on Earth may be (even if it is in outer space such as the Nation of Celestial Space; see Pop 2006). They are involved in greater negotiations and politics - the present and past geopolitics of the world - beyond the boundaries surrounding their territories (Dodds 2007a).

As liminal entities, micropatrias are at a unique vantage point outside of ‘the system’. Arnold van Gennep (1960) discusses liminality as a transitional stage, a threshold. He uses the transformative example of student ‘novitiates’ to illustrate a liminal status. The term novitiate is quite useful here in discussing liminality and the transition from a preliminal to a postliminal phase. The preliminal phase is where individuals are part of the everyday society (as are student novitiates before they undertake training). During the liminal stage, individual transformation occurs. The postliminal is the phase where these individuals rejoin society (as when students have completed training and are ready to move into a new social role), although in an altered state due to the liminal period of transformation (van Gennep 1960). Alongside ever changing pre/liminal/post roles, group integration and reintegration form a generalized other from which an individual identity is
formed: “We get then an ‘other’ which is an organization of the attitudes of those involved in the same process” (Mead 1967, 154). The integration process takes place through shared language and symbols (van Gennep 1960; Mead 1967). Micropatrias, in this ever esoteric game of recognition from legitimate sovereigns and micropatrial ‘sovereign’ nations, intentionally inhabit a liminal form, distancing themselves from everyday society.

Liminality is the “signifying ‘threshold’” (Turner [1969] 1977, 94). This socio-political stage of separation creates a role reversal in ordering (Turner [1969] 1977). Individuals take on attitudes and roles for a short period that are opposite to their everyday realities (Turner [1969] 1977). Micropatrical leaders, transforming from an anonymous individual to a king, prince, or president, exemplify this activity of role reversal. In terms of Marin’s ideas on liminality, he plays with limits, “The limit would be a way between two frontiers, a way that would use their extremities to make its way. The limit is at the same time a way and a gap” (1993, 409; emphasis original). Using Marin’s ideas of the limit as a way, a gap, a space to make a way, the link between micropatricalism and liminality is drawn, but the context of the liminality still needs to be discussed. This context is one where the micropatricia is playing off sovereign hegemony through parody while being enclaved within the United Kingdom and reifying sovereign convention. Any and every one of my case studies fits into this statement and quite often as royalty (like King Richard Booth of the Independent Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye, King Danny of the Kingdom of Lovely, and ‘England’s Other Monarch’ HM King Nicholas I of the Copeman Empire).
A point to make here is that micropatrias are limited as an enclave within the more democratic host sovereigns. This is most likely the more tolerant form of government compared to a communist, militant, or dictatorial government that would see these entities as greater threats. As geopolitical anomalies, micropatrias create parallel global sovereignties and parodic nations. Throughout the literature on identity (Hetherington 1998); otherness (Mead 1967; Said [1978] 2003); exclusion (Sibley 1995); liminality (van Gennep 1960; Turner [1969] 1977); marginality (Shields 1991); heterotopics (Foucault 1986; Foucault [1970] 1991; Hetherington 1997); utopics (More [1516] 1869; Marin 1993; Harvey 2000; Levitas and Sargisson 2003); resistance (Sharp et al. 2000); transgression (Stallybrass and White 1986; Creswell 1996; Sargisson 2000), and deviance (Cohen [1972] 2002), this notion of an alternate existence seems to be a continuing thread. An alternate existence is often seen as a challenge or threat to the status quo. With this history of the status quo viewed as a time of peace and order (Morganthau 1993), any existence which threatens to disrupt this order, whether real or imagined, is constructed as a danger.

**Creating a ‘dangerous’ nation?**

Micropatrias are nascent nations that begin as geographical fantasy and manifest into fantastic geography. They are examples of ways that practitioners “reimagine and contest” power and of a “blanket refusal to stick to the scripts handed down” (Ingram and Dodds 2009, 11). Micropatrias develop a ‘parallel global sovereignty’ and therefore challenge the orthodox construction of
sovereignty. The dangers micropatrias may pose are measured by the host’s perceptions. Practitioners approach their micropatrial stages from a parodic platform and, therefore, humorous representations of the nation simultaneously are labeled as funny and serious while typically ‘not threatening’ (this statement of course ignores extreme right-wing micropatrias). Micropatrias do not intend to topple their hosts, but push the boundaries of change and commentary.

As subversive national enclaves working from a platform of discursive and performative rhetoric, micropatrias challenge legitimated sovereign hosts. The parody permits micropatrias a distancing in order to be critical of legitimated sovereign actions. In turn, this distancing grants a liminal position that enables one to be an outsider, a ‘spectator’ (Bergson 1956, 63). The ‘non-threatening’ approach stems from the user’s feedback ability in the face of direct reactionary threat to respond “I wasn’t serious, it was only a joke” (Telfer 1995, 362). Yet, even when positioned as non-serious and, therefore, not prompting offense, such parodic expressions are serious and need to be registered as forms of seriousness rather than opposite to it. Such forms of humor can be considered to make visible embedded and naturalized social constructions through performances, reactions, and results. In talking about the social reproduction of seriousness, Allon White confirms that “Words and things in themselves are neither serious nor comic, but the ability, the power, to legislate what shall be deemed serious is a key to hegemonic control” (1993, 130). Consequently, parody, by way of being constructed as the non-serious, superficially loses its threatening platform as a vital expression of the serious. This opens opportunity for expressions to challenge
hegemony (or reinforce it in some instances) while ‘safely’ couched as only a joke. In fact, part of the power of humor is the non-serious cloak hegemonically cast upon it. Nevertheless, hegemonic control over the reproduction of seriousness, as that which is outside the humorous, can become more transparent through examination. As White declares, “Seriousness as the exclusion of laughter has much more to do with rituals of power and control than with thoughts intrinsically or essentially important” (1993, 134). Liminality engages with a distancing from society; and humor with an indirect approach to disrupting (or at times maintaining) hegemonic discourses. Both can create opportunities for an ‘outside’ and subversive platform of critique.

Micropatrias, represented as nations via their parodies, adopt a (pseudo)superior position. As a mimic, they are a ‘resemblance’ of the constructed colonial nation-state system (Bhabha 1984), a resemblance of the superior. Mimicry, as almost sameness, is in Homi Bhabha’s arguments “one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge” (1984, 126). Discursively produced superiority and inferiority, the mainstays and remaining vestiges of colonialism, define and reinforce social boundaries and physical borders. Hegemonic discourses work to naturalize holdover colonialism by, in turn, defining the serious from the not worthy. As a parody, inhabiting the space between mimicry and mockery, micropatrias become “instances of colonial imitation” (Bhabha 1984, 127). Through their mimicry, micropatrias idealize the very systems of superiority they parody.
Even as mimicry, micropatrias, while displaying a form of dominant rhetoric through parodying sovereignty and nationalism, do so only from outside of geopolitical national constructions, from marginal spaces. They use humor as a mechanism that mocks those on the inside to disrupt the dominance of hegemony. A couple examples of this can be seen in the creation of nobilities, such as King Danny I of the Kingdom of Lovely and King Richard de Coeur du Livre of the Independent Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye, and the minting of currencies, such as the Sealand Dollar from the Principality of Sealand, the Bobalan from the Democratic Republic of Bobalania, and the Dustaroon from the Kingdom of TwoChairs. Therefore, while superficially representing themselves as unique and superior in terms of hierarchical statuses, such as kings and presidents, they laugh at established nations, as well as themselves. The almost sameness of micropatrial mimicry, as resemblance, highlights the constructed and normalized colonial ‘knowledges and powers’ (Bhabha 1984, 126). As resemblance, micropatrial mimicry underscores the current nation-state system as the ideal, only working to disrupt the details of hegemony, but not sovereign hegemony itself. The everyday lived tension is one between identity and difference, the status quo and subversion of it; and mimicry, as a mode of representation to handle this tension, is “an ironic compromise” (Bhabha 1984, 126; emphasis original). The compromise works as a relief from the tensions imposed upon social boundaries and physical borders. Through parody, micropatrias dispel some of these tensions. Humor and mimicry allow for release while simultaneously supporting the current system of colonial nation-states as the ideal.
Micropatrial humor can work to exploit the arbitrary. For example, by taking the Great British Pound and materially manipulating the icon, through the replacement of images, into a new currency, the United Kingdom is arguably exposed as ‘ridiculous’. Illustrations of currency are given in chapter 6 with, for example, King Danny I in place of the Queen. Such circumventing humor through parody is an ironic compromise, a form of counter-hegemony that idealizes the vestiges of colonialism while simultaneously working to disrupt imposed hegemonic norms.

The micropatria, if viewed as hobby, is a distraction and, therefore, relief from everyday tensions caused by imposed socio-political hegemonies. The fantasizing through the mimic however highlights norms and opens room for the lifting of inhibitions, no matter how temporary. The mimicry of micropatrial parody is a “sign of the inappropriate” (Bhabha 1984, 126). In its parodic ambivalence, micropatrial mimicry produces “slippage” (Bhabha 1984, 126). The slippage is the incongruity between hegemonic norms and subversive perceptions which in turn “poses an immanent threat to both ‘normalized’ knowledges and disciplinary powers” (Bhabha 1984, 126). While attempting to ‘appropriate’ sovereign hegemony through mimetic resemblance, micropatrial representation is ‘inappropriate’ through mocked menace. The parody is at the same time ‘mimicry and mockery-resemblance and menace’ (Bhabha 1984, 127). Micropatrias, displaying themselves as sovereign nations, momentarily deceive by subsuming their heterogeneous representations under the universal concept of sovereignty. Their heterogeneous representations (as a menace to the naturalization of
hegemonic norms) express a challenge to dominant social constructions of sovereignty and offer a platform for critique of these same constructions. This can be seen as a ‘transgression of expectations’ (Cresswell 2001, 150).

Micropatrias, through their mimicry, become ‘partial presences’ (Bhabha 1984) making transparent the arbitrariness of current sovereign hegemony and hegemonic norms. As partial presence, micropatrial representation “marginalizes the monumentality of history” (Bhabha 1984, 128). The ambivalence of the parody, in between mimicry and mockery, produces an excess which “is at once resemblance and menace” (127). While an ironic compromise between mimicry and mockery, which works to reinforce the validity of the in-place colonial system now taken-for-granted, micropatrias challenge authority through their inappropriateness. They are ‘partial presences’ that disrupt authority through a displacing gaze, becoming a menace which ‘ruptures’ hegemonic discourses and highlights authority’s arbitrariness (Bhabha 1984, 127). Micropatrias laugh at established order by way of subversively adopting ‘superior’ personas, their partial presences. They poke fun at hegemonic constructions of sovereignty and deflate to some degree the notion of superiority through a displacing gaze, the ‘gaze of otherness’ (Bhabha 1984, 129). The gaze of otherness reverses positionality thereby making the ‘observer’ (sovereign hegemony) into the ‘observed’ (arbitrary authority) which works to ‘alienate’ identity from naturalization (Bhabha 1984). Micropatrial expressions garner the power of the inferior, and through liminal distancing, manifest counter-hegemonic spatial expressions that play with and
disrupt embedded notions of sovereignty and the constituted rights of the sovereign.

Laughter and humor are exhibitions of amusements and playfulness, ‘play signals’ (Morreall 2009, 36; see also Meredith 1956; Bakhtin 1982). As partial presences, through play, micropatrias problematize the ‘notion of origins’ (Bhabha 1984, 130). The partial presence inhabits an interstitial space, one which is “both against the rules and within them” (Bhabha 1984, 130). Practitioners play at being ‘objects of power’ which in turn questions authority, but paradoxically desire to be ‘authentic’ within parallel networks—the “irony of partial representation” (Bhabha 1984, 131, 129). Play offers up opportunity to make statements from the margins due to the very fact that play “is regarded as peripheral to the real business of life” (Thrift 1991, 145). The play is the resemblance and the menace for the micropatria. Play ‘transfigures reality’ and allows one to say the ‘unsayable’ rather than ‘doing the undoable’ (Jacobson 1997, 33). Playfulness can be a judgment that can work to expose or critique (Freud [1922] 1966, 10). The play allows for a ‘reevaluation of normative knowledges’ (Bhabha 1984, 131). Jokes, as a form of serious play, can highlight social norms through aims at disorganization and attacks at hierarchy (Douglas 1968, 370).

Comedy, the “game that imitates life”, and life, the game of moral elements, make room for a different type of seriousness (Bergson 1956, 105). Culture acts as a ‘damping down’ of play, yet culture would seem to be the playground of play (Connor 1998). Shields examines secret clubs that play with authority and appropriateness. Members of these clubs became targets of authority “not for
practicing sedition, but for playing at it” (Shields 1994, 300), for representing the subversion. Here, we can see that humor and play can lead to rebellious, transgressive, and subversive acts. Wit pops up as a tool of critique of church and state in freedom and humorous play (Shields 1994). As an example, “Social clubs in particular constituted havens of aesthetic play and free conversation in which the most troublesome sorts of expressions to church and state could be voices as burlesque or travesty....public opinion achieved its fullest scope of liberty by voicing criticism as wit” (Shields 1994, 293-294). Micropatrias embrace humor through play positioned as a challenge to authority. They play at sedition; they are ‘anomalous representations’ (Bhabha 1984, 130).

**Micropatrial liminality**

Today, the territorial locations of enclaved micropatrias within ‘legitimated’ sovereigns nullify declared micropatrial land claims. Yet, this territorial positioning within does not lessen the importance of these enclaves, rather, it highlights tensions and demonstrates, as Peter Berger notes, “the importance of studying enclaves in order to understand fully a range of geopolitical conflicts in the contemporary world” (1997, 312-313). While Berger was talking about the ‘serious’ enclaves, micropatrias, as enclaves, also highlight geopolitical constructions in the global world. Strauss comments, “These model enterprises have all the trappings of the real thing, in miniature. Similarly, it’s possible to run a model ‘country’. You need only to declare your home an independent nation, and proceed from there”
Strauss’ statement emphasizes the status of sovereignty as unnecessary to the micropatrial endeavor.

In fact, non-legitimated sovereignty is the liminal niche that micropatrias reside in. These liminal niches create van Gennep’s neutral zone or area of transition (1960), Victor Turner’s liminality ([1969] 1977), and Marin’s limit or gap (1993), where those living in or passing through are not held to the norms and laws. Micropatrias are in socio-political transition and are ‘outside society’ (van Gennep 1960, 114). Yet, for micropatrias this niche cannot have an end, the transition needs to remain in transition, through never receiving the status of legitimate sovereignty. If micropatrial sovereignty were to be recognized by legitimate sovereigns, then the status as a micropatria would dissolve and be replaced by something else, like a microstate, similar to Monaco, Luxembourg, Lichtenstein, Malta, Andorra, or San Marino. This non-legitimated sovereignty is the critical positioning of the micropatrial niche.

This space of permanent transition is outside the ‘sacred’ (ruling order and government) and the ‘profane’ (the everyday, the mundane) (van Gennep 1960, 186). Micropatrias ‘have no status’ in society (van Gennep 1960, 95), yet Turner notes that when transferred to a liminal position the “inferior [the profane] contains as its key social element a symbolic or make-believe elevation of the ritual subjects to positions of eminent authority [the sacred]” ([1969] 1977, 168). This then places micropatrias in niches as liminal entities that work outside society to subvert, invert, and challenge the status quo. Turner ([1969] 1977, 95) ponders what liminality means in terms of social placement:
The attributes of liminality or of liminal personae (‘threshold people’) are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial.

Not only is the liminal outside society, but it accomplishes two outcomes. First, a liminal positioning offers a platform for criticism. Second, the liminal positioning ironically works to reify that which the micropatria criticizes (the sovereign).

Marin’s gap is useful here. The gap is “an interval where our attempt of seeing the dominating term [the sacred] and the dominated one [the profane]” creates a ‘neutral position’ [the liminal] (1993, 404). Liminality has bounded outcomes that are entangled and work in a symbiotic relationship to form the place and space of the limit. The gap creates the neutral place of residence while the way creates the socio-political space of critique (Marin 1993, 409). The liminal position of serious humor, especially seen in the thesis with micropatrias, is a ‘double play’ as Mary Douglas explains (1968, 373):

...the joke consists in challenging a dominant structure and belittling it; the joker who provokes the laughter is chosen to challenge the relevance of the dominant structure and to perform with immunity the act which wipes out the venial offence. The joker's own immunity can be derived philosophically from his apparent access to other reality than that mediated by the relevant structure. ... His jokes expose the inadequacy of realist structurings of experience and so release the pent-up power of the imagination. ....he is one of those people who pass beyond the bounds of reason and society and give glimpses of a truth which escapes through the mesh of structured concept.

Making fun of the dominant structure is a recurring theme with micropatrial practitioners, as “a big wind up”. The micropatria is meant as an anarchic joke to challenge hegemonic norms. Via a storyteller mode, micropatrial leaders (the
jokers) create myths of the nation (the joke) to highlight the constructed nature of embedded nationalism, constituted sovereignty, and geopolitical boundaries (the objects of the joke). The storytelling becomes the press release and the appeal is the humor, as one practitioner from a micropatria that was squatting territory points out: “The press actually loved it... They liked the joke... It very much served its purpose of opening up a debate about whether or not people should be turfed out of broken down housing and made homeless in order to do nothing with the land which is what was going to happen” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). Another practitioner echoes the media sentiment, “one of the reasons why this worked is that everything we described seemed as if it ought to be real” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). This is often done through media, and in particular currently through the Internet. With the Internet functioning as a storyteller mechanism, narratives are made available to “build an understanding of the world and one’s place in that world” (Alderman 2005, 264). The role of the micropatrial storyteller is to spin together serious humor to build a distanced platform that plays with sovereignty. For instance, an example from the Principality of Paulovia illustrates (PP 2011, np):

On 15 October 2010 HRH Prince Paul promulgated an amended Constitution allowing transfer of executive power to a National Assembly without the need for the 'Act of Transfer' to be triggered. The National Assembly consists of the royal appointed Council of Ministers and the elected representatives of the Paulovia Islands in a combined single house. The Cabinet of the National Government is selected by the monarch from a list of National Assembly members recommended by the National Assembly.

Micropatrias also call for engagement from those who happen across their digital locations by calling for voluntary citizenship. For example, the Kingdom of Lovely
promotes new citizenship: “Sign up and become a citizen, oh go on it'll be fun” (KL 2011, np). This citizenship, if accepted by the user, illustrates an agreement to the story, a digital interactivity (Alderman 2005, 265). The interactivity between the storyteller and the listener, here a humorous micropatrial representation, produces discursive identities and worldviews (Alderman 2005). Here we can label the interactivity of storytelling and listening of shared humor “transcendental chuckling” (Jacobson 1997, 29). In talking about such humor, one practitioner notes that “it’s one of the few weapons you’ve got available if you’re faced by implacable power and law, there’s not much else you can do apart from laugh at it” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). Micropatrias transcend the profane and the sacred by way of their liminal niche that distances them from the everyday, and, hence, the conflicts and confines of placement.

Thinking of transcendental chuckling can lead to an investigation of other forms of humor, such as political cartoons or comedians. Humor can challenge geopolitics by offering alternative ways of looking by ‘confronting and disrupting dominant practices’ (Dodds 1996, 589). These confrontations and disruptions through ‘absurd’ representations can highlight ‘inadequacies’ and play a part in “a critical interpretive stance” (Dodds 1996, 589). Dodds calls for types of ‘alternative geopolitical sources [including political cartoons]...to be taken seriously” (1996, 589). Seriousness is displayed through a ‘subsumption’ of reality by fantasy of national symbols and icons (Dodds 1996, 585). This subsumption works to ‘raise issues’ and lend a critical geopolitical perspective (Dodds 1996, 585). Hence, as Dodds stresses, the “notion of a critical geopolitical eye is something that explicitly
challenges the hegemonic ways of representing international politics and geopolitics” (1996, 575). These critical representations aid in making transparent the naturalized and taken-for-granted socio-political constructions, the ‘national fantasies and myths’ (Dodds 1996, 575). Dodds notes these representations as a way that “problematizes the dominant ways of seeing places” (1996, 588; see also Dodds 2007b; Epstein and Iveson 2009; Ridanpää 2009; Smith 2009; Hammett 2010; Purcell et al. 2010), and it is this very act of problematizing that makes an examination of micropatrias valuable. As one practitioner explains “Most of what government and authority got up to was actually ridiculous so what we had to do was expose it as ridiculous” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner).

Micropatrial practices of the nation are counter-hegemonic by way of their unofficialness and include, but are not limited to: the manufacturing of material objects to reify the national narrative, such as currency, postage, passports; the bringing into being of traditional markers to reinforce the sovereignty of a nation, such as flags, emblems, anthems; and ruler imagery to represent the right to rule. These symbols, national fantasies and myths, ‘shared cultural codes,’ represent meanings (Skelton 2000). Tracey Skelton points out how these shared symbols work to construct meaning, “there are elements which we use to express or communicate something—a thought, concept, idea or feeling—which others will understand in a similar way to that which we mean. Thus meaning is conveyed through representation” (2000, 185). Therefore, national symbols are an unspoken language of shared meanings and are often meant to evoke sentiment, reinforce values, and be a reminder of identity and loyalty (Billig 1995). Micropatrial
representations that challenge national fantasies and myths, hence problematizing their ‘naturalness’, are considered in depth in Chapter 6.

Micropatrias seriously play with humor. While play and humor have been traditionally seen as “not mattering or not serious” (Telfer 1995, 362), humor “loosens our attachment to rigid attitudes and ideas” (Telfer 1995, 368). Even Bakhtin commented on the dichotomous nature of humor and seriousness, “Laughter ... cannot be transformed into seriousness without destroying and distorting the very contents of the truth which it unveils” (Bakhtin 1984, 94). Yet, I would argue that this truth, or alternative way of looking, revealed is a form of seriousness, rather than being placed as antonymic to the serious. Even John Morreall sees humor as ‘rest from the serious’ (2009, 23), a cognitive shift from a ‘serious mode’ to a ‘play mode’ (Morreall 2009, 50). If humor, as Morreall argues, “is a function of a disordered society” (2009, 7), then serious humor allows one to play with power within this disorder. Humor can be used to “expose government as ridiculous.....to puncture the pomposity” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). As one practitioner states, “If you can ridicule people, it’s such a powerful tool, so to introduce humor into a situation is actually far more powerful than outright conflict”. Another practitioner notes how “the whole thing was a joke...did not like the world as it was but instead of getting angry” humor was used as “one of the few weapons” to express dissatisfaction (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). Especially when the serious involves protest and activism, as one micropatrial practitioner says that, “there’s always a bit of humor in protest” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). In terms of activism,
the same practitioner notes that, “in activism...using language to put across humorously something very important” is important (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). This interviewee highlights the roles of humor in “dispelling fear, tension” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner).

Sometimes humor works to denaturalize embedded constructions, such as questioning the rights of sovereigns to claim certain territories and demanding an explanation of these rights. One practitioner finds that in asking such a “very simple question....that no one is able to tell me” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). And in return, numerous practitioners find humor in the inability/lack of desire of sovereign government personnel to directly address ‘infractions’ caused by practitioners, beginning with the declaration of sovereignty to the refusal of paying taxes to creating national documents to refusing to recognize the territorial claims of the legitimate sovereign.

Sometimes humor can work to deflate power, as when one practitioner calls Rupert Murdoch “a walking dildo” and curses scholars from Oxford and Harvard as “idiots” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). This deflation can extend to bureaucrats, as one practitioner likens them to a stool “with one leg to stand on and the other three rotted” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). If laughter and humor are expressions of power, then they are also expressions of the serious.

Cresswell considers the relationship between the serious and humor. Humor undermines the “hegemony of seriousness, jokes and laughter often serve the purpose of revealing the invisible and making the normal seem strange”
(Cresswell 2001, 169). Here Cresswell points out that humor is not opposite to the serious, but works to question hegemonic constructions of the serious (2001, 169):

Laughter, then, is a result of the transgression of normality. By breaking from the continuity and rhythm of life, it can prize open the powerful grip of civilized, ‘proper’ behaviour. Laughter’s power lies in its ability to mark the transformation from the unspoken, unquestioned and invisible to that which is asserted, in a visible way, to be correct, right, true and enforceable. This is a dangerous power, for it can provoke the full force of official malevolence.

Micropatrial practices use humor to subvert hegemony, to make the normal visible and therefore questionable. For instance, one micropatrial practitioner points out that democracy is a way of “flattering the stupid” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). Hence, laughter and humor are framed as serious expressions and the importance of their ‘subversive potential’ is pointed out (Cresswell 2001, 165). Micropatrias transgress normality by liminally raising the profane to the sacred through serious humor. For the micropatrias, humor becomes “an element of victory ... the defeat of power, of earthly kings, of the earthly upper classes, of all that opposes and restricts” (Bakhtin 1984, 92).

Practitioners promote involvement and awareness, of whatever their cause or purpose might be. Getting others involved gives practitioners the fuel they need to continue to open for questioning that which is the unquestioned, hegemonic norms. Increased involvement could “cause some headaches for the authorities” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioners). Micropatrial attempts at ‘winding up’ officials and organizations, to see how they will react, poses challenges to hegemonic norms. As one practitioner states, “Whichever way things go, we win” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). Threats to take the host sovereign to a micropatrial court in order to demand answers seem ludicrous, but
such actions work to highlight the arbitrariness of power: “As long as these authorities are not challenged, as long as the questions are not being asked, consent is being given for it to continue, so until the questions are asked nothing will happen” (personal interview with micropatrial practitioner). By declaring sovereignty, manufacturing sovereign materials such as currency and postage, writing laws and constitutions, appointing hierarchical government positions to national citizens, joining international micropatrial organizations and practicing digital diplomacy, micropatrias liminally and humorously defeat earthly kings and open up space to question, challenge, and problematize hegemonic socio-political constructions of geopolitical knowledge and boundaries, sovereignty, citizenship, the nation, national identity, and nationalism.

Remarks

Micropatrial serious humor discursively plays with and challenges hegemonic socio-political constructions. Play and challenge aim to highlight the ‘unnatural’ and taken-for-granted embedded everyday realities of the nation, national identity, nationalism, sovereignty, citizenship, and geopolitics. While dominant discourses become naturalized and discourse analysis seeks to unpack the meanings embedded within hegemonic language (see Hannam and Knox 2005; Moreau and Alderman 2011), micropatrias move beyond to appropriate dominant discourses through liminal ascension of the profane to the sacred. Serious humor can work “as an indicator of deeply held norms and expectations” (Cresswell 2000,
Micropatrial serious humor aids in making these embedded norms and expectations more transparent and as a result more questionable.
In creating symbols for the Nation of Heliotrope, I looked at symbols from different legitimate sovereigns nations. What type of symbols did they have and what did they look like, sound like, represent? This is where I really began to see how micropatrial practitioners in the thesis were for borrowing from historical accounts and for the most part from the United Kingdom. Below I tell a story about my experience meeting a practitioner who fashions himself into a symbol of subversiveness through his actions and who borrows from the historical accounts of the Shetland Islands to create his national symbols.

Flying on the tiniest of planes from the Scottish mainland to Shetland was a harrowing experience. Rather than seeing them as a novelty, I finally realized why paper bags are available to airline customers. While I eyed mine with renewed interest, the woman across from what can only be termed as the airlines idea of an aisle held hers in a white knuckled grip. The plane was tossed around as if being bounced like a ball by some unforeseen child. Finally, land in sight and we are on the ground. Basically I headed to what can be termed as remote UK territory; at least this is how it seemed to me. I jump on a bus heading into Lerwick on my way to meet the self-proclaimed Steward of the Sovereign State of Forvik. The landscape is breathtaking and the bus driver loquacious, recanting the history of Shetland as if I am on an official tour bus. I check into the Fort Charlotte Guest House and make my way to the waterfront where the ferry docks. Mr. Hill steps into the coffee shop where I await him. He wants to take me to the Shetland
Museum, a reinforcement of Shetland’s independent identity, and we ride over in his car. He hopes to be pulled over by the police during the ride so that he can challenge their authority over him and in Shetland. I secretly hope the police pull us over for Mr. Hill’s defiance of the local driving laws so that I may witness such a confrontation first hand. Needless to say, the ride was uneventful. We enter the history center and sit in the auditorium where my official interview with him takes place. Mr. Hill recounts everything I have read from his website...his political line and motivations. His website is overtly dripping with symbols of the nation he is forging, or re-forging since his aim is to free Shetland from all ‘external’ rule, being any rule beyond the island’s borders. Even though dressed casually, nothing outwardly reflecting his practitioner lifestyle, his actions speak of the same symbolic subversiveness. While the practitioners I have met for the most part look ‘normal’ in person, meaning lacking the visual national paraphernalia they present in official images, they still exude their national symbols through their speech and in their actions. By obeying the traffic laws he has made, which apparently do not require the wearing of seatbelts and considering the UK traffic laws as not valid in the Shetland Islands, Stuart Hill is subversive in his actions. His subversive sovereignty is enacted through such actions where he means to garner the attention of UK authority so he may challenge it.

This chapter focuses on multiple forms of subversive symbols of nationalism through imagery, speech, and text. Take for instance the words *Eiaik takieseweil ilianiak mano teese*, an Ibrosian motto meaning “To be rather than to seem” (IP 2010a, np). This motto is indicative of the tensions between the declarative and
constitutive theories of statehood discussed earlier in the thesis. This tension places micropatrias in a liminal niche as enclaves of host sovereigns. To further investigate the micropatrial constructed enclavic platform, the concepts of nation, symbols, subversion, and the accompanying heterotopic spaces and heterodox practices from the mixture of these three concepts, are considered. What can be taken from these potentially subversive spaces and practices are the ways in which micropatrial practitioners draw identity from the established nations they live within. Before engaging with these concepts, the chapter first considers some examples of micropatrial practices (leaders, stamps, currency, emblems, anthems and flags) that are drawn from my research.

3 Kings: The Presence of a Leader

“It was the importance of looking the part” announced King Danny in regards to his regal attire (Wallace 2005, episode 3). Upon King Danny’s arrival at the Dege and Skinner tailor shop on Savil Row (London) in casual clothes (a parka and denim trousers), the man who was awaiting Danny from an earlier call said, “I was expecting someone a little more regal looking.” King Danny replied, “A little more regal, than this, well that’s kind of my problem you see ‘cause I am a king as I explained. I want to inspire people and when I walk in I want them to see my nobility and my right to rule” (Wallace 2005, episode 3).

King Danny I of the Kingdom of Lovely, King Nicholas I of the Copeman Empire, and King Richard de Coeur du Livre of the Independent Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye are three kings whose appearance and words play with practices of the nation.
By way of their words and images, micropatrial leaders embody national identity. These subversive performances are heterotopic spatial representations and heterodox practices of the nation that combine parodic humor with serious political concerns. Style, through dress, music, movements, and objects, becomes subversive when “posing a symbolic threat to law and order” (Hebdige 1979, 31). Here, the subversive symbolic ‘threat’ represented through style, while dismissed by the United Kingdom, is visually produced through images of the micropatrial leaders. These images aid in reinforcing their national stance, adding an air of legitimacy, while making room for new identities that are antithetical to and questioning of the status quo of the United Kingdom. By way of images and words, micropatrial leaders subversively work to create their own rules and push through their own agendas. Yet, while these leaders do pose a symbolic ‘threat’ to hegemonic law and order, they reify the very existence and, in turn, legitimacy of the United Kingdom as the sacred power holder, the top level of territorial control. Meaning, even with their attempts to play with and at times disrupt the status quo, they reify hegemony through acknowledging the host as that which is in power. This power is not in reality toppled, but layered upon. Hence, the ‘threat’ they represent to the host is superficial.

Fashion and Serious Fun

Fashion sets the tone for approach; and uniforms and official regalia are the epitomic expression of a ruler in imagery. Fashion “supports the idea that identity can be possessed, produced, purchased, and adjusted” (Aris 2007, 17). This
micropatrial playfulness through fashion illustrates ways to practice the nation. For instance, King Danny surrounds himself with the ‘paraphernalia of ideology’, including military cap, UN flag, printed manifestos, crown, bullhorn and backpack with a Kingdom of Lovely flag draped over his ‘throne’ (fig. 6.1). His open arms and accompanying paraphernalia emphasize the King’s approach to citizens and participation within his nation as: existing (with the Kingdom of Lovely national flag); mobile (with the backpack); voiced (with the bullhorn and flyers); under strong leadership (doubly represented with the military cap and crown); and as a supporter and a participant of the international movement towards peace (with the United Nations flag sticking out of the backpack, evincing of his mobile diplomacy). His welcoming stance and friendly smile is reflective of his agenda setting addresses to his nation (KOL 2010a, np; stress original):

![Figure 6.1: King Danny I of the Kingdom of Lovely. Source: http://www.citizensrequired.com/unit/bk_home/bk_home.shtml.](http://www.citizensrequired.com/unit/bk_home/bk_home.shtml)
Fellow citizens,
As I have learnt being a good leader is not just about wearing a plastic crown and looking good in a parka (although that does help). No! Being a good leader is about setting the agenda for the country. In the modern media age this agenda should be nice and catchy and must be communicated in as few words as possible - that way it looks good on banners, placards and newspaper front pages.

So what is our new country’s agenda to be?

Well as President Kennedy once said...“Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country.” Wise words indeed. Well what you can do for your country is to follow the wise words of another true great: The explorer, botanist and interplanetary traveller, E.T...

“BE GOOD!”

Being good can become a way of life, and if together we can all live the simple philosophy of the glowing fingered one, I truly believe that we’ll create the happiest place on earth. A country where everyone is free to follow their dreams, and we can all live together in peace and harmony. You never know, we might even have some fun on the way.

King Danny I

This agenda setting speech is straightforward in approach. Be Good. Simple words and a simplified message that can be likened to those voiced by United Nations officials and in the United Nations Charter in more complex forms. King Danny’s parodic heterodox display challenges the right to the nation and his words create a heterotopic spatial claim through the notion of a ‘country’ that did attract over 55,000 voluntary citizens to the Kingdom of Lovely with King Danny’s agenda of niceness.

King Nicholas of the Copeman Empire also dons the military uniform, but poses in a stance of victory over his empire rather than a welcoming embrace for new citizens (fig. 6.2). In a landscape encompassing portrait that takes in land, sea,
sky, and palace, King Nicholas is poised displaying military prowess, divinity, and victory. The King has documented his adventures in his book which shows his journey from being ‘on the dole’ (receiving government funds for financial support) to going thousands of pounds in debt attempting to maintain a royal appearance (Copeman 2005). This account accentuates the cost to taxpayers who supply the financial pedestal that all leaders stand on, including the Royal Family, to maintain their personas. King Nicholas dons his national gear when making public statements about himself, the existence of his Kingdom, and dares from friends. 

The following passages highlight the King’s socio-political perspectives (CE 2010, np):

![Figure 6.2: King Nicholas I of the Copeman Empire. Source: http://www.kingnicholas.com/kingnicholas/](image-url)

On his empire-
People want to know and people do ask what ...why? You know, it’s all wonderful you being the king in your little empire, but what’s in it for me? Uhh and I don’t know really, I think in a small way it’s all about, this on a very small scale I think is what everything else is like on a big scale, but just smaller and in a caravan.

On current affairs-
Who do I admire worldwide? I’m not sure because my current affairs isn’t great, but if you’d have asked me something like who’s your, I don’t know, if
you’d have said who was your favorite in the A-Team. I could have answered that. I could answer straight away, you know, The Face.

On coastal erosion-
We’re suffering from coastal erosion here. This is a big concern for the grounds here on the caravan park because the sea is eroding the cliffs. I mean, I used to have a next door neighbor, I don’t anymore.

The concerns raised in these excerpts illustrate serious play. Playful in approach, a questioning of ‘what is a nation’ is raised, the lack of education on political matters for the public loses out to forms of entertainment since a stakeholder urgency is missing, and awareness of environmental concerns and impact is illustrated by way of example. All these serious concerns are spoken with a hint of laughter from ‘England’s other monarch’.

On the other hand, King Richard, displayed with crown, robe, and orb, is the image of the traditional monarch (fig. 6.3). The benevolent King is standing over a chair of books further emphasizing his title as King Richard de Coeur du Livre (Richard the Book-hearted); a play on Richard de Coeur de Lion who ruled England from 1189-1199. This imagery reinforces notions of a learned king, a wise king. The King stands in front of his kingdom’s pastoral landscape similar to the image of King Nicholas, showing his claims over the land, yet with friendly countenance similar to the image of King Danny. Although, whereas social concerns of niceness or physical concerns of coastal erosion were seen in the agendas of the two previously discussed monarchs, King Richard’s concerns are on the political mismanagement of rural towns by government bureaucracies (IKH 2010a, np):
Citizens of Hay, your extraordinary talents, your brilliant and unusual qualities are enabling you to take the courageous step of separating yourself from central government bureaucracy. The council has a proven record of failure and the opportunity has now occurred to establish a unique form of government which will make Hay famous throughout the world. Ten-thousand small towns in the British Isles try to solve their problems with committees, councils, boards. And ten-thousand small towns declined. All are left holding an ineffective begging bowl to central government bureaucracy. Independence means that we must revive the market and produce our own products. ... I know myself that there is considerable income from the sale of dukedoms, earldoms and other titles in the state of Hay. The opposition to independence has not one sensible thing to say. A reporter comes down to Hay, interviews me in the pub and spends £20. Therefore independence works. That is the end of it. All I can say to the opposition is that we have been responsible for many thousands of pounds spent in the town. If they can come forward and achieve anything, we will support them. I now raise the flag of independent Hay.

King Richard is an intensely opinionated leader who is concerned about rural decline and out migration of the rural youth to urban centers. His speeches and writings are clearly politically motivated with strong leanings against bureaucracy in its current form. Yet, even with this important mission of economic restructuring
and the protesting of produce and farming laws that have a negative impact on small agriculture, King Richard loves rhetoric. When asked if he was serious about his kingship, he replied, “Of course not—but it’s more serious than real politics” (IKH 2010a, np). These examples are all white males, referring back to the aforementioned gendered component of the practice.

**Opportunities for National Narratives**

Images and speeches are one form of reproducing the national narrative, whether for the United Kingdom or its micropatrial enclaves. Other hegemonic (and counterhegemonic) approaches include more banal symbols such as postage stamps and currency notes and coins. While hegemonically constructed, these types of symbols and their associated meanings can be and are appropriated, transformed, and reified by those belonging to the nation. Conceptualizing nations and nationalisms as narratives illustrate how members of the nation can identify with and actively shape through performance such narratives (Dittmer and Dodds 2008). Micropatrial members become such agents of symbolic performances to construct and shape nascent nations and national narratives. These subversive symbolic performances and their associated materialities create heterotopic spaces and heterodox practices of the nation. As representations, as paraphernalia, these materialities are symbols of images, texts, and objects that add to the (parodic) ‘legitimacy’ of the nation; and are only practical as such symbolic markers.
Postage

The postage stamp is an indicator of national “identity-building, image-making, and propaganda” (Raento 2009, 125). From this understanding of postage as a banal form of national production and reproduction, it is easy to see why the national narrative is embedded in the development of stamp imagery. As an example of such, the Australian Antarctic stamp of 2001 is a form of textualization for consumption (Collis 2004). The stamp sheet celebrates 100 years of Australia’s claim to Antarctic territory. The individual stamps illustrate images of explorers and scientists claiming, trekking, and examining the Antarctic territory as if physical presence determined ownership. This image then was purchased mainly, not for the imagery and embedded discursive statements, but to lick and affix to an envelope for mailing across town, across the country, or even across the ocean. The economy of the stamp aids in unconscious national narrative reproduction. The images are not questioned, but accepted as part of Australia’s spatial history. Beyond the varied themes of local (and foreign) landscapes and national symbols that are reproduced on stamp issues for identity consumption, the recognition of national and international scientists, by way of their portraits appearing on postage stamps, helps to “transmit and define the official view of the national culture” (Jones 2004, 75; see also 2001). Such celebration of scientists communicates to a wide audience not only a connection to technological advancement, and, hence, power and progression, but also signals which achievements are considered ‘valuable’ when the scientists’ visages grace stamp issues. By being political and
cultural outlets for national narratives, the importance of postage stamps as socio-political artifacts is given.

The philatelic tradition is strong within micropatrias and is actually a source of revenue for those pursuing postal ambitions. These illegitimate, yet official national stamps are often called “Cinderellas” in the world of philately. The Cinderella Stamp Club of the United Kingdom lists Cinderellas as being “anything that looked like a stamp but was not a government-issued postage stamp” (CSC 2010, np); basically not issued through the efforts or approval of a legitimate sovereign. The term Cinderellas is meant to signify their fantasy-like illegitimate quality. Micropatrial Cinderella postage, including ‘bogus’ stamps (fake micropatrial stamps not issued by a micropatrial government), offer an opportunity for national reproduction and symbolic diffusion.

Micropatrial stamps tend to depict centered in the foreground, in an often striking pose, the national leader, lending a degree of legitimacy to their rule. Such Cinderellas are often portraits which can include an assemblage of national images with a landscape background. Another approach for postage imagery is the placement of the national flag or a national emblem on the stamp to reify national existence and evoke national sentiment. Other stamp issues work to raise awareness of environmental and social concerns, for example through avian imagery, or promote shared histories with legitimate sovereign nations by celebrating famous figures, such as Charles Darwin or Frederic Handel (fig. 6.4). Together, these types of stamp issues work: to reify the nation through the display of subversive symbols; to parodically play with such banal sovereign forms of
national identity and control; to question the exclusiveness of the host government in developing and regulating the postage stamp; to legitimate the leader’s personas and rights; to reinforce a historical and international connection; to promote shared scientific and cultural values; to raise awareness about environmental and social concerns; and to connect members to the nation via material artifacts.

Figure 6.4: Micropatrial postage stamps, examples from the Copeman Empire, the Kingdom of Lovely, the Principality of Sealand, and the Principality of Paulovia. Sources: http://www.kingnicholas.com/; http://www.citizensrequired.com/unit/sn_home/sn_home.shtml; http://www.sealandgov.org/Stamps.html; and http://www.store.paulovia.org/index.html.

Currency

Along similar lines, currency is universally used by states across the globe, is recognizable by citizens and in the international realm, and changes with new minting issues (Hymans 2004). Currency is more than an embedding of national values, it is a tool of increasing legitimacy (Hymans 2004). The development of a territorial currency is linked to the rise of nation-states (Gilbert 2007). Currency and social programs that handle currency, like welfare and social security, bound or ‘fix’ territory and citizens to the national (Gilbert 2007). Non-official government
actors printing currency creates the possibility for non-traditional currency systems to further heterodox national narratives, to test new systems of exchange, and to challenge current sovereign rights of control over these types of systems. Also, micropatrias mimetically play with contemporary note and coin designs to make more transparent the banal symbols that are working to unconsciously reproduce the host nation. These are symbols we see on a daily basis as we pay transportation fares, buy groceries or lunch, or have an evening out with friends. As currency is used to purchase goods, generally very little time, if any, is spent reflecting on or even understanding the images placed on coins and notes. Alternative currencies, however mimetic of sovereign state practices, retain an illegitimate place in the system of world currencies. Besides the heterotopic economic spaces being created and the relevance of scale in maintaining these economies, having a key actor, an individual who is the motivator and who sustains interest and active support behind it all, could make or break the success of an alternative currency system (North 2004; 2005). Micropatrias then can be examined as valuable examples of alternative symbolic currencies in alternate heterotopic spaces that are shaped by a key actor. Such currencies generally maintain a symbolic purpose and are seldom used for exchange within a micropatria, but are sometimes exchanged in terms of sale (foreign exchange). Hence, they are not typically used as a form of everyday consumer purchasing power. In fact, the currency itself becomes the consumed good.

A quick foray into micropatrial currencies hints at such heterodox practices. The King of Hay-on-Wye minted the Haylo depicting rural farming images and a
drawing of the king on edible rice paper. Unfortunately, the Haylo had a shelf life which has by now expired, showing a very different approach to the desire for longevity in currency and the associated narrative images struck on notes. Kelsae had the Bawbee, “used essentially as a symbolic token of independence” (Stenhouse 2007, 28). The Ibrosian Protectorate in true mimetic practice labeled their currency the Great Commonwealth Pound (GCP), but has valued it to be worth 0.37 GBP. The GCP is pegged to the Galaxy chocolate bar, “one bar of six-segment ‘Galaxy’ chocolate” (IP 2010b, np). Forvik plans on pegging its Gulde to gold. Lovely minted the Interdependent Occupational Unit (IOU) based on the commodity of time (similar to the Ithaca Hour). As payment for web postings, the IOU boosts citizen activity and creates a form of employment, although it might not get you very far. In all seriousness, King Danny was able to buy a pint at a London pub with one of his freshly minted notes. This playfulness with currency stretches and crosses the boundaries of monetary design, use, and world systems (fig. 6.5). Such currency design, and eventual use, can be seen with the Transition Town phenomena in places like Brixton, Lewes, and Totnes within the United Kingdom (Transition Towns 2011).
Alternative forms of currency are sometimes used by micropatrias that are not new bank notes pegged to precious metals, chocolate bars, pine cones (as is the case with the Dustaroons from the Kingdom of TwoChairs), or time. Thinking outside of contemporary monetary notes, the Mondcivitan Republic claims a postal coupon as their form of currency (fig. 6.6). “The price of one Mondo is tied to the price of one International Postal Reply Coupon rather than to currency market fluctuations. This provides for a very stable currency, it is possible for anyone to discover the prevailing exchange rate (which rarely changes) merely by walking into
a post office and enquiring” (MR 2010, np). The Mondo does not require any effort by the micropatria to produce, no need to embed with political figures or iconic symbols, and can simply be exchanged (purchased) at a local post office by asking for an International Postal Reply Coupon. The Mondo relies on an alternate system of value and exchange, a predetermined postal coupon, yet symbolically turns the orthodox into the heterodox by transitioning or extending the norms and ideals attached to the postal coupon. While seemingly absent, the Mondcivitan national narrative of international unification is very much still present in this predesigned, official material object. By renaming the coupon to the Mondo, there is a transformation of meaning being attached to the coupon by those who call it such. The Mondo works to further the ideological foundations of the Mondcivitan Republic to unite the world into one community. The postal reply coupon (the Mondo) “can be used to buy postage for anywhere in the world, not just to reply to the country they have been sent from” (RM 2010, np). By adopting the coupon as the legal form of currency, global networks can be established from, to use the Royal Mail’s generalization quoted above, ‘anywhere in the world’. The Mondo bridges the divide between currency and postage by being simultaneously both. No nascent micropatrial symbols adorn this coupon currency, yet the overall goal of the Mondcivitan Republic is subversively reflected in the established use of this object. This multi-use currency is not a unique concept, but through the ages many objects have had this multiple correlation, such as necklaces and knives (see British Museum catalogue on currency, BMRC 2014).
Currency and postage use assemblages of images and text to embed meaning into typically banal, everyday material objects. They tend to picture leaders, national symbols (like flags and emblems) and the natural world of the nation (such as birds and landscapes) as an unconscious method of national reproduction. Micropatrial notes, coins, and stamps mimetically employ these techniques to create their own national narratives. Micropatrial assemblages associate with previous identities through ‘associations or allusions’ and ‘counter established styles' and roles (on assemblages see Morgan 2007). The production of a new nation relies on meaning embedded in previous identities. Currency and postage collage together such complex and conglomerate associations “to represent the intersection of multiple discourses” (Brockelman 2001, 2). Currency and postage are the epitomic examples of national symbolic collages. Mostly, such currency development, printing, and exchange are ignored by the host to date. A possible exception is the case of Lundy (which was dropped from research early since it fell outside of the fifty year time frame adopted, but is still instructional in this case), where King Harman is rumored in 1931 to have gone before the House of Lords for violating the Public General Act, 33 & 34 Victoria, c. 10 of 1870 (Coinage
Act of 1870). While I have been unable to verify this rumor, Martin Coles Harman, the supposed King of Lundy Island, did go before the courts and was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment for fraud in 1934 (Parliament 1934).

**The Triad**

National symbols are important identifiers of the nation and, as the symbol of the leader through imagery, voice, and national artifacts such as stamps and currency, all tow the national narrative line. National symbols “are the common identity that binds a population together, in essence the centripetal forces of stability that counter the centrifugal forces of instability” (Webster and Webster 1994, 134). Beyond these visual, voiced, and material artifacts is a power triad of symbols that produce and reproduce the nation to insiders and outsiders: emblems, anthems, and flags. “Contemporary nation states are identified by a triad of official symbols: a flag, an emblem and an anthem” (Gilboa and Bodner 2009, 460). This triad of images and voice can work to unite or divide a nation (Kolstø 2006). They can be waved during times of conflict or unwaved throughout their presence in everyday rituals.

**Emblems**

Emblems often use an assemblage of images and text to show a national presence. To stress the importance of emblems, especially the coat-of-arms, for national identity, I refer to the United Nations Treaty Series 1961 article 10 (UN 1961, 285-286; emphasis added):
(1) (a) There may be placed, on the outer enclosure and outer wall of the building in which a consulate is installed, the *coat-of-arms* or national device of the sending state ... It shall also be permitted to place such *coat-of-arms* or national device and inscription on or by the entrance door to the consulate.

(b) The flag of the sending state and its consular flag may be flown at the consulate and also, on suitable occasions, at the consular officer's residence. In addition, a consular officer may, in connexion with the exercise of his duties, place the *coat-of-arms* or device and fly the flag of the sending state and its consular flag on the vehicles, vessels and aircraft which he uses.

(c) The authorities of the receiving state shall take appropriate measures to ensure that due respect and protection are accorded to the flag of the sending state, its *coat-of-arms* and consular flag....

Some micropatrias also develop national emblems, such as a coat-of-arms. Many UK enclaves depict animals, similar to the way the United Kingdom uses the lion in its coat-of-arms (fig. 6.7). Diverting attention away from a traditional British lion icon yet playing with various connections to an entangled British identity and past, other animals draw on notions of purity and pride (swan); strength and survival (the polar bear); and heritage (the lamb) (fig. 6.8).

![Figure 6.7: Arms of the Kingdom of New Brittania, the Ibroian Protectorate, and the Principality of Sealand, respectively. Sources: http://www.freewebs.com/newbrittania/; http://novabritannia.tripod.com/national_symbols.htm; and http://www.sealandgov.org/](http://www.freewebs.com/newbrittania/; http://novabritannia.tripod.com/national_symbols.htm; and http://www.sealandgov.org/)
The Kingdoms of Lovely and TwoChairs offer alternative approaches to constructing a coat-of-arms (fig. 6.9). A pixilated and colorful crest with the motto *Die Dulci Freure*, meaning *have a nice day*, symbolizes Lovely's outlook of hope for a better society. In a sense, society here meaning human society and is not spatially bounded, although originating within the boundaries of the United Kingdom and diffusing outward with embassies across the United Kingdom and abroad. It is odd that King Danny chooses to use esoteric Latin phrasing for such a warm and welcoming message, since most mottos tend to be rather ‘serious’—sometimes threatening, sometimes inspiring. This exemplifies how Latin can be perceived as the official and sacred language of government representation by attempting to connect to ancient roots. King Nicholas of the Copeman Empire hints to this perception when he said, “I wanted an impressive motto underneath, and he [Baby Face] suggested we use something Latin, because apparently all the best mottos are in Latin” (Copeman 2005, 64). On the other hand, the Kingdom of TwoChairs iconizes two garden chairs and Mungo (a garden sculpture) to represent the greenness of the nation. Utopic expressions of hope for a better future through environmentally conscious and welcoming representations illustrate the serious
humor of the micropatrial symbol. While emblems are visually prominent national symbols, more textual symbols such as anthems also offer passages of identity and connection with a different kind of embodied experience.

![Figure 6.9: Arms of the Kingdom of Lovely and the Kingdom of TwoChairs, respectively. Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Lovelycoatofarms.jpg and http://kingdomoftwochairs.blogspot.com/2008/07/signs-and-symbols-of-twochairs.html.](image)

**Anthems**

Textual and voiced symbols of the nation can be as compelling in national imagined consciousness as visual images. Gearóid Tuathail (2003) taps into this consciousness by examining the 9/11 reactions and public affect in terms of a ‘somatic marker’. The somatic marker works an ‘instantaneous’ mechanism to evoke decision without thought. Tuathail investigates how 9/11 is a somatic marker evoked through a variety of means, including flags and songs. Here, songs work as evocative symbols that connect individuals through national imagined consciousness. For instance, Avi Gilboa and Ehud Bodner (2009) find that, in examining reactions to the Israeli national anthem, the anthem evokes feelings similar to those found when dealing with the national flag and stronger than those evoked by emblems. Anthems aid in carving out exclusionary national spaces, separating members of the nation from those outside it and those out of place.
within it, through evoking emotional affection or aversion. For example, the Latvian national anthem *God Bless Latvia* evoked affection with identified Latvians, but aversion by the Russian Empire (Li 2010, np):

...played an important role in leading to Latvia’s independence in 1918. It was written ... at a time when the Latvian people were beginning to openly display strong national sentiments... At the time, Latvians were well known as an ethnic group in the Czarist Russian Empire, but a country called Latvia did not exist. Nationally-minded writers and activists had begun developing the idea of ‘Latvia’ as a designation for the territories that had traditionally been inhabited by Latvians. To use the word ‘Latvia’ in a song was a bold challenge to the Czarist regime and was initially forbidden by Moscow. .....

Latvia’s anthem was originally a subversive provocation vis-à-vis the Russian Empire, illustrating the power of challenge and opposition to the status quo through the creation of national anthems.

The United Kingdom’s anthem, *God Save the King* (or Queen where appropriate), centers the lyrics on the figure of the monarch with qualitative descriptions such as noble and gracious as well as including a religious tone by calling for God’s protection: “God save our gracious Queen! Long live our noble Queen!” The United Kingdom stresses the history of the national anthem, “European visitors to Britain in the eighteenth century noticed the advantage of a country possessing such a recognized musical symbol” (UK 2010b, np). This anthem is a musical and textual symbol of British identity. As such a symbol, *God Save the Queen* has also received contestation through transgressive means by musical bands. One such example is the 1977 release by a UK band, the Sex Pistols, with new lyrics. The Sex Pistols challenge the democratic style of the UK and question the Queen’s humanity. Below is an excerpt of the Sex Pistols’ alternate version (Vermorel and Vermorel 1978):
Another transformed and subversive version of God Save the Queen graces the lyrics of the national anthem of the Grand Duchy of the Lagoan Isles and is re-titled God Save our Islands Three. By mimetically borrowing the tune and structure of God Save the Queen, the Grand Duchy of the Lagoan Isles is reflecting an identity connected to Great Britain, yet subversively plays with this identity through a new nationalism. “The anthem message covers the theme of love. Our love for our nation, monarchy and higher power” (GDLI 2010, np):

[Chorus]
God Save Our Islands Three
Give them reality
For all to see
[Verse 1]
Give us a bolder voice
And let us all rejoice
Lord, give us all a choice
To live in Peace
[Verse 2]
Grand Duke of Majesty
Nation because of thee
Family of Royalty
To live in Peace
[Verse 3]
One day we all will be
Dancing because we’re free
Oh Lord we’ll be with thee
To live in Peace
Although the religious inclusion in this anthem is celebratory with words like rejoice and dancing, peace and freedom seem to be the reasons for this rejoicing with a call to a higher power to “give them reality”. The reality and voice they lack as a legitimate sovereign, rather than as a micropatria.

As an alternate to drawing from God Save the Queen, the Kingdom of New Brittania elected Jerusalem as the national anthem (KNB 2010, np). Jerusalem was written by William Blake in his preface to Milton: A Poem (1808). The poem follows a commentary of discontent with governments and suggests a more religious approach. “We do not want either Greek or Roman models if we are but just and true to our own imaginations those worlds of eternity in which we shall live forever; in Jesus our Lord” (Blake 1808):

And did those feet in ancient time
Walk upon England's mountains green
And was the holy lamb of God
On England's pleasant pastures seen
And did the countenance divine
Shine forth upon our clouded hills
And was Jerusalem builded there
Among those dark Satanic mills
Bring me my bow of burning gold
Bring me my arrows of desire
Bring me my spears o’clouds unfold
Bring me my chariot of fire
I will not cease from mental fight
Nor shall my sword sleep in hand
*Til we have built Jerusalem
In England's green and pleasant land

Hubert Parry put the lyrics of Jerusalem to ¾ time music in 1916 with the words “slow but with animation” above the musical score (Parry 1916, 2). The lyrics focus on the land rather than a monarch and the religious tone is at times zealous. What it has in common with and is mimetic of God Save the Queen is a call to a divine
being. Also, it boasts an ancient connection to the land and the land as divinely chosen.

In 2003, Billy Bragg, a singer and political activist from the United Kingdom, called for a replacement of *God Save the Queen* with *Jerusalem*. Bragg sees the current anthem as a British, rather than English, symbol of identity and monarchy and considers *Jerusalem* to be “a much more uplifting song” (Ellison 2003, np). Bragg comments how the current anthem is only about “a little old lady in Windsor and her relationship with the supreme being” (Espiner 2008, np). What Bragg accomplishes with this call is a challenge to how English identity is constructed as and conflated with British identity and the question of monarchical importance to this identity. This challenge portrays the English as victims of the monarchy’s stranglehold as a kingdom. Rather than the Queen being the ultimate symbol to glorify in song, Bragg feels the nation and the land itself should be the anchor from which to identify with, the English territory. It is debatable whether the song is more uplifting, but for the Kingdom of New Brittania, Billy Bragg and possibly others, it is a more appropriate symbol of identity.

In a move of separation from *God Save the Queen* as an important symbol of identity and moving in a different direction than the contesting Jerusalem as a true anthem of English identity to separate from a British identity, the lyrics of the Copeman Empire’s national anthem were written by the Right Reverend Baby Face the Archbishop of Fantaberry to the tune of *Thine be the Glory*. The musical score was composed by George Frederic Handel in 1747 in his work *Judas Maccabaeus*. According to a biography on Handel, “This oratorio was demanded from the
composer by Frederick Prince of Wales, to celebrate the return of his not very much beloved brother, the Duke of Cumberland, who, on the 16th of April, 1726, had won the decisive battle of Culloden” (Schoelcher 1857, 303). In the end, King Nicholas chose a musical score associated with Britain’s warring and monarchical history (Copeman 2005, 69-70):

Fine Copeman Empire,  
Ruler of the Sea,  
Under Fearless Nich’las  
Shepherd of the free.

Out through perilous waters  
To the Copeman Isle,  
Guiding us victorious  
With his boundless guile.

Fine Copeman Empire  
Ruler of the Sea  
Envy of all nations  
Ever home to me.

The anthem talks about the land, the sea, and the monarch, accentuating the elements shown in imagery depicting King Nicholas. Like the UK anthem, there are qualitative descriptors that define the monarch. It is however peculiar that guile is used as a positive descriptor since it is often negatively connotative of deceit and trickery. Another quirky item to point out is that the Copeman Empire is a coastal nation (not an isle as mentioned in the anthem), and although King Nicholas does not have a navy (or military) of any kind, he is deceivingly portrayed as ‘ruler of the sea’. Although religion doesn’t at first seem to play a role in this anthem, the line “shepherd of the free” pulls from an analogy used widely in Christianity; psalm 23 verse 1 “The Lord is my shepherd I shall not want” (KJV 1987, np). King Nicholas is
then raised to a divine status. The last two lines call to the idea of a homeland and therefore, nationalistic sentiment and pride.

Like the Kingdom of New Britania and the Copeman Empire, The Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye’s national anthem is another shying away from *God Save the Queen* as a musical score from which to borrow. The national anthem was written by George Barker who is the Poet Laureate of the Kingdom (IKH 2010b, np):

Lord Host of Host, asleep on high
awake and cast a kindly eye
on independent Hay-on-Wye.

Let long the liberal urm [sic] here flow
with fruits that from our labour grow:
conserve them long, Lord, here below.

Let flourish here the lame and odd,
the hazel twig, the unknown God,
and this independent sod.

Let your goodwill establish by
this river under neutral sky
a truly rural Hay-on-Wye.

Let us at every parish crisis
invoke Apollo, Dionysus,
the I-Ching and even Isis.

Let us and our direct descendants,
with you, O Lord, in close attendance,
depend upon our independence.

The notion of divinity is also present in this anthem asking for protection, blessing, and longevity. Rather than a closed religious outlook, Hay-on-Wye is a place of tolerance and neutrality. Ironically, rural areas like Hay-on-Wye are often places of intolerance and tension (Gibson and Davidson 2004; Gorman-Murray et al. 2008). The use of “independent sod” is a play on words regarding the parcel of land called
Hay-on-Wye and the King himself for declaring independence. Self-deprecating humor is an optional tool of these micropatrias. This tool works to position them as not completely serious, but, at the same time, allows for them to make bold political statements.

The Kingdom of Lovely takes a more modern and quite lengthy route to creating an anthem. After whipping up this little ditty, the King went on to professionally record the song in a studio and made a music video which included some of his citizens (KOL 2010b, np):

[Verse 1]
Yesterday was dark and dingy
My temperament was rather whingey
Things had got me wonderin'
Why I lived in London
Anyway - My days were grey
Now I welcome all and sundry
Everyone can join my country
Listen if you're near them
Maybe you can hear them say...

[Chorus]
You've got to...
Teach the world to sing
Danny Wallace is the king
For justice and politeness are the laws that he will bring
Where the order of the crown
Is to frown upon the frown
We done a constitution and we even wrote it down...
Although the nation may be small
It's the nicest of them all
A land of opportunity
Where crime's against the law
Every subject do your part
With your hand upon your heart
A Kingdom-come-democracy to start...

[Verse 2]
Everyone is just the same
It doesn't matter who you name

188
Anyone can be a dame, or sir, or lord
(But not King)
People gather round completely
Listen as I tell you sweetly
All across our nation
Join the recitation with me...

Chocked full of the national narrative, the anthem offers citizenship to everyone.

Micropatrias making humorous references at times employ landscape rhetoric, such as reference to the ‘grey days’ in London. Historical references are also tools of such textual symbols and the line “we done a constitution and we even wrote it down” is referring to the discovery by King Danny that the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution. Rather than divinity, the driving nationalistic force behind the Kingdom of Lovely is due to the fact that ‘It’s the nicest of them all’.

Micropatrial national anthems are subversive symbols of nationalism that mimic, in one way or another, the national anthem of the host, in particular, and the anthems of sovereigns, in general. In producing a national anthem, practitioners tick off another developed and hegemonic symbol of sovereignty. Such developments highlight the anthem as a banal production that evokes emotions, or not, at local, national, and international events. It highlights how such textual symbols are ingrained, producing a recall of memory and imagery without effort. Singing the anthem becomes a banal act that is part of event ritual without a questioning of what is embedded in the meaning of the text. Therefore, enacting and embodying the nation becomes a banal behavior that is expected at such events.
National Flags

From a research perspective, flags are valuable symbols because they are a mark of a nation in place of a name and are embedded with meaning (Hutcheon 1985). Flags are materialities that can be waved (or in a sense ‘unwaved’) by rulers and citizens. For many, “the flag is an icon of great power” (Webster and Webster 1994, 134). Flags are used in claims (Collis 2004; Yusoff 2005; Collis and Stevens 2007), in conflicts (Lambert 2010), in rituals (Williams 2002); as identification (Freeman 2002; Lindqvist 2009; Lugosi 2009), and as symbolic cartographic materiality (Wells 2007). Flags symbolize declaration and existence (Bartram 2001 or Breschi 2001). According to Whitney Smith, who coined the term vexillology, founded the Flag Research Center, and developed the national flag of Guyana, “Flags are more than just colorful decorations. They announce the presence of a country...They inspire people, proclaim victory, identify government offices and ships...The most important use for most national flags, however, is to define the country and its people” (2001, 4). What is missing from Smith’s list of functions is how flags are used to claim and appropriate territory either by territorial processes of cooperation (such as Andorra with Spain and France), assimilation (such as the annexation of Puerto Rico by the United States), annexation (such as China has done to the territory of Tibet), or re-appropriation (such as was seen in France with the capturing of the Nazi flag).

Tracing the origins of the flag to the Roman Army around 200 BCE, Smith (2001) indicates the importance of flags to nationhood by simply acknowledging that all sovereign nations have them. On the other hand, William Crampton (1989)
believes flags originated from China and were filtered to the west through Arab traders. In any case, Smith (2001) notes that national flags express a “civil religion” and feels that, “Learning about these flags gives us a better understanding of the people who fly them” (2001, 5). Flags, just like any other national symbols, are an opportunity to represent a nation. Even the notion of ‘rallying around the flag’ can have a powerful pull over populations as demonstrated in the United States post-September 11th 2001 attacks (Chapman and Reiter 2004). Flags spark controversy and are used to represent national ideals in socio-politically tense climates (Webster and Webster 1994; Webster and Lieb 2001). These are examples of what Billig (1995) terms ‘waved’ symbols. Yet, unlike just any national symbol, flags are flown and are a major indicator of a nation to insiders and outsiders. Whether waved or unwaved, flags evoke a sense of national identity along streets and parks, over buildings and post offices, in classrooms and courtrooms, on ships and planes, and on battlefields, whether consciously or unconsciously, working to reproduce the nation on a daily basis.

UK enclaved micropatrias reflect sovereign convention through the creation of national flags. Some micropatrial national flags are mimetic of their leaders’ original identity, showing that, as mentioned earlier, it is impossible or at least challenging to disentangle oneself from multiple spatial layers that shape identity. To illustrate this discussion are examples from the United Kingdom’s flags following with UK enclaved micropatrial flags and a brief consideration of the layers of meaning embedded in the enclaved visual symbols. The United Kingdom’s national flag is the Union Flag, more popularly known as the Union Jack (fig. 6.10). This flag
was adopted in conjunction with the Act of the Union 1800 which went into effect on January 1, 1801 (BA 2010; Fl 2010; and UK 2010c). The Union Flag is meant to represent the countries that are part of the sovereign United Kingdom. This internationally recognized symbol is embedded with elements from England (and Wales) with the inclusion of St. George’s Cross, Scotland with the inclusion of St. Andrew’s Cross Saltire, and Northern Ireland with the inclusion of St. Patrick’s Cross Saltire (fig. 6.11). Many UK micropatrial enclaves draw from these territorial markers for their own identity and designs.

![Figure 6.10: Flag of the United Kingdom. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg.](image)

The Kingdom of New Brittania blatantly copies the 1606 British flag used until the Act of Union in 1800 with Ireland (fig. 6.12). James VI and I (simultaneously the King of Scotland and England) constructed the 1606 flag in an attempt to unite the north and south of Britain into one identity (Fl 2010, np). The borrowing of this flag stresses the importance of this unification to the Kingdom of New Brittania. This flag works to visually reproduce what this nation’s moniker implies, a repackaged but modern Britain. Ironically while reinforcing a united identity, (re)purposing this flag for a contemporary nationalism works to disestablish Northern Ireland as part of the current sovereign state. This separation reverts the United Kingdom back to its previous existence as the Kingdom of Great Britain, spiraling back over 400 years of conquests and unions to re-inscribe national identity and historical significance. This absence of St. Patrick’s Cross Saltire in the flag of the Kingdom of New Brittania can be viewed as one that is against Irish involvement or inclusion, and is therefore a British nationalist slant on representation. Or, this absence could also be seen as supporting the movement in Northern Ireland to disassociate itself from UK control. Either way, the appropriation of this flag implies a modern, but different territorial United Kingdom.

Unlike the Kingdom of New Brittania, the flag of the Democratic Republic of Bobalania was inspired not by the whole territory of the United Kingdom, but by a territory within the United Kingdom—England (fig. 6.13). This shows a difference in influence on and identification by the ruler on a scalar level. The Democratic Republic of Bobalania’s identification spatially shrinks, emphasizing the essential geographical element of entanglement and connection to England’s territorial borders within which it is enclaved. While not a reproduction of a national flag as seen above, President Bobbie Bailey adopts England’s St. George’s Cross and the color palette of England’s flag, but opts for a different layout. By barring in Saint George’s Cross, there is a sort of reversal of symbolic layering occurring. England’s representation on the flag, while centered, is displayed as an element of the larger Bobalanian government. This reversal is antithetical to the spatial reality on land, but symbolizes the Democratic Republic of Bobalania as more than just a reflection of England.

![Flag of the Democratic Republic of Bobalania](http://www.bobalania.com/symbols.html)

Figure 6.13: Flag of the Democratic Republic of Bobalania. Source: http://www.bobalania.com/symbols.html.

Another example of mimesis is almost a reversal of Bobalania’s flag. Rather than shrinking the borrowed national icon, the Independent Kingdom of Hay-on-Wye (located within the border of Wales) chooses to replace it, but elects to keep the background color scheme and layout of the Welsh national flag (fig. 6.14).
Superimposed onto this historical territorial demarcation is an image of King Richard’s castle. The castle is the place where the King originally claimed independence in 1977 as a protest against government bureaucracy and is therefore an iconic space of remembrance and presence on the flag. While the image operates as a memory catalyst, there is an absence of the Welsh dragon. This absence works to forget the myth and history attached to the Welsh icon and therefore connected with the territory. Simultaneously, the castle’s presence works to impose a new history and myth upon the kingdom’s territory and people.

The castle is emblematically centered on the flag as it is physically centered in town. Again, this layering of imagery can be seen as a symbolic reversal of connection to Hay-on-Wye and Wales through different means. The image of the heraldic Lion, Richard’s preferred figure of identity (Booth 1999, 146), and the castle are laid on top of the Welsh colors showing greater prominence and therefore importance in ordering. This layering is similar to that seen in the Union Flag, which shows the cross of St. George as more visually prominent and positioned on top of the crosses of St. Patrick and St. Andrew, hence implying England’s importance as the center of government and control over the others. This prominence works to reify England’s conquest of the other areas as King Richard’s imposed image reifies his kingdom’s taking of Welsh and therefore British land.

Figure 6.14: Flags of the Independent Kingdom Hay-on-Wye and Wales, respectively. Sources: http://www.richardbooth.demon.co.uk/haypeerage/anthem.htm; and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Wales_2.svg.
A case of contested UK territorial ownership involves the Sovereign State of Forvik (originally known as the Crown Dependency of Forvik). Here, drawing from locational identity, the mimetic practice is divided between two national heritages while reflecting its regional enclavistic spatial relationship within Shetland. From the Sovereign State of Forvik’s perspective, Shetland, in accordance with the agreement of 1469 between King Christian I of Norway and Sweden and King James III of Scotland, was given by King Christian to King James via a trustee, but not an ownership, position as part of a marriage dowry (CDF 2010, np). This is where Stuart Hill of the Sovereign State of Forvik finds fault with the United Kingdom’s land claims on and monetary profit from the natural resources of this territory. An opposing explanation to the Sovereign State of Forvik’s claim is that, “Christian I was never able to redeem his pledge, and so Orkney and Shetland remained Scottish possessions” (UK 2010d, np). The Sovereign State of Forvik overlays an altered Nordic image on top of a British one (fig. 6.15), making the contested heritage and spatial control more transparent in flag representation that at the same time highlights the tensions between the UK government and its claimed territories, that include for instance Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland.

Both the Mondcivitan Republic and the Principality of Paulovia (fig. 6.16) mimetically retain the color palettes of England (in the case of the Mondcivitan Republic) and the United Kingdom (in the case of the Principality of Paulovia). The Mondcivitan Republic wishes to see the world as a whole territory rather than politically divided parcels of land. Their mission is to unite the world and create a service nation. Here the concept of territory is expanded to its earthly limits, the world. Similar to the reconfiguration seen in the flag of the Democratic Republic of Bobalania, the Mondcivitan Republic reconfigures the background layout of the English flag. Rather than an English cross or Bobalanian stripes, the Mondcivitan Republic places the colors into blocks, symbolizing, as the government states, a unification of people via the shared “red and white corpuscles of the human blood” (HHS 2010, np). Paradoxically, the image can be seen as a divide that is traversed by the bridge capping the ‘m’. A bridge connects two points that are divided. In return, this architectural feature symbolizes unity and agency, a point of connection as well as an object of mobility and shared journeys. In addition to such discursive and subversive practices, the national flag of the Principality of Paulovia contains not only territorial connection to the UK through color choice, but a similar ideology of hope as is seen with the Mondcivitan Republic. For the Principality of Paulovia, the blue on the national flag “represents the Mediterranean Sea and the seas around the UK” (PP 2010a, np). The red on the national flag “represents the royal blood line and the sacrifices of the Paulovian peoples” (PP 2010a, np). The flag element not mimetic of the United Kingdom is the gold star which represents “unity
and family” (PP 2010a, np). Here, the Mondcivitan Republic and the Principality of Paulovia wish to unite the world through peace, unlike the past practices of the United Kingdom during colonization. A form of critique can be read that shames aggressive approaches to unification and territorial control by legitimate sovereigns.

Reported in the Kemetian Tribune, the Sovereign Kingdom of Kemetia announced to the world the replacement of the original Kemetian flag with a new one. The transition is a symbolic representation of a switch in government practices (fig. 6.17). The new flag is a reminder and supporting symbol of government metamorphosis from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy (Ryan et al. 2006; KT 2010, np). This is mimetic of the United Kingdom’s government transition in the same direction. Illustrated by the Sovereign Kingdom of Kemetia, the creative and transformative properties of symbols highlight the possibilities of the evolutionary processes of the nation, national identity, and nationalism. Going in a politically different direction, the Peoples Republic of K-Marx designed their flag to “to represent [their] Communist background” (PRK 2010, np; fig. 6.18). The flag shows a similarity in design to the Flag of Cuba (fig. 6.18). Drawing inspiration, not from the United Kingdom, but from a video game.
called Tropico, a simulation game of ruling an island through displays of power (and maintaining control of your land and over your people). While not directly mimetic in imagery, the connection is one of power such as was seen during colonization by the British over lands in the West Indies. This flag and what it represents also borrows from a Cold War legacy, dictatorial control, and coups-d’état. This illustrates the multiple and complex expressions of identity through micropatrial flags, nation borrowing, and identity creation and negotiation.

![Image of flags](image1.png)

*Figure 6.17: New and old flags of the Sovereign Kingdom of Kemetia, respectively. Sources: [http://www.facebook.com/album.php?profile=1&id=17332994660](http://www.facebook.com/album.php?profile=1&id=17332994660) and [http://www.angelfire.com/nv/micronations/missingnewcountry.html](http://www.angelfire.com/nv/micronations/missingnewcountry.html).*

![Image of flags](image2.png)


The flag is another requirement on the unspoken ‘list of things sovereigns need’.

The micropatrial flag, along with the other symbols discussed above, are meant to be representative of claimed (subversive) sovereignty. These symbols do little beyond representation. However, there are examples where micropatrial flags go
beyond such two-dimensional representations, such as at declaration ceremonies, international meetings, and public appearances.

**Practicing the Nation**

Micropatrial practices play with notions of the nation, national identity, and nationalism. In the examples from the research above, we have seen how UK enclaved micropatrias include a number of parodic versions of national symbols including kings and their regalia, postage stamps, currency, emblems, anthems and flags. Such parodic playfulness with these symbols is a subversive positioning vis-à-vis the status quo. In what remains of this chapter, I dig deeper into the notions of nation, nationalism, and sovereignty and what micropatrial practices and objects tell us about the power of subversion and parody in relation to such notions.

Different micropatrias have different levels of play, from the parodic donning of the sovereign cloak to a visible disregard of host regulations. In terms of parodic practices, while superficially seeming to be forms of hobby play or role play, the play is of a serious nature; one that makes transparent hegemonic sovereignty, everyday norms, and the taken-for-granted embedded symbols that form part of individual and collective identity. The task of defining the nation, national identity, and nationalism challenges social scientists to grasp that which is deeply embedded in the minds and identities of individuals. Shared group concepts, such as these, are imperative to forming an identity through having an association with others (Mead 1967). Nations are “political and cultural processes” that “represent fractured social constructs” (Jones and Fowler 2007a, 333, 339). For groups, the
nation becomes a narrative and, in the process of becoming (never static), the narrative can consist of a multiplicity of entangled and contested narratives, such as can be seen with Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom (Dittmer and Dodds 2008; Jones and Fowler 2007b); and nationalism becomes a unifier (Ingram 1999) or a symbol of conflict (Raento and Watson 2000) within a sovereign realm.

While the concepts nation, national identity, and nationalism are slippery social constructions, they are ever so stubborn and resistant to being transformed, or in a sense violated, by those external to the historically, or maybe ‘traditionally’, developed nation. Even with revolutions, while there is a temporary overthrow of a governing body, the resulting replacement remains the same in terms of reifying hegemonic sovereignty. These concepts are more than notions and ideas; they play an integral role in the everyday lived realities of most, if not all, people (Anderson [1983] 1991). Whether conscious or unconscious of how these concepts shape the embodied everyday, there is no escape from performing some national narrative.

The construction of nations is hidden and consuming for, as Cresswell notes, “they [nations] seem as natural as the air we breath” (2004, 99). Nations manifest nationalism through a variety of symbols of national identity that delineate those belonging to the nation from those who are ‘others’ (Said [1978] 2003; see also Ingram 2011): others who are physically outside the nation and others who are socially ‘out-of-place’ within it (Cresswell 2004; 1996). The notion of the other is constructed through “geopolitical exclusive binaries” (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007, 418) and it is the responsibility of geographers to study “this uncomfortable but persistent tradition” within narratives of national identity (Atkinson 2008, 400).
The delineation of belonging is the foundation of the nation, national identity, and representations of nationalism, leading a clear division between the ‘self’ (those belonging to the nation) and the ‘other’ (those not belonging to the nation) (Campbell [1992] 1998). This sense of belonging works twofold for micropatrias. One, is the belonging attached to the established country they have citizenship in and, two, is the cultural attachment of belonging; both tied to a physically attendant nation and both of which micropatrias rely on for their parodic national practices.

‘Paraphernalia of Ideology’

The concepts of nation and nationalism lend political legitimacy to the idea of the sovereign (Gellner [1983] 2006). Legitimacy maintains socio-political reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966) and springs from imagined and shared notions of community (Anderson [1983] 1991); and, therefore, geographically, “the imagination of place creates political and spatial realities” (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007, 406). The imagined community of the sovereign is represented through symbols, the “paraphernalia of national ideology and belonging” (Cresswell 2004, 100). Such paraphernalia are the ‘material technologies’ used by governing regimes to reproduce their legitimacy (Merriman and Jones 2009). The tangible and textual symbols of the sovereign are used unconsciously in everyday practice to reproduce the ‘spirit’ of the nation and nationalism (Billig 1995; see also Merriman and Jones 2009). These symbols are deliberate banal forms of nationalism (Billig 1995), not to be confused with more forceful methods such as protesters waving flags or the
planting of flags. The production of such materialities does lead to contestations
over design, imagery, and meaning, but eventually (for some) these tangible
symbols become mundane. Even when transformed into the banal, such symbols
can be ‘hot’ to certain populations, furthering processes of exclusion and division
(Merriman and Jones 2009; Jones and Merriman 2009). National narratives are
embedded in these banal symbols, such as coins and stamps (Raento et al. 2004;
Raento and Brunn 2005; Raento 2006 and 2009). Beyond the tangible, intangible
symbols also reify nationalism, such as with the act of speech and the use of words
like ‘our’ and ‘we’ and ‘national weather’ (Billig 1995). At times, banal symbols can
illustrate the complexity and entanglement of multiple national identities within a
sovereign nation, such as road signs (Jones and Merriman 2009; Merriman and
Jones 2009) and place naming (Azaryahu 1996; Alderman 2006). These sovereign
symbols of the nation and nationalism play a spatial, embodied, performative role
in reifying national identity (Edensor 2002). This is illustrated in Tim Edensor’s
poignant remarks on national symbols, “By their physical presence in the world, and
in specific times and places, things [national objects] sustain identity by constituting
part of a matrix of relational cultural elements including practices, representations,
and spaces which gather around objects” (2002, 103). These symbolic
paraphernalia, these material objects of nationalism, thus, can reinforce political
and, in turn, spatial legitimacy.

Nationalism research has typically focused on the ‘exotic’ and ‘marginal’,
rather than the everyday and even unconscious reproduction of the nation (Billig
1995). According to Billig, symbols of the nation only acquire a banal position when
they are seen but used without the remembrance of the national significance and ideology embedded within; the idea of “the unwaved flag” being one such exemplar (1995, 39). Contrary to the mundane, micropatrial representations, while using these material symbols in an everyday fashion, wave their ‘flags’ of national existence on a daily basis. Micropatrias practice ‘the nation’ through national representations such as the ones considered above. They create spaces of national identity that are connected to and reliant upon subversive symbols vis-à-vis orthodox internationalism and hegemonic sovereignty. As subversive nations, they carve out heterotopic spaces and perform heterodox practices.

**Heterotopic Subversion**

Micropatrial representations are a subversive form of nationalism that is alternate to the nationalism of the sovereign nation it is enclaved by. The social or physical presence of an alternate does not necessarily mark subversion. For instance, Hetherington (1997) considers heterotopic sites as alternate spaces of ordering that are a part of society (see also Foucault 1986). Yet, he also illustrates how the heterotopic Palais Royal was used as a space of subversion to the ruling French order. For instance, the Palais Royal Arcade cafes were a gathering site for those planning rebellion. Hence, this space, and the practices of the alternate connected to it, became a place employed for subversive means. Rather than just a marketplace, the Palais Royal became a space to subvert and resist the status quo. In the case of the Palais Royal, the alternate marked subversion through socio-political idealization (on subversion as idealization, see Westwood 2004, 786).
Micropatrias as subversive heterotopic places or developing national spaces might be results of “unfinished business” from previous conflicts (Hobsbawm 1990, 165). Meaning by this that nations are embedded in the past that has shaped them, drawing memory and identity from previous national territories, labels, and experiences. The embedded and embodied connection calls attention to the entanglements between new and old identities; and how the results of the past affect the actions of the present and the visions of the future. For the purposes here, the notion of ‘unfinished business’ highlights dissatisfaction with the status quo, and included in this dissatisfaction is its supra-manifestation as the enclaving nation, hence leading to subversive national activities and micropatrial development.

Subversion is authoritatively defined in official documents as activities “intended to undermine” state power and “practices against the state” (Spjut 1979, 254-255). Today, the sovereign state is the existing order of power in power. Micropatrias as alternate and subversive nations do work, in a fashion, to undermine the state through challenging who has the right to print and create government artifacts such as stamps, currency, national anthems, emblems, and flags, as well as, make and pursue sovereign and additional territorial claims. These micropatrial practices are not sanctioned by the legitimated sovereigns, the enclaving nations, and therefore are practices against or at least resistant to micropatrial sovereign ‘hosts’. Whereas James Scott (1987) discusses resistance movements by examining how peasants are resistant to hegemonic forces through techniques such as false compliance, sabotage, foot dragging, etc., micropatrial
resistance challenges hegemony, not through petulant and transgressive acts of
mobility and practice, but through subversive acts of representation which
challenge sovereign spatial control. These representations are not Scott’s covert
and subtle acts of resistance, but brazen subversions to the status quo.

Propagandist ideologies of “control by convincing” (Scott 1987, 23) and the
heterotopic micropatrial spaces themselves offer a subversive and alternate
platform for layered occupation. Micropatrias are typically not embroiled in
debates over time or, Ironically, size but space. Rather than erasing, temporarily
replacing, or conditionally negotiating with previous sovereign claims on a
particular territory through a physical reterritorialization of space (Debrix 1998; see
also Suleiman 1999; McConnell 2009a; 2009b), micropatrias work to add another
facet to space. This space is not a flat, two-dimensional surface often associated
with the standard map of political boundaries, but an enlivened, multi-dimensional
space with layered meanings of identity, nationality, and citizenship that are
entangled and not easily drawn apart with a pencil, computer, or a declaration.
While this is the case with states in general, micropatrias are a reminder of such
place entanglements. And examining them focuses on a ‘spatio-temporal specific’
of a parallel sovereign (Massey 2001, 259). Whereby, we can consider the time
element as an ‘open historicity’ and the space element as an ‘open multiplicity’
(Massey 2001, 259).

**Heterodox Subversion**

206
Being alternate to legitimated host sovereigns as nations and subversive in their practices against their hosts, micropatrias ‘wave’ the generally banal forms of national symbols (flags, stamps, currency etc.) in order to claim partial control through their own propagandist ‘convincing’ (development) of space as dynamic, multi-layered, and open to transformation and challenge. Ayse Oncu explains how the banal can become the subversive (2000, 297):

The banal undergoes a ‘change of state’ when unformulated experiences acquire voice and visibility, entering the established world of political order, to become potentially ‘subversive’. It is only when experiences ‘recognize themselves in the public objectivity of an already constituted discourse’, suggests Bourdieu (1977: 167), that they enter the universe of argument and scrutiny, becoming part of the struggle for representation against the fixities of orthodoxy.

In this passage Oncu draws from Pierre Bourdieu, pulling out the critical element of orthodoxy, and how representation against it leads to subversion. Thinking through the idea of orthodoxy and its linguistic companions (doxa and heterodoxy) a brief discussion further positions micropatrias as subversive entities. In 1899, Francis Brown etymologically defines orthodoxy as “right thinking”, not on the scale of the majority, but on the level of individual belief (409). Steven Sangren takes a harder line in defining orthodoxy; and its relationship with heterodoxy. He notes that orthodox views “legitimate elements of social order” whereas heterodoxy “undermines any order’s legitimacy” (1987, 76). From this perspective, heterodoxy is then the “counterpoint” to orthodoxy (Sangren 1987, 77). As a counterpoint, heterodox practices are a form of socio-political marginality that “locate efficacy not in mediation, but in entities that stand outside hierarchy and history” (Sangren 1987, 82-83). Hence, marginalized heterodox practices can be likened to the socio-
politically liminalized and socio-physically heterotopic micropatria as that outside society and out-of-place within it.

Creating strict dichotomies leads to uncritical territory and the dichotomous constructions of orthodoxy to heterodoxy is no different. Denis MacEoin argues that heterodoxy is an extension of orthodoxy, an ‘aberration’, or rather it can be a ‘reformulation’ of “norms and ideals in which all sense of dichotomy is virtually eradicated” (1990, 325). Heterodoxy can be seen then as a transition from one status to another that relies on, and therefore reifies, what it is transitioning from. This is similar to how micropatrias through their ironic parodies pull away from established sovereigns, yet simultaneously reify the institution of sovereignty. Paradoxically then, the liminal ‘declared sovereign’ distance of micropatrias feeds off a parodic closeness with their sovereign hosts.

Bourdieu adds a third element, doxa, into this perspective of ‘reality’ where “the natural and social world appears as self-evident” (1977, 164). Doxa is the unquestioned, taken-for-granted, naturalized way of the world (Bourdieu 1977). Heterodox views challenge this social construction to make more transparent that which is taken for granted. This challenging of the social world and it’s ‘naturalness’ exposes unconscious processes of reproduction of the nation, national identity, and nationalism. Orthodox views then work to reify the existing doxa through sovereign expression. Bourdieu articulates how these three concepts work in relation (1977, 169):

The dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, orthodoxy.
Adding to the discussion of Bourdieu’s doxa, orthodoxy, and heterodoxy by way of geographic metaphor, Ann Farnsworth-Alvear notes how, in using these concepts of social reality, there is “a way to chart simultaneous and overlapping parts of the social world” (1997, 74). She considers heterodoxy in light of the possibilities of subversion and the doxa in terms of delineating the rules and limits of “how the social game is played” (1997, 82). These limits of the game, of the sovereignty of nations, are not transgressively stretched by internal nations vying for rights like the Lakota in the United States, but are subversively crossed in order to represent the heterodox practices and heterotopic spaces of the micropatria.

**Waving Subversion**

Thinking back to Oncu’s statement about subversive potential, micropatrias do acquire voice and visibility through their digital embassies, thus entering a universe of representation and argument against the established sovereign world order. Due to their subversive positioning and liminal niche, micropatrial symbols do not set out to achieve the banal status that their sovereign host counterparts have established. Micropatrial symbols remain waved in order to mimetically reflect sovereign practices and call into question or challenge production and reproduction of the nation, national identity, and nationalism. The waving is done vis-à-vis the host, in order to reify the claimed ‘sovereignty’ and to critique the status quo. The epitomic example is the Sovereign State of Forvik, which is actively critical of the resources (such as oil) taken out of the Shetlands by the UK government. Such critique includes apparent tactics to challenge UK authority,
such as driving with a Sovereign State of Forvik license, registration tags, and inspection tags. Micropatrias work as critical entities from their liminal position, the gap, the area of transition, the neutral zone (van Gennep 1960; Turner [1969] 1977; and Marin 1993). From this perch, micropatrias subvert hegemonic norms and question the taken for granted qualities, the doxa, of sovereign construction. This doxa is reinforced via orthodox reification by legitimated sovereigns through the ‘inventedness’ of traditions and connections to ‘ancient pasts’, highlighting the ‘natural’ development of the sovereign (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Orthodox sovereignty is not a natural, but naturalized socio-political status that micropatrial parodying breaks open by raising the profane (the dominated) to the level of the sacred (the dominating) by way of liminal separation (on liminal separation see van Gennep 1960). Such instances of a military soldier, civil service worker, or college student voluntarily promoting themselves to a king, president, or emperor with the symbolic accoutrements of a republic, empire, or nation-state are examples of this ascension. Ironically, the same parodying reifies the sovereign doxa. Transparent micropatrial practices are very much mimetic of sovereign conventions and traditions. Nevertheless, micropatrial symbols remain waved to consciously and discursively produce their nations and garner attention, albeit in a limited vein.

The discursive playfulness of the micropatria paradoxically alludes to the inflexibility and flexibility of ‘reality’. Reality is inflexible through notions of ‘ordered reality’ which ‘imposes’ upon the individual; and flexibility manifests through ‘enclaves’, those “provinces of meaning characterized by a turning away of attention from the reality of everyday life” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 35-39).
Yet, micropatrias as enclaves, as subversive heterodox heterotopic liminal niches, while in positions of socio-political critique, reify the sovereign doxa by relying on it for micropatrial parodic construction. Hence, the micropatrial enclavic turning away from the everyday reality through mimetic representation reinforces the very reality that is the target of its criticism. An example being how the Kingdom of Lovely draws upon the United Kingdom for its very identity by borrowing images and designs; and how the Kingdom of Lovely reinforces the very power and position of the United Kingdom by acknowledging the United Kingdom as power holder over UK claimed territory, accepting the same system of rule and structure as the norm, and attempting to communicate diplomatically with various positioned authorities, such as the Prime Minister.

**Micropatrial Digital Embassies**

Micropatrias primarily represent their national symbols through digital space. These online international embassies become vehicles for diffusing information to citizens and non-citizens alike. Barney Warf and John Grimes discuss how these forms of ‘counter-hegemonic’ discursive presences work on the Internet to “challeng[e] established systems of domination” while “legitimating and publicizing political claims by the powerless and marginalized” (1997, 260). They go on to say that (1997, 260; stress original):

*Counterhegemonic,* in this context, refers to varied messages from groups and individuals who refuse to take existing ideologies and politics as normal, natural, or necessary, typically swimming against the tide of public opinion. Increasingly easy access to e-mail and the World Wide Web allows many politically disenfranchised groups to communicate with like-minded or sympathetic audiences, publicizing causes often overlooked by the mainstream media and offering perspectives frequently stifled by the conservative corporate ownership of newspapers, television, and other media
outlets. Many such outré groups, though far from homogenous, subscribe to opinions that are effectively outside the mainstream and are not always taken seriously by the larger public.

Here, the importance of the Internet as a socio-political space is highlighted. This socio-political space is a place of social production and reproduction of shared (and oppositional) group discourses (Adams 1997; Alderman and Modlin 2008).

Positioned outside the mainstream, micropatrial leaders find ‘voice’ through virtual spaces via digital dissemination of cultural information. Therefore, the digital realm offers nations a space to ‘plant’, to territorialize, their symbols and their ideologies. Digital routes allow micropatrias, as counter-hegemonic representations, an easy resource in which to by-pass mass media.

Micropatrial nations are not alone in this endeavor. Sovereign nations take advantage of the prospect of an ‘international embassy’ to also proselytize the nation, national identity, and nationalism since nations are “territorialized and situated” in an international system (Dittmer 2007, 403). According to the United Kingdom’s official government website on the national ceremonies and symbols page, “The union flag, the national anthem, currency, stamps and other national events help identify and symbolize what it is to be British and to live in the United Kingdom” (UK 2010a, np). This information is meant to educate those outside the United Kingdom and those out of place within it on ‘what it is to be British’ while concomitantly reinforcing the identity of those who are in place within it through educating the ‘British’ public on citizenship. As shown, hegemonic influences also use the Internet as a space of online ideological reinforcement. From a dominant stance, this purpose is meant to discursively reproduce digitally what exists in the
‘real’ world (Warf and Grimes 1997). Therefore, the digitized symbols of the micropatrial nation, which are often objects, images, and texts, embody a subversive national identity through heterodox practices to create heterotopic spaces and enclaved places that are liminally niched as sites of parodic critique.

**Micropatrial Territory and Mimesis**

Concepts such as sovereignty and territory are extremely important in the contemporary, ‘post-nation’ era (Dodds 2007a). Dodds notes that “Despite the claims made in favour of ever more intense forms of globalization, the relevance of territory, international borders, and claims to sovereignty remain as pressing as ever” (2007a, 1). For micropatrias, the concept of territory takes on a duality. First, the term ‘territory’, as used by Dodds, expresses the physical placing of claims over space, the act of bounding place, creating a sense of discrete territory. In researching spatial territorial claims, Stuart Elden sees the ‘bounded space’ of territory as “a violent act of exclusion”; and considers geopolitically constructed “geographies of threat” from movements and networks that challenge the territorial status quo (2007, 822, 828; see also MacDonald 2006). Yet, micropatrias, while challenging the status quo, also challenge this draconian and regressive idea of closed off territory through the act of layering their own claims onto existing sovereign claims, through declaration and critique, rather than through ‘violent acts of exclusion or threat’ – a kind of palimpsest, but not in a strict sense. For micropatrias then, there is a ‘politico-territorial force’ that counters ‘supranational unification’ for those who desire “to achieve new levels of ‘selfhood’ never before
attained...the desire to have a more direct say in how one’s life is being lived” (Knight 1982, 526). Second, ‘territory’ is a socio-political space, as is used by van Gennep when he concludes how “the passage from one social position to another is identified with a territorial passage” (1960, 192). David Knight confirms the connection of the personal with the territorial when he declares that, “Our personal sense of ‘place’...has a territorial component” (1982, 515). Here, the ascension of the profane to the level of the sacred is a heterodox territorial passage taken by the micropatria. This state of territorial transitioning in both senses requires ‘a change of residence’ (van Gennep 1960, 192); and hence the micropatria is born.

As the micropatria declares sovereignty and claims territory, it attempts symbolic mimetic re-creation of sovereign convention. Maybe this mimesis is a reflection of and commentary upon the host expressions of territoriality, whereby an attempt is made “to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack 1986, 19; emphasis original). Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf tackle deconstructing mimesis in terms of geographical implications, “Mimesis aims at influence, appropriation, alteration, repetition; it operates by means of new interpretations of already existing worlds” (1995, 316). They describe in detail alternate realities created through mimetic practices (1995, 315; emphasis original):

Mimetic worlds have an existence of their own; they can be understood from within in their own terms. But, rather than being closed systems, they make reference to another world. ... In each case, the mimetic world is possessed of its own particular right in relation to the one to which it refers; ...It entails a mimetic process of transformation of the elements of a prior into a symbolically produced world. The first is a world of Others, the second, the world of I.
The world of others is the imposed reality, the world of the profane, of being dominated. The world of I, in relation and conversely to the world of others, is the inversion of reality, the liminal ascension of the profane to the sacred. In creating realities and worlds, mimesis has the ability to ‘actualize and breakdown’ hegemonic constructions through “dancing between the very same and the very different” (Taussig 1993, 44, 129). Mimetic practices work as a reminder of the unconscious productions in hegemonic sovereign constructions (Hume 1984, 83). National symbols play a large role in these mimetic territorial micropatrial representations; and the micropatrial paraphernalia are symbols of political subversion. Dodds notes, how in challenges to the status quo, there is “an appreciation of the power of the visual and the manner in which symbols are used [as] part of an ongoing project to probe, to ridicule and to subvert the contemporary geopolitical condition” (2007b, 174). Dancing between the same and different, micropatrias appropriate power through their national symbols to ‘probe, ridicule, and subvert’ the contemporary geopolitical condition.

Remarks

This chapter illustrates how micropatrias enclaved by the United Kingdom represent themselves through subversive national symbols that work to (re)produce the idea of a nation. Such subversive playfulness highlights identity entanglements in micropatrial heterodox practices, heterotopic spaces, and mimetic performances. In turn, subversive playfulness empowers these leaders with platforms for political commentary without ‘direct threat’ to the United
Kingdom. They work to challenge territorial claims and sovereign conventions while concomitantly relying on the construction of the legitimate sovereign and its attached identities. Micropatrias add a dynamic dimension to space by layering onto sovereign political constructions heterodox, heterotopic spaces. Subversively, they work to challenge traditional notions of political space through their own transparent national practices and symbols. Specifically by ‘waving’ their national symbols, conceptual deconstructions of the nation, national identity, and nationalism can begin to take place from a detached liminal perspective. Yet, it is important to remember how micropatrias reify the current dominant spatial construction of the sovereign. And that non-legitimated sovereignty is the crucial liminal niche micropatrias reside in to exist; otherwise they dissolve, collapse, transform into the ‘other’ from which they are detached (Gebauer and Wulf 1995, 320). As Gebauer and Wulf point out, “The history of mimesis is a history of disputes over the power to make symbolic worlds, that is, the power to represent the self and others and interpret the world. To this extent mimesis possesses a political dimension and is part of the history of power relations” (1995, 3). Hence, mimetic practices allow for an expanding of symbolic use and an attempt to push beyond hegemonic understandings of reality.
Chapter 7: Diplomacy and Subversive Sovereignty

The penultimate chapter is about diplomacy. Diplomacy is an external representation of a nation-state’s internal desires of involvement in international affairs. It “usually requires reconciling different and often conflicting objectives” (Fréchette 2013, xxxii). Governments, non-government agencies, not-for-profit organizations, and businesses are all involved in contemporary diplomacies. Enacting diplomacy is an attempt to appropriate geopolitical agency. Micropatrial practitioners also practice diplomacy within their networks and attempt to practice it with legitimate sovereigns and local authorities (those in power).

As the head of my own micropatria, I have experienced diplomacy in various forms and various stages of formality. The most formal experience of diplomacy came, not surprisingly, from my time with Princess Anne, daughter of Queen Elizabeth. While we spoke only a few minutes about my research, I was required to stand in a particular spot next to my fellow students in the University of Westminster leadership program. Princess Anne was surrounded by body guards and moved through the line of student leaders, spending time with each one. When one of my fellow leaders stepped out of line the guards were quick to put him back in his designated and hierarchical place. On the other hand, my diplomatic communications with fellow micropatrial practitioners tended to be a mix of formal and casual, often blurring a divide between subversive reality and sovereign fantasy.
Most of my communications with micropatrial practitioners came in the form of emails and posted letters. Sometimes I received gifts of micropatrial paraphernalia (such as postcards and currency), acknowledgments of acceptance as a fellow practitioner (such as shared embassy links), or a sharing of micropatrial information (such as guidance from practitioners on creating my own micropatria). The most memorable occasions came from diplomatic meetings. One diplomatic meeting with a micropatria enclaved by the United States called for handshakes across the border with a tyrannical leader in full military style regalia. This meeting was tightly staged and the practitioner very rarely broke with his micropatrial persona. The meetings with UK practitioners held much less formality.

Meeting with Richard Booth, the King of Hay-on-Wye, took place at his home where I spent a couple of days. The first day I breakfasted with him, he spent the morning repeating a rehearsed speech about the ills of bureaucracy, the idiocy of academics, and his distaste for Rupert Murdoch between mouthfuls of his full English served by his wife and assistant. The second morning was a replay of the first. Being an academic I was among those listed as idiots, but still an outlet for Booth’s nostalgic broken record and ambitious goals of reviving British rural life. My family travelled with me to visit the self-proclaimed King of Hay-on-Wye and, not being academics, received honorary titles of professorship from King Booth. My husband became the Professor of French Book Towns and my daughter the Professor of the Anthropomorphic Tradition. Needless to say they were both thrilled at being given official titles and enjoyed the fact that I
was not. While I was using Richard Booth as a participant in the research, he was simultaneously using me as an audience and snubbing me as an academic.

Claiming to be king and continuing this claim for decades, Richard Booth subversively subsumes reality to further his political agenda of decentralized government. Being a die-hard royalist, Richard Booth purchased a castle in the town center, dons crown, orb, and robe in official images, calls press conferences as the King of Hay-on-Wye, and has written an autobiography of his rise to rule thereby creating a sovereign fantasy that is in league with his loathing of democracy. This coupling of subversive reality and sovereign fantasy is how Richard Booth, and other micropatrial practitioners, diplomatically communicates his motives to the world.

Diplomacy is not only a one way outlet, beginning with practitioner aims and ending in consumption by others, some practitioners work to build micropatrial communities through diplomatic means, such as the Treaty of New Brandenburg (Lovely 2008a):

*Treaty between the Kingdom of Lovely and the United Kingdom of Luthoria regarding the Luthorian colony of New Brandenburg*

The governments of the Kingdom of Lovely and the United Kingdom of Luthoria, in an effort to settle territorial disputes regarding the former territories of Lovely and the colonial expansion of the United Kingdom of Luthoria, have resolved to establish this treaty as an affirmation of understanding between the two nations.

**Article I. Recognition of Lovely**

The United Kingdom of Luthoria hereby recognizes the Kingdom of Lovely as a sovereign and independent nation state, maintaining full territorial integrity over its homelands, their colonial of *sic* Ports Zambelis and Danninia, and all future GSO validated claims.
Article II. Recognition of Luthoria
The Kingdom of Lovely hereby recognizes the sovereignty of United Kingdom of Luthoria as an independent nation state, maintaining territorial integrity over its homelands, existing colonies, and all future GSO validated claims.

Article III. Recognition of Special Influence
The United Kingdom of Luthoria hereby acknowledges the special influence that the Kingdom of Lovely exerts over its former territories, stemming from its unique history as a world power.

Article IV. Recognition of Special Influence
The Kingdom of Lovely hereby acknowledges the special influence that the United Kingdom of Luthoria exerts over its territories.

Article V. New Brandenburg
The Kingdom of Lovely hereby recognizes the exclusive sovereignty of the United Kingdom of Luthoria over the colony of New Brandenburg.

Article VI. Friendship and Non-Aggression
The United Kingdom of Luthoria and the Kingdom of Lovely hereby pledge to a policy of non-aggression, friendship, and cooperation with one another.

This treaty is an example of diplomacy among micropatrial practitioners that lends tangibility to micropatrialism as not only a phenomenon, but a shared practice that can build international networks and relies on diplomatic finesse across micropatrial borders. James Der Derian (2009) writes about the role of diplomacy as a mediation of estranged relationships due to previous alienation of man from others, meaning humans split off into groups breaking solidarity and form smaller groups which then are estranged from other groups. These estranged relationships are mediated through diplomacy (Der Derian 2009). Micropatrial practitioners play with parodic forms of diplomacy to create and extend parallel international networks through treaties, embassies, and ambassadorial representation, while explicitly acknowledging and poking fun at the contemporary hegemony of the state and international systems. As an indicator of exclusionary processes
embedded in sovereign and international diplomatic systems, micropatrial practitioners parodically denaturalize such systems and open up room for questioning of the very taken-for-granted core of acceptance and reification of such systems and their accompanying forms of practices, including diplomacy. For this reason, micropatrial parodic uses of the sovereign doxa within a greater international system are considered in this chapter. After examining some examples from my research of micropatrial parody in the form of international diplomacy, this chapter posits the value of parody as a form of humor, power, and representation. Included in this is a consideration of the paradoxes of parody, illustrating the complexities and entanglements embedded within such representations.

The aim of the chapter is to further engage with the subversive qualities of parody as well as open up for examination alternative forms of national diplomacy beyond the hegemonically approved channels. Parody as a subversive tool challenges the practices of micropatrial hosts and makes more transparent the social, political, and cultural processes that we are all embedded in. International communication, including the accompanying protocols, procedures, and practices, by national elite actors is diplomatic action. An opening up of “channels of contact” (Gilboa 2002, 83) between nations allows for the further reinforcing of an international environment and a global consciousness, while reifying or challenging geopolitical constructions. Geopolitics for our purposes can be considered the “iterative, performative and embodied materialization of spaces and relationships” (Dittmer et al. 2001, 212). Forms of communication between nations range to
include, and are not limited to, foreign aid programs, treaties, international leagues, embassies, trade, visits, letters, emails, and so on. This chapter highlights the ways in which micropatrias use parody in the form of diplomatic means to communicate internationally, including communication with hosts and with each other. Specifically, the focus is on the actions that are taken to spread the identity of the micropatria abroad and how these actions play with declared and constituted forms of statehood. I want to examine micropatrial parodic processes of representation on an international level to include the ways that micropatrias communicate via embassies, leagues, and international forums.

While there is a vast and growing literature on diplomacy and international relations (see for instance any of a variety of journals such as Diplomacy and Statecraft; The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations; Millennium-Journal of International Studies; International Relations; Journal of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Leadership; The Hague Journal of Diplomacy; Journal of International Relations and Development; Journal of International Affairs; European Journal of International Relations; International Studies Quarterly; Stand Journal of International Relations; and the list goes on and on), here I want to briefly focus in on power, in particular hard/soft power. In terms of the performance of diplomacy and the appropriation of power, Joseph Nye (2006) differentiates between the hard and soft power of sovereign performances. He states, “Hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country’s military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies”; and he goes on to stress that “soft power will become increasingly important in ... dealing
with transnational issues that require multilateral cooperation” (2006, 26). On the other hand, Janice Mattern (2005) undermines more traditional notions of sovereign power by arguing for the breakdown of the dichotomy between hard and soft power, seeing the latter as an extension of the former. She presses the issue of the coercive rather than attractive power inherent in soft power and labels this *representational force*. In the diplomacy literature, these powers are discussed in terms of how a sovereign uses each, implying that sovereignty requires both hard and soft power (Ilgen 2006; Hook 2007; Lyon 2007; and Sondhaus 2007). Yet, micropatrias generally rely on the representational power of an alternative (subversive) sovereign diplomacy. Diplomatic performance is the representational force enacted by micropatrial sovereigns within and outside of micropatrial networks through alliances, embassies, lax citizenship procedures, a sense of agency and civics, and, for some, an enjoyable approach to snub formal government. This does not mean that some micropatrias do not play with ideas of economic and military strength, such as the Kingdom of Lovely’s printing and spending of their own national currency within the United Kingdom or the Principality of Sealand’s aggressive firing at a British ship in warning of their proximity to Sealand’s claimed national border, but rather that diplomatic performance is the representational force enacted by these nations as a reminder of the heterogeneity of an international environment and its exclusionary practices. Considering how a declared sovereign uses soft power adds a layer of complexity to the practices of hegemonic norms, the taken-for-granted socio-political constructions (Hannam and Knox 2005), that operate in heterogeneous
international environments; and can elicit further discussion on addressing alternative sovereign diplomacy. As mentioned, these non-legitimated sovereigns are enclaves within ‘host’ sovereigns. Aforementioned, the three major micropatrial host sovereigns are the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. In this chapter, only the specific enclaves within the United Kingdom will be considered for the following discussion on inter-diplomacy and intra-diplomacy, while the listed international organizations do consist of multiple sovereigns from various geographical locations.

Ambassadors and leaders correspond (and sometimes meet) with representatives from other micropatrias, legitimated sovereign nations, and international organizations. These parodic national diplomatic acts make more transparent the ability of some micropatrias to mimic the actions of their sovereign hosts while retaining their liminal niche. This chapter aims to consider what parody is, what it does, and how it is paradoxical. Also, as a parodic outlet, micropatrial diplomacy is illustrated to consider what, as a subversive practice, it can achieve. While many forms of diplomacy exist, such as those listed above, this chapter focuses on embassies, leagues, and forums. These mainstays of diplomacy work to create diplomatic communities. The parodic diplomatic representations of micropatrias point to larger processes of the constitutive forces of sovereigns and their exclusive membership in sovereignty further illustrating the embedded inequalities and esoteric practices of sovereignty and geopolitics. Let us begin with some accounts of acts of parodic diplomacy involving micropatrias in the thesis.
The Alternative Diplomacy of Micropatrias

“Recognition is best when it occurs simultaneously with a reversal”

In Aristotle’s view, the poet as the creator of comedy and tragedy is “a maker of plots rather than of verses” and “the object of his imitation is action” ([350 B.C.E.] 1996, 16-17). This chapter illustrates how diplomacy and sovereignty are not only strategic hegemonic tools employed by constituted powers, but can also be tactically performed by subversive entities that challenge the construction and status of international society (on strategies and tactics see de Certeau 1984). Micropatrias, in an attempt to create new geopolitical actors and international networks, take advantage of the socio-political tensions between constituted de jure ‘imagined realities’ (Anderson [1983] 1991) and de facto performances that offer ‘alternative realities’ (Pop 2006; Lattas 2009; McConnell 2009a). These heterodox performances play with notions of autonomy and agency that interrogate orthodox expressions of diplomacy and sovereignty (see Cross 2007). This creates socio-political spatial representations that call into question these orthodox practices while paradoxically reifying the sovereign-diplomatic doxa (see Bourdieu 1977). Micropatrias offer another alternative example of this heterodox performance per expressions and representations of autonomy and agency.

Micropatrias and Power

Micropatrias are self-declared nations that play with sovereignty through national representations and diplomatic performances. These nations subversively use sovereignty as a parodic template for socio-political critique. Micropatrial
nations claim sovereignty based on the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Micropatrial citizens are practitioners at different levels of involvement that seek commonality based on shared ideologies, rather than birth, race, ethnicity, or religious belief. Many times commonality is based on promotion of sustainability practices, belief in equality, charitable efforts, protests against government bureaucracy, interests in history and role-playing, and so on. They strive not to achieve sovereignty, but declare it. While micropatrial recognition from a host or other legitimate sovereign would be welcomed by practitioners, it is not necessary to the micropatrial endeavor. Spatially, micropatrias are enclaved by constituted hosts. Host here refers in one sense to the location of the enclave within the ‘hosting’ constituted sovereign. This is a matter of placement. In a second sense, it allows for a spatial investigation into the possible types of power-relationships between enclaves and their hosts (see McConnell 2009a). Enclaved within hosts and as self-declared nations, micropatrias take issue with constituted hegemonic norms of sovereignty and diplomacy (Ammon 2001). Hence, micropatrial enclaves engage in formal diplomatic practices in order to reinforce their declared status. This perpetuation of the myth of international status through diplomatic rituals, among other forms of national reification, is reflective of contemporary sovereign practices.

As self-declared nations enclaved within hosts, micropatrias take issue with constituted hegemonic norms of sovereignty and diplomacy. Diplomatic communication reaffirms a world society (Cooper 2002; Sofer 2007) and is intended to create perceptions that maintain a state’s ability to engage with other states (de
Gouveia and Plumridge 2005; Cross 2007; Henrikson 2007). It is how states handle information as commodities that are ‘exchanged, sought out and targeted’ (Potter 2002). Micropatrial practitioners, as geopolitical agents, develop parallel international networks, the “people-to-people conversation[s]” that helps to push for political change by “developing new coalitions” (Leonard et al. 2005, 8, 5); coalitions that are marginal and resistant to hegemonic government gatekeepers (Deibert 2002; Smythe and Smith 2002). This resistance from below challenges the power and domination from above (Cooper 2002; Smythe and Smith 2002). This lends possibilities to the everyday person as they “develop…new competencies for global engagement and mobilization” (Potter 2002, 7; see also Smythe and Smith 2002). These coalitions then can “bypass…traditional gatekeepers of information” (Potter 2002, 5; see also Cooper 2002; Deibert 2002; Smythe and Smith 2002).

Diplomatic non-government coalitions aim for cooperative promotion of agendas (Leonard et al. 2005); and micropatrial practitioners are no different. Communication is intrinsic to diplomacy and “is the field upon which the game of diplomacy is played” (Ammon 2001, 9). Growing communicative technologies and access to them, such as the Internet, television, and news sources, “erode[s] monopolies over knowledge” allowing space for new and alternate forms of knowledge to be shared with audiences (Ammon 2001; see also Deibert 2002; Potter 2002; Smith and Sutherland 2002). Working from a platform of tension between declarative and constitutive sovereignty, micropatrias diplomatically perform in two overarching communicative tactics. First, to reinforce their declared status, typically micropatrias send word to the host via a letter (whether posted,
hand delivered, or sent as an email). At this point, the host has the option to constitute the declaration by response (on constitutive theory as it refers to sovereignty and international society, see Frost 1996). This autonomous representation of the micropatria and micropatrial perspectives on host responses is discussed below as ‘inter-diplomacy’. Secondly, micropatrias communicate with each other in numerous ways lending agency to their sovereign diplomatic performances that is discussed below as ‘intra-diplomacy’. These diplomatic approaches to two target ‘imagined communities’ (the two being the orthodox sovereign and the heterodox micropatria) represent micropatrial communicative performance on a transnational, multilateral scale that paradoxically reifies the sovereign-doxa in complex ways while simultaneously challenging orthodox international constructions of constituted sovereignty.

*Inter-diplomacy: alternative diplomatic performances with the host*

The performance of inter-diplomacy is the socio-political representational force between a declared micropatrial sovereign and a legitimated sovereign and/or international community. The prefix inter here is taken to mean between, therefore between the different types of communities. Inter-diplomacy by enclaves within the United Kingdom usually takes the form of a letter sent by a micropatrial representative to the local host council, Prime Minister, Lord Chancellor, the Queen of England, or even the United Nations. The performance of inter-diplomacy by micropatrias reflects their declared status and represented autonomy, yet the paradoxical need to communicate with others to (re)produce
this autonomy illustrates the need for some practitioners to make a show of attempts at ‘international recognition’ and, in turn, reifies the practices of hegemonic constitution. To a degree, this need belies the pragmatics of the aforementioned declarative theory of statehood. While constitution at first appears as extraneous to micropatrial declarations, given that the sovereign doxa establishes recognition as an intrinsic element of sovereignty, it is sought after by practitioners attempting to gain recognition from other micropatrias and to receive some form of response from sovereign nations.

In return, the United Kingdom as host and the United Nations as international community either do not respond (a refusal to constitute), respond in an aggressive manner (a discursive employing of criminality through arrests and/or court cases for example), or respond politely via either an acknowledged receipt of letter while not referring to the original letter’s contents (an automated protocol) or referring the micropatrial member to another department (a refusal of responsibility). These responses could easily be considered failed diplomacy and examples of the weakness of soft power, yet micropatrias envisage these responses as victories to some degree. The response of a refusal to constitute the enclave is regarded as an acceptance of the declared autonomy, such as when King Danny I of Lovely delivered the Kingdom of Lovely’s declaration of independence to the UK government. After waiting for a response, he stated, “So far I haven’t heard any news so I guess that everything is okay” (Wallace 2005, np). As a practitioner myself, I did not send out any formal declarations to any authority in power. By employing the idea of criminality as a response, the host then creates a tenuous
opportunity for opposition and opens to interpretation whether micropatrial citizens are bound by UK laws. This is illustrated by the Principality of Sealand’s court case which resulted from the aforementioned shots fired at the British Navy from Sealand territory. In the end, Sealand was declared outside of UK jurisdiction (PS 1968). When the host responds politely via a letter as response, the micropatria perceives this as constitution of their declaration. The Sovereign State of Forvik (originally the Crown Dependency of Forvik) repeatedly experiences the polite acknowledgement of letter while being passed to other governmental departments from local authority to the Queen of England. Since no UK authority has directly confronted Forvik’s declared status or prosecuted the leader for non-compliance of laws or non-payment of taxes, Stuart Hill views Forvik as not under UK rules and regulations. As he stated in regards to response versus non-response, “it’s a win-win situation” (personal interview with Stuart Hill September 2010).

While all three types of responses can be hegemonically dismissed as non-constitution, they make transparent the esoteric quality of constituted epistemic sovereign communities on national and international scales. An epistemic community is a “network of professionals ...in a particular domain”; and “actors comprising international society can be viewed as epistemic communities” that operate in a “moderating role” (Cross 2007, 225). For constituted sovereigns, epistemic communities, such as diplomats, are “transnational groups of experts” that “resolve conditions of uncertainty” (Cross 2007, 226), basically they endeavor to “fill what would otherwise be a ‘democracy-gap’” (Cross 2007, 240). Micropatrial diplomats create epistemic communities and experts through
transnational and multilateral performances to fill a democracy gap and lend autonomy and agency to the shared ideologies of their members. Epistemic communities are not limited to governments, but can be international communities of transnational non-profits, private transnational companies in banking or shipping (Hasenclever et al. 2000). What occurs is a sharing of experience, expertise, and knowledge for “international action and a vision of a better public policy” (Hasenclever et al. 2000, 5).

Intra-diplomacy: embassies and organizations and forums

Turning to such shared ideologies, the performance of intra-diplomacy is the socio-political representation between micropatral sovereigns, citizens, and international communities. The prefix intra here is taken to mean among, therefore among the micropatral communities. While these communities constitute the declared sovereignty of micropatras, they also constitute international diplomacy along micropatral networks. Intra-diplomacy is successful in terms of constitution within these epistemic communities and is an exoteric tactic that reflects upon the esoteric strategies of host sovereigns, such as the United Kingdom, and international epistemic communities, such as the United Nations. These performances lend agency to micropatral diplomats by means of a multilateral and transnational approach. Where micropatral inter-diplomacy could be argued from one perspective to be unsuccessful, intra-diplomacy creates epistemic communities that are successful in terms of constitution within these communities. Whilst inter-diplomacy is typically limited to the three previously mentioned responses, intra-
diplomacy is vast. Transnational and multilateral examples include embassies, forums, treaties, contact (visits, emails, and letters), gifts, leagues, international practices, such as a Micronational Olympics, and cooperation across borders, such as joint ventures in space programs. For purposes of brevity, three of these examples are considered below: first, the sovereign diplomacy of embassies and consulates as transnational performances; second, the sovereign diplomacy of membership in international organizations as multilateral performances; and third, how diplomatic representational force is enacted on micropatrial international forums.

Embassies and consulates are a mainstay of the diplomatic corps that reify the epistemic community of diplomats and orthodox sovereignty (Berridge 2007; Sofer 2007). The 138 pages of the September 2010 issue of the London Diplomatic List by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BFCO) supports this claim by cataloguing the hundreds of members of the London Diplomatic Corps. The BFCO also makes available the extensive embassy locations the United Kingdom maintains scattered around the globe. The importance of diplomacy to the United Kingdom would be hard to question upon browsing this profuse information. The BFCO states that: “It’s not just about delivering messages but holding a two-way dialogue, listening to and learning from audiences around the world, in order to get a better understanding of the changing perceptions of the UK and its policies” (2010, np).

Diplomatic outlets are also important to the representational force of the micropatria, maybe even more so in the case of intra-diplomatic constitution.
Diplomatic representation further reinforces micropatrial declared sovereign claims and plays with notions of sovereignty and diplomacy. This playful approach situates micropatrias as parodies, therefore humorous, therefore falling into the convention of a non-serious category. Yet, the serious humor of micropatrial engagement allows for a platform that challenges and questions taken-for-granted geopolitical constructions. An example is the sharing of digital links between the Nation of Heliotrope and the Principality of Paulovia. Paulovia has opened up space for Heliotrope on its website as an embassy as has Heliotrope opened up a space for Paulovia at its international embassy. More on this, the Principality of Paulovia, which has 49 consulates throughout the world (fig. 7.1), finds that diplomacy aims to (PP 2010b, np):

Represent the interests of Paulovian Citizens and provide advice and support in their host countries; promote the principles, ethos and culture of Paulovia and build friendship and understanding between Paulovian citizens and all peoples worldwide....

Promote and support international and local charities, relief organisations, environmental, health and education organisations and programmes, emergency aid appeals and campaigns among [sic] citizens and non-citizens alike in their region. ... This is the key role of the Diplomatic Corps.
Figure 7.1: Example of Consulates for the Principality of Paulovia, European Region. Source: http://www.paulovia.org/consulates_directory.html.

This statement highlights two main goals of Paulovian diplomacy: promoting Paulovian beliefs and aid to foreign nations. Micropatrial consulates and embassies are symbolic and represent a shared and layered space, rather than a territorially fixed place. This symbolism is a mutual recognition of efforts in pursuit of micropatrial causes and shared values in outreach. Micropatrial digitally or orally agreed upon consulates and embassies are imagined without requiring physical presence. Ambassadors who tend to these consulates and embassies are further agreeing to aid in the continuance of micropatrial practices and particular statements of shared belief, such as peace and equality. These goals are similar to many diplomatic aims by constituted sovereigns, like the United Kingdom, and organizations, like the United Nations.

Switching to a hosting position, the Democratic Republic of Bobalania (which has official relations with over 20 micropatrias) and the Realm of Strathclyde hosts 10 and 18 embassies, respectively, within their borders (DRB 2010; RS 2010).
These diplomatic relations are not open to all sovereigns, but are typically based on democratic ideals. For instance, in terms of diplomatic sanctions, the Realm of Strathclyde refuses diplomatic relations with sovereigns that breach basic human rights such as discrimination, racism, religious non-tolerance, violation of human rights or civil liberties, or the advocating of terrorism. This mimesis of legitimated sovereign diplomacy opposes the exclusionary practices of sovereignty, sovereign diplomacy, and international sovereign organizations. With messages of peace and concern for human welfare and charitable outreach, little seems to separate these non-constituted, yet declared sovereigns from constituted sovereigns in terms of sovereign diplomacy.

International sovereign organizations are key agents in multilateral diplomatic performance. The United Nations is such as an epitomic international sovereign organization. Established in 1945, there are currently 192 member states in the United Nations Organization. The UN charter explicitly lays out four purposes (UN 1945, Chapter 1, Article 1):

1. To maintain international peace and security...;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples...;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems ...and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. (UN 1945, np)

The Commonwealth Organization, as an example of another international sovereign organization, also reinforces similar ideals as the United Nations in regards to ideological support, development goals, freedom, equality, and peace for all sovereign members: “The Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 54 countries...”
that support each other and work together towards shared goals in democracy and development.... it is the association’s values which unite its members: democracy, freedom, peace, the rule of law and opportunity for all” (CS 2011, np). What can be taken from international sovereign organizations of cooperation such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth are the explicit values that bind such organizations together to create epistemic communities that function through representational force to fill in the democracy gap. These shared values and more (like sustainability and green practices) are also expressed by many non-government organizations that work as geopolitical actors to form alternative diplomacy and aid networks, such as Doctors without Borders, Amnesty International, the Red Cross, the Jane Goodall Institute, the World Wildlife Fund, and so on. Keeping in mind a caveat in regards to the small percentage of right-wing micropatrias, generally micropatrias share in many of these values, especially human rights, sustainability, tolerance, and equality.

International micropatrial organizations offer digital international communities for member states to share concerns, consider possibilities, and practice statehood. The fundamental function of such organizations is recognition of sovereign claims via diplomatic representation and digital communication. The League of Secessionist States (which has around 40 member ‘states’) for instance “exists to promote intermicronational communication and partnership, and serves to act as a supramicronational, impartial body where such a need for one exists” (LOSS 2011, np; emphasis original). LOSS challenges which sovereigns (constituted or declared) have the right to such actions of agency. The League of Active
Micronations (LOM 2010, np), like LOSS, works to maintain micropatrial practice and constitutes through intra-diplomatic representation. LOM (which has 35 member nations) encourages peaceful dialogue and international cooperation between nations. While not as explicit in their comparison as LOSS to similar types of organizations, LOM still mimetically captures goals similar in spirit and form to the United Nations. Another example is the Organization of Active Micronations (which has 84 member nations) that works to “maintain micronational peace and security” as well as implement “recognition of sovereignty and legitimacy of government of every member micronation” (OAM 2011, np). A final example here is the Grand Unified Micronational (which has a mixture of approximately 55 members and delegates). GUM states that it is (2011, np):

...a voluntary association of unrecognised nation states who wish to develop their nations in the social, political, cultural, economic and scientific spheres of development and who also wish to enjoy the benefits of a collective security policy. ... The GUM is also renowned for it’s [sic] intermicronational peacekeeping efforts, striving to resolve conflicts where they arise by providing independent mediation and - where absolutely necessary - trying to provide the appropriate legal and military defence to member states to share concerns, consider possibilities, and practice statehood. The fundamental function of such organizations is recognition of sovereign claims via diplomatic representation and digital communication who are threatened by outside forces.

GUM reflects similar ideologies to that of the United Nations and the Commonwealth while challenging the diplomatic exclusivity of these types of organizations. These international organizations are made up of micropatrial practitioners representing their nations. While there are numerous types of these organizations, many micropatrias overlap membership in these groups. What all these examples represent is how micropatrias transnationally and multilaterally
perform sovereign diplomacy. These organizational performances challenge the right to diplomatic agency under the banner of sovereignty. Such performances create epistemic communities that are similar to those in the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the Commonwealth. These heterodox representations of intradiplomacy work to constitute micropatrias and reinforce the doxa of sovereignty while paradoxically challenging the orthodoxy of constituted sovereignty.

Micropatrias heavily rely on digital forms of representation and communication. Forums, and guest books, are a popular form of communication within and amongst micropatrias. For example, on my micropatrial guestbook, visitors have left messages of support, such as “Greetings to Your Majesty Lady Moreau and the people of Heliotrope! May our two nations grow and prosper in the light of the sun!” This message was left by HRH Prince Paul of the Principality of Paulovia. Below are some other micropatrial examples of embassy visitor’s comments. Beyond the information dissemination of the international embassy websites, the forums further communication. Among other concerns such as the various political characteristics within particular micropatrias, citizen status, national concerns, and suggestions for blossoming micropatrias, diplomacy plays a large role in the discussions on these forums. Diplomatic topics range from greetings, acknowledgements, and treaties to disagreements and citizen violations of other nations. Forums and guest books allow micropatrias a low cost way of maintaining international diplomatic communication with other nations and citizens from other nations.
One common communicative strategy found on these forums and guest books is the initial greeting, where micropatrias formally introduce themselves. For instance, one such greeting below highlights how digital communication can function to initiate diplomatic communication and create international micropatrial networks (Lovely 2008b):

Lovely: Greetings!

I would like to introduce myself as the People's Commissar for the Exterior of the Katyusha Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.

The Katyusha SFSR is interested in establishing amicable relations with the Kingdom of Lovely, and we invite you to come and explore our Workers Paradise at our forum.

If the Kingdom of Lovely should decide to send an [sic] representative to Katyusha, they would be most welcome and our best security precautions would be taken.

In micronational friendship,

Ivono Nortonovitch Orlov
People's Commissar for the Exteror [sic] Katyusha Soviet Federal Socialist Republic

This form of gaining an audience with micropatrial leaders is an accepted form of introduction. For instance, on the Grand Duchy of the Lagoan Isles’ guestbook H.S.H Eric Ball, the Grand Duke of Elsanor, leaves a greeting. This greeting includes a shared preference for monarchical government rule, “the monarchy is the purest form of rule”, and the aim for an allied future “I hope we can enjoy diplomatic relations in the future” (GDLI, 2006). As well, the Grand Duchy of the Lagoan Isles’ guestbook hosts messages of those seeking to open diplomatic relations; and such offers come from a wide range of geographical locations, for example: the Sovereign State of Hezpenya (near the Iberian Peninsula); the
Nation of Hightower (enclaved within Canada); the Kingdom of Lovely
(enclaved by the United Kingdom); from a citizen of the Basque Country
(enclaved by Spain); and an exiled King of Lundy Island. While guest books offer
an opportunity for contact, communication is limited to messages rather than
two-way conversation. Forums offer up greater communication potential for
numerous micropatrial participants to be involved in the communication
process. Forums are set up by micropatrias to inform and discuss internal and
external concerns. Micropatrial forums are generally open for viewing by the
general public, but usually require registration to access permission to
participate. Registration is often simple: username, password, email, maybe
website, gender, date of birth, occasionally a small fee, and so on. For example,
below are screen captures of the forum registration for the Democratic Republic
of Bobalania [DRB 2010], the Principality of Paulovia, and the Sovereign State of
Forvik (fig. 7.2).
Figure 7.2: Citizen applications for the Democratic Republic of Bobalania, the Principality of Paulovia, and the Sovereign State of Forvik. Sources: www.bobalania.com (no longer active link); http://www.paulovia.org/citizenship.html; and http://www.forvik.com/index.php?option=com_community&view=register.

Once registered, an individual is able to post messages, reply to posted messages, and participate in a micropatrial community. Posts are limited in that comments can lead to a person being barred from the site, meaning they lose access to posting capabilities, or spark arguments that can lead to internal
divisions within a nation or external embargos. For example, this post declares a ceasing of diplomatic relations with Ocia on the Kingdom of Lovely’s forum (Lovely, 2009):

The Kingdom of Lovely does not recognise the Democratic Republic of Ocia and shall have no further diplomatic relations with them. All Lovely citizens are advised not to do business in the DRO.

Beyond diplomatic greetings or declarations, recognition, legitimacy, and alliances are formed on micropatrial forums. An example of a treaty between two micropatrias further reinforces declaration, constitution, and legitimacy of the Democratic Republic of Bobalania and the Peoples Republic of K-Marx (PRKM 2007):

On the 14th of November the following treaty was signed:

Treaty of Recognition between The Democratic Republic of Bobalania and The Peoples Republic of K-Marx

The treaty of recognition shall acknowledge the recognition between the above nations. This shall include land claims; of both macronational and micronational nature, external organization associated with the nations, and the general existence of the nations as a whole.

Both nations will send a representative of there [sic] country every so often to the other nation to keep relations healthy and to ensure everything is ok in the other nation.

The above nations may start an embassy on each others forums, if this is requested, here the representative of the other nation will become moderator of this board and will post regular updates within there [sic] home country.

Both the nations will insert in their official website and any other sites, the link of the address (URL) of the other micronation. And will announce there [sic] relations on there [sic] forum and news channel (blog) if applicable.

Bobalanian Signature: Bobbie Bailey
Alliances come in many forms through micropatrial diplomacy, and at times consist of multiple nations being involved in treaty formation. The Council of Free Nations Treaty is one such example (Lovely 2008c)

The Council of Free Nations Treaty

In cognizance of the fact that the object of the Communist Faction is the disintegration of, and the commission of violence against, existing States by the exercise of all means at its command,

Believing that the toleration of interference by the Communist Faction in the internal affairs of nations not only endangers their internal peace and social welfare, but threatens the general peace of the two worlds,

Being inspired by their common principles of liberty, free enterprise, rule of law and constitutional government,

Desiring to co-operate for defence against communistic disintegration, have agreed as follows.

Article I
No nation may be admitted to this alliance which does not share the common principles mentioned in the pre-amble and that has not been in existence for more than three months on either Giess or Micras.

Article II
The High Contracting States agree that they will mutually keep each other informed concerning the activities of the Communist Faction, will confer upon the necessary measure of defence, and will carry out such measures in close co-operation.

Article III
The High Contracting States will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is menaced by the disintegrating work of the Communist Faction, to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of the present Agreement or to participate in the present Agreement.

Article IV
The High Contracting States agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised, will assist the High Contracting State or High Contracting States so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other High Contracting States, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the territorial domains of the High Contracting States.

Article V
The Agreement shall come into force on the day of its signature and shall remain in force for the term of six months. The High Contracting States will, in a reasonable time before the expiration of the said term, come to an understanding upon the further manner of their co-operation.

Article VI
The Council of Free nations shall have its permanent headquarters in the Lovely territory of Home. Within these headquarters there shall be a Grand Assembly for all contracting states and shall be presided over by one of the High Contracting States. There shall be a Micran Committee to deal with issues arising on Micras. There shall also be a Giessian Committee to deal with issues arising on Giess. Both these committees will be chaired by a High Contracting State.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have affixed hereto their seals and signatures.

Signed for the Empire of the Alexandrians,
Signed for the Kingdom of Babkha
Signed for the Britanic Empire
Signed for the Kingdom of Lovely

Not only are treaties forged and signed, but offers of help between nations are inscribed on the forums further strengthening alliances and networks. Another form of inscriptions displays the branching out of diplomatic offices within other micropatrias or established nations. On the Grand Duchy of the Lagoan Isles site, a citizen of the Principality of Snake Hill gives offers for Consul General Offices in New Zealand and California, as well as an Ambassadorship. Adding to these forms of representation, citizens and site-users aid leaders through forum
participation and suggestions of diplomatic actions. For example, one forum post on the Crown Dependency of Forvik’s site offers a funny, but somewhat ludicrous suggestion (CDF #53):

I have one heck of an idea.
This is not all that silly.
1) Forvik must declare war on the USA
2) At some point Forvik will surrender and of course accept foreign aid.

That should take care of Housing, schools, a hospital, environmental remediation, a seat in the UN, possible admission to NATO, and training the Forvik Military.

While the Steward of Forvik, Stuart Hill, did not respond to this message, another site visitor did (CDF #90):

Somebody was been watching the film 'The Mouse That Roared' a little too often.
Forvik is not a middle-european country - it is a single island with fewer than two residents. It is not trying to get money, it is trying to prove its existence.

This reply points out two things. First, how communication is open and creates and reinforces international micropatrial networks, even where there are disagreements, disputes, or caustic comments. Second, the intertextuality of micropatrias are read and interpreted by multiple users. More specifically in this instance the reference to the film/book The Mouse that Roared in which Grand Fenwick, a ‘fictitious’ micropatria, declares war on the United States in hopes of gaining international aid to fund their failing treasury. Another post on the forum further offers Stuart suggestions of how to proceed in terms of international tactics (CDF #59):
Hi Stuart

Ive [sic] just sent the best bit of 3hrs reading letters and stuff on the site, and i laughed out loud at your attempts to rock the boat and stir things up tring [sic] to get taken to court, I have a few ideas myself:

Contact the Norwegian crown and tell them you have retaken the Island.

You should claim diplomatic immunity when on the shetland [sic] etc, the land rover should have had diplomatic flags on the wings.

send HMRC a cheque [sic] for the amount owed in Forvik currency lol

Start a radio station, sure to cause a stir

put red diesel in your landrover [sic]

claim the uk [sic] as a part to Forvik

demand the repayment of all taxes imposed [sic] by the Uk over the last few hundred years

contact the queen and ask for the appointment [sic] of a Lieutenant Governor, if she refuses appoint [sic] one yourself.... a sealion [sic] or bird something [sic] daft

start to take in paying guests to the island, on working holidays to help you build stuff on the island.

start importing pigs from mexico [sic] and open a Viking [sic] hamburger joint.

on a serious not you need to think about starting a government, and pointing officials, and think about embassies and consulates, and you need to write a constitution.

Stuart responds to this post regarding a proposed radio station (CDF #94):

If and when I start a radio station, I won't be looking for loopholes, I'll be looking for as many ways as possible to get the 'AUTHORITIES' to prove their position.

Stuart

On his international embassy website forum, Stuart purposefully provokes the UK authorities in hopes of clashing in courts (CDF #54):
I’m saying there is no legal basis for the imposition of UK statutes, or EU directives here in Shetland. All my activities are directed towards exposing that. The only reason that those statutes and directives have any power is because we do not question them.

What all these examples are meant to illustrate is how micropatrias are subversive sovereigns that parodically play with sovereign diplomacy by way of an appropriated representational force. And the digital component adds wide reaching and increasingly democratic possibilities as a form of formal diplomacy (Potter 2002). Through the remainder of this chapter I consider some of the implications of these practices of parodic diplomacy.

**A Means to Subvert**

The forms of diplomacy accounted for above are parodies of what goes on between legitimate states. Parody is a ‘rebellious humour’ that “outwardly mocks the rules and the rulers” (Billig 2005, 207). This mocking allows for a ‘delight’ in subverting norms and rules and offers ‘moments of freedom’ from imposed social constraints (Billig 2005, 207, 208). Parody is a challenge, yet meant to stay a parody, never meant to be adopted in place of that which it parodies. By breaking the word parody down we can further gauge the function. The first part para means beside and opposite and the second part ode means song (Rose 1993, 46). Hence, it is a representational form that is similar, yet different. It emerges from and requires an already existing form; therefore it subverts the form from which it is born. Yet, while Douglas sees successful subversion through humor as that which “changes the balance of power” (1968, 365), I tend to think that rather than culminating in such a strong effect, it works to flag the failures of power. Such
failures being the dominant actions or inactions that individuals and groups find dissatisfaction with. Parody, in a sense, is a socio-political monitoring device. Now, whether parody produces change or is even noticed by dominant powers is subjective. Some official spaces have been created for humor and parody, such as Carnival. But, for the purposes of the thesis, the focus is on the unofficial (non-sanctioned) humor. What parody does is open up space for questioning the status quo and conversing on taboos. The receiver of the parody, the audience, is then given a frame in which to think about the taken-for-granted. Nevertheless, agreeing with Douglas’ consideration of humor, however, I can see how parody drops the magic curtain that hides the wizard who makes everything seem so in-place. Humor disrupts the illusion and shows how constructed society is “arbitrary and subjective” (Douglas 1968, 372).

In addition, from their liminal positioning, the agents of parody accomplish an easing of reality through illustrating the arbitrary constructions we assume as natural; and therefore open up possibilities for alternative ways to view the world (Douglas 1968, 372). The power of parody, laughter, and humor subvert the status quo, while at the same time reifying it (Mbembe 1996). This subversion “builds its own world versus the official world, its own church versus the official church, its own state versus the official state” (Bakhtin 1984, 88). Parody, as a form of reversal, challenges such arbitrary hierarchy. Like the subversive social clubs, parody is a form of play. And like the micropatrias, some subversive social clubs declare themselves autonomous entities, taking on subversive forms of sovereignty. What takes place through these types of parodying, of micropatrias in general and
particular subversive social clubs, is the critiquing of the “structure of national authority” and the ‘derealization’ of “Jure divino, patriarchy, and absolute rule” (Shields 1994, 300). Micropatrias, like autonomous social clubs, critique and derealize through their parodic national representations, especially through diplomatic action.

Micropatrias employ various techniques and tools by way of their humorous expressions, such as the lovable buffoonery of satire (Jacobson 1997, 146); the independence, distance, and game play of irony (Smith 1996, 9); and the ludicrousness of parody (Bergson 1956, 81). Linda Hutcheon (1994) points out how these various forms of humor are entangled and enrich each other. Their actions and agency creates subversive forms of sovereignty. Satire, irony, and parody, as tools of representation, therefore can work to subvert the status quo if not sanctioned, if unofficial (Espinoza-Vera 2009). Douglas captures how humor and subversiveness work together, “Whatever the joke, however remote its subject, the telling of it is potentially subversive. Since its form consists of a victorious tilting of un-control against control, it is an image of the leveling of hierarchy, the triumph of intimacy over formality, of unofficial values over official ones” (1968, 366). Humor as a tool, as a tactic (de Certeau 1984) of representation and critique, only works subversively from a distance, separating the subversion from the subverted (Westwood 2004, 781). As a result, micropatrias require distance from sovereignty and therefore must retain their subversive non-legitimated sovereign status, but continue to rely on the parent form for an intertextual understanding of the parody. Accordingly then, micropatrial representations geopolitically challenge
hegemonic constructions of the nation, national identity, nationalism, and sovereignty through such tools as satire, irony, and especially parody while concomitantly making these processes more transparent.

Such tools of humor are expressive means appearing through “[d]istortion, exaggeration, and reversal” (Reik 1941, 155). The reversal is the “phantasy” (Reik 1941, 152) where “with a little imagination, another possibly can be conceived” (Reik 1941, 148). While parody displays mimesis to that which it is intertextually referring to, irony displays an incongruity between what is being said or implied and what is actually meant. Particularly, irony functions by way of agency as “oppositional rhetoric” (Hutcheon 1994, 11-12) and “the discursive community makes the irony possible” (Hutcheon 1994, 19). As mentioned in Chapter 6, the liminal positioning works to reify that which the micropatria criticizes (the sovereign doxa) while simultaneously and subversively revealing the socio-political and unnatural construction of the sovereign through ironic nationalisms and parody. Barry Sanders notes that, “The ironist has a political agenda, to subvert the status quo ... however, ironists do not intend to overthrow the reigning order. They merely [attempt to] prod and poke and strike their way toward reform” (1995, 235). The status quo is the “maintenance of the distribution of power” (Morganthau 1993, 51); and the existing order of power in power at this particular moment is the legitimated sovereign.

Therefore, micropatrias, through their ironic expressions of nationalism and parodying of sovereigns work to ‘prod and poke’ the status quo through subversive representations to ‘expose construction’ of the sovereign (Taussig 1993, 68). These
expressions of humor are ‘politically charged’ (Ridanpää 2009, 729). In this respect, humor is not the binary opposite of seriousness, but a manifestation of it (Macpherson 2008). Parody creates room for criticism, questioning, and ‘consciousness-raising’ towards efforts at “preventing the acceptance of the narrow, doctrinaire, dogmatic views of any particular ideological group” (Hutcheon 1985, 103). Parody is an ancient form of representation that represents the elements of the target that are not promoted by the target (Bakhtin 1982, 51, 55).

As Mikhail Bakhtin puts it “parody discovered the Achilles’ heel that was open to derision” (1984, 87). Here the Achilles’ heel being the unnatural construction of orthodox sovereignty and hegemonic geopolitical understandings. Parody is an “authorized transgression” that involves “ideological implications” (Hutcheon 1985, 110), hence further stressing parody as a form of seriousness. Parody offers power, power for political commentary against the dominant constructions of society and aesthetics, as well as, renewal (Hutcheon 1985, 110, 115). It is a form of art meant as a tool “to provoke reaction” (Hutcheon 1985, 115) and prompts intertextual discursive playfulness as well as ‘self-reflexivity’ (Hutcheon 1985, 2). Parody as a form of imitation requires a reversal of norms, an ‘ironic inversion’ and ‘cunning cannibalization’ (Hutcheon 1985, 6, 8). In an increasingly globalizing world where various forms of media work to inform of happenings at locations across the world, the power of parody is infinite; it grows with wider audiences understanding the target of the parodist. Social media disseminates and defines images for audiences, hitting on the power of the visual and the role of media as translator. Hutcheon talks about how the “competence of
the reader” is important to the proliferation and understanding of the parody (1985, 19). This is due to the intertextual nature. Like a parasite, it requires a host from which to form an identity and a relationship. For micropatrias, that host is the sovereign system including sovereignty, diplomacy, the nation, and nationality. Parody, as a tactical tool, offers the power of transformation, yet paradoxically also continuity through its “critical distance” (Hutcheon 1985, 20).

Parody creates ‘discrepancy or incongruity’ by “offering at least two texts within one work” (Rose 1993, 37, 40). We could label the work as the sovereign system (the doxa) and the two opposing texts here that of the hegemonically understood, the orthodox, and the alternative to the hegemonic, the heterodox. The paradox, again reiterated here, requires parody to reside at a liminal critical distance, yet feed off of the supplying structure (the doxa). This allows for transformations, but also creates continuity (Rose 1993, 41). Yet, ambivalence belies to some degree the critical distance of the parody: “This ambivalence may entail not only a mixture of criticism and sympathy for the parodied text, but also the creative expansion of it into something new” (Rose 1993, 51). Margaret Rose calls this something new a ‘refunctioning’ of the object of the parody into the parody itself (1993, 83).

Micropatrias use tools to challenge orthodox geopolitics while reifying the sovereign doxa. By creating embassy sites that are open for citizens and visitors alike to visit and sometimes interact, becoming part of the narrative, practitioners are making visible arbitrary sovereign constructions while simultaneously lending agency to participants. Primarily, parody plays this role. Micropatrias create
nations, produce national symbols, and practice international diplomacy. This paradoxical positioning allows micropatrias, through their parodies, to make more transparent processes of the nation, nationalism, national identity, and sovereignty.

To refresh from Chapter 6, doxa is what Bourdieu terms as ‘sense of reality’ (1977, 164). This unquestioned reality becomes manageable, moldable, and defendable through two types of expressions. First, orthodox practices further reinforce social constructions to naturalize the current doxa. Second, heterodox practices challenge orthodox practices to highlight their unnaturalness. And adding to this, paradox then means simultaneously beside and opposite...a ‘contradictory’ expression (Reik 1941, 39). The paradox of micropatrias themselves is paradoxical: “something that rationally could not exist and yet it is there” (Reik 1941, 39).

Paradox is part of humor (Berger 1997, 136) through destruction and regeneration, a social leveler (Douglas 1968, 374). Parody to exist takes on a paradoxical manifestation. It must reference from the past, the knowable, it is intertextual as well as containing elements of satire and irony (Espinoza-Vera 2009, 237). This intertextuality parodies the knowable by placing it with “a different set of codes” and adds “new levels of meaning—and illusion” (Hutcheon 1985, 110; 30). Hutcheon best explains parody (1985, 106-107):

The ideological status of parody is paradoxical, for parody presuppose both authority and its transgression, or, as we have just seen, repetition and difference... Yet, while it is true that parodic borrowing or stealing challenges this [appropriation in terms of property] and that parody can certainly appropriate the past in order to effect a cultural critique, it is also true that any concept of textual appropriation must implicitly place a certain value upon the original. In fact, some have argued that the past is often pirated by the avant-garde as a way of both softening and giving meaning to radicalness: the new can shock only when underwritten by the old.
Within micropatrial diplomacy, parodying of legitimated sovereigns and international organizations takes place. Such parody also occurs within legitimate sovereigns, so parody is not unique to micropatrias, but a tool to use. As a form of serious and humorous representation, parody works to challenge these hegemonic constructions, while simultaneously and contradictorily reifying them. This creates the paradox of micropatrial representation. On one hand subversive of the state and sovereignty and on the other a mechanism of reification of geopolitical sovereign systems.

**Conclusion - Playing with Diplomacy**

Micropatrial sovereign diplomacy performs as a way to parodically play with hegemonic constructions of sovereignty and diplomacy; and as a result challenges the exclusionary nature of constituted sovereigns and international organizations. By creating enclaves within hosts, micropatrial sovereign diplomacy parodically works dynamically to emphasize the pragmatic and complex spatial layers that exist and are often hidden behind the hegemony of non-legitimation. Through their autonomous declarations and inter-diplomacy, micropatrias parodically call into question the right of membership in the international community and the constitution of sovereignty. Through their heterodox agency, micropatrias playfully move in and out and beyond the esoteric orthodoxy of sovereignty. This move then begs the question whether the tension of declarative versus constitutive sovereignty even matters. Specifically, since this tension is a springboard for parodic distancing and playfulness, for micropatrial practitioners
this tension is not one to be resolved, but to be toyed with. In essence, highlighting this tension through parodic play, makes more transparent how this tension works in an exclusionary process of cutting out the excess which does not fit the mold, in turn, creating geopolitical anomalies (like the TGiE) that have impact and are greatly impacted by such processes. Micropatrial citizens, tactically employing autonomous representations and expressions of agency, transform into heterodox geopolitical actors. Via these diplomatic performances, micropatrias spatially play with the normative spatialities of sovereign diplomacy. This playfulness, the performance of sovereignty and the numerous tactics of diplomatic communication, make transparent the mix of inclusionary/exclusionary practices embedded in the conventional international system.
Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks

In Chapter 1 I proposed some research questions to prompt my investigation into micropatrial practices. From these questions I focused my examination on the subversion, representation, and spatiality of micropatrias (politically and culturally) through their parodic identities, symbols, and diplomacy and the attached identities that are created within and entangled with the United Kingdom. Here, in Chapter 8, I return to these initial prompts that motivated the thesis and ask what micropatrias are and what do they tell us about core geopolitical concepts such as nationalism, internationalism, and hegemonic sovereignty.

First, micropatrias produce alternate sovereign realities; they produce strangeness. Second, micropatrias attempt to engage hegemonic sovereigns and extend their networks within parallel sovereign realities; they are counter to sovereign hegemony. Third, in manifesting sovereignty as arbitrary, they appropriate power towards achieving their goals (whether they are successful or not). In these terms it is possible to consider the micropatria as a form of creative or alternative geopolitical practice; and as such we can borrow from Ingram and say that they ‘interrupt the normal’ (2012a) and offer different geopolitical imaginings (2011; 2012b).
National Identity

The focus of the thesis on UK enclaves offered the opportunity to do a spotlight study of such micropatrial symbols of identity in a bounded territory with an inter-sub-national relational element. A thesis about the ways people (re)imagine themselves by creating a nascent identity and national construct that cannot shed previous socially constructed identities from their surrounding nation-states. From this research, one of the most telling things is that identity shifts in degrees, rather than being created as new, even at the level of the micropatria. For example, micropatrial symbols from UK enclaves appropriate UK symbols. They transform these symbols, but keep visible elements or remnants of the UK identity. This illustrates that while nations form and change over time, as is seen from the collapse of the USSR or Yugoslavia or any number of examples of this ilk, there are traces left behind that are entangled elements of identities. These traces are existent in micropatrial practices and offer the potential for practitioners to retain the elements they find attractive or are an integral part of their identity while dropping the others.

National Symbols

According to Ingram, there is an “upsurge in artistic interventions addressing contemporary geopolitics” (2009, 258). While Ingram lists a variety of ‘site-specific’ interventions of artistic display, we can add to this list discourse-specific interventions for micropatrial practitioners as possible geopolitical actors. Micropatrias, as representations of nations, can be considered forms of creative
interventions into contemporary geopolitics. One form of micropatrial representation is national symbols. As intertextual levers, symbols evoke emotions and rely on identity and experience as to what particular emotion is roused. Symbols become indicators of much more than an aesthetic visual image or textual document. For example, national flags are burned at protests to rally anti-patriotic emotions, songs are played at events to draw from people a shared identity, and documents and artifacts are displayed in museums to remind patrons of their existence, their import, and their patriotic connections. As another example, international symbols can be sources of cohesion or contestation; even when they are superficially meant to globally link the world in camaraderie. Controversy over the 2012 Olympic symbol is an instance of simultaneously being a source of cohesion and contestation (fig. 8.1). Iran threatened to pull out of the 2012 Olympic Games when reading into the symbol the word ‘ZION’ (Borger 2011; Lipman 2011). As a form of meaning, symbols play a role in the everyday; they are markers from which to gauge internal and external identity; they are representations of intentions.
Micropatrial national symbols are not limited for practitioners and come in all shapes and forms, ranging from textual documents (like declarations) to visual icons (like images of leaders) to everyday symbols (like flags and currency). Common practices include the creation of regal or ‘official’ images of those ‘in power’ wearing the ‘right’ dress, postage stamps, currency notes and coins, emblems, national anthems, laws, constitutions, flags, borders, passports, visa stamps, and ‘trademarked’ goods like t-shirts and coffee mugs. What all these symbols of the micropatrial nation have in common is their subversive representation vis-à-vis the host nation; their strange sovereign declarations of statehood.
**International Diplomacy**

Diplomacy reinforces the international system and externally reifies notions of sovereignty. Performing diplomacy can create alliances, push forward treaties, and diffuse cultural information beyond borders; and the role of social media plays an important role in modern diplomacy and epistemic communities (see for instance Morgenthau 1993; Mattern 2005; Nye 2006; and Cross 2007). Diplomatic attempts can be fruitful or disastrous, but diplomacy is always a show, a representation, an intertextual embodiment by an ‘authority’. Diplomatic representatives cross sovereign thresholds and transcend national norms and regulations. Diplomats themselves become political negotiators outside of society.

Reactions and dialogue are the main forms of diplomatic endeavors by micropatrias beyond supporting charitable organizations. The communicative, diplomatic approaches by micropatrias typically take the form of either inter-diplomacy or intra-diplomacy. Inter-diplomacy between micropatrias and their legitimated hosts often seems rather one-sided, yet micropatrial leaders’ reactions to host (non)responses is divulging of their indifference to the host and playfulness with the tensions between declarative and constitutive theories of statehood. Intra-diplomacy, or diplomacy within micropatrial realities, creates communities and international networks that surpass the ‘official’ channels of sovereign diplomacy and offer up alternative geopolitical interventions. This nexus re-infuses micropatrial practices, lends an internal legitimacy between nations, and adds practitioners to micropatrial sovereignty. These networks and practices create a paradox of subversive sovereignty and diplomacy. While challenging who has rights
to internally represent sovereignty and to externally constitute sovereigns, these representations are parodic of the sovereign and diplomatic doxa, and hence micropatrias still reify the foundations of the system they challenge and critique. Micropatrial diplomacy is a creative geopolitical intervention to shake off the anomic vestiges that trap the inhabitants of the globalized world (Merton 1938). It is a way to show that there are other identities, other beliefs, other ways forward; and in a socially separated, yet spatially shared agenda, progress without hegemonic or dominant consent. In the end, diplomacy is a tactical tool by micropatrias to spread and share their practices with an international audience.

**Micropatrial Representation**

Many past micropatrial nations have had grounded protests and represented challenges to the status quo in located and embodied spaces, such as squats, road protests, and challenges to inefficient bureaucracies. With continual improvements to Internet access and increasingly user-friendly ways to create a personal website, micropatrias are able to further represent their nations to broader and more international audiences. This is by no means static or faltering, even considering some of the fugacious nations that dot the Internet. As my research progresses the practice proliferates.

Micropatrial symbols are national paraphernalia reifying a parodic approach to ‘practicing the nation’. These practices are heterodox, challenging orthodox practices around constructed sovereignty. Yet, while a challenge is present, the sovereign doxa is left intact, maybe even unscathed from such representations.
Through their layering effect, micropatrias create heterotopic spaces. The claiming of territory on top of pre-existing claims by the UK makes transparent the claiming and dominating territorial national processes. By representing micropatrial symbols, often in digital formats, practitioners are ‘waving’ their subversion in the face of the host.

**Final Remarks**

The micropatria as a creative geopolitical intervention is a growing social movement. Throughout history social movements gain power and have impact from the Outspan Orange Boycotts in Holland to the civil rights marches in the United States to rebellions that topple regimes as in the case of Cuba. What micropatrias can bring as a form of social movement and practice is direct and indirect challenges to the status quo. The prodding and poking can open spaces to display dissatisfaction with government procedure.

As discussed earlier the constitutive theory of statehood requires recognition from sovereign nations, especially in terms of international laws and relations, for a micropatria or any other form of a nation-state to be considered sovereign. This lack of recognition is inherent in the micropatrial status; it is the working liminal niche. Through the denial of recognition by legitimated sovereigns, micropatrias maintain their liminal existence and can point to larger processes in geopolitics. Specifically, I am concerned with how the subversion, representation, and spatiality of micropatrias are layered on top of legitimated sovereign territory and are mimetic of ‘conventional’ international practices. Interestingly, these
subversive national movements are headed not by minorities, but by some of the very demographic groups that are often discussed as the controlling (or oppressive) dominant group.

By way of ‘practicing the nation’, micropatrias parody sovereignty. They take hegemonic understandings of sovereign nations and reverse their accepted presence. They create their own nations by mimicking sovereign and international practices. Through playfulness, micropatrias challenge accepted sovereign constructions while paradoxically reifying the sovereign system. The research is about the vast array of sovereign practices from the margins, the practices of geopolitical anomalies; those unofficial, yet still formal practices that many political entities practice. Even those entities that search for forms of sovereignty, yet unachieved, like the Tibetan-Government-in-Exile (e.g. McConnell 2009a), are types of geopolitical anomalies that aid in shaping international networks, global communications, shared goals and values, and geopolitical world understandings of place and space.

Through ‘practicing the nation’, micropatrias act from diplomatic margins as geopolitical anomalies and create parallel sovereign realities, layered international networks, alternate worlds that are spatially stratified on top of orthodox ones. Through their communicative expressions and representations, they challenge orthodox constructions, prodding and poking hegemonic understandings, highlighting the constructed-ness of the world taken for granted and the system worked within. They also challenge realist constructions of international society as chaotic through their expressions of care and hope. Many micropatrias display
notions of peace and equality, human rights and sustainability practices, charitable contributions and open dialogue. They offer agency to those who wish to participate, lending a feeling of involvement and empowerment in a rather overwhelming and often times apathetic reality.

The geographic implications of these subversive groups are intriguing given that they criss-cross international networks, such as when we find the Lakota Native Americans with micropatrial representatives from ‘a nation’ enclaved by the United Kingdom or when micropatrias are listed on sites next to UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization) which include nations and peoples such as Tibet, Taiwan, Kosova, the Maasai, and the Hmong. Subversive practices become tactical tools for micropatrias to represent their nations vis-à-vis the orthodox system of sovereignty. These expressions offer appropriation of power for agency against imposed norms. By playing with ideas of sovereignty, identity, nationalism, symbols, diplomacy, and statehood, micropatrias pose challenges and open room for questioning of the established and overwhelming accepted system of hegemonic reality.

Narrowing the discussion to the United Kingdom and the significance of micropatrias for its contemporary political geography opens up questions to consider the potentialities for impact. Clearly one argument that can be made is that micropatrias simply have no significance to the contemporary political geography of the United Kingdom; rather they could be considered solely as forms of play. Hopefully, the thesis worked to dispel such a quick dismissal of micropatrias. Another avenue to consider is the amalgamated, and contested,
existence of the United Kingdom. While it perhaps may appear to be a stable
sovereign state, there are movements within to secede from the very state that has
annexed and colonized adjacent territories and cultures; a sort of national
repatriation movement by various groups including, most notably, the people of
Scotland, Wales, and the island of Ireland. Keep in mind the upcoming vote in
September (2014) that will decide whether Scotland remains part of the United
Kingdom. Micropatrias can work to inflame such movements or to question the
very foundation upon which these annexations are built. On the other hand, their
subversive play with the very notions of nation, state, and sovereignty call into
question the national(ist) basis of such movements. Another possibility for
potential impact is in forward thinking. For example, micropatrial movements have
elicited responses from other enclaving nations such as the United States of
America. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation has claimed such micropatrial
movements as acts of terrorism, furthering the climate of fear within the United
States and control by the US government. Again, Italy’s forceful evacuation and
subsequent physical destruction of Rose Island can be considered as having been
significant enough to the political geography of Italy to elicit such a response from
the Italian government. The closest micropatrias in the United Kingdom have come
to this kind of dramatic conflict is the case of the Principality of Sealand whereby
residents (and ‘citizens’) of Sealand fired shots at the Royal Navy, evaded taxes to
the UK government, and went through the British court system to defend their
status as Sealand citizens outside of UK jurisdiction. Sealand’s current and future
impact is unknown with founder Prince Roy Bates’ passing and Prince Michael
Bates’ ascension to head of Sealand. In whatever way micropatrias are viewed by the UK government, they work to question UK sovereign hegemony and territoriality. Such questioning is a reflection of Scottish, Irish, Welsh, and English political movements and sentiments around the United Kingdom.

**Possible Research Paths**

As a final note, there is a great amount of work to be done to further elaborate on and understand the complexities of geopolitical anomalies and their expressions of sovereignty, symbols, and diplomacy. Here are three, of many, possible agendas for future investigation into micropatrial representations, networks, relationships, and variations of such. First, is an in-depth investigation into communication mechanisms and outcomes within micropatrial networks (such as the interactive forums) with a specific look into how practitioners (re)produce themselves and others into geopolitical agents acting on parallel sovereign networks, and what are the main discourses running through such communicative practices, and what, if any, impact and/or influence can be measured. Second, is an academic intervention into the concept of sovereign territory, thereby deconstructing the difference between profane, liminal, and sacred perceptions, and the nuances of power appropriated by each. Basically, what is needed is a focused study, to further existing literature, on a ‘re-pluralizing’ of socio-political spaces and the everyday dynamics within, in terms of how the micropatria fits and how the practitioner straddles all three (as a citizen of the host, as a practitioner, and as a geopolitical agent). Third, and to me the most compelling with the current
shifting of perceptions of danger, is an examination of the creation of practitioners as internal ‘terrorists’. This shift keeps the United States, a major micropatrial hub, and its ‘citizens’ in a state of emergency by aiding in the growth of a fear ‘of thy neighbor’. It is reminiscent of the Red Scare of McCarthyism during the Cold War, whereby fear of the internal ‘communists’, who can be anyone, forces the populace to back the government, thereby giving such powers the rights to transgress their own laws. This is also similar to the increased popularity and handing over of powers to the Bush administration upon the declaration of ‘war on terror’ after the September 11, 2001 attacks on US soil. There are many avenues of continued examination of ‘what micropatrias are’ and hopefully more research will enhance an understanding of the national and international roles of such creative geopolitical interventions.
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## Appendix A

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Year Est.</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Head</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Enclaved by</th>
<th>Motto</th>
<th>Currency</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
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<td>Adammia, Empire of</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Emperor Adam I</td>
<td>66,266 m²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Quaerentibus sapientiam et honorem (Seek wisdom and honour)</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Flag" /></td>
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<td>Aibreania, Republic of</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>President Joel Holderness</td>
<td>8,580 m²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>The purest of all soils for the purest of all people</td>
<td>Saibtach</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>West Yorkshire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Altania, United States of</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>President Hill</td>
<td>Approx. 255,483 m²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>King Daniel</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Pound Sterling, Althasa</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>HIM Emperor Jonthan I</td>
<td>146,475 m²</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<td>Residence</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>Capital</td>
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<td>Barrington, Kingdom of</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>King Joe I</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>Barrington Shilling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>President Bobbie Bailey</td>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>The small country with a big passion</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>England</td>
<td>Licentia, pacis, amicitia (Freedom, peace, friendship)</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>President Padraig Treeman</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Bovorttemberg</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>HRH Darkovar</td>
<td>Approx. 8,361 m²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Indivisibiliter ac inseparabiliter</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>HRH Okolumbus</td>
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<td>England</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Chairman Bill</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>2012</td>
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<td>HM High King Joseph Neobritannia I</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>In gloria nostri regionem</td>
<td>New Britannia Pounds</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Lancashire</td>
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<td>Britannia, Kingdom of New</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>King Jeremy II</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Fight for what you believe to be right</td>
<td>FONs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Lincolnshire</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>HRH King Jack I</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>For the king, for Broughtopial</td>
<td>Broughtopian Pounds</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
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<td>Camuria, Kingdom of</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>King Ian II</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Nothing is good enough but the best itself</td>
<td>Camista</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Off west coast of Scotland</td>
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<td>Catan, Kingdom of</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>King James I</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Ex nihilo, aliquid (From nothing something)</td>
<td>Catan-eone</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Normanton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheslovian Federation</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>President Urosh Dushanov</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Long live Cheslovia</td>
<td>Cheslovian Oubel (€k)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Oxford</td>
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<td>Cheynland, United Republic of</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>El Presidente Alastair Cheyne</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Sans per, sans ser, sans cheveux</td>
<td>Pound Sterling, Euro, Don</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Northumberland (Near Newcastle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Name</td>
<td>Start Year</td>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>President/Title</td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>Capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Children's Boytown Sovereign State</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>President Louis Bram Burrows</td>
<td>200 m²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Eizo (¥)</td>
<td>Yes Hackney</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coqueland, Duchy of</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Duke Stephen I</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Standen eens</td>
<td>No Sheringham</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
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<td>Dallingrad, Soviet Socialist Republic of</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Premier Ewan Whitmore</td>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Electus de multi! (Chosen from many!)</td>
<td>Yes Norfolk</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>Domanglia, Kingdom of</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>HRM Urokah</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Peace and monarchy</td>
<td>Yes Cambridge-shire</td>
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<td>Dorzhabad, Parliamentary Republic of</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Sir Daniel Morris PM</td>
<td>435,118 km²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Ene lând, ene vâlk, ene stât (A land, a people, a nation)</td>
<td>Yes Southeast England</td>
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<td>Dradelia, Socialist Republic of</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Chairman Igor Kutsrutu</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Gigimot dradelisrutu babomu</td>
<td>Yes UN</td>
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<td>Country/Region</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Leader/Title</td>
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<td>Draega, High Kingdom of</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High King Storkan</td>
<td>200,000 km²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Adöran ånt løjalten, vråm dess freigen åf libertej (Love and loyalty, from the lease of liberty)</td>
<td>Draega-Krun (DK, Draegan Crowns)</td>
<td>Cambridge-shire</td>
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<td>East Anglian Soviet Socialist Republics, Union of</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Emperor John Gordon</td>
<td>143.04 km²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Workers of East Anglia unite!!</td>
<td>Palasian Pound</td>
<td>East Anglia</td>
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<td>Egtavia, Republic of</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Président du Présidium Pierre d’Égtavie</td>
<td>26,140 m²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>J’espère, je rêve, je pense (I Hope, I Dream, I Think)</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
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<td>Elysium, Duchy of</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Duke Ashleigh Laine</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>In the conquest of paradise, we forge our own</td>
<td>Elysium Aegis (ELY)</td>
<td>Elyria</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>President Billy Neil</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Alles ändern (Change everything)</td>
<td>Erephisian Graaf</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>King Thomas</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Whythra</td>
<td>Shoal</td>
<td>Southwest Cornwall</td>
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<td>Forvik, Crown Depency of</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Steward Stuart Hill</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Með løgum skal land biggja’ (With laws the land will be built)</td>
<td>Gulde</td>
<td>Shetland</td>
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303
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Member Type</th>
<th>Original Member</th>
<th>Road</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Original Member Type</th>
<th>Original Member Location</th>
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<td>Frestonia, People’s Republic of</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Original Member</td>
<td>Tony Sleep</td>
<td>Frestons Road</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Nos sumus una familia</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>Ganja Den Empire</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>REMEMBER THE DEN FOR SANJAY AND THE GREATER GLORY OF TEAM PUMA</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>HAIL GARAGSTAN</td>
<td>Pound Sterling, Garag Pound</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Southminster</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>King Andrew I</td>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>VIVEMUS RIDERE (WE LIVE TO LAUGH)</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
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<td>Hamland, Commonwealth of</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Lord Lewis</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Inferior ut nemo</td>
<td>Hammish Obol (Ø)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>King Lewis I</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Inprobus ut nemo</td>
<td>Obol (Ø)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>King Richard Booth</td>
<td>Hay-on-Wye</td>
<td>Wales</td>
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<td>Haylo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Ibrosian Protectorate, Great Commonwealth of the Ibrosian Democracy</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Duke of Amberly</td>
<td>Eiaik takieseweik ilianiaj mano teese (To be rather than to seem)</td>
<td>Great Commonwealth Pound (GCP)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Indonovia</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Unity through diversity</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Kaznian Empire</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>England</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tsar Denis Bagration</td>
<td>God bless Kazniaj</td>
<td>Kaznian Kren (K)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>West of Oxford</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Kelso, Free</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Charlie Robinson</td>
<td>Do or die</td>
<td>Bawbee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Kelso</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Kemetia, Sovereign Kingdom of</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>England</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>King Adam Hemmings</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Deben</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Priors Dean</td>
<td></td>
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<td>K-Marx, People's Republic of</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chairman Damien Biggs</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Euro, Pound Sterling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>Lagoan Isles, Grand Duchy of the</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>England</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grand Duk Louis</td>
<td>As ondas do amor cercam-nos (The water of love surrounds us)</td>
<td>Edney</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Portsmouth</td>
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305
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Position</th>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Currency</th>
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<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>Landashir, Community of</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>James von Puchow</td>
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<td>England</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High Wycombe</td>
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<td>Libertas, Republic of</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President Harry Fitzpatrick</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Ad novam lucem</td>
<td>Libertas Dollar</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lindsey, Kingdom of</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>King Dominic I</td>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Moorby</td>
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<td>Lovely, Kingdom of</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>King Danny I</td>
<td>Flat</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Die dulce freure (Have a nice day)</td>
<td>Inter-dependent Occupational Units</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>London</td>
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<td>Lundy, Kingdom of Heaven</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>King Martin Coles Harman</td>
<td>Lundy Island</td>
<td>Lundy</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Puffin</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Lundy Island</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lundy, New Kingdom of</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>King Levi Newman</td>
<td>Lundy Island</td>
<td>Lundy</td>
<td>Found in the gutter, and restored above all</td>
<td>Puffin</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Lundy Island</td>
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<td>Mercia, Acting Witan of</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Jeff Kent, Acting Witan</td>
<td>20 Shires</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Midlands</td>
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<td>Mondcivitan</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Hugh Schonfield</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>The guinea pigs of their own experiment</td>
<td>Postal Reply Coupon</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Camden</td>
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<td>Country Name</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Join</td>
<td>Leader/Founder</td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Region</td>
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<td>Monovia, Democratic State of</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Harry Fitzpatrick</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Fly the flag of freedom!</td>
<td>Renasian Pecune</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
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<td>Monovia, Principality of</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Harry Fitzpatrick</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Lux in obscuritate conferri (May light be bestwoed in times of darkness)</td>
<td>Monvish Pound</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
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<td>Myrotania, Empire of</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>HIM Emperor Thomas I</td>
<td>423.45 m²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Opinio essentialis (Imagination is essential)</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Northern England</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Premier Ben Lawson</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Republic credits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Hull</td>
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<td>New Anglia, Kingdom of</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>King William the Founder</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Ut vexillum elevatum est peccabitis (Once the flag is raised it will never fall)</td>
<td>Dale Republic Pound</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cambridge-shire</td>
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<td>New Wales, Kingdom of</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>20,779 km²</td>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>Ad finem fidelis (to the end, faithful)</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
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<td>Aberystwyth</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>HM King Declan I</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Look for the light</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wilton</td>
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<td>President Sir Daniel Morris</td>
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<td>England/Scotland</td>
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<td>King Nicholas I</td>
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<td>England</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>President Edward Hunt</td>
<td>0.3 km²</td>
<td>England</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>HRH Prince Paul I</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Leader Colin McLeod</td>
<td>360 acre park</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>King Red</td>
<td>A few square meters</td>
<td>England</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Omnes unum fieri (All become one)</td>
<td>Pecune</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>London and Hertfordshire</td>
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<td>Reylan Imperial Triumvirate</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>HIM Taeglan</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Freedom, peace, justice, and equality</td>
<td>Imperial Currency Unit (ICU)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Rukora, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Tom Turner</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Every citizen counts</td>
<td>Ruk</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Southeast England</td>
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<td>San Serriffe</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>General Pica</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>San Serriffe Corona</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>London (Indian Ocean island)</td>
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<td>Sealand, Principality of</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Prince Michael</td>
<td>Ocean based tower</td>
<td>E mare libertas</td>
<td>Sealand Dollar</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Off east coast of England</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>President Barnaby Hands</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Our nation</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Norfolk</td>
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<td>Solid Gold, Empire of</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Emperor Drew I</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Doing it for the lulz</td>
<td>Drew Bucks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Glenisla</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Government Type</td>
<td>Leader/Head of Government</td>
<td>Population (km²)</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>Solid Gold, Tyrantate of</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Un</td>
<td>Supreme Tyrant and Villain Dr. Drew Nevis</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Onyx Shillings</td>
<td>Glenisla</td>
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<td>South London Soviet Socialist Republics, Union of</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President Alex Whitmarsh</td>
<td>143.04</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>People of South London unite</td>
<td>USLSSR Ruble</td>
<td>London</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southminster ROC</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Presidents Kenny Harber, Sam Park, and Matthew Dean</td>
<td>Hill</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Southminster</td>
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<td>Strathclyde, Realm of</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>HM Mark</td>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>Strathclyde Region</td>
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<td>Strathy, Communist People's Republic of</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Peoples Commissar James Whittle</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Audaci fortuna favet (Fortune favors the audacious)</td>
<td>Whitsen-mark</td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
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<td>Taigh a Bata, Republic of</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President Scott Harwwod</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>Ginnies</td>
<td>Residence</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Proletarians, unite</td>
<td>Transdonian Pound (TRP)</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>West Acomb</td>
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<tr>
<td>TwoChairs, Kingdom of</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>His Excellency King Eoin</td>
<td>2.5 m²</td>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>Cenedl Cryf à Dwy Gadair</td>
<td>Pound Sterling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Varcetia, Republic of</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>President Henry Wilkinson</td>
<td>0.0015625 m²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Dor place si dor kindom (Your home is your kingdom)</td>
<td>Varcetian Poond (¼)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Dorset</td>
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<td>Voltar, Grand Barony</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Baron William I</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Unus Voltar, unus gens, unus futura (One Voltar, one nation, one future)</td>
<td>Ginnie Sterling</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Waveland</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>10 m²</td>
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<td>West Germania, Kingdom of</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>King Penda II</td>
<td>U.K. and beyond</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Stand sieker (Stand sure)</td>
<td>New Israeli Burgin</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Wilkland</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>King Henry I</td>
<td>0.000026 m²</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Wilkinfiglio</td>
<td>Wilkländische Dollar (WLD)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Dorset</td>
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311
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<th>Williamsia, Kingdom of Wales</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>King Jasper</th>
<th>Wales</th>
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<th>Williamsia yn ffyd</th>
<th>Williamsian Pound</th>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Prince Jordan</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Wales</td>
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<td>Wis Franc</td>
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*UN stands in place of Unknown in the table above.*