Analysis of the cinema’s place within capitalism can broadly be seen to have entailed a double focus for Marxists, both generated and legitimated by a sense of what constitutes a proper and recognisable Marxist concern. In general terms this might be characterised as a concern both with determination and with effectiveness. On the one hand, a ‘materialist’ concern to place cinema via its social and economic determinants whether grasped in terms of technology, economy (cinema’s subservience to the logic of capital accumulation), class base or conjunctural complex. On the other, a ‘critical’ concern to place the cinema via its role within the social formation, to account for cinema in its ideological clothes, its complicity with a continuing structure of domination. Yet the articulation of these twin foci has remained problematic. The emphasis here is on articulation, with its demand for a structured combination which is more than mere addition or a setting of the two beside each other as equal but alternative choices (precisely the language of ‘on the one hand’ and ‘on the other’). Such difficulty is not merely the product of bad analysis or conceptual confusion (though this may of course be the case) but is symptomatic of a more generalised problem of emphasis within Marxist analysis with its polar temptations of economism and idealism. In both cases the problem of articulation is effectively displaced through a dissolution of one of the terms into the other: the effect of ideology becomes directly ‘readable’ in the sum of its determinations (the ownership of the cinematic means of production, the logic of the market, and so on) or alternatively the determinative complex becomes evacuated from the ideological scene, ‘unreadable’ either directly or indirectly. And in occupation of the hinterland is the compromise whereby ideology and economy are seen to coalesce, but in some unexplicated liaison whose specific parameters and modalities remain occluded (take, for example, the Comolli/Narboni (1971) formulation: ‘every film . . . is determined by the ideology which produces it . . . but is all the more thoroughly and completely determined because . . . its very manufacture mobilises powerful economic forces’ (p. 30). Indeed, the necessity to resort to such ultimately evasive formulations such as ‘all the more’ seems almost to be the condition upon which . . . for example, is the ‘relative’ in ‘relative’? which is ‘relative’ to what; and just what is ‘mediation’? And it may be that attempts are inaugurated to counterbalance’ so often tends to be the result of the other. This would seem discussed here: both set out with ideology through an analysis of end up by giving one privileged role. Murdock and Golding (1977a contribution to this volume) largely collapsed into economic; the reverse is true — film (and ideology) is the determinations.

In ‘Capitalism, Communism and film’ Murdock and Peter Golding develop a Marxian theory which have placed culture beginning with cultural artifice as the economic base rather than vice versa, and can be accounted for in terms of feminism and the popularity of film. Golding nonetheless argues that in the economic base we are ‘to give Marxian sociology its due’ (1977a, p. 17) and that while feminism would nevertheless not be undermined by it, and their changing distribution of such levers in cultural production (with material on media industry with two general consequences outlined: 1) the traditional decline as market forces exact their toll, and 2) this evolutionary process is accompanied by those voices lacking economic advantage. It is of course possible to raise the level of empirical observation to the level of originality in the drive for power. The second criticism on the possibility of opposition media, consequent upon the interest of capital in generating...
to be the condition upon which such work can begin: how 'relative', for example, is the 'relative' in 'relative autonomy' and what precisely is 'relative' to what; and just what is 'mediating' what in the notion of 'mediation'? And it may be precisely because of this that, when attempts are inaugurated to combine the twin modes of analysis, the 'balance' so often tends to be lost and one is emphasised at the expense of the other. This would seem to be the case in the two examples discussed here: both set out with the broad ambition of examining textual ideology through an analysis of its conditions of production, but both end up by giving one privilege over the other. Thus in the case of Murdock and Golding (1977a; but see also 1974a and 1974b and their contribution to this volume) media (and ideological) specificity is largely collapsed into economy while for Cahiers du Cinéma (1972) the reverse is true — film (and ideological) specificity is largely evacuated of its determinations.

In 'Capitalism, Communication and Class Relations', Graham Murdock and Peter Golding explicitly attack those brands of Marxist theory which have placed cultural criticism above economic analysis, beginning with cultural artefacts and then working backwards to the economic base rather than vice versa. Although for them this proclivity can be accounted for in terms of a reaction against economic determinism and the popularity of 'critical philosophy', Murdock and Golding nonetheless argue that by abandoning any sustained analysis of the economic base we are 'thereby jettisoning the very elements that give Marxist sociology its distinctiveness and explanatory power' (1977a, p. 17) and that while not wishing to return to economic determinism would nevertheless claim 'that control over material resources and their changing distribution are ultimately the most powerful of the many levers in cultural production' (p. 20). The thesis is fleshed out with material on media integration and diversification and concludes with two general consequences for cultural production of the economic processes outlined: '1) the range of material available will tend to decline as market forces exclude all but the commercially successful and 2) this evolutionary process is not random, but systematically excludes those voices lacking economic power and resources' (p. 37).

It is of course possible to quibble with Murdock and Golding at the level of empirical observation — their under-emphasis on the need for originality in the drive for media expansion and similar under-emphasis on the possibility of oppositional viewpoints within the commercial media, consequent upon their problematic conflation of the long-term interest of capital in general and short-term interest of the individual
entrepreneur — but the concern here is rather with the way the general problem of ideology and economy is established and resolved by them. The concern here circulates around the 'gap' which remains for Murdock and Golding between economic production on the one hand and media forms on the other, which is only overcome for them through the dissolution of media specificity (the particular organisations of matters of expression) and consequent reduction of the media to transcriptions of socio-political ideologies originated elsewhere. Thus, for example, Murdock and Golding criticise a large proportion of media studies for concentrating almost entirely on news and failing to address themselves to 'the main dramatic, fictional and entertainment forms which make up the bulk of most people's media fare' (p. 36) — yet it is precisely these forms which Murdock and Golding themselves would seem unable to account for in the absence of any provision of the means for their conceptualisation. At most their concluding theses would allow them to account for the repetition and exclusion of particular forms once constituted but not for their dominance within the media nor for their particular operations. Or they can only do so through an attribution of unproblematic transparency to these forms whereby the difference between the various media in terms of matters of expression and conventions can be elided and the way formal conventions actually work in meaning-production be ignored. Thus when Murdock and Golding discuss the 'readings' of media imagery presented by others such as Poulantzas, Berger and Barthes, judging it a 'bald beginning', it is in turn difficult to see how Murdock and Golding can even reach such a bare starting point purely from their perspective. For 'imagery' is not only the end product of an economic process, but the product of a work of signification as well with its own internal dynamics and operations (and internal history), which is precisely the domain then that Murdock and Golding ignore.

It is this field which Stephen Heath has tried to capture in his use of the term 'machine': 'cinema itself seized exactly between industry and product as the stock of constraints and definitions from which film can be distinguished as a specific signifying practice' (1976, p. 256), where 'specificity' implies not only a sense of media peculiarity but also a semiotic particularity (signification through both codes unique to the cinema and broader socio-cultural ones) and 'practice' stresses process: 'film as a work of production of meanings'. That is to say, film does not merely 'express' or 'represent' but is itself an active process of signification through which meaning is produced. Two consequences for a consideration of ideology seem to follow. First, that the media are not merely 'empty' forms within the ideological systems, but enjoy their own autonomous specificity and potential for a different kind of ideologisation; the cinematic 'machine's' potential to theorise this, for example Jean-Paul Fargier (1977) in his 'specific ideology: the impossibility of a literature of the variety of impressions' and 'impression' is fundamentally disjunct from the 'ideological machine' and its effects. Second, that the ideologisation of the cinema extends beyond the operations within the industry. Thus, the example of a literary text cannot be merely a matter of a text as a part of a film's 'machine'. Rather, the author's pre-existing ideological positions affirms by a broadening out of the film's effect as the object of the ideological dispositif: that the ingredients to be detected are productive also of practical consequences to the potential positions of engagements of cinema and the world around it. Yet it is not merely place it as a reflection of the economic and the social (Marxist functionalism — and again, as active productive of possibilities but also as productive of new sets of possibilities potentially being generated through the film's effects of 'contradiction' retrieval), but how it needs to be clearly demarcated from the media. It is not just 'entertainment' but an active process of ideologisation dedicated to consumption.
merely ‘empty’ forms which neutrally transcribe socio-political ideologies, but enjoy their own level of effectivity which is the property of the cinematic ‘machine’ and not the cinematic institution. One attempt to theorise this, for example, at a general level can be seen in the work of Jean-Paul Fargier (1971) where cinema is considered not merely as a vector of ideologies already in circulation, but as producing its own specific ideology: ‘the impression of reality’. Now whether or not we accept fully this formulation (for example, it is not at all clear that the ‘impression’ is fundamental to ‘bourgeois cinema’ or that its appearance is irreducibly ideological), it does nonetheless help clarify the point that the ‘ideological effect’ of the cinema cannot be understood outside of the operations of its particular conventions and constraints which then, because they carry their own specific effectivities, cannot be seen necessarily to correspond to a maker’s personality or ‘intentions’ nor likewise his or her social and political beliefs. As Francis Mulhern has argued for literature, so with reservations (considered below) it would here be accepted for film: ‘the formal characteristics of a literary text cannot be considered as the aesthetic expression of its author’s pre-existing ideological positions . . . Moreover, the ideological positions affirmed by a literary text need not even coincide with the positions formally adopted by its author. They are the determinate effects of the form of the text, and may in fact be deeply inconsistent with the latter’ (1975, p. 85). Second, it follows that if the media do not merely express ideologies, they must then be considered as actively constitutive of ideologies. That is to say, ideologies are not merely ingredients to be detected in the media, but also its products. And again, as active productions, ideologies are not merely to be seen as sets of positivities but also as processes of exclusion — with these ‘exclusions’ potentially being able to feed back to disturb or deform their progenitive system (and thereby furnishing our analysis with a notion of ‘contradiction’ retrieved from both a reductionism which would merely place it as a reflection of contradictions determined at the level of the economic and the homeostasis of a reproduction-orientated Marxist functionalism — though as we shall see later not then without difficulties). For Murdock and Golding, however, it is the former relationship (ideologies as ingredients): ‘The first task is to spell out the nature of the ruling ideology, and to specify the propositions and assumptions of which it is composed. Secondly, the appearance and entrenchment of such propositions and assumptions in media output needs to be clearly demonstrated’ (1977a, p. 35). But the ruling ideology is not just ‘entrenched’ in the media: it is actually produced.
For there is no general or abstract system which is the ruling ideology: rather the ruling ideology is only constituted in and through the concrete: ‘[Ideology] is there and yet it is not there. It appears indeed if the general structure of a dominant ideology is almost impossible to grasp, reflectively and analytically as a whole. The dominant ideology always appears, precisely, in and through the particular’ (Hall 1972b, p. 82). Indeed, as Hall and his colleagues at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University have gone on to show, the task of the media as part of the State may indeed be to create an ideological unity where none before existed (Hall et al., 1976; Chambers et al., 1977): ‘Far from expressing or reflecting an already given class interest, television is one of the sites where ideological elements and positions are articulated into a specific type of political class discourse’ (Chambers et al., 1977, p. 114). And this may be part of the problem. For Murdock and Golding classes are by and large seen as already constituted, with their own social and economic identities which can then be reflected or not reflected within the media, rather than as complex and contradictory unities without any necessary homogeneity at the cultural level but rather ‘represented’ through a variety of forms.

However, given the impossibility of grasping ideology purely in terms of class origins we must then avoid evacuating class from our analysis altogether. Thus, from beginning with similar premises, one tendency has been to define ideology neither by its class base nor its reproduction of the social formation but merely as that part of the social formation that exists when we subtract the political and economic levels. Raymond Williams (1973) has argued that if the concept of ‘social totality’ is to be retrieved from a mere sociology of interconnections, then it must include a notion of ‘domination’. Likewise I would wish to argue that if ideology is to be rescued from a significant egalitarianism (and conjunctural analysis from a new form of empiricism) it must also include a notion of ideologies not just as discursive systems but as ultimately maintaining a structure of dominance. Not of course directly or crudely, but in complex and contradictory ways whose specific potencies and inflections have to be analysed in particular and concrete ways. This is not then to imply a subscription to the thesis of cultural transparency. It is quite possible to concede that human beings may always be subjects insofar as they are constituted in and through discursive practices of whose grounds they are not conscious, but this does not then imply that they will always be subjected (in the sense of subjection) to the particular discursive practices of capitalism. For here cultural practices from their material origins or total autonomy or total determinacy for this in-between). Just as practices from its material context give a coherent account of agencies and apparatuses. But it is more than this. As sociological ideologies. Domination must not be conceived as a single layer but rather multi-layered and will be constrained by the constraints of the ‘machine’ and ‘economy’.

Returning to Golding and Murdock’s representation of this volume’s approach to a number of the problem of the privileging of a specific polemic against ‘too much’ or both a ‘defence’ of their own positions posed here, their need for further investigation. Golding’s analysis cannot provide an explanation governing a text’s content. Nonetheless turns the pertinent production relations may now analyse this does not then imply that can then be read forward for. Returning to Golding and Murdock’s second, their analysis is a form of ‘content analysis’ of the significant advances of as classically understood) and ‘qualitative’. Again the argument thesis on methodological emphasis on the required conceptual and generating demands of methods of adjudicates the value of the that can really only make its...
of capitalism. For here cultural opacity is not necessarily allied to relations of domination, just as ideology is not then coterminous with discourse.

Likewise I would not wish these conclusions to lead to an abandonment of the problem of determination (and here I would part company with Hindess (1977) and Hirst (1976b) whose either/or choice of total autonomy or total determination can find no theoretical coherence for this in-between). Just as we cannot read off cinema's signifying practices from its material conditions of existence, so we cannot provide a coherent account of cinema which evacuates such material agencies and apparatuses. Because they don't tell it all, it does not follow that they then tell us nothing (likewise 'creators'' intentions and socio-political ideologies). But just as class is not a monolith, so determination must not be conceived as single-layered and uni-directional, but rather multi-layered and complex and operant within 'ideology' (the constraints of the 'machine') as well as between 'ideology' and 'economy'.

Returning to Golding and Murdock via their more recent paper as represented in this volume it can be seen that they address themselves to a number of the problems posed here largely to re-assert their initial position of the privileging of the economic but with the novel input of a specific polemic against 'textual [sic] analysis'. As this can be read as both a 'defence' of their own position and an 'attack' on some of the positions posed here, their three main arguments may well merit further investigation. Golding and Murdock firstly maintain that textual analysis cannot provide an adequate account of the relations of production governing a text's construction. This is undoubtedly correct, but nonetheless turns the pertinent issue on its head: for while indeed production relations may not be able to be read back from textual analysis this does not then imply the converse — that textual processes can then be read forward from those same relations of production.2

Golding and Murdock's second argument refers to inference. Textual analysis is a form of 'content analysis' (a label hardly doing justice to the significant advances of much textual analysis over content analysis as classically understood) and is thus necessarily 'circumstantial' and 'qualitative'. Again the argument is carried on by means of a reversal. A thesis on methodological capabilities is made to do service instead of the required conceptual analysis. Rather than the problems of theory generating demands of methodological procedure, technical possibilities adjudicate the value of theory instead. Furthermore it is an argument that can really only make sense if we are to assume that inference is
something peculiar to content analysis rather than a condition general to sociology. It would indeed be a barren and denuded sociology (at best an operationism whereby concepts become fully defined by their procedures of measurement) that could lay claim to have resolved the problems of inference. The third argument of Golding and Murdock is that exclusive concentration on textual analysis would necessarily be truncated and partial in its explanation of ideological production. This is, of course, true — but in establishing the opposite case Golding and Murdock are in danger of an equal partialness and truncation. They themselves recognise that economic analysis cannot be sufficient in itself, but then fail to theorise that very ‘insufficiency’ whereby themselves ‘bracketing off’ the very issues which are at stake.

If then it can be argued that Golding and Murdock devalue the signifiﬁcative level of the media and that this has effects for how they can formulate a theory of ideology, let us now look at the reverse tendency in the work of the Cahiers du Cinéma editorial group (1972) and its implications. An increasingly common response to this analysis of ‘Young Mr. Lincoln’ is to note the inadequacy of Cahiers’ attempt to define the historical determinations of the film but nonetheless to applaud the actual textual analysis as if the two were quite happily separable (Campbell, 1977, p. 30; Caughie, 1977-8, p. 93) despite the defined object of the piece:

...to distinguish the historicity of [a number of ‘classic’ films including ‘Young Mr. Lincoln’s’] inscription: the relation of these films to the codes (social, cultural ... ) for which they are a site of intersection, and to other films themselves held in an intertextual space: therefore, the relation of these films to the ideology which they convey, a particular ‘phase’ which they represent, and to the events (present, past, historical, mythical, fictional) which they aimed to represent’ [Cahiers du Cinéma, 1972, p. 6].

While agreeing with such writers in their diagnosis of a certain failure, I would nonetheless not want to gloss this over in terms of ‘the intrinsic difﬁculty of the task’ or an ‘unhappy contingency’ but rather I would see the imbalance as consequent on the premises founding the analysis and thus necessarily undermining the original ‘object’.

Unlike Golding and Murdock, whose object was to account for fairly general features of the media in terms of the structural principles of the economy, Cahiers selected a speciﬁc media artefact — one film — which they sought to account for in fairly speciﬁc ways. This they then did through a rather elliptical formula that glossed over the movie’s appearance on television at the Republican Zanuck was the only one to support Lincol in order to promote an immigration election of 1940. Breasted was generally antagonistic to substanating such historical ﬁgure of Lincoln in (Cahiers du Cinéma, 1972) which is more than a symptomatic ideological choice. Thus a division between ideological determinations of the ideological undertaking and the actual being a property of the form of mediation between their own analyses of these whereby ‘an artistic production is not reducible to a linear, expressive form’.

The consequence of this line can only have a limited further to the film’s ideological role (whether it is a “spontaneity” of its ideological role (whether the Cahiers’ refusal to anybody but rather to examine their relation with the other object) of their self-selection themselves from of the ‘text’, of the interpretation, mechanistic structure that speciﬁes their project as the ‘essay’ is to be seen as according to this thematic of signiﬁcation. Cahiers are staking a theme of ideological statements’ in one part, and follow ‘the film’s process of signiﬁcation. This might be seen as an essay on the cinematic experience of what is called a “process of active reading” within what they leave undeveloped. In such terms, this is not a process of more decisive importance. One can not hesitate to force the issue of a film constitutes itself as a text and... (p. 37). But the dilemma
then did through a rather 'unmaterialist' mode of operation — accounting for the movie's appearance in terms of the intention of one man: the Republican Zanuck wanted to make a film about the Republican Lincoln in order to promote a Republican victory in the Presidential election of 1940. Brewster (1973) suggests that, faced with the difficulty of substantiating such a thesis, this specific ideological purpose is ignored in favour of the more general one of 'the reformulation of the historical figure of Lincoln on the level of the myth and the eternal' (Cahiers du Cinéma, 1972, p. 13). However, it seems that this division is more than a symptom of intellectual difficulty, but rather of theoretical choice. Thus a division can be seen being made between the ideological determinations of the film (Zanuck's purpose) and the ideological undertaking actualised in the film, the latter not in fact being a property of the former, and hence clarifying Cahiers' distinction between their own analysis and that which they call 'demystification' whereby 'an artistic product' is 'linked to its socio-historical context according to a linear, expressive, direct causality' (p. 7).

The consequence of this then is that political and economic analysis can only have a limited function and can only loosely, if at all, place the film's ideological role (which is not to question the essential 'correctness' of Cahiers' refusal to 'read off' ideology from its social determinants, but rather to examine its theoretical effects). And this conjoins with the other object that Cahiers set themselves. For in differentiating themselves from other types of reading (commentary, interpretation, mechanistic structuralism and demystification) Cahiers specify their project as that of an 'active reading'. At one level this can be seen as according recognition to the 'work' of the text, its process of signification. Cahiers are not content merely to abstract broad 'ideological statements' in one simultaneous operation, but rather wish to follow 'the film's process of becoming-a-text', its 'dynamic inscription'. This might be seen as an operation which traces the audience's diachronic experience of watching a film, but for Cahiers it involves more: 'A process of active reading is to make them say what they have to say within what they leave unsaid, to reveal their constituent lacks' (p. 8). In such terms, then, the initial concern with a socio-historical situating can be seen to be misplaced, for there is no textual meaning to be discovered independent of consumption anyway, which becomes in fact of more decisive importance than the moment of production: 'We do not hesitate to force the text, even to re-write it insofar as the film only constitutes itself as a text by integration of the reader's knowledge' (p. 37). But the dilemmas are in the very formulation. For if the text
only exists through 'integration of the reader's knowledge' in what sense can they be said to be 'forcing' or 're-writing'? Does the object-text have an existence independent of the knowing subject after all, or is there at least some recognition of 'correctness' in the process of 'meaning-extraction'? The problem can be posed in terms of validity - does the by and large correct observation that the text only exists through the 'integration of the reader's knowledge' allow *carte blanche* in analysis, or do there remain 'controls' or 'limit-positions' which continue to govern the analysing discourse?

Clearly *Cahiers* are concerned that their reading should not be viewed as a purely personal or idiosyncratic one (they make recurring references to readings being 'authorised', of occurrences in the film bringing out its 'true meaning', and so on); but they are equally clearly, through their use of the language of psychoanalysis, not attempting to reproduce a 'lay' reading or any actual historical reading. Indeed, they pose their critical activity as exactly opposite to the norms of conventional consumption: 'a kind of non-reading' (p. 6) governed by the 'transparency' and 'presence' of 'classic' representation and narrative. The problem is then not only of what guarantees their reading (can the methodological licence apparently legitimated by their founding premises be overcome without theoretical circularity?) but perhaps more importantly for our purposes, what this might mean in relation to our understanding of ideology. What are we told about the ideological project of the film, whether successful or failed, if the reading which *Cahiers* locates was never in fact accessible to a general audience? (A claim referring us back to the privileged warrant of psychoanalysis to explicate the unconscious workings of ideology would, apart from problems of validity, still have to cope with the problems of the dehistorised and decontextualised versions of the unconscious and ideology it sought to work with). A division could perhaps be made between the film's general ideological undertaking - the reformulation of the historical figure of Lincoln - which could then be viewed as fairly accessible to an audience ('transparent' and 'present') - and *Cahiers* analysis of the costs of producing that ideological formulation, the repressions involved. But what then is the significance of *Cahiers* formulation to the effect that a 'distortion of the ideological project by the writing of the film' is manifested within the film (1972, p. 37)? For whom is the ideological project distorted if it takes a skilled reading based on psychoanalysis to reveal it, and in just what way is our understanding of thefilm's ideological effectiveness altered?

Subsequent work (Willemen, 1971 and 1972-3; Johnston, 1975) which has built upon *Cahiers* project necessarily abandoning historical legitimation either from its use-value institution of a more 'progressive' modern film-making (the strategies then quite self-consciously constructed readings (whether skilled or lay) are irrelevant (though Willemen (1972-3) the audience's non-awareness of the for a historical sensitivity if continued Sirk's films just as the claims of unnoticed in their own day, rest of their pertinence for a contemporary that the attempt to combine-economy been effectively removed from the such 'revisions' has been a 'strategy of at all of the enterprise here called the theory of history, whereby film and for the present with validity knowledge of the current conjuncture (1977-8; McCabe, 1977; Ellis, 1977) see whether such work has been a problems of relativism and political of the 'current conjuncture' remains foundational concepts).

It is in this way then that the set of problems to those considered by Golding. Whereas Murdock and Golding to significatory processes, *Cahiers* point of accrediting them an almost allied to the problem of consumption; problem did not arise - for them what read out from the media texts the correctly refuse to see the audience's textual meaning, but in doing so ignore the socio-historical context of audience here is to suggest that just as production, so audience respect properties of the text only. The essential notions of the passive consumer - productive of meaning through a
which has built upon Cahiers' protocols has then evaded such issues by necessarily abandoning historical analysis altogether and deriving its legitimacy either from its use-value for contemporary criticism (the institution of a more 'progressive' mode of reading texts) or for contemporary film-making (the strategies it might suggest). Readings are then quite self-consciously constructed in opposition to actual historical readings (whether skilled or lay), the evidence of which then becomes irrelevant (though Willemen (1972-3) at once conjoins an acceptance of the audience's non-awareness of textual contradictions with the demand for a historical sensitivity if contemporary critics are not to 'misread' Sirk's films just as the claims of relevance for aesthetic strategies, unnoticed in their own day, rests on an unexplicated assumption as to their pertinence for a contemporary audience). As such then it is clear that the attempt to combine economic and ideological analysis has been effectively removed from the agenda (Kuhn, 1975). Accompanying such 'revisions' has been a 'stronger' repudiation of the possibility at all of the enterprise here called for, made in terms of current work on the theory of history, whereby film analysis can only be carried on in and for the present with validity being guaranteed by political knowledge of the current conjuncture (Hindess and Hirst, 1975; Tribe, 1977-8; McCabe, 1977; Ellis, 1977). As yet however it is difficult to see whether such work has been adequately able to resolve its own problems of relativism and political opportunism (the ritual invocation of the 'current conjuncture' remaining as yet peculiarly empty of foundational concepts).

It is in this way then that the Cahiers analysis reveals a complementary set of problems to those considered in relation to Murdock and Golding. Whereas Murdock and Golding fail to pay adequate attention to significatory processes, Cahiers conversely emphasise these to the point of accrediting them an almost total autonomy. This is in turn allied to the problem of consumption. For Murdock and Golding the problem did not arise — for them the audience can by and large be 'read out' from the media texts themselves. Cahiers, on the other hand, correctly refuse to see the audience as locked into some pre-ordained textual meaning, but in doing so tend to dissolve the text altogether and ignore the socio-historical context in which it is received. The importance here is to suggest that just as the text cannot be read off directly from production, so audience response cannot be read back from properties of the text only. The emphasis on signification breaks with notions of the passive consumer — audiences are rather seen as actively productive of meaning through a knowledge and activation of codes.
(but not then as self-conscious 'decoders') — but this must then be understood in actual conditions of social and historical readership. Neale (1977) has argued in the case of propaganda that 'it can't simply be a matter of reading off a set of textual characteristics. What has to be identified is the use to which a particular text is put, to its function within a particular situation, to its place within cinematic conceiv as a social practice' (p. 39). This is the case for Neale because he wants to see propaganda as a form of address which 'produces a position of social struggle' (p. 32) and, for him, such a position cannot be purely the product of textual address. However, while Neale himself would not want to do this, it does seem possible to generalise this to notions of textual 'effectivity' (including ideological effectivity) beyond those which imply forms of social action. And thus an analysis of media ideology could not rest with an analysis of production and text alone but must in turn include a theory of readership and analysis of consumption (indeed outside of which there is no text at all). So just as production and text are articulated through the 'machine' of social and historical cinematic conventions and constraints, so the 'machine' of socially and historically placed readership cuts across the text and its audience.

The 'meaning' then of a film is not something to be discovered purely in the text itself (into which the spectator may or may not be bound) but is constituted in the interaction between the text and its users. The early claim of semiotics to be in some way able to account for a text's functioning through an immanent analysis was essentially misfounded in its failure to perceive that any textual system could only have meaning in relation to codes not purely textual, and that the recognition, distribution and activation of these would vary socially and historically. On the other hand the fact that we are concerned with codes, that is systems of regularity, should indicate that this does not then imply textual meaning to be dispersed altogether whereby all readings become equal and novelty becomes a virtue in itself. Likewise it does not abandon us to uses and gratifications theory with its collapse of the text into an individualistic and psychologistic problematic. Rather we would want to argue that readership must be understood in terms of broader patterns of socio-cultural consumption whereby texts are read both 'aesthetically', in terms of codes specifically 'artistic', and 'socially', in relation to the broader contours of life-experience engendered via class, race, sex and nation, where again these are not conceived as homogeneous but variegated (and thereby resisting the associated assumptions often governing analyses of the

passive consumer of the development of homogeneity; as Swingewood describes, 'and capitalist culture — high and cultural richness and diversity of production has served to subvert the ideology that mass culture is uniform' (1977, p.x). If a notion such as text value, it is not as a means of fixing, but rather a means of accessing the conditions, a text will tend to in any way meaning is placed through social and historical codes.

In this we can see that the production of new meanings by the texts are not constructed from within the novel, but to posit the unified signified that is the novelty lying in this analysis is misplaced. Following from this it is clear that analysis predicates should not be based on the evidence of actual socio-historical conditions that as film analysis develops a series of methodological tools of the institution of its own specific particular credentials (the codification of disciplinary discourses such as semiotics and deconstructivism), the importance of such disciplinary discourses such as semiotics and deconstructivism, the importance of such disciplinary discourses such as semiotics and deconstructivism, the importance of such disciplinary discourses such as semiotics and deconstructivism, the importance of such disciplinary discourses such as semiotics and deconstructivism, the importance of such disciplinary discourses such as semiotics and deconstructivism. As Barthes puts it in 'The operation contrary to the common sense' (1975, p. 15). But then, if this is not then to argue that the text's 'true meaning', or the interests of subversion, but in a particular context, the text is not the discovery of something new, the text is not the discovery of something new, the text is not the discovery of something new. 

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passive consumer of the development of society itself towards a 'mass' homogeneity; as Swingewood argues, 'capitalist economy and technological culture — have achieved new principles of economic and cultural richness and diversity ... the development of the capitalist mode of production has served to augment, not destroy, civil society' (1977, p.x.). If a notion such as 'preferred reading' then is to have a value, it is not as a means of fixing one interpretation over and above others, but rather a means of accounting for how, under certain conditions, a text will tend to be read in particular ways because of the way meaning is placed through the articulation of particular aesthetic, social and historical codes.

In this we can see that the task of ideological analysis is not the production of new meanings but rather of accounting for how old meanings are generated for and through particular audiences (which is not then to posit the unified sign-community of much early semiotics), the novelty lying in this analysis and the new problematic in which it is placed. Following from this it is clear that the readings which such analysis predicates should not be so fashioned as to contradict the evidence of actual socio-historical readings. Indeed, there is a real danger that as film analysis develops an ever more complex and sophisticated battery of methodological tools it loses sight of social analyses in favour of the institution of its own skilled community of readers with its own particular credentials (the codes of academia and advanced interdisciplinary discourses such as semiotics and psychoanalysis). This is not to deny the importance of such disciplines, but to argue that their value lies not in the discovery of some new signified (a new way of capturing the text's 'true meaning'), or the liberation of the signifier in the interests of subversion, but in accounting for the processes of signification through which particular meanings are produced in specific contexts. As Barthes puts it in his influential S/Z: 're-reading is an operation contrary to the commercial and ideological habits of our society' (1975, p. 15). But then whether his own multiple re-reading is an analysis of how the form of realism is textually produced with all its concomitant difficulties, or merely the introduction of a new (more 'writely') mode of consumption, would be open to dispute. Likewise this is not then to argue that each and every meaning is to be found raised to the level of consciousness. Obviously within our culture certain very central types of meaning surround us without being explicitly recognized — but the identification of such 'non-consciousness' is not then arbitrary and unless some 'control' at the level of experience (which does not thereby become privileged in
analysis) is exercised a licence is spawned which in all likelihood may only have the remotest of links with an understanding of the production and reproduction of ideologies. Put another way, because our methodology is anti-phenomenological, it does not then make phenomenology irrelevant: a confusion which seems to vitiate the critiques of phenomenology in Metz and Culler respectively by Henderson (1975) and Tribe (1976).

In translating these concerns to the British cinema, it can at once be seen that work has hardly begun. In part symptomatic of a contest for the 'entropy' and 'wretched cultural provincialism' (Anderson 1964, p. 50) of British culture in general, in part symptomatic of a hostility to the nullity of British cinema in particular, the effect has been for attention to be turned further afield, often to Hollywood with its more immediate appeals of life-force and dynamism. To quote once more Wollen's often repeated remark: 'The English cinema . . . is still utterly amorphous, unclassified, unperceived' (1972, p. 115).

And within the work that has been done, the tendency has been towards compartmentalisation and a refusal of theory. On the one hand, documentation of the structure of the industry with little attempt to theorise the relation of this to films actually produced (except perhaps numerically), on the other critical exegeses outside of any reference to either conditions of production or reception. And, in between, the 'histories' with their juxtapositions of 'social background', incidental economic details and film commentary, but with little attempt to specify relationships beyond the most general. A few attempts have been made in the direction of a more sophisticated historiography but these have usually been handicapped through being controlled by an ill-theorised conception of 'reflection'. Thus, Durgan (1970; but see also 1976) calls his work 'A Mirror for England' while Barr (1977; but see also 1974) sees his task as accounting for the particular ramifications of Ealing's claim (inscribed upon a plaque erected at the studios in 1955) to be 'projecting Britain and the British character': and in doing so, not only attempting an 'inner history' of the nation, but of the rise and fall of Ealing studios themselves. The double problem (both significatory and social) of whether film can be said to reflect at all and if so just what or whom and in what way (issues to which it must be admitted Barr is the more sensitive) is resolved through an assumption of a national 'consensus' whereby film does not strictly speaking 'reflect' at all but merely becomes part of the 'mood' or 'spirit of the times'. In both cases the writers are thereby absolved from any responsibility to disentangle the representation of the social formation in favour of removing its material bases together into an undifferentiated and unquestioned. Thus, for Barr, 'the fashionable impressionistic' term modern but for Barr equally ideologically consistent (p. 108).

However, it is not altogether clear how the British cinema and analysis of the relationship between the two should have been prominent in arguments against a notion of the 'reflective', that the British cinema has been predominantly belonging to 'middle-class' and possessing a peculiar quality which is largely subservient to 'content', the audience, the makers for their failure to utilise the cinema as an ideological (constituted by an extra-cinematic, political or "middle class") brought into the industry and to them "legible" and not by a cinema that is controlling the aesthetic manifest in the reflected, transformed or critical film (Cockin, p. 10) and thus for him renders any film a British cinema all the more appealingly pascaly. And although no reference for a mode of ciné-text and hence under-emphasises the often formal invisibility (and extra-cinematic reflected), his reading of the British cinema as only the aesthetic but also the social needs for the adoption of an unproblematic story, characters and environments (p. 10) are precisely seen as properties of a consciousness of its supposed structuring contexts.

Putting this another way, if the work is largely 'form-less', recent debates over the 'content-less'. Thus for McCabe (1976b) the 'classic realist text' in his hierarchy of discourses, and can produce a nineteenth-century novel but the popular television, while for Burch 'the novel housing all the representative{'}
any responsibility to disentangle the particular levels and interrelations of the social formation in favour of an idealist notion of culture, removed from its material bases, evacuated of its divisions and run together into an undifferentiated mesh of experience, privileged and unquestioned. Thus, for Barr, it can make sense to substitute the ‘old-fashioned impressionistic’ term ‘national character’ with presumably the modern but for Barr equally impressionistic term ‘ideology’ (1977, p. 108).

However, it is not altogether coincidental that hostility to the British cinema and analysis of it predominantly in terms of reflection should have been prominent in the literature. For although I have argued against a notion of the media as mere ‘transcriptions’ and ‘reflections’, the British cinema has nonetheless been frequently identified as possessing a peculiar quality which has rendered its forms invisible and largely subservient to ‘contents’ (and hence the hostility towards filmmakers for their failure to utilise fully ‘the resources of the medium’). As Elsaesser has put it, in the British cinema ‘the level of coherence is constituted by an extra-cinematic system (the hypothetical “consensus” or “middle class”) brought into the films from outside in order to make them “legible” and not by a cinematic specificity and a formal coherence controlling the aesthetic means by which ideological contents are reflected, transformed or critically expressed within a film’ (1972, p. 10) and thus for him rendering a socio-ideological critique of the British cinema all the more appropriate because of its otherwise signifying paucity. And although Elsaesser elides a particular critical preference for a mode of ciné-signification with cinematic specificity itself and hence under-emphasises the significatory ‘work’ required to produce formal invisibility (and extra-cinematic coherence which is not just then reflected), his reading of the British cinema clearly accords with not only the aesthetic but also the political dismissal of that cinema for its adoption of an unproblematic realist form, whose ideological effects are precisely seen as properties of the form and only in a limited way its supposed structuring contents.

Putting this another way, if the British cinema can be seen to be largely ‘form-less’, recent debate about ‘realism’ has been peculiarly ‘content-less’. Thus for McCabe (1974, but see also 1975-6, 1976a and 1976b) the ‘classic realist text’ is to be defined formally in terms of its hierarchy of discourses, and can be seen to subsume not only the nineteenth-century novel but the standard fictional forms of film and television; while for Burch ‘the edifice of illusionism’ may be seen as housing all the representational practices which rise to dominance along
with the bourgeoisie during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and continuing to dominate massively the cultural life of all capitalist and most socialist countries today and this has organic links with the illusion of parliamentary representation upon which political class domination is maintained (1976, pp. 54-5). And thus for Burch the analysis of a film’s ideological effectivity requires no specific attention to the film’s diegesis but rather to the less ‘geographically and historically localised’ relation of signifier and signified which is the modus operandi of representation (1974, pp. 49-50). Now it is clear that both authors are correct to abandon the endless tail-chasing exercise of attempting to define realism by reference to some ‘known’ eternal reality. Realism has no absolutist kernel but constitutes a set of constructed conventions whereby particular identifications of the ‘real’ are accorded plausibility. But on the other hand it is likewise by no means apparent that all realisms can then be subsumed under one great Realism (or one Realism with a few sub-variants) and that evaluations of effectivity (in terms of subject-positionality and so on) can be made independently of specific social and historical contexts and specific ‘contents’ (with which the ‘forms’ of realism are inextricably in articulation). That is to say, evaluation of the effectivity of realism (including its conservative or progressive qualities) is like evaluation of ideologies — dependent on context, its conditions of production and of consumption and its relations to other discourses (both specifically aesthetic and socio-political), dominant and subordinate in a particular period.

Indeed, examination of the history of ‘realisms’ would suggest that the claim generally made for a ‘new realism’ in the arts is rarely made in terms of technique alone, but is usually embodied within a complex repository of social values and attitudes. Because realism is generally bound up with a social extension (the inclusion of hitherto neglected sections of the population) it is usually part of a broader claim to legitimacy by a social group or at least a social syntax not specifically aesthetic. And thus the ‘real’ in the process of being constructed will discover its groundings less in relation to some supposed external referent and more in the symbolic universe from which it emerges. Thus to take an example of the documentary movement of the 1930s, its particular demand for observation and fidelity in the arts was not merely a technical project but an active social response to the crises of the inter-war period. As Hall has put it: ‘The documentary style, though at one level a form of writing, photographing, filming, recording, was at another level, an emergent form of social consciousness: it registered, in the formation of a social rhetoric, the emergent structure of feeling, in the immediate pre-war and the very climax of the “realist” movement which began cinema at the end of the 1950s due to the development of post-war trajectory in the 1950s — and as ideological significance despite its cutaneous movement.

It can be seen then that some of the options offered here with potentially opposite implications that purchase is to be secured of realist forms, analysis must be made without then assuming an unproblematic (the sense of the real is specifically structuring the cultural field in which the work operate is not to look for the absolute but to attempt in some way to go without its authentic meaning. Rather some of the particular conditions exist and in terms of which their sense (the logic of realism precisely which it represents).

Thus what we are designating as a new realism is not referring to a cluster of films circumscribed around Room at the Top (1959), Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (1961), The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner (1963), A Kind of Loving (1962) in the sense of ‘satisfying the particular field of ideas which structured the real world’ in terms of which social development by participation into an account of change of social constitution then, loosely translated, can be seen to take shape pre-eminent in party political rhetoric. Thus the productivity and post-war stability of mixed economy, and welfare as achievement (in the absence of attempt to address inequalities despite absolute increase in ‘temporary palliatives’ (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1976, pp. 54-5).
the immediate pre-war and the war periods’ (1972a, p. 100). Likewise the ‘realist’ movement which began to infiltrate the British commercial cinema at the end of the 1950s constituted part of a particular response to the development of post-war British capitalism and in particular its trajectory in the 1950s — and as such can be seen to have a different ideological significance despite its ‘technical’ similarities with the documentary movement.

It can be seen then that something of a double prescription is being offered here with potentially opposite pulls on the analysis. That is to say, if purchase is to be secured on the specific socio-historical effectivity of realist forms, analysis must be inter-discursive (as opposed to immanent) for the grounds of their ‘sense’ to be apprehended (extra-textual ‘contents’ carrying their own pre-stressed significance) but without then assuming an unproblematic expressiveness or reflection (the sense of the real is specifically a textual constitution). Thus constructing the cultural field in which certain films might be seen to operate is not to look for the absent origin or cause of the films’ effects nor to attempt in some way to go behind the back of the text and pull out its authentic meaning. Rather it is part of an attempt to specify some of the particular conditions upon which realist forms necessarily exist and in terms of which their claims to legitimacy can only have sense (the logic of realism precisely claiming its validity through that which it represents).

Thus what we are designating as a particular realist movement — referring to a cluster of films circa 1959-63 including such films as Room at the Top (1959), Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (1960), A Taste of Honey (1961), The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner (1962), A Kind of Loving (1962) and the like — can be seen to draw upon a particular field of ideas which focuses issues for it and provides its ‘sense’ of reality. What it draws upon is a particular ‘handling’ of the data of social development by particular social groups and their construction into an account of changes within British capitalism. This constellation then, loosely translatable as a sort of ‘ethical revisionism’, can be seen to take shape pre-eminently within groupings on the left but drawing also on academic social science and the commonplace of party political rhetoric. Thus the data of full employment, increasing productivity and post-war stability (with its mix of Keynesianism, mixed economy, and welfare state) was first accorded an undue achievement (in the absence of attention being drawn to the persistence of inequalities despite absolute increases in living standards or the ‘temporary palliatives’ (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1970, p. 59) — particularly in
the case of sterling — and the ‘fortuitous circumstances’ (Bogdanor and Skidelsky, 1970, p. 8) — such as the rapid growth in world trade and fall in commodity prices in the 1952-55 period — upon which such ‘affluence’ had been built) and then correspondingly read as undermining fundamental supports of a socialist economic strategy, the response to which was to effect a displacement away from a programme of economic advance towards an emphasis on socialism as an ethical system. Thus the editorial of the first Universities and Left Review (Spring 1957) complains that ‘It was inevitable that the post-war generation should identify socialism at worst with the barbarities of Stalinist Russia, at best with the low pressure society of Welfare Britain’ (p. 1) and presses its case as follows: ‘The pressing need now is that socialist intellectuals should face the damage which Stalinism and Welfare Capitalism have done to socialist values — a sustained socialist movement must be informed by the belief that the moral imagination can now intervene creatively in human history’ (p. 11). In doing so the classic armoury of cultural criticism was revamped to do service to the moral nullity of a consumer-durables society.

Hoggart’s influential book, The Uses of Literacy, accordingly agrees upon the new economic emancipation of the working class, but continues to argue that ‘commerce’ rules the working class culturally and that ‘this subjection promises to be stronger than the old because the chains of cultural subordination are both easier to wear and harder to strike away than those of economic subordination’ (1957, p. 201). Thus in such analyses economic progress far from advancing the cause of socialism, could be read as undermining the very qualities required to sustain it. Crucial here was the opposition of a traditional working class grounded in a network of community and moral integrity now being eroded by the advance of mass society (just as a ‘popular art’ organic to such a tradition, expressing and confirming its values, was being eroded by a new synthetic and inauthentic mass art). Within such a complex then the call for ‘reality’ became less an epistemological one and more a moral one — a contradiction in part touched upon by Pauline Kael in her earlier lampoon against a similar set of critics: ‘Surely Mr. Corbuth has let the cat out of the social realist bag: manual workers are more real than other people’ (1966, p. 343). At one level this is of course absurd, but yet Kael’s point fails to perceive the texture of feeling from which such a claim might be made. For in a sense for the ‘sociolect’ the working class were ‘more real’ precisely because their tradition represented an authenticity and vitality absent from mass, and indeed probably middle-class culture. But this claim was not made in the name of a class in ascendance, but rather considered to be happy in such a condition’) had largely to be represented by ‘intellectuals’) who had the cultural apparatus to understand the costs of society (of which was seen to increase in proportion to the Young Men, CND, and so on). But this social base, could easily slide into an accident or a generalised anti-militarist villain of the piece is ‘commerce’, or the particular production relations (as was not represented as an issue, but rather that class was accorded that its continuation, as a substantial social transformation, becomes a progressive affirmation of capital and labour in the face of the final moral farewell to the working-class social stage (making way for the groupings trapped alike under the wash of unmet need). But if the realist movement is a broader social syntax it did not do, the level appropriate to it but which was likewise refracted through the struggles of the British film industry. Thus the critique of commerce’s specific commercial practices of the cinema and corresponding restrictiveness of cinema had likewise created nulls in which, it was argued, must stand the imagination who could restore value. This would be achieved through the ‘reality’ (the potential contradiction of overcometo through a notion of ‘social art’ which could only be created in a context not only a re-connection with the genuinely popular art in which he himself , and not escape from art. As Tony Richardson, director of The Long-distance Runner, etc., go on doing the sort of subject...
of a class in ascendance, but rather in decline and because that class was considered to be happy in such decline (‘easily wearing its subordination’) had largely to be represented by ‘outsiders’ (‘socialist intellectuals’) who had the cultural capital and ‘moral imagination’ to understand the costs of society’s development and whose role of dissent was seen to increase in proportion to the working class’s decline (Angry Young Men, CND, and so on). And this, in the absence of any particular social base, could easily slide into reactionary nostalgia (the Leavis legacy) or a generalised anti-materialism (thus for Hoggart the real villain of the piece is ‘commerce’ considered in abstraction from any particular production relations). Thus it is not strictly true that class was not represented as an issue in the culture (Dyer, 1977b, p. 16), but rather that class was accorded a recognition precisely at the time that its continuation as a substantial social force was no longer credited; and likewise the demand for ‘class representation’ was not so much a progressive affirmation of class and the unbridgeable gap between capital and labour in the face of an apparent victory of consent as a final moral farewell to the working class as they made their exit from the social stage (making way for ‘youth’ and other compartmentalised groupings trapped alike under the umbrella of the ‘social problem’).

But if the realist movement within the cinema can be seen as part of a broader social syntax it did not then merely express such attitudes at the level appropriate to it but was itself constitutive of that response which was likewise refracted through the particular context and struggles of the British film industry and its cinematic conventions. Thus the critique of commerce was particularised in terms of the specific commercial practices of the cinema with its stifling of creativity and corresponding restrictiveness of representation. ‘Commerce’ in the cinema had likewise created nullity and stereotyped uniformity against which, it was argued, must stand ‘artists’ (outsiders) of passion and imagination who could restore vitality and freshness to the cinema. This would be achieved through re-connecting with ‘a sense of life’ and ‘reality’ (the potential contradiction between art and reality being overcome through a notion of ‘commitment’ whereby authentic art could only be created in a context of social responsibility). This meant not only a re-connection with the traditional working-class but a genuinely popular art in which audiences could share and recognise themselves rather than escape from themselves in the fantasies of mass art. As Tony Richardson, director of A Taste of Honey, The Loneliness of The Long-distance Runner, etc., said in an interview: ‘I would like to go on doing the sort of subjects I am doing now. Subjects related to the
world we are living in, the roles and the issues that are facing people in the society we are living in. I think films should be an immensely dynamic and potent force within society.

As the quote suggests, the novelty of the movement was largely conceived in terms of 'contents' (subjects) — of the presentation of the working class on the screen no longer as the stock types or comic butts of 'commercial' British cinema, but as 'real', 'fully-rounded' characters in 'real' settings (the regions, cities, factories etc.) with 'real' problems (both everyday and of the culture — freedom/restraint, purity/corruption, tradition/modernity, affluence/authenticity). And the ramifications of the notions of 'reality' dominated both promotion and critical reception: the 'reality' either being accepted and welcomed, denied as in fact 'false', or accepted but criticised in the interests of art (which requires more than a reproduction of reality) or entertainment (people already get enough of reality). However, this appropriation at the level of the 'represented' (whereby validity and authenticity are seen to reside primarily in proportion to the authenticity and validity of the pro-filnic event) away from its mode of representation was not accidental but also the product of the cinematographic 'machine' which consisted not just of an ingrained notion of technique (the 180-degree rule, shot matching, editing for spatio-temporal continuity, diegetic and configurational continuity, concentration on particular scales of shots and angles, etc.) but the 'naturalisation' of these in terms of preconceptions of cinema and other available cinematic discourses. This might be characterised as not only an ingrained tradition of craftsmanship and film making (well discussed by Dyer (1977b) in terms of the 'organic film') but a subservience of this craft to the importance of 'themes and 'ideas' (characterised by MacArthur (1977) as the 'Anglo-American critical tradition' but finding a particular enshrinement in two influential British film movements; thus Tudor's verdict on the documentarists: 'Aesthetics is reduced to morally prescribed social theory' (1974, p. 75) and Alan Lovell's on Free Cinema: 'Free Cinema didn't show any great interest in aesthetic problems' (Lovell and Hillier 1972, p. 143)). These in turn intertwine with a fundamentalism and hostility towards stylisation which is not then just a 'fallacy of Realism' dependent on the bad faith or just plain idiocy of film makers but an implantation with historical and material roots, such as the importance of documentary for both non-commercial and commercial film-making (the inheritance of British war movies and Ealing), the insulation of British culture from European modernism in the 1920s and 1930s at the very time that the 'documentary spirit' was achieving its hegemony across the arts and the selective 1950s (the reception of Brecht, cinema and consequent criticism by the moral entrepreneur, reproducing direct social effects) is a project for a 'socially conscious' cinema that has been predominantly functionalist. The lack of entry into the traditional filling 'creative' in a substantial émigré input at the state level (even though there is a serious state interest in film at the conventions of the privileged sphere, but it is still to be seen as into extending the logic of the basis for the also legitimised by its representation of clichéd cinematic conventions, minimised melodrama, location shooting — with the push towards cinémathèques expectations of what would constitute)

But these senses of limits are important because they represent the limitations of audiences and film-makers, even powerful because of their 'unconscious' embedded in the practical routine of making as we have argued, are not necessarily both pressures and relation between the space of cinema and the world around it. It defines in terms of its condition that the institutions of representation, a real active form cinema takes on the period under consideration of being re-defined, a process which through its internal organisation, only re-located cinema's place within society (increasing the importance, for example for representation denied known 'decline of the cinema', the industry was re-shaped in acknowledgement of its existence. Withdrawal from diegetic space was intensified, studios were disinvested, projects became almost exclusively entrepreneur, now perhaps back
issues that are facing people in this country should be an immensely important...'

The movement was largely concerned — of the presentation of the stock types or comic butts in 'real', 'fully-rounded' characters (scripts, stories etc.) with 'real' problems (freedom/restraint, purity/corruption, authenticity). And the ramifications both promotion and critical acceptance and welcomed, denied as in the interests of art (which authenticity) or entertainment (people), this appropriation at the level and authenticity are seen to authenticity and validity of the representation was not acci-

matic 'machine' which consisted in terms of the 'organic film') in terms of 'the Anglo-American critical movement in two influential eminently suited to film making'.

The 'real' Cinema didn't show any great (1974, p. 75) and Hillier (1972, p. 143)). These the importance of 'themes and 'ideas' in the 'Anglo-American critical movement in two influential verdict on the documentarists:

'embedded social theory' the internal organisation. Thus the appearance of television not only re-located cinema's place within the relations of representation (the X-Film with its possibilities for representation denied to TV) but began to force the well-known 'decline of the cinema', while the internal organisation of the industry was re-shaped in acknowledgement of its new conditions of existence. Withdrawal from direct production by the major combines was intensified, studios were disposed of or leased, and capitalisation of projects became almost exclusively dependent on the individual entrepreneur, now perhaps backed by the state in the form of 'end
money' provided by the NFFC. With a replacement of direct combine control of production by an indirect one through maintained control of distribution and exhibition and a new 'openness' to ideas which might turn the tide of decline, a possibility of innovation was allowed though subject to the demands of financial success. Thus despite the difficulties of capitalisation faced by earlier projects - Look Back in Anger only got Warners' finance and hence ABC handling because Burton was owed a picture which they would have had to pay him for anyway; Saturday Night and Sunday Morning failed to find a backer when Joseph Janni owned the rights and later when made by Woodfall only hit lucky due to a Warners' West End cinema falling vacant, and the film was only able to fill the vacancy through producer Harry Saltzman's previous ties with Warners - by the time of This Sporting Life the commercial viability of the 'realists' had been established to such an extent that Karel Reisz's suggestion of Lindsay Anderson as director was accepted without demur despite Anderson's lack of previous feature experience. However, with the film's financial failure, full circle was turned with Rank's chairman, John Davis, being quick to inform us that the public didn't want 'dreary kitchen-sink dramas' and that 'independent producers . . . should make films of entertainment value' (Husna, 1964).

That this signalled to a large extent the end of the movement tells us something of the limits of the challenge that was made to the industry. Control had been conceived in terms of an overcoming of the fragmentation of skills concomitant upon cinema's 'factory system' through a unification of control under the director, and this was to some extent 'won' in the leeway given to independents, but it was a control dependent on a system founded upon monopoly in distribution and exhibition which through its 'distribution guarantees' accorded the duopoly a right of appraisal and definitional status over the category of 'entertainment'. This could dominate over competing versions of others and in this case ultimately did so (though it might also be argued that the movement destroyed itself anyway through becoming seen to be 'conventional' and hence de-legitimitising its claims to 'reality').

The purpose here then, in an albeit abbreviated fashion, has been to suggest the need to avoid a-priorism and over-abstraction in the theorisation of both ideology and realism (the two being here brought together through the dominance of realism within British cinema, whose characterisation has been necessarily selective, and the attempts of current work to define realism as intrinsically ideological). An emphasis on effectivity has suggested the necessity of analysis neither in terms of origins nor textual characteristics alone, but in relation to the particular complex of circumstances in which it arises. This case discussed here, then, has revealed the socio-historical specificity of realism and certain of its sense would be lost if it were to be maintained an awareness of cinema as the 'machine') and its particular positions and spaces constructed. As a consequence of all these I hope qualities cannot be assessed independently of the production of film-making, available in other available cinematic and social contexts. And thus the ideological implications one read off from a class base, from an un-unified one articulated in media courses and to socio-political contexts (constitute) but from which the

Notes

1. Cf. Murdock and Golding's paper swamped by the volume of material on the 'contradictions' inherent in the reality that is grounded in private enterprise imperative therefore ends by underplaying the legitimacy rests' (1976, p. 137). The commercial imperatives will not necessarily in the case of The Angry Silence. In Film 

2. Indeed, the whole issue is somewhat complex. A selection of a representative for some unproblematic reading of a rather problematic text: assertion is it unclear whether these relations might mean (if to be more precise what it was. Only one thing is clear in the film and only then after a sacrifice of fees by many of the leading the film's producer within a particular set of relations under the category of 'livelihoods' largely understood as those of the
Complex of circumstances in which film texts are materialised. For the case discussed here, then, I have argued for a recognition of first, the socio-historical specificity of media ideologies (without which a grasp of certain of their sense would be impossible) but one which, secondly, maintains an awareness of cinematic specificity (the determinations of the 'machine') and its particular level of effectivity which is not then, thirdly, understood in terms of autonomy but rather in terms of the positions and spaces constructed at the level of the economic. Hence as a consequence of all three I hold that progressive or reactionary qualities cannot be assessed independently of the conditions of production of film-making, available modes of consumption as well as other available cinematic and socio-political discourses within the culture. And thus the ideological performance of the films is not a unitary one read off from a class base or a production process but a complex, un-unified one articulated in relation both to specific cinematic discourses and to socio-political ones which in part they support (constitute) but from which they also in part dissent.

Notes

1. Cf. Murdock and Golding's position that oppositional views 'are easily swamped by the volume of mainstream output' (p. 38) with Alvin Gouldner's claim for the 'contradictions' internal to a system of producing accounts of social reality that is grounded in private ownership: 'The hegemonic class's profit imperative therefore ends by undermining the very culture on which its own legitimacy rests' (1976, p. 157). The opposite of this can also be formulated — commercial imperatives will not necessarily lead to an investment in that which would appear conducive to capital's long-term interests. Take, for example, the case of The Angry Silence. In Film World Ivor Montagu (1964) argues 'Seeing the income level of those who control the controlling circuits in this country, such a film, had it been ten times cruder than it was, must inevitably have been certain of distribution and exhibition before ever it was begun' (p. 271). Yet this was precisely what it was not. Only one company could be found with any interest at all in the film and only then after £40,000 had been lopped off the bill through a sacrifice of fees by many of the leading participants in favour of a share of the profits, such as they might be.

2. Indeed, the whole issue is something of a red herring relying on a peculiar selection of a representative for semiotics (Terry Eagleton) and an assumed unproblematic reading of a rather confused claim. Far from being a 'very reasonable' assertion it is unclear what a text's 'internalisation' of its production relations might mean (if to be more than a mere axiom of the sort that every text is produced within a particular set of production relations). Eagleton himself reveals a hesitancy, and through his unsure employment of the notion of 'literary mode of production' — relations largely understood as those of the mode of production proper and those operant
between text and audience. And thus while probably attempting a ‘stronger’ and thus more tenous claim he is likely to be more correctly seen as constructing an argument about relations of consumption and not relations of production at all and hence to be reading forward from text to audience (Interestingly one of the relations submerged in Murdock and Golding’s analysis) rather than back from text to production relations, as full quotation of the relevant passage reveals:

‘One might add, too, that every literary text in some sense internalises its social relations of production – that every text immates by its very conventions the way it is to be consumed, encodes within itself its own ideology of how, by whom and for whom it was produced. Every text obliquely posits a putative reader, defining its productivity in terms of a certain capacity for consumption’ (Eagleton, 1976, p. 48).

3. Brewster (1973) attempts this by establishing rules of pertinence in accordance with motivations generated within the textual system itself (though insofar as the ‘implicit reader’ which this is supposed to predicate is never empirically found not altogether without contradiction). Henderson (1973/74) rightly criticises Brewster for his attempt to impose Metzian terms within a foreign problematic, but in re-stating Cahiers’ own rules of pertinence he hardly resolves the issue which Brewster was at least attempting to face: ‘The Cahiers reading goes beyond the text relating what is present to what is absent, thereby defining its own principles of pertinence’ (Henderson, 1973/74, p. 43). The rules of pertinence then may be the properties of the studying discourse (Cahiers’ reading) rather than of the text itself (Young Mr Lincoln), but then that hardly exempts that discourse from the demands of validity and coherence.

Two major interests inform this chapter. One, argued, it is politically important to understand how they function, ideologies are so resilient in the face of contradictory evidence that it is important to understand how they function in order to model resistance and act for political action. It seems that many of whose ideas are true.

The second interest which leads me to believe that a Marxist approach to ideology and the concept of value is essential is that we do not have what we need to analyse the unwillingness of theorists to get rid of old ideas. Consequently the use of actual ideological processes requires a more sophisticated approach than stereotypes is as yet hard to analysis. From this: stereotypes seem to be capable of being essentially ideological; conversely as ideological concepts are and easily identifiable kind that can account for their influence. Consequently the study of ideological processes requires a broader perspective (provided by psychological study) that can account for their influence the least to test hypotheses about them. At the moment the generally accepted hypotheses about, stereotypes may actually falsified. Another theoretical statement about this is, of course, to draw attention to the presuppositions about ideology that is based. Let me outline these.

Ideology must be understood as ideas and as being inconsistent...
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