Pope Honorius III and the Holy Land Crusades, 1216-1227:
A Study in Responsive Papal Government

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I, Thomas William Smith, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: ..................................................

Date: ..................................................
Abstract

This thesis is a study of medieval papal government and the Holy Land crusades under Pope Honorius III (1216-27). Based on the systematic study of the unpublished manuscripts of Honorius’s papal registers (Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticana 9-13) and supplemented with contemporary diplomatic evidence and chronicles, it examines the institutions of papal government that were central to Honorius’s administration of crusade affairs in the East and the West.

This thesis seeks to repair the significant historiographical gap for Honorius III’s pontificate and to analyse the pope’s reign on its own terms. It also puts forward a new view of the nature of papal crusade government, arguing that Honorius’s administration of the Holy Land crusades was primarily responsive rather than proactive in its operation. This thesis contends the prevailing view in the current historiography that the papacy played a proactive role in formulating, implementing, and modifying a coherent and premeditated crusade policy. Instead it is demonstrated that Honorius pursued his crusade policy responsively, which was defined by input from outside the papal curia. It is established that the direction of most papal crusade decisions was determined in an ad hoc fashion in response to petitioners and diplomats presenting business at the curia.

Part one of the thesis is formed of three chapters which provide a chronological framework and propound a detailed political narrative of
Honorius’s diplomacy with the lay powers between 1216 and 1227. Part two of the thesis consists of three chapters arranged thematically to consider the institutions of papal government under Honorius, investigating the theology in his letter *arengae*, his deployment of papal legates, and the management of the crusade tax respectively.
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<tr>
<td>MGH Const.</td>
<td>Monumenta Germaniae Historica Constitutiones</td>
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<td>MGH DD F II</td>
<td>Monumenta Germaniae Historica Diplomata Regum et Imperatorum Germaniae (Die Urkunden Friedrichs II.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGH SrG</td>
<td>Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores rerum Germanicarum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGH SS</td>
<td>Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores (in Folio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg. Vat.</td>
<td>Registra Vaticana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHGF</td>
<td><em>Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Rolls Series (Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores or Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland)</td>
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Thomas W. Smith

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Introduction

Contribution to the Historiography

This thesis is a study of the organisation of the Holy Land crusades under Pope Honorius III (1216-27), namely the Fifth Crusade (1217-21) and the preparation of the Crusade of Frederick II (1228-29). It has two main aims: the first is to help repair the significant gap in the historiography that exists for Honorius III’s pontificate; the second is to put forward a different understanding of the way that papal government operated in its administration of the Holy Land crusades to that commonly propounded in the historiography.

To begin by addressing the first aim, Honorius III’s pontificate has long been overshadowed by his more famous predecessor, Pope Innocent III (1198-1216), and his successor, Pope Gregory IX (1227-41).1 Next to these two seemingly more dynamic and assertive popes, Honorius appeared less significant. He did not intervene decisively to remove candidates for the imperial throne who threatened the papacy, such as Innocent did, nor did he excommunicate and go to war with Emperor Frederick II (king of Sicily, 1208-50; king of Germany, 1211-20; Roman-German Emperor, 1220-50), as Gregory did. Honorius’s pontificate has often been viewed as an historical backwater in which nothing really

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1 Raoul Manselli, ‘Onorio III e Federico II: revisione d’un giudizio?’, Studi Romani, 11 (1963), 142.
happened, and he is often given short shrift in general textbooks on the papacy.²

Honorius does appear - sometimes only as a cameo - in histories of the Dominicans and Franciscans, in which he played an important role by recognising the orders in 1216 and 1223 respectively, and also in studies of Frederick II.³

Works that did mention Honorius often did so disparagingly. Horace Mann famously said that Honorius’s pontificate was nothing more than ‘an echo’ of Innocent III’s.⁴ Honorius has regularly been labelled as weak, mild, gentle, simple, and peace-loving.⁵ Recently however, the tide has begun to turn, and a more sympathetic appraisal has started to emerge from the historiography, particularly in the work of Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt and Rebecca Rist on Honorius’s involvement in crusading within Europe.⁶


⁶ Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, 1147-1254 (Leiden, 2007), 149-53; Rebecca Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198-1245 (London, 2009), 82-83. Manselli was the one to spearhead this view, and painted a positive picture of Honorius, arguing
The historiography on Honorius is thus fragmented and uneven in coverage; his pontificate has not received anything like the comprehensive treatment afforded to Innocent III, which is surely one of the reasons he has been portrayed poorly in the past. To date only three monographs and a slender *libellus* have been published on Honorius. In 1895 a German book, *Papst Honorius III. (1216-1227): Eine Monographie*, was published by Johannes Clausen - who had only printed sources to work from - which is now greatly outdated. Adalbert Keutner published his slim *libellus* on the papacy and war under Honorius III in 1935, entitled *Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des Papstes Honorius III. (1216-1227)*, but was also reliant on printed sources, and attempted a broad sweep in his short work of only sixty-three pages; as a result his study lacks detail. Jane Sayers published an important study of papal government and England under Honorius in 1984, *Papal Government and England during the Pontificate of Honorius III (1216-1227)*, which focused on his chancery and its products, but not on his wider diplomatic affairs. Most recently, in 2013, Pierre-Vincent Claverie published the monograph emanating from his habilitation thesis, entitled *Honorius III et l’Oriente (1216-1227): Étude et publication de sources* that he was not weak and submissive but wise and prudent. Manselli’s analysis, however, had a limited impact on the historiography: Manselli, ‘Onorio’, 159.


8 Johannes Clausen, *Papst Honorius III. (1216-1227): Eine Monographie* (Bonn, 1895). Clausen’s work is predominantly descriptive, and has been superseded by more recent works.

9 Keutner, *Papsttum*.

inédites des Archives vaticanes (ASV), although unfortunately it appeared too late to take account of in this thesis.¹¹

Honorsiu’s involvement in crusading to the Holy Land has featured in a number of works, most significantly those of James Powell. In his 1986 work *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221* - which remains the most comprehensive study of the campaign of the Fifth Crusade - Powell analysed a number of aspects of Honorius’s ‘crusade government’, including the preaching, diplomacy, use of legates, and financing of the Fifth Crusade.¹² This thesis focuses not on the campaign of the Fifth Crusade itself, but on the papal crusade diplomacy and administration in the West. As a result, closer attention is given to the operation of papal government. This thesis confirms many of Powell’s findings and offers some nuances as well as new directions, such as the study of Honorius’s theological statements in the *arengae* of his letters. In addition, whilst Powell’s monograph ended with the Fifth Crusade’s failure in 1221, this study covers Honorius’s entire pontificate. Though the topic of this thesis is Honorius’s involvement in the Holy Land crusades, it is hoped that the focus on the *how* his curia operated will be of interest to those working on the early thirteenth-century Church more broadly, which the second aim of the thesis addresses.

Turning then to the second aim, a common trend in the historiography is to treat the medieval papacy as a proactive policy-making, and alternately, policy-

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¹¹ Pierre-Vincent Claverie, *Honorsius III et l’Oriente (1216-1227): Étude et publication de sources inédites des Archives vaticanes (ASV)* (Leiden, 2013). I am extremely grateful to Dr Claverie for sending me a copy of his book which I received during the last weeks of writing up this thesis; Dr Claverie and I have worked entirely independently of each other.

following, body.\textsuperscript{13} Works often state that the popes took the initiative in formulating policies with their cardinals at the curia, and then imposed them on Christendom through letters despatched from the papal chancery. Furthermore, it is often stated that popes were reluctant to deviate from the policies laid down by their predecessors, and that it was a significant event when these policies were modified or changed (see the works cited in the note above, in particular those by Fonnesberg-Schmidt and Rist). Many research questions have focused on whether Honorius followed Innocent III’s policies, whether he altered them, or if he created his own policies.

To adopt such an approach - championing the pope as a proactive policymaker - is problematic. The evidence from Honorius’s reign instead suggests that rather than proactively formulating and implementing papal policy regarding the Holy Land crusades, he was actually much more reactive and most often made policy decisions in response to input from outside the curia, which came in the form of petitions and letters from lay powers. Moves towards such an interpretation of papal crusade government have been aired in the most recent

historiography. In 2004 Andrew Jotischky argued that Innocent III’s crusade policy can be thought of as *ad hoc* problem solving:

Because so much of lasting significance was articulated in Innocent’s pontificate, it is easy to see him as an idealist who created new ways of formulating papal primacy. But Innocent’s crusading policy can just as convincingly be interpreted as a series of pragmatic reactions to problems as they arose. Some of these problems were chronic, others the result of fortuitous circumstances; but all were inherited, rather than being of Innocent’s own making.¹⁴

Such a way of thinking about papal government spotlights outside initiative in the processes of decision-making. In 2012 Anne Duggan picked up this thread and emphasised the importance of petitions and outside initiative on the crusade decision-making of Pope Alexander III (1159-81), stating that:

Petitioners from the Holy Land, no less than bishops, religious houses and secular lords, also sought support for their attempts to attract more substantial military assistance from the West. To them he [Alexander III] gave letters granting ‘crusading privileges’ and authorizing their quests for men and money for the defence of the Latin kingdom, and tried, unsuccessfully, to engage the kingdom of France in a crusading effort. None of these letters represented papal initiative, however, and it is difficult to see in them anything approaching the development of a ‘crusading policy’.¹⁵

Duggan does not rule out the popes taking the initiative in making decisions, but her argument cuts to the heart of the historiographical problem: scholars need to take more care in judging which decisions were made on the pope’s initiative and

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¹⁴ Andrew Jotischky, *Crusading and the Crusader States* (Harlow, 2004), 171.
which were made responsively. It is an attractively simple approach to bundle all papal crusade decisions into a supposedly coherent policy, the development of which can easily be measured, and compared against other pontificates. Yet this does not do justice to the nature of papal government, which was heavily influenced by input from diplomats and petitioners: their varied entreaties complicated papal decision-making.

The idea that the popes were more reactive than proactive in their political affairs is only just beginning to emerge from the historiography. Aside from a few early attempts to argue for responsive papal government, the concept has yet to take proper hold in the historiography. In 2012 Barbara Bombi made the clearest exposition of this view:

‘Papal policy’ was hardly ever imposed from above and the extent to which from a modern perspective we can assess papal strategies either as successful or unsuccessful is often inadequate. Indeed, we should focus on the machinery of government and administrative practices that lie behind such policies. Arguably, the medieval papacy pursued its interests and legislated within its jurisdiction through what we can define ‘responsive forms of government’, namely the papacy was approving or rejecting requests and petitions according to religious, political, social and economic circumstances.17

On the subject of medieval diplomacy more broadly, Björn Weiler sounded a similar note of caution in 2006:

When considering thirteenth-century diplomatic exchanges, it is important to remember that decisions were frequently made on an ad hoc basis. We should avoid seeing a detailed and finely thought-out ‘grand strategy’ behind every move, without necessarily claiming, as the other extreme, that medieval kings had no underlying aims and ambitions at all.18

There is thus a balance to be struck between claiming that the papacy was a proactive policy-maker and arguing for a totally reactive operation which lacked any initiative on the part of the pope.

Colin Morris and Patrick Zutshi have made significant contributions in favour of responsive papal government. In 1989, Morris wrote that:

International Congress of Medieval Canon Law, Esztergom, 3-8 August 2008 (Vatican City, 2010), 41; and eadem, ‘Alexander’, 46. Malcolm Barber made the point that Innocent III ‘sometimes seems to have formulated policy on the basis of the views of the most recent lobbyist to have gained access to him’: Malcolm Barber, The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages (Harlow, 2000), 136.

Papal activity was the outstanding example of what has been called ‘rescript’ government. This means that letters or rescripts were issued in response to petitions from outside the curia, and that they often simply echoed the wording of the request ... This administration by response left most of the initiative in the hands of petitioners and meant that a vast amount of paperwork might imply only a minimum of true policy-making ... At the heart of what may seem a very active administration the pope or king was passive, responding to applications without, in many cases, any real capacity to assess the situation. A picture of this kind helps us to understand the popes’ remarkable failure (as it has seemed to historians) to carry through a systematic reform of the western church. This was not mainly because the Roman curia was itself corrupt but because the structure was not designed for the exercise of major initiatives or the application of consistent policies.19

In 2007 Zutshi built upon Morris’s view, stating that:

Historians have tended to see papal decisions as exemplifications or reflections of ‘policy’, even when they were in fact responses to requests made to the pope and did not result from the pope’s own initiative.20

Morris and Zutshi, however, have both explicitly excluded the crusades from their models. Morris thought that the crusade was a vehicle through which the popes could indeed introduce policies:

There were ways ... in which the popes could take the initiative in introducing policies to the church as a whole ... The custom that a crusade was originated by a papal bull was widely accepted in the [twelfth] century. It did not mean that the pope’s policy always prevailed ... But it

19 Morris, Monarchy, 212-13. See also ibid., 571.
did give the pope the opportunity to originate and plan crusades and to publicize his theology of crusading.\textsuperscript{21}

Whilst Honorius took the opportunity to propound his theological stance on crusading in his letters (see chapter four), his role in planning the Holy Land crusades more broadly was much less proactive. Building on the view of Morris, Zutshi argued that crusading was of such importance to the popes that this was one of the few areas in which they took the initiative in decision-making:

There were areas such as the crusades and the fight against heresy to which the popes gave high priority and where one cannot see their actions primarily as response to initiatives from outside.\textsuperscript{22}

This thesis seeks to extend the model of responsive papal government - from which Morris and Zutshi excluded crusading - to include the papacy’s crusade organisation.\textsuperscript{23} Whilst recognising that the crusades were of the highest priority to Honorius, and that he took more personal initiative regarding crusading than in the issue of common letters, it will be argued that the pope’s involvement in the Holy Land crusades was almost as responsive to outside initiative as his other curial business, such as the granting of privileges and settlement of legal disputes. It should therefore form a cornerstone of the model of responsive papal government.

\textsuperscript{21} Morris, Monarchy, 218-19.
\textsuperscript{22} Zutshi, ‘Petitioners’, 293.
\textsuperscript{23} I wish to thank Dr Danica Summerlin for her advice on selecting the term ‘responsive’ over ‘reactive’: use of the latter term for the model would suggest that the popes never took the initiative. ‘Responsive papal government’ better fits an institution which was mostly reactive, but occasionally proactive.
Honorius did have aims and attitudes towards particular issues and lay powers: the objectives of his crusade policy were to recover the Holy Land by cooperating with Frederick II in order to secure an imperial crusade, whilst simultaneously attempting to safeguard the integrity of the Papal State. Yet, as this thesis argues, this policy was pursued responsively and was defined through input from outside the papal curia in the form of petitions and political missives, not by Honorius functioning as a proactive policy-maker. While Honorius aimed to persuade Frederick to depart on crusade, the agenda of negotiations, and the course that they took, was very much determined by the initiative of the emperor rather than the pope. The pope took the initiative when possible but he was not consciously formulating and then implementing a defined crusade policy from the curia.

Top level political negotiations were inextricably entwined with petitioning for privileges, exemptions, and other favours. It obscures the character of papal government to draw too rigid a distinction between the issue of curial and common letters. Requests from lay powers were often included in their political correspondence, to which the pope would reply in a curial letter. Diplomats at the curia acting on behalf of lay powers would also request and receive common letters whilst conducting political negotiations, such as the archdeacon employed by King Andrew II of Hungary (1205-35) in the run up to his crusade (see chapter one). As Robert Swanson pointed out, petitions for papal provisions allowed ‘scope for the play of royal politics’. The more powerful the lay ruler, the more likely the pope was to grant their wishes. When one studies the papal registers

from Honorius’s reign, it quickly becomes clear that while he did issue curial letters regarding the crusades on his own initiative, many were actually responses to petitions, political letters, and written reports.

Even Innocent III himself - held to be the most powerful and interventionist of medieval popes - admitted the great pressures he was under from petitioners in a letter prefacing his sermon collection that he sent to Abbot Arnald of Citeaux, probably at some point between 1201 and 1205:

While if only in the office of preaching I might have done that which I say, but I am hindered by the assaults [incursibus] of so many legal cases, entangled by so many obligations of business, that inevitably I find myself divided among many things. Indeed I am not permitted time to think, nor allowed space to breathe; I am surrendered to others in such a way that my very self seems to have been carried off.25

Here then, from no less a figure than Innocent III, is the admission that he was perhaps not the primum mobile in the issue of legal documents at least; rather, the balance of power appears to have been in favour of the clamouring masses of supplicants hammering on the doors of the papal residences. The anonymous continuator of The Song of the Cathar Wars, writing between 1218 and 1219, told of the pressure put on Innocent by delegates at the Fourth Lateran Council (November 1215) over the lands conquered by the Albigensian Crusade. The

25 Patrologiae cursus completa, series Latina, ed. J.P. Migne, ccxvii (Paris, 1855), 311-12: ‘Utinam autem in praedicationis officio fecerim ipse quod dico, sed tot sum causarum impeditus incursibus, tot negotiorum nexibus irretitus, ut necesse sit divisum ad singula minorem in singulis inveniri. Contemplari quidem non sinor, sed nec respirare permittor; sic traditus aliis, ut pene penitus mihi videar esse subtractus.’ The increasingly heavy pressure that petitioners exerted on the papacy during the thirteenth century led to institutional growth - such as the creation of the papal penitentiary - as part of an effort to try and cope with the business that the curia was regularly bombarded with: Zutshi, ‘Petitioners’, 276, 290-91.
press of these supplicants was so great that even after an exasperated Innocent retired from his palace to a garden to escape their demands, the clergy concerned simply burst into the garden and resumed their lobbying.  

Although the personalities of different popes (and their cardinals) must have affected the way in which the papacy conducted its political diplomacy - and perhaps Honorius took the initiative less than Innocent - the dynamic of papal government driven by response appears fundamental to the early thirteenth-century papacy.

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Illustration 1. Fresco of St Francis preaching before Pope Honorius III, Basilica of San Francesco d’Assisi, Assisi (Wikimedia.org)
The Career of Cencius from Chamberlain to Pope

The man elected as Pope Honorius III, Cencius, is best known to the historiography as Cencius camerarius (chamberlain), a position he first held at the curia under Pope Clement III (1187-91). He is regularly claimed to have belonged to the Roman noble family of Savelli, but this attribution was demonstrated to be
baseless several years ago. Rather, we know very little of Cencius’s background and early life. We do not even know which decade of the twelfth century he was born in. One can only establish a rough date of birth as a matter of conjecture. Judging from his known career history before becoming pope, and that the curialist Jacques de Vitry, bishop of Acre (1216-28, d.1240), referred to him as *senex* (mature) in 1216, a date in the middle decades of the twelfth century seems certain. This can probably be narrowed down to the 1150s, or possibly the early 1160s. Raoul Manselli posited a date *circa* 1160, which is plausible.

The famous image of Honorius III in the St Francis Cycle at the Basilica of San Francesco d’Assisi in Assisi shows a misleadingly youthful pope (Illustration 1, p. 25). Fierce controversy swirls around the date of composition and the master who accomplished the work, but it was probably executed in the last decade of the thirteenth century or the first decade of the fourteenth, and scholars have noticed that Honorius’s image is the same as those of Innocent III and Gregory IX in the same cycle - they were probably modelled on a portrait of Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303). More trustworthy is the contemporary image of Honorius in the mosaic decorating the apse of the Basilica of San Paolo fuori le mura in Rome, which portrays the pope with grey-white hair cut in a short style.

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and a short grey beard (Illustration 2, p. 26). Here, then, is Jacques de Vitry’s *senex*: Honorius - the donor of the image, who admittedly, was unlikely to request an unflattering depiction - is depicted as mature and humble, and cuts the figure more of a sophisticated statesman than the frail relic that the earlier historiography would have us believe. This is presumably how the pope saw himself, and it is consistent with his view of the papal office (see chapter four).

That Cencius’s family is unknown, and that he acknowledged in one of his great works, the *Liber censuum* (an administrative work he completed in 1192 that listed payments due to the Roman Church), that everything he had in life he owed to the Church, points to humble parentage and a self-made man. Matthias Thumser has made a case for Cencius belonging to the Capocci family, although this attribution was questioned by Sandro Carocci, and one must conclude that Cencius’s background remains obscure; in the face of such uncertainty, the humble origins still seem most likely.

Cencius first features for certain in the historical record in the 1180s, when he was appointed chamberlain by Clement III in 1188. Cencius held a canonry at S. Maria Maggiore probably around the same time. Subsequently, he was made

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34 There is evidence which suggests that Honorius might have been an oblate in the church of St John Lateran as a child, and may have been *cubicularius* at the church of S. Maria in Cosmedin before taking on the canonry at S. Maria Maggiore: Sayers, *Government*, 1-2.
cardinal-deacon of S. Lucia in Orthea by Pope Celestine III (1191-98) in 1193. In 1194, Celestine promoted Cencius again to become joint chancellor and chamberlain. Between 1191 and 1198 he acted as an auditor, hearing litigation presented at the curia, which suggests that he had some training in canon law. In 1196 Cencius gained important diplomatic experience when he was chosen to negotiate with Emperor Henry VI (1191-97). Although his powerful dual role of chamberlain-chancellor was abolished by Innocent III on his accession, Cencius was promoted to cardinal-priest of SS. Giovanni e Paolo in 1200, perhaps as something of a consolation prize.

Cencius’s curial career under Innocent III was somewhat unremarkable, although this was not necessarily a sign of disfavour as has been claimed. This all changed when Innocent died on 16 July 1216. At Perugia on 18 July Cencius was elected by compromise as the successor to Innocent, taking the name Honorius III; he was consecrated on 24 July. Arguably the Holy Land crusade was the defining theme of Honorius’s pontificate and the cause to which he was most committed, which makes it such a good lens to examine his pontificate as a whole. From his accession in 1216 until his death in 1227, Honorius was heavily involved in organising the Fifth Crusade, which he had inherited from Innocent, and, following its failure, the Crusade of Frederick II. For much of this period, the pope’s involvement focused around trying to secure the departure of Frederick II

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35 For analysis of Cencius’s appointment to the College of Cardinals by Celestine III, see John Doran, ‘A Lifetime in the Service of the Roman Church’, in idem and Damian J. Smith, eds., Pope Celestine III (1191-1198); Diplomat and Pastor (Farnham, 2008), 44-45.
37 Maleczek, Kardinalscolleg, 112. See also Sayers, Government, 1-2.
38 Kelly, Dictionary, 190.
on crusade, and coordinating other lay powers in response to Frederick’s changing promises. Papal-imperial negotiations were generally cooperative and fruitful - Honorius was of a different mettle to his successor, Gregory IX.

Honorius also played an instrumental role in ensuring the success of the Dominicans, Franciscans, and Carmelites by recognising their Rules in 1216, 1223, and 1226 respectively, and prohibiting the study of civil law at Paris (possibly to encourage the study of theology).\(^40\) Although not traditionally renowned as an author, Honorius was involved in the production of a number of important works. Aside from compiling the *Liber censuum*, he made several different recensions of his sermon collection, composed an *Ordo Romanus* (a liturgical work for use at the curia) whilst chamberlain, and near the end of his pontificate he ordered the compilation of a new canon law collection from the decretal letters in his registers, the *Compilatio quinta*, which was promulgated *circa* 1226.\(^41\)

Honorius was therefore a figure of some note at the papal curia: a seasoned administrator, a not insignificant author, and a man with diplomatic experience of dealing with the emperors. He was by no means an unworthy successor to Innocent III. Indeed, that Honorius experienced a different


upbringing to noble, university-educated men like Innocent, may offer a clue to the innovative theological stance revealed in chapter four.

Sources and Methodology

Honorius’s pontificate is ill-served by chronicle evidence, which is sparse and cursory in nature, and unfortunately there is no known biographical account such as the *Gesta Innocentii III* for Innocent III’s reign. There are, however, much fuller accounts of the Fifth Crusade by participants which can shed some (indirect) light on Honorius - these and other chronicles are drawn on where relevant throughout this thesis to contextualise the diplomatic correspondence.

As for most medieval popes, the main sources for the reign of Honorius are his letters, and specifically for Honorius, the copies of outgoing letters entered into his registers. The manuscripts of Honorius’s registers, Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registra Vaticana 9-13, have never been printed in full.

A number of editors have printed selections of letters from the registers. C.A. Horoy collected a large part of Honorius’s letters and sermons in his *Opera Omnia*, published between 1879 and 1882. Horoy’s title, however, belies the fact that this collection is far from complete: a large number of important letters

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are missing. He was also merely reprinting the texts of others, and many letters are presented in a mutilated form, lacking whole clauses, and featuring transcriptional errors. In 1883, Carl Rodenberg made a good edition of the letters from the papal registers regarding the papacy and the Empire. Rodenberg’s selection of letters, however, is obviously far from an accurate reflection of the content of Honorius’s register as a whole, and there are some minor errors of transcription. Petrus Pressutti calendared Honorius’s registers in two volumes published in 1888 and 1895. Pressutti’s calendar remains an excellent finding aid when used in conjunction with the manuscripts, but his extracts alone cannot be relied upon as a guide to the content of Honorius’s letters. In 1965 Demetrio Mansilla printed a collection of documents from Honorius’s pontificate that regarded Spain. Most recently, in 2013, Claverie appended his study of Honorius with the texts of one hundred and fifty letters from the registers.

Because Honorius’s registers lack a complete modern edition, it is necessary to go back to the manuscripts. This thesis is based upon the study of the register manuscripts, along with Pressutti’s calendar as a finding aid, and references are given to these in the notes. Pressutti’s calendar lists printed versions of letters where they exist (up to his time of writing at the end of the nineteenth century). Where original letters (letters that were not copied into the registers) have been consulted in print, the Horoy edition - which is easier to find than some of the obscure volumes he was reprinting letters from - is cited for ease

45 Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum, ed. Carl Rodenberg, 3 vols (Berlin, 1883-94), i.
48 Claverie, Honorius, 279-478.
of reference. The evidence from Honorius’s letters is contextualised with imperial and royal letters and chronicles, which have been accessed in printed versions (I have also examined the manuscripts wherever possible); references are given to the best or most easily available editions.

The nature of the thirteenth-century papal registers is well known to scholars. Nevertheless, as the most important source material for this thesis, it is necessary to provide a summary here. Honorius’s registers form some of the precious early survivals from the Registra Vaticana series: volumes of copies of outgoing papal documents. Apart from an eleventh-century copy of parts of the register of Pope John VIII (872-82), that of Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) is the only one to survive before those of Innocent III, which begin an almost unbroken series throughout the Middle Ages.49

Registra Vaticana is the only series of registers that was kept during Honorius’s reign. There does not seem to have been a special register kept for political affairs in the fashion of Innocent III’s Regestum Innocentii III papae super negotio Romani imperii.50 Geoffrey Barraclough has noted that aside from the Registra Vaticana series, it was not until the beginning of the fourteenth century that the inception of almost all the series of curial registers was

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49 Reginald L. Poole, Lectures on the History of the Papal Chancery down to the Time of Innocent III (Cambridge, 1915), 33-34, 124. The Registra Vaticana series for the thirteenth century only lacks volumes from Innocent III’s pontificate, from which most of year 3, and the entirety of years 4, 17, 18, and 19 were lost: Alfred J. Andrea, Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade (rev. edn, Leiden, 2008), 8.

witnessed.\textsuperscript{51} From the start of Pope Clement VI’s reign (1342), we have a register of successful petitions submitted to the papacy in the \textit{Registra Supplicationum} series. Zutshi has commented critically on the tenuous evidence held up by others as evidence of a register of petitions under Popes Clement V (1305-14) and John XXII (1316-34), but does state that the registration of petitions could have begun under Pope Benedict XII (1334-42).\textsuperscript{52} There was thus no archiving of supplications during Honorius’s pontificate (see below).

Registration - the act of copying ‘original’ outgoing papal letters into a register - was a selective practice under Honorius: there was no system for deciding which letters to enregister.\textsuperscript{53} When supplemented with surviving original papal letters, the registers provide us with an extremely valuable source for the study of Honorius’s reign, but one that is far from complete. Petitioners who were willing to pay could have their document registered as a safeguard in case of the loss of the original, but the demand for registration at the request of supplicants was kept deliberately low by high costs. The papacy wanted to deter registration because the costs outweighed the benefits: it was cheaper to continue detecting forged letters by long-winded tests than to begin a system of total registration.\textsuperscript{54} Increased demand for registration would have further burdened chancery officials. Papal complaints about the weight of business they had to deal with are a frequent occurrence in papal letters, and Honorius himself complained that he was required

\textsuperscript{51} Geoffrey Barraclough, \textit{Public Notaries and the Papal Curia: A Calendar and Study of a Formularium Notariorum Curie from the Early Years of the Fourteenth Century} (London, 1934), 123.


\textsuperscript{53} Sayers, \textit{Government}, 71.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 74.
to have a superhuman memory when he was but a man (although ironically, total registration of outgoing letters would have eased this burden).\textsuperscript{55}

Registration at the papacy’s behest was reserved for letters that were deemed important enough to keep a record of. Paradoxically, although the fact that a letter was enregistered suggests its significance, many such letters were not enregistered.\textsuperscript{56} It has been estimated that no more than one-tenth of medieval papal letters were registered, and Sayers gives a greater estimate of around one-quarter for Honorius’s pontificate.\textsuperscript{57}

What appears to be at least a representative corpus, if not the majority, of Honorius’s letters on the Holy Land crusades were entered into his registers for safe-keeping, but one must acknowledge that there may be gaps that cannot be identified and partially filled in with other evidence (such as the lost papal crusade call that was clearly sent to Frederick II at the end of 1218, the existence of which can be established through Frederick’s extant reply of 12 January 1219 - see chapter one). This is in line with Harry Bresslau and Paul Rabikauskas’s statements that while many important political letters were frequently registered, this was by no means the rule, and the registers do not represent a complete record of the popes’ political correspondence.\textsuperscript{58}

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\textsuperscript{55} Zutshi, ‘Petitioners’, 283-85.
\textsuperscript{58} Bresslau, Handbuch, i, 121; Paul Rabikauskas, Diplomatica pontificia (6th edn, Rome, 1998), 82.
Pressutti calendared 6,288 letters issued by Honorius, of which 5,144 letters were entered into the papal registers.\textsuperscript{59} Sayers has multiplied the average number of letters registered per year (482.5) by four to give a potential total yearly chancery output of somewhere around 1,930 letters. Taking this figure and multiplying it by the ten years and eight months of Honorius’s reign gives a potential total output of around 20,573.8 letters for the whole of Honorius’s pontificate. This figure seems plausible and is supported by Sayers’ count of scribes employed under Honorius: somewhere between sixty-four and seventy-three in total, perhaps with some twenty-five to thirty employed at once and each producing some five documents a day.\textsuperscript{60} Therefore it is abundantly clear that many letters are missing from the registers: at least some of them must concern the Holy Land crusades.

The letters copied into the registers were not entered in a strict chronological order but a seemingly erratic series of rough groupings of letters issued on similar dates which was frequently disrupted.\textsuperscript{61} Letters concerning the same or related matters might also be gathered together, and were sometimes enregistered as a group once a final decision had been made. These groupings stemmed predominantly from the nature of papal government. When batches of petitions were accepted and subsequently selected for registration, they would often be registered together.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 56, 50-52.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 84; Bresslau, \textit{Handbuch}, i, 124; Carl Rodenberg, ‘Ueber die Register Honorius III., Gregors IX. und Innocenz IV.’, \textit{Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde}, 10 (1885), 516.
Letters that were selected were often ruthlessly abbreviated during registration to save space. Nevertheless, this did not affect the internal contents of the letter, and despite the abbreviation of words and some protocols, the text should be a trustworthy representation of the original. The greeting protocol is always abridged, or omitted altogether, and the addressee’s name is written in the margin. Common clauses are abbreviated, along with the main body of text.

Rabikauskas has stated that chancery scribes would often abbreviate the dating clause of letters to ‘Dat[um] ut supra’ to signify that a letter was issued on the same day as the letter registered immediately before it. This was regularly then further abbreviated simply to ‘Dat’, and often even this was omitted to save time. No letter would have been purposely entered into the register without a date except in the case of scribal error. Where possible, and depending on the internal evidence of the letters in question, in this thesis some of the letters which Pressutti calendared as ‘undated’ are therefore attributed dates according to this system.

There are, nevertheless, a number of threats to the accuracy of the texts. There is the possibility that a register copy was made from a letter draft that was subsequently altered before engrossment, but without being updated in the register. Because the pope often sent letters to distant delegates that were only to be enacted under certain circumstances, there is also the possibility that letters could be countermanded after registration and not noted in the registers. Similarly, just because a letter was despatched from the curia does not mean that it reached

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63 Rabikauskas, Diplomatica, 83-84.
64 Calendar, ed. Cheney and Cheney, p. xxi.
65 Rabikauskas, Diplomatica, 84.
66 Calendar, ed. Cheney and Cheney, pp. xxi-xxii.
its destination, or that the circumstances which brought about its production had not changed, thus precluding its enactment. The less glamorous spectre of scribal error is also a possibility, and Friedrich Bock has identified examples of divergences between extant original letters and Honorius’s register copies.

Honorius’s registers contain many letters which were the end products of petitioning, yet the petitions themselves - which were so important to the operation of papal government - do not survive. One extant petition which may date from Honorius’s reign (Franco Bartoloni dated it to 1223 x 1231) was submitted by the cathedral chapter of Spoleto. It concerns their dispute with the bishop, and requests absolution from the interdict that the bishop had placed them under for omitting a ceremony during the liturgy. Another rare survival is a petition from late January or February 1224, in which King Louis VIII of France (1223-26) requested certain conditions prior to leading an expedition against heretics in the Languedoc. Fortunately, despite the loss of the original petitions en masse, their influence can still be traced through the extant source material: requests from lay powers submitted in the form of political letters survive more regularly, and the content of successful petitions can be established with some certainty from the narratio clauses of the resulting papal documents, which summarise their requests.

Petitions have recently become the focus of scholarly attention, although early thirteenth-century petitions to the papacy have not featured heavily in this

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68 Bock, ‘Registereinträge’, 102-03.  
research, presumably because of the lack of sources.\textsuperscript{71} Zutshi has stated that ‘the vast majority of papal letters were issued in response to petitions, rather than on the initiative of the pope or the papal government.’\textsuperscript{72} They represented the ‘demand’ rather than the ‘supply’ side of medieval government, although in the case of Honorius’s pontificate, as for all medieval popes before the mid-fourteenth century, the ‘demand’ side is massively under-represented in the surviving sources.\textsuperscript{73} Petitions do not survive in any great numbers because after being granted or rejected by the papacy, they were of little value. The letter that resulted from the petition was important, not the petition itself. A petition which had been rejected was of even less worth.\textsuperscript{74}

The different types of petition (\textit{petitio} or \textit{supplicatio}) that Zutshi has identified for the fourteenth century can also be found in the early thirteenth century: petitions for graces; petitions for letters of justice - these often sought the appointment of judges delegate to hear cases outside the curia; petitions for expectatives - essentially an advance reservation for benefices before they were available; petitions for the appointment of an auditor to hear a case at the curia; and petitions to the penitentiary.\textsuperscript{75} In this thesis entreaties preserved in political missives and framed in the language of petitioning, employing verbs such as

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\textsuperscript{72} Patrick Zutshi, ‘Petitions to the Pope in the Fourteenth Century’, in Ormrod, et al., eds., \textit{Petitions}, 82.
\textsuperscript{74} Peter Linehan and Patrick Zutshi, \textit{‘Fiat A: The Earliest Known Roll of Petitions signed by the Pope (1307)’}, \textit{English Historical Review}, 122 (2007), 998.
\end{flushright}
supplicare or petere, are analysed alongside the more formal categories outlined above under the lexical umbrella of ‘petitions’ because they had exactly the same impact upon the processes of papal government. Although these political letters were different in terms of diplomatic and would bypass most of the petitioning procedures outlined directly below, the intention and purpose of the documents were, nevertheless, the same.

To stand any chance of being granted, petitions had to be composed in the correct style required by the chancery and therefore took on a common, regimented form. The words used in the successful petition were frequently repeated in the resultant papal letter. Two formularies survive from Honorius’s reign that were used as guides to help supplicants compose petitions. Cardinal Guala Bicchieri’s formulary dates from 1226 x 1227, and actually received Honorius’s approval. The other survival is the Rhetorica antiqua, composed by Master Boncompagno da Signa sometime between c.1215 and c.1226. Boncompagno’s formulary is arranged under forty-five headings on subjects such as mandates, applying for vacant benefices, and absolution from excommunication, and begins by defining a petition: ‘Petitio est brevis et expressus dicendi modus, qui principalia tangit et accessoria non omittit’. Formularies such as these - particularly Guala’s, according to Zutshi - were

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76 Bresslau, Handbuch, ii, 5-6.
probably aimed at poor supplicants, to help them compose their petitions without paying for the services of a professional, as was becoming common during the early thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{82}

Despite the existence of these formularies, most petitioner would still have sought the services of a professional to give their petition a better chance of succeeding.\textsuperscript{83} Employing a third party to deal with one’s business at the curia also saved the supplicant the difficulties involved in seeking out the curia on the move and the potentially dangerous journey - traversing the normal land route from England to Rome, for instance, took around six weeks.\textsuperscript{84} Even those who were presenting themselves in person at the curia could still benefit from the proctors’ expertise.\textsuperscript{85} The increasing number of petitions and their complexity led to changes in petitioning practice in the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{86} One of these changes was the widespread employment of proctors to impetrator on behalf of supplicants.

Often (but not always) Italian, proctors utilised personal relationships and unofficial networks that they had developed over a long period of service at the curia to the advantage of the fee-paying supplicants who made up their clientele.\textsuperscript{87} Proctors (appointed by a procuratorium letter) acted as the main intermediaries

\textsuperscript{82}Zutshi, ‘Petitioners’, 273.
\textsuperscript{83}Zutshi, ‘Petitions’, 86.
between petitioners and the curia.\textsuperscript{88} Zutshi has described the three categories of proctor that were active at the curia in the thirteenth century: non-resident proctors, who were sent to acquire a single or small number of documents for the supplicant and tended to act on behalf of one or a handful of clients; resident proctors, who acted in a professional or semi-professional capacity, and represented a larger number of clients over a longer period; and general proctors, who were resident proctors which represented religious orders (and usually belonged to the order themselves).\textsuperscript{89}

The resident (also called ‘standing’) proctors would follow the movements of the curia from Rome to the other papal residences.\textsuperscript{90} Because they were conducting regular rather than ‘one-off’ business at the curia, their services were employed by lay powers and religious orders.\textsuperscript{91} However, both Innocent III and Honorius III tried to clamp down on the actions of resident proctors. Honorius ordered away any resident proctors who had been present at his curia for longer than two years, and tried to prevent ecclesiastical and secular petitioners from employing them; instead they were to present their petitions personally in one go.\textsuperscript{92}

The particular attraction of employing a proctor lay in their talents for navigating the offices of the curia and dealing with the technical and legal

\textsuperscript{88} Bombi, ‘Petitioning’, 74.
\textsuperscript{89} Zutshi, ‘Petitioners’, 279.
\textsuperscript{91} Sayers, \textit{Government}, 34.
complexities of petitioning.\textsuperscript{93} The familiarity of proctors with (and at) the curia benefitted supplicants in two ways. Firstly, proctors were well placed to advise their clients on whether the general circumstances of the curia would be favourable to their petition.\textsuperscript{94} Secondly, the proctors had access to their own unofficial personal networks, built up over their time at court and unavailable to petitioners themselves, which they could exploit to help ease a petition’s journey through the system.\textsuperscript{95} The work of proctors was not of a merely mechanical nature, but was an occupation which ‘required skill and persistence.’\textsuperscript{96} We can assume that the chances of achieving the successful issue of a papal document depended to some extent on the quality of the proctor selected and the extent of his network of contacts.

Much of the activity of proctors in the reign of Honorius is obscure because of a scarcity of evidence. We know they existed and they can sometimes be identified in the impetration of documents. For instance, the Teutonic Order - which was extremely successful in exploiting its position as a papal-imperial go-between to acquire privileges - made good use of proctors at Honorius’s curia (see chapter two). Sayers has noted another exception, Master Stephen of Ecton, who dealt with diplomatic affairs for King Henry III of England (1216-72).\textsuperscript{97} It is clear that although Italian proctors dominated the curia in the thirteenth century, they did not have a monopoly.\textsuperscript{98} The sources for fourteenth-century proctors are much

\textsuperscript{93} Bombi, ‘Petitioning’, 80.
\textsuperscript{94} Zutshi, ‘Proctors’, 17.
\textsuperscript{95} Bagliani, ‘Curie’, 509-10.
\textsuperscript{96} Zutshi, ‘Proctors’, 16.
\textsuperscript{97} Sayers, Government, 59.
more plentiful however, and Bombi has demonstrated how important ‘the creation of a network of unofficial contacts’ was to the English Crown’s success in communicating with and petitioning the papacy in the first half of the fourteenth century, a political reality which must surely also have existed in Honorius’s time. It is therefore important to be aware of these personnel and the diplomatic processes that were occurring behind the scenes in the issue of Honorius’s letters. Where possible I have brought these aspects to the fore of my analysis, such as the archdeacon employed by Andrew II (see chapter one) and the Teutonic Order’s proctors (see chapter two).

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into two parts. The three chapters of part one provide a detailed analysis of Honorius III’s relations with the lay powers on the subject of the Holy Land crusades, focusing on a close study of the diplomatic evidence, contextualised where relevant by narrative sources. The chapters in part one are arranged chronologically and divided according to the different ‘phases’ of Honorius’s involvement in the Holy Land crusades. Chapter one addresses the years 1216-18, when Honorius was handling the takeover of the organisation of the Fifth Crusade from his predecessor. At this time he was working towards the launch of the first crusade contingents, which departed in 1217. Between 1216 and 1218, Honorius’s diplomacy centred on negotiations with King Andrew II of Hungary, and it is argued for the first time that Andrew was Honorius’s favoured

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choice of leader for the Fifth Crusade. Chapter two tackles the years of the Fifth Crusade proper, from 1218 to 1221. After Andrew II’s abandonment of the crusade in early 1218, the focus of papal diplomacy shifted to securing the participation of the emperor-elect Frederick II, which it is contended was made in response to an entreaty from the crusaders. The date of Honorius’s approach to Frederick is also pushed back to the very end of 1218. Chapter three covers the years from the aftermath of the Fifth Crusade to the end of Honorius’s pontificate, 1221-27, which witnessed renewed efforts to achieve a successful imperial crusade. It is asserted that the gaps in papal crusade correspondence between the three papal-imperial colloquia that trisect the period testify to the responsive nature of papal government: without interaction with the lay powers, Honorius was not taking important crusade decisions on his own initiative.

A chronological approach has been selected for part one for a number of reasons. In addition to providing a chronological framework in which the thematic chapters of part two can easily be located, it is also better suited to the presentation of the evidence. A chronological structure brings into sharper focus the responsive day-to-day nature of business being conducted at Honorius’s curia and the ebb and flow of petitioners and diplomats. Such an approach was successfully adopted by John Moore in his biography of Innocent III, who sought ‘to recapture events as Innocent experienced them and to look for their impact on him personally and on the decisions he made.’

Chapters one to three demonstrate how responsive the curia was to outside initiative in taking policy decisions on the crusade.

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100 Moore, Innocent, p. xiv.
Part two of the thesis is made up of three thematic chapters on aspects of papal government under Honorius which extend the study of responsive papal government, whilst also demonstrating some more proactive aspects. Chapter four addresses the *arengae* of Honorius’s letters. It represents the first study of his *arengae* to be undertaken, and reveals aspects of continuity and innovation in papal diplomatic, as well as a pope who was proactively propounding an original and distinct theological conception of his office to that of Innocent III. Chapter five examines Honorius’s deployment of legates to support the Holy Land crusades. Rather than merely being instruments through which curial policy was implemented, this chapter shows that Honorius was often responding to the initiative of these largely autonomous agents. Chapter six is the first comprehensive investigation of the 1215 tax of a twentieth on ecclesiastical income levied to fund the Fifth Crusade. Honorius’s administration of the tax witnessed both responsive papal government and policy-making operating in tandem. The occasions of Honorius taking a more proactive stance help to define the limits of the model of responsive papal government.
PART I

PAPAL DIPLOMACY, 1216-1227
Chapter 1

The Preparation of the Fifth Crusade, 1216-1218

The originator of the Fifth Crusade, Pope Innocent III, died at Perugia on 16 July 1216. Less than a year later, in May 1217, the first contingents of the expedition armed themselves and boarded ships bound for the Holy Land. After the crusaders assembled in the kingdom of Jerusalem at Acre and skirmished around Mount Thabor during the winter of 1217-18, one of the expedition’s most prominent and promising leaders, King Andrew II of Hungary, cut short his campaign and returned to the West in early 1218.

From July 1216 onwards, Honorius took over the preparation of the crusade, and with it the responsibility of transforming Innocent’s vision into reality. He had inherited the deadline (1 June 1217) and departure ports (Brindisi and Messina) circulated by Innocent in *Ad liberandam* - the constitution appended to the decrees of Lateran IV. Otherwise, Honorius’s role in the preparation of the first stages of the Fifth Crusade was shaped more by the ever-changing political context than a concern to adhere to an Innocentian policy. This chapter charts the course of papal diplomacy with the lay powers over the period 1216 to 1218 and demonstrates Honorius’s level of responsiveness to outside initiative - chiefly the receipt of entreaties from lay powers - in making crusade decisions.

Beginning with the immediate assumption of Innocent’s crusade business and the negotiations with Andrew II over his vow, this chapter then considers the
significance of the imperial delegation sent to the curia by Frederick, king of Sicily and emperor-elect of Germany, before finally analysing Andrew’s expedition and its aftermath. Analysis of papal diplomacy from between 1216 and 1218 reveals the hitherto unappreciated importance of Andrew II in the Fifth Crusade. Though he has been neglected and maligned in the historiography, examination of the papal registers reveals Andrew to have been the most significant leader in the crusade’s early stages. The chapter will also reassess the role of Frederick in papal crusade diplomacy and will propound an argument that pushes back the date of his involvement as the crusade’s commander-in-waiting to the very end of 1218: after Andrew’s abandonment of the crusade.

Honorius’s reputation for diplomacy with the lay powers has received mixed reviews in the historiography. In 1931 Ernst Kantorowicz wrote that Honorius seemed a ‘pigmy’ in comparison to Innocent, and claimed that he was old, frail, and inclined towards gentleness.1 Joseph Donovan put forward a much more sympathetic appraisal of Honorius in 1950, writing that he ‘ably seconded’ Innocent’s involvement in crusading.2 Steven Runciman noted in 1954 that on his accession to the papal throne ‘Honorius eagerly took over his great predecessor’s programme.’3 These more positive opinions found support in Raoul Manselli’s article of 1963, which judged Honorius not as weak and submissive, but wise and prudent, noting perceptibly that he compares favourably with the ‘great’ popes of his time.4

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1 Kantorowicz, Frederick, 96.
2 Donovan, Pelagius, 28.
3 Runciman, Crusades, 146.
4 Manselli, ‘Onorio’, 159.
This positive assessment was tempered by Thomas Van Cleve. In 1969 he regarded the pope as ‘aged but vigorous’, but in 1972 wrote that Innocent had been ‘inflexible’ - thereby implying strong - whereas Honorius was ‘mild and conciliatory’ - character traits which Frederick took advantage of.\(^5\) Powell’s 1977 article on Honorius and the leadership of the crusade found that the pope’s negotiations with Frederick were marked by cooperation and conciliation rather than exploitation on either side.\(^6\) Powell also defined Honorius’s crusade policy as being Innocent’s crusade ‘program’ coupled with a revival of the model of papal-imperial cooperation witnessed in Clement III’s reign.\(^7\) Powell developed this view in his 1986 monograph on the Fifth Crusade, in which he considered Honorius to have been a vigorous successor of Innocent.\(^8\)

Hans Mayer took a somewhat dim view of Honorius in 1988, criticising him as ‘a lesser man [than Innocent], lacking the political strength and energy of his great predecessor.’\(^9\) Mayer took this unfavourable comparison one step further and claimed that Honorius’s own successor, Gregory IX, was ‘made of sterner stuff’.\(^10\) In the same year, and in a similar vein to Powell, David Abulafia highlighted Honorius’s willingness to cooperate with Frederick, and thought that although conciliatory by nature, Honorius possessed a resolute grip on papal

\(^7\) Ibid., 523.
\(^8\) Powell, Anatomy, 110-11.
\(^9\) Mayer, Crusades, 220.
\(^10\) Ibid., 233.
rights, something demonstrated in his letters, which Abulafia judged to be respectful but firm in tone.\textsuperscript{11}

Morris stated in 1989 that Honorius was not a mere ‘pale and senile shadow of Innocent’.\textsuperscript{12} He remained critical, however, of Honorius’s crusade organisation, arguing that Innocent’s ‘direction would have been more forceful than that of his successor, Honorius, and he was much more likely to secure the participation of Frederick.’\textsuperscript{13} Wolfgang Stürner adopted a similar position to Powell and Abulafia in 1992 when he wrote that continuing the Fifth Crusade’s preparations was the central concern of Honorius’s pontificate, and that, compared to Innocent, he adopted a more flexible attitude towards the lay powers.\textsuperscript{14}

This more positive portrayal of Honorius has been built upon most recently by Fonnesberg-Schmidt, who in 2007 portrayed Honorius as an innovative successor to Innocent.\textsuperscript{15} Likewise, in 2009, Rist drew attention to Honorius’s stinging rebukes of southern French lay powers, drawing into question his perhaps unwarranted reputation for mildness.\textsuperscript{16} Nevertheless, it was maintained in the second edition of The Oxford Dictionary of Popes in 2010 that Honorius was ‘outmanoeuvred politically by the emperor’.\textsuperscript{17}

This chapter and the two that follow seek to demonstrate that Honorius’s diplomacy with the lay powers defies explanation as simply conciliatory or mild. There were occasions when Honorius was cooperative and lenient, but at other

\textsuperscript{11} Abulafia, Frederick, 127, 162.
\textsuperscript{12} Morris, Monarchy, 564.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 442.
\textsuperscript{14} Stürner, Friedrich, i, 228-29.
\textsuperscript{15} Fonnesberg-Schmidt, Popes, 149-53.
\textsuperscript{16} Rist, Papacy, 82-83.
\textsuperscript{17} Kelly, Dictionary, 190.
times the pope adopted a more robust stance. These fluctuations can be interpreted largely as specific responses to changes in the political situation.

Map 1. The Holy Land (taken from Powell, *Anatomy*, 129)

**Andrew II’s Negotiations**

The Fifth Crusade appears to be the first issue that Honorius dealt with on his accession to the papal throne. The first document registered in his pontificate was
a letter dated at Perugia on 25 July 1216 - the very day after Honorius’s consecration - and sent to the king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne (1210-25, d.1237), the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Antioch, the masters of the Hospitalers and Templars, and the Christian faithful of the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{18} The letter announced the death of Innocent and the succession of Honorius. The new pope urged the inhabitants of the rump kingdom of Jerusalem not to fear, because despite Innocent’s death the crusade was still coming to the Holy Land. Innocent III had sent a similar ‘mail-shot’ when he succeeded Celestine III, which included a letter to Patriarch Aimery of Jerusalem (1194/97-1202).\textsuperscript{19} But while Innocent’s letter only pledged ‘that one of his many future duties as pope would be to attempt a resolution of the Holy Land problem’, Honorius had inherited the outcome of that resolution - the Fifth Crusade - which was on the verge of becoming a reality.\textsuperscript{20}

The Franks of the kingdom of Jerusalem had no reason to be apprehensive about the change in pope. Honorius was quite capable of coordinating the coming crusade, and besides, a large carryover of the members of the College of Cardinals from Innocent’s pontificate meant that Honorius was surrounded by experienced advisers who had dealt with preparations for the expedition under his predecessor. Although the character of the College could be changed with the appointment of new cardinals, there does not seem to have been a great sea-change under Honorius: only two new cardinals were appointed in December 1216, and

\textsuperscript{18} Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 1r: ‘Non ergo propter obitum prefati successoris nostri consternatur cor tuum neque formidet, quasi propter hoc Terre Sancte impediatur succursus’; Pressutti 1.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 154-55.
Honorius only made a total of six appointments over his entire pontificate.\footnote{For the older historiography, see Conrad Euel, Hierarchia catholica medii aevi, i (2nd edn, Münster, 1913) 5; cf. Alphonsus Ciacconius, Vitae, et res gestae pontificum romanorum et S.R.E. cardinum, ii (Rome, 1677), 57-64. Honorius actually only created six cardinals, see: Matthias Thumser, ‘Aldobrandino Orsini (1217-1221), ein Kardinal Honorius’ III.’, Römische Historische Mitteilungen, 32/33 (1990/91), 41-42 and n. 5; Falko Neininger, Konrad von Urach († 1227): Zähringer, Zisterzienser, Kardinallegat (Paderborn, 1994), 159; Thomas W. Smith, ‘The College of Cardinals under Honorius III: A Nepotistic Household?’, in John Doran and Charlotte Methuen, eds., The Church and the Household, Studies in Church History, 50 (forthcoming, 2014).} Therefore most of the cardinals at Honorius’s curia were those appointed by Innocent. The influence of the cardinals and the nature of Honorius’s discussions with them cannot be gleaned from the extant source material. Whether the papacy responded as one man (the pope) or collectively (the pope and his cardinals), however, does not undermine the argument that the crusade decisions of the curia were influenced more by external initiative than internal policy formulation; indeed, the impact of the latter is difficult to find in the papal registers.

John Watts has written that medieval politics may be better understood by arguing for the importance of political structures rather than individuals, whilst recognising that individuals were not unimportant.\footnote{John Watts, The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300-1500 (Cambridge, 2009), 420.} Although the influence of curialists cannot be discerned from the sources, and it is relatively rare for the College of Cardinals to be explicitly mentioned in papal letters, it should be remembered that they played an instrumental role in the day-to-day issue of papal documents.

Shortly after the letter of 25 July, Honorius continued in his crusade administration by despatching a letter on 7 August to the episcopate and crusaders of France, including Odo, duke of Burgundy, Hugh, count of La Marche, Drogo
de Merlo, constable of France, and Simon de Joinville, seneschal of Champagne.\textsuperscript{23} The pope urged the recipients to prepare for Innocent’s deadline, and hoped that by making ready they might inspire others to do so as well. If the Fifth Crusade was to avoid becoming a fiasco in its opening stages, Honorius could not alter the inherited deadline.\textsuperscript{24}

Honorius also spurred on the monarchs of the West to crusade, and in early 1217 he was engaged in negotiations with Andrew II to fulfil the crusade vow inherited from his father, Béla III (1172-96). On the sidelines of this correspondence was a papal letter sent to the young Henry III of England on 20 January 1217.\textsuperscript{25} Honorius offered his condolences to the nine-year-old boy on the death of his father, King John (1199-1216), and congratulated him on his coronation. Like Andrew, Henry had also inherited an unfulfilled crusade vow from his father, but as the letter acknowledged, Honorius did not expect him to carry it out at such a young age. Rather, the pope was anxious to shore up the vulnerable kingdom of England, which was in the throes of civil war, and the same letter also laid out the role of the papal legate, Guala, cardinal-priest of S. Martino (1211-27), as the king’s personal protector.

In addition to inheriting John’s crusade vow, the young Henry had also made his own at his coronation in October 1216, in a conscious bid to add the

\textsuperscript{23}Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 2v: ‘quod exemplo tui alii excitati, ad id ipsum fortius animetur’; Pressutti 14.
\textsuperscript{24}I have argued elsewhere that after the Ad liberandum deadline expired, so too did the expectation that Honorius would abide by Innocent’s crusade decisions: Smith, ‘Honorius’, 104, 108-09.
\textsuperscript{25}Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 41: ‘ita ipso volente illi etiam in apostolice sedis devotione succedes, eo nostram hanc fiduciam plurimum roborante, quod etatis tue primitias dedicans Domino Deo tuo, ad exequendum pro ipso patre tuo votum quod emiserat de subsidio Terre Sancte, te suscepto crucis signaculo sicut gaudentes accepimus obligasti’; Pressutti 267.
further layer of papal protection awarded to crusaders. Honorius must have hoped that Henry would fulfil this eventually, presumably after the Fifth Crusade, which saw an English contingent depart under Earl Ranulf of Chester in 1218. The pope thus had no realistic hope of English royal participation in the Fifth Crusade. In addition, after his service on the Third Crusade (1189-92), the king of France, Philip Augustus (1180-1223), remained uninterested in crusading to either the Holy Land or southern France, and the young emperor-elect Frederick was consolidating his position as king of the Romans (Germany). The king of Hungary was, however, a viable target. Hungary has often been overlooked by historians of the crusades, despite the fact that its monarchy had traditionally been closely associated with the papacy. By the early thirteenth century Hungary was a ‘politically mature’ nation that was responsive to the crusade call. Early thirteenth-century Hungary was a country that had the leadership, financial machinery, and popular support to successfully prosecute a crusade, combined with a royal house experienced in diplomacy with the papal curia. It is not surprising then, although it is certainly underappreciated, that Honorius looked to Andrew II as a significant leader of the Fifth Crusade, if not the leader of the expedition.

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Honorius and Andrew were in close contact prior to his crusade, and the pope appears to have been impatient for the king to fulfil his vow. Attempting to coordinate the different western crusade contingents, which were all preparing at different speeds, was a difficult task. This was made readily apparent in a letter Honorius despatched to the crusaders of Cologne on 27 January 1217.\textsuperscript{31} The pope urged them to depart by the June deadline because Andrew was ‘preparing himself splendidly’.\textsuperscript{32} There is, however, reason to believe that the pope’s letter to Cologne may have put an optimistic spin on Andrew’s true situation so as to encourage the Germans to leave. In a letter addressed to the king issued only a few days later on 30 January, the pope revealed his true opinion of Andrew’s readiness. This was a reply to a letter of Andrew’s that claimed he was unprepared to leave on account of his candidacy for the throne of the Latin Empire.\textsuperscript{33} While the pope accepted the general tenor of Andrew’s claims that he still desired to rescue the Holy Land, Honorius pushed him to leave by Easter.\textsuperscript{34}

The papal letter continued that Andrew’s delays were an affront to the pope that could not be tolerated with patience. As a result of which, Honorius was sending Hugolino, cardinal-bishop of Ostia (1206-27), with full papal authority to

\textsuperscript{31} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 49v: ‘Inter quos carissimus in Christo filius noster Ungarie rex illustris ad hoc opus prout nobis suis litteris intimavit, magnifice se accingit ’; Pressutti 284.
\textsuperscript{32} The phrase ‘magnifice se accingit’ seems to have been a set phrase that papal draftsmen used rather than a bespoke assessment of Andrew’s preparations, and can also be found in, for instance: Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 172r; Pressutti 2361; Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 147v; Pressutti 6038.
\textsuperscript{33} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 54v: ‘Ex ipsarum sane accepimus litterarum tenore, quod cum toto desiderio ad Terre Sancte liberationem aspires, firmum habuisti propositum iter peregrinationis arripere in termino diffinito in concilio generali, sed arduus de novo casus emergens videlicet quod universitas latinorum in Grecia commorantium ad te suos nuntios destinarunt, in imperatorem Constantinopolitanum te vel nobilem virum comitem Autisiodorensem tuum sociorum electuros, predictum terminum te perveni re compellit unde nobis eisdem litteris supplicasti, ut universis crucesignatis nostris curaremus litteris intimare, te per terram ad eiusdem terre subsidium profecturum, et moneremus eodem ut se tuo committatu adiungentes, tecum votum peregrinationis exequantur assumptum.’; Pressutti 291; Chrissis, Crusading, 60.
\textsuperscript{34} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 54v: ‘nostris litteris exortamur, ut circa Pasca iter arripiant tecum ad sepedicte Terre subsidium prefecturi.’; Pressutti 291.
investigate Andrew’s circumstances and to deal with the other matters requested in his letter.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 54v: ‘Tu ergo caveas diligenter, ne per hoc Terre Sancte retardetur succursus, qui multa est procuratus sollicitudine ac labore, quin hoc in Dei offensam apostolicam sedis injuriam, et tui sempiternum obprobrium redundaret, quod et a nobis non posset in patientia tolerari. Super eo vero quod de regno et natis tuis de liberatione provida ordinasti exultantes in Domino gratias agimus bonorum omnium largitori, a quo huiusmodi dispositio creditur provenisse. De aliis equidem que a nobis eisdem litteris postulasti, venerabilis frater nostier Hugolius Hostiensis episcopus apostolicus sedis legatus, cum illic venerit cognita veritate ac consideratis circumstantiis universis auctoritate nostra statuet quod apostolicus sedis honor et tue saluti viderit expedire.’; Pressutti 291.}

Hugolino never actually reached Hungary. Possibly this was on account of his peacemaking mission in northern Italy (see chapter five), or because the threat of a papal representative intervening in his affairs persuaded Andrew to stop stalling for time. In any case, the selection of such an important legate, one of the most prominent in the College of Cardinals - who would later be elected in 1227 as Honorius’s successor, Gregory IX - implies the importance which the pope attached to Andrew’s crusade.

The other requests that Andrew made in his letter fit into the context of certain concessions that the king was petitioning for in January prior to his crusade. So as to circumvent delays and secure his participation, Honorius is recorded to have granted (at least some of) his supplications. Crusading was a risky undertaking and the king was justified in requesting the confirmation of the succession to the Hungarian throne in the event of his death. A papal document issued on 11 February confirmed that Andrew, his family, kingdom and goods were all taken under papal protection and that Andrew’s firstborn son, Béla,
would succeed to the throne should certain news be received of the king’s death on crusade.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 60v: ‘Ad hec dispositionem quam de terra tua fecisti regnum Ungarie primogenito tuo, Bele, regnum vero Galitie Colomanno relinquuens et eorum alterutri vel utrique sine liberis decedentii Andream instituen successor, sicut iuste ac provide facta est auctoritate apostolica confirmamus, et presentis scripti patrocinio communimus.’; Pressutti 330.}

Honourius granted another concession in a letter of 25 February, sent to the archbishop of Kalocsa and the bishop of Veszprém, which allowed them to absolve five or six of the guardians of Andrew’s sons from their crusade vows.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 73v: ‘Carissimus in Christo filius noster Andreas Ungarie rex illustris, tam per litteras suas, quam per dilectum filium D. archideaconum nuntium suum, nobis instantissime supplicavit, ut cum ipse se ad exequendum votum peregrinationis accinxerit in subsidium Terre Sancte aliquot de crucesignatis regni sui quos idem elegerit, ut eis tutelam filiorum suorum et custodiam eiusdem regni committat ab huiusmodi voto absolvere dignaremur.’; Pressutti 371.} A small amount of papal leverage over the king was exerted with the condition that should the monarch fail to depart, this concession would be rendered null and void. This letter also allows a glimpse into the events at the curia that led to its creation and likely that of the other documents issued to, or relating to, Andrew around this time. Although the previous papal letters revealed that the king had despatched written entreaties to the papacy, that of 25 February demonstrated that Andrew was also using a representative to present his petitions at the curia (‘supplicavit’), an unknown archdeacon with the initial D.

It is probable that this archdeacon was involved in the issue of all the letters regarding Andrew’s crusade, having been sent from Hungary bearing a number of written letters and petitions, which the representative could supplement orally with information supplied by Andrew. D could then carry back (or send through a third party) any papal documents that might be issued to the Hungarian royal court. The first letter in the batch of four that related to Andrew was that

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\footnote{Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 60v: ‘Ad hec dispositionem quam de terra tua fecisti regnum Ungarie primogenito tuo, Bele, regnum vero Galitie Colomanno relinquuens et eorum alterutri vel utrique sine liberis decedentii Andream instituen successor, sicut iuste ac provide facta est auctoritate apostolica confirmamus, et presentis scripti patrocinio communimus.’; Pressutti 330.}

\footnote{Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 73v: ‘Carissimus in Christo filius noster Andreas Ungarie rex illustris, tam per litteras suas, quam per dilectum filium D. archideaconum nuntium suum, nobis instantissime supplicavit, ut cum ipse se ad exequendum votum peregrinationis accinxerit in subsidium Terre Sancte aliquot de crucesignatis regni sui quos idem elegerit, ut eis tutelam filiorum suorum et custodiam eiusdem regni committat ab huiusmodi voto absolvere dignaremur.’; Pressutti 371.}

\end{quote}
sent to Cologne and dated 27 January, and the last was the letter of 25 February (it is of course possible that more were issued but not registered). There are no more letters recorded leaving the curia bound for Hungary until the end of July 1217, and these were not sought by Andrew, but were instead issued in response to the unforeseen capture of the newly crowned Latin Emperor, Peter II (d. circa 1217), in the mountains of Albania. The archdeacon could therefore have arrived at the curia sometime around mid-January and left with documents in hand at the end of February.

At the same time Honorius was trying to speed Andrew to the Holy Land, a petition arrived from Albert of Orlamünde, count of Holstein, requesting that a number of his vassals be allowed to commute their Holy Land crusade vows to fight with him against pagans in Livonia instead. In a letter issued on 25 January that granted Albert’s petition, Honorius wrote back that he was despatching letters which permitted the bishop of Schleswig and the abbot of Aurea Insula in the diocese of Schleswig to allow ten of Albert’s knights to commute their vows if they thought it would benefit the land of Livonia. Honorius’s justification, that it made no sense to fight enemies of Christ in one region while leaving other regions open to their attacks, was perhaps glossing the situation. Whilst supportive of

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38 Pressutti 684.
39 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 50r: ‘Verum quia sicut tuis nobis litteris intimasti, te pro expeditione regia in remotis agente cum ad bone memorie Innocentum [sic] predecessorem nostrum litteras destinasses, ut tibi liceret caracterem crucis accipere volenti contra paganos Livonicos proficisci, medio tempore multi de familia tua tuum propositum nescientes pro subventione terre Ierusolimitane crucis signaculum receperunt’; Pressutti 276; Smith, ‘Honorius’, 105; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, Popes, 137, 144.
40 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 50r: ‘quod dum ab una parte propulsat iniurias ab alia promptum periculum non incurrat.’; Pressutti 276. Pope Urban II had employed a similar idea in his letter of 1096 x 1099 to the counts of Besalú, Empuries, Roussilon, and Cerdaña, urging them to recover the Spanish church of Tarragona rather than join the First Crusade. The phrasing is, however, completely dissimilar: *Papsturkunden in Spanien vorarbeiten zur Hispania Pontificia: I. Katalanien*, ed. Paul...
the crusade in Livonia it is unlikely that Honorius would have elected to divert a small but powerful contingent of crusaders from the Fifth Crusade, for which preparations were in full swing. This episode ably demonstrates the power that petitions could have over the processes of papal government.\textsuperscript{41}

**Frederick II’s Imperial Delegation**

Early 1217 was a busy time at the curia for crusade preparations. Soon after dealing with Andrew’s requests the pope also received an official delegation from Frederick II, emperor-elect.\textsuperscript{42} The purpose of this delegation can be approximated from the contents of Honorius’s written response, which the pope addressed to Frederick on 8 April.\textsuperscript{43} The letter explained that the delegation (the abbot of St Gall, William, marquis of Montferrat, the dean of Speyer, and the castellanus of San Miniato) had raised the issue of Frederick’s crusade vow, taken at his coronation as King of the Romans at Aachen in 1215, and Stürner suggests the possibility that they may also have discussed the imperial coronation.\textsuperscript{44} Honorius

\textsuperscript{41} Smith, ‘Honorius’, 105.

\textsuperscript{42} Stürner, *Friedrich*, i, 231.

\textsuperscript{43} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 93r: ‘Nos ergo ad ea que Dei et ecclesie Romane honorem ac exaltationem tuam respicient apirantes, ad te legatum nostrum disponimus destinare, per quem tam super hiis que ex parte tua nobis fuere proposita, quam super Terre Sancte succursu celsitudini regie secundum quod expedire viderimus curabimus respondere. Monemus igitur serenitatem tuam et exhortamur in Domino, quatinus in devotione sancte Romane ecclesie matris tue firmiter perseverans te talem exhibere studeas erga ipsam quod ipsius erga te caritas tepere non debat, set de die in diem suscipere potius incrementum.’; Pressutti 482.

\textsuperscript{44} Stürner, *Friedrich*, i, 231. Frederick’s motives in taking the crusade vow appear to have been a combination of piety and kingly ambition: Bodo Hechelhammer, ‘Der Diplomat: Kaiser Friedrich II. (*1194, †1250)’, in Hans-Jürgen Kotzur, ed., *Die Kreuzzüge: Kein Krieg ist heilig* (Mainz, 2004), 308. A parallel can be drawn with Henry III of England’s crusade vow on his succession - it seems likely that Frederick sought to strengthen his position in Germany against Otto IV by securing the papal protection afforded to crusaders: G.A. Loud, ‘The Papal “Crusade” against Frederick II in 1228-1230’, in Balard, ed., *Papauté*, 93-94.
wrote that he was sending an unnamed legate back to discuss matters. The letter ended by exhorting Frederick to persevere in his devotion to the Church. The next day, another letter was addressed to the German princes, asking them to remain faithful to Frederick.

Powell thought that the papal letter of 8 April was proof that negotiations for Frederick’s participation in the Fifth Crusade were underway. He wrote that by summer 1217 some form of agreement had been reached that Frederick would lead the crusade, and that any subsequent leadership arrangement was merely a temporary expedient until Frederick should arrive in the East. Christopher Tyerman supposed that this took place even earlier, and wrote that when Frederick took the cross in 1215 he ‘became the putative commander of the crusade.’

Although the April letters are the first evidence of correspondence between the pope and emperor-elect to mention the crusade, this short spurt of diplomacy should not necessarily be taken as definitive evidence that serious negotiations for Frederick’s imminent departure had begun: from the extant sources we can only reconstruct what might have been discussed. There are several pointers in the letters of 8-9 April which should warn against just such a conclusion. That the legate whom Honorius intended to send to Frederick’s court

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45 Anton Pokorny, _Die Wirksamkeit der Legaten des Papstes Honorius III. in Frankreich und Deutschland_ (Krems, 1886), 16.
46 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 93r: ‘nos tamen ex assueta sedis apostolice providentia vobis dirigimus scripta nostra, universitatem vestram attentius exhortantes quatinus cum menbris expediat, ut honor capitis non vacilleat dicto regi sicut fecistis hactenus potenter ac viriliter assistatis, cum et nos ipsi ad exaltationem eiusdem quantum cum Deo possimus intendamus.’; Pressutti 486.
47 Powell, _Anatomy_, 125.
48 Ibid., 112.
50 See also Bodo Hechelhammer, _Kreuzzug und Herrschaft unter Friedrich II._: _Handlungsspielräume von Kreuzzugspolitik (1215-1230)_ (Ostfildern, 2004), 86-89.
went unnamed in the letter of 8 April suggests that the pope had not decided whom to send. Nor does it seem that a legate *a latere* was actually despatched, because there is neither an extant appointment letter nor subsequent correspondence mentioning such a legate. It can be inferred from this that negotiations were inconsequential at this stage. That this was probably the case is supported by the letter to the German princes of 9 April, which is really only a generalised exhortation to stand by Frederick, rather than a call for specific action regarding his crusade. Frederick was perhaps only dangling the carrot of his crusade to soften up the pope regarding his imperial coronation.

Stürner has argued convincingly that the small number of letters exchanged between the two parties in the following months is evidence that negotiations between them were not intensive in early 1217.\(^{51}\) Friedrich von Raumer believed that more correspondence took place in the period 1217-18, but that it has now been lost.\(^{52}\) This seems improbable given that the curial staff chose to register what appears to be the vast majority of its important political correspondence with the lay powers on the crusade: some trace of such correspondence would surely have survived in the papal and imperial archives. When Frederick did agree in a letter of 12 January 1219 to go on crusade, Honorius deemed it of such importance that he had it copied into the papal register (see chapter two). The lack of letters for 1217-18 should instead be interpreted as evidence that neither the pope nor the emperor-elect considered an imperial crusade to be a realistic undertaking at this time. While Honorius

\(^{51}\) Stürner, *Friedrich*, i, 231.

certainly does seem to have come to an understanding with Frederick that he would take over leadership of the Fifth Crusade, the date of this agreement should be pushed back to the turn of 1218-19, when one witnesses the initiation of a prolonged correspondence that lasted until the pope’s death in 1227.

Two letters issued on 24 July attest to the papal conception of the Fifth Crusade’s leadership in summer 1217. They both concern the proposed meeting of the main western crusade contingents on Cyprus, planned for 8 September. Honorius despatched one to a number of Italian clergy informing them that Andrew II, Leopold VI, duke of Austria (1198-1230), and all the other crusaders were going to convene on Cyprus, and urged the clergy to preach the crusade to recruit more soldiers.53 A slight variation of this letter was addressed to John of Brienne, the patriarch of Jerusalem, and the Templars and the Hospitallers in the kingdom of Jerusalem.54 This letter informed the recipients of the planned gathering and invited them to attend or to send messengers so that the crusaders might have their counsel.55

In the end, probably on account of coordination problems, the rendezvous on Cyprus does not seem to have actually occurred. Nevertheless, the papal letters are very instructive on the pope’s thinking regarding the crusade leadership at this time. There are a number of important conclusions that can be drawn. Firstly, it is

53 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 138r; Pressutti 672.
54 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 138r: ‘Cum karissimi in Christo filii Ungarie rex illustris dux Austrie ac alii multi magnates magnumines et magnifici ad subsidium Terre Sancte inspirante Domino aspirantes in nativitate beate Marie Deo propitio apud Ciprum disposuerint convenire, ut secundum tuo discretionis consilium in negotio Christi ordinate procedant, sicut idem rex tue celsitudo per suas litteras dicitur intimare, serenitatem rem, rogamus et monemus attentes quam sicut causam Christi zelaris, eis illum per te vel sollemnes nuntios occurrere non omittas impensurus eisdem, prout tua noscitur specialiter interesse consilium et auxilium oportunum.’; Pressutti 673.
55 Donovan, Pelagius, 30.
clear that Honorius did not consider Frederick about to depart in the near future, or that his leadership of the crusade had even been agreed upon, or else the pope would surely have mentioned him in the letters, as became common later in the crusade, and invited him to send messengers as well. This brings into question Tyerman’s judgement that Frederick was considered the ‘putative commander’ from 1215 onwards.\(^\text{56}\) Secondly, because the meeting was planned to occur on Cyprus, rather than in John’s kingdom, suggests that either the pope or Andrew may have been trying to cut him out of the initial strategic decision-making. Thirdly - and connected to the possible exclusion of John from the highest echelons of leadership - it is apparent that Honorius was hoping that Andrew would play a leading role in the crusade, with Leopold presumably as his second-in-command, a point which has yet to feature in the historiography.

**Andrew II’s Expedition**

No historian has thought fit to credit Andrew with being - at least in the pope’s eyes - the initial leader of the Fifth Crusade. As examination of the papal registers has shown, however, Honorius seems to have been supporting Andrew as the preeminent leader of the Fifth Crusade in 1217; but in the end, the king bungled his opportunity. Andrew has not been allocated his proper place in the leadership of the crusade by scholars on account of the short-lived nature and limited impact of his expedition. After sailing from the West in autumn 1217, Andrew abandoned the crusade in January 1218 for reasons which will be examined below. Historians

\(^{56}\) Tyerman, *God’s War*, 625
have read backwards from his shameful departure and ignored any earlier promise. This reflects the concentration of many historians of the crusades on the traditional narrative sources for the Fifth Crusade, which, understandably, have little to say about Andrew. The diplomatic evidence, nevertheless, tells a different story.

Andrew’s sullied reputation has never recovered from the damage inflicted when he left the crusade in 1218. Runciman judged Andrew’s expedition to have ‘achieved nothing’.57 Van Cleve agreed, writing that Andrew’s crusade ‘had achieved nothing and brought him no honor’.58 James Ross Sweeney called for a ‘more temperate’ judgement, which Powell subsequently delivered, noting that the king’s crusade accomplished more than other historians have credited it with.59 Still, Powell did not consider him as the papacy’s choice for leader. Z.J. Kosztolnyik wrote a damning (and unreliable) account of the crusade, claiming that it should not be deemed a crusade because it ‘was not a serious military undertaking’, and calling the Hungarian crusaders ‘adventurers’ because they supposedly lacked any religious motivation.60 In light of its seemingly limited role in the history of the Hungarian nation, Gyula Kristó gave a very succinct, if dispassionate, overview of the enterprise.61 Most recently, Attila Bárány has

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57 Runciman, Crusades, 149.
60 Z.J. Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century (New York, 1996), 60, 64.
decried the fact that historians have underestimated and heavily criticised the expedition.\textsuperscript{62}

Andrew’s crusade is certainly worthy of proper scholarly attention. Not only was the king favoured by the papacy, but the size of the force he assembled with Duke Leopold at the port city of Split was considerable.\textsuperscript{63} The Austro-Hungarian force was substantial and its members were bonded by regional and blood ties. Sweeney has demonstrated that Andrew’s crusade was traditional in that the core of his army was composed of blood relatives who ruled neighbouring territories which shared a common currency (the Friesacher \textit{pfennig}), and noted the importance of forming an army based on family units from the same region.\textsuperscript{64} Among his army Andrew could count his cousin, Duke Leopold, his brother-in-law, Duke Otto VII of Andechs-Merania, and Otto’s own brother, Egbert, bishop of Bamberg. The Babenberg family, to which Leopold belonged, also had a strong family tradition of crusading.\textsuperscript{65} As the only crowned king from the West, Andrew possessed credible military force to lead the crusade.

Andrew’s military and financial preparations ahead of his expedition had also been great.\textsuperscript{66} In early 1217 the king despatched the provost Alexander of Siebenbürgen and the prior of the Hungarian Hospitallers to Venice to arrange for

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  \item Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 127; Tyerman, \textit{God’s War}, 626.
  \item Sweeney, ‘Hungary’, 478-79.
  \item Sweeney, ‘Hungary’, 479.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
transport vessels to carry his army to the Holy Land. The ships were to be delivered to the port of Split by the Feast of St James (25 July) and were to await there Andrew’s arrival for one month. As an indicator of how serious the king was, he was prepared to hand over permanently the contested city of Zara to Venice in return for the ships.

In an ironic twist on the fate of the Fourth Crusade (1202-04), which was bankrupted by a massive overestimate of the size of the crusade, Andrew was unable to procure enough ships to transport his army, which must have exceeded the number provided for in his Venetian agreement of ten large ships together with other smaller vessels. Thomas of Split claims that Andrew’s army was composed of more than ten thousand warriors on horseback and innumerable foot soldiers. This is clearly intended to signify that Andrew had assembled a very large force - although Van Cleve accepts it unquestioningly, the figure is too large to be taken literally. The History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church records that Andrew arrived in one hundred and sixty ships and transport ships, with a complement of four thousand knights and ninety thousand infantry. The estimate of ships and knights are plausible figures, although the number of infantry is obviously a huge exaggeration. It is clear from all of the sources

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69 Thomas, Historia, 160.
70 Van Cleve, ‘Fifth Crusade’, 388.
though that Andrew succeeded in assembling a viable force with which to play a leading role in the crusade. The gravitas and influence that this force would have brought the king should not be underestimated.

Kosztolnyik thought that the king had failed to make full and proper preparations for his campaign, and was motivated to crusade only on account of his claim to the throne of the Latin Empire. Sometime before Kosztolnyik wrote, however, Sweeney had already dismissed this theory as ‘demonstrably incorrect’. Kosztolnyik thought that when Peter II was chosen instead of Andrew, the king merely made the passage to the Holy Land to fulfil his father’s vow. But this is to underestimate Andrew and to strip him of any pious motivation at all. It also fails to explain the large donations that Andrew made to the Military Orders for the defence of the Holy Land on his journey back home from the crusade, which are analysed below.

There is only a single chronicle that names Andrew as the crusade’s leader in its early stages - something which reflects the number and influence of narrative sources for the Fifth Crusade composed by authors from countries other than Hungary. The *Chronicon de gestis Hungarorum* (also known as the ‘Illuminated Chronicle’), a mid-fourteenth-century compilation that drew on earlier texts, names Andrew as the crusade’s leader during his brief expedition

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73 Sweeney, ‘‘Hungary’’, 478.
74 Kosztolnyik, *Hungary*, 60.
and, perhaps unsurprisingly, states that he led the army to a glorious victory against the Muslims.\textsuperscript{75}

Andrew probably did consider himself as the crusade’s leader, and it is important to note, as Guy Perry has, that the first large crusade council took place in the Hungarian royal tent.\textsuperscript{76} But Andrew and John of Brienne seem to have been at odds, and Andrew kept himself at a distance from John, creating a lack of cohesion in the crusade army that culminated in his withdrawal.\textsuperscript{77} According to Perry, it is probable that John eclipsed Andrew during these initial stages, when he emerged at the top of the leadership pile, which perhaps crushed Andrew’s motivation to carry on.\textsuperscript{78} Indeed, Mayer thought that Andrew abandoned the crusade ‘in vexation’.\textsuperscript{79} Nevertheless, Jotischky writes that the Hungarians and Germans ‘dominated’ the early phase.\textsuperscript{80} Certainly the size of Andrew’s contingent would have given him great sway in the expedition’s leadership, although it seems that Andrew failed to convert this into uncontested command.

In November 1217 there had been no indication in the information available at the curia that Andrew was wearying of the crusade. Towards the end of the month Honorius received a despatch from the master of the Knights Templar in the Holy Land, William of Chartres, which was probably composed at

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77 Sweeney, ‘Hungary’, 479.


79 Mayer, *Crusades*, 220.

80 Jotischky, *Crusading*, 216.
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the end of October.81 The report recounted the early activities of the crusaders, the state of their provisions, and the plan to attack the Egyptian city of Damietta. After receiving this information the pope forwarded the text of the report in a letter to the archbishops of Székesfehérvár and Reims on 24 November, which celebrated the successful launch of the crusade and urged the recipients to secure reinforcements for the crusaders.82 That the pope chose to send this early report on the crusade’s progress to Hungary reflects Andrew’s prominent role in the crusade leadership, although it was not an exclusive sign of papal favour. The Reims copy was not listed as an in eundem modum copy in the papal register, and is only known through the survival of the original copy. This begs the question: were others sent out of which no traces remain?

The papal letters to the archbishops of Székesfehérvár and Reims containing the copy of William Chartres’ original despatch are the only forms in which it is preserved. The report is a lucky survival. There must surely have been many more reports that informed and prompted the issue of papal letters which are no longer extant, especially given that the curia was only selectively registering documents. Diplomatic evidence such as this, where information arriving at the curia informed papal decision-making and was then passed on to third parties (and this is not an isolated example), supports Powell’s perceptive statement that ‘the role left for the pope [in the Fifth Crusade] was that of a

coordinator and at times a clearinghouse for information, rather than a director of operations.\textsuperscript{83}

Despite optimism at the curia about the king of Hungary’s role in the crusade, Andrew himself obviously did not share it. His departure in January 1218 justifiably met with criticism from chroniclers. The thirteenth-century Old French continuation of William of Tyre, \textit{Eracles}, noted that there was no honour in his withdrawal.\textsuperscript{84} Oliver of Paderborn (head of the cathedral school of Cologne, 1201-25; bishop of Paderborn, 1225; cardinal-bishop of Sabina, 1225-27) recorded in his eyewitness account of the Fifth Crusade, the \textit{Historia Damiatina}, that Andrew ignored the warnings of the patriarch of Jerusalem, and, on leaving the army, was excommunicated by him.\textsuperscript{85} Thomas, archdeacon of Split (b.1200-68), is the only source to claim that Andrew left early because his enemies attempted to poison him.\textsuperscript{86} Thomas further explains Andrew’s motivation in returning home to have been the protection of his own life and the security of his kingdom, which he did not want to risk when he had already done enough to fulfil his crusade vow.

Whilst Thomas’s account provides a valuable counterbalance to the other narrative sources, some of his excuses are, like the posioned drink he claims struck down Andrew, hard to swallow. Andrew probably departed because he was unable to exert the total control that he wanted over the expedition. Nevertheless, at some point in 1218 after his return to the West, the king addressed a letter to

\textsuperscript{83} Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 111.
\textsuperscript{85} Oliver, \textit{Historia}, 168.
\textsuperscript{86} Thomas, \textit{Historia}, 164.
Honorius to make his case for the withdrawal.87 Andrew was anxious to explain to the pope why he had left early, and argued that it was because he had been receiving reports of dissension and unrest in Hungary, claims which correlate with elements of Thomas’s account; indeed, the corroboration of the sources on this point could offer the real reason for the brevity of the king’s crusade.

Andrew’s journey home from his short expedition was not entirely fruitless, nor did it reveal a lack of interest in crusading and the defence of the Holy Land. He visited the Hospitaller castles of Krak des Chevaliers and Margat, and arranged marriage alliances through the betrothal of his son, Andrew, to the Armenian princess, Isabel, and his eldest son, Béla, to Maria, the daughter of Theodore I Laskaris, emperor of Nicaea (1208-22).88 Andrew’s journey may have had the secondary objective of securing the kingdom of Jerusalem’s northern flank by marriages and donations.89 This was, however, probably a corollary effect. Andrew was most likely making the marriage alliances out of dynastic self-interest. The donations to the Hospitallers should be seen as a continuation of an affinity that the king seems to have felt for the Order, having already employed the prior of the Hungarian Hospitallers in the Venetian negotiations for crusade transport in early 1217. Perhaps the king also hoped to alleviate any guilt he felt for abandoning the crusade.

After receiving Andrew’s donations, the Hospitallers petitioned the pope for papal confirmation of them. The Hospital’s supplications were successful and led to the creation of a series of papal documents at the end of June 1218 which

87 *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus et civilis*, ed. G. Fejér, iii (Buda, 1829), 250-54.
88 Van Cleve, ‘Fifth Crusade’, 393.
89 Tyerman, *God’s War*, 629.
reveal the extent of the king’s generosity. A papal document of 25 June confirmed the annual donation of five hundred silver marks to the Order, taken out of Andrew’s revenues from the salt mines at Szalacs.\textsuperscript{90} On the same day another document confirmed a further annual donation, this time of one hundred silver marks to the Hospitaller castle of Margat.\textsuperscript{91} On the next day the chancery issued another confirmation of a grant of lands that Andrew had made to the Order.\textsuperscript{92} Finally, on 27 June, the pope confirmed Andrew’s annual grant of another one hundred silver marks to the castle of Krak des Chevaliers.\textsuperscript{93}

These grants are important because they flesh out Andrew’s character in more detail and extend our understanding of his crusade beyond the slanderous reports of contemporary chroniclers. The depth of the king’s piety and his initial commitment to the crusade have never been properly appreciated, and these four grants attest to a more complex personality than the current historiography attributes to Andrew - he was not merely a cowardly villain, but neither was he a model crusade hero in the mould of Leopold of Austria (and even he returned to the West without seeing the expedition through to its bitter end). Andrew’s withdrawal from the crusade certainly brought shame upon him, but his

\textsuperscript{90} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 275v: ‘Annuum quingentarum marcarum argenti redditum vobis a karissimo in Christo filio nostro Andrea illustri rege Ungarie de proventibus salium suorum in Salech pia liberalitate concessum’; Pressutti 1469.

\textsuperscript{91} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 276r: ‘Annuum centum marcarum argenti redditum vobis pro custodia castri vestri quod Margati dicitur a karissimo in Christo filio nostro Andrea illustri rege Ungarie de proventibus salium regni sui apud Zolacha pia liberalitate concessum’; Pressutti 1470.

\textsuperscript{92} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 275r: ‘Redditum porte de Supran qui Bobet dicitur, et terram que est inter Dravam et Chergou, vobis cum nemoribus et aliis pertinentiis suis a karissimo in Christo filio nostro Andrea illustri rege Ungarie pietatis obtentu collate, necnon libertates immunitates et exemptiones secularum exactionum ab eodem rege vobis et hominibus vestris indultas, sicut ea omnia iuste ac pacifice obtinetis, et in eiusdem regis litteris plenius continetur, vobis et per vos domui vestre auctoritates apostolica confirmamus’; Pressutti 1474.

\textsuperscript{93} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 275r: ‘Annuum centum marcarum argenti redditum vobis ad opus castellanum et aliorum fratrum vestrorum custodientium castrum vestrum quod Crati dicitur a karissimo in Christo filio nostro Andrea illustri rege Hungarie de proventibus salium suorum in Scolasche pia liberalitate concessum’; Pressutti 1478.
expedition should no longer be viewed as an insignificant failure. Instead it should be considered a missed opportunity, especially for the pope, who as we have seen for the first time, held such high hopes for the king of Hungary’s participation in the Fifth Crusade.

Conclusions

Through the careful analysis of the papal registers, Andrew’s underappreciated role as the initial leader of the Fifth Crusade has been revealed. Andrew’s position, and Honorius’s support of him, alter the interpretation of papal diplomacy during the early stages of the Fifth Crusade. Frederick II does not emerge as the crusade chief-in-waiting during the years 1216-18. Rather it seems that with Andrew’s large fighting force, the desire for imperial involvement was not urgent at this stage. After Andrew had turned tail and headed for home though, the situation changed, and, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, Frederick was called into the breach in direct response to an entreaty from the crusaders begging for reinforcements. This chapter has also attempted to shift the focus of study of papal diplomacy onto the roles of petitioners, diplomats, and messengers at the papal curia. The extent of their influence over Honorius’s crusade decision-making will become even more apparent in the next two chapters.
Chapter 2

The Administration of the Fifth Crusade, 1218-1221

The Fifth Crusade never had a completely satisfactory leader. A few months after Andrew II abandoned the expedition in January 1218 the crusaders urgently requested reinforcements. In the West, as part of his response to their petition, the diplomacy of Honorius during the years 1218 to 1221 focused on securing the potentially crusade-winning leadership of Frederick II. Negotiations with Frederick were long and complex. The main sticking point was the imperial coronation: Frederick was anxious to be crowned emperor before departing on crusade, but the pope was wary of the potential threat to the security of the Papal State in so doing. The imagined threat came from making an emperor of the man who was already king of the Romans (Germany) and king of Sicily (see Maps 3 and 5, pp. 87, 108). If these two kingdoms were united under the imperial crown, Honorius thought (perhaps wrongly) that the integrity of the Papal State would be compromised by being sandwiched between the German kingdom to the north and the kingdom of Sicily to the south (see Map 4, p. 107). Honorius’s policy therefore was to retain the separation of the two kingdoms.

In the East the period 1218-21 witnessed the arrival on the Fifth Crusade of the papal legate, Pelagius, cardinal-bishop of Albano (1213-30), the success of the expedition in capturing the Egyptian city of Damietta in November 1219 (followed by a long period of inaction), and finally the crusade’s failure during a
disastrous march on Cairo in August 1221 (see Map 2, p. 77). Investigating further the effect of diplomats and petitioners on crusade diplomacy, this chapter considers Honorius’s role in managing the leadership of the crusade, Frederick’s commitment to the campaign and his first postponements, John of Brienne’s claim to the throne of Armenia, and finally, the negotiations leading up to, and following, the imperial coronation.

Map 2. Damietta and the Nile Delta (taken from Powell, Anatomy, 139)

Managing the Leadership of the Crusade

With Andrew departed, the king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne, was left *de facto* as the only viable leader of the Fifth Crusade: there were no western kings
interested or ready to take Andrew’s place, and though possessing an important role in the crusade’s leadership, the legate Pelagius was charged with keeping the army united rather than acting as its undisputed military commander (see chapter five). But John does not seem to have possessed the support or the prestige necessary to elevate him to a position of total control over the crusade, and he does not seem to have been thought of as the leader of the crusade by the papacy.\(^1\)

Although he was elected by the army as the expedition’s leader in May 1218, this really only made him the head of a ‘steering committee’ rather than commander-in-chief.\(^2\) John’s election was a result of pragmatism, given that he was a skilled military leader, and that since Andrew had gone, John was the only remaining crowned king in the army.\(^3\) Nevertheless, John could not bind the various crusade contingents together under his authority.\(^4\) This wavering and uncertain supremacy is evidenced by the fact that before the crusaders arrived, he and his vassals had actually been planning to attack Nablus rather than Damietta.\(^5\)

Powell observed that studies of the Fifth Crusade have often focused on its leadership, asking questions about the character and ability of individuals - an avenue of investigation which reflects the narrative sources for the crusade.\(^6\) Gregory Fedorenko has noted that Oliver of Paderborn and Jacques de Vitry, bishop of Acre, rarely portray John as the crusade’s leader.\(^7\) It is possible to tease information out of the narrative sources to discover if John really did act as an

\(^{2}\) Riley-Smith, Crusades, 178.
\(^{3}\) Powell, Anatomy, 141.
\(^{5}\) Perry, ‘John’, 129.
\(^{6}\) Powell, Anatomy, 107.
\(^{7}\) Fedorenko, ‘Career’, 62.
authoritative leader on the ground, by noting that the chronicle of Ernoul (another Old French continuation of William of Tyre) has John taking charge of victualling the ships as the crusaders left Acre for Damietta, or that the *Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum* mentioned John (along with Leopold of Austria) in a leading role during the assault on the chain tower at Damietta. Nonetheless, although one can scour the narrative sources for evidence that supports or disproves the idea of John as leader, however fleetingly, the very fact that such detective work is necessary mitigates against him being any kind of commander-in-chief figure on the crusade.

The nature of command on the Fifth Crusade has been ably analysed by Powell, who sketched the crusade council as an ever-changing, flexible body of nobles who tended to campaign for only about a year, a body which was depleted and replenished in a rhythmical series of departures and arrivals dictated by the seasonal passages across the Mediterranean. Jotischky summarises the manpower situation thus: ‘the total number of crusaders between 1217 and 1221 was high, but most had already arrived before the end of 1218, and the effect of staggered contributions to the crusade was to stretch resources during crucial moments.’

By the thirteenth century, crusading had changed from a mass movement (*commotio*), to a series of passages (*passagia*), structured around the two Mediterranean sailing seasons which took place around Easter and autumn. The

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8 *Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard de Trésorier*, ed. Louis de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), 415.
average passage from the West to the Holy Land took somewhere between four and six weeks, and most journeys were made during the two seasonal passages - from late March until early April, and from late September until early October - so as to avoid the more dangerous sailing conditions experienced in winter. Sailing back to the West from the East against the prevailing winds took about twice as long.\textsuperscript{12} A firmer guide to the date of passages comes from 1233, when Venice imposed a final deadline for passages from the East: 8 May for the Easter sailing, and 8 October for the autumn journey.\textsuperscript{13}

Not a single powerful western noble’s campaign in the Holy Land and Egypt lasted for the duration of the whole crusade, and the varied and short-lived contingents that made up the expedition prevented the establishment of an espirit de corps that had been a feature of previous crusades.\textsuperscript{14}

John does not loom particularly large in the papal registers, and Honorius’s attention seems to have been devoted more to other lay powers and their petitions. In the summer of 1218 Hervé, count of Nevers, was readying for that year’s autumn passage with the other French crusaders, including the count of La Marche, who were preparing to sail for Egypt from the port of Genoa. Hervé submitted a petition to Honorius requesting that Robert of Courçon, cardinal-priest of S. Stefano in Celiomonte (1212-19), who had recruited many of the French crusaders, be sent to accompany their contingent. On 21 July the pope granted Hervé’s request for Robert to accompany the army, but without the

\textsuperscript{13} Mayer, \textit{Crusades}, 229.
\textsuperscript{14} Tyerman, \textit{God’s War}, 633.
legatine powers that he had previously possessed.15 Penny Cole wrote that Robert was sent ‘at the behest of Pope Honorius’, but the initiative here clearly came from outside the curia.16 That the pope permitted a lay request for a high-ranking cardinal to accompany the crusade army demonstrates the balance of initiative in the relationship between the papacy and the lay powers. It seems that the agenda of papal crusade diplomacy was, to a large extent, being dictated by the lay powers, rather than the pope and his cardinals. Although Honorius did of course have the power to refuse Hervé’s petition, in order to achieve his aim of a successful crusade he had to grease the wheels of the crusade machine with papal favours - one of the only ways in which he could get the lumbering beast moving.

In August Honorius received another despatch from the crusade. On 15 June the crusaders had written to the pope informing him that they had sailed from the kingdom of Jerusalem and put ashore in Egypt to begin the investment of Damietta, and petitioned for reinforcements (‘supplicamus’).17 This report made it clear that the crusaders saw the siege of Damietta as a step towards the capture of

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15 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 287r: ‘Receptis litteris tuis et earum intellecto tenore, quod a nobis fuit ex tua parte petitum, quantum cum honestate nostra potuimus, curavimus exaudire, in proposito firmo gerentes, secundum Deum petitionibus tuis libenter annuere, et exaltationi tue intendere ac honori. Sane cum sicut tuis nobis litteris intimasti, tu et nobilis vir comes Marchie ac universi crucesignati de regno Francie, Andegavie, Brittannie, Betunie, Aquitanie, et Burgundie promiseritis prestito iuramento, vos cum Iauensibus de civitate de ipsorum versus Egyptum in instantis mensis Augustis passagio transfretare, nos zelum fidei vestre in Domino commendates, ad vos ibidem iuxta petitionem vestram dilectum filium nostrum Robertum tituli sancti Stephani in Celio Monte presbyterum cardinalem absque legationis officio destaminamus’; Pressutti 1543.
17 The original report is preserved in the papal copy that was distributed to the French contingent and registered. Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 9v: ‘Hiis igitur vobis nuntiatis supplicamus sanctitati vestre in Domino et per Domino flexis genibus exorantes, quatinus Christiano exercitiui magnis periculis exposito curetis misericorditer et celeriter subvenire.’; Pressutti 1581; Regesta Regni Hierosolimitani (MXCVII-MCCXCI), ed. Reinhold Röhrich (Innsbruck, 1893), no. 911; idem, Studien zur Geschichte des fünften Kreuzzuges (Innsbruck, 1891), 39-40.
all of Egypt, followed by the recovery of the Holy Land. Yet they were not just in correspondence with the Roman curia. On 15 June the crusaders had also written a very similar letter directly to Frederick himself, which requested that he join the campaign. The letter to Frederick had no immediate effect, yet the despatches sent from the East had an important impact on papal decision-making. In time they were influential in drawing Frederick into the crusade, and in so doing, altered the course of papal-imperial diplomacy for the rest of Honorius’s reign, as will be demonstrated below.

The receipt of this report at the curia led to a two-stage response. The first part was to reply directly to the crusaders on 13 August, notifying them that their letter had been received and that the pope was acutely aware of their need for reinforcements. Honorius went on that he was continuing to raise support in the West and was sending crusaders on to Damietta by way of Genoa, Venice, and the other Italian port cities. The letter ended by urging the crusaders to stand firm and unified in carrying out the siege, and reassured them that they had full curial support.

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18 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 10r: ‘Qua obtenta firmiter speramus, ut totam Egyptum possemus obtinere, et Terram Sanctam pro qua laboramus finaliter liberare.’; Pressutti 1581.
20 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 10r: ‘Receptis igitur litteris vestris et nuntiis et intellecto quam arduam rem estis de divino auxilio confidentes aggressi’; Pressutti 1580.
21 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 10r: ‘Volentes autem operationi divine nostre humilitatis ministerium adhibere, continuo Ianuam, Venetias ac per alios Italie portus litteras nostras direximus, crucisignatos qui ad portus ipos convenerant et convenire decrebant attentius exhortantes, ac momentes, terrarum episcopis ac rectoribus, ut diligenter exhortentur eosdem, ut ad succursum vestrum celeriter festinantes, versus civitatem Damitam in nomine Domini saboath dirigant iter suum’; Pressutti 1580.
22 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 10r: ‘Interim igitur vos sicut fideles servi et strenui milites Ihesu Christi firmi et constantes estote, ac quod pernecessarium est unanimes et concordes quasi vir unus uno numero serviatis Domino Deo vestro, et quicquid oculos divine maiestatis offendid, quantum humana
The second part of the pope’s response was to compose another letter, issued around the same time, and possibly on the same day, this time addressed to the French contingent assembling at Genoa. This letter actually contains very few of the pope’s ‘own’ words, and is really only a brief exhortation flanking a copy of the crusaders’ report of 15 June at both ends. Honorius exhorted those massing at Genoa to hurry to Egypt, because, as the crusaders stated, if they received reinforcements, Damietta and the whole of Egypt would be delivered into the hands of the Christians.

The copying of the despatch into the pope’s own letter to the French crusaders is further evidence of Honorius acting as a coordinator of the crusade rather than being its director, and demonstrates how a single instance of outside initiative could lead to the creation of multiple papal documents. That the crusaders’ report was copied into the papal letter to the French contingent provides a clear and irrefutable link between the crusaders’ initiative and the issue of papal documents.

To make decisions regarding the crusade, Honorius and his cardinals were reliant on reports arriving from Egypt. Fortunately, the pope was kept abreast by a

permittit fragilitas evitetur, ita ut supernum auxilium quod nostris et aliorum fidelium precibus vobis impetrare satagimus, debeatibus merito expectare.’; Pressutti 1580.

23 The letter is dated simply using the ‘Datum ut supra’ formula in the register. The letter registered immediately before it is dated 27 August, but the letter registered after, the reply to the crusaders themselves, is dated 13 August. If one firmly adheres to the dating formula, then the date of this letter to the French contingent must be 27 August. It is possible that scribal error crept in here though.

24 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 10r: ‘Monemus igitur universitatem vestram, rogamus et exhortamur in Domino, per apostolica vobis scripta precipiendo mandantes, quatinus, attendentes discriminamus in quo positus est exercitus Christianus nisi succurrsum habuerit festinatum, providetatis et disponatis ac irrefragabiliiter ordinetis quod tam vos quam aliis crucisignati qui ad portum Ianuensem conveniunt versus Damiatam in nomine Domini sabaoth dirigatis celeriter iter vestrum, quia sicut et littere ipse inhunut et nuntii qui attulerunt eas expressissime dicunt, certa spes est quod si vos et aliis crucesignati applicueritis ad civitatem iamdictam, et illa et tota Egyptus ab eo cuius est terra et plentudo eius daritub in manus populi Christiani.’; Pressutti 1581.
number of correspondents. In addition to the crusaders’ own missives, which soon included the legate Pelagius as an author, Oliver of Paderborn and Jacques de Vitry were also sending letters back to the West. Oliver’s account of the Fifth Crusade, the *Historia Damiatina*, was a later redaction of two letters sent during the expedition to Cologne which chronicled the course of the crusade. It does not seem odd to suggest that he may also have been sending reports back to the pope given his close relationship with the curia (or that other informants were forwarding them to the curia), a point recognised in 1225 with his promotion to the College of Cardinals as cardinal-bishop of Sabina.

In the autumn of 1218 Jacques de Vitry composed two despatches intended for the curia. In a letter written after the fall of the chain tower at Damietta on 24 August, Jacques recorded the events of the crusade up until that point, writing about the assault on Mount Thabor, the withdrawal of Andrew II and the king of Cyprus, and the council of war held in Acre before sailing to Egypt. There is reason to believe, however, that the form this letter survives in is not the original written by Jacques, but a reconstruction created to replace a lost original. Jacques finished another letter on 22 September that continued where ‘his’ previous letter had left off, recounting the events of the crusade, emphasising

25 There was also a letter purportedly written by the patriarch of Jerusalem to Honorius in June 1221 which has been claimed as genuine, although Peter Jackson writes that this was apocryphal and probably dates from the 1230s: Pierre-Vincent Claverie, ‘L’apparition des Mongols sur la scène politique occidentale (1220-1223)’, *Le Moyen Age: Revue d’histoire et de philologie*, 105 (1999), 601-13; cf. Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410* (Harlow, 2005), 59 and n. 14.
27 Oliver’s letters are printed in *Schriften*, ed. Hoogeweg, 288-96. On Oliver’s promotion to the College of Cardinals, see: Eubel, *Hierarchia*, 5; Smith, ‘College’.
Egypt’s biblical history, and giving an account of the country’s flora and fauna. This letter also mentioned the arrival of the French crusade contingent which Honorius had been in contact with (and included the papal legate Pelagius).

All of Jacques de Vitry’s crusade letters (he wrote seven over the course of the whole campaign) seem to have been reports that required no papal response, given that they only sought to inform and that no replies are recorded in the papal registers. If we use the Venetian decree of 1233 mentioned above, which imposed 8 August as the last day for ships to set out on the return journey from the eastern Mediterranean, then Jacques’ two autumn letters were probably composed too late to be delivered via the ships that brought the French contingent. While it is difficult to detect the impact of Jacques’ reports on papal decision-making, it is essential to be aware of their existence, along with those of other correspondents, as part of the background of information that was available at the curia which influenced the pope’s decisions.

It seems, however, that although Jacques missed the last passage back to the West, the crusade leadership did not, because a papal letter of 27 November refers to a report received from the crusaders, and specifically names the legate Pelagius as being one of the authors (below). The crusaders’ report does not survive, but it seems almost certain that on his arrival in Egypt, Pelagius, with the

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30 Jacques, Lettres, (no. 4) 88-109. See also Jacques de Vitry, Lettres, in Serta Mediaevalia: Textus varii saeculorum x-xiii in unum collecti, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum, 171 (Turnhout, 2000), 583-95. The information being sent back by Jacques supplemented older information on the geography of Egypt and the Holy Land, such as the twelfth-century Tractatus de locis et statu Sancie Terrae Ierosolimitane which remained popular throughout the thirteenth century: I Cristiani e il favoloso Egitto: Una relazione dall’Oriente e la storia di Damietta di Olivero da Colonia, ed. and trans. Giancarlo Andenna and Barbara Bombi (Genoa-Milan, 2009), 22. See Bombi’s introduction in ibid., 7-44, and an Italian translation of the Tractatus in ibid., 44-60.
crusade leadership, took the opportunity to write a letter on their dire financial situation, and then sent it back to the curia on one of the crusader ships turning around and heading for home from the same passage that Pelagius had sailed in on.

On receiving their letter Honorius wrote to Peter of Corbeil, archbishop of Sens, all the crusaders in his diocese, and all the archbishops of England and France on 27 November.\(^\text{31}\) This papal letter recounted that, having exhausted their funds, the crusaders had urgently petitioned (‘instantissime supplicarunt’) the curia for men and money to pay for siege machines and galleys, and that the pope was hurrying to send aid to the East. Honorius urged the recipients to push the crusaders in their dioceses to depart in the March or May passages at the latest.\(^\text{32}\)

\(^{31}\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 31r: ‘ut cum expense [sic] quas fecerunt et faciunt in machinis et galeis ac alii bellici sumptus eos pecunia sic exhauserint, ut viris bello strenuis qui pro defectu rerum remeare coguntur, necessaria ministrare non possint, et sic exercitus paulatim cotidie dilabatur, eis post Deum in cismarinorum auxilio totam spem suam habentibus, tam bellatorum quam pecunie succurrum mittere festinemus.’; Pressutti 1716.

\(^{32}\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 31r: ‘quod vos filii crucesignati proximo Martio vel saltem Madio transfretes’; Pressutti 1716.
Map 3. Germany in the thirteenth century (taken from Abulafia, Frederick, p. xvi)
Frederick II’s Commitment and Postponements

The crusader report received in August also appears to have prompted the pope to move to engage Frederick as one of the requested reinforcements. Although the letter despatched to Frederick is neither preserved in the original nor in the registers, it is certain that Honorius sent one, and a rough outline of its contents can be estimated. A letter addressed to the pope by Frederick on 12 January 1219 reveals that he was replying to a recent papal letter on the state of the Holy Land.33 It is plausible to suggest that the lost papal letter was sent at around the same time as the letter to the archbishops of England and France on the same theme from 27 November 1218. Judging from Frederick’s reply, the content was similar: Honorius must have exhorted the emperor-elect to fulfil his vow and reinforce the crusaders. Of course, perhaps unbeknownst to Honorius, Frederick had already been primed by the receipt of his own copy of the crusaders’ letter of 15 June.

Frederick wrote to the pope that the crusade held a special place in his heart and he understood that without support the crusade might soon fail. Frederick’s pledge to leave by the Feast of John the Baptist (24 June) correlates with the deadline Honorius set in his letter of 27 November, thus Honorius must have made a similar request to the emperor-elect in his letter. That Frederick’s letter was copied into the papal register (with the pope’s reply of 8 February, see below), indicates its importance to Honorius: this was Frederick’s promise to

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crusade by a fixed deadline and also marked the beginning of serious papal-imperial negotiations on the subject of his crusade.

Presumably after receiving the lost papal letter in December 1218 Frederick announced to the German princes that he planned to crusade in the next year and called for a Diet to be held at Magdeburg in March 1219 to settle on a regent during his crusade.\footnote{Abulafia, Frederick, 128; Hechelhammer, Kreuzzug, 89.} This announcement was also mentioned by Frederick in his letter to Honorius of 12 January, although in the end this Diet never occurred.

Frederick’s letter of 12 January also requested that Honorius compel Henry of Brunswick, the brother of the defeated emperor, Otto IV (1209-18), to surrender the imperial emblems to him, and asked the pope to wield the threat of excommunication and interdict in order to achieve this. Honorius responded favourably to Frederick, replying on 8 February that the prior of Santa Maria Nova de Urbe was being sent to fulfil his wish.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 58r: ‘Cum tam litteris quam nuntiis tuis nobis intimare curasses, quod nobilis vir Henricus dux Saxonia insignia imperialia detinet et tibi resignare contempnit, nos tuis aspirantes protectibus et honori, dilectum filium priorem Sancte Marie Nove de Urbe virum utique magni consilii, et honestate perspicuum ad te duximus destinandum, ut ipsum commonefaciat vias nostras et eo mediante ipsa regie serenitati resignet, ad quod illum monere ac hortari nostris curavimus litteris diligenter.’; Pressutti 1862; Pokorny, Wirksamkeit, 17.} The papal pressure on Henry worked and he agreed to relinquish the imperial insignia, thus moving Frederick a step closer to his crusade.\footnote{Van Cleve, Frederick, 112.} Set against a background of \textit{quid pro quo} diplomacy, we see here the cogs of papal government turning in response to the requests of a lay power, and the pope carrying out Frederick’s will in order to fulfil a papal aim.
Mayer decided that it was only after the threat from Otto had disappeared that Honorius tried to engage Frederick, but wrote that this coincided with Andrew’s departure on crusade in autumn 1217.\textsuperscript{37} Although initially Andrew II was Honorius’s favoured leader, when he returned in disgrace the pope must have desired another strong western king to assume control of the crusade, which was only nominally under the command of John of Brienne. When the crusaders’ despatch of autumn 1218 arrived, notwithstanding his relative youth and the ongoing turmoil in the West, the most promising candidate for this role was undoubtedly Frederick, who had already taken the cross. When Frederick responded with an enthusiastic acceptance of Honorius’s request, he petitioned in his letter that the pope wield the threat of excommunication against any crusaders who did not depart by 24 June: ‘Pergit petens ut ... nullum crucesignatum retro morari patiatur’.\textsuperscript{38} Serious negotiations and preparations for Frederick’s expedition had now begun.

Preparations for Frederick’s crusade began to ramp up on 11 February when Honorius issued another three letters regarding the imperial expedition. The first took Frederick, his family, and the kingdom of Sicily under papal protection.\textsuperscript{39} Another addressed to the archbishop of Salzburg, the bishop of Würzburg, and the bishop of Utrecht, awarded them the power to excommunicate any German crusaders who did not depart by 24 June.\textsuperscript{40} The third letter issued on

\textsuperscript{37} Mayer, \textit{Crusades}, 231.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Diplomatica}, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, 586; Van Cleve, ‘Crusade of Frederick’, 433.

\textsuperscript{39} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 59r: Pressutti 1867.

\textsuperscript{40} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 59v: ‘Quocirca fraternitati vestre per apostolica scripta precipiendo mandamus, quatinus siqui in Teutonia constituti contra huius nostre protectionis constitutionis et inhibitionis tenorem aliquid temere presumperint attemptare, vos presumptionem ipsorum monitione previa per censuram ecclesiasticam sublato appellationis obstaculo compescatis’; Pressutti 1868.
11 February was sent to Frederick and all the crusaders in his territories, declaring that, unless they faced a clear and justifiable impediment to their departure, the emperor-elect and all other crusaders were to leave by the feast of John the Baptist under penalty of excommunication.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 60r: ‘Denique venerabilibus fratribus nostris archiepiscopo Salzeburgensi et Herbipolensi ac Traiectensi episcopis damus per nostras litteras in preceptis, ut crucisignatos qui arripare iter ultra terminum suprascriptum sine manifesto impedimento distulerint cuiuscumque ordinis aut dignitatis existant ex tunc denuntient excommunicatione ligatos, et omnes eos simili districione compescant’; Pressutti 1869.}

The threat of excommunication for late departure appears a harsh, and perhaps imprudent, measure to impose at such short notice, but this action was performed at Frederick’s own request.\footnote{Abulafia, Frederick, 128.} It became clear a few months later, however, that this was an unrealistic timeframe in which to prepare for the crusade. On 18 May, in response to a recent petition from Frederick, Honorius issued another letter to the emperor-elect and the crusaders in his territories which granted Frederick’s requested postponement until the Feast of St Michael (29 September).\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 97r: ‘verum tu fili rex nuper tuis nobis litteris supplicasti, ut cum principes tecom ituri nequent infra tam arti temporis brevitatem necessarium ad hoc facere apparatum prefatum terminum prorogare, usque ad festum sancti Michaeli proximum dignamur.’; Pressutti 2071; Hechelhammer, Kreuzzug, 96.}

This short episode reveals the main role of the pope in crusade preparation: a coordinator who was often responsive in his actions. Frederick was setting the agenda for his crusade preparations and Honorius ratified it with papal approval and by agreeing to deploy one of his only real sources of temporal power - ecclesiastical censure - against crusaders who did not perform as Frederick wished. The initiative to issue the batch of letters drawing Frederick into fulfilling his vow can be traced to the receipt of the crusaders’ report of autumn 1218.
Indeed, it was the letter-writing of the crusaders in Egypt which appears to have been the decisive factor in Honorius’s approach to Frederick, and the emperor-elect’s decision finally to weigh in on the Fifth Crusade.

On 7 September, with the new deadline of 29 September rapidly approaching and Frederick being no closer to departing, Honorius wrote a response to a recent letter of Pelagius. The pope’s letter was mostly concerned with the matter of sending funds from the collection of the twentieth tax to the crusade army, but at the end Honorius included a note stating that Frederick would not set out before receiving the imperial crown. The purpose of the letter was to relay information to the crusade army, keeping it abreast of Frederick’s preparedness; the dispositio clause of the letter (which contained the pope’s orders) merely instructed Pelagius to hold the army together (‘as another Joshua’) until Frederick’s arrival.

Although no written request survives, the emperor-elect appears to have asked for a second postponement from Honorius, presumably after the letter to Pelagius on 7 September. On 1 October Honorius wrote to Frederick notifying him that such a letter had been received. Honorius criticised him for failing to leave, having twice demanded postponements and not set out. The pope and his cardinals had wanted and expected plausible reasons why Frederick had missed

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44 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 128v: ‘Noveris autem multitudinem signatorum ad Terre Sancte festinare succursum ad quem etiam karissimus in Christo filius noster Fredericus illustris Sicile in Romanorum imperatorem electus speratur imperii corona in proximo accessurus, quare sicut alter Iosue populum Domini corrobora et conforta sustinens et sustinere docens difficilia quoque animis indefessis, ut opus Dei quod laudabiliter incepisti, ipso auctore valeas feliciter consumare.’; Pressutti 2195.

45 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 132r: ‘Litteris excellentie regie consueta benignitate receptis exultavit animus noster in Domino quod accessit ad patris desiderium filius’; Pressutti 2207.
another deadline: ‘expetivimus et expectavimus excusationes probabiles’.\textsuperscript{46} Frederick obviously had not provided a satisfactory explanation, but nevertheless Honorius acquiesced and set a third deadline for the next Feast of St Benedict (21 March).\textsuperscript{47} This deadline was publicised throughout Germany in another papal letter issued on the same day, which renewed the threat of excommunication against those who failed to comply.\textsuperscript{48}

What are we to make of Frederick’s continued failings to leave on crusade? Rudolf Hiestand has written that Frederick’s vow was taken out of genuine piety, and that the fulfilment of it was of great importance to him, just as it was to the pope.\textsuperscript{49} Abulafia has drawn attention to Frederick’s struggle to balance the dire necessity of the Holy Land with the never-ending demands on his time from Germany, and stated that he could not depart until he no longer faced a threat from a Welf revival or civil war in Germany.\textsuperscript{50} The increasing papal pressure on Frederick to leave would surely have been known to his opponents as well - the emperor-elect could not risk leaving the Empire facing such a threat. Hiestand also declared that Honorius knew his credibility, together with that of the emperor-elect, was at stake over Frederick’s crusade, and was understandably concerned about it, which explains why the pope’s humour turned bitter when, in

\textsuperscript{46} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 132v; Pressutti 2207.
\textsuperscript{47} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 132v; ‘Honori tuo quantum in Domino possimus providere volentes, dilationem tibi concedimus postulatum festum beati Benedicti proximo futurum terminum prefigentes quo ad Terre Sancte succursum iter arripias prosecuturus quantum sufficiencia possibilitatis affuerit votum tuum.’; Pressutti 2207; Hechelhammer, \textit{Kreuzzug}, 101.
\textsuperscript{48} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 133; Pressutti 2208.
ironic tones, he asked Frederick how much transportation he had prepared for the crusade.\textsuperscript{51} Van Cleve noted a papal-imperial tension, but from earlier in the year, writing that from the summer of 1219 onwards there was apparent enmity between Frederick and Honorius in their communication.\textsuperscript{52}

Rather than the result of on-going friction from summer 1219, the letter of 1 October appears to be a product of sheer frustration and disbelief that Frederick had missed yet another deadline. It is difficult to understand why Frederick was repeatedly requesting such short extensions when he was patently unable to meet them, but it suggests that he was serious about leading a crusade in the near future, and felt the pressure to do so. The later papal correspondence with Frederick is not typified by the elements of bitterness that come as something of a surprise in the letter of 1 October. Honorius was probably genuinely optimistic that Frederick could fulfil his vow in 1219, and his confidence must have received a crushing blow when the emperor-elect failed to carry out his promise in September. After this point the pope appeared more understanding and less surprised when Frederick deferred his departure time and again.

Was it too much to expect the emperor-elect to leave on crusade so soon? Honorius, after all, had the example of the rapid departure of King Conrad III of Germany (1138-52) on the Second Crusade (1147-49). Conrad’s position when he took the cross in late December 1146 had been similar to Frederick’s given the ‘considerable disorder’ in the Empire and that he had not received the imperial

\textsuperscript{51} Hiestand, ‘Friedrich’, 134, 137.
\textsuperscript{52} Van Cleve, Frederick, 114. Van Cleve cites: Diplomatica, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, 628-29, 673-74.
crown. In spite of this, Conrad still managed to depart on crusade in early June 1147 - less than six months after making his vow - and Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa (1155-90) had taken the cross in early June 1188 then left on the Third Crusade in May 1189. Frederick’s imminent participation was therefore not an impossibility; it would be a mistake to label the pope naive for believing Frederick’s promises, as one scholar has.

Papal-imperial relations have been characterised as generally cooperative by Powell, and although the pope rebuffed Frederick in October, their relationship continued along these lines. Honorius’s policy consisted of responding favourably to Frederick’s requests (something that would be altered by Gregory IX). Yet one cannot claim that a detailed and preconceived papal policy of action extended beyond the aim of maintaining a cooperative relationship when it was Frederick who was defining the direction that their negotiations took.

After the disappointment of early October 1219, the amount of crusading business being presented to the curia slackened off, and few papal crusade letters were issued as a result. No doubt the few months of breathing space allowed Honorius to devote more time to the cacophony of petitioners seeking privileges and justice. Nevertheless, before the walls of Damietta, the crusaders’ siege was coming closer to fruition, and on 5 November the city finally fell into their hands. On 11 November the leadership wrote to the pope informing him of their success, updating him on events up until that point, and (again) begging for reinforcements.

54 Ibid., 128.
55 Donovan, Pelagius, 77.
and funds for the crusade. The letter also reveals that by this stage the crusaders were anxiously expecting Frederick to arrive, and they asked the pope to compel him to come, along with others signed with the cross. That Frederick’s participation was commonly anticipated is corroborated by Oliver of Paderborn, who also records that after the capture of Damietta the crusaders were eagerly anticipating Frederick’s arrival. It is clear that by late 1219 Frederick was widely acknowledged as the commander-in-waiting, something which had probably been encouraged by Honorius’s letter of 7 September to Pelagius.

The next day, a group of nobles including Simon de Joinville, wrote a separate letter to Honorius in support of John of Brienne’s claims to the city of Damietta, and asked that the city be made over to the kingdom of Jerusalem, using the justification that it would make peace among the crusaders. That a separate letter was despatched, presumably in secret, implies that a tension existed in the crusade council between John and his supporters on one side, and those waiting for Frederick to arrive and assume command on another. John must have felt the need to bolster his position in the council because he also wrote his own letter to Frederick on 12 November, recently rediscovered by Perry, which related the events of the crusade up to that point. Perry argues convincingly that John was taking the initiative to try and establish himself as Frederick’s equal, or at least a peer, as well as trying to secure his control over the crusade and Damietta before the emperor-elect might arrive. John obviously felt that his tenuous position was

57 The letter is edited in Röhricht, Studien, 43-46.
58 Oliver, Historia, 231.
60 Perry, ‘John’, appendix 2, 300-02.
61 Ibid., 150-53.
under threat from the pope and Frederick, and made the bold move of tackling the papal-imperial axis head on, rather than waiting for his information to be filtered through the papal curia to Frederick, an aim in which John seems to have been successful.  

The crusaders’ missives did not reach the curia until February 1220 - they must have raised the pope’s spirits after the setback in October. On 24 February Honorius issued a response to the crusaders’ letter of 11 November (there is no known reply to the letter of 12 November in support of John). Honorius congratulated the army on its success and picked out Pelagius for special praise. Presumably prompted by the letter supporting John’s claim to Damietta, the papal letter of 24 February ended with Honorius’s concern of dissension permeating the army (‘quod abit inter vos possit disensio suboriri’) and ordered that the crusaders obey Pelagius in order to prevent this.

The arrival of the despatches at the curia in February 1220 ended what appears to have been a recent drought of news from the crusaders at the curia. That Honorius had taken no important decisions regarding the crusade since 1 October 1219 reveals the extent to which the functioning of the pope’s crusade administration was reliant on despatches from Egypt and the Holy Land, as well as on the initiative of the lay powers more generally.

The receipt of the crusader reports also coincided with the run up to Frederick’s new deadline of 21 March, although yet again, the outcome was to

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62 Ibid., 153.
63 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 162v: ‘Ideoque universitatem vestrarn rogamus attentius et hortamur, per apostolica vobis scripta precipiendo mandantes quatinus eidem in predictis omnibus devote ac humiliter more solito intendatis.’; Pressutti 2338.
64 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 162v; Pressutti 2338.
disappoint the pope. Frederick was angling to secure his imperial coronation and the coronation of his son as king of the Romans before he left on crusade.\textsuperscript{65} Again, this had a precedent in Conrad III’s preparations for the Second Crusade: before Conrad’s departure, he had been successful in having his son elected by the German princes as his successor as king of the Romans.\textsuperscript{66}

Honorius was suspicious of Frederick’s ambitions regarding the kingdom of Sicily and its relation to the Roman-German Empire. The pope wanted to avoid the unification of Sicily and the Empire under a single crown at all costs, an eventuality which would leave the Papal State surrounded, and potentially at the mercy of the emperor. It is worth pointing out though that until his excommunication by Gregory IX in 1227, Frederick had no reason to antagonise the papacy. Although the patience of Honorius and his cardinals was tested throughout his pontificate by Frederick’s repeated delays, his interventions in episcopal elections, and his demands for military service from the duchy of Spoleto and Viterbo (which were in the Papal State), the pope was not being directly threatened by the emperor-elect.\textsuperscript{67} To think that the pope and emperor-elect were mutually aggressive towards each other at this stage would be to misread the evidence in light of the later papal-imperial conflict.

In a golden bull addressed to the pope on 10 February 1220, Frederick reaffirmed his promise of 1216 that when crowned emperor he would pass on the

\textsuperscript{65} Van Cleve, ‘Crusade of Frederick’, 434.
\textsuperscript{66} Phillips, \textit{Second Crusade}, 129.
\textsuperscript{67} On the duchy of Spoleto and Viterbo, see Daniel Waley, \textit{The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century} (London, 1961), 127.
kingdom of Sicily to his son, Henry (VII) and would not rule it himself.\textsuperscript{68} This was a reissue of Frederick’s earlier bull addressed to Innocent III on 1 July 1216, and which had been copied into Honorius’s own register for safekeeping.\textsuperscript{69} The renewed pledge of 1220 seems to have prompted Honorius to issue a letter to Henry on 16 March, taking him and the kingdom of Sicily under papal protection as part of the preparation for Frederick’s crusade.\textsuperscript{70} The emperor-elect despatched another letter to the curia on 19 February, declaring that he was readying for action in Germany and taking charge of the nobles marked with the cross.\textsuperscript{71} Despite the lead he had taken in preparing the German crusaders, on account of the German princes’ apathy, Frederick needed more time - he sent the abbot of Fulda as legate to the curia to engage in negotiations over his imperial coronation.\textsuperscript{72}

On 20 March Honorius replied to Frederick’s letter permitting yet another postponement, but warned that he did not want to seem to have negligently abandoned his duty, and only extended the deadline until 1 May.\textsuperscript{73} The rhetorical flourishes of chancery officials were put to good use in this letter, which is characterised by sections that sought to inspire Frederick to equip his sword, to

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{70} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 172r: ‘genitor tuis ad transfretandum magnifice se accingit’; Pressutti 2361.
\bibitem{71} Diplomatica, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, 741-44.
\bibitem{72} Van Cleve, ‘Crusade of Frederick’, 434.
\bibitem{73} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 169v: ‘ad kalendas Maii proximas tui processus terminum prorogamus’; Pressutti 2372.
\end{thebibliography}
place himself humbly in the hands of God, and to complete the crusade.\(^{74}\) The pope was using every means possible to try and persuade Frederick to fulfil his vow.

After the abbot of Fulda’s audience with the pope, at which the abbot presented Frederick’s coronation case *viva voce*, Honorius issued a letter on 10 April 1220 to Frederick which stated that after discussion with his cardinals, the most important matters of policy to the curia were the crusade, Church liberties, and heresy.\(^{75}\) The pope needed to be satisfied on these three issues by Frederick before he would crown him. Honorius also granted Frederick’s request for a papal legate to be sent in return, and although no legate is named in this letter, this role was later carried out by Nicholas da Chiaromonte, cardinal-bishop of Tusculum (1219-27), whom was sent later in the year to join the papal chaplain and subdeacon Alatrinus (who had been acting as a diplomat and papal informant at Frederick’s court since summer 1219).\(^{76}\)

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\(^{74}\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 170r: ‘Accingere, accingere gladio circa femur potentissime principum terrenorum. Accingere in humilitate potens, accingere in potentia humiliter, ut non in br[achio tuo confius, de manu altissimi suscipias in tanti consumatione negotii gloriam que speratur.’; Pressutti 2372.

\(^{75}\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 171v: ‘Venientem ad presentiam nostram dilectum filium abbatem Fuldensi nuntium tuum virum providum et fidelem consueta benignitate recipimus, et tam ea que super negotiis tuis nobis proposuit viva voce, quam ea que tue misse nobis per eundem littere continebant, intelleximus diligenter. Habito igitur super hiis sicut decuit cum fratribus nostris diligenti colloquio et tractatu, serenitati tue deliberato consilio respondemus, quod inter desideria cordis nostri quasi primum et precipuum est, ut tue sublimationis feliciter inchoata promotio felicius confirmetur, cum id exposcat et Terre Sancte succursus, et conservatio ecclesiastice libertatis, que invalescentibus in plerisque locis heresibus, plus solito conculcatur, et generaliter totius fere orbis tranquillitatis que insurgentibus ubique discordii, quasi quibusdam quatitur fluctibus tempestatum.’; Pressutti 2392.

Frederick’s desire to see his son Henry elected as king of the Romans was realised at Frankfurt in April 1220; although it made good sense dynastically given the dangers inherent in crusading, it went against the pope’s wishes.\(^{77}\) It had also been effected without Honorius’s knowledge.\(^{78}\) Like Conrad III before him, it was probably actually part of Frederick’s crusade preparation rather than a threat to the papacy, but it was a move which muddied the waters regarding Frederick’s promise to Innocent III in 1216 that Henry would owe fealty to the pope alone as king of Sicily.\(^{79}\) Olaf Rader has called the promise a ‘marvellous lie’ because not only did Frederick retain the throne of Sicily, but he now also had Henry crowned king of the Romans.\(^{80}\) In a placatory letter sent to the pope on 13 July 1220, Frederick made the flimsy excuse that the election had been performed in his absence in order to settle feuding among the German princes.\(^{81}\) Having performed a fait accompli behind the pope’s back, Frederick could not be relied upon to fulfil his other promise to maintain a legal separation between the kingdom of Sicily and the Empire; all Honorius could do was hope that he would.

**John of Brienne’s Claim to the Armenian Throne**

Frederick’s participation in the Fifth Crusade was made even more urgent by events away from the curia and perhaps contributed to Honorius’s decision to crown the emperor-elect. At Easter John of Brienne left the crusade army in

\(^{77}\) Stürner, *Friedrich*, i, 235.

\(^{78}\) Van Cleve, *Frederick*, 123.

\(^{79}\) Abulafia, *Frederick*, 128. On Frederick’s promise see Partner, *Lands*, 244.

\(^{80}\) Olaf B. Rader, *Friedrich II.: Der Sizilianer auf dem Kaiserthron, eine Biographie* (Munich, 2010), 111.

\(^{81}\) *Diplomatica*, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, 802-03; Van Cleve, *Frederick*, 123-24.
Damietta to return to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Oliver of Paderborn records that he gave many false excuses for his departure but promised to return quickly.\textsuperscript{82} Donovan - citing the attacks on the kingdom mentioned by Ernoul and Oliver - thought that his primary reason was to defend his kingdom against the threat posed by al-Mu'azzam.\textsuperscript{83} In addition to this, Mayer pointed to his anger at not being awarded outright control of Damietta, and the fact that he was running out of money.\textsuperscript{84}

John also had a claim to the throne of Armenia through his wife Stephanie, and had petitioned for papal confirmation of it, which was duly granted in a document issued on 2 February 1220.\textsuperscript{85} It is probable that John left to assert his rights in Armenia.\textsuperscript{86} Runciman wrote that the papal document of 2 February permitted John to leave the crusade in order to pursue his dynastic concerns, but there is no such statement in the letter, it merely confirms that John had a claim, not that the pope recommended or allowed him to go.\textsuperscript{87} That Honorius later wrote to John ordering him to rejoin the crusade supports this interpretation (see below).\textsuperscript{88}

Perry writes that although John may have been attending to his Armenian affairs, his main concern must have been his vulnerable kingdom, and notes the significance of the Templars’ departure as well, although they did not travel with

\textsuperscript{82} Oliver, \textit{Historia}, 248.  
\textsuperscript{83} Donovan, \textit{Pelagius}, 71; \textit{Chronique d’Ernoul}, ed. de Mas Latrie, 423; Oliver, \textit{Historia}, 244.  
\textsuperscript{84} Mayer, \textit{Crusades}, 225.  
\textsuperscript{85} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 161v: ‘Sane tua nobis serenitas supplicavit, ut regnum Armenie quod ad te ratione carissime in Christo filie nostre H. regine uxoris tue hereditario iure asseris pertinere, tibi tuisque heredibus confirmare de benignitatis sedis apostolice dignaremur. Nos igitur tuis iustis postulationibus grato concurrentes assensa, ius quod in ipso regno habere dinoacis, sicut illud rationabiliter obtines, tibi tuisque heredibus auctoritate apostolica confirmamus’; Pressutti 2320.  
\textsuperscript{86} Jotischky, \textit{Crusading}, 217.  
\textsuperscript{87} Runciman, \textit{Crusades}, 164.  
\textsuperscript{88} Pressutti 2610.
John but left separately.\textsuperscript{89} Perry states that if John had been truly serious about his Armenian ambitions, he would have left Egypt sooner.\textsuperscript{90} The king of Armenia, Leo, had died in May 1219.\textsuperscript{91} A substantial amount of time passed before John’s claim was confirmed by the papacy but this does not mean a lack of interest in the claim on John’s behalf. It took a matter of months, depending on the season, for despatches from Egypt to reach the curia (as well as a further delay in carrying the news from Armenia to Egypt). In addition, prior to November 1219, the crusade army had been focused on capturing Damietta; it may only have been after the city’s fall - when John was unsatisfied that it was not added to his kingdom without hesitation - that the king began seriously to consider pursuing his claim.

Historians have not drawn attention to the neat correlation between the date of issue of the papal confirmation, 2 February 1220, and John’s departure at Easter, a window which tallies with the timeframe for the receipt and despatch of letters between the curia and Egypt. Oliver of Paderborn’s note that John’s departure coincided with the arrival of that season’s passage allows one to speculate that the papal confirmation perhaps arrived on one of these ships, and that as soon as John received it, he may have cut a hasty path north to try and set about making his claim. Unfortunately the sources do not permit one to do more than speculate. That Oliver of Paderborn records the destruction of Caesarea and the Templar stronghold of Safita in the two chapters immediately preceding John’s departure probably gives us the main impetus (or at least justification) for

\textsuperscript{89} Perry, ‘John’, 165.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 158-59.
\textsuperscript{91} Donovan, Pelagius, 69.
John’s return to his kingdom. Even so, the possibility that he sought to kill two birds with one stone - to secure his kingdom and claim the Armenian throne - cannot be ruled out. Powell judged that ‘the most that can be concluded is that John took advantage of the lull in the fighting after the capture of Damietta to see to his own affairs.’

John’s pursuance of his claim in Armenia does not mean that he suddenly relinquished his interest in Damietta: he had coins minted (deniers), probably in the city itself, between 1219 and 1221 which bore the legends +IOhANNES REX around John’s facing head, and DAMIETA on the reverse. D.M. Metcalf has argued against the claim in the historiography that this first issue established John as ‘king of Damietta’. Metcalf states that such a notion ‘is numismatic as well as constitutional nonsense’ on the basis that ‘Damieta indicates merely the town where they were minted, or, by extension, the name of the coin’. There was another issue of this denier with the legends reversed (a practice which was accepted in the early thirteenth century to signify a regency), so DAMIATA surrounded the king’s head, and IOhES REX featured on the reverse, and must have been struck outside of Damietta, elsewhere in the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Metcalf writes that the second issue was probably minted between 1221 and 1222, and may indeed have sought to signify a claim over the now-lost (but perhaps recoverable) city, in the ‘period when John’s position was being

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92 Oliver, Historia, 244-48.
93 Powell, Anatomy, 177.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
challenged by Frederick.\footnote{Ibid., 23.} The problem with Metcalf’s theory is that the agreement that Frederick would marry John’s daughter, which is presumably the challenge to which Metcalf is referring, did not come about until 1223, and Metcalf states that the notion of the coins being minted as late as 1223 is problematic.\footnote{Ibid. and n. 12.} In any case, the minting of the coins sent a clear message and demonstrates that John had not abandoned his interests in the city: he obviously meant to return to the crusade.

Word of John of Brienne’s departure from the crusade host did not reach Honorius until August 1220, and in response he addressed a letter to John on 11 August.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 7r: ‘Licet igitur confidamus quod tu hec prudenter attendens evitabis aliquid attemptare per quod perire ac evacuari posset totus labor quem hactenus pro Terra Sancta subiit populus Christianus, ex habundanti tamen sub obtentu gratie divine ac nostre et sub anathematis pena tibi auctoritate presentium districtissime inhibemus, ne hoc tempore aliquatenus arma moveas contra ipsos Armenos aut quoslibet alios Christianos, sed studeas ut tota Christianitas ultramarina in unitate consistat, et venerabili fratre nostro Pelagio Albanensi episcopo apostolice sedis legato qui strenuitatem tuam frequentem suis nobis litteris commendavit, sicut persone nostre reverenter intendens, studeas quod commune populi Christiani negotium desideratum largiente Domino consequatur effectum, postmodum tuis specialibus commodis operam decentius utiliusque daturus.’; Pressutti 2610.} Honorius did not wish to believe the rumour that John had abandoned the crusade to go to Armenia, which he claimed had jeopardised the campaign and was an affront to those who had travelled across the sea to come to the aid of John and his kingdom. The letter finished by urging the king to return to the expedition and the pope threatened him with anathematisation for non-compliance. Honorius’s letter throws interesting light on John’s actions, because either the information circulating at the curia did indeed make out that John had left the crusade to follow his Armenian ambitions, or else the pope drew the logical
conclusion from his own confirmation of John’s claim. The evidence therefore indicates that John was pursuing his claim at the expense of the Fifth Crusade.

When John re-joined the crusade army on 7 July 1221, just in time for its march on Cairo, Runciman thought that this was to avoid being accused of cowardice, whereas Linda Ross logically judged his return to have been prompted by the death of his wife Stephanie and their son, with whom his claim to the Armenian throne died as well.\(^{100}\) It took eleven months from the issue of the papal letter for John to return to the crusade. One must allow for the time delay inherent in medieval correspondence, but nevertheless, this implies that he was not simply motivated to come back by the papacy’s strictest orders as Mayer and Van Cleve have propounded, and calls into question the extent of papal authority, especially in cases where the lay rulers did not stand to gain papal favours in return for obedience.\(^{101}\)

\(^{100}\) Runciman, *Crusades*, 167. Linda Ross has also published under the name Linda Goldsmith; the name Linda Ross is used throughout the thesis text, whereas footnotes cite the given name in each publication. Linda Goldsmith, ‘John of Brienne (d.1237)’, in Alan V. Murray, ed., *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, 4 vols (Santa Barbara, CA, 2006), ii, 691.

\(^{101}\) Van Cleve, ‘Fifth Crusade’, 424; Mayer, *Crusades*, 226.
Map 4. The Papal State in the thirteenth century (taken from Abulafia, *Frederick*, p. xiii; this map originates from Waley, *State*)
Map 5. The kingdom of Sicily in the thirteenth century (taken from Abulafia, Frederick, p. xii)
Negotiations over the Imperial Coronation

Back in the West, Frederick’s deadline of 1 May slipped by without his departure. The pope issued a letter addressed to Frederick at some point in May, which allowed him to leave in the next (autumn) passage under the penalty of ecclesiastical censure, and notified him that he was sending the papal chaplain and penitentiary, Conrad, *scholasticus* of Mainz, to preach the crusade and to help him depart by the new deadline. Though Frederick might not have been ready, Honorius instructed him not to detain German crusaders who were prepared to depart. The decision of Honorius to send Conrad to preach the crusade and exert additional pressure on the emperor-elect implies that he was not satisfied with Frederick’s attempts to prepare alone. It was an acknowledgement that Frederick would need more assistance than merely the despatch of papal letters.

Frederick subsequently made it known that he could not arrive for coronation before the Feast of St Michael (29 September), only then would he cross over the sea. Honorius relayed this information to Pelagius in a letter of 24 July in which he also stated that funds from the twentieth were being transferred to the crusade. The imperial crown then, was the crux of papal-imperial

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102 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 185r: ‘Rogamus itaque tue celsitudinis providentiam et in Domino attentius exhortamur, quatimus, una cum crucesignatis Teutonie instanti passagio iuxta promissionem tuam studeas transfretare. Quod si forte non potes crucesignatos ipsos ulterius non detineas, sed data eis licentia reddendi Domino vota sua, illos ad exercitus predicti succursum libere transire permettas, sciens nos dilecto filio magistro Conrado scolastico Maguntino capellano et penitentiario nostro tam viva voce quam litteris iniuncxisse [sic], ut eos ad vota sua in ipso passagio exequanda, per censuram ecclesiasticam appellatwne remota compellat.’; Pressutti 2469. Earlier in his career, Conrad had preached the Albigensian Crusade (prior to 1209). He was deployed to preach the Holy Land crusade in Germany by both Innocent III and Honorius, and in 1220 was put in charge of all crusade recruitment in Germany: Paul B. Pixton, *The German Episcopacy and the Implementation of the Decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, 1216-1245: Watchmen on the Tower* (Leiden, 1995), 203.

103 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 1v: ‘Speravimus quoque ut karissimus in Christo filius noster Fredericus illustris rex Sicilie in Romanorum imperatorem electus cum sit crucesignatus in hoc passagio
negotiations, and it was inhibiting the crusade leadership in Egypt, which awaited Frederick’s arrival.

The letter to Pelagius goes a long way towards explaining the dynamic at work in the negotiations between Honorius and Frederick in 1220. Frederick was playing for time in order to achieve his imperial coronation, which was not an unreasonable aim to secure before crusading. Honorius was reluctant to crown Frederick because of fears for the security of the Papal State, especially given the underhanded election of Henry as king of the Romans. Papal government by response reflected the balance of power in the papal-imperial relationship, which was not swinging in Honorius’s favour. Aside from the despatch of exhortatory letters and papal representatives, he was largely confined to watching and waiting for the emperor-elect’s next move.

That the pope would eventually be forced into a corner and give way only strengthens this interpretation of papal-imperial diplomacy. Honorius aimed to safeguard the integrity of the Papal State: although by the end of 1221 he had been successful in securing imperial recognition of papal supremacy over the disputed Matildine lands in Italy (a long-running issue in papal-imperial diplomacy), his attempts to create an irrevocable separation between the thrones of the Roman-German Empire and the kingdom of Sicily were ultimately unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{104} Long gone were the days when the papacy could look to the kingdom for military protection against the Empire when it was under Norman

\textsuperscript{transfretaret, sed sive ab aliis prepeditus sive retardatus propria voluntate id non potest efficere cum sicut idem suis nobis litteris intimavit, non ante quam circa festum beati Michaelis venire proposuerit coronandus, transfretaturas deinde auctore Domino in subsidium Terre Sancte.’; Pressutti 2574.}

\textsuperscript{104} On Honorius’s ‘recovery’ of the Matildine lands, see: Partner, \textit{Lands}, 245; Abulafia, \textit{Frederick}, 134.
rule (although the relationship still had not always been easy). With the kingdom under imperial control, the papacy was especially reluctant to allow any move by the Empire to engulf the Papal State, yet in this instance we see Honorius subjugating one of his key policy goals in order to satisfy Frederick and to see his crusade happen.

Watts has noted the papacy’s flexibility in its dealings with lay powers in most matters, except, that is, when it came to papal territorial interests. This episode, however, underscores the reality of Honorius’s relationships with the lay powers. It was mostly the lay powers who took the initiative in setting the political agenda, to which the pope responded on an *ad hoc* basis, attempting to secure the Church’s interests as best as he could. Even when it came to the Papal State, the papacy was not inflexible. A large number of papal decisions bent - or in the case of Sicily, would eventually bend - to the will of the lay powers. As Weiler has pointed out, although the kingdom of Sicily was nominally a papal fief, this ‘mattered little in practice, since papal overlordship, unless backed up by military force, remained very much a legal fiction.’ It is extremely revealing that in Honorius’s correspondence on the crusade I have found only one outright refusal of a request by a powerful secular ruler: Honorius’s decision to turn down Frederick’s request for the count of Tripoli to be absolved from excommunication in the winter of 1225-26 (see chapter three). David d’Avray has written that the curia ‘seldom refused demands for its services’ because the papacy did not wish

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106 The integrity of the Papal State was a common theme in papal-imperial negotiations prior to imperial coronations, particularly from the twelfth century onwards: Weiler, *Henry*, 11.
to ‘turn away litigants and petitioners’, whose very presence helped to ensure the continuing importance of the papal curia.\textsuperscript{109} This applies in a similar sense to the lay powers as well. Paradoxically, despite the pope’s inclination to grant lay powers’ requests, this system served to reinforce papal authority by establishing the pope as the arbiter of Christendom; one can draw parallels with the establishment of a private petitionary system in England under King Edward I (1272-1307), which served to project royal power throughout the realm.\textsuperscript{110}

One must, however, be aware of the nature of the papal registers as evidence and how it can potentially create a warped view of an institution that almost always said ‘yes’. Because only successful petitions were dignified with the issue of a papal document in response, it means that in the registers one only finds the occasions when the pope granted petitions, and even then, on account of selective registration, not all of them. For political affairs however, which often went hand-in-hand with petitioning, the pope’s curial letters were often registered for their own sake. This means that the registers preserve both positive and negative responses to requests by lay powers that were framed in political letters or delivered through diplomats. It can therefore be asserted with some confidence that the lack of refusals is broadly reflective of the pope’s position in the political landscape.

In the run up to his coronation, Frederick had been trying, with mixed results, to satisfy Honorius on the Church’s interests.\textsuperscript{111} In order to secure the election of his son Henry as king of the Romans - which threatened to arouse

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\textsuperscript{109} D’Avray, \textit{Rationalities}, 143.
\textsuperscript{110} Dodd, \textit{Justice}, 41-42.
\textsuperscript{111} Van Cleve, \textit{Frederick}, 130-31.
\end{flushleft}
Honorius’s ire, but was necessary before leaving on crusade - Frederick had to grant concessions to the German ecclesiastical princes.\(^{112}\) On 26 April 1220, just prior to Henry’s election, Frederick issued the decree *Confederatio cum principibus ecclesiasticis*, which awarded enhanced privileges to the German episcopate.\(^{113}\) Abulafia has argued that this was not issued merely to placate Honorius, but it did benefit the crusade by creating a stable political situation in preparation for Frederick’s absence.\(^{114}\) In addition, although Frederick did not leave on crusade in person, he sent a contingent under the command of Count Matthew of Apulia, who arrived in Egypt with eight galleys in July.\(^{115}\) This was not what Honorius really wanted, which was Frederick’s personal participation, but it was a start, and was probably designed by Frederick to signal his commitment to the crusade.\(^{116}\)

In August Honorius dealt with a batch of Frederick’s petitions connected to his upcoming coronation and crusade. Two letters were issued on 20 August regarding the protection of Frederick’s lands while he would be away. One was addressed to the princes of Germany, ordering those signed with the cross to depart with the emperor-elect, and those staying behind to keep the peace in his lands.\(^{117}\) The other was addressed to Egbert, bishop of Bamberg, ordering him not

\(^{112}\) Haverkamp, *Germany*, 244.


\(^{114}\) Abulafia, *Frederick*, 124, 129.

\(^{115}\) Oliver, *Historia*, 249.


\(^{117}\) Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 14v: ‘Ideoque universitatem vestram rogamus et hortamus in Domino et sub obtentu gratie divine ac nostre per apostolica vobis scripta districte preciando mandamus quatinus, et illi nostrum qui cum ipso rege transibunt curent sic ordinate dimittere terram suam, et illi qui remanebunt in terra semetipsos ac suos sic regem studeant et ab illicitis cohercere, quod et
to stir up trouble in Frederick’s absence.\textsuperscript{118} On the next day the pope issued a
document to Henry de Neiffen releasing him from his crusade vow as a result of
Frederick’s requests (‘preces’), because he was entrusted with the care of
Frederick’s son.\textsuperscript{119} On 28 August Honorius granted Frederick’s request that his
wife Constance be crowned empress alongside him.\textsuperscript{120}

Frederick’s requests were strikingly similar to Andrew II’s prior to his
crusade, and the pope must have had high hopes that after his coronation,
Frederick would finally cross over the sea just as Andrew had done when his
petitions had been granted. As Powell has stated, the negotiations leading up to
the coronation ‘were full of promise’.\textsuperscript{121} The coronation marked a watershed in
the papal-imperial negotiations up to this point. By crowning Frederick, Honorius
would be relinquishing the carrot which he had been attempting to use to secure
the separation of the kingdom and the Empire. After making Frederick emperor,
Honorius was left only with the stick of excommunication, and this was a penalty
which he was extremely reluctant to use.

Excommunication was the papacy’s ‘ultimate weapon’, and once
deployed, there was no higher ecclesiastical penalty that could be enforced, unless

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\textsuperscript{118} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 15v: ‘Ideoque presentium tibi auctoritate, mandamus quatinus taliter ab
huiusmodi perversitate quiescas, quod clamor ad nos super hoc decetero non recurrat, quia id non
possemus ulterius in patientia sustinere.’; Pressutti 2632.
\textsuperscript{119} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 15v: ‘Ad preces karissimi in Christo filii nostri Frederici illustris regis Sicilie
in Romanorum imperatorem electi qui filium suum et totam Sueviam tua cure commisit,
auctoritate tibi presentium indulgemus, ut executione voti tui quam diu fuerit de beneplacito nostro
suspensa, nullus te ad illud cogere valeat exequendum, nisi de speciali apostolice sedis mandato,
faciente de hac nostra indulgentia mentionem.’; Pressutti 2638.
\textsuperscript{120} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 14v: ‘Gratanter accepimus quod karissimam in Christo filiam nostram
Constantiam illustrem reginam coniugem tuam precum nostrarum intuitu tecum ducis ut et ipsa
tecum suscipiat imperialis glorie diadema.’; Pressutti 2650.
\textsuperscript{121} Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 183.
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the pope attempted to depose the ruler in question.¹²² That the Church often relied on the secular arm to enforce sentences of excommunication only strengthened Frederick’s bargaining position, and there is nothing to suggest that such an extreme course of action as deposition or fomenting civil war in Germany was either considered a warranted or realistic option under Honorius. Encouraging rebellion in Germany or aiding the Lombard League would certainly have been options available to Honorius if he had ever wanted to depose Frederick. Frederick’s position as emperor was not unassailable, and the German princes were powerful political players in their own right.¹²³ The emperor-elect’s position was vulnerable before his imperial coronation in 1220 (the very reason he could not leave on crusade), and the events of Frederick’s early life, and again later in the 1240s, demonstrated the threat that papally-encouraged rivals could pose.¹²⁴

This restraint must be attributed to Honorius’s personality, because Gregory IX proved himself to be of a different temperament when, on receiving the news of Frederick’s failure to depart on crusade in 1227, he took the step that Honorius never had (despite it being within his rights to carry out), and excommunicated the emperor, released his subjects from allegiance, and invaded the kingdom of Sicily.¹²⁵ In 1229 Gregory offered the German crown to the Welf

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¹²⁴ On Innocent III’s role, see Haerkamp, *Germany*, 240-41; on the 1240s see Benjamin Arnold, ‘Emperor Frederick II (1194-1250) and the Political Particularism of the German Princes’, *Journal of Medieval History*, 26 (2000), 240, 246.
¹²⁵ James M. Powell, ‘Frederick II and the Church: A Revisionist View’, *Catholic Historical Review*, 48 (1963), 493; Manselli, ‘Onorio’, 158. The conflict over ecclesiastical appointments appears to have been as important as the issue of Frederick’s crusade in Gregory’s decision to excommunicate the emperor: James M. Powell, ‘Church and Crusade: Frederick II and Louis IX’, *Catholic Historical Review*, 93 (2007), 257.
heir, Otto the Child (1227-52), but was turned down.\(^{126}\) This was a political act
driven by papal initiative, and Gregory’s response completely reversed Honorius’s
aim of papal-imperial cooperation - proof that the papacy was not always reactive
in its political affairs.

Outside the papal curia, pressure was also mounting on Frederick to
depart. It seems to have been common knowledge among the well informed that
the crusade army was in a state of limbo whilst awaiting the emperor-elect’s
arrival. A letter despatched by Peter de Montacute, master of the Knights
Templar, to the bishop of Elne, given at Acre on 20 September 1220, informed the
bishop that the crusaders were in desperate need of money and that they had been
waiting for Frederick for a long time.\(^ {127}\) Peter believed that Frederick’s
participation would bring the crusade to an end, and ominously foretold that if he
did not arrive by summer of the next year (1221), that the Franks’ position in
Syria and Egypt would be untenable. This then was the backdrop against which
Frederick’s end-game negotiations for the imperial crown played out: Frederick
was under mounting pressure to fulfil his vow, and the pope, by association, to
facilitate it. Such pressure perhaps helps to explain why Honorius, despite his
fears over Sicily, risked crowning Frederick.

Only days before the coronation, Honorius hurriedly despatched a letter on
10 November to Nicholas da Chiaromonte, cardinal-bishop of Tusculum, and the

\(^{126}\) Arnold, ‘Particularism’, 246.

\(^{127}\) This letter is clearly from 1220, when the Templars had withdrawn from Damietta to Acre, and
not from 1221 as it is included in the printed edition of Roger of Wendover and subsequent
reprintings of the letter elsewhere: Rogeri de Wendover liber qui dicitur Flores Historiarum, ed.
Henry G. Hewlett, 3 vols, RS, 84 (London, 1886-89), ii, 262. It is also dated to 1220 in Claverie,
Temple, iii, (no. 517) 457-58.
subdeacon and papal chaplain Alatrinus. Nicholas had been appointed as legate to Frederick and travelled to meet him and join Alatrinus before the coronation. This letter is instructive in gauging the pope’s mindset at this point and reveals that even at this late stage, Honorius still harboured suspicions regarding the emperor-elect’s motives. As well as discussing the publication of the agreed laws that were to be issued at the coronation, the letter ordered Nicholas and Alatrinus to investigate whether Frederick was using his crusade as a pawn in his game to unite Sicily with the Empire. Honorius stated that he wanted Frederick to leave in the next passage (‘in instanti passagio’), and ordered the recipients to try and discover the emperor-elect’s true ambitions regarding Sicily, and to report back to the curia.

Imperial delegates had already arrived in Rome by October to discuss the Sicilian question, including Hermann von Salza, the master of the Teutonic Order who had already personally fought at Damietta in the Fifth Crusade. At some point in November, Frederick issued a document at his camp on Monte Mario overlooking Rome, named the Declaratio regis de regno Siciliae by its editor, which promised that the kingdom of Sicily would never be united with the Empire in word or deed, and acknowledging that the kingdom was a dependant of the Roman Church.

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129 Manselli, ‘Onorio’, 150; Zimmermann, Legation, 78.
130 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 37v: ‘Quicquid autem super his poteritis intelligere, nobis curetis quam fideliter intimare.’; Pressutti 2766.
132 Constitutiones, ed. Weiland, 105; Abulafia, Frederick, 136-37.
That Honorius needed to issue the letter of 10 November to Nicholas at all suggests that the imperial delegation (and the Declaratio if it had been issued by then) was not successful at allaying his fears. Despite his apparent misgivings though, Honorius went along with Frederick’s wishes; perhaps he clung onto the validity of the golden bull Frederick had issued in February. The pope wanted to believe Frederick’s promise, indeed he had to if he was ever to secure his most urgent aim of imperial leadership of the Fifth Crusade.\textsuperscript{133}

Abulafia has questioned whether Frederick had even decided what Sicily’s relationship would be to the Empire at this point, but admits that Frederick had promised not to unite the kingdom and the Empire at his coronation, despite envisaging a personal union under his authority.\textsuperscript{134} If Frederick was vague about his intentions regarding Sicily, and this became apparent in the discussions with the imperial envoys at the curia, then it is hardly surprising that Honorius wanted the inside track on Frederick’s thoughts regarding this contentious and potentially perilous issue.

Although Honorius’s dealings with Frederick were generally tolerant, the letter of 10 November demonstrates that the pope was not easily deceived in his relationship with Frederick, as some have claimed.\textsuperscript{135} Honorius clearly knew that he could not afford to take Frederick’s promises at face value. Frederick was not the only one capable of wily diplomacy, and the despatch of Nicholas to the emperor-elect’s court was a clever move in two ways. Not only did Nicholas serve as a constant, physical reminder to Frederick of his vow, but he could also be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{133} Rader, Friedrich, 117.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Abulafia, Frederick, 134-37.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Donovan, Pelagius, 77; Runciman, Crusades, 164.
\end{itemize}
utilised as an intelligence-gatherer at Frederick’s court. Nicholas could hopefully deliver independent reports, untainted by the imperial spin present in letters such as that of 13 July explaining Henry’s election. The pope’s information network was the lifeblood of papal government, and the reports and letters being received at the curia were at the core of papal decision-making. Without such agents on the side of the Church, it would have been much easier for a skilled diplomat such as Frederick to pull the wool over the pope’s eyes.

Walter Ullmann remarked of Frederick that there were few other western rulers who built up such important experience of dealing with the papacy, and that by developing a full grasp of the institution’s way of thinking he was well placed to exploit this knowledge.\(^{136}\) It must be remembered, however, that this familiarity benefitted both sides. The pope and his cardinals would have been just as aware of Frederick’s way of thinking as he was of theirs, especially by 1220. As Powell has commented, Honorius was well versed in using diplomacy to achieve his own ends.\(^{137}\)

Honorius crowned Emperor Frederick II in Rome at St Peter’s on 22 November 1220. Although Frederick appeared to be the ‘winner’, the pope gained in a number of ways too. Despite enjoying generally good relations with the city of Rome, the pope had received imperial support to make his return to Rome in the autumn of 1220 for the coronation, after short absences in 1219 and 1220 on account of Roman aggression. Another short exile followed in 1222 when the


\(^{137}\) Powell, Anatomy, 112.
Romans attacked Viterbo, and 1225 saw a further period of leave from Rome, from which Honorius returned early in 1226, again with imperial backing.  

Although the pope had lost arguably his biggest bargaining chip for the crusade in crowning Frederick, the promulgation of imperial laws at the coronation, the *Constitutio in basilica beati Petri*, benefitted the papacy with regards to Church liberties and action against heresy; they represented a not inconsiderable, and certainly very tangible, consolation prize.  

Powell argued that the papal-imperial negotiations were not a one-way street that led only to imperial gain, and observed that Honorius actually saw the laws as a major achievement of his pontificate. The pope had the laws copied into his register for the curia’s reference, and Stürner has made the significant observation that the text of the laws had already been approved during the preliminary negotiations, and was largely ‘ein Produkt der Kurie’, lending further support to Powell’s interpretation.

Honorius probably did not even have to twist Frederick’s arm regarding the action against heresy because he shared the Church’s view. Frederick’s coronation promise was not empty, and in March 1224 he issued a new law to combat heresy in Lombardy, which ordered that the local bishopric should hunt down unrepentant heretics who were to be delivered over to the relevant podestà.

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139 *Constitutiones*, ed. Weiland, 106-09.
141 Reg. Vat. 11, fols 95v-96v; Pressutti 2786; Stürner, *Friedrich*, i, 251.
142 Powell, ‘Frederick II and the Church’, 488.
and burned at the stake. Through his negotiations with Frederick, Honorius had achieved his policy aims of securing Church liberties and imperial action against heresy, and had removed supposedly the final impediment to Frederick’s crusade. The aim of creating a separation between the kingdom and Empire, however, remained elusive, having been abandoned as a hostage to fortune in the pope’s adaptation to the political reality.

The events immediately following the coronation reveal further details about the negotiations that took place beforehand. Bombi has linked the arrival of the imperial envoy, Hermann von Salza, with the issue of a series of papal privileges granted to the Order immediately after the coronation. Since 1198 the Teutonic Knights had enjoyed close links with the Hohenstaufen. Many recruits were loyal to the emperor, and the Order drew most of its assets from the Empire - ultimately they were more loyal to their emperor than the pope who held supreme authority over the Order. Bombi has drawn attention to the fact that the Teutonic Order was issued with no fewer than fifty-seven papal documents between December 1220 and March 1221, thirty-four of which were issued in only six days between 15 and 21 January 1221. Even before Hermann’s arrival, a letter from July 1220 proves that the Order already had a proctor named Otto at

Honourius’s curia. The privileges granted to the Order in the wake of the coronation elevated it to the same position as the Templars and Hospitallers in the eyes of the papacy. The gains made by the Teutonic Order demonstrate the great importance of petitioning and maintaining one’s ‘presence’ at the curia, and also the rewards that could be obtained from working the system. Furthermore, they display the blurring between petitioning and political diplomacy which seems to be symptomatic of papal politics.

Frederick’s chronicler, Richard of San Germano (d.1244), records that after his coronation the emperor publically renewed his crusade vow in the presence of Hugolino, cardinal-bishop of Ostia. Honourius moved to capitalise on his renewed vow and tried to persuade the emperor to set out as soon as possible. The coronation prompted the issue of a flurry of papal documents regarding the crusade.

After the coronation Honourius wrote to the papal penitentiary and chaplain, Conrad, scholasticus of Mainz - who had already been appointed as a crusade preacher in Germany - just a few days later on 27 November. Soon

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148 Ryccardi de Sancto Germano notarii chronica, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH SrG, 53 (Hannover, 1864), 45.
149 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 45v: ‘Ideoque discretionem tibi monemus attente per apostolica tibi scripta mandantes quatinus predictas indulgentias sicut premisum est denuntiis revocatas, donec super hoc a nobis aliquid contingat emanare mandatum, universos Christi fideles ad succursum Terre Sancte moneas propensus et inducas. Ad hec ut litteris nobiscum et alias lethifices audientes, noveris quod karissimus in Christo filius noster Fredericus Romanorum imperator illustris et rex Sicilie nuper in dominica que precedit dominicam de Adventu in omni pace ac tranquillitate suscipiens de manibus nostris imperii diadema in omni devotione affixit suis humeris publice signum crucis, prestito ex intimo mentis fervore corporaliter iuramento, quod in proximo futuri mensis Augusti passaggio transfretabit auctore Domino in subsidium Terre Sancte’; Pressutti 2796; Pokorny, Wirksamkeit, 17.
after Honorius had received the petition of Albert of Orlamünde, count of Holstein, in 1217, the pope had been prompted by petitions from the Baltic to issue an indulgence for crusaders fighting in Livonia.\textsuperscript{150} This new letter of 27 November 1220 to Conrad cancelled that indulgence in order to prevent Frederick’s crusade, planned for August 1221, from haemorrhaging soldiers swayed by the geographical proximity of Livonia. This decision reflects more the responsive nature of papal government, which constantly adapted itself to changing circumstances, than a change in curial opinion.\textsuperscript{151}

On 28 November Honorius wrote again to Conrad, awarding him the power to relax the sentences of excommunication levelled against German crusaders who had failed to depart on time, so that having been given another chance, they might depart in the next passage.\textsuperscript{152} Two days later the curia issued another two letters connected to the imperial crusade. Frederick had pledged five thousand marks to Duke Louis of Bavaria to pay for the imperial contingent he was going to lead in March, and Honorius granted Louis the concession of being allowed to delay his departure until the August passage if Frederick reneged on his promise.\textsuperscript{153} On the same day Honorius issued another letter on this matter, this time to Pelagius, informing him of developments at the curia.\textsuperscript{154} As it stood,

\begin{itemize}
\item Fønnesberg-Schmidt, \textit{Popes}, 138-39.
\item Ibid., 142.
\item \textit{Acta}, ed. Böhmer, ii, (no. 946) 656; Pressutti 2798.
\item Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 37v: ‘Cum carissimus in Christo filius noster Fredericus Romanorum imperator illustris quinque milia marcarum se certo termino soluturum promisit tibi promittenti eidem te in instanti Martio ad subventionem Christiani exercitus transiturum, presentium tibi auctoritate concedimus, ut si dicta pecunia tibi soluta non fuerit termino constituto, tu usque ad Augustum proximum dilationem habes transfretandi.’; Pressutti 2799.
\item Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 37v: ‘Ad animum autem ipsius duci ad id fortius incitandum, eidem promissimus, quod duo milia marcarum a te sibi faceremus exolvi, in exercitus Christiani subsidio [sic] convertenda. Ideoque fraternitati tue presentium auctoritate mandamus quatinus si dux ipse moram in exercitu Christiano fecerit congruentem, dictam pecuniam sibi de hiis que tibi Dominus
\end{itemize}
Frederick was planning to leave in August, and Louis would lead a vanguard force in March. Honorius told his legate that he had promised Louis two thousand marks from Pelagius’s funds, but that if he delayed then Pelagius was authorised to reallocate the money to support the crusade by another means.

The two letters of 30 November reveal that the pope was no longer surprised by Frederick’s delays but had become more versatile and begun to plan around them. By providing contingency options to prevent the Church being caught off balance by any imperial recalcitrance, it allowed agents on the ground such as Pelagius to respond faster to the changing circumstances of the crusade.

It was just as well that Honorius did not immediately assume unqualified confidence in Frederick, because although the emperor was seriously committed to the crusade, his first priority was to secure his domestic situation in Sicily.\textsuperscript{155} The political situation in the kingdom of Sicily had degenerated after the death of Frederick’s mother, Constance of Sicily, in 1198. As Powell states: ‘virtually every group and faction represented in the kingdom took advantage of the royal minority and, after 1212, the absence of the King in Germany to strengthen its position in the existing scheme of things.’\textsuperscript{156} The systems of tax and trade were in need of reform, the barons on the mainland had become over powerful, and Muslim rebels were ensconced in the mountains.\textsuperscript{157} That Frederick first turned his attention to the kingdom should therefore not be judged as an outright betrayal of the pope’s trust.

\textsuperscript{155} Stürner, \textit{Friedrich}, ii, 87; Rader, \textit{Friedrich}, 381.


\textsuperscript{157} Van Cleve, ‘Crusade of Frederick’, 436.
On 15 December the pope wrote to the legate Pelagius, informing him of the emperor’s expected departure date and ordering that he rally the crusaders to stand firmly together until that time. Yet only a few weeks later, Honorius sent another letter to Pelagius, on 2 January 1221, commenting on the uncertain nature of Frederick’s participation and his frequent delays. In light of this the pope ordered the legate to put out feelers for a potential truce with the Muslims, to see if an advantageous deal might be struck, and then to report back. The truce Honorius envisioned was probably more of a pause in the campaign to await Frederick than to seek terms such as had already been offered by Sultan al-Kamil and rejected by the crusaders. That Honorius had such a rapid change of heart, and was mulling over the idea of a pause in the crusade only weeks after the coronation and his letter of 15 December to Pelagius, suggests that there must have been further developments which dented his confidence in Frederick’s imminent departure. It is also evidence of Honorius behaving more proactively in his administration of the Fifth Crusade.

An imperial contingent under Louis of Bavaria was successfully launched, and arrived in Egypt in May, supposedly ahead of Frederick’s own arrival. But by June rumours had reached the pope that it was unlikely that Frederick would be ready to depart in August. On 13 June Honorius issued a letter addressed to

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158 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 49r: ‘Confortare ergo in Domino et in eius servitio Christiani exercitus corda confirma, desideratum succursum favente Domino magnifice habiturus.’; Pressutti 2866.
159 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 61v: ‘verum quia futura frequenter dubio suspenduntur eventu circumspectio tua provideat si medio tempore possit haberi tractatus qui ad gloriem Dei et Christianitatis cedat honorem, et quod occurrerit nobis antequam stabilius aliquid cito et caute rescribas, ut facta collatione de illis, que per te nobis fuerint intimata, et hiis que tunc parata viderimus ad succursum dirigatur prudentius negotium Ihesu Christi, et provideatur salubrius subsidio Terre Sancte.’; Pressutti 2940.
160 Powell, Anatomy, 160.
161 Oliver, Historia, 256-57.
Frederick, informing him that he was well aware of the reports about his delays in preparing ships for the crusade. The pope urged Frederick to set out, and made it clear that he knew the emperor was aware of the effect that his delays were having, and the criticism that the pope was attracting as a result. Honorius’s scepticism was perhaps misplaced. John Pryor has argued that the type of ships Frederick sent with Louis - galleys designed for war, rather than transport ships - signalled a firm commitment not only to participate in person, but also to strike the campaign’s coup de grâce before his arrival by fighting up the Nile.

Whether the pope was aware of these logistical subtleties is unclear, but a papal letter to Pelagius, the Military Orders on the crusade, and the archbishop of Bordeaux from 20 June reveals that Honorius was losing confidence. The letter bewailed Frederick’s many delays, and recounted the pope’s own actions to try and secure his participation. It notified the recipients that Hugolino was being sent as legate to Lombardy and Tuscany to secure aid for the campaign. It certainly seems that by the summer of 1221, although not completely despondent, Honorius was not expecting Frederick to go on crusade by his August deadline.

In a move to show his support for the crusade the emperor despatched forty more imperial galleys under Count Henry of Malta, which reached Egypt at

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162 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 141v: ‘Sed nunc multi murmurant, multi clamant, quod postponis exequi votum tuum, et ut velle illud exequi videaris, galeas quas feceras preparari, detines, quasi tecum in tuo comitatu duc tur us easdem, que si forsitan nunc transirent, magnum possent conferre auxilium exercitui Christiano qui eo indiget vehementer.’; Pressutti 3462.


165 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 146v: ‘Preterea nos venerabili fratri nostro Hostiens epi scopo pro eodem negotio in Lombardiam et Tusciam destinato, et non modica de nostro erogata pecunia per eundem, obtimum procuravimus Terre Sancte succursum, ita quod si dictus imperator quod avertat Dominus non transiret, operante illo a quo est omne datum obtimum et omne donum perfectum, felicem poteris ipsius negotii expectare processum.’; Pressutti 3478.
the end of August, although embarrassingly they arrived just in time to hear of the crusade’s failure.\textsuperscript{166} When Honorius received Frederick’s letter in July informing him that he had sent the galleys, Honorius replied on 20 July that while this was duly noted, Hugolino had been sent to Italy and that Frederick ought to leave in August.\textsuperscript{167} Honorius desired no less than Frederick’s personal departure on crusade. Imperial reinforcements under the command of German princes were all well and good, but the worrying reports that the curia had been receiving from Pelagius, the Military Orders, and Jacques de Vitry, all made it clear that the crusade was in danger of breaking up without a universally recognised leader of Frederick’s stature. The letters and chronicle sources all agree that the crusaders had been waiting for Frederick for around two years, and Honorius aimed to supply the army with the crusade-winning leadership that only the emperor could provide. Yet now that Frederick had been crowned, the pope had even less leverage over him.

In a letter to Frederick of 21 August, issued only eight days before the crusade army would surrender to Sultan al-Kamil, Honorius wrote to Frederick as a father to a son (‘ad te itaque tanquam pater ad filium...’) and sounded a note of disappointment.\textsuperscript{168} The pope’s informants had reported that Frederick was meddling in episcopal elections in Salerno, and Honorius thought fit to remind the emperor that the curia had many eyes and ears and was by no means ignorant of affairs in the Empire. Honorius ordered him to stop intruding on Church affairs.

\textsuperscript{166} Oliver, \textit{Historia}, 277.
\textsuperscript{167} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 152v: ‘cum debueris in instantis mensis Augusto passagio transfretare’; Pressutti 3504.
\textsuperscript{168} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 155v: ‘Nos quoque qui multorum oculos et aures habemus, non ignoramus in Theotonia et aliis partibus imperii, ac regno Sicilie posse aliquid quod non acceptares, fieri si vellemus.’; Pressutti 3519.
Unknown to both the pope and the emperor, however, while Honorius was scolding Frederick for frittering away time in the West, the crusade had foundered in Egypt. It came as an abrupt and crushing blow to Honorius’s curia which had no idea that in August the crusade was in the process of being routed. News of the crusade’s collapse did not arrive at the curia until November, and what was worse, it was delivered in a letter sent by the man whom the pope felt had jeopardised the crusade. Despite Honorius’s best and unrelenting support, the Fifth Crusade was over.

Conclusions

This chapter has put forward an assessment of Honorius’s diplomacy with the lay powers that reveals a pope who was persistent, yet tactful in managing occasionally difficult relations with the secular rulers. The firmest of orders to John of Brienne to return to the crusade army demonstrate that Honorius was not afraid to flex his diplomatic muscles when required, although the muted impact this appears to have had, and the fact that the pope was cornered by Frederick over the kingdom of Sicily, draws into question the amount of temporal power the pope really possessed. Honorius was therefore engaged in the art of persuasion: without overwhelming temporal power to back up papal orders, he had to balance his praise with rationed criticism, hoping all the time that Frederick would finally depart.

At the risk of generalisation, it is probably broadly correct to state that Honorius employed a softer approach to solving problems than Innocent III, who
had excommunicated King John of England and imposed an interdict to bring the
king to heel, and who had also assumed an interventionist attitude towards the
candidature for the imperial throne.\footnote{169} Honorius has been chastised in the past as
mild and weak, but one must ask what the result of a blunt head-on attack on the
emperor could possibly have achieved? The attainment of the imperial laws at
Frederick’s coronation represents one of Honorius’s great diplomatic successes,
and was extracted from negotiations which appear to have been driven largely by
Frederick. The importance of incoming petitions, reports, and envoys in the issue
of papal documents has drawn out the responsive character of papal government,
and the lull between October 1219 and February 1220, when no significant letters
on the crusade were issued, testifies to the rarity of proactive policy-making on
the crusade. This respite in crusade business and the corresponding lack of papal
action is not an isolated incident, and will be witnessed again, even more
prominently, in the next chapter.

\footnote{169} Brenda Bolton, ‘Philip Augustus and John: Two Sons in Innocent III’s Vineyard?’, in eadem, 
_Innocent_, V: 123-24; Moore, _Innocent_, 173, 188-90.
Chapter 3

The Organisation of Frederick II’s Crusade, 1221-1227

After the Fifth Crusade failed, Honorius and Frederick II refocused their efforts on organising a new imperial-led crusade to avenge the loss of Damietta and to restore the reputations of those involved. The diplomatic contact revolved around a series of papal-imperial colloquia which supply essential markers against which to measure the operation of papal government. The flurries of papal letters issued immediately after them, followed by a lack of papal action for months at a time in between, demonstrate further the importance of outside initiative in papal crusade decision-making, and perhaps also point to Honorius’s waning interest in supporting Frederick’s long overdue crusade. This chapter is structured around the three colloquia which trisect Honorius III’s diplomacy with Frederick and the lay powers during the period 1221-27: Veroli in April 1222; Ferentino in March 1223; and San Germano in July 1225.
The Veroli Colloquium

Frederick’s letter of 25 October 1221 sounded the death knell for the Fifth Crusade at the papal curia.\(^1\) Frederick informed Honorius that the crusade had failed, and sought to assuage the pope’s anticipated disappointment by pouring out his own grief. The emperor stated that his concern for the Holy Land was such that he would not rest, and claimed that he was making urgent preparations for his crusade.

Honorius replied to Frederick on 19 November.\(^2\) The letter deplored Frederick’s years of delays, yet despite castigating the emperor for his failure to go on crusade, the pope channelled his frustration into organising a new crusade. Frederick was exhorted to devote all of his strength to Christ’s cause. Once again, Nicholas, cardinal-bishop of Tusculum, was being sent to Frederick as legate to work towards the imperial crusade.\(^3\)

Although the Fifth Crusade had failed, it was perhaps not a complete catastrophe for the papacy. Crucially, the peace that the crusade army had made with the Egyptian sultan, al-Kamil, was not binding on Frederick if he led a crusade in person.\(^4\) Therefore although the crusade army had been defeated and returned home, there was nothing to prevent Frederick from leading his own crusade, which, considering the might of the Empire, would potentially be as

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2 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 166r: ‘Expregiscere igitur, expurgiscere serenissime princeps et ad vindicandam inuriam Christi et nominis Christiani accingere totis viribus, toto corde.’; Pressutti 3581.
large, if not larger, than the armies of the Fifth Crusade. United under the unquestioned authority of a single leader, it would more closely resemble past crusades that had not suffered from the rhythm of seasonal departures which had afflicted the Fifth Crusade. The initial target of Frederick’s crusade - whether Jerusalem or Damietta - can only be guessed at. When it was proposed in 1223 that Frederick would marry John of Brienne’s daughter, the focus of his crusade firmly shifted to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Honorius thus still had everything to play for.

Despite the pope’s sorrow, the failure of the Fifth Crusade did not destroy the relationship between Honorius and Frederick, and the previous spirit of cooperation was maintained. The history of the papal-imperial negotiations from 1221 until Honorius’s death in 1227 is punctuated by three colloquia at which the crusade was discussed. These meetings supplied the impetus for the issue of a large number of papal letters on the crusade, and batches of letters can be discerned that were issued in direct response to particular colloquia and reflect the emperor’s input.

The despatch of Nicholas to the imperial court was part of the preparations for the new round of discussions with Frederick. On 10 December Honorius issued a letter to Nicholas that sheds a small amount of light on Honorius’s

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6 Powell, ‘Church and Crusade’, 256.
7 Hechelhammer, Kreuzzug, 135.
meetings with his cardinals. The pope ordered Nicholas to confer with the emperor over the recovery of the Holy Land, and to try to persuade Frederick to set a certain date for his departure in the near future. This would then be transmitted throughout the Empire.

Honorius also hoped to recruit new crusaders to accompany Frederick from lands outside of the Empire, and on 19 December he sent a letter to the episcopate of Sens, France, England, Scotland, Ireland, Germany, Hungary, Tuscany, and Lombardy. In this letter Honorius lamented the Fifth Crusade’s failure but reassured the recipients that he was taking action, and had already sent Nicholas to Frederick to arrange a colloquium in which his impending crusade would be discussed. These clergy were charged to preach the new crusade. It seems that although Honorius wanted Frederick to play the lead role in the new expedition, he (and perhaps Frederick himself) did not envisage it being an exclusively imperial venture. The pope’s actions were motivated by his desire to avoid criticism for the Fifth Crusade, and in his participation in the papal-imperial colloquia, one can observe elements of a more proactive papal role alongside the responsive behaviour outlined in the previous two chapters.

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8 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 182r: “Volumus fraternitati tue de fratrum nostrorum consilio iniuungentes, quatinus, si spiritum karissimi in Christo filii nostri Frederici illustris Romanorum imperatoris semper augusti et regis Sicilie ad Terre Sancte recuperationem cognoveris quod circumspectio tua perpendere poterit suscitatum, et quod ei Dominus ad prosequeundum negotium fidei Christiane inspirarit affectum, labores efficaciter et attente, ut ipse certum et breviorem quem valueris terminum statuat et prefigat, ad quem nobiscum de ipsius promotione negotii tractaturus debeat convenire. Quod cum obtineris studeas diligenter, ut idem imperator per cursores suos civitatibus et per totum imperium imperiali scripta transmittat’; Pressutti 3614.

9 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 178r: ‘Quia igitur per mutuos nuntios et etiam per colloquium si comode fieri poterit cum ipso imperatore habendum, ordinare satagimus tam de passagii termino, quam de alis que sunt circa tantum negotium ordinanda, moxque ordinata fuerint, significaturi Christi fidelibus et eos ad subventionem negotii propt expedire videbimus hortaturi, fraternitatem vestram rogamus, et hortamus in Domino per apostolica vobis scripta mandantes quatinus interim singuli commissos vobis populos ad id sedulis exhortationibus animetis, ut exhortatio nostra eos tanto paratiores inveniat, quanto vestra fuerint exhortatione preventi.’; Pressutti 3637.
Before the first colloquium at Veroli, we can identify a very similar set of papal-imperial relations to those before the failure of the Fifth Crusade. The pope was still urging Frederick to set a fixed date and depart as soon as possible, and Frederick was still promising to perform as such. Nevertheless, the upcoming papal-imperial colloquium possessed real potential to make progress on Frederick’s crusade planning. Rather than merely exhorting Frederick to depart and then criticising him for failing in his duty, meeting the emperor face-to-face for discussions on the crusade, this time without ulterior motive of angling for the imperial crown, held out the prospect of both sides gaining a deeper understanding of the other’s motivations and the wider circumstances which impacted upon the organisation of the new crusade.

The first colloquium at Veroli between 12 and 14 April 1222 seems to have been preliminary in nature. Richard of San Germano, a supporter of Frederick, recorded that the emperor agreed to a deadline for his crusade, but does not state when this actually was beyond his vague statement ‘in certo termino’.

Richard could be saving Frederick’s blushes here over yet another missed departure, or it could reflect the inconclusive character of this first set of talks. The latter seems most likely, because the small batch of papal letters issued in response to the colloquium suggest that Frederick renewed his promise to go on crusade, but that a deadline had been left in abeyance until the next colloquium.

Immediately following the colloquium Honorius issued a small number of letters that obviously stemmed from the negotiations with the emperor, and

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10 Ryccardi, ed. Pertz, 49-50.
tellingly, were all dated at the location of the colloquium, Veroli. On 17 April Honorius sent a letter to the Templars in an effort to establish concord between them and the Teutonic Order over the assumption of the white mantle by the latter, which Honorius had granted in 1220-21. Two days later the curia despatched a letter to the Teutonic Order, confirming Frederick’s donation of two hundred ounces of gold to them, and their right to wear white mantles. Hermann von Salza and the Teutonic Order were perhaps emerging from the papal-imperial negotiations as the biggest winners yet again, having previously secured a long series of papal privileges after Frederick’s coronation. They were now playing a significant role as intermediaries in the new negotiations. Indeed, Honorius’s support for the Order appears to have been instrumental in their growth. Of 474 documents issued to the Order between 1216 and 1254, 116 privileges which were important for its institutional growth were secured from Honorius.

On 24 April a letter addressed to the episcopate of Germany took Frederick, his family, and his lands under papal protection yet again. The most important letter emanating from the colloquium was that of 25 April, sent to Pelagius and John of Brienne. It informed them that Frederick was still planning on crusading, but did not give a fixed deadline. A follow-up colloquium was to be

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13 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 230r: ‘in civitate Brundusii de redditibus suis sive de baiulatione sive de Sicla specialiter pro emendis albis mantellis ad usum fratrum vestrorum militum annuatim ducentas uncias auri ad pondus Baruli vobis imperiali liberalitate donarit’; Pressutti 3928.
15 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 231; Pressutti 3929.
16 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 232r: ‘Denique nos et ipse ad id unanimiter intendentes, celebre colloquium nuper habuimus specialiter pro negotio memorato, et post multos tractatus super hoc diligentissime habitos, demum concorditer disposuimus aliud colloquium in Lombardia in civitate Verone circa festum beati Martini proximum celebrare, in quo nos et ipse imperator personaliter esse decrevimus Domino annuente’; Pressutti 3931.
held at Verona on the next Feast of St Martin (11 November 1222), which Frederick was to attend in person. Honorius also wanted John and Pelagius to be involved because of their experience leading the Fifth Crusade, and invited them both to attend, or at least to send messengers if they could not come in person. In addition to John and Pelagius, the patriarch of Jerusalem and Hermann von Salza, along with the masters of the Templars and Hospitalers were also invited. Although Honorius had possibly connived in excluding John from the leadership of the Fifth Crusade, he now sought his counsel. Presumably there was no risk of John eclipsing Frederick on his crusade as he had done to Andrew in 1217-18, and Honorius appears to have invited him to attend as an adviser rather than a potential leader, which probably reflected Frederick’s conception of how the new crusade would be organised and led.

The Ferentino Colloquium

Frederick supplied the transport to bring the delegates from the Holy Land in time for the Verona colloquium in November. Oliver of Paderborn writes that in September four galleys arrived at Acre to carry John of Brienne, the patriarch of Jerusalem, Pelagius, and the master of the Hospitalers back to the West. The master of the Templars remained in the Holy Land to protect the kingdom, but sent messengers in his stead to the council. John’s passage to the West under Frederick’s banner was emblematic of his relationship to the emperor: whatever pretensions to command of the new crusade John may have possessed, it was clear

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17 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 232r: ‘quod si venire forte nequiveris per litteras vel nuntios tuos super iamdiceto negotio tua nos fraternitas procuret instruere de quibus videris expedire.’; Pressutti 3931.  
18 Oliver, Historia, 280.
who was in control. As the delegates prepared for the Verona meeting, however, it had to be called off because of Honorius’s ill health; it was rearranged for March 1223 and the venue was changed to Ferentino.\(^{19}\) The two main decisions that came out of this meeting in 1223 were that Frederick committed to leave on crusade by the Feast of John the Baptist (24 June 1225), and it was agreed that Frederick would marry John’s daughter, Isabella (also known as Yolande).\(^{20}\)

Several different candidates have been put forward as the originators of the marriage proposal. It had traditionally been held that it was Hermann von Salza, but Stürner has pointed to Honorius, who hoped it would finally bring about the crusade, and Ross has argued that the idea belonged to the patriarch of Jerusalem and the Syrian barons, who actively sought the match rather than having it foisted upon them.\(^{21}\) Ross writes that marrying into the Hohenstaufen family was merely a continuation of previous endeavours to bring strong rulers to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Ultimately, one can only guess where the idea originated, although Honorius’s later actions - his dispensation for the marriage, and tacit support of Frederick after John’s deposition - demonstrate that the arrangement had his approval whether it was his idea or not.

After Ferentino Honorius, Frederick, and John - the three main players - all went their separate ways. Frederick was supposedly going to prepare for his crusade in just over two years’ time, but in the interim he was still involved in crushing the Muslims and other rebels in Sicily, Calabria, and Apulia, tasks which

\(^{19}\) Ryccardi, ed. Pertz, 51-52.
\(^{20}\) Stürner, Friedrich, ii, 91.
occupied him during 1222-23. John of Brienne began a fundraising tour of the West, incorporating France, England, the Rhineland, and Spain (where he married Berengaria, the sister of Ferdinand III of Castile, in 1224), in an effort to drum up support for his kingdom, and Honorius returned to the regular business of papal government, which now included the issue of a large number of important crusade letters.

The colloquia themselves were an arena in which the crusade was proactively planned with the emperor. Although the course of the colloquia cannot be established, Honorius’s active participation means that he was not playing a merely passive role. The extent to which he dictated the course of the proceedings, however, is questionable. The decisions made did constitute a coherent policy, at least in the short term, although as the evidence below suggests, Honorius was often carrying out Frederick’s bidding rather than carving out his own policy.

The periods in-between the colloquia testify to the responsive nature of papal decision-making. The batch of letters issued immediately after Ferentino provides further evidence of the importance of the lay powers in driving the processes of papal government. That Honorius is not recorded to have issued a single important crusade letter in the period between the colloquia at Veroli, in April 1222, and Ferentino, nearly a year later in March 1223, demonstrates that the papacy was not behaving proactively, but predominately reactively, and responding to interaction with the lay powers; without the input of the secular

22 Burchardi et Cuonradi Uspergensium Chronicon, ed. Otto Abel and L. Weiland, MGH SS, 23 (Hannover, 1874), 380; Abulafia, Frederick, 145-46, 148.
23 On John’s movements, see Perry, ‘John’, 177.
rulers, crusade business at the curia almost entirely dried up. No significant business concerning Frederick’s crusade was created at the curia until the papacy and the lay power met once more at Ferentino. Proactive policy-making did not turn the cogs of papal government because the institution did not operate in this way. The input and initiative of the lay powers were the main catalysts for the curia’s crusade affairs and its related papal document production at the chancery.

In response to the Ferentino colloquium, on 11 April 1223 Honorius launched a pan-European recruitment drive by sending the crusade call Iustus Dominus in to Philip Augustus of France, Henry III of England (on 27 April), Andrew II of Hungary, King Erik XI of Sweden (1222-29 and 1234-50), and innumerable other recipients listed under the general in eundem modum clause. This was probably done at the request of Frederick, who appears to have been eager to attract other lay rulers to the expedition. Honorius updated the recipients on the events at Ferentino, and stated his firm belief that Frederick would depart this time, having set 24 June 1225 as his deadline. This letter was an attempt to recruit the recipients to join the expedition themselves, and is noteworthy as the first call to crusade that seems genuinely to have addressed Henry III as a viable

24 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 52v: ‘Ecce ipsius inspiratione, ut firmiter credimus karissimus in Christo filius noster Fridericus illustris Romanorum imperator semper augustus et rex Sicilie omnis multis arduisque negotiis quorum onus honorum imperialis celsitudinis sequitur, venit ad nos in Campaniam nobiscum de predicte Terre subsidio tractaturus.’; Pressutti 4262. The register copies are dated 11 April, employing the ‘Datum ut supra’ formula, whereas the original letter to Henry III, preserved in the National Archives at Kew, is dated 27 April: Kew, The National Archives, SC 7/18/14. The original letter to Erik is now lost (it was probably destroyed in the fire of 1697 that gutted the Swedish royal archive), but it has been printed in Vitis Aquilonia, ed. Johannes Vastovius (Cologne, 1623), 172-74; Pressutti 4304. On 27 April Honorius also sent a letter to Count Thibaut IV of Champagne, calling on him to crusade, likely an in eundem modum copy, although this cannot be proven without consulting the manuscript, see Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne, ed. Henri d’Arbois de Jubainville, v (Paris, 1863), (no. 1528) 197; Pressutti 4332.

participant, despite probably having received absolution from his vow by this point.\textsuperscript{26} It is also rare in addressing the king of Sweden, with whom Honorius had relatively little contact.

This letter was distributed more widely than the evidence of recipients from the registers suggests, and the number of copies sent under the \textit{in eundem modum} clause would surely have been extensive. The copy sent to King Erik XI was not noted in the register, nor was the copy sent to the faithful of Flanders and Brabant - there must have been many more original copies which are no longer extant.\textsuperscript{27} The papal register records the customised wording that was used in some of the letters, which personalised them to the recipient in the hope of exerting more leverage over them. The copy sent to Henry III, for instance, exhorted him to take the crusade and become a new Richard I (1189-99), whose name still struck terror into the hearts of the Muslims.\textsuperscript{28}

Simon Lloyd noted that Honorius’s call for Henry to crusade did not come until two weeks after the papal declaration of Henry being ‘of legal age in most respects’ on 13 April.\textsuperscript{29} This may explain why Henry’s copy of the 11 April crusade call (dated two days before the declaration of Henry being of legal age) was not issued to Henry until 27 April, although this might just be a coincidence, especially given that crusade calls to Count Thibaut IV of Champagne and

\textsuperscript{26} Forey, ‘Vows’, 230 and n. 7. Henry III took three crusade vows during his life, in 1216, 1250, and 1271.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Sacrae antiquitatis monumenta historica, dogmatica, diplomatica}, ed. Charles Louis Hugo, i (Etival, 1725), (no. 136) 122-23; Pressutti 4388.
\textsuperscript{28} SC 7/18/14: ‘Sensit enim quis qualis et quantus ei fuerit illustris memoria rex Riccardus, cuius nomen sic in terrem hostium fidei creverat, quod exclamatio eius in prelio nonnumquam sufficiebat ad stragem.’; Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 53v; Pressutti 4262; Lloyd, \textit{Crusade}, 33.
\textsuperscript{29} Lloyd, \textit{Crusade}, 209.
Leopold of Austria were also issued on this date.\textsuperscript{30} The letter of 27 April was the first serious attempt to engage Henry in the crusade, and the pope unsurprisingly stressed his family’s connection to crusading. As Nicholas Vincent has pointed out, although only one English king had gone on crusade, that king was Richard I, Henry’s uncle.\textsuperscript{31} In addition, Henry’s great-great-grandfather, Fulk of Anjou, and his descendants had held the throne of Jerusalem from 1131 to 1186. Vincent states that ‘such ties were not unimportant, and would quite naturally be stressed by correspondents ... anxious to recruit Henry’s support.’\textsuperscript{32} This is how we should interpret Honorius’s October 1219 call for Frederick to imitate his own grandfather’s example and the April 1223 letter to Henry: they were a means to inspire the lay powers to participate, rather than evidence that Honorius was renewing Clement III’s crusade policy of securing Anglo, French, and German leadership of the Third Crusade, as has been suggested.\textsuperscript{33}

Honorius’s call to crusade in April 1223 was the most important and widely distributed crusade call from his entire pontificate. The very length and rhetorical flourishes of the letter itself signify its importance - this was not one of the standard calls to crusade or support crusading that had been emanating from the chancery on a fairly regular basis since Honorius became pope, this was something different: a concerted effort on behalf of the papacy in support of Frederick’s expedition, targeted at the most powerful western lay rulers. That Honorius issued such a letter implies that despite Frederick’s record of

\textsuperscript{30} Histoire, ed. D’Arbois de Jubainville, (no. 1528) 197; Pressutti 4332.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
disappointing the pope, he truly believed (‘firmiter credimus’) that the emperor’s crusade would go ahead.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 52v; Pressutti 4262.}

For the rest of April and May Honorius was occupied not only with the regular rhythm of business created by petitioners at the curia, but now also with the continued despatch of crusade letters following the colloquium at Ferentino. Certainly by 5 March 1224, Frederick was anxious that peace between England and France be maintained so that it would not derail his crusade and wrote to Honorius for his assistance.\footnote{Weiler, Henry, 27; Acta imperii inedita seculi XIII: Urkunden und Briefe zur Geschichte des Kaiserreichs und des Königreichs Sicilien in den Jahren 1198 bis 1273, ed. Eduard Winkelmann (Innsbruck, 1880), (no. 261) 238-39.} It seems plausible that he could have made the same request in person at Ferentino the year before. On 18 April 1223 the pope sent another letter to Philip Augustus, beseeching him to keep the peace with Henry III.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 39: ‘Cum ergo ad eiusdem Terre subsidium undique preparandum sit permaxime necessarium, ut inter principes et populos Christianos pax interim firmiter observetur sicut in colloquio cum eodem imperatore habito duximus statuendum, serenitatem rogandam duximus et monendam, in remissione tibi peccaminum iniuengentes, quatins eius intiitui qui pacificos filios Dei asserit appellandos, cum karissimo in Christo filio nostro Henrico Anglorum rege illustri si fieri potes, inheas firmam pacem, vel saltem proroges treuguas, inter te ac ipsum hactenus observatas’; Pressutti 4321.} That Honorius sent a separate letter to the 11 April crusade call, and also despatched Pandulf, bishop of Norwich (d.1226), to Philip, reveals the importance that the pope attributed to peace between England and France.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 39v: ‘Ceterum cum venerabilem fratrem nostrum Norwicensem episcopum quem sue probitatis obtentu sinceritatis brachis amplexamur, ad presentiam tuam propter hoc specialiter destinemus.’; Pressutti 4321.} At the end of April and beginning of May Honorius also sent letters to many western powers, including Henry, Philip Augustus, and the Sicilian barons, requesting that pedagia (taxes on travellers) be waived for crusaders making their way through the West.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 55r: ‘Quatins a crucesignatis in Terre Sancte subsidium profecturis sive ab illis qui necessaria deferent eorumdem, in regno tuo extorqueri pedagia non permittas’; Pressutti 4321.}
The issue of these papal letters was prompted by the requests of petitioners (‘petitores’) readying for Frederick’s coming crusade, and the pope reassured the lay powers that he was asking the same of other rulers throughout the West.  

On 27 April, the same day he wrote to Henry III and Thibaut of Champagne, Honorius extended his call to crusade even further, beseeching Duke Leopold of Austria, who had acquitted himself well on the Fifth Crusade, to join Frederick’s crusade. Honorius urged Leopold once again to make this sacrifice, because others might follow him in the enterprise. This letter reveals that the pope was working on Frederick’s behalf after Ferentino by acting as his intermediary with other lay powers to help arrange recruitment for the crusade. Honorius put the emperor’s offer to the duke: ten thousand marks if he agreed to take up the cross once more.

A similar proposition was related to the landgrave of Thuringia in a papal letter of 26 May, who stood to earn imperial, papal, and divine gratitude, not to

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4263. Other original copies of this letter (Pressutti 4331 and 4336) have been printed in Opera, ed. Horoy, iv, (no. 120) 342, (no. 122) 343-44.  
39 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 55v: ‘Hoc etiam ab aliis regibus et principibus et aliis Christianis exposcimus, non erubescentes pro illo apud alios fieri petitores qui parati sumus de his que habet ecclesia et aliis que ad succursum Terre predice provenirint liberter et liberaliter provenire.’; Pressutti 4263.  
40 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 56r: ‘In tam ergo secundo et tam arduo negotio eo te fiducialius requirentes quo promptiorem fidei et proniorem devotionis affectum habere te novimus erga Deum, nobilitatem tuam rogamus monenum et exhortamur in Domino, quatum pluram quam exprimamus prudenter intelligens hoc oporunio tempore Domino Ihesu Christo qui et si bonorum nostrorum non egeat, exhibita tamen sibi gratis obsequia gratuitis retributionibus incomparabiliter recompensat modis quibis potes assistere non desistas, ita quod continuatis obsequiis totalem ostiam probetis Domino laudabiliter immolare, ac ad alios ad idem tuo animans exemplari maiorem tibi comparescum cum uerumuror. Ad hec quoque non mediocrer debes induci ex eo quod karissimus in Christi filius nostre Romanorum imperator illustris sicut in eius litteris perspeximus contineri, habere te cupiens in Christi servitio socium et precipium consultorem, adue subventionis auxilium decem milia marcharum tibi offt liberaliter et libenter, sper nichilominus inmuin auxili potrior quod utique non expendit aspemrari, ne quod avertat Dominus Christi causam parvipendere videreris.’; Pressutti 4330.  
mention four thousand silver marks from Frederick.\textsuperscript{42} That such large financial
grants were deemed necessary to tempt nobles to crusade has been flagged up by
Weiler as evidence that there was a general reluctance among the nobility to go on
another crusade.\textsuperscript{43} They simply could not bear the cost and were probably
apathetic after the recent failure in the Nile Delta - something witnessed after the
foundering of the Second Crusade as well.\textsuperscript{44}

Weiler’s statement seems to be borne out by the fact that after Honorius’s
efforts in support of the crusade, there are no more recorded papal letters issued
on this matter until March 1224. If the western nobility had been enthusiastic
about the crusade then Honorius’s call would have initiated series of
correspondence between interested participants. Instead it seems to have fallen on
deaf ears, which perhaps in part can be attributed to Frederick’s poor record of
reliability. When the emperor finally did assemble his crusade in 1227, it is telling
that, with the exception of a group of English and French crusaders who left
independently, it was largely made up of his own vassals.\textsuperscript{45}

Despite the reluctance among other western lay powers, Frederick’s
preparations were beginning to gather pace. In summer 1223 the Melkite patriarch
of Alexandria (who had been one of Innocent III’s key informants) sent a letter to
the curia explaining how the Fifth Crusade was defeated and the way in which a
new crusade might best be carried out; Honorius obviously thought it important in

\textsuperscript{42} Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 55r: ‘Imperialis enim munificentia que tibi quatuor milia marcharum argenti
pro huiusmodi laboris subventione promittit sicut in eius litteris perspeximus contineri’; Pressutti
\textsuperscript{43} Björn Weiler, ‘Henry III’s Plans for a German Marriage (1225) and their Context’, in Michael
\textsuperscript{44} Phillips, \textit{Second Crusade}, 272.
\textsuperscript{45} Stürner, \textit{Friedrich}, ii, 131; Runciman, \textit{Crusades}, 178.
the crusade planning and had it copied into his register.\textsuperscript{46} It is also instructive that on 26 May Honorius was confident enough to begin organising transport for the crusade, when he addressed a letter to Ancona, Genoa, Pisa, and Venice, asking them to prepare ships for the expedition.\textsuperscript{47} The \textit{Chronica regia Coloniensis} records that in 1223 the pope sent out preachers to promote the crusade before Frederick’s deadline of 24 June 1225.\textsuperscript{48} This reference could refer to local preachers, or perhaps is a misdated reference to Conrad of Urach’s later 1224 legation as a crusade preacher in Germany.\textsuperscript{49} In either case, the curia was pulling its weight in its preparations for the crusade.

Away from the curia, John was touring the West in his attempt to accrue support and funds for his kingdom. After the colloquium at Ferentino, John spent the period 1223-24 in France, England, the Rhineland, and Spain, before returning to Italy.\textsuperscript{50} John met with success at the French royal court. Conveniently for John and his kingdom, Philip Augustus died on 14 July while John was still in France, and the king bequeathed large sums for the defence of Christ’s patrimony.\textsuperscript{51} In his will the king of France left three thousand silver marks to John, and two thousand each to the Hospital and Temple.\textsuperscript{52} Philip left a further 150,500 marks of silver to pay for the cost involved in the general defence of the Holy Land, specifying that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Reg. Vat. 12, fols 89v-90r: Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 27. The registered copy of the letter is undated.
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 55r: ‘universitatem vestram rogamus, monemus, et obsecramus in Domino Ihesu Christi quatinus ad succursum ipsius Terram tam in navigio quam in aliis vos taliter preparetis quod cum terminus passagii supradictus advenerit, exhortium quod terre vestre magnitudinem deceat exercitui Christiano impendere valeatis, per hoc Deo et hominibus placituri, ut autem aliis ad id vestro provocentur exemplo et nos ipsi de vestra devotione letemur, promptum vestre voluntatis affectum nobis per vestras litteras declareris.’; Pressutti 4387.
  \item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{Chronica regia Coloniensis (Annales maximi Colonienses)}, ed. George Waitz, MGH SrG, 18 (Hannover, 1880), 252.
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Zimmermann, \textit{Legation}, 82; see also chapter five.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Perry, ‘John’, 177.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 185.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{RHGF}, 17 (Paris, 1878), 115.
\end{itemize}
three hundred knights should be employed for three years after the truce between
the kingdom of Jerusalem and the Muslims ended.

The ‘Barnwell Chronicler’ (writing c.1202-25), from whom Walter of
Coventry (fl.1293) copied when composing his Memoriale, recorded John
arriving in England in September, staying for a considerable length of time, and
supposedly carrying away large amounts of gold and silver from the clergy and
nobility.\(^{53}\) According to the same chronicler, John succeeded in securing provision
to aid his kingdom in the form of a levy of three marks from each earl, one mark
from every baron, twelve pence from knights, and a single penny from every
household.\(^{54}\) Still, he seems barely to have benefitted from this levy, and there is
no evidence that he actually received any of the funds pledged.\(^{55}\)

Frederick, still dealing with his domestic problems, successfully petitioned
for papal dispensation to marry John’s daughter, Isabella, on 5 August, and
Honorious noted in his letter how closely the matter was tied to the succour of the
Holy Land (see chapter four).\(^{56}\) The pope was nothing if not pragmatic in his
involvement in the marriage, and kept his focus on the benefit the union would

\(^{53}\) Memoriale, ed. Stubbs, ii, 252.
\(^{54}\) Ibid.
\(^{55}\) Perry, ‘John’, 193; Christopher Tyerman, England and the Crusades, 1095-1588 (Chicago,
1988), 191; Nicholas Vincent, Peter des Roches: An Alien in English Politics, 1205-1238
(Cambridge, 1996), 238.
\(^{56}\) Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 84v: ‘Cum igitur zelo fidei Christiane succensus et inspirante Domino aspirans
ardenter ad vindicandam iniuriam Ihesu Christi, et Terram eius de perfidorum manibus
vendicandam, accepta cruce illuc devoveris transfretare, ac ut exhiberes circa Christi causam
ferventioris devotionis affectum, et ad prosecutionem eius te artius obligans, alios ad id efficacius
exhorteris, fastigium excellentiae imperialis decenter humilians, ad consilium nostrum et fratrwm
nostrorum nobilem mulierem Isabellam natam karissimi in Christo filii nostri Iohannis illustris
regis Ierusolimitani affidaveris publice in uxorem, nos provide attendentes, quod tanta res que
noscitur principaliter Dei esse, non erat impedimento aliquo retardanda, sed potius sed potius [sic]
favore benivolo prosequenda, impedimentum consanguinitatis vel affinitatis si quod obsistetet
tunc decrevimus summovendum, et nunc ut non obstante quod in quarta consanguinitatis linea
eadem Isabellam tibi dicitur attinere, legitime copulemini, auctoritate presentium dispensamus.’;
Pressutti 4460.
bring to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Honorius supported the planned marriage because it bound the emperor to the vulnerable kingdom and appeared to guarantee Frederick’s crusade in the near future.57 Once married, Frederick would not have been able to extricate himself from the marriage without another papal dispensation. Honorius had therefore managed to claw back a potential element of control over the emperor, replacing the carrot lost with the imperial crown in 1220.

One wonders whether Frederick was actually preparing for his crusade at all whilst putting the kingdom of Sicily into order, considering the lack of crusade correspondence recorded flowing in and out of the papal curia, although a letter dated 5 March 1224 informed the pope that he had ordered the construction of one hundred galleys and fifty horse transports (usseria) for his crusade in 1225.58 In the same month Frederick also issued a new law that charged the bishops of Lombardy to root out unrepentant heretics and hand them over to the local podestà to be burned.59 These were encouraging signs for Honorius. Frederick’s moves suggested that the emperor was successfully working towards the new timetable, and was fulfilling his coronation promises with regards to the uprooting of heresy, but the arrival of the news came at an inauspicious time. In June 1224, the new king of France, Louis VIII, had invaded and taken control over most of the English crown’s possessions in Poitou.60 The kings of England and France were therefore preoccupied with domestic affairs and through their conflict were damaging Frederick’s crusade effort by sapping away potential support. Frederick

57 Rader, Friedrich, 380; Stürner, ‘Federico’, 162.
59 Fischer, ‘Herrscherliches’, 81.
60 Weiler, ‘Marriage’, 178.
perceived this to be such a problem - or sought to use it as a plausible excuse for inaction - that in February 1225 he wrote to Honorius requesting that the pope try to make peace between Louis and Henry. Peace in the West was of paramount importance to both the pope and the emperor (see chapter five).

In March 1224 Honorius moved to increase crusade preaching ahead of the planned 1225 expedition. He wrote to Jacques de Vitry on 6 March, urging him to preach the crusade to the people of the Holy Land in time for Frederick’s arrival. A question mark hangs over Jacques’s effectiveness in preaching or organising the crusade given his absences from the See of Acre. After he took part in the Fifth Crusade between 1218 and 1221, Jacques visited Italy in 1222-23, before returning from the Holy Land for good in 1225 as part of Isabella’s entourage. On 22 April the pope also wrote to the clergy of Germany, stating that crusade preachers had been despatched to all the territories where men were signed with the cross. Honorius went on to announce that he was sending Conrad, cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina (1219-27), as legate a latere to Germany to preach the crusade, and ordered the recipients to receive him

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61 Ibid.
62 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 168: ‘Ne igitur qui confortare manus dissolutas et genua soles debilia roborare animans verbo et exemplo iuxta datam tibi a Domino gratiam Christianum populum in obsequio Ihesu Christi, nunc quasi fatiscens alios fessos reddas presertim cum karissimus in Christo filius noster Fredericus illustris Romanorum imperator semper augustus et rex Sicilie in proximo auctore Domino cum numerosa multitudo bellatorum transferre disponat in subsidium Terre Sancte ubi tua erit presentia more solito plurimum oportuna, fraternitatem tuam rogamus et exhortamur attentius per apostolica tibi scripta precipiendo mandantes quattuor prudenter advertens quod finis, non pugna coronat et currentibus in studio virtutibus universis sola perseverantia bravium accipit destinatum’; Pressutti 4839.
64 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 183v: ‘in omne terram veri Dei signum habentium predicatores deputavimus speciales’; Pressutti 4903. This letter was addressed to all the clergy of Germany; another on the same topic was despatched on the same day to high-ranking German clerics: Pressutti 4904.
Although Honorius and Frederick hoped for pan-European recruitment, it seems that papal preaching efforts were concentrated, quite logically, on Germany.

Information was also reaching the curia at this time from the kingdom of Georgia - a potential ally in the East against the Muslims. Georgia had been successful in its conflicts with the Muslim forces in Armenia and Azerbaijan during the twelfth century, Jacques de Vitry had held great hopes for Georgian assistance in the Fifth Crusade, and there existed open channels of communication between the popes and Georgian rulers. The kingdom therefore seemed to be a viable ally in the East. At some point before 12 May 1224, two letters were received, one from Queen Rusudan of Georgia (1223-45), explaining that the Tartar invasion had prevented the Georgians from assisting the army of the Fifth Crusade, but that they were awaiting Frederick’s new crusade. The other letter was sent by Ivané, constable of Georgia, informing the pope that King George IV of Georgia had died, as well as promising a large number of knights for Frederick’s expedition. Again, like the patriarch of Alexandria’s report, both of these eastern letters were copied into the papal registers. Honorius replied to the constable on 12 May, notifying him that the emperor’s crusade was imminent and

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65 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 183v: ‘Ecce venerabilem fratrem nostrum Portuensem episcopum virum utique secundum cor nostrum habentem donationes secundum gratiam que data est sibi a Domino differentes ad prosequendum tantum Christi negotium quantumcumque ipsius cara presentia careamus inviti commisso sibi plenissime legationis officio, tanto fiducialius providimus destinandum, quanto ipsum tam merito sanctitatis et operum exemplari, quam virtutis vocis et genere lingue inqua quod intendit plene ac plane poterit explicare, credimus auctore Domino per amplius profecturum.’; Pressutti 4903.

66 Jackson, Mongols, 16.

67 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 189r; Jackson, Mongols, 59.

68 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 189.
advised him to prepare for it, so that the Georgians might be ready to join the expedition.\textsuperscript{69}

After the letter of 12 May 1224 to the constable of Georgia, however, there are no more significant crusade letters recorded in the papal registers for an entire year. It was not until 12 May 1225 (coincidentally exactly a year later) that Honorius is recorded to have written to the new patriarch of Jerusalem, Gerold of Lausanne (1225-39), beseeching him to raise support for the crusade in the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{70} It is possible that other important letters were sent during this year but not registered. However, the registration of documents regarding Frederick’s crusade appears to be quite comprehensive, and is supported by the diligent copying of eastern reports into the registers - Honorius appears to have desired the thorough documentation of this matter. The year-long void of crusade business at the curia is very similar to the eleven-month gap in papal documentation discernible between the colloquia at Veroli and Ferentino, and the four month gap witnessed between October 1219 and February 1220 in the previous chapter. That Frederick was not petitioning for further last-minute concessions before his deadline of 24 June 1225 must have concerned the pope. This was a fear shared by John of

\textsuperscript{69} Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 190r: 'unde tue notum facimus magnitudini id quod intelleixisti de karissimo in Christo filio noster Fredericus illustri Romanorum imperatore semper Augusto et rege Sicilie, super negotio Terre Sancte, proculduelb verum esse. Idem enim imperator ad ipsius Terre liberationem magnanimiter ac magnifice, et cetera, ut in alia usque transiturus. Monemus igitur nobilitatem tuam et hortamur attentius per apostolica tibi scripta mandantes quatinus iuxta laudabolem et magnificam promissionem tuam ita tuum studeas exforium preparare, quod tunc sicut decet magnitudinem tuam, venire possis in auxilium exercitus Christiani, et dignum Domino Ihesu Christo servitium exhibere’; Pressutti 4980.

\textsuperscript{70} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 59r: ‘Quanto te specialius tangit et angit negotium Terre Sancte, tanto fiducialius ea tibi committimus que noscuntur ad ipsius Terre Sancte subsidium pertinere. Hinc est quod fraternitatem tuam per auctoritate iniungimus, quatinus in terris ad quas te devenire continget’; Pressutti 5481.
Brienne, who discovered on his return to Italy in late 1224 that Frederick was indeed not preparing for the crusade.\textsuperscript{71}

That Frederick was going to miss his 1225 deadline must have been apparent at the imperial court for some time, but it was left until June, the very month of the deadline, before the emperor sent Hermann von Salza and the patriarch of Jerusalem, accompanied by John of Brienne, to the papal curia to ask for an extension.\textsuperscript{72} Richard of San Germano wrote that when this delegation arrived at Rieti, the pope accepted their request favourably, although this imperial spin surely glosses over another bitter disappointment for Honorius and his curia, a development which must have been met, privately at least, with anger and reproach.\textsuperscript{73}

**The San Germano Colloquium**

A third colloquium was arranged for 25 July 1225 at San Germano, but Honorius did not attend in person, and delegated the task instead to Pelagius and Guala as legates \textit{a latere}.\textsuperscript{74} Honorius despatched a letter to Frederick on 18 July shaming him for the offence that he had caused to the papacy and the Church by repeatedly deferring his crusade.\textsuperscript{75} The letter announced the appointment of Pelagius and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Perry, ‘John’, 177.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Stürner, \textit{Friedrich}, ii, 94.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Ryccardi, ed. Pertz, 56.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 68r: ‘Verum licet prout divine maiestatis offensam videaris nos et universalem ecclesiam confudisse’; Pressutti 5566.
\end{itemize}
Guala who were to be well received.\textsuperscript{76} When the parties met at San Germano, the terms reached were conclusive. In the agreement issued on the same day as the Colloquium the emperor promised to crusade in person in August 1227, maintaining at least one thousand knights for two years, and agreed that he should be excommunicated if he did not depart. Experience must have taught Frederick, however, that this penalty could quite easily be avoided by renegotiating deadlines with, what had proven so far to be (at least under Honorius) a rather agreeable papacy. Frederick also agreed to hand over one hundred thousand marks of gold, or its equivalent in silver, in five instalments to John, the patriarch of Jerusalem, and Hermann von Salza as surety against his departure, which he could claim back to fund the crusade once he had left. If Frederick failed to depart a further time then the money would be used to support the kingdom of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{77} By investing regularly in his own crusade, Frederick would become more and more likely to depart with each instalment he paid, thus increasing his own incentive to leave.

There is a striking dearth of papal letters on Frederick’s crusade after San Germano, presumably because the emperor was now shouldering almost all responsibility for the crusade, and the pope was perhaps tired of calling the West to crusade and attempting to coordinate the departure timings of different contingents only to be embarrassed by Frederick’s failures.

\textsuperscript{76} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 68r: ‘ut igitur ea que in recipito nobis exhibito continentur efficaciter si datum fuertit de super compleantur, prout ipse voluntarius obtulisti, et est a nobis et nostris fratribus acceptatum, ecce venerabilem fratrem Pelagium Albanensi episcopum et dilectum filium nostros Gualam tituli Sancti Martini presbyterum cardinalem, viros utique probate virtute conspicue honestatis et eminentis scientie quos velut columnnas erectas in domo Domini et stellas in firmamento ecclesie relucentes nos et fratres nostri speciali prerogativa dilectionis et gratie amplexamur commisso eis plene legationis officio providimus ad tuam presentiam destinandos’; Pressutti 5566.

\textsuperscript{77} Ryccardi, ed. Pertz, 56; Constitutiones, ed. Weiland, ii, 129-31.
Powell wrote that the choice of Pelagius as one half of the papal delegation at San Germano was a chance for the legate to wipe the disaster of the Fifth Crusade from his record, a sign ‘that the pope really meant business’. While there must have been an element of this in his selection, it was probably more testament to Honorius’s confidence in Pelagius’s abilities. It seems extremely unlikely that the pope would send a legate to such an important colloquium merely to make a point, or so as to provide him with an opportunity to expiate himself for his supposed failings on the last crusade. Rather Pelagius’s previous experience on the Fifth Crusade would have proven invaluable in advising the emperor.

Van Cleve thought the terms of San Germano to be harsh - something of a surprise from the apparently ‘milder [than Innocent] Honorius’, and saw the impetus for them coming from elsewhere, either Pelagius or the Syrian representatives. In a colloquium such as this it is near impossible to trace the gestation of the final terms, but if one takes as a guide the course of papal-imperial negotiations witnessed during the previous chapter, it may have been Frederick himself who was originator of these terms, which, in their striking flamboyance, are reminiscent of his previous behaviour. He had, after all, requested before that Honorius use the threat of excommunication against himself and the German crusaders, and had set his own deadlines, to which the pope had acquiesced. Perhaps Frederick felt that he had to make big promises in order to appease the pope.

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78 Powell, Anatomy, 197.
79 Van Cleve, ‘Crusade of Frederick’, 441-42.
Unfortunately one month after San Germano the rumbling papal-imperial tension over ecclesiastical appointments briefly flared up. This long-running power struggle had shifted according to the waxing and waning of imperial strength. Honorius had already warned Frederick in 1223 not to impede canonical elections to bishoprics, and in August 1225 the pope took the initiative in unilaterally appointing four archbishops, one bishop, and an abbot in the kingdom of Sicily.\textsuperscript{80} Nevertheless, this conflict does not seem to have derailed the papal-imperial relationship.

More promisingly the likelihood of Frederick’s crusade occurring improved dramatically when he married John’s daughter, Isabella, in August 1225. Frederick and Isabella were married by proxy in Acre, where Isabella was crowned, before the emperor brought her to Brindisi and married her in person on 9 November.\textsuperscript{81} Soon after marrying Isabella, Frederick moved swiftly to deprive John of his crown. Frederick assumed the title ‘king of Jerusalem’ (from December 1225 until his death in 1250), obtained the homage of the knights who had accompanied Isabella to the West, and sent the bishop of Melfi to the Holy Land to procure the homage of the Syrian barons.\textsuperscript{82}

Ross suggests that John had never enjoyed an easy relationship with his adopted barons in the kingdom of Jerusalem after his arrival in 1210, and that his prolonged spell in the West cannot have alleviated this; the barons therefore had

\textsuperscript{80} Reg. Vat. 12, fols 60r-61r; Pressutti 4408; Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 87; Pressutti 5655; Loud, ‘Papal’, 96, 95.

\textsuperscript{81} Stürmer, Friedrich, ii, 96.

\textsuperscript{82} Rader, Friedrich, 397-98; Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277 (London, 1973), 160.
few qualms about transferring their allegiance to Frederick.\textsuperscript{83} Bernard Hamilton has also noted conflict between John and his barons after the death of his wife Maria in 1212.\textsuperscript{84} It is perhaps not surprising then that the barons did homage to Frederick immediately and without protest in 1225.\textsuperscript{85} Ross has pointed to the continued presence of high-rankıng representatives from the kingdom of Jerusalem at Frederick’s court from 1225, which aside from Hermann von Salza, who was already closely tied to Frederick, included the new patriarch of Jerusalem, Gerold of Lausanne, the archbishop of Tyre, Jacques de Vitry, Balian of Sidon, and Daniel of Tenremonde.\textsuperscript{86}

Frederick’s \textit{putsch} should not be seen as the culmination of an escalating conflict. Perry has noted that John’s deposition actually marked the end of two years’ close cooperation.\textsuperscript{87} In the wake of seizing John’s crown, Frederick then moved to strip his assets as well, going after the money that Philip Augustus had bequeathed.\textsuperscript{88} Perry suggested that papal influence could be detected in this move by Frederick because Honorius would have wanted the emperor to use the money for his crusade, and in any case was about to safeguard John’s financial situation with the grant of a papal patrimony.\textsuperscript{89} The grant of a papal patrimony, however, did not go through until January 1227, and although Honorius surely would have wanted Frederick to be in the best possible position to execute his crusade, it is perhaps more likely that the emperor seized John’s money for his own needs, and

\textsuperscript{83} Ross, ‘Tyant’, 152.
\textsuperscript{84} Bernard Hamilton, ‘King Consorts of Jerusalem and their Entourages from the West from 1186 to 1250’, in idem, Crusaders, Cathars and the Holy Places (Aldershot, 1999), II: 20.
\textsuperscript{85} Rader, \textit{Friedrich}, 398.
\textsuperscript{86} Ross, ‘Tyant’, 153.
\textsuperscript{87} Perry, ‘John’, 177-78.
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ex Chronico S. Martini Turonensi}, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH SS, 26 (Hannover, 1882), 471-72.
\textsuperscript{89} Perry, ‘John’, 198.
then Honorius attempted to console John with the papal patrimony. When Frederick dispossessed John of his crown, he invited increased pressure to fulfil his vow. He opened himself not only to criticism as a failed crusader but also that of a king who did not defend his kingdom.\(^{90}\) As Powell put it, prior to 1225 Frederick’s crusade role was as the protector of Christendom, after 1225 it also became a dynastic affair.\(^{91}\)

Frederick began using the title ‘king of Jerusalem’ by mid December 1225.\(^{92}\) It has been claimed that the pope made a point of not using Frederick’s assumed title in its own correspondence. Hiestand wrote that Honorius and Gregory IX both avoided using ‘king of Jerusalem’ in their dealings with Frederick, which began with Honorius in 1225.\(^{93}\) Study of the papal registers in fact reveals that Honorius \textit{did} award Frederick this title in a letter to the Lombard League issued on 5 January 1227, which instructed the League on the proper title to address Frederick, with whom it had been at war (see below).\(^{94}\) That the papal letter in which it was issued was also a model letter for a peace agreement between the League and Frederick, composed by the papacy, only increases its importance. Here was Honorius advising the League on documentary style, and recommending that its members correctly address Frederick as ‘king of Jerusalem’.

In the dative address clause for the template, Honorius instructed the League to address Frederick thus: ‘Serenissimo et excellentissimo Domino suo,

\(^{90}\) Weiler, ‘Marriage’, 184.
\(^{91}\) Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 203.
\(^{92}\) Perry, ‘John’, 199.
\(^{94}\) Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 157; Pressutti 6145.
Frederico Dei gratia invictissimo Romanorum imperatori, semper augusto et regi Ierusolimitani at Sicilie illustrissimo’. As this was a model of a letter which the League was to send to Frederick, there is the possibility that Honorius might not have been according Frederick the title on principle himself, but did not worry about the League using it. If Honorius really did have a blanket ban imposed on addressing Frederick as ‘king of Jerusalem’ though, then it is unlikely that he would have allowed it in any papal document leaving the chancery, and certainly would not have recommended and instructed its use. Instead this is probably evidence of pragmatism on Honorius’s part, and a tacit acknowledgement that Frederick had completed a thorough fait accompli with his seizure of the throne of Jerusalem.

Although the pope made all the right noises in criticising Frederick’s treatment of John, one cannot help but think that, purely regarding the crusade, Honorius must actually have been quietly satisfied with the outcome. Frederick had married Isabella and was about to lead a large crusade to her kingdom - what position could John really hold when the emperor arrived? When Honorius awarded John a papal patrimony in 1227, the papacy acquired a military defender. The wisdom of that decision was later demonstrated under Gregory IX when John led a papal army against Frederick. The deposition of John was ruthless and brutal, but necessary for the sake of the Holy Land, something that seems to have been recognised even by John’s own barons.

The kingdom of Jerusalem certainly needed strong leadership - at the turn of the year, the Holy Land was riven by internal conflict. In December 1225

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95 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 157r.
Honorius had received petitions from the Hospitallers, who had been attacked by the forces of Bohemond IV, count of Tripoli (1201-33), during the Fifth Crusade (see chapter five). Bohemond was a particularly brutal individual who had ordered a Hospitaller knight to be flayed alive, a crime which earned him excommunication.  

Honorius sent out three letters in reply to the master of the Hospital between 16 and 20 December, permitting the Order to use armed force to retake their possessions and allowing them to celebrate divine services in the count’s interdicted lands. Not only was the Holy Land vulnerable to outside attack, but the count of Tripoli was threatening to tear it apart from the inside as well.

Nevertheless, at the same time, Honorius also received petitions from Frederick, who requested that the count be absolved from his sentence of excommunication. In a reply issued on 24 January 1226 Honorius refused, stating that he could not accept the emperor’s supplication. In a further letter on this matter, sent to the archbishops of Nicosia and Caesarea and the abbot of the Mount of Olives on 30 January, presumably to circumvent any imperial pressure that might be brought to bear, Honorius narrated the abominable crimes of the

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96 Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Knights Hospitaller in the Levant, c.1070-1309* (Basingstoke, 2012), 56
97 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 103; Pressutti 5752, 5759, 5761.
count, stated that he was to be held under *excommunicationis sententia*, and likewise that all his lands were to be held under interdict.99

This episode is not only useful in illuminating the troubled state of the Holy Land at this time, but also represents the only case I have found in the papal registers of Honorius issuing an outright refusal to a request from Frederick that was connected to the Holy Land and his crusade.100 The rarity of the event was even acknowledged by the pope himself in his letter to Frederick. Honorius stated that while he wished always to be amenable to the emperor’s supplications, it was simply not possible in this instance: ‘unde licet preces tuas velimus semper, in quibus secundum Deum possumus, exaudire’ 101. The very fact that Honorius felt the need to explain himself is significant for the argument in favour of responsive papal crusade government: it suggests that he was doing something out of the ordinary in rejecting Frederick’s petition.

Back in the West Frederick had troubles of his own to deal with. The emperor convened the Diet of Cremona at Easter 1226, announcing that the three main topics for discussion were his crusade, the problem of heresy, and the recognition of imperial rights. Weiler has stated that the primary aim of the Diet was to recruit for the crusade.102 Choosing the fiercely imperial city of Cremona to discuss imperial rights, however, was enough to send the members of the old Lombard League into crisis, and the League hastily reformed to meet the

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100 Honorius did refuse other requests from Frederick which were unconnected to the Holy Land, such as his entreaty for the Duchy of Spoleto during the Veroli colloquium: Waley, *State*, 126; Pressutti 3949.
101 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 108r.
perceived threat from the emperor. As Perry has noted, John of Brienne was also travelling through Lombardy at this time, and appears to have been purposely whipping up opposition against the emperor.\textsuperscript{103} The League frustrated the Diet with blockades, but Frederick did not seek conflict. Instead he wanted to return to peace in order to concentrate on his crusade and on asserting his new dynastic rights in the kingdom of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{104}

The League was a relic of the twelfth-century conflict between Frederick I and the Italian city states, and as Gianluca Raccagni has demonstrated, it does not seem to have been active in the early thirteenth century. Aside from the renewal of the League’s oath in 1208, there is little other evidence that it was functioning at this time.\textsuperscript{105} When the League was swiftly renewed in 1226, it could count Milan, Brescia, Bologna, Mantua, Padua, Vicenza, and Treviso among its members, a group soon bolstered by the support of Verona, Vercelli, Lodi, Alessandria, Novara, and Faenza. Although Milan was still the dominant member of the 1226 League, it operated in a collegial manner.\textsuperscript{106} The League presented a united front against Frederick, and individual cities could not make war or peace without the agreement of the other League members.\textsuperscript{107}

On Frederick’s request, Honorius acted as mediator between the Empire and the League in an effort to remove this thorny obstacle from the emperor’s path to the kingdom of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{108} In spite of the strife in upper Italy, crusade business was still being presented at the curia, and promising news was received

\textsuperscript{103} Perry, ‘John’, 206-07.
\textsuperscript{104} Abulafia, Frederick, 157-59.
\textsuperscript{105} Gianluca Raccagni, The Lombard League, 1167-1225 (Oxford, 2010), 171.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 196.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 92.
\textsuperscript{108} Weiler, Henry, 29.
from Norway in November, where Duke Skule Bårdsson (d.1240), the half-brother of King Inge of Norway (1204-17), was preparing to crusade (see chapter six).\textsuperscript{109}

In November the crusaders of Cologne and Lübeck also petitioned to be taken under papal protection before the crusade, which led to the issue of three papal documents granting this request on 13 November.\textsuperscript{110} This was a standard request, and an equally standard papal response, yet study of the pope’s choice of words regarding the date of the next general passage is potentially illuminating. The deadline for Frederick’s crusade was set for August 1227, yet Honorius took the crusaders under papal protection for the next, unspecified, general passage: ‘ut postquam in proximo generali passagio iter arripuerint transmarinum’.\textsuperscript{111} There are three plausible explanations for the inclusion of this general clause, two of which spring from Frederick’s reputation for serially disappointing those who depended on him. The first is that it results from a papal desire to cut down on unnecessary business being presented at the curia, and the chancery staff therefore sought to circumvent the need to reissue the privilege if the imperial crusade fell apart. The second is that it could reflect the supplications of the petitioners, who may have sought the privilege for the next general passage, whenever it might have occurred. The third possibility is that it is simply an unconnected change in diplomatic practice at the curia, although this phrase does not appear to have been used by Honorius before 1226. If one of the first two possibilities is correct, it

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\textsuperscript{109} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 147v; Pressutti 6039, 6038.
\textsuperscript{110} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 148v; Pressutti 6046, 6047, 6048.
\textsuperscript{111} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 148v; Pressutti 6046.
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reveals a lack of confidence in the emperor keeping his promises, especially now that the Lombard League was in rebellion against him.

For all that Honorius acted as mediator between the emperor and the League, it was Frederick who seemed to be taking the initiative in seeking peace rather than Honorius, and in a letter to the pope dated 29 August 1226, the emperor made clear his wish that Honorius might mediate between him and the League.\footnote{Honorius used Conrad, cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina, to represent him in the mediation, and in December and early January the League and Frederick came to terms.\footnote{That the terms imposed by Frederick were incredibly light was proof of his urgent desire to crusade. The League was pardoned for its rebellion, captured property and prisoners were to be returned, four hundred knights had to be provided for two years on Frederick’s crusade (although in the event they did not abide by this), and the League had to purge its cities of heresy (again upholding his pre-coronation promise to Honorius).}} Honorius used Conrad, cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina, to represent him in the mediation, and in December and early January the League and Frederick came to terms.\footnote{The intervention of papal legates is mentioned in Annales Placentini Guelfi, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH SS, 18 (Hannover, 1863), 442-43; Abulafia, Frederick, 159-60. The Dominican, Guala of Bergamo, was used as a papal representative: Christoph T. Maier, Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 1994), 29-30.} That the terms imposed by Frederick were incredibly light was proof of his urgent desire to crusade. The League was pardoned for its rebellion, captured property and prisoners were to be returned, four hundred knights had to be provided for two years on Frederick’s crusade (although in the event they did not abide by this), and the League had to purge its cities of heresy (again upholding his pre-coronation promise to Honorius).\footnote{Abulafia, Frederick, 160-61.} The emperor was prepared to accept peace on these terms despite the damage it might have done to his pride.

Following the agreement of terms, Honorius issued another batch of letters. In one letter of the three that Honorius sent to the Lombard League on 5 January 1227, the pope regretted the damage that the conflict had done to the crusade, and set out the peace arrangements, which included the return of

\footnote{Diplomatica, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, ii, 675-77.}
prisoners and the provision of four hundred knights for the crusade.\textsuperscript{115} He ordered the League to make a firm peace with Frederick.

Stürner has written that the papacy used the peace negotiations to secure its own aims, and evidence of this can be found in the registers.\textsuperscript{116} The next letter from this batch to the League explained that the clause requiring four hundred of its knights would be void if Frederick failed to depart on crusade.\textsuperscript{117} This was clever arbitration by Honorius, who profited from both sides by reinforcing Frederick’s army with a substantial force and acquiring another source of leverage over the emperor, because if Frederick did not leave, he would lose this extra support. The conflict had been bad news for the crusade, and an unforeseen obstacle. Honorius’s response to it provides evidence of how the papacy had to adapt to a changing political landscape in its aim to recover the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{118}

Honorius did not need to send Frederick as many letters as the League to restore peace because the emperor was offering all the terms. On 5 January Honorius merely issued a letter asking the emperor to receive the marquis of Montferrat - who had joined the League - back into imperial favour.\textsuperscript{119} Honorius had model letters drawn up containing the peace agreement and then despatched them to Frederick and the League for them each to copy and seal before sending

\textsuperscript{115} Reg. Vat. 13, fols 156v-57r; Pressutti 6142.
\textsuperscript{116} Stürner, Friedrich, ii, 113.
\textsuperscript{117} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 157r: ‘auctoritate presentium declaramus, ut si forte ipse quod absit non transerit imperator, transire non teneantur milites supradicti, nisi forsan ipsum imperatorem propter necessitatem evidentiem et manifestam et a sede apostolica approbatam contingent non transire.’; Pressutti 6143.
to the other party. These letter templates were sent out in the batch of documents issued on 5 January.

The model letter that the pope sent to the League bound it to observe the peace agreement faithfully, and, in an expedition decided on by Frederick and approved by the pope, to provide the knights for the crusade. The template despatched to Frederick bound the emperor to receive the cities of the League back into his grace and return to a state of peace. The clause limiting the provision of knights to a passage agreed on by the pope helped to keep the curia updated on Frederick’s crusade, which since San Germano, Honorius had not been heavily involved in organising: it reveals that Frederick was the one taking the initiative in crusade planning.

In a letter to Frederick dated 8 January, now that peace had been made, the pope took him under papal protection once more in preparation for his crusade, and informed the emperor that his devotion to God and the Church, and his peace efforts were duly recognised. Frederick’s genuine commitment to the crusade has been noted by a number of historians, and it is worth emphasising. Nevertheless, in his relationship with Honorius, Frederick was sometimes difficult, and Honorius’s attitude towards the emperor is most often characterised

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120 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 157v: ‘Supradicti vero quadringenti milites teneantur ne in vestro passagio quod a vobis statutum est et a Romana ecclesiá approbatum.’; Pressutti 6145.
122 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 159r: ‘Sincera devotio quam te ad Deum et eius ecclesiam habere conspicimus nos inducit, ut ad tuam tranquillitatem et pacem diligentia intendamus.’; Pressutti 6149.
123 Riley-Smith, Crusades, 180; Powell, Anatomy, 198; Abulafia, Frederick, 130; Stürner, Friedrich, i, 232.
as conciliatory and co-operative in the historiography.\textsuperscript{124} While this is certainly true for much of Honorius’s reign, letters such as that of 8 January allow us to form a more nuanced picture of the pope’s attitude towards the sometimes difficult emperor.

The letter suggests the warm feelings of the papacy towards Frederick at this time, whose compliant behaviour in negotiating peace with the League had obviously impressed Honorius. This contrasts quite sharply with Honorius’s bitter disappointment and frustration at the emperor’s earlier disregard for his crusade deadlines. Honorius’s attitude towards the emperor was not fixed and quite naturally fluctuated in response to the emperor’s actions. A reading of the papal correspondence with the emperor suggests that Honorius treated Frederick as a loving father might treat an unruly son. Although the pope certainly saw fit to chastise the emperor when he had done wrong, this did not mean that papal caritas disappeared entirely.

After the models of the peace agreement had been sent out from the curia and the impediment to the crusade had been lifted, the pope had more time to deal with crusade business, although to the League’s discredit, it played for time on receipt of the peace agreement and did not seal it until late March (after Honorius’s death), claiming feebly that their copy was water-damaged.\textsuperscript{125}

With the situation resolved, preparations were resumed in earnest. The Muslim author Ibn Wasil (d.1298) reports that at some point in 1226, Sultan al-Kamil, seeking support against his brother al-Mu’azzam, despatched Fakhr ad-

\textsuperscript{124} Van Cleve, \textit{Frederick}, 108-09; Powell, ‘Leadership’, 531.
\textsuperscript{125} Abulafia, \textit{Frederick}, 160-61; Rainini, ‘Guala’, 139.
Din to meet with Frederick as an envoy.\textsuperscript{126} Frederick may have been negotiating regarding the city of Jerusalem ahead of his arrival, presumably without the pope’s knowledge. On 11 January 1227 the pope wrote to Ugrino, archbishop of Cologne, informing him that peace had been made in Italy and that Frederick was now planning to leave in the August passage.\textsuperscript{127} Ugrino was ordered to preach the crusade for August. On the same day, Honorius despatched a letter to the clergy and nobility of Germany and Hungary, the landgrave of Thuringia, and Andrew II, to whose letter Honorius attached a short personalised message. Again, the letter resumed preparations for the crusade by informing the recipients that Frederick had made peace, and urged them to crusade with the emperor in return for remission of sins.\textsuperscript{128} The personalised message attached to Andrew’s letter asked him as one who had once taken up the cross (‘te qui abolim suscepto crucis signaculo’), to take up the burden once more and leave in the August passage, for which he would receive papal thanks in the present and glory in the future.\textsuperscript{129} In a letter dated 13 January to the archbishops of Germany and Italy, Honorius


\textsuperscript{127} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 159r: ‘Sperantes quod Deus exurgens iudicare disposuit causam suam et Jerusalem sicut diebus pristinis instaurare, mandatum quod de predicanda cruce dudum a sedis apostolica recepisti, duximus innovandum fraternitatem tuam sollicitantes et hortantes attente ac per apostolica tibi scripta mandantes quatinus inuncte tibi predicationis officium exerceas studiose, magnos et parvos secundum datam tibi a Deo prudentiam sedulis exortationibus inducendo, ut in instanti Augusto quo generale passagium est indicatum suam dicte Terre Sancte subsidium modis omnibus quibus possunt.’; Pressutti 6155.

\textsuperscript{128} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 159v: ‘universitatem vestram rogamus, monemus, et obsecramus in Domino Ihesu Christo, ac per apostolica vobis scripta mandamus, et in remissionem inuungimus peccatorum’; Pressutti 6156.

\textsuperscript{129} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 159v: ‘rogamus, monemus, et hortamur attente, ac per aspersionem sanguinis Ihesu Christi nichilominus exhortantes, quatinus taliter preparare te studeas, quod in instanti Augusto quo generale passagium es indicatum valeas Deo duce feliciter transfretare, recepturus ex hoc gratiam in presenti et gloriam in futuro.’; Pressutti 6156.
awarded them the power to excommunicate and place under interdict any opponents of Frederick, to be used at their discretion as often as required.\textsuperscript{130}

There was still one problem that Honorius was concerned about: Frederick’s treatment of John of Brienne. This episode had soured papal-imperial relations but Honorius was not prepared to go all-out against the emperor over John’s crown.\textsuperscript{131} Honorius wanted a crusade and an heir to the throne of Jerusalem from Frederick’s marriage to Isabella.\textsuperscript{132} This made the pope pragmatic: although making a show of castigating Frederick’s actions, Honorius seems to have turned a blind eye in the interests of the Holy Land, for which, in purely Machiavellian terms, Frederick’s deposition of John was unavoidable.

In a letter of 27 January Honorius wrote to Frederick asking him to reconcile himself to John, whom the pope referred to here as ‘king of Jerusalem’, despite having accorded this title to Frederick in the model peace agreement sent to the Lombard League on 5 January.\textsuperscript{133} Honorius does not seem deserving of the mildness which he is usually accused of. If anything, here we see the pope employing sharp diplomacy and playing the angles by according the title to John, while recommending behind his back that the League use it to address Frederick. Honorius was focused on the end goal of the recovery of the Holy Land, but he still strove to take care of John, and implored Frederick to make amends with his

\textsuperscript{130} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 160r: ‘Quocirca discretionis vestre per apostolica scripta preciipiendo mandamus, quatinus siquid contra prohibitionem nostram ausu temerario venientes, ipsius imperatoris honores et iura que infra fines tue metropolis frater archiepiscopo obtinet invadere vel minuere, seu quomodolibet presumariprent indebite perturbare. Huiusmodi presumpto re undecumque fuerint, ut a sua presumptione desistant, et de presumptis debita satisfactionem impendant monitione premissa per excommunicationem in personas et interdictum in eorum terras appellazione remota cogatis quotiens fueritis requisiti’; Pressutti 6160.

\textsuperscript{131} Perry, ‘John’, 204-05.

\textsuperscript{132} Abulafia, Frederick, 153.

\textsuperscript{133} Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 164r: ‘... carissimo in Christo filio nostro Iohanne illustri rege Ierusolimitano ...’; Pressutti 6202.
rival, claiming that the quarrel had caused the devotion of many crusaders to become cool. Honorius hoped that if Frederick would make reparations, the crusaders’ enthusiasm might grow warm again.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 164r: ‘Denique per factum inter te ac ipsum regem dissidium multorum devotione circa Terre Sancte subsidium, ut dicitur refrigescit, quam facies recadescere, si ad ipsum regem tuum ut decent vultum et animum curaveris serenare.’; Pressutti 6202.}

Whatever reconciliation Frederick might have made with John, it would not have included the return of the throne, despite the pope’s insistence on referring to John as the rightful king. Therefore on 27 January, the very same day that Honorius named John as king of Jerusalem in his letter to Frederick, he awarded John the papal patrimony of Tuscia, and wrote to the patrimony to inform them of the appointment.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 164r: ‘totum patrimonium quod habet Romana ecclesia a Radicofano usque Romam, excepta marchia Anconitana, ducatu Spoleti, Reate, ac Sabinia’; Pressutti 6203.} This is clear evidence that the pope knew John’s cause to be futile, and also demonstrates just how far Honorius was willing to back John against the emperor. As witnessed in his other mediations, the pope gained something from the award, this time in the form of a lay power of some distinction on whom the pope could rely to help defend the Papal State.

The last important letter from Honorius’s pontificate connected to the crusade was issued on 10 March 1227. Despatched to the Lombard League, Honorius informed it that he was sending the Dominican, Guala of Bergamo, to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement that the League had been attempting to dodge.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 174v: ‘Misimus autem ad vos propter hoc dilectum filium Ordinis P redicatorum latorem presentium qui statum et tranquillitatem eiusdem provincie sicut manifeste cognovimus’; Pressutti 6280. See also Maier, Preaching, 29-30.} The pope did not live long enough to oversee the implementation of this order though; Honorius died at Rome on 18 March 1227, having never seen his efforts in support of Frederick’s crusade come to fruition.

134 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 164r: ‘Denique per factum inter te ac ipsum regem dissidium multorum devotione circa Terre Sancte subsidium, ut dicitur refrigescit, quam facies recadescere, si ad ipsum regem tuum ut decent vultum et animum curaveris serenare.’; Pressutti 6202.
135 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 164r: ‘totum patrimonium quod habet Romana ecclesia a Radicofano usque Romam, excepta marchia Anconitana, ducatu Spoleti, Reate, ac Sabinia’; Pressutti 6203.
136 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 174v: ‘Misimus autem ad vos propter hoc dilectum filium Ordinis P redicatorum latorem presentium qui statum et tranquillitatem eiusdem provincie sicut manifeste cognovimus’; Pressutti 6280. See also Maier, Preaching, 29-30.
Chroniclers simply record that the pope passed away and do not give a cause of death; presumably, Honorius died of an illness to which he was prone in old age; his poor health in November 1222 had already forced the rearrangement of the Verona colloquium planned for that month.137

Honorius had done all within his power to assist in preparing for Frederick’s crusade, and when the August deadline approached, Frederick had actually made full preparations. When Frederick had temporarily to abandon the crusade after setting sail because of his own illness, Honorius’s successor, Gregory IX, excommunicated him. Frederick’s abortive attempt does not seem to have been a cynical one though. Jonathan Riley-Smith has pointed out the thoroughness of the emperor’s preparations.138 Similarly, Hiestand remarked that the army which Frederick mustered for his crusade, numbering between ten and fourteen thousand men, equated to a force about the same size as the whole Third Crusade, assembled by a single ruler.139 Honorius’s final push in assisting Frederick had paid off by helping to create the conditions in which the emperor could levy such a large army. Despite winding a disappointing and agonisingly slow path towards fulfilment, Frederick’s crusade was ready to leave by the final deadline set during Honorius’s reign. The pope’s diplomatic policy must therefore be considered a success.

137 For contemporary notices of Honorius’s death, see Presutti, pp. 487-88.
138 Riley-Smith, Feudal, 161.
Conclusions

This chapter, and the two that preceded it, have striven to achieve two aims: first, to demonstrate that Honorius was not a weak pope and to provide a careful analysis of his diplomacy with the lay powers to illustrate how the papacy interacted with them on the stage of western politics; second, to sketch out how the curia operated, and to argue that the papacy was much more responsive in its crusade affairs than has been perceived, and depended on the lay powers’ initiative in presenting crusade business at the curia. The papacy, at least under Honorius, was not a proactive policy-making machine. This chapter has revealed how the direction of batches of papal crusade decisions despatched after the papal-imperial colloquiu were clearly heavily influenced by the emperor’s input. There are large gaps in the issue of papal crusade letters between the colloquiu which illustrate that Honorius was not proactively executing a policy under his own steam. His role as a mediator on Frederick’s behalf, both in coming to peace terms with the Lombard League and in attempting to entice other western lay powers to join the imperial crusade, indicate the extent to which papal crusade policy was influenced by the emperor.

Between 1216 and 1227, Honorius’s crusade policy was to recover the Holy Land whilst protecting the Papal State, and he attempted to achieve these goals by cooperating fully with Frederick. Honorius did not, however, proactively formulate, implement, modify or develop a coherent preconceived policy. Papal crusade policy was instead pursued in a responsive manner: by replying in the best way possible to petitions and political missives which changed along with the
contemporary political situation. This meant that Honorius’s policy was therefore *ad hoc* and often in flux.

It is clear that, at least under Honorius, the papacy did not seek to fulfil the role of director of crusading, despite the high priority the pope attributed to it. Rather it functioned as its chief supporter, sponsor, and administrator. The pope assisted crusading lay powers in preparing for departure, protecting their interests whilst they were absent from the West, and organising preaching and funding to support the crusade while it was underway. Honorius did not wish or attempt to exercise total control over the crusade once it had left the West - that was the task of the secular leaders of the crusade.
PART II

INSTITUTIONS OF PAPAL GOVERNMENT
Chapter 4

Honorius III’s Theology in his Arengae

In medieval papal letters the arenga was an important clause in which the pope, drawing on biblical quotations and allusions, established his authority to decide on the matters to which the letter pertained; the arenga was effectively a miniature sermon justifying papal authority. As the first clause after the salutatio in a papal letter (if it was used - some letters omitted an arenga), it was intended to have a ‘sonorous ring’ that provided an impressive opening, leading smoothly into the following clauses of the text.\(^1\) Arengae were ‘long, florid passages’ that were ‘filled with rich programmatic declarations of papal ideology.’\(^2\) Yet they should not be dismissed as empty rhetoric. They were more than superfluous rhetorical exercises, and should, by contrast, be interpreted as carefully constructed theological statements that derived from their contemporary political and ecclesiastical context.\(^3\) The study of arengae is therefore crucial to understanding the diplomatic positioning of popes and their conception of the authority inherent to their office.

Aside from a few exceptions, papal arengae have been largely ignored by scholars, and a systematic study of the arengae of any high medieval pope is still

\(^1\) Poole, Lectures, 43.
wanting. The present chapter goes some way towards addressing this gap in the
historiography. The landmark work on arengae was published by Heinrich
Fichtenau in 1957. Fichtenau surveyed the existing literature on arengae in
papal, imperial, royal, and episcopal letters at the time, which amounted to almost
nothing. Aside from a number of scattered articles on diverse aspects of papal
arengae, notably for the Avignon popes, little has changed since Fichtenau
wrote. Notably, Fonnesberg-Schmidt has recently analysed some of Honorius’s
favoured biblical quotations in his letters regarding mission and crusading in the
Baltic, which appear to be distinct from his letters on the Holy Land. Bernard
Barbiche has also contributed a short essay on the arengae of medieval popes
regarding the appointment of legates, and traced common themes and parallels in
arengae over the centuries - something which is borne out in this chapter.

Fichtenau’s work, which studied arengae across late antique and early medieval
western institutions, demonstrated how early medieval papal arengae were used,
reused, and adapted within the papal curia, and also borrowed from the imperial
chancery and vice versa. The present chapter builds upon these themes for the
pontificate of Honorius III.

This chapter studies a representative sample of Honorius’s arengae from
his letters concerning the Holy Land crusades: first, the authorship is examined -

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5 Fichtenau, Arenga, 11-16.
8 Bernard Barbiche, ‘Diplomatie, diplomatique et théologie: les préambules des lettres de légation (XIIIe-XVIIe siècle)’, in idem, Bulla, Legatus, Nuntius: Études de diplomatique et de diplomatie pontificales (XIIIe-XVIIe siècle) (Paris, 2007), 147-56. I am very grateful to Dr Barbara Bombi for bringing this reference to my attention.
how far can we attribute their authorship to Honorius?; second, it analyses the content of their themes as an indicator of his theological stance; and third, it compares them with the *arengae* of his predecessors and successors to gauge their originality and how they were reused. Engaging with the question of whether a papal theological policy was carried over from Innocent III’s pontificate by Honorius, it will be argued that while Honorius drew on long-established justifications of papal authority in his letter *arengae*, thus providing evidence of continuity in thought and practice at the curia, crucial differences can be identified between his *arengae* and those of Innocent. These differences suggest that Honorius (and/or his chancery) was composing new *arengae* on a mostly *ad hoc* basis, rather than relying on his predecessor’s theological statements - this aspect of crusade administration was one in which the could pope take the initiative, as Morris phrased it, ‘to publicize his theology of crusading.’

9 This approach extends Powell’s research into Honorius’s sermon collections, in which he argued that while Honorius made great use of Innocent’s sermons, he often revised the texts, and altered the meaning, revealing ‘differences between his thought and that of his predecessor.’

10 In a similar vein it will be argued that in his *arengae*, Honorius propounded a distinct theology to that of Innocent.

There are a number of problems inherent in working on *arengae* as sources. Fichtenau pointed out two: how far would these statements and concepts have been understood at the time, and how far has one reinterpreted them and assimilated them to one’s own nature? The problem is thus one of contemporary

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10 Powell, ‘Sermons’, 524.
interpretation. If recipients took the trouble to read the *arenga* (one cannot prove that they were not skipped), the biblical quotations and allusions in *arengae* would have met with a receptive - and active - audience. Beryl Smalley has stated that in addition to being ‘the most studied book of the Middle Ages’, the Bible permeated contemporary thought; knowledge of the scriptures was not the preserve of the elite few.\(^{12}\) Readers of biblical texts were conditioned to take an active role in interpreting them, rather than merely receiving them passively.\(^{13}\) Nevertheless, as we shall see, papal *arengae* were designed to deliver a clear message that recipients could easily grasp, even if the finer points of scriptural allusion were lost on them.

Leonard Boyle has questioned how far we should believe the evidence from *arengae*: while they have been used by scholars to reveal how high and mighty Innocent III’s conception of his office was, they were general statements, rhetorical in nature, designed to lead into the next part of the letter.\(^{14}\) The acid test according to Boyle is to check *arengae* against the *dispositio* clauses of papal letters (which carried the letters’ orders) to discern if they rest ‘squarely on the rhetorical foundation which the *arengae* should have established.’\(^{15}\) The sample of Honorius’s *arengae* presented in this chapter correspond closely with the orders in the *dispositio* clauses of their letters, and therefore can be utilised as valid sources for the analysis of Honorius’s theology.

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\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. vii.


\(^{15}\) Ibid., 7.
Arengae should not be construed as monolithic statements of papal authority that were rigidly applied to every situation. Brian Tierney has shown how despite some bombastic statements in some letters, Innocent III tailored letters to the recipient and the situation, and when intervening in secular affairs, he always selected the justification ‘that was most likely to be accepted by the disputants in a particular case.’ Evidence then of subtle diplomacy: the pope adapted himself to fit changing circumstances, rather than bludgeoning on throughout, trumpeting blunt statements of theocratic authority. ‘The real difficulty of interpretation’, Tierney notes, ‘arises from the fact that in none of his really important interventions in secular affairs did Innocent declare simply and lucidly that he was acting by virtue of a supreme temporal authority inherent in his office.’ Instead Innocent always skirted around the issue and justified his intervention in a more nuanced manner, claiming that he had no desire to usurp the lay powers’ jurisdiction. We should therefore not extrapolate a statement of authority found in one arenga and use it to characterise a whole pontificate.

Attempting to isolate the arenga from the following narratio clauses (which described the circumstances leading to the issue of the letter, as understood at the papal curia) presents a more practical problem of working with this material. It can be difficult, on occasion, to distinguish the arenga from the narratio because there is sometimes no clear break between clauses, and a rhetorical narrative of events is recounted. Papal letters also include biblical language throughout. This is testament to the fluidity in the structure of papal

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16 Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300 (Toronto, 1988), 130.
17 Ibid., 128.
18 Ibid.
letters. Chancery staff did not adhere rigidly to the internal structure of *salutatio*, *arenga*, *narratio*, *dispositio*, *sanctio*, *datum*, that the student of papal diplomatic might expect.

In this study I have adopted a stricter definition of the *arenga*, limiting it to the purely rhetorical, and specifically religious, clause that opens the letter. Snippets of narrative information still crop up in *arengae* that are otherwise completely theological, but any subsequent rhetorical clauses which contain large amounts of narrative information anchored in the contemporary political events, have generally been excluded. An example *arenga* however, *Iustus Dominus in*, is given below which demonstrates the mixing of narrative information with rhetorical and biblical language after the purely theological opening of the letter.

**Authorship**

How accurate is it to analyse Honorius’s *arengae* as reliable reflections of his theological stance? As Christoph Egger has asked, can we attribute a theological stance to the pope alone, when he may have been advised by a specialist?\(^{19}\) After all, Honorius was surrounded by cardinals educated at Paris - might they have been influential in composing the text of *arengae*? The personal role of popes in the composition of letters issued in their names cannot be discerned with complete certainty.

As Sayers has stated, it is impossible to apportion responsibility for drafting important curial letters (as opposed to common letters) to the pope, the vice-chancellor, and the notaries. The vice-chancellor (in the case of Honorius, who removed the position of chancellor) and the pope played a significant role in the issue of the chancery’s important letters. The vice-chancellor, for instance, would have been present when the texts of the most important letters were read to Honorius for approval prior to issue (*littere legende*). Honorius immediately removed Innocent’s acting chancellor on his accession, Thomas of Capua (d.1239), and replaced him with the notary Willelmus, and then more permanently by October 1216, when Rainerius was acting as vice-chancellor. At least at the very top of the chancery, this provided a clean break from Innocent’s administration, and perhaps helps to explain the differences in Honorius’s *arengae* from those of Innocent (see below).

Positive proof that a pope composed the text of a particular letter is extremely rare, and it is hopeless to try and discriminate between the views of the pope and his curialists, who carried out his orders and often shared a similar

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23 Bresslau, *Handbuch*, i, 249; Sayers, *Government*, 25-26. Willelmus was acting as temporary vice-chancellor in August 1216 and was replaced by Rainerius from around October 1216, who held the post until the end of 1219. Willelmus then came back to play a more permanent role when he was drafted in as vice-chancellor from the start of 1220 until April 1222. In May 1222 Guido headed the chancery, but was not awarded the title of vice-chancellor. Guido carried out this role until 1226, and was replaced in turn by Sinibaldus Fieschi by at least November of that year. Again, Sinibaldus was not awarded the title of vice-chancellor. Gregory IX retained Sinibaldus in his employ on accession, and made him vice-chancellor by June 1227: Bresslau, *Handbuch*, i, 249-50; Sayers, *Government*, 25-26.
intellectual background. In addition, notaries would not only have taken down the minute, but also personally written curial letters on occasion.

Zutshi has, however, identified an instance where it is certain that Honorius dictated the contents of a letter: *Gratiarum omnium*, issued to the Dominicans on 21 January 1217. According to the Dominican chronicler Thomas of Cantimpré (d.1265 x 1270) writing around forty years later, Honorius dictated the draft of this letter to a notary, and then, when the engrossed copy was read before him, he queried why the word ‘predicantes’ had been changed to ‘predicatores’. The notary’s explanation was satisfactory to Honorius and the alteration was allowed to stand. Thomas’s account is confirmed by the original letter preserved in Carcassonne, which shows the word ‘predicantibus’ to have been erased, and replaced with ‘predicatoribus’, which is also found in the papal register.

Zutshi has also pointed out alternatives to papal dictation, such as the outside chance of the pope writing a draft in his own hand. There are twelve such examples written by John XXII, but Zutshi stresses that these were the exception rather than the rule. The techniques of dictation and writing were not mutually exclusive in the Middle Ages, as proven by Thomas Aquinas (c.1224-74), who

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26 Pressutti 269.
sometimes used autograph drafts to dictate his writings to secretaries.\textsuperscript{29} Even rarer than autograph drafts by a pope were autograph engrossed letters, used by some Avignon popes, which allowed for secrecy from papal officials and displayed special regard for the recipient.\textsuperscript{30}

Papal sermons and personal treatises can potentially shed valuable light on the authorship of letters if conclusive links between them can be established. Sermons, after all, provide a more reliable guide to the personal thought of a pope than the collegial papal letters.\textsuperscript{31} For instance, Egger has proven textual parallels between Innocent III’s letter \textit{Cum Marthe circa} and his theological treatise \textit{De missarum mysteriis} (aside from the \textit{arenga} and the pope’s answers to the questions of Jean de Bellesmains), which itself copied ideas from Hugh of St Victor’s work \textit{De sacramentis}.\textsuperscript{32} Likewise, another of Innocent’s letters, \textit{Quod pietatem colendo}, displays textual parallels with \textit{De missarum mysteriis} and two of his sermons.\textsuperscript{33}

Despite the uncertainty regarding the exact level of influence that popes had in the composition of letter texts, Zutshi concludes that ‘in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the pope’s personal part in the production of documents continued to be vital.’\textsuperscript{34} Ultimately, although we cannot definitively attribute the wording of theological statements in \textit{arengae} to the pope himself, the ‘essence’ of

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 234-35.
\textsuperscript{31} Powell, ‘Sermons’, 526.
\textsuperscript{32} Christoph Egger, ‘Papst Innocenz III. als Theologe: Beiträge zur Kenntnis seines Denkens im Rahmen der Frühscholastik’, \textit{Archivum Historiae Pontificiae}, 30 (1992), 114-17.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 117.
\textsuperscript{34} Zutshi, ‘Personal’, 236.
the letter can confidently be said to belong to him.\textsuperscript{35} The ideas about the Church that one finds in the registers, and especially the \textit{arengae}, must correspond with the ideas of the pope, whether or not he was personally involved in drafting the texts in question.\textsuperscript{36} The \textit{arengae} discussed in this chapter are therefore attributed to Honorius, and given in his name, but with the implication that that he may not have been their sole author, or even their author at all.

Honorius composed a sermon collection at some point before his accession in 1216, which he subsequently revised before the end of 1219 or early 1220.\textsuperscript{37} Powell identified four manuscripts containing the collection or large parts of it.\textsuperscript{38} Only one text has been printed: the transcription made by Dom Hieronomo Bottino from Rome, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele II, Sessoriano MS 51, which was published by Horoy in his collection of Honorius’s works.\textsuperscript{39} Fortunately this manuscript would appear to contain the best text - Sessoriano MS 51 is a fuller recension of the sermons than the other known collections. The manuscript once belonged to the cardinal legate Pandulf, who knew Honorius personally. Powell posits that this recension was probably prepared by the pope himself and presented to Pandulf before his death in 1226.\textsuperscript{40}

It is possible to make links between the scriptural quotations in Honorius’s sermons and his papal letters. A reference to 1 Corinthians 1:31 appears in Honorius’s first registered letter to the Holy Land, issued on 25 July 1216, and

\textsuperscript{35} Sayers, \textit{Government}, 29.
\textsuperscript{36} Imkamp, \textit{Kirchenbild}, 86.
\textsuperscript{37} Powell, ‘Sermons’, 524.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 523-24; \textit{Opera}, ed. Horoy, i-ii.
\textsuperscript{40} Powell, ‘Sermons’, 525.
also appears in three of his sermons. Romans 11:33 features in the same arenga and another five sermons. Similarly, 1 Peter 2:21 is drawn upon in both a letter to the clergy of Germany sent in March 1224 and two sermons. Links can also be drawn between Mark 16:15 found in the same arenga, and another three sermons. Even more examples can be found for Matthew 16:19, one of the most traditional claims to papal primacy, which features in an arenga to Frederick II, and no less than seven times in five different sermons.

It is not surprising that Matthew 16:19 features prominently in Honorius’s writings given how commonly it was used by popes to justify papal primacy. There are, however, so many cases of scriptural quotations and allusions in the sermons that cannot be found in the sample of arengae selected for this chapter that it is not possible to deduce from their use alone whether Honorius had a hand in a particular letter. A more fruitful search might be conducted if close textual analysis was performed on the sermons and arengae, such as Egger used on Innocent III’s sermons, but unfortunately that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Themes

The letter Magnus Dominus, sent on 25 July 1216 to John of Brienne, king of Jerusalem, the patriarch of Jerusalem, the people of the Holy Land, and the

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41 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 1r; Pressutti 1: Opera, ed. Horoy, ii, 37, 60, 258.
42 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 1r; Pressutti 1: Opera, ed. Horoy, i, 815, 896; ii, 161, 238-39, 352.
43 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 183v; Pressutti 4904: Opera, ed. Horoy, i, 665, 846.
44 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 183v; Pressutti 4904: Opera, ed. Horoy, i, 781, 829; ii, 132.
45 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 84; Pressutti 4460: Opera, ed. Horoy, i, 758, 782; ii, 90, 98-99, 100, 133, 140.
masters of the Templars and Hospitallers, represented an important opportunity for Honorius.\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Magnus Dominus} was the first letter recorded to have been issued by Honorius as pope, and it is the first letter entered into his register. The \textit{arenga} was also recycled and used in the entire batch of Honorius’s outgoing letters on his accession (see below). In the letter, Honorius relayed the news of Innocent III’s passing, but reassured the recipients that the crusade was still on its way. This was Honorius’s chance to make his mark on the crusade he had inherited, and he opened the letter with an \textit{arenga} rich in biblical references:

Great is the Lord and extremely praiseworthy (Ps. 144:3), famous in sanctity, wonderful in majesties and performing marvels (Ex. 15:11), He changes circumstances (Dan. 2:21) in the high counsel of His own arrangement, to whom another counsellor does not exist, and He calls them which are not, as if they are (Rom. 4:17), so that no flesh may glory in His sight (1 Cor. 1:29), but, just as it is written, he who glories, may glory in the Lord (1 Cor. 1:31). For indeed, He himself brings the searchers of secrets to nothing, and makes judges of the earth as vanity (Is. 40:23), drying up standing pools and turning rivers into islands (Is. 42:15), He gathers to Himself seed from the east and the west, and says to the north ‘Give’, and to the south ‘Do not hinder’ (Is. 43:5-6), so that good fortune might smile on them and they are unable to prevent the sons of the north from coming into the grace of the sons, He sets the humble on high, and lifts those who mourn to safety (Job 5:11). Since His judgements might be unsearchable and His ways inscrutable (Rom. 11:33), if we can hold on to one thing for certain, it is that everything He does for us comes from just judgement, however unspeakably great and hidden.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{47} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 1r; Pressutti 1.

\textsuperscript{48} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 1r: ‘Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis, gloriosus in sanctis, mirabilis in maestatibus, faciensque prodigia, immutat tempora alto sue dispositionis consilio, cui consiliarius alius non existit, et vocat ea que non sunt, tamquam ea que sunt, ut non glorietur omnis caro in conspectu eius, sed quemadmodum scriptum est, qui gloriatur in Domino glorietur. Ipse namque dat secretorum scrutatores quasi non sint, et velud inanes iudices terre facit, arefaciens stangna \textit{sic}, flumina in insulas collocando, ab oriente ac occidente congregat sibi semen, et dicit aequiloni da, et austro noli prohibere, ut illi, quibus arridet prosperitas, filios aequilonis impedire non possint, venire in gratiam \textit{sic} filiorum, quia ponit humiles in sublimi, et merentes erigit sospitae. Cumque incomprenhensibilia sint iudicia sua et investigabiles eius vie, istud ex eis tenemus procerto quod omnia iusto facit iudicio nobis, tamen ineffabili et occulto.’; Pressutti 1.
Innocent’s death in his mid-fifties on 16 July 1216 would have come as a shock to those at the papal curia and those preparing for the Fifth Crusade. This arenga presented Honorius as God’s chosen vessel through which to carry out the crusade, though His plan in striking down the relatively youthful and vigorous Innocent might have been incomprehensible to man. Honorius was effectively marking out his authority to continue the crusade’s organisation. The reference to Isaiah 43:5-6 connected directly to the content of the letter, which reassured the recipients that the crusade was still coming: the crusaders from the north were about to enter into the grace of the sons.

This arenga also highlights the distinction that must be made between biblical references that were consciously used, such as the deliberate quotation from 1 Corinthians 1:31 that was preceded with the words ‘just as it is written’, and those that seem to have been used in passing, perhaps subconsciously, as useful textual building blocks. The present arenga resembles something of a medieval ‘cut and paste’ job, with as many biblical allusions included as possible, but aside from the 1 Corinthians 1:31 reference, this may not necessarily have been the intention. It seems probable that the biblical allusions (as distinct from deliberate quotations) were remembered from the liturgy. The pope and his curial staff would have attended or read the eight services of the Divine Office every day, and particular word combinations must have subconsciously tumbled forth from memory when composing arengae.49

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49 This idea was suggested to me by Professor Bernard Hamilton.
The *arenga* of the letter *Gratias agimus*, sent to the crusaders of Cologne on 27 January 1217, sought to inspire them to leave on the Fifth Crusade by the muster deadline of 1 June 1217 fixed by Innocent III at Lateran IV:

We give thanks to our God in the grace of God which was given to you in Lord Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 1:4). For after the blast of the trumpet of salvation sounded in your ears, reverberating through the mouths of preachers and inviting you to the fight of the Christian knighthood, continuously inspired by divine grace, and assuming the sign of the life-giving cross, you resolved to march out from your land, homes and kin, by the corporal and mystical example of Abraham at the Lord’s command, so that you might walk in that land once glorious and consecrated by the blood of Christ, which the Lord will reveal to you, and so that, when with the help of God the Canaanites have been driven out, with Judas Maccabeus, then you might climb Mount Sion, to cleanse the holy places and even to repair them (1 Mac. 4:36), so that, with the filth removed, you might be able to adorn the front of the Lord’s temple with crowns of gold (1 Mac. 4:57), and, in hymns and by confessions, to praise the Lord splendidly.\(^{50}\)

Stylistically, the *arenga* was an impressive call to arms, and relied upon imagery from the Book of Maccabees. Honorius aligned the crusaders with the pious army led by Judas Maccabeus that had overcome the superior forces of the Gentiles to retake Mount Sion and cleanse its sanctuary. The parallel with the Holy Land crusade and the city of Jerusalem was obvious: just as Judas Maccabeus had triumphed, so would the crusaders in their own time. This was an idea shared by

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\(^{50}\) Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 49r: ‘Gratias agimus Deo nostro in gratia Dei, qua data est vobis in Domino Ihesu Christo. Nam postquam auribus vestris clamor tube insonuit salutaris, per ora predicatorm clangentis et invitantis ad pugnam militie Christiane, protinus divina gratia inspirante, assumpto vivifice crucis signo, de terra, domibus et cogntione vestra, corporali ac mistica [sic] exemplo Abrae ad preceptum Domini, egredi statuistis, ut eatis in terram illam olim olim incitam ac Christi sanguine consecratam, quam vobis Dominus demonstrabit, et ut expulsis exinde cum Dei adiutorio Chaneneis, cum Iuda Machabeo, montem Syon ascendatis, mundare sancta necnon etiam renovare, ut, eliminata inde spurtitia, ornare possitis faciem templi Domini coronis aureis, et in ymnis ac confessionibus Dominum magnifice collaudare.’; Pressutti 284.
at least some of the crusaders themselves. As Nicholas Morton has pointed out, Oliver of Paderborn measured the efforts of his fellow crusaders against the Maccabees.  

Innocent III does not appear to have used Honorius’s particular allusions from Maccabees in his letters, which perhaps demonstrates their individuality. Whilst Honorius may have been distinct from Innocent in the recollection of these particular passages, nevertheless, the idea of aligning the crusaders with the Maccabees was by no means unique to him. Morton has demonstrated how popular this biblical imagery was in crusade narratives, and how in reference to the Knights Templar, Pope Celestine II (1143-44) was the first pontiff to employ the allusion, which was subsequently applied to the military orders by some of his successors, including Innocent III and Honorius III.

Maccabees’ imagery was also commonly deployed in papal encyclicals launching crusades. Pope Eugenius III (1145-53) made an allusion to the Maccabees in his famous encyclical launching the Second Crusade, Quantum praedecessores. Similarly, Pope Gregory VIII’s (1187) call to the Third Crusade, Audita tremendi, and Innocent III’s letter calling for the Fourth Crusade, Post miserabile, both employed allusions to Maccabees. Bernard of Clairvaux deployed the Maccabees’ imagery of the faithful few triumphing over the faithless multitude - a theme Honorius would return to - in his De laude novae militiae,

52 This is based on the study of Innocent’s letters edited in: Die Register Innocenz III., ed. Othmar Hageneder et al., 11 vols to date (Graz-Cologne-Rome-Vienna, 1964-).
54 Phillips, Second Crusade, 56.
which promoted the Order of Temple in c.1130 (see below). Honorius thus fitted into a long and distinguished tradition, but differed from Innocent III in his choice (whether subconsciously or not) of specific Maccabean allusions.

The theme of humility, of the pious few triumphing over the faithless multitude, was employed again in Honorius’s *arenga* to the letter *Adversus hostes visibles*, despatched to certain clergy in Hungary and Reims on 24 November 1217, which reported on the early successes of the Fifth Crusade following skirmishes with the Muslims in the Holy Land:

Against visible enemies, with invisible weapons, that is with prayers, we are taught to fight by ancient examples, which are also renewed in our times, we rejoice when the Lord of hosts delivered the multitude of infidels in the Spanish war into the hands of the faithful few (1 Mac. 3:18). Behold moreover the time all the faithful should rush to arms for this (2 Mac. 9:2), behold the time when they should sprinkle their heads with ashes (2 Kings (2 Sam.) 13:19), behold the time when they should cry out to heaven with voices of tears and prayers (4 Kings (2 Kings) 20:5; Is. 38:5), so that He who does not fight among the many, when signs have been renewed and miracles worked (Sir. 36:6), in accordance with His omnipotence, may overcome a great multitude in scarcity.  

A recent demonstration of the historical link with the biblical past had been witnessed in the ‘Spanish war’ with the Christian victory over the Muslims at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. Smalley noted:

57 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 177r: ‘Adversus hostes visibles invisibilibus armis, id est, orationibus, dimicare veteribus exemplis instruimur, que nostris quoque temporibus innovata, quando exercituum Dominus infidelium multitudinem bello Yspanico tradidit in manus paucorum fidelium gloriamur. Ecce autem tempus quo universi fideles ad hec debent arma concurrere, ecce tempus quo cinere debent aspergere caput suum, ecce tempus quo debent in celum lacrimarum et orationum vocibus exclamare, ut ille qui non in multitudine dimicat, innovatis signis et mirabilibus immutatis, secundum omnipotentiam suam multitudinem in paucitate devincat.’; Pressuti 885.
How the Old Testament influenced princes through their clerical advisers and how it affected ideas on Christian priesthood. The New Testament inspired reform movements, both Catholic and heretical. Bible history was real history; it taught by example.\textsuperscript{58}

Honorius was experiencing reverberations from biblical events, which had been ‘renewed’ in his own time. Drawing upon Maccabees again (1 Mac. 3:18) - in another allusion which the pope shared with Bernard of Clairvaux - he interpreted the victory in Spain as prefiguring the success of the Fifth Crusade.\textsuperscript{59} Honorius believed that despite being outnumbered, the crusade \textit{would} succeed.

After receiving a report on the Fifth Crusade’s progress from the crusaders, who had moved in to begin the siege of the Egyptian port city of Damietta and requested reinforcements from the West, Honorius returned to the motif of the faithful few in the \textit{arenga} of his reply to the army, \textit{Multis divine scripture}, issued on 13 August 1218:

\begin{quote}
We are taught from many examples of divine scripture that God, at whose command all things are arranged and whose will nothing can resist (Rom. 9:19), often delivered a multitude of the mighty into the hands of the frail and the few (1 Mac. 3:17-18). After having received your letter and messengers and it having been understood how difficult a thing you are, by divine aid, carrying boldly, even if all our bones should shake (Job 4:14) while we were considering your few standing against many, by looking back, however, it soon occurred to us that it is written: the adversaries of the Lord shall fear Him, and upon them He shall thunder in the heavens (1 Kings (1 Sam.) 2:10), and we were filled with confidence and encouragement, He does not abandon those trusting in His mercy (Eccl. 47:24), but enlarging them in their troubles (Ps. 4:12), He transformed the crooked straight, and the rough ways plain (Is. 40:4) by His almighty love, so that human frailty may not dare to glory in itself, but when it sees itself prosper there through heavenly assistance, when it
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{58} Smalley, \textit{Bible}, p. ix.
\textsuperscript{59} Sancti Bernardi, ed. Leclercq and Rochais, 221.
appeared to falter through earthly reasons, it might burst out in divine praise, and say: thy right hand, Lord, is magnified in strength, and thy power has broken the enemy (Ex. 15:6).

The *arenga* reminded the crusaders of the biblical examples of God delivering success ‘into the hands of the frail and the few’. Honorius admitted that although he had been concerned by the plight of the crusaders, he trusted in the power and mercy of the Lord, and made a deliberate quotation from 1 Kings (1 Samuel) 2:10 that built upon yet another allusion to the First Book of Maccabees in the *arenga*. This chapter of the First Book of Samuel explains how the Lord would support the feeble and break the bows of the mighty, thus destroying His enemies.

Honorius’s use of these motifs of the few triumphing over the many reflected the situation on the ground in Egypt: it was meant to bolster the crusade army while they awaited the requested reinforcements. The pope’s message presumably met with a receptive audience given that Oliver of Paderborn was also comparing the crusade army to that of Judas Maccabeus. Most of the biblical allusions woven into the *arengae* were probably absorbed by the pope and his staff through the liturgy, and the use of particular allusions (as opposed to direct quotations from the Vulgate) was probably determined by the current situation of

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60 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 10r: ‘Multis divine scripture docemur exemplis, quod Deus, ad cuius nutum omnia disponuntur et cuius nichil potest resistere voluntati, sepe multitudinem fortium tradidit in manus debilium et paucorum. Receptis igitur litteris vestris et nuntiis, et intelлектo quam arduam rem estis de divino auxilio confidentes aggressi, et si subito concussa fuerint omnia ossa nostra, dum paucitatem vestram respectu opposite multitudinis pensaremus, mox tamen occurrentem nobis quod legitur. Dominum formidabunt adversarii eius, et super ipsos in celis tonabit, fuimus fiduciae et consolatione repleti, de illius auxilio confidentes, qui sperantes in sua misericordia non reliquint, sed eos in ipsa tribulatione dilatans, prava in directa, et aspera in vias planas, sua omnipotenti pietate convertit, ut humana fragilitas in se gloriari non audeat, sed cum viderit se per supernum auxilium ibi proficere, ubi secundum causas inferiores deficiere videbatur, humiliter in laudes divinas erumpat, et dicat, dextera tua Deus glorificata est in virtute, et tua confregit potentia inimicos.’; Pressutti 1580.
the crusaders in Egypt, the pope’s predilection for certain passages, and also by the patterns of his memory.

If we accept that many of the biblical allusions were subconsciously remembered, rather than proactively sought out from the Vulgate, it raises the question of whether it is even possible to analyse the pope’s *arengae* as evidence of his theological stance. The *arengae* were not artless rush jobs, but meticulously constructed theological statements - whether the biblical justification used to express this was taken verbatim from the Vulgate or recalled in segments from the memory of the liturgy does not affect their validity. *Arengae* still propagated the pope’s conception of the divine order of the world, and his place within it. That these recollections seem to have been distinct from those of Innocent is instructive in identifying shades of difference between the two popes’ theological ideas.

As pointed out by Kenneth Pennington, historians ‘almost unanimously concur that his [Innocent III’s] pontificate represented the apogee of the medieval papacy.’ If this really was the case, then Honorius’s pontificate did not represent a slump following his predecessor’s reign. In Honorius’s *arengae* to the lay powers regarding the crusade he propounded careful theological arguments that relayed a clear message, without being antagonistic.

In the *arenga* of *Sinceris fili karissime*, despatched to the emperor-elect Frederick on 20 March 1220 in reply to a letter of his, Honorius urged him to join the Fifth Crusade as soon as possible:

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Most beloved son, with purity and fervour, the page [Frederick’s letter] shone with sincere emotions and laid out the desire of your fervent mind, full of devotion, and not lacking in humility; which while it replicates the memory of perceived good deeds and offers exchange of favours for preparations, the Mother Church has in so excellent and so great a son, that she rejoices over these contributions; and she also has to make provision so that nothing is overlooked in the abundance of contributions. Blessed, blessed is the Lord (Gen. 9:26), by whom kings reign and who rules in the kingdom of men (Prov. 8:15), because, just as it is believed with firm hope and held with credible presumption, He provides for the Church in his son, to whom while milk was presented to him in his tender years and whom took solid food in older age (1 Cor. 3:2), with a satisfied mouth and by authentic writings he comes to know that the labour of solicitude is repaid more sweetly and pleasantly in fruit. Therefore the Lord does these things and adds to them, because as He has breathed wholesomely upon them, the wholesome might become most wholesome, so that by continued devotion in this way he might combine the end with the beginning, which because you might be entirely devoted all the time of your life to the Church, all to God. O how much we wish that you in sight of the Almighty, o how much in the eyes of men, so that in His presence your conscience might observe whatever is of integrity, and that your notable fame might meet with nothing of notorious description. Moreover, he who esteems highly enough, fears enough.

The arenga made a subtle statement of papal authority by the allusion to Proverbs 8:15. Otherwise the pope avoided antagonising the emperor-elect and instead sought to advise Frederick, encouraging him to become a more devoted son of the

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Church (Innocent III had acted as Frederick’s guardian during his minority).\textsuperscript{63} It has been claimed that Honorius and Frederick were experiencing tense relations at this stage, but there is no evidence for such emotions in this \textit{arenga}.\textsuperscript{64} Indeed, the opening of the \textit{arenga} glowed with papal affection for the ‘most beloved son’ of the Church.

Even when Frederick had tested the pope’s patience by repeatedly delaying his departure on crusade, Honorius concealed his rebukes with charity, and adopted the role of a loving father chastising an errant son. In \textit{Si aliqua tue celsitudini}, sent to Frederick on 13 June 1221, Honorius opened the letter thus:

\begin{quote}
If we have to write anything to your highness, and as far as it seems bitter, if we proceed with it out of sincere affection, you ought not to bear it badly, but it is fitting that you accept it wholly, because a father who loves his son rebukes him, and the Lord loves, blames, and chastises those whom he loves (Prov. 3:12; Hebr. 12:6), in whose sacrifice sweetness was prevented from being offered, seeing that he detests flattery, and, granted that they taste honey-sweet charm, while their ears are soothed, nevertheless they are dangerous, because sometimes they are led astray by listening to their feelings, and therefore the wounds of another are better than the flatterer’s kiss (Prov. 27:6).\textsuperscript{65}
\end{quote}

The pope sought to guide Frederick, not to provoke him, and justified his criticism of the emperor and his crusade delays by alluding to Proverbs 3:12 and Hebrews 12:6, combining it with colourful imagery on the dangers of honey-sweet flattery.

\textsuperscript{63} Moore, \textit{Innocent}, 65.

\textsuperscript{64} Van Cleve, \textit{Frederick}, 114.

\textsuperscript{65} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 141v: ‘Si aliqua tue celsitudini scribimus, quae utcumque amara videntur, cum ea ex sincero amore procedant, egre ferre non debes, sed illa te decet potius omnimodis acceptare, quia pater filium quem diliget corripit, et Dominus quos amat, arguit et castigat, in cuius sacrificio mel prohibetur offerri, quoniam abhominatur blanditias adulantium, que, licet sapiant mellitam dulcedinem, dum aures demulcent, periculose sunt tamen, quia nonnuncquam audientis animum alienant, et ideo sunt diligentis vulnera meliora, quam obsacula blandientis.’; Pressutti 3462.
The reference to Proverbs 27:6 has also been identified by Duggan in an *arenga* of Pope Alexander III; it was clearly an allusion well suited to the papacy’s purpose as an international mediator.66

The pope was not afraid to adopt a more combative stance when the occasion called for it however. The *arenga* of the letter *Hereditate superna se*, addressed to Philip Augustus of France on 18 April 1223, adopted a hectoring tone to persuade the king to extend his peace with Henry III of England for the sake of the Holy Land crusade:

From the celestial inheritance he made himself undeserving, and from it he can fear being excluded, and not without cause be terrified, whom the zeal of the Christian faith does not excite, whom the injury to Jesus Christ does not move, and whom the pollution of the shrine and the contempt to the Redeemer does not hurt, by the heathens coming into His inheritance and polluting His Temple, using Jerusalem just as a place to keep fruit (Ps. 78:1), and the daughter of Sion left behind as though a hut in a cucumber field (Is. 1:8). Surely he cannot be the co-heir of Christ, who may have neglected to perform according to his own strength in coming to His aid, when He was expelled by the blasphemers against His name from the [Holy] Land which He chose for revealing the mystery of our redemption, or at least does not suffer with the one who is suffering from the bottom of His heart? For those who suffer with Him will also reign with Him. Is not the vassal of any temporal lord judged to be unworthy of the fief that he holds from him as if guilty of treason, if he did not resist with all his strength the incursion into his lord’s land by his enemies, and just the same did not strive with the best of his ability to drive them out? How much those, who profess to be Christians, can fear being proscribed and drawn down from the heavens themselves by infernal ropes to the lower hell, unto torments (2 Petr. 2:4), if from Christ, when He is complaining that His inheritance has been turned to strangers, and His temple to outsiders (Lam. 5:2), they withdrew the succour of devotion and compassion and did not put the sword upon the thigh, for going from gate to gate (Ex. 32:27) in vengeance against the blasphemers of His name, who granted that He might not need our goods (Ps. 15:2), and by word alone it might be possible to fill the enemies with terror, for this, nevertheless, He

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mercifully asks for our aid, that by the fruits of your devotion it might 
increase, from which He bestows on us the prizes of eternal life.\textsuperscript{67}

Honorius pre-emptively shamed Philip and equated any military conflict with 
England with sabotage of the crusade. Honorius implied that anyone who fought 
in the West was responsible for abandoning the daughter of Sion (Jerusalem) like 
a hut in a cucumber field (Is. 1:8). This allusion is specific enough to be 
considered a conscious insertion into the \textit{arenga}. Honorius hoped to recall to 
Philip’s mind the first chapter of the Book of Isaiah, in which Isaiah railed against 
the sinful nation of rebellious sons that had forsaken the Lord, whose land had 
been overthrown by enemies, in which the daughter of Sion had been discarded, 
like a besieged city - like Acre, Jerusalem, and the rest of the Holy Land in the 
1220s.

The reference to ‘the heathens coming into His inheritance’ from Psalm 
78:1 echoed Gregory VIII’s Third Crusade encyclical, \textit{Audita tremendi}, which 
also deployed the allusion, as well as alluding to Maccabees and calling upon the

\textsuperscript{67} Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 39r: ‘Hereditate superna se reddit indignum, et excludendum ab ea se potest 
non immerito formidare, quem zelus Christiane fidei non accendit, quem non movet injuria Ihesu 
Christi, et quem non urit pollutio sanctuarui ac contumelia redemptoris, in hereditatem ipsius 
gentibus venientibus et pollutibus templum eius, posita Ierusalem velud pomorum custodiarum, 
et filia Syon quasi tugurium in cucumerario derelicta. Numquid Christi poterit esse coheres, qui ei 
succursum iuxta vires proprias prestare neglexerit, a Terra, quam ad exhibenda misteria nostre 
redemptionis elegit, a blasphemis nominis eius expulso, vel saltem patienti eidem, non compatiatur 
ex animo? Cui qui compatiuntur et conregnabunt. Nonne vassallus cuiuslibet domini temporalis 
qui priditionis reus et feodo quod tenet ab eo iudicaretur indignus, si domini sui terram 
intrantibus hostibus pro viribus non resisteret, et se iuxta posse ad expulsionem non attingeret 
eorundem? Quantonagis hii, qui Christiana professione censentur, a celesti patria se timere 
poterunt proscriptos et rudentibus inferni detractos in tartarum cruciandos, si Christo querenti, 
quod hereditas eius ad alienos sit versa, et ad extraneos Templum eius, subtraxerunt devotionis et 
compassionis succursum et non posuerint gladium super femur, de porta transeundo ad portam in 
ultionem blasphemantium nomen eius, qui licet bonorum nostrorum non egeat, et solo verbo possit 
coterere inimicos, ad hoc tamen nostrum elementer requirit auxilium, quod fructibus vestre 
devoctionis accrescat, quibus etere vite nobis premia largiatur.’; Pressutti 4321.
rulers of the West to lay down their arms.68 Indeed, as Amnon Linder notes, Psalm 78 had ‘acquired a Holy Land specificity’ after the fall of Jerusalem in 1187.69 By writing about ‘the Land which He chose for revealing the mystery of our redemption’ Honorius was also citing the prayer *Deus qui ad nostre redemptionis*, which circulated from 1187 and throughout the thirteenth century as part of the Holy Land clamor (a series of supplicatory texts on the theme of a particular crisis, composed of psalms, versicles, and prayers) of the same name.70 Honorius’s *arengae* were infused with fragments of texts taken from the wider liturgical struggle to recover the Holy Land: parallels in *arengae* reinforced this post-1187 tradition, which Philip Augustus would surely have recognised. Indeed, the fall of Jerusalem was thought to have been divine punishment for the sins of the whole Christian community.71 It was therefore incumbent upon that community to rectify the situation through devotion and prayer. This, then, is evidence of a certain continuity in papal thought.

68 The text of the encyclical is preserved in the *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris*, ed. A. Chroust, MGH SrG, n.s., 5 (Berlin, 1928), 6-10. The allusion to Psalm 78:1 is found in ibid., 6, and n. x.
69 Amnon Linder, *Raising Arms: Liturgy in the Struggle to Liberate Jerusalem in the Late Middle Ages* (Turnhout, 2003), 4.
70 On Holy Land clamors, see ibid., 3. On the date of this clamor, see ibid., 29. The text of the prayer is given in ibid., 35: ‘Deus, qui ad nostrre redemptionis exhibenda mysteria terram promissionis elegisti, libera eam quesumus ab instantia paganorum, ut gentium incredulitate confusa populus in te confidens de tue virtutis potentia glorietur.’ The prayer was also referenced in a later sermon by Gauthier Cornut, archbishop of Sens, written in 1239 to commemorate the translation of the relic of the Crown of Thorns to the Sainte-Chapelle by King Louis IX of France - see Gauthier Cornut, *De susceptione coronae spineae Iesu Christi*, in *RHGF*, 22 (Paris, 1865), 27: ‘Sicut igitur Dominus Jesus Christus ad suae redemptionis exhibenda mysteria terram promissionis elegit’. On Gauthier’s sermon, see: Beat Brenk, ‘The Sainte-Chapelle as a Capetian Political Program’, in Virginia Chieffio Raguin, Kathryn Brush, and Peter Draper, eds., *Artistic Integration in Gothic Buildings* (Toronto, 1995), 197 and n. 15; Edina Bozöky, *La politique des reliques de Constantin à Saint Louis: Protection collective et légitimation du pouvoir* (Paris, 2006), 166 and n. 166. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Bernard Hamilton and Matthieu Rajohnson for their advice and generous assistance on the matter of crusade prayers and the liturgy.
The pope compounded his assertion of spiritual authority with a justification from the temporal realm, employing a feudal metaphor. It was required of Philip, as a Christian ruler and a vassal of God, to defend his Lord’s land from invaders. The topos of Christ as a feudal lord and the Christian faithful as His vassals was popular during the twelfth century, and Innocent III employed it in his own crusade calls.72

This more robust *arenga* to Philip might be explained, perhaps, by the fact that conflict between France and England was a clear and present danger to Frederick’s fledgling crusade (as would be proven correct by King Louis VIII’s invasion of Poitou in 1224) and that Philip was a ruler who, given his advanced age and his previous role in the Third Crusade, seemed determined not to become involved in crusading again. As a result, Honorius had little to gain from mollifying the aged Philip, but everything to lose if he offended the crusader Frederick.

Honorius also rounded on the soldiers of the Fifth Crusade in an *arenga* addressed to the bishop and chapter of Tarantaise on 26 May 1223. The letter requested that they receive an unnamed papal representative honourably, and the *arenga* was recycled verbatim in letters sent to the Landgrave of Thuringia and the people of Venice, Pisa, and Ancona in the same month, urging them to join Frederick’s coming crusade:

The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength in the capture of Damietta and had exalted the glory of the Christian name (Ps. 117:16), but

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because Christian devotion from divine favours cooled off, from which it ought to have attained a new ardour, and filled with the spirit of elation, He was seen to have made flesh his arm (Jer. 17:5), that same right hand of the Lord, thus raised up, violently dashed against the land and made it drunk with the cup of His wrath (Is. 51:17), transforming grace into anger and rejoicing into sadness, with the disgrace through which the city was lost [perdita], overcoming the glory through which it was chosen. We hope, however, because the heavenly kindness will not repress mercy acting in anger, but turning it away from us, it will pour out the same on them who did not know Him nor invoke His name (Ps. 78:6), but as a reproach to him they rush to us and then say, where is our God? (Ps. 113:10).73

The arenga was heavily critical of the devotion of the Fifth Crusade’s participants, which dissipated after the initial success in capturing the city of Damietta on 5 November 1219. The defeat of the crusade in August 1221 was thus entirely deserved according to the pope. Honorius believed it was God’s vengeance on the unworthy crusaders, which fitted into traditional papal explanations of disastrous events caused by the sins of man.74 It was probably also part of an effort to deflect the criticism that Honorius (along with Pelagius and Frederick) had attracted.75 The pope drew on Psalm 78 again when he lambasted those hypocrites ‘who did not know Him nor invoke His name’, but then came running to the pope after the crusade’s failure asking where their God had been.

73 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 54: ‘Dextera Domini fecerat in captione Damiate virtutem, et exaltaverat gloriam nominis Christiani, sed quia Christiana devotio ex divinis tepuit beneficiis, ex quibus novum fervorem debuerat assumpsisse, ac spiritu elationis inflata, carnem suum posuisse brachium videbatur, eadem dextera Domini sic elatam graviter allisit ad terram et inebriavit calice ire sue, gratiam convertens in iram, et gaudium in merorem, ignominia, per quam eadem est predicta [perdita?] civitas, gloriam, per quam conquista fuerat, superante. Speramus autem, quod divina benignitas misericordiam non continebit in iram, sed illam a nobis avertens, eandem effundet in eos, qui non noverunt eum, nec invocant nomen eius, sed in eius obprobrium nobis improperant atque dicunt, ubi est Deus eorum?’; Pressutti 4382. Rodenberg suggests perdita instead of predicta, which I agree with: Epistolae, ed. Rodenberg, i, 158. This arenga was reused in Pressutti 4386 and 4387.
74 Schein, Gateway, 171.
There are no extant *arengae* that adopt such a tone to Frederick himself, despite the fact that by dithering in the West for years he was one of those individuals most culpable for the Fifth Crusade’s failure. Honorius probably considered it too reckless to address him in such a manner.

Honorius did reprove Frederick in his letters, bitterly at times, but never with such unconcealed aggression that he directed towards the crusaders in the *arenga* to *Dextera domini fecerat*. This supports Tierney’s argument regarding Innocent III’s confusing and seemingly contradictory expressions of authority discussed above.76 Honorius’s expression of his authority in the *arengae* of his documents was not monolithic. Rather, Honorius and his staff composed *arengae* on an *ad hoc* basis, customising the theological justifications for papal authority according to the recipient. While the pope could unleash the full force of spiritual authority on a cleric who was directly responsible to the Church hierarchy, and ultimately to the pope himself, Honorius had to be more subtle in his diplomacy with the most powerful secular rulers, with whom he needed to maintain positive relationships if the Holy Land crusade was to stand a chance of succeeding.

Surprisingly, only a handful of Honorius’s crusade letters to Frederick II - with whom he engaged in a long-running and important correspondence - actually have an *arenga* at all. One possible explanation is that Honorius reserved the use of *arengae* for the most important letters, in which he needed to justify intervention, and conversely (and paradoxically), for common letters, in which long established *arengae* were easily recycled from formularies. Another is that the *arengae* may have been omitted as a time-saving measure. Composing a long

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76 Tierney, *Crisis*, 128, 130.
arenga, rich in biblical allusion and striking the correct tone, must have taken a long time. Some arengae themselves appear to bear witness to this through their diminutive length and absence of scriptural quotations.

For instance, Honorius employed a short and straightforward arenga in Quanto nos angit, sent to Andrew II of Hungary on 11 February 1217, concerning his papal protection as a crusader and confirming the succession of his sons should he die on the Fifth Crusade:

How greatly the injury to Jesus Christ distresses us, that the land of his very Cross is occupied, which He chose for revealing the mysteries of our redemption, to the extent that we dispense apostolic protection and favour liberally to those who for the liberation of it, moved by the injury of the Redeemer, are manfully girding themselves.77

Once more, as in Hereditate superna se, Honorius tapped into the liturgical struggle to recover the Holy Land by quoting the prayer Deus qui ad nostre redemptionis clamor, which emphasised the importance of the Holy Land as that land which the Lord ‘chose for revealing the mysteries of our redemption’ (see above).

Similarly, Honorius employed a short arenga lacking biblical quotations in Iusta doloris et anxietatis, despatched to Frederick exactly two years later on 11 February 1219, warning him and the crusaders in his territories to depart by the Feast of John the Baptist under penalty of excommunication:

77 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 60v: ‘Quanto nos angit iniuria Ihesu Christi, qua terra illa detinetur crucis ipsius, quam elegit ad nostre redemptionis mysteria exhibenda, tanto his qui ad liberationem ipsius, moti eadem Redemptoris iniuria, viriliter se accingunt, apostolicum presidium liberaliter impendimus et favorem.’; Pressutti 330. Again, the mysteria redemptionis theme appears here - see above.
A just occasion of sorrow and anxiety for the Christian people will not be wanting, as long as the unbelieving race hostile to Christ’s name holds the land in which the only-begotten son of God, our redeemer and Lord Jesus Christ, deigned to secure our salvation by His death.78

As an *arenga* it was plain and simple, but it led into long rhetorical sections. The reader would have been detained for some time before arriving at the *dispositio* clause. This raises the question of whether recipients paid any attention to the *arenga*? Were they merely skipped over or skim-read by lay powers and their staff, who were busily embroiled in affairs of state and simply looking to get to the document’s bottom line? Perhaps more attention was paid to them later, when Frederick was engaged in conflict with Honorius’s successors and looking for ammunition to use in the propaganda campaign. Regardless of whether they were actually read by recipients, the *arengae* still provide us with an important source for the study of papal theology and diplomatic as mirrors of papal thought, but measuring any impact they might have had is not so clear cut.

Another *arenga* in a letter to Frederick, *Quanto mentis affectu*, issued on 21 August 1221, was equally short, yet was also succeeded by long sections of papal rhetoric. The letter ordered the emperor to stop meddling in episcopal elections, and opened thus:

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78 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 59v: ‘Iusta doloris et anxietatis materia populo Christiano non deerit, quam diu terram in qua unigenitus Dei filius, redemptor noster ac dominus Ihesus Christus, sua morte nostram dignatus est operari salutem, gens incredula et inimica Christiano nomini detinebit.’; Pressutti 1869.
With what great happiness of the heart and concern of the mind we awaited, desiring longingly the day of your accession to the throne, when you came to the summit of sovereignty - He knows, to whom nothing is unknown, and who is aware of secrets. 79

The pope shamed the emperor, who had let him down, and reminded him that God was fully aware that instead of crusading, Frederick was intervening in ecclesiastical affairs. Honorius’s hope of securing an imperial crusade had obviously diminished since the coronation in 1220. In shaming Frederick, Honorius was employing a similar technique to that used with Philip Augustus in the letter of 18 April 1223 regarding his conflict with Henry III, although it was much less critical in tone.

Honorius’s widest call to crusade, Iustus Dominus in, which was sent to rulers throughout Christendom in April 1223, furnishes us with a good example to demonstrate the mixing of rhetoric and narrative in the section immediately following the purely theological arenga:

The Lord, just in all of His ways (Ps. 144:17), who answers to each one very worthy recompense in proportion to their merits, keeps the hope of the Christian people warm about the business of the Holy Land, sometimes with good fortunes, and occasionally He cripples it with misfortunes. O how greatly good fortune seemed to smile on Christians! O how much the morning of blessed successes was believed to have dawned on the faithful, when the army of crusaders was attacking Egypt, after the tower [of chains] had been captured, after the river [Nile] had been crossed, after the enemies had fled, the army pitched camp in the places of the enemy, and hemmed in Damietta, which was considered the mainstay of Egypt, with the hardships and difficulties of the siege. The miraculous success was enacted, when the Lord, who chose the weak of the world, so that He

79 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 155r: ‘Quanto mentis affectu, quanta ve cordis letitia expectavimus, sublimationis tue diem desiderio desiderantes, ut ad culmen imperii pervenires, novit ille cui nil est incognitum, et qui est conscius secretorum.’; Pressutti 3519.
might bewilder the strong (1 Cor. 1:27), delivered this city, which was
difficult to take by storm, at the opportune time to the assault of those
waging His war, when the power of the enemy was much increased, and
the number of our warriors was weakened not a little. All of Christendom
had reason from these events to extend hope and confidence for the future,
but following the successes, the name of the Lord was forgotten (Gen.
40:23) by the conquerors after their triumph, who, issuing a bill of divorce
(Jer. 3:8)\(^80\), they thus entered into a contract with vices, such as detracted
from the faith where there were infidels to be converted, and there was
more committing of sins, where their great remission had been hoped
for.\(^81\)

Arguably the *arenga*, strictly defined, ends after the first sentence, with the words
‘debilitavit adversis’. Interspersing biblical language with a narrative of events
was probably faster and easier than composing long sections which were
exclusively theological in content. Again the pope cited the crusaders’ sins as the
reason for the expedition’s failure, and the participants were censured by the pope
for forgetting the Lord’s name, just as Joseph had been forgotten in the Book of
Genesis. The narrative elements actually offer an overview of the campaign that
accurately identify reasons for the crusade’s failure, such as the army’s irregular
rhythm of seasonal departures and reinforcements, and the inactivity of the

\(^80\) This motif also appears in Deuteronomy 24:1, Deuteronomy 24:3, Matthew 5:31, Matthew 19:7,
and Mark 10:4. The sense in which it is used in Jeremiah 3:4 seems most relevant in this context.
\(^81\) Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 52: ‘Iustus Dominus in omnibus viis sui, qui unicumque pro meritis condigna
retributione respondet, circa negotium Terre Sancte, spem populi Christiani fovit aliquando
prosperis, et interdum debilitavit adversis. O quantum Christocolis videbatur arridere prosperitas,
O quantum illuxisse credebatur fidelibus felicis aurora successuum, quando crucesignatorum
exercitus Egyptum aggrediens, post turrim captam, post transitum fluminis, post hostes exterritos,
in adversariorum stationibus castra fixit, et Damiatam, que robur censebatur Egypti, duris
obsidionis angustiis coartavit. Res quidem agebatur miraculi, cum Dominus, qui elegit infirma
mundi, ut confunderet fortia, civitatem expugnationi difficilem eo tempore tradidit gerentibus
bellum eius, quo invaluerat multum partis adverse potentia, et abbreviatus erat non modicum
nostrorum numerus bellatorum. Habebat autem in his universitas Christiana unde pretenderet
quasi certe spei fiduciam in futurum, verum succendentibus prosperis victores obliti nomen
Domini post triumphum, dato virtutibus libello repudi, sic contraxere cum vitiis, quod
detrhebatur fidei, ubi convertendi fuerant infideles, et maior erat peccatorum commissio, ubi
maior remissio sperabatur.’; Pressutti 4262.
crusade army after the capture of Damietta. Tellingly though, Frederick’s role as the absentee commander-in-chief was omitted.

**Originality**

As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the operation of papal government was influenced in a large part by the influx of petitions being presented to the pope, and diplomats arriving to engage in diplomacy. Creaking under the sheer weight of business during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the papal curia, especially the chancery, adapted to operate as efficiently as possible. Formularies for common documents such as confirmations, indults, mandates, and privileges, were widely used by chancery staff to speed up document production. How far then were the *arengae* of Honorius’s curial letters bespoke creations? The formulary books in use at the chancery, combined with the twelfth-century registers of previous popes, provided a treasure trove of example *arengae* for Honorius and his staff to plunder, which could have been adapted or copied verbatim. Yet, strikingly, the *arengae* in Honorius’s crusade letters appear to be original to him.

Fichtenau demonstrated that in the Early Middle Ages, papal decretals, such as the Decretal of Siricius from the year 385, were recycled time and again in the composition of papal documents, because as he stated, the worries and

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82 Zutshi, ‘Petitioners’, 278.
troubles of the papal office remained constant throughout the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{84} In his \textit{arengae}, Pope Gregory I (590-604) revealed a debt to ancient Rome, and they were not only reworked by his successors, but also found their way into the late seventh- or eighth-century formulary, the \textit{Liber Diurnus}, and were later drawn upon as models in the high medieval papal chancery.\textsuperscript{85}

A good example of just how prevalent and complicated this reuse of \textit{arengae} could be comes from the eleventh century. In 1049 Pope Leo IX (1049-54) drew on an \textit{arenga} of Gregory I (originally composed in 599) when forming part of one of his own. The second part of Leo’s \textit{arenga} was copied from the \textit{Liber Diurnus}, which had been used already by Pope John VIII in 877. Then in 1074, Gregory VII recycled the first part of Leo’s \textit{arenga}.\textsuperscript{86}

Similarly a letter of Pope Alexander II (1061-73) from 1067 copied an \textit{arenga} exactly from a letter of Gregory I from 592, and another of Alexander’s letters from 1068 reused - verbatim in parts - another \textit{arenga} of Gregory’s. Fichtenau has established how carefully Alexander amended the text, leaving the beginning unaltered, inserting a new section in the middle, and then hanging a new sentence on the end.\textsuperscript{87} Gregory’s text was, Fichtenau stated, a sacred piece of history that was still perfectly relevant and could be reused freely.\textsuperscript{88}

C.R. Cheney and W.H. Semple have identified an example of Innocent III recycling an \textit{arenga} of Clement III.\textsuperscript{89} As they noted, papal draftsmen would reuse

\textsuperscript{84} Fichtenau, \textit{Arenga}, 92.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 94-95.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 107-08.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 107
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Selected}, ed. and trans. Cheney and Semple, p. xxiii.
the best passages from past papal letters on relevant topics, even when they were years old.\textsuperscript{90} The career of draftsmen could span pontificates: a number of notaries can be identified who served variously at the courts of Innocent III, Honorius III, and Gregory IX, including one notary who worked under all three popes.\textsuperscript{91} Yet by immediately removing Innocent’s chancellor, Thomas of Capua, on his accession, Honorius made a small, but potentially important, break with his predecessor’s diplomatic practice. There was also borrowing across medieval institutions, and Fichtenau has shown how the papacy and the lay powers took technical aspects from each other’s documents in the Early Middle Ages, including \textit{arengae}.\textsuperscript{92}

Hans Martin Schaller has written that the language of Frederick II’s imperial chancery was influenced in a large part by the rhetoric of late antiquity, the Christian liturgy, and papal documents.\textsuperscript{93} Some of Frederick’s royal Sicilian chancery staff, for instance, had experience of working at the papal curia.\textsuperscript{94} The most important example of borrowing from a papal document by the imperial chancery was in its formula for naming imperial legates, the \textit{arenga} of which was taken almost word-for-word from the formulary of a papal official, Thomas of Capua, who had taken his example from a letter of Honorius III from 1217.\textsuperscript{95} Oft-used papal incipits were also sampled by the imperial chancery.\textsuperscript{96} Schaller notes

\begin{footnotes}
\footnoteref{90} Ibid.
\footnoteref{91} Sayers, \textit{Government}, 31.
\footnoteref{92} Fichtenau, \textit{Arenga}, 113.
\footnoteref{95} Schaller, ‘Kanzlei’, 306.
\footnoteref{96} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
though, that despite evidence of some papal-imperial borrowing taking place, it does not seem to have been extensive.\textsuperscript{97}

Like the papal chancery, the imperial chancery was also recycling earlier material of its own. In the years 1198-1212, more than a fifth of all \textit{arengae} from Frederick’s Sicilian chancery were either copied from Norman formularies or heavily influenced by them.\textsuperscript{98} Indeed, Schaller notes that prior to 1212 it is difficult to discern pappally-influenced language in imperial documents, precisely because much of the papacy’s style had also been received from the Norman tradition.\textsuperscript{99} After Frederick II’s election as king of the Germans in 1212 and his relocation to Germany from Sicily, his chancery staff gained access to the old \textit{arengae} of Frederick I, and the more mature products of Otto IV, and used this material in the composition of their own \textit{arengae}.\textsuperscript{100} It was thus common practice both at the papal and imperial courts to make use of their predecessors’ documentary output. Indeed, formularies used in composing papal documents - from which \textit{arengae} could easily be copied - were in existence during Honorius’s reign, although only one survives from his time (which unfortunately still lacks a proper edition), more have surely been lost.\textsuperscript{101}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 305-06.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 297.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 298.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 302.
\textsuperscript{101} Barraclough lamented that this ‘very important formulary, dating from the pontificate of Honorius III, is inadequately described by Hasksins’: Barraclough, \textit{Notaries}, 10, n. 1. Haskins’ work is only a description, rather than an edition: Charles H. Haskins, ‘Two Roman Formularies in Philadelphia’, in \textit{Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle: Scritti di Storia e Paleographia}, iv (Rome, 1924), 275-86.
\end{footnotes}
Sayers has examined the forms of *arengae* used in common letters at Honorius’s curia.\textsuperscript{102} Documents were issued in their hundreds which employed these standard *arengae* for dealing with the flood of petitions being presented at the curia. For example, *Sacrosancta Romana ecclesia* had been known in an early version from the reign of Gregory VII, before developing further as a form between the 1120s and 1150s.\textsuperscript{103} *Cum a nobis* was an *arenga* first documented in 1184 under Lucius III (1181-85), and possibly reached its final form under Celestine III.\textsuperscript{104} *Solet annuere sedes* dates from sometime between 1138 x 1143, and was first used by Innocent II (1130-43), before going through further development during the rest of the twelfth century, and becoming common by the time of Innocent III.\textsuperscript{105} *Iustis petentium desideriis* made its first appearance in the historical record in a letter fragment of Lucius II from 1144, and varied in form until after the mid-twelfth century.\textsuperscript{106} *Ea que iudicio* was used for the first time by Alexander III, and, after being copied into *audientia* formularies, was then used frequently.\textsuperscript{107} The first use of *Religiosam vitam eligentibus* dates back to the year 593, during the reign of Gregory I; by the eleventh century it had become common.\textsuperscript{108}

There is thus a distinction to be drawn between the composition of *arengae* in common and curial letters. While it was standard operating procedure to simply copy the *arengae* of common letters from exempla, Honorius’s *arengae* in curial letters on the subject of the crusade seem to have been mostly bespoke.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 102.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 104.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 109.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 110-11.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 113.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 121.
products. It was probably thought counter-productive to reuse recent *arengae* in curial letters. The intended persuasive effect, such as shaming lay powers into behaving as the pope expected, would undoubtedly have been reduced if the recipient recognised the *arenga* as a standard formula. It would only have increased the chances of the recipient passing over it to get to the *dispositio*.

Incipits, however, were frequently reused in different letters - they were obviously considered common intellectual property to be used freely, just like the *arengae* for common letters. Honorius had his crusade letter incipits *Iustus Dominus in* and *Gratias agimus* in common with his predecessors.\(^{109}\) Similarly the incipit from Honorius’s first registered letter, *Magnus Dominus [et laudabilis nimis]*, provided Gregory IX with the incipit for his letter of 19 May 1229 to Pelagius, cardinal-bishop of Albano. Gregory also borrowed *Celestis altitudo consilii* (which Honorius is recorded to have used three times as an incipit himself) and used it as the incipit for letters to the sultan of Baghdad and the caliph of Baghdad in 1233.\(^{110}\)

Aside from the borrowing of incipits, a few examples can be found of Honorius recycling his own *arengae* from curial letters regarding the crusade. In the exceptional circumstances following Innocent III’s death and Honorius’s accession, the whole *arenga* from *Magnus Dominus* (above) was pressed into service in the dozens of documents despatched throughout Christendom by


Honorius on 25 July 1216. It was an important *arenGa* for a mass mailing: there was neither the time nor necessity to formulate an individual *arenGa* for each recipient.

Honorius or his chancery staff also reused the opening few words from the *arenGa* of *Deo in cuius* which took Frederick under papal protection before his crusade, sent on 11 February 1219:

To God, in whose hands are the hearts of kings, and who directs them however He pleases (Prov. 21:1), we give thanks that you, humbly recognising the great things afforded to you [by God], and dutifully and prudently reflecting, thus He made you have fear and love of His name, so that taking up your cross, you decided to follow Him and to wield His sword of vengeance against blasphemers, so that you might not seem to Him to carry without purpose that given to you by Him for the praise of the good and the punishment of the evil.

The allusion to Proverbs 21:1 opened the *arenGa* with a reminder of the pope’s spiritual authority as the vicar of Christ over the lay power. These initial words were reused with some minor adaptation, and featured in four of Honorius’s other letters on crusading themes issued during a relatively tight time span, between 5 September 1218 and 18 May 1219. One letter copies the *arenGa* verbatim. Two letters use only: ‘Deo, in cuius sunt manibus corda regum, gratiarum referimus

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111 Pressutti 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Note the large number of *in eundem modum* copy recipients listed.

112 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 59r: ‘Deo, in cuius sunt manibus corda regum, et qui ea quaecumque sibi placet inclinat, gratiarum exolvimus actiones, quod te, magna que tibi fecit recognoscentem humiliter, et pie ac provide meditantem, sic fecit habere sui timorem nominis et amorem, ut tollens crucem tuam disposueris illum sequi ac contra blasphematores ipsius gladium ultionis exerere, ne illi datum tibi ab ipso ad laudem bonorum malorumque vindictam videaris sine causa portare.’; Pressutti 1867.

113 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 59r; Pressutti 1868.
actiones’. Another modifies this to: ‘Deo, in cuius sunt manibus corda regum et tue celsitidini multas gratiarum referimus actiones’. This opening segment thus appears to have been used as an ‘all purpose’ arenga building block in the pope’s crusade correspondence during this time; it was probably being copied from a draft floating around the chancery during these months, which might explain why it was used five times during a short space of time.

The openings of these arengae are clearly related to the prayer Omnipotens sempiterne Deus in cuius manu that circulated as part of a Holy Land clamor immediately after the loss of Jerusalem in 1187, and was itself a lightly modified version of the prayer Pro Christianissimo imperatore nostro. The prayer Omnipotens sempiterne Deus in cuius manu was also instituted in the Holy Land clamor promulgated by the Cistercian General Chapter at around the same time (1188/89), and was confirmed throughout the 1190s. Honorius’s arengae drew on this tradition in a small way and fitted into the efforts of the Christian community as a whole to recover the Holy Land through the power of prayer as well as arms: something to which Honorius referred in the opening words of his arenga to clergy in Hungary and Reims on 24 November 1217, Adversus hostes visibiles, which promoted prayer as a weapon to be used in support of the Fifth Crusade (above).

114 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 11v; Pressutti 1615; Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 96r; Pressutti 2070.
115 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 93r; Pressutti 2056.
116 On the date and different interpretations of the institution of this clamor, see Linder, Liturgy, 8-10. The text of the oratio of the Holy Land clamor that the prayer was part of is given in ibid., 11: ‘Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, in cuius manu sunt omnium potestates et omnia iura regnorum, respice ad Christianorum benignus auxilium, ut gentes quae in sua feritate confidunt potentiae tuae dextera comprimantur. Per Christum Dominum nostrum.’ Cf. the text of the earlier prayer given in Le sacramentaire Grégorien: Ses principales formes d’après les plus anciens manuscrits, ed. Jean Deshusses, 1 (Fribourg, 1971), 177-78.
117 Linder, Liturgy, 26.
Letters announcing the arrival of papal legates in a territory, for example, were sent out fairly regularly, and while the letters contained some common formulas, such as the quotation from Jeremiah 1:10 that informed the recipients of the invested powers of legates *a latere* ‘to root up and to pull down, to destroy and to overthrow, to build and to plant’, the *arengae* were often unique. It seems to have been common under Honorius and Innocent III to employ a new *arenga* each time when issuing letters which announced the despatch of legates with plenary powers. On at least three occasions though, when notifying the local Church hierarchy to receive legates as crusade preachers, Honorius used the same *arenga*. In *Cum is qui secundum*, despatched to select German clergy in March 1224, which announced the arrival of Conrad, cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina, to preach the crusade, Honorius justified his appointment thus:

When He, who according to the omnipotence of His majesty can be comprehended neither in place nor time, being uncircumscribed and infinite, and remaining stable He gives movement to everything (Boethius), He can make His angels’ and ministers’ spirits (Ps. 103:4, Heb. 1:7), and when the height of the heavens had turned, assuming human flesh for this reason, that His delights are to be with the children of men (Prov. 8:31), He chose disciples and sent them throughout the whole world, so that they might preach the gospel to all creation (Mk. 16:15), He provided us with His example, so that following in His footsteps (1 Petr. 2:21), when we were assumed into the plenitude of power, but cannot be present for a single piece of business ourselves, we divide burdens among those whom we summoned to part of the responsibility, we are used like

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118 Jeremiah 1:10 was one of Innocent III’s favoured biblical quotations: Moore, *Innocent*, 256.
119 See for example, *Register*, ed. Hageneder et al., i, no. 413; ii, no. 193; vii, no. 77, no. 209; viii, no. 56, no. 57, no. 103; x, no. 137.
120 Here Honorius quoted and lightly adapted book III, metre 9 of Boethius’s *De consolatione philosophiae*. See Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae opuscula theologica*, ed. Claudio Moreschini (Munich, 2000), 79: ‘stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri’.
Jethro for consultation (Ex. 18:21-26), entrusting to each one according to his strengths, those things which are pressing at different times.  

Honourius had already used this exact arenga in a letter issued on 14 March 1221 announcing the arrival of the legate Hugolino, cardinal-bishop of Ostia, to preach the crusade in northern Italy. The pope recycled it verbatim one more time when he wrote to the clergy of Livonia and Prussia on 31 December 1224, announcing that William, bishop of Modena, was being sent as legate to preach in the region. The form of the arenga appears to have been developed from an earlier letter of Honourius, Cum is qui et, which was despatched to the archbishops of Cosenza and Brindisi on 8 July 1217, arranging preaching and an ecclesiastical presence at the Fifth Crusade’s appointed departure ports of Messina and Brindisi.  

It is clear that the wording and content was developed between Cum is qui et and Cum is qui secundum. Most notable is Honourius’s use of Boethius’s sixth-

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121 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 183v: ‘Cum is qui secundum omnipotentiam maiestatis nec loco potest nec tempore comprehendit, utpote incircumscriptibilis et immensus, et stabilis manens dat cuncta moveri, faciat spiritus suos angelos et ministros, et celebrium inclinata, carnem assumens humanum pro eo, quod deliciue suo sunt esse cum filiis hominum, discipulos quos elegaret in mundum destinaverit universum, ut omni predicarent evangelium creature, suo nos instruxit exemplo, ut eius sequentes vestigia, cum assumpti simus in plenitudinem potestatis, nec per nos ipsos possimus singulis negotiis imminere, inter eos, quos in partem sollicitudinis evocavimus, onera quas eiusmodi consilio dividamus, unicumque secundum virtutem propriam que variis temporibus iniminent committendo.’; Pressutti 4904.  
122 Pressutti 3178.  
123 Pressutti 5242. See also, Fonnesberg-Schmidt, ‘Honourius’, 111.  
124 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 120r: ‘Cum is qui et si secundum humanitatis naturam loco et tempore potuit quia voluit comprehendi, secundum tamen divinitatis omnipotentiam erat sicut et est ubique, utpote incircumscriptibilis et immensus, pro suo beneplacito cuncta disponens discipulos quos elegaret in mundum destinaverit universum, omni creature evangelium predicare ac nunc et semper in sua regnans ineffabili maiestate, faciat spiritus suos angelos et ministros, nos qui licet immerni eiusdem in terris sumus vicarii constituti, ad eius exemplar ea que non possimus exequi per nos ipsos hiis qui sunt in partem nostre sollicitudinis evocati et tamquam membrum capiti nobis obedire tenentur, committimus exequenda ut non videatur fieri sine nobis quod nobis mandantibus adimpletur.’; Pressutti 654.
century text *De consolatione philosophiae* and the reference to Jethro in the later form of the *arenga*. Because the developments took place during Honorius’s pontificate, they can thus confidently be attributed to him. It is suggestive of self-confidence in his own theological stance, distinct from his predecessor, and also of a vibrant intellectual culture at his curia.125

By aligning himself with the words of the Old Testament figure of Jethro, Honorius revealed an insight into how he viewed his own role as pontiff. In the Book of Exodus Jethro advised his kinsman Moses that he could not, and should not, judge every small disagreement among his people because it was too much strain for one man alone to bear (Ex. 18: 13-18). Instead Jethro counselled Moses that he should share his burden as leader by delegating the less important affairs to trusted representatives, and only consider the most important cases in person (Ex. 18:21-22). It was important for the pope to justify why he had invested legates with plenary powers in the *arenga* because of the performative aspect of papal documents, especially in mandates announcing the arrival of legates, which would probably have been read aloud *in partibus*.126

The *arenga* from *Cum is qui secundum* elegantly combined biblical allusions justifying the papal preaching mission (Mk. 16:15), with the institution’s plenitude of power, and the sharing of part of this responsibility with legates (Ex. 18:21-26). The deft use of this theological justification and sagacious phrasing probably explains why it was recycled. Pope Innocent IV (1243-54) reused part of the second half of this *arenga* in two crusade letters, although interestingly, not in

125 Cf. the wording of Innocent III’s *arenga* in the appointment letter of Peter of Capua examined in Barbiche, ‘Diplomatie’, 150.
126 I am grateful to Dr Barbara Bombi for suggesting this to me.
the *arenga* clauses. The first letter was issued on 23 February 1248 to all the nobles on the crusade of King Louis IX of France (1226-70) requesting that they receive the papal legate, the cardinal-bishop of Tusculum, and the second was issued to the legate himself on 21 July 1248, and both used the same segment from Honorius’s *arenga*.\(^{127}\)

The *arenga* may have been original to Honorius. I have found no evidence that the entire *arenga* from *Cum is qui secundum* (or *Cum is qui et*) was used by any other pope, either before or after Honorius. In the study of *arenga*es, however, one must be cautious not to misattribute the invention of an *arenga* to a particular pope. Earlier precedents may have been lost altogether or reworked and given new incipits, and thus they might be missed by the researcher relying on the incipit to identify *arenga*es. While one must be alert to the possibility that *Cum is qui secundum*, or sections of it, may have been culled from earlier letters, nevertheless it remains possible that this elegant *arenga* was in fact an original product of Honorius’s curia. Even if it was not, then the clear development that this *arenga* underwent during Honorius’s pontificate is testament to the intellectual vitality of his curia - he obviously did not feel constrained merely to follow his predecessor, but confidently created and modified his own *arenga*es. Such developments originating from within the curia are examples of the pope behaving proactively in his administration of the Holy Land crusades.

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The case for Honorius as the creator of original and important *arengae* is strengthened by another example from his reign. On 5 August 1223, Honorius issued *Quia celestia simul* to Frederick, granting him dispensation to marry the king of Jerusalem’s daughter, Isabella, who was within the prohibited four degrees of consanguinity:

Because heavenly along with terrestrial knowledge is guided by the Almighty, for this reason, He bestowed the keys of the kingdom of heaven to the blessed Peter as His vicar and his successors after him, and entrusted the loosing and binding of popes (Matt. 16:19), so that the highest pontiff, with no regard for the application of human invention, but rather driven on by divine inspiration, establishing beneficial laws, He might unite all men by bonds of necessity to observe the same laws, even if at least sometimes, when urgent necessity compels or evident usefulness to the people persuades, in respect of some of them He might prudently release some of the people from the plenitude of power, so that nonetheless the rest might be closely bound by him; yet without receiving the undue interventions of people, since it is not to be considered for a [single] person, when for a particular case, place, and time, for the sake of the common good not private but public, by the greatest consideration of divine service, anything may be conceded to some without injury to the law.  

Relying on the traditional basis for papal primacy in Matthew 16:19, Honorius justified his power to relax certain laws in special circumstances without injury to the law, but stressed that this power was not to be used for the benefit of a single person, but for the Christian community as a whole. By allowing Frederick to

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128 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 84: ‘Quia celestia simul et terrena omnipotenti prudentia moderatur, ad hoc beato Petro tamquam vicario suo et successoribus eius post ipsum conferens claves regni celestis, ligandi et solvendi tradidit pontificium, ut summus pontifex non humane adinventionis studio, sed divine potius inspirationis instinctu leges statuens salutares, quodam necessitatis vinculo liget homines ad observantiam earundem, quod utique nonnumquam, cum urgens necessitas exigat vel evidens utilitas maxime publica persuadet, sic laxat provide circa quosdam de sue plenitudine potestatis, ut ceteri nichilominus astricti teneantur eodem, nulla tamen interveniente acceptione indebita personarum, cum non sit reputandum deferri persone, cum pro causa, loco et tempore non privati sed publici commodi gratia, et maxime consideratione divini servitii, quicquum aliqui sine iuris iniuria indulgetur.’; Pressutti 4460.
marry the daughter of John of Brienne, the dispensation directly benefitted the
crusade by binding the powerful emperor to the vulnerable kingdom of Jerusalem.
Honourius was relaxing Canon 50 of Lateran IV which had reduced the prohibited
degrees of consanguinity from seven to four. 129 Honourius appears to have
borrowed a phrase from the canon that he was relaxing: ‘cum urgens necessitas
vel evidens utilitas id expostit’. 130

D’Avray has noted that papal dispensations such as this were rare until the
reign of Innocent III. 131 As far as can be ascertained, the first occurrence of this
arenga seems to be under Honourius, before it was copied widely by his
successors. Alexander III is recorded to have issued a letter to the archbishop of
Trondheim between 1164 x 1181 that allowed him to offer marriage dispensations
to those living on a remote island twelve-days’ journey from Norway, so that they
could marry within the fifth, sixth, and seventh degrees. 132 Alexander’s letter
lacks an arenga entirely, and launches immediately with the narratio clause.

Another decretal of Alexander III’s, Super eo quod, originally despatched

129 At Lateran IV Innocent III made significant changes to marriage laws, making it harder for lay
powers to acquire annulments as well as reducing the prohibited degrees of consanguinity: D.L.
d’Avray, Medieval Marriage: Symbolism and Society (Oxford, 2005), 104. For an overview of
marriage dispensations issued for the benefit of the Latin East, see Wipertus H. Rudt de
Collenberg, ‘Les dispenses matrimoniales accordées à l’Orient Latin selon les Registres du
Vatican d’Honourius III à Clément VII (1223-1385)’, Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome:
Moyen-Age, Temps modernes, 89 (1977), 11-93. Although Honourius’s 1223 dispensation features
in passing, no mention is made of the arenga and its importance.
130 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Volume I, Nicaea I to Lateran V, ed. and trans. Norman P.
Tanner (London, 1990), 257.
and Jane Martindale, eds., Law, Laity and Solidarities: Essays in Honour of Susan Reynolds
(Manchester, 2001), 196 and n. 41. D’Avray quotes Kroppman who noted that Honourius III is
recorded to have issued three such dispensations and Gregory IX eighteen, a figure which rocketed
to 272 under Innocent IV: Hubert Kroppman, Ehedispensührung und Stauferkampf unter Innocenz
IV.: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des päpstlichen Ehedispensrechtes (Berlin, 1937), 4. On Innocent
III’s marriage dispensations, see Constance M. Rousseau, ‘A Papal Matchmaker: Principle and
132 Decretales ineditae saeculi XII, ed. Walther Holtzmann, Stanley Chodorow and Charles
Duggan, Monumenta Iuris Canonici Series B, 4 (Vatican City, 1982), (no. 86) 149-51.
between 1168 x 1170 in response to the bishop of Split’s questions, was structured into three sections. The third section, on the topic of consanguinity and marriage, bears no textual resemblance to Honorius’s arenga.

Innocent III’s marriage dispensation letters similarly furnish us with no antecedent for Honorius’s Quia celestia simul. All apart from one of Innocent’s arengae for letters on marriage dispensation bear no textual resemblance at all. The one exception is Innocent’s arenga from his dispensation granted to the crusader Count Hervé of Nevers and his wife Mathilda on 20 December 1213, Ascitis aliis in, which displays elements of similarity.

Whilst Honorius appears to have taken a small amount of inspiration from Innocent’s arenga, the ideas were so heavily reworked and developed that the authorship of Quia celestia simul must be attributed to Honorius. Ascitis aliis in and Quia celestia simul are totally different chancery products. It was Honorius who developed the bare bones of Innocent’s simple arenga into the majesty of Quia celestia simul. Indeed, Honorius had actually used the arenga Ascitis aliis in himself on 26 May 1219 after making a number of small alterations, some of which prefigured elements of Quia celestia simul, such as ‘cum imminens

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134 Register, ed. Hageneder et al., ix, (no. 61) 110-11, (no. 68) 133-34, (no. 75) 143-44; x, (no. 118) 203-04, (no. 136) 228-29; Patrologiae, ed. Migne, ccxvi (Paris, 1855), 715, 1268-69; Regestum, ed. Kempf, (no. 23) 66-67, (no. 169) 375, (no. 181) 390-92.
135 Patrologiae, ed. Migne, ccxvi, 943-44: ‘Ascitis aliis in partem sollicitudinis, summus pontifex assumptus est in plenitudinem potestatis, qui cum moderator sit canonum, iuri non facit iniuriam si dispensat; presertim cum dispensatio sic iuris vincula laxet in aliquo quod in aliiis non dissolvit, et sic beneficium gratie specialis inducat quod vigorem constitutionis non perimit generalis.’
necessitas et evidens utilitas id exposcit’, which, as noted above, is also found in Canon 50 of Lateran IV.136

That Honorius reused Innocent’s Ascitis aliis in is strong evidence that the text of Quia celestia simul was not created until 1223 - if it had been then Honorius would surely have used it in 1219. This is perhaps the closest thing to conclusive proof that one can find to demonstrate the invention of an arenga by a particular pope. The evidence is therefore strong enough to claim confidently that it was Honorius (or his staff) who invented the arenga for Quia celestia simul: it was he who set the basis of the text that was used, with only slight modifications, for over one hundred years by his successors.

Gregory IX recycled Honorius’s arenga nearly verbatim on 29 October 1230, making only the smallest modifications: Honorius’s first word of the incipit, Quia, was switched to Qui; adinventionis became simply inventionis; inspirationis was replaced with aspirationis; and ad observentiam was made plural - ad observentias.137 When Gregory reused the arenga again on 26 June 1237, however, he made substantial changes.138 Nevertheless, Gregory’s amendments to

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136 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 99v: ‘Ascitis aliis in partem sollicitudinis summus pontifex assumptus est in plenitudinem potestatis, qui cum moderator sit canonum iuri non facit injuriam si dispensat cum imminens necessitas et evidens utilitas id exposcit, presertim cum dispensatio sic iuris vincula laxet in aliquo quod in alii non dissolvit, et sic beneficium gratie specialis inducat, quod vigorem constitutionis non perimit generalis.’; Pressutti 2084.

137 Reg. Vat. 15, fol. 42r. The letter is edited by Lucien Auvray, although crucially, and frustratingly, as with other papal letters in the editions in the Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome series, the arenga is truncated to the incipit only: Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. Lucien Auvray, 4 vols (Paris, 1896-1955), i, (no. 517) 339.

138 Reg. Vat. 18, fol. 303r: ‘Qui celestia simul et terrena omnipotenti providentia moderatur, ad hoc beato Petro suo vicario et successoribus eius post ipsum collatis clavibus regni celestis ligandi atque solvendi contulit potestatem, ut summus pontifex non humane inventionis studio, sed divine potius inspirationis instinctu subtili examine pensare debeat singula que ad tribunal deferuntur ipsius, et quantum judicium permittit humanum res etiam perscrutari latentes, ne vel damnet innoxios, vel nocentes absolvat neve diat bonum malum, aut malum bonum meditentium tenens formam qui manus prudenter moderantur officium, ne dum pars corrupta, vel cauterio uritur, vel aliter resecatur, cum ea trahatur vel ledatur etiam pars sincera.’
Honorius’s *arenga* were short-lived, perhaps because the altered wording was considered less effective compared to the elegant text of Honorius. It was in a form much closer to the latter’s 1223 usage of *Quia celestia simul* that the *arenga* was reused by Gregory’s successors.

Perhaps most important for the survival and subsequent entrenchment in papal diplomatic of Honorius’s *arenga* was its use by Innocent IV. Innocent IV ignored Gregory IX’s 1237 modification of the *arenga*, and recycled it in its 1230 form - which was much closer to its 1223 issue - in a letter to the landgrave of Thuringia, despatched on 12 April 1244. Innocent made only minor changes, omitting Honorius’s words ‘omnipotenti prudentia’ and rearranging his ‘ligandi et solvendi tradidit pontificium’.139 The rest of the *arenga* was copied verbatim, apart from the swap of Honorius’s *inspirationis* for *aspirationis*, as Gregory had done, and Innocent returned to using Honorius’s singular *ad observentiam*.

Not only was it reused in this letter, but the *arenga* was even copied into the formulary of Marinus of Eboli, Innocent IV’s vice-chancellor between 1244 and 1251, under the heading: ‘Incipit liber quartus cuius forme propter eorum dissimilitudinem que de matrimoniis tractant omnes simul sine aliqua rubricarum distinctione ponunutur’.140 That Marinus took his example from Honorius’s letter - presumably the first instance of it that Marinus could trace, and most probably the *arenga*’s first ever use - lends weight to the argument that this *arenga* was an original creation of Honorius’s curia, and is testament to its quality and the

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139 Reg. Vat. 21, fol. 95r: ‘Qui celestia simul et terrena moderatur, ad hoc beato Petro tanquam vicario suo et successoribus eius post ipsum conferens claves regni celestis, ligandi pontificium tradidit et solvendi’; *Epistolae*, ed. Rodenberg, ii, 41.

140 Arles, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS 60, fol. 245r; *Die Formularsammlung des Marinus von Eboli*, ed. Fritz Schillmann (Rome, 1929), 290.
superlative nature of its style. That the recipient of the arenga had originally been Frederick II and the matter contained within the letter itself (his marriage to secure the future of the kingdom of Jerusalem) were undoubtedly extremely important to Honorius, are also factors which support the assumption that he created the arenga.

Innocent IV also appears to have reworked the arenga from Quia celestia simul into Dum summus pontifex, first witnessed in his reign for a marriage dispensation issued on 8 December 1244. By December 1245 Dum summus pontifex had been further revised into a shorter arenga entitled Cum summus pontifex for marriage dispensations, cutting many parts from the text to shorten it. These cropped sections were later reintegrated into the arengae for Cum summus pontifex letters issued by Innocent IV and his successors, which fluctuated in details and length, but maintained many core elements from Quia celestia simul. It was still being used in a lightly modified form as Summus pontifex as late as 28 December 1345 by Clement VI.

141 Reg. Vat. 21, fol. 121r: ‘Dum summus pontifex collatis sibi in persona beati Petri ab eo qui eterna providentia celestia simul et terrena disponit, clavibus regni celestis ligandi obtineat pontificium et solvendi, nonnunquam supra ius de iure dispensans, necessitatis vinculum quod ad ipsius iuris observantium cuncti tenentur, laxat provide de sue potestatis plenitudo circa quosdam, cum urgens necessitas exigat, vel evidens utilitas maxime publica persuadet, nulla interveniente actionem indebita personarum, quia non est reputandum deferri personae cum pro loco et tempore non privati sed publica comodi gratia et presertim divini consideratione servitii quicquam alicui sine iuris iniuria indulgetur.’; Registres, ed. Berger, no. 749.
142 Registres, ed. Berger, no. 1633. Unfortunately the British Library’s digitised Registra Vaticana collection is lacking the required folio (Reg. Vat. 21, fol. 252v), so I have been unable to corroborate this with the manuscript.
143 Innocent IV issued more under his pontificate: Registres, ed. Berger, nos. 1802, 1807, 2406, 2709, 6013, 6358, 6476, 6823, 6876, 7178, 7248, 7351, 7372, 7477, 7644. It was also used by Alexander IV, for example: Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. C. Bourel de La Roncière, J. de Loye, P. de Cenival, and A. Coulon, 3 vols (Paris, 1902-59), nos. 408, 574, 861 and others.
144 Reg. Vat. 139, fol. 174r.
The ‘popularity’ of the arenga text from Honorius III’s *Quia celestia simul* is astounding. Its prolonged use with only slight modifications over more than a century represents a previously unnoticed and extremely significant development in papal diplomatic under Honorius.¹⁴⁵ Honorius’s curia appears to have been a vibrant intellectual forum for the development of papal diplomatic, an interpretation which is reinforced by Cheney’s point that dispensations for bastard clergy which excluded the episcopate were also developed during Honorius’s pontificate.¹⁴⁶

*Cum is qui secundum* and *Quia celestia simul* reveal Honorius propounding a discrete, original theology to that expressed by his predecessors, and one worth copying - imitation is, as the saying goes, the sincerest form of flattery. Nevertheless, although Honorius’s arengae have a distinctive flavour to those of Innocent III, like all popes he was building upon and reworking traditional claims to papal authority (such as Matthew 16:19) which had featured in the arengae of his predecessors.

For instance, in *Sinceris fili karissime* to Frederick II (above), Honorius had drawn upon Proverbs 8:15: ‘per quem [the Lord] reges regnant et in regno hominum dominantur’. This was a typical theological justification for the popes’ spiritual authority over lay powers. Innocent III had used it in his documents to rulers such as Frederick (‘per quem reges regnant et principantur’; ‘per quem reges regnant et principes principatur’) and King John of England (‘per quem

¹⁴⁵ Bernard Barbiche has identified more limited copying of phrases or themes over a long period in legation arengae of other popes: Barbiche, ‘Diplomatie’, 152, 154-55. The significance of Honorius’s *Quia celestia simul* is demonstrated by the continued use of the whole arenga with very few alterations over such a long period of time.

etiam reges regnant et principes principantur’). Even so, subtle differences in theological justification between popes can be discerned by how they used these traditional biblical allusions.

An instructive example comes from comparing Honorius’s Si aliqua tue celsitudini to Frederick (above) with the arenga from Innocent III’s letter Cum divina testante to King John of England, sent on 20 February 1203. Innocent reproved John for his offences against the Church, and like Honorius in Si aliqua tue celsitudini, his purpose was to shame John into compliance. Like Honorius, Innocent also drew upon Proverbs 3:12 and Hebrews 12:6 to justify his criticism of the king:

Holy scripture testifies that a father rebukes and chastens the son whom he loves: and so if your Majesty, whom we love with sincere affection in the Lord, is rebuked in our apostolic letter, and even upbraided, for the sins which you are known to have committed against the head and members, that is, against us and the Roman Church, the clergy and the churches, it should be pleasant and welcome to you to realise that our rebuke springs from love and not from anger - especially as, in administering this rebuke, we obey the decree of the Apostle who, in his instructions for bishops, says to Timothy, ‘Be instant in season, out of season, reprove, plead, upbraid with all long-suffering and doctrine.’

147 Register, ed. Hageneder et al., ix, 283, 425; xi, 125.
148 Selected, ed. and trans. Cheney and Semple, 48: ‘Cum, divina testante scriptura, pater filium quem diligentem corripiat et castiget, si magnificentiam regiam, quam sincera diligimus in Domino caritate, super his que contra caput et membra, nos videlecet et Romanam ecclesiam, clericos et ecclesias, dinsicitur commississe, apostolicis litteris reprehendimus et etiam increpamus, ei gratum debet existere pariter et acceptum, cum hoc ex dilectione noscatur non ex indignatione aliqua provenire, presertim cum in hoc apostoli exsequamur edictum, qui episcopum instruens, inquit ad Timotheum: insta oportune importune, argue, obsecra, increpa, in omni patientia et doctrina.’ Innocent also deployed the same reference to 2 Timothy 4:2 again in a letter of 17 February 1205 to the patriarch-elect of Jerusalem: Bolton, ‘Serpent’, 171-72.
John’s crimes against the Church up to 1203 were not dissimilar to Frederick’s own interferences in ecclesiastical affairs. Innocent had been involved in disputes with John over his aggressive posturing towards the Church, especially - like Frederick - regarding benefices and Church property. Keeping the danger of generalising firmly in mind, the similarity of theme of the arengae, and the fine shades of dissimilitude in justification are striking, which makes them valid examples for comparison. Broadly, the arengae are similar, but Innocent’s seems blunter and less nuanced than Honorius’s. In these arengae Honorius seems to have expressed a less aggressive theological conception of his role than Innocent III, but it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from a single pair of letters. The roles of popes and their political concerns did not change greatly during the Middle Ages. As a result, any variations in arenga theology between popes would only have been subtle.

The shades of difference in Honorius and Innocent’s arengae complement the findings of Powell, who compared the two popes’ sermons on the Pastor bonus, noting that ‘the structural development of Honorius’s sermon parallels that of his predecessor, but with striking differences in emphasis and interpretation of themes.’ Their differences were further demonstrated during Honorius’s pontificate. Readings from Innocent’s sermons had been compiled into a breviary by a papal chaplain who held them in ‘a somewhat inflated regard’, inserting them alongside the traditional readings from Saints Augustine, Leo, and Gregory - Honorius was perhaps making a statement of opinion on Innocent’s sermons when he had these readings removed from his own revision of the breviary; Moore sums

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150 Powell, ‘Sermons’, 531-32.
up that Honorius ‘was not so impressed’. Powell has also drawn attention to Honorius’s outspoken concern in compiling his own sermon collection to explain the authorities that he relied on - making his work distinct from the collections of his predecessors (whilst relying on the traditional authorities). Arguably this impulse to ‘go his own way’ is also found in the arengae examined above.

After all, it has long been recognised by historians that Innocent’s theological works were not stunningly original. Pennington wrote that Innocent’s theological tracts ‘are of pedestrian quality ... [and] very similar to contemporary theological tracts which were produced in Paris.’ Innocent received his formal theological education ‘in the late 1170s in the School of Pastoral Theology within the nascent University of Paris.’ It was not inevitable that Honorius - a man of humble origins - would simply follow in the footsteps of his Paris-educated predecessor in his theology. Indeed, that Honorius was not educated in Paris, together with his immediate removal of Innocent’s chancellor on accession, might explain the different nuances in his arengae.

Conclusions

Honorius III’s arengae from his crusade letters demonstrate elements both of continuity and innovation from Innocent III’s pontificate. Whilst traditional topoi and theological justifications feature in Honorius’s arengae, one also finds a

distinct theology expressed using different scriptural allusions to his predecessor. Honorius emerges as an important influence on the creation and development of arengae. His fingerprints (or those of his staff) can be found on significant additions to arengae such as Cum is qui secundum, and also on Quia celestia simul, which the evidence suggests is one of his original creations, hitherto unappreciated in the history of papal diplomatic. Had Honorius simply revised Innocent’s arengae from the old curial letters of his predecessors, it could arguably be considered as a conscious effort to continue the theological justifications of predecessors. Yet by taking the initiative in developing bespoke crusade arengae, he propounded a theology which was similar, but crucially distinct, to that of Innocent III. Honorius’s theology found in his arengae was therefore not a mere continuation of Innocent’s theological stance, but something more complex and original, and is also an area of crusade administration in which the pope took a proactive role.
Chapter 5

The Deployment of Legates

Papal legates played a role of the uppermost importance in the organisation of the Holy Land crusade under Honorius III. As representatives of the pope, legates acted as intermediaries between the Roman curia and the royal courts of the West, the local Church hierarchy, and the crusaders. Honorius deployed legates to fulfil a number of roles: to continue his negotiations with lay powers, such as Frederick II; to make peace between the kingdoms of England and France, and among the Italian communes; to reform the Church and eradicate heresy in southern France; to shore up the recently acquired Latin Empire of Constantinople; to preach the crusade and collect the crusade tax; and finally, to represent him on the Fifth Crusade itself. Understanding the roles of these ‘middle men’ is crucial to comprehending papal diplomacy and Church government more broadly, yet the roles of legates, their mandates, duties, and powers, has often been glossed over and generalised, something which is especially apparent in the historiography on Pelagius, Honorius’s crusade legate.

This chapter seeks to fill an historiographical gap by providing a thematic analysis of Honorius’s legates, and also to reconcile two distinct historiographies, that on legates and that on the Fifth Crusade. The aim is to arrive at a nuanced understanding of the role of legates in promoting and conducting crusading. It first addresses the appointment of legates and their powers. This is followed by
studies of legates’ roles as peacemakers in northern Italy and England whose purpose was to benefit the Holy Land crusade, and of Pelagius’s role in the course of the Fifth Crusade. This chapter locates the work of these legates in the context of the overall effort made by Honorius to organise and support crusading to the Holy Land, and demonstrates further aspects of responsive papal government in action.

The existing scholarly work on Honorius’s legates is far from comprehensive, and a detailed study of his deployment of legates to prepare for the crusade has yet to be attempted.¹ Powell conducted a short survey of the topic, but his research tails off with the end of the Fifth Crusade in 1221 and does not explore the later years of Honorius’s pontificate.² Others, such as Kate Norgate, Sayers, David Carpenter, and Fred Cazel Jr, have discussed the legates’ work for peace in England during Honorius’s reign, but do not always place it against a background of Honorius’s wider diplomatic affairs.³

Some of Honorius’s individual legates have received attention, such as Falko Neininger’s study of Conrad of Urach, and Vincent’s edition of the ‘acta’ of the legate Guala Bicchieri, which features a detailed introduction.⁴ Other relevant studies by Helene Tillmann, Christine Thouzellant, Anton Pokorny, and Heinrich

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¹ On papal legates and delegates in general and for a comprehensive summary of the state of research, see Claudia Zey and Maria Pia Alberzoni, ‘Legati e delegati papali (secoli XII-XIII): stato della ricerca e questioni aperte’, in eaedem, eds., Legati, 3-27.
² Powell, Anatomy, 67-84.
⁴ Neininger, Konrad; Charters, ed. Vincent.
Zimmermann are useful in sketching out the details of legates’ movements and actions during their commissions.5

One of Honorius’s legates in particular, Pelagius, cardinal-bishop of Albano, has attracted considerable attention and criticism in the historiography. Because Pelagius was the papal representative on the crusade in possession of plenary powers, historians have circled around the carcass of his reputation for the easy pickings on offer. It is often claimed that he had an arrogant personality and an alleged blotch on his record from an earlier legation to the Latin Empire of Constantinople (1213-15) under Innocent III.

In 1936 René Grousset displayed no hesitation in attributing the failure of the entire Fifth Crusade to Pelagius - it seemed clear to him that it was the fault of the legate alone.6 Grousset thought that in Pelagius’s opposition to John of Brienne over the decision-making of the crusade leadership, he proved himself uncompromising, full of pride and driven by fanaticism.7 Grousset quoted the diatribe against Pelagius’s earlier actions in the Latin Empire by the later Greek historian George Akropolites (1217-82) without question, and thus thought that in opposing John, Pelagius was simply reprising the haughty attitude that he had already adopted towards the Greeks.8

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7 Ibid., 250.
8 Ibid.
Runciman’s opinion of Pelagius in 1954 was that he was ‘a man of great industry and administrative experience, but singularly lacking in tact’.9 Whilst not attributing the crusade’s failure to the legate alone, Runciman thought that ‘Pelagius was a haughty, tactless and unpopular man whose faults as a general were revealed by the last disastrous offensive’.10 Van Cleve likewise propounded a damning verdict on Pelagius’s personality in 1969, criticising him as ‘imperious, proud, headstrong, and dogmatic’.11 In 1988 Mayer maintained a similarly critical judgement of Pelagius, whom he considered ‘a man of driving energy but hopelessly shortsighted, autocratic, self-satisfied, and uncommonly pigheaded’.12 Like Grousset, Mayer stated that the Fifth Crusade failed ‘dismally owing to the legate’s pigheadedness’.13

A number of historians have nevertheless put forward more favourable views of Pelagius. In 1950 Donovan wrote that the Fifth Crusade did not fail because of the legate, even though the available evidence points to him as the culprit for the final defeat.14 Demetrio Mansilla shifted the blame away from the legate in 1953, and concluded that the failure of the crusade was not the fault of Pelagius, but the apathy and selfishness of the military leaders.15 Powell published the most sympathetic and nuanced assessment of Pelagius’s role in 1986, stating that the legate was not to blame for the entire crusade’s failure, but conceding that ‘Pelagius and Duke Louis of Bavaria share the responsibility for the decision that

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9 Runciman, Crusades, 155.
10 Ibid., 170.
12 Mayer, Crusades, 223.
13 Ibid., 227.
14 Donovan, Pelagius, 95-96.
impelled the army to its fate.' In the wake of Powell’s work, historians have generally avoided making the sweeping, one-sided judgements on Pelagius’s personality that had previously dominated the historiography, but nevertheless, remnants of Pelagius’s reputation for arrogance linger on.

Stürner noted that Pelagius’s tenacity as much as his arrogance had been demonstrated by the legation to the Latin Empire, and in 1992 wrote that the legate worked passionately to spur the crusade on, but without noticing, or caring, that his actions created enemies and jeopardised the whole undertaking. Stürner’s view echoed that of Werner Maleczek, who had written of Pelagius’s two-sided personality in 1984, which brought enthusiasm and success to the crusade, but also created tensions in the crusader camp. In 2008 Norman Housley stated that it would be wrong to attribute the blame for the crusade’s military defeat to Pelagius alone, when he was advised and had the counsel of others. The historiographical debate thus swirls around Pelagius’s personality, the mandate awarded him by Honorius, and his role in the military leadership of the crusade - these issues will be examined in this chapter and placed into the context of other contemporary legations.

Appointment and Powers

The pope’s choice of legate was an important matter. A legate a latere was invested with the same powers as the pope in his territory of legation (known as

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16 Powell, *Anatomy*, 191. See also, Powell, ‘Church and Crusade’, 255.
19 Norman Housley, *Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land* (New Haven, CT, 2008), 192.
his *provincia* by thirteenth-century canon lawyers), and therefore it was crucial that a legate could be relied on to act not only as a determined representative of the pope, but also as one who could deal with contentious matters sensitively.\(^{20}\) Carpenter’s assessment of one of Honorius’s legates in England, Pandulf, bishop of Norwich, as confident and determined, but also tactful, summarises the ideal traits for a papal legate, although it was a fine balancing act to achieve.\(^{21}\)

Legates *a latere* were most often chosen from the College of Cardinals, a circle of top-ranking churchmen who acted as the pope’s ‘closest advisers and collaborators’ (on the different classifications of legates, see below).\(^{22}\) As an institution, the College tended to outlive reigning popes: a large carryover of cardinals can be witnessed from the reign of Celestine III to that of Innocent III, and then in turn to that of Honorius.\(^{23}\) Whilst it has been claimed that Honorius flooded the College with kinsmen on his accession, removing Innocent’s appointments in the process, in fact, as I have argued elsewhere, he only made six appointments, and most of his cardinals were actually appointed by Innocent.\(^ {24}\) The relatively static membership of the College ensured that the pope had a select group experienced churchmen, up-to-speed on current diplomatic affairs, from which to appoint legates *a latere*.


\(^{21}\) Carpenter, *Minority*, 133.

\(^{22}\) Robinson, *Papacy*, 90, 92.

\(^{23}\) See the prosopographical study of the College of Cardinals in Maleczek, *Kardinalskolleg*.

The pope could also employ high-ranking clergy from outside the College to act as ambassadors; for instance Innocent III used the Cistercian Gerald, abbot of Casamari, to negotiate between England and France in 1203-04. As Bolton writes: ‘such sensitive diplomatic negotiations required trusted men, well-informed and authoritative who could also appear neutral and impartial. That Innocent should have turned to the Cistercians of the Patrimony ... should not surprise us.’ That two of Honorius’s six appointments to the College were Cistercians reveals a similarly high regard for the Order. It is important to remember that the pope’s choice of diplomats and legates could extend beyond the College, which Honorius demonstrated with his selection of Pandulf, bishop of Norwich, as legate to England (see below).

Studying the earlier careers of the legates despatched by Honorius reveals no fixed pattern to elucidate why one legate was chosen over another for a particular task. While some cardinals appear to have been selected because of their previous experience, others were plucked from relative obscurity for high profile legations. It is interesting to note for instance, that Guala, cardinal-priest of S. Martino, had a history of mediating between Italian communes before he was sent as a peacemaker to England in 1216, which may explain his selection as Bolton suggests. In July 1207, Innocent III had employed him as legate to settle disputes between Florence and Siena, and on 4 September 1210 he brokered a peace between Todi and Amelia on one side, and Orvieto on the other. During his

27 Conrad of Urach and Nicholas da Chiaromonte were both made cardinals in 1219.
legation to France in 1208-09, one of Guala’s responsibilities was to preach the Holy Land crusade.29 Innocent III sent him to England, possibly at King John’s request, to deal with the baronial revolt, to preach the Holy Land crusade, to make peace between England and France, and to collect funds for the crusade.30 Guala arrived on 20 May 1216. Following Innocent’s death, rather than recalling the legate for replacement, Honorius immediately confirmed Guala’s legation.31

On Guala’s resignation from office as legate to England in 1218, Pandulf was chosen as his replacement. Pandulf hailed from Monte Cassino in southern Italy. Nothing is known about his career before 1211 when he worked in England as a nuncio, except that he was a subdeacon under Innocent III.32 Pandulf’s role as nuncio continued (encompassing several trips to and from the curia) until 1215, and included the duties of collecting Peter’s Pence, acting as a judge delegate, and as Innocent’s representative, receiving King John’s homage for the kingdom in 1213.33 In 1215 he was elected to the see of Norwich (but not consecrated until 1222), and by January 1217 was appointed chamberlain by Honorius.34 Pandulf gained important diplomatic experience, acting on John’s behalf in negotiations in Wales and France in 1213, and at Runnymede in 1215.35

29 Maleczek, Kardinalskolleg, 142; Charters, ed. Vincent, p. xxxv.
30 Charters, ed. Vincent, pp. xxxviii-xxxix.
31 Maleczek, Kardinalskolleg, 143-45; Tillmann, Legaten, 109.
32 Nicholas Vincent, ‘The Election of Pandulph Verracclo as Bishop of Norwich (1215)’, Historical Research, 68 (1995), 156.
33 Ibid.
35 Vincent, ‘Pandulph’, 156.  

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There was a precedent for Honorius’s selection of Hugolino, cardinal-bishop of Ostia, as legate for important political affairs. When Honorius appointed Hugolino as a peacemaker in northern Italy on 31 January 1217, he perhaps called to mind Hugolino’s legation of 1207-09, when Innocent III had used him to mediate between the two candidates vying for the imperial throne, Philip of Swabia and Otto of Brunswick. Therefore a tenuous parallel can be drawn between the careers of Guala and Hugolino, who had experience of peacemaking before their deployment by Honorius.

The pope also chose legates for important missions who seem to have had little or no background in political affairs. We possess little information to help us understand the appointment of Bertrand, cardinal-priest of SS. Giovanni e Paolo (1217- after 1221), as legate to the south of France, making it difficult to speculate about why he was chosen for the Languedoc legation. He had been created cardinal-deacon of S. Giorgio in Velabro, most likely on 19 May 1212, by Innocent III. Bertrand had worked as an auditor at the curia under Innocent, and occasionally subscribed papal privileges. On 7 January 1217 Honorius promoted Bertrand to become cardinal-priest of SS. Giovanni e Paolo, just before appointing him as legate to Languedoc on 19 January.

Conrad of Urach, cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina, was appointed to replace Bertrand as legate to Languedoc. Prior to his appointment, Conrad had been abbot of Citeaux. Arriving in Rome to negotiate privileges for the Cistercian Order, he was consecrated as cardinal-bishop of Porto e S. Rufina by Honorius on

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36 Zimmermann, Legation, 73; Maleczek, Kardinalskolleg, 129-30.
37 Maleczek, Kardinalskolleg, 170; Pokorny, Wirksamkeit, 3-4; Zimmermann, Legation, 72.
6 January 1219.\textsuperscript{38} Conrad was appointed as legate to Languedoc probably in December 1219, and left the curia in early 1220, carrying out this office until 1223, when he successfully requested that he be recalled to the curia.\textsuperscript{39} Honorius subsequently employed Conrad again as legate to Germany between 1224 and 1226 to preach Frederick II’s crusade.\textsuperscript{40} It seems likely that Conrad was selected for the German legation because he was related to Frederick in four or five degrees through his mother.\textsuperscript{41}

Roman, cardinal-deacon of S. Angelo (1216-31), had no legatine experience before being despatched to southern France to replace Conrad. Again we know little of the origins and upbringing of Roman, although Maleczek suggests that he might have belonged to the Bonaventura family. He was created cardinal-deacon of S. Angelo by Innocent III in his last appointment, and undersigned his first papal privilege on 11 April 1216. Before his appointment as legate, he had acted as an auditor at the curia from 1216, and held the position of rector of Campagna and Marittima, an administrative division of the Papal State, between 1220 and 1222. The highlights of his career at the curia were his appointments as legate to Languedoc, first by Honorius from 1225-27, and then after Honorius’s death by Gregory IX from 1228-30.\textsuperscript{42} This reappointment must have stemmed from a favourable opinion of his first legation.

\textsuperscript{38} Neininger, \textit{Konrad}, 157.
\textsuperscript{40} Neininger, \textit{Konrad}, 64; Pokorny, \textit{Wirksamkeit}, 18; Zimmermann, \textit{Legation}, 82-83.
\textsuperscript{41} Neininger, \textit{Konrad}, 75; Smith, ‘College’.
\textsuperscript{42} Maleczek, \textit{Kardinalskolleg}, 189.
The legate despatched by Honorius to the Latin Empire, John Colonna, cardinal priest of S. Prassede (1217-45), began his career in the papal chapel, and in May 1206 was created cardinal-deacon of SS. Cosmo e Damiano by Innocent III, undersigning his first papal privilege on 8 June 1206. John’s sphere of activity was not at the curia, and he rarely operated as an auditor. Rather he worked in diplomacy, the administration of the patrimony of St Peter and its military defence. He was probably promoted on 18 February 1217 to be cardinal-priest of S. Prassede by Honorius, and undersigned a privilege on 4 March 1217. Soon after his promotion, John was made rector of Campagna by Honorius, but then was shortly appointed as legate to the Latin Empire, perhaps in view of his experience, on 21 April 1217.\textsuperscript{43} John’s legation lasted until 1222.\textsuperscript{44}

The most controversial legate appointed by Honorius was Pelagius. We are fortunate to possess relatively full documentation regarding his appointment, and the close study of this material provides an important case study for the process of appointing legates more broadly. Pelagius was a Spaniard, and given his connections, in all likelihood came from León.\textsuperscript{45} Innocent III had elevated Pelagius to the College of Cardinals in 1206/07 when he was made cardinal-deacon of S. Lucia in Septasolio. Pelagius acted as an auditor hearing litigation at the curia, and was promoted to become cardinal-priest of S. Cecilia in 1211, and then again to cardinal-bishop of Albano in 1213. In the same year, Innocent III gave Pelagius the Latin Empire legation.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 157-58; Zimmermann, \textit{Legation}, 74.  
\textsuperscript{44} Zimmermann, \textit{Legation}, 74.  
\textsuperscript{45} Mansilla, ‘Pelayo’, 13.  
\textsuperscript{46} Maleczek, \textit{Kardinalscolleg}, 166-67.
There is a sense in the historiography that Pelagius overstepped his authority on the Fifth Crusade, and went off the rails by exceeding his mandate. Van Cleve wrote that:

Imperious, proud, headstrong, and dogmatic, over-conscious, perhaps, of the lofty position to which he had been elevated by the pope, and literal in his interpretation of his mandate, Pelagius did not hesitate to interfere in the making of military decisions instead of deferring to the judgment of experienced commanders.\(^{47}\)

Similarly, Mayer thought it a shame that Robert of Courçon, cardinal-priest of S. Stefano in Celiomonte, who was accompanying the crusade, died, because Pelagius needed someone ‘to hold him in check.’\(^{48}\) Nonetheless, the most important source for assessing whether Pelagius exceeded his authority, the pope’s letter of appointment to Pelagius, has not been published or analysed in print by scholars.\(^{49}\) For a start, there is uncertainty regarding the timing of Pelagius’s appointment as legate to the East. Donovan put forward a date of July 1217.\(^{50}\) This was then followed by Honorius’s grant to Pelagius of full authority for the Fifth Crusade on 12 June 1218.\(^{51}\) Mansilla and Powell, on the other hand, have claimed June 1218 as the date of Pelagius’s appointment.\(^{52}\)

So which is correct? At the end of July 1217 Honorius issued a flurry of documents concerning Pelagius. On 24 July, Honorius granted Pelagius - as cardinal-bishop of Albano, rather than as legate - his requests to have his

\(^{47}\) Van Cleve, ‘Fifth Crusade’, 403.
\(^{48}\) Mayer, Crusades, 223.
\(^{49}\) Transcribed in full in the appendix.
\(^{50}\) Donovan, Pelagius, 31, and n. 24, n. 25.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., 44.
\(^{52}\) Mansilla, ‘Pelayo’, 33; Powell, Anatomy, 124.
possessions in Albano confirmed according to the example of Innocent III, holdings which included its hot baths, the hill called Sol et Luna, the episcopal palace, and all the appurtenances that went with the position.\textsuperscript{53} On the same day Honorius wrote a letter to a number of Italian clergy which notified them of the planned meeting of crusade contingents on Cyprus.\textsuperscript{54} This letter explicitly referred to Pelagius as apostolice sedis legatus. The next day, Honorius issued a letter to Pelagius as legate, entrusting to him the safeguarding of Raymond-Rupen, prince of Antioch, who had been taken under papal protection.\textsuperscript{55} Another letter on the same topic was also issued to Pelagius on 27 July.\textsuperscript{56}

After July Honorius issued a number of letters regarding Pelagius’s legation. On 31 August the pope responded to the dean and chapter of Antioch, who had chosen Pelagius as their new patriarch, deftly deflecting their decision on account of Pelagius’s desire to continue serving the Roman curia.\textsuperscript{57} That Pelagius was in such demand, and that he was chosen for such an important position in addition to his appointment as legate for the crusade, suggest that contemporaries held him in high regard (at least before the crusade). On 8 May 1218 Honorius issued another letter to Pelagius on the duties of his forthcoming legation and

\textsuperscript{53} Opera, ed. Horoy, ii, 474-76; Pressutti 674.
\textsuperscript{54} Reg. Vat. 9, 138r; Pressutti 672.
\textsuperscript{55} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 142r: ‘fraternitati tue per apostolica scripta mandamus quatinus eos contra protectionem nostram non permittas super permisssis ab aliquibus illicite molestari.’; Pressutti 675.
\textsuperscript{56} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 142v: ‘per apostolica scripta mandantes quatinus ipsum ob reverentiam apostolice sedis et nostram in iure suo taliter manuteneas et defendas’; Pressutti 682.
\textsuperscript{57} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 151v: ‘Nuntii quos cum litteris vestris ad nostram presentiam destinastis, viri utique providi et fideles a nobis consueta benignitate recepti, pro postulatione quam de venerabili fratre nostro Pelagio episco Albanensi fecistis’; Pressutti 760; Bernard Hamilton, The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church (London, 1980), 224.
ordered him to settle the conflict between the archbishop of Tyre and the Venetians.\textsuperscript{58}

It is clear then that Pelagius was designated as legate \textit{a latere} for the Fifth Crusade in July 1217. He was not, however, issued with his written appointment mandate, which set out his authority as legate \textit{a latere}, until July 1218, when he was about to depart on crusade. In fact, Honorius despatched a letter to all the clergy in \textit{outremer} and the crusade army on 18 May 1218 setting out Pelagius’s powers before he had even issued Pelagius with his personal written mandate.\textsuperscript{59} This was presumably issued first so that the letter would arrive before the legate.

In the letter of 18 May, Honorius employed the standard formula praising Pelagius as a man of ‘prudence, honesty, and knowledge’, and stated that his mission was to maintain harmony among the crusaders.\textsuperscript{60} Honorius was not appointing Pelagius as a military leader of the crusade, but as its spiritual leader. The recipients were ordered to receive Pelagius honourably and to observe his orders strictly. It was standard practice to quote Jeremiah 1:10 in legates’ appointment mandates, awarding them vague and wide-ranging powers ‘to root up and to pull down, to destroy and to overthrow, to build and to plant’.\textsuperscript{61} Honorius

\textsuperscript{58} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 250r: ‘fraternitati tue per apostolica scripta mandamus quatinus eundem archiepiscopum super possessione ipsius ecclesie quam felicis memorie Innocentii papae predecessoris noster causa rei servande assignavit eidem, non permittens indebite molestari.’; Pressutti 1298. See also Pressutti 1540.

\textsuperscript{59} Mansilla, ‘Pelayo’, 33.

\textsuperscript{60} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 265r: ‘venerabili fratri nostro Pelagio Albanensi episcopo apostolice sedis legato, viro itaque prudentia, honestate, scientia, et benignitate conspicuo laborem peregrinationis in iuncximus, ut exercitum Domini cum humilitate procedens, concordes in concordia foveat, et ad pacem revocet impacatos.’; Pressutti 1350.

\textsuperscript{61} This quotation from Jeremiah 1:10 was the standard formula used by the papacy when appointing legates \textit{a latere}: Paul C. Ferguson, \textit{Medieval Papal Representatives in Scotland: Legates, Nuncios, and Judges-Delegate}, 1125-1286 (Edinburgh, 1997), 17-18. It was a favourite phrase of Innocent III to justify the doctrine of papal primacy, see: Imkamp, \textit{Kirchenbild}, 276; Moore, \textit{Innocent}, 256.
also granted Pelagius special powers usually reserved to the pope so that nothing might impede him, although these went unexplained.  

Legates were granted a general mandate by nature of their appointment, which could be supplemented with ‘papal reserved powers’ at the time, or later in response to necessity (such as Guala’s requests, below).  

The grant of special powers extended the general mandate to include specific privileges, which Innocent III considered to include the absolution of excommunicates who had committed violence against members of the clergy, the transfer of bishops, and the division or unification of bishoprics.  

The scope of these reserved powers was not set in stone, however, and thirteenth-century decretalists differed on the number and extent of these powers.  

A manageable example is supplied by Johannes Teutonicus (d.1245/46), who compiled a list of sixteen reserved powers in his gloss to the canon law collection *Compilatio tertia*.  

By contrast,

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62 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 265r: ‘Volumus autem et districte vobis precipiendo mandamus, ut ipsum legatum sicut personam nostram immo nos in eo devote recipere ac honorifice tractare curetis, salubria monita et statuta ipsius que per se vel per nuntios aut litteras suas duxerit facienda suscipientes humiliter et inviolabili observantes. Alioquin sententiam quam rationabiliter tulerit in rebelles, ratam haberi volumus et firmiter observari. Nos enim ei officium plene legationis commisisimus, ut in terris sue legationis commissis, evellat et destruat, edificet atque plantet, prout queque sollicitudine sua cognoverit indigere, reformando statum Christianitatis in illis que de paganorum manibus fuerint liberate, et que statuenda secundum Deum et fidei catholicam viderit statuendo, concessa ei plenaria potestate, ut cum necesse fuerit, vice nostra illa etiam exequatur, que nostro sunt speciali privilegio reservata, firmiter inhibentes nequis processum ipsius frustratorio appellantionis objectu audeat impediere.’; Pressutti 1350.  
64 Ibid., 193.  
65 Ibid., 196-97.  
66 To quote Figueira, the papal reserved powers according to Johannes Teutonicus were: ‘questions of faith; “major matters” (*majora negotia*); depositions, restitutions, and transfers of bishops; transfers of confirmed bishops-elect; the acceptance of episcopal resignations; the exemption of bishops from metropolitan control; dispensations in cases of major crimes; adjustment of onerous local customs; commutation of vows; the convocation of universal councils; absolution of persons excommunicated by himself or by his judges-delegate; the granting of a benefice or prebend that is not yet vacant (i.e., the grant of an expectancy); and the capability to adjudicate an original complaint or even an appeal to the neglect of all other judicial instances.’ Ibid., 196.
Hostiensis (d.1271) identified no fewer than sixty-three papal reserved powers. These differences are testament to Vincent’s statement that ‘there was no such thing as a typical legation ... the office of legate was subject to great flexibility, governed as much by individual circumstances as by any general set of rules.’ The special powers granted to Pelagius were by no means unique to him; indeed, Honorius had also granted them to other legates, such as John Colonna. Pelagius thus had the full backing of the pope and was not to be hindered in any way when executing his office as legate.

Finally, on 12 June 1218, Honorius issued his written appointment mandate to Pelagius. The terms of the appointment matched the previous month’s letter to those in outremer. Honorius awarded his full powers as legate a latere for his mission in ultramarinum provinciam, as well as his special reserved privileges, and the pope counselled him to use these powers prudently and with discretion. It is clear that Pelagius was charged by the pope to act as his true plenipotentiary, with almost no limits on his actions. This makes it difficult to reconcile Van Cleve and Mayer’s claims about Pelagius’s abuse of his power with the appointment letter itself, which set no written limits on his powers, although disgruntled parties reserved the right to appeal to the pope about a legate’s

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67 Ibid., 197 and his appendix 2, 206-11.
68 Charters, ed. Vincent, p. xlvi.
69 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 14r: ‘Cum te in imperio Romanie de fratrum nostrorum consilio a latere nostro duxerimus destinandum, plene legationis officium tue discretioni committimus, ut evellas, destruas, dissipes, edifices, et plantes iuxta quod quelibet sollicitudine tua cognoveris indigere. Ut autem nichil tibi desit eorum que ad plenitudinem legationis pertinent exequenda, plenaria tibi auctoritate presentium concedimus facultatem, ut cum necesse fuerit vice nostra illa etiam exequaris, que nostro sunt speciali privilegio reservata firmiter inhibentes nequis processum tuum provocationis obiectu audeat impedire.’; Pressutti 1600.
70 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 265r; Pressutti 1433. This document has never before been edited; the full text of the appointment mandate is given in the appendix.
decisions. Before Pelagius’s departure Honorius continued to add to his duties in a number of letters issued to him throughout the rest of July; his mission was not merely a crusade legation. On 12 July the pope sent a letter to his legate, and copies to the masters of the Hospitallers and Templars, ordering them to defend the kingdom of Cyprus and the sons of the recently deceased King Hugh (1205-18). Honorius was concerned that turbulence in the kingdom would prove damaging to the Fifth Crusade. The next day Honorius also issued Pelagius a letter charging him to settle an episcopal dispute in Nicosia.

By the mid-thirteenth century three different classifications of legate existed, which contemporary canon lawyers defined thus: the most powerful was the legatus a latere, a plenipotentiary dispatched on high profile missions with full powers to act on the pope’s behalf; the legatus missus or nuncius apostolicus was entrusted with fewer powers, and performed the more limited functions of a messenger rather than a negotiator; and finally, the legatus natus was an honorific post awarded to a particular archbishopric that lacked the powers enjoyed by legates despatched from the curia. In addition to the office of legate, popes also employed judges-delegate in response to the increase in legal cases being presented at the curia. These categories were not fixed by Honorius’s

72 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 283r: ‘Ideoque fraternitati tue per apostolica scripta precipiendo mandamus quatinus reginam eandem cum filiis suis habens in quibus cum Deo poteris propensius commendatam, eos nec non regnum predictum a malignantium protegas incursibus et defendas, ita ut ibi omnes sub tua manentes defensione securi ab hiis qui eos forte molestare presumperint indebite non vexentur, et crucis negotium quod per hoc posset impediri de facili non turbetur.’; Pressutti 1524.
73 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 284r: ‘fraternitati tue per apostolica scripta mandamus quatinus quaturinus reginam eodem episcopo sicut iustum fuerit integre restituto, audias causam, et appellacione remota, debito fine decidas, faciens quo decreveris per censuram ecclesiasticum firmiter observari.’; Pressutti 1527.
74 Robinson, Papacy, 147-48; Ferguson, Representatives, 13-15.
75 Ferguson, Representatives, 13, 16.
pontificate, but they provide a useful guide to the representatives - mostly legates a latere - that he employed to handle crusade affairs.⁷⁶ Although there were clearly different levels of power awarded to legates a latere, such as the grant of papal reserved powers, there appears to have been a degree of flexibility in what limits were placed on the legates’ powers. Thirteenth-century canon lawyers skirted around any restrictions on legates’ powers by awarding extensive authority to all legates a latere, regardless of whether they only possessed a general mandate or had been endowed with extraordinary powers.⁷⁷

**Peacemaking and the Crusade**

Honorius employed legates in the West in a number of roles to support the Holy Land crusade. In addition to acting as tax collectors (see chapter six), legates functioned as preachers and recruiters. Honorius relied upon legates, along with the local Church hierarchy and charismatic individual preachers such as Oliver of Paderborn, as the main channels through which to disseminate crusade ‘propaganda’.⁷⁸ It is the role of peacemaker, however, in itself closely tied to recruitment, which emerges most prominently from Honorius’s registers. This section examines legates as peacemakers in northern Italy and England - the most important flashpoints of conflict during Honorius’s pontificate.

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⁷⁶ For instance there has been no comprehensive study of the use of the term nuncius to describe papal representatives and whether this precluded the award of plenipotentiary powers: Robert C. Figueira, ‘The Classification of Medieval Papal Legates in the Liber Extra’, Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 21 (1983), 212.


⁷⁸ Maier, *Preaching*, 3-4.
The warring communes of northern Italy naturally came to the attention of the pope due to their geographical proximity, and their great - but wasted - potential to assist in the recovery of the Holy Land, especially the wealthy port cities of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice, which had traditionally been relied on to transport crusade armies by sea and to assist in naval warfare in the Holy Land. Hugolino was appointed to two legations in northern Italy, between 1217 and 1219, and again in 1221. Hugolino’s 1221 legation to the communes is extremely important for the study of papal government because he kept a register which sheds light on the minutiae of his actions that went unrecorded in Honorius’s own registers. Hugolino’s register allows us to extend our knowledge of his role a stage further, from the level of the papacy’s interaction with its legate, to that of the legate’s interaction with his province. The existence of Hugolino’s register allowed Thouzellier to reconstruct the legate’s very full itinerary for 1221. Hugolino’s efforts to pacify the fractured political states of northern Italy were vast, and he rarely stayed put in the same location, visiting a different commune to conduct negotiations almost every few days.

Hugolino’s legation and his register provide crucial evidence to support the argument for responsive papal government that underpins this thesis. His register proves that papal peace efforts in the West were not just a papal initiative

79 Manselli, ‘Onorio’, 145. For Venice’s preparations to transport the Fourth Crusade, see Thomas F. Madden, Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice (Baltimore, MD, 2003), 119-41. For Genoa’s role in the Fifth Crusade, see Steven A. Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996), 109-11.
80 Maleczek, Kardinalscolleg, 130-31; Zimmermann, Legation, 73, 78-79.
81 Registri dei Cardinali Ugolino d’Ostia e Ottaviano degli Ubaldini, ed. Guido Levi, Fonti per la storia d’Italia, 8 (Rome, 1890). It is probable that other legates also kept similar registers, now lost: H.G. Richardson, ‘Letters of the Legate Guala’, English Historical Review, 48 (1933), 250; Charters, ed. Vincent, pp. lxxxiv-lxxxv.
82 Thouzellier, ‘Légation’, 511-12.
83 Ibid.
that derived from a one-way level of interest of the pope attempting to impose peace on the unruly secular powers, with little effort made in return. In northern Italy at least, more of a two-way system can be discerned whereby the communes actively co-operated with the papal legate. Hugolino’s efforts were welcomed by many podestà who were suffering as a result of warfare with their rivals or owing to civil strife within their own cities.

A letter sent to Hugolino from Redolfus, the podestà of Cremona, in April 1221, painted a bleak picture of local warfare, and sought Hugolino’s assistance in sowing the seeds of peace (‘pacis semina seminare’) between Piacenza and the other Lombards. Hugolino’s register also records a letter dated 20 April 1221 from the podestà of Piacenza, Berlengerius Mastagius, in which he vowed to abide by the mandates of Hugolino for peace between the knights and the people of Piacenza, and promised to obey all of Hugolino’s orders. Honorius’s legate was certainly in demand. Other evidence that the communes actively co-operated with the legate is provided by letters in Hugolino’s register which show that not only did he travel out to meet with the podestà of various cities, but that the communes actually despatched ambassadors who travelled to meet with him. A letter of 28 July 1221 from the commune of Piacenza thanked Hugolino for all his exertions to bring peace and security to the city, and revealed that they sent to him Arnaldo Stricto and Rufino de Porta as representatives of the milites of Piacenza, and Gandulfo de Fontana and Alberto Sicamilice as ambassadors for the populi.

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85 Ibid., 16-17.
86 Ibid., 52-53.
During both legations, Hugolino’s peacemaking and recruitment met with good results. He enjoyed early success at Lucca in 1217, where the commune agreed to send a contingent of soldiers on the Fifth Crusade, supported financially by a tax of a fortieth raised by the commune. This successful pattern of peacemaking followed by procurement of a contingent of crusaders whose costs were paid by the commune became typical of Hugolino’s legation. His register for the year 1221 contains many letters sent to him from north Italian communes confirming just such agreements. To take one example, on 13 May 1221, in response to Hugolino’s request, Laurentius de Ricardo and Carbo Superaqua, messengers and ambassadors for the commune of Lodi, promised to send four fully-equipped knights to the Holy Land in the next passage for the duration of one year.

Hugolino’s tour of northern Italy encompassed all aspects of the papacy’s organisation of the crusade, being involved in preaching and tax collecting as well. Hugolino had been entrusted with the collection of the tax of a twentieth levied on Church income at the Lateran IV to help fund the Fifth Crusade, something which the pope made mention of in a letter of 20 June 1221 sent to Pelagius. Honorius played a crucial role in the organisation of the crusade by passing on information throughout Christendom and keeping legates informed of their counterparts’ activities. Making peace in northern Italy also had a knock-on effect for Honorius’s other concerns relating to the Fifth Crusade. Abulafia has

87 Powell, Anatomy, 71. For Lucca’s involvement in the crusades, see also Amedeo Pellegrini, ‘Le crociate in terrasanta e la parte che vi ebbero i Lucchesi (1095-1278)’, Studi e documenti di storia e diritto, 19 (1898), 379-91.
89 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 146v: ‘Preterea nos venerabili fratri nostro Hostiensis episcopo pro eodem negotio in Lombardiam et Tusciam destinato, et non modica de nostro erogata pecunia pro eundem, obtinimum procuravimus Terre Sancte succursum’; Pressutti 3478.
pointed out that the pacification of northern Italy smoothed Frederick II’s
coronation journey through territories that were fiercely opposed to him and had
supported the rival candidate Otto IV during the struggle for the imperial throne.90
The problem presented by warring communes raised its head once again in 1226
when the Lombard rebellion delayed Frederick’s long-promised crusade.91

The civil war in England also threatened the Fifth Crusade by preventing
English crusade contingents from departing and it endangered any future
prospects of Henry III fulfilling his vow. Honorius employed two legates in
England whose successes as peacemakers rivalled those of Hugolino. Since 1215
England had suffered from a civil war between the king and the rebel barons, a
conflict sparked in the reign of King John and carried over into the reign of his
young successor, Henry III, who took to the English throne aged only nine. The
protection of this young and vulnerable papal ward became an instant priority for
Honorius, who had also supported his father before him against the rebels. The
barons’ rebellion drew the French royal house of Capet into the war when Prince
Louis of France invaded England at the barons’ behest in May 1216.92 This did
little to alleviate Anglo-French tensions that centred on the rump of the Angevin
Empire remaining on the continent - another source of hostility that the pope
attempted to regulate.

During the barons’ rebellion in England the papacy tried to appear neutral,
although examination of Honorius’s correspondence reveals that he naturally

90 Abulafia, Frederick, 132-34.
91 Ibid., 158-59.
the Middle Ages (Berkeley, CA, 1986), 333.
favoured the royalists, as Innocent had done. Nevertheless, it was crucial for Guala and Pandulf’s roles as mediators to give the impression of neutrality. This was especially important because some of the rebel barons were also signed with the cross, and Honorius hoped to persuade them to fulfil their vows alongside royalist crusaders, something which would both help to stabilise the kingdom by exporting their violence abroad and also bolster the crusade in one fell swoop. It was in this light that Honorius wrote to Pandulf on 30 May 1220, praising him for his discreet and prudent execution of his office, and reassuring him that by continuing to act in such a way he would overcome the malice of his enemies.93

Non-papal sources corroborate the importance of executing the legatine office with neutrality and tact. The patent rolls of Henry III for 1220 record Pandulf’s important role as a mediator between the king and his barons.94 In the contemporary royalist political song *The Taking of Lincoln*, Guala found extreme praise as the ‘star of right’ and the ‘mirror of reason’, although this was perhaps unsurprising given that he found himself on the winning side.95 Whether the barons felt the same about the papal legates is a different matter.

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93 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 186v: ‘Quanto de persona tua gerimus fiduciam pleniorem scribendo tibi super diversis articulis iuxta quod ex parte tua frequenter a nobis a clericis tuis et nuntiis postulatur, tanto magis est tibi circumspectio necessaria ut in te videamur cum omnia prudenter feceris quievisse, nec aliquis cum multi tibi sint emuli, undique factis tuis ponentes insidias contra nos de te habeat materia obloquendi. Specialiter autem volumus, et per apostolica tibi scripta mandamus quatinus super castris regis et facto crucisignatorum et baronum Anglie cum ea prudentia et maturitate procedas, ut discretio tua tuorum superet malitiam emulorum, nec de te nobis improperari contingat, nec eisdem baronibus suscitandi aliquam turbatione in regno tempore tuo materia ministretur, ex qua quantumque levis existeret grave posset karissimo in Christo filio nostro regi Anglorum illustri et eidem regno periculum provenire.’; Pressutti 2464.


Guala played a pivotal role in bringing peace to England and used his full complement of ecclesiastical powers to change the course of the war. When Prince Louis left his troops in England in 1217 to gather support in France, Guala used the opportunity to turn many of the rebellious nobles to the king’s cause. Evidence from the ‘Barnwell Chronicle’ shows that Guala served as a ‘rallying point’ for those who supported Henry: after wielding his powers of excommunication and interdict the English clergy flocked to support the legate. Throughout the months of war with Louis’s invading force, Guala used his powers as legate to support the king’s cause and even signed Henry’s supporters with the cross and offered them remission of sins in return for their service.

Honorius was acutely aware of the importance of making the kingdom of England secure, and thus temporarily subjugated the needs of the Holy Land to those of the English king. On 17 January 1217, presumably in response to English requests, Honorius wrote to Guala allowing him to suspend the crusade vows of knights who were needed in England by Henry until the kingdom was in a more stable state. This letter was followed by another on 27 March 1219, this time sent to Pandulf, in which Honorius released English knights from their vows at the

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97 Memoriale, ed. Stubbs, ii, 234.
98 Carpenter, Minority, 28; Charters, ed. Vincent, p. xlii.
99 Reg. Vat. 9, fols 40v-41r: ‘Preterea licet ad subsidium Terre Sante ferventi desiderio aspiremus, tribulationibus tamen regis ac regni paterno compatientes affectu, dispensandi cum crucesignatis Anglie in fidelitate regia persistentibus, vel redire volentibus ad eandem, ut videlicet suspendant suorum executionem votorum, donec regni status dante Domino in melius reformetur, et interim ipsi regi sicut laudabiliter incepserunt, assistant fideliter et potenter, cum ex hoc sibi possint comparare gloriam apud homines, et meritum apud Deum, liberam tibi concedimus facultatem.’; Pressutti 244; Tillmann, Legaten, 112.
petition of the king because of their great utility to him. Pandulf was ordered to find a suitable alternative way for them to redeem their vows.\textsuperscript{100}

These two letters demonstrate Honorius’s ability to respond to the immediate needs of a country under threat from rebellion and invasion, whilst at the same time trying to support the Fifth Crusade. Through the pacification of England, English knights were able to depart on the Fifth Crusade where they played a noteworthy role. As Powell has noted, that the English contribution to the Fifth Crusade contained contingents led both by royalists and rebel barons was testament to the ability of the legates in England. Indeed, the force led by the staunch royalist Earl Ranulf of Chester could even count the prominent rebel Robert Fitz-Walter among its members.\textsuperscript{101} Peace between England and France would also allow the future Louis VIII to turn his attention towards the Albigensian Crusade.

After the victory of royalist forces at the battle of Lincoln on 20 May 1217 and the naval battle of Sandwich on 24 August, Louis had made peace with the king and his supporters near Kingston on 12 September, a treaty which was ratified by a larger assembly at Lambeth on 20 September.\textsuperscript{102} It is clear that Guala played a vital role in the peace negotiations with Louis. Once the prince had renounced his claim to the English throne, Guala released Louis from the sentence

\textsuperscript{100} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 83r: ‘Karissimus in Christo filius noster Henricus rex Anglorum illustris nobis fecit humiliter supplicari, ut cum quibusdam nobilibus et fidelibus suis crucesignatis sibi valde utilibus super voto crucis quod quidam eorum dando de bonis suis iuxta facultates proprias pro subsidio Terre Sancte affectant redimere, dispensare misericorditer dignaremur. Nos igitur eius precibus inclinati, discretione tue de qua plenam in Domino fiduciam obtinemus, per apostolica scripta mandamus quatinus personarum ac rerum circumstantiis provide circumspectos agas super hoc cum eis prout animarum suarum saluti et eiusdem Terre utilitati noveris expedire’, Pressutti 1959.

\textsuperscript{101} Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 77.

\textsuperscript{102} Carpenter, \textit{Minority}, 44; Tillmann, \textit{Legaten}, 113.
of excommunication.  

Honarius upheld his legate’s decision in a letter addressed to Louis on 13 January 1218 that confirmed the peace made by Guala.

Following Louis’s absolution, Guala had to tend to the wounds of a country torn asunder by civil war if there was to be any hope of English participation in the Fifth Crusade, reconciling noblemen who had previously fought one another, and uniting them under the young king. Guala had excluded the clergy from the terms of the Treaty of Kingston, and he meted out different levels of punishment to ecclesiastical and lay rebels. Guala treated the latter with leniency, and pardoned offenders, but he punished disloyal churchmen severely, and deprived some from office. The variation in punishment owed partially to the greater power that the legate could wield over the clergy, but primarily reflected the more heinous nature of their crime. They had not only rebelled against their anointed king, but had also disobeyed the clear and direct wishes of the pope and his legate.

Although Guala did not involve himself in the routine administration of the kingdom after the war, he did have a hand in important government decisions. Guala had built up a strong relationship with the appointed regent, William the Marshal (c.1147-1219), during the war, and continued to communicate with him on matters of state right up to the end of his legation, as

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103 Radulphi, ed. Stevenson, 186.
104 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 199v: ‘Cum igitur reprobato perversorum fallaci consilio qui te pravis suasionibus fascinantes impulerant, ut deserens imitanda progenitorum tuorum vestigia erigeres te contra Romanam ecclesiam matrem tuam humiliter sicut sapiens filius ad eius devotionem redieris mediante dilecto filio nostro Gualo tituli sancti Martini presbytero cardinali apostolice sedis legato faciendo pacem cum karissimo in Christo filio nostro Henrico rege Anglorum illustri’, Pressutti 1001.
106 Memoriale, ed. Stubbs, ii, 239; Tillmann, Legaten, 114. For a detailed analysis of Guala’s spoliation of rebel clerks, see Charters, ed. Vincent, pp. lxi-lxvi.
107 Carpenter, Minority, 52-53.
evidenced by a letter of 2 September 1218 discussing Louis’s detention of hostages in violation of the truce and advising William on how he should respond.\textsuperscript{108}

When Guala resigned his legation in September 1218, Pandulf was quickly appointed as the legate to England by Honorius on 12 September.\textsuperscript{109} Pandulf’s legation is not so well documented as Guala’s, although it is clear that he played a premier position in the government of England after the death of William the Marshal, when he formed part of a triumvirate with the justiciar, Hubert de Burgh, and the bishop of Winchester.\textsuperscript{110} As Guala’s successor, Pandulf was required to make a different type of peace to that made by Guala in the immediate aftermath of the war, and on beginning his legation he reversed some of his predecessor’s more stringent punishments on the clergy, releasing thirteen clerics from prison and restoring others to office.\textsuperscript{111} The dissimilarity between Guala and Pandulf’s actions are evidence of the free rein that was given to legates \textit{a latere} to make their own decisions. Whilst in communication with the pope during their missions, legates were allowed remarkable independence. They did not simply execute papal orders, but in England at least, played integral roles in royal decision-making as largely autonomous agents.

Guala and Pandulf both conducted legations that were extremely difficult but also successful, something that was recognised by Matthew Paris in the 1250s,

\textsuperscript{109} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 13r; Pressutti 1621; Radulphi, ed. Stevenson, 186; Carpenter, Minority, 93; Tillmann, Legaten, 116.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 19.
who applauded Pandulf’s execution of his office.\footnote{Flores Historiarum, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 3 vols, RS, 95 (London, 1890), ii, 173.} High praise indeed from a chronicler who according to Carpenter was ‘not in general a friend of papal legates’.\footnote{Carpenter, Minority, 254.} The positive write-up that Guala and Pandulf received from English commentators was a relatively rare occurrence for legates (see below). Vincent has pointed out, however, that Guala did attract some criticism for despoiling English clergy of their churches, supposedly without cause, and awarding them to his household.\footnote{Charters, ed. Vincent, p. xli.} Overall though, the roles performed by Guala and Pandulf do not appear to have been thought of as unwanted papal interference, but vital mediation that was positively welcomed.

When Pandulf resigned his legation on 26 July 1221, Honorius did not rush to replace him. The foundations of a stable kingdom had been laid by summer 1221.\footnote{Carpenter, Minority, 254-55.} With peace established, on 27 April 1223, and with Henry having reached the age of fifteen (and having made the transition in Roman law from \textit{pueritia} to \textit{adolescentia} at fourteen), Honorius felt able to exhort him to participate in the imperial crusade (see chapter three).\footnote{Pressutti 4262. On Henry’s majority, see Carpenter, Minority, 123-24, 240-41.} The pacification of England created a benefit for the Fifth Crusade in the form of enabling English nobles to leave the country, and held out the prospect of future involvement in crusading; that said, Honorius did not expect the young Henry to crusade whilst still in his minority.
Pelagius on the Fifth Crusade

Having established above that Pelagius’s legatine mandate was essentially limitless, one must move on to analyse the execution of his office on the Fifth Crusade, and the reactions of Honorius and other contemporaries to his actions. It is not the intention here to refight the course of the Fifth Crusade, and clashes of its principal actors, in print yet again.¹¹⁷ There is now a general consensus in the historiography that Pelagius did not take total control over the direction of the Fifth Crusade as soon as he arrived in Egypt in the autumn passage of 1218, but rather gradually assumed more influence as the crusade wore on, on account of his stable presence in a constantly changing leadership council, his access to the papal crusade tax (see chapter six), Frederick II’s absence, John of Brienne’s disputed role as leader, and Honorius’s full support.¹¹⁸ Pelagius and John of Brienne do seem to have clashed with each other, but they also collaborated successfully during the early stages of the crusade.¹¹⁹

As Powell has noted, although Pelagius and John found themselves on opposing sides over Sultan al-Kamil’s truce offer in autumn 1219, it was not until after the capture of Damietta in November that they publicly fell out over control of the city. Pelagius followed Honorius’s orders that gave him power over the division of conquered territories and acted to protect the interests of Frederick II, while John demanded that the city be joined to the kingdom of Jerusalem. This

¹¹⁷ The best account of the Fifth Crusade’s course remains Powell, Anatomy.
¹¹⁹ Powell, Anatomy, 145.
dispute was settled when Pelagius compromised and awarded John control of Damietta until Frederick’s arrival.\(^{120}\)

Regardless of commonplace statements in much of the historiography that Pelagius was an arrogant and proud individual - whether or not this is given as the main reason for the crusade’s failure - the legate’s personality cannot be discerned objectively within the sources. Scholars have attributed too much importance to the narrative sources composed after the crusade’s failure which display the clear agenda to find a scapegoat in the legate. Not enough weight has been given to the evidence committed to parchment before August 1221.

The *Chronique d’Ernoul*, composed in the West in the late 1220s, has often been quoted on the ominous arrival of Pelagius in Egypt.\(^{121}\) Ernoul wrote that when the cardinals Robert of Courçon and Pelagius arrived, it was a great misfortune for the crusade that the former died and the latter survived.\(^{122}\) Alberic of Trois Fontaines, writing between 1227 and 1241, judged Pelagius to have pushed for the final disastrous advance into the Egyptian interior in summer 1221 against the advice of John, and criticised him for gambling on capturing more cities when he should have been concentrating on holding Damietta.\(^{123}\) Burchard of Biberach (d. after 1231) recorded that it was Pelagius’s arrogance that led to failure.\(^{124}\) It is possible to find some favourable mentions of Pelagius in chronicle sources, such as Tolosanus of Faenza (d.1226), who refers to him as *legatus*.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., 163.
\(^{121}\) According to Professor Peter Edbury’s latest research into the dates and relationships of the Old French continuations of William of Tyre, presented in a paper at the Crusades and the Latin East Seminar, Institute of Historical Research, London, 5 December 2011.
\(^{122}\) *Chronique d’Ernoul*, ed. de Mas Latrie, 417.
dignissimus, and Lucas of Tui (d.1250), a fellow countryman of the Spaniard, who calls him ‘noble and prudent’ and portrays him as the appointed leader who was successful in capturing Damietta and its countless treasures.\(^{125}\) This evidence, composed in the West after the failure of the Fifth Crusade, should not be dismissed out hand, but it must be treated with caution given the distance of the authors from events.

While scholars have been quick to accept the later western sources, the favourable reports of Pelagius’s actions on the Fifth Crusade given in eyewitness accounts - admittedly by curialists - have been correspondingly underappreciated. Oliver of Paderborn wrote that when Damietta fell to the crusade, Pelagius was skilfully and vigilantly performing his role as legate.\(^{126}\) As Pelagius’s secretary on the crusade, it was certainly in Oliver’s best interest to link the legate’s role with the fall of Damietta.\(^{127}\) Nevertheless, Pelagius’s pivotal role in the capture of Damietta is corroborated by Jacques de Vitry’s letters back to the West.

In March 1220, Jacques wrote a letter to the pope that informed him of Pelagius’s involvement in the siege. Proving himself ‘wary, prudent, vigilant, and careful’ in spurring on the army to action, Pelagius led a group of soldiers who burned down the gate of Damietta’s outer wall and then the gate of the inner wall.\(^{128}\) According to Jacques, glory was thus delivered to the Roman Church and


\(^{126}\) Oliver, *Historia*, 224-25.

\(^{127}\) Runciman, *Crusades*, 483-84. Despite his role as Pelagius’s secretary, Runciman judges - rightly, I think - Oliver to be a surprisingly impartial witness to the Fifth Crusade.

\(^{128}\) Jacques, *Lettres*, 140-42. This letter is dated to March 1220 in *Letters*, ed. Barber and Bate, 117.
its legate. In another letter which Jacques had composed in two stages, on 14 and 22 September 1218, he also wrote to Honorius that the army had been pleased to receive Pelagius, whose arrival they had been eagerly awaiting. Pelagius’s arrival was thus perhaps not as ominous as Ernoul made out.

A weakness in the historiography on the Fifth Crusade is that the treatment of Pelagius by chroniclers has not been compared to that concerning other papal legates. It has largely escaped historians of the crusades that Pelagius was far from unique in attracting fierce criticism - in fact it was somewhat par for the course for a papal legate. Legates proved irresistible targets for chroniclers who loathed the representatives of papal authority sent to root up local ecclesiastical abuses, collect taxes, and settle disputes - there was after all, always likely to be at least one dissatisfied party in every dispute that was brought before a papal legate. Even Robert of Courçon, beloved of Ernoul and the French crusade contingent, had executed one of the most controversial legations of the early thirteenth century in France a few years before.

Honorius’s letters provide no evidence that Pelagius was discharging his office in a way that was anything but satisfactory to the pope. Maleczek has pointed out that Honorius never had a bad word to say about Pelagius. The pope’s letters demonstrate that despite being in close contact with the crusade

129 Jacques, Lettres, 142.
130 Ibid., 104.
132 Powell, Anatomy, 34.
133 Maleczek, Kardinalscolleg, 168.
army, and especially Pelagius, Honorius was content to let the legate make his own decisions, like the pope’s other representatives. Although the most important sources written during the crusade all present the views of curialists, if used critically, a more accurate depiction of Pelagius’s role on the Fifth Crusade can be reconstructed.

Honorius was obviously confident in the abilities of Pelagius, and him alone, to act as his representative. Despite the comment of Ernoul lamenting Robert of Courçon’s death - and Mayer’s repetition of it - the pope would never have allowed Robert to eclipse Pelagius if he had survived. It had not even been the pope’s idea to send Robert with the army. In a letter of 28 July 1218 to the French crusade contingent assembling at Genoa, Honorius granted their petition for Robert, who had recruited many of them, to accompany the army, but put it beyond doubt that Pelagius was the undisputed legate over the entire crusade, whom they were ordered to obey. The pope did not want partisanship to weaken the army. Honorius must have feared that if he did not spell out the distinct roles of Robert and Pelagius, his approval of the petition would have been taken as tacit approval for the French contingent to treat Robert as their own exclusive papal representative. In the end, Robert’s untimely death soon after he arrived in Egypt rendered the question a moot point, and, given the French

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134 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 1r: ‘Ad hec siquidem vobis assidue suggerenda misimus vobis ad petionem tuam fili comes Nivernensi dilectum filium nostrum Robertum tituli sancti Stephani in Celio Monte presbyterum cardinalem, ut sicut vir potens in opere ac sermone, proponat vobis secundum datam sibi a Deo prudentiam verbum Dei, cui legationis officium idcirco dare nequivimus, quia dudum ante quam ad nos pervenisset dicta petita, de consilio fratrum nostrorum venerabili fratri nostro Albanensi episcopo plenam legationem super totum cruceignatorum exercitum dederamus. Vos igitur predicationis verbum devote ac humiliter obedientes in his quos spectant ad legationis officium recurratis, cum opus fuerit ad episcopum antedictum, cui tamquam unico in partibus illis apostolice sedis legato, tam a vobis, quia a cruceignatis alii, volumus et precipimus humiliter obediri.’; Pressutti 1558.
contingent’s loyalty to Robert, probably circumvented the development of any further divisions in the already fragmented leadership.

It is clear that to Honorius, Pelagius’s role never changed from being that of a peacemaker in the army, charged with keeping it as united as possible so as to perform as an effective fighting force. His letters to the legate never questioned his judgement, and on only one occasion did the pope send orders to Pelagius that sought to direct the course of the crusade through his representative. On 2 January 1221, with Frederick II still delaying in the West, Honorius instructed Pelagius to investigate if a potential truce could be struck with the Muslims that would be to the advantage of the Holy Land, and to then report back.\textsuperscript{135} Pelagius dutifully wrote back with the terms of the truce, and in Honorius’s reply of 20 June 1221, the pope stated that they were both in agreement that the terms were unsatisfactory and that the army should await Frederick’s arrival.\textsuperscript{136} Aside from this occasion, Honorius trusted in Pelagius to direct his own actions according to his written mandate of June 1218.

Honorius was not imposing a policy for the crusade’s direction from the curia - Pelagius was largely a free agent. If anything, more influence can be detected in the other direction. Pelagius’s letters back to the curia caused the pope to take action on his behalf. For instance, on 28 July 1220, having received a letter from Pelagius that requested more support against al-Kamil, Honorius wrote to the papal chaplain and penitentiary, Conrad, \textit{scholasticus} of Mainz, ordering him

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{135}{Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 61v; Pressutti 2940.}
\footnotetext{136}{Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 146r: ‘Porro benigne receptis litteris tuis et consideratis que olim a parte altera sunt oblata, et que ad eadem noviter offeruntur, pactio in litteris ipsis expressa, cum iam dudum conditionem habere potuerimus eque bonam sicut te quasi statim quod Egyptum applicuisti acceprimus referente, grata nobis non potuerit existere vel accepta.’; Pressutti 3478.}
\end{footnotes}
to preach the crusade incessantly, and to organise preaching throughout Germany, so as to provide Pelagius with the reinforcements he had requested.137

Most of the pope’s letters to Pelagius were designed to bolster his faith and enthusiasm in the enterprise so as to keep the crusade host together until Frederick’s arrival. When word of the capture of Damietta in November 1219 reached Honorius, he replied in a letter issued to the army on 24 February 1220. This letter congratulated the crusaders on their triumph and urged them to continue following Pelagius whose leadership Honorius aligned with the biblical Joshua.138 Honorius went on to award Pelagius temporal and spiritual powers so as to prevent dissension and urged the crusaders to remain united in their undertaking.139 This award of temporal power was not a grant of full military control over the crusade as has been traditionally argued.140 Powell convincingly

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137 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 208v: ‘Sane licet sic feceris sicut de tua probitate fuimus opinati quia tamen prout ex litteris venerabili fratris nostri Albanensi episcopi apostolice sedis legati accepcimus caliph de Baldac cui ut Christiani nobis, blasphemie crucis intendunt, gentem suam ad succursum Sarracenorum qui sunt in partibus Damiate continuis exhortationibus et suis falsis indulgentiis excitavit, exercitusque Christianus sub spe adventus regii debilitatus est plurimum viris presertim potentibus destitutus, quod ad grave peccatum regis accedit, discretioni tue per apostolica scripta mandamus quatinus si hactenus diligenter nunc diligientius ad promovendum Crucis negotium et incessanter intendas, ad quod si non poites solus sufficere, alios de quorum circumsepectione confids tui constitutas per totam Alamanniam in eodem negotio adiutores.’; Pressutti 2580.

138 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 162r: ‘Quis scit si Deus quod faciendum tune innuit, nunc tandem fieri alto et incomprehensibili consilio sapientie sue velit, et quemadmodum per ipsius Isue ministerium voluit impiorum terram suo populo distribuere, ita et per ministerium venerabilis fratris nostri Pelagii Albanensi episcopi apostolice sedis legati quem quasi alterum Isue vobis ducem sua miseratione providit, infidelium terram velit ad utilitatem fidelium limitare.’; Pressutti 2338.

139 Reg. Vat. 10, fols 162r-62v: ‘Ne autem occasione terre vobis iam date a Domino vel sicut speramus in posturum dande aliqua quod absit inter vos possit dissensio suboriri, tam super iam acquisitis, quam decetero dante Domino acquirendis plenam ipsi legato, tam in temporalibus, quam in spiritualibus, commissimus potestatem, ita ut per se aut per alios libere illam exerceat prout res videbitur postulare. Ideoque universitatem vestram rogamus attentius et hortamur, per apostolica vobis scripta precipiendo mandantes quatinus eidem in predictis omnibus devote ac humilitate more solito intendatis.’; Pressutti 2338.

140 Runciman, Crusades, 165.
demonstrated that the grant referred to the division of spoils and conquered territories.\textsuperscript{141}

The exact nature of Pelagius’s command - whether he was a spiritual or military leader - on the crusade has proven a battleground for historians. Runciman thought that Pelagius proved himself a blundering general.\textsuperscript{142} According to Van Cleve however, Pelagius was forced to make military decisions in order to keep the army united.\textsuperscript{143} Mayer criticised Pelagius for playing an active part in the crusade’s military affairs, despite the contraventions of canon law.\textsuperscript{144} Powell has stated that Pelagius was never intended to be the crusade’s military leader, and that his role was to attend to the spiritual needs of the army.\textsuperscript{145}

Pelagius seems to have played his most important role as the army’s spiritual leader. After the crusader camp was devastated by a storm in November 1218 for instance, Pelagius ordered three days of fasting, prayers and processions before Damietta.\textsuperscript{146} Soon afterwards the other leaders sought the legate’s help and intercession with God. Powell stresses that the other leaders approached him as the expedition’s spiritual, rather than military, figurehead, and that it was not an attempt by the legate to seize military control.\textsuperscript{147} According to Powell, when Pelagius assumed a more prominent role during the winter of 1218-19, he

\textsuperscript{141} Powell, ‘Leadership’, 530-31; Powell, Anatomy, 180.
\textsuperscript{142} Runciman, Crusades, 170.
\textsuperscript{143} Van Cleve, ‘Fifth Crusade’, 403.
\textsuperscript{144} Mayer, Crusades, 223.
\textsuperscript{145} Powell, Anatomy, 115.
\textsuperscript{146} Oliver, Historia, 191; Gesta obsidionis Damiate, in Quinti, ed. Röhrich, 81.
\textsuperscript{147} Powell, Anatomy, 147-48.
‘continued to work within the framework of the collective leadership that prevailed in the army.’\textsuperscript{148}

In the opinion of Oliver of Paderborn, after the capture of Damietta the army fell into sinful idleness.\textsuperscript{149} Pelagius repeatedly pushed for action to try and keep the army unified and to prevent the host disintegrating through inactivity. This seemingly hawkish behaviour was perfectly in line with his orders from Honorius - Pelagius was merely fulfilling his original mandate. It has also been pointed out by Powell that the legate’s calls to attack were probably made in cooperation with the other leaders beforehand, and that he was acting on their behalf.\textsuperscript{150} Pelagius was not, and could not be, the crusade’s sole leader. Indeed, Oliver of Paderborn candidly records that many of the crusaders, to their shame, refused to follow the legate’s exhortations. After the capture of Damietta, Pelagius assembled the other leaders and urged them to attack the sultan’s camp, but was ignored because the knights were against his proposal.\textsuperscript{151} Pelagius then pitched his tents away from the main camp in an attempt to inspire others in favour of action to join him. This was also a failure, even among mercenaries in his pay.\textsuperscript{152} The legate therefore did not have unchallenged command over the crusade; in fact he appears somewhat impotent at this point.

Pelagius’s actions throughout 1220 reflected the wishes of the pope, who wrote to his legate to keep him updated on Frederick II’s faltering progress towards departing and instructed him to strive to keep the army together. On 24

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 149.
\textsuperscript{149} Oliver, \textit{Historia}, 252.
\textsuperscript{150} Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 149-50.
\textsuperscript{151} Oliver, \textit{Historia}, 248.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 250.
July 1220, Honorius wrote to Pelagius to enumerate all the money sent to him from the crusade tax, and urged the legate not to give up on his duties, since Frederick was expected to arrive soon. He reassured Pelagius that he would succeed in achieving the ‘desired prize’.\(^{153}\) Once Frederick had been crowned on 22 November 1220, Honorius wrote to his legate again on 15 December to inform him of the coronation and Frederick’s plan to crusade in person in August 1221. The pope ordered Pelagius to take courage in the Lord and in his service, and to reinforce the hearts of the crusaders, who would, God willing, receive the longed for succour.\(^{154}\)

While Pelagius’s role as peacemaker and spiritual leader was most important, he was involved to some extent in the military affairs of the crusade, as evidenced by Jacques de Vitry’s letter above. The legate also funded assaults with money sent to him from the crusade tax, such as that proposed by the Pisans, Genoese, and Venetians in 1219.\(^{155}\) During another assault in 1219, Pelagius and the patriarch of Jerusalem (who was carrying the Cross) urged retreating crusaders unsuccessfully to stand and fight.\(^{156}\) Pelagius was clearly often close to the action.

There is an important distinction to make, however, between the crusade’s military direction and actually picking up a sword to join in. Timothy Reuter has demonstrated that accusations of bishops being more familiar in wielding the temporal sword than the spiritual one had been common since the twelfth

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\(^{153}\) Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 1v: ‘fraternitatem tuam monemus et hortamur in Domino quatinus in ipso confidens qui dat virtutes, et premia elargitur semper ad forta studeas mittere manus tuas, ut de virtute proficiens in virtutem bravium accipias destinatum.’; Pressutti 2574.

\(^{154}\) Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 49r: ‘Confortare ergo in Domino et in eius servitio Christiani exercitus corda confirma, desideratum succursum favente Domino magnifice habiturus.’; Pressutti 2866.

\(^{155}\) Oliver, *Historia*, 212.

\(^{156}\) Ibid., 214.
century. Reuter cites Caesarius of Heisterbach who noted in the 1220s how experienced German bishops were in personally waging war. Although frowned upon, the direction of soldiers by the episcopate was not unheard of. Reuter wonders, nevertheless, how much of this was unique to Germany, where German bishops did more to support their lay rulers militarily than their French and English counterparts. What matters for our purpose here though is to note that while to modern observers there seems little difference between commanding soldiers and actually spilling blood with them, ‘this distinction was undoubtedly felt in the twelfth century.’ Therefore, provided he was not actually doing the fighting himself, Pelagius probably saw no tension between his roles as cardinal-bishop and crusade leader.

In addition to his crusade duties, during 1218-21 Pelagius was also carrying out the other aspects of his legation in ultramarinum provinciam. The prince of Antioch, Raymond-Rupen, had been urgently petitioning Honorius for protection and assistance in taking the throne of Armenia. Raymond-Rupen certainly needed protection from his own uncle, Bohemond, count of Tripoli, who had expelled Raymond-Rupen from Antioch, and for which Pelagius excommunicated him for the first time. Honorius had previously confirmed the claim of John of Brienne through his wife and son, but when they both died, the pope recognised Raymond-Rupen’s. The pope acquiesced to Raymond-Rupen’s

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158 Ibid., 79.
159 Ibid., 85.
160 Ibid., 80-81.
161 Hamilton, Latin, 224-25; Donovan, Pelagius, 98-100; Oliver, Historia, 235.
162 Runciman, Crusades, 171.
petitions, and in response sent orders on to his legate. On 16 December 1220, after receiving Raymond-Rupen’s messengers and letters, Honorius entrusted the business of his coronation to Pelagius.\textsuperscript{163} When the Antiochene situation escalated and Raymond-Rupen was imprisoned by the regent of Armenia, Constantine of Lampron, the pope wrote to Pelagius on 9 July 1221 to explain the gravity of the situation, and in a rhetorical flourish that he must have regretted a few months later, cautioned Pelagius to deal with Bohemond carefully, since the loss of Antioch would be worse than the loss of many Damiettas.\textsuperscript{164} After Bohemond seized possessions of the Hospitaller Order and had two of their knights brutally murdered, Pelagius excommunicated him for a second time (which Frederick II later appealed unsuccessfully to have overturned - see chapter three).\textsuperscript{165}

Pelagius had also been tidying up affairs in the kingdom of Cyprus whilst on crusade. On 17 December 1221 Honorius issued a letter to Alice, queen of Cyprus (d.1246), which confirmed the agreement regarding the conflict between the Latin and Greek clergy on the island, made between her and the Cypriot nobility on one side, and Eustorge, archbishop of Nicosia, and his suffragan

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 52r: ‘unde cum idem nobilis nobis per suos nuntios et litteras supplicarit instanter, ut quia regno Armenie ad ipsum de iure spectante coronari debet in regem, sibi per te inunctionis munus faceremus impendi, nos de tam arduo negotio et tam a nobis remoto plenam habere certitudinem nequeuentes, et attendantes quod huius rei circumstanzias potes plenius indagare, tam super hiis que ad inunctionem et coronationem eius pertinent, quam super principatu Antiochie ac dicto regno Armenie et alius que causam eius respiciunt tibi committimus plenarie vices nostras.’; Pressutti 2876.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 151r: ‘Quare fraternitati tue monemus per apostolica tibi scripta mandantes quatinus cum eo moderamine super facto nobilis viri comitis Tripolitani procedas, ut nichil sinistri de eadem civitate Christianitati contingat, in cuius ammissione sicut dictur plus damnii et ignominie sustineret populus Christianus quam si plures perderet Damiatas. Super facto quoque ipsius comitis ideo est maxime subsistendum quia de nobili viro Rupino quod captus fuerit minime dubitatur, et nunc publice fertur eundem carnis debitum exsolvisse.’; Pressutti 3495; Hamilton, \textit{Latin}, 225.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Runciman, \textit{Crusades}, 172; Donovan, \textit{Pelagius}, 100 and n. 100.
\end{itemize}
bishops on the other.\textsuperscript{166} The letter mentioned Pelagius’s role in putting his own confirmation to the agreement whilst on crusade, which had taken place at Damietta on 16 May 1221.

After the failure of the Fifth Crusade in August 1221, Pelagius remained in the East as legate. Raymond-Rupen was killed in 1221, but the affair rumbled on into the next year.\textsuperscript{167} On 23 March 1222, Honorius wrote to his legate again, explaining that Raymond-Rupen’s mother had sought papal protection. Pelagius was entrusted with defending her and Raymond-Rupen’s daughters and territory.\textsuperscript{168} Pelagius finally left the East when he was invited by Honorius on 25 April 1222 to attend the papal-imperial colloquium at Verona scheduled for 11 November 1222.\textsuperscript{169} Pelagius was picked up in one of the four galleys that Frederick sent to Acre to collect Pelagius and John of Brienne in September 1222, but stopped at Cyprus on the passage to the West.\textsuperscript{170} As Donovan noted, despite the failure of the Fifth Crusade, Pelagius’s authority was still respected in his more normal duties as legate.\textsuperscript{171} Proof perhaps that Pelagius was not a failure as a legate, something bolstered by the fact that Honorius did not end his legation after the crusade. After Pelagius’s return to the West, Honorius employed him in his old role of auditor at the curia for the rest of his reign.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{166} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 172v: ‘quam [compositionem] idem legatus auctoritate legationis ad tuam et predictorum prelatorum instantiam confirmavit.’; Pressutti 3627; Regesta, ed. Röhricht, no. 938.
\textsuperscript{167} Hamilton, Latin, 340.
\textsuperscript{168} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 220r: ‘fraternitati tue per apostolica scripta mandamus quatinus ipsam et predicti principis nati sui, filias ac terram suam protegas et defendas, et eas in iure suo studeas confovere.’; Pressutti 3883.
\textsuperscript{169} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 232; Pressutti 3931.
\textsuperscript{170} Donovan, Pelagius, 102.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} Pressutti 4391, 4958, 4969, 4981, 5011, 5261, 5402, 5514, 5629, 5646, 5871, 5961, 6010, 6045, 6227.
Conclusions

Honorius’s deployment of legates was an integral part of the pope’s efforts to support the Holy Land crusade, and was, for the most part, successful. The award of plenary powers permitted them to pursue their own approach to their appointed mission, and though in close contact with the curia, they seem to have acted with a great degree of autonomy. This raises the question of how Honorius’s despatch of legates fits into the model of responsive papal government. They were often despatched in response to events in the localities of Christendom, such as the civil war in England, although obviously their appointment was done at the pope’s behest. The decisions that the pope made were issued in response to reports sent back by his legates, which appear to have had a powerful influence on the issue of papal letters, such as Honorius’s actions to support Pelagius’s requests for reinforcements on the crusade.173 The pope’s decisions varied according to the changing situations in the provinciae of his representatives, and aside from the policy to make peace in the West and recruit more crusaders, it is clear that Honorius was not implementing a preconceived programme of action through his legates; something which draws into question I.S. Robinson’s statement that they were the ‘foremost executors of papal policy.’174

173 On this point, see Charters, ed. Vincent, p. xlvi.
174 Robinson, Papacy, 170.
Chapter 6

The Tax of a Twentieth

The 1215 tax on ecclesiastical income has much in common with modern taxation: despite being dogged by loopholes and fraud and resented by those who had to pay, it proved broadly effective in generating large amounts of money. A systematic study of Innocent III’s three-year tax of a twentieth upon ecclesiastical income to support the Fifth Crusade has yet to be attempted by scholars, especially concerning the mechanics of its operation. The present chapter endeavours to fill this historiographical gap, and also to extend further the investigation of the responsive nature of papal government, and to question statements by historians that Honorius III's tax collection followed a linear progression from devolved local collection to centralisation - an innovation that set the precedent for his predecessors.¹

The imposition of the twentieth and its collection arguably represent one of the few examples of policy-making formulated at the curia, but one that was still administered in a largely responsive fashion. There was no clear-cut case of advancing financial centralisation under Honorius. Rather centralised collection methods were employed alongside devolved local tax collection and distribution

that was driven by petitioning. This chapter first addresses the announcement of the tax in 1215, then local and centralised collection and transfer, the issue of diversion, followed by exemption, fraud and theft; the final section examines spending of the tax on the Fifth Crusade, and how it was collected after 1221.

This chapter seeks to establish how Honorius supported the Fifth Crusade financially through his administration of the 1215 twentieth tax, based on the systematic analysis of evidence from the papal registers. In 1969 Helmut Roscher noted that the registers of Honorius contained all the information necessary for a detailed study of the collection of the twentieth, but that it was outside the scope of his own work.2 The historiography on the twentieth, and papal finance in general, is sparse. Adolf Gottlob’s 1892 monograph on thirteenth-century papal crusade taxation is still extremely valuable, as are the publications on papal finance by William Lunt from the early twentieth century, works which have yet to be superseded even if some of their conclusions have been slightly tweaked.3 Nevertheless, these studies are general in their outlook, and while containing much extremely useful information regarding the 1215 twentieth, they are far from comprehensive. Powell’s short chapter on the financing of the Fifth Crusade in his monograph provides a useful starting point which this chapter builds upon.4

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2 Roscher, Innocenz, 163.
4 Powell, Anatomy, 89-106.
The Institution of the Twentieth in 1215

In November 1215 Pope Innocent III presided over Lateran IV to discuss a raft of legislation concerning reform of the Church, the threat of heresy, and the Fifth Crusade. The final constitution appended to the decrees of the Council, *Ad liberandam*, officially launched the Fifth Crusade, and set out Innocent’s plan for getting the expedition off the ground. Among other things it offered participants the indulgence of remission of sins, assigned a departure deadline, identified the ports to be used, and prohibited trade with Muslims. Innocent also made provision for financing the crusade in two ways. Firstly, he confirmed the offer made in the encyclical letter of 1213, *Quia maior*, which extended the indulgence to include those who could not campaign in person but funded the participation of another in their stead.\(^5\) Secondly, Innocent attempted to support the crusade by levying a tax of a twentieth - or five percent - on ecclesiastical income for three years, and he also promised a tenth of the income of the pope and cardinals:

We therefore decree, with the general approval of the council, that all clerics, both those under authority and prelates, shall give a twentieth of their ecclesiastical revenues for three years to the aid of the Holy Land, by means of the persons appointed by the apostolic see for this purpose; the only exceptions being certain religious who are rightly to be exempted from this taxation and likewise those persons who have taken or will take the cross and so will go in person. We and our brothers, cardinals of the holy Roman Church, shall pay a full tenth. Let all know, moreover, that they are obliged to observe this faithfully under pain of excommunication, so that those who knowingly deceive in this matter shall incur the sentence of excommunication.\(^6\)

\(^5\) *Decrees*, ed. and trans. Tanner, i, 268; *Quia maior* is printed in: *Patrologiae*, ed. Migne, ccxvi, 817-22.

\(^6\) *Decrees*, ed. and trans. Tanner, i, 269.
Apart from attempting to collect money to fund the crusade, the Council also legislated to assist crusaders financially by exempting them from paying taxes and interest on debts, which has been claimed as the measure that was of most practical use to those preparing to crusade. In the twelfth century most crusades had been funded privately, primarily through the sale of assets, often to monastic houses. Despite the provision of a tax towards the costs of the Fifth Crusade, the crusaders were still expected to fund most of their own campaign, and Powell has remarked that there is no evidence for an early thirteenth-century downturn in the traditional methods of funding crusades that had proliferated during the twelfth century.

The 1215 twentieth was not the first general tax levied to aid the Holy Land. The first known levy was made by King Louis VII of France (1137-80) in 1166 on his subjects, which was quickly imitated by King Henry II of England (1154-89). Similar levies followed in 1183 and 1185. The first levy to support a specific crusade, as opposed to the Holy Land in general, was the 1188 Saladin Tithe which was imposed on all non-crusaders in England and France with few exceptions. Powell has pointed out that the 1166 and 1188 taxes were levied on laity and clergy alike, and Cazel has claimed that it was Clement III who imposed

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7 Ibid.; Purcell, Policy, 138.
9 Powell, Anatomy, 91-92, 95.
the first crusade tax on the clergy, but that it has been overlooked by historians because it was rolled into the collection of the Saladin Tithe.11

Innocent III thus had a precedent for the tax of a fortieth that he levied on the clergy in 1199 to support the Fourth Crusade. The effectiveness of the 1199 fortieth was hampered by Innocent’s decision to leave the method of collection up to each province, which was unlikely to be conducive to the efficient collection and transfer of funds from reluctant tax payers.12

Of all the crusades, the Fourth Crusade was the one which was most affected by a lack of money, and it was the financial shortfall of the French crusaders in trying to meet the terms of the 1201 Treaty of Venice that led eventually to the conquest and sack of Constantinople, because the crusaders could not afford to continue on to the Holy Land.13 Although the failure of the crusaders to meet the calamitous terms of the treaty was not connected to the papacy’s collection of the fortieth - the crusaders who assembled at Venice were neither awaiting nor expecting a papal subsidy - the financial disaster of the Fourth Crusade proved a bitter lesson for the papacy.14

The 1215 twentieth differed from the 1199 fortieth in that it was not imposed on the pope’s authority alone, but crucially, as Roscher and Powell have noted, was granted with the full authority of the Lateran Council.15 Gottlob has written that by passing Ad liberandum at Lateran IV, the clergy was effectively

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15 Roscher, Innocenz, 162-63; Powell, Anatomy, 92.
recognising its duty to pay tax.\textsuperscript{16} This was a step forward for the pope: the acknowledgement by the wider clergy of the necessity of paying the twentieth meant that the pope could hold them more effectively to their promise, and many of Honorius’s letters on the collection of the twentieth were prefaced by reminders that the tax had been agreed to \textit{in generali concilio}.

There was another offer made to sweeten the deal. Those who paid the twentieth or made donations to the crusade received the remission of a portion of their enjoined penance.\textsuperscript{17} The laity were invited to give free will donations of any size they chose, and the \textit{Regesto delle Pergamene} records the will of a certain Roger, who in 1218 arranged to leave three ounces of gold for the aid of the Holy Land, his property to his mother, and another one-and-a-half ounces of gold for his funeral.\textsuperscript{18} The \textit{Annals of Dunstable} record in 1217 that the priory paid the full three years’ worth of the twentieth in that year, a statement which precedes a relatively full account of the Fifth Crusade.\textsuperscript{19} Presumably the priory felt that they had a vested interest in the crusade now that they had paid a share to fund it, and followed their investment closely in the \textit{Annals} until the end of the crusade. This is what Innocent had wanted when planning the crusade: it was to involve the entire Christian community by broadening the base of support - and spiritual rewards - to include those who helped finance it and prayed for its success.\textsuperscript{20}

After winning the support of those who would be instrumental in collecting and paying the twentieth at Lateran IV, according to Lunt, Innocent

\textsuperscript{16} Gottlob, \textit{Kreuzzugs-steuern}, 24.
\textsuperscript{17} Lunt, \textit{Financial}, 243; Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 92.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Annales de Dunstaple}, in \textit{Testimonia}, ed. Röhrich, 64.
\textsuperscript{20} Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 16, 93.
appears to have moved fairly swiftly to appoint local collectors and order the local clergy to pay the twentieth by a specific date.  

However, the loss of Innocent’s register from the end of his pontificate means that this order is taken from a rubric of his lost letters and cannot be proven to have been sent throughout the West. Although the rubric notes that it was sent to ‘diversis archiepiscopis et eorum suffraganeis’ - exactly how many this was cannot be proven.  

Even so, any order that Innocent made was superseded by Honorius’s first collection mandates issued in November 1216 and February 1217 (see below).

Before Lateran IV, Innocent had begun preliminary moves to collect money for the crusade in 1213. There is evidence that he appointed crusade procurators (mostly bishops, archbishops, abbots, and a large number of academics) who were to preach the crusade and collect any money given in aid of it, depositing the funds in religious houses and sending annual reports of the amounts collected to the curia. Unfortunately none of these reports survive, but Powell has drawn attention to a letter sent by Abbot Gervase of Prémontré to Archbishop Simon of Tyre in autumn 1217 that proves the existence of the procurators.

Although Innocent was instrumental in laying the foundations of the twentieth tax, the main responsibility for collecting and administering the tax (and ironing out any problems) was bequeathed to Honorius when Innocent died in 1216. Roscher has pointed out that Honorius was well prepared for such a task,

21 Lunt, Financial, 243.
23 Powell, Anatomy, 22-23 and n. 20; Sacrae, ed. Hugo, (no. 34) 34-35.
given his decade of service as *camerarius* (chamberlain) between 1188 and 1198.\(^{24}\) The papacy’s financial administration apparatus had been centralised in the *camera*, under the direction of the *camerarius*, during the second half of the twelfth century.\(^{25}\) Cencius (Honorius) had managed the *camera*’s reorganisation whilst he was in charge at the end of the twelfth century, and Leonard Boyle has remarked that it was under Cencius that the *camera* ‘became fully a department in its own right ... with its own clerks, notaries, and scriptors.’\(^{26}\) He would therefore have possessed a keen understanding of how papal finance worked and what could reasonably be achieved in terms of crusade taxation. If any man had the right experience and pedigree to make the collection of the twentieth work, it was Honorius. Unfortunately there are no records for the operation of the *camera* during the Fifth Crusade because it did not begin keeping records of receipts until the reign of Pope Alexander IV (1254-61), and none of these receipts survive before 1270-80; even then records are patchy until after 1316.\(^{27}\)

The papacy’s relatively small regular income derived from its landed estates (the Patrimony of St Peter), payments owed by the churches of Christendom as laid out in the *Liber censuum* (completed by Cencius himself in 1192), money collected from papal vassals, and ‘Peter’s Pence’ - an aptly named small levy only collected from England and some Baltic kingdoms. The sum of this income was not great, but nevertheless it represented a vital element of the

\(^{24}\) Roscher, *Innocenz*, 163.


curia’s budget. \(^{28}\) Given Honorius’s previous experience as camerarius, he would have been all too aware that the curia’s income had not been enough to support its twelfth-century expansion, let alone a crusade. \(^{29}\)

**Local Collection and Transfer**

The twentieth agreed to by the Church hierarchy at Lateran IV in 1215 was not levied (excluding Innocent III’s early foray mentioned above) until Honorius sent out orders to begin collection, the first of which was issued by the papal chancery on 21 November 1216. \(^{30}\) This letter marked the beginning of collection for the twentieth, but was not sent throughout Christendom. The register copy is addressed to the archbishop of Palermo, and the scribe recording the *in eundem modum* copies despatched noted some fifty other recipients, but then stopped, leaving a blank space in the folio. There are some notable absences from the *in eundem modum* list, including England, Lombardy, and France. It is possible that they were despatched copies which were meant to be recorded in this blank space, but it is much more likely that, given the presence (or imminent presence) of papal legates in all of these regions, Honorius intended the legates to oversee the collection of the twentieth and thus did not need to forward on the same written instructions. \(^{31}\) Unfortunately there are no surviving instructions from Honorius to

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\(^{28}\) Kay, Bourges, 176-78.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 185. Similarly d’Avray has stated of papal government that the ‘papacy could not afford a proper bureaucracy proportionate to the role it accepted.’ D’Avray, Rationalities, 135.

\(^{30}\) Reg. Vat. 9, fols 25r-26r; Pressutti 111.

\(^{31}\) Guala, cardinal-priest of S. Martino, was legate a latere to England between 1216 and 1218, and was superseded by Pandulf, bishop of Norwich, in September 1218; Hugolino, cardinal-priest of Ostia was appointed legate a latere to Lombardy in January 1217; Bertrand, cardinal-priest of SS. Giovanni e Paolo, was appointed legate a latere to the south of France in January 1217 (see chapter five). See also Lunt, Financial, 244.
his legates, but it is probable that they were similar to those in his letter of 21 November, but with the legate as the chief collector, possibly with or without the same apparatus outlined below.

The letter of 21 November is therefore crucial in establishing how Honorius planned the collection of the twentieth to be carried out in provinces without a legate present. The letter opened with a reminder to the recipients that the Church hierarchy had agreed to the imposition of the twentieth tax in generali concilio and threatened excommunication against those who were discovered to have defrauded the tax. The masters of the Hospitallers and Templars and the cantor and treasurer of each province were named as collectors, with the power to select two suitable clerics and a Templar and Hospitaller to make up a four-man collection team. Each province was ordered to calculate a twentieth of its ecclesiastical income by the Feast of All Saints (1 November 1217), and then to pay this amount honestly by the following kalends of May (1 May 1218). The Premonstratensians and Cistercians were exempted from paying the twentieth from the beginning, which probably reflected curial favour, especially in the case of the Cistercians.

The letter of 21 November 1216 was then followed by another issued on 28 February 1217 to all the churches of the West - this time including the

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32 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 25r: ‘quod illi qui super hoc fraudem scientur comiserint, sententiam excommunicationis incurrant.’; Pressutti 111.
33 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 25: ‘Ut igitur hoc salutare statutum debitum consequatur effectum, dilectis filiis magistris domorum militiae Templi et Hospitalis Ierosolimitani in [province name] provincia constitutis, et cantori et thesaurario [province name]. Hanc sollicitudinem duximus committendam, dantes eis plenariam potentiam eligendi et ordinandi, duos idoneos clericos sive plures, ac etiam duos fratres unum Templi et alium Hospitalis, quos auctoritate nostra per provinciam vestram transmittant, cum suarum testimonio litterarum ad ipsam vicesimam colligendam.’; Pressutti 111.
34 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 25v: ‘Abbates autem Premonstrantensium et Cisterciensis ordinum per questores huiusmodi non providimus requirendos.’; Pressutti 111.
provinces with legates present - establishing the method by which the twentieth would be distributed.\(^{35}\) Honorius wrote that he had heard many different pieces of advice on the best way to disperse the twentieth, and had decided to distribute it among crusaders from the regions in which it was collected to circumvent accusations of misuse.\(^{36}\) The local bishop and collectors were to select four or five trustworthy crusaders of good repute (either clergy or laity) from their diocese, including the bishop himself if he was signed with the cross, who were to transport their local twentieth to the crusade army in the East.\(^{37}\) After arrival in the crusader camp these four or five escorts were to pay out the twentieth to crusaders from their area with the approval of the papal legate and the masters of the Hospital and Temple, before acquiring testimonial letters from them to ensure that the distribution of the twentieth had been carried out properly.\(^{38}\) Honorius’s letter ended with another mandate to collect the twentieth.

By the end of February 1217 then, the papacy had outlined the process by which it hoped the twentieth might be administered. However, study of the registers reveals that like many administrative procedures, the model put forward

\(^{35}\) Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 81; Pressutti 381.

\(^{36}\) Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 81r: ‘Sane super modo dispensandi huiusmodi vicesimam audivimus consilia diversorum, quibus inter se plurimum variantibus illud de consilio fratrum nostrorum providimus eligendum, secundum quod vidimus ipsam vicesimam distribuendum utilius, et tam ab hiis qui conferent quam ab illis quibus fuerit distributa materiam suspicionis, et murmurus amputandam’; Pressutti 381.

\(^{37}\) Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 81r: ‘ut videlicet vicesima cuiusque dioecesis redacta fideliter in pecuniam sub certo numero comprehendendo, in autenticorum virorum, et preservit illorum qui eam collegerint testimonialibus litteris et nobis etiam explicando ultra mare portetur, per quatuor vel quinque seu plures viros prudentes clericos et laicos crucesignatos illius civitatis et dioecesis, qui note fidei discretionis et opinionis existant, quorum unus sit episcopus loci, siquidem crucesignatus exitierit’; Pressutti 381.

\(^{38}\) Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 81r: ‘per manus ipsorum de conscientia tamen cardinalis qui fuerit ibi legatus distribuatatur fideliter et discrete, crucesignatis egentibus et utilibus negotio Terre Sancte ac preservit de illa dioecesi ubi vicesima illa collecta fuerit oriundis, idemque distributores, ipsi legato et magistris Hospitii et Templi reddant diligentissime rationem, per quam redactam inscriptis appareat evidenter pecuniam quam ut premissum est sub testimonialibus litteris secum attulerint esse crucesignatis fideliter et utiler distributam’; Pressutti 381.
was subjected to modification when it was put into practice. Right from the outset there were different methods of collection for different churches. Even before the general letter of 21 November 1216, Honorius had sent a letter to the abbot of Cluny on 12 November instructing the order - which was allowed to collect its own twentieth - to make collection and transfer it to Aymard, treasurer of the Paris Temple. This decision was presumably made in response to the abbot’s lobbying.

The levying of the twentieth is important because it is the only aspect of papal government and the crusade under Honorius that was clearly a programme of action that the curia formulated and then carried out. Yet like the other aspects of papal government examined in this thesis, the curia’s efforts to collect and transfer the twentieth to the crusaders were often ad hoc and changed according to petitioners’ requests. Funds from the twentieth were awarded to local crusaders throughout the Fifth Crusade as prescribed in the papal letter of 21 November, but this also ran alongside more centralised collection under papal officials and the transfer of funds through the Paris Temple and the papal curia. Writing the history of the collection and transfer of the twentieth is complex, but this reflects the reality of the curia’s administration. The complications should not be glossed over in order to make the case for a neat policy of the initial local collection and transportation of the twentieth being superseded by centralised collection and transfer, as some have tended towards. Input from outside the curia again played a large role in papal decision-making on administering the twentieth. Honorius’s decisions were often driven by petitions (to award the funds to local crusaders)

39 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 13r; Pressutti 101.
40 Lunt, Financial, 246-47; Roscher, Innocenz, 163.
and by urgent requests for aid from the crusaders in Egypt (when the pope stepped in to order collection and transfer through the Paris Temple, see below).

Given that Honorius had provided set rules for the appointment of local crusaders to carry the twentieth with them, most of the decisions on this matter were presumably made locally, but nevertheless, a number of decisions were brought before the curia. Throughout the crusade Honorius granted the twentieth to local magnates who petitioned for it. In a letter issued on 2 December 1216, Honorius granted the provosts Albert of Salzburg and Frederick of Berchtesgaden the right to take their local twentieth with them on their crusade.41 A similar letter was also sent to the archbishop of Salzburg, who is listed as an in eundem modum recipient. On 14 May 1218, Honorius granted the crusader bishop of Brescia the twentieth from his diocese, to be spent on the crusade with the advice of the legate Pelagius.42 In the same month, a flurry of papal documents were issued concerning the crusader Count William of Holland, who was petitioning the pope to set his affairs in order before crusading. On 21 May 1218, William, previously excommunicated in 1216 for abducting the wife of Count Louis of Loos (among other crimes), was awarded the twentieth from Holland, Zeeland, and east Frisia for his crusade, and on 23 May, the on-going legal case between him and Louis was suspended until after his return.43 William was also issued a document on 23

41 Reg. Vat. 9, fols 21v-22r: Pressutti 137.
42 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 254v: ‘eam secum ad Terre Sancte subsidium deferat de venerabilis fratris nostri Pelagii Albanensis episcopi apostolice sedis legato consilio dispensandam.’; Pressutti 1317.
43 Reg. Vat. 9, fols 256v-57r; Pressutti 1359; Pixton, Episcopacy, 241-42; Suspension of the legal case is ordered in: Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 256v; Pressutti 1365; Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 257r; Pressutti 1366.
May that prevented him from being excommunicated again while he was on crusade.\textsuperscript{44}

A similar case of a reformed enemy of the Church receiving the twentieth came on 5 July 1218 when Hervé, count of Nevers, in trouble over the validity of his marriage and his repeated attacks on the monastery of Vézelay, was granted the twentieth from his lands.\textsuperscript{45} On the same day a letter was issued to the clergy in Hervé’s lands letter ordering collection.\textsuperscript{46} Again, this grant resulted from a petition (‘petitionem vestram’), sent by Hervé and the other crusaders assembling at Genoa, who, as we have seen, also requested that Cardinal Robert of Courçon be sent to accompany the army.\textsuperscript{47} This was followed up by another letter on 13 February 1219 to Hugo, the dean, treasurer and sacrist of Nevers, ordering him to collect the twentieth and alms and send them on to Hervé, and also states explicitly that Hervé had originally petitioned for the award of the twentieth (‘nobis fecit humiliter supplicari’).\textsuperscript{48}

Three documents were issued to Milo, crusader bishop-elect of Beauvais, on 12 November, 15 December, and 29 December 1218. These three documents awarded him the twentieth from Beauvais and Reims, money from collection chests, and money from the redemption of vows (excluding that already granted to

\textsuperscript{44} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 256v: ‘siqua in te post iter peregrinationis arreptum excommunicationis est sententia promulgata, eam de potestatis plenitudine revocamus.’; Pressutti 1364.
\textsuperscript{45} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 277r; Pressutti 1498; Donovan, Pelagius, 45 and n. 35.
\textsuperscript{46} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 277r; Pressutti 1499.
\textsuperscript{47} Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 277r; Pressutti 1498.
\textsuperscript{48} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 60v; Pressutti 1873.
Philip Augustus for the Albigensian Crusade) respectively, to take with him and his contingent.49

On 26 February 1219 the abbot of Polirone (in northern Italy) was permitted to divide the twentieth among local crusaders, funding three knights and four foot-soldiers with horses, arms and victuals for three years, again in response to petitioning.50 On 6 July of that year, Savaric de Mauleon was awarded the twentieth from Poitiers, having incurred a debt of 1,200 silver marks to Sienese merchants in preparing for his crusade.51

A year later, in July 1220, Honorius was still allowing the twentieth to be distributed and transported to the East by local crusaders intending to crusade in 1221 - clearly he had not changed the twentieth collection policy to a purely centralised system, even at this late stage in the administration of the Fifth Crusade. Honorius’s approach to the collection and transfer of the tax was still being determined to a large extent by petitioners. On 7 July 1220 Honorius issued a reply to a letter of the crusader Ugrinus, archbishop of Kalocsa, in which Ugrinus had written to the pope requesting permission to delay his departure because the Hungarian contingent was not ready to leave.52 Honorius granted him an extension until Easter 1221, or failing that, as late as the Feast of the Nativity of John the Baptist (24 June). Although the twentieth had already been awarded to this contingent, even now, after centralised collection had been implemented

49 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 24r; Pressutti 1675; Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 37r; Pressutti 1745; Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 43v; Pressutti 1770.
51 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 106r; Pressutti 2133. See also the document of 21 July to the bishop of Poitiers regarding the same matter: Reg. Vat. 10, fols 114v-15r; Pressutti 2158.
elsewhere (see below), Honorius allowed the Hungarian contingent to keep it rather than ordering its immediate despatch to Pelagius. In a letter issued the day before, on 6 July, Honorius had instructed Robert, bishop of Veszprém, to preserve the twentieth for his countrymen until they were ready to depart.\textsuperscript{53} As Powell has highlighted, by allowing devolved collection, distribution and transfer, Honorius was trying to curry favour with tax payers by demonstrating that their taxes were being used to support local crusaders.\textsuperscript{54}

This survey of the pope’s awards of the twentieth to local crusaders demonstrates an aspect of the papacy’s administration of the twentieth that is crucial to understanding the way the curia collected and transferred the tax. These cases brought before the pope involved predominantly high profile and controversial cases from the western nobility that were far from the norm - one of the recipients of the twentieth was a kidnapper, another a repeat attacker of a monastery, and yet another was crippled with debt. That Honorius was still authorising the twentieth to be transported to the East with local crusaders throughout the crusade disproves the notion that the twentieth’s administration was a policy of devolution advancing ever onward towards centralisation. That is not to say that more centralised control did not take place towards the end of the crusade, but it does reveal that there was not a single policy of collection and transfer in place - rather petitions and outside initiative still played an important role.

\textsuperscript{53} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 199r: ‘Detentoribus autem vicesime supradicte dummodo eam cum integritate persolvant in Terre Sancte subsidium destinandum, munus absolutionis impenendas.’; Pressutti 2530.
\textsuperscript{54} Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 93.
The cases that made it as far as the papal curia and were recorded in Honorius’s register were the high profile exceptions to the rules that Honorius had circulated throughout Christendom in November 1216 and February 1217. It is probable that the twentieth was being allocated to local contingents of crusaders throughout the crusade according to the pope’s rules without need for recourse to the curia. To employ a cliché beloved of historians: this absence of evidence for devolved distribution should not be taken as evidence of absence. It must also be borne in mind that rejected petitions leave no documentary record; there could have been more petitions requesting local allocation that were unsuccessful.

Centralised Collection and Transfer

Honorius did employ more centralised methods of collecting and transferring the twentieth, but it is vital to recognise that these co-existed alongside devolved methods - the two were not mutually exclusive. Papal collectors were despatched, papal legates were used as collectors \textit{in situ}, and money was transferred through the houses of the Hospitallers and Templars in Paris for direct despatch to Pelagius (see below). Indeed, one of the most compelling pieces of evidence for the lack of a coherent centralisation policy comes from November 1216. The order issued on 12 November to the abbot of Cluny to pay the twentieth to Aymard mentioned above was part of a pair - the other was sent to Aymard himself on the same day, instructing him to expect receipt, and this only days before the general letter was sent out ordering local collection and distribution.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 13v; Pressutti 102.}
The functioning of papal government was driven by this *ad hoc* approach to solving problems, hence this first example of a more centralised collection of the twentieth coming even before the order for devolved collection teams was issued by the curia on 21 November.

During the crusade Honorius stepped in to order further collections of the twentieth and sent orders for funds to be made over to papal officials. This was partially autonomous and undertaken on the curia’s own initiative, but it is clear that a significant number of Honorius’s interventions to collect the twentieth and ship it to the crusaders were prompted by the crusaders’ own calls for financial assistance. The papacy’s involvement in this aspect of the twentieth’s collection - the use of papal officials and more centralised transfer through the houses of the Military Orders in Paris - is best thought of as semi-autonomous. While there are clear and indisputable links between the receipt of crusader reports begging for financial assistance and flurries of curial activity, equally there are papal orders to transfer the twentieth that cannot be directly connected to a specific crusader call for aid. Instead they should be interpreted as part of Honorius’s on-going efforts to support the crusade that were made on his own initiative, but set against a background of pressing calls for aid from the East.

In February 1218 the papal legate for the crusade, Pelagius, was readying to make the passage to Egypt, and this seems to have prompted Honorius to write to the archbishop of Magdeburg on 23 February, ordering the collection of the twentieth.\(^{56}\) The following day Honorius despatched a letter to the archbishop of Toledo, ordering the collection of the twentieth there and for the figures to be sent

\(^{56}\) Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 227; Pressutti 1110.
to the curia so that Pelagius might know the level of funds available to support the crusade.  

In August 1218 Honorius received the crusaders’ second despatch (written on 15 June) requesting reinforcements. Another crusader report (no longer extant), written after the 15 June despatch, also arrived at the curia around this time, explaining the dire financial situation and urgently petitioning for money to pay for siege machines and galleys in particular, which had not been a specific request in the letter of 15 June. This, together with the inclusion of Pelagius as an author (who arrived too late to have had a hand in the June letter), marks it out as distinct. This appears to have led Honorius to issue a letter on 5 October addressed to the clergy of Spain announcing the arrival of Master Cintius and his chaplain Huguico, which marked the beginning of centralised collection. Honorius explained that the crusaders had written to the curia expressing their desperate need for siege machines and ships, which the curia was unable to finance because the camera was exhausted, having already spent over twenty thousand marks of silver on the crusade. Honorius therefore ordered that these papal agents be allowed to collect the twentieth along with the usual census levy.

57 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 229r: ‘Cum igitur tempus immineat passagii generali fraternitati vestre per apostolica scripta precipiendo mandamus quatinus singuli per vestras dioceses vicesimam tam exemptarum ecclesiarum quam aliarum diligentissime colligatis, et unusquisque quantotius nobis significet eorum que collegerit quantitatem, ut ea cognita legato ad partes Ierosolimitanas ituro cautius inungere valeamus, qualiter habere se debeat inveniendo numero galearum et aliis faciendis que pertinent ad ipsius negotium Terre Sancte.’; Pressutti 1116.

58 Copied into the papal letter sent to the crusaders at Genoa (see chapter two): Reg. Vat. 10, fols 9v-10r; Pressutti 1581.

59 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 16v: ‘Sane venerabilis frater noster patriarcha et karissimus in Christo filius noster Iohannes illustris rex Ierosolimitanus, magistri quoque Hospitalis et Templi, et universi principes ac barones exercitus Christianus existentis in partibus transmarinis suis nobis litteris intimarunt, quod tam importabiles expensas facere compelluntur, tum in machinis et galeis, tum in alio bellico apparatu, quod nisi ad eas faciendas subveniamus eiusdem, eas nullatenus poterunt sustinere, sed non absque confusione quod Deus avertat ab incepto desistere compellentur. Cum autem pro navigio Romanorum in quo ultra viginti milia marcharum argenti expendimus camera nostra pene penitus sit exhausted’; Pressutti 1634.
The letter of 5 October was connected to another letter, issued on 27 November, which Honorius sent to the archbishop of Sens, the crusaders in his diocese, and the archbishops of England and France in an attempt to secure manpower to reinforce the expedition.\(^60\) This was also followed up with letters issued in January 1219 assigning papal agents as collectors and coordinating its transfer through the Paris Temple. On 2 January 1219 Honorius wrote to the archbishop of Bremen and the bishop of Riga ordering that the twentieth be assigned to the Templar *cubicularius* Martin and the Hospitaller marshal John.\(^61\)

Two days later, on 4 January, Honorius addressed another letter ordering the same to all the clergy of Germany.\(^62\) On 17 January a similar letter was sent throughout Hungary, stating that the pope was acting in response to the crusaders’ supplications (‘clamant ad nos preces supplices’) and assigning the papal chaplain Accontius to collect the country’s twentieth.\(^63\) A papal official named Stephen and an assistant also appear to have been appointed for France, because on 19 January Honorius sent orders to the collectors noted above for Spain, Germany and Hungary, and it was also recorded in the register that a copy was despatched to him and his associate: ‘In eundem modum scriptum est fratri Stephano et socio eius in Francia destinatis.’\(^64\)

In a letter to Pelagius and the masters of the Hospitalers and Templars in the East dated 23 January, Honorius notified them to expect the transfer of the money that they had petitioned for to pay for siege machines and galleys, which

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\(^60\) Reg. Vat. 10, fols 30v-31v; Pressutti 1716.

\(^61\) *Opera*, ed. Horoy, iii, 86-87; Pressutti 1779.

\(^62\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 42; Pressutti 1783.

\(^63\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 49v; Pressutti 1808.

\(^64\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 48v; Pressutti 1815.
amounted to five thousand marks, of which the masters of the Military Orders were to receive half each.\textsuperscript{65} That Pelagius was not awarded total control over this twentieth is interesting in itself, and further nuances his controversial role on the crusade (see chapter five). More relevant to our purpose here is the statement that this money was to pay for machines and galleys, which supplies evidence that the crusaders’ petitions, written in the summer of 1218, had led to a chain of papal decisions authorising the immediate despatch of funds to the East to support them.

The allocation of papal agents to parts of Christendom did indeed amount to centralisation, but this was in response to specific needs in Egypt, and as demonstrated above, did not entirely replace the local allocation of the twentieth, as the letters to the Hungarian crusade contingent from July 1220 prove. Indeed, Cazel has also argued that the papal agents sent out supplemented - rather than replaced - the original collectors.\textsuperscript{66}

The Paris Temple (and to a lesser extent the Paris Hospital) played an important role in the centralised collection and transfer of the twentieth. From at least the reign of Philip Augustus to that of King Philip IV (1285-1314), the Paris Temple served as the French royal treasury.\textsuperscript{67} At around the same time, from the second half of the twelfth century, the papacy also began using the Templars to deposit, exchange, and transfer money.\textsuperscript{68} Indeed, the way in which Honorius administered the twentieth at the Paris Temple was very similar to how Philip Augustus used it to manage his own tax collections: by the end of the twelfth

\textsuperscript{65} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 50r: ‘quinqve milia marcarum, duobus milibus quingentis uni, et totidem alteri, assignatis in predicte Terre subsidium destinamus, sive in galeis, sive in machinis alis, seu in alio apparatum secundum ... providentiam utiliter expendenda.’; Pressutti 1824.

\textsuperscript{66} Cazel, ‘Financing’, 137.

\textsuperscript{67} Alan Forey, \textit{The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries} (Basingstoke, 1992), 116.

\textsuperscript{68} Lunt, \textit{Revenues}, 1, 51.
century, Philip had begun depositing surplus tax collection funds at the Temple, which the Temple would pay out on receipt of a royal mandate.69 Joshua Prawer noted that during the development of the Military Orders, when the papacy awarded them long lists of privileges, it was quick to realise the utility of having an international order with houses throughout the West and the Holy Land that was in direct obedience to the pope.70 These attributes thus made the Military Orders the ideal institutions through which to transfer money directly to the Fifth Crusade, because money deposited with the Templars in the West for instance, could be withdrawn from one of its houses in the East.71

As noted above, according to the evidence in the papal registers, the Paris Temple seemed to play a larger role than the Hospitallers in the transfer of the Holy Land twentieth to the East, although this could merely be a distortion of the evidence caused by selective registration. Léopold Delisle has drawn attention to the fact that the treasurer of the Paris Temple from 1202-27, Brother Aymard, had travelled to Italy and met Innocent III after Lateran IV.72 Delisle also noted that at the time of the Fifth Crusade, Aymard was handling financial transactions for the French nobility as well as the crown.73 From the inception of his appointment as treasurer, Aymard had implemented an effective system of accounting for Philip Augustus that consolidated all state revenues and took into account the expenses incurred by the Temple and royal officials in carrying out their state duties, a

71 Cazel, ‘Financing’, 130.
73 Ibid., 63.
system so effective, Ignacio de la Torre states, that during the thirteenth century it was copied and introduced to other countries. Thus Aymard must have appeared one of the most experienced and suitable individuals to oversee the transfer of the Church’s twentieth, and this perhaps explains why the Templars of Paris appeared to play a more high profile role than the Hospitallers.

On 5 April 1219 Honorius wrote to the bishops of Noyon and Meaux in response to their communication regarding the twentieth, which the bishops had collected for two years along with donations from collection boxes and money from the redemption of vows, and then transferred to Aymard (only half of which was destined for the Holy Land - the other half had been reserved for the Albigensian Crusade, see below). This letter highlights a crucial aspect of the twentieth’s collection that goes habitually unmentioned. When collection was made, it was often not the full three years’ twentieth, but rather a portion of it, as was the case in this letter, which ordered that two years’ twentieth be transferred (again probably resulting from pressure from the crusaders). Therefore the orders for more centralised collection of the twentieth - the use of papal officials and the Paris Temple - did not necessarily totally supersede local collection and distribution. Rather these devolved methods could very well have continued after the orders for centralised collection were carried out, creating a situation where parallel systems were in operation simultaneously. Unlike orders for centralised control, which by their very nature resulted in the issue of papal documents, the

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74 De la Torre, ‘Temples’, 122.
75 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 80r: ‘Intellecto ex litteris vestris quod diligenter mandatum apostolicum exequentes duorum preteritorum annorum vicesimam et pecuniam truncorum ac pro redemptione votorum exhibitam per metropolitanos in provinciis suis et eorum suffraganeos ad mandatum vestrum collectas ad domum militie Templi Parisius deferri fecistis, et assignata mediate ipsarum karissimo in Christo filio nostro Philippo regi Francorum illustri iuxta mandati nostri tenorem, reliquam pro Terre Sancte subsidio reservatam in domo reposuistis predicta.’; Pressutti 1998.
operation of devolved collection did not leave a large paper trail because, if handled correctly at a local level, it did not need to be brought before the pope and therefore lead to the creation of papal documents.

By contrast, orders needed to be issued in order for money to be transferred from the Paris Temple to Pelagius. Thus we have more evidence for centralised control, such as Honorius’s written instruction to Aymard on 15 June 1219. In at least one instance, however, Aymard did not follow the pope’s protocol, and transferred money to Egypt without a special papal mandate. Honorius despatched a letter to him on 6 August 1220, in which the pope rebuked Aymard for allegedly sending thirteen thousand marks of silver to the East without papal order and commanded him not to transfer any more money without a special mandate.

A batch of papal letters despatched in July 1220 illustrate Honorius’s use of the Paris Temple and Hospital to transfer funds to the crusaders. On 1 July Honorius sent orders to Aymard to transfer six thousand marks of silver from the English twentieth to Pelagius, and if this was not sufficient, the pope instructed him to make up the deficit from other papal funds in the Temple. At the same time...

76 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 103v: ‘Presentium tibi auctoritate, mandamus quatinus pecuniam de vicesima iam collectam sub aliquorum testimonio prelatorum prout tibi cuius discretionii committimus expedire videbitur in subsidium Terre Sancte transmittas venerabili fratri nostro Albanensi episcopo apostolice sedis legato sicut eidem scribimus sub aliquorum prelatorum testimonio assignandam.’; Pressutti 2114.

77 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 5v: ‘Ceterum discretionii tue per apostolica scripta firmiter precipiendo mandamus quatinus nichil transmittas decetero de vicesima, vel de alis ad nos spectantibus, quicquid super talibus tibi hactenus mandaverimus, nisi de novo a nobis super hoc mandatum reciperes s peciale.’; Pressutti 2600.

78 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 193v: ‘Ceterum quorum subventione presertim pecunie indiget Terra Sancta, volumus et per apostolica tibi scripta mandamus quatinus venerabili fratri nostro Pelagio Albanensi episcopo apostolice sedis legato sex milia marcarum argenti de Anglie vicesima que si ad hoc non sufficit, de alia que ad nos pertinet pecunia per eos per quos dirigitur tue domus subsidium sine mora transmittas.’; Pressutti 2513.
time Honorius also wrote to Pelagius, telling him to expect six thousand marks of silver from Aymard, although the pope omitted the original source of the twentieth.\(^79\) Honorius also wrote to the Paris Hospital ordering that it transfer either four, five, or six thousand marks of silver, also from the English twentieth, to Pelagius in the next passage.\(^80\) On 4 July Honorius ordered the archbishop of Benevento to transfer the twentieth (which the bishop of Avellino had assigned to him) directly to the curia, cutting out the Military Orders of Paris entirely, which made practical sense given the proximity of Benevento to the curia and its position as part of the Papal State.\(^81\)

A papal letter of 24 July 1220 sent to Pelagius outlines the allocation of the twentieth from the summer of 1218 to July 1220, offering us important information on the papacy’s administration of the tax.\(^82\) The letter lists the recipients of the twentieth which had resulted from centralised transfer - mainly Pelagius - but also mentions the *multi magnates et potentes crucesignati* who had received the twentieth from local distribution.\(^83\) Devolved distribution did not require the documentation that centralised distribution did, and as a result these many recipients are not listed, but it is important that they are not ignored in favour of those who are named in the document.

\(^79\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 193v: ‘ut per eos per quos dirigitur domus sue Terre Sancte subsidium sex milia marcarum argenti tibi sine mora transmittat.’; Pressutti 2514.

\(^80\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 195v: ‘per apostolica tibi scripta mandantes quatinus sex milia, vel quinque milia, aut id minus quatuor milia marcharum de vicesima quam dilectus filius Pandulphus Norwicensi electus camerarius noster apostolice sedis legatus penes vos deponi mandavit’; Pressutti 2519.

\(^81\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 197v; Pressutti 2527.

\(^82\) Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 1; Pressutti 2574, 2575.

\(^83\) Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 1r; Pressutti 2574. Table 5.1 in Powell, *Anatomy*, 100-01, summarises the content of the papal letter.
Despite the difficulties of trying to standardise all the different currencies, Powell estimated that the sums in these letters totalled 775,461 marks.\textsuperscript{84} Using this figure in any meaningful way beyond agreeing with Powell that Pelagius was using the funds sent to him to support ‘a very large army’, is probably not possible.\textsuperscript{85} Yet the letter does reveal an important insight into the pope’s overall administration of the twentieth that is not always allowed by the study of individual collection mandates. Honorius stated that collection and distribution had been carried out locally, but when he saw that money was being detained in the West at a regional level waiting for the departure of local crusade contingents, he switched to sending out papal chaplains \textit{ad diversas partes mundi} to collect any remaining twentieth.\textsuperscript{86} Arguably then this was a change in policy at the curia made on the initiative of Honorius. Yet the collection and transfer of the twentieth still demonstrates aspects of responsive papal government, such as the influence of petitioning, and the evidence that devolved collection still took place after more centralised efforts were imposed. Powell has similarly argued that ‘Honorius was not innovating a more efficient administrative structure but responding to a specific set of problems.’\textsuperscript{87}

After the issue of this report to Pelagius Honorius despatched a number of other letters ordering centralised control of the twentieth. On 18 August 1220

\textsuperscript{84} Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 99.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 1r: ‘Postmodum autem multi magnates et potentes crucesignati dicentes quod ad exequenda vota sua sibi non sufficiebant proprie facultates obtinuerunt a nobis de consilio fratrum nostrorum vice sima terre sue, verum videntes licet sero quod sic vicesima minus utiliter tractaretur ne Terra Sancta ipsius subventione frustraretur omnino capellanos et alios familiares nostros ad diversas partes mundi transmisimus pro residuo vicesime colligendo, et quicquid unquam habere potuimus de vicesima vel redemptione votorum, et de hiis que nobis remanserunt in camera tibi curavimus destinare.’; Pressutti 2574; Gottlob, \textit{Kreuzzugs-steuern}, 182-83; Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 97-98.
\textsuperscript{87} Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 98.
Honorius sent an order to his legate in England, Pandulf, that he should count out the twentieth, the census, and Peter’s Pence, attach his seal to it, and then transfer it to the Templars and Hospitalers of Paris, while sending a written account of the sums involved to the curia. A letter dated 12 January 1221 was addressed to the bishop of Albenga, ordering him to send the twentieth - amounting to ninety-six Genoese pounds - to the curia, or else to entrust it to the archbishop of Genoa.

On 25 March Honorius ordered the archbishop of Salzburg to transfer the twentieth to the Holy Land.

A case could be made for increasing centralisation as the crusade wore on, and the elements of more centralised control outlined here appear to support this. But such an interpretation would be too simple and misleading to suffice. While centralised control was preferable to the pope because it prevented money sitting idly in the West when it was needed on the crusade - something mentioned by the pope himself in his letters of 24 July 1220 - it appears to have supplemented, rather totally supplanted, devolved collection. It is important to remember that only a few days after the more centralised initiatives of early July 1220, Honorius granted retention of the Hungarian twentieth to the bishop of Veszprém until the Hungarians’ planned 1221 departure, and that the example of the transfer from Benevento to the curia was not a true case of centralisation because it was part of the Papal State anyway. When taken as a whole, the evidence rather points to the

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88 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 8v: ‘Preterea cum nuper quicquid habuimus in camera miserimus in subsidium Terre Sancte propter quod multis tenemur debitis obligati, denarium beati Petri et censum ecclesie Romane debitum ac vicesimam colligi facias diligentem, et efferri de Anglia, ac ipsa omnia tui sigillum muninme sicut expedire videris consignata Parisius penes Templarios et Hospitalarios caute deponere studeas et prudenter, quantitatem omnium singillatum tuis nobis litteris rescripturus.’; Pressutti 2620.
89 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 69r; Pressutti 2974.
90 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 100r; Pressutti 3207.
co-existence of devolved administration of the twentieth with more centralised control. These were simply two different approaches to getting the same job done. Despite recognising the advantages that centralisation offered, Honorius was still persuaded by petitions to permit local collection throughout the crusade.

**Diversion**

Not all of the twentieth collected in aid of the Holy Land was delivered to the armies of the Fifth Crusade. Instead, as a result of pressure from other theatres of war - Spain and the south of France - Honorius made two major diversions of some of the twentieth to support the *reconquista* and the Albigensian Crusade.

When Honorius authorised the ‘Second’ Albigensian Crusade in August 1218, he hoped that Philip Augustus would participate in it.91 Philip, however, had been reluctant to intervene personally in the south of France since hostilities had begun under Innocent III.92 As part of the negotiations aimed at securing the king’s participation, on 5 September 1218 Honorius issued a letter which offered Philip Augustus half of the Holy Land twentieth collected from France to fund a royal crusade against the southern French heretics.93 Scholars have written that Honorius made the offer of the twentieth to try and entice Philip to crusade, and while it should not be forgotten that the diversion fitted into a long series of Franco-papal negotiations, careful attention to the *narratio* of the letter suggests that it was actually Philip himself who asked (‘*postulasti*’) for the French

twentieth to be used in support of the Albigensian Crusade in a previous letter.\textsuperscript{94} Therefore it should be interpreted more as the positive response to a diplomatic request than a change of policy formulated at the curia.

Honorius immediately issued letters on the same day to the clergy of Narbonne, Auch, Vienne, Aix, Arles, and Embrun, who were to divert their Holy Land twentieths to the Albigensian Crusade, and to the papal legate Bertrand, who was to receive it.\textsuperscript{95} Richard Kay has written that this diversion had already been planned by the pope, which explains why Honorius was able to issue the orders to Bertrand and the clergy.\textsuperscript{96} The diversion of the twentieth must have been planned before 5 September, or else Honorius would not have immediately ordered the clergy and legate to start transferring the twentieth if he was awaiting Philip’s response. But this does not preclude the possibility that the idea to divert the twentieth originated at the royal, rather than papal, court. Despite this grant, Philip did not participate personally, but sent his son Louis instead.\textsuperscript{97}

The next major diversion came on 9 February 1219, when Honorius allowed Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo (who was actually defrauding the twentieth - see below) half of the Holy Land twentieth from Toledo and Segovia

\textsuperscript{94} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 11v: ‘Sane quod per easdem litteras postulasti, ut de vicesima regni Francie et alis collectis et colligendis ibidem huic subvenire negotio curaremus, animum nostrum quasi quadam perplexitate perstrinxit.’; Pressutti 1615. Kay argued that Honorius had planned to offer half of the French twentieth to Philip Augustus from the beginning: Kay, Bourges, 6-7. The offer is also implied to have been part of a papal initiative in: Mark Gregory Pegg, A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom (New York, 2008), 163; Baldwin, Government, 337-38.

\textsuperscript{95} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 12v; Pressutti 1616; Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 12v: ‘Cum autem vicesimam Narbonensis, Auxitanensis, Aquensis, Ebredunensis, Viennensis, et Arletanensis, provinciarum vobis concedendam duxerimus in utilitatem negotii pacis et fidei convertendam’; Pressutti 1617.

\textsuperscript{96} Kay, Bourges, 7.

\textsuperscript{97} Costen, Cathars, 151.
to be retained to fund the *reconquista* in response to his requests.\(^{98}\) Again, this was a diversion made by the pope in response to pressure from outside the curia. A later letter of 4 July 1220 addressed to Rodrigo states that the grant had been made in response ‘ad preces tuas’.\(^{99}\) Honorius was reluctant to divert the twentieth, but managed to retain - at least nominally - half of the tax for the Holy Land. Just prior to his treachery being discovered though, on 13 February 1220 Honorius inclined to grant Rodrigo, who held the position of *legatus natus*, the whole twentieth from his province, probably on account of the good reports of his actions sent to the curia by the papal chaplain Huguico, who was in league with him.\(^{100}\) All these reluctant diversions were immediately revoked however as soon as the fraud was discovered on 4 July 1220.\(^{101}\)

Similarly, in response to his requests (‘preces’), after much careful deliberation, on 1 April 1219 Honorius granted William, bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne, the whole of his local Holy Land twentieth to use on campaign against the southern French heretics, by special grace (‘de speciali gratia’).\(^{102}\) Three days later, however, Honorius issued another document to William limiting the grant: half was to be used to support the planned royal crusade in the south of France,

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\(^{98}\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 58: ‘Licet igitur vicesima ecclesiasticorum proventuum deputata fuerit specialiter negotio Terre Sancta, nos tamen attendentes quod fideles de partibus tuis contra mauros in Hyspanie finibus constitutos, verbo provocas et exemplo, propter hoc exponendo te multis laboribus et expensis, medietatem totius vicesime dioecesis Toletanae ac Segobiensis que tue sollicitudini specialiter est commissa, tibi auctoritate presentium concedimus, inhiis que ad defenseonem fidelium et expugnationem maorum fuerint precipue necessaria, secundum providentie tue arbitrium expendendam. Medietatem vero reliquam ad ipsius Terre Sancte subsidium reservamus’; Pressutti 1864.

\(^{99}\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 195r; Pressutti 2525.

\(^{100}\) *Opera*, ed. Horoy, iii, 386-87; Pressutti 2329; Peter Linehan, *The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1971), 8-9.

\(^{101}\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 195r; Pressutti 2525.

\(^{102}\) Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 80r; Pressutti 1987.
while the other half was to be retained to support the Fifth Crusade.\textsuperscript{103} That this change in decision was made so rapidly is perplexing, although behind the decision probably lies lobbying from another interested party; the imminent departure of Louis to the south (who left in May) provides a clue.\textsuperscript{104}

The few diversions of the twentieth to support crusading in other theatres outlined here were driven by petitions rather than papal initiative, and crucially, were granted despite Honorius’s reluctance. When news of the failure of the Fifth Crusade reached the curia in early November 1221, within days (15 November) Honorius allowed a tax of a full twentieth to be levied from the French clergy for three years in order to support the Albigensian Crusade, imposed on the same terms as the 1215 twentieth.\textsuperscript{105}

\textbf{Exemption}

Cazel wrote that ‘exemptions from the [twentieth] tax fill the papal registers’, implying that collection cannot have been very effective.\textsuperscript{106} Yet careful examination of the registers and original letters reveals this statement to be incorrect. There are in fact only thirteen cases of Honorius exempting particular religious houses and churches from payment of the twentieth, including exemptions granted to the Premonstratensian (a reissue), Grandmontine, and


\textsuperscript{104} Baldwin, \textit{Government}, 338.

\textsuperscript{105} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 164; Pressutti 3574. For a full account of the 1221 twentieth for the Albigensian Crusade, see Kay, ‘Albigensian’.

\textsuperscript{106} Cazel, ‘Financing’, 137.
Teutonic Orders. There is the possibility that exemptions were granted without being registered at the curia by the petitioners, but it would have been ill-advised not to do so, and even the poverty-stricken monks of S. Marco of Mantua discussed below decided to register their exemption privilege alone, distinct from other documents granted by Honorius at the same time. Therefore it seems reasonable to argue that the register copies represent most, if not all, of the exemptions granted by Honorius.

The existence of only thirteen exemption privileges demonstrates that exemption from paying the twentieth was by no means easy to get, and that Honorius planned to collect the tax from almost all the clergy. The first exemption recorded in the registers was issued to the prior of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and dated 8 July 1217. The document was addressed to all clerics who should examine it, and it prevented the prior and his brothers transmarina from being compelled to pay the twentieth, as had been occurring. This petition for exemption was also made at the same time as a petition for the confirmation of existing privileges granted by previous popes, a request that was frequently made by institutions looking to safeguard their interests when a new pope was elected.

Of the other exemptions granted, most were on account of pleas of poverty. The exemption granted to the prior and brothers of S. Marco of Mantua

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107 Pressutti 652, 1205, 1358, 1458, 1720, 1921, 2088, 2090 2322, 2558, 3014, 3016, 3746, 4417.
108 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 119r; Pressutti 652.
109 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 119r: ‘Audivimus et audientes nequivimus non mirari, quod dilecti filii fratres Sepulchri Domini ad solvendam vicesimam de proventibus ecclesiarium suarum quas habent in vestris diocesisibus compelluntur.’; Pressutti 652.
110 Honorius’s confirmation was issued the day before on 7 July: Reg. Vat. 9, fols 118v-19r; Pressutti 651.
on 31 March 1218 was in response to just such a petition.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 237v: ‘Ex parte vestra fuit nobis humiliter supplicatum, ut cum in generali concilio provida sit deliberatione statutum, ut omnes clerici, tam subditi, quam prelati, vicesimam ecclesiasticorum proventum usque ad triennium conferant integre in subsidium Terre Sancte, quibusdam dum taxat religiosi exceptis, vos a prestatione iamdicta, misericorditer absolvere dignarumur. Nos igitur considerata paupertate ac religione domus vestre vestris supplicationibus paterno condescendentes affectu, vos a prestatione huismodi duximus eximendos.’; Pressutti 1205.} Like the monks of the Holy Sepulchre, those of S. Marco also took the opportunity to petition for the confirmation of existing privileges while they were at the curia, which was issued on 4 April 1218.\footnote{Opera, ed. Horoy, ii, 691; Pressutti 1217.} Nevertheless, unlike the document issued exempting them from paying the twentieth, the monks decided not to pay to have this confirmation registered because of the deliberately and prohibitively high cost of registration.\footnote{Sayers, Government, 74.} As a poor monastery, it was presumably decided that it was worth having a copy of the tax exemption preserved in the curia’s records - where the administration of the twentieth was taking place - as insurance in case of loss and as a preventative against future attempts at collection. The confirmation of existing privileges, on the other hand, must not have been deemed worth the cost of registration, given that the monastery probably held the original documents along with confirmations by Honorius’s predecessors, and may even have registered them under one of his predecessors.\footnote{The existence of twelfth-century papal registers has been proven conclusively in Blumenthal, ‘Registers’, 135-51.} This suggests that despite the selective registration practised at Honorius’s curia, if a poverty-stricken monastery such as S. Marco’s was willing to pay for registration, then the registers probably contain most if not all of the exemptions granted (aside from those granted to the Teutonic Order, see below).

The nuns of S. Lorenzo in Amalfi were exempted from paying the twentieth on account of their poverty in an incredibly short document issued on 21

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\footnote{Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 237v: ‘Ex parte vestra fuit nobis humiliter supplicatum, ut cum in generali concilio provida sit deliberatione statutum, ut omnes clerici, tam subditi, quam prelati, vicesimam ecclesiasticorum proventum usque ad triennium conferant integre in subsidium Terre Sancte, quibusdam dum taxat religiosi exceptis, vos a prestatione iamdicta, misericorditer absolvere dignarumur. Nos igitur considerata paupertate ac religione domus vestre vestris supplicationibus paterno condescendentes affectu, vos a prestatione huismodi duximus eximendos.’; Pressutti 1205.}
May 1218, that is atypical in that it resulted not from petition, but from the input of the legate Hugolino.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 256v: ‘Religione ac paupertate monasterii vestri per dilectum filium Hugolimun plenius intellectis, vos a prestatione vicessime [sic] duximus absolvendas presentes litteras vobis in testimonium concedentes.’; Pressutti 1358.} Given the small number of exemptions from the twentieth, perhaps Hugolino’s influence at the curia was decisive in the award of the privilege in this case, and is something which dovetails with the findings from chapter five on legatine influence over papal decisions. On 21 June 1218 the provost and canons of Montjoux were also granted exemption because they could not pay the twentieth.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 272r: ‘Attendentes vestre religionis fervorem et caritatis subsidium quod transeuntibus exhibetis necnon onera debitorum quibus propter pauperum peregrinorum frequentiam gravata esse asseritur plus solito domus vestra, vos et domos vestras a prestatione vicesime duximus absolvendos, presentes vobis litteras in testimonium concedentes.’; Pressutti 1458.} It seems that the scribes of the papal chancery either used the document issued to the nuns of S. Lorenzo the month before - or some other chancery formulary - as a template when composing the letter to Montjoux, which replicates the last sentence almost exactly: ‘a prestatione vicesime duximus absolvendos, presentes vobis litteras in testimonium concedentes’.

A number of other grants were made on grounds of poverty. On 1 December 1218, Stephen, bishop of Nantes, was granted an exemption for him and his clergy out of compassion because of the count of Brittany’s exactions.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 33r: ‘Compatientes tibi super gravaminibus et pressuris quibus nobilis vir comes Britannie te ac clericos tuos exulare coegit, te a prestatione vicesime proventu mense tue duximus eximendum.’; Pressutti 1720.} On 11 March 1219 Honorius also granted exemption to the nuns of Fontevrault, despite residing in lands from which the twentieth had been awarded to Count Hugh of La Marche and Savaric de Mauleon, because although a shining example of the faith, Fontevrault claimed to suffer from extreme poverty.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fols 70v-71r: ‘monasterium vestrum et magne religionis odore prefulget et nimia paupertate gravatur, de speciali gratia sedis apostolice vos a prestatione ipsius vicesime duximus
of the hospital of Roncesvalles also successfully petitioned for exemption on 28 May 1219 so that they could focus funds on their hospital.\textsuperscript{119} On 5 February 1220, the bishop of Piacenza was granted exemption, as part of a batch of at least three documents resulting from petitions issued on the same day concerning affairs in his diocese, which he paid to have registered.\textsuperscript{120} On 19 January 1222, in a late, post-crusade exemption, Honorius granted the petition of the prior of S. Frediano of Lucca.\textsuperscript{121} Another late exemption was awarded on 5 July 1223 to the monks of Scilla as a reward.\textsuperscript{122} Presumably these late exemptions were sought by those who had not paid up until that point anyway.

Whole orders also received exemption from the tax. When the twentieth was levied, only the Cistercian and Premonstratensian orders were exempted. This changed on 28 May 1219 when, presumably in response to lobbying, the Grandmontine Order was also exempted.\textsuperscript{123} On 16 July 1220, the exemption for the Premonstratensian Order was reissued.\textsuperscript{124} As part of a large batch of privileges granted by Honorius in January 1221 in return for their high-profile involvement at the curia in the negotiations between the pope and Frederick II before his imperial coronation, the Teutonic Knights were also awarded exemption from the

\textsuperscript{119} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 100v: ‘Odor boni nominis qui de vestra hospitalitate ac religione diffunditur usque ad nos ut vestro intendamus commodo et honori ex exaudiamus petitiones vestras rationabiles nos inducit.’; Pressutti 1921.

\textsuperscript{120} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 159r; Pressutti 2322; Pressutti 2323, 2324.

\textsuperscript{121} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 189r: ‘Hinc est igitur quod vestris supplicationibus inclinati a prestatione vicesime iuxta generali statuta concilii in Terre Sancte subsidium transmittende, ipsam ecclesiam vestram absolvimus ex gratia speciali.’; Pressutti 3746.

\textsuperscript{122} Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 64v; Pressutti 4417.

\textsuperscript{123} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 102v; Pressutti 2090.

\textsuperscript{124} Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 205r; Pressutti 2558.
twentieth on 19 January.\textsuperscript{125} Probably on account of cost, the Order chose not to have these documents registered at the curia, and instead recorded copies of the original documents in their own cartulary.

When one plots the location of exempt institutions on a map (Map 6, p. 305), it is striking that most were geographically close to the Papal State (cf. Map 4, p. 107) - there is a striking dearth of evidence for successful exemption petitions from central and northern Europe. This perhaps suggests that poor institutions from these outlying regions simply could not afford to travel to petition the curia for exemption, or that those further away from the curia simply chose to commit fraud when performing their self-assessment tax.

\textsuperscript{125} Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, ed. Ernest Strehlke (Berlin, 1869), (no. 332) 300; Pressutti 3014; Tabulae, ed Strehlke, (no. 334) 301; Pressutti 3016; Bombi, ‘L’Ordine’, 205. Morton emphasises the Order’s role during the Fifth Crusade in the issue of the documents: Morton, Teutonic, 37.
Map 6. Exemptions from the twentieth tax

Fraud, Theft, and Non-Payment

Given that the twentieth was a self-assessed tax, it is not surprising that some decided to try and cheat the system. Innocent III had ordered preachers of the Fifth Crusade to conduct themselves in an exemplary manner when it came to collecting money for the crusade, yet not all abided by this instruction, and several subdelegati were accused (and found guilty) of stealing from collection boxes, and the contemporary Walther von der Vogelweide criticised the papacy’s
perceived avarice in poetry. Abbot Gervase of Prémontré’s letter of 1217 to Honorious reveals disturbances in which collection trunks were thrown out of churches when it was discovered that the money was being siphoned off and would not be spent on supporting poor local crusaders as had been assumed.

The worst and most famous abuse in the collection of the twentieth came from Spain, where Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo, also a papal legate, petitioned for diversion of the Holy Land twentieth to use in fighting the Moors, stole a large amount, and found a willing accomplice in one of the papal officials that Honorius despatched to Spain, who joined in with the fraud. The Spanish Church had been extremely reluctant to pay the twentieth from the beginning, and was still smarting from Lateran IV, where their pleadings for exemption on grounds of poverty from supporting the *reconquista* fell on deaf ears. The Spanish Church therefore, spearheaded by Archbishop Rodrigo, actively sabotaged the collection of the twentieth. One of the letters issued at the start of Honorius’s reign on 1 December 1216 was a response to what the curia considered the paltry doubts and uncertainties of the dean and chapter of Compostella over payment of the twentieth, with reminders that the tax was levied with the authority of the Lateran

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127 *Sacrae*, ed. Hugo, 7; Brenda Bolton, ‘Faithful to Whom? Jacques de Vitry and the French Bishops’, *Revue Mabillon*, n.s., 9 (70) (1998), 70. For commentary and English translations of two of Gervase’s letters regarding crusade recruitment and financing, see Jessalynn Bird, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell, eds., *Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187-1291* (Philadelphia, PA, 2013), 133-41. I would question the assertion that the local disturbances Gervase records in 1217 resulted from the diversion of the Holy Land twentieth to the Albigensian Crusade because this did not occur until 1219; this also draws into question the identification of ’N.’ as the bishop of Noyon and/or Meaux by the editors as evidence linking the uprisings to the Albigensian Crusade diversion: ibid., 139, n. 16.
Council, and took the opportunity to once again make the threat of excommunication against those found guilty of fraud.  

Elsewhere in the Iberian Peninsula we know that fraud was being detected at least as early as January 1218, because on 12 January, the archbishop of Braga successfully petitioned for the power to absolve clerics who had confessed to committing fraud in payment of the twentieth. Honorius also instructed him to send any such wrongdoers to the curia. The archbishop also petitioned for six other documents regarding his other affairs, which were all issued between 10 and 12 January and registered as a group. The archbishop had obviously waited to collect a decent amount of business together that would make the long trip to the curia (or that of a representative) worthwhile, which raises the possibility that the fraud could have been discovered months before the document granting powers of absolution was issued.

By 1 July 1220, the fraud being committed in Spain, and the papal chaplain Huguico’s implication in it, had become known at the curia, (probably through another papal agent in Spain, Master Gonzalo García) which prompted the despatch of a number of letters to Spain and Egypt on that day. One letter was sent to the archbishop of Tarragona, charging him to investigate Huguico's

130 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 22v: ‘Sed caveant ne dolo a venditione desistant, quoniam qui fraudem scientur committunt vinculum excommunicationis incurrunt.’; Pressutti 132; Linehan, Spanish, 7.
131 Reg. Vat. 9, fols 197v-98r: ‘Nos igitur de discretione tua gerentes fiduciam pleniorem, et volentes fraternitatem tuam in quibus cum Deo possimus gratia prosequi speciali, auctoritate tibi presentium indulgemus, ut siquis clericus tue provincie post factam collectoribus solutionem, tibi secreto in solutione vicesime se fraudem confessus fuerit commississe, absolutionis beneficium eidem impendere valeas vice nostra, recepto tamen ab eo propter quod laqueum excommunicationis incurrit, quod siquidem in subsidium Terre Sancte secundum mandatum apostolicum convertatur, precavens diligenter, ut illos de quibus publica fama est quod vicesimam defraudarint, sublato cuiusibiet contradictionis et appellationis obstaculo transmittas ad sedem apostolicam absolvendos.’; Pressutti 993.
132 Reg. Vat. 9, fols 196v-99r; Pressutti 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 993, 994.
133 Linehan, Spanish, 9.
abuses and enquire into the amounts collected in his diocese.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 194v: ‘fraternitati tue per apostolica scripta in virtute obedientie districte precipiendo, mandamus quatinus diligenter inquirens quantum ab ecclesiis tue diocesis et a singulis suffraganeis tuis receperit pro vicesima, et quot et qualia ecclesiastica beneficia in diocesi vel provincia tua noviter est adoptus, neconon de aliis gestis suis presertim de quibus ecclesie Romane aliquam notam impinxcit, ea omnia plene ac plane nobis tuis litteris intimare procures’; Pressutti 2515.} Another was sent to Archbishop Rodrigo, who was reprimanded for his role in the crime, which had disgraced the curia.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 195r: ‘Sed quod dolentes referimus, ecce nos et fratres nostri omnino contrarium sumus experti, quia cum Huguicio subdiaconus et capellanus noster quem tamquam simplicem nuntium ad partes Ispanie misimus pro vicesima colligenda mandatorum nostrorum fines excedens et apostolice sedis legatum se mentiens abiecto pudore multa enormia et abusiva te sciente patrarit, que liquido in nostram et ecclesie Romane ignominia redundabant, tu qui obprobria exprobrium nobis super te cadere debueras reputare, ac ipsum duris obruere increpationibus in spiritu libertatis ut eius insolentiam refrenares.’; Pressutti 2516.} Honorius then moved to investigate the extent of the crime, and ordered Pelagius to look into the receipts that he had received from the Paris Hospital.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 195: ‘Ideoque fraternitati tue per apostolica scriptas mandamus quatinus nuntium ad partes Ispanie misimus pro vicesima colligenda mandatorum nostrorum fines excedens et apostolice sedis legatum se mentiens abiecto pudore multa enormia et abusiva te sciente patrarit, que liquido in nostram et ecclesie Romane ignominia redundabant, tu qui obprobria exprobrium nobis super te cadere debueras reputare, ac ipsum duris obruere increpationibus in spiritu libertatis ut eius insolentiam refrenares.’; Pressutti 2517.} The order to Pelagius is illuminating in another way, because it also suggests that the Spanish twentieth had been transferred to the East via this Hospitaller house, on which we have less surviving evidence than the role of the Templars of Paris, presumably because Honorius favoured use of the Temple. Honorius then wrote to the Paris Hospital, ordering that they despatch four, five, or six thousand marks of silver from the English twentieth in the next passage (mentioned above), presumably to make up for any deficit from the defrauded Spanish twentieth.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 195v: ‘aut si forte illa tanta non est, de alia pecunia nostra in domo vestra deposita vel si forsae utraque ad perfiiciendum alicuem, de numeris predictis non sufficit de alia pecunia undecumque ipsam habere potestis, quia nos vobis reddi faciemus’; Pressutti 2519.} Honorius ordered the Paris Hospital to make up this transfer from other papal funds held there, or any other money - which the curia would reimburse them for - if the English twentieth was not sufficient: evidence that Honorius seems to have had an agreed system of credit with the Hospital.
Three days later, on 4 July, Honorius issued another letter to Rodrigo, revoking the earlier diversion of half of the Holy Land twentieth to fight the *reconquista*: the money was now destined for Egypt.\(^{138}\) Peter Linehan has criticised the way that Honorius dealt with Rodrigo as ‘fumbling incompetence’ which he claims was symptomatic of his relations with the Spanish Church in general, a statement which does have elements of truth in it.\(^{139}\) Nonetheless, Honorius was also a victim of circumstance, with the legate-archbishop and a papal official, probably receiving the support of many Spanish clerics at grassroots level, succeeding in their deception of the pope by depriving him of accurate information on which to base decisions. What cannot be explained away is why Rodrigo was not removed from office, and even more incredibly, why on 15 January 1222 the pope ordered the archbishop of Tarragona to transfer twentieth funds to him.\(^{140}\)

Fraud and non-payment were by no means a rare occurrence, as the papal registers reveal. The Spanish case above represents the most detailed evidence we possess, and it is not possible to trace fraud, theft, and non-payment in such detail for other cases, on which we know next to nothing except that fraud was committed. Nevertheless, throughout Honorius’s pontificate, the pope issued letters in response to the petitions of archbishops, bishops, and abbots, awarding them the power to absolve those excommunicated for committing crime regarding


\(^{139}\) Linehan, *Spanish*, 17, 9.

the twentieth, and these documents can be revealing in a different way.\textsuperscript{141} These letters represent the end result of detection and confession of crime at a local level, and can tell us a number of things about the efficacy of the tax collection.

Firstly, they prove that the threat of excommunication was carried out - it was not an empty threat, and also testifies to the loyalty of the majority of the Church hierarchy in carrying out the papal mandates to excommunicate those found guilty. The poor nuns of S. Maria de Rocca in Lucedio must have thought that this was ruthlessly effective when they were excommunicated for non-payment, before being absolved when their poverty became known at the curia.\textsuperscript{142}

Secondly, the petitions for power of absolution were common enough to imply that fraud was certainly not unheard of, and given that the tax was self-assessed, common sense informs us that many more clerics must have committed fraud without being discovered or admitting their guilt. There is no way of telling how widespread abuses in the payment and collection of the twentieth were, with only the Spanish case being known about in detail, and the papal letters granting power of absolution being general rather than specific in scope. The letters employed catch-all language that allowed bishops and abbots to absolve multiple cases at their discretion, without having to petition the papacy again, such as ‘eos qui fraudem in solutione vicesime commiserunt’.\textsuperscript{143} We must bear in mind also

\textsuperscript{141} Pressutti 993, 2670, 2847, 2894, 2900, 2949, 3253, 3559, 3642, 3698, 3851, 3966, 4457, 4658, 4770, 4830, 5292, 5482, 5513, 5888.
\textsuperscript{142} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 51v: ‘Presentium tibi auctoritate mandamus quatinus priorissam et moniales sancte Marie de Rocca absolvas a vinculo excommunicationis quam se incurisse formidant, pro eo quod in vicesime solutione cessarunt, eisdem denuntians quod intellecta paupertate ipsarum eam absolvimus a prestatione vicesime memorate.’; Pressutti 2880.
\textsuperscript{143} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 48v; Pressutti 2847.
that even more documents regarding this could have been issued without being registered.

Thirdly, plotting the location of the petitioners on a map reveals a trend for exemption and crime (Maps 6 and 7, pp. 305, 312). Whereas those who successfully petitioned the pope for exemption tended to live closer to the curia, those who were excommunicated for committing fraud and non-payment tended to live much further away. This suggests that those clergy who were more distant from the curia might have been more likely to attempt to evade the tax. That there was no reported crime in England, where a legate a latere (who was also the papal camerarius) played an important role in the country’s governance is also very instructive. There is the possibility, however, that the dense cluster of detection around northern France could signify more active prosecution of offenders by the Church authorities in that region, rather than a propensity among more distant clerics to commit crime. The limitations of the evidence do not allow any conclusive statement on this matter, but it does seem highly suggestive that those who were more distant from the curia were also more likely to commit fraud or to try and get away without paying.

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144 Cheney and Lunt both posited the view that collection in England may have been more effective than elsewhere given Pandulf’s role in royal government: Cheney, England, 267-68; Lunt, Financial, 247.
The Fifth Crusade and its Aftermath

The twentieth was used in Egypt to fund specific crusade offensives, to support poor crusaders, and to further the crusade as a whole. The legate Pelagius played an instrumental role in spending the twentieth, but he did not do this alone. A papal letter issued on 7 September 1219 in reply to Pelagius informed him that the pope was putting all his effort into sending money from the West, included the amounts that he could expect to receive from various sources, and outlined how
the legate was to distribute the twentieth on the crusade. This letter is important because it reveals that Honorius sent Pelagius slightly differing instructions for the distribution of the twentieth depending on its origin - something which has hitherto gone unnoticed in the historiography.

The twentieth which the legate received resulting from centralised collection was to be spent to further the crusade generally, in agreement with John of Brienne, the patriarch of Jerusalem, the foremost Roman princes, and the masters of the Hospitallers, Templars, and Teutonic Knights. Honorius’s instructions for the distribution of the twentieth collected and distributed among local crusade contingents was slightly different. The legate was to spend the money on needy crusaders and for the aid of the crusade, but the money was ideally to be spent amongst those contingents which had brought their local twentieth with them, and for this, Honorius wrote that Pelagius only required the agreement of the masters of the Military Orders. This essentially accelerated

**Footnotes**

145 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 128r: ‘Litteris tuis in vigilia assumptionis beate Marie animo desiderante receptis et continentia earumdem ac his que venerabilis frater noster Bethleemitianus episcopus nobis propospuit viva voce, cum diligentia intellectis, ferventer ad tuum et Terre Sancte subsidium aspirantes quedam que penes nos erant de redemptione votorum et quince milia marcarum de camera nostra continuo ad opus huiusmodi segregavimus, et eas tibi per eundem episcopum destinamus, ac insuper fratri Aymaro thesaurario domus militie Templi Parisiensis mandavimus sine mora ut ea que habet de vicesima Francie que sicut accepiimus circa summam sedecim milium marcarum ascendunt studeat divisum per diversos nuntios prudentes et fidos sub episcoporum et aliorum testimonio signatam in ipsius Terre subsidium celeriter destinare, tibi ab ipsis nuntiis in venerabilis fratris nostri partriarche ac illustris regis Ierosolimitani ac magistrorum Hospitali et Templi ac domus Teutonicon et principis exercitus Romanorum presentia exhibenda ac expendenda per te cum ipsorum consilio et aliorum quod videris advocandos prout res videbitur postulare.’; Pressutti 2195.

146 The inclusion of the master of the Teutonic Knights alongside the masters of the Templars and Hospitallers adds further support to the arguments for the importance of the Fifth Crusade in the rise of the Teutonic Knights: Morton, Teutonic, 35, 31-42.

147 Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 128r: ‘Sicut enim potes recolere ab ipso nostre promitionis exordio ad suspitionem tollendam fuit de consilio communi provisum ut ipsa vicesima in vestris manibus non veniret, sed colligeretur in unaquaque diocesi et per tres aut quatuor crucesignatos illius probate fidei et prudentie ad te sub episcoporum et aliorum testimonio deferetur, per manus tuas cum consilio eorumdem magistrorum Hospitali et Templi ac domus Teutonicon distribuenda inter
the process by removing red tape and it reinforced the high priority given to local Christian communities in raising and financing contingents of warriors for the Fifth Crusade. Pelagius’s important role in spending the twentieth certainly lent him influence among the crusade leadership, but Honorius was very specific that Pelagius was to work with the rest of the crusade leadership, which brings into question some of the statements in the historiography that exaggerate the legate’s role.\textsuperscript{148}

An example of Pelagius spending the twentieth to support a specific offensive comes from 1219, when he proposed and supported an attack on Damietta by the Genoese, Pisans, and Venetians, supported by copious funds from the common store.\textsuperscript{149} Another comes from 1220, when he was urging action but getting no response, so he used the twentieth to hire French and German mercenaries.\textsuperscript{150} The outcome, however, was less successful, since the mercenaries, though happy to take the legate’s money, were less enthusiastic about actually fighting.

Pelagius was not the only one to fund offensive initiatives on the crusade. Oliver of Paderborn, who had preached the Fifth Crusade and enjoyed close links with the pope, also famously financed an ingenious floating siege machine made by lashing two ships (cogs) together in 1218.\textsuperscript{151} Although Oliver’s role in this is no secret despite his own modesty in the \textit{Historia Damiatina}, what is not common knowledge is where he got the money to fund it. Jacques de Vitry wrote that

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crucesignatos egentes et utiles Terre Sancte, ac specialiter inter eos in quorum diocesi collecta fuisset’; Pressutti 2195.
\textsuperscript{149} Oliver, \textit{Historia}, 211-12.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 250-51.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 181-82.
\end{flushleft}
Oliver’s siege machine had cost two thousand marks - a very large sum that simply cannot have been drawn from his own personal finances.\footnote{Jacques, \textit{Lettres}, 96.} The answer can perhaps be found in the \textit{Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum}, a neglected chronicle that was composed in Oliver’s home region, which gives a slightly different figure spent on the siege machine - one thousand six hundred marks - but states that this money came \textit{ex puris eleemosinis} (‘from alms’).\footnote{MS Burney 351, fol. 114v; \textit{Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum}, 40.} The evidence from the author of the \textit{Gesta} - potentially an eyewitness to the collection of alms and the tax in the Rhineland, who may even have contributed towards it - suggests therefore, that Oliver was in command of funds from the Rhineland, at least consisting of alms, and probably extending to the twentieth as well. Oliver was indeed spending it among his local contingent as ordered by Honorius, because his \textit{Historia} notes that it was the Germans and Frisians who provided the supplies and the labour, and subsequently manned the machine during its deployment in the assault on Damietta’s chain tower.\footnote{Oliver, \textit{Historia}, 181-82.}

The twentieth was certainly useful in supporting the crusaders’ initiatives, but it was never designed to fund the entire crusade. Shortage of funds among the crusaders was still a grave concern, as evidenced by the letter sent on 20 September 1220 by the master of the Templars, Peter de Montacute, to the bishop of Elne, in which Peter complained that the deficiency of money in that month was so bad that the army was unable to maintain its ships for any great length of time.\footnote{Rogeri, ed. Hewlett, ii, 261.} Peter ended his letter saying that the Templars and all the other crusaders were oppressed by such great costs in carrying out the crusade that they would be
unable to continue unless reinforced in the next passage. This evidence for the impoverished state of the army is corroborated by Jacques de Vitry, who wrote in a letter to leading figures in the West (including Honorius and Duke Leopold of Austria) dated 18 April 1221, that the poverty among the army was so great that barely four or five knights could be maintained. Jacques went on that the situation was exacerbated by the absence of any powerful secular rulers apart from Count Matthew of Sicily, who retained as many knights as he could at his own expense, and noted that Pelagius was rationing the twentieth to try and sustain the army.

Honorius appears to have left the spending decisions entirely up to the crusade leadership and he is only recorded to have intervened on one occasion. On 30 November 1220, the pope issued two letters on the subject of funding the crusade of Duke Louis of Bavaria, which stemmed from discussions with the emperor at the time of his coronation eight days earlier (see chapter two). Honorius wrote to Louis, allowing him to delay his departure on crusade from March until August if Frederick did not pay him the five thousand marks that he had promised. At the same time, Honorius wrote to Pelagius, and ordered him to set aside two thousand marks to fund Louis’s crusade. Apart from this instance, which had its roots in negotiations with the emperor, Honorius made no other recorded attempts to intervene in the expenditure of the twentieth. Honorius’s order would surely have come as a blow to Pelagius if the army was as impoverished as Peter de Montacute and Jacques de Vitry claim, yet evidence from Oliver of Cologne’s Historia reveals that Pelagius was still able to draw

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156 Rogeri, ed. Hewlett, ii, 262.
157 Jacques, Lettres, 166.
158 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 37v; Pressutti 2799.
159 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 37v; Pressutti 2800.
from the twentieth to fund the final march on Cairo in the summer of 1221. Oliver estimated that of around four thousand archers marching with the army, maybe two and a half thousand of them were mercenaries, and noted that the legate was able to pay generous wages to knights and for the arming of ships.\textsuperscript{160} This could have been the result of the transfer of another portion of the twentieth, recently received from the West, or it could point to the common store of the twentieth being rationed strictly by the legate in preparation for the ‘big push’. That the crusade army was short of cash, however, is not in doubt.

When news of the Fifth Crusade’s failure reached the West, Abbot William of Andres complained vividly that the whole Church had been wounded and disembowelled by paying the enormous twentieth for three years, which had been for nothing now that the crusade had ended in disaster.\textsuperscript{161} Of the few studies that exist on the papacy’s administration of the twentieth, none have questioned what happened to it after the Fifth Crusade. The answer is a diffuse scattering of collections, distributions, and exemptions. The twentieth had only been levied for three years, but delays in collection meant that it was still being collected in 1221, and money was still sitting in the system awaiting transfer to Egypt when the Fifth Crusade failed.\textsuperscript{162} This is the first attempt to analyse what happened to the money.

Despite the end of the crusade, collection of the twentieth due from the clergy still went ahead, which Honorius claimed would be put towards the defence of the Holy Land. On 15 January 1222, the pope chased up the troubled collection of the Spanish twentieth, and sent out a collection mandate to the

\textsuperscript{160} Oliver, \textit{Historia}, 259-60.
\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Ex Andrensis monasterii chronico}, in \textit{RHGF}, 18 (Paris, 1879), 578.
\textsuperscript{162} Cazel, ‘Financing’, 137.
archbishop of Tarragona ordering him to pay up. Paul Freedman has discovered two previously unknown papal letters to Spain from August and September 1222 which ordered the archbishop of Tarragona and his suffragans to pay the remnants of the overdue twentieth to the papal representative and Hospitaller knight Gonzalo, and awarded him the powers to collect the twentieth and absolve excommunicates. On 27 October 1223, Honorius wrote to the bishop of Gurk, noting that his predecessor had failed to pay the twentieth, and that if he wanted to retain the curia’s favour, he should transfer it to the papacy without delay. Similarly, on 20 January 1224, Honorius ordered that Simon, archbishop of Bourges, should deposit the Holy Land twentieth along with money from vow redemptions from his diocese and those of Clermont and Limousin at the church of St Victor in Paris. On 16 November 1226 Honorius also followed up the twentieth being held by the bishop of Turin, whose predecessor had been awarded the local twentieth to take with him on crusade but died before he could depart.

Many of the petitions for powers of absolution discussed above were also

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163 Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 185v: ‘Cum igitur totis viribus laboremus ad ignominiam Christiani nominis abolendam, per apostolica vobis scripta firmiter precipiendo mandamus quatinus eandem vicesimam archiepiscopo ipsi nomine nostro sine diminutione solvatis, eam fideliter colligentes, ac deponentes ubi archiepiscopus ipse duxerit providendum.’; Pressutti 3729.


165 Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 115v: ‘Ideoque fraternitati tue per apostolica scripta mandamus quatinus sine dilatione nobis insinuare cures ipsius vicesime quantitatem, conservaturus eandem quousque super hoc receperis nostro beneplacitum voluntatis, indulgentes fraternitati tue ne propter cessationem solutionis huiusmodi aliquaui possis calumpnie vel periculo subiacere.’; Pressutti 4544.

166 Reg. Vat. 12, fols 141v-42r: ‘Fraternitati tue de qua plenam in Domino fiduciam obtinemus, per apostolica scripta mandamus quatinus vicesimam tue ac Claromontensis et Lemovicensis diocesum collectam et colligendam ad subsidium Terre Sancte, necnon et quod datum est in eisdem diocesis pro redemptione votorum tibi auctoritate nostra facias assignari, que postmodum penes ecclesiam sancti Victoris Parisiensis cum ea qua decet cautela deponas, quantitatem eorum per litteras tuas nobis sine more dispendio fideliter expressurus.’; Pressutti 4698.

167 Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 148r: ‘Cum bone memorie Taurinensis episcopus crucis assumpto signaculo proposuisset transire in subsidium Terre Sancte, et ea que de vicesima collocerat secum ferre discretioni tue presentium auctoritate mandamus quatinus vicesimam ipsarum ad quorumcumque manus devenit tibi facias assignari. Contradictores et cetera usque compescendo, eamque ad nos afferas vel mittas per nuntium oportunum Terre Sancte subsidio conservandam.’; Pressutti 6051.
presented at the curia after the failure of the crusade.\textsuperscript{168} Conversely, only two exemptions were registered after the Fifth Crusade, on 19 January 1222 to the prior of S. Frediano of Lucca, and on 5 July 1223 to the monks of Scilla.\textsuperscript{169}

Money from the twentieth appears to have been collected centrally in the \textit{camera apostolica} after the crusade, given the order to the bishop of Gurk above, and also a pair of letters issued on the subject of the crusade of William VI of Montferrat (d.1225). On 7 February 1224, Honorius wrote to the Latin emperor informing him of William’s gathering crusade to Thessalonica - which was under threat from the Greeks - and announced that William had been granted fifteen thousand silver marks from money collected for the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{170} The letter of 7 February 1224 does not reveal where this money was being drawn from, but an earlier letter despatched to William of Montferrat himself on 28 May 1222 acknowledged that the fifteen thousand marks - promised to him by Hugolino during his Italian legation - was to be drawn from the \textit{camera apostolica}, which demonstrates that the curia was collecting the remnants of the twentieth and storing them centrally to fund the next Holy Land crusade.\textsuperscript{171} The letter also

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{168} Pressutti 3642, 3698, 3851, 3966, 4457, 4658, 4770, 5292, 5482, 5513, 5888.
  \item \textsuperscript{169} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 189r; Pressutti 3746; Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 64v; Pressutti 4417.
  \item \textsuperscript{170} Reg. Vat. 12, fol. 152v: ‘Nos autem de subventione tua eo magis solliciti quo graviora dampna te accepimus estate pretenta incurrisse, ecce dilecto filio nobili viro Willelmo marchioni Montisferrati qui ad succursum Thesalonicensis regni iure ad eum hereditatio pertinentis magnanimiter se accingit, et omnibus cum eo in Greciam transituris plenam suorum concessimus veniam peccatorum sicut et illis qui transeunt in subsidium Terre Sancte, ac in super ipsi marchioni ministravimus quindecim milia marcarum argenti de pecunia ipsius Terre Sancte subsidio deputata, firmam spem fiduciamque tenentes quod eius ad partes illas accessus magnifice corrobabit statum totum imperii Romanie, quod etiam ipsi Terre Sancte constat non modicum expedire.’; Pressutti 4754.
  \item \textsuperscript{171} Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 242v: ‘Cum venerabilis frater noster episcopus Hostiensis dum in Lombardia legationis officio fungeretur, tibi crucis signaculum assumenti, quindecim milia marcarum de mandato nostro promisit pro te ac pro militia tue tecum in Terre Sancte subsidio profecturis, et passagium quod tunc sperabatur instare sit propter ammissionem Damiate dilatam, nos ad solvendum tibi pecuniam memoratam distribuendam secundum quod tecum dispositum episcopus antedictos [sic], nos et cameram nostram per presentes litteras obligamus, dum modo infra instans.
\end{itemize}
remarks that the money had been destined for the next Holy Land crusade to be launched by the papacy, but this was obviously diverted in response to events in Thessalonica. Nevertheless, despite the redirection of funds, Honorius still wanted those crusaders who had originally taken Holy Land vows to continue on to campaign there as well after the Thessalonica crusade.\textsuperscript{172}

There was also the question of how to deal with the twentieth collections that had been granted to local crusade contingents which never departed and were still in possession of the funds. A batch of three documents was issued to the Premonstratensian abbot of Middelburg on 12 May 1225: one was a grant to absolve those guilty of defrauding the twentieth provided they make amends,\textsuperscript{173} another concerned his role as a crusade preacher in Flanders and Brabant;\textsuperscript{174} and the third was an order to compel the bishop of Cambrai, Henry duke of Brabant, and anyone else who had been awarded the twentieth for the crusade, to put the money honestly towards the Holy Land crusade by transferring it to the Hospitallers and Templars.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{172}Chrissis, Crusading, 72.
\textsuperscript{173}Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 59r: ‘Nos igitur tamen eorum saluti quam ipsius Terre Sancte subsidio consultentes, absolvendi eos ab excommunicatione huiusmodi dum modo tibi ipsam restituant pecuniam in eisdem Terre Sancte subsidium convertendam, tibi auctoritate presentium concedimus potestatem.’; Pressutti 5482.
\textsuperscript{174}Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 59v: ‘Cum predicande crucis officium tibi in Flandria et Brabantia duxerimus committendum’; Pressutti 5484.
\textsuperscript{175}Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 59r: ‘Significasti nobis quod cum tibi dederimus in mandatis, ut in terris in quibuscum predicis verbum crucis colligas pecuniam legatam a fidelibus vel alias deputatam subsidio Terre Sancte detentores ad restitutionem ipsius districtione canonica compellentur venerabilis frater noster Cameracensis episcopus et nobilis vir dux Brabantia pretextu quarundam litterarum eis in proximo preterito passagio a sede apostolica indultarum ipsam sibi deberi pecuniam asserentes, eam interminis suis fere totaliter receperunt, et residuum exigere non desistunt, Templarii quoque Hospitalarii et quidam alii qudam de huiusmodi pecunia receperunt, quare quid tibi super his sit agendum instrui postulasti.’; Pressutti 5483.
Preaching and the allocation of remnants of the twentieth also occurred in Norway. In 1226 the archbishop of Nidaros wrote to the pope declaring the desire of Duke Skule Bårdsson to crusade, but lamenting that he could not prepare to leave because of a lack of money to pay for his passage (‘naulum’). Honorius responded by writing to the archdeacon of Hetland on 4 November 1226, ordering that the twentieth from Nidaros be awarded to Skule.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 147v: ‘sicut tam ipse quam venerabili fratri nostri Nidrosiensis archiepiscopus et eius suffraganei suis nobis litteris intimarunt, nos congruo volentes eum auxilio in tam pio proposito adiuvar, vicesimam ecclesiasticorum proventuum per predictorum archiepiscopi et suffraganeorum dioceses, Terre Sancte subsidio secundum statuta generalis concilii deputatam eidem duci duxus concedendam.’; Pressutti 6039.} On the same day, Honorius also wrote back to the archbishop of Nidaros, and instructed him to preach the crusade in support of the expedition.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 13, fol. 147v: ‘Cum sicut ex litteris tuis accepimus et utique acceptamus, dilectus filius nobilis vir dux Norwegiae crucesignatus ad Terre Sancte subsidium cum numerosa crucesignatorum multitudine magnifice se accingat offerens omnibus secum transfretare voluntibus gratis navigium sine naulo, ut tue predicationis tuba exercitatus populus Christianus ad dicte Terre subsidium fortius animetur fraternitati tue monemus attente per apostolica tibi scripta mandantes quatinus in provincia tua evangelizes, et evangelizari facias sollemnitier verbum crucis commonefaciendo universos et singulos ut in hoc necessitatis articulo succurant Christo modis omnibus quibus possunt’; Pressutti 6038.} This two-stage reaction to outside initiative provides another good example of responsive papal government in action, and by awarding money and ordering preaching, illustrates the pope’s role as a supporter or sponsor of crusading.

**Conclusions**

When Powell considered ‘whether papal financial planning and administration was adequate’ for the Fifth Crusade, he concluded that ‘no final answer is possible. The temptation to provide qualitative evaluations of quantitative
questions is tantalizing but much too risky.\textsuperscript{178} I am inclined to agree. It is possible though to draw some conclusions on the way in which the twentieth was administered and its implications for the model of responsive papal government. I have sought to demonstrate in this chapter that the collection and distribution of the twentieth was arguably one of the few examples of proactive papal policy-making, but crucially, that it still demonstrates many of the aspects of responsive papal government which have been set out throughout this thesis - it is thus the exception that proves the rule.

Centralisation did occur at the curia’s behest when Honorius saw that money required in the East was tied up in the West, though it must be remembered that it did not entirely replace local collection and distribution, but supplemented it. The power of petitioning over papal decision-making is nowhere more evident than the grant of the local twentieth to the Hungarians in early July 1220, only a few days after orders for centralised collection had been sent out. The petitions for exemptions and powers of absolution have also proved illuminating on the subject of petitioners’ (or would-be petitioners’) proximity to the curia and the likelihood of making a supplication. The implementation of the collection and distribution policy for the twentieth was not simple and clean, but messy and complicated. It did not develop in a linear progression, and this was largely due to petitions and external pressures which were outside Honorius’s control.

\textsuperscript{178} Powell, \textit{Anatomy}, 102.
Conclusion

The first aim of this thesis has been to subject Honorius’s pontificate to detailed scrutiny in order to repair a significant historiographical gap. It is hard to judge the personality of a medieval pope using his letters alone, which were often more the products of collegial composition and chancery formularies than his own thought. Yet thorough study of Honorius III and his curia in the administration of crusading to the Holy Land allows us to move one step closer to Honorius the man. Honorius came from a different background to that of his peers; he was not a university-educated nobleman, but a self-made man, a Roman who owed everything in life to the Church. He was a pope simultaneously conciliatory and forgiving, but also sharp and skilful in diplomacy. Honorius was mild in the sense that he was not rash, but he was neither weak nor naive as he has been frequently portrayed in the fragmented historiography on his pontificate.¹

Aside from the rare instances (such as October 1219) when the pope became noticeably frustrated, Honorius emerges from his negotiations with Frederick II as a slick and professional diplomat. Arguably he handled the emperor in a superior manner to his immediate successor, Gregory IX, who drew the Papal State into armed conflict with Frederick. Honorius’s administration was not a complete success, however, and his failure to remove Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo (also a legatus natus) from office after discovering his fraud in

¹ Keutner, Papsttum, 12; Kantorowicz, Frederick, 96; Donovan, Pelagius, 105; Runciman, Crusades, 164; Van Cleve, Frederick, 108-09; Mayer, Crusades, 220; Kelly, Dictionary, 190.
collecting the twentieth tax, and then entrusting him again with its transfer, is
difficult to explain away. But this represents a rare blunder from Honorius’s
pontificate, which is outweighed by his diplomatic successes, epitomised perhaps
by Frederick II’s grant of the *Constitutio in basilica beati Petri* at the imperial
coronation in 1220.

Honorius was not a mere emulator of Innocent III. He possessed a firm
grasp of the authority of his office, and was much more innovative than has been
recognised in the historiography. Examination of his *arengae* for the first time has
revealed a pope and curia who were intellectually vibrant and self-confident. In
his theological conception of his office, Honorius expounded a similar but discrete
vision to that of Innocent. Some of this can be explained by his upbringing.
Honorius was a pope unafraid of taking his own path, and for that, other aspects
of his pontificate deserve further attention, especially his theology in his letter
*arengae* and sermons, which remain largely unexplored.

This thesis has made a number of original contributions to the
historiography on the crusades. It has been argued for the first time that Andrew II
appears to have been Honorius’s favoured choice as the leader of the entire Fifth
Crusade. The date of Frederick II’s nomination as the papally-sanctioned leader of
the crusade has been pushed back to the end of 1218, after Andrew II abandoned
the crusade, and in direct response to an entreaty from the crusaders themselves.
The role of Honorius (and/or his curial staff) as the creator of original *arengae* on
the subject of crusading has been demonstrated for the first time. Pelagius’s role
on the Fifth Crusade has been reassessed by placing his crusade legation in the
context of Honorius’s other legates and thirteenth-century legation more broadly.
This thesis has also put forward the first comprehensive study of the management of the 1215 tax of a twentieth, shedding valuable light on the papacy’s financial machinery in the early thirteenth century.

The second aim of this thesis has been to propound a model of responsive papal crusade government. Building upon the findings of scholars such as Duggan and Bombi, who have argued against looking for coherent papal crusade policies which were proactively implemented, this study has taken the arguments of Morris and Zutshi for responsive papal government, which explicitly exclude the crusades, and sought to extend the model to include them. The evidence from Honorius’s pontificate clearly demonstrates that, despite being dedicated to recovering the Holy Land, his administration of crusading to the Holy Land should be thought of as predominantly responsive in nature. There was no defined papal crusade policy in the sense of a preconceived course of political action that Honorius planned and implemented. Rather, the vast majority of his policy decisions regarding the crusade were determined by the influence of petitioners and diplomats presenting business at the curia.

Honorius’s crusade policy was to recover the Holy Land by securing Frederick II’s departure on crusade and to attempt to protect the integrity of the Papal State in the process. But in working towards achieving these aims, the pope was steering St Peter’s ship through choppy waters, responding to the changing requests and demands from the lay powers rather than formulating his own premeditated policy. It was largely the lay powers who were setting the agenda of

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Honorius’s crusade diplomacy, in response to which the pope’s decisions fluctuated. He took a proactive stance on occasion, as witnessed in the development of original arengae, the moves towards centralised crusade tax collection, and his participation in papal-imperial colloquia. Yet this proactive behaviour was disproportionately small compared with the responsive operation of papal government.

The responsive nature of Honorius’s diplomacy is most evident in the lack of consistency in papal decisions on matters such as the indulgence for crusading in Livonia, the sudden limitation of Bishop William of Châlons-sur-Marne’s twentieth grant, and the operation of centralised tax collection in tandem with local distribution. There was also a frequent bending of rules, such as allowing Frederick II to postpone departure time and again without levelling the threatened sentence of excommunication against him (although it is clear that some German crusaders who did not have the pope’s ear were not so fortunate). Papal legates operated with a great deal of autonomy, and Honorius seems to have been responding to them rather than using them as vessels through which to impose a papal policy on the provinces of Christendom. That no important crusade decisions were taken when Honorius was not interacting with the lay powers at the curia or in papal-imperial colloquia demonstrates how important the initiative of the lay powers was in creating crusade business at the curia and prompting the subsequent issue of documents. Many of Honorius’s decisions can also be traced directly back to initiative from outside the curia. Supplications from the crusaders in Egypt spurred Honorius to approach Frederick to join the Fifth Crusade, and to send out papal representatives to collect money for financing specified siege
equipment. Frederick also set his own timetable of departure to which the pope acquiesced, and the emperor publicised deadlines for crusaders from his territories and threatened them with excommunication via Honorius.

One important question that arises from this research is how specific was responsive crusade government to Honorius? A direction for future research would be to consider how responsive the operation of papal government was in other periods by pursuing comparative study. Was Honorius a particularly responsive pope - more so than Innocent III or Gregory IX? Did this simply derive from the contemporary circumstances: was Honorius not faced with situations where he needed to make policy? The political position of the papacy shifted over time. The role of the early thirteenth-century papacy in the political landscape was very different from that of the eleventh-century papacy for instance, or the fourteenth-century papacy at Avignon; papal government may have operated more or less responsively under different temporal and geographic conditions. Another direction for new research would be to test the limits of the model of responsive government further. The examination of papal crusade administration has provided rich results: one can discern proactive elements of policy set against a backdrop of overwhelmingly responsive operation. Because popes took more initiative in their political affairs than in routine ecclesiastical administration, such as the granting of benefices or the auditing of legal cases, research into the papacy’s other political affairs could enhance the model of responsive papal government.

This thesis does not claim that papal government was universally and equally responsive in operation throughout the Middle Ages. But it does argue
that, on the subject of the Holy Land crusades, the pontificate of Honorius III was characterised by its responsive operation, and suggests that the model of responsive papal government could be applied to the study of the medieval papacy more broadly in further research.
Appendix: Pelagius’s Appointment Mandate

The mandate Honorius III issued to Pelagius, cardinal-bishop of Albano (1213-30), on 12 June 1218 appointed him as legate a latere for the Fifth Crusade. Although he had already been designated as legate for the crusade in July 1217, Pelagius was not formally appointed until this document was issued. Pelagius was awarded the full powers of a legate a latere, along with special papal reserved powers. The pope cautioned him to use these powers wisely and to proceed discreetly in executing his office. Despite controversy in the historiography over Pelagius’s role and powers on the Fifth Crusade, his appointment mandate was standard for a thirteenth-century legate a latere (see chapter five). The original does not survive, therefore the text is transcribed from the contemporary copy made in Honorius’s register; it has never been published.

Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 265r; Pressutti 1433. 12 June 1218.

Pelagio, Albanensi episcopo, apostolice sedis legato.

Cum aliquos ex fratribus nostris exigitibus variis ecclesie necessitatibus ad varias provincias destinamus, sic debemus inuniecte illis legationis onus iurisdictione auctoritatis ecclesiastice compensare ne ipsorum fiat labor inanis si tenuis eis fuerit collata potestas cum plerique ipsorum presumant propositum impedire, quos presumptionem suam intelleexerint non posse distinctionis ecclesiastice gladio prohibere. Cum ergo te in ultramarinum provinciam de fratrum nostrorum consilio non tam ecclesie quam totius populi Christiani exigente necessitate a nostro latere destinemus, plene legationis officium tue discretioni committimus, ut evellas, destruas, dissipes, edifices, et plantes, iuxta quod quelibet sollicitudine tua cognoveris indigere. Ut autem nichil tibi desit ex
illis que ad plenitudinem legationis pertinent exequende, plenariam tibi auctoritate presentium concedimus facultatem, ut cum necesse fuerit vice nostra illa etiam exequaris que nostro sunt speciali privilegio reservata, firmiter inhibentes nequis processum tuum provocacionis obiectu audeat impedire. Tu ergo tamquam vir providus et discretus sic deferas apostolice sedis honori, sicut tibi vides ab ipsa deferri, ut et nos consulas in quibus videris consulendos et plenitudinem nostre auctoritatis requiras, in quibus eam cognoveris requirendam, et sic modeste procedas in omnibus et discrete, ut et que agenda sunt agas, et ab illis abstineas a quibus fuerit abstinendum, ac tales te omnibus exhibere procures, ne cui merito possis esse suspectus. Datum Rome, apud Sanctum Petrum, II Idus Iunii, pontificatus nostri anno secundo.
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