AN HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF THE TURKISH NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL’S ROLE IN TURKEY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Declaration of Authorship

I Gulay Icoz hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own work. Where I consulted the work of others this is always clearly stated.
ABSTRACT

Scholars have drawn heavily on new institutionalist approaches in the study of comparative European politics and European integration. These approaches however have been neglected in the study of Turkey-European Union (EU) relations. And although Turkey-EU relations have been widely researched, there has been little scholarly engagement with the role of Turkey’s National Security Council (MGK) in shaping the country’s European policy, resulting in a significant gap in the academic literature on Turkey and the EU. To fill this gap this thesis provides an historical institutionalist account of the role the MGK has played in Turkey-EU relations. There are two central and interlinked hypotheses: (1) The origins of both the MGK and Turkey’s relations with Europe can be found in the years between 1923 and 1957, and the MGK’s evolution, its decisions/preferences and the changes it embarked upon shaped the development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–EU relations; (2) the historical institutionalist conceptualisations of how institutions originate, in what ways they determine political actions, and the types of changes they go through can best explain the interaction between the MGK’s institutional processes and Turkey–EU relations. This thesis draws upon both primary sources such as the MGK’s press releases (1983–2004) and secondary sources. It shows that historical institutionalism and its associated concepts of critical junctures, path dependence and unintended consequences, and punctuated equilibrium may help to explain not only the origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe between 1923 and 1957, but also the three significant phases of Turkey’s subsequent European policy: the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–European Economic Community (EEC)/ European Community (EC) relations amid the Critical Junctures of I–III (1957–1983); the MGK’s tendency to rule through states of emergency and its incompatibility with EC/EU membership criteria (1983–1997); and the curtailment of the MGK’s powers and the EU’s decision to begin accession negotiations with Turkey (1997–2004).
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This section expands some of the abbreviations used in this thesis.

AKP                Justice and Development Party
ANAP               Motherland Party
ARGK               Kurdistan People’s Liberation Army
AYOD               Ankara Higher Education Association
DEV-GENC           Revolutionary Youth
DISK               Confederation of Revolutionary Unions
DSP                Democratic Left Party
EEC                European Economic Community
EC                 European Community
ECJ                European Court of Justice
EP                 European Parliament
EU                 European Union
ERNK               Kurdistan National Liberation Front
FP                 Virtue Party
HEP                People’s Labour Party
JP                 Justice Party
KADEK              the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress
Kongra Gel         the People’s Congress of Kurdistan
MGK                National Security Council
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>National Salvation Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Nation Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCP</td>
<td>Free Republican Party (also known as Liberal Republican Party)</td>
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<td>OJ</td>
<td>Official Journal</td>
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<td>PKDW</td>
<td>Parliament-in-Exile</td>
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<td>PKK</td>
<td>the Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
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<td>RP</td>
<td>Welfare Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Populist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Felicity Party- Bliss Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTP</td>
<td>New Turkey Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBMM</td>
<td>Turkish Grand National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCF</td>
<td>Progressive Republican Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOBB</td>
<td>Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Trade, and Trade Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSK</td>
<td>Turkish Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSIAD</td>
<td>Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUTSI</td>
<td>Turkish Textile Employers’ Association</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION – RESEARCH STRATEGY

The role of the National Security Council (hereafter MGK) in Turkey’s progress towards integration in the European Union (EU) has been largely overlooked in the literature on Turkey and the EU. Thus there has been little attention paid to matters such as the origins and the evolution of the MGK in the context of the development of Turkey–European Economic Community (EEC) relations; the interaction between the MGK’s treatment of the Kurdish Workers’ Party, the PKK, and Turkey’s slow progress in meeting European Community (EC)/EU’s membership criteria; and the relationship between the changes both in the MGK’s powers and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. Additionally, historical institutionalism as a useful analytical approach has been neglected in literature on Turkey and the EU – this has meant that the role of critical junctures in the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations has not been highlighted; the unintended consequences of the MGK’s treatment of the PKK on both the Turkish political system and Turkey’s bid to join the EC/EU have been overlooked; and the relationship between developments in the MGK’s endogenous variables such as the closure of the Welfare Party (RP) and the ban on Necmettin Erbakan’s political involvement in 1997 and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK in 1999 and changes both in the MGK and Turkey–EU relations has not been unveiled. The central question to this thesis is what role did the Turkish National Security Council play in Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations between 1923 and 2004?

Historical institutionalism is a strand of New Institutionalism which emerged out of a critique of the behavioural revolution in political science. The New Institutionalists argued that institutions determine social and political outcomes. Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three strands within New Institutionalism: rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism (ibid.: 936). Each strand of New Institutionalism offers different approaches and frameworks for the study of institutions and institutional processes. In this research, I focus on four distinct parts of institutional processes: (1) institutional genesis; (2) institutional evolution; (3) the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes; and (4) institutional change. Mainstream literature covering the strands of New Institutionalism and the scholars employing different branches of New Institutionalism on various policy areas however have not clearly separated different parts of these institutional processes; in fact they have generally conflated the different parts of institutional processes. I argue that each part of these institutional processes develops one at a
time; by this I mean that each level of the institutional processes occur within a distinct period of time. This is because an institution needs to exist to either evolve or change. For instance institutional genesis takes place separately from institutional evolution and institutional evolution operates separately from how institutions determine political action. This does not however mean I suggest that each part of the institutional process take place independent of each other. I rather believe that one part of institutional processes can follow the other, but I would not make any predictions in which order it happen since historical institutionalists are generally not interested in making predictions. Since the institutional processes develop one at a time, I suggest that there should be clearer lines drawn between different parts of institutional processes, and it will be useful to associate certain concepts or approaches with explaining and studying the separate parts of institutional processes. This has a number of advantages. One of the advantages is that it brings clarity to what part of an institutional process the researcher is explaining. As it stands at the moment there is no clarity in any of the strands of New Institutionalism as to what parts of institutional processes should be explained with what concept or approach. It thus makes the application of the concepts more dynamic and fruitful since the researcher knows which concept to use for which part of an institutional process. One can argue that this would curtail rational choice; I would rather suggest that when new and young researchers of historical institutionalism are provided with clear ways of applying historical institutionalist concepts, they can be at least given a chance to engage with the concepts of historical institutionalism in the simplistic manner. Otherwise, since there is such no clarity, many new researchers can diverge their interests to other theoretical frameworks. However, once new researchers’ interest is kept in the first instance, then as they gain more experience in using historical institutionalism I am very sure they would go make their own rational choice in their future works. The second advantage is that it brings focus to the study of institutional processes. With this level of focus, a researcher may produce a more detailed analysis of a single part of an institutional process. And once this is done successfully, future researchers could pull all the findings together and this could contribute to the development of historical institutionalism into a rigorous theory.

Additionally there is a lack of clarity among the well-known historical institutionalists such as Steinmo (2008), Pierson (1993) and Peters (1999) as to whether they treat historical institutionalism as a theory or a framework or an approach. However looking at their work, I found that while Pierson (1993) refers to it as either a “framework” or an “approach”, Peters
references it as an “approach”. Steinmo (2008: 118) openly puts forward his position on this subject, saying: “Historical institutionalism is neither a particular theory nor a specific method. It is best understood as an approach to studying politics” (italics in original). These scholars’ treatment of historical institutionalism has been very helpful for me to think about my own categorisation of historical institutionalism. It is however a bit difficult to agree with Steinmo’s denial of the status of theory for historical institutionalism. Hay and Wincott (1998: 955) draw our attention to historical institutionalism’s potential “to develop into a theory of institutional innovation, evolution, and transformation capable of linking the subject in a creative relationship with an institutional environment.” My separation of institutional processes, drawing clear lines between these processes and associating a concept to each of these processes, has developed into a framework which may be used to understand and to explain the interaction between institutional processes and policy outcomes. More specifically, in this thesis I use historical institutionalism as a framework to interpret the interaction between the MGK’s institutional processes and the development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. Additionally, I would argue we should not overlook Hay and Wincott’s statement about how historical institutionalism has the potential to develop into a theory and I therefore urge that academic attention be paid to historical institutionalism’s potential to develop in to a theory.

The main hypothesis of this thesis is that the Turkish National Security Council’s (MGK’s) evolution, policy preferences and the changes it has embarked upon have made a major contribution to the nature, development and pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations and that the historical institutionalist framework of institutional processes can help to explain how and why the MGK shaped Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. This can be divided into further four hypotheses:

i. Rational choice institutionalism’s approach to institutional genesis would tell us that not only the MGK, but also Turkey’s interest in Europe originated through the actions of self-interested actors in order to reduce their political or economic costs relative to the benefits gained. On the other hand, it could be hypothesized that the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe were socially structured and given, following sociological institutionalism. Historical institutionalism however would claim that one needed to go back and look so as to
identify what factors and developments instigated the genesis of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe.

ii. While sociological and rational choice institutionalisms do not say much on institutional evolution, historical institutionalism provides a framework of questions which unveil the Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980 which have contributed both to the evolution of the MGK and to the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations.

iii. As far as the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes are concerned, the historical institutionalist concepts of path dependence and unintended consequences may highlight the interaction between the MGK’s policy preferences and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. On the other hand the calculus approach of rational choice institutionalism can help to understand the power relations between different members of the MGK and this approach would argue that the policy preferences of the MGK and its implications for Turkey–EC/EU relations were shaped by the strategic actions of the MGK’s members. Whereas the cultural approach that is put forward by the sociological institutionalist would suggest that the established routines and familiar pattern of behaviour of the members of the MGK have shaped the MGK’s future actions and in the same way Turkey–EC/EU relations have been shaped by the established routines of the Turkish politicians.

iv. If sociological institutionalism’s approach to institutional change is adopted to explain how and why both the MGK and Turkey–EU relations have changed, we can refer to three possible mechanisms of change: (1) coercion (2) mimesis and (3) norms. However, the rational choice institutionalists would suggest that the changes under question have occurred because either the MGK and Turkey–EU relations were dysfunctional or the incentives for the MGK and Turkey–EU relations were changed. In contrast, the historical institutionalist concept of punctuated equilibrium would provide a framework of questions to unveil the causes of the changes both in the MGK and in Turkey–EU relations.

There are therefore two objectives in this thesis: (i) to provide an historical institutionalist account of the role the MGK has played in the development, in the nature and in the pace of
Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations; and (ii) to show the utility of historical institutionalism in highlighting the interaction between the MGK’s institutional processes and Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations.

I opt for an in-depth and longitudinal approach to study both the origins of the MGK and Turkey’s desire to be part of Europe covering the years between 1923 and 1957 and the three significant phases of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations between the late 1957 and 2004. It is vital for this thesis to study the early years of both the Turkish Republic and the European Economic Community to find out not only the factors that have contributed to the genesis of the MGK, but also to illuminate the origins of Turkey’s aspiration to be part of Europe. Chapter 3 will therefore test hypothesis (i) to find out if the origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe can be better explained by the historical institutionalist framework than the rational choice and sociological institutionalist perspectives. The first phase of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations covers the period between late 1957 and 1983. This is an important period to study to unveil the domestic political, economic and social developments that triggered the Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980; and it is also helpful in explaining the causes of the delays in Turkey’s Associative Membership application for the EEC in 1960s and the EC’s decision to freeze dialogue with the Turkish authorities in the early 1980s. Chapter 4 will test hypothesis (ii) to find out if the historical institutionalist framework explains better the factors behind both the evolution and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations than the rational choice and sociological institutionalists’ approaches. The second phase covers the period from late 1982 to 1997; this is a key period when the MGK’s policy preferences on domestic politics hindered Turkey’s membership of the EC/EU – the EC refused to begin political dialogue with Turkey; Turkey’s application for Full Membership of the EC received a response two years after the submission of the application; the resolution of the Kurdish issue became a condition for Turkey to sign the Customs Union; and finally Turkey chose to freeze its political dialogue with the EU at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. In Chapter 5 therefore I will test the hypothesis (iii) to test if the interaction between the MGK’s actions and the nature of Turkey–EEC/EU relations would be explained better with the historical institutionalist framework or the rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches. The last phase of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations covers the years between 1998 and 2004; this is the phase of change in both the Turkish political system and the pace of Turkey’s European policy. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party (RP), was banned from politics and the RP was closed in 1999; Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK,
was captured in 1999; the MGK was abruptly wakened, a moderately Islamic Justice and Development (AKP) party won the November 2002 general election; and in 2004 the EU decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005. Therefore in Chapter 6 I will test hypothesis (iv) to find out if the causes of the changes in the both MGK and pace of Turkey–EU relations can be better explained with the historical institutionalist framework of institutional change or the rational choice and sociological institutionalist perspectives.

The study of the years between 1923 and 2004 provides the contextual background to highlight thoroughly both how and why the MGK and Turkey’s aspirations to being part of Europe have originated and how and why the MGK have contributed to the development, nature and pace of Turkey’s European policy. It is also necessary to investigate several decades to capture sufficient details to appropriately assess the role the MGK played in shaping and determining Turkey’s European policy. I end my thesis in 2004 because my decision to carry out this research was instigated by the EU’s decision of 2004 to begin accession negotiations with Turkey; there and then I began to question why it had taken so long for Turkey to be this close to Full Membership and who or what actor shaped Turkey’s bid to join the EU up to this point.

It is important to carry out this research because the MGK’s role in Turkey’s European policy has been overlooked and understudied, which results in a significant gap in the literature in the following areas: European integration, Turkey’s European policy and Turkish politics. Although scholars accept the significant role of the MGK in the Turkish political system and make comments on the authority and influence of the military members over the civilian members of the MGK (as I discuss in more depth below), there has not been a thorough analysis of either the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system or with reference to Turkey–EU relations. This has resulted in the overly simplistic assumptions that the MGK is dominated by the Turkish army and thus hinders Turkey’s accession to the EU. In this thesis I will go beyond existing assumptions about the MGK and provide an in-depth analysis of the MGK’s role in Turkish political decision making with reference to Turkey’s bid to join the EU.

Turkey–EU relations have been considered within the framework of constructivism (Piccoli 2004), Europeanisation (Diez et al. 2005a) and post-Westernisation (Rumford and Turunc 2011), but New Institutionalism has hardly been used to understand Turkey’s decades-old desire to be both part of Europe and a full member of the EU. However, Zeki Sarigil (2007)
in his PhD thesis entitled “Endogenizing Institutions” opted for rational choice institutionalism to study the changes in civil–military relations in Turkey. His “conflicting process” framework was made of two stages: initiation, and bargaining, and he saw the EU as having played a primary role in initiating shifts in power relations between the civilian and military sides in post-Helsinki Turkey, suggesting that the Turkish military found itself entrapped by its own pro-European rhetoric and thus forced to agree to the changes the government introduced (for more on this see Chapter 6). While different strands of New Institutionalism, in particular rational choice and sociological institutionalism, have been heavily used to explain the role of institutions in European integration, historical institutionalism has not received much interest in the study of either Turkey–EU relations or EU studies in general. It has however been most used in comparative politics such as Immergut (1992), Skocpol (1992), Rose and Davies (1994), King (1995), Mahoney (2001) and Hansen (2002). I would argue that it is important to study Turkey–EU relations within the framework of historical institutionalism, not only to make an original contribution to the literature on Turkey–EU relations by studying the MGK’s influence on the development, nature and pace of Turkey’s European policy with the use of concepts such as critical junctures, path dependence, unintended consequences and punctuated equilibrium, but also to show the importance of domestic political institutions and the wider political, social and economic context in shaping policy processes and outcomes. This will consequently bring out the significant role of institutions in political decision making and policy processes in Turkish and EU studies.

This research was also carried out in the hope of demonstrating the utility of historical institutionalism and its associated concepts for understanding different parts of institutional processes and how these processes may interact with the development and pace of policies. Although rational choice and sociological institutionalism can also be helpful in studying the MGK’s position in Turkey’s policy making, I found historical institutionalism more suitable to trace back the political developments and highlight the interaction between the MGK and Turkey’s European policy outcomes for the following three reasons. Pierson and Skocpol (2002) note, historical institutionalism tends to engage with big and real-world questions of interest far beyond the academy (2002: 697). Questions like “why have welfare states emerged and developed along various paths?” or “why do some countries become stable democracies, while others do not?” constitute clear real-world puzzles that are not driven by methodological or narrow theoretical concerns (Meunier and McNamara 2007: 4). Likewise,
I address the important puzzle of why Turkey has been waiting for so long to join the EU, and question what developments in Turkey affected the prospects of membership between 1923 and 2004.

A second reason why historical institutionalism can help shed light on the importance of the MGK is its emphasis on the importance of history and past policy choices in determining political action, or path dependence. I agree with Pierson and Skocpol (2002) that a particular characteristic of historical institutionalism is its stance in relation to history, claiming that the approach does not just consider the past, rather it looks at processes over time (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 713). This investigation of processes over time therefore allows for a wider range of experiences to be considered and it becomes necessary to investigate a long period of time to encompass all the influencing effects that may contribute to a particular policy output. And this is really helpful to investigate how over time the MGK’s institutional processes influenced Turkey’s European policy and the preferences it opted for in relation to Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. By contrast, rational choice institutionalism treats history simply as a series of discrete events in which strategic actions are taken by utility-maximizing agents. This means that past political decisions and policy preferences made by the utility-maximising agents do not particularly impact on the choices they make at the present moment or in the future. It is therefore not very helpful to unveil the MGK’s policy preferences in relation to the Kurdish problem in the early 1980s and whether it opted to maintain a similar line in handling the Kurdish problem over the years and what this meant for Turkey’s aspiration to join the EC between 1983 and 1997. Whilst sociological institutionalism similarly does not pay much attention to the role of history; it suggests that individuals act in accordance with the expectations of the given cultural settings. It thus lacks interest in questioning what contribute to the genesis and to the development of the so called “given cultural settings”. If one accepts that the MGK acted and acts in accordance with the expectations of the Turkish cultural settings, then we would not question what contributed to the genesis and the development of the MGK’s policy choices and preferences over time. I therefore argue that rational choice and sociological institutionalism lack tools to trace in history the patterns and sequences of decisions made in the past, but also overlook the relationship between the past and future decisions or choices institutions make.

The third reason is that historical institutionalism’s approach to institutional change is helpful to this thesis in unpacking two separate aspects of the MGK’s institutional processes: the
MGK’s evolution from advisory body to a paramount institution, and the curtailment of the MGK’s powers. On the former, historical institutionalism’s emphasis on the role of institutional change in institutional evolution (Pierson 1996), its references to the triggers of critical junctures (Hogan 2006; Cortell and Peterson 1999) and its position on the characteristics of critical junctures such as the conditions under which political leaders make decisions at critical junctures (Gourevitch 1986; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) help not only to identify three important critical junctures in the history of Turkish politics, but also to analyse under what conditions and by whom the MGK was gradually empowered, on the one hand, and how and why the EEC chose to partially freeze its relations with the Turkish authorities, on the other. On the latter, neither rational choice institutionalism’s suggestion that institutions change when they are dysfunctional (Lecours 2005: 12) nor sociological institutionalism’s references to mechanisms of institutional change (Meyer and Rowan 1977) provide a framework for questioning what precipitated the changes both in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. Historical institutionalism however points to the sources of change, in this case exogenous crisis/shock (Krasner 1984).

EU studies scholars, however, such as Mark Pollack (2009) and Aspinwall and Schneider (2001) who have opted for rational choice institutionalism have heavily criticised historical institutionalism; thus historical institutionalism’s utility has not been clearly set out in this area of research. Pollack (2009) says that although historical institutionalism rejects functionalist accounts of institutionalism – which can be found in rational choice institutionalist approaches – it shares a similar position with functionalism on how actors’ preferences are formulated, pointing to David (1985), North (1990) and Pierson (2000a). He then notes that he does not “consider historical institutionalism as a distinct and competing school of thought, but rather as a particular variant of rational choice theory emphasising the importance of inertia, sequencing and path dependence in the process of European integration” (2009: 346). In similar vein Pollack, Aspinwall and Schneider (2001) argue:

[H]istorical institutionalism, while not a coherent body of thought, stresses the role of prior commitments and institutional and policy stickiness in the process of European integration. Unlike neo-functionalism, with which it shares some traits, historical institutionalism does not predict movement toward or away from integration; rather it predicts that agency rationality, strategic bargaining and preference formation are conditioned by institutional context. (2001: 12)
Pollack, Aspinwall and Schneider’s point of view indicates the lack of dialogue between historical institutionalism and newly emerging interests in different strands of New Institutionalism in EU studies. There are, I argue, three significant differences between rational choice and historical institutionalism which make historical institutionalism a distinct school of New Institutionalism. The first is that rational choice and historical institutionalisms’ positions on how and why institutions originate vary significantly. While the rational choice institutionalists’ position on how and why the institutions originate is shaped by the functionalist perspective, the historical institutionalist framework is built upon rejecting the functionalist position. More specifically, rational choice institutionalism’s response to the question of how and why institutions originate is that one can tell how and why an institution originated by looking at the current functions of that institution, while the historical institutionalists rather suggest that one should go back and look to unveil the factors that have contributed to the genesis of an institution (see Chapter 2 for more details). I found the functionalist perspective on institutional genesis very reductionist; historical institutionalism however provides a framework of questions to investigate how and why institution originates. The second is that these two schools of New Institutionalism diverge on how they define institutions. Thelen and Steinmo (1992) observe that the historical institutionalists agree with rational choice institutionalists that institutions provide a context in which political actors define strategies and pursue their interests. The historical institutionalists nevertheless find rational choice institutionalism’s strict rationality assumption overly confining; therefore they not only propose to go beyond rational choice institutionalism’s strict treatment of the institution, but also claim that institutions play a much greater role in shaping politics, and political history (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 7). Thelen and Steinmo (1992) suggest that one of the other differences between rational choice and historical institutionalism is their position on preference formation. The rational choice institutionalists assume that political actors are rational and will act to maximise their self-interest; they do this by deducing the preferences of the actors from the structure of the situation itself. This is however different for historical institutionalists, who argue that not just the strategies but also the goals actors pursue are shaped by the institutional context. “For example, a historical institutionalist would emphasise how class interests are more a function of class position (mediated – reinforced or mitigated – by state and social institutions like political parties and union structure) than individual choices” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 8).
Furthermore, I would like to make three more points in respond to Pollack, Aspinwall and Schneider’s position on historical institutionalism. The first is that it is incorrect to disregard historical institutionalism and suggest it is a particular variant of rational choice theory; there are many historical institutionalist scholars who have produced excellent studies contributing to theory building and have applied historical institutionalism to various empirical case studies, enriching our understanding of different policy making (Pierson 1996; Meunier and McNamara 2007; Hall 1989, 1992; King 1995; and Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Pollack’s position in relation to historical institutionalism undermines the existing literature and discourages the use of historical institutionalism in EU studies. The second point I want to make is in relation to Pollack, Aspinwall and Schneider’s suggestion that historical institutionalism neither predicts movement toward nor away from integration. I think one could use the historical institutionalist approach to how and why institutions originate to first unveil the factors that underpinned European integration in the first place, and then use historical institutional approaches on how institutions shape political action to analyse the factors that contributed to the maintenance of European integration, and lastly, on the basis of the findings, one could make predictions about the continuing pace of European integration. The third is in response to the argument that historical institutionalism is not a coherent body of thought; I argue that they simply overlook the utility of historical institutionalism. In this thesis, I will show that although historical institutionalism may have shortcomings like any theoretical framework, its associated concepts on different aspects of institutional processes builds into a coherent body of thought which may be useful to study the genesis and evolution of institutions, to trace historical paths and sequences of decisions or political preferences made by the institutions, and to unveil the cause of changes in the institutions. It is therefore helpful to highlight how and why the institutional processes may interact with one or two policy areas. And my use of historical institutionalism and its associated concepts may encourage new researchers to draw more on historical institutionalism to explain other puzzling questions in the political and social sciences.

Assessment of the Literature on Turkey–EEC/EC/EU Relations

Turkey’s decades old desire to be both part of Western Europe and a full member of the EEC/EC/EU has received a lot of attention in both Turkish and EU studies. The origins of Turkey’s interest in being part of Europe; the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations; changes in the EC’s attitude towards Turkey post-Cold War; Turkey’s journey from
Luxembourg Summit to Helsinki Summit; whether and how Turkey may join the EU; the likely benefits of Turkey’s EU membership for the EU; what and who may or have impacted on Turkey–EU relations; and the changes in Turkey-EU relations have all been discussed in the literature. However the role that the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) has played in Turkey’s slow progressing relationship with the EEC/EC/EU has been neglected. This neglect has meant that the existing literature fails to discuss how and why the MGK’s institutional processes have interacted with Turkey’s European policy and what this has meant for the development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. In addition, Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations have not been studied in the context of domestic political, economic and social developments. More specifically this has meant that the role of domestic political instabilities have not been considered in the context of Turkey-EEC/EC relations; the impact of the MGK’s handling of the PKK on Turkey’s journey from Luxembourg Summit to Helsinki Summit has not been paid attention; the impact of domestic political developments have not been considered in the context of whether and how Turkey may join the EU; what in Turkish politics may be overshadowing Turkey’s likely benefits for the EU has not been discussed; and the MGK’s position has not discussed in the context of impacts on Turkey–EU relations; and the changes in Turkish political dynamics have not received much attention in the discussions over what contributed to the changes in Turkey–EU relations. I therefore argue that it is very important to conduct an in-depth study of the MGK’s role in Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations in the context of political, economic and social developments. This section will assess the existing literature on Turkey and the EU to identify (1) how Turkey’s European policy has been interpreted, (2) the benefits of the existing literature for understanding the development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relationship and (3) the omissions which this thesis will address.

The reason behind Turkey’s application for the Associative Membership of the EEC and how the Turkey–EEC/EC relationship developed has been of interest to academics. Ian Bache and Stephen George (2006) Politics in the European Union suggest that Turkey’s application for the EEC’s Associative Membership application was driven both by the elites in Turkey who wanted to see Turkey as Western and by those who benefited economically from the Modernisation period in Turkey. I agree that the elites in Turkey wanted and want Turkey to be part of Europe, but it is difficult to say they were the driving forces. In Chapter 3 I will show that Ataturk’s desire to see Turkey part of Western Europe has shaped Turkish political structure and culture in a Western way; and it was in fact Fatif Rustu Zorlu, the Turkish
Foreign Affairs Minister, who was behind Turkey’s initial application for the EEC’s Associative Membership.

Gülşin Aybet and Meltem Muftuler-Bac (2000), in “Transformations in security and identity after the cold war: Turkey’s problematic relationship with Europe”, recognise Turkey’s economic problems, its shortcomings in upholding democratic principles, the Kurdish issue, the Cyprus problem, and the size of its population as some of the factors that have posed serious obstacles to Turkey’s integration into the EU. Aybet and Muftuler-Bac argue that at the root of Turkey’s problematic relationship with the EU is the contrast between Turkey’s place in Europe before and after the cold war. They argue that at the end of the Second World War Turkey’s participation in the new European order was crucial for maintaining stability in southeast Europe as well as for marking Europe’s boundaries against the communist ‘other’; equally, during the cold war Turkey’s position was relatively secure despite various ups and downs in Turkish-European relations. When, however, the Soviet threat disappeared, Turkey’s relations with the EU worsened because Turkey’s association with the EU was a by-product of its inclusion in the ‘Western security community’. Additionally Turkey’s Europeanness has become questionable because the idea of Europe as constructed along historical and cultural lines, that is, an attempt to redefine Europe in terms of Christianity, ethnicity, and race, has become much important. Furthermore Meltem Muftuler-Bac (2001) in Turkiye ve AB: Soguk Savas sonrasi iliskiler (“Turkey and the EU: Post-Cold War Era Relations”) has observed the EC’s interest in forming and developing relations with the countries of the former Soviet bloc has increased while Turkey’s efforts to join the EC has been overlooked by the EC authorities observes that the EC’s interest in forming and developing relations with the countries of the former Soviet bloc showed that Turkey’s efforts to join the EC was overlooked by the EC authorities. In addition Neil Nugent (2006) in The Government and Politics of the European Union says that the identity issue is raised in even sharper focus in the case of Turkey and suggests this is partly because most of Turkey is not geographically located in Europe and partly, and for many of those who are opposed to Turkish membership, namely, “because it is an Islamic country” (ibid.: 64). Furthermore, on why Turkey applied for the Full Membership of the EC in 1987, Nugent says a constructivist theoretical framework is very helpful to understand the EC/EC/EU’s position on Turkish application for membership. Nugent argues that:
Such a framework can help explain why in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s the EU moved from its preferred policy of being close to Turkey but stopping short of holding out the possibility of membership, to giving Turkey a foreseeable membership perspective. The gradually evolving ‘upgrading’ of language – which can be traced through European Council Conclusions – produced a situation that made it progressively difficult for doubters and opponents to backtrack. Notions of collective identity and kinship-based duty are by no means as strong in respect of Turkey then they were in respect of CEECs, which helps explain why upgrading of the language has been much more hesitant and drawn out in the Turkish case than it was in the case of the CEECs. But some such notions – emanating in part from shared membership of European and Western organisations, in part too from empathy with Turkey’s liberalising and democratising reforms programmes, in part from a sense of responsibility towards an Islamic state that is looking to Europe and the West – appears to exist amongst many European governing elites. (Nugent 2006: 70). Going back to Turkey’s application for full membership of the EU in 1989, Atilla Eralp (1994) in ‘Turkey and the European Community, Forging New Identity along Old Lines’ said that Turkey applied to the European Community for full membership at a time when the chances of its immediate inclusion were at their lowest and suggested that the outcome of the application have contributed to the debate on the Turkey’s Europeanness in both Turkey and Europe.

These works are important to gain an insight into how the EC treated Turkey’s interest to join the EC post-Cold War or in late 1980s and how and why this impacted on the nature of Turkey–EC relations and what role Turkey’s identity played in changing the EU’s attitudes towards Turkey. They however pay little attention to how and why the three years of military rule in Turkey, the rise of the PKK and the Kurdish problem, the rise of Turkey’s human rights records, and the MGK’s role in handling the Kurdish problem have contributed to the EC’s position on Turkey from the early 1980s to late 1990s.

By the end of the 1990s Turkey–EC relations were facing a more challenging time. The standards of democracy and respect for human rights in Turkey, the consequences of the latter on the relationship and what role the EU could have played have been discussed to understand the EU’s exclusion of Turkey at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. Chris Rumford (2000), in “From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the Politics of EU Enlargement and Prospects for Accession”, considers how and why Turkey was granted a candidate membership status in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit, after being excluded from the
Enlargement process at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. Rumford refers to the EU’s concerns over democratic and human rights abuses in Turkey and Greece’s opposition to Turkey’s membership of the EU as to why Turkey was not added to the list of candidate countries in 1997, and suggests that the earthquake in Turkey in 1999 meant that Greece was no longer a rival of Turkey. He then argues that although Turkey was granted a candidate membership status in 1999, Turkey has been over the following ten years and is still excluded from a whole range of pan-European initiatives (infrastructural projects, environmental initiatives, and transport and communication networks) that have been made available to the candidate countries from eastern and central Europe (CEECs). He suggests that Turkey’s exclusion should not continue since it was made clear that Turkey’s candidature was to be equal to that of other applicants in every EU-network programme. I agree with Rumford that Turkey should not have been excluded from EU-network programmes and Turkey should have received all the financial support the other candidate countries received over many years. It is however more important to question why the EU excluded Turkey from these programmes. Although Rumford refers to Turkey’s human rights abuses, he does not draw a connection between Turkey’s systematic of abuse of human rights and treatment of ethnic minority and the EU’s exclusion from these funds. Helene Sjursen (2002) “Why Expand?; The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy” argues that “Turkey’s failure to respect fundamental human rights is on its own enough to explain why the country was included neither in the first nor in the second round of enlargement negotiations” (ibid.: 508). Sjursen then points out that if human rights concerns were the principal driving force behind enlargement, then there should have been comparatively more resources in support of democratization going from the EU to Turkey than from the EU to, for example, Poland. I agree with Sjursen that the EC could have put in more resources to help Turkey in democratising its political system, but it is important not to overlook how the EU constantly requested Turkey to resolve its Kurdish problem through both use of political means and removing state of emergency from the South East of Turkey. Pinar Bilgin (2007a) in “Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey’s Geography”: The uses of “geopolitical truths” in Turkey” has reflected on the implications of the EU Helsinki Summit of 1999 for debates in Turkey, in relation to the plausibility of EU membership for Turkey in the context of geopolitics, EU conditionality and EU reforms. Those who favour Turkey’s membership of the European Union have deployed the metaphor of “bridge” to substantiate Turkey’s case when talking to EU audiences; such representations of Turkey as a “bridge” between regions, continents and cultures have resonated with some EU actors as well in that they have invoked
similar notions to convince the sceptics within the EU of the virtues of Turkey’s membership. Those who oppose Turkey joining the EU have deployed a similar notion to arrive at different conclusions; referring to General Ilhan’s (2000) book entitled “Why No to the European Union: The Geopolitical Perspective”, it is believed that the EU stands to gain “geopolitically” from Turkey’s membership: “it enhances its horizons and sphere of influence to include the Caucasus, Middle East, Central Asia; attains the opportunity to enhance and reinforce the advantages created by the Customs Union treaty” (ibid.: 750).

Whether and how Turkey could join the EU is also an area of interest to scholars. Mehmet Ugur (1999) in Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye: Bir dayanak/ İndiriciilik Ikilemi (The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/ Credibility Dilemma) considers both the Turkish and the EU sides in assessing what he names the problematic nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. Ugur claims to discover sources of incompatibility in Turkey–EU relations and analyses what factors have underpinned the ongoing difficulties. He then claims that the problems between Turkey and the EU can be resolved if both sides learn from their past mistakes and if they are willing to reduce the scope for discretion in the interpretation as well as implementation of the contractual provisions that govern EU–Turkey relations. Ugur is very positive that if Turkey and EU do what he sets out then Turkey could join the EU as a full member. Harun Arikan (2003) in Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? is very negative about Turkey’s EU membership prospect. Arikan observes that Turkey was treated as an “awkward candidate” country by the EU authorities. He then argues that the EU developed an alternative form of bargaining for a Turkish round of EU enlargement and recognises this form of bargaining as a “containment” strategy, “designed to delay indefinitely the prospect of membership while keeping Turkey within the economic, security, and political sphere of influence of the EU” (ibid.: 1–2). Similarly Erol Manisali, who has numerous publications on Turkey–EU relations (2001, 2002a, 2002b and 2002c), predicts that the EU never will grant Turkey a full EU membership status. Manisali particularly concentrates on the impacts of establishing the Customs Union before Turkey was a full member of the EU and what this has meant for Turkey’s importance for the EU. He argues that since the EU already receives economic benefits from its relations with Turkey, the EU would not grant Turkey Full Membership. While Ugur, Arikan and Manisali have overlooked what other options could be available to Turkey other than Full Membership, Thomas Silberhorn (2009) “Tertium Datur: Turkey’s Application for EU Membership” asserts that alternatives to full Turkish membership in the EU should be developed. Silberhorn refers to
Turkey’s cultural differences as to why Turkey and the EU members do not have a common identity and suggests that if the EU wants to attain a political union in Europe, Turkey should be given a privileged partnership status of the EU. The discussed works are very useful to develop an understanding of what Turkey and the EU could do to unlock Turkey’s problematic relationship with the EU, why the EU would not grant Turkey full EU membership status and what options are available as alternatives to Turkey’s Full Membership in the EU. In contrast to Ugur’s attention to what steps the Turkish authorities need to take to gain Full Membership of the EU, Arikan and Manisali entirely understate the impacts the domestic political developments had on the EU’s position on Turkey’s Associative Membership, on Turkey’s requests to form a political dialogue with the EU after the 1980 army intervention, on Turkey’s application for the Full Membership of the EU and on Turkey’s requests for establishing the Customs Union. By doing this they neglect to see that if Turkey makes the necessary changes in its own political system, it has a good chance of joining the EU. Additionally I argue that Manisali and Silberhorn overlook the fact that both Turkey and the EU may benefit politically and economically from Turkey’s full EU membership – there is thus also a good chance that the EU may grant a Full Membership to Turkey.

On whether Turkey’s Full Membership would generate benefits to the EU, academics such as William Chislett (2008), Laciner et al. (2005), Pantelis Sklias (2009), Michael Lake (2005) and Dirk Rochtus (2008) refer to a number of benefits Turkey’s Full Membership may have for the EU. William Chislett’s chapter “Socio-Economic Arguments For and Against Turkey’s EU Membership” (2008) suggests that Turkey’s fast-growing young population can give an injection of labour into the European labour market, which can be seen as an asset since the EU’s population is ageing rapidly. Laciner et al. (2005), who wrote European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey’s Membership on the European Union, after the 11 September attacks in New York and the March 2004 Madrid bombings, argue that “probably only a Europe with Turkey may embrace the world … there is no other alternative” (2005: 14). They suggest that

[T]here is nothing strange in Turkey’s aspirations for membership. However, Turkey offers a remarkable difference than other members. Turkey has certain qualities that no other member has. It does have material expectations from the EU, on the other hand, it has so much to offer to European civilization that other member cannot offer. Turkey is not only a
“demanding” party vis-à-vis the EU. It also wants to contribute. It has the features that can ease Europe, on the verge of yet another edge, to leap to the next stage. In this respect, Turkey has a request from the EU not just for itself but also from the future of Europe and the whole world. (Laciner et al. 2005: 14).

Like Laciner Pinar Tank (2007) in “Turkey’s Ambiguous Identity: The Symbolic Significance of EU membership” has put emphasis on Turkey’s desirability for both the USA and the EU in the world of post 9/11. Tank observed that since the inception of the Turkish Republic, Turkish authorities have regarded themselves as Western and secular, denying their Muslim identity, but the Europeans recognised Turkey as the other, not part of Europe. With the success of the moderately religious AKP (Justice and the Development Party-AKP), however, Turkey’s Muslim identity began to be widely accepted in Turkey and in EU. Tank said:

“…after 11th September 2001, Turkey’s Islamic identity became a desirable, even ‘marketable’, attribute and set the stage for an alternative ‘branding’ of Turkey. The United States’ plan to ‘democratise’ the Middle East stands little chance of success without the support of regional powers while Europe’s efforts to create a sense of belonging among its Muslim communities cannot succeed if the EU is perceived as a ‘Christian fortress’. Thus, the United States and Europe have begun considering the security advantages, rather than the cultural burdens, of Turkey’s Muslim identity” (Tank 2007: 144).

Sklias (2009) in “The Political Economy of Turkey’s Accession to the EU: A Comparative Analysis” on the other hand pointed out that although Turkey’s European integration will probably be a lengthy and difficult process, its political-economic transformation will be in the EU’s interest. In The EU and Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Millstone? Michael Lake (2005) notes that starting accession negotiations with Turkey will bring an immediate advantage of more predictability, reliability, and commitment to the EU (ibid.: 13–14), and therefore suggests that the different sections of the media should also move away from constantly reporting the difficulties lying ahead of Turkey’s accession to the EU and move towards reporting a range of positive aspects of Turkey’s accession. Dirk Rochts (2008) “European Hesitation Turkish Nationalism on the Rise?” suggests that one of the benefits of Turkey’s candidasy is that ordinary EU citizens have started to think about the further enlargement of the EU – that is something the accession of the central European and Baltic States in 2004 could not bring about.
I found these studies very useful to identify what benefits Turkey’s EU membership may have for the EU and what actions for example the media should take to inform public opinion about Turkey and what Turkey can offer to the EU in the post-9/11 era. I would however ask, if Turkey can provide these benefits, why has the EU not yet accepted Turkey as a full member? These authors overlook how Turkey’s domestic political developments have overshadowed the benefits Turkey could have offered to the EEC/EC/EU. For instance over many years Turkey’s geostrategic and geopolitical importance has been overshadowed by the Kurdish question and Turkey’s poor human rights records. I argue that it is therefore necessary to investigate what or who in Turkey has been determining the nature and pace of Turkey’s progress in meeting the membership criteria and as well as overshadowing the benefits Turkey may provide to the EU.

As to what factor(s) or actor(s) have shaped Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations, this has been discussed widely in academia, for example: Esra Cayhan (1997) considers the role of Turkish political parties; Saban Calis (2001) studies Turkish identity in the context of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations; the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (2004) discuss whether Turkey’s religion hinders its EU membership possibility; Tevfik Nas (2011) questions Turkey’s economic performance in the context of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations; Arrmagan Emre Cakir (2011) investigates the role of Turkey’s rivals; and Pinar Bilgin (2011) questions the security dimension of the relationship. A very important and useful book by Esra Cayhan (1997), Dunden Bugune Turkiye ve Avrupa Birligi Iliiskileri ve Siyasal Partilerin Konuya bakisi (“From Past to the Present, The Turkish Political Parties’ Views on Relations with the EU”) explores the debate in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) on the EEC/EC/EU by looking at the political parties’ stances on Turkey’s bid to join the EU. Although this is a very useful work for charting the attitudes of parliamentary political parties towards Turkish membership in the EU, it overlooks the crucial fact that most of the political parties have been inconsistent in their position towards EU membership, and does not question whether and how this inconsistency contributed to the shape of Turkey’s European policy. Saban Calis (2001) however in Turkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri, Kimlik Arayisi, Politik Aktorler ve Değişim (“Turkey and EU Relations: Search for Identity, Political Actors and Changing Attitudes”) analyses the role of identity and political actors’ roles in Turkey–EU relations between 1959 and 2000. Although Calis’s book has been a useful source of information in preparation of this thesis, it lacks focus and contextualisation as he uses many explanatory factors in his assessment. On the other hand, however, his
application of Lindblom’s (1959) and Idem’s (1979) approaches on foreign policy making and decision making enriches the work. The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy’s (2004) report entitled “The European Union, Turkey and Islam” suggests that after the September 11 attacks the concerns in member states about Islam and Muslims have increased, and therefore contributed to growing doubts over the question of whether Turkey’s Islamic character is compatible with the political achievements of the EU and member states. The author argues however that the fact that Turkey is a country with a majority Muslim population is no hindrance to its EU accession because the principle of the secular democratic state is solidly rooted in Turkish society. Thus from the EU perspective the issue of Islam in Turkey is not so much a problem of the influence of religion on the state as a problem of the influence of the state on religion; there is no indication that Turkish Islam will lose its moderate character. Although this is a very enlightening piece of research, it does not however make any suggestion as to how the absence of overwhelming support by the citizens of the EU can be changed and what steps should be taken to change general negative perceptions of Turkey’s Muslim population. Tevfik Nas (2011) in “Economic Dimension: The Turkish Economy from the 1960s to EU Accession” instead refers to Turkey’s economic performance affecting its chances of accession to the EU. Nas is very helpful for developing an understanding of how and why Turkey’s economic performances have determined the future of Turkey–EU relations. I however think that it is important to pay attention to the choices made by the Turkish politicians in relation to the economy and the country’s obligations to meet the requirements of Associative Membership and the Customs Union. In particular, Bulent Ecevit’s constant requests for concessions on the protocols of the Association Agreement should be paid attention as it was Ecevit who eventually called for the freezing of Turkey’s obligations under the Associative Agreement in 1978 (see Chapter 4 for more details on this argument). Arrmagan Emre Cakir’s (2011) “Political Dimension: Always in the List of ‘Also-rans’; Turkey’s Rivals in EU–Turkey relations” argues that Turkey’s rivals have had an important impact on EU–Turkey relations. It provides an interesting debate about Turkey’s perceived rivals, such as Greece, and how Turkey managed its rivals and what implications the rivals’ preferences have had on, for instance, Turkey’s Associative Membership application in 1959. I think Cakir overemphasises the role of rival countries. I suggest if Turkey had met with, for example, the criteria for Associative Membership of the EEC, the rivals would have not been that influential in delaying Turkey’s accession. It is important to look at domestic political developments such as the army’s intervention in 1960 and the preferences the army made and how this changed the EEC’s
attitudes towards Turkey’s Associative Membership application. Pinar Bilgin (2011) “Security Dimension: A Clash of Security Cultures? Differences between Turkey and the European Union Revisited” suggests that the “difficult” relationship the European Union and Turkey have had since the late 1980s is rooted in their security cultures that grew increasingly apart during the Cold War. Bilgin’s chapter brings in Turkish internal and external security in understanding the EU’s security perceptions post-Cold War. Although Bilgin writes about Turkey’s internal and external security perceptions, she overlooks to the role the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) played and plays in formulating Turkey’s security policy. I found all the works discussed above very informative as to who and what have been important in shaping, contributing and influencing Turkey’s bid to join the EEC/EC/EU, but the role the MGK has played has entirely been overlooked.

As to what, or what conditions, initiated changes in Turkey–EU relations, how effective these conditions have been, what needed to be done to maintain the change and what theoretical framework can explain the changing nature of Turkey–EU relations, these have all been of interest to academics. Frank Schimmelfenning et al. (2003) in “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe” argue that once Turkey was recognised a candidate country in 1999, the EU used the membership carrot to put pressure on Turkey to refrain from specific norm-violating actions. For instance, when the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was arrested, the EU demanded that he not be executed. And “When Turkey threatened to annex Northern Cyprus in November 2001, EU Commissioner Verheugen responded that “the EU will admit Cyprus whether there is an agreement or not”” (ibid.: 507). The EU has stressed repeatedly that the date of negotiations totally depends on the progress achieved in Turkey. As far as the effectiveness of these conditions is concerned, Schimmelfenning et al. suggest that “Three years after Turkey received candidate status at the Helsinki summit of 1999, EU conditionality has produced its first significant effects. The legislative package passed by the Turkish Parliament in August 2002 includes the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime and cultural rights for the Kurdish minority (the teaching of Kurdish in education and its use in broadcasting)” (2003: 508). Turkey’s progress was acknowledged by an increase in its pre-accession financial assistance as well as the fixing of a target date (December 2004) to decide on the opening of membership negotiations. I found Schimmelfenning et al. very useful to understand how and why the EU put pressure on Turkey in relation to Ocalan and what steps the Turkish authorities were expected to take and have taken since it was recognised as a
candidate country in 1999. Although Schimmelfenning’s et al. reference to the capture of Ocalan shows that they are aware of the domestic political developments in Turkey, they however overlook what Ocalan’s capture meant for Turkish political system. In this thesis I will show that the capture of Ocalan and Ocalan’s conciliatory approach during his trial have generated an “improved security environment” in Turkey, which then initiated changes in the Turkish political system. Along similar lines to Scimmelfening, Ziya Onis (2003) in “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey–EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era” argues that the EU, by granting a candidate membership status to Turkey, provided an incentive for the Turkish authorities to make a number of reforms and changes in the Turkish political system. Onis suggests that the EU should break the deadlock and shift power in favour of the pro-EU coalition in Turkey as it did with the East and Central European counties. Onis suggests that this is vital because the pro-EU coalition in Turkey could make an important contribution by challenging the orthodox, security-conscious mind set in Turkey and conveying what EU integration is all about in the first place. He then suggests that it is also crucial that the reforms process is “internalised”, meaning that the kind of reforms needed to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria ought to be portrayed as reforms which are intrinsically valuable and not simply accomplished to meet EU criteria in a purely instrumental fashion. I agree that the EU needs to anchor Turkey in pursuing the political reform process, but as I will show in this thesis there is only a little the EU can do when the domestic political dynamics are ready for change. This then takes us to Michelle Cini (2007) European Politics who suggests that the speed of the negotiations depends on progress made by the state on the implementation of EU rules; the pace of negotiations will be determined by Turkey’s own merits. Perhaps knowing that Turkey has been slow in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, Cini predicts that some prospective applicant states in the Western Balkans become member states before Turkey (2007: 429). I agree with Cini that the pace of the accession and negotiations process depends on the Turkish government’s performance on meeting the membership criteria. However, I also think it is important to pay attention to how and why domestic political dynamics are impacting on Turkey’s performance in meeting the membership criteria. As to how this changing period of Turkey–EU relations should be contextualised, Chris Rumford and Hasan Turunc (2011) in “Identity Dimension: Postwesternisation: A Framework for Understanding Turkey–EU Relations” put forward a new theoretical framework to study Turkey’s changing relationship with the EU. Rumford and Turunc challenge the prevalent belief that Turkey’s accession to the EU can be understood in the context of Westernisation. They suggest that Turkey and the EU are both in
an era of post-Westernisation, which means that the relationship should be analysed within the parameters of post-Westernisation. I think their proposed framework provides an original perspective for the study of changes in the both the Turkish political system and Turkey’s progress toward meeting EU membership criteria. I however think Rumford and Turunc lack the necessary attention to the domestic political developments.

Since Turkey’s accession negotiations started, progress has been slow and at times stalled. Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfenning (2006) in “Relations with Wider Europe” argue that the conditions the EU has set out for candidate countries not only casts doubts on the EU’s appetite for further expansion, but also raise questions about the future effectiveness of the EU’s accession conditionality. Lavanex and Schimmelfenning notes that the EU put forward two conditions for Turkey: enactment of the revised penal code and signature of an additional protocol, which would extend the 1964 Ankara Agreement of association and the Customs Union with the EU to the new Member States. In June 2005, the revised penal code entered into force and on 29 July 2005, Turkey also signed the additional protocol, although it issued a political declaration that the protocol did not entail recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Apart from still refusing to implement the additional protocol by 2006, Turkey was heavily criticised by the European Commission for the slow pace of change and use of repressive law, such as that prohibiting the insulting of Turkish identity. They conclude that by saying that it is not clear how, in the absence of the attraction of accession, the European Neighbourhood Policy will succeed in promoting democracy and human rights. I agree with Lavanex and Schimmelfenning that the EU’s accession conditionality causes a lot of uncertainties in Turkey as to whether Turkey ever will be able to join the EU as a full member. I would however draw Lavanex and Schimmelfenning’s attention to why the Justice and Development Party (AKP) have stalled their plans to resolve the Kurdish problem and adopt a new and democratic Constitution for Turkey.

Additionally the EU’s decision to begin accession negotiations with Turkey has also been considered in the context of Turkey’s handling of its internal and external policy challenges and Turkey’s uniqueness. Gulnur Aybet (2006) “Turkey and the EU After the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges” argued that the EU’s commencement of accession negotiations left Turkey with the dilemma of how to reconcile its internal policy challenges such the Kurdish minority rights and external policy challenges namely the Cyprus question and unresolved Aegean disputes with Greece and the Armenian
issue. Traditionally Turkey has separated its security challenges such as Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism, from its external security relations, which are based on state-centric security relationships (529). Between January and May 2005, the implications of reconciling internal and external pressures led to a rise in nationalism, a drop in interest in EU membership in public opinion polls and the military has been supportive of the government’s EU accession policy but the issues of Cyprus and Kurdish minority rights still constitute red lines (p.530). While Turkey’s uniqueness such as the special place of its military within the state and society-is difficult for the EU grasp, the very speciality of the Turkish case does not itself warrant an alternative to full membership, such as privileged partnership. All previous accession negotiations have ended in full membership. If Turkey were to become an exception, this would have wider repercussions for Turkey’s relations with the West and the EU’s image in the Islamic world at large. Aybet thus concludes that the case of Turkey constitutes the greatest challenge the EU has had to face in dealing with an accession country (p.546).

Just as EU citizens are not very supportive of Turkey’s accession to the EU, on the grounds that Turkey is not European and is Muslim, academics also have questioned whether Turkey is part of the West or part of Asia, and what implications Turkey’s religion may have for the future of the EU and EU identity. Desmond Dinan (2006) The Origins and Evolution of the European Union very briefly says that Turkey’s possible accession to the EU has encouraged debates about where the Union’s borders should be (2006: 292). Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford (2005) in Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization consider the issue of the borders of the EU in a more sophisticated manner. Delantly and Rumford say: “As the borders of the EU move closer to Russia and with the eventual entry of Turkey, extending to Asia, the identity of Europe will become more and more ‘post-western’”. This, they suggest, is not anti-Western or non-Western, but a condition defined increasingly by the legacy of an earlier modernity which will have to be negotiated with other modernities (2005: 47). Turkey’s close relationship with the countries of Central Asia will also have implications for the present countries of the EU, which will no longer be entirely within Europe, but will also be partly with Asia (ibid.). The other prevalent difference of Turkey to the current EU Member States is its religion. In the context of Turkish membership and the drafting of the European Constitutions there has been considerable debate on the foundations of the EU in Christianity. Even though the Turkish state is highly secular, the inclusion of a large Islamic population will certainly have
implications for the definition of European identity as rooted in Christian tradition. As opposed to Robins’ (1996) statement that Europe is Christian and that Turkey cannot therefore be European, Delantly and Rumford argue that this view does not fit comfortably with the view that by virtue of its NATO membership Turkey is part of the West (2005: 48). This mentioned work is very important to gain an insight to debate where the EU’s borders end and whether the EU is a religious entity or a political Union.

While the above authors do not make comment as to what European politicians could do to change public opinion in the EU in relation to accession to the EU, Jurgen Gerhards and Silke Hans (2011) in “Why Not Turkey? Attitudes Towards Turkish Membership in the EU Among Citizens in 27 European Countries” suggest:

EU citizens’ attitude will only change in a positive direction if they are convinced that the expansion process will not bring about inordinate financial costs or increased immigration from the accession to the well-off countries. If politicians want to influence their citizens towards a more positive view of Turkish accession, they should address these specific concerns. They should work to better portray the economic and political advantages that Turkey’s EU membership would have for current EU citizens. If the common fear is that accession would create large-scale migration and therefore threaten culture and labour markets in the EU, then politicians could set longer-term limits on freedom of movement, for example. (2011: 763, italics in original).

Gerhards and Hans’s work is very important because it make recommendations for the European politicians’ attention about what steps they can take to change their electorates’ opinion in relation to Turkey’s accession to the EU. In this thesis I like to draw academics’ interest to the Turkish National Security Council whose decisions, preferences and choices have I think contributed to the negative perception in relation to Turkey’s accession in member state of EU. To do this I will first below study what has already been said about the MGK and how I propose to examine it.

The position of the National Security Council (MGK) in Turkish political system began to be discussed among academics right after the 1980 army intervention. Gareth Jenkins (2001) in Context and Circumstances: The Turkish Military and Politics describes the MGK as a symptom rather than a cause of the flawed nature of Turkish democracy and recognises the MGK as platform on which the army attempts to exercise influence in the Turkish political
system (ibid.:7), and Pinar Tank (2001) in Turkey as a 'Special Case' for the EU: Will the Generals Retreat from Politics?' said “The MGK was created in 1961 as a channel for the military voice (ibid.: 220). However Jenkins does not explain how and why the MGK is a symptom and he and Tank do not comment on why he believes that the MGK is a platform for the army to have control over Turkish politics. I would argue that Jenkins overlooks the fact that the civilian and military members of the MGK have mostly held equal votes in the MGK. Cengiz Candar (1999) in “Redefining Turkey’s Political Centre” describes the MGK as “the institution that really runs the country” (1999: 131). I found Candar’s position very interesting, but it is difficult to understand why he argues that the MGK was the institution running the country. Furthermore Mehmet Ali Birand (1986) in Emret Komutanim (“At your command, Sir!”) argues that after the 1980s intervention the MGK was given a new role and position in the Turkish political system that was both outside and above the democratically elected government (ibid.: 462). I agree with Birand that the MGK was given new powers after Critical Juncture III, but it is unclear why he thinks that the MGK’s new powers made it more powerful than the democratically elected government. Tanor speaking to Atay ([1998]: 128) focuses on the MGK’s position in Turkish legislation and argues that the MGK is an institution that is above the elected government and even above the TBMM. Tanor describes the MGK’s position by drawing an analogy in which the legislation process was depicted in the shape of a triangle: one of the three edges of the triangle was taken by the President; the other two were taken by the Prime Minister and the military, with the MGK at the heart of this triangle. This rather meant, according to Tanor, that the MGK was the “beyin” (“brain” – author’s translation) of the legislation (Tanor, cited in Atay 1998:128). Although this is a very interesting point of view, Tanor does not test his thesis with reference to a particular policy area – it is unknown how in practice the MGK is above the other bodies and the institutions in the legislative process.

While Jenkins, Birand, Candar and Tanor only comment on the MGK’s position with respect to domestic politics, Bertil Duner and Edward Veverall (2001) in “The Country Cousin: Turkey, the European Union and Human Rights” study the EU’s perception of the MGK. Duner and Veverall suggest that the EU treated the MGK as an obstacle to Turkey’s bid to join the EU and therefore advised the Turkish authorities to abolish the MGK in order to remove the army’s position in the Turkish political system (Duner and Veverall 2001: 3). I found this article very useful in understanding how the EU treated the MGK and what the EU asked the Turkish authorities to do in relation to the future of the MGK. There are however
two problems with this article. The first is that the European Commission’s Regular Reports of 1998 to 2004 never asked the Turkish authorities to abolish the MGK, but they consistently suggested that the MGK needed to be democratised. The second is that the MGK is not a military body; it is made up of military and civilian members and each side has an equal say on the decisions made in the MGK.

Similar to the EU’s and Duner and Veveall’s perception of the MGK, Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu (2003) in “Demythologizing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey” argues that the military has often used the MGK to put forward its own political agenda (ibid.: 222). In another publication, Cizre (2004) speculates on the way the composition of the MGK has affected politics. In this very important work, she argues that the military members of the MGK have dominated the civilian members of the institution. To support her argument she draws a comparison between civil–military relations in Turkey and in the Western European countries. Thus she asks, “who describes the nature of the threat posed by a particular enemy and who has the authority to decide whether to feel threatened and if so, how, or even whether, to respond?” Her finding is that while in Western European countries it was the civilians who described the threat and decided how to respond to it, in Turkey it was the military who described the nature of the threat and decided whether and how to respond (2004: 104–5). She concluded by arguing “one of the central factors preventing Turkey’s potential accession into the European fold is the prevailing civil–military relationship” (Cizre 2004: 104). This is a very interesting point of view; however, Cizre appears to conflate three different issues she discusses in this article: the military (TSK)’s authority over the MGK; the military members’ authority over the civilian members of the MGK; and civil–military relations in Turkey in general. It is therefore very difficult to grasp what she thinks of the MGK’s position in both the Turkish political system and in Turkey’s European policy.

On the other hand, Burak Ulman (2000) in “Increasing influence of the Military in the 1990s in Turkish National Security and Foreign Policy” speculates over the role of the military wing of the MGK in making Turkey’s National Security policy and argues that it is against the principles of any democratic political system for the military to have a say on national security policy making and suggests that this responsibility should reside in the hands of the elected representatives (ibid.: 105).

The above literature shows that Ataturk’s interest in seeing Turkey part of Europe has not received much attention, and Fatih Rustu Zorlu’s role in Turkey’s Associative Membership
application has also been overlooked. It shows that the impacts of what I suggest are the Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and the 1980s have not been analysed in the context of the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. Little attention has been paid to how Turkish political developments have contributed to the EC/EU’s changing position on Turkey’s membership of the EC/EU. The interaction between Turkey’s poor human rights and the exclusion of Turkey from the EU network has not been highlighted. Although a number of factor(s) and actor(s) roles have been considered in the context of Turkey’s relations with the EEC/EC/EU, the role of the Turkish National Security Council has been entirely overlooked and neglected. And the changes both in the pace of Turkey–EU relations and in the MGK have not been analysed in the context of changes in Turkish political dynamics. Furthermore, the MGK has been treated as the army-dominated body of the Turkish Security Forces; its origins and evolution from advisory body to paramount political institution have been neglected. Although it has been suggested that the MGK is a very influential institution in Turkish political system, its position in reference to any single policy has not been shown, and the changes it went through have not been analysed in the context of domestic political dynamics. In this thesis I will study the MGK’s genesis, evolution, its decisions and preferences and the changes it experienced with reference to Turkey’s European policy and will analyse how the MGK’s institutional process impacted on the development, nature and the pace of the relationship.

The above literature review also shows that the use of New Institutionalism has been neglected in the study of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations; in particular historical institutionalism has not received any attention in the literature covering Turkey’s slow progressing relationship with the EU. I argue that this has resulted in, if I can borrow the expression from Pollack (2009), “institution-free” studies of Turkey’s European policy. This means that not only domestic political institutions have been overlooked in the study of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations, but also the role of domestic political developments in the origins, in the nature and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations have not been considered. Historical institutionalism has however been popular in Comparative Politics and in American Politics. There are a number of good examples which have been inspirational for the use of a historical institutionalist theoretical framework to study the MGK’s role in Turkey’s European policy, for example, Judith Goldstein’s (1988) “Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy”, in which she studies the impacts of protectionism in the making of trade policy in the USA. She suggests that protectionism and its origins should be analysed in
its historical context and three kinds of protectionism are identified, namely liberalism, fair-trade and redistributive, each operating according to a different logic. She then shows that the policy makers’ choice between different types of protectionism depended on when protectionist legislation was chosen (ibid.: 183). This is a very important work because it puts greater emphasis on the historical context and time, which is something I will also pay attention to in this thesis when I am studying the MGK’s institutional processes and its bo

A very important and relevant article is by Paul Pierson (1996), “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis”, which asks why member states cannot take control of the subsequent developments of institutions, and argues that, despite the initial primacy of member governments in the design of Community institutions and policies, “gaps” may occur in the ability of member governments to control the subsequent developments of EC institutions and policies, for four reasons. First, member governments in democratic societies may, because of electoral considerations, apply a high discount rate to the future, agreeing to EC policies which lead to a long-term loss of control in return for a short-term electoral return. Second, even when governments do not heavily discount the future, unintended consequences of institutional choices may create additional gaps, which the member governments may be able to address only imperfectly. Third, Pierson argues, the preferences of member governments may change over time, most obviously because of electoral turnover, leaving new member governments, with new preferences, to inherit an acquis communautaire negotiated by, and according to the preferences of, a different government. Pierson is very helpful for seeing that institutions may produce unintended consequences, but he does not provide a framework in which one can analyse the sources of such unintended consequences, and it is not clear what he means by unintended consequences. In this thesis I will show that the concept of path dependence and the concept of unintended consequences can both formulate a framework to study how one institution’s path dependent action can cause unintended consequences.

The last book I have found very helpful in conducting my research is Sophie Meunier and Kathleen McNamara’s (2007) edited book entitled Making History: European Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty: The State of the European Union. This places the analysis of European Integration in broader historical perspective, probing the sources of stability, crisis, and change across the Union as a whole as well as within all the key policy arenas the EU encompasses (ibid.: Preface). The theoretical approach best suited to this goal is that of historical institutionalism. Throughout the volume, leading scholars of European integration
situate a wide variety of policy issues, from citizenship to competition policy to foreign policy to the stability of the EU as a political system, within the historical institutionalism. All of the accounts are united in stressing the role of temporality, in addition to formal and informal institutional contexts, in mediating political struggles and outcomes. Meunier and McNamara’s very brief and rigorous framework has been instructive for me in preparation of my use of historical institutionalism. They cover most of the concepts associated with historical institutionalism and I think their book is one of the few books on EU studies drawing on historical institutionalism. They do not however explain in detail what these concepts are, how they have been used so far, how and why historical institutionalism has been criticised in EU studies and what contribution they are making to historical institutionalism. In this thesis however I provide detailed explanations of the concepts of critical junctures, path dependence, unintended consequences and punctuated equilibrium and I show how and why they can be used to understand a number of different institutional processes in the context of the interaction of two policy areas.

1.1. Contributions, Sources of Data and Readership

The originality of my thesis lies in treating the Turkish National Security Council as the main explanatory independent variable in studying Turkey’s slow progressing relationship with the EEC/EC/EU. This is entirely new and different in Turkish studies and European studies since the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system and its role in the development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations have not been considered at this level before. This thesis therefore brings a new and different dimension to the study of the MGK and Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. Additionally employing historical institutionalism to analyse Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations is completely new since domestic institutions’ role in Turkey’s European policy has been neglected. I however offer a different and original application of historical institutionalism that draws heavily on the concepts of critical juncture, path dependence, unintended consequences and punctuated equilibrium to explain how the MGK’s genesis, evolution, political preferences and the changes it embarked upon have made a major contribution to Turkey’s slow and inconsistent relationship with the EEC/EC/EU. Distinguishing parts of institutional processes and associating each part with one or more concepts is also an entirely new and different form of application of historical institutionalism since historical institutionalism and its associated concepts have not been used in this form and at this level before. In addition applying this framework to how and why a chosen
institution’s processes have interacted with a policy’s development, nature and pace is also a new use of historical institutionalism and its concepts.

My thesis therefore makes original contributions to three areas of research. This research makes an original contribution to EU studies by providing an historical institutionalist account of the impact of a domestic institution’s institutional processes on a candidate country’s path towards EU membership between 1923 and 2004. In addition my treatment of the MGK as an institution brings in a new dimension to the study of institutions in Turkish Studies. This historical institutionalist account of the MGK’s institutional processes within the context of domestic economic and social developments makes an original contribution to Turkish studies. Drawing clear lines between different parts of institutional processes and assigning different concepts to explain each part makes historical institutionalism more dynamic; to study the interaction between an institution and a policy’s development, nature and pace in this way is a major contribution to the literature on historical institutionalism.

More specifically, as said earlier, the origins of the MGK have been overlooked in the literature. Using historical institutionalism’s approach on institutional genesis I study the origins of both the MGK and Turkey’s desire to be part of Western Europe in the context of political, social and economic developments in the early years of the Turkish Republic. By doing this I give a detailed insight into not only how and why the MGK was established, but also Ataturk’s interest in adopting a Western European political system for the newly established Turkish Republic. It is generally assumed, as shown above, that the MGK was given more authority and power so that the Turkish military could have control over Turkish politics, thus there has not been a detailed analysis of how and why the MGK was empowered. In addition, the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations has not been studied in the context of domestic political developments; particularly there is not a detailed analysis of what, how and why, at a domestic level, has contributed to the development of the relationship. By heavily relying on the concept of critical juncture I will study the role of the Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980 in the evolution of the MGK and in the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. Additionally, it is generally argued that Turkey’s weak democracy and poor human rights records have hindered Turkey’s bid to join the EC/EU, but it is not well researched as to what or who contributed to this. By using the concept of path dependence I will highlight the MGK’s role in handling the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), and the outcomes of the MGK’s path of pursuing a state of
emergency on both the Turkish political system and Turkey’s slow progress in meeting the membership criteria. Lastly, it is generally agreed that the EU’s requests or incentives have triggered the changes in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. This has meant that the domestic political developments related to the MGK have been overlooked. By using the concept of punctuated equilibrium I will study sources of institutional changes with particular interest in endogenous causation; the closure of the Welfare Party (RP) and the ban on Necmettin Erbakan’s active political involvement and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, will be considered as the developments in the MGK’s endogenous variables that have generated an improved security environment in Turkish political system which then triggered the changes both in the MGK and in the pace of Turley–EU relations.

The third of areas of contribution I am making to is historical institutionalism, my distinction of different parts of the institutional processes and my reference to using certain concepts for certain parts of the institutional processes is a major contribution to the theory building, as well as bringing dynamism to the use of historical institutionalism. More specifically, I make a number of original contributions to historical institutionalism’s position on different parts of institutional processes. The existing literature considering the origins of institutions is generally limited to description of how one institution originates; the above outlined historical institutionalist study of how institutions originate has not been used before. Therefore I am making an original contribution to the literature on the both institutional genesis and origins of policies. The concept of critical junctures is generally used to explain institutional change, but these explanations are generally brief – merely lines or paragraphs. The existing literature additionally has overlooked the connection between critical junctures and institutional evolution and policy development. In this thesis I show the utility of critical junctures in explaining institutional evolution and policy development. This is a very important contribution to the literature of historical institutionalism because it not only allows the researcher to explain what role critical junctures may play in the evolution of institutions, for example, here, from advisory body to a paramount institution, but it makes it possible to highlight how and why a policy’s developments may be stalled and delayed at the critical junctures. While the concept of path dependence has been criticised for drawing a prominent dichotomy of stability and changes, thus masks the possibility of gradual policy change (Peters et al. 2005: 1277), I in this show that the concept of path dependence is only equipped to explain the institutions’ path dependent actions and path policies. My use of the concept of path dependence is also original because I study how one institution’s path dependent actions
on a policy interact with another policy area. When I find the concept of path dependence not entirely helpful, in a situation when an institution chooses to maintain its original path despite its negative consequences, I opt to complement the concept of path dependence with the concept of unintended consequences. This framework is completely new and makes an original contribution to the study of how institutions influence political action and policy outcomes. Additionally, it is a very useful framework to highlight the interaction between one institution’s path dependent actions and its unintended consequences for other policy areas. Lastly, the concept of punctuated equilibrium has been neglected in the study of institutional change and one of the reasons for this is it has been criticism of the notion of exogenous shock as a source of radical institutional change. This means that the concept of punctuated equilibrium treats institutions as the dependent variable and so the emphasis is on external developments, rather than institutions themselves. In this thesis however I focus on the endogenous source of institutional change and show that developments in the endogenous dynamics of an institution may trigger radical institutional changes. My contribution on radical institutional change is that I show how the punctuated equilibrium framework can be very helpful to explain radical institutional changes; it can show both how and why a powerful institution’s power may be curtailed. And the originality of the framework lies in the emphasis on the endogenous causation of the change. This framework is also helpful to understand changes in the pace of policies.

This research will appeal to those interested in the study of:

- New Institutionalism, with particular focus on the historical institutionalism and its associated concepts of critical junctures, path dependence, unintended consequences and punctuated equilibrium
- The Turkish National Security Council’s origins, evolution, political preferences and the changes it went through within an historical institutionalist framework
- The MGK’s role in Turkey’s European policy in the context of Turkey’s Associative Agreement (1963) with the EEC, Turkey’s application for EC’s Full Membership (1987), the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the introduction of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), the establishment of the Customs Union (1994) between Turkey and the EU, the Luxembourg Summit (1997) and the EU’s decision to both
grant Turkey a candidate membership status (1999) and begin accession negotiations with Turkey (2004)

- Turkish political history and domestic political developments and the EU’s attitudes towards these developments: the Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980; the rise of the Kurdish issue and the PKK; the Islamic Movement and religiously oriented Turkish political parties; and democracy and human rights.

This thesis is a piece of historical research, and adopts a qualitative approach. Hockett (1955, in McNabb 2010: 248) said that “historical research occurs in three steps: the gathering of data; the critical evaluation of the data; and the presentation of the facts, interpretations, and conclusions the historical researcher draws from the data”. As Hockett suggests, I first gathered data that is relevant to the question this thesis asks, and then evaluated the data, using the historical institutionalist framework of institutional processes that I briefly introduced above and will explain in greater detail in the next chapter. The historical institutionalist framework has helped me not only to ask questions about how and why the MGK’s institutional processes interacted with Turkey’s European policy, but it also helped to analyse the impacts of this interaction on the development, in the nature and in the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations within a theoretical framework.

Harrison said: “[I]f we adopt a qualitative approach, we may choose to gather primary data, and we can do this via two particular research tools: interviews and observation. Alternatively (and as supplementary) we can analyse existing data – be it official documents, reports, biographical studies or the media” (Harrison 2001: 78). Although I have not conducted interviews, I have chosen to draw upon the existing primary and secondary data. Harrison again notes: “[I]f we wished to discover how political institutions operate, how important decisions are made and how political power is attained, we are not likely to ask the public at large, but rather those individuals (very often a small group) who have access to this level of information – those referred to as political elites” (2001: 94). In the case of my research, to understand how and why the MGK made the decisions it made, it would have been useful to have interviews with the MGK members. In the early days, furthermore, it was part of my PhD proposal to conduct interviews with the both civilian and military members of the MGK. Before I explain why I chose not to conduct elite interviews, I want to consider some of the advantages and disadvantages of having interviews. If we are interviewing the
actual actor, it may help with the interpretations of existing documents and reports (Harrison ibid.) and it can provide access to crucial information about political events that otherwise unavailable (Manheim et al.2008: 373). As far as the disadvantages are concerned, Manheim et al. (2008) argues that interviewing those who are or were deeply involved in political process may threaten the scientific validity of the information obtained if the interviewees, for example, “have convinced themselves, in order rationalize their own actions, that things are one way when they are actually another” (Manheim et al. 2008: 373–374). Harrison (2001) has suggested that the most challenging issue is “where to start – or, put it another way, who to interview and when” (ibid.: 95). If I had interviews with the civilian and army members of the MGK, I would have had the opportunity not only to ask them for clarifications on some of the decisions and preferences of the MGK, but also I would have had insight to some of the conversations took place in the MGK meetings between the civilian and the army members. However, as I read more about the MGK and analysed the MGK’s press releases I identified a number of difficulties and problems in organising and conducting interviews with the political elites concerned. One of which was to decide on where to start and whom to interview; as I said earlier, my thesis covers over eighty years, it is therefore very difficult and time consuming to have interviews with every one of the political and military elite who sat in the MGK between 1923 and 2004. Additionally, some of the civilian and army of the MGK have passed away and the composition of the MGK changed many times over the years. The military members of the MGK, as well as the politicians, are hard to reach and it is particularly difficult to interview around sensitive issues like the Kurdish question or the Islamic movement.

Harrison (2001) has noted: “[I]n order to answer a political question, it may be more appropriate to analyse data that which already exist, rather than collect new information.” (ibid.: 106). There are a number of reasons for this: (1) due to time restraints, (2) as historical context needs to be taken in to account (Harrison ibid.) and (3) it may allow access to subjects that may be difficult or impossible to research through direct, personal contact (Johnson and Reynolds 2012:301). I chose to rely on existing primary and secondary sources of data since newspapers, the MGK’s press releases and the Official Journal of European Community helped me to highlight the interaction between the MGK and Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations, which would not have been possible without them. The primary sources I used in this thesis include the minutes of the National Security Commission (1980–
1983); the press releases of the National Security Council (MGK) (1983–2004); the minutes of the debates in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), and the Turkish broadsheet newspapers: Cumhuriyet; Tercuman; Hurriyet; Sabah; Milliyet; Zaman; and Radikal. Most of the primary data was collected from a number of libraries in Turkey: the library of the Turkish parliament; Beyazit Merkez Kutuphanesi (Beyazit Central Library); and Ataturk Kitapligi (Ataturk’s Library). I agree with Johnson and Reynolds (2012) that one of the disadvantage of the use of existing information is that “some written records are unavailable to researchers” (Johnson and Reynolds 2012: 301) and this applies to the Minutes of the MGK’s meetings, which are recognised as top-secret documents and are not available to public view under Law 2945, which was introduced in 1983. To a certain extent this has limited my understanding and analysis, such as understanding the interaction between the civilian and military members of the MGK. The only available data to gain an insight to the MGK was the MGK’s press releases. I therefore collected these from the MGK’s official website. However since 2010 these press releases – covering the years between 1980 and 2004 – have been removed from the MGK’s official website. I think this will make it difficult for new researchers to consider looking into the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system; however I am happy to share the data I have with the other researchers, upon request. Having said that, the MGK’s press releases gave me an insight into how often the MGK met, who sat at the MGK’s meetings and what sort of decisions the MGK made. It is commonly argued that the reliability and the accuracy of this sort of data can be questionable. One should note that the MGK’s press releases were products of the MGK’s meetings and were published in the widely read newspapers. I think this is adequate to suggest that the MGK’s press releases are reliable since they were exposed both to the media and to public scrutiny. It is however questionable how objective the press releases are; and that is something I cannot be sure of since the minutes of the MGK’s meetings are not open to public view. I thus cannot compare the minutes of the meetings with the MGK’s press releases to decide how biased the press releases are. The secondary sources I used in this thesis include the Official Journal of European Community (1980–1997); the European Commission’s Annual Regular Reports on Turkey (1998–2004); English newspapers: the Guardian, the Independent, and the Financial Times; and academic writings. I collected the secondary data mostly from the London School of Economics Library, the British Library and the Royal Holloway College Library. One of the most contentious disadvantages of the use of existing data is that its content may be biased, or may be incomplete or inaccurate. And it could be claimed that some of the existing information I have used in this thesis may
be biased or inaccurate. However, throughout this thesis I have aimed to use facts – be it a decision made by the MGK or the EU’s position on the MGK – only after I have double checked it with another source of information. This will have hopefully minimised the risk of the information being biased or inaccurate.

This thesis consists of seven chapters. The current chapter covers the questions I will address, hypotheses I will test, the brief outline of why I chose historical institutionalism, the literature review and the methodology I will adopt in this thesis. Chapter 2, “The Historical Institutionalist Framework of Institutional Processes” will debate the strengths and weaknesses of rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms’ positions on the distinct parts of institutional processes; it will then outline in greater details the historical institutionalist framework of this thesis. Chapter 3, “The Genesis of Both the MGK and Turkey’s Interest in Europe in an Illiberal Context, 1923–1957” shows how well historical institutionalism can explain the factors behind the origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in being part of Europe. Chapter 4, “The Evolution of the MGK and the Development of Turkey–EEC/EC Relations, 1957–1983” analyses the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations post Turkey’s transition to a multi-party system and discusses how the critical junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980 contributed to Turkey’s aspiration to join the EEC/EC. Additionally, it argues that the concept of critical junctures, their characteristics and their sources are very helpful not only to unveil how and why the MGK evolved, but also very helpful to explain what contributed to the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations between 1957 and 1983. Chapter 5, “The MGK’s Tendency to Rule through States of Emergency and its Incompatibility with EC/EU Membership Criteria, 1983–1997” shows that the concept of path dependence is inadequate on its own for analysing how institutions influence political decision making. It suggests that the concept of unintended consequences is needed to supplement the formulations of path dependency if we are to understand why the state of emergency was kept for more than fourteen years while this conflicted with Turkey’s progress towards EU membership. Chapter 6, “The Curtailment of the MGK’s Powers and the EU’s Decision to Begin Accession Negotiations with Turkey, 1998–2004”, assesses the existing interpretations of the changes both in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. It goes on to suggest that the concept of punctuated equilibrium is suitable to understand the source and mechanism of change. Chapter 7, “Conclusions”, begins by setting out the findings of this study and discusses my contributions to the literature on Turkey and the European Union.
as well as the theoretical approach of Historical Institutionalism and outlines what future studies may be conducted.
CHAPTER 2: WHY HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Introduction

Neither sociological institutionalism nor rational choice institutionalism pays an academic attention to the role of history in the study of the institutional processes. Historical institutionalism on the other hand is fundamentally driven by its emphasis on history in shaping the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes. Whilst rational choice and sociological institutionalisms’ position on the institutional processes do not form a productive framework in highlighting the interaction between the MGK and Turkey-EEC/EC/EU relations, historical institutionalist framework is very fruitful in gaining an insight to how and why the MGK’s institutional processes have interacted with Turkey’s bid to join the EU and what outcomes this interaction had produced for the nature, the development and the pace of the relationship. To show these points, I will begin by comparing and contrasting rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms’ positions on institutional genesis, institutional evolution, the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes and institutional change. I will then set out the historical institutionalist framework of the institutional processes; as well as I will discuss the benefits and the limitations of this framework in explaining the interaction between the MGK’s institutional processes and Turkey’s European policy. Conclusions will follow.

2.1 Rational Choice, Sociological and Historical Institutionalisms on Institutional Processes

Early rational choice institutionalists (Shepsle and Weingast 1995) questioned the impact of the American Congress on the behaviour of legislators and analysed the relationship between Congress and regulatory agencies. In addition, a variety of other phenomena including cross-national coalition behaviour, the development of political institutions, and the intensity of ethnic conflict have been at the centre of rational choice institutionalism. For instance, Przeworski (1991, 2000) analysed democratic transitions in game-theoretic terms, and there are many other examples of the application of rational choice institutionalism in European studies such as Pollack (1996, 2009); Jupille and Caporoso (1999); Aspinwall and Schneider (2000); and Scully (2006). The rational choice institutionalists’ definition of what an institution does varies. Riker (1980) refers to institutions as “congealed tastes” (ibid.:432), describing them as condensed conventions reflecting tastes and values about interpersonal
rules; they consist of attitudes, beliefs, expectations, and preferences about the way things are done around the individuals. In contrast to Riker, Shepsle (1989) describes them as “procedures”, “arrangements”, or as a “structure-induced equilibrium” or “game” (ibid.: 135–42). Thelen and Steinmo (1992) note: “For the rational choice scholars, institutions are important as features of a strategic context, imposing constraints on self-interested behaviour. Thus political and economic institutions are important for rational choice scholars interested in real-world politics because the institutions define (or at least constrain) the strategies that political actors adopt in the pursuit of their interests” (ibid.: p.7). Sociological institutionalism on the other hand adopts a broad definition of institutions and recognises informal norms and conventions as well as formal rules and regulations as institutions. For instance, March and Olsen (1989) describe institutions as a “collection of interrelated rules and routines” (ibid.: 2). Scott (1995) however improved this by expanding on the features of institutions and emphasised the cognitive, the normative, and the regulative structures and activities which arguably provided stability and meaning to social behaviour (ibid.: 33). Sociological institutionalism has been heavily used in EU studies to examine the EU enlargement (Fierke and Weiner 1990); regionalism and European integration (Christiansen 1997); domestic–European relations (Larsen 1997); the European Commission’s political strategy in creating the Single European Market (Jabko 2006); and the effects of Europe on national identity constructions (Diez 1996).

Like sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalism’s definition of institutions has been broad. A very well-known early historical institutionalist, Hall, describes institutions as “formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure relationships between individual units of the polity or the economy” (1986: 19). Another well-respected historical institutionalist, Ikenberry, calls this the “normative social order” that comprises not just formal constitutional entities, but also instances of established informal interaction (1988: 222–23). Thelen and Steinmo (1992) however combine the latter two perspectives and say institutions are both formal organisations and informal rules and procedures which generally structure political or social action (ibid.: 2). Peters (1999) notes that one of the other operational definitions of institutions that stand out in the historical institutionalist literature is the role of ideas in defining institutions: Goldstein’s (1988) emphasis on protectionism, Hall’s (1989) focus on Keynesianism, Immergut’s (1992) analysis of health policies, Skocpol’s (1992) interest in the relationship between moral values and formal institutions such as courts of law, and Kings’s (1995) study of the liberal
principles in work–welfare programs reflect the broadness and variation in the use of explanatory factors in historical institutionalism. It is necessary to clarify what I treat as institutions in this thesis and why. I agree that informal institutions such as ideas, traditions or interests can play an important role in shaping political action and policy outcomes. However, in this thesis I will show that ideas can evolve into formal institutions; in this case it was “Ataturk’s desire to protect the Turkish Republic” that evolved into the National Security Council (MGK). I therefore begin by discussing how and why a informal institution evolved into an formal institution and I then, in a very large part of the research, focus on what role the formal institution, that is to say the MGK, played in Turkish political decision making and what implication this had for Turkey’s European policy. The reason for this is that, as I will show throughout this thesis, the origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe, and the MGK and its institutional processes, have interacted with Turkey’s European policy and this shaped the development, the nature and the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations between 1923 and 2004. I argue that this requires academic attention.

On institutional genesis, sociological institutionalism’s approach is that institutions are given and socially constructed. Sociological institutionalism focuses attention on the processes whereby actors who develop new institutions borrow from the existing world of institutional templates (Solton 1998: 30). If a researcher accepts that institutions are given and socially constructed, does it mean that we do not need to research the origins of that institution? Then does not this limit the researchers’ ability to research and investigate? I argue that accepting that institutions are given restricts the researchers’ ability to conduct a detailed investigation of why an institution is formed. In addition, while sociological institutionalism has society as its focus, it is difficult to understand why it may overlook the ways in which social developments may have contributed to the genesis of institutions. Rational choice institutionalists, on the other hand, would argue that institutions are chosen; and suggest that they do not simply happen (McCubbins and Sullivan 1987: 313 and Tsebelis 1990); self-interested actors will make decisions and create institutions that will reduce their political or economic costs relative to the benefits gained (Campbell 1997: 15). Another point of view on institutional genesis comes from Weingast (2002) who suggests that the reason societies or groups cannot do without institutions is because “parties often need institutions to help capture gains from cooperation. In the absence of institutions, individuals often face a social dilemma, that is, a situation where their behaviour makes all worse off” (Weingast 2002: 670). Furthermore, rational choice institutionalists borrow from functionalism, suggesting...
that the origins of an institution can be explained in terms of the effects that follow from its existence; as Soltan et al. (1998) note: “Although such effects may contribute to the persistence of an institution, explaining persistence should be confused with explaining an institution’s origins” (ibid.: 29). Additionally, suggesting that “the institutions are chosen” or “a product of strategic action” results in limiting the researcher’s aim of investigating and questioning why an institution is formed. If one applies the rational choice institutionalist approach to how and why the MGK was established, one would list the MGK’s functions and point them to as to why the MGK was established; and if one applies rational choice institutionalism to understand the origins of Turkey–EU relations, one would perhaps suggest that the current state of Turkey–EU relations can explain the origins of the relationship. As I said earlier, this is a reductionist approach to institutional genesis, as one cannot pursue a detailed analysis of how and why institutions originate or why relationships are formed. Since I am interested to find out how and why the MGK was established and since I want to do research in the context of Turkey’s relationship with Europe, I will opt for historical institutionalism. Pierson and Thelen’s proposal to “go back and look”, and Thelen’s emphasis on paying attention to political and social settings, are instructive and may lead to a detailed analysis of what political, economic and social developments contributed to both the formation of the MGK and Turkey’s desire to be part of Europe.

Peters (1999) identified the concepts of critical juncture and punctuated equilibrium as important elements of the historical institutionalist model of change, but Peters did not comment on what concepts should be used to understand what type of change. In contrast to Peters, Cortell and Peterson (2001) identified two forms of institutional change: incremental change and radical change. Cortell and Peterson did not comment on what concept can explain what types of institutional change. Drawing on both Peters’ and Cortell and Peterson’s findings, I argue that incremental changes tend to occur slowly and continuously and they tend to contribute to both the evolution of institutions and the development of policy. I thus suggest that incremental institutional changes and their further implications can be explained by the concept of critical juncture. As I said earlier, apart from historical institutionalism, the other strands of New Institutionalism have not said much about how and why institutions evolve. Institutional evolution is one of the fundamental parts of the institutional process and I argue that it requires theoretical attention. I found the concept of critical junctures very helpful in forming a framework to identify the critical junctures in the history of Turkish politics, to explain what decisions were made at these critical junctures and
under what conditions and by whom. It has proved helpful to analyse the role critical junctures played not only in the evolution of the MGK from an advisory to a paramount political institution, but also in the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations, particular why Turkey’s application for Associative Membership was delayed in the 1960s, why Turkey’s Associative Agreement was stalled in the 1970s and why the EC chose to freeze its political dialogue with Turkey.

As for how institutions influence political action and preference, rational choice institutionalism suggests that institutions do shape action through offering opportunities for action and imposing constraints (Lecours 2005: 9). Hall and Taylor (1996) regard this as the “calculus approach” (ibid.: 939). Under the calculus approach:

institutions affect behaviour primarily by providing actors with greater or lesser degree of certainty about the present and future actions/preferences of other actors. More specifically, institutions provide information relevant to the behaviour of others, enforcement mechanisms for agreements, penalties for defection and the like. The key point is that they affect individual action by altering the expectations an actor has about the actions that others are likely to take in response to or simultaneously with his own action. Strategic interaction clearly plays a key role in such analyses. (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939, see also Lecours 2005: 9–11)

Rational choice institutionalism’s calculus approach can be helpful for understanding the power relations between different members of one institution and it can provide an insight into the debates in one institution. This approach however is not equipped to explain how the MGK’s actions in domestic politics have interacted with Turkey’s European policy. I further disagree that institutions or the members of the institutions make strategic actions all the time and suggest that we should pay more attention to the role of history and past decisions that have been made by the institutions and how these decisions constrain the future decisions of that institution. Sociological institutionalism disagrees with the argument that the social world reflects a formal means–ends “rationality” and suggests that it displays a diverse set of practices associated with culture (Hall and Taylor 1996: 946). I agree with the sociological institutionalist approach that the social world is not only shaped by means–ends rationality. Political life for sociological institutionalism is organised by shared values and worldviews based on a community of common culture, experience, and vision (March and Olsen 2006: 55)

The sociological institutionalists rather apply a “cultural approach” to analysing and demonstrating how institutions determine political action. Under this approach behaviour is not always rational or purposive; the individual’s established routines and familiar pattern of behaviour tend to decide their actions. The individuals are, therefore, “satisfiers, rather than utility maximizers”, which means that the individual’s choice of action depends on the interpretation of a situation rather than on a purely instrumental calculation (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939). In this branch of institutional theory, institutions influence how individuals view the world and how they act within it. In my opinion it is difficult to make a generalisation about whether individuals are satisfiers or utility maximisers; I think beginning a research project with the assumption that the individuals involved are either satisfiers or utility maximisers may lead to a reductionist analysis of how an institution shapes political or social action or policy outcomes. I think recognising the important role of the shared values and worldviews of communities is vital; having said that, attention also needs to be paid to history and the political, social and economic context. Sociological institutionalism’s suggestion that institutions behave in the form they are expected also fails to see that institutions have a number of opportunities to opt for a different form of action.

Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that historical institutionalism applies an “eclectic approach” to the study of how institutions shape political action and outcome (ibid.: 940). The eclectic approach is made of both the “calculus approach” and the “cultural approach”. I do not agree with Hall and Taylor and suggest instead that historical institutionalism has developed a “temporal approach”. Under this approach, “time” and “history” are two fundamental factors in the study of how institutions determine political action and policy outcomes. It is conditioned by the concept of “path dependence”.

The general argument of the concept of path dependence is that the decisions and policy preferences made earlier do influence the nature of the decisions taken in the future (Peters 1999: 63). Krasner (1984), Levi (1997) and Pierson (2000a, 2000b, 2004) develop different approaches to the concept of path dependence. I found these scholars’ formulations of the concept of path dependence very helpful in identifying not only the options available as alternatives to an institution’s original policy preference (the path), but also to analyse how and why institutions maintain their original paths over a long period of time. Krasner’s
emphasis on institutions keeping naturally to their original path, Levi’s suggestion that institutions respond to the costs of any reversal and Pierson’s emphasis on the increasing returns of staying on one path have provided me with a framework for formulating a number of questions to research in order to understand why an institution may maintain its original path. The concept of path dependence is one of the most popular concepts emerging from historical institutionalism and examples include Mahoney (2001), Hansen (2002) and Ackrill and Kay (2006). These works appear however less willing to recognise that institutions may have other options to their original paths and that the reasons for institutions to remain on the same path may differ from one institution to another. This means that they have been limited in applying the basic principles of path dependence to their empirical case studies and have overlooked the alternative options and the reasons for maintaining the original path suggested by Krasner, Levi and Pierson. Furthermore, they have failed to question if the original paths of the institution produce the intended outcomes all the time. Having said that, Krasner’s, Levi’s and Pierson’s conceptualisations of path dependence have not paid attention to whether established institutional paths do always produce the intended outcome and if not, why institutions maintain their original paths. I therefore propose to complement the conceptualisations of path dependence with Merton’s (1936) concept of unintended consequences to explain the cases in which institutions maintain their original path despite its unintended consequences.

Historical institutionalism gives importance to history and past decisions; the concept of path dependence is central to historical institutionalism’s temporal approach. The concept of path dependence and formulations of this put forward by Krasner, Levi and Pierson are very helpful for identifying both what path the MGK formed against the PKK and how it maintained it. In addition the concept of path dependence highlights how the MGK’s treatment of the PKK and the Kurds hindered Turkey’s progress in meeting the EC/EU membership criteria. The formulation of the concept of path dependence however says little about the fact that institutions’ paths do not always produce the intended outcomes, therefore they fail to provide an answer as to why the MGK maintained its path on the PKK and the Kurds when this path had unintended consequences for both the Turkish political system and Turkey’s European policy. In Chapter 5, I therefore complement the concept of path dependence to explain why the MGK maintained its path despite its unintended consequences.
Peters (2008) says that rational choice institutionalism sees change as occurring easily – all one needs is to do change the incentives (e.g., the pay-off matrix of the game) and behaviour will almost immediately change (see Goodin 1995; Keman 1996). Another view on rational choice institutionalism’s perspective on institutional change is that the institutions may change when they are dysfunctional or yield sub-optimal results (Lecours 2005: 12; Thelen 2003: 215). The last possibility is a power-based political bargaining approach that tends to consider distributional outcomes in order to account for institutional change (see Knight 1992). It is an interesting point of view that under rational choice institutionalism institutional change can easily take place and there are references to a number of causes of institutional change such as “change in incentives”, “dysfunctional institution” or “distributional outcomes” which are important in identifying some of the causes of institutional changes. It is however unclear how one researcher is supposed to discuss and analyse the sources of an institution and difficult to formulate questions under rational choice institutionalism to carry out a detailed analysis of why an institution may change and what consequences this may have for policy outcomes.

Scholars writing on sociological institutionalism on the other hands tend to argue that there is not a common position on whether institutions change or maintain equilibrium in sociological institutionalism. Institutional processes, and thus they can be studied independent of each other – my suggestion is, if there was not an institutional equilibrium, institutional change would not have taken place. And I suggest that institutions at times remain in equilibrium and at times change. Academics should therefore aim to understand the cause of the equilibrium and change and analyse what these institutional changes mean for policy outcomes. Clemens and Cook (1999) argue that the sociological institutionalist generally treats institutions as durable to the extent they are reinforced through socialization or interaction or legitimisation while alternative scripts remain unimaginable (ibid.: 445; see also, Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 5). Since institutional equilibrium of the institutional processes is not of interest in this thesis, I will not be saying more on it.

In contrast to Clemens and Cook, Powell and DiMaggio (1983, 1991) however identify three mechanisms of institutional change: (i) “coercion”, which involves explicit pressures from other institutions, as well as from the cultural environment; (ii) “mimesis”, under which one organisation recognises the success of another and attempts to copy it; and (iii) “norms”, through which an organisation adopts the “conventional wisdom” that certain forms are more
“modern, appropriate, and professional” (1983: 151–54; 1991: 67–74 respectively; see also Gorges 2001: 157). I find Powell and DiMaggio’s approach to institutional change very informative as they make references to three different sources of institutional change. A researcher can easily use these mentioned sources of institutional change to investigate how and why institutions change – it is however unclear how the researcher is supposed to do that; the tools of research are not provided. Overall, I would argue that sociological institutionalism, like rational choice institutionalism, fails to provide the researcher with a framework to carry out a detailed analysis of the causes of institutional change and whether institutional changes have implications for policy outcomes.

Radical institutional changes occur abruptly and discontinuously and they tend to contribute to the curtailments of an institution’s powers and to policy changes. I found Krasner’s concept of punctuated equilibrium very helpful for studying sources of radical institutional change. In particular Krasner’s emphasis on the long years of stasis in institutions being broken by an exogenous shock has provided me with a framework to see stasis in institutions as linked with the concept of path dependence, and to analyse radical institutional changes and their implications for policy outcomes in relation to sudden changes (shocks). I disagree however with Krasner’s emphasis on exogenous crisis in breaking the institutional stasis and rather emphasis the MGK’s endogenous political developments as the source of radical institutional changes.

Overall, rational choice institutionalism is driven by the central perception that the strategies of political actors or individuals are either defined or constrained by the institutions; and the actors involved generally aim to maximise their interests. This perception then shapes rational choice institutionalism’s position on different part of the institutional process: institutions are established for certain gains and institutions change when they are dysfunctional. Rational choice institutionalism’s emphasis on the rationality of political actors and individuals in the study of institutional processes may provide a focused analysis of how and why the interests of individuals’ can shape the policy outcomes of an institution. One major problem I find in rational choice institutionalism is that it overlooks other factors such as history, and political, social and economic surroundings of institutions in which institutions originate, evolve and shape political decision making and policy outcomes. Unlike for rational choice institutionalism, for sociological institutionalism the community of common culture, ideas and vision is central to their analysis of the different parts of
institutional processes. The strong point of sociological institutionalism is that it pays attention to the social surroundings of institutions – their suggestions that institutions are socially constructed, are embedded in the society and are satisfiers of the existing social institutional structure prove this point. However, I have two problems with sociological institutionalism. The first is that while it makes references to how institutions are socially constructed and embedded, it overlooks the role of history and past decisions in how institutions evolve over the time. In particular I find some informal institutions such as ideas or interests evolve into formal institutions over time; I will show that the idea of “the need to protect the Republic and its very principles” evolved over the years into a formal institution, that is to say the MGK. The second point is that it lacks dynamism, which means that institutions are treated as passive actors. It overlooks the options institutions have, as opposed to the behaviour expected of them by society. I argue that institutions can and do choose from options available to them; they do not always act in the way the society would expect them to. And institutions’ preferences or decisions can be shaped by the earlier choices made by that institution and this original behaviour can be maintained by other reasons than solely to satisfy social expectations.

Both rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism point to different sources of institutional change; this is very useful for helping a researcher to spot a change in one particular institution. These two strands of New Institutionalism however do not provide a concept or an approach for a researcher to analyse the sources of these institutional changes. Additionally they lack clarification as to what types of change may exist. It is therefore very difficult to analyse the radical changes in the MGK and what implications these have for Turkey–EU relations with these strands of New Institutionalism. Historical institutionalism is better equipped, because it points to a concept of punctuated equilibrium which puts the emphasis on the sources of institutional changes and thus directs researchers to investigate sources of the institutional changes. Although Krasner points to exogenous factors as the sources of institutional change I show endogenous developments may also be sources of radical institutional changes.

2.2 Historical Institutionalist Framework

Kreps (1990), who analysed the effects of institutions in the microeconomic literature, asked the very pertinent question, “where did the institutions come from?” and added, “having a theory about how institutions arise and evolve could be more informative than theories of
equilibrium within the context of a given set of institutions” (ibid.: 530). Agreeing with Kreps, Pierson (2000b) has said, “the origins of institutions … remain opaque …[and] political scientists have much more to say about institutional effects than about institutional origins …. Both cause and consequence of these lacunae has been a turn to functionalist reasoning”. He argues that as a result “in each case one is left with the impression that institutional functioning in large part explains the presence of particular institutional arrangements” (ibid.: 475–76, italics in original). The functionalist assumption is that institutions exist in the form they do because they are functional for social actors. This approach is associated with Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons. According to Lipset (1985), Durkheim argued that different men must be motivated to perform different roles in modern society since there is a complex and highly differentiated system of rules (ibid.: 60). Lipset added, “the functionalists see man as a social animal whose needs are not primarily physical and satiable but, rather, culturally determined and potentially unlimited” (ibid.). In contrast Parsons (1951), according to Peters (1999), argued that societies must fulfil the “adaptive” function and extract sufficient resources from the environment to survive – the performance of these functions was then related to the existence of institutions (structures), with the comparative analysis of societies being possible through different manners of relating structure and function (ibid.: 99).

Pierson (2000a) argues that the task of the analyst in the functionalist approach is to lay bare the particular function (ibid.: 477) and refers to this approach acting as an end-point rather than a starting point. He suggests in fact that institutions do not have a single effect and nor do the institutional designers act instrumentally or have short-term horizons (Pierson 2000b: 109–22). For Pierson, the study of institutional genesis should not begin from the end-point but from the starting point and he points out that we cannot assume a connection between current effects and original intentions (ibid.: 477). Similarly, Thelen (2004) argues that the main problem with functionalism is that there is a tendency to work backwards in order to develop an account of how these institutions were rationally chosen (ibid.: 25). Thelen in contrast to functionalism argues that institutions should be seen as the product of concrete temporal process. Thelen then emphasises the features of the broader political and social context in the study of how institutions originate and suggests that institutional arrangements cannot be understood in isolation from the political and the social settings in which they are embedded (ibid.: 384).
For both Thelen (2004) and Pierson (2000a), then, “we have to go back and look” (ibid.: 25, 264, respectively, italics in original) to find out how and why institutions originate. I would agree that history, social and political settings are very important in the study of institutional genesis since institutions are embedded in these settings. I furthermore agree with Pierson and Thelen that we should “go back and look” to highlight why institutions are established. Pierson and Thelen do not comment over what the researchers should look for when they go back. Peters’ (1999) argument is “when an idea becomes accepted and is embodied into a structural form then the institution has been created” (ibid.: 67).

Criticisms of the functionalist approach to how and why institutions originate have shaped the historical institutionalists’ position on institutional genesis. Pierson has described the functionalist approach as acting as an end point rather than starting point, as it was argued that the functions the institutions perform were related to the existence of that institution. Thelen also criticised the functionalist approach for having a tendency to work backward to account for how the institutions were rationally chosen. I agree with Pierson and Thelen on this because if I had applied the functionalist approach to try and understand how and why the MGK was established I would have researched what function the MGK performs and then listed the MGK’s functions and responsibilities as reason enough for the existence of the MGK. Additionally if I had employed a functionalism to understanding Turkey’s interest in being both part of Europe and a full member of the EU, I would have argued that the current state of Turkey–EU relations can explain the origins of Turkey’s interest in being part of Europe. This is a very reductionist approach as it limits the researcher from carrying out detailed research, such as how and why the MGK was established in 1933 and why Turkey developed an interest in being part of Europe or being Western. Thelen and Pierson, as I have noted above, suggest that the researcher needs “to go back and look”, to find out how and why an institution originated. I would argue that this approach is very helpful because it provided me with a framework to follow – going back to when the institution was established. In addition, Thelen’s emphasis on the history, social and political settings is very informative in the sense that you know that institutions are mostly embedded in social and political settings and you know when you go back and look, you will need to pay attention to the context of social and political settings. This very framework can also be applied to investigate the origins of Turkey’s interest in adopting a Western political system and way of living. In addition, Peters’ emphasis on how ideas are embodied into the structural form of an institution has also been useful for seeing the link between Kemalism and why the MGK was
established in 1933. In the following section therefore I will study the historical and political background of the early years of the Turkish Republic beginning from 1923 and leading up to 1957 to analyse how and why the MGK was established and how and why the Turkish Republic felt close to Western Europe. And this will be done with particular focus on Kemalism and the political, economic and social context.

Incremental institutional changes are both evolutionary and gradual ones which either weaken or empower institutions. Pierson (1996; see also Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 708–9) has pointed out that evolution is an important process of change in historical institutionalism and argued more gradual change is also possible. As I said earlier I will use the concept of critical juncture to explain institutional evolution. The concept of critical juncture (after time and political sociology derives from a “dual” conception of political (social, organisational, historical, institutional, depending on the phenomenon of interest) development, including moments of fluidity and rapid change followed by phases, normally longer, of relative stability (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Collier and Collier (1991) defined critical juncture as a period of significant change that generally occurs in distinct ways in different countries and can shape politics, institutions and policy formation into the future (ibid.: 27–29).

As far as the sources of critical junctures are concerned, while Cortell and Peterson (1997) point to international and domestic triggers, Hogan (2006) focuses on societal cleavages. Cortell and Peterson (1999) argue that in democratic states the following three factors may lead up to critical junctures and institutional changes and these include (1) triggers; (2) changes-oriented preferences; and (3) institutional opportunity. The latter two will not be discussed here as it is not relevant to this thesis; triggers will however be studied to bring some light to understanding the cause of critical junctures. Cortell and Peterson break the triggers down into groups as international and domestic triggers. They argue that international triggers include war, geopolitical conflict, changing balance of power, technological change and macroeconomic change, while the domestic triggers cover revolution, civil war, coup d’état, election/change of government, economic growth rate, demographic change and social movement/conflict (ibid.: 185). Hogan (2006) suggests that it is important to examine the tensions between social cleavages that may lead to critical junctures and periods of change (ibid.: 664).

Gourevitch (1986) and Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) point to the characteristics of critical junctures and comment on the role political or non-political actors play at critical junctures.
Gourevitch names critical junctures as “crises” and describes them as “open moments when system creating choices are made” (1986: 236). Similarly Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) note that critical junctures are characterised by a situation in which the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period. They then argue this significantly relaxed period has two consequences: (1) the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and (2) the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are potentially much more momentous (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 343–44). In contrast to Gourevitch and Capoccia and Kelemen, Gorges (2001) has commented on how political or non-political actors makes changes, and said that leaders at critical junctures are presented with an opportunity to enact new plans and realise new ideas, embedding them in the institutions they establish (ibid.: 156).

I agree with Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) that “most scholars invoking critical junctures have been rather causal users, simply referring to the concept as a model of change but not probing its meaning or developing methodologies associated with it” (ibid.: 346). Some of the early users were Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Collier and Collier (1991) and there are later examples in EU studies such as Deschouwer (2005), Stetter (2007) and Oner (2011). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue in their seminal work that the development of the European party system took place as a result of critical junctures in history and suggest that these junctures resulted in social cleavages of class, religion, centre-periphery etc. which in turn led to the formation of political parties representing distinct social and economic interests. I found Lipset and Rokkan’s work very useful for identifying how critical junctures may contribute to the evolution of a structure or of an institution, as this is something I will do in Chapter 4, showing that the critical junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980 made a major contribution to the evolution of the MGK into a very influential political institution in Turkey. They however do not explain not only what critical junctures mean to them, but also how and why critical junctures contributed to the evolution and the formation of political parties, for example. Another very important study is provided by Collier and Collier (1991) who are among the few authors who have employed the concept of critical juncture to describe and to explain change in the institutionalist literature. Collier and Collier analyse the relationship between the state and the organised labour movement in Latin America in the early and mid-twentieth century. They associate critical junctures with institutional or political changes; with the concept of critical junctures they explain the patterns of
differences in labour movement incorporation and their legacy and heritage in eight different Latin American countries. Collier and Collier’s work is helpful to see that institutional change may follow critical junctures, as this is something Lipset and Rokkan overlooked. However, Collier and Collier do not pay attention to whether or how the changes introduced at the critical junctures contributed to the nature of the labour movements in different Latin American countries.

Deschouwer (2005), when studying the role of political parties and democratic political representation in the context of changing institutional arrangements in European politics, refers to “the process of European integration” as a new critical juncture in the development of the political institutions of Europe (ibid.: 86, italics in original). It is however unclear how and why Deschouwer recognises the process of European integration as a critical juncture and if he used any theoretical framework to this end. Stetter (2007) recognises the Maastricht Treaty as a critical juncture in the development of EU Foreign Policy and notes “some incremental, yet highly significant changes towards a greater autonomy of the Council of the Secretariat in Foreign policies” was made at the Maastricht Treaty (ibid.: 62). Stetter, like Deschouwer, does not explain how and why he recognises the Maastricht Treaty as a critical juncture. It is however very interesting to see very rightly how both Deschouwer and Stetter associate critical junctures with institutional development and institutional changes. Since these works are lacking substantial theoretical frameworks, they do not provide a full picture of the triggers of critical junctures, of the decisions and the preferences made at the critical junctures and of the political, economic and social conditions under which the decisions and the preferences are made. This simple use of the concept of critical juncture in EU studies also proves my earlier point made in Chapter 1 that the utility of historical institutionalism and its associated concepts have yet not yet been highlighted in EU studies, which results in a significant gap. This thesis may make a significant contribution to EU studies by showing that incremental institutional changes may lead to institutional evolution and this can be well explained by the concept of critical junctures outlined above.

Oner (2011), while questioning the role of European identity in the context of Turkey and European Union relations, refers to a number of international developments as critical junctures and assesses their implications “for the dynamics of the interaction process between Turkey–EU” (ibid.: 119). Additionally, Oner recognises the collapse of the Soviet Union as a critical juncture. She suggests that the collapse of the Soviet Union forced the EU to
reconstruct itself. This meant according to Oner that the EU changed the way it interacted with Turkey (ibid.: 196). She also treats the September 11 attacks in New York as a critical juncture; and comments that “the possibility of Turkey’s EU membership has been increasingly discussed in terms of ‘clash of civilisation’” (ibid.: 173). This is a useful and interesting work to gain an insight into how internal political developments have interacted with Turkey’s European policy, but there are a number of problems with Oner’s use of the concept of critical juncture. The first is that Oner claims to use a social constructivist framework to answer the questions she sets in this book, but she instead heavily draws on the historical institutionalist concept of critical juncture. The second is that as she does not provide a detailed explanation of what critical junctures mean to her and how and why she is using this very concept. It is therefore not clear how and why she both recognises the collapse of Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks as critical junctures and analyses the impacts of the two so-called critical junctures on the Turkey–EU relations.

Since I am interested in incremental changes introduced at the critical junctures, I would also like to draw attention to modes of incremental institutional change. Streeck and Thelen (2005) identified five modes of incremental and transformative institutional change: layering; conversion; drift; displacements; and exhaustion. I found Streeck and Thelen’s reference to modes of institutional change very useful to think about whether the incremental institutional changes in the MGK can be explained with any of these five modes of changes.

On institutional evolution, I agree with Pierson that institutional evolution is an important process of change; it is however not clear what Pierson means by that statement. My interpretation of Pierson’s statement is that institutional change may lead on to institutional evolution. I opt to use the concept of critical juncture to explain institutional evolution and policy development. It is through the triggers and the characteristics of critical junctures that one can highlight how and why institutions evolve. This framework can also be used to investigate policy development. On the trigger of critical junctures I found Cortell and Peterson’s emphasis on domestic triggers of critical junctures very helpful to seek what in Turkish political history triggered the critical junctures of 1960, 1971, and 1980. Hagon’s reference to social cleavages and social tension also provides me with a framework to study the triggers of the critical junctures in the context of social cleavages and social tensions. Once the critical junctures and their triggers are identified, it is important to find out under what conditions decisions and preferences were are made at the critical junctures and by
whom. Gourevitch and Capoccia and Kelemen’s descriptions of critical junctures as free moments where the rules of decision making are relaxed is instructive: I shall investigate under what conditions and by whom decisions in relation to the MGK and Turkey’s European policy were made at the critical junctures I identify in the history of Turkish politics. Gorges’s point about actors having the opportunity to enact new plans and realise new ideas, embedding them in the institutions they establish, is very helpful to direct us to pay attention to how and why Kemalism was embedded in the MGK after the critical juncture of 1980. One last point is that Streeck and Thelen’s reference to modes of institutional change is helpful to seek not only if the changes introduced at the critical juncture took place in a mode, but also what this meant for the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system.

Sewell (1996) defined path dependence as a concept in which “what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” (ibid.: 262–63). Pierson (2000a) conceptualised the different claims of path dependence in his description of path dependence as a notion that is used to reinforce a few key claims: that specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; that starting from similar conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; that large consequences may result from relatively “small” or contingent events; and that particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse (ibid.: 251). The main claim here is that history matters because “where we go next depends not only on where we are now, but also upon where we have been” (Liebowitz and Margolis 1998: 981).

On the issue of how and why institutions maintain their original path, my analysis will draw on conceptualisations of the issue put forward by Krasner (1984), Levi (1997), and Pierson (2000a, 2002b, 2004). Krasner (1984) notes: “once a critical choice has been made it cannot be taken back. There may be a wide range of possible resolutions of a particular state-building crisis. But once a path is taken it canalizes future developments” and he adds, “it is not possible in human affairs to start de novo with every change in wants, needs, and power capabilities” (ibid.: 240). Levi (1997) focuses on the cost of reversal, putting an emphasis on the existence of the other choice points, and argues, “once a country or region has started down a path, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct easy reversal of the initial choice” (ibid.: 28). He furthermore presents a metaphor of a tree, rather than a path, and goes on to say: “From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches.
Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if the chosen branch dies – the branch on which climber begins is the one she tends to follow” (ibid.). Pierson (2004) similarly argues: “The paths, once created, are inflexible in the sense that further steps on a certain path make shifting from that path to another one much more difficult” (ibid.: 157). The reason for this is the “increasing returns process” – by which he means that the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path, since the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increases over time: “each step along a particular path produces consequences which make that path more attractive for the next round” (ibid.: 253).

Three of the early historical institutionalists, Hall (1986), Rose and Davies (1994), and Berman (1998) have questioned why countries in similar circumstances make different policy choices. Hall analyses the development of economic policy in France and the United Kingdom (UK), and shows the importance of institutions in shaping policies over time. By looking at these countries’ political and policy histories, he argues that the choices being made during the 1970s and 1980s reflected very clearly long-established patterns of economic policy making in these countries. Rose and Davies conclude that public policies in Britain were inherited from the past, and argue that past policy choices tend to determine present and future policy choices. Berman uses the concept of path dependence to examine responses to the depression in Germany and Sweden by asking how and why different paths were taken in these countries. She found that the policies chosen by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany and Social Democratic Labour Party of Sweden (SAP) could be understood only in the context of their choices and actions in the past (1998: 380 and 397). Overall, these three works provide useful case-studies of countries’ different preferences in policy choices in similar situations.

Mahoney (2001) and Hansen (2002) make their analyses within a much more rigorous theoretical framework. Mahoney has studied the reasons for diverging regime trajectories in Central American countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Theoretically speaking, according to Mahoney, there are two components of path dependence: Critical Junctures and legacies. Thus, in his work he recognises the nineteenth century liberal reform period as a “Critical Juncture” locking the Central American countries onto divergent paths which in turn yielded contrasting outcomes. Hansen discusses certain feedback effects in the context of path dependence, and develops an account of (certain) categories of colonial
migrants to the UK and France, and the disproportionate number of asylum seekers Germany received (2002: 260–61). He notes: “it is useful to view path dependence as a particular type of positive feedback effect. When policy at one point limits choice points at subsequent points, it engenders feedback in the form of path dependence” and he adds “large patterns of colonial immigration … and migration-related issues were engendered by path-dependence and policy feedback” (ibid.: 272).

A distinct use of this concept comes from Ackrill and Kay (2006) who argue that the concept of path dependence offers an appealing framework within which the stability and persistence of policies can be analysed and explained. This meant they sought to show that change and stasis can co-exist. To do this they adopt an approach they name as “fine-grained analysis”, that is, the observation of a complex policy framework consisting of multiple interrelated, or layered, and institutions. They propose distinguishing between the changes that are likely to occur at the individual institution level and at the overall policy framework level. Through applying this framework to the principles of the EU budget, they analyse both how and why the EU member states agreed ‘reforms’ at the individual budgetary institution level in order to maintain the overall policy framework. I would agree with Ackrill and Kay that change and stasis co-exist. Since these occur at two different levels (the level of individual institutions and that of overall policy), it is important to keep them as separate as possible. I argue that one can also find stasis at both of these levels at the same time, which is something I will show in detail in Chapter 5.

As far as critiques of the concept of path dependence are concerned, Hall and Taylor (1996: 942), and Gorges (2001) claim that the application of the path-dependency mechanism blinds the researchers to gradual changes or policy drifts over time. However, I would defend the concept of path dependence by arguing that Krasner’s, Levi’s and Pierson’s conceptualisation rigorously confirms the availability of other options to the institutions’ original path. The researcher in this field is therefore always aware of the possibility that institutions can drift away from their original path if they opt for one of the other options.

Peters et al. (2005) similarly point out “path dependency assumes a prominent dichotomy of stability and change that masks the possibility of gradual policy evolutions” (ibid.: 1277). I would not agree with these critiques and find them flawed. I argue that there is absolutely a need for a dichotomy of stability and change, for they are different parts of an institutional process.
Peters et al. (2005) therefore put forward a way to consolidate the path dependence approach. They suggest including some dynamism by paying more attention to the role of both agency and political conflicts. By this, they aim to make this approach more adequate to explaining institutional stability (ibid.: 1277). They note: “Political conflict … is not just a feature of formative moments but just as often occurs during path-dependent periods, whenever path dependency is sustained by a dominant political coalition successfully fending off all attempts by minorities to alter the political course. With political pressures for change being more common than assumed under this approach, there is more probability of incremental change than appears as admissible in the prevailing conceptions of historical institutionalism” (ibid.: 1278). As said earlier, my argument in this thesis does not support the idea of interlinking institutional stability with institutional change.

I find Peters et al.’s (2005) way forward to make path dependence an adequate approach not very convincing. The authors fail to see that there are choice-points during the stasis when the institutions and the members of the institutions do have other options to choose from, and in case where they do choose another option, this does definitely mean a change. These choice-points are not critical junctures; rather they are times when the members of the institutions meet to decide on how to proceed. The members of the institutions do discuss the other options and decide on whether it is appropriate to maintain the original path. The empirical evidence in Chapter 5 will show that the MGK at a number of choice-points had different options to choose from. Additionally, at these choice points there were conflicts among its members with different preferences. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that conflicts and political stability can co-exist, which means conflict does not necessarily lead to change in the original path. However, the challenge or the conflict among the members of an institution could produce a new short-term dimension that is likely to disappear once the conflict is withdrawn.

Greener (2005) asks two questions: (1) what exactly is the role of ideas in path-dependence? (2) what is the relationship between ideas and history, and how can they combine to create continuity and resist forces for change in the past? Greener argues that the historical institutionalists use ideas in a systematic and coherent way in to understand the role ideas play in institutional genesis And he criticises the historical institutionalist for their lack of interest in ideas in other parts of institutionalist research, for instance in path dependence. To a certain extent I would agree with these criticisms, because scholars who have written on
path dependence tend to overlook the role of ideas in their analysis. I above showed that Peters (1999) recognised the role of ideas in forming an institution, but when it comes questioning how institutions determine action/policy, Peters et al. writing in 2005 do not comment on whether ideas play a role in institutional stasis. Chapter 3 will assess how ideas do play a very significant role in how institutions emerge by looking at how the MGK emerged once the idea (Kemalism) was accepted in the early 1920s, and how the principles of Kemalism were imposed on the MGK at Critical Juncture (III). Here the aim is to understand how institutions determine political action by analysing how the MGK’s recommendations shaped the government’s political action in relation to the Kurds, and to question whether the MGK’s recommendations were determined by Kemalism (the idea). Chapter 5 however will assess how ideas tend to play an important role in influencing the nature of the recommendation only at the initial decision making. However, they do not particularly play a significant role in how/why an institution remains on the same path, because there tend to be other factors influencing that trajectory.

The functionalists argue that institutions are purposive and efficient in producing intended outcomes. By this, they overlook to the fact that institutions may also produce unintended outcomes. Thelen (1999) suggests that unintended consequences are central to historical institutionalism and Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that institutions may not always produce the intended outcomes (Ibid.: 941–42). Two important works which have applied the concept of unintended consequences are Pierson (1996) and Vachudova (2007). Pierson was one of the first historical institutionalists who used the concept of “unintended consequences”. While writing about European integration, Pierson showed that gaps emerge in member states’ control over the evolution of European institutions and public policies and suggested that these gaps were difficult to close. He went on to argue that these gaps allowed other actors to get involved in policy and decision making which then produced outcomes that were not the initial intention. The case of interventions on gender equality was used to prove his point of view. The key development here was the inclusion of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome that required member states to ensure and maintain the application of the principle that men and women receive equal pay for similar work (Pierson 1996: 156). Contrary to the initial aim, the proposal of equal payments played a major role in the development of gender policies in the EU and granted a determining role to the European Court. I would agree with the argument that this was not the intended outcome, but would not support conclusions, as the EU member states had at all times the option of not letting the other actors (or factors)
such as the governments’ electoral considerations interfere with the EU’s decision-making process, which meant that the member states could have chosen to eliminate the influence of other actors in this process (path) if they had thought it was necessary. Since this option was not chosen, Pierson’s work should rather have asked: why did the member states let the other actors influence the future of EU policies?

Studying the EU’s eastward enlargement, Vachudova (2007) argues that there have been two unintended consequences of the EU’s response to the collapse of communism. The first is that enlargement has become a very successful democracy-promotion programme. The second is that the quantity of new members and the long membership queue have become implicated in the disaffection of EU citizens for deepening integration (ibid.: 105–6). Although Vachudova’s work has been interesting and helpful in how one could identify unintended consequences, it displays a number of weaknesses. Since Vachudova has taken a limited period of history to apply the concept of unintended consequences, her work lacks attention to the broader factors that have gradually contributed to the occurrence of these unintended consequences. She overlooks the fact that a path toward EU enlargement was established in early 1973 and was followed by five subsequent enlargements between 1985 and 2007. Hence she does not discuss how and why the path of EU enlargement may have contributed to the EU’s role of democracy promotion. When writing about either the intended or the unintended consequences of the institutional actions, it is beneficial for researchers not to limit their study to a limited section of history. It would be useful to go as far back as possible to trace a pattern like a path that may have contributed to both the occurrence and the evolution of intended or unintended consequences.

Pierson and Vachudova have been helpful, in providing examples of how the concept of unintended consequences has been applied to empirical case-studies. As said above however these works have not paid attention sufficiently to tracing whether there was pattern or a path that contributed to the occurrences of unintended consequences. These studies have not been conducted in the context of the concept of path dependence. When this framework tested in Chapter 5, a significant contribution will be made to the literature on how institutions shape policy outcomes through a framework that is based on both concepts, of path dependence and unintended consequences. In addition, Pierson and Vachudova have both overlooked the origins of the concept of unintended consequences; below will show that Robert K. Merton is one of the early scholars who named the concept of unintended consequences. It is necessary
to develop a theoretical understanding of the concept of unintended consequences so that it can be used to understand how and why the MGK’s path of state of emergency produced unintended consequences for the Turkish political system and the Turkey-EC/EU relationship. To do this, I will draw on Robert K. Merton’s (1936) classic piece titled The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action. The following will discuss Merton’s methodological suggestions as to how to identify unintended consequences and discuss factors that cause the occurrence of the unintended consequences.

Merton was known as both a functionalist and critic of the functionalists because he was not supportive of the functionalist grand narrative associated with Talcott Parsons (1951). Merton (1936) argued “... the consequences of purposive action are limited to those elements in the resulting situation which are exclusively the outcome of the action, i.e., those elements which would not have occurred had the action not taken place.” (ibid.: 895). As Aydinonat (2008) notes:

Thus, unless the action of an individual (or individuals) is, at least partially, causally responsible for the “consequence”, it is not the consequences of that action. If there is an unintended consequence of an action, it is plausible to think of other unseen or neglected (disturbing) causal factors which prevented the action from bringing about the intended end. However, for us to consider this as an unintended consequence of an action, it is also necessary that if the action had not taken place, the unintended consequence would not have occurred. That is, the action in question is a necessary condition for the unintended consequence, ceteris paribus. (ibid.: 13–14, italics in original).

In addition, on the question of what type of unintended consequences could occur and whom and what these unintended consequences concern, Merton attempts to classify unanticipated consequences according to the notion of the “sum-total” consequences of action: “These sum-total or concrete consequences may be differentiated into (a) consequences to the actor(s), (b) consequences to other persons mediated through (1) the social structure, (2) the culture and (3) the civilization” (Merton 1936: 895). When I apply Merton’s framework on the MGK’s path of state of emergency in Chapter 5, I will show that the MGK’s choice of keeping the state of emergency in the South East of Turkey had resulted in deterioration of Turkey’s political system and its relations with the EC/EU as the MGK’s consistent choice of path resulted in poor human rights and weak democracy. By this I will be making a contribution to
Merton’s list of “sum-total” consequences of action: (1) “consequences of actions to the political system of a country (2) “consequences to its international relations”.

There are however two problems with the methodology used in identifying the unintended consequences of a given situation and action (Merton 1936: 897). The first problem is how one could reasonably justify the attribution of a certain consequence to a certain action. For example, to argue that unintended consequence X was caused by A’s intention to bring about Y, one would need to know whether A’s action caused X or not. To challenge this problem, one should ask whether X would have occurred in the absence of A’s action and this should provide a justifiable connection between A’s action and X. The second is about clarifying the actual purposes of a given action. That is, if we want to show that X (unintended consequences) was caused by A’s action, it is essential to know the actual intention of A to do Y, or it could be useful to show whatever A’s intention might be, it is not that of bringing about X (Aydinonat 2008: 16–17).

Merton identified three factors which tend to cause occurrences of unintended consequences, namely “existing state of knowledge”, “ignorance” and “imperious immediacy of interests” (1936: 898–901). Aydinonat (2008) suggested that we might think of different cases to conceive of Merton’s distinctions

- “Existing state of knowledge”: for example, let us assume that A intends to achieve X and it believes that by doing Y it could achieve X. This means A thinks that Y causes X and acts upon this. A can however be mistaken in supposing that Y causes X because it might be the case that Y causes V. If this is the case, V is an unintended consequence of A’s action and this consequence can be accounted for by A’s lack of knowledge of the causal determinants of X

- “Ignorance”: another case might be that A is right about the determinants of X, but they might be ignorant of the other factors that may change the course of events that will follow his or her action. We can therefore say that A is ignorant of the fact that Y only causes X, and if this is the case, when A does Y to achieve X, because of other interfering factors some other event, say Z, may happen – Z is an unintended consequence of A’s action and it can be accounted with A’s “ignorance” about the other possible interfering factors
• “Imperious immediacy of interests”, if A is motivated by his or her “imperious immediacy of interests”, they might want to achieve X by doing Y without thinking about the other further consequences of their actions. In this case when A does Y to achieve X, A’s action Y will bring about X, V, and Z all together. This because V and Z were not part of A’s intentions, they are the unintended consequences of A’s action and can be explained as due to A’s “imperious immediacy of interests”. (Aydinonat 2008: 14–15).

There are two points to be made in relation to the above outline. The first point is that Paul Pierson wrote a theoretical paper entitled “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change” in 2000, in which he discussed and explained the concept of unintended consequences in institutional processes. Although it is clear Pierson was influenced by Merton’s article of 1936, he omitted any reference to Merton’s earlier findings and analysis. Unlike Pierson, I intend to use Merton’s framework, and contribute to the literature on the concept of unintended consequence. The second point is that when Merton defined and explained what unintended consequences were, he did this in the context of purposive human/individual actions. In Chapter 5 I will use this framework to analyse if the MGK’s path of state of emergency produced unintended consequences. Once this framework is applied to the empirical case study, original contributions will be made to the historical institutionalist literature on path dependent institutional action, showing that the concept of path dependence on its own is not equipped to explain why an institution chooses to maintain its original action while that path clearly does not produce the intended outcomes, but the unintended. Thus complementing the concept of path dependence with the concept of unintended consequences will increase the utility of the concept of path dependence to explain not only the case studies where institutional actions are simply path dependent and the intended outcomes are met, but also the situation in which the institutions maintain their original path despite hardly achieving their intended outcomes and producing unintended consequences.

The concept of path dependence is helpful to trace both how institutions establish a form of action (path). Once a path of an institution is traced with the tools of the concept of path dependence, Krasner’s (1984), Levi’s (1997) and Pierson’s (2000a, 2002b, 2004) conceptualisations of how and why institutions maintain their original path help to ask the following series of questions:
• What path did the MGK establish?

• How and why did the MGK maintain its original path?

• Has the MGK’s choice of instituting a path of state emergency canalised the development of this path? Or, has the MGK naturally kept to its original path?

• Or, is it because it would have been costly had the MGK chosen to reverse its original path?

• Or, is it because it generated benefits either to Turkish political system or Turkey’s European policy?

• Did the MGK have other options to its path of imposing a state of emergency?

In Chapter 5 I will try to answer the above questions to highlight the interaction between the MGK’s instituting a path of state of emergency and Turkey’s progress in joining the EC/EU in the years between 1983 and 1997.

Three of the earlier works to use the concept of path dependence include Hall (1986), Rose and Davies (1994) and Berman (1998). These three academics looked at why countries in similar circumstances make different policy choices. These three works have been useful to get an insight into how the concept of path dependence was used in earlier works. They remained descriptive and lack a rigorous theoretical framework, which was substituted in later work by Mahoney (2001), Hansen (2002) and Ackrill and Kay (2006) with strong theoretical frameworks. One thing these mentioned works have in common is that their works involve a number of case-study countries and a single area of policy. I, however, have one case study country and two areas of policy, that is to say I am considering how the Turkish National Security Council’s path of a state of emergency interacted with Turkey’s European policy between 1983 and 1997. Additionally, the mentioned works that have used the concept of path dependence have not applied Krasner (1984), Levi (1997) and Pierson’s (2000a, 2002b, 2004) conceptualisations of path dependence in the way I propose to use in this thesis, and thus I will be making a contribution to the literature on path dependence, using these conceptualisations to understand why the MGK maintained its original path of a state of emergency over many years.
As shown above, the concept of path dependence does not pay attention to whether the institutions’ original paths always continue to produce their intended consequences over a long stretch of time. I thus propose to complement this with the concept of unintended consequences. It is important to mention here that Pierson (1997) and Vachudova (2007) have the used the concept of unintended consequences in their works. Both of these works have been useful to identify not only how the concept of unintended consequences could be applied to an empirical case study, but also how its application to an empirical case study could be improved with the additional concept of path dependence. Using Merton’s (1936) conceptualisations of what are unintended consequences, how they can be identified and what may be the causal factors of unintended consequences, I would ask:

- Did the MGK’s state of emergency produce any unintended consequences for either the Turkish political system or Turkey’s European policy?
- And if it did, why the MGK maintain its path of a state of emergency?
- What caused the MGK’s path to produce unintended consequences?
- Is it the MGK’s “existing state of knowledge”?
- Or, is it the MGK’s “ignorance”?
- Or, is it the MGK’s “imperious immediacy of interests”?

In Chapter 5 I will answer the above questions to find out why the MGK pursued its path of a state of emergency while it had clear unintended consequences for the Turkish political system and Turkey’s progress in meeting requirements of the EU membership.

Krasner (1984) described punctuated equilibrium as a notion that implies that the “normal” pattern of institutional equilibrium or stasis is punctuated by sudden changes caused by exogenous pressures. Krasner writes, “once institutions are in place they can assume a life of their own extracting societal resources, socializing individuals, and even altering the basic nature of civil society itself.” (ibid.: 240). Furthermore, he argues, “punctuated equilibrium is an apt description of an analytic stance that sees political institutions enduring over long periods once they are established” (ibid.: 243). Krasner’s emphasis on institutions maintaining stasis for long stretches of time is appropriate here because, there were changes neither in the MGK’s position nor in the pace of Turkey–EU relations between 1983 and
1997. I however do not agree with Krasner that institutional changes tend to be underpinned by exogenous pressure. I will show that endogenous pressure also tends to trigger institutional changes; by endogenous pressure, I mean the pressure for change that is generated by political developments in the areas for which the institution under study is responsible (endogenous variables).

Krasner furthermore notes, “If institutions adjusted relatively quickly to societal changes, and if formal institutions did not explain political behaviour, there was little point in making them an object of scholarly investigation. Attention could be focussed on the motivations of individuals or groups…. But if institutions – the administrative apparatus, legal order, and political beliefs – are seen as basis determinants of both the interests and the power of political actors, a different agenda is suggested for political research” (ibid.: 243). I would agree that if an institution changes quickly in accordance with societal changes, it is less worthy of research because such change is relatively easy to understand. It seems more important to research sources of abrupt change in a politically powerful institution, particularly if this took place immediately after developments in the endogenous variables.

The use of the concept of punctuated equilibrium has however been less popular in understanding an empirical case study of institutional change. Many academics mention the concept of punctuated equilibrium, but only in passing (Pollack 1996; Bromley 2001: 49; Clements 2001; Kelam 2001; Bailes and Frommelt 2004: 100; Smith 2004). It has, however, been used to a greater extent in studying policy changes (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cashore and Howlett 2006; Ingram and Fraser 2006; Lynggaard 2006; Repetto 2006; Repetto and Allen 2006).

Kelam’s perception of punctuated equilibrium is that it is associated with a situation where "[s]pecies ...develop quickly, endure with little change for a long time, and then die out suddenly" (Kelam 2001: 14). He therefore suggests that the rise, long ascendancy and decline of the Hanseatic city-states on the Baltic Coast fits the pattern of punctuated equilibrium (ibid.: 14). However, in the rest of the book, there is only a description of the rise and decline of the Hanseatic city-states; it is not clear how the concept of punctuated equilibrium has been used or whether it has been really helpful to understand the chosen case study. In another case, in order to understand the new security challenges of Europe, Clements put forward a complex theory framework, saying that this framework integrates many concepts (Clements 2001: 58): (i) the concept of fitness, which means that European security must be
evaluated in tandem with the security of other actors; (ii) optimal fitness, generally found between rigid order and chaos, that illuminates Europe’s deep assets; and then (iii) the concept of punctuated equilibrium. Of this, he says “the notion of punctuated equilibrium also helps explain the movement toward European integration. The concept helps us to understand why there have been surges toward European unity followed by long periods of stability” (ibid.: 59). Again, Lynggaard (2006) has suggested that the current literature on the stability and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) does not adequately explain the interrelation between the institutions and ideas and the related dynamics of change within them. He therefore opts for a New Institutionalist framework. In doing this, he gives an insight to the three strands of New Institutionalism: sociological, rational choice and historical institutionalism; and he goes on to refer the concept of punctuated equilibrium under historical institutionalism’s perspective on institutional change. However, he does not apply the concept of punctuated equilibrium to understand the changes in the CAP, and rather suggests that the study of types of institutional changes may be advanced by the discursive institutional approach.

Pollack (1996) and Smith (2004: 230) have loosely used the concept of punctuated equilibrium in their works. Pollock argued that the literature on EC governance and European integration has a tendency to ignore or downplay the fundamental insights offered by New Institutionalism. As far as change in the EC was concerned, Pollock did not agree with the rational choice institutionalist approach that institutions are resistant to change. He said that, “change is not impossible: environmental and other changes may occasionally lead to the necessary convergence of the preferences of all the member states around a given institutional reform, or set of reforms” (Pollack 1996: 439). He then pointed to the historical institutionalist concept of punctuated equilibrium but did not agree that punctuated equilibrium produces radical institutional change, and said “European integration, in other words, is a path-dependent process, in which past institutional choices shape not only day-to-day policy-making ... For this reason, treaty amendments such as the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty have generally taken the form of incremental adjustments ... which remains essentially unchanged” (ibid.: 439-40). While I agree with Pollack that change is not impossible, I would not agree that change is always incremental; changes have sometimes been relatively sudden at the EU level. In addition, one should note that the concept of punctuated equilibrium is often applied to understand abrupt institutional or policy changes and there are other theoretical frameworks to analyse incremental institutional changes.
Smith (2004) takes a rather different approach from Pollack. In order to explore the factors influencing the nature of European foreign policy cooperation, Smith employs an eclectic framework of historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. He argues that there is a two-way relationship between institutional developments and foreign policy cooperation, that this interaction profoundly influences foreign policy cooperation. On change, he notes that “the trajectory of change varies, depending on the policy area, the original agreement to institutionalise cooperation in the policy area and the actors involved in that agreement, and later historical and environmental conditions” (ibid.: 31). As to the sources of the changes, he points to many factors; external crises are just one of them, to be understood by the concept of punctuated equilibrium. Smith appears to be considering many concepts and factors in order to understand institutional changes and therefore, his work lacks focus and detailed analysis of use to the chosen case study.

Baumgartner and Jones (1993) were among the early political scientists who applied the concept of punctuated equilibrium to policy processes. They noted that those who follow public policymaking in the United States (US) have long have suspected that the dynamics they observed hardly seemed to match up to the laws embodied in the discipline’s dominant models. Instead they suggested that the concept of punctuated equilibrium could explain both the long periods of stability that students of public policy have noted to be characteristic of most public policy as well as the occasional bursts of policy innovation that come at the beginning of a new policy or in its occasional restructuring. In addition, they provided a different interpretation of a number of policy changes by taking the long view of several issues – including nuclear energy; urban affairs, smoking and safety – to demonstrate that bursts of rapid unpredictable policy change punctuated the patterns of stability more frequently associated with government. When these cases were taken individually, they showed long periods of policy subsystems stability interspersed with sharp spasms of change. The work of Baumgartner and Jones has been most helpful to this thesis to drawn on their framework and methods of analysis.

While the authors discussed so far have referred to punctuated equilibrium merely in passing, the volume edited by Repetto, entitled Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and the Dynamics of U.S. Environmental Policy has the concept of punctuated equilibrium at its heart. In his introduction, Repetto observes: “When both positive and negative feedbacks are at play in the policy arena, it is possible to observe the ‘punctuated equilibria’ that seems to justify many
policy areas” (Repetto 2006: 9). By negative feedback he is referring to the forces within institutions that tend to resist change, and if such forces dominate policy change will rarely occur. By positive feedback, he meant the forces that would ensure that when a policy position is established, change is driven even further from the initial position. Some of the examples of positive feedback include (i) bandwagon effects which means “Most politicians dislike being on the losing side of what appear to be popular issues and are more likely to support a policy, the more evidence there is of political support, creating a positive feedback” (ibid.: 10); (ii) social contagion or social learning which means “Many people, including politicians, form their opinion on an issue by consulting polls, other indications of popular opinion, or expert opinion; so the more people build a particular view, the more convincing or compelling it will become to others, ultimate becoming ‘common knowledge’” (Gavious and Mizrahi, cited in Repetto 2006: 11); and (iii) media mimicry which means “Media outlets are more likely to ‘cover’ a story that their competitors are covering. As a result, issues may either be largely ignored or afforded a great deal of attention, at least temporarily” (ibid.: 11). This thesis will add “improved security environment” to Repetto’s list of examples of positive feedback. Baumgartner (2006), who wrote one of theoretical chapters of this book, argues in it that the dynamics of environmental policy behave in accordance with the punctuated equilibrium model and suggests that generally however stability and incremental adjustment are the norm. He observes that abrupt policy innovations and reversals do occur, only rarely; and he suggests that this pattern appears across many environmental and resource policy issues. He furthermore identifies critical elements that often form part of abrupt policy change, including an institutional shift that opens the previously constrained decision-making domain to other interests and participants, and a “reframing” of the issue that undermines the previous policy justification. In addition, he puts emphasis on the usefulness of the empirical case studies that follow in comparing episodes of rapid change and period of stalemate and stability which helps in identifying key differences in the conditions that make for stability and those that allow punctuated change. I would agree with Baumgartner that it is vital to have empirical case studies of abrupt change, and one of the contributions of this thesis will make would be applying the concept of punctuated equilibrium to an empirical institutional change and to the outcomes of these changes.

Brock (2006), in the same volume, argues that the reason for the manifestation of punctuated equilibrium is not just that things happen to disturb the status quo. He emphasises the dynamics created by the interdependence of choices and social or economic pressures that
tend to arise whenever the positive feedback mechanisms were present, i.e., bandwagon effects, social contagion and media mimicry. He shows that policy discontinuities and abrupt transitions can arise, especially when one participant’s actions or decisions are conditioned by her expectations about what others will do, such as the tendency of compact special interest groups to prevail against the broader public interest or the tendency of political advocates to use propaganda and disinformation campaigning to confuse voters on issues (ibid.: 13-14).

Using Baumgartner and Brock's theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium, the following chapters by Ingram and Fraser (2006), Repetto and Allen (2006) and Cashore and Howlett (2006) test the applicability of the framework to different forms of environmental policies. Ingram and Fraser (2006) show how a punctuated equilibrium framework helps in understanding the policy innovations introduced in connection with long-standing California water management problems. Here, Ingram and Fraser recognise that the professional ideology (professionalization of management) as the path-dependency. They then analyse the events leading up to two remarkable innovations: (1) an institutional change that broke the previous policy oligopoly and admitted a broader range of stakeholders interests into policy and management; and (2) the introduction of a market mechanism, the Environmental Water Account, to ensure sufficient water for endangered fish species. When they examine the antecedents to the innovations, two key developments are identified that arguably pushed the policymaking process to dramatic change. These include a change in the policymaking venue and the emergence of a shared perception among these stakeholders that the existing approach was not feasible to any further extent.

Cashore and Howlett (2006) tested the punctuated equilibrium framework by examining changes in timber management and harvesting in old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest. They identify a correlation between the abrupt drop in the timber harvest from national forests in the regions in the early 1990s and water policy innovation further south in California. According to Cashore and Howlett, for decades, the Forest Service maintained a policy subsystem based on the ideology of scientific management. In addition, they observe that it was able to use the discretion implicit in its multiple-use management mandate to give primacy to cutting the trees at the expense of ecological and economic considerations. They suggest that the policy “punctuation” was precipitated by a change in venue and the “reframing” of the issue from one of commodity supply to endangered species protection.
This meant that the environmental groups were able to draw the federal courts into an active oversight role in harvesting decisions; the outcome was dramatic reduction in the harvest from national forests and a shift toward “ecosystem management” by the Forest Service.

Repetto and Allen (2006) investigated punctuated equilibrium in the approach to managing maritime fisheries. They observe that the fisheries managers opted for an approach that was based mainly on input controls by which they mostly ignored more successful experience in other countries, such as Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ), which limited the catch to sustainable levels through transferable harvest quotas. Repetto and Allen found that when management councils in a few fisheries adopted the latter approach, a coalition of opposed interests secured a congressional legislative moratorium on any further development of such systems; this moratorium was renewed and sustained for six years, which prevented any further policy experimentation or innovation. However, in 2002, without much significant change from the conditions prevailing in most fisheries when the moratorium was adopted, the moratorium was dropped and two years later, the ITQ approaches were accepted widely.

While it appears useful in these case studies, however, the concept of punctuated equilibrium has been criticised by well known institutionalist scholars such as Thelen and Steinmo (1992), Cortell and Peterson (1999) and Peters, Pierre and Kings (2005) for various reasons. Thelen and Steinmo argue: “The problem … is that institutions explain everything until they can explain nothing. Institutions are an independent variable and explain political outcomes in periods of stability, but when they break down, they become the dependent variable, whose shape is determined by the conflicts that such institutional breakdown unleashes. Put somewhat differently, at the moment of institutional breakdown, the logic of the argument is reversed from ‘Institutions shape politics’ to ‘Politics shape institutions’” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 15). As I have argued above, endogenous pressure deserves academic attention in understanding why radical institutional changes occur; by endogenous pressure, I mean pressure which emerges from developments in endogenous (internal, domestic) variables. In this case, these were the political incidents that were related to the MGK’s areas of responsibility, see Chapter 6 for details. I argue that an institution that is pressured for change by endogenous pressure not only continues to be an independent variable, but still matters. The outcomes of the changes and the changed institution itself continue to play an important role in policy making.
As opposed to Krasner’s conceptualisations of change, Thelen and Steinmo have proposed “[a] more dynamic model” to understand institutional change (ibid.: 15). Thelen and Steinmo present three models of institutional change and dynamism, all of which emphasise exogenous causation. First, “broad changes in the socioeconomic or political context can produce a situation in which previously latent institutions suddenly become salient”; second, similar drivers of change “produce a situation in which old institutions are put in the service of different ends”, and third, where “exogenous changes produce a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing institutions” (ibid.: 16-17). The dynamic model is interesting, but not convincing. The manoeuvring among either the political actors or within the members of a particular institution does not always take place strategically and it is not at all times underpinned by the calculated interests of the political actors. It can rather take place suddenly by the pressure emerged from the aftermath of the political incidents that unsettled the related domestic political dynamics.

Cortell and Peterson (1999) similarly contend that the idea of punctuated equilibrium offers an incomplete understanding of change. They note: “by focusing attention on periods of radical change precipitated by crisis, a model of punctuated equilibrium downplays the roles individuals play in affecting domestic structural change … state officials decide when and how to seek change in existing institutional configurations” (ibid.: 179). It is true that the concept of punctuated equilibrium does not say much about the role of individuals in affecting institutional change. However, the individuals’ role in radical institutional changes is limited to taking the official decisions that make the changes. It is therefore more helpful to ask what pressure or endogenous situation motivated the political actors in taking the decisions they did.

Another criticism of the concept of punctuated equilibrium has come from Peters, Pierre and Kings who argue that there appears to be little or no capacity to predict the occurrence of punctuations in a given stable path (Peters et al. 2005: 1289). Peters argues that “when a major institutional (evolutionary) change does occur … it can be argued that there was a sufficient force available to produce a movement away from the equilibrium and inertia affecting an institution. How do we know? The change surely did occur, so there must have been sufficient political or environmental ‘pressure’ to generate a change” (Peters 1999: 68-69). I do not agree with Peters and would suggest that one could have predicted that changes
would occur both in the MGK’s position in Turkish political system and in Turkey-EU relations after many years of stasis.

As I have shown above, the concept of punctuated equilibrium has often been used to understand changes in the policy realm. Although it has not been overlooked in the institutional change literature, there has not been a detailed study of institutional changes from within the punctuated equilibrium framework. I will use the concept of punctuated equilibrium to both investigate the sources of the changes in the MGK and analyse its outcomes for Turkey–EU relations. By doing this, it will make a contribution to the literature on institutional change.

Although I would disagree with Krasner’s emphasis on exogenous pressure, his description of the concept of punctuated equilibrium is helpful to formulate a series of questions:

- Have the changes in the MGK occurred after long years of stability?
- If so, what punctuated the long years of equilibrium?
- Is it exogenous or endogenous pressure?
- What formed the endogenous pressure?
- What effect do the changes in the MGK have for both policy processes (the pace of Turkey–EU relations) and policy outcomes (the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey)?

As far as the criticisms of the concept of punctuated equilibrium discussed above are concerned, I argue that they are abstract and lacking empirical evidence. Chapter 6 will benefit from the above outlined questions to explore the sources of changes in the MGK, in the endogenous variables and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. In particular my emphasis on endogenous rather than exogenous pressure may be used to defend the concept of punctuated equilibrium against Thelen and Steinmo (1992) who have suggested that when institutions are changed by exogenous pressure, they become dependent variables. Chapter 6 will show that when and if institutional changes are caused by endogenous pressure, the institutions continue to be independent variables.
2.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, I introduced rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms' positions on the four distinct parts of institutional processes. I then have discussed how and why historical institutionalism is better equipped than rational choice and sociological institutionalism in explaining the origins of the both the MGK and Turkey’s aspirations to be part of Europe (1923-1957) and the three significant phases of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations (1957-2004). Having done this I went into details of explaining the historical institutionalist framework of institutional processes, as well as debating the use of historical institutionalist concepts by other scholars and addressing some of the criticisms put against the use of concepts of critical junctures, path dependence and punctuated equilibrium.

By doing so, I have found that rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalists not only differ in what they define institutions as, but also differ in how they propose to study distinct part of the institutional processes. I furthermore have found that the historical approach on institutional genesis and its concepts of critical junctures, path dependence, unintended consequences and punctuated equilibrium all form a better framework than the rational choice and sociological institutionalist perspectives in explaining both the origins of the MGK and Turkey's interest in Europe (1923-1957) and the role MGK has played in Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations (1957-2004). Additionally, I have found that the historical institutionalist approach and its concepts have not widely been used by current scholars and it has rather been criticised by many. Although I have defended the use of historical institutionalism in the study of institutions’ political decision and policy making, I have also identified some of the limitations with historical institutionalist concepts and made some suggestions for improving the use of, for example, the concept of path dependence by supplementing it with the concept of unintended consequences. The next chapter will test hypothesis (i) through studying the early years of both the Turkish Republic and the European Economic Community, relying on the conceptualisations of institutional genesis.
CHAPTER 3: THE GENESIS OF BOTH THE MGK AND TURKEY’S INTEREST IN EUROPE, 1923-1957

Introduction

It is generally agreed in the academic literature that the Turkish National Security Council (MGK – its predecessor was called the Secretariat General of the Supreme Defence Assembly, YMMUK) was established in 1961. The earlier origins of the MGK, however, have been overlooked and unquestioned. While the origins of Turkey’s interest in forming good relations with Europe and becoming more like the Western European countries have been researched widely, the connections between the origin of the MGK and the origin of Turkey’s interest in Europe have not been studied together in one piece of work. This chapter will investigate how and why the MGK was established alongside how and why Turkey’s desire for strong relations with Europe originated. What material does currently exist on these issues covering the years between 1923 and 1957 lacks, I would argue, a rigorous theoretical engagement with how the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe originated. This chapter proposes to test whether rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms can best explain the origins of both the MGK and Turkey’s interest in forming relation with Europe. Thus there are two questions central to this chapter.

- How can the genesis of the MGK and Turkey’s aspiration to be part of Europe be understood?

- What school of new institutionalism can best explain the origins of both the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe?

I will answer the above questions first by discussing the benefits and the limitations of the existing academic material. Then I will move on to trace a theoretical debate as to which school of New Institutionalism can best explain the origins of Turkey’s interest in Europe. Once this is done I will show how beneficial historical institutionalism is for unveiling in what social and political context the Turkish political leaders aimed to adopt a Westernisation and modernisation programme and what domestic political developments contributed to the genesis of the MGK. This will be followed by discussing the benefits and limitations of sociological and rational choice institutionalism using the evidence gathered in the former sections, and drawing conclusions as to the best way to understand this material.
3.1. Brief Literature Review and Theoretical Debate

Guvenc and Barlas’s (2009) article “Turkey and the idea of a European Union during the Inter-war Years, 1923–1939” has been useful for this chapter to gain insight into the first pro-European political elites and their ideas around integrationist European projects, as well as being helpful to find out about how the newly established Turkish Republic treated these integrationist European projects. However, the paper pays little attention to domestic political developments in the early years of the Turkish Republic since it predominantly focuses on developments in Europe in the inter-war years. Aydinli (2004), in “The Turkish Pendulum between Globalization and Security: From the Later Ottoman Era to the 1930s” fills this gaps by giving detailed analysis of the two attempts to introduce multi-party politics during the Republican era. And he shows how the previously identified dichotomy between liberalisation and security developed into a “national security syndrome”, through which the democratic liberalization process was systematically administrated, managed and, ultimately, contained (ibid.: 102). I found Aydinli’s paper very useful for developing an understanding of both Turkish politics in the 1920s and 1930s and Ataturk’s perceived contradictory desires for democracy and state security. Aydinli, however, like Parker and Smith (1940), Howard (1966), Kazancigil and Ozbudun (1981), Weiker (1981), Landua (1984), Zurcher (1993), Mango (1999), Kili (2003) and Kucera (2010), who have all written about Turkish politics covering the years the MGK was established, fails not only to mention the MGK, but also fails to discuss how and why the MGK originated at this point. Having said that, these works have been very useful for gaining an insight into the early years of the Turkish Republic more generally, to help understand the secular and democratic political structure Ataturk had introduced and to learn how Turkish people reacted to the newly established Turkish Republic. It is however important to mention her a recent work Gencer Ozcan (2007) in ‘National Security Council’ mentioned that the MGK was founded on 24 April 1933, saying that the Higher Defence Council (Yuksek Mudafaa Meclisi, YMM), was a predecessor of the current National Security Council (Milli Guvenli Kurulu, MGK) (ibid.:41). Ozcan (2007) does not however does not comment how and why the MGK was established. This chapter argues that it is important also to understand how and why the MGK was established, and to have a complete overview of the political and social developments that may have contributed to the genesis of the MGK.
Out of many views that have been put forward by the rational choice institutionalists on how institutions originate, I will be testing three commonly used approaches to explain how and why the MGK was established and how and why Turkey developed an interest in forming relations with Europe (see Chapter 2 for more details). These three viewpoints include:

- “institutions are chosen; and … they do not simply happen” (McCubbins and Sullivan 1987: 313 and Tsebelis 1990)

- “self-interested actors will make decisions and create institutions that will reduce their political or economic costs relative to the benefits gained” (Campbell 1997: 15)

- the reason societies or groups cannot do without institutions is because “parties often need institutions to help capture gains from cooperation. In the absence of institutions, individuals often face a social dilemma, that is, a situation where their behaviour makes all worse off” (Weingast 2002: 670).

Suggesting that institutions are chosen and they do not simply happen can be useful to a certain extent. One can then suggest that the MGK was chosen, in the sense that it was planned to set up the MGK, and it thus did not simply happen. This approach can be useful to the extent that you can question who decided to establish the MGK and why. There is however one problem with it and that is, if institutions do not simply happen, how and in what ways do they appear? In the last section of this chapter I will therefore test the case that it was planned to set up the MGK.

To take the second point, Campbell’s suggestion of how institutions originate, one could argue that the MGK was created by self-interested actors who aimed to reduce their political and economic costs whilst increasing their gains from the MGK. However there is no clarity about who these self-interested actors are and how one can find out about these actors. As far as the reasons behind this self-interested behaviour are concerned, this approach is useful to question if the formation of the MGK increased the political and economic benefits of those who formed the MGK, and whether the formation of the MGK was their conscious choice to reduce political and economic costs. Thus in the very last section of this chapter I will examine the idea that the MGK was created by the self-interested actors who aimed to reduce their political and economic costs whilst increasing their gains from the MGK.
Again, it is very interesting to argue that societies need institutions not only to help capture gains from cooperation, but also to diminish the risk of social dilemmas which individuals may face. This approach is useful to consider whether the MGK was established to increase cooperation within Turkish society and diminish social dilemmas. Testing this approach can help to reveal much about the characteristics of Turkish society and discuss whether there were any social dilemmas. It is however difficult to say how one would start to research this perspective since the researchers are not signposted about how one can begin a research on institutional genesis. In the last section of this chapter I will nevertheless examine the case the MGK was established to increase cooperation and diminish social dilemmas.

If however one applies the same approach to exploring the origins of Turkey’s interest in Europe, one would argue that Turkey’s interest in being both like and part of Europe was planned. This can be very useful to discuss who planned for Turkey to both adopt a Western European political structure and be part of Western Europe, and how and why they planned it. This approach however does not comment on how one would go about conducting such research. If one rather takes Campbell’s suggestion, one may argue that self-interested actors originated this interest in Europe in order to increase their gains from Turkey’s relations with Europe. And when it is tested on the evidence which will be gathered in this chapter, it will be interesting to discuss if Ataturk and his successors were self-interested and if they wanted to increase their political and economic gains from Turkey’s relations with Europe. Applying Weingast’s point of view on Turkey’s interest in forming relations with Europe, one could argue that Turkey’s interest originated in order to develop cooperation between Turkey and Europe and hence diminish the risk of social dilemma. This is a very interesting point of view, and testing it in the last section of this chapter can generate an interesting debate as to whether cooperation between Turkey and Europe was necessary so as to diminish the risk of social dilemma.

The above discussion attempts to apply rational choice institutionalism show that this approach is lacking in providing a framework for research as to how both an institution is established and a country’s interest in forming relations with the another country/continent originated, but it has some potential in pointing to some reasons which can explain both why an institution may be established and why a country might develop an interest in forming relations with another one. As I said earlier, I will test them in the last section of this chapter. First, however, I want to discuss how well sociological institutionalism is equipped to
provide a framework to unpack how and why both the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe originated.

Unlike rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism does not offer a selection of different viewpoints as to how and why institutions originate. The general agreement is that institutions are given and socially constructed. If one applies this approach to the case study in hand then one would argue that the MGK was given and socially constructed. From this point of view, the role of social practice is given greater attention in the study of institutional genesis. Relying on this approach, one can develop a research into questioning what social practices constructed the MGK and how. This may then generate a detailed study of the MGK’s origins. Applying the same approach to how and why Turkey developed an interest in Europe, one can suggest that Turkey’s interest in Europe was socially constructed. It is however unclear how one would go and find out about what social practices or social attitudes have generated the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe. In the last section of the chapter, I will examine the case for arguing that both the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe was socially constructed.

Another viewpoint is that when actors develop new institutions they tend to borrow from the existing world of institutional templates (Solton 1998: 30). This approach suggests that when actors decide to establish an institution, they tend to look at other institutions to learn about how to form a new one. Using this approach would suggest that the MGK was established by actors who had adopted another institution’s templates. This could lead into an interesting debate as to whether, when the MGK was established, anyone thought about the existing world of institutional templates. Furthermore, applying the same approach to the question of how and why Turkey developed an interest in forming relations with Europe, one would argue that Turkey learned from other countries’ interest in being like Europeans and being part of Western Europe.

While rational choice institutionalism has potential for explaining why an institution is established, sociological institutionalism is not concerned with the question of why an institution is formed. Sociological institutionalism however has some potential in explaining how institutions are established since it points to some possible ways in which both how an institution originate. However both of these schools of New Institutionalism lack signposts for the researcher to a starting point that can be utilised to begin a research on institutional genesis. Historical institutionalism however fills this gap by Thelen’s (2004) and Pierson’s
(2000a) suggestion that “we have to go back and look” (Thelen 2004: 25; Pierson 2000a: 264, italics in original). This gives instructions to the researcher as to how they can start their research on institutional genesis.

Historical institutionalism also points to what a researcher needs to look for when they go back and look. Thelen’s emphasis on the features of the broader political and social context in the study of how institutions originate and suggestion that institutional arrangements cannot be understood in isolation from the political and the social settings in which they are embedded is also very useful. This is very helpful to unveil the political and social settings in which the MGK and Turkey’s interest in forming relations with Europe was established. This can help to develop a detailed analysis of political and social development in Turkish politics of the years in which the MGK formed. And Peter’s (1999) point that “when an idea becomes accepted and is embodied into a structural form then the institution has been created” (ibid.: 67) is very instructive for the researcher to trace if there was a prominent idea that was structured in to the MGK. Therefore the researcher who applies the historical institutionalist framework of institutional genesis knows that when they “go back and look”, they need to pay attention to the political and social settings in which the institutions is established, and question if there is a prominent idea which was embodied into the structural form of an institution. One last point I want to make in relation to the historical institutionalist framework is that like sociological institutionalism, it is not concerned with why institutions originate; it rather provides the researcher with instructions to trace how an institution originates. This means that the intention behind the genesis of an institution is not as significant for historical and sociological institutionalism, as for rational choice institutionalism.

Since both sociological and rational choice institutionalisms are lacking in not signposting how to begin a research into institutional genesis, I will utilise historical institutionalism’s position on how one may begin to find out about how and why an institution originate. The discussion above has shown that while rational choice institutionalism has some potential in pointing to some reasons as to why institutions originate, sociological institutionalism has some potential in pointing to some ideas as to how institutions originate. This does not however mean that I will not utilise these points of view hereafter. In the very last section of this chapter, when all the details of the political and social settings in which the MGK established are considered, I will then move on to discuss to what extent sociological and
rational choice institutionalisms can help to explain how and why the MGK was established, respectively.

3.2. Tracing the Origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe with the historical institutionalist approach

Having above outlined the historical institutionalist framework of institutional genesis, I will below apply this framework to understand how and why the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe originated. Since the MGK was established in 1933, relying on the instructions provided by the historical institutionalist framework, I will “go back and look” at the era in which the MGK was established. I will begin by giving a swift summary of the rise and the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of Turkish Republic. This will be done to have a better understanding of Ataturk’s Westernisation and modernisation period during which he introduced a series of reforms in the hope of changing the characteristics of the former Ottoman Turkey and its people. I will then study the early years of the Turkish Republic when, as said earlier, Ataturk’s political, social and cultural reforms aimed to create a new Western way of living in the newly established Turkish Republic. Utilising Thelen’s suggestion I will then pay attention to both the political and the social settings of the newly established Turkish Republic to both find out about what political and social developments in the years between 1923 and 1933 contributed to the genesis of the MGK and discuss whether there was a prominent idea behind the embodiment of the MGK. Using the same framework I will consider the early European integrationist initiatives and discuss Turkey’s position in them. This will be followed by briefly discussing Ataturk’s position on Turkey’s relations with the West. Once the origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe are unveiled, I will move on to discuss Turkey’s adoption of a multi-party system and its position in the developing federal and intergovernmental European organisations in the years between 1933 and 1957. This will be useful not only to gain insight into how and why the Turkish political system shifted from a single party regime to a liberal democratic multi-party system, but also how and why Turkey’s interest in European organisation grew. And lastly I will discuss the limitations and benefits of sociological and rational choice institutionalism in explaining how and why the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe originated, respectively, using the evidence gathered before.

The Ottoman Empire was founded at the end of the fourteenth Century and reached its peak in the fifteenth century, stretching around the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea, at one
point reaching across northern Africa and up through Eastern Europe to Austria. Turkey was a central component of the Ottoman Empire and Istanbul served as the capital and leading city of the Empire. Under the Ottoman Empire, the ruling power was assigned to the Sultan who was expected to respect the Caliphate. The Caliphate was religious in character and its authority extended beyond the boundaries of the Empire itself (Parker and Smith 1940: 19) and under universal Islam its jurisdiction covered almost every aspect of life (Tamkoc 1976: 99–100). Heper (1992) described the role of state in the Ottoman-Turkish polity as “isolated from and autonomous vis-à-vis civil society … The Ottoman-Turkish polity thus constituted a polar case among the polities with a strong state.” (187). The Empire however began to lose the momentum of expansion from the second half of the sixteenth century until the end of the nineteenth century and this era is known as the ‘Period of Decline’ (Heper 2000: 63). When the territorial expansion of the Empire came to an end, then the Empire began to lose territory steadily and regions of the Empire began pulling away and forming independent countries, such as Greece. The Ottoman Empire emerged economically exhausted from the wars with Egypt and the Russian Empire. The Ottoman Empire was introduced into Europe with the Treaty of Paris in 1856, following the Crimean War; with this treaty the European powers acknowledged both that the Ottoman Empire was a member of the Concert of Europe and the Empire’s independence and territorial integrity (Karaosmanoglu 2000: 206). Furthermore when the Ottoman Empire took sides with Germany in WWI, the victorious Allies – Britain and France – occupied most of the land of the Empire (Ahmad 2003: 78). The partition of the Empire however was confirmed by the signature of the Treaty of Sevres in August 1920; Ozoglu (2011) regarded the Treaty of Sevres as “practically the death sentence for the Ottoman Empire” (ibid.: 47), but the Sultan never ratified the Treaty. By this time a Turkish Nationalist movement emerged, rebelling against the partition of the Empire. Thus a war of National Liberation took place between 1919 and 1923. This meant that the civilian and the military bureaucrats took the control of the Ottoman states apparatus and started its transformation into a nation-state (Aktar et. All. 2010: xiv). And when the Treaty of Sevres was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, the Turkish Republic proclaimed (Macfie 1998: 207).
3.2.1. The Origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe in the context of illiberal political and social settings, 1923–1933

(i) Atatürk’s top-to-down reforms

Phillips (2004: 84) says “In 1923, Mustafa Kemal collected the remnants of the shattered Ottoman Empire to create the Republic of Turkey, hoping to build a truly modern state on a par with its European neighbours” and Atatürk introduced a political structure consisting of a parliament, a president, a single political party, and universal franchise. Kili (2003) describes it thus:

The Turkish Republic was founded upon the former territory of the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia and Thrace. Its form and system of government and policies were future oriented from its very inception. But the founders of this state are one of the oldest nations in the history of mankind. The structure and fabric of this new state structure, its political, cultural and economic features and aspects, were formed within the framework of the system of thought of its founder, Atatürk. (2003: 83)

Landua (1984) says that Atatürk tended to believe that progress could never be achieved within the multi-racial Ottoman state and for modernisation to succeed it was necessary not to combine the old with the new. He notes “It would have to assume a radical character, to affect all aspects of Turkish society, and to sweep away most, if not all, of its traditional beliefs and institutions” (ibid.: 51). Tank (2007) said “the Kemalists ardently adopted Western civilisation and culture as the foundations of modern Turkish identity” (ibid.:133) and it was believed that nation-state building and civilisation is intrinsically linked to and operates with the distinctive horizon of global modernity that is believed to be only achieved through the introduction and dissemination of Western reasons (Keyman 2010: 16). Therefore political modernity for the Kemalist could have been only achieved through a top-down and state-led transformation of the traditional society into a modern nation (Keyman 2010:20). Therefore in November 1922, Atatürk abolished the Sultanate and assigned sovereignty in the new regime to the citizens of the Turkish Republic (Aksin 2007: 191–97). The 1924 Constitution granted legislative and executive powers to the National Assembly (Parker and Smith 1940: 60). Although participation in politics or political decision making was restricted in the early days of the new Turkish Republic, legal and constitutional amendments were later made which paved the way for a more participatory democracy. For
this purpose, the requirement of electors, candidates, and voters to be tax payers was eliminated from the Electoral Law in April 1922. Atatürk then extended the right to vote to all male citizens over eighteen.

As far as women’s position was concerned in Atatürk’s Republic, the extract below from Atatürk’s speech in 1923 gives the indication that women were to be treated as equal with men:

Win for us the battle of education and you will do yet more for your country than we have been able to do. It is to you that I appeal. … If henceforward the women do not share in the social life of the nation, we shall never attain to our full development. We shall remain irremediably backward, incapable of treating on equal terms with the civilizations of the West. (Quoted in Kinross 1964: 390)

Women then were given the right to vote in municipal elections in 1930 and four years later they were allowed to vote at the national elections (Tamkoc 1976: 100–1; Aksin 2007: 195). And the Turkish Civil code was passed in October 1926 through which women gained equality with men in inheritance and divorce matters. And then Atatürk decreed that every Turk should have a Western-style surname in June 1934.

Additionally, Atatürk defined nation: “as a community that is based on common political existence, language, territory, descent, historical affiliation, and morality” and religion was not included in the common bond that constitutes a nation (quoted in Kadioglu 2011, 41). Thus the religious schools and the medreses mektebs were abolished; and all schools were put under the Ministry of Public Instruction. Soon after, all religious courts were closed, leaving to the secular courts the application of religious law in appropriate cases” (Davison 1998: 149). Thus the Islamic education system was replaced with a secular education that was open to everyone, female as well as male. European languages were taught in the newly secularised Turkish universities (Starr 1992: 14; Tank 2007: 134). Additionally, so as to eliminate the wearing of religious and traditional clothing, Atatürk introduced the Hat Law in November 1925: this abolished the use of religious headgear by citizens (except for religious officials who were authorized, approved and appointed by the government) and the use of Western style hats was encouraged. Furthermore, in July 1928 Atatürk adopted a Latin alphabet for Turkish language, replacing the Arabic alphabet; Ahmad (2003) said “At a stroke, even the literate people were cut off from their past. Overnight, virtually the entire
nation was made illiterate’ (ibid. : 34). Another dress control was introduced in 1934 to ban religion-based clothing such as the veil, rather promoting Western style dressing.

Some of the other reforms included:

- The Caliphate’s “Sacred Religion Law” was abolished in March 1924
- Sharia courts were abolished in April 1924
- All activities of the Dervish order and visits to tombs of sultans and sheiks were prohibited by law in November 1925
- Reference to Islam as the “religion of the state” was removed from the Constitution in April 1928
- The Islamic Sabbath was changed to Sunday in 1935

With these reforms Ataturk and his colleagues aimed to create a new Turkish identity. Kadioglu (1996) argues that:

Turks were a “made” nation by virtue of emphasizing their difference from the Ottomans along the similar Jacobin lines that the French revolutionaries followed in creating the Frenchman. The fervent desire to break with the past was clearly manifested in the ensuing reforms.(ibid.: 188)

In the subsequent sections I will show that when the above reforms were not successfully adopted, the problem was remedied with further reforms from above in order to create a new Turk (Kadioglu 2011: 188).

I have considered above the very early years of the Turkish Republic and found that Ataturk introduced a number of reforms concerning various aspects of the former Ottoman Turkish Republic. Ataturk changed how people conducted themselves in politics, as well as in public life; reformed how they dressed, what they could wear and what they could not wear; granted a new status to the women of his Turkish Republic, equalised them with the men; and diminished people’s practice of Islam in everyday life. In this sense I agree with Keyman (2010) who said “[T]he Kemalist commitment to political modernity … aimed to achieve top-down and state-based transformations of a traditional society into a modern nation by introducing and disseminating Western reason and rationality” (ibid.: 20). Whilst doing all of these, how-
ever, he never consulted the people of the Turkish Republic; he entirely overlooked people’s views and preferences. For him there was his Westernisation and modernisation reforms to implement, which he believed to be in the interest of his people – without realising he was actually imposing his most desired way of living, political system and practice of religion on others by force.

(ii) Origins of Turkey’s position in the integrationist European projects

Whilst the Turkish Republic was proclaimed in 1923, pro-European integration groups were emerging in post-war Europe. In 1923, Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi put forward the idea of a European Union in his book Paneuropa (or Pan-Europe). Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that the League of Nations (LON) was a failure for a number of reasons: (1) two world powers including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA) rejected the League; (2) the League was inorganic; instead of grouping the peoples and states of the world organically according to their economic, cultural and geographical affinities, it joined them together mechanically, without regard to geography, history, culture, or economics; (3) it had an abstract structure, rendering it impersonal and producing no response in the sentimental life of mankind, which starting from the family (quoted in Guvenc and Barlas 2009: 426). Coudenhove-Kalergi rather put forward a United Europe which would be defined politically rather than geographically or culturally; for him, Europe was a political concept which embraced all the non-Soviet states of continental Europe. European Turkey however belonged to Asia, politically. He believed that nationality problems in Europe could be diminished by means of both economic and political integration based on democratic principles.

In contrast to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s idea of pan-Europe, Aristide Briand, at his address to the League of Nations in September 1929, called for the creation of a sort of federal link between the European nations, having pointed out the important role the League of Nations have played in reaching a peaceful settlement. Briand suggested that his European federation would act especially in the economic domain as it was the most pressing need and he emphasised geographic criteria in the making of the European federation, saying “I think that a sort of federal link has to exist between people geographically grouped like the European

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1 Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi is Austrian politician, geo-politician and philosopher; is recognised as the founder of the first popular movement for a United Europe.

2 French statesmen who served eleven terms as Prime Minister of France during the Third Republic; is one of the first politicians who promoted the idea of a —Regime of Federal European Union.
people” (quoted in Guvenc and Barlas 2009: 428). Briand believed that the collaboration of three great powers – France, Britain and Germany – was fundamental for the formation of a new order in Europe; he however was not clear about the nature of his own European Union.

As far as Turkey’s position in these two projects was concerned, Counenhove-Kalergi and Briand had different views. Counenhove-Kalergi initially wanted to leave Turkey out of his Pan-Europe, but then he was convinced that Turkey was an integral part of Pan-Europe. It was the Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos who persuaded Counenhove-Kalergi that Turkey under the rule of Kemal Ataturk had become an integral part of Western civilization and that whatever the future Pan-Europe, Turkey should be made a part of it (Guvenc and Barlas 2009: 438–439). Despite this change in Counenhove-Kalergi’s position on Turkey and its European identity, Turkish leaders preferred to avoid being seen as publicly enthusiastic about Pan-Europe. Government representatives nevertheless participated in the Pan-Europe conferences; records show that Turkish Ambassador Cemal Husnu Taray and Secretary Nedim Veysel Ilkin attended the Basel meeting in November 1932 as official delegates of the Republic of Turkey. Counenhove-Kalergi, thereafter, defined this participation as a manifestation of Turkey’s accession to Europe. While Counenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe called for participating states to make concessions from their sovereignty to a somewhat supranational entity, the newly established Republic was preoccupied with gaining full sovereignty. Therefore, Ankara’s immediate objectives were not compatible with some of the founding principles of Pan-Europe.

Like Counenhove-Kalergi, Briand did not initially include Turkey among the 26 European countries which were invited to discuss his ‘Memorandum on the Organisation of a Regime of European Federal Union’. There were two reasons for this:(1) Turkey was not a member of the League of Nations; and (2) Turkey was not part of the geographical Europe as defined by Briand (Barlas and Guvenc 2009: 431). This made Turkish political leaders draw links between Brian’s attitudes towards Turkey and France’s hostility towards Turkey. According to the Turks, nevertheless, Turkey was geographically in Europe, since it was bounded by two European seas: the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

When I went back and looked I found that the first founders of the United Europe Movement held mixed feeling towards Turkey’s position in Europe. Similarly, Turkey on the one hand wanted to be part of any pro-integrationist European project while on the other hand it was reluctant to give up on its newly earned national sovereignty. Ataturk said “the West has
always been prejudiced against the Turks ... but we Turks have always consistently moved towards the West ... In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative” (quoted in Erdogdu 2002: 40). There are two points I want to make in relation to this quote. The first is that it shows that Atatürk is aware of Europe’s perception of Turkey with its Ottoman background. The second is that it shows how Atatürk associates civilisation with the West. Probably this is why the reforms he introduced have all been influenced by Western values and principles since there was not any other alternative. Thus only five years later after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Aras defined his country’s new orientation and identity as being a Western power and paid a visit to European countries. Following on this Atatürk chose to cut his country’s traditional ties with the Arab world, and Republican Turkey distanced itself from Middle Eastern politics.

(iii) Origins of illiberal democracy

Furthermore, although Atatürk wanted to adopt a multi-party system, he believed a single party regime would not only be in the interest of the nation but would also assist a smooth transition to a democratic and modern way of living. Kilic (2003) argues that Atatürk was convinced that only a unified party organisation could have imposed his programme of Westernising reforms and any organized opposition might demand the restoration of the caliphate and religious traditions (ibid.: 152). Heper (2000) says that the Republican founders hoped that Turkey would have a rational democracy, where long-term interests of the community would not be sacrificed to narrow political interests and the objective was to enable Turkey to catch up with the West (ibid.: 72). Atatürk however was not the only political leader in Europe at the time who opted for a single party regime; there were two other examples. The first is Benito Mussolini who ruled Italy between 1922 and 1943 under his National Fascist Party (PNF), having crushed all the political opposition, and the second is Adolf Hitler who ruled Germany between 1933 and 1943 under the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP). However Mussolini being fascist and Hitler being totalitarian, the only similarity they had with Atatürk was their choice of single party regime. Atatürk had however used illiberal and undemocratic ways to establish a Western Secular Liberal Democratic Republic; I will explore this further below.

When Atatürk dissolved the Grand National Assembly on 15 April 1923, nationwide elections were held over the months of June, July and August of the same year. The candidates’ political records and qualifications were closely scrutinized by Atatürk, and
consequently a parliament consisting largely of Ataturk’s chosen candidate was produced (Lewis quoted in Aydinli 2004: 116). Ataturk formed the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) in 1923 with the name “People’s Party” and gave it the responsibility of guiding modernisation and political development in Turkey. Ozoglu (2011) has noted that most members of the group that formed the CHP shared a political vision similar to that of Mustafa Kemal for the modernisation of the state (ibid.: 84). The CHP members were divided into two groups: the evolutionists, who were responsive to the demands of the public, and the revolutionists, who believed that there was no time to waste in introducing and promoting new reforms – they believed that “people needed to be led, and the reforms, if possible, had to be top down for the good of the country” (ibid.: 84). Yet seeds of opposition to the ruling elite and their vision of governance were nonetheless present in the second parliament of the republic, and were growing more vocal (Aydinli 2004: 204). Ataturk’s support for a single party regime did not mean that no opposition political parties were established. Between 1924 and the mid 1930s three different political parties were formed, but all were short-lived.

The first opposition political party, called the Progressive Republican Party (TCF), was established in October 1924 by Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Kazim Karabekir and Rauf Orbay. The Progressive Republicans declared their commitment to liberalism and promised to respect religious opinions and beliefs. Although Ataturk was supportive of having a second political party in the newly established Turkish Republic, there was a serious opposition to it from other CHP members. Aydinli (2004) said that the CHP members made their discomfort obvious with the TCF in everyday political debates through, for example, a parliamentary inquiry in 1924 into corruption charges concerning the population exchange between Greece and Turkey that turned into a serious struggle between the government and the TCF. The CHP representatives did not hold back from suggesting that the opposition’s views were shaped by anti-republican principles, even pro-sultanate, despite the fact that the leaders of the TCF were well known to be in favour of the Republic, national independence and liberties. Rauf Orbay, one of the founders of the TCF, was accused of being anti-republican and pro-sultanate (Ozoglu 2011: 89). The government concentrated on out-of-context extracts of opposition speeches such as “‘the declaration of the Republic is rushed’, rather than on broader opposition statements such as ‘we became MPs in order to establish the system of democracy, not to pass this authority over to the hands of institutions that are not directly responsible to the society’” (Aydinli 2004: 117–118). This thus led into debates about the
security of the regime, with suggestions that having the TCF in the political arena threatened Ataturk’s project of secularisation.

Soon after the TCF was formed, complaints about the TCF members and their political activities found their way into the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). In February 1925, a complaint claimed that the TCF recruiters signed up new members by asking the question “Do you prefer the Sultan or Mustafa Kemal” (quoted in Ozoglu 2011: 89). And this complaint was investigated by the Ankara Independence Tribunal. Another complaint concerned Mehmet Fethi Bey, TCF representative, who was accused of manipulating religion for political gains. This case was brought before the Eastern Independence Tribunal and it resulted in the closing down of TCF branches in Eastern Anatolian on May 25, 1925 (Ozoglu 2011: 116; for more information on the rise and fall of the TCF see Zurcher 1991: 52–94).

Ismet Inonu considered the closure of the TCF in June 1925 necessary because the party had challenged the Republican ideals (Heper and Sayari 2002: 31). Ozoglu (2011) notes, “It was almost a natural reflex to force the opposition to dissolve, for it was obvious that what the radical Kemalists hoped to accomplish and the methods to achieve that would be hindered by any political opposition” (ibid.: 119). Ahmad (2003) connected the closure of the RPP with the Kurdish rebel movements in the same year – this will be explained below – saying “The Kurdish rebellion provided the pretext to dissolve the PRP and crush all opposition” (ibid.: 86).

Five years after the TCF was closed down, another attempt towards liberalising the Turkish Republican political system was made through forming the Free Republican Party (OCP) in 1930 (Yerasimos 1987: 87; Heper 2000:72). Ali Fethi Okyan, former prime minister and later Turkish ambassador to France said: “Our new republic does not look that impressive. I am a mortal, before I die I want to see my nation accustomed to real freedom and democracy, and for this there is the need for a new alternative political party” (quoted in Aydinli 2004: 222). He asked Ataturk’s permission for this, saying:

In order to consolidate and further the republican regime in Turkey, instead of having a single party system [we need] a multi-party system that will establish freedom, debate, and control over the government about its policies vis-a-vis society. With your permission, I intend to enter politics with another party in order to reach this goal. (Quoted in Aydinli 2004: 222)
Ataturk agreed with Okyan forming the OCP in 1930. Aydinli (2004) notes that there are two main arguments to explain why Ataturk wanted to promote the formation of an alternative party and make another attempt at multi-party politics. The first is the external image of the Turkish elite; some of the Turkish elite observed Turkey’s single party political system as inferior to the Western democracies. It has also been noted that the speaker of the Turkish parliament told Ataturk that it was “really embarrassing” to try to defend the single-party system when he was in Europe. The second is that with the intensive transformation which took place in the newly established Turkish Republic, an opposition group had emerged which gained support day after day. Thus the opposition had to be controlled by the government through allowing it to form a political party to channel the opposition in a more manageable way.

Unlike the TCF, the OCP received significant support from wider society and this was very unwelcome to the CHP; for example when the leadership of the OCP travelled to the city of Izmir, the local CHP city administrators tried to block their coming. Aydinli (2004) notes that the OCP slogans of “Long live the free republic” and “Long live the free country” also reflected what the people saw in this party, or what they wanted from it for themselves. There was constant discussion between the CHP and the OCP on what level of democracy was needed in the newly established Turkish Republic. While the leader of the OCP, Fethi Bey, criticized the existing conditions for the improvement of democracy, a CHP parliamentarian said, “we cannot give up state authority in the name of freedom and democracy”, adding that free politics would “plunge the country into a blood bath” (quoted in Aydinli 2004: 125). This meant that the CHP’s priority was protecting state authority rather than freedom and democracy (liberalisation) since they believed the people could not be trusted.

Thereafter charges were brought against the OCP with regard to threats to the regime and to state security. It was suggested that the OCP leadership be tried for betrayal and treason to the motherland. To control the OCP Ataturk thought about chairing both the CHP and the OCP, as well as nominating candidates for each party's forthcoming elections; this however never was put into practice since Ataturk rather opted to chair only the CHP and suggested that if the OCP ran for the elections, it would be competing against him. Fethi Bey, leader of the OCP, said that the party had not been formed in order to fight Mustafa Kemal, and on 17 October 1930, the OCP closed itself down.
When I above paid attention to the political settings of the newly established Turkish Republic, I found that the CHP was the political party allowed to stand in the elections and represent the people of Turkey in the TGNA. However, looking at it closer I noted that the CHP in practice stood for Ataturk's reforms and did not particularly represent the views of the electorate. Ataturk and his CHP colleagues believed that people had to be led and could not trusted as far as the future and success of Ataturk's reforms were concerned, this meant that Ataturk’s Turkish Republic was far off from adopting features of liberal democracy. I also found out that when Ataturk’s single party regime was criticised by the Europeans and the Turkish elite, the TCF and the OCP were formed to show that Turkey is a multi-party system. This meant that Ataturk was prepared to take any step to increase Turkey’s prestigious among the Europeans. It did not however mean that Ataturk changed his top-to-down and authoritarian approach after he allowed formation of opposition political parties. In fact they adopted much stricter line on the opposition political parties when the TCF and the OCP criticised Ataturk’s republic for lack of strong sense of democracy. And furthermore the OCP’s calls for more democracy and freedom triggered the debate about state security.

(iv) Growing opposition against Ataturk’s Republic

Heper (2000) has said that “Westernisation reforms faced stiff opposition from the Islamist traditionalists” (ibid.: 72) and I suggest as well as from Kurds. This means that the reforms that were introduced in the 1920 had not taken root (Kadioglu 1996: 188). I argue the reasons for this lies in the exclusionary and assimilating principles of Turkish Nationalism on which Ataturk’s Turkish Republic was established; Keyman (2011) argued that “in the making modern Turkey as an organic society was … the governmentality of nationalist discourse to practice inclusion/exclusion, to create identity in relation to difference, and to freeze the Other (such as the Islamic identity, the Kurdish identity, or the Ottoman root) into history” (ibid.: 18). Furthermore Ozdogan (2010) observed that the territorial-political aspect of Turkish nationalism purports that all citizens of Turkey are considered Turkish, that is, “the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race are Turkish in terms of citizenship, as officially expressed in the constitution (Ozdogan 2010: 49).

Ataturk’s directive, which said that Turkish alone is permissible for the proclamation of the call to prayer and the delivery of an entire sermon, including passages from the Qur’an, caused protests in Bursa. Although no directive had been issued on a national level, officials in Bursa were under instructions to ensure the use of Turkish during Ramadan (Brockett
1999: 51). This directive coincided with the closure of the OCP; a rebellion thus took place in the small town of Menemen, near Izmir, where the OCP had enjoyed significant popularity (Ahmad 2003: 88). This was followed by another group which was led by “Dervish Mehmet” to organise some pro-caliphate groups; in December 1930, they called for a rebellion, citing the “siege” on religion and Islam, and calling for sharia. A total of 36 alleged participants were later sentenced to death for opposing the state. Kadiologlu (1996:187) has said “The Menemen incident is critical in channelling the subsequent route of the Republican regime since it made it quite clear to the Republican elites that the reforms that were undertaken in the 1920s had not taken root” (Ibid.:187). This meant that Ataturk’s authoritarian approach was not very successful in winning the hearts and minds of the people of Turkey. These incidents, according to Aydinli (2004), provided a kind of justification to the elite who had emphasized the importance of state security and regime safety; and Ataturk and the security-minded elite who subscribed to the argument that democratic expansion would lead to anarchy now seemed to be proved right. Thus it became now “obvious” to many elite minds that society was not ready to be trusted with democracy – international standards of democratic values had to be at least postponed, if not sacrificed, in the name of preventing anarchy and insecurity of the regime (ibid.: 128). Aydinli’s observation supports my earlier point about the emergence of a debate about state security. While earlier the opposition political parties were perceived as threat for the future of Ataturk’s Westernisation and modernisation projects, now the people who asked for more of a democracy were treated as threats to state security. Brockett (1999) has noted that the Kemalists have perpetually cited these incidents as evidence of the potential threat posed by radical Islamists (ibid.: 54). This chapter notes that this is first time in history the radical Islamists or the Islamists are recognised as a potential threat to the Turkish Republic. Kadioglu however argued that “The plain fact remained, however, that the Kemalist ideology could not replace Islam in the lives of the people (Ibid.: 188).

According to Zurcher (1993) the relationship between the Kurds and the Turkish Government deteriorated not only because the public use and teaching of Kurdish languages was prohibited (ibid.: 178), but also because the abolition of the Caliphate had removed a symbol that had bound the two communities together. In December 1926, the Ministry of Education decreed that ethnic names such as Kurd or Laz should not be used, as it was believed to be damaging Turkish unity. According to Mango (1999) Ataturk supported these restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language because he wanted to create a single nation united by the
Turkish language and Turkish culture, in the same way that the French language and French culture had formed the French nation (ibid.: 428). The first sign of resistance among the Kurds against these policies was an abortive rebellion by the garrison in Beytussebap in August 1924 in the South-East. A year later, another serious revolt took place in 1925 in Piran, a village in the eastern Anatolian province of Bingol and this quickly spread to the district of Lice led by Sheikh Said of Palu (Howard 1966: 336; Davison 1998: 150). The leader of the revolt, Sheik Sait, who was the head of his own clan and a member of the Nakshibendi religious order, also had influence over the other clans (Aksin 2007: 200). Initially the rebels were successful in defeating several local military units; however, when the government mobilised and dispatched more layer units, the rebellion was contained in two months. Sheikh Said and his 47 followers were tried and hanged on June 29, 1925 (Ozoglu 2011: 90). In 1927, Khoyboun (Independence), a transitional Kurdish party that had been founded that year in Lebanon, helped to launch another major uprising under General Ihsan Nuri Pasha in the Ararat area that was completely crushed, this time with Iranian cooperation. Zurcher (1993) suggested that this could be considered as a direct outcome of the Sheik Sait rebellion, but it did not spread (ibid.: 179). Finally, there was the Dersim (now called Tunceli) rebellion from 1936 to the end of 1938, led by Sheikh Sayyid Riza (Gunter 2006: 99).

According to Metin Toker, son-in-law of Ismet Inonu who became the Prime Minister at the time of the revolts, the new reforms were incompatible with the freedom that the Kemalists pledged. Hence, in order to eliminate the opposition and to introduce the reforms, the Kemalists postponed implementing democracy, and this revolt was instrumental in that regard (Toker 1968: 44, quoted in Ozoglu 2011: 90). Ozoglu (2011) has said that this line of thinking reminded the opposition in and out of parliament of the Young Turks period, in which the slogan “for the people, by the people”, was replaced with “for the people, despite the people” (Tuncay 1999, quoted in Ozoglu 2011: 84). This meant that Ataturk and his CHP colleagues were not ready to adopt a more democratic political system, since they interpreted democracy as the source of opposition against their Westernisation and modernisation project. According to Brockett (1999), the Sheik Sait rebellion was the only significant internal threat to the security of the Turkish state in the early 1920s (ibid.: 52); and Ozoglu (2011) has said that the revolt is regarded in republican history as one of the greatest internal challenges to the new Turkish state. However, at the same time, it is often postulated that the Sheikh Said Revolt provided Mustafa Kemal with the appropriate milieu in which to
complete his radical reforms without any political opposition (Ozoglu 2011: 90). There are
two points I want to make in relation to the Kurdish movement being recognised as an
internal threat. The first is that this is first time in the history of Turkish Republic that the
Kurds or any other group of people are recognised as internal threat. The second is that the
origins of Turkey’s long standing Kurdish problem lies in the years studied above.

Having above considered the social settings of the early years of the Turkish Republic, I have
identified the Kurds and the Islamists as being against Ataturk’s reforms; the Kurds for being
banned from speaking their own language and the Islamists for being banned from wearing
religious gowns. Here I then found that the state security debate was enhanced by the Kurds
and the Islamists’ opposition to the Ataturk’s new way of living. While the Islamists were
recognised as a potential threat to the Turkish Republic, the Kurdish movement was treated
as an internal threat for state security and unity. Furthermore, I also noted here that
democracy was seen as a source of insecurity for Ataturk.

(v) The need for an institutional solution

To address these upsurges, the government took strong countermeasures (Heper and Sayari,
2002: 30). I would argue that the first time Ataturk recognised the need to protect the
Republic and their principle was in 1920s. Ismet Inonu, the Prime Minister, sent Ataturk the
following telegram:

[B]ecause of the necessity demonstrated by the recent extraordinary circumstances and
events, in order to strengthen the power and strength of the Turkish Republic and to
safeguard the foundation of the revolution and in order to persecute and subject quickly
the foolhardy ones who are harming and humiliating the innocent masses, through the
adoption of the necessary measures against the reactionary and subversive actions and
initiatives which may threaten the safety, law and order and social structures in the
country, I request you to agree that this bill, which has been approved in the cabinet
meeting March the 4th, 1925, be submitted to the exalted Assembly for approval and

The law on the maintenance of order consisted of three Articles. The first article said: “The
government is empowered to prohibit on its own initiative and by administrative measure
(subject to the approval of the President) all organisations, provocations, exhortations,
initiatives and publications which causes disturbance of the social structures, law and order
and safety and incite to reaction and subversion. The government can hand over the perpetrators of these acts to an Independence Tribunal”. The second said: “This law will be in force for a period of two years from the date of its promulgation”. The last said: “the cabinet is entrusted with the implementation of this law” (Zurcher 1991: 160). Martial law thereafter was applied in the Kurdish provinces, which included Bingol, Elazig and Diyarbakir. The High Treason Law was changed to include the political use of religion and sacred religious notions among the treasonable offences and these were implemented nationwide and used to silence all dissident opinions. Additionally eight of the most important newspapers and periodicals (Conservative, Liberal, and Marxist) in Istanbul were also closed down when the law on maintenance of order was applied. All the leading journalists from Istanbul were arrested and brought before the Independence Tribunal in the East (Zurcher 1993: 179–80). The law was in force for a period of two years. According to Mango (1999), Ataturk, at the time, did not deny that there were Kurds in Turkey. He however believed that “Turks and Kurds were indissolubly linked by a common history and interests, and should be considered an indivisible national identity” (Mango 1999: 367). Therefore in 1927 he defended “the Law on the Maintenance of Order” as a necessity at a time of revolutionary change (Mango 1999: 429).

Further uprisings by the 1930s, which have been discussed above, caused Ataturk to become seriously concerned that Turkey’s territorial integrity was threatened (Mango 1999: 492); Ahmad (2003) has noted that the Kemalists’ state of mind was “shaken by [these] incidents” (ibid.: 8). These statements suggest why it was that Ataturk stated that civilisation and “law and order” were inseparable and Turkey’s territorial integrity and independence needed to be safeguarded. I would argue that this is the second time Ataturk recognised the need to protect the Republic and its very principles; he therefore agreed on a three-fold solution involving cultural enrichment, articulation of Kemalism and the establishment of security measures. By which Ataturk consolidated state’s authority and power in every sphere of the Turkish people.

Ataturk formed a number of organisations that were set up with the aim that Turks could live in integrity by feeling proud of their history and language/culture. From 1932 the People’s Houses (Halkevleri) were founded in fourteen cities in order to promote the core principles of the republic (Kadioglu 2011: 42). In 1931, the Historical Society (Turk Tarih Kurumu) was established and new history books were written – all emphasising Turkey’s accomplishments and that all civilisations in the world stemmed from the Turkish civilisation that was rooted in
Central Asia and has researched the history of Turks the Pre-Islamic period (Mango 1999: 493; Kadioglu 2011: 42). Landua (1984) has argued that this can be best evaluated as yet another revolutionary step in the break with the Ottoman and Islamic past and its replacement with a new political and social culture (ibid.: 131). A year later, the Turkish Linguistic Society (Turk Dil Kurumu) was formed in 1932 and was given the task of simplifying and purifying the language, not only by bringing written Turkish closer to the spoken tongue, but also through trawling dictionaries of various Turkish languages for “pure” Turkish words, which had fallen into disuse (Mango 1999: 494–95. Kadioglu (2011) argued that The People’s Houses as well as the Turkish History Society and Turkish Linguistic Society aimed at creating a Turkish citizen prior to the emergence of an individualist ethos in Turkey and therefore they were instrumental in forming a notion of citizenship that emphasised obligations instead of rights. These meant that “Turkish nationalism served the function of generating obligations for Turkish citizens rather than empowering them” and have contributed to the generation of a language of obligations that has geared towards the preservation of the state (Kadioglu 2011: 42).

Furthermore, the Kemalists’ “soul searching debate concluded that the revolution required an ideology that [would] guide people towards modernity and win their allegiance so they would be able to substitute patriotism for religion” (Ahmad 2003: 88; see also Kadioglu 1996). Ataturk thus suggested that one of the ways to keep national integrity was by introducing an ideology that would put nationalism before religion. Thereafter, in May at the third Party Congress Ataturk, in a three-hour speech, put forward the Kemalist ideology as the “autonomous” ideology which was later integrated into the Constitution in 1937. It consisted of six principles: namely, Republicanism, Secularism, Reformism, Nationalism, Populism and Etatism. These principles may be categorised into four different groups: social; political; political/cultural/social; and economic. The social category includes the principle of populism; it calls on the political elite to both initiate and maintain the social revolution (Dumont 1984: 31–33). The political category covers the principles of republicanism and nationalism. Stone (1998) argues that the former represented a political revolution and adds that it not only entailed a change from the multi-national empire to the establishment of the nation-state of Turkey, but also stipulated the republican regime as the most representative of the wishes of the people (Stone 1998: 26). Karal (1981) has characterised the principle of nationalism as the anti-imperialist nationalism that is against both the rule of dynasty and the superiority of any social class within Turkish society; Kemalist nationalism believes in the
principle that the Turkish state is an indivisible whole comprising its territory and people (ibid.: 17–19). The social, cultural and political category consists of secularism and reformism. The principle of secularism asks for the separation of religion from educational, cultural and legal affairs and demands that both thought and institutions should be independent of religious practice (Stone 1998: 27; Dumont 1984: 35–38). The principle of reformism means promoting a Western way of life and replacing the traditional institutions with the Western equivalents. Lastly, the economic category contains the principle of Etatism under which the state is expected to both regulate the country’s general economic activity and engage in areas of the economy where private enterprise is not willing to invest or has proved to be inadequate (Stone 1998: 26–27; Dumont 1984: 39–41). Kadioglu (1996) said that liberalism and democracy had already been discredited in the eyes of the Republican elites in the 1930s due to the instability of the regimes in Western Europe, and therefore they were not included within the founding principles of the Republic. I however think the reason liberalism and democracy were not made part of Kemalism is because both principles were seen and treated as sources of threat for the future, integrity and unity since the inception of the Turkish Republic.

Ozdogan (2010) argued that the concern with the security and survival of the state is a significant dimension of Turkish Nationalism (Ozdogan 2010: 47) and agreeing with Ozdogan, Keyman (2011) pointed out that the goal of saving the state through modernisation remained the dominant motto of nationalism in the Republican era (ibid.: 19). To save the state therefore Ataturk chose to establish the Secretariat General of the Supreme Defence Assembly (YMMUK – MGK hereafter) by a decree in 1933. The MGK was given the responsibility of preparing the necessary principles concerning national mobilization that would best serve the interest of Turkey’s independence and territorial integrity. It was composed of the President, the Prime Minister (PM), the General Chief of staff, and the members of the Council of Ministers and a personal clerk who was responsible for preparing National Defence Policy. This meant that saving the state was put before security of it citizens; Turkish Nationalism was serving the state rather than the citizens (Kadioglu 2011:35).

Ataturk’s top-down and authoritarian approach could not however prevent opposition groups from coming together. As shown above the Kurds and the Islamists stood against the new lifestyle Ataturk introduced. With the formation of vocal opposition political parties Ataturk
began to fear for the future of his Republic. However it was with the Kurdish movement and
the Islamist protests in different parts of Turkey, that his fear for integrity and unity of the
Turkish grew seriously. Thus the debate about state security developed to take a different
form and an institutional solution was sought.

3.2.2. Moving towards adopting features of liberal democracy and joining the early
European Organisations, 1933–1957

(i) Adopting a multi-party regime

When Ataturk died in 1938, he was succeeded by Ismet Inonu. Inonu was selected as the
leader of the CHP and the President of the Turkish Republic. Ahmad (2003) notes:

As the world war wound down, the Inonu regime found itself in a difficult predicament.
The majority of the people in Turkey were suffering severe hardship. All the basic
needs were in short supply... All classes except the bureaucracy were alienated from
the regime: businessmen by the arbitrary wealth tax, which had enriched a few Muslims
but revealed how autocratic the state could be; the landlord and peasants by the agrarian
Legislation and the harsh and arbitrary rule of the gendarmerie; and the urban masses
by the labour legislation, which overworked them, gave low wages and left them
hungry. (Ibid.: 99)

Karaosmanoglu (2000) has noted, “After the Second World War, democratisation became
and indispensable element of Westernisation. The first significant development, in this
regards, was Turkey’s transition to a multi-party regime in 1950” (ibid.: 209). Inonu’s
Assembly speech in November 1945 was considered a definite green light for further
democratisation; he said:

[I]n fact: The democratic character has been preserved in particular throughout the
Republican period. Dictatorship, in principle, has never been accepted and it has been
considered harmful and unbecoming to [the] Turkish nation. Our only shortcoming is
the absence of a party to face the government party. There have been past experiences
in this direction. There have even been attempts encouraged by those in power. It is
unfortunate that such attempts failed twice because of the reactions that appeared in this
country. But the needs of the country will lead to the establishment of another political
party through the normal operation of the atmosphere of freedom and democracy. (Quoted in Ozbudun 2000: 15).

Before approving the formation of the Democrat Party (DP), however, Inonu had to make sure that the DP would safeguard Republican Westernisation reforms. Thus the DP was established in January 1946 when Celal Bayar, the leader of the party, confirmed that his party would respect Republican principles (Heper 2000: 72). In the next General Election in 1946, the DP also stood in the elections as opposed to the CHP. Ozbudun (2000) recognises the 1946 General Election as “the first truly competitive election in Turkish history” (ibid.: 16) since the CHP was not the only party running in the election. The DP won 61 seats as opposed to 396 for the CHP. Since they were not happy with the results of the election, the DP claimed large-scale electoral fraud and manipulation had been committed, the true extent of which seems difficult to establish; thus further democratization of the electoral process remained a principal demand of the DP in the 1946–1950 periods (Ozbudun, 2000: 16). The DP’s small but significant success in the 1946 General Election forced the CHP to make concessions in both their program and structure; for example, religious instruction was allowed to be resumed in the schools—though in a quite restrictive way in that a parent had to specifically request it (Weiker 1981: 122). Additionally, in order to revive his party’s political popularity Inonu cautiously opened the economy to market forces, devalued the currency, eased import facilities and permitted banks to sell gold (Ahmad 2003: 103). On the other hand the opposition forces, according to Ahmad (2003) told “voters that nothing would change while Inonu remained in power; Inonu, not Ataturk, had come to symbolise the single party regime” (ibid.: 104).

Four years later at the 1950 General Election, the CHP lost its popularity and lost the elections to the DP. Mango (1994) described the DP’s victory thus: “A major change in the Turkish political system occurred in 1950, when the twenty-seven year reign of the Republican People’s Party was brought to an end by a stunning electoral victory won by the break-away Demokrat Party” (ibid.:13,italics in original). The DP won 50% of the village vote and a substantial majority in town and city, thereby winning generally with a 55% majority (Robinson 1963: 142). Thereafter “Inonu and his Republican Party relinquished power without violence” (Robinson 1963: 142); Ahmad (2003) notes: “The party in power had accepted the verdict of the voter, and this was seen as a great step forward for the
democratic process” (ibid.: 104). I agree with Ahmad that having the CHP respect the voters’ preference was a milestone in adopting liberal democracy into the Turkish political system.

This chapter will identify three reasons why the CHP lost ground to the DP at the general elections (for the details see Zurcher 1993: 231–45). First, the CHP became saddled with the legacy of having been strongly authoritarian, and having concentrated power in the hands of particular groups (intellectuals, the central bureaucracy, the military) to the exclusion of others (such as local leaders and later, the rising group of private entrepreneurs) (Weiker 1981: 122). Second, the CHP did not attract the newly rising middle classes who wanted the state to provide greater opportunities for industrial and commercial talents (Dodd 1983: 7–8). The last reason is that the CHP government’s strict control of the countryside in order to hasten the social and the cultural revolutions meant losing the votes of those Turks who had been unsettled by the rapid changes. “[T]he DP was the vehicle through which large numbers of lower-class Turks were brought into connection with Turkish political life” (Weiker 1981: 128), but it was also supported by the commercial middle class, the urban poor and the modern sections of the rural population (Dodd 1983: 8).

Although during the 1950 General Election the DP pledged to improve the democratic features of the Turkish political system, it failed to keep its promises. Jenkins (2001) notes that Menderes’ policy preference were shaped by “short-term political advantage” (ibid.: 11) and this indeed would seem to be the case. The DP introduced a number of restrictions on opposition political parties, on the work of academics and on the press. Mango (1994) notes: “The secular elite were, or were believed to be, in favour of liberal democracy. Before and immediately after the elections of 1950, many supported the DP. But it soon became clear to them that electoral power threatened their material interests and their way of life” (ibid.:12–13). I would agree with Erogul’s (1987) assessment that the DP’s vision for political liberalisation was limited to two actions (ibid.: 108): the proclamation of a general amnesty and the promulgation of a liberal press law. While religion had been restricted to the private sphere by Ataturk in the 1920s, the DP removed these limitations and eased the restrictions on religious education (Lombardi 1997: 15; Cornell 2002: 25; Mango 2004: 57–60) and lifted the ban on the recitation of the call to prayer in Arabic, on 17 June 1950. Furthermore, a new decree gave the government the authority to distribute official notices to withhold critical publications (Aksin 2007: 266; Erogul 1987: 108). Despite its original promise to refrain from settling old scores, the DP soon launched an open attack on the opposition (Dodd 1983:
The Public Party (MP) was soon closed on the basis that its views and activities were against the Turkish Republic. On 24 December 1952, the DP Government made a number of changes in the constitution and replaced the modern Turkish text accepted in 1945 with the former version in order to gain popularity within reactionary circles. The DP then formed a new body called the “Investigation Commission” and granted judicial power to it. Publications and discussion of the work of this Commission was prohibited (Aksin 2007: 263). Despite all the restrictions the DP had adopted, in 1957, the Democrats won their third election and kept their third majority in Parliament although their share in the polls dropped from 57% to 48% (Mango 1994: 14).

Upon Ataturk’s death, Turkey, with its new President Inonu, stepped up the liberalisation of the Turkish political system, as we have seen above. The formation of the DP, its landslide victory in 1947 and the CHP’s handling of the DP’s electoral success proved that Inonu did not want to adopt Ataturk’s ruling style. While Ataturk treated democracy as a source of threat for his Westernisation and modernisation project, Inonu opted for a more liberal democratic approach for consolidating democratic credentials in Turkey. Inonu’s successor Menderes, however, adopted a much stricter attitude towards the opposition political parties upon the DP’s success. The next chapter will show that the adoption of the multi-party system came along with its own problems, for instance, political instability.

(ii) Turkey’s position in newly established European organisations

As shown in the beginning of this chapter, perceived failure of the League of Nations have motivated Coudenhove-Kalergi, Briand and many others to look for other ways to prevent any other war between the European countries. Turkey however managed to join the League of Nations in July 1932. Whilst after the Second World War Turkey was experiencing a multi-party political system, economically exhausted European countries were looking for ways to recover from their desperate economic situation. In June 1947 the Marshall Plan was introduced by the USA to contribute to European recovery; in total Turkey received 137 ($ million) aid between 1948 and 1951. In order to handle the dealings of the Marshall plan the Committee for European Economic Cooperation was established in 1948, and then converted into a more permanent Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1949. There was clearly a shared optimism at the end of the Second World War that if the European states could work together in joint schemes and organisations, barriers of mistrust could be broken down. Thus in May 1949 the Statute of the Council of Europe was signed between the
representatives of ten states (Nugent 1999: 12). The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 to achieve greater unity between its members by maintaining and developing the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms (Lelievelt and Princen 2011: 6) and Turkey also joined the Council of Europe in August 1949 and this proved Ozcan’s (2008) point that the become an “active member of the Western camp” (ibid.: 92) during the multi-party system.

Following the Council of Europe’s success, in April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed: a military intergovernmental alliance through which each of the members pledged support to the other members in the event they were attacked (Lelievelt and Princen 2011: 6). Signed by the USA, Canada and ten European countries, this gave the latter a guarantee of their continuing independence and integrity against Russian attack for at least twenty years. And thereafter so to provide for common deference in case of an attack on any of its members and prepared for common deference in case of an attack on any of its makings and prepared to guard for the foundation of NATO, the Western European Union was established by the Brussels Treaty between the UK, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Three years later, in 1952, Turkey joined NATO. Kuniholm (1991: 34) notes:

[A]s the threat of Soviet expansionism seemed to fix on Europe, and US policy shifted from containment in the Middle East (under the Truman Doctrine) to containment in Europe (under the Marshall Plan and NATO), Turkey’s main strategic role was increasingly seen in European context: as potentially bottling up the Soviet navy in the Black Sea, and tying up Warsaw Pact forces along NATO’s southern flank, and serving as at a staging ground for a counterthrust against the Soviet Union. Underpinning Turkey’s early role in the NATO alliances was the principle of reciprocity: Turkey would play an important part in the defense of the West, and make its facilities available, while the West would provide Turkey with a deterrent against Soviet attack, as well as military and economic assistance.

Karaosmanoglu (2000) argues that “Turkey’s decisiveness in joining NATO derived mostly from a profound belief in Western values and in the virtues of Western political orientation by establishing a long-standing institutional and functional link with the West” (ibid.: 209); agreeing with Karaosmanoglu, Tank (2007: 135) notes “Turkey, for its part, backed up its commitment to the West with military force”.
The Second World War produced a greater realisation than had existed ever before that unfettered and uninhibited nationalism was a recipe for war, which in the post-1945 world was increasingly seen as meaning mass destruction (Nugent 1999: 12). In September 1946, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, called for a kind of United States of Europe. He formulated his conclusions drawn from the lessons of history in his famous speech to the academic youth held at the University of Zurich in 1946:

There is a remedy which ... would in a few years make all Europe ... free and ... happy. It is to re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe.

Lelievelt and Princen (2011) have said that Churchill’s speech became historic because he proposed to recreate the European family in a regional structure called the United States of Europe – he urged France and Germany, the two arch-enemies, to take the lead in setting up such a federation (ibid.:5). Providing the inspiration to the people of Europe as the binding factor in the allied fight against Nazism and fascism, Winston Churchill consequently became a driving force behind European integration and an active fighter for its cause, and following Churchill, Robert Schuman draw up a plan with the aim of forming a coal and steel community. Schuman said:

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. … Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries. With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus
established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely un-thinkable, but materially impossible. (Quoted in Piodi 2010: page range).

The European Coal and Steel Community was thereafter established with the Treaty of Paris in April 1952 between Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; the Treaty came into force in July 1952. Upon the successful establishment of the ECSC two more projects were put forward: (1) a European Political Community (EPC) was drafted in order to provide for a common foreign policy; and (2) European Defence Policy (EDP) was also drafted. These however forced the nations involved to talk about how much each was ready to give up of their sovereignty. Since France did not approve these projects, Jean Monnet, unhappy with the lack of progress in European cooperation, resigned as a President of the High Authority (Lelievelt and Princen 2011: 11). Monnet thereafter proposed his federalist ideal by setting up the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Monnet pressed for broadening cooperation in the field of energy by proposing a European Atomic Energy Community (ibid.). Around the same time the Dutch Foreign Minister came up with a proposal for a common market that would cover all types of economic activity. Representatives of the founding member states discussed these different proposals in a series of meetings in Messina. In the end the governments agrees on the establishment of two new Communities that were laid down in the Treaty of Rome: (1) the European Atomic Energy Committee (Euratom), which would strive for the development of nuclear energy; (2) the European Economic Community, which would focus on the establishment of the free market of goods, persons and capital between the member states (Nugent 1999: 42). The Community’s four main institutions would be: a Council of Ministers, representing the member state governments, to co-decide on policies not in the Treaty; a High Authority, consisting of independent appointees, acting as a daily executive making decisions on the policies of the Treaty provisions; a Court of Justice, consisting of independent judges, to interpret the Treaty and adjudicate conflicts between member states and the High Authority; and a Commons Assembly, drawn from members of national parliaments, to monitor the activities of the High Authority.

When I paid attention to political and social settings in Europe and in Turkey, above, I found that Ataturk and his successors worked towards the aim of making Turkey like and part of the West at two complementary levels. At the first level, as shown in the beginning of this chapter, Ataturk took a number of steps to reform the former Ottoman Turkey and bring it in line
with European countries in every aspect of life. He recognised Turkey’s relations with the West as the only way for civilisation. It does not matter how authoritarian he became, what undemocratic ways he used, and despite the Kurdish and Islamist opposition, he never made a U-turn on his Westernisation and modernisation programme. At the second level, both Ataturk and his successors followed every integrationist development in Europe closely and expressed their interest in joining these federal or intergovernmental European organisations, as shown in this section. Turkey joined the League of Nations in 1932, the European Council in 1949 and NATO in 1952 and received Marshal Aid between 1948 and 1951. The subsequent chapter will show that Turkey applied for associative membership of the EEC in 1959.

3.3. How useful are the historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches in explaining the origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe?

Historical institutionalism’s position on institutional genesis, discussed above, instructed me to go back to the early years of the Turkish Republic to find out about the origins of both the MGK and Turkey’s interest in forming relations with Europe. Having done that, I found that the partition of the Ottoman Empire led to the formation of the Turkish Republic. I observed that Ataturk was the only influential character in shaping the top-down perceived Westernisation and modernisation reforms and the single party regime of the newly established Turkish Republic.

When I paid more attention to the political settings, I analysed how and why opposition political parties were closed by the governing party, the CHP. Since the people of Turkey could not express their discomfort with Ataturk’s reforms and the changes came along with them through a political party, I noted that the Kurdish and Islamists groups formed protests against the governing single-party regime. The closure of the opposition political parties and growing protests against Ataturk’s Westernisation and modernisation programme generated debates about the future of the Turkish Republic, as well as of its integrity and its unity.

Peter’s reference to the role of ideas in forming an institution was very helpful to find out that when Ataturk recognised what I shall call “the need to protect the Republic and its very principles” against those who opposed his Western values and way of living, he first took counter-measures to oppress the rebels. And when the opposition to the principles of the Turkish Republic grew stronger among Kurds and the Islamic-oriented, he then took a
vigorous step and institutionalised the idea, that is to say “the need to protect the Republic and its very principles”, by forming the MGK.

As far as how useful this framework has been in to understanding the origins of Turkey’s interest in forming relations with Europe, I went as back as far as the end of the First World War. I found out about the pro-integrationist European political elites and their projects for bringing European countries together. Although Ataturk’s Westernisation and modernisation project were in line with what the European political elite expected Turkey to be like, Turkey’s positions in these projects were not clear. However, looking at political and social settings in the newly established Turkish political system, I noted that Ataturk’s top-down reforms were shaped by Ataturk’s desire to see Turkey as part of the West so that Turkey could catch up with the civilised nations of Europe. This was not however a desire shared by everyone in Turkey.

When studying the political and social settings in which the MGK was established I have also unveiled the origins of four important elements of Turkish politics: (1) origins of Turkish Nationalism; (2) the infrastructure security debate; (3) the origins of the Kurdish problem; and (4) the roots of the resisting Islamists. And I observed that democracy was not a priority in the early years of Turkish Republic, but the adoption of a second party in the late 1940s allowed to me trace the transition period from a single-party regime to a multi-party political system. The subsequent chapters will consider how and why these identified elements evolved and changed and what implication they may have had for the development, nature and pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations.

I now want to discuss to what extent sociological and rational choice institutionalisms can explain both how and why an institution originates, respectively. I will begin with discussing how well sociological institutionalist approaches can explain the genesis of both the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe. As shown above, the MGK was not given, but it was established by Ataturk in 1933. The sociological institutionalist’s suggestion that the institutions are socially constructed may however help to open up a debate as to whether Turkish society demanded the formation of the MGK. The study of the political and the social settings of Turkey showed that there was not a social demand for the MGK; the society did not ask for just such an institution to be established by the government of the day. Using the sociological institutionalist approach, when I look at the evidence above to find out about what the people of Turkey wanted in those years, I have noted that the opposition political
parties demanded a more democratic political system, the Kurds asked for freedom to speak their own language and the Islamists wanted to practice their religion freely in public space and wear Islamic gowns. These socially constructed demands however, as seen above, were overlooked and were in fact oppressed by Ataturk’s single-party regime.

The case that Ataturk borrowed from the existing world of institutional templates before he set up the MGK is the next sociological institutionalist point of view to consider. This is again very interesting to think about and one can carry out a long detailed research into whether Ataturk was influenced by any other institution in another country. However in order to carry out this research it is necessary to look at similar institutions in different countries and check whether Ataturk was influenced by them. I would argue that conducting such a research may reveal interesting points about Ataturk and what countries he was influenced by. This is not however something this thesis is interested to do. One of the reasons for this is that the evidence above shows that domestic and political and social developments were much important in shaping Ataturk’s decision in forming the MGK.

The next task is to test how well rational choice institutionalism’s three approaches can explain why institutions originate. It is right that the MGK did not just happen, but one needs to question whether it was planned to establish the MGK. This means that one needs to check if Ataturk planned to form the MGK. The evidence above shows that the origins of the MGK lie in Ataturk’s fear for the security and unity of his Republic. In order to tackle the disorder caused by the Kurdish and Islamic protests, and in order to protect the future of the Turkish Republic, he initially introduced countermeasures. Upon the failures of the countermeasures, Ataturk opted for an institutional solution, and formed the MGK. I now want to judge if Ataturk and his colleagues were self-interested, and whether they wanted to reduce political costs and increase their gain. One could conduct a detailed research to find out about Ataturk’s and his closer allies’ characteristics and analyse what genuinely motivated them in their political career. The results of this research could then be utilised to explain why Ataturk established the MGK. Relying on the analysis I made above I would argue that Ataturk never was self-interested, but always held the integrity and the unity of the Turkish Republic before his possible personal gains. Nevertheless one can still argue that the MGK was established to protect Ataturk’s Republic from the opposition political parties and opposing groups so that his project would not collapse. Furthermore, Ataturk’s single-party regime can be recognised as a gain for Ataturk’s CHP. The evidence however does not
support this claim as Ataturk promoted the idea of a multi-party system as he believed in liberal democracy, but he thought people were not ready for such a move. I do not want to give the impression that I approve of Ataturk’s treatment of the opposition political parties, the Kurdish rebels and the Islamists, but it is also clear that his behaviour was not to increase personal political or economic gain. The very last rational choice institutionalist suggestion I want to discuss is the case that the MGK was established to increase cooperation and diminish social dilemmas. One can argue that to a certain extent this can be recognised as the one of the reasons behind Ataturk’s decree to form the MGK. This is because Ataturk’s new Western political system and way of living were perceived to be in the interest of the people of Turkey in the long term. Yet it was however challenged by those who, for example, did not want to change the way they used to dress. If one treats the matter in this way then you can argue that Ataturk’s long-term plans clashed with, for instance, the Islamists’ short-term interests. It can then be suggested that this then led into a social dilemma which could only be resolved through cooperation facilitated by the MGK.

As far as Turkey’s interest in Europe is concerned, there is clear evidence since the early 1920s that Turkey wanted to be both like the West and part of the European project. The historical institutionalist approach has helped me to go back and look at the political and social settings in which Turkey’s interest in Europe originated. I found that after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk adopted a Westernisation and modernisation programme which meant reforming every aspect of Turkish peoples’ life in line with European equals. This was done through a top-down approach. I agree with the rational choice institutionalist approach that it was chosen and it did not simply happen since it was Ataturk who decided that his Turkish Republic should be like a Western European country. And both Ataturk and Inonu preferred Turkey joining any of the intergovernmental and federal pro-integration European organisations formed after the First World War. Is it that Ataturk and his successors were self-interested and wanted to increase their political gains by Turkey’s relation with Europe? Looking at the evidence above I cannot say that Ataturk and his successors were self-interested, but they were motivated by the aim of Westernising the former Ottoman Turkey so that Turkey could catch up with the rest of the world. The third rational choice institutionalist approach is to look at whether Turkey’s interest in forming relations with Europe originated to increase cooperation and diminish social dilemmas in Turkey. I found this approach very helpful to discuss whether Ataturk and his colleagues opted to form relations with the European countries so that the opposition political parties and
the opposing group could also develop an interest in Western European values, begin to imitate the European values voluntarily and start to cooperate with their European counterparts, so that social dilemmas could be diminished. The evidence above however has shown that Ataturk adopted a Westernisation and modernisation programme so that Turkey could be accepted among the European states without paying attention to what the people of Turkey wished; social dilemmas increased, therefore.

Moving on to consider how well sociological institutionalism can explain how Turkey’s interest in forming relations with Europe originated, I want to begin by questioning the case that Turkey’s interest in Europe was socially constructed. For Turkey’s interest in Europe to be socially constructed the demand for being like Europeans and forming relations with Europe should have emerged from the people of Turkey over a certain number of years. This approach can lead one to carry out a detailed research to find out about what the people of Turkey thought of Europe and of European values in the past, for instance, twenty years. The above evidence has shown that the Turkish Republic’s interest in Europe was shaped by Ataturk’s personal interest in Europe. Lastly I want to consider whether Ataturk and his successors borrowed from other countries’ experiences before they established their interest in Europe. As I noted earlier in this chapter, after the World War many of the European countries began to be interested in founding a United Europe for the economic and the political benefits of their countries. It may be that Ataturk and his successors learned from the experiences of the pro-integrationist European countries.

3.4. Conclusions

In this chapter I have tested whether rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms can best explain the origins of both the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe. While rational choice and sociological institutionalisms are lacking signposting as to how one researcher may begin a research into institutional genesis, historical institutionalism instructs one to go back and look. Having said that, I have also found that rational choice institutionalism has potential in providing some reasons to explain why institutions are established. In contrast, sociological institutionalism is able to pointing to some possible ways to explain how institutions are established. Since the MGK was established in 1933, this chapter began with studying the early years of the Turkish Republic, and followed by studying the political and social settings in which the MGK was established. Whilst studying the political and social settings in the years between 1923 and the mid 1930s I found that
Ataturk adopted an authoritarian style so as to Westernise and democratise the former Ottoman Turkey and have observed that Ataturk wanted to create a modern, Western and democratic country out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. This meant that he had to reform every aspect of life of the people of Turkey. Opposition political parties and protests against Ataturk’s reforms were treated as threats for both the integrity and unity of the Turkish Republic. Thus Ataturk felt the need for securitising the Turkish Republic and established the MGK as one of the ways to reach this aim. Having studied the years after the establishment of the MGK, I have found that Ataturk and his successors paid close attention to the pro-integrationist developments in Europe and made every effort for Turkey to join these federal and intergovernmental European bodies. Additionally, this chapter has provided a new analysis of not only the genesis of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe, but it also helped to highlight Turkey’s security infrastructure, the origins of Turkey’s Kurdish problem and the roots of resisting Islamists. This is because (1) the genesis of the MGK has been entirely overlooked in the literature (2) the origins of Turkey’s interest in Europe has not been studied in the context of the genesis of the MGK; and (2) rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms’ positions on institutional genesis have not been utilised before as it has been in this chapter. This chapter has highlighted the origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in Europe through utilising the historical institutionalist framework of institutional genesis. Based on this background the next chapter will study the implications of the multi-party system for the evolution of the MGK and for Turkey’s wish to be an Associate Member of the European Economic Community, using the concept of critical junctures.

Introduction

Turkish and European Studies tend to point to Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution and Law 2945 as crucial in granting more powers to the MGK (Bilgin 2007; Heper and Guney 2004; Roy 2005; Efegil 2001; and Kardas 2004) and suggest that the Turkish military gained a say in the Turkish political system through having empowered the MGK (Tank 2001; Karaosmanoglu 2000; Kotsovilis 2006; and Ozcan 2007). And the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations covering the years between 1957 and 1983 have generally been descriptive and historical accounts of a number of chosen key periods, for instance, Turkey’s Associative Membership application and the army’s 1960 intervention. The impact of the instability of Turkish domestic politics has not been considered in the context of Turkey’s aspirations to be admitted to Associative EEC Membership. The connections between the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations have not been studied together in one piece of work. Furthermore schools of New Institutionalism have not been utilised to explain the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. This chapter will investigate how and why the MGK was empowered alongside how and why Turkey–EEC/EC relations developed the way they did, and furthermore it will show that historical institutionalism is better equipped to explain the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. To do this I will divide this chapter into two parts. In the first I will discuss the strengths and weakness of the existing material on empowerment of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. In the second part I will show how useful the historical institutionalist concept of critical junctures is in highlighting how and why both the MGK was empowered and Turkey–EEC/EC relations progressed slowly and stalled in the 1980s. The conclusions will bring together all the findings of this chapter.

4.1 Literature Review and Theoretical Debate

The empowerment of the MGK has not been studied in the context of the evolution of the MGK before. Many academics have noted that MGK’s powers were increased with the Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution and the law 2945 (Bilgin 2007b; Heper and Guney 2004; Roy 2005; Efegil 2001; and Kardas 2004) and others have pointed how the military’s position in the Turkish political system was strengthened with the new powers assigned to the MGK
Bilgin (2007b) notes, “The 1982 constitution further reinforced the role played by the NSC through changing its status from an advisory body ‘outlining the principles of the national security policy’ to one that ‘determines the views with regard to the decisions on the formulation, setting, and implementation of the national security policy and maintenance of the necessary coordination’ which are then ‘included in the agenda of the Council of Ministers’” (ibid.: 562). Heper and Guney (2004: 184) and Roy (2005: 31) argue that MGK’s powers were extended by both the 1982 Constitution and Law 2945. For example Efegil (2001) states that the MGK became the most important institution in the policy-making process by the introduction of Article 118 in the 1982 constitution (ibid.:149–50). Kardas (2004) however points to the importance of Law 2945, saying that Law 2945 granted the MGK functions and responsibilities which were beyond the remit of the 1982 Constitution, and suggests that Kemalist principles were also imposed on the MGK by this Law (ibid.: 301). These authors have proved very helpful for finding out about not only when the MGK began to gain authority and decision-making powers in the Turkish political system, but also how the MGK’s powers were extended. The question as to why the MGK was given more power has also been of interest to academics. Tank (2001) the need for such a body came from the inability of the military to make their views known to be politicians and their sense of alienation from the political process, factors which led to the 1960 coup” (ibid.:220). Karaosmanoglu (2000), however, has suggested, “The military, after three direct interventions (in 1960, 1971 and 1980), chose to wield influence in politics indirectly, especially through Turkey’s National Security Council (NSC)” (ibid.: 214). Kotsovilis (2006: 49) comments that the army, by Article 118, entrenched itself in the political arena and Dorronsoro (2004: 31) argues that the Turkish army granted special privileges to the MGK to ensure they retained control in politics. Ozcan (2007) said “After the regulation of 12 September 1980, the MGK’s authority and duties were expanded, and the military wing within the MGK gained a determining influence over the council’s decisions”. (42) According to Ozcan (2000), this meant that the MGK was given a superior position in the legislative branch of government and this undermined national sovereignty and prevented Turkey from having a democratic legislation, since the MGK was accountable to the TBMM (ibid.:70–87).

However, these works do not provide a detailed explanation of exactly how Article 118 of the 1982 Constitutions or Law 2945 made the MGK an influential institution in the Turkish political system. They also overlook the fact that the MGK was established in 1933 and had
evolved from an advisory body to a paramount political institution by the early 1980s. They therefore do not pay attention to how and why the MGK evolved from 1933 to 1980; I suggest it is important to show how and why the MGK was incrementally changed from the early 1960s to early 1980s. The third problem is that although it was the Turkish Security Forces that took control in 1960, 1971 and the 1980s, it does not necessarily follow that all of the decisions made at these Critical Junctures were made by the military; civilians for example were involved in the preparation of the 1960 and 1982 Constitutions. This thus means that it was not only the military choosing to give more power to the MGK. Additionally, the MGK was not and is not a military dominated army as it also has civilian members too and each side has equal say on the decisions made in the MGK. I think it is important to pay attention to the triggers of the Critical Junctures to gain an insight to the political, economic and social developments that may have contributed to the occurrence of the Critical Junctures. It is by this way one may unveil how and why the MGK was empowered.

On the development of Turkey-EEC/EC relations, Birand (1990) writes from a descriptive historical perspective and gives a very informative insight to Turkey-EEC/EC relations. It is mainly written from a Turkish point of view and concentrates on the role of domestic politics and political actors and focuses on the number of chosen key periods in the process, namely Turkey’s Associative membership application, the Ankara Agreement, a transition stage, and the Turkish application for full EU membership. Although Birand pays attention not only to Zorlu’s role in Turkey’s application for the Associative Membership of the EEC, but also to the impact of the military’s interventions on Turkey-EEC/EC relations, his works is very descriptive and lacking analysis. He does not question how and why the military intervened in politics and what changes the military interventions have brought to the Turkish political system. In similar with Birand, Karluk (2003) provides a detailed descriptive account of the development of Turkey-EEC/EC relations and concentrates on different aspects of the relationship, and discusses social, economic and political policies of the EU. Karluk neglects to question why and how Turkey –EEC relations developed the way they did and how and why Turkey’s application for Associative Membership progressed slowly. In contrast to Birand and Karluk, Bac (1997) pays attention to what role Greece has played in Turkey’s Associative Membership application. Bac (ibid.: 54) argues, “[h]ad it not been for Greece’s application, it would have taken Turkey much longer to decide what kind of a relationship to establish with the Six”. I would argue that Bac not only overstates how much Greece’s
application influenced Turkey’s application, but she also fails to pay any attention to what role domestic political leaders have played in making the application. In this chapter I will show that Zorlu was the main driving force behind Turkey’s application. Whilst studying the triggers of Critical Juncture 1960, I have found out about Zorlu and how influential he was in getting Turkey to apply for the Associative Membership of the EEC. This is something I want to study in greater detail because it is important to have awareness of who and what political actors were influential in Turkey’s European policy before the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system was enhanced and it had become the only institution shaping most of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. Bac additionally analyses the period after Turkey applied for the Associative Membership and considers the progress of the negotiations between Turkey and the EEC in the context of both domestic and EEC level political developments. She however neglects to question how and why the military interventions have slowed Turkey’s application and negotiations processes.

Having debated the strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature both on the MGK’s empowerment and on the way Turkey–EEC/EC relations developed, I now want to move on to discuss the different schools of New Institutionalism, and which school’s position on institutional evolution can best explain the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. In chapter 1 and chapter 2, I have shown that both sociological and rational choice institutionalisms do not comment on how and why institutions may evolve. Whereas historical institutionalism points not only to the connection between institutional change and institutional evolution, but also to the concept of critical juncture which can be used to explain how and why institutions change. It is agreed that critical junctures generate institutional change (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Collier and Collier 1991), which leads me to ask the following questions:

- What institutional changes took place in the position of the MGK in the Turkish political system between 1959 and 1983?

- Did changes take place at a critical juncture?

- And, how can one identify a critical juncture?

As far as the sources of critical junctures are concerned, while Cortell and Peterson reference domestic triggers, Hogan emphasises social cleavages and social tensions. This is again very useful to think about, and leads to the following questions:
What triggered the critical junctures in Turkish political history?

Did domestic factors trigger critical junctures in Turkey?

Did social tension play a part in the rise of the critical junctures in Turkey?

In considering how and under what conditions political elite make decisions at the critical junctures, Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) describe it as a significantly relaxed period which has two consequences: (1) the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and (2) the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are potentially much more momentous (ibid.: 343–44). This is again very helpful to formulate the questions below:

Which political actors decided to increase the MGK’s powers in the Turkish political system at a critical juncture?

Under what conditions at a critical juncture was it decided to empower the MGK?

If however I formulate the above-outlined framework of institutional genesis to explain policy development, particularly in reference to the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations, the following are the questions I come up with, utilising the characteristics of the concept of critical juncture:

What changes took place in Turkey–EEC/EC relations between 1959 and 1983?

Who made decisions in relations to Turkey’s European policy at a critical juncture?

Under what condition at a critical juncture did Turkey–EEC/EC relations progress slowly and stall?

As said earlier, both sociological and rational choice institutionalisms do not comment on institutional evolution. Above I have outlined the historical institutionalist approach on how and why institutions evolve and how this approach can also be utilised to explain policy development. In the next part of this chapter I will test how useful the historical institutionalist framework of institutions is in explaining how and why both the MGK was empowered and Turkey–EEC/EC relations developed between 1959 and 1983.
4.2. Explaining the empowerment of the MGK and the development of Turkey-EEC/EC relations, 1957-1983


In Chapter 3 I have shown that Turkey adopted a multi-party system in 1946 and Ismet Inonu, then the President of the Turkish Republic, allowed the formation of an opposition political party, named the Democrat Party (DP). The DP then won the 1950, 1954 and 1957 General Elections, leaving the CHP behind as the opposition political party. Although it was initially thought that the DP would enhance the features of liberal democracy in the Turkish political system, its strict attitude towards the newly established opposition political parties gave signals that the transition to a multi-party system was not going to be smooth for Turkey. The DP’s strict policies initially motivated university students to protest in different parts of Turkey (Lombardi 1997: 15). Then low-ranking lieutenants of the Turkish Security Forces (TSK) began to express their concerns over the restrictions applied on the opposition political parties. They questioned the DP’s position on the secular nature of the Turkish Republic since the DP had relaxed the laws on the practice of religion in the public sphere.

On 27 May 1960, “[C]onsequently, when relations between government and opposition deteriorated dangerously, to the point at which the government seemed prepared to re-establish a pre-1950 style, one-party authoritarianism, the military found themselves on the horns of a painful dilemma” (Tachau and Heper 1983: 21). I would argue this was the first critical juncture of Turkish political history, which will be called hereafter Critical Juncture (I).

I quickly want to consider the role of the army in the Turkish political system. Lyber has said, “The Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else … in fact, Army and Government were one. War was the external purpose, Government the internal purpose, of one institution, composed of one body of men” (quoted in Lerner and Robinson 1960: 19). Under the Turkish Republic the role of the army grew “out of a specifically Turkish historical, social, and cultural context” (Jenkins 2001: 9) that had always occupied a special place in Turkey, especially in the foundation of the Ottoman Empire and the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Birand 1991: 93). Ataturk aimed to separate the army’s role from that of the government in order to reduce the army’s authority in politics as he believed in the “supremacy of civilians” (Atay 1998: 69). At the same time, Ataturk did not want a weak army as he was mindful that the army’s political support was essential for his power and
authority (Lerner and Robinson 1960: 2–4). Demirel (2004) has noted: “the Republican leaders were realistic enough to recognise that a strong and loyal army was vital if the young Republic was to endure” (ibid.: 129). I agree with Atay and Demirel that Ataturk kept the army away from intervening in the everyday work of the government, but he ensured that the army would be there whenever needed. Additionally Tachau and Heper (1983) described Ataturk’s position on the role of the army as:

“One of the important aspects of the so-called Kemalist regime was the attempt on the part of Mustafa Kemal to separate the military from the ordinary conduct of political affairs. In addition to his public statements on this point, he took official action by persuading the parliament to forbid military officers to stand for election unless they resigned their commissions. The aim of this policy was not only to prevent the military from exercising direct political influence, but also to insulate the military establishment from the pulling and hauling of the political arena.” (Tachau and Heper 1983: 19)

Despite Ataturk’s desire to steer the army away from involvement in the everyday politics of Turkey, Tank (2001) claimed that the army legitimised its “guardianship” position as in the most trusted institution (ibid.: 220). The army’s intervention in politics in 1960 proves Tank’s point that the army was the most trusted institution.

Under military rule, the Constitution and the TBMM were dissolved and their powers were vested in a new body called the National Unity Committee (MBK) made up of thirty-seven lieutenants headed by General Cemal Gurses (Hale 1994: 131). The MBK formed a “Constituent Assembly”, composed of members of the MBK, and trade unions, professional organisations, and members of both the CHP and the Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (CKMP). The Constituent Assembly met for the first time on 6 January 1961 and worked towards drafting a new Constitution for Turkey which was then promulgated in 1961 (Hale 1994: 136–37). The 1961 constitution formally recognised the MGK (Zurcher 1993: 258; Michaud-Emin 2007: 27). While the MGK, (then known as the YMMUK) had been responsible for advising MPs since the mid 1930s, its responsibilities were extended by the 1961 constitution. It was given the responsibility of both determining the internal and external defence policies and providing expert knowledge to the Council of Ministers “so to assist” (yardimcilik etmek uzere) them in the overall formulations of a national security policy (Kardas 2004: 297 and Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution, author’s translation).
Michaud-Emin (2007) has said that by this change the emphasis was to be placed on the word “assist” in describing the duties of the MGK in the areas of national security. In addition, the MGK was assigned a General Secretary, responsible for presentation of proposals to the MGK, the examination of the work of the MGK and the organisation of the meetings of the MGK (Bayramoglu 2004: 77–78). Heper (1992) has suggested that with the 1961 Constitution, a new dual political regime was established; Article 4 of the 1961 Constitution said that “the nation” was to exercise its sovereignty through “authorized agencies”, including the Constitutional Court and the National Security Council. Heper described this process of change as “stacking the statist elites against the political elites”, and argued that in this way “the makers of the 1961 Constitution tried to check what they perceived as tendencies on the part of political elites aspired toward a debilitating pluralism; in the process, bureaucratic elites aspired to have the last word” (1992: 180).

Since the MGK was constitutionally recognised by the 1961 Constitution, I have studied the background to how and why this incremental change was introduced in 1960. I identified that the Turkish army intervened in politics in 1960, and I recognised this as a critical juncture. Cortell and Peterson’s reference to a coup d’état has been helpful to identify the army’s 1960 intervention as Critical Juncture (I) in Turkish politics. As far as the triggers of Critical Juncture (I) was concerned, I studied the domestic political developments after Ataturk died to the point when the Critical Juncture (I) emerged. I found that upon Ataturk’s death, Inonu acted as the President. Unlike Ataturk he opted for a multi-party system, which meant that he allowed different voices to be heard in politics. The DP was then formed in Inonu’s politically encouraging atmosphere. During the election campaigns the DP pledged to bring more democracy and freedom to the Turkish political system. As shown above however once the DP was in power, it opted for more restrictions on the opposition political parties and lifted many of the restrictions Ataturk applied on the practice of religion in public life. I would argue that the DP’s position on the opposition political parties, in relation to restrictions on what academics could write, and in relation to the practice of religion were the triggers of Critical Juncture (I). One other reason why I recognised the 1960 army intervention as Critical Juncture (I) is that it was followed by a number of changes, for example: entirely a new Constitution was adopted, known as the 1961 Constitution; the MGK was constitutionally recognised; and the MGK’s responsibilities were extended to assist the Council of Ministers on the formulation of National Security Policy. As far as the conditions under which these changes were introduced, the triggers of Critical Juncture (I) show that the conditions under which the
army and selected civilians made their decision were dominated by the need to eliminate the threat again the secular nature of the Turkish Republic. As far as Streeck and Thelen’s modes of institutional change are concerned, I can say their identified fives modes of institutional change does not explain of mode of change in the MGK. I would therefore add a new mode of institutional change to Streeck and Thelen’s list of modes of institutional change, and that would be “empowerment” which means extending the existing institution’s position and powers through Constitutional changes.

The first general election after Critical Juncture (I) took place in 1961 and was contested between fourteen political parties. The results were inconclusive: the CHP won 173 seats; the Justice Party (AP) gained 158 seats; and the New Turkey Party (YTP) won 65 seats in the TBMM. Ismet Inonu, the leader of the CHP, chose to form a coalition government with the AP despite their ideological differences. Berberoglu (1982) has suggested that the AP blocked the implementation of the new Constitution. By the end of 1962, the AP had allowed over 50 landowners who had been exiled during the 1960 army intervention to return to Eastern Anatolia. By doing this, the AP, according Erogul (1987), eliminated the chances of land reform in that region. In addition the team of experts which was responsible for the preparation of the First Five-Year Development Plan was forced to resign on 26 September 1962 (Erogul 1987: 126). Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the AP, and Inonu however did not agree on whether to introduce an amnesty to the former DP MPs who were convicted during the 1960 army intervention.

In 1961 a group of trade unionists founded the Turkish Workers Party (TIP) and Mehmet Ali Abdulkadir was selected as the leader of this newly established political party. Within a year the TIP received significant support from intellectuals and university students, while at the same time it maintained its rank-and-file working-class base. The TIP and the YON group were the only legally organised left-wing forces in the country. Although the labour movement and the forces on the left in general were not yet strong enough to pose an immediate threat to the Turkish Republic, they were nonetheless steadily gaining momentum. The TBMM therefore on 19 January 1963 set up a cross-party Commission to Combat Communism (Berberoglu 1982: 91). Leftist groups assumed that Turkey’s relations with the US required suppression of the masses (Hale 1994: 177). They therefore suggested that if a leftist bureaucracy supported a leftist military, the masses in Turkey would not be oppressed any longer (Dodd 1983: 11). Under this climate, the 1965 general election was held; while
Demirel’s AP won 240 of the seats in the TBMM, Inonu’s CHP only received 134. The AP thereafter formed the government, and Demirel was directly selected as the Prime Minister (PM).

By 1968, the leftists had gained significant support among university students. In the same year some of these students occupied their own university campuses, attacked American sailors and burned the American Ambassador’s car (Dodd 1983: 12). The right-wing groups similarly became active and destroyed “law and order” in the universities and outside. In the meantime, the former exiled pro-Turkes officers were granted permission to return to Turkey; by the end of 1963 many of them had arrived in Turkey. Political violence first began at the universities as the extremist section of the TIP and students in Ankara formed the Federation of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (DG) in 1969 which was followed by a number of Marxist revolutionary organisations, such as the Turkish People’s Liberation Front (Dev-Sol or Devrimci-Sol) (Hale 1994: 177). On 16 February 1969, two people were killed and about sixty injured in the clash between the leftist and the rightist groups – this day was named “Istanbul’s Bloody Sunday” (Dodd 1983: 12). Berberoglu (1982) has said that repression against the left and the progressive forces intensified under the fourth coalition government because right-wing forces enjoyed good relations with the AP (ibid.: 92). When the next general elections were held in 1969, Demirel – despite all criticisms – gained 256 seats in the TBMM and formed the government as the PM again.

Although Demirel had the electorate on his side, by 1971 he was asked by the military to resign when he did not produce any long-term solution to the political instability which was widespread both across Turkey and almost among every organisation representing different political values and principles. In the urban industrial areas the workers began to feel their strength after the implementation of the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike which was permitted under the new Constitution (Berberoglu 1982: 89–90). By the end of October, thousands of workers staged a mass rally in Istanbul to press the government to accede to their demands. Since no agreement was reached between the representatives of the government and the workers, shortly afterwards the government was dissolved (Berberoglu 1982: 89; Erogul 1987: 123–24). Calis (2001) has suggested that under these circumstances people lost confidence in the political parties (p.155). People therefore chose to take their demands to the streets. The demonstrations however were not conducted peacefully, which resulted in violence and disorder because the government was not equipped to quell the riots.
and the upsurges (Cumhuriyet, 11/03/1971). As Calis (2001) has said, once again the army was looked to in order to bring a solution to this difficult situation (ibid.: 157) On 12 March 1971 an ultimatum demanding that Demirel resign was signed by the Chief of the General Staff (Memduh Tagmac), Commander of the Army (Faruk Gurler), Commander of the Navy (Celal Eyiceoglu) and Commander of the Air Forces (Mahsin Batur). These high-ranking military members initially formed a cabinet of “technocrats”; Nihat Erim was later chosen as the leader of this cabinet. One of the changes Erim’s government introduced was in relation to the MGK’s position in security policy. An amendment to the 1961 Constitution removed the section that read that the MGK was to provide expert knowledge to the Council of Ministers so as to “yardımcılık etmek uzere” (“help the Council of Ministers”, author’s translation) and assigned to the MGK the responsibility of making recommendations to the Council of Ministers on fundamental parts of National Security policy (Kardas 2004: 299; Bayramoglu 2004: 79–82; Michaud 2007: 28). Another change was related to the MGK’s composition: civilian members were increased by one (Bayramoglu 2004: 80).

The second form of incremental change of the MGK’s position in Turkish political system thus took place in 1971. I have therefore studied the post-Critical Juncture (I) period stretching up to 1971 when the MGK was given responsibility to make recommendations to the Council of Ministers in the formulation of National Security Policy. I would identify the army’s ultimatum to Demirel to resign as the Critical Juncture (II) of Turkish political history. What did trigger Critical Juncture (II)? The above outline show that the 1961 Constitution increased political participation since civil liberties such as freedom of expression and association were extended as never experienced before. By this fourteen political parties were established and a number of left-wing Marxist and right-wing organisations were established. Additionally, the 1961 election results were inconclusive, which brought two conflicting political parties to form a government, but they hardly agreed on any policy area. The subsequent general elections of 1965 and 1969 resulted in AP gaining a significant number of seats in the TBMM, which guaranteed them authority and power in Turkish politics. Agreeing with Heper’s (1983) suggestion that the 1971 army ultimatum was a “culmination of a deteriorating political situation marked by a rising tide of violence, fragmentation of political parties, and weak and ineffective government” (ibid.:23), I argue that the AP’s closer affiliations with right-wing organisations and Demirel’s lack of interest in handling the political conflict among many different organisations have triggered Critical Juncture (II). The conditions under which it was decided to extend the MGK’s position in
formulating National Security Policy were dominated by political, economic and social uncertainty, which was caused by Demirel’s lack of interest in developing a long-term solution to the political instability. This in my opinion paved the way for empowering the MGK so that it could make recommendations to the Council of Minister in the case of political instability. As above the mode of incremental change in the MGK can be considered as “empowerment” (my term), this is because the MGK’s powers extended with changes in the Constitution.

As said earlier, Nihat Erim formed a new government at Critical Juncture (II), which lasted for a year, and then general elections took place on the 14 October 1973, and seats were shared between the CHP (185), the AP (149), DP (45) and MSP (48). A coalition was formed in June 1974 between the MSP and the CHP. These political parties agreed on an amnesty covering those convicted of political crimes by the 1971 administration as well as those ordinarily convicted (Hale 1994: 217). They however differed on which political party prisoners should be given amnesty – while the MSP was against amnesty to cover the left-wing prisoners, the CHP was only for amnesty for that particular group of prisoners. As a result the coalition broke down after three months. Upon this, a bipartisan government was formed, headed by Sadi Irmak, which stayed in power until March 1975. Between 31 March 1975 and 21 June 1977, Demirel formed a right-wing National Front government made up of the AP, the MSP and the MHP. At the June 1977 general elections, while the CHP won 213 seats, the AP secured 189 seats, the MSP gained 24 seats and the MHP won 16 seats. Disregarding the CHP’s calls to form a coalition government, Demirel opted to form the second right-wing National Front coalition with the MHP and the MSP. It however collapsed in six months as Demirel’s deputies began to resign from the Party when large proportions of Ministerial positions were given to the MSP’s MPs. Thirteen of them resigned from the AP, and the CHP promised these MPs a ministerial position in the next government if they resigned from their parties. Demirel therefore was forced to resign following defections from the AP in December 1977. Ecevit formed a new government on 21 July 1977 and it lasted until 5 January 1978. To stabilise the growing political and social instability, Ecevit declared martial law in thirteen provinces of Turkey. Upon these developments the opposition tabled a motion denouncing the government for its failure to suppress disorder (Hale 1994: 230). Demirel formed another government on 5 January 1978 and it lasted until 12 November 1979.
Political violence escalated and control seemed to be slipping more and more out of government hands. Fights took place between the Kurds and the state Security forces. Religious sectarian divisions increased among the Alewis, the Sunnis and the Shiites (Hale 1994: 226). On 19 December 1978, a bomb attack in a cinema in Maras, where mainly Alewis lived, killed a number of people. A few days later a bookshop owned by leftist groups was attacked by a rightist group. As to why political instability escalated,

Heper (1992) notes:

The very concept of the state as a generalizing, integrating, and legitimating entity remained alien to the Turkish political philosophy and praxis. This did not prevent the political elites from remaining aloof toward civil societal elements. Thus Turkish politics lacked not only the moderating influence of the phenomenon of political elites performing that function (dual polity) or (b) politically efficacious civil societal elements balancing each other’s demands through their political representatives (pluralism). Consequently, a fundamental tension between the states and political elites lingered on. Thus the major problem the Turkish democracy has faced has been that of reconciling the views of statist and political elites. (ibid.: 188)

By the end of 1978, about a hundred people were killed in similar incidents (Davison 1998: 197). In response to these developments, General Kenan Evren first issued a “warning letter” in September 1979 and called all the constitutional institutions, particularly the political parties, to seek solutions within a Kemalist nationalist perspective, and within the current parliamentary democratic regime, to eradicate anarchy and secessionism (Hale 1994: 233–34). This warning letter was followed by a number of attacks on well-known people. On 27 May 1980, the Deputy Chairman of the MHP was killed, and the party had a number of regional leaders murdered around the same time (Zurcher 1993: 277; Dodd 1983: 19). On 22 July 1980, Kemal Turkler, head of the Metal Workers’ Union and formerly the renowned chairman of Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DISK) was attacked (Zurcher 1993: 277; Dodd 1983: 19–20). At one point, nearly twenty people were dying each day on the streets. Following these incidents Evren then decided the TSK needed to take control of Turkey on 12 September 1980. He formed a body to govern Turkey during the intervention and called it the National Security Commission. It was composed of Evren, the Chief of the General Staff, Nurettin Ersin, Commander of the Army, Tahsin Sahinkaya, Commander of
The MGK’s position in policy making was strengthened by Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, which said:

[The MGK shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the National Security of the state. The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the MGK concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and visibility of the country, and the peace and security of society. (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982: 75, author’s translation)]

The 1982 constitution equalised the number of civilian and army members in the MGK. The civilian members included the President, the Prime Minister (PM), the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence; and the military members included the Chief of the General Staff, the Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces and the General Commander of Gendarmes. The responsibility for decision making was given to the President, who was bound to take into account the views of both Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff while preparing the agenda. It was decided that the MGK would take its decisions with a majority vote and in the case of a tie, the Chairman would possess the casting vote. Once the Council made its decisions, these were sent to the President and to the PM to be discussed at the Council of Ministers (Bayramoglu 2004: 82).

The National Security Council Law, No. 2945 (henceforth Law 2945), ratified in September 1983, also gave new responsibilities and duties to the MGK. It most importantly embedded Kemalist ideas and principles into how it operated and made decisions. This chapter argues that this was done to both protect the state ideology (Kemalism) and make sure that decisions were made in accordance with Kemalist principles. This Law established an extensive organisation for its general secretariat and it came in effect in November 1983 (Bayramoglu 2004: 87–88). While Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution mentioned that the Council of Minister should give priority to the MGK’s views, Law 2945 gave the MGK the responsibility of determining an opinion on the subjects in relations to the designation,
determination, and application of the national security policy of the state. It was also given the responsibility of monitoring and evaluating the national elements of power that could affect the national security policy of the state and also political, social, economic, cultural and technological conditions and developments.

The details of the National Security Policy were clearly explained by Law 2945. It said that the National Security policy was based on principles relating to internal, external and defence type operations. The concept of National Security was to be defined by the preservation and protection of the state, which was said to be formed by the constitutional order, national existence, national integrity, and contractual rights in the international arena, including in the political, social, cultural and economic sphere. The MGK was given direct responsibility for protecting and defending national security against internal and external dangers. It was given the responsibility to define, determine, and apply national security policy based on the principle of the indivisible unity of a state’s people and its territory according to Kemalist state doctrine (Gurbey 1996: 12). By this, the MGK’s powers were also increased through having the authority to consider measures for both the preservation of the country, the peace and security of society and to preserve the constitutional order, providing for national unity and integrity, orienting the Turkish Nation around the national ideal and values by uniting around “Kemalist thought”. Lastly, a less strict interpretation of Law 2945 channelled the MGK to take direct involvement in wider policy areas. For instance, it was given power to have direct involvement in foreign policy, especially the aspects that directly could have impinged on national security; and it had to inform the Council of Ministers, in the form of a council decision, of the views, measures and principles it had determined.

The third incremental change on the MGK’s position in Turkish political system was thus introduced by Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution and Law 2945. So to find out how and why these changes were introduced, I outlined above what developments took place in the Turkish political system after Critical Juncture (II) up to the point when the changes in relation to the MGK’s powers and responsibilities took place. I would identify the army’s 1980 intervention into politics as Critical Juncture (III). As far as the triggers of Critical Juncture (III) is concerned, I argue that the inconclusive result of the first election after Critical Juncture (II) meant that the MSP and the CHP had to a form a coalition, which broke after three months since they stood on different sides of the political spectrum, and this generated political instability. Although the MSP’s and the CHP’s weak coalition government
was succeeded by two stable right-wing National Front coalitions of the AP, the MSP and the MHP between 1974 and 1980, their lack of authority and control over the clashes between the different political and social organisations allowed the army to intervene in order to take control of the political, social and economic instability. The conditions under which the changes to the MGK’s position were made were dominated by serious levels of political, economic and social uncertainty and instability. I argue that the army felt that the directly elected political leaders were not equipped to develop policies to prevent social instability and take measure to tackle the clashes between different community representatives; the army and a selected number of civilians therefore decided to grant more power to the MGK so that it could cover the mentioned shortcomings of the democratically elected government in providing a secure and peaceful environment to live to the people of Turkey.

Overall, I have identified above the three important critical junctures of Turkish political history: the 1960 army intervention as Critical Juncture (I); the 1971 army ultimatum to Demirel as Critical Juncture (II) and the army’s 1980 intervention as Critical Juncture (III). I outlined that the main source of these three mentioned critical junctures, and the underlying reason for them, was that the democratically elected political leaders in Turkey in those years lacked the interest and the ability to develop policies to prevent social tensions between different groups and communities in Turkey. The conditions for the changes that took place were dominated by uncertainty about the future; so that Turkey would not be plunged into another political, economic and social crisis in the future I argue that therefore it granted more power to the MGK; and the modes of the incremental changes were “empowerment”. This takes to me to the next section, to study the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations in the context of the above explained three critical junctures.

4.2.2. The Development of Turkey-EEC/EC Relations in the Context of the Critical Junctures of 1960, 1971 and 1980

(i) Zorlu, the Associative Membership Application and Critical Juncture (I)

Leche notes: “The starting of accession negotiations was a step forward in a process that began in 1959 with Menderes’s application for association with the EEC and the subsequent signature of the Ankara Agreement in 1963” (ibid.: 33). I would argue that Leche overstates Menderes’s role in Turkey’s application for Associative Membership of the EEC and below I will show Fatih Rustu Zorlu, the Foreign Minister, was the main character behind Turkey’s
Associative Membership application. It is important to study Zorlu's role in Turkey's application for the EEC's Associative membership since it highlights the background to the Critical Juncture (I) and provides a context for the researcher to study rigorously as to how the Critical Juncture (I) contributed to the progress of Turkey's EEC Associative membership application in 1959. Zorlu used his political knowledge and experience at every stage of the application process to ensure that the application was submitted properly. In the early 1950s, Zorlu had already been allowed to attend meetings of the Council of Ministers because of his expert knowledge of European economics and politics (Gunver 1985: 42–52). Between 1947 and 1949, Zorlu served as chairman of the Turkish delegation at the European Economic Council. During this time, he also served as chairman of the Turkish delegation at the Havana Conference in 1947. In 1948, he received promotion to become an assistant to the secretary general in charge of economic affairs. Zorlu was appointed secretary general of the International Cooperation Administration in 1950. The same year, he was elected as deputy of the Democratic Party from Canakkale and entered politics. Zorlu was then appointed deputy prime minister and Minister of State on May 17, 1954, and served until July 29, 1955, at which time he was appointed Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tamkoc 1976: 360). Birand (2005) described Zorlu as a disciplined politician whom Ahmad (1993) regarded as the “architect of Turkey’s Foreign policy under Menderes’s government” (ibid.: 118).

In July 1959 the Turkish Foreign Ministry received two telegraphs, one from Athens and the other from Brussels, both of which informed Turkey about Greece’s Associative EEC Membership application (Birand 2005: 51). Zorlu told officers at the Foreign Ministry: “How come none of you were aware of Greece’s intention to make this sort of application? Are you all sleeping here? You cannot even make a good doorman” (Birand 2005: 52, author’s translation). These reported utterances of Zorlu underlined his very personal interest in Turkey becoming part of Europe. Zorlu then asked officers at the Foreign Ministry to find out about how to approach the EEC. At that time people in Turkey did not know much about the EEC and were not aware of the outcomes of any relationship with the EEC.

Zorlu first contacted President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to inform them about Greece’s application and explain why Turkey also needed to apply for the EEC’s Associative Membership. Bayar and Menderes were reluctant to make an application and questioned the outcomes of this application not only on the Turkish economy and politics, but also for Turkey’s relationship with the United States (US) – Menderes and Bayar had to be
persuaded about the benefits Turkey might receive from the EEC’s Associative Membership (Birand 2005: 52–53). Oran (2005) said that Zorlu used statistical data to show Bayar and Menderes that Associative Membership would bring economic relief to Turkey (Oran 2005: 819). As to their concerns about America’s reaction, Zorlu contacted the American Embassy and three days later, the American Embassy informed them that the US was happy to find out that Turkey was interested in improving relations with Europe (Oran 2005: 819). Zorlu, with the approval of Bayar and Menderes, submitted the application on 15 July 1959 (Vardar 1994: 125).

The governing political party, the DP, chose to not to inform the public about the Associative Membership application (Cumhuriyet, 31/07/1959). Oran (2005) has suggested that there were two reasons for this. The first was that the government wanted to premeditate reactionary attitudes against the application. The second was that the government believed that the EEC might refuse Turkey’s application, in which case the opposition political parties could use this against the government, damaging the government’s prestige and power in the TBMM (Oran 2005: 819). Thereafter, in September 1959 the EEC confirmed that Turkey’s application was applicable and proposed that the European Commission would contact the Turkish authorities to discuss the requirements, the nature of Associative Membership and the dates for beginning negotiations.

The negotiation process was made up of ten meetings, culminating in the signing of the Ankara Agreement (AA) in 1963. In the first two meetings (28–30/09/1959 and 2–4/12/1959), representatives of both sides presented their expectations from this relationship, but no firm decisions were reached. The first two meetings indicated that Turkey’s application would be treated as equal to Greece’s application. At the third round of negotiations, Zorlu suspected that the EEC was not treating Turkey’s application as fairly as promised and he took further actions to ensure Turkey’s application received the required attention. He aimed to speed up the process of decision making on the application (Karlk 2003: 532); and in March 1960 published a memorandum saying, “How can you compare Turkey to Greece? Do you think the potential of a small country like Greece would be same as that of Turkey?” (ibid.: 391, author’s translation). On 17 March 1960 he contacted the EEC members’ embassies and told them that Turkey was a European country like Greece and wanted to be part of Europe. He then implied a warning to the EEC, saying that if the EEC was not going to assist Turkey in accomplishing its aim of becoming part of Europe, Turkey
would improve its relations with the Middle Eastern countries (Calis 2001: 65; Birand 1990: 98–99). These interventions demonstrate that Zorlu continued to play an important role after submitting the application.

Zorlu’s efforts however were overshadowed when Turkey was plunged into domestic political and social instability, which as I showed earlier resulted in Critical Juncture (I). The National Unity Committee’s (MBK) decisions in relation to Turkey’s European policy, as well as on the domestic politics, meant delays in the negotiation meetings; therefore, Greece received its full Associative Membership in July 1961, while Turkey signed the Associative Agreement later in September 1963. At Critical Juncture (I), the TBMM and the government were dissolved: the DP was closed down and all other political parties were banned from active politics (Oran 2005: 666). The National Unity Committee (MBK) was given the responsibility of governing Turkey, headed by Cemal Gursel; and Selime Sarpe was promoted to Foreign Minister. These appointments showed that the MBK would adopt the former government’s position on Turkey’s European policy (Gonlubol 1974: 333). An MBK statement was broadcast on radio on 27 May 1960 which said that it would not make any changes to Turkey’s foreign policy, particularly Turkey’s European policy. Furthermore, a memorandum sent to Tevfik Saracoglu on 1 June 1960 said that Turkey would watch Greece’s negotiations with the EEC and act according to the developments of Greece’s application (Oran 2005: 823–24) and the MBK members said that they would not take an action unless there was progress on Greece’s application. Thereafter, when Greece’s negotiations were near to completion, the MBK realised that Turkey was falling behind Greece and began to put pressure on the EEC in June 1960 (Tekelli and Ilkin 1993: 14). Birand (1990) said that the EEC then offered Turkey a meeting to diminish the risk of having Turkey forming relations with the Soviet Union (ibid.: 77–79). When, however, the MBK found out about Greece’s full Associative Membership (9 July 1961) to the EEC, it protested against this development and implied a warning to the EEC, saying that Turkey would not sit around a table with the EEC unless it guaranteed a Customs Union with Turkey (Birand 2005: 11–13). As a result, the decisions made by the MBK meant further delays in Turkey’s negotiations with the EEC, and Turkey arguably lost prestige among EC member states during Critical Juncture (I). The MBK’s decision to execute Menderes, Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, the Finance Minister, furthermore made the EEC wonder if Turkey was suitable for Associative Membership (Calis 2001: 79 and Mango 2004: 65). The European Commission
therefore postponed the scheduled negotiation meetings with Turkey; in addition, the French President de Gaulle called for a freeze on Turkish and EEC negotiations (Bac 2001: 26)

(ii) The Ankara Agreement and the Emergence of Critical Juncture (II)

Post-Critical Juncture (I), the EEC restarted negotiations with Turkey on 24 July, 1962. The negotiation meetings held on 14–21 October 1960, 10–12 April 1961, 18–22 June 1962 and 8–12 October 1962 were not conclusive since the Turkish and the EEC sides expected rather opposite things from this relationship. The EEC wanted to keep its relations with Turkey at an economic level, Turkey desired to form political and economic ties with the EEC as a member (Oran 2005: 820; and Tekeli and Ilkin 1993: 146–47).

At the seventh round of the meetings, between 14 and 24 January 1963, it was decided to prepare a draft agreement that would be similar to the “Athens Agreement” which would assure a Full Membership to the EEC through a Customs Union. In the last three meetings held on 18–20 March 1963, 23–24 April 1963 and 16 May 1963, the content of the agreement was discussed and the details were made clear. The Ankara Agreement of Association was then signed in 1963. Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement said, “as soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community”. This was to be obtained in three stages. Turkey, during a five-year preliminary stage, would strengthen its economy with the assistance of the Community that would take the form of tariff quotas to be gradually reduced, allowing Turkey to sell limited amounts of tobacco, figs and hazelnuts to specific countries of the EEC. It would also grant Turkey the right to obtain 175 million dollars for economic development through the European Investment Bank. Moving on to the transition stage which would start in 1974 and last in a maximum of 12 years, this would see “the gradual establishment of a customs union between Turkey and the EEC” (Article 4 of the Ankara Agreement). Although the details would depend upon Turkey’s economic situation at the end of the preliminary stage, Turkey would be expected to adapt its economic policy, with regard to free movement of persons, transportation, competition and monetary/fiscal policies, in line with that of the EEC. The last stage was to be based on a customs union and implied the reinforcement of coordination of economic policies (Article 5 of the Ankara Agreement).
As far as the business community was concerned, the Confederation of the Turkish Worker Trade Union (Turk-is) and the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD) welcomed Turkey’s application for Associative Membership of the EEC and stressed the benefits the Turkish economy would receive from this agreement (Aksam, 13/09/1963). Bahir Ersoy, who was the Chairmen of the Turkish Textile Employers’ Association (TUTSI), said that “relations with the EEC would help the Turkish authorities to reduce its unemployment rate” (Cumhuriyet, 11/09/1963). However, an extremely important organisation, the State Planning Organisation (DPT), disagreed with the business representatives and suggested that the Associative Agreement would set back financial improvements in Turkey. The DPT representatives argued that it would be much more beneficial for Turkey if it improved relations with Middle Eastern countries (Bac 2001: 28).

Zorlu responded to the DPT’s stance, saying that Turkey’s future lay at the heart of the EEC and relations with the EEC would bring prosperity and political stability to Turkey (Bac 2001: 28). As far as the political parties’ position was concerned, the Turkish Workers Party (TIP) published a declaration called “No Common Market”. The declaration stated, “even though we know that the Common Market would provide us short-term benefits namely financial help and loan opportunities ... we are also aware of the fact that the working class would be paying these back through heavy interest rates ... [W]e argue that membership of the Common Market will bring us a long-term risk of losing independence and undesirable consequences for the working-class” (Cayhan 1997: 49, author’s translation). Like the TIP, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) criticised the government’s European policy, the MHP regarding the EEC as a Community that was established on foreign cultural values. Therefore, it rejected any form of relationship with the EEC and suggested that Turkey should find its own way to renew itself by concentrating on the areas of culture, history, tradition, and industry. Their alternative for Turkey was to strengthen relations with the Turkic countries by organising campaigns to defend the rights of the Turks under Chinese and Soviet control.

While Turkish political leaders and Turkish public was still discussing the benefits of Turkey being an Associate Member of the EEC, as shown earlier in this chapter, the social tension was growing between the right and left wing organisations, and Demirel’s governments did not have any form of initiative to take control over the clashes and the fights between different organisations. Demirel therefore was asked to resign by the army. A new government was formed by Nihat Erim in accordance with the army’s advice. According to
Calis (2001) the army’s intervention in 1971 was not like the coup d’état in 1960, but rather an ultimatum, so that the EC did not freeze its relations with Turkey (ibid.: 161). A month before the army sent an ultimatum to Demirel’s government an implied warning was made to Turkey by the EC using the example of military rule in Greece in 1968. Emile Noel, who was the European Commission Secretary, had said then that the EC had to freeze its relations with Greece because it was no longer a democracy and the EC could not retain a relationship with a country that is not governed by democratic means (quoted in Oran 2005: 847). Noel had said this to warn Turkey that if an intervention took place in Turkey, the EC would not continue its relations with Turkey.

Even though the 1971 intervention remained an ultimatum, it did not obscure the fact that the EC doubted the level of democracy in Turkey. This doubt was confirmed when the army decided which political party should govern Turkey during the intervention and for how long and where martial law would be implemented. In addition there were concerns raised within the EC regarding Turkey’s human rights record, especially in reference to the closure of the political parties the MNP and MSP, and the ban that was put on the MNP and the MSP’s leaders (Calis 2001: 160–61; Oran 2005: 841). Additionally, the cancellation of the King of Belgium’s visit to Turkey did show that the EC was very doubtful about how safe Turkey was. Erim’s government, in reference to European policy, argued that the government’s programme would be administrated with respect to Ataturk’s principles (Calis 2001: 159). Without taking into consideration the views of the opposition political parties in the TBMM and ignoring the DPT’s findings on whether it would be beneficial for Turkey to sign the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement (AA), Erim’s government approved the Additional Protocol, so that the TBMM was left to ratify it without any form of discussion (Calis 2001: 160). However, because the signature of the Additional Protocol coincided with the EC’s first enlargement period, a temporary protocol was signed between Turkey and the EC, but it was later legally recognised on 1 January 1973.

(iii) Success of the Eurosceptic Political Parties in Turkey, Greece’s application for Full Membership of the EC and Critical Juncture (III)

In June 1974 a new coalition government was formed by the CHP and the MSP after Critical Juncture (II). While the CHP was a fairly stable pro-European political party, the MSP was against Turkey–EC relations. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the MSP, believed that the signing of the Additional Protocol of the AA was against Turkey’s national interest and
industrial development. The MSP stood against not only selling land to the citizens of the EC member states, but was also critical of providing accommodation opportunities to the EC member states. Despite their different positions on the EC however this coalition government’s programme said that it would work to improve Turkey–EC relations and request the relevant changes in the Additional Protocol of the AA (Cumhuriyet, 18/11/1978). Upon that, Hasan Korkmazcan, MP from the DP, argued that the MSP had changed its stance on the EC for political benefits and in order to remain in the coalition government (Cayhan 1997: 163). A reply to these critics came from Hasan Aksay, MP from the MSP, who said that the MSP had not changed their stance on the EC and argued that the MSP was still Eurosceptic. He added that when coalition governments prepare their programmes for their governing term, the partners of the coalition governments necessarily make compromises to form a strong and affective government (Cayhan 1997: 163–65). When the European Commission President, Francois-Xavier Ortoli, was in Turkey in April 1974, Bulent Ecevit, then the PM, informed the EC authorities about Turkey’s request for the revision of the obligations arising from the AA (Cayhan 1997: 175 and Ugur 1999: 114). In September 1974, the CHP–MSP coalition government resigned (Ugur 1999: 115), and the CHP formed a new government with non-political technocrats. During this period Turkey’s European policy did not receive much attention (Birand 1990: 338–39).

In March 1975 a new coalition government was formed between the MHP, the MSP, the GP, and the AP. Although the work programme of this coalition government of the four political parties said that it would keep Turkey’s European policy as it was and would aim to improve relations with the EC, the government turned its back on an opportunity to apply for Full Membership of the EC in 1975. Turhan Gunes, the Foreign Minister, said that Turkey should follow Greece and apply for full EC membership, but he could not persuade the government to make the application (Tekelli and Ilkin 1993: 239). First of all, the Greek application for Full Membership of the EC made the Turks worry about the balance between Greece and Turkey (The Economist, 21/06/1975). Oran (2005) furthermore noted that the Turkish authorities discussed what actions they should take to oppose the Greek application for Full Membership of the EC, and three options were considered: the first option was to put pressure on the EC so it refused Greece’s application; the second was to submit an application for membership, but the Eurosceptical political parties – MSP and MHP – were not keen on this (ibid.: 849); and the third option, which Turkey opted for, was the most
passive one, that was to ask the EC to make sure that Greece’s Full Membership of the EC would not affect the development of Turkey–EC relations (Birand 2005: 238).

Onis (2001) has argued that there are three reasons why Turkey did not apply for Full Membership of the EC: Turkish policymakers underestimated the implications that Greece’s Full Membership would have for Turkey–EC relations; Turkish policymakers overlooked Greece’s fast moving progress on making a Full Membership application for the EC; and Ankara was reluctant both to accelerate the pace of European integration and expose Turkey’s industry to premature competition (Onis 2001: 111). I agree with Onis that Turkish authorities underestimated the implications Greece’s Full Membership would have for Turkey–EC relations. Onis however is lacking attention to the fact that Turkey was experiencing political and economic instability by the mid 1970s. In contrast to Onis, Levin (2011) has drawn attention to this and noted, “When the Turkish leadership decided not to apply for Full Membership together with Greece in 1979, they did so because domestic political unrest and the state of the Turkish economy made membership unrealistic at the time, not because membership was deemed undesirable as the ultimate goal” (ibid.: 166).

Although I agree with Levin that political and economic instability was one of the reasons for Turkish decision not to apply for the membership of the EC, it is important to pay attention to the position of the ruling political parties on Turkey’s European Policy. I would argue that the ruling Eurosceptic political parties, that is to say the MHP and the MSP, were behind Turkey’s decision on whether to apply for the Full Membership of the EC. The MHP and the MSP had since the 1960s been sceptical about Turkey’s relations with Europe. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the MSP’s leader Erbakan regarded the EC as a “Christian club” in which Turkey did not have a place (Birand 2005: 238). The MHP’s leader Turkes similarly believed that Turkey–EC relations would not benefit Turkish industry as it was not sufficiently developed to compete with the EC member states (ibid.: 215). Therefore, when Turkey was in the process of considering whether to apply for Full Membership of the EC, these two Eurosceptic coalition partners preferred not to apply (Cayhan 1997: 155–75). The AP and the GP, despite being pro, were both too weak to challenge the MSP and the MHP’s stance because they only had a minority of seats in the TBMM. Additionally, they were determined to keep the coalition by agreeing with the MSP and the MHP, as they knew that if they had disagreed with the sceptical political parties, this would have resulted in the break-up of the coalition, which would have contributed to Turkey’s existing political and economic instability. They therefore adopted a consensual approach. According to Birand, Demirel was
determined to keep the coalition government (Birand 2005: 238), and the AP and CP believed missing the chance to improve relations with the EC was not as important as Turkey’s domestic stability.

If Turkey had applied for Full Membership of the EC, would it have received membership there and then? Karluk (2003) has argued that Turkey missed the “train to Europe” (p.536), but he does not comment on whether, if Turkey had applied, a Full Membership status waited for Turkey as the destination. Onis (2001) argues that Turkey’s exclusion from the Community at the time of its “southern enlargement” constituted a case of self-exclusion as opposed to exclusion by the community itself (ibid.: 112). I agree with Onis that it was self-exclusion and the reasons for this exclusion are discussed above, but it is ironic that Onis does not comment on whether Turkey in the mid 1970s was capable of handling the political and economic obligations of EC’s Full Membership. I argue that if Turkey had applied for Full Membership along with Greece, and if the EC’s decision on the Full Membership application was in favour of Turkey, Turkey would not have managed the EC’s membership’s obligations because of both unstable politics and an underdeveloped economy. Mango (2004), however, has treated this from a different point of view and argues that the EC authorities wanted Turkey to apply for Full Membership of the EC in 1975 so that the EC could refuse both of these applications, from Turkey and from Greece (ibid.: 88). Mango presents a different dimension to this discussion, but I find him oversimplifying a very important question of Turkey’s self-exclusion from applying for Full Membership. This question was also the subject of discussion in a documentary programme on Turkish TV (TRT) in 2004. A very well-known politician, Murat Karayalcin, the leader of the SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party), argued, in the programme, that Turkey lost its chance of joining the EC in 1975. Karayalcin explained that while Turkey was expected by the EC institutions to apply along with Greece, Turkey, instead, disregarded the EC’s welcoming approach and did not make an application. He believed that if Turkey had applied, Turkey would have, by now, become a full member of the EC. This was because, according to Karayalcin, the EC would have had to treat Turkey equally with Greece (quoted from the TV programme Ninth Symphony, TRT 19/11/2004). Furthermore, the issue of Turkey’s “self-exclusion” was discussed when the EU decided to commence accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.
When Turkey and the EC signed the Additional Protocol in 1973, Turkey–EC relations entered into a new phase. The EC accepted a lifting or lowering of the trade barriers for most manufactured goods imported from Turkey in 1972 and this allowed Turkey to export manufactured goods to EU markets freely. Turkey however lacked a liberal economy. Soon after the Additional Protocol was signed, Turkey informed the EC of its economic problems and asked for revision of some of the protocols of the Ankara Agreement, such as on agricultural policy. Gaston Thorn, then the leader of the Council, said that the EC was determined not to make further changes to the agricultural policy. When Calangil heard the EC’s decision on Turkey’s request, he left the meeting (Oran 2005: 849–50). The EC then offered financial aid to Turkey. The meeting of the Council of Association in July was postponed to November and the next meeting took place on 20 December 1976 when the EC decided that it would make concessions on 33 products out of 65 and provided financial aid. However, regardless of the EC’s proposal, Turkey decided to postpone the implementation of the obligations arising from the Protocol for one year under Article 60 of the Additional Protocol and by this, the 10 per cent discount was delayed for one year (Oran 2005: 850).

The Turkish economy slumped into a deep recession between January and March 1978 and Ecevit’s government could not afford to maintain interest payments on loans. The government was in breach of the Ankara Agreement (Ozsoy 2002: 25; Onis 1986: 7). This economic situation led Ecevit to present a proposal to the European Commission on 9 October, which asked for $8 million of credit and the freezing of Turkey’s obligations under the AA (Ugur 1999: 117). Turkey’s request for financial aid was refused, but its request for freezing Turkey–EC relations was accepted by the EC (Kar luk 2003: 535–36). The EC member states received Ankara’s decision with considerable relief with an EC official saying that the situation was so difficult that the EC could not turn down Ecevit’s request of freezing Turkey-EC relations (The Guardian, 19/09/1978). Ecevit’s request was discussed in a documentary TV programme in Turkey in 2004. It was said that Ecevit did not think carefully enough before making the decision to make the request. Murat Karayalcin, leader of the SHP, in the same TV programme, said that if Turkey at present still had problems with the EC, it was because of Ecevit’s request to freeze relations for ten years in the 1970s (quoted from the TV programme, Ninth Symphony, TRT 19/11/2004).

Gundog Oaken, the Foreign Minister argued at the time, “We look for alternative relations to both the West and the EU” (Calis 2001: 175, author’s translation). He added that this was
particularly important for a country like Turkey because it had cultural, regional, and geopolitical values that were, already, similar to Middle Eastern, Balkan and Eastern countries. Like the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, began to think about different destinies for Turkey at this point. In one of his speeches, he said that Turkey was driven into this economic crisis by the Western countries because the EC had refused to provide it with economic assistance. He went on to say, “when any country is forced into an economic crisis there are people, institutions or countries that would like to exploit that situation for their own interest. I do not know whether this is what happening to our country at present … Yes, we are in our worst economic crisis and period of instability. However, nobody should ever think that they could force us or put pressure on us” (Cayhan 1997: 207, author’s translation). Ecevit went on to imply a warning that if the EC did not provide Turkey with assistance over its economic difficulties, then Turkey need to think about strengthening its relationship with the Soviet Union. In Ecevit’s words, “if at any time they begin to think about pressuring Turkey, we will open our doors to those on whom it is thought we had turned our back. If at present we are not on the other side of that wall, is because we have decided to be where we want to be … [W]e are not interested in crossing over to the other side of the wall … but we do not want anyone to force us to do that” (Cayhan 1997: 207, author’s translation).

After Ecevit’s pledges to develop a better approach to Turkey’s economic unsettlement and political violence, the AP’s victory at by elections in October 1979 deprived Ecevit of a majority and he resigned. Thus, in November 1979, Suleyman Demirel formed an AP-majority government with the backing of the MHP and MSP. Demirel’s government disregarded the previous government’s hostile policies towards the EC. Furthermore, in February 1980, at the meetings of the Council of Association, Hayrettin Erkman, the Foreign Minister, spoke out about Turkey’s interest in applying for Full Membership of the EC (Calis 2001: 189). However, the MSP, whose support the AP needed in the TBMM, did not support Erkman in applying for Full Membership. Recai Kutan, who was the deputy leader of the MSP at the time, argued that the MSP would not continue supporting the AP, because Erkmen was not paying enough attention to improving Turkey’s relations with the Islamic countries and rather aiming to improve its relations with the West and Israel. Kutan believed that the AP’s foreign policy aims were against Turkey’s religion and history (Milli Gazete, 04/09/1980).
The MSP suggested that Turkey should develop economic and political relations with the Islamic countries whom Turkey could trust, and where they would be treated equally, and have equal rights with other member countries. Thus, the MSP presented a motion of no confidence in Erkman in August 1980. When Erkmen could not gain a majority in the TBMM, he resigned (Calis 2001: 19). On the other hand, while the EC was negotiating with Greece, Spain, and Portugal for enlargement in the late 1970s, Turkey missed its second chance of applying for Full Membership on this occasion too as Critical Juncture (III) emerged, when again there were constant clashes among different communities in Turkey, but this it was more intense. Therefore at Critical Juncture (III) the National Security Commission published eighteen communiqués in the early days of the 1980 intervention; each concentrated on different policy areas. The first communiqué outlined its perception of the period before 12 September 1980. It underlined the army’s important role in the following: protection of the unity of Turkish land, taking measures to prevent civil war and fostering a healthy democratic order (Minutes of the National Security Commission, 19/09/1980, B.1, O.1: 4). The second communiqué said that legislative and executive powers would be given to Evren and the Force Commanders of the National Security Commission to restore stability to the streets of the Turkish Republic. The National Security Commission dissolved the TBMM and the government, declared martial law throughout the country and took into custody the chairmen of the following political parties: the AP, the CHP, the MHP, and the MSP (ibid.: 19/09/1980, B.1, O.1: 6). It took decisions not only in relation to politics, but also on the future of the economy. The seventh communiqué said that Turkey would honour its economic agreement with the EC and aim to continue negotiations with it on the Fourth Financial Protocol to be approved (ibid.:19/09/1980, B.1, O.1: 8).

Following these changes, Bulend Ulusu, former admiral, was asked to form a government and Ozal was appointed as the Deputy PM to manage the economy – emphasis was put on protection of the fundamental principles of Kemalism (Milli Gazete, 23/09/1980). The "Martial Law Act” was amended in order to enhance the martial law commandants’ powers by giving them the right to:

- ban strikes, public meetings, and demonstrations
- suspend newspapers and other publications
• dismiss local and central government staff whose employment was deemed undesirable, without right of appeal (Hale 1994: 251)

For example, Turkes, together with 2,000 members of his party (MHP) was arrested and charged with instigating civil war and murdering 600 people between 1974 and 1980. Turkes was then sentenced (though later released due to his illness in April 1985). Erbakan, the leader of the MSP, was charged with violating the Constitution, as well as violating Section 163 of the Penal Code, which made it illegal to call for the establishment of an Islamic state. In February, he was sentenced to four months imprisonment, before receiving a formal acquittal on appeal in September 1985. In the meantime, Turkes and Erbakan were banned from participating in politics (Milliyet, 10/10/1985, 20/09/1985 in Hale 1994: 252).

Calis (2001) argues that the National Security Commission accepted Erkmen’s previous policies concerning Turkey–EC relations as a framework for Ulusu's government (ibid.: 210), and this was approved by Evren (Oran 2005: 83). Ulusu’s government was also interested in improving relations with the Islamic countries, for which reason he allowed meetings of Islamic countries to take place in Turkey and represented Turkey at these meetings. The aim of these meetings was to discuss how to improve economic integration of the Islamic countries (Milli Gazete, 04/11/1980). Ulusu also went to Saudi Arabia for the Confederation of Islam meetings (Milli Gazete, 12/12/1980).

On the day of the army’s intervention, the European Commission called on the army members to respect human rights in Turkey. They continued associational relations with Turkey and held negotiation meetings on the Fourth Financial Protocol of the Association Agreement (EC Bulletin 1980). The following month however the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on the situation in Turkey and expressed its concern over the military’s takeover and requested steps be taken immediately towards guaranteeing Turkish people the right to join both a political party and trade unions. It stressed the importance of immediate assurances of physical safety of those people who had been detained, for instance, the Turkish members of the EEC/Turkey Joint Committee. Thereafter, the EC appeared to apply a “wait and see” policy over Turkey (Milli Gazete, 28/09/1980). In early 1981, the EP then began to discuss what strategy it should take towards Turkey – discussions caused divisions among the EP’s political party groups. On the EP’s first meeting in relation to Turkey, called “Conditions in Turkey”, which took place in April 1981, the European Socialist groups proposed to terminate Turkey–EC relations, referring to the 1967 army intervention in Greece
when the EC terminated its relations with Greece (EC Briefing 1980: 3). Then in 1981 when Turkey requested to have a meeting with the delegates of European Parliament–Turkish (joint committee), the EP refused to meet with Turkey. In response to the EP’s criticisms and attitudes towards Turkey, Evren said that conditions in Turkey were not only improving day by day, but it was soon going to adopt democracy again (Cumhuriyet, 29/03/1981). He furthermore promised that a consultative parliament would soon be established and a new Constitution would be prepared (Cumhuriyet, 29/03/1981, 01/05/1981).

The National Security Commission worked on an extensive number of policy areas. It passed a large number of Bills in different policy areas that had not received a majority in the TBMM before the army’s intervention, ensuring they were in line with Kemalist principles. Turkey’s European policy was one of those policies on which the political parties had failed to achieve consensus for many years either because of weak coalitions or Eurosceptical political parties (Cumhuriyet, 30/03/1981). There were two instances when Turkey had missed its chance to apply for Full Membership of the EC when it had a good chance to join. Therefore, the MGK wanted to “waste no more time” on the question of whether Turkey should apply for Full Membership of the EC. While questions were raised about Turkey’s place in a democratic Europe, on 25 March 1981, Turkey–EC relations were on the agenda of a National Security Commission meeting. It was discussed whether Turkey should apply for Full Membership of the EC. Except for Turgut Ozal, the deputy Prime Minister, and Haydar Saltik, the Chairman of the State Planning Organisation (DPT), the other members – Kenan Evren, the Chairmen of the National Security Commission; Bulend Ulusu, the Prime Minister; Ilter Turan, the Foreign Minister; Kaya Erdem, the Ministry of Finance; Cenap Keskin, the Turkish representative in Brussels –agreed that when Turkey returned to democracy, it would apply for Full Membership of the EC (Cumhuriyet, 30/03/1981). Ozal did not believe Turkey was competent to join, but the National Security Commission said that Turkey could improve its political and economic system in the midst of the long process of negotiations, “one never goes to the battlefield fully prepared … one completes the preparations on the battlefield” and “it seems that we already wasted 18 years by not making this application any earlier” (Birand 2005: 302). Furthermore, the National Security Commission decided that it would start the preparations by asking the Minister of Finance to remove the existing restrictions on custom so as to normalise relations with the EC before an application was made (Cumhuriyet, 29/03/1981).
Echoing arguments it made in the 1960s when Turkey applied for Associative Membership, the DPT wanted Turkey to maintain Turkey’s autonomous economic development and was suspicious of diktats received from the EC. The DPT looked at the possibility of alternative economic relations with the countries of the Middle East and South Asia. The DPT pointed out that Turkish infrastructure was weak and thus it was less able to compete with European countries, while this would not be the case with Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and India. The DPT claimed that if Turkey could consolidate its bilateral relations with these countries, Turkey would be a leading country among them, whereas within the EC it would be a weaker partner. The National Security Commission however disregarded the sceptical stances of Ozal and the DPT and proposed that separate departments specialising in the EC be created for every ministry. Ozal suggested that the DPT be in charge of this process, but the National Security Commission did not agree because it wanted an institution that was pro-European to be in charge of this process. A new EC expert group under the leadership of the National Security Commission then was established (Birand 2005: 303).

As for domestic politics, Evren promised that Turkey would follow a two-step journey back to democracy; the first was to establish a constitutional assembly that would be responsible for preparing a constitution. As far as the composition of the Constitutional Assembly was concerned, it was decided that it would consist of the National Security Commission and a consultative parliament. The consultative parliament was made of forty members who would be selected by the National Security Commission with certain restrictions. For example, if you were a member of political party before 12 September 1980 you were disqualified, and applications from the East of Turkey were not accepted (Cumhuriyet, 01/07/1981). Lastly, the National Security Commission’s composition remained as it was. The constitutional assembly was established so that it would assist the National Security Commission in the passage of laws and help reach the public, while remembering to protect the unity, independence and secular nature of Turkey. It was also expected to respect human rights and the rule of law. But the most important role of the constitutional assembly was to prepare a constitution, present it to the public for referendum, and ensure that the constitution received full support. Once the constitutional assembly ensured that the constitution was approved, it would move on to prepare an electoral law that would allow free elections, but until then, the political parties would not participate in the work of the constitutional assembly (Cumhuriyet, 03/07/1981). There was another positive movement from Turkish side, as Evren agreed with the EC authorities that ninety days of detention without trial was too long and against human
rights (Cumhuriyet, 25/07/1981). Therefore, he promised to make improvements on the issue by reducing detention days without trial to a more appropriate number of days. Evren continued by claiming that they would return political power to the hands of those democratically elected once they had achieved stability. However, Evren also argued that they would make these changes cautiously to achieve the best results, so Turkey would not suffer from similar problems of instability in future (Cumhuriyet, 25/07/1981). Evren and the rest of the members of the National Security Commission believed that once the constitutional assembly was established the EC would soften its attitudes towards Turkey. However, these moves did not change the EC’s attitudes as it was not fully convinced that the constitutional assembly would have authority over the National Security Commission. It was noted that “the Constitutional Assembly does not meet the need for restoration of democracy, since in the last resort the overall power still remained in the hand of the National Security Commission” (EC Doc. 1981a;Cumhuriyet, 21/02/1981). Therefore, the National Security Commission’s first step towards democracy was not found acceptable because Turkey was supposed to take bigger and more serious steps towards democracy, such as a democratically elected parliament through free and open elections. The establishment of the constitutional assembly was a positive movement, but it lacked these democratic elements.

The second stage was to hold an election in 1983, prepare a new “Political Parties Law” which went into effect on 24 April 1983, and allow new political parties be formed (Ahmad 1993: 188). In the hope of restoring democracy gradually and having adequate time to consolidate democracy in Turkey, restrictions were applied on the number of political parties allowed to stand in the election. It was suggested that political parties with similar views should gather under a single political party and there should not be more than three political parties (Cumhuriyet, 20/06/1983 and 15/08/1983; Narli 2000: 114): the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP), Motherland Party (ANAP), and Populist Party (HP) were chosen as the three (Cumhuriyet, 26/08/1983).

Another way to preserve the new democracy was, Evren argued, to have a new type of politician that would henceforth be the only type of politician in Turkey. The new politician for Turkey was expected to protect the unity and secular nature of Turkey and have this as his/her priority (Cumhuriyet, 24/08/1983). The possibility of having a different type of politician, that is to say having politicians who would be interested in the equality of classes,
or have religious orientations, needed to be diminished if not discarded and replaced with Evren’s new type of politician.

The National Security Commission then continued to exert similar methods to gain stability between 1981 and 1982. It applied restrictions on political involvement of citizens and trade unions by dissolving the confederations of trade unions including the Marxist trade-union federation (DISK) immediately after the coup. This resulted in the DISK’s leader, Aptullah Basturk, and over fifty officials of this confederation being given the death penalty in December 1981 by the Martial Law Command prosecutor for alleged involvement with terrorism. Although they had denied any involvement in terrorism, they were judged under section 141 of the Penal Code with having run a Marxist-Leninist illegal revolutionary organisation that had conspired to set up the “dictatorship of the proletariat” (Dodd 1990: 54; Harris 1985: 66). Their five-year trial ended in December 1986 (Hale 1994: 253). Furthermore, the Turkish Peace Association, a pro-disarmament pressure group, was charged under section 141 with having been an allegedly communist front organisation (Hale 1994: 253). The National Security Commission also brought tight control to the universities by means of a new Higher Education law, which virtually ended their independence from the government (Hale 1994: 253).

The National Security Commission’s decision on the DISK prompted Mr Pannella to table a motion on the forthcoming execution of a Turkish trade unionist (EC Doc. 1981b). In the same motion, it was claimed that the military regime in Turkey was being increasingly repressive and totalitarian and the motion requested the suspension of the trade unionists in prison. It also requested that Turkey comply with the European Convention on Human Rights which Turkey had ratified. Allegations of breaches of provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights by Turkey were formally tabled, under Article 24 of the Convention, by five countries, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, of which three were members of the European Community. These allegations were referred to the European Commission (Cumhuriyet, 02/07/1982). Furthermore, the European Parliament and the European Commission recommended to the Council of Ministers “that aid under the Fourth Protocol should be withheld pending further progress towards restoration of civilian rule” in December 1981 (Dodd 1990: 60–61). And in July 1982 the EP expressed its concerns in relation to reports alleging the continued use of torture and the ill-treatment of prisoners. It argued that it was disturbed by the continuing political trials of former politicians among
others, the difficulties with which the defence council was confronted and the constant demands for the death penalty. And it asked the National Security Commission to ensure that human rights were respected, particularly in the case of persons on trial or in detention, and called for the removal of all restrictions preventing former Turkish political and trade union figures from taking part in public debate and voting in parliamentary elections. The EP also called on the European Commission to recommend that the European Council of Ministers adopt the Fourth EC–Turkey Financial Protocol as soon as the National Security Commission completed the various stages of re-establishing democracy in the Turkish political system. It proposed sending a delegation representing all shades of political opinion of the European Parliament to act as observers during the campaign preceding the constitutional referendum planned for the autumn of 1982 as it had already done in associated countries (OJEC 1982).

4.3. Conclusions

The strength of historical institutionalism’s approach to institutional evolution is that it accepts that institutions evolve through institutional change. Pierson argues that institutional change is an important part of institutional evolution. This is very helpful because it instructed me to look for institutional change in the MGK’s position to understand and to explain how and why the MGK evolved. As to what concept to use to explain institutional change, Peters’ point that historical institutionalists generally use the concept of critical junctures and the concept of punctuated equilibrium to explain institutional change has been informative. As said earlier in Chapter 1, I use the concept of critical juncture to understand and explain incremental institutional changes. Hogan and Cortell and Peterson’s references to the likely sources of critical junctures have allowed me identify the military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980 as Critical Junctures (I–III). Additionally Gourevitch’s and Capoccia and Kelemen’s points on the characteristics of critical junctures have helped me to highlight under what conditions the Critical Junctures (I–III) took place, what changes were introduced to the MGK’s position in Turkish political system at these critical junctures, and what impact the choices and the decisions made at these junctures had on the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. One other point is that Streeck and Thelen’s emphasis on the modes of institutional change has helped to show that the mode of changes in the MGK’s position was “empowerment”.

When I applied historical institutionalism’s position on institutional evolution to find out about both the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations, I
identified the Turkish army’s interventions in politics in 1960, in 1971 and in 1980 as Critical Junctures (I–III). I highlighted the interaction between these critical junctures and the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations (1959–1983). I found that these critical junctures were instigated by domestic political, economic and social instabilities and the politician’s lack of control over these tensions. I then highlighted that the MGK’s position was incrementally empowered at each of these critical junctures. While the MGK was an advisory body in 1930s, by the 1980s it evolved into a paramount institution in the Turkish political system. I argue that the MGK was empowered because the Turkish politicians were not able to take the initiative to produce policies not only to prevent political, economic and social tensions among the people of Turkey, but also to take measures to control the domestic instabilities. Therefore the MGK was empowered to make recommendations to the Council of Ministers to maintain peace and social well-being in Turkey. I found that although the Turkish military was pro-European and wanted Turkey to improve its relations with the EEC and gain an Associative Membership of the EEC, its decision to close political parties, to execute Menderes and Zorlu, and to restrict people’s involvement in politics slowed down Turkey’s progress in receiving the EEC’s Associative Membership in early 1960s. Furthermore, Critical Juncture (II), that is, the army’s ultimatum which demanded Demirel resign, made the authorities in the EC wonder about democratic features of the Turkish political system. By the 1980s, at Critical Juncture (III), the EC constantly asked Turkey to establish a democratic political system and respect human rights; however the strict governing style of the army meant that the EC chose not to have any dialogue with Turkey.

This chapter has provided a new analysis of the evolution of the MGK and development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. This is because (1) the Turkish army’s intervention in politics has not been studied in the context of critical junctures and therefore the role of critical junctures in both the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relation have not been studied before and (2) historical institutionalism’s position on institutional evolution has not been utilised before as it has been in this chapter. Therefore the chapter is different to what has been said previously on why the MGK’s powers were extended and how Turkey’s relationship with EEC/EC developed. It is also different because it pays a greater attention to domestic causation in how and why the MGK evolved and how and why Turkey–EEC/EC relations developed slowly and stalled by the 1980s.
In this chapter I also demonstrated that Critical Junctures (I–III) have contributed to the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. In particular, as shown above, by the early 1980s the MGK acquired new powers and responsibilities by which it became the most effective institution in the Turkish political system. In the next chapter therefore I will analyse how the MGK practiced its newly acquired powers and assess what this meant for both the Turkish political system and Turkey’s Full Membership Application and its desire to sign the Customs Union with the EC/EU.
CHAPTER 5: THE MGK’S TENDENCY TO RULE THROUGH A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND ITS INCOMPATIBILITY WITH EC/EU MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA, 1983–1997

Introduction

Every book or journal article written on Turkish politics mentions the National Security Council’s (MGK’s) important position in the Turkish political system. A number of them discuss this around its role in determining Turkey’s Kurdish policy, but mostly by implication rather than directly. Their arguments tend to be limited to stating that the MGK plays a significant role in determining policies on the Kurdish issue, and questioning whether the army members of the MGK overrule the civilian members’ position in relation to the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), without very much in-depth analysis. Examples include Barkey and Fuller (1998), Nachmani (2003) and Guler (2005). Thus, there is a need to go beyond this current academic analysis and approach. It is important to look at how the MGK developed; how it began to practice its newly acquired powers and responsibilities; what social and political developments enabled the MGK to use its new status in the Turkish political system; and how/why the MGK’s practice of its extended powers did influence the progress of democracy and human rights in Turkey between 1983 and 1997. Additionally, for most academics who have written on relations between Turkey and the European Community, Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish citizens and the Kurdish issue have generally been seen as an obstacle to Turkey’s aspirations to join the EC, and they have suggested that Turkey’s poor human rights records caused deterioration in its relations with the EU. Apart from lack of depth in their analysis, these works do not pay necessary attention to domestic political developments in Turkey. Examples include Cornell (2001), Ergil (2000), Evin (2005), McDowall (1992), Abramowitz (1993), Cooper (1994) and Calis (2001). It should be asked what institution could have been behind the handling of the PKK, and how this handling impacted on Turkey–EC/EU relations. We also need to perhaps reassess what caused poor democracy and human rights in Turkey at this time. This chapter proposes to test whether rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms can best explain the relationship between the MGK and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations.

- Thus there are three main questions this chapter will tackle:
What school of New Institutionalism can best explain the relationship between the MGK’s path of state of emergency and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations?

How and why did the MGK determine the Turkish government’s political actions regarding the Kurdish issue/the PKK?

What developments between 1983 and 1997 made Yilmaz’s government call for a freeze on political dialogue with the European Union (EU) in 1997, when the government had worked hard to revitalise the relationship in the early 1980s, had applied for Full Membership in 1987, and had signed the customs union in 1994?

To answer the above questions, this chapter will be divided into three parts. In the first part I will assess the current literature on the Kurdish issue and the PKK in the context of relations between Turkey and the EU, and discuss their weaknesses and omissions. Then I will move on to develop a theoretical debate as to which school of New Institutionalism can better explain the interaction between institutions and institutional action. In the second part I will adopt the historical institutionalist framework, using the concepts of path dependence and unintended consequences to explain the interaction between the MGK’s policy preferences and Turkey’s bid to join the EC/EU. In the third part I will make an assessment about firstly how and why the MGK maintained the state of emergency in the Kurdish region and secondly assess what school of new institutionalism is better equipped to explain the relationship between the institutional action and policy outcome. My conclusions will draw together all the findings of this chapter.

5.1. Assessment of the literature on the Kurdish issue, the PKK, and Turkey-EU relations and the theoretical debate

Turkey’s relationship with the EC/EU (1983–1997) and the emergence and evolution of the PKK and the Kurdish issue have been widely researched among scholars specialised in Turkish politics (Gunter 1994; Ergil 2000; Yegen 1996; Guler 2005; Ozcan 2006; Heper 2007; and Marcus 2007). These two research areas are often considered together in order to try to understand not only how the Kurdish issue impacted on Turkey’s integration into the EU, but also how the EU influenced Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds (McDowall 1992; Van Bruinessen 1992, 2000; Abramowitz 1993; Ergil 2000; Cornell 2001; Kirisci 2004; Evin 2005). I would argue however that there has been a lack of depth in many of these analyses,
and there is a need for the kind of focus on the detail of Turkish domestic politics that I undertake in this chapter.

Gunter (1994), writing in the early 1990s, argued that Turkey had an assimilative policy towards the Kurds and suggested rather that the government should have constructed “a socie-tal and legal order that recognises the country’s population as consisting of many strands, each entitled to some degree of identity”, to resolve the issue of conflict with the Kurds (ibid.: 24). Yegen (1996) argued that the Turkish state both misrepresented the Kurdish question and concealed the exclusion of Kurdish identity (ibid.: 216). Moving from how Kurds have been treated; Ergil (2000) analysed what consequences this treatment had on the Turkish political system, in particular he questioned how the Kurdish problem affected the fragility of Turkish democracy. For him: “One of the greatest obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey has been the country’s treatment of its Kurdish citizens. … The Kurdish problem is but one symptom of more general weaknesses of Turkish democracy” (ibid.: 123). Additionally, Ulmar (2000) argued that the throughout the 1990s both the government and the political parties treated the Kurdish question as a national security matter. Thus the Kurdish question was dealt with outside the political settings. According to Ulmar, this therefore gave the Turkish military the right to take actions in relation to the Kurdish problem (ibid.: 126).

Pro-state academics like Guler (2005) and Heper (2007) have been less critical of state policies towards the Kurds. Guler (2005) has argued that “Turkey neither has a Kurdish nor an identity problem, it has a problem with terrorism”; and according to her, the PKK since its inception aimed to establish a Kurdistan independent of Turkey through what she named “a bloody war against Turkey” (ibid.: 29). Similarly Heper, on the question of whether there was an assimilative policy applied to the Kurds, disagreed with the above mentioned academics Gunter (1994) and Ergil (2000), saying: “the Turks and the Kurds, along with every other element of Turkish polity and society, have gone through a long process of mutual acculturation and, therefore, came to share a constellation of common ideals, values, and attitudes” (Heper 2007: 12).

Ozcan (2006) and Marcus (2007) both discuss the PKK and the role of its leader, Ocalan. Ozcan’s focus is the PKK’s organisational structure and he argues that significant factors contributed to the growth of this organisation: the PKK’s philosophy of the education; the emergence and the formation of capitalism in Turkey; and the Republican nature of Turkish political system, all of which have consolidated the PKK’s structure. Marcus gives a
descriptive historical account of how and when the PKK was established, how it evolved, and the political developments and changes that occurred in the aftermath of the capture of Ocalan. Marcus describes the state policy towards the Kurds as “assimilative” and “ignoring”, based on “refusal” (ibid.: 26, 85, 126 respectively).

The literature outlined above does not ask what institutions shaped the governments’ policy on the PKK and the Kurdish issue; it also fails to discuss how and by whom the PKK was handled. They therefore have not questioned the nature of the state of emergency in the Kurdish region and the consequences this had both on Turkey’s political system and on the lives of the local inhabitants. However, a handful of scholars such as Guler (2005), Barkey and Fuller (1998) and Nachmani (2003) have identified the MGK as the key actor in determining policies towards the Kurds and the PKK. These works generally however lack further discussion of their arguments and evidence to back up their points of view. For instance, Guler (2005) argues that the MGK is the “key actor in defining Turkey’s policy toward the Kurds [and] makes Turkey’s Kurdish policy” (ibid.: 139). It is not clear from this work why Guler thinks that the MGK is or was the key actor in determining Turkey’s attitudes towards the Kurdish issue. Similarly Barkey and Fuller note: “When it comes to the Kurdish question, the National Security Council (NSC) is the most influential state body” and they argue that the MGK has submitted opinions on “renewing Operation Provide … renewing the state of emergency in the south east … deciding the curriculum in schools” (1998: 143–44). These academics however fail to question to whom the MGK made recommendations, and why it called a state of emergency in the South East of Turkey. They do not look at whether the MGK succeeded in eradicating the PKK. Most importantly, Barkey and Fuller lack a discussion of what kind of regime evolved in the state of emergency zone over this time. Nachmani (2003), rather, speculates on how powerful the army members of the MGK were in dealing with the PKK and notes that “policy towards the Kurds continued to be determined by the army … in the mixed decision-making bodies the military has the upper hand when it comes to the Kurdish issue. The discussions pertaining to the Kurds made by Turkey’s National Security Council (NSC) – a body that makes recommendations to the cabinet – often reflect the military stand and [are] rarely overruled” (Nachmani 2003: 33–34). However, Nachmani does not acknowledge that Article Seven of the Law of the National Security Council and the Secretariat General of the National Security Council (see appendix 1) states that army and civilian members of the MGK have equal number of votes in the decision making process and a decision is only made by simple
majority. Additionally, in the early 1990s, when Ozal talked about developing a political solution to the Kurdish issue, the MGK’s press releases showed that Ozal had succeeded in influencing the views of all the MGK members, including the military members. I would argue that this indicates that as long as the civilian members of the MGK were determined to pursue a policy and had strong negotiation skills, they were able to change the opinion of the army members of the MGK. It is therefore important to simply assess the MGK’s role in the government’s handling of the Kurdish issue and go beyond speculating whether the army members of the MGK were stronger than the civilian members.

As far as Kurdish question is discussed in the context of Turkey-EU relations, Cornell (2001), Evin (2005) and Ergil (2000) make general statements about how the Kurdish issue affected Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU. I found these mentioned very useful to understand how the Kurdish question has been treated in the context of Turkey’s aspirations to join the EC/EU; and there is seems to an agreement how negatively the Kurdish issue impacted on the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. Cornell argues that the Kurdish question was the most serious internal problem of Turkey and became the main obstacle to its bid for closer integration with Europe (2001: 31). Evin analyses the Kurdish issue as “the key area of tension between Turkey and the European Union” (2005: 38). Ergil earlier suggested that the Kurdish issue played a very important role in the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU (2000: 123). However, these works lacked detailed analysis of how and why the Kurdish has been either an obstacle for Turkey’s accession to the EC/EU or source of tensions between Turkey and EC/EU.

McDowall (1992), Abramowitz (1993), Cooper (1994) and Calis (2001), in contrast to the above mentioned academics, have focused on why the Kurdish issue has influenced the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. McDowall refers to the state’s oppressive policy towards the Kurds and its poor human rights records (1992: 21). Agreeing with McDowall, Abramowitz and Cooper both argue that political relations with Europe have not prospered mainly because of the internal war against the Kurdish insurgency and the PKK (Abramowitz 1993: 166–67 and Cooper 1994: 127). Calis argues that EC’s perception of the Kurdish issue as an ethnic problem, and the Turkish government’s recognition of this as a move threatening the indivisibility of the Republic, have resulted in conflicting conceptions that ultimately troubled the relationship between them (2001: 263). Picking on Calis’s argument in relation to Turkey and the EU’s different security perceptions, Ozcan (2008) argued that during the
1990s the impact of the EU on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy were limited since Turkey was not a candidate country. Also Turkey’s struggle with the PKK and the criticisms of European countries from the point of human rights was a major point of friction. Additionally Ozcan (2008) argued that the security threat against the territorial integrity of the state legitimized the role of army in the politics in the eyes of the general public and many Turks believed that European countries either did not understand Turkey’s concerns or consciously opposed Turkey’s policies (ibid.: 133).

There has been academic engagement with both the Kurdish question and Turkish foreign politics in the context of wider international politics in the 1990s – the end of Cold War, the beginning of the gulf War and the emergence of the newly independent former Soviet states. Kut (2000) has suggested that in the 1990s Turkey’s domestic and foreign politics were at their most problematic and intertwined; the rising Kurdish problem in the South East of Turkey, increasing radical Islam in Iran, Turkey’s European policy, and Turkey’s relations with Greece were all influencing each other’s direction (ibid.:57). Kut however puts particular focus on the standards of democracy in Turkey and its human rights records in shaping Turkey’s problematic European policy. She argues that the1990s made Turkish politicians and the public more informed of Turkey’s geopolitical position, role and power which made them feel overly secure at times and overly insecure on other occasions. Additionally, Ulman (2000) has conducted archival research into the situation in the 1990s to find out how the government, the political parties and the military treated the Kurdish problem and what positions they adopted on the extension of the State of Emergency in the Kurdish region. Ulman observed that the Motherland Party (ANAP) had a changing perception and treatment of the Kurdish problem (ibid.: 109); found that Suleyman Demirel recognised the Kurdish question as a state security problem that was not in the remit of elected politicians to resolve (ibid.: 110); and suggested that the military did not share the power to make decisions in relation to the Kurdish question with the civilian authorities (ibid.: 118–119).

Van Bruinessen’s (1992) and Kirisci’s (2004) focus has been the growing Kurdish diaspora in Western European countries. Van Bruinessen analysed how these groups strengthened the Kurdish movements in “Kurdistan” and found that the emergence of an organised Kurdish diaspora changed the nature of the Kurdish question. In his later work (2000), he showed that Turkey’s poor performance in human rights and its handling of the Kurdish issue was a big concern for the EU when Turkey’s progress was assessed (ibid.: 28). Kirisci (2004) notes
how the growing diaspora has influenced the European Parliament’s attitude towards Turkey, arguing that “the PKK in Europe became increasingly successful in mobilizing the Kurdish Diaspora and leading the campaign against Turkey. This was reflected in growing barrage of criticisms directed against Turkey for violating the human rights of Kurds. … [T]he European Parliament (EP) suspended financial assistance to Turkey” (ibid.: 296–97). Although Van Bruinessen’s and Kirisci’s perspectives have been useful in understanding the role of the diaspora in shaping the future of the Kurdish issue, these works do not discuss in any depth what made the Kurdish communities in Europe leave their own country; they omit to recognise that these were one of the characteristics of the state of emergency; and they fail to contextualise them as part of the unintended consequences of the MGK’s policy of imposing a state of emergency.

Apart from the specific weaknesses and omissions of the works covered above, there are a number of general weaknesses and omissions in the above studied literature:

- they lack detailed assessment of how Turkey’s handling of the PKK/the Kurdish issue influenced the nature of Turkey–EU relations
- they lack any serious questioning as to which institutions in particular have contributed to the government’s political action towards the PKK
- they omit to explain the reasons for Turkey’s weak democracy and poor human rights record
- they overlook how Turkey’s poor human rights and weak democracy affected Turkey’s progress towards EC/EU membership.

This chapter therefore will give a detailed assessment of Turkey-EU relations (1983–1997). It proposes to do this by questioning the MGK’s new position in the Turkish institutional setting, in particular by paying more attention to its role in handling the PKK. In addition, I will outline what consequences the MGK’s actions had for the Turkish political system and then analyse how this impacted on Turkey’s application for the Full Membership of the EC in 1987, its aspirations to establishing the Customs Union in 1994, and its position at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997.
Having debated the strengths and the weaknesses of the existing literature on the Kurdish issue, the PKK, and Turkey–EU relations, I now want to move on to discuss the schools of New Institutionalism, and which of their approaches to the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes can best explain the interaction between the MGK’s state of emergency path and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. As shown in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, while sociological institutionalism adopts a cultural approach to explaining the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes, rational choice institutionalism tends to opt for a calculus approach. For sociological institutionalists the individuals involved are “satisfiers, rather than utility maximizers”, which means that the individual’s choice of action depends on the interpretation of a situation rather than on a purely instrumental calculation (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939). This is called the “cultural approach” under which the individual’s established routines and familiar pattern of behaviour do trend to decide their actions. If one were to apply this cultural approach to explain the relationship between the MGK’s preference to keep the state of emergency and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relation, one would argue that both the MGK’s choice to maintain the state of emergency and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations were shaped by established routine and familiar behaviour. One main problem with the cultural approach is that it takes the established routines and familiar behaviour as given, it does not seem to question how they are established and in what time scale they have developed. Nevertheless I will later check how useful the cultural approach can be for the question in hand in this chapter. For rational choice institutionalists the individuals are utility maximisers; institutions affect individual action by altering the expectations an actor has about the actions that others are likely to take in response to or simultaneously with his own action. Strategic interaction clearly plays a key role in such analyses (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939; see also Lecours 2005: 9–11). If one were to adopt the calculus approach to explain the relationship between the MGK’s Kurdish policy preference and the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations, then it can be suggested that the members of the MGK were motivated to maximise its gains through keeping the state of emergency and Turkish political leaders kept Turkey’s bid to join the EU so to increase their benefits from Turkey–EC/EU relations. The calculus approach can be useful to highlight relationship between the members of the institution, as well as the political leaders’ behaviour in relation to a policy area. This is something I will test in the very last part of this chapter. In contrast to sociological and rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism offers the temporal approach that can be utilised to explain the interaction between institutional action and policy outcomes. As shown in Chapter 1 and 2, the historical institutionalist concepts of path dependence and unintended consequences to-
gether form a very useful framework which I will use below to highlight the interaction between the MGK’s maintenance of the state of emergency and Turkey’s bid to join the EU, and the outcomes of this interaction on the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations between 1983 and 1997.

5.2. Understanding the relationship between the MGK’s Kurdish Policy and the nature of Turkey–EEC/EU relations with the historical institutionalist approach

5.2.1. The MGK’s Path of State of Emergency

Chapter 4 showed that the MGK’s powers and responsibilities were extended at Critical Juncture (III). Although it was clear that the MGK had evolved into a powerful institution as a result of the changes introduced the Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution and the National Security Council Law, No. 2945, the current academic literature lacks clear evidence that the MGK practiced its newly acquired powers in a context of policy making. To fill this gap this section will analyse the MGK’s role in handling the rise of the insurgency by the PKK to show how the MGK determined political action in a policy area (the Kurdish question). This will be done in three sections: (1) will look at the Kurdish citizens of Turkey, ask where they come from and what language they speak, and discuss the emergence of the PKK; (2) will analyse how the MGK perceived the PKK, what recommendations (path) it made to the government for handling the PKK, and how it maintained this path; (3) will discuss what the MGK’s path-dependent recommendations evolved into.

(i) Emergence of the PKK

When the Ottoman Empire fell the Kurds were dispersed between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. In the process of establishing the Turkish Republic those in Turkey were promised local autonomy, but these promises were not kept when the Republic was established. The Treaty of Sevres of 1920 and the Lausanne Conference of 1923 were the agreements that formed the foundation of the Kurds’ position in the newly established Turkish Republic. The Treaty of Sevres was a peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and its allies at the end of World War I (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 68). “The Treaty has provided for local autonomy for ‘Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontiers of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia’ and referred to the possibility of independence for Kurds under certain conditions” (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 68; Lundgren 2007: 21). However the Treaty was
never ratified by the signatories and the promises of administrative autonomy and even of “independence” were not kept (Atacan 2001: 131). The current boundaries of the Turkish Republic were established by the Lausanne Conference of 1923. This, according to Gunduz (2001) “settled the ethnic problem once and for all” by permitting special status for non-Muslim minorities only (Gunduz 2001: 25). All Muslim ethnic groups, primarily Kurds, were expected to identify themselves as Turks (Kramer 2000: 40; Ergil 2000: 125). Multiculturalism was rejected and the existence of separate Muslim ethnic groups was denied (Yegen 1996: 216). Until the late 1990s, Kurds were officially referred to as Mountain Turks (Dag Turkleri) (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 10–100; Gunter 1997: 6; Yavuz and Özcan 2006: 111).

Ergil (2000), and Ibrahim and Gurbey (2000) have observed that there is no reliable figure of how many Kurds there are living in Turkey, because the government has been reluctant to count the minorities in the belief that having an exact number would mean not only having to legally acknowledge the Kurdish minorities, but also having to satisfy their cultural and political demands (Ergil 2000: 127; Ibrahim and Gurbey 2000: 182 respectively). The figures given in different sources show a broad variation. The 1959 census estimated 10–20 per cent native Kurdish speakers (McLaren 2008: 39). Additionally, the results of the 1965 national census reveal the breakdown of the population by mother tongues – Kurdish speakers numbered 2.37 million. However, Van Bruinessen (1992) argued that a “reasonable and even conservative” estimate for the size of the Kurdish population in Turkey in 1975 was 7.5 million, which amounted to 19 per cent of the total population of 56.4 million (ibid.: 14–15). The European Commission’s Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession said “a population of Kurdish origin estimated at between 8 and 15 million, depending on the source” (1998: 19).

The Kurdish language consists of several dialects and is related to Persian, but heavily influenced by Arabic and Turkish as well (Ergil 2000: 126). Van Bruinessen (1992) has argued: “As a result of forced or voluntary assimilation … there are quite few Kurds who speak no, or only a poor Kurdish, preferring to use Turkish, Arabic, or Persian” (ibid.: 35). During the 1980 army intervention, 8,000 villages and towns were renamed in Turkish under Article 5542 of Turkish law, names of mountains and lakes were changed into Turkish, Kurdish families were forced to give Turkish names to their children (Ergil 2000: 127; Nachmani 2003: 33). Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution also introduced a number of
limitations on the use of Kurdish. Article (26) stated, “No language prohibited by the State [namely Kurdish] shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought” and Article (28) banned publication in any language prohibited by law (McLaren 2008: 189). By these, according to Gunter (1990: 15–45) and Ergil (2000: 127), military regimes reemphasized the idea of the Turkishness of the people in Turkey.

The Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978. Ocalan had been a student in Ankara at the time of the 1970 coup, involved with the Revolutionary Youth (DEV-GENC) and the Ankara Higher Education Association (AYOD). Following the amnesty of 1974, Ocalan gathered six political colleagues to initiate a specifically Kurdish national liberation movement based on revolutionary Marxism-Leninism by “an armed struggle to free themselves from Turkish colonization” (Marcus 2007: 27). In 1975, Ocalan and his followers withdrew from Turkish territory into the Kurdish marches, concentrating on building up a following in those areas from which they came: Urfa, Elazig, Tunceli, Gaziantep and Maras (McDowall 2000: 418; Marcus 2007: 28). In 1977, the followers of Ocalan identified the enemies of the Kurdish people as the fascists (Grey Wolves and similar groups); agents of the state and those who supported them; the Turkish Left, which subordinated the Kurdish question to the leftist revolution; and finally, the exploitative Kurdish landlord class (McDowall 2000: 419).

The PKK was made of number of different divisions or related organisations which operated at various levels of command. Central committees acted as the highest organ of the PKK, subordinate only to the General Secretary, who was Ocalan. The Kurdistan National Liberation Front (ERNK) was the popular front and propaganda division (Gunter 1997: 35–37). The Kurdistan Peoples Liberations Army (ARGK) was chosen to be the party’s professional guerrilla army (Gunter 1997: 37–43). The Parliament-in-Exile (PKDW) represented the will of the people both inside and outside of Kurdistan (Gunter 1997: 43–45).

The PKK’s first goal was to establish a credible military force within Turkey that would challenge the political power of the authorities. When this was accomplished, the party was to expand its control to Kurdish areas beyond the Turkish border comprising parts of north-eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria, and north-western Iran, where the Kurdish population was in the majority (Radu 2001: 50) and thus create a unified and independent Kurdish state (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 23). The method the PKK used against the Turkish Security Forces (TSK) was to launch a guerrilla campaign in the southern-eastern provinces. Ergil (2000:
127) and Nachmani (2003: 43) have argued that at first the PKK were able to regularly outwit the Turkish troops, who were inexperienced in and ill-equipped for guerrilla combat; and by employing hit-and-run tactics from their hideouts in the mountain, the PKK guerrillas were able to maintain military superiority over the Turkish security forces throughout the 1980s. Additionally, “tourists destinations, and key government economic operations, such as transport and communication ... teacher and schools” were targeted by the PKK (McLaren 2008: 188; Amnesty International 1996: 5; Barkey and Fuller 1998: 29). Yavuz and Ozcan (2006: 111) have argued that these successes significantly raised Kurdish political consciousness and developed new sets of Kurdish political and social networks within and outside Turkey.


When academics such as Barkey and Fuller (1998: 135), Nachmani (2003: 33) and Yildiz (2005) write about state of emergency, they generally devote a few lines to note that it was Turgut Ozal, the Prime Minister, who called a state of emergency in 1989. There are four important facts that they do not mention: (1) when Turkey adopted democracy in 1983 there was a gradual movement towards lifting martial law from every part of the country; (2) that a state of emergency was called in the provinces where martial law was lifted, and extended every four months; (3) the state of emergency was then kept in the ten South Eastern provinces; and (4) it was the MGK that not only recommended to the Council of Ministers whether to call or remove martial law and the state of emergency, but also took decisions about where and when the government needed to take action. I would argue that Ozal’s position in taking political action against the PKK has been overemphasised, and these academics have overlooked the MGK’s role in calling and maintaining the state of emergency. This section will give a detailed account of how the MGK gradually removed martial law from many parts of Turkey and replaced it by a state of emergency. Furthermore, it will assess how and why the MGK established the path of state of emergency, and how and why it chose to maintain the state of emergency in the presence of other options.

Under Law 2945, the MGK was asked to determine an opinion on the application of the national security policy of the Turkish Republic; national security means “The protection and maintenance of the constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests in international field as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of the State” (See Appendix 1). Because this chapter is only concerned
with the internal threat I shall not be considering the MGK’s definition of external threat that may also be found in Law 2945. The MGK defines “internal threat” as “widespread acts of violence of either internal or external origin threatening the order, indivisibility of the country, and public order” (MGK’s official website, author’s translation).

The fight between the ARGK (the Kurdish guerrilla army) and the TSK (the Turkish security forces) begun as soon as the PKK guerrillas moved into Turkey from Syria; and the ARGK’s first attack was launched on military installations near Eruh and Semdinli in August 1984 (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 126). These developments however were not reflected in the MGK’s discussions until early 1985. This showed that either the MGK did not realise how effective the PKK was going to become or it was too early for the MGK to comprehend the nature of these developments in the South East of Turkey; Ozcan (2000) noted that in the until mid-1980s the Kurdish movement was treated as a regional problem (ibid.:18). In early 1985, the MGK perceived these clashes as “regional unsettlements” (MGK Press Releases: 25/01/1985). In the later meetings, between 1985 and 1990, frequent referrals to “developments in the South East” have been noted (MGK Press Releases: 31/08/1989, 26/10/1989) and at times these have been recognised as “terrorist movements” (ibid. : 31/05/1985, 02/03/1986). When the MGK recognised the PKK as an internal threat to Turkey’s indivisibility and public order, it began to make recommendations to the Turkish government on how to eradicate this threat. One of the recommendations was to declare, withdraw, extend and re-extend martial law or a state of emergency in the provinces selected by them. Before going into details, it is important to define what is meant by martial law and a state of emergency and identify under which circumstances these could be called and by whom.

In Turkey, the Council of Ministers, after consultation with the MGK, may declare martial law in one or more regions or throughout the country for a period not exceeding six months. It could be declared in the event of widespread acts of violence, which are more dangerous than the cases necessitating a state of emergency, that aim at the destruction of the free democratic order or the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution, or, in the event of war, the emergence of a situation necessitating war, an uprising, or the spread of violent and strong rebellious actions against the motherland and the Republic (Article 122 of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic) (Alexander et al. 2008: 89–90). Provost (2002) has argued that the concept of a state of emergency was created in the French Law of 8 July 1791
in which “the individual rights [that?] were entrenched in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen could be suspended in times of war” (ibid.: 269 footnote). In Turkey, after consulting with the MGK, the Council of Ministers could also declare a state of emergency. It could do this under two circumstances: whenever there was one or more of natural disasters, dangerous epidemic diseases, or serious crises; and whenever there appeared to be serious indications resulting from widespread acts of violence, which were aimed at destroying the free democratic order of fundamental rights and freedom, or violent acts causing serious deterioration to public order, more rigorous, or throughout the country for a period not exceeding six months (Alexander et al. 2008: 90–91).

English scholars tend to omit a detailed account of where and for how long martial law or a state of emergency was called in Turkey. There is a tendency to keep the removal of martial law or re-extension of the state of emergency to a sentence without further detail or analysis. In this section I will examine in more detail where and how martial law or a state of emergency was called, and by so doing will go beyond the current academic works. Furthermore, I will question whether the MGK had other options to choose from at the choice-points.

In March 1984, under the chairmanship of Kenan Evren, the President, and the others attending the MGK meeting, including Turgut Ozal, PM and M. Necdet Urug, Chief of the General Staff, the MGK agreed to recommend to the Council of Ministers that they remove Martial Law in 13 provinces (Kirklareli, Bilecik, Mus, Kutahya, Burdur, Canakkale, Kirsehir, Gumushane, Sinop, Isparta, Kastamonu, Cankiri, Bitlis); and suggested then calling a state of emergency in 8 of those provinces (Canakkale, Kirsehir, Gumushane, Sinop, Isparta, Kastamonu, Cankiri, Bitlis) for another 4 months. Additionally, it was decided to re-extend martial law in the rest of the country for another 4 months (MGK Press Releases: 01/03/1984). Despite the EC’s requests to remove martial law from every province of Turkey, the government later in 1984 was then advised to remove martial law and call a state of emergency in the following provinces: Afyon, Amasya, Aydin, Balikesir, Bolu, Corum, Mugla, Nevsehir, Nigde, Rize, Sakarya, Tekirdag, and Yozgat. The MGK also recommended lifting the state of emergency in Bitlis, Canakkale, Kastamonu, and Sinop but not in Isparta, Kirsehir, Cankiri, and Gumushane (ibid.: 28/06/1984). Additionally, even though Turkey’s political system was under close scrutiny by the EC in 1986, the MGK members recommended that the ANAP government lift martial law and call a state of emergency in
Bingol, Elazig, Tunceli, and Sanliurfa; and re-extend the state of emergency for another 4 months in Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, and Van (ibid.: 02/03/1986).

By late 1987, martial law was completely lifted from every province in Turkey but the MGK had recommended the government to call for a state of emergency in many of the provinces in the South East of Turkey. Since the MGK continuously recommended the Turkish government to re-extend these state of emergency orders, by the early 1990s a effectively permanent state of emergency zone had been established in the South East of Turkey. This zone included the provinces where: Kurdish citizens of Turkey lived; the PKK camps were generally located; and the fight between the PKK militants and TSK soldiers mostly took place. Thus in 1987 the MGK’s press releases showed that the MGK had recommended to the Council of Ministers that they remove Martial Law from Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt and Hakkari and declare a state of emergency in them for another four months and re-extend the state of emergency in Istanbul, Elazig, Bingol, Tunceli, and Van for another 4 months (ibid.: 16/05/1987).

While the MGK referred to the PKK and its activities as “regional developments” in the mid 1980s, by the 1990s the MGK’s use of vocabulary had changed significantly. This issue occupied much of the MGK’s quarterly meetings between the late 1980s and 1997. The PKK and its activities were regarded as “terrorist and anarchic movements in the South East” (MGK Press Releases: 23/02/1990); as “Divisive movements” (ibid.: 27/01/1992); and as “divisive and separatist” (ibid.: 31/03/1992, 24/05/1993, 21/061993). The PKK was often referred to as a “separatist terrorist organisation” (ibid.: 21/12/1992, 22/01/1993, 22/12/1993, 30/03/1993, 28/12/1994, 25/01/1995, 24/04/1995, 25/12/1995, 28/12/1995, 31/05/1996, 31/10/1996); as “separatist terror” (ibid.: 25/08/1993, 22/03/1996, 16/06/1996, 25/07/1996, and 28/02/1997); and as a “terrorist organisation” (ibid.: 14/04/1995). Clearly, by this point the MGK perceived the PKK as a terrorist organisation and its activities as terrorism.

Between 1990 and 1997, a number of different options were made available to the MGK’s original path. In the 1990s, Turgut Ozal, then the President, suggested that the PKK could be tackled through political and democratic means. The EC/EU asked the Turkish authorities on several occasions to lift the state of emergency. Moreover, throughout the 1990s, Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, called for a unilateral ceasefire twice in order to create the basis for a peaceful solution. However, none of these three options, proposed by different actors, broke the MGK’s stasis; the original path was kept to.
In accordance with its established position, the MGK continued to advise the government of the day to re-exextend the state of emergency in the chosen ten provinces: Batman, Bingol, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli, and Van. In October 1996, Mardin was included in the state of emergency zone and Elazig was removed permanently from the zone (Ibid.: 31/10/1996).

Assessment of the MGK’s press releases shows that in the early 1990s, the MGK began to discuss whether democratic means could be used to tackle the PKK. Having said that, it also expressed openly its support for Ozal, when he put forward plans for a peaceful and democratic solution to the conflict between the PKK and the TSK (ibid.: 27/12/1991). In early 1992, the press releases showed that the MGK had Ozal’s proposals for a democratic solution on its agenda for discussion and on 25 February 1992, it suggested that the government should tackle the PKK through democratic terms and means. Furthermore, they advised Ozal’s government to take measures to strengthen the relationship between the state and its citizens living in the state of emergency zone, and suggested that the government should improve the economic conditions in the South East of Turkey so that people in that region could live in similar conditions of those in the West (ibid.: 25/02/1992).

There are two important points to be made on the MGK’s new position on democracy and human rights. The first is that the MGK’s emphasis on democracy, on rule of law, and on human rights was never reflected in its practical recommendations; this meant that the MGK continued to recommend that the Council of Ministers keep the state of emergency in the Kurdish region. The second is that, in March 1992, talks about democracy, human rights and the use of democratic means disappeared from the MGK’s agenda. The MGK began to say that the TSK would use every means to fight against the PKK – the MGK’s emphasis had shifted from “democracy” to “the protection of national and territorial unity”. The MGK’s Press Releases of August 1992 made this absolutely clear: “every available method will be used to eradicate the terrorist organization to protect national and territorial unity” (ibid.: 27/08/1992, author’s translation and emphasis).

Barkey and Fuller (1998: 136) have argued that “Ozal was successful in shifting the terms of the debate within the state and in introducing alternative approaches”. In addition Larrabee and Lesser (2003) argue that the political environment in Turkey is very volatile and suggest that political parties come and go, while the MGK is a lasting and stabilizing force that can play a conciliatory role in the disputes among political parties. Strong prime ministers or
presidents like Turgut Ozal can resist the pressure of the MGK (ibid.: 28). This short-term rhetorical change/new dimension was an outcome of Ozal’s success in influencing the views of the members of the MGK. There are two important conclusions one could draw from this. The first is that this shows that was dialogue between Ozal and probably the army member of the MGK. The outcome indicates that Ozal was successful in influencing the army members of this institution, which means that the army members are not in stasis and do not have the upper hand in the MGK (this will be discussed further in this chapter). This also shows, in contrast to what Peters et al. (2005) proposed above, that there could be challenges among the politicians or the members of an institution during stasis and this does not necessarily produce a long-term change to the original path, but it creates a new short-term dimension – which disappears once the disagreements or the person who initiated the bargaining disappears from the political scene. The second is that one could speculate that if Ozal had not passed away unexpectedly he could have gradually changed the minds of the members of the MGK, could have succeeded in lifting the state of emergency in the early 1990s and could have had developed a political solution to the issue there and then.

(iii) Characteristics of the State of Emergency Zone

The characteristics of the state of emergency ruling have not been contextualised by the current academic literature on Turkish politics. This chapter argues that the MGK’s path of state of emergency generated a unique regime in the South East of Turkey with distinct characteristics to prevent the local people supporting the PKK guerrillas and to fight against terrorism. These characteristics are namely legal measures, regional governors, village guards, the anti-terrorism law, and the evacuation of the villages. This section will consider the features of the state of emergency and discuss the consequences of the MGK’s path of state of emergency.

The legal measures taken to fight against the PKK and the PKK supporters included the following:

- Any kinds of assembly or procession or movement or vehicles in certain places or within certain hours were prohibited;
- Officials were authorised to search persons, their vehicles, or property;
• People living or entering the state of emergency region had to carry identity cards at all times;

• Permission was required to publish and to distribute newspapers, magazines, etc.;

• Persons or groups of persons believed to be disrupting public order or public security were prohibited from entering the concerned regions; such people or groups were expelled from such regions; and

• Assemblies and demonstrations in both enclosed and open spaces were prohibited (Alexander et al. 2008: 90–93).

The “regional governors” were appointed by the government to contain and to prevent existing or potential social disturbances in the region with the use of forces under their command or with the use of security forces specially organised for this purpose (Alexander et al. 2008: 96). In addition, they were expected to bring co-ordination to the various bodies fighting the guerrillas including the police, the gendarmerie, the army and the village guards (McDowall 2000: 425).

The definition of terrorism emerging from the “anti-terrorism law” was identical with the MGK’s definition and perception of what the internal threat was. What the MGK defined as an internal threat was defined as terrorism by the anti-terrorism law. One difference was that the MGK’s definition of internal threat predominantly covered the PKK, its guerrillas, and its activities, while this law’s perception of terrorism encompassed everyone in Turkey, most particularly those local people who lived in the state of emergency zone. Under the anti-terrorism law, “terrorism” was defined as any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organisation with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Turkish Republic (Alexander et al. 2008: 117). Some of the articles which influenced many of the people’s everyday life in the regions are as follows: As far as disclosure and publications were concerned, Article 6.2 stated that those who printed or published the leaflets and declarations of terrorist organisations would be punished (ibid.: 118). Those who assisted members of organisation constituted in the manner described above or made propaganda in connection with such organisations would be punished with imprisonment. Where assistance was provided to organisations in the form of buildings or premises, the punishment was to be doubled. The activities of associations, trade unions, and similar institutions found to have supported terrorism would be banned (ibid.: 119). Furthermore, Article 8.1 said that any kind
of propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state, either written or oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of Turkish Republic were forbidden and those conducting such activities would receive punishment (ibid.: 119–120).

The system of “village guard” was activated in 1985 by the amendment (3175) to the Village Law (Article 74), by which the unelected village guards became public servants (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 129), paid by the Ministry of Interior Affairs (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 147). The size of this force reached almost sixty two thousands by the end of the 1990s (bid.: 147–48). According to Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 129), the village guard system was not only used to improve security in the rural areas, but also to determine the loyalty of the villagers to the TSK. The Regional Governors were empowered to evacuate villages on a temporary or permanent basis so as to deprive the Kurdish armed movements from logistical support from the civilian population. The exact number of destroyed and evacuated villages is difficult to establish, since some villages are comprised of several settlements, each with its own name, and some quarters of villages might have been burned, while others were spared. In its booklet for the Habitat II conference in Istanbul 1996, the Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD) stated that over two thousand villages were destroyed by the end of 1995 (Ibrahim and Gurbey 2000: 182). In summer 1997, it was reported that there just over three thousand villages were evacuated (Radikal, 14/07/1997). Ergil (2000) has said that the South East of Turkey “differed from the rest of the country” (ibid.: 324). The scholars’ views however varied on in how differences existed between the Kurdish region and the other parts of Turkey. Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 122), Nachmani (2003: 42), Alexanders et al. (2008: 236) and Guler (2005: 30) have described the region as less economically developed, but they lack attention as to how and why the Kurdish region had received less economic and financial investment. Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 122) have said “it would be wrong to suggest that this was the product of deliberate policy on the part of the Turkish government”. I would agree with Kirisci and Winrow that this was not a deliberate act, but suggest that it is important to consider what or who produced or perpetuated the level of impoverishment in the region.

Unlike the above discussed academics, Yildiz and Muller (2005) and Heper (2007) have shown the effects of the state of emergency ruling on the people living in the region and how the features of this strict regime violated their civil liberties. Yildiz and Muller particularly focus on the role of “village guards”, noting that “the Kurds were subject to further violence
by the Village Guard” and describing the “village guards” as “inadequately supervised”,
resulting “widespread notoriety following respected accusations of theft, beatings, and rape” (ibid.: 17). I would agree with Yildiz and Muller that the village guards misused their power and humiliated many women and children in particular. Their emphasis on how much these village guards were unsupervised is also vital. There was no job description or any sort of educational requirement for one to be employed as a village guard, which meant any men interested in taking this position would be given a weapon and this would make him stronger than the rest of the villagers. Heper (2007: 60) similarly notes that under the state of emergency such “extreme human rights violations as illegal executions, murders by unknown persons, death while in custody, forceful evacuations of villages, and molestations and torture did take place”. Heper then suggests that the reason village guards conducted themselves in that way was because they “thought they were acting as patriots trying to maintain the national unity and the territorial integrity of the country” (ibid.: 161), although he adds that he would not condone such practices, arguing that these were not “the official policy of Ankara”, by which he means the policy of the government (ibid.: 160–61). While I would agree with Heper that it was not an official policy, one should not overlook the fact that the civilian and the military members of the MGK had equal say on the decisions made in the MGK. The PMs and some of the government ministers who sat in the MGK between 1983 and 1997 played an equal part in shaping the nature of the recommendations the MGK made.

When academics write about economic circumstances and human rights records in the Kurdish region, I would argue that they should ask what caused this and which institutions’ decisions have been behind these developments, and further ask whether this is deliberate, and if not, how this could be explained. Thus, in this chapter I would challenge the functionalists’ arguments that institutions are efficient and that they always produce the intended outcome. I ask, if decisions of institutions do only produce the intended or the anticipated outcomes, then what can explain the situations where institutions not only fail to produce the intended outcomes, but also produce unintended consequences? One can see from the evidence above that the characteristics of the state of emergency produced a strict regime in the South East of Turkey over time. Local people living in the area were deprived of their civil liberties – restrictions were applied on their mobility in and outside the region and on how they could assemble. Businessmen were discouraged from making investments in these areas because of the constant military operation and clashes between the PKK’s ARGK guerrillas and the TSK’s soldiers. Many of the schools in the region were shut, depriving a
significant proportion of the school children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the area remained poor and underdeveloped when compared to other parts of Turkey. In addition, the locals were ruled and governed by unelected, unrepresentative and illegitimate bodies; and the regional governors and the village guards mostly misused their powers and made the local people’ life unbearable.

(iv) Tracing the MGK’s Path of State of Emergency and its Options and Characteristics

The assessments of the MGK’s press releases (1983–1997) have shown that after Critical Juncture (III) the MGK gradually lifted martial law from across Turkey and replaced it with a state of emergency. By 1987 ten Kurdish provinces remained under the state of emergency, and between 1987 and 1997 the MGK continued to recommend that the government reextend the state of emergency in these provinces. This means that the MGK’s path of state of emergency was established in 1983, but was more formalised by 1987 and was maintained until 1997. When I asked if the MGK had other options to choose from as opposed to its original path of state of emergency, I found that a number of options were presented to the MGK by different actors: first, the EC/EU on a number of occasions asked the Turkish authorities to lift the state of emergency from the South East of Turkey and find a political solution to Turkey’s Kurdish problem; second, Turgut Ozal, who served as both the PM and President suggested to the MGK members that they develop a political solution to the Kurdish problem, and he publicly talked about removing the state of emergency; and last, Abdullah Ocalan, who was the leader of the PKK, called a ceasefire on two occasions and called to resolve the Kurdish problem using democratic and political means. The MGK’s press releases show that the MGK did not take much notice of these options: the path of state of emergency was maintained. I however found that Ozal succeeded in changing the attitudes of the MGK members in relation to the Kurdish question when the MGK began to discuss whether democratic means could be used to tackle the PKK in the early 1990s. As to what characteristics developed under the state of emergency, I identified five unique features, including legal measures, regional governors, village guards, the anti-terrorism law and the evacuation of the villages. Under this regime local people were left to be governed by unrepresentative and illegitimate bodies, and deprived of their civil liberties. Despite the options to deviate from its path of state of emergency and the consequences it had for both local people and Turkish political system, the MGK maintained its original path. In the
next section I want to find out what implications the MGK’s path had for Turkey’s aspirations to join the EC/EU.


At Critical Juncture (III) the National Security Commission decided that Turkey would apply for Full Membership of the EC when it adopted democracy. Since the relationship between Turkey and the EC was virtually frozen during the army interlude, Ozal’s government worked towards revitalising the path of EC membership, exerting every means and opportunity available. However, the MGK’s path-dependent approach and its unintended consequences made it challenging for Ozal to make progress on the path towards EC/EU membership. This will be shown in three sections. The first will consider the ANAP governments’ efforts to revitalise the relationship, and question what made it significantly difficult to re-activate the Association Agreement between 1983 and 1989. The analysis of the options available for EC membership and the path of state of emergency will be made in the second sections. I will discuss how and why stasis was maintained in both Turkey’s path toward EC/EU membership and the MGK path of state of emergency. I will then outline how the introductions of the Maastricht Treaty and the Copenhagen Criteria formed obstacles on Turkey’s path to join the EC from 1989 to 1994. The last section will cover 1994 to 1997, and show that the resolution of the Kurdish issue became a condition to establish the Customs Union. I will also analyse why Ocalan’s second call for a ceasefire was not noticed by the leading politicians.

(i) Revitalising the EC Membership Path, 1983–1989

Arikan (2003) notes: “Following the return to elected civilian government after the military regime of 1980–1983, Turkey–EU relations showed signs of normalization” (ibid.: 64). I would argue however that it took many more years than Arikan argues for the government to normalise this relationship and convince the EC to begin political dialogue with the Turkish authorities. This was because: (1) during the army intervention Turkey and its political system lost prestige among the EU member states and (2) the insurgency raised by the PKK, and how the MGK dealt with this, had negative implications for Ozal’s government in its attempts to normalise the relationship in these years. Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party (ANAP) won the elections in 1983 by getting 45.1 per cent of the votes and 53 per cent of the seats in the TBMM. Therefore Ozal was selected as the PM and General Kenan Evren was
chosen as the President. During the 1983 general election campaign Ozal had made two important pledges on Turkey's foreign policy: that he would improve economic relations with the Middle Eastern and Islamic Countries by increasing imports and exports; and that he would apply for full of membership of EC (45. TC Hukumet Programi, 1986). Ozal, as the Chair of the State Planning Committee (DPT), had been sceptical about Turkey pursuing a path of EU membership. Now, as Prime Minster, he was promising that his government would apply for Full Membership of the EU. This has caused a number of academics to ask: what factors underpinned this change in Ozal’s stance on the EU? Birand (1990) argues that Ozal’s interest in the EC was purely economic by referring to a quote from one of Ozal’s speeches: “We need to use our resources very carefully. In the long term, we are planning to strengthen our relations with Europe. We need to make a use of the European market that is four or five times larger than the Middle East’s markets. … [T]his does not mean we need to turn our back to the East, rather we need to join the EC and cooperate with the East” (quoted in Birand, 1990: 464, author’s translation). Calis (2001) suggests that Ozal treated the EC not primarily as an economic market, but as an international organisation, anchoring Turkey’s transition to democracy (ibid.: 221; for more information go to Ozcan 2008: 94-95). I would rather agree with Birand that financial interests and the economic benefits of the EU membership played a significant role in this. Ozal initially realised that the economic market in the EC was much larger than those in the East and then had a growing interest in a free market economy which could only have been accommodated within the EC.

In January 1984, Vahit Halifoglu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited the European Commission to discuss Turkey’s position in the EC (Bac 2001: 139). In response to this visit the European Parliament (EP) said that it would reconsider the situation in Turkey to decide whether to hold joint committee meetings – the delegation of both the EP and the TBMM forming the joint committee – again. The EP additionally asked the Turkish authorities to begin institutionalising democracy, to remove martial law and to respect human rights (OJEC 1984; OJECb 1984: 49–50). A year later, a number of human rights cases were submitted against the Turkish authorities at the European Commission of Human Rights. In April of the same year, the EP reported that the regime in Turkey had launched a systematic campaign of genocide against the Kurdish minority as 30 Kurds were given the death sentence and 84 were under trial. For the EP this meant a "ruthless violation of human rights” (OJEC 1985). The Socialist and Communist party group (PES) asked the Turkish authorities to grant cultural rights to the ethnic minorities (Eralp 1997: 139). The Committee of Political
Relations produced a report entitled the "Balfe Report", which said that Turkey was a long way from respecting the basic features of human rights and advised the EP that the joint committee meetings with Turkey should be deferred (European Parliament 1985).

In the second general election after the 1980 army intervention, in November 1987, Ozal's ANAP again won the largest number of seats in the TBMM. Along with the renewed confidence his government made a number of constitutional changes as a result of which the EC’s critical position on Turkey began to gradually change. There are four different areas where steps were taken to undertake significant changes. The first is that the minimum age of voting was reduced from 21 to 20 and the membership of the assembly was increased from 400 to 450. The second is that the government proposed to amend the Provisional Article 4 which had said, “the former chairmen, deputy or acting chairmen, general secretaries, deputy general secretaries and members of the central executive committee of the old parties were banned from joining any new parties or running as parliamentary candidates until November 1992. Other former deputies and MPs were not allowed to form new parties, or to serve on their central executive bodies, until November 1987” (Finkel and Hale 1990: 104, footnote 2). Soon after a referendum was held, giving the Turkish public a choice over whether to have the former politicians back in the Turkish political system (Dodd 1990: 88–90; Ahmad 1993: 196; Hale 1994: 279). The third is that an amnesty was called, realising the 30,000 members of the Association of Peace, and the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK). The last is that the death penalties were overturned by the TBMM (Dagi 1997: 140). Looking at these constitutional changes, it is obvious that the EC’s requests in relation to Kurds and how the PKK should be handled have not received specific attention from Ozal’s government since there is not a single reference to Kurds in these changes. However, criticisms over the TBMM’s unrepresentative composition were dealt with when the Social Democracy Party (SODEP) and the True Path Party (DYP) agreed to merge and won a number of seats in the Parliament at the 1987 general election. The EU recognised these as progressive movements towards consolidating Turkish democracy and advised that Ozal’s government should further pursue this direction (EPCD Bulletin 1987). The EC then accepted Ozal’s request to have the Association Council meetings at ministerial level and Claude Cheysson, responsible for Mediterranean policy and North-South relations, visited Turkey (EC Bulletin 1986: 87). During this meeting weakness surrounding features of Turkish democracy was discussed and then Turkey was asked to take the necessary steps to resolve the Kurdish question (Dagi 1997: 141).
Ozal argued: “for the West, Turkey should not only be important because of its strategic position and military strength. … Turkey shares the same values with other European countries” (quoted in Dagi 1997: 143, author’s translation); and he applied for Full Membership of the EC in 1987 (Eralp 1994:204). However, before the application was submitted, Emile Noel, then the Secretary of the European Commission, advised Turkey not to hurry making an application because this would not help either to stabilise its political system or improve its relations with the EC. In addition, Margaret Thatcher, then the UK Prime Minister, suggested that Turkey should apply for Full Membership in the next 10 years, and this was because, according to Thatcher, Turkey did not yet fully satisfy the Association Agreement’s requirements (Cumhuriyet, 05/03/1986). Despite this cautious advice, Ozal’s government handed in an application in April 1987. The application received great attention, both in Turkey and in Europe. There are two important conclusions this chapter will draw from the data collected: there is another option to Turkey’s path to join the EU, and the application was supported by Turkish political parties, believing that it could anchor the political and economic developments, while the EC member states wanted to grant the membership status to those countries with established democracy and strong economy. These will be discussed below.

Except for the Welfare Party (RP), the other Turkish political parties supported the government’s application, but with reservations. The DYP stressed the negative implications Turkish political problems might have on the outcome of Turkey’s application to join the European club. The DYP therefore suggested that one of the immediate actions the government should take was to remove the restrictions on political participation. By contrast the Democratic Left Party (DSP) speculated on the consequences of membership for the TBMM’s sovereignty, expressing their concerns over the directives the government ministers would receive from the EC institutions (Milliyet and Tercuman, 05/05/1987). The Social Democrat Public Party (SHP) was more optimistic about Turkey’s place in Europe, believing that Turkey had a common history and culture with the other EC member states. The RP, in contrast to the above political parties, presented another option to Turkey’s path of EC membership. Necmettin Erbakan, then the leader of RP, said that “Turkey did not have a place in the European Community” (Milli Gazete, 15/12/1987) and went on to say that it would be in the interest of Turkey to improve relations with the Muslim countries. He added that the Turkish authorities had to make a choice between being treated like a second-class citizen among the member states of the EU or be the leading country of the Islamic Common
Market (RP 1987 Election Manifesto: 41–43; Cumhuriyet, 16/03/1986). Barkey and Fuller (1998: 105) argue that Erbakan was urging the establishment of an Islamic NATO, an Islamic Common Market, and an Islamic United Nations. Vehbi Koc, a well-known businessman, however, disregarded Erbakan’s suggestions and said that Turkey’s only option was to join the EC (Milli Gazete, 18/12/1987).

While the British government of the day had been supportive of Turkey’s EC prospects, headlines of some of the more widely read newspapers had been rather critical of this application. Margaret Thatcher, then the PM, said that Great Britain would anchor Turkey in normalising its relationship with EC if Ozal took initiatives to improve human rights and democracy in Turkey (Hürriyet, Thatcher’s speech, 25/09/1987; Herald Tribune, 07/11/1987). An article however in the Independent argued that Turkey wanted to join the EC just as it was and how it aspired to be, and referred to its differences in religion, culture, and traditions as reasons why Turkey should not join the EC (The Independent, 15/05/1987, cited in Calis, 1999). Another article with a similar perception was published in Financial Times entitled “A shock for European Culture”, by Edward Mortimer. Mortimer argued that European countries were well integrated because they shared a common culture, an outcome of common history, and claimed that Turkey was different, as its cultural origins went back to Islamic civilisation rather than Christianity (Financial Times, 17/07/1987, cited in Calis 2001). For some, then, in the UK, Turkey’s common culture, religion and history with the Middle East and the Islamic countries indicated not only that it should not join the EC, but also that it was less likely to integrate into the EC. These articles also implied that Turkey could develop stronger ties with the Islamic countries rather than the EC member states due to its common religion and culture with them. One should however recognise that this point of view was already present in Turkey, proposed by Erbakan.

As far as some of the other member states were concerned, France, Denmark, Belgium, and Luxembourg did not support the application because of Turkey’s domestic political weaknesses. France focused on Turkish domestic problems and stated that Turkey was incompetent to practice the required EC implementations (Milliyet, 16/04/1987). Turkey’s poor human rights records and weak democracy were why Denmark and Luxembourg had a critical stance on the application. However, the constitutional changes Ozal’s government made were regarded as a paramount improvement by Belgium. Another group of member states that did not support the application included the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain,
Portugal and Italy, and the only difference this group had to the former was that they looked at the application from the economic perspective not from a political point of view. The cost of free movement of Turkish workers in the EC member states was a cause of concern for Germany (Cumhuriyet, 06/01/1988). As for Spain and Portugal, they did not want to share the EC’s financial benefits, e.g., funds, with a newcomer (Milliyet, 16/04/1987). Italy did not want its companies to compete with Turkish firms, particularly in textiles (Soz, 21/02/1988).

The ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) kept hopes alive that Turkey’s application might be successful, particularly because the EC tends to deepen prior to enlargement. It is acknowledged that “Deepening is a process parallel to, or even as a necessary step prior to, enlargement (The EU online glossary). The SEA was signed in Luxembourg on 17 February 1986, which came into effect under the Delors Commission on 1 July 1987 (Nugent 1999: 50). The Act consisted of three documents: the first contained a small number of common provisions, of which the most important gave the first formal Treaty recognition to the European Council (Article 2 SEA); the second set out the amendments to the Treaties; and the third was a new and separate Treaty text formalising the procedures known as European Political Cooperation (EPC). In addition, this strengthened the economic and social cohesion between the member states by adding formally new policy areas to the EC’s jurisdiction, including foreign and security policy, the environment, research and development and culture and education.

Applying for EC membership brought Turkey and its political system under close scrutiny; particularly the non-governmental organisation Amnesty International began to pay great attention to the protection of human rights in this applicant country. The initial finding was that there were serious problems. The characteristics of the state of emergency were, in particular, Amnesty’s focus. Their 1988 report condemned the TSK for rounding up the villages in the state of emergency zone, and threatening and beating the local people there (Amnesty International 1988: 9). Amnesty’s reports on developments in Turkish politics not only kept the authorities and European public opinion informed about Turkey, but also affected how Turkey’s aspiration to join the EC was received at the EC level.

The approval of the SEA and its contribution to the deepening of the EC did not produce the expected opportunity for Turkey’s membership application to receive a positive response from the European Commission, as the refusal came along in 1989. Turkey was however found eligible for membership and was offered a prospect of a customs union. It was said that
the EC was “in a state of flux”, caused by the third enlargement (Portugal and Spain in 1986) and enforcement of the SEA (EC Opinion 1989: 2); therefore, it was not ready for another enlargement. However, the political and economic improvements that had taken place were recognised as positive by the European Commission. Furthermore, it was suggested that Turkey had overcome its four economic weaknesses: very major structural disparities, in both agriculture and industry; macro-economic imbalances; high levels of industrial protectionism and a low level of social protection; and the report read “there is still a substantial development gap between the Community and Turkey” (ibid.: 4–5). As for the political improvements, it was reiterated that they “have not yet reached the level required in a democracy” (ibid.: 7). The European Commission thereafter proposed to take “four measures in order to enable both sides to enter now on the road towards increased inter-dependence and integration” and these included completion of the customs union; the resumption, and intensification of financial cooperation; the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation; and the strengthening of political and cultural links (ibid.: 7). These measures were later gathered under the title of the “Matutes Package” on 7 June 1990, but they never been implemented.

Onis (2000: 468) writing about the refusal of the Turkish application, noted: “The outcome was another round of disappointment”. I would agree that this was a disappointment for the government because it not only meant that it would not be a full member of the EC, but its aspiration to form a political dialogue with EC had to be challenged further. Another interesting perspective came from Arikan (2003) who said: “The main implication of the Commission’s opinion on Turkey’s application for EU membership was that the EU wished to pursue a containment policy towards Turkey, designed to strengthen EU-Turkey relations through reactivating the AA, while delaying Turkish membership for the foreseeable future” (ibid.: 66). However, I do not believe there was or is a “containment strategy”; and would argue that Arikan fails to recognise that the Turkish political system, its standards of democracy and its economy was simply not at a level that the EC would have expected. The EC response suggests rather that when Turkey’s domestic problems are resolved, when it fully both satisfies the requests of the EC institution and harmonises itself with its EC counterparts, it has a solid chance to join the EC as a full member.

We can see in this section the ways in which the MGK was beginning to impact on Turkey’s EC membership path. This path was established at Critical Juncture III by the National
Security Commission. Ozal’s landslide victory at the 1983 General Elections gave him relatively conducive grounds to regain trust in the EEC and to begin negotiations with the EEC. However, the PKK insurgency and how it was handled by the MGK meant that the EC refused to hold joint committee meetings with Turkey. Using the concept of path dependence, I have questioned in this chapter whether other options were available to Ozal’s government, as opposed to the path of joining the EC. My assessment of the views on Turkey’s application for the Full Membership of the EC show that Erbakan was against Turkey joining the EC and he suggested that the Turkish authorities should optionally consider forming relations with the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries.

(ii) **Stasis in the Presence of Other Options, 1989–1994**

Tank (2007) has noted: “Throughout the Cold War Turkey maintained the traditional Kemalist line towards the Arab World, choosing to remain distant and disengaged” (ibid.:136). However, the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of Soviet Union (SU) were significant developments in international politics and they underpinned speculations over whether Turkey was losing its geo-strategic importance to the EC. In addition to Turkey’s aspiration to join the EC, developing close ties with the newly independent Turkic states of Central Asia appeared as another option (q quoted in Ozcan 2008: 94-95). Karaosmanoglu (2000) has argued that the end of the Cold War also led to fundamental changes in Turkey’s national security culture and Ankara begin to exert influence in Central Asia, the Black Sea Region, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans and began to pay particular attention to regional cooperative security and multilateralism in foreign affairs. Its interest in cooperative security and multilateralism extended from its willing involvement in the Gulf War and participation in peace operations to the initiation of regional arrangements such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (ibid.: 210) and also contributed to the formations of the Naval Task Force for the Black Sea (BLACKSEARFOR) among the coastal states to respond to soft security challenges (Ozcan 2008: 95). As for domestic politics was concerned, Ozal was selected as the new President of the Turkish Republic in 1989. In the early 1990s Ozal moved to commit Turkey as a staging ground for US and coalition air forces against Iraq. Kuniholm (1991) argued: “Ozal is hoping for a substantial return on his country’s investment in the war effort, from both the Unites States and Europe. From Europe – and here Ankara is expecting Washington’s support – Ozal clearly expects military and economic assistance and wants a softening of resistance from the European
Community to its application for membership in the 12- nation economic bloc” (ibid.: 35). The 1991 general election results indicated changes in political dynamics as the ANAP was not any longer the single political party holding the majority of the seats in the TBMM. The ANAP received 24 per cent of the votes, and the others shared the rest of votes, the DYP (27 per cent); the SHP (20 per cent) and the RP (16 per cent). Then the DYP and the SHP formed a coalition government; Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the DYP, was selected as the new PM.

Ozal, upon receiving his new position as the President, began to campaign about finding a solution to the Kurdish issue. To this end he legalised the usage of Kurdish in everyday conversation and folkloric music recordings by rescinding Law No. 2932 – which was enacted in October 1983 – but usage of Kurdish in the media and education remained prohibited (Gunter 1997: 19). Ozal considered having a political dialogue with the PKK as an option (Lundgren 2007: 48–49) and publicly acknowledged the “Kurdish reality”. Many political prisoners were released following the introduction of an amnesty and asked the Kurdish guerrilla to cease clashing with the TSK soldiers. Regardless of a considerable amount of opposition received from the ANAP, he initiated discussions about transforming the Turkish Republic into a series of confederated states, on the US model, with each state having certain degree of freedom in local affairs (White 2000: 162). He then recognised the PKK as a political actor and suggested that the PKK should be accommodated in the Turkish political system (Lundgren 2007: 49). In response to Ozal’s proposals Ocalan declared that the PKK was willing to give up on their aim of an independent state and favoured a federal solution. This meant that the ANAP for the first began to treat the Kurdish problem in terms of its social, cultural, and economic dimensions (Ulman 2000: 109).

Academics such as Nachmani (2003), Evin (2005), Gurbey (2005) and Lundgren (2007) have tried to interpret Ozal’s attempts to settle the Kurdish issue by political means from different perspectives. Lundgren described Ozal as: “The only major politician who advocated a more liberal policy ... Ozal tried to reform the rigid attitude of the state and to introduce a radical political change” (2007: 48) and Nachmani (2003: 43) has referred to him as “the last Turkish politician to advocate other than purely military means to end the Kurdish violence”. Evin (2005: 38) similarly noted: “To his credit Ozal was the first political leader to seek ways to begin solving the bloody conflict”. Ozal was indeed one of the first politicians to accept the reality of the Kurdish question and he made a number of legal changes to accommodate
Kurdish citizens in the Turkish Republic. He however was not the last politician, as in early 2009 Tayyip Erdogan, who was still the Prime Minister at the time of writing this chapter, drew up a democratisation package to strengthen the state-citizen relationship as a way to address Turkey’s Kurdish problem. Gurbey (2005) suggested that Ozal’s position granting cultural autonomy and political liberalisation to the Kurds would consequently have posed a danger to the unity of the Republic Gurbey’s (2005: 141). Gurbey’s point supported Tank’s (2001) observation that “any significant concession to Kurdish identity is regarded as weakening the ‘unitary state’” (ibid.: 222). Gurbey’s analysis of Ozal’s position on how to deal with this issue runs closely parallel to how the MGK perceived the PKK. For the MGK, the PKK was an internal threat to Turkey’s indivisibility and had to be eradicated through the strict state of emergency. However, the borders of Turkish Republic remain unchanged upon Ozal’s public talks, and having granted cultural, political and the economic rights to Kurds, proving that the fears that these rights may jeopardize the unity of Turkish state were overstated.

While the writers above do not question why the ANAP and Ozal developed a new political approach towards the Kurdish problem, Ulman (2000) argues that there are three reasons for this: (1) due to the Gulf War, Kurdish identity was widely expressed in discussions in Turkish politics; (2) there were widespread and well attended protests in Cizre, Nusaybin, Silopi and Silvan in 1990s; and (3) the ANAP wished to secure the Kurdish votes in the region in the coming up elections (ibid.: 109).

The European Parliament asked Turkish authorities in the early 1990s “to stop the prosecution of the Kurdish population and halt the evacuation of the villages” (OJEC 1991). When the Turkish government however interpreted this as violation of its national and parliamentary sovereignty, it called off the long awaited Joint Parliamentary Committee meeting with the EC, scheduled for 23-25 March 1992. In the following year, as promised by Thatcher, Douglas Hurd, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, emphasised the importance of revitalising the EC’s economic and political relations with Turkey. The European Council then in Lisbon decided that a political dialogue between the EC and Turkey should be established immediately. Hurd additionally asked for an update report on the current state of the relationship and the update report was considered at the Council of Ministers on 20 July 1992, which made the following suggestions: joint committee meetings should be held every six months; Turkey should be invited to the Western European Union (WEU) meetings as an
associate member; and Turkey should be granted financial aid (Calis 2001: 258). Thatcher’s support for Turkey however did not prevent the financial aid section being removed from this report and the remaining promises forgotten. In addition, the EP reported that it was disappointed that Ozal had not succeeded in delivering on his promises to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem. This showed that the EP was not aware that President Ozal, on his own and in a very short period of time, could not have radically changed what had been established by the MGK over many years. I would argue that the EP should have given more credit to Ozal’s efforts and should have given more time to Ozal so that his new ideas and policies could have been implemented. The EP should have known that Ozal needed the support of the army members of the MGK, of his party, of the opposition political parties and of other interests groups to take more concrete steps in implementing these proposed policies. On the contrary, the EP kept its critical stance and said that the special units of the TSK and country guerrilla groups of the PKK were murdering, abducting and causing the disappearances of innocent people (OJEC 1992a). The EP then stressed the need for the Turkish authorities to take economic and cultural measures which may pursue a settlement to the Kurdish problem (ibid.).

In 1991 a new coalition government was formed between the DYP and SHP leaving the ANAP in the opposition once again. Calis (2001: 255-257) has argued that this coalition of the DYP and the SHP followed in the footsteps of Ozal’s government, but unlike the ANAP government their priority was not Full Membership in the EU but establishing the Customs Union with the EU. Demirel therefore visited the capitals of some of the European countries to inform them about Turkey’s interest in establishing the Customs Union. He met with John Major, the UK PM, and Jacques Delors, the European Commission President and told them that “Post-Cold War Turkey gained a new role based on democracy, secularism, and Western values. If the EC was anxious about fundamentalism in the region, Turkey could help the EC”. He went on to say that Turkish public was concerned with the EC’s constant criticisms over Turkey’s human rights records and democracy (Hurriyet, 24/11/1992). Demirel’s visits however did not have much positive impact on how the EP treated domestic politics in Turkey. The EP rather asked the Turkish authorities to restore confidence between the state and the local people living in state of emergency region and asked the government to establish a dialogue with the Kurdish side to reach a democratic and peaceful settlement (OJEC 1992b). Aybet (2006) said that since the early 1990s Turkey found it difficult to accept the EU’s criticisms or interference in its internal security matters; in particular Turkey
was extremely sensitive to EU criticism of how it handled the internal conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military (ibid: 542). This meant that Turkey found it difficult to reconcile its Westernisation project with its internal security policy and highlighted a dilemma of reconciling its external (joining the EU) and internal policy challenge (Kurdish problem).

The Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992, and came into force on 1 November 1993. The term Union is used from the very beginning of this Treaty to clearly convey the advancement in this historical project. In this way, article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union affirms: "This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." The treaty led to the creation of single European currency and created what is commonly referred to as the pillar structure of the European Union including the European Commission pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar, and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. In addition, with the creation of the Maastricht Treaty, the current and new member states introduced and implemented common policies that supported the idea of “ever-closer union”.

Ocalan called for a unilateral ceasefire for the period between 20 March and 15 April 1993 (Cumhuriyet, 12/03/1993). He said that the PKK should be recognised as a political party. As far as disarming the PKK was concerned, Ocalan gave an assurance that the PKK would not open fire against the TSK. He said: “We do recognise the authority of the TBMM and the Kurdish issue could be resolved in the TBMM”; confirmed that the PKK had given up on its aim of having an independent Kurdish region; and added “we believe in Turkish and Kurdish brotherhood” (Cumhuriyet, 14/04/1993, author’s translation). This ceasefire was said to be a response not only to the demands of the Turkish and Kurdish public, but also to that of the international community (Cumhuriyet, 12/03/1993; Human Rights Report Turkey 1995: 36-37). It is unclear to whom or to what Ocalan refers by “international community”, but possibly it includes the EC since it has consistently asked the Turkish government to resolve the issue since the early 1980s. This also gives an indication that Ocalan was very pragmatic in terms of changing the PKK’s ultimate aim – of having an independent Kurdistan – so as to have good relations with the international community.

The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey found that the important parts of the Turkish community treated the unilateral ceasefire as a step towards a peaceful stage all over the country. The public began to talk about “amnesty” and “abolition of the Emergency State
Legislation”. Furthermore, the wide-scale military operation planned to be carried out under the name of the “Spring Operation” was suspended (ibid.: 37). For the first time in many years, Demirel and Erdal Inonu, the deputy PM, visited the state of emergency region. At this visit, Demirel said that if the ceasefire continued by June, he would think about lifting the state of emergency permanently in the Kurdish region (ibid.). A prominent academic, Prof. Server Tanilli, supported this by saying: “Turks and Kurds could live together. This togetherness should be voluntary and based on sharing equal rights – the Kurdish problem should be resolved through political dialogue and democratic means” (Cumhuriyet, 28/02/1993, author’s translation). Ismet Sezgin, the Home Affair Minister, however was not sympathetic to Ocalan’s calls for a ceasefire and commented: “We, as the Turkish government, will not act in the wake of the bandits. We will not sit around a table with them and they should instead deliver themselves to the Turkish legal system” (ibid.).

Ocalan’s calls for a ceasefire did not however change the MGK’s path of state of emergency, and it maintained its original path. The structural, institutional and policy changes at the EU level gave the signals that Turkey’s accession to the EU was to be significantly difficult in the subsequent years. This chapter will identify two important decisions made at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1991, which would make Turkey’s accession to the EU significantly difficult for Turkey in the coming years. The first is that “the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required” (European Council 1993). This meant the EU was beginning the process of accession of the Central and Eastern European countries, while keeping Turkey away from these developments. The second was the decision which set out the conditions for membership to the countries interested in joining the EU, in particular it concerned Turkey’s path of EU membership. These conditions included:

- stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy;
- the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Bulletin EC, 6/1993: 13).

According to Serdar: “Turkey found it degrading to be perceived as on the same level as the former Eastern Bloc countries, that had long been under communist rule, whereas Turkey had been a democracy since 1923” (Serdar 2003: 63). However, I would not agree with Serdar and would instead argue that one should note that the above identified political conditions which the EU expected the applicant countries to comply with were not completely new to the authorities in Turkey. Since the early 1980s the EC had been asking the Turkish Governments to consolidate its democracy and respect human rights which meant that since the early 1980s the Turkish authorities had had a number of years and a number of opportunities to resolve the Kurdish problem and improve standards of democracy and human rights.

We can see from this section is that the years between 1989 and 1993 have witnessed changes at the international, the domestic and the EC/EU levels. The Cold War ended in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed. At domestic level Ozal began to talk to about finding a political solution to the Kurdish question, the MGK’s press releases indicated that the MGK discussed about making sure democratic means are used in handling the PKK and Ocalan said that the PKK had given up on their aim to have an Independent Kurdistan in Turkey. At the EC/EU level, the Maastricht Treaty was approved in 1992, and the Copenhagen criteria introduced a number of conditions a country would need to meet before it can join as a full member. I would like to make three points in relation to whether these changes had any implications for the both MGK’s path of state of emergency and Turkey-EU relations. The first point is that when the Soviet Union collapsed, the option of forming relations with the former communist Turkic countries has emerged for Turkey. This did not however mean Turkey had to choose to between the EC or the former communist Turkish countries, but since Turkey’s bid to join the EC was not progressing as smoothly as the Turkish Governments would have liked, I think developing closer ties with the Turkic countries could have been an attractive to the Turkish authorities. I found nevertheless that this option did not catch Turkish authorities’ attentions and Turkey’s EC membership path was maintained. The second point is that despite Ozal and Ocalan’s position in how to handle the Kurdish issue, the MGK also opted to recommend the Government to re-extend state of emergency in the ten Kurdish provinces. The third point is that in a rapidly changing world Turkey chose to change neither their
aspirations to join the EU nor its path of state of emergency; furthermore, little or no progress was reached in either of these paths. The European Parliament constantly refused to begin political dialogue with Turkey and have withdrawn financial aid from over Turkey’s treatment of the Kurdish issue. And the MGK’s state of emergency violated the local people’s human rights and deprived them from a decent life standards, which again contributed negatively Turkey’s progress towards joining the EC.

(iii) One Step Toward EU Membership and Two Step Backwards, 1994–1997

Upon Ozal’s death in April 1993, Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the DYP, was selected as the new President, and Tansu Ciller, replacing Demirel, was to be the first female Prime Minister of Turkish Republic. Ciller formed the government in June 1993 and her government was determined to establish the long-delayed Customs Union. However, it had to tackle the Kurdish condition, since as Arikan noted: “The EU intensified its efforts to highlight the Kurdish issue as a condition for establishing a customs union with Turkey” (Arikan 2003: 128). While I agree with Arikan that this was immediately highlighted, I would suggest it would be very useful to know what aspects of the issue formed the conditions and difficulty in establishing the customs union. Serdar (2003: 62-63) and Calis (2001: 271) put emphasis not only on the rise enforced of disappearances of Kurdish civilians and prisoners, but also on other domestic political weaknesses in trying to understand what caused the delay. One should note that these were some of the long-listed consequences of the MGK’s path of strict state of emergency. In 1994 the confirmed number of cases of “disappearances” had increased up to 50 and according to Amnesty International’s 1995 Report on Turkey, “many people ‘disappeared’ because of their suspected political activities, legal, or illegal which could be recognised as a product of Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Law and some others ‘disappeared’ because they had refused to act as village guards. In addition, the European Parliament’s legislative powers were extended with the introduction of the co-decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty. By this it became an influential institution in the EU, and thus it was speculated by many that the EP’s requests would have to be met before Turkey could sign the Customs Union. Gunter argued: “During 1995, Turkey came under considerable pressure to correct its most egregious human rights abuse in order to win approval from the European Parliament to join the European Customs Union” (Gunter 1997: 19).

Bilgin (2005) points to the role of globalisation in empowering non-state actors in, for instance, shaping the methods used by states to guarantee the security of their citizens.
Bilgin pays attention to the growing media presence as another dimension of globalisation which arguably has meant that governments use violence under the media spotlight and thus have to justify their actions to audiences both at home and abroad. As Bilgin (2005) notes, “Turkey’s struggle with the PKK was conducted under this media spotlight. Turkey’s politicians and civilian-military bureaucratic elite resented this, as they did, for example, when the German government suspended the delivery of weapons to Turkey to investigate whether they were used in the struggle with the PKK in April 1994” (ibid.: 179). Alain Juppe, then the French Foreign Minister, said in 1994 that closing the doors to Turkey would be a political and strategic mistake. The European Parliament therefore appointed Carlos Carnero Gonzales as a rapporteur to prepare an update report on the political and economic conditions in Turkey. The findings of this report later informed the EP’s requirements for setting the Customs Union with Turkey: removal of Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism law; improvement in human rights records; and resolution of the Kurdish problem through political means (Bac 1998: 246). In July 1995 therefore Ciller’s government made a number of changes to meet these requirements, some of these are as follows:

- Voting age was reduced – lowered from 21 to 18
- Parliamentary seats were increased by 100
- Bans on political activity and participation in unions and other organisations were removed
- Civil servants were granted the right to form or join trade union
- Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Law was amended. (Gunter 1997: 19-20)

Although these changes covered features of the state of emergency regime, the MGK’s path of state of emergency was nevertheless kept as it was. Kirisci and Winrow noted however that there was a significant reduction in some of types of prison sentences upon the changes in Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Law (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 129). The EC therefore decided “to conclude the negotiations with Turkey on the completion and full implementation of the Customs Union and to reinforce the relations with this partner” (Bulletin EC, 12/1994). With the Association Council’s decision of 6 March 1995, it came into force on 1 January 1996.
Lagro and Jorgensen (2007: 5) have argued that the option of Customs Union was not “big news” since the European Commission had offered this to Turkey in 1989 instead of Full Membership, and I would agree. Barkey and Fuller (1998: 165) and Eralp (1997: 175) have identified differences between how Turkey and the EU perceived the Customs Union, with Turkey viewing the Customs Union as one step closer to Full Membership of the EU, while the EU treated it as a mechanism to improve its relationship with Turkey without linking it to the issue of Full Membership. Manisali (2002b: 104-5), who is critical of the Customs Union agreement, regarded it as a one-sided agreement under which Turkey was left to interpret the EU’s directives. These directives, according to Manisali, were not in the interests of the Turkish economy as Turkey’s exports rose 40% after signing the Customs Union and he has suggested that the Customs Union required businesses in Turkey to export more than import (ibid.: 66). Keyman and Onis have noted “In the absence of firm prospects for full membership, however, the customs union provided few incentives for the Turkish political elites to undertake the reforms that would satisfy the Copenhagen criteria” (Keyman and Onis 2004: 182).

After Ozal’s sudden death, in spite of his recognition of “Turkey’s Kurdish reality” in 1991 and promises to lift the state of emergency, Demirel began to claim that Turkey did not have a Kurdish question, but a terrorism problem. The U-turn in Demirel’s position on the Kurdish issue was in parallel with the MGK’s maintenance of the state of emergency. Demirel’s formulation that “any talk of cultural rights is tantamount to dividing the country” once again returned to the idea that the PKK and the Kurdish issue was a threat to Turkey’s indivisibility, which was again in line with the MGK’s perception of the PKK (Yeni Yuzyl, 22/05/1995, author’s translation). In addition, as far as Demirel was concerned, only non-Muslims were recognised as ethnic minorities in Turkey, so since the Kurds were predominantly Muslim, they were not minorities.

Ciller proposed establishing a commission to investigate the Kurdish issue and considered allowing Kurdish broadcasts on state-owned television channels, as well as optional classes in Kurdish. Demirel’s response to Ciller on the Kurdish position was that “concessions could not be made while terrorism was rampant” (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 137). When faced with opposition from the President, her treatment of “the Kurdish question was reduced to eliminating the PKK, body counts, and cross-border raids” (ibid.: 138). Apart from the political leaders’ changing rhetoric on the Kurdish question, there was a radical shift of votes
to the religiously oriented RP at the 1995 general elections. For the first time, after many years, the RP received 21.3%. The ANAP, with 19.6% of the votes, and the DYP, holding 19.2%, were reluctant to form a coalition with the RP. Therefore a short-term coalition was formed between the DYP and the ANAP, keeping Ciller as the PM and selecting Yilmaz as the Deputy PM. This lasted until March 1996. Then Ciller formed a government with Erbakan, leader of the RP – a detailed analysis of the RP’s electoral success story will be made in Chapter 5. It was under this political climate that Ocalan once again called for a unilateral ceasefire which was to begin on 15 December 1996. On the night of 14 December, on the television channel MED-TV, Ocalan commented that the duration of the ceasefire could be re-determined in accordance with the attitude of the government and added: “Unless there is an attack aiming at annihilating us, we will not open fire. It is to give a chance to the choice of peace. The other side should at least consent to political dialogue. We are not in a position to divide Turkey” (Human Rights Report Turkey 1995: 48).

Ocalan’s call for ceasefire was well received among the businessmen and representatives, but the politicians either did not pay attention to the call or denied the existence of the Kurdish problem. Sakip Sabanci, an influential Turkish businessman, did get a report prepared on the situation in the South East of Turkey, where generally the Kurdish population of Turkey lived. The report suggested that economic investment on its own would not solve the problems of the region and advised the Turkish authorities to learn from other countries’ experiences of accommodating their ethnic minorities to the political, social and economic structure, for example Spain, Britain, and Italy (Hurriyet, 30/09/1995). Halis Komili, chairman of TUSIAD, similarly said that “the Kurdish question was most severe dilemma of Turkey and without a solution to it, the other domestic problems would not be resolved” (Hurriyet, 22/12/1995, author’s translation). Despite the support from the business platform, the government did not respond to Ocalan’s ceasefire calls and the operations in the region, cross-border operations, large scale clashes and deaths continued. The cease-fire ended by mid 1996 (Human Rights Report Turkey 1995: 50).

Demirel’s answers to the question on ethnic minorities at a press meeting in Romania explained why he did not respond to Ocalan’s calls for ceasefire. When asked, “Turks in Romania have been granted a number of rights, why cannot Kurds in Turkey have similar rights?” his answer was: “Turks here are a minority. Kurds in Turkey are not a minority. Everyone is free to speak their language in Turkey. If you begin to recognise the Kurds in
Turkey as minority, then you will be treating them as second class citizens. … Apart from non-Muslims, the rest are first class citizens of Turkey” (*Milliyet*, 19/04/1996). Not taking notice of Ocalan’s calls for a ceasefire and rather maintaining the state of emergency regime in the Kurdish region made the EU neither release the resources of the fourth protocol nor activate the measures to have institutional integration between Turkey and the EU. Forming political dialogue with Turkey was no longer a priority for the EU and on 19th September 1996 the EP decided to freeze financial aid due to “protracted human rights violations” in Turkey.

As Lagro and Jorgensen have noted: “Turkey-EU political relations began to fade, reaching their nadir in 1997, a completely disappointing year for Turkey” (Lagro and Jorgensen 2007: 5). As far as the Turkish authorities were concerned, the EU had not only failed to keep its promises over Protocol Four and financial aid, but had also continued to criticise harshly Turkey’s political and economic conditions, which raised questions about the EU’s reliability. Furthermore, the outcomes of the Luxembourg Summit (1997) disappointed Turkey. On 12 December 1997 at the Luxembourg Summit the European Council underlined the gradual and all-inclusive nature of the enlargement process by which a two-tier accession process was set up with the Eastern European and Baltic countries, plus Cyprus and Turkey (Bac 1998: 242). A separate emphasis was also put on Turkey’s eligibility for Full Membership, but a different strategy was to be drawn up for it, called “A European Strategy for Turkey” to help Turkey to enhance its candidacy for membership (Onis 2000: 463-64; Karluk 2003: 125-27). Lagro and Jorgensen (2007: 6) have argued that the decision of 1997 was so unacceptable to Turkey that the government decided to freeze political dialogue with the EU.

Hence, Mesut Yilmaz, leader of the ANAP and PM, published two declarations to warn the EU authorities. In the first declaration, Yilmaz demanded the EU treat Turkey on equal terms with the other applicant countries and asked the EU to keep its promises. Yilmaz said, “If the EU does not change its attitudes towards Turkey, we will halt our bilateral relations” (Karluk 2003: 125-27, author’s translation). The Turkish authorities then turned down the invitation to attend the March 1998 European Conference in London because, according to McLaren (2000: 119), they felt they had been treated unfairly at the Luxembourg Council meeting. Kirisci has said that “Turkey was excluded from a new list of candidates because of its treatment of Kurds” (Kirisci 2004: 283); I would add to this the government’s unwillingness
to introduce political reforms and the MGK’s unwillingness to lift the state of emergency. This was confirmed by the President of the European Council, Jean-Claude Juncker, who defended the EU’s position at the summit by referring to Turkey’s human rights record and the Kurdish issue; he said, “it cannot be that a country where torture is still practised has a place at the European Union table” (Financial Times, 23/11/1997).

Academics such as Cooper (1994), Rumford (2001) and Serdar (2003) have commented on Yılmaz’s decision to freeze political dialogue with the EU. Cooper regarded Yılmaz’s decision as “profound and emotional” (Cooper 1994: 125). Serdar argued that this decision would not necessarily lead to a permanent change in Turkey’s path of seeking EU membership, but he suggested that the Luxembourg Summit’s decision not to include Turkey in the EU’s enlargement of 2004 made the Turkish authorities question whether Turkey would ever be accepted as a full member of the EU, even when and if Turkey fully complied with the Copenhagen Criteria (Serdar 2003: 62-63). Rumford noted: “It was a watershed in Turkey’s relations with the EU and appeared to constitute a major derailment of the process of integration” (Rumford 2001: 94). I would certainly agree with Rumford that it was a watershed in Turkey’s relations with the EU, but as Serdar said above, it did not lead to a permanent change in the EU membership path, and this will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

In this section I showed that the resolution of the Kurdish issue had become a condition for Turkey to establish the Customs Unions with the EU. Although the MGK maintained its path of state of emergency, the EU approved the Customs Union with Turkey in 1994 when Ciller’s government made a number of constitutional changes. And when Turkey felt closest to full EU membership after having established the Customs Union with the EU, on 19 September 1996 the EP decided to freeze the financial aid to Turkey due to protracted human rights violations. Furthermore, the Luxembourg Summit’s decision not to include Turkey into the EU’s enlargement of 2004 made Yılmaz to choose to freeze political dialogue with the EU.

5.3. Cultural and Calculus Approaches versus the framework of Concepts of Path Dependence and Unintended Consequences –Studying the MGK’s Path of State of Emergency in the Context of Turkey’s Path of EU Membership

In section 5.2.1, I identified what path the MGK established and maintained in relation to
both the PKK and Turkey’s Kurdish problem, and have discussed what characteristics the state of emergency developed over a long stretch of years. In the subsequent section 5.2.2, I studied how the MGK’s path of state of emergency interacted with Turkey’s European policy in the years between 1983 and 1997. I found that the MGK’s path of state of emergency negatively impacted on Turkey’s progress to join the EC/EU and the characteristics of the state of emergency meant weak democracy and poor human rights in Turkey; I furthermore noted that regardless of these outcomes, the MGK continued to recommend that the Turkish government re-extend the state of emergency in the South East of Turkey. In this section I will first very briefly discuss how well cultural and calculus approaches can explain implications of the MGK’s state of emergency policy on the nature of Turkey-EC/EU relations. I will then use Krasner’s (1984), Levi’s (1997) and Pierson’s (2004) conceptualisations of path dependence to discuss why the MGK maintained a state of emergency over a long period of time. I will second discuss the benefits and the limitations of these conceptualisations in explaining why the MGK opted to maintain the path of state of emergency. Last, I will show the utility of Merton’s (1936) concept of unintended consequences in explaining why the MGK kept the state of emergency despite its consequences and in the presence of other options.

Based on the findings in part 5.2 I now want to test the cases that cultural and calculus approaches can explain the interaction between the MGK’s Kurdish policy preferences and Turkey’s European policy between 1983 and 1997. I have shown that the MGK chose to handle the Kurdish question by calling a state of emergency in the Kurdish region in the early 1980s and the policy of state of emergency was maintained throughout the 1990s. Keeping the state of emergency over many years can be considered as an established pattern of behaviour, as far as the cultural approach is concerned. However the cultural approach does not ask how and why an institution may maintain a pattern of behaviour over the years. Additionally, through applying the cultural approach one cannot highlight the connection between the MGK’s maintenance of state of emergency and the nature of Turkey-EC/EU relations. This is because the cultural approach is a very reductionist perspective and does not let one ask many questions, but rather expects one to accept the given state that an institution or a policy is in. As far as the cultural approach is concerned, I cannot comment either on whether the MGK members were motivated in maximising their gains through keeping the state of emergency in the Kurdish region or if Turkish political leaders kept Turkey’s bid to join the EU so as to increase their benefits from Turkey-EC/EU relations. The reason for this is that one
would need to conduct interviews with civilian and military members of the MGK who sat in the MGK between 1983 and 1997 and the Turkish political leaders of the same years to answer the questions in hand.

The MGK called for a state of emergency to protect the indivisibility of the Turkish Republic, to safeguard constitutional order and public order and to eradicate the PKK. The PKK was an armed organisation which initially aimed to establish an independent Kurdistan in the South East of Turkey through a guerrilla fight, mostly in the mountains. The MGK had therefore recognised the PKK as an internal threat to Turkey's indivisibility, to its constitutional order and to its public order. Having briefly explained why the MGK called for a state of emergency, I will below use the above-mentioned scholar’s conceptualisations of path dependence to understand how and why the MGK maintained its path of state of emergency.

Krasner (1984) argued that institutions’ choices tend to naturally canalise for a path of that action (author’s italics). I ask if the MGK’s choice of instituting a path of state of emergency canalised the development of the path for a state of emergency. The MGK’s press releases show that the MGK held quarterly meetings between 1983 and 1997. At these quarterly meetings both the civilian and military members of the MGK discussed and negotiated over how to handle the PKK. I therefore argue the MGK’s decisions to re-extend the state of emergency in the South East of Turkey did not evolve naturally, but these decisions were made at the MGK’s quarterly meetings.

In contrast to Krasner, Levi (1997) stressed the cost of reversal and has suggested that institutions tend to maintain their original path because the cost of reversal may be higher than keeping to the original path. I therefore ask, had the MGK opted for an alternative way of handling the PKK such as lifting the state of emergency permanently or resolving the Kurdish issue through political and democratic means, would these have cost more to both the Turkish political system and Turkey’s progress towards joining the EC/EU than maintaining the path of state of emergency. I argue that had the MGK either removed the state of emergency or recognised Ocalan’s calls for unilateral ceasefire, the cost probably would not have been higher than having kept the state of emergency. Had the MGK used political means to handle the PKK and resolve the Kurdish issue instead of calling for and maintaining the state of emergency, more progress could have been made towards resolution of Turkey’s ethnic minority problem and this would have hastened Turkey’s accession to the EC/EU. In the early 1990s when Ozal began to talk about finding a political solution to the
Kurdish problem, Ocalan as a response declared that the PKK had given up on its aim of forming an independent Kurdish state in Turkish lands. This meant that the level of threat emerging from the PKK was minimised. Ozal’s successors Demirel and Ciller and the MGK members in the mid 1990s however overlooked the fact that the PKK had changed its ultimate aim; they therefore continued to treat the PKK as a serious internal threat and maintained the state of emergency in the Kurdish provinces which arguably had higher costs for the Turkish political system and Turkey’s European policy. In addition, the MGK’s path of state of emergency over time generated unique characteristics of governing in the South East of Turkey. These characteristics were namely legal measures, regional governors, village guards, the anti-terrorism law and evacuation of the villages. These meant local people were restricted in what paper they could read, deprived of practicing their civil liberties, governed by unrepresentative and illegitimate regional governors, ill-treated by the village guards and were left to evacuate their villages. These on the one hand raised questions about the quality of democracy in Turkey and raised doubts about what human rights meant to the Turkish authorities on the other hand. As a result Turkey could not meet the political and ethnic minority aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria for Full Membership of the EU.

Pierson (2004) noted that institutions maintain their original path as the benefits of that path increases over the next round. As far as the outcomes the MGK’s path of state of emergency is concerned, it is difficult to say that these outcomes were attractive to the MGK’s members or to the Turkish authorities. Here I will show that the MGK’s state of emergency not only violated the Turkish constitutional order, but also failed to eradicate the PKK. As said earlier the MGK called for a state of emergency to protect the indivisibility of the Turkish Republic and to safeguard the constitutional order and public order and eradicate the PKK. However under the evolved characteristics of the state of emergency zone, people were ruled by illegitimate and unrepresentative bodies such as the regional governors and the village guards and people had to conduct themselves in accordance with requirements of the anti-terrorism law. This meant that both Article seven of the 1982 constitution, which said “Legislative power is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on behalf of the Turkish Nation. This power cannot be delegated”, and Article eight, which noted, “Executive power and function shall be exercised and carried out by the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers in conformity with the Constitution and the law”, were violated by the existence of and the authority held by the regional governors and village guards. In addition, public order was not protected since local people lived under constant military operations and...
clashes between the PKK and the TSK. However, the MGK had successfully protected Turkish territorial unity since the Turkish borders remained as they were between 1983 and 1997, but the PKK was not eradicated. Furthermore, partly because of the characteristics of the state of emergency, Turkey’s application for Full Membership of the EC was not successful and the European Parliament kept a critical eye on the developments in Turkey and refused to provide Turkey with financial aid. This meant that the MGK’s path of state emergency were beneficial neither to Turkish democracy and human rights standards nor to Turkey’s aspirations to join the EC/EU. The only outcome of the MGK’s path which can be considered as a benefit is the protection of Turkish territorial unity and that was vital for many in Turkey.

I found the concept of path dependence very helpful not only to identify what path the MGK established and maintained over the years, but also to identify the options that were available to the MGK and to the Turkish authorities as opposed to maintaining the state of emergency. In addition, the above applications of the conceptualisation of path dependence have been useful to gain an insight into what factors may have shaped the MGK’s preference for keeping the state of emergency. I found that the MGK’s decisions on whether to maintain the state of emergency were made at the MGK’s quarterly meeting by the military and civilian members who sat in the MGK between 1983 and 1997, which meant it did not take place naturally. I found that had the MGK opted for other options such as lifting the state of emergency permanently, it probably would have not been costly to either the Turkish political system or Turkey’s European policy. I noted that the characteristics of the state of emergency had weakened the features of the Turkish democracy and slowed down Turkey’s progress to meet the EC/EU’s membership criteria. I furthermore found that the MGK’s path of state of emergency did not produce many benefits to the Turkish political system and to the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations. The MGK’s state of emergency violated two significant Articles of the Turkish Constitution which the MGK had to safeguard. Due to the characteristics and the consequences of the state of emergency zone, resolution of the Kurdish issue became a condition for the EU to establish the Customs Union with Turkey. Although these findings are vital, I still have not been able to explain completely why the MGK maintained the state of emergency despite the alternative options and their more beneficial outcomes. I here argue that the concept of path dependence should be complemented by Merton’s concept of unintended consequences to highlight the relationship between the consequences mentioned above and the MGK’s path of state of emergency. I first want to clarify if there is a clear
connection between poor human rights records, weak democracy and the slow progressing of Turkey–EC/EU relations and the MGK’s state of emergency with Merton’s framework of unintended consequences. I then will assess whether these outcomes are intended or unintended consequences. Lastly, I will draw on Merton’s framework to explain what causal factor shaped the MGK’s choice of keeping the state of emergency in the South East of Turkey.

First of all it is necessary to clarify if the MGK’s action caused the unintended consequences to both the Turkish political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations that I have outlined above. Thus I ask: had the MGK not opted for the state of emergency, would the situation in the Kurdish region have developed as it did, and would this path have hindered Turkey’s bid to join the EC/EU? The short answer to this question is “probably unlikely”. Had the state of emergency not been called for an initial four months and had it not been consistently extended every four months, then the situation would not have produced the unintended consequences to both the Turkish political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations that it did. This shows that there is a clear connection between the MGK’s state of emergency and the unintended consequences. And these unintended consequences can be added to Merton’s list of sum-total consequences of actions as the unintended consequences to the political system of a country and its international relations through (1) poor human rights and (2) human rights.

The second task is to clarify the actual purpose of the MGK’s given action so to find out if the above identified consequences to both the Turkish political system and Turkey’s European integration were intended or unintended. What did the MGK want to achieve by the state of emergency? The MGK’s press releases and my analysis above show that the MGK recognised the PKK as a “terrorist organisation” and as far as the MGK was concerned, the PKK had to be eradicated, and the local people living in the state of emergency zone had to be prevented from helping the ARGK guerrillas with shelter and food or by joining them. However, the underlying aim of the MGK was to protect the Turkish Republic’s constitutional order and indivisibility and safeguard public order. And to reach these ends the MGK chose to call and maintain the state of emergency. This however unpredictably evolved into a strict regime in the South East of Turkey; therefore this shows that the outcomes of the MGK’s actions were clearly unintended consequences of the MGK’s path of state of emergency.
Next I want to find out what factor(s) caused the MGK’s action to produce unintended consequences. To do this, the causal factors suggested by Merton will be tested on the available empirical evidence. Was it the MGK’s existing state of knowledge, which meant that the MGK thought its intended outcomes, could be achieved through the state of emergency? I argue that it would be misleading to say that the MGK supposed that through the state of emergency it could achieve its intended outcomes. It is rather the case that the MGK was restricted in what type of action it could have taken initially, but it will be useful to question why the MGK continued to take the same action over the years. Here, its state of knowledge or its restricted space of action cannot be seen as the causal factors. We can ask whether the MGK was ignorant of the consequences of its actions? This chapter argues that the MGK cannot be considered as ignorant that its actions would produce the unintended consequences, instead of the intended consequences. This is because the MGK was composed of well-educated and informed senior politicians and military members.

In that case, is it the MGK’s “imperious immediacy of interests” that is the significant factor? This means, if the MGK wanted to achieve its intended outcomes through the state of emergency above, but that it did not think about what further consequences its action would have both for the Turkish political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations. This could be argued, but having said that, my analysis above has shown that the MGK was only successful in meeting one of the elements of its intention and that is Turkey’s territorial unity. It however violated two of the other elements of its intentions: the protection of constitutional order and public order. I would argue this means that the MGK’s sole aim in calling the state of emergency was to protect Turkey’s territorial unity, even at the expense of violating the Constitutional and public order, weakening democracy, creating a poor human rights record and slowing the progress of Turkey–EC/EU relations.

One can challenge this chapter on how and why the outcomes of the MGK’s actions could be recognised as unintended consequences. There are a couple of points: (1) it is not in the remit of this work to make a judgment of whether the MGK’s actions are supportable and (2) here it is not suggested that the MGK should not be criticised, but it suggests that one should go beyond this and question why the MGK maintained its original path despite its unintended consequences, and ask why it did not opt for another option while its actions were not
achieving the aims it had set. These questions will be answered below in the context of Turkey’s aspirations to join the EC/EU.

5.4. Conclusions

By applying historical institutionalism’s temporal approach to the MGK’s handling of the PKK, I found that in the early 1980s the MGK – with its newly acquired powers as a result of Critical Juncture (III) – recommended that the Council of Ministers call for a state of emergency in the ten provinces where Kurds predominantly lived. Additionally I found that the MGK kept re-extending this state of emergency from the early 1980s to the late 1990s despite the EC/EU’s request to remove the state of emergency throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, Ozal’s call for a political solution in the 1990s, and Ocalan’s calls for a ceasefire throughout 1990. As I noted, the MGK recognised the PKK as an internal threat, and therefore it called for a state of emergency to protect Turkey’s territorial unity and safeguard its constitutional order and public order. I also observed that the MGK’s path of state of emergency generated a unique regime in the South East of Turkey with distinct characteristics intended to prevent the local people supporting the PKK guerrillas and to fight against terrorism. The distinct characteristics of the unique regime in the South of East of Turkey meant people living in the region were restricted in where they travelled, what they read, how they assembled and how they associated. It also meant that they were governed by illegitimate and unrepresentative bodies. This therefore meant poor human rights records and fairly weak features of a democratic political system in Turkey. As far as Turkey’s relations with the EC/EU were concerned in those years, I found Ozal’s newly elected government in mid 1983 were determined about reestablishing political dialogue with the EC. As was decided by the National Security Commission at Critical Juncture (III), Ozal’s government applied for Full Membership of the EC in 1987 and it was refused two years later when the EC also began to have political dialogue with the Turkish delegates. I found that the state of emergency in the Kurdish region was at the centre of debates in the EU and there was a constant demand for the Turkish authorities to find a political solution to the Kurdish question. Additionally, Turkish authorities were criticised over its weak democratic political system and poor human rights record. This is the point where one best can see the interaction between the MGK’s path of state of emergency and Turkey’s progress to join the EC as a full member.
After Turkey’s Full Membership application was refused, the European Parliament continued on a regular basis to request that Turkey find a political resolution to its Kurdish question, instead of military action. When in the early 1990s Ozal openly discussed the idea of resolving the Kurdish problem politically, the EC welcomed Ozal’s initiative and supported his position in granting cultural rights to Kurds in Turkey. Since Ozal suddenly passed away, and thus did not have the chance to implement many of his policies, the European Parliament refused to begin a political dialogue with Turkey and withdrew financial aid over Turkey’s treatment of the Kurdish issue. The introduction of the Copenhagen Criteria meant that Turkey had to meet political criteria and respect and protect its ethnic minorities before it joined the EU. Despite all these criticisms and the introduction of the Copenhagen Criteria the MGK opted to maintain its path of state of emergency in the mid 1990s. And by 1994 the resolution of the Kurdish question became a condition for the Turkish authorities to tackle before Turkey could sign the Customs Union with the EU. When both Demirel and Ciller took no steps to improve human rights in Turkey in the mid 1990s, forming political dialogue with Turkey was no longer a priority for the EU and on 19th September 1996 the EP decided to freeze financial aid due to “protracted human rights violations” in Turkey; this was followed by the Luxembourg Summit’s decision not to add Turkey to the list of candidates that would join the EU in 2004.

I then began to question why the MGK continued its state of emergency despite the fact that its path violated human rights and hindered Turkey’s accession to the EC/EU. Krasner’s suggestion of ‘natural canalisation’, which means that institutions naturally canalise their original path, does not explain the MGK’s choice to maintain a state of emergency, since the MGK’s decisions in relation to re-extending the state of emergency were made at its quarterly meetings. Levi’s reference to ‘cost of reversal’ also does not explain the MGK’s reasons for keeping the state of emergency, as I highlighted that reversal from the state of emergency policy would have been very beneficial for the local people who lived in the South East of Turkey, for the Turkish political system and for Turkey’s bid to join the EU. Pierson’s emphasise on the ‘increasing benefits’ of continuing a path has also not been helpful to explain why the MGK maintained its path of state of emergency: as the MGK continued to re-extend the state of emergency in Turkey, the EC/EU not only refused to grant the Turkish authorities financial aid because of violations of human rights in the South East of Turkey, but also excluded Turkey from the 2004 Enlargement process.
So to highlight the relationship between the MGK’s state of emergency and the situation in the South East of Turkey and Turkey’s slow progressing relationship with EC/EU, I found Merton’s framework of the concept of unintended consequences very helpful. I found that had the MGK not called for and maintained the state of emergency over a long period of time the situation in the South of Turkey would probably not have developed the way it did and Turkey–EC/EU relations would probably have not developed the way they did. These were unintended consequences of the MGK’s state of emergency, and they were unintended because the MGK called for a state of emergency so as to eradicate the PKK; protect Turkey’s territorial unity and Constitutional order; and safeguard public order. However, this had unintended consequences for the political system of a country and its international relations through (1) poor human rights and (2) human rights and I argue that these are an original contribution to Merton’s list of sum-total consequences of actions. As to what caused these unintended consequences, I found Merton’s suggestion of the ‘imperious immediacy of interests’, which is one of the factors he suggests may cause unintended consequences, very useful since it does to a certain extent explain why the MGK maintained the state of emergency in the presence of other options and despite the unintended consequences. Thus, as I have observed, the MGK only wanted to protect Turkey’s territorial unity, and it did not consider the further consequences of its actions, either for its intended outcomes or for the Turkish political system and Turkey’s efforts in meeting EC/EU membership criteria.

This chapter puts forward an entirely new analysis of Turkey–EC/EU relations post Critical Juncture (III) and in the light of the escalated Kurdish question. This is because (1) the MGK’s role in handling the Kurdish question and the PKK have not been acknowledged widely; (2) Turkey’s poor human rights and weak democracy have not been studied in the context of the MGK’s state of emergency; (3) Turkey’s slow progressing relationship with the EU between 1983 and 1997 has not been analysed in the context of the MGK’s path of state of emergency and its unintended consequences; and (4) the framework, of concepts of path dependence and unintended consequences, has neither been formulated as it has been in this chapter nor has it been utilised as it has been in this chapter. Therefore the chapter offers an original perspective on how and why Turkey’s could not re-establish political relations with the EC after Critical Juncture (III); why Turkey’s Full Membership application was refused in 1989; what role Turkey’s poor human records played in Turkey–EC/EU relations; why the EC/EU did not provide Turkey with any financial assistance; why the Customs Union was delayed for a long time; and why Turkey was excluded from the 2004 Enlargement process.
In this chapter I have analysed how the MGK practiced its newly acquired powers in the years between 1983 and 1997. I have shown that the MGK was the main institution in Turkish political decision making, making recommendations to the Council of Ministers, in relation to the PKK. I have also shown that the MGK was not an army-dominated institution, as Özal, in the early 1990s, managed to begin discussions in the MGK quarterly meetings about finding political solutions to the Kurdish question. This meant that civilian members of the MGK were able to express opinion and change other members’ position. And this also means that, in contrast to Peters’ suggestion that path dependence approaches are lacking in attention to human agents, I have shown that the concept of path dependence allows space for analysing the role of agents in how and why institutions form path dependent actions. Although the MGK’s choices and decisions on the PKK were undermining Turkey–EC/EU relations between 1983 and 1997, the EU’s documents show that the MGK was not known to the EU authorities until 1998. In the next chapter I will therefore analyse how the EU treated the MGK, what developments took place in relation to the MGK and why and how the MGK and Turkey–EU relations faced a significant degree of change.

Introduction

The years between 1997 and 2004 have witnessed long awaited radical changes in the role, power, and composition of the National Security Council (MGK). At the same time, there has been vigorous progress in Turkey’s bid to join the European Union (EU). There has been some discussion as to what precipitated these changes in the MGK. The general agreement among many such as Cizre (2003), Onis (2003), Lundgren (2007) and Faucompret and Konings (2008) has been that the Turkish government made these changes to hasten the pace of Turkey’s path to EU membership. I argue that one should study the domestic political developments that took place prior to the changes in question in order to explore the sources and consequences of the changes. This chapter proposes to test whether rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms can best explain the changes in the both MGK and Turkey–EU relations. There are three central questions to this chapter:

- What school of New Institutionalism can best explain the changes both in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations?

- What domestic political developments initiated the changes in and around the MGK?

- Have the changes in the MGK triggered the EU’s decision to begin accession negotiations with Turkey?

These questions will be answered in the next three parts. The first part will assess the strength and weaknesses of current interpretations of the changes in the MGK and this will be followed by a theoretical debate on what schools of New Institutionalism can best explain both institutional and policy change. The second part will begin by explaining the EU’s perception of the MGK’s position both in the Turkish political system and in the policy areas it is responsible for. Then it will discuss the antecedents to the changes in the MGK and Turkey–EU relations using the historical institutionalist concept of punctuated equilibrium. In the third part I will assess how useful rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism is in explaining how and why both the MGK’s powers were curtailed and the
EU decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey. The conclusion will draw together the findings of this chapter.

6.1. Assessment of the Literature on the changes in the MGK and Turkey-EU relations and the theoretical debate

The changes in the MGK’s powers and authority, and the new era of Turkey–EU relations have received significant academic interest. The question of what triggered the changes in the MGK has been debated by scholars who have either suggested that the EU or the European Commission’s Regular reports precipitated the changes in the MGK (Cizre, 2003; Onis 2003: Lundgren 2005; Faucompret and Konings 2008) or argued that the prospect of full EU membership strengthened the voice of civilian politicians in taking bold steps to change civil–military relations (Rumford 2000; Tank 2001; Diez 2005; Watts 2006; Cinar 2008). The role of domestic politics has not been discussed in sourcing the changes both in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. The following will assess in detail the existing interpretations of the changes in the MGK and it will propose a different model of analysing institutional changes and their consequences.

Cizre (2003) suggests that in order to normalise civil–military relations in Turkey, the army’s role in politics was reduced through the changes in the MGK. She then argued that the European Commission’s regular reports played an important role in the government’s reformation of the MGK. And in a different publication Cizre (2007) said “Since the Summit, the possibility of EU accession has become the main driving force for democratic reforms in the security sector and civil–military relations. The EU’s use of pre-conditionality is having used as an effective instrument for the promotion of democratic civilian oversight mechanisms over the security sector” (ibid.:5). Lundgreen agrees: “In order to meet the requirements stipulated by the EU, the NSC has been transformed from an executive to an advisory body and civilian control of it has increased” (Lundgren 2007: 51-52). Additionally, Faucompret and Konings note: “In response to the EU criticism, the government passed its seventh reform package [which] … introduced some fundamental changes to the duties, functioning and composition of the NSC” (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 154). As far as Onis was concerned, this was “a period of profound and momentous change in Turkish history” and, he argues, “clearly, a change of this magnitude would have been impossible in the absence of a powerful and highly institutionalised EU anchor in the directions of Full Membership” (Onis 2003: 13-14). I would not agree with Cizre (2003) and Faucompret and
Konings (2008) that the Turkish authorities made these changes because the EU asked them to do so, and I argue in this chapter that commentaries of these kind are not only too simple but also fail to explain the mechanisms by which the changes took place. Onis’s (2003) emphasis on the EU’s anchoring role is rather more plausible. Having said that, one should also question what initiated the changes in the MGK, rather than what simply paved the way for Turkey to reduce the MGK’s political authority.

The changes in the MGK have also been considered in the context of power relations between the civilian and the military members of the MGK. It has been asked what role the EU played in helping the civilian members to change the military members’ position in the MGK. Tank (2001) argues that although the Turkish military has been supportive of Turkey’s EU membership endeavour, it is now its role in the Turkish political system has been under pressure from the EU post Helsinki Summit and has suggested that the Turkish political elite is beginning to see the central role of the military as a barrier to an eventual EU membership and is slowly arriving at the conclusion that, if the goal of this membership is to be realised, the military must be willing to sacrifice considerable political power (p.218). The choice to be made by the military leadership will be determined by its corporatist traditions and political inheritance, Turkey’s evolving geostrategic posture and assessments of the value of the EU membership (p. 218). Diez (2005: 168) points out that that post-Helsinki the Europeanization process in Turkey created new circumstances for civil–military relations and described it as an era of “revolutionary” changes. He then added that once the EU started the accession process, granting Turkey candidate membership status in 1999, the sense of powerlessness of the civilian side was removed to a greater extent. This meant that the EU as an external reference point played the role of “legitimiser in Turkish domestic politics”, which ultimately empowered the civilian side (ibid.: 177). On similar lines, Rumford (2000) and Watts (2006) observe that credible signals emerging from the EU on Turkey’s membership helped the civilians to question existing civil–military relations in Turkey. Rumford argues that as a result of this empowerment, the civilian side more effectively demanded the embodiment of more democratic norms (i.e., civilian control of the military) within the MGK. They furthermore suggested that this created an opportunity for those who were discontent with the status quo, civilians in this case, to seek to change the rules of the game (ibid.: 51; see also Watts 2006: 131). In addition, Cinlar argues: “Since the Helsinki summit decision to extend candidate status to Ankara, the EU-membership project has become the main democratising dynamic providing the elected governments with some
leverage in standing up to the military-led establishment” (Cinar 2008: 120). On the whole, I would disagree with the idea that the European Commission’s regular progress reports initiated the changes in the MGK; these reports rather provided the Turkish authorities with a roadmap to comply with the requirements of beginning accession negotiations with the EU.

My argument in this chapter recognises the importance of the EU’s support for Turkey in curtailing the MGK’s authority and composition, but I do not agree with Rumford (2000), Tank (2001), Diez (2005), Watts (2006) and Cinar (2008) that the civilians on the MGK facilitated the changes only when they were empowered by the credible prospect of the EU membership. My argument is that the MGK’s role in handling internal security threats should have not been considered: over the past 15 to 17 years, the MGK has prepared the national security policy of the Turkish Republic. Since the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the rise of radical political Islam were recognised as internal threats to Turkey’s indivisibility and secular nature, respectively, the MGK made recommendations to the government on how to handle these threats. The political dynamics related to these two internal threats should have been researched and analysed in the context of the changes in the MGK. In this chapter, I argue that this relative negligence has resulted in overlooking the connection between domestic political incidents and the changes both in the MGK and in Turkey–EU relations.

Having said that, Sarigil (2007) questions how and why the military agreed to the removal of its own powers. Institutional change, according to Sarigil, could be understood as a “conflicting process” which is made of two stages: initiation and bargaining. In the first stage, he suggested that certain internal or external developments such as shifts in the power structure among institutional actors trigger the process of change. In the second stage, he argued, institutional actors bargain over alternative arrangements, either tacitly or explicitly. His work suggests a two-dimensional bargaining model involving “the logic of consequence” and “the logic of appropriateness”. One of his conclusions is that the EU played a primary role in initiating shifts in power relations between the civilian and military sides in post-Helsinki Turkey – an argument which I would dispute for the reasons outlined above. His second conclusion was that although the military was highly concerned about the consequences of reforms on its own powers, it nevertheless continued to express its commitment to further integration into the EU, because it found itself entrapped in its own rhetoric.
There are three points to be made in connection with Sarigil’s analysis. The first is that the military was always loyal to Ataturk’s legacy in its support for Turkey’s relationship with the EU. Chapter 3 showed that during the Critical Junctures (I–III), the military aimed to keep Turkey’s relations with the EU; at Critical Juncture III, it had decided that Turkey would apply for the Full Membership of the EC. It is therefore misleading to suggest that the army agreed to relinquish its powers because it found itself entrapped in its own rhetoric. The second is that Sarigil, like the other academics discussed above, does not put the necessary emphasis on the fact that the changes occurred suddenly. He does not question why the changes in the MGK and in Turkey–EU relations occurred very soon after the closure of the Welfare Party (RP) in 1997 and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), in 1999. Overall, I would not agree with Sarigil that the changes in the MGK’s powers and composition were initiated by the EU, and would argue that Sarigil, like others, have overstated the influence of exogenous variables on the future of a domestic institution.

While the above discussed academics have pointed to the role of the EU in the changes that took place in the MGK and in Turkey–EU relations, Kubicek (2005) and Ozcan (2004) have also paid attention to the role of domestic factors. Kubicek sounds a note of warning: “[Is] this, however, entirely an externally driven process? Are Turks responding merely to the material incentives of conditionality, or are some Turkish actors advocating reforms for their own sake?” (Kubicek 2005: 361–63). To explain his point of view, Kubicek uses an article from the Turkish Daily News (18 July 2000), which questioned whether the Turks were making reforms like students who do their homework only because the teacher tells them to do it. He analyses this era of change as democratisation being imposed from outside, but then imbued with Turkish authorship, but nevertheless argues that it is more an instrumental adaptation to the demands of conditionality than a sincere change based upon acceptance and internalization of democratic means. He thus suggests that the Turkish government is responding to the “logic of consequences” (do X because you will get Y) rather than the “logic of appropriateness” (do X because it is the right thing to do” (Kubicek 2005: 361–65). He emphasises the support “from below” within Turkey as essential for consolidation of reforms and argues that although there is evidence of Euroscepticism within the public at large, there is a broad support in abstract terms for democratic principles and human rights. Like Kubicek, Ozcan (2004) disagrees with the suggestion that increasing prospects of EU accession have been exerting a tremendous impact on Turkish foreign policy and on the
dynamics of Turkish politics. Instead he suggests that the impact may have stemmed from different roots. He points to Turkish society: according to Ozcan Turkish society has become more receptive to open debate as interest groups develop, and they are now far better organized to transmit their demands across Europe through peer associations accredited with the Union (ibid.: 6). Globalisation, the EU integration process and customs union brought about their own grinding effects on the prominence of traditional statecraft in Turkey. A vast spectrum of civic organisations are involved in activities formerly pertinent to the security sector on a greater scale and are thus becoming the agents of a de-securitization process in Turkey (Oczan 2004: 6–7). This chapter argues that Kubicek is right to stress the importance of support from below in the process of change that has taken place in Turkey and agrees with Ozcan over the role of interest groups. However, one should not overlook the fact that throughout Turkish political history, the public and interest groups have been predominantly supportive of a fairer and democratic political system, but yet successive governments did not take the necessary steps to strengthen democracy and improve human rights until the late 1990s.

Bilgin (2007b) has suggested that decreasing the numbers of military members of the MGK and reducing the frequency of the MGK’s meetings did not change the role of the military in the Turkish political system and argued that “the military remains the major actor shaping the contours of the national security policy document through a mixture of formal mechanism and intersubjective understandings, which, in turn, are warranted by the ways in which ‘security’ has been understood and practiced in Turkey” (ibid.: 563–64). Bilgin (2007b) suggested that change became possible owing to some social actors’ too-prolonged strategy of claiming ‘security-speak’ in order to frame concerns, such as the ‘limited life-chance opportunities for a rapidly increasing population’, in strictly security terms (as ‘threats to Turkey’s future’) and pointing to Turkey’s accession to the EU as a solution that would help stabilise Turkey’s foreign relations as well as the economy and provide an anchor for reform. This strategy according to Bilgin was successful since it has challenged the state establishment’s monopoly over ‘security speak’ and de-centred the existing ‘security problem’ through identifying new ones; these, in turn, allowed room for debates, dissent and change (ibid.: 556).

In a different publication Bilgin (2008) has argued that the concept of security is going through a change; the “new security” approach suggests that security policies should not aim
only at preventing wars but should be transformed into policies that would bring about emancipatory change (ibid.:43). A few examples of “new” threats include economic inequalities and injustices, environmental degradation and the conflicts produced by international migration; these are tagged as “soft security” in Western literature and practice whereas the traditional military threats stemming from abroad are named “hard security” (ibid.: 50). Bilgin argues that the change in the approach to what security means represents the adoption of a more holistic understanding, including an understanding that covers the military as well as all the remaining non-military aspects of security. And it has been argued that “‘This is achieved by asking the question, ‘Who is security for?’ The answer is this: Security is for the people. The state is only the tool for providing security for the people and is never the real aim itself’” (quoted in Bilgin 1998: 50). There are two reasons for the emergence of this new security concept: (1) to meet the needs of the people whose insecurities are deepened, rather than eliminated, by the prevailing military-focussed approach and (2) to stress the fact that state security is not an end in itself, but only a tool for providing the citizens’ security. For Bilgin (1998) this means that the state should of course be safe in order to provide security for its citizens, but the oppressive policies of some states that limit freedoms raise doubt about whether they give enough importance to their citizens’ security (ibid.:60-61).

Kirisci (2009) refers to a domestic factor in his analysis of how and why Turkey’s foreign policy has changed. Kirisci notes that Turkish foreign policy makers changed their narrowly defined focus on national security with their aspiration to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment. He argues that Turkey has been transformed from being cited as a “post-Cold War warrior” or a “regional coercive power” to a “benign” if not “soft” power and claims that it is crucial to pay adequate attention to the role of economic factors in shaping Turkish foreign policy. Turkey, according to him, has been in the process of becoming a “trading state” as foreign trade has steadily grown and come to constitute a growing proportion of its economy; he suggests that that the formation of a customs union between Turkey and the EU in 1996 would also come to play an important role in creating an environment conducive to the eventual emergence of a trading state. The nature of a trading state is such that a wider range of actors come to participate in foreign policy making or diplomatic games and that the interests and priorities of these actors are quite different from those of the traditional foreign policymakers of Turkey. Furthermore, the rise of the trading state has transformed and is transforming traditional foreign policymakers,
too. They are increasingly coming to recognize that Turkey’s national interest cannot be solely determined in terms of a narrowly defined national security, and that economic considerations such as the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment are just as important.

As mentioned above, it is important not to overlook the fact that the changes in question took place very soon after two important developments in the endogenous variables, namely the closure of the RP (Welfare Party) and the ban on Erbakan’s involvement in politics in 1998, and the capture of Ocalan in 1999. These developments have been studied, but separately and independent of the changes in the MGK. The relationship between these incidents and the MGK has been overlooked. The aftermath of these developments has not been studied in detail. The implications of these incidents and their aftermath for the MGK, for domestic politics and for the relationship between Turkey and the EU have been only vaguely researched (Kirisci 2002; Nachmani 2003; Duran 2004; Onis and Keyman 2004; Diez 2005; Oran 2005; Akcapar 2007; Faucompre De and Konings 2008). My argument here is that to understand the radical institutional changes that occurred at this time it is necessary not only to consider developments in the policy areas for which the institution is responsible, but also it is crucial to understand the link between these domestic developments and their aftermath.

Duran (2005) notes that “the Feb 1997 process” – by which expression Duran is referring to the MGK’s February 1997 where the Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party (RP) was asked to take measures to check the growth of religious fundamentalism in Turkey – to have brought some significant changes in the “Islamists’ position in Europe and democracy” and has suggested that they came to re-evaluate their views on Turkey’s membership of the EU. Duran suggests that post 1997 the Islamists adopted a new discourse according to which democratisation, the rule of law and the Copenhagen criteria should shape the reform and restructuring of the Turkish political system” (Duran 2004: 140), and this then meant that Turkey’s endeavour to become a full member of the EU became compatible with their aim of democratising the Turkish political system. Duran’s work is a very interesting one, but it is not clear what he means by “the Feb 1997 process”, the reader is left to guess whether he means the MGK meeting that took place in February 1997 when the RP was given a list of measures necessary to take control of religious fundamentalism or the period which led up to the banning of Erbakan from active politics. It is in addition not clear whom he refers to by “the Islamists”: is it the political parties or the people who are religiously
oriented? On the other hand, Diez, discussing what contributed to improved Turkey–EU relations in the late 1990s, refers to three developments: the improved relationship between Turkey and Greece; the series of reform packages approved by the National Assembly to bring Turkey’s constitutional and legal system in line with EU requirements; and the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a secular party with religious roots (Diez 2005: 170). This chapter agrees with Diez that the improved relationship between Greece and Turkey has positively contributed to Turkey–EU relations, but Diez does not seem to question how and why there have been a number of changes in the Turkish political system and what role domestic political developments played in this. Diez also overlooks to the fact that it is not the rise of the AKP that supported Turkey’s bid for EU membership but the moderately conservative and pro-European approach the AKP adopted that has positively contributed to Turkey’s bid to join the EU.

On the capture of Ocalan, when discussing causes of the changes in the Turkish political system, Keyman and Onis have noted that the Helsinki decision was very influential in initiating changes in the Turkish political system and argue that civil society also contributed to this. In addition, they note, “we should recognise that the end of the armed conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the early part of 1999 also helped to provide a more congenial environment with which democratisation reforms could proceed” (Keyman and Onis 2004: 181-82). Oran (2005: 352) similarly suggests that Ocalan’s trial and then his arrest allowed the Turkish government to take rigorous steps to consolidate democracy. This chapter agrees with Keyman and Onis (2004) and Oran (2005) that after Ocalan’s capture a wide scale of political reforms were made in Turkey and this contributed positively to Turkey’s path toward EU membership. Both of these works however lack not only to outline the political reforms they are referring to, but also more concretely how and why Ocalan’s arrest contributed to Turkey’s democratisation period.

Faucompret and Konings have noted: “The PKK lost much of its élan when its leader Abdullah Ocalan was arrested in February 1998” and suggest that it was only with the EU’s pressure and the PKK’s defeat by the TSK that the Turkish government lifted the state of emergency and introduced constitutional amendment (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 168). I would argue that certainly after Ocalan was captured, the PKK adopted a new moderate approach so that its demands could be accommodated in the political debates in Turkish politics. Nachmani similarly has said that “Turkey crushed the PKK armed uprising”
Nachmani 2003: 2) and added “Turkey’s integration in Europe and in the West seems to grow stronger as Turkey’s external adversaries and internal conflicts become weaker and appear to be less threatening” (ibid.: 3). However, the PKK was not crushed; it is important to recognise the fact that the PKK had called for a ceasefire after Ocalan’s capture; therefore there were no armed clashes between the TSK and the PKK. Kirisci notes, “The apprehension of the leader of the PKK in February 1999 very quickly brought the violence to an end. A general improvement in the political climate in Turkey occurred and the coalition government elected to power in April 1999 committed itself to reforms” (Kirisci 2002: 3). Kirisci also argues that the EU played an influential role not only in the removal of the state of emergency in the South East of Turkey, but also in creating an environment conducive to solving the Kurdish problem (Kirisci 2004: 264). However, I would argue that all these discussed works overstate the impact of the EU in the removal of the state of emergency and fail to see that the capture of Ocalan and his conciliatory approach have on their own generated an improved security environment which paved the way for changes to take place in the MGK’s state of emergency.

By contrast, Akcapar (2007: 41) does recognise that an improved internal and external security environment emerged in Turkey when Ocalan was arrested and has noted that this helped Turkey to improve its relationship with the EU. Akcapar however does not explain how and why Ocalan’s capture generated an improved internal security environment and in what ways this changed the pace of Turkey–EU relations. In addition, she omits to connect this with the closure of the RP and the newly established Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) moderate Islamic and pro-European approach, which contributed to this improved security environment. This chapter argues that the removal of the leaders of the two internal threats and the aftermath of this formed the endogenous pressure that underpinned the changes under consideration.

Having debated the strengths and the weaknesses of the existing literature on how and why changes took place in the MGK and in the Turkey-EU relations, I now want to move on to discuss which school of the New Institutionalism’s approach on institutional change can best explain the changes both in the MGK’s position in Turkish political system and in the pace of the Turkey-EU relations. Although rational choice institutionalism offers many approaches to how and why institutions change (see Chapter 2 for more details), I will test two of them in this chapter. One of which suggests that institutional change occurs easily – all one needs is
to do change the incentives and behaviour will almost immediately change (see Goodin 1995; Keman 1996) and the other one argues that institutions change when they are dysfunctional or yield sub-optimal results. If one applies the first rational choice institutionalist approach on how and why the MGK has changed, then one would argue that when the EU changed the incentives by granting Turkey a candidate membership status in 1999, then the Turkish authorities changed their behaviour in relation to the MGK. This is a very interesting point of view and goes hand in hand with the above mentioned academics’ point of view as to how and why the MGK’s powers were curtailed (Rumford, Diez, Cinar and Watts). And in the very last part of this chapter I will however test the case that the MGK's powers and functions were changed when the EU changed its incentives in relation to Turkey’s bid to join the EU. If one however adopts the second approach, it could be argued that when the MGK was dysfunctional and yielded sub-optimal results, the MGK’s powers and functions were changed, for example, to make it more functional. It is however unclear how one would assess whether an institution is dysfunctional. Testing however whether the MGK was changed because it was dysfunctional and yielded sub-optimal result can reveal an interesting insight to the MGK’s ability in accomplishing its functions—this will be done in the very last part of this chapter.

Before I move on to discuss how well the above discussed rational choice institutionalist approaches can explain how and why the pace of Turkey-EU relations has changed, I want to clarify one point. When the pace of Turkey-EU relations is discussed, I argue one need to be aware that there are two independent variables involved in this: (i) Turkey’s treatment of the EU and its position on making changes in its political system and (ii) the EU’s treatment of Turkey and its position in relation to Turkey’s bid to join the EU. And the interaction of these two independent variables makes up the dependent variable: the pace of Turkey-EU relations. If however one applies the two rational choice institutionalist approaches on how and why the pace of Turkey-EU relations changed, one would suggest that Turkey-EU relations has accelerated when the EU granted Turkey a candidate membership status. This would mean that the greater attention would be given to the EU’s role in the change of Turkey-EU relations; whilst domestic Turkish politics, as well as the reforms took place in the Turkish political systems would be overlooked. The second rational choice institutionalist approach suggests that when Turkey-EU relations yielded sub-optimal outcomes, it was decided to change the pace of the relationship. This approach however fails to provide a framework for to go and find out about what can be the sub-optimal outcomes of Turkey-EU relations and
for whom, is it the EU or Turkey or both. I will nevertheless test these two approaches in the last part of this chapter.

As far as sociological institutionalism is concerned, Clemens and Cook, Powell and DiMaggio (1983, 1991) identify three mechanisms of institutional change: (i) “coercion”, which involves explicit pressures from other institutions, as well as from the cultural environment; (ii) “mimesis”, under which one organisation recognises the success of another and attempts to copy it; (iii) “norms”, through which an organisation adopts the “conventional wisdom” that certain forms are more “modern, appropriate, and professional”. If one applies the first mechanism on to the case study in hand, then one would say that the other institutions and the cultural environment have put pressure on the MGK to change its position in the Turkish political system. Whereas the second mechanism would suggest that when the MGK recognised success of another institution and it attempted to copy it, changes began to take place in the MGK’s powers and functions. However if one adopts the third mechanism then it could be said that conventional wisdom was behind the curtailment of the MGK’s powers so that MGK can be modern and be more fitting for the modern days. I now want to move on to how well the above mentioned three sociological institutionalist mechanisms can explain the change in the pace of Turkey-EU relations. As far as how and why the pace of Turkey-EU relations changed, the first approach would suggest that change has occurred through pressure from other countries or the other EU like bodies, for instance, the NATO. The second may argue that both Turkey and the EU recognised successful relationships of other countries and copied them; therefore change took place in Turkey’s bid to join the EU. The very last one mechanism can say both Turkey and the EU must have adopted the conventional wisdom so that they can establish a much modern and professional relationship. This shows that like rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism gives great importance to the external factors in the study of institutional change. Testing these three mentioned mechanisms of sociological institutionalism will be useful to develop an interesting debate as to which mechanisms have triggered changes in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey-EU relations.

Brief discussion of how well the rational choice and sociological institutionalists’ approaches can explain institutions change point to a number of reasons as to how and why changes may have taken place in the MGK and in the Turkey-EU relations. Both schools of the New Institutionalism share common grounds in granting greater emphasis in the role of external
factors in producing institutional and policy change. They lack interest in the role of domestic factors in triggering institutional and policy change. Additionally both schools do not provide the researcher with a framework or a method of research that could be utilised to test if their approaches can explain how and why the MGK’s powers were curtailed and Turkey was granted a candidate membership status in 2004. In contrast historical institutionalism points to the concept of punctuated equilibrium which can be used to explain institutional change. Krasner’s concept of punctuated equilibrium is very useful to formulating a number of questions, which have been mentioned in Chapter 2, to unveil the triggers of the changes in the MGK and in the Turkey-EU relations. Additionally the concept of punctuated equilibrium helps to draw strong connections between Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. While Chapter 5 explained the MGK’s long years of stasis in keeping the path of state of emergency it had adopted in the early 1980s, Chapter 6 proposes to consider changes in the MGK’s path of state of emergency, as well as changes in the both the MGK’s powers and Turkey-EU relations. Additionally the concept of punctuated equilibrium recognises the importance of exogenous shock in breaking the years of stasis, which then lead one to ask what exogenous shock took place both in Turkey and in the EU. In the next part, I will apply the concept of punctuated equilibrium to explain how and why the MGK and Turkey-EU relations have changed.

6.2. Unveiling the triggers of the changes in the MGK and Turkey-EU relations with the Historical Institutionalist approach

6.2.1. Turkey Receiving Candidate Membership Status

Turkey was not included in the 2004 enlargement of the EU at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. A different strategy, however, was drawn up to improve relations with Turkey. As part of this, the European Commission announced a document titled “European Strategy for Turkey” in March 1998. It said: “The European Council considered that it was important for a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field” (European Strategy for Turkey 1998: 1). The strategy consisted of developing the possibilities afforded by the Ankara Agreement: intensification of the customs union; implementation of financial cooperation; approximation of law and adoption of the Union acquis; and participation, to be decided case by case, in certain programmes and in certain agencies, as provided for in paragraphs of 19 and 21 of the Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council (ibid.).
At the Cardiff Summit in June 1998, the importance of satisfying the Copenhagen Criteria was reiterated, if a country wanted to join the EU. According to Oran (2005), three developments took place post-Cardiff Summit in relation to Turkey’s bid to join the EU: (i) Turkey was described as “candidate member” rather than an “eligible country”; (ii) Turkey was included into the mechanism of assessing and preparing the candidate member country for Full Membership; and (iii) it was decided that the European Commission would produce Annual Progress Reports for Turkey, a process that is applied only to those officially recognised as candidate member countries. He therefore suggested that these gave out the signals that the EU was stepping towards recognising Turkey as “candidate country”.

In spite of these positive moves on the EU’s side, the Turkish authorities continued to be critical of the EU’s position on Turkey’s accession. The European Commission, however, proved its commitment to the Turkish authorities by (1) producing the first “Progress Report” on Turkey in November 1998, (2) suggesting that the “European Strategy for Turkey” should be improved, (3) treating Turkey like a “candidate country” in the European Commission’s 1999 Progress Report and (4) suggesting that a partnership document be prepared for Turkey – from which process it was excluded at the Luxembourg Summit. Consequently, at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 Turkey was officially recognised as a candidate country for eventual membership as long as it met Copenhagen criteria.

The Confederation of the Turkish Worker Trade Union (Turk-Is) and the Turkish Industrialist’s and Businessmen Association (TUSAID) welcomed the new status, and both of these Unions defended the move to Full Membership of the EU. The Turk-Is was not, however, entirely convinced whether the EU wanted Turkey as a full EU member state, or it wanted to keep Turkey under its control for geo-political gains. These groups also were cautious of EU treating Turkey as a colony (Radikal, 12/12/1999). Karluk (1998: 36) and Manisali (2001: 178) did not treat the offer of candidate membership as a success, arguing that accepting candidate membership status meant rejecting ‘other better opportunities’. By the ‘other better opportunities’, they pointed to forming relations with the Turkic and Middle Eastern countries. They shared Turk-Is’s concerns about Turkey risking its independence by affirming this new status. Thus, they argued that Turkey should make a decision on whether it wants to be with the EU as a dependent country or form a Turkic Union and be the leader country in that region. Nachmani (2003), on the other hand, asked: why did the EU grant candidate membership status to Turkey after having it dismissed from the 2004 enlargement of the EU? Nachmani asked: “Was there any connection between the 1991 War in the Gulf
and the December 1999 EU Helsinki decision to invite Turkey to negotiate its entrance into the Union?” (ibid.: 1); and he argued: “Perhaps not a direct one, but one cannot fail to see that the 1990s were marked by crossroads, developments, events, etc. which united two dates, perhaps even led to the December 1999 decision” (ibid.: 1). Altunisik and Tur suggested that by candidate membership status, the EU had practiced its policy of “not totally alienating Turkey” (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 120).

(i) Unveiling the MGK

Chapter 3 showed that the MGK began to receive academic attention very soon after its powers were extended at the Critical Juncture III by both Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution and Law 2945. Up to this point, the EU’s official papers show no interest in either the powers of the MGK or its position in the political decision-making process. When Turkey was recognised as a candidate member country in 1999 however the regular reports produced by the European Commission began to pay considerable attention to the MGK’s role in Turkish politics. Thereafter the MGK’s composition, powers, functions and internal structure began to be cause for concern in the EU about Turkey’s suitability for membership.

A well-known Turkish politician, Ismail Cem, who served as the Minister for Foreign Affairs between 1997 and 2002, has observed that the MGK “provides a forum for the top civilian and military personalities to share views and to make recommendations to the government on national security issues” (interview quoted in Cem 2001: 122). Cem’s observations of the MGK, as someone who had at that point been a civilian member of the MGK for about three years, were the following: (1) “the MGK is not a place, which is dominated by the military”; (2) “this is a consultative body. It is for the government to decide whether to go along with the proposals of the NSC or not”; (3) “what we discuss really are security issues. In a country like Turkey – which has faced in its recent past several vital security issues, both internal and external – it is normal that such a body is more functional than in some other countries”; (4) “[t]he military here is under the control of the Prime Minister and the government. So there hasn’t been any recent case which could be interpreted as the military going beyond its role” (ibid.: 123). Cem added that the MGK does not interfere with the government’s efforts in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, and he suggested that the MGK and the government were two separate institutions where each had separate functions to pursue. As far as Turkey’s relations with the EU were concerned, Cem disagreed that the MGK’s position in the political system would hinder Turkey’s accession to the EU. He said
“I don’t agree with that analysis; it contains lots of scenarios that are based on exaggerations” (ibid).

Cem’s analysis, however, would seem overly optimistic about the effect of the MGK’s role on Turkey–EU relations. European Commission reports (1998–2004) constantly requested the Turkish authorities to relinquish the MGK’s powers and change its composition. These reports first of all informed the Turkish authorities about which features of democracy its political institutional setting was lacking and then formed pressure on it to comply with the EU’s requests and recommendations. My argument in this chapter is that this type of pressure can be seen as ‘exogenous pressure’ because it emerges outside both Turkey and the MGK. The following will study the regular reports (1998–2004) to analyse the EU’s perception of the MGK and it requests for change.

As well as unveiling the MGK’s influential position in politics, the 1998 report touched on the composition of the MGK. Particularly, the military members were at the centre of scrutiny. The report argued said that the MGK’s recommendations to the Council of Ministers were a strong influence on government policy. The Turkish constitution allowed the army to play a civil role and intervene in every area of political life. Furthermore, it stated that: “The National Security Council demonstrates the major role played by the army in political life. The army is not subject to civil control and sometimes even appears to act without the government's knowledge when it carries out certain large-scale repressive military operations” (ibid.: 10). Both the 1998 and the 1999 reports, furthermore, agreed “the organisation of public authorities in Turkey has most of the basic features of a democratic system, but the MGK’s position in the political settings and lack of civilian control of the army members of the MGK prevent these authorities from functioning in the same way as they do in the Member States of the European Union. The 2000 report focused on the institutional strength, power and authority of the MGK, and said: “Its conclusions, statements or recommendations continue to strongly influence the political process, … In addition, it appears that at present the views of the National Security Council in practice seriously limit the role played by the government. …[T]here seems to be too little accountability to the Parliament with regard to defence and security matters” (ibid.: 14).

Moving onto the 2002 report, this noted that although the MGK was transformed into an advisory body, it continued to carry political influence. Like the other reports, the 2002 report felt that the army members of the MGK had a greater say in politics than they
should. It noted: “The introduction of a civilian majority of members and the limitation to an advisory role, in line with the Accession Partnership priority, do not appear to have changed the way the NSC operates in practice. ... Although decisions are taken by majority, opinions of its military members continue to carry great weight” (ibid.: 24). The same report identified four separate areas of day to day politics in which the MGK played a significant role. It said that the MGK was still active in making recommendations to the government on lifting the state of emergency in the provinces of Hakkari and Tunceli on 30 July; and it pointed out that the MGK was, at the same time, making recommendations on the extension of the state of emergency for Diyarbakir and Sirnak while indicating that the state of emergency in those provinces be lifted – this particular functional capacity of the MGK was dealt with extensively in Chapter 3. Furthermore, it observed that: “On various occasions throughout the year, military members of the National Security Council expressed their opinions about political, social and foreign policy matters in public speeches, statements to the media and declarations” (ibid.: 25). The third area was the MGK’s contributions to the debates about the reforms the government was supposed to make in order to comply with the EU’s political criteria; they have been particularly active on issues such as cultural rights, education, and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (ibid.: 25). The fourth area was related to the seats the MGK members held in the civil institutional platforms, such as the RTUK (Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music) (ibid.: 25).

Both the 2003 and 2004 reports touched on the MGK’s position in civilian bodies including the High Audio-Visual Board (RTÜK) and the High Education Board (YÖK) (ibid.: 18-19, 12). They additionally noted: “In order to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU member states, it is important that … military representation be withdrawn from civilian bodies and for Parliament to ensure full control of the defence budget” (ibid.: 19, 12). The 2004 report added “it is important that the civilian authorities fully exercise their supervisory functions in practice, in particular as regards the formulation of the national security strategy and its implementation, especially concerning relations with neighbouring countries” (ibid.: 23).

(ii) Endogenous Variables

Chapter 3 showed that the MGK’s path of state of emergency had evolved into a significantly strict regime in the South East of Turkey with a number of unique features including regional governors, village guards, legal measures, terrorism law, and evacuation of the villages. This
regime partly contributed to Turkey’s poor human rights records, its weak democracy and to the unsettled nature of Turkey–EU relations and these are recognised as unintended consequences of the MGK’s path of state of emergency. Since this chapter is considering whether the changes in and around the MGK were caused by either exogenous or endogenous pressure, it is necessary to separate variables in two categories namely exogenous variables and endogenous variables. The EU and its regular progress reports on Turkey can be thought as exogenous variables, and the EU’s requests for change can be considered as exogenous pressure. The MGK’s policy remits such as the Kurdish issue and state of emergency will be treated as endogenous variables and developments in the endogenous variables, generating pressure for change, shall be endogenous pressure. A new field furthermore will be added to the list of endogenous variables, which is the MGK’s handling of the religious movement and the Welfare Party (RP). By the end of 1990s, the RP, a religiously oriented political party, gained a significant support from the electorate and managed to receive a large number of seats in the TBMM. This resulted in political discomfort in Turkey – it was feared that the RP’s associated religious activities and decisions and movements might endanger the secular nature of the Turkish Republic (Cornell 2002: 27-28). From the late 1990s therefore the RP was closely scrutinised by both the MGK and the wider political spectrum. Below I will contextualise the characteristics of the state of emergency, the constitutional restrictions on minority rights and the rise of the RP as endogenous variables. First, however, I will briefly discuss the European Commission’s Regular Reports on Turkey as a source of information not only to explore the nature of the pressure the EU put on the Turkish authorities, but also to give a background understanding of these variables.

The European Commission Reports of 2001 to 2004 did draw closer attention to the above outlined characteristics of the state of emergency. They recognised the village guards as “undisciplined and abusive” (EC Regular Report 2002: 16). The 2001 and 2003 progress reports pointed to the regional disparity in Turkey. It therefore asked the government to improve the economic situation in the South East of Turkey. It said that a comprehensive approach involving enhancement of economic, social and cultural opportunities for all citizens would help to improve the situation (ibid.: 32, 139). Keeping the state of emergency in the South of Turkey, and the hardship experienced by displaced persons, have been the two other areas of focus for the European Commission. The 2002 Progress report noted: “The majority of the displaced rural population continues to live in urban centres in very difficult economic and social conditions and inadequate health care, lack of hygiene, malnutrition,
insufficient drinking water, and improper disposal of sewage and garbage are common problems; this situation has adverse consequences for the children whose education and literacy levels are unsatisfactory” (ibid.: 16). It, furthermore, asked the government to improve infrastructure and re-build villages for those returning to their villages (ibid.: 39). Picking up on the same issue, the 2003 report noted: "Although limited financial assistance has been provided to some returnees, there is a more general lack of financial resources to support return to villages, to compensate villagers for the destruction of houses or dwellings and to develop basic infrastructure in areas previously subject to armed clashes” (ibid.: 40).

Apart from the characteristics of the state of emergency, constitutional and legal aspects of Turkey’s political system were also criticised by the European Commission in four particular areas. The first was the ‘legal restrictions of the use of Kurdish language’. The 1998 report noted that Kurdish is no longer banned in the context of cultural activities but cannot be used in “political communication” or education, and that radio and television broadcasting in any of the Kurdish languages is forbidden (EC Regular Report 1998: 18–19). In the following year, “the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe” indicated in its January 1999 report that “the essential point is that any such group [Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin] should have the opportunity and material resources to use and sustain its natural languages and cultural traditions” (EC Regular Report 1999: 14). The second was the existence of the “death penalty”: the European Commission was aware of the death penalty not having been applied since the 1980s, but it strongly asked the authorities to abolish the death penalty. The third was “minority rights”; the European Commission’s 2000 report noted that Turkey had not signed the “Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities” and did not recognise minorities other than those defined by the Lausanne Treaty (ibid.: 19). It added that the Turkish government had taken two significant initiatives: (1) signing several international human rights instruments and (2) endorsing the work of the Supreme Board of Co-ordination for Human Rights. Furthermore, the report said that compared to last year the situation on the ground had hardly improved, and pointed out that “Turkey still does not meet the political Copenhagen criteria” (ibid.: 19). The fourth area was the “10% electoral threshold”, which hindered the Turkish parliament from being a fully representative body; in particular, the
2003 European Commission said “the electoral system makes it difficult for minorities to be represented in Parliament” (ibid.: 38).

To return to the domestic politics of this period: Ozbudun (2000) suggests that the rise of religiously oriented political parties and growing interest in the pro-Islamic political parties were overshadowed by the conflict between the TSK and the PKK until the late 1990s, but in fact the beginnings of this rise were clear earlier: “In the 1990s, political Islam emerged as a significant challenge to Turkish state”. The pro-Islamic political parties do indeed have a long history in Turkish politics. Chapter 3, in particular, touched on two of them, the National Order Party (MNP) and the National Salvation Party (MSP), and where appropriate it explained their attitude towards the EU. This section will give an introduction to the chronological development of religiously oriented political parties, and it then will discuss the rise of the RP and Necmettin Erbakan’s success at the General Elections in 1995. The Reformist Democracy Party (IDP) was the first religiously oriented political party formed by Cevat Rifat Atilhan and it entered politics during the multi-party system period in 1951 (Yesilada 2002: 63). Its slogan said: “The sun of welfare and happiness will rise when [we] take the Koran into our hands. Believers unite and form your own regime” (Cumhuriyet, 28/08/1951). It was, however, closed in six months. In the meantime, an influential religious figure, Sheik Mehmet Zahit Kotku, a leading figure of the Naksibendi order (tarikat) and head of the related Iskendur Pasa congregation (dergah) was formulating a political agenda to form the next Islamist political party (Yesilada 2002: 64). When Necmettin Erbakan became involved in politics in the late 1960s, Suleyman Demirel, who at the time was the leader of the AP, refused his candidacy for the Justice Party (AP). Subsequently, Erbakan was elected as an MP from Konya in the 1968 General Election, when he stood in the elections as an independent candidate. Post the 1968 General Election, the key Islamist figures such as Hasan Aksay, Mustafa Yazgan, Arslan Topcubasi, and Osman Yuksel Serdengecti began speculating on the AP’s stance on Islamic values, and agreed to form a new political party (ibid.: 64). Hence the MNP was established after being approved by Kotku, with an emblem of a hand pointing to the heavens in an Islamic manner. If one looks closely into the background of the founding members of the MNP, one could see a coalition of the Naksibendi Order and Nurcu Movement followers: Erbakan (Member of the parliament and Naksi); Ahmet Paksu (Member of Parliament and Nurcu); and Aksay (former Member of Parliament and Naksi).
Erbakan replaced Suleyman Arif Emre as the MNP’s chairman in 1970. The short-lived MNP was closed by the Constitutional Court at the Critical Juncture II (CJ-II) in 1971 for advocating anti-secular political views and opposing the Republic. When the MNP was closed, Erbakan left for Switzerland and began publishing the Tek Nizam (Sole Order) newspaper, and also established the Milli Gorus (National View) organization. Upon the court’s dismissal of his case, Erkaban returned to Turkey and formed the National Salvation Party (MSP) in October 1972. The other founding members of the party included Aksay, Fehmi Cumalioglu, Recai Kutan, Korkut Ozal, and Salih Ozcan (ibid.: 65). It remained a medium-sized party between 1973 and 1980; its national vote share never exceeded 12% (Ozbudun 2000: 87). Then at the Critical Juncture III (CR-III), the MNP was closed. This was followed by forming the Welfare Party (RP) in July 1983 and Erbakan was selected as the leader in 1987.

By the mid 1990s, Erbakan’s RP began to attract the attention of a wider section of the community and his party gained about 21.5% of the votes in 1995 General Election, which was translated into to the largest number of seats in the TBMM (ibid.: 87). The RP had to look for a coalition partner as it did have the majority to form the government on its own. Despite leading a campaign before the General Elections based on anti-RP discourse and claiming to be the guarantor of the Republic against rising political Islam, the True Path Party’s (DYP) Tansu Ciller formed a coalition government with the RP in January 1996 (Yesilada 2002: 67). Ciller commented “it is said two parties working together having different bases of support would be difficult. However, parties with the same constituency could equally lead to harmful competition. I think we will be able to complement each other, find the right way and use the competition for service to our country” (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 57).

(iii) Changes and Antecedents to the Endogenous Variables

Krasner’s emphasis on institutions maintaining stasis for long stretches of time is appropriate here because, as shown in Chapter 3, there were changes neither in the MGK’s position nor in the pace of Turkey–EC relations between 1983 and 1997. Then changes suddenly began; the equilibrium was punctuated after nearly fourteen years. There are three main areas of change I wish to discuss here: the first area concerns the changes within the MGK; the second developments in the security situation, the endogenous variables; the third, changes in Turkey’s relations with the EU.
With regards to the first area, in 2001, 2003 and 2004, a number of changes took place in how the MGK operated. The most significant changes in the MGK were made in 2001. To reduce the political power of the military members, the number of civilian members of the MGK was dramatically increased from five to nine, while the military representatives remained at five. With these changes, the civilian members of the MGK included the President, the Prime Minister (PM) and the PM’s four advisors: the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Justice Minister, and the Minister of Defence; and the Chief of the General Staff, the Commanders of the army, navy, and air forces and the General Commander of Gendarme were among the military members (Hurriyet, 29/12/2001). In addition, in order to curtail the political authority of the MGK over the Council of Ministers and the Governments, the wordings of the Article 118 were revised. The new text emphasised the advisory nature of this body, stressing its role in making recommendations, where now the government was only required to “evaluate” them rather than give them “priority consideration” (Hurriyet, 29/12/2001). The 7th reform package, introduced in 2003, brought in a number of other changes: (1) internal restructuring; (2) restricting access to the civil institutions and (3) enhancing the transparency of defence expenditure. The executive and supervisory powers of the General Secretariat of the MGK were abolished; and the Secretariat’s responsibility to follow on the implementation of the MGK’s recommendations was abrogated. Furthermore, while restructuring the MGK internally, reducing or wiping out the presence of the military members was a clear intention. The following amendment said that the post of Secretary General would no longer be reserved exclusively for a military person (Bayramoglu 2004: 110); in August 2003, it was decided to appoint a military candidate to replace the outgoing Secretary General for a year term (Ozcan 2007: 43). In August 2004, as the first civilian Secretary General of the MGK, a senior diplomat was appointed by the President upon the proposal of the Prime Minister. Additionally, it was decided that the MGK would meet every other two months, instead of meeting every month (Hurriyet, 17/06/2003; The Times, 31/07/2003). Secondly, the provisions authorising the MGK unlimited access to any civilian agency was restricted; and it no longer had a representative in the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video, and Music (Hurriyet, 17/11/2003). Thirdly, new provisions were adopted with a view to enhancing the transparency of defence expenditures: the Court of Auditors, upon request of Parliament, was granted leave to audit accounts and transactions of all types of organisations, including the state properties owned by the armed forces (EC Regular Report 2003: 19; Ozcan 2007: 45).
In 2004, there were further changes in the MGK’s position in civil boards and bodies. Its representatives withdrew their membership from both the High Board for Radio and TV (RTUK) and the Council of Higher Education (YOK). On the internal restructuring of the MGK, there was a substantial staff reduction: 20 of 53 staff with military backgrounds were removed from employment (Hurriyet, 3/12/2004). In addition, some of the legislative changes that had been made in past years were actually implemented in 2004. The changes to the power of the General Secretariat read as “the Ministries, public institutions and organizations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-classified and classified information and documents needed by the Secretariat General of the NSC” (EC Regular Report 2004: 22). Furthermore, under this regulation, the office of the Secretariat General of the MGK was transformed to serve purely the consultative function of this institution and its role was limited to the definition of the agenda.

In December 2003, the Law on Public Financial Management and Control was amended to allow the inclusion of extra-budgetary funds in the budgets of the relevant administration, i.e., Defence Ministry, as of 1 January 2005, and the dissolution of these funds by 31 December 2007 (Ibid. 22-23). This related in particular to the Defence Industry Support Fund which was used for major arms procurement purchases and was expected to reach US $1.3 billion in 2004. These provisions also contributed to strengthening the role of the Under Secretariat for Defence in defining budgetary appropriations in the field of military expenditures. Secondly, moreover, further new provisions were adopted in relation to the ex-post audit of military and defence expenditure. A regulation was adopted in February enabling the Court of Auditors, on the request of the President of Parliament, to audit military and defence expenditures. In May 2004, a constitutional amendment deleted the exemption of the “state property in possession of the Armed Forces in accordance with the principles of secrecy necessitated by national defence” from the control of the Court of Auditors. However, appropriate enabling legislation will be needed to allow this important reform to be applied in practice.

The second area involves changes in the endogenous variables; in 1997, the TBMM was advised by the MGK to lift the state of emergency in Batman, Bingol, and Bitlis; while in the other provinces the state of emergency was extended for four months (MGK Press Releases, 25/09/1997). In 1999, another province (Siirt) was removed permanently from the state of emergency zone (ibid., 27/10/1999). In 2000, the MGK recommended that
government should lift the state of emergency in Van; and the state of emergency was extended for four months in the remaining provinces (ibid., 26/06/2000). This was followed by lifting the state of emergency in Hakkari and Tunceli (May 2002) and in Diyarbakir and Sırnak (October 2002) (ibid., 30/05/2002 and 22/10/2002 respectively). In June 2002, following a recommendation made by the MGK, the Parliament decided to lift the state of emergency in the provinces of Hakkari and Tunceli. This measure took effect as of 30 July 2002, and in the same year, the MGK indicated that the state of emergency would be lifted permanently from the rest of the provinces (EC Regular Report 2002: 42).

The TBMM took a number of further steps to address the remaining characteristics of the state of emergency regime. In 2003, in order to foster social peace in the region, the Parliament adopted a law on "social reinsertion" which entered into force on 6 August 2003. This law provided a partial amnesty and reduction in sentences for persons involved in the activities of the PKK; however, it excluded the leaders of the organisation, as well as those who committed crimes. According to official figures of September 2003, of 2,067 applications 524 prisoners have been released (EC Regular Report. 2003: 39). In addition, a legal procedure was opened against some village guards involved in murders (ibid.: 40). In 2004, a “Law on Compensation of Losses” resulting from “Terrorist Act” was adopted in July, and this represented recognition of the need to compensate those in the South East who have suffered material damages since the beginning state of emergency regime.

In order to improve housing conditions, and provide access to educational and health facilities and psychosocial care for women and children among the internally displaced persons, a new project called “The Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project” was introduced. The 2003 report said that 82,000 people were authorised to return to their villages in the period between January 2000 and January 2003. The same report noted: “There is, however, concern regarding the lack of transparency and adequacy of consultation in the development of this project and disquiet about the absence of a clear strategy that explains the project aims, scope and budgetary implications” (Ibid). The 2004 report added that the project was inconsistent and slow in pace.

In relation to ethnic minority rights, in August 1999, the Turkish Parliament adopted the Repentance Law (No. 4450) that was applicable for a six month period, and it granted an amnesty notably to the PKK members; it excluded those of the PKK command structure and those who had killed members of the Turkish Security Forces. In April 2001, Turkey signed

As for Human Rights and the protection of minorities: (1) Turkey has signed and/or ratified several international conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Social and Cultural Rights. Constitutional amendments were introduced allowing for the signature of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (EC Regular Report 2004: 16); and (2) Turkey has made increased efforts since 2002 to comply with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (ibid.: 16). In addition, the constitution was amended to lift the ban on the use of the Kurdish language. The changes allowed radio and TV broadcasting in languages and dialects other than Turkish including Kurdish. Subsequently, Kurdish language courses have opened and television and radio broadcasting in several different languages, such as Kurdish, Arabic and Bosnian, has begun. There has also been greater tolerance towards the use of Kurdish during cultural events in the South East (ibid.: 18).

The third area covers changes in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. Along with the European Commission’s progress reports on Turkey, there have been other documents exchanged between Turkish authorities and the EU institutions. Upon granting Turkey candidate membership status, the EU offered Ankara a pre-accession strategy which was designed to support the reforms that were necessary for Turkey’s accession to the EU. At the Nice Summit in December 2000 thereafter the EU Council approved an Accession Partnership (AP) document and this document identified the principles, the priorities, and the intermediate objectives/conditions for Full Membership. It was then published in the Official Journal of European Community in the following year. Onis (2003) noted that the AP highlighted that Turkey had to take radical steps in order to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, not only in the political arena but also in the economic sphere (ibid.: 12).

In 2001, Turkey presented its programme for adaptation of Acquis Communautaire, application, coordination, and monitoring of National Program of Turkey (OJEC 2001: No. 24352). However it was a disappointment for the Turkish authorities when the 2002 European Commission progress report did not recommend the beginning of accession negotiations. Kirisci (2002) said that Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the President, during the Prague
NATO Summit held talks with the EU governmental leaders about the EU’s reluctance over giving Turkey a date to begin the accession negotiations (ibid.: 4). Then Abdullah Gul, the PM, and his delegation went to the Copenhagen Summit and declared their goal of negotiations for December. Although the Franco-German alliance was not receptive to the idea of early negotiations with Turkey, Britain and Southern European countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece on the other hand, showed more commitment to accommodating Turkey by offering the possibility of an early date to initiate the negotiation process (Keyman and Onis 2004: 186). Consequently, the final Presidency Conclusions offered December 2004 as a date when the decision to open negotiations could be taken “without delay”, ensuring that Turkey meets the political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria.

Following this the European Commission’s 2004 regular progress report found Turkey satisfying the political criteria, and recommended beginning the negotiations. In December 2004, therefore, the heads of EU states reiterated the EU Commission’s stance on Turkey and said that Turkey had sufficiently implemented the political criteria and that the EU could open the negotiations in October 2005. It then set out a framework, made of requirements, for starting accession negotiations: Turkey was to bring into force six pieces of legislation including the law on associations, the new penal code, the law on intermediate courts of appeal, the code of criminal procedure, the legislation establishing the judicial police and the law on execution of punishments. In addition, Turkey was required to sign the Adaptation Protocol extending its existing Association Agreement with the EU to all new Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus. When Turkey fulfilled these requirements, the EU opened the accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 as planned. In addition, two other pillars were designed to provide assistance for Turkey in the pre-accession phase: ‘reinforce and support the reform process in Turkey’ and ‘strengthen the political and cultural dialogue’ (EC Regular Report 2005: 4).

Having above identified changes in the three interconnected areas of Turkish politics I now ask:

- What punctuated stasis in these three areas?
- Why was the state of emergency lifted after nearly 17 years?
- What motivated the removal of restrictions in the use of Kurdish language?
• What triggered the curtailment of the MGK’s power and authority?

• Why the EU decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey?

As mentioned earlier, my contention in this chapter is that Krasner’s emphasis on exogenous pressure is not appropriate here. The European Commission’s regular progress reports on Turkey (1998–2004) and its consistent requests for changes in the institutional settings of Turkish political system did form an exogenous pressure on the Turkish government. This pressure however was simply treated as a roadmap by the authorities showing how to comply with the EU’s standards. I argue in this chapter that it was rather endogenous pressures that played a greater role in triggering the radical institutional changes that took place over this period. Developments in endogenous variables are more likely to have an impact on the future of an institution than pressure for change received from externally. The closure of the RP and the ban on Erbakan’s political involvement and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan are developments which not only took place prior to the changes under question, but they also concern the internal threats on which the Turkish government was advised by the MGK for many years. These developments are more likely to have an impact on the MGK and its position in political decision-making. In addition since these developments are related to the endogenous variables, they generate changes to the future shape of the endogenous variables. In terms of how these developments concern Turkey–EU relations, the MGK’s handling of the PKK and the Islamic movement over the years weakened Turkey’s democracy and raised questions about the standards of human rights in Turkey and as shown throughout this thesis Turkey–EU relations have been unsettled as a result. I therefore argue that long years of stasis in the MGK’s powers, in the MGK’s endogenous variables and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations were punctuated by the endogenous pressure, generated by the developments at the MGK’s endogenous variables. The changes I have discussed in the endogenous variables however improved both the quality of democracy and the standards of human rights in Turkey and hence accelerated the pace of Turkey–EU relations.

6.2.2. The specific relevant changes in the endogenous variables

(i) Development One: Closure of the RP and the rise of the Pro-European and Moderate Islamic AKP (1997–2003)

Kotsovilis (2006: 51) notes that “the RP aimed to integrate the political principles of Islam with the state and thus reorient Turkish politics away from Liberal Europe and towards...
authoritarian regions of the Muslim world” and all of these challenged the state and its secularist foundations. On the economy, the RP proposed an Islamic-inspired “just order”, conceived as the third way and thought to be different from and superior to both capitalism and socialism. It claimed that the “just order” is the “true private enterprise regime” and heavy state control was necessary for implementing this order (Ozbudun 2000: 88). Erbakan was not just interested in continuing economic cooperation with the Islamic countries, but also wanted to establish an Islamic NATO, which, after its establishment, was to be called the D-8 – made of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey (Dagi 1998: 116–18). Winrow (1997: 3) argued that the RP seemed more interested in the Islamic world than the Turkic; and Erbakan's official visits to Egypt and to Libya proved Winrow’s point on the RP’s aspirations to form good relations with the Islamic countries.

Erbakan devoted most of his time and attention to the promotion and financing of the Islamic revival in Turkey (Altunisik and Tur 2005); to which end he organised a fast-breaking dinner in January 1997 and invited the sect leaders to this dinner and started to talk about introducing Sharia (Islamic Law) (Ulman 2000: 122). Then when the RP’s calls for Sharia received a lot of positive attention from Turkish Muslims, demonstrations and rallies were organised in support of the RP. One of these was the Jerusalem Night (Kudis Gecesi, author’s translation), organised by the Sincan municipality of Ankara (Hurriyet, 03/02/1997; Milliyet, 03-04/02/1997). The event used posters of the leaders of the Lebanese Hisbullah and Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Muhammed Riza Bagheri, the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey, was invited to this event (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 59). The Iranian Ambassador called for Sharia rule in Turkey and declared that “we do not need to be afraid of being called fundamentalists. … fundamentalists are the most intelligent, civilised and believing people”, and a governor from the RP said that they would “impose Sharia on the secularists by force”(Cumhuriyet, 02/02/1997, author’s translation). As a result of this 20 tanks and 15 armoured vehicles were seen on the streets of Sincan on the morning of 4 February 1997. Suleyman Demirel, the President, sent warning letters to Erbakan and called on him to respect and to protect the secular nature of Turkish Republic. Some military officials were reported in the newspaper as reflecting the general concern in the different ranks of the armed forces, noting, “Turkey has been pushed towards disaster thanks to political interests and calculations, and nobody tries to stop this situation” (Hurriyet, 03/02/1997). The Naval Commander Admiral Guven Erkaya commented that the reactionary
Islamic movement had become more dangerous than the PKK. This is when first Erbakan and the RP’s policies and activities were recognised as internal threats and more dangerous than the PKK (Ulman 2000: 123).

The RP leadership reacted in a rather dismissive way towards the worries of these circles. Erbakan argued that “the issue is not secularism; these are just worries of the people who want to use secularism as hostility to religion. They are only a handful. And they have become fossils” (Cumhuriyet, 05/02/1997). Furthermore, having disregarded all the warnings and suggestions to respect the secular nature of Turkish Republic and its constitution, Erbakan’s RP was discussed at the MGK’s meeting on 29th February 1997 under the chair of Suleyman Demirel, the President and the following members of the MGK: Necmettin Erbakan, the PM; Tansu Ciller, the Deputy Prime Minister; the Minister of National Defence; the Minister of Home Affairs; the Force Commanders; Gendarme; the General Secretary of MGK; and Ismail Hakki Karadayi, Army of the Chief of the Staff. The meeting was ended with eighteen written measures to check the growth of religious fundamentalism in Turkey.

Five of the MGK’s 18 demands are: (1) the ending of schools, residences, and foundations operated by religious brotherhoods; (2) a reduction in the number of Imam schools to a level commensurate with the need for imams; (3) the ending of the infiltration of fundamentalism into bureaucracy, the judiciary, schools and universities; (4) measures to stop subversive activities emanating from Iran; and (5) extension of compulsory primary education from five to eight years. Following this the Chief of Staff announced changes in the National Military and Strategic Concept; the internal threat (Islamists) was the priority over the external threat (Ulman 2000: 122-123). In the briefing held in the military headquarters it was stated that the separatist (PKK) and religious groups (RP), were both trying to divide the Turkish Republic with their operations. Therefore the internal threat preceded the external one and became a top priority (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 60; Ozcan 2000; 19).

Tank (2001) “In recent years, the priority of the task of maintaining internal security has been further strengthened. The turning-point came following a meeting of the MGK on 28 February 1997 which issues 18 recommendations to the government, seeking to eliminate the ‘tide of radical Islam’. This led to changes in the National Military Strategic Concept (Milli Askeri Strateji Konsepti), whose primary target since 1984 had been the Kurdish separatist threat and external threats of interstate war. The new concept, announced to the public in briefings in April 1997, shifted focus to new internal threats to the country’s unity and
ideology. It was ‘reactionary’ Islam that evoked the greatest concern, while Kurdish separatism was downplayed (the capture of Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK]) leader Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999 further diminished this threat). As part of the process of refocusing efforts towards the new primary threat, the Western Working Group (Bati Calisma Grubu) was established in the General Staff headquarters. This group of intelligence experts monitors Islamist activities in all sectors of society, from the media to local government and education, and ensures that the 28 February recommendations are implemented. Emphasising the seriousness of its concerns, the military in 1997-99 examined its own ranks, weeding out 700 officers (including a number of colonels) and non-commissioned officers suspects of harboring fundamentalist sympathies” (p.221)

I showed in Chapter 4 that the MGK between 1983 and 1997 mainly developed recommendations to the Governments in how to weaken and may be, eradicate the PKK, but Karadayi’s statement gives the indications that by the end of 1990s the ‘reactionary Islamic movement’ led by Erbakan and the RP had become the main internal threat in Turkey. Thus the MGK tried to take a control of it initially by giving warning to Erbakan, but when this had failed, the MGK opted for the above explained radical option. However, the below will show that the closure of the RP and the ban on Erbakan’s political involvement have paved the way for the rise of a moderately religious political party, which have generated an ‘improved security environment’ in Turkish politics.

In May 1997 the state attorney opened a case for the closure of the RP based on the allegation that it had become the headquarters of action against secularism. When Erbakan resigned in June 1997, Aksin (2007) noted: “Demirel entrusted the job to Mesut Yilmaz on the grounds that the country needed a government to diminish tensions” (ibid.: 306–7). Hence, the Constitutional Court closed the RP on 16 January 1998 and Erbakan was banned from politics for a period of five years (Hughes 2010: 140–46). I recognise the Constitutional Court’s decision in relation to the RP and Erbakan as the one of two developments in the MGK’s endogenous variables that has generated “improved security environment” and therefore put pressure for punctuation in the long years of stasis in the MGK, in the MGK’s endogenous variables, as well as in Turkey-EU relations. Upon the closure of the RP, the Virtue Party (FP) was formed by Recai Kutan in December 1997 and most of the former RP parliamentary deputies then joined the FP. They attempted to tone down their criticism of secular reforms by embarking on a campaign to present a new image for their party. The
younger elites of the party, led by individuals such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the former Mayor of Istanbul, and Abdullah Gul went so far as to emphasise the need for a system-oriented political party and they openly challenged the old guards led by Kutan (Yesilada 2002: 68). Though the FP had tried to cultivate a more a moderate image than the Welfare Party, it was still distrusted by the secular elite, especially the “military” (The Guardian, 24/03/1999). It was finally closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001, on the grounds that it was a continuation of the RP.

Erdogan was elected as the Mayor of Istanbul in the local elections in March 1994 as a member of the RP. Erdogan’s speech of December 1997 in Siirt put his political career at risk. There, he read a poem comparing “mosques to barracks, minarets to bayonets, and the faithful to an army”, and it was interpreted as militaristic, constituting racial and religious provocation. However, this was a poem quoted from a book published by a state enterprise and recommended to teachers by the Ministry of Education. The Turkish Appeal Court imprisoned Erdogan for ten months, stripped him of his office and barred Erdogan from standing for elections. Following this, Erdoğan resigned as mayor. The EU in a statement of 25 September 1998 said that it regretted the ruling of the Turkish Appeals Court and expressed its concern at the implications of this decision on democratic pluralism and freedom of expression in Turkey (EC Regular Report 1998: 10). In addition, the American Consul-General in Istanbul paid Erdogan a visit of sympathy.

After serving four months of his sentence, Erdogan was released in 1999 and established the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in August 2001. Although the AKP gained a landslide victory in the 2002 General Elections, Erdogan's conviction of 1998 barred him from serving in parliament both as an MP and the Prime Minister (Aksin 2007: 308–9). Erdogan’s disqualification was removed through a constitutional amendment in December 2002. Following this Erdogan won a by election in March 2003 and formed the new government, taking office in May 2003. Faucompret and Konnings (2008) noted that the AKP’s landslide victory of November 2002 “sent shock waves throughout Turkish society. The traditional centrist parties – tainted by alleged corruption, incompetence and continuing infighting – were swept away by a new party, the AKP. … while all other parties but the CHP disappeared” (ibid.: 16).

Lieutenant General Nevzat Bolugiray argued that Erdogan, “in comparison to the previous Turkish political leaders …is much closer to the people, he is decisive about learning and
determined to resolve problems. Even though he makes mistakes, he shows efforts to learn from his mistakes and tries not to repeat them. He will definitely contribute to the new changing period by being critical of the ‘National Vision’” (quoted in Avcı 2008: 123). Bolugiray’s views in relation to Erdogan is not representative of the Turkish Security Forces’ (TSK) position on Erdogan, but it both shows that Bolugiray praised Erdogan for who arguably learned from his mistakes and gives the indications that the TSK members were beginning to acknowledge that the religiously oriented political parties and political leaders were changing.

Similarly a well-known Turkish academic, Metin Heper said “Erdogan will continue to represent the views of Islam, but more as a moral force than an outfit, political one … He thinks that for the individual you need ethics derived from Islam. He also thinks that at the community levels, Islam should to some extent regulate interpersonal relations. This is the extent to which he wants to use Islam” (New York Times, 11/11/2002). I think Heper could have made his comments about Erdogan’s position on Islam much clearer had he compared Erdogan to Erbakan. This is because Erbakan, who was banned from active politics in 1997, in contrast to Erdogan wanted Islam to shape every sections of life, in particular the political structure.

The AKP had two fundamental features by which it differed from the other religiously oriented political parties. Cosar and Ozman (2004) identified one of these as a “synthesising tendency”, which was related to the self-definition of the party (ibid.: 62). When Erdogan was asked whether the AKP was a religiously oriented political party, he answered: “‘We are fed up listening to these types of questions. We are not a political party based on religion. The best way to find out whether this is true or not is to watch…The AKP is a party of the right of centre which has reshaped the political centre… and brought together the right of centre in one place in a stronger manner’ (The Guardian, 07/11/2002). Turunc (2007: 84) similarly noted: “The AKP depicted itself as a national party not based solely on regional, ethnic or religious support”. To one interviewer, Erdogan argued “we are conservative democrats … our notion of conservative democracy is to attach ourselves to the customs, traditions, and values of our society, which is based on the family. …This is a democratic issue, not a religious issue” (quoted in Turunc 2007: 84; see also Cosar and Ozman 2004: 63 and Aksin 2007: 314). I agree with Turunc’s observations about the AKP having both claimed to be a national party and adopted a conservative democrat identity, but I
argue it is much important to ask what AKP’s representativeness and political identity meant for Turkish politics? In this chapter I argue that the AKP’s political stance and identity have contributed to the ‘improved security environment’ in Turkish politics that was generated after the closure of the RP and the ban on Erbakan’s involvement in to politics. Unlike RP and Erbakan, the AKP and Erdogan succeeded in gaining political popularity across the wider political spectrum by both its stance on the issues related to Turkish domestic politics and its position on Turkey’s European policy. These therefore evaporated concerns over whether the AKP was a continuation of the RP or whether it wanted to bring Islam to Turkey.

It was however asked why the AKP was labelled as ‘conservative democrat’? Cosar and Ozman (2004: 65) argued that it was “an attempt to provide the AKP with a breathing space from the intrusion of both Kemalist elites and the Turkish armed forces which have insisted on perceiving the AKP as a pro-Islamist and fundamentalist political party”. Additionally, Erdogan wanted to dissociate himself from his past of having served as a “former disciple of Erbakan”. The AKP’s relations with the army proved this argument right. The chief of the general staff issued a stiff warning to the government in January 2003, and concerns were raised in relation to the AKP’s commitment to secularism and its attitude with respect to Cyprus and EU membership (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 16). Cosar and Ozman (2004) described the second feature as the ideological stance of the party, and this mainly concerns the policy proposals and implementations by the AKP. The socio-economic and administrative policies of the AKP government were arguably representative. Furthermore, the AKP displayed a neo-liberal stance both during the election campaign and after forming the government. The neo-liberal market-based approach dominated the AKP’s economic policies and identity. This approach has been symbolized by their emphasis on “making Turkey an international trademark”. Furthermore, Erdogan aimed to transform active politics into the ‘politics of merchants’ (Cosar and Ozman 2004: 63).

As far Turkey–EU relations are concerned, Erdogan abandoned Erbakan’s anti-imperialist stance and adopted a strong pro-EU stance (Onis and Keyman 2003: 103; Cosar and Ozman, 2004: 63; Tocci 2005: 80; Aksin 2007: 314). He then went on a tour of European capitals to secure a definite date for the start of accession negotiations just after the elections of 3 November 2002 and despite not being the PM at the time (Duran 2004: 134–35). On his European tour, Erdogan claimed that Europe would not only be deciding whether to give Turkey a date for starting the accession negotiations, but would also be taking an historic
decision on whether or not the EU is essentially a Christian club (Hurriyet, 14/11/2002). Kotsovilis noted: “While the AKP was feared and reviled by the many, ironically the future of Kemal’s dreams for Modernisation and Westernisation, together with democratic consolidation, may rest with this very party’s fate and performance in government” (2006: 52). Turunc (2007: 88) noted: “The priority in the AKP’s foreign policy is Turkey’s membership of the EU” and the AKP perceived Turkey as part of Europe, therefore it should take its place in the EU. Since 2002, no other Turkish government has implemented as many constitutional reforms as the AKP government. This has impressed public opinion in both Turkey and the EU (Faucompreyt and Konnings 2008: 17). And Cizre (2007) said “The EU was instrumental in the JDP’s plans to introduce reforms which involve society and include concern for citizens” (ibid.: 8). I agree with Turunc that Erdogan prioritised Turkey’s European policy, but I suggest that Turkey-EU relations was stalled between 1997 and 1999 until Turkey was granted a candidate membership of the EU, therefore it is important to ask what impact Erdogan’s stance had on Turkey’s position in the EU? And, what implications this had on the pace of Turkey-EU relations? In this chapter I argue that Erdogan’s pro-European approach and the changes he introduced hastened changes in the pace of Turkey-EU relations and therefore in 2004 the EU decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005.


Khalil (2007) notes that Syria harboured Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, for years, and the Turkish government held evidence of Ocalan’s presence and his organisational capacity in Syria. The Turkish government thus asked the Syrian government to expel Ocalan, and seriously threatened Syria with war if it did not remove him (ibid.: 395). Schmulevitz (1999) argues that when Turkish armed forces held manoeuvres along the Syrian border in September–October 1998, Turkey managed to convince Syria that it had no choice but to expel the rebel leader (Shmuelevitz 1999: 608). Relations between the two countries were normalised only after Ocalan left Syria. The PKK leader initially sought refuge in Rome, but when he was not given asylum, he tried to obtain asylum in Russia, Greece and Holland. Ocalan was thereafter was detained at the Greek embassy in Kenya on 16 February 1999 (Khalil 2007: 395).
A couple of months before Ocalan was captured in Kenya, he appealed to the British and the European authorities to mediate in the struggle between his movement and Ankara. He said: “What we want is for this war to stop for the Turkish state to recognise that the Kurdish problem is a political one and accept the need for dialogue. I think that is nothing compared to the IRA” and he added that Europe had a moral responsibility for this “because of its failure to secure a homeland for the Kurds when the Ottoman Empire was dismantled in the 1920s” (The Guardian, 12/12/1998). However, his appeals did not receive much attention among European countries or in the EU.

Ocalan, during his trial in 1999, developed a “conciliatory and apologetic manner and rhetoric” (Siitone 2008: 79). He said that continuing rebellion was a “mistake” and apologised to relatives of soldiers killed by his Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK. He added “Turkey enjoyed political freedom and freedom of expression” (The Guardian, 13/06/1999).

It was surprising to many that Ocalan neither mentioned the Kurdish people who lived under difficult conditions of a state of emergency nor the Kurdish villagers who were displaced as a result of the constant clashes between the TSK and the Kurdish guerrillas. Kirisci (2004) suggested that the discourse Ocalan adopted during his trial throughout May and June 1999 contributed significantly to the dramatic decline in the intensity of the armed conflict between the TSK and the PKK guerrillas (ibid.: 278). However, Kirisci does not explain how and why Ocalan’s new conciliatory discourse contributed to the decline in the armed conflict. I would argue that it is important to recognise that Ocalan’s new approach generated a sense of an improved security environment in Turkey and his call for a unilateral ceasefire substantiated this environment – as a result of these, the conflict between the TSK and the PKK was significantly reduced. Additionally I would argue that the capture of Ocalan and his apologetic approach during his trial is the one of the two developments that has generated “improved security environment” in Turkish political system and punctuated the long year of stability in the MGK, in the MGK’s endogenous variables and in the pace of Turkey-EU relations. Then changes suddenly began; the equilibrium was punctuated.

Ocalan argued: “The atmosphere of armed conflict and violence constitutes an obstacle to human rights and democratic developments. The violence that mainly derives from the Kurdish problem plays a fundamental role in this. It is necessary to stop the violence in order to overcome the dilemma and solve the problem” (quoted in Larrabee and Lesser 2003). The PKK then pledged to transform itself from a guerrilla group into a political organization and
it promised to call a unilateral cease-fire and a withdrawal (The Guardian, 25/08/1999). This was followed by Ocalan’s order: “I call upon the PKK to end the armed struggle and withdraw their forces outside the borders [of Turkey] for the sake of peace from 1 September 1999 (Kirisci 2004: 285; Siitonen 2008: 79). This coincided with Ocalan being sentenced to death for treason, but he managed to be influential on the PKK while under arrest and issued a set of orders to his PKK rebel movement to observe a ceasefire and withdraw from Turkish territory from 1st September, 1998. Siitonen (2008: 80) has noted that many Kurdish people regarded Ocalan as a traitor for trying to save his own life with calls for ceasing the military struggle. I agree with Siitonen that Ocalan regarded as a traitor by many Kurdish people, but it is important not overlook to the fact many other Kurdish people and the PKK recognised Ocalan’s decisions and actions upon his arrest as an opportunity for the people of Turkey to find a political solution to Turkey long-lasting Kurdish problem. Khalil (2007) argues that Ocalan’s capture and his conciliatory approach was a significant opportunity for Turkey to reconcile with its Kurdish citizens through recognising their identity and granting them greater rights within the Turkish state (p.396). I would agree with Khalil on this point and argue that the rights-based solution could have anchored Turkish governments in developing better relations with its Kurdish citizens. Furthermore, in the same year, Suleyman Demirel, the President, met with the Democratic People’ Party (DEHAP) representatives to talk about the problems of the South East, where predominantly Kurds lived under the state of emergency regime.

The PKK’s decision to end armed conflict opened the way for further changes in this organisation, and structural changes were introduced. In April 2002, at its Eighth Annual Congress, the PKK formally abolished itself and established the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK). As far as the KADEK’s new aim was concerned, regional autonomy within the Turkish state was what they aimed at. Another strategy was the articulation of an approach called the “democratic Turkey solution”, which meant essentially a rights-based solution to the Kurdish problem. According to Tocci (2006) these rights included “the freedom to publish and broadcast in Kurdish; private and public education in and of Kurdish; the freedom to establish and operate Kurdish civil society associations, freedom of assembly and freedom of expressing non-violent political opinion; freedom from torture and access to fair trial the abolition of state security courts, the abolition of the death penalty; lifting the state of emergency in law and practice and abolishing the village guard system; a general amnesty for all militant; freedom to establish, and operate political parties
and reduction of electoral threshold; and the reduction of regional disparities and priorities of socio-economic development in the southeast, including through local autonomy” (ibid.: 123–24).

The pro-Kurdish HADEP’s choice to disassociate itself from the PKK after Ocalan’s capture have contributed to the ‘improved security environment’ in Turkey; to show this argument, I will next give a historical account to the development of the Kurdish political parties in Turkey, analyse the relationship between the PKK and the Kurdish political parties, discuss how and why this relationship has changed over time and what implications this had for Turkish politics.

The first pro-Kurdish political party had been established in June 1990, called the People’s Work Party (HEP). The founding members of the HEP were MPs expelled from the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) for attending a conference in Paris related to the Kurdish question. Upon long discussions and negotiations, the SHP and the HEP merged to run under the SHP’s umbrella at the October 1991 general elections, and the former HEP deputies secured their seats. While taking their oath in the parliament, several former HEP deputies spoke in Kurdish and displayed colours associated with the PKK; soon after this incident, they left the SHP to re-establish the HEP. Howe of Kurdish political and cultural rights and for formulating a framework of “the rights to self-de ver, the HEP was banned by the Constitutional Court in July 1993 due to overt promotion termination”. Guney (2002: 125) notes that “the court’s decision was on the grounds that the party had become a focus of illegal political pursuits and was engaged in activities against “the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and people”.

When the HEP was closed, the Democracy Party (DEP) was formed, in 1993, but it was a short-lived political party. Guney (2002) notes, “division emerged between a moderate flank and a radical group” on whether to support the PKK (ibid.: 125). The incidents following showed that the radical group were more influential. During its congress in 1994, PKK flags were displayed and Turkey was presented as an occupying country. Following this, the DEP was seen as closely associated with the PKK. At the same Congress, Hatip Dicle said that the PKK was a political, not a terrorist, organization, and another leading member of the DEP referred to the PKK’s terrorist activities as a struggle for “an independent and unified Kurdish state”, and demanded a political solution to the Kurdish question. When the DEP was closed by the Constitutional Court, most of the DEP members
fled abroad and formed a Kurdish parliament in exile in 1995 (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 53). The remaining parliamentary deputies’ immunities were removed in March 1994 and six DEP deputies were arrested, and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The party then was closed in June 1994 by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that Dicle and the other members had made provocative statements against the Turkish Republic (Guney 2002: 125).

The closure of the DEP was followed by the formation of the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) in May 1994 by Murat Bozlak, a lawyer. Guney (2002) notes that the HADEP initially seemed to have a moderate approach towards the Kurdish question and kept its distance from the PKK (ibid.: 125). It did not join the parliament-in-exile in the Netherlands in order to disassociate itself from the PKK as well as keep its seats and position in the TBMM. Its efforts to stay among the mainstream political parties in the TBMM however were evaporated by the developments that took place at its second Congress in June 1996, when masked men let the Turkish flag drop to the floor and raised the banner of the PKK in its place (Altunisik and Tur 2005: 54). As a result of this incident, all HADEP members, including the party’s leader, were arrested; furthermore, HADEP supporters were charged with belonging to a leading an illegal armed group, under Article 168 of the Turkish Penal Code. Following this, Guney (2002) notes, the public prosecutor said that the HADEP acted as a front for the PKK (ibid.: 125; see also Ergil 2000: 178).

In January 1999, the public prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to close the party on the ground that there had been an organic link between the HADEP and the PKK. The prosecutor argued that the HADEP Congress had turned into an arena of support for Ocalan. The Prosecutor said that “the PKK threatened to kill people who did not vote for HADEP” (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 95). Although it remained open and its vote share increased only marginally between 1995 and 1999 (Sayari and Esmer 2002: 142–44), it did not pass the nationwide threshold. At the local elections, the HADEP won the control of seven municipalities in the South East of Turkey, including the biggest city of the region, with more than 1 million Kurds, Diyarbakir (Guney 2002: 128).

On the Kurdish issue, the HADEP called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the Turkish Security Forces and the PKK. For long time, it hesitated to deny its linkage to the PKK. Guney (2002) suggested that the HADEP developed a different discourse on this matter by the mid 1999s; in June 1999 the HADEP’s mayor in the town of Kızıltepe in Mardin province visited family of policemen killed by the PKK terrorists and expressed his
condolences (ibid.: 130). His statement – “Enough is enough. We all suffered a great deal” – may be taken as a sign of willingness on the party of the HADEP to disassociate itself from the PKK (ibid). The Mayor of Diyarbakir, Feridun Celik, also made similar statements. On one occasion Celik stated: “From now on we should leave this debate behind and start to think how we shall be able to live together as Turks, Kurds, Lazes and Circassian, so that we can jointly work for this country” (ibid.).

This was followed by a statement by Murat Bozlak, the leader of the HADEP:

It was claimed that HADEP has been the political arm of the PKK. It is not true. This is not something we claim today. We made the same point in 1996 … Let me point out in all my sincerity: HADEP is not a separatist party. Neither is it a vulgar nationalist party. Ours is a leftist mass party. We have never perceived ourselves as a Kurdish Party … All of those who dies … [In one of our meetings in Istanbul]? … [w]e brought together the mother of a soldier who had died with the mother of a young man from the Southeast who also lost his life on top of a bus, and pleaded with everybody that from now on we should put an end to the loss of lives … Yet we are still seen as a Kurdish party. (Guney 2002: 130)

It was moreover noted that when Ahmet Turan Demir, the Deputy Chairman of the HADEP, was asked by a journalist, “It is claimed that the PKK is trying to politicize the Kurdish problem, what are your views on this?” he said:

We want everyone to have the rights to freely engage in politics. If the PKK wants to engage in politics in a way that accords with Turkey’s laws and regulation, then the necessary legal and constitutional groundwork should be prepared for this. If the creation of an environment that will preclude a return to violence is desired, then we should welcome this. Whoever wants to participate in politics in accordance with the State’s laws and the regulations, the ground should be prepared for this. This is one of the criteria for democracy. (Guney 2002: 130)

I agree with Guney that by the mid 1990s the HADEP began to dissociate itself from the PKK, but I will ask why the HADEP chose to dissociate itself from the PKK and what this meant for Turkish politics? I argue that the HADEP dissociated itself from the PKK because it wanted to gain space in the Turkish political system to develop a political ground for the
resolution of the Kurdish problem and I think this has also contributed to the improved security environment in Turkish politics.

6.3. How useful are the historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches in explaining the changes in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey-EU relations?

When I applied the concept of punctuated equilibrium to look at the changes in the MGK and in Turkey–EU relations, I first noted that there have been long years of stability in the MGK, in the MGK’s endogenous variables and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. I then identified that the EU both granted Turkey a candidate membership status in 1999 and decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005. When Turkey was granted a candidate member status in the EU, the European Commission produced Regular Progress Reports on Turkey. By studying these reports I analysed that the EU began to develop an awareness of the MGK’s position in Turkish political decision making in 1998 and onwards. It furthermore requested that the Turkish authorities make a number of changes not only in the MGK’s authority, composition and powers, but also on the MGK’s endogenous variables such as the adoption of legal and constitutional changes to grant cultural rights to Kurds and the removal of the state of emergency from the South East of Turkey. These then were followed by radically curtailing the MGK’s position in the decision making process, which meant that the MGK was transformed into an advisory body, like it was in 1960s. And a number of Constitutional changes were introduced in relation to the extension of cultural rights of Kurds and the removal of the state of emergency in 2002. In this chapter, I do not deny that the EU put exogenous pressure on the Turkish authorities in making the changes they did, but I argue that it is primarily developments in the MGK’s endogenous variables that initiated the changes in the MGK and in the MGK’s endogenous variables. I have therefore studied the antecedents to the changes under question; and have identified that the capture of Ocalan, the ban on Erbakan’s political involvement, and the closure of the RP, were all very effective developments in the MGK’s endogenous variables. I argue that these developments generated an ‘improved security environment’ in Turkish politics and suggest that Ocalan’s apologetic approach during his trial and the emergence of a moderate religiously oriented AKP also contributed to this ‘improved security environment’ and acted as endogenous pressure for change in the both MGK and Turkey–EU relations.
Since rational choice and sociological institutionalism did not provide a framework for the researcher, but have only pointed to a number of reasons as to how and why institutional changes have taken place, this chapter relied on the credentials of the historical institutionalist concept of punctuated equilibrium. Here, however, based on the findings above, I will test how well both rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches can explain how and why the MGK’s powers were curtailed and the EU decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey.

Considering the evidence above, it is difficult to tell if Turkish governments introduced a number of reform packages, reduced the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system to an advisory body and lifted the state of emergency from the Kurdish region just because the EU granted Turkey a candidate membership status. There are two reasons for this. The first is that of how one would prove that it is really the case; by which I mean how could one researcher prove that only when Turkey realised there was a good chance for it to join the EU and become a full member of the EU, did changes began to take place in the Turkish political system? Secondly, Chapter 5 has shown that the Turkish authorities were well informed by the European Commission’s report on Turkey’s full membership application that when Turkey met the EU’s criteria, it could join the EU as a full member. Additionally the introduction of the Copenhagen criteria had set a number of conditions for Turkey to meet before it could join the EU. The European Commission’s Report (1989) and the Copenhagen Criteria (1992) could have been treated as an incentive by the Turkish authorities. However they were not; therefore, how can one explain why the Turkish authorities did not treat the European Commission Report and the Copenhagen criteria as an incentive, but did so treat the candidate membership status in 1999?

As far as the second rational choice institutionalist proposition is concerned, it would be interesting to research whether the MGK’s roles and powers were changed because it was dysfunctional and it was not producing beneficial results. It is however unclear on what basis one would assess how dysfunctional the MGK was and to what or to whom it was not producing beneficial results. And in terms of timing, why only in 2001 was it thought that the MGK was dysfunctional, but it was maintained as it was back in the 1990s. Chapter 5 has shown that the MGK’s resistance, in keeping the state of emergency in the Kurdish region for almost fourteen years, produced a number of unintended consequences for both the Turkish political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations. This then leads one to ask why in the 1990s
the MGK’s authority was not reduced, when it was clearly slowing Turkey’s progress in meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Applying the same approach to the changes in the pace of Turkey–EU relations, there is little clarity again as to how one might measure how and for whom the Turkey–EU relations were dysfunctional.

Using the evidence above I want to discuss how beneficial the sociological institutionalist mechanism of institutional change is in explaining the changes in the MGK and in Turkey–EU relations. Looking at the evidence above one can say that there is evidence that the European Commission, in its Annual Reports on Turkey, requested the Turkish authorities to reduce the MGK’s role in the Turkish political system to that of an advisory body. One however needs to show how influential these reports were on Turkish political decision makers. In order to do this one would need to analyse the political leaders’ positions on the requests of the European Commission. As far as the pace of Turkey–EU relations is concerned, the ‘coercion’ mechanism cannot say much about how one would trace who may have put pressure on either Turkey or the EU or on both of them in relation to changing their attitudes towards each other or towards Turkey–EU relations.

Researching to find out about if conventional wisdom has played a part in both changes in the MGK and changes in Turkey–EU relations can produce a very interesting study. Chapter 5 has shown that the MGK’s policy preferences and assessment of the EU’s regular reports in the chapter have shown that the MGK was unsuitable for a modern and democratic country. Clearly there was a need to modernise and democratise the MGK, but there is no evidence to support this point of view. Additionally, as far as the role of conventional wisdom is considered in the context of Turkey–EU relations, it is unclear how one would measure how and for which side involved (Turkey and the EU) conventional wisdom has been influential and why. One can suggest that both sides (Turkey and the EU) realised the need to modernise their relationship after years of slow progressing relationship. Conducting a research into this may produce an interesting study as to how and why conventional wisdom influenced either Turkey or the EU or both.

6.4. Conclusions

In this chapter I have tested whether rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms can best explain the changes both in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. I have found that both rational choice and sociological institutionalism point to
a number of reasons as to how and why the Turkish authorities may have decided to reduce the MGK’s powers and the EU may have offered Turkey a date for accession negotiations. In contrast to both of these schools, historical institutionalism has pointed to the concept of punctuated equilibrium which I utilised to unveil the triggers of the changes in MGK and in Turkey–EU relations.

Having utilised the concept of punctuated equilibrium, this chapter provides a new analysis of the changing phase of Turkey–EU relations post the stalemate of the Luxembourg Summit and in the face of receiving a long awaited date to begin accession negotiations with the EU. This is because (1) the changes in the MGK have not previously been studied in the context of domestic political causation; (2) the capture of Ocalan and the ban on Erbakan’s involvement in politics and the closure of the RP have not been studied in the context of changes both in the MGK and Turkey–EU relations; (3) the change in the pace of Turkey–EU relations has not been analysed in the context of developments in the MGK’s endogenous variables; and (4) the concept of punctuated equilibrium has not been utilised in the literature on institutional change as has been done in this chapter. Therefore this chapter provides an original and different account of what triggered changes in the MGK, in the MGK’s endogenous variables and Turkey–EU relations by putting greater emphasis on domestic causation.

I have a number of questions related to my findings in this chapter: Will the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system remain as it is or be abolished or be radically empowered? How will the MGK’s endogenous variables develop – for example, will the Kurdish question escalate, or will the Turkish authorities adopt political, economic and social solutions to the Kurdish question and resolve it once for all, and will the religiously oriented moderate AKP continue along the same lines or radicalise its political rhetoric? Finally, will the EU keep the speed of accession or will it stall? And most importantly, what will the answers to these questions mean for Turkey’s aspirations to be a full member of the EU, or will Turkey, after all, look inward and not outward? In the next chapter I will draw together the conclusions of my research, outline the contributions I make to both EU and Turkish studies and to historical institutionalism, and point to future research areas.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS

The first objective of this thesis was to provide an historical account of the role the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) has played in the development, in the nature and in the pace of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations between 1923 and 2004. To meet this objective I have investigated not only the origins of the MGK and Turkey’s interest in being part of Europe, but also the evolution of the MGK and the development of Turkey–European Economic Community (EEC)/European Community (EC) relations between 1923 and 1983. I have analysed the impacts of the MGK’s path of establishing a state of emergency in parts of the country on both the Turkish political system and on Turkey’s effort to join the EC/European Union (EU) between 1983 and 1997. I have also researched the domestic causation of the changes in the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations between 1997 and 2004.

The second objective of this thesis was to test the utility of historical institutionalism as opposed to rational choice and sociological institutionalism in highlighting the interaction between the MGK’s institutional processes and Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations. And to meet the second objective I have unveiled the usefulness of historical institutionalism’s framework of institutional genesis in to explain the origins of the MGK and of Turkey’s interest in being part of Europe and have shown benefits of sociological and rational choice institutionalisms’ in pointing to a number of reasons as to how and why institutions originate, respectively. I have shown the benefits of the concept of critical junctures to explain and to understand what role critical junctures have played in the evolution of the MGK and in the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations. I have demonstrated the utility of historical institutionalism’s temporal approach in highlighting the interaction between the MGK’s path of state of emergency and Turkey’s slow progress in meeting the membership criteria of the EC/EU and have pointed out the weaknesses of the cultural and calculus approaches in explaining the interaction between institutional actions and policy outcomes. Lastly I have shown the effectiveness of the concept of punctuated equilibrium in unveiling the role endogenous pressure has played in curtailing the MGK’s powers and in the EU’s subsequent decision to begin accession negotiations with Turkey, and have highlighted the benefits of rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches to institutional change.

Having met the two objectives of this thesis, I am making a number of original contributions to the both European and Turkish studies and to historical institutionalism;
below I will outline these contributions. In the very last part of this chapter, I will discuss possible future areas of research.

As I have shown in Chapter 1, the existing literature on Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations has largely overlooked the MGK’s role in Turkey’s European policy. Therefore (1) the origins of Turkey’s interest in being part of Europe and the origins of the MGK have not been studied in the context of domestic political, social and economic developments; (2) the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations has not been studied in the context of the evolution of the MGK; (3) the relationship between the MGK’s decisions and preferences and Turkey’s slow progressing relationship have not been considered; (4) the interaction between the changes in the MGK and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations has not been analysed in the context of political developments in the MGK’s endogenous variables. This thesis makes an original contribution to EU studies by highlighting the interaction between the MGK’s institutional processes and the three significant phases of Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations.

By utilising the historical institutionalist framework on institutional genesis in Chapter 3, I have highlighted that the principles of Kemalism were vital in explaining the genesis of both the MGK and Turkey’s interest in being part of Europe. Ataturk’s reformist principles meant that he not only wanted his newly established Turkish Republic to adopt a Western political system, but also expected the people of his Republic to adopt a Western outlook, culture and share Western values. When, however, these principles, the political structure adopted, and the kind of day-to-day life that came along with these principles, were not supported by some sections of the community, Ataturk established the MGK so as to protect the secular, Western outlook of the Turkish Republic and the very principles of Kemalism.

In Chapter 4 I have shed a light on role of what I have termed Critical Junctures (I–III) in the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations and in the evolution of the MGK. I have shown that the choices and the decisions made at these critical junctures meant that (1) Turkey’s Associative Membership application faced delays in the 1960s; (2) the EC began to doubt the standards of democracy in the Turkish political system; (3) the EC constantly requested the Turkish authorities to adopt a democratic political system and criticised both the closure of political parties and the restriction applied on political involvement, and then chose to freeze dialogue with Turkey. Since the historical institutionalist framework
on institutional genesis directed me to pay attention to the wider political, economic and social contexts, I have also noted the important role Zorlu played in making Turkey’s Associative Membership application in 1959, discussed the impact of eurosceptic political parties on Turkey’s decision not to apply for Full Membership of the EC in 1975, and have analysed the implications of Ecevit’s handling of Turkey’s economic problems on the development of Turkey–EC relations in the late 1970s. These are original contributions to the literature on the origins and on the development of Turkey–EEC/EC relations.

I have shown that the nature of Turkey–EC/EU relations between 1983 and 1997 was shaped by the MGK’s path of establishing a state of emergency in the South East of Turkey. I have demonstrated how and why the MGK’s choice of maintaining the state of emergency over fourteen years produced unintended consequences for both the Turkish political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations, drawing on the framework of the concepts of path dependence and unintended consequences. While Turkey’s poor human rights records, weak democracy and the Kurdish question have been recognised as the main obstacles to Turkey’s integration into the EC/EU (Van Bruinessen 1992; Cooper 1994; Ergil 2000; Calis 2001; Cornell 2001; Kirisci 2004; and Evin 2005), in Chapter 5 I have shown in detail that these were unintended consequences of the MGK’s path of state of emergency. These are very important contributions to the literature covering the period between 1983 and 1997, showing in greater detail that the unintended consequence of the MGK’s path of state of emergency meant that the EU not only refused to re-establish political dialogue with Turkey until 1989 but also delayed responding to Turkey’s Full Membership application for two years (Kuniholm 1991: 41). I noted that the EC criticised Turkey over keeping the state of emergency in the South East of Turkey and asked the Turkish authorities to find political solution to the Kurdish problem. When the EC’s calls for respect for human rights did not receive much attention in Turkey, the EC refused to release any financial aid for Turkey. Additionally I have shown that the EC made the resolution of the Kurdish question a condition for Turkey to establish a Customs Union with the EC in the mid 1990s and ultimately the EC excluded Turkey from the 2004 Enlargement processes over protracted violation of human rights in 1997. Furthermore, Merton’s framework on the causes of unintended consequences have enabled me to discover the reason the MGK maintained the state of emergency despite its unintended effects; I would argue that the MGK solely concentrated on its desire to protect Turkey’s
territorial unity and it did not think about what further consequences its action would have for the Turkish political system and Turkey–EC/EU relations.

In this thesis I have also unveiled the domestic causation of the changes in the MGK, in the MGK’s endogenous variables and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations. The changing phases of Turkey–EU relations (1997–2004) have generally been studied in the context of the EU’s pressure on Turkey to take up the changes outlined in the European Commission Regular Progress Reports (Cizre 2003; Onis 2003; Lundgren 2007, and Faucompret and Konings 2008), or it has been suggested that the credible EU membership status granted incentives to civilians to democratise civil–military relations (Rumford 2000; Diez 2005; Watts 2006; and Cinar 2008). I showed in this thesis that the EU and the European Commission’s Regular Annual Progress Reports have been important in informing the Turkish authorities in what areas they were falling behind the EU standards, and instructing Turkey about what steps the Turkish authorities needed to take so as to meet EU standards. In Chapter 6, with the help of the concept of punctuated equilibrium, I have shown that political developments in the MGK’s endogenous variables, such as the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK (the Kurdish Workers’ Party), in 1999 and the ban on political involvement by Necmettin Erbakan – the leader of the Welfare Party (RP) – as well as the closure of the RP in 1997, generated an “improved security environment” which subsequently formed endogenous pressure for change. Ocalan’s apologetic rhetoric during his trial in 1999 and the success of the religiously oriented but moderate Justice and Development Party (AKP) have consolidated this “improved security environment”. I then highlighted that the long years of stasis in the MGK’s powers, responsibilities and composition, in the MGK’s endogenous variables, and in the pace of Turkey–EU relations, were punctuated with this consolidated endogenous pressure; and changes began. These are important contribution to the literature on Turkey–EU relations covering the changing phase of Turkey–EU relations because it provides a detailed explanation of how and how endogenous pressure triggered the changes in Turkey–EU relations.

As said in Chapter 1, the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system received little academic attention in Turkish studies; having said that, it has generally been agreed that the MGK was granted more powers by the 1982 Constitution and Law 2945 so that the Turkish military could have control over Turkish politics, and it is generally been agreed
that the MGK is an army-led body. Therefore (1) the origins and the evolution of the MGK has been overlooked; (2) the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system has not been studied in the context of any particular policy; and (3) the changes in the MGK have not been analysed in the context of the domestic political system. This has indicated a significant gap in Turkish studies. In this thesis I am making an original contribution to Turkish studies by shedding a light on the MGK’s institutional process, utilising the institutionalist framework on institutional genesis, institutional evolution, the interaction between institutions and policy outcome and institutional change. In Chapter 3, the historical institutionalist framework on institutional genesis directed me “to go back and look” to understand and explain how and why the MGK was established; this is an original contribution to the literature covering the early years of Turkish Republic. In Chapter 4 I have highlighted in the second part of the chapter, with the help of the concept of critical junctures, that the army did not just grant more powers to MGK so that it could dominate politics, but the MGK was empowered to make recommendations to the Council of Ministers to maintain peace and social well-being in Turkey; my research on the triggers of critical junctures in Turkish political history has shown that this was because the Turkish politicians were not able to take the initiative to produce policies not only to prevent political, economic and social tensions among the people of Turkey, but also to take measures to control domestic instabilities. This is also an original contribution to the literature on the MGK. Furthermore, within the framework of the concepts of path dependency and unintended consequences I have highlighted the role the MGK played in particular policy areas. I have shown that the MGK was the key institution handling the PKK and the Kurdish movement. In connection to the latter I also showed how the MGK’s handling of these issues interacted with Turkey’s European policy. This means I have demonstrated what role the MGK played in two forms of policies.

Historical institutionalism has not been utilised at this level in either European studies or Turkish studies. The historical institutionalist framework and its associated concepts have not been brought together, and yet also separated in this way so as to understand and explain the different parts of institutional processes, as well as the interaction between institutional processes and policy outcomes. Therefore doubts have been raised about historical institutionalism’s utility in explaining the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes and institutional change. My separation of institutional processes, drawing clear lines between these processes and associating a concept to each of these
processes is an original contribution to historical institutionalism. I have shown in the first part of Chapter 1 that Pierson’s (2000b) and Thelen’s (2004) suggestion that “we need to go back and look” is very fruitful for explaining how and why both an institution and a policy originates. Since this framework has not been applied in an empirical case study in the way I did I am making an original contribution to the literature on institutional genesis. Additionally, I have shown that historical institutionalism’s concept of critical juncture is useful to understand and explain institutional evolution; I shed a light on how and why the sources of critical junctures and the decisions and the choices made at these juncture make major contributions to both the evolution of an institution as well as the development of a policy. I found the conceptualisations of path dependence (Krasner 1984; Levi 1997; and Pierson 2000a; 2002b; 2004) lacking in interest in whether institutions do always produce the intended outcomes through keeping to the original path, as well as in whether the institutions maintain their original path in the case that the original path does not meet their intended outcomes. I therefore complemented the concept of path dependence with Merton’s (1936) conceptualisation of unintended consequences. I then utilised this framework to understand and to explain how and why the path-dependent action of an institution may produce unintended consequences, as well as why an institution may opt to maintain its original path despite its unintended consequences. This is an original framework and I have shown the usefulness of this framework in Chapter 5 in how and why it may shed a light on to the interaction between one institution’s path-dependent actions and its unintended consequences for other policy areas. Additionally, I have utilised the concept of punctuated equilibrium to explain radical institutional changes. Although the concept of punctuated equilibrium has been heavily criticised by Thelen and Steinmo (1992) and Peters et al. (2005), I have shown that focusing on endogenous pressure in generating institutional change means that the institution under question is still treated as an independent variable and Krasner’s explanation of punctuated equilibrium can be treated as making a prediction about when and under what conditions institutional change is likely to occur. This is an original contribution because punctuated equilibrium has not been utilised in the way I did in Chapter 6 and this shows that the concept of punctuated equilibrium is equipped to explain why and how institutional change occurs.

As far as my future areas of research are concerned I want to bring in some of the questions pointed out in the conclusions of Chapter 6. Will the MGK’s position in the Turkish political system remain as it is or be abolished or be radically empowered? How
will the MGK’s endogenous variables develop – for example, will the Kurdish question escalate, or will the Turkish authorities adopt political, economic and social solutions to the Kurdish question and resolve it once for all, and will the religiously oriented moderate AKP continue along the same lines or radicalise its political rhetoric? Finally, will the EU keep the speed of accession or will it stall?

I found it less interesting to predict the future for the MGK, for the Kurdish question, or for the AKP in the context of Turkey’s accession negotiations. Having said that, from the point when Turkey began accession negotiations with the EU in 2005 and to date, the negotiations have either been significantly slow in progressing or have stalled. The AKP won its third landslide victory in the 2011 General Elections but has not kept its promises about adopting political solution to the Kurdish question. As I write this thesis, military operations are taking place in the Northern Iraqi borders of Turkey. And since the AKP holds the majority in the TBMM, the opposition parties do not hold seats in the MGK’s meetings. Civilian seats on the MGK consist of the AKP’s senior cabinet members, with the remaining members an equal number of senior generals, and thus the opposition political parties in the TBMM do not take part in the MGK’s meeting and decisions. When this was criticised, the AKP representatives agreed to brief the CHP’s senior MPs after the actual meetings about the discussions that took place and what decisions were made. I would like to consider the following related questions in the future: why did the AKP agree to brief the CHP members about the MGK’s meetings? Was this encouraged by the EU? Or was this change endogenously driven? What does this say about the EU’s influence on Turkey? Why did one of the endogenous variables (AKP) override one of the other endogenous variables (the Kurdish question), as well as the slow pace of the accession negotiations?

Another area I would like to look into is Britain’s political stance on Turkey’s EU membership since 1980s. Britain’s interest in establishing and retaining strong political and economic relations with Turkey and its constant support for Turkey’s accession to the EU raises the following questions: Why have the British government and mainstream political parties (Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour) consistently encouraged accession talks with Turkey? Why have the British government or the political leaders viewed the prospect of Turkish membership positively? Why has this been consistent since the late 1980s? What factors contributed to keeping the British on this pro-Turkey path? Here I would like to utilise
the conceptualisations of path dependence to answer these questions and to explain how and why the British government has maintained its path of support for Turkey. And if this goes well, I would be interested to draw comparisons between “pro-Turkey of Britain” and “anti-Turkey path of France” and find out about how and why Britain and France diverge in relation to Turkey’s accession to the EU.

In relation to historical institutionalism, I would like to further improve and refine the framework I set out in the thesis. I would particularly like to concentrate on the question of whether historical institutionalism leaves any room to study the role of agents or the agent–institution relationship. My initial finding in this thesis is that researchers can identify the interaction between institutions and actors whilst studying the relationship between institutions and outcomes, if the wider political context is paid sufficient attention. This is an area I would like to address in the future but it brings with it broader and more important questions. There is an increasing interest among institutionalist scholars in understanding the role of agents, while we nevertheless agree that institutions matter and determine political actions and policy outcome. Yet, if we accept the role of agents in political action formation and in policy outcomes, does not this mean that we are moving away from studying institutions as the primary focus?

In this thesis I have used historical institutionalism as a framework. And this framework has been helpful to understand and explain many questions I had in my mind about the role the MGK has played in Turkey–EEC/EC/EU relations, as well how and why the MGK originated, evolved, changed and impacted on political action and policy outcomes. As I said in Chapter 1, Hay and Wincott’s emphasis on the historical institutional approach having the potential to develop into a theory is an area I like to look into in the future. Some of the questions I would like to consider are: is historical institutionalism a theory? Or is it a developing theory? And if it is not a theory, what is it lacking in order to be one? Is historical institutionalism’s lack of interest in making predictions for the future a downside to this end? Or does historical institutionalism have an as yet unveiled potential to make predictions? And lastly, if historical institutionalism can make predictions, can it still be called ‘historical’ institutionalism?
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APPENDIX

1. LAW OF THE NSC AND THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE NSC

CHAPTER ONE
Objection and Definitions

Objection
Article 1 - The goal of this law is to arrange the establishment, duty, working principles and procedures of the National Security Council and the organization, duty, competence, working principles and procedures of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council.

Definitions
Article 2 - The terms mentioned in this law mean,

(a) National Security: The protection and maintenance of the constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests in international field as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of the State.

(b) The State’s National Security Policy: The policy covering the principles of the course of internal, external and defense actions determined by the Council of Ministers within the views set by the National Security Council with the aim of ensuring national security and achieving national objectives,

CHAPTER TWO

The National Security Council

PART ONE
Establishment and Duties

Establishment
Article 3 - In accordance with the article No.118 in the Constitution, the National Security Council was established.

(Amended in the article No: 15th January, 2003-3789/1) The National Security Council, chaired by the President, consists of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Land Forces Commander, the Naval Forces Commander, the Air Forces Commander and General Commander of the Gendarmerie.

As well as the regular attendees, depending on the agenda, related ministers and persons can also be invited to attend the Council meetings for their views.

The Secretary General of the National Security Council participates in the meetings however does not have the right to vote.

**Duties**

**Article 4** - (Amended in the article No: 7th, 2003-4963/24) The National Security Council shall, within the framework of the definitions on national security and the national security policy of the State as stated in Article 2, take advisory decisions on issues pertaining to the determination, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the State, and shall provide its views with a view to ensuring the necessary coordination; it shall submit these advisory decisions and views to the Council of Ministers, and fulfill duties given by laws. The Prime Minister may entrust a Deputy Prime Minister with the responsibility of submitting to the Council of Ministers the advisory decisions and views of the National Security Council to be evaluated, and of coordinating and following the implementation of these advisory decisions should they are approved by the Council of Ministers.

**PART TWO**

**Working Procedure**

**Meetings of the Council**

**Article 5** - (Amended in the article No: 7th August, 2003-4963/25) The Council shall convene once every two months. If necessary, the Council may convene upon the proposal of the Prime Minister or the direct request of the President of the Republic.

The Council meetings shall be held under the chairmanship of the President. The Council shall be chaired by the Prime Minister in the absence of the President.

**Agenda**

**Article 6** - The agenda of the Council is drawn up by the President of the Republic, taking into account the proposals of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff.
The topics proposed by the ministers who are the Council members and the other ministers to be put on the agenda, after taking the opinion of the Prime Minister, are submitted to the President through the Secretary General of the National Security Council.

**Decisions**

**Article 7** - The Council takes its decisions by the majority of votes. In case of a tie, the side which has the Council Chairman is assumed to form the majority.

The decisions of the Council are submitted to the President and the Prime Ministry to be discussed at the Council of Ministers by the Secretariat General of the National Security Council.

**The discussion of the decisions in the Council of Ministry**

**Article 8** - The decisions of the National Security Council are primarily put on the agenda of the Council of Ministers by the Prime Minister and necessary decisions are taken.

**Distribution and steering of the decisions**

**Article 9** - (Repealed in the article No: 7th August, 2003,4963/35, c)

**The minutes of the meetings**

**Article 10** - Discussions in the National Security Council are appropriately reported by the officials of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council. Original copies of the decisions and the minutes of the meetings are kept in the Secretariat General of the National Security Council. The minutes and the negotiations are to be explained or published. Decisions can be explained or published with the permission of the National Security Council.

**CHAPTER THREE**

**The Secretariat General of the National Security Council**

**PART ONE**

*Establishment and Organization*

**The Secretariat General**

**Article 11** - The Secretariat General of the National Security Council was established under the authority of the Prime Ministry.
The Units of the Secretariat General

Article 12 - The Secretariat General of the National Security Council consists of the Secretary General, Deputies of Secretary General, bureau of Secretariat General and the units which are indicated below:

(a) Legal Advisory,

(b) Main Services Units,

(c) Personnel and Administrative Affairs Department

Main Services Units are founded upon the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval of the Prime Minister.

If necessary, upon the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval of the Prime Minister, apart from the Main Service Units, temporary service units, special profession and research commissions, special education, planning and implementation units within the Secretariat General or not, can be established, stating the duties and the periods of service. To prolong the periods of service and working of these units is based on the same procedure.

PART TWO

Duty and Competences

(Repealed in the article No: 7th August, 2003,4963/26)

The Duty and Competences of the Secretariat General

Article 13 - The Secretariat General of the National Security Council;

(a) Conducts the secretariat services of the National Security Council.

(b) Carries out the duties given by the National Security Council and the relevant laws.

The Competences of the Secretariat General

Article 14 - (Repealed in the article No: 7th August, 2003,4963/35,c)
PART THREE

Personnel

Article 15 - (Amended in the article No: 7th August, 2003,4963/27) The Secretary General is appointed upon the proposal of the Prime Minister and the approval of the President. The positive opinion of the Chief of General Staff is to be sought in case a member of the Turkish Armed Forces is to be appointed to this post.

Other personnel

Article 16 - The personnel employed in the Secretariat General of the National Security Council are composed of;

(a) The ones to be assigned to the staff of the Secretariat General,

(b) Contracted personnel,

(c) The ones to be charged from the Turkish Armed Forces to the Secretariat General.

(d) The personnel of the public institutions and organizations, subject to the 4th article of the Law No:160 on the foundation of the State Personnel Organization, who are assigned to the Secretariat General upon the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval of the Prime Minister.

In the Secretariat General of the National Security Council, first degree staff is appointed by notification of the Secretary General and through joint decision; 2nd-4th degrees are appointed by proposal of the Secretary General and approval of the Prime Minister; 5th-15th degrees are appointed by approval of the Secretary General.

In case of a need for the appointment of the personnel in the Secretariat General to other public institutions, application is submitted to the Prime Ministry. The Prime Ministry determines the institutions and the establishments where these staff will be appointed to. The relevant institutions carry out appointment procedures in accordance with the general provisions.

Special provisions

Article 17 - Personnel of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council are subject to the State Employee Law no.657 except for certain special provisions listed below.
The staff of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council is established or abolished by the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval of the Prime Minister, with the supplementary charts determined in conformity with the general provisions.

According to the additional item on wage raises and compensations annexed to the State Employee Law with 31.07.1970 no. 1327 Code, payment proportions without exceeding the maximum limits are determined by the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval of the Prime Minister.

Members of the Turkish Armed Forces who will be appointed to the Secretariat General of the National Security Council are determined by joint decision of the General Staff and the Secretariat General of the National Security Council. Appointment process of officers and non-commissioned officers is executed under the principles of Turkish Armed Forces Staff Law no. 926.

In case of a need, personnel working for other public agencies, mentioned in the 4th article of the Law No:160 on the foundation of the State Personnel Organization, may be employed at the Secretariat General of the National Security Council; provided that their employment matters are kept in their own institutions, their status on discipline, employment record and permissions are regulated by the Secretariat General, as long as the Prime Minister finds that such an employment is necessary.

The difference is paid as compensation out of the Secretariat General budget to the personnel appointed to the Secretariat General of the National Security Council in accordance with the above 4th and 5th clauses, in case sum of the raise and compensation paid in their institutions is less than the sum of the payments given to the equal staff.

The contracted personnel who will be employed at the Secretariat General of the National Security Council are not required to fulfill the conditions indicated Article 4 of the State Employee Law. Working conditions, principles of contracts, minimum and maximum payment limits determined without exceeding the ratios of the Council of Ministers, as well as principles of their social rights are arranged by a regulation. (Annex: 8/4/1990 - 417/1 article) The contracted personnel will be subject to the Retirement Fund on their will.
In case of a need, financial contribution for clothing to some personnel of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council is made under the provisions of the State Employee Law no.657 with the proposal of the Secretary General and the approval of the Prime Minister.

PART FOUR
*The Working Principles and Various Provisions*

The working order

**Article 18** - The Secretariat General of the National Security Council fulfills its duties given by this and other legislations, in its own organization and, when necessary, in coordination with other ministries, establishments and institutions.

Internal working conditions of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council and relations and working procedures with other ministries, establishments and institutions are arranged by regulations.

**Information and Documents**

**Article 19** - (Repealed)

**Budget of the Secretariat General**

**Article 20** - The Secretariat General of the National Security Council is subject to the General Budget System. An extra allocation is included in the budget for confidential expenditures. The Secretary General is responsible for using this allocation, to the Prime Minister.

**Regulation**

**Article 21** - (Amendment: 17/12/2003-5017/1 article) The principles and procedures on the implementation of this law and the issues mentioned in the law are arranged by a regulation prepared by the Secretariat General of the National Security Council, discussed in the National Security Council and approved by the Council of Ministers.

This regulation is prepared and enters into force within three months after the publication of the law.

**Repealed Provisions**

PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 1 - Implementation of the ongoing decisions of the National Security Council functioning according to the repealed law no.129 and the national policy decisions accepted by the National Security Council will continue until the enforcement of the amendment and abolishment decisions of the National Security Council reorganized by this law.

PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 2 - Until the enforcement of the regulation to be issued under the provision of 21st article, the implementation of the provisions of the regulation issued according to the National Security Law no.129 will be in force.

PROVISIONAL ARTICLES 3 - Existing organization and staff of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council are regulated in accordance with the provisions of this Law. The personnel of the ministries, establishments and institutions working in the Secretariat General and all personnel including contractual employees can be tasked by the Secretary General, with their new staff and status, or appointed to the other public establishments and institutions within the context of article 14.

PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 4 - (Annex: 03-4963/28 article) In accordance with the arrangements in the National Security Council and the Secretariat General of the National Security Council Law dated 9.11.1983 no.2945, envisaged by this law, a regulation is issued within three months after the publication of this law with in the context of the principles of the 21st article of the law no. 2945.

Entry into Force
Article 23 - This law enters into force on the date of publication.

Execution
Article 24 - The Council of Ministers is responsible for the execution of this law

2. CONSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS

By Constitutional setting it is referred to the 1-9 Articles of the Turkish Constitution of 1982, which are as follows:

Article 1- The Turkish state is a Republic.
Article 2- The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.

Article 3- The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish (Art.3).

Article 4- The provision of Article 1 of the Constitution establishing the form of the state as a Republic, the provisions in Article 2 on the characteristics of the Republic, and the provision of Article 3 shall not be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed

Article 5- The fundamental aims and duties of the state are; to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and democracy; to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and society; to strive for the removal of political, social and economic obstacles which restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in a manner incompatible with the principles of justice and of the social state governed by the rule of law; and to provide the conditions required for the development of the individual’s material and spiritual existence.

Article 6- Sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally in the nation.

Article 7- Legislative power is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on behalf of the Turkish Nation. This power cannot be delegated.

Article 8- Executive power and function shall be exercised and carried out by the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers in conformity with the Constitution and the law.

Article 9- Judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts on behalf of the Turkish Nation.