An annotated critical edition of Demetrios Chrysoloras’

Dialogue on Demetrios Kydones’ Antirrhetic

against Neilos Kabasilas

Vasos Pasiourtides

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at the University of London

(Royal Holloway and Bedford New College)

March 2013
Candidate’s declaration:

I confirm that this PhD thesis is entirely my own work. All sources and quotations have been acknowledged. The main works consulted are listed in the bibliography.

Candidate’s signature: [Signature]

Date: 25 March 2013
To my family
Abstract

The present thesis is an annotated critical edition of the *Dialogue on Demetrios Kydones’ Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas* by the Byzantine scholar and theologian Demetrios Chrysoloras (ca. 1360-post 1440). Composed in the form of an imaginary dialogue this text presents the Orthodox position with reference to the procession of the Holy Spirit, the main doctrinal issue that divided, and still divides, the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches. In this fictitious dialogue Chrysoloras ‘resurrects’ both Kydones (†1397) and Kabasilas (†1363), as well as Thomas Aquinas (†1274), the author who gave rise to their own debate. In this way, three theological discourses, and two perceptions are involved in Demetrios Chrysoloras’ work. At the same time this text highlights perspectives of cultural and ethnic identity within Byzantine society.

The thesis comprises an **Introduction** and a critical **edition** of the text.

The **Introduction** is divided into two **Parts (I-II)**. **Part I** gives information on the author and his times, his works and the background of the composition of this text in the context of the ecclesiastical dialogue between Byzantine and Western theologians in this period. This Part also examines the circumstances that gave rise to the composition of this fictitious *Dialogue*, followed by an analysis of its structure and content, a commentary on the arguments put forward by Chrysoloras to refute Kydones’ *Antirrhetic* and an evaluation of the *Dialogue* in the wider historical, theological and cultural context.

**Part II** is devoted to the manuscript tradition. The four codices which preserve the complete text of the *Dialogue*, datable between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, are described and studied from the codicological and palaeographical point of view, followed by a palaeographical and textual examination in order to establish their relation.

To help the reader, the **edition** of the text is accompanied by five apparatuses, recording: (a) passages of Neilos’ treatise *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit (DPSS III)* and Kydones’ *Antirrhetic (Defensio)*; (b) parallel passages in Chrysoloras’ *Dialogue* and other works of his; (c) passages from Thomas Aquinas’ works cited in the text; (d) **apparatus fontium** recording proverbs and classical, Scriptural and patristic citations in the text; and (e) **apparatus criticus** recording palaeographical and textual observations in the extant manuscripts. The edition is preceded by a brief note on the principles and conventions adopted, and a list of abbreviations and signs used in the **apparatuses**.

The thesis closes with full **bibliography** and **facsimiles** of selected folios of the extant manuscripts.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of contents</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Plates</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part I: The Author and the Dialogue</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Author of the Dialogue</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date and circumstances of the composition of the Dialogue</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The structure and content of the Dialogue</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part II: The manuscript tradition</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of the extant manuscripts</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palaeographical and textual examination of the Dialogue</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation of the manuscripts</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Edition</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The present edition</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demetrii Chryssolorae Refutatio operis Demetrii Cydonis Contra Nilum Capasilam sub forma dialogi, in quo auctor ipse cum personis Thomae Aquinatis, Nili Capasilae et Demetrii Cydonis loquitur</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plates</strong></td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plates</strong></td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

The present thesis would not have been completed without the help of my teacher the late Julian Chrysostomides (†18.X.2008), my co-supervisors Dr Charalambos Dendrinos and Dr John Demetracopoulos and my advisor Professor Anne Sheppard. Their scholarly guidance, encouragement and support have been inspiring and invaluable. I owe my deepest gratitude to them.

I would also like to express my deep thanks to the examiners of the thesis, Revd Professor Richard Price (Heythrop College, University of London) and Revd Professor Andrew Louth (Durham University), for their valuable comments, corrections and suggestions.

I gratefully acknowledge the financial help I have received from the Church of Cyprus towards maintenance expenses (2009) and from RHUL History Department towards the purchase of digital facsimiles of Greek manuscripts. To RHUL Hellenic Institute I owe particular thanks for awarding me The Panagiotis and Eleni Xenou Postgraduate Studentship (2008-9), the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomaios I Studentship (2009-10), a George of Cyprus Bursary (2010-11), and a Julian Chrysostomides Memorial Bursary (2010) thanks to which I was able to pursue my doctoral studies.

I would like to thank the staff of the following libraries, where most of my research was carried out: British Library, University of London Libraries including Senate House Library, the Warburg Institute, Institute of Historical Research, Institute of Classical Studies and Heythrop College, the Library of the University of Cyprus, the Library of the Archbishop Makarios III Cultural Foundation in Nicosia, and the Founder’s and Bedford Libraries at RHUL. I am also grateful to the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris, the Biblioteca
Medicea Laurenziana in Florence, and the Royal Library in Copenhagen, for kindly providing me with digital facsimiles of the manuscripts (MSS) consulted in the present thesis.

Grateful thanks are also due to Professor Justin Champion and Dr David Gwynn (RHUL History Department) and Dr Dennis Searby (University of Uppsala) for their valuable suggestions and helpful advice and to Revd Dr Demetrios G. Koutsoures (Higher Ecclesiastical Academy of Athens) for encouraging me to undertake the edition of Chrysoloras’ Dialogue. I am also indebted to Mrs Marie-Christine Ockenden, Postgraduate Administrator and Mrs Stephanie Surrey, Finance Administrator at RHUL History Department for their help and encouragement. Among my friends and fellow students I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dr Konstantinos Palaiologos, Dr Andreas Meitanis, Miss Stavroula Kiritsi, Mr Kenneth and Mrs Sheena Fielder, Mr Mushal Almasaad and Miss Maria Charalambous for their invaluable help and support. To Mrs Christina Kakkoura I am particularly grateful for her constant help, valuable advice and friendship over the years. I also thank Mr Simon and Mrs Theodora Constantinou for their kind and generous hospitality in Cardiff during the last year of my postgraduate studies. Miss Michela Libertini has been an unfailing source of support and encouragement over the last four years. I would like to express my deep thanks to her.

My profound gratitude goes to my grandparents, Revd Socrates and Mrs Athena Chrysostomou, for their love as well as their moral and financial support throughout my postgraduate studies. It is to my grandfather Revd Socrates that I owe my love for Byzantium. My late grandparents Vasilis and Theophano would have been pleased to know that their blessings, advice and faith in me enabled me to complete my studies in Britain.

Last but not least my parents Orthodoxos and Marina, my sister Maria and my brother Socrates. Without their unconditional love and support it would have been impossible for me to sail to Byzantium. It is to them that this thesis is dedicated.

Camberley, 25 March 2013
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Ανάλεκτα Βλατάδων</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ackrill, Aristotle</td>
<td>J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHC</td>
<td>Annuario Historiae Conciliorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldama, Repertorium</td>
<td>J.A. de Aldama, Repertorium pseudochrysostomicum (Paris, 1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anagnostopoulos, Companion</td>
<td>G. Anagnostopoulos, ed., A Companion to Aristotle (Chichester, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Byzantion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSI</td>
<td>Byzantinoslavica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ByzSt</td>
<td>Byzantine Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BV</td>
<td>Byzantina Vindobonensia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZ</td>
<td>Byzantinische Zeitschrift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cammelli, I dotti bizantini</td>
<td>G. Cammelli, I dotti bizantini e le origini dell’umanesimo, vol. I: Manuele Crisolora (Florence, 1941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candal, Nilus Cabasilas</td>
<td>E. Candal, Nilus Cabasilas et theologia S. Thomae de processione Spiritus sancti, ST, 116 (Vatican City, 1945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSG</td>
<td>Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSL</td>
<td>Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CFHB  
Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae

Chrysostomides, *Καθηγήτρια*  
J. Chrysostomides, ed., *Καθηγήτρια: Essays presented to Joan Hussey for her 80th birthday* (Camberley, 1988)

Constantinides, *Higher Education*  
C.N. Constantinides, *Higher Education in Byzantium in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries* (Nicosia, 1982)

CparG  

CPG  

Davies, *Thomas Aquinas*  

Demetracopoulos, ‘*Thomas Aquinas’ Impact*’  

Demetrios Chrysoloras, *Abridged exposition*  

Demetrios Chrysoloras, *Comparison*  
Demetrios Chrysoloras, *Comparison between the old emperors and the new Emperor Manuel Palaiologos*, ed. S. Lampros, ‘*Σύγκρισις παλαιών ἀρχόντων καὶ νέου τοῦ νῦν αὐτοκράτορος Μανουήλ Παλαιολόγου*, ΠΠ Γ (1926), pp. 222-245

Demetrios Kydones, *Antirrhetic*  
Demetrios Kydones, *Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas*, in *Vaticanus graecus 614*, ff. 110'-126'

Demetrios Kydones, *Apologia I*  

Dendrinos, *Annotated*  
Dendrinos, ‘Co-operation and friendship’


Dendrinos, ‘Palaiologan scholars at work’


Dendrinos, ‘Reflections’


Dennis, Manuel II, Letters


Devreesse, Le fonds

R. Devreese, Le fonds grec de la Bibliothèque Vaticane des origines à Paul V, ST, 244 (Vatican City, 1965)

Dialogue

Demetrios Chrysoloras, Dialogue on Demetrios Kydones’ Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas, ed. below, pp. 190-397

Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, Celestial hierarchy


Ps-Dionysius the Areopagite, On the divine names


DOP

Dumbarton Oaks Papers

EA

Έκκλησιαστική Αλήθεια

Emery, The Trinitarian Theology


EO

Échos d’Orient

Gautier, ‘Action de grâces’


GCS

Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/Title</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geanakoplos, Constantinople and the West</td>
<td>D.J. Geanakoplos, <em>Constantinople and the West: essays on the late Byzantine (Palaeologan) and Italian Renaissances and the Byzantine and Roman churches</em> (Madison, WI and London, 1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussey, <em>The Orthodox Church</em></td>
<td>J.M. Hussey, <em>The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire</em> (Oxford 1986; repr. 1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHS</td>
<td><em>Journal of Hellenic Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JÖB</td>
<td><em>Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author/Editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koutsoures, Δημητρίου Χρυσολωρᾶ, Κατά Λατίνων λόγος συνοπτικός</td>
<td>D. Koutsoures, ed., <em>Δημητρίου Χρυσολωρᾶ, Κατά Λατίνων λόγος συνοπτικός, ἀφ’ ών ἐποίησεν ὁ ἁγιώτατος Νεῖλος ἁρχιεπίσκοπος Θεσσαλονίκης</em> (Athens, 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximus, Metropolitan of Sardes, Οἰκουμενικὸν Πατριαρχεῖον</td>
<td>Maximus, Metropolitan of Sardes, <em>Τὸ Ὀικουμενικὸν Πατριαρχεῖον ἐν τῇ Ὑπὸ Ορθοδόξω Εκκλησίᾳ</em>, AB, 52 (Thessalonike, 1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercati, Notizie</td>
<td>G. Mercati, <em>Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota ed altri appunti per la storia della teologia e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV</em>, ST, 56 (Vatican City, 1931)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercati, Per la storia</td>
<td>G. Mercati, <em>Per la storia dei manoscritti greci di Genova di varie badie Basiliane d’Italia e di Patmo</em>, ST, 68 (Vatican City, 1935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Work Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necipoğlu</td>
<td>Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latinns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicol</td>
<td>Church and Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papadopoulos</td>
<td>Ελληνικαὶ μεταφράσεις</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>Patristische Texte und Studien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REB</td>
<td><em>Revue des Études Byzantines</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roca Meliá</td>
<td>I. Roca Meliá, ‘Demetrio Crisoloras’ y su homilía inédita sobre la dormición de María’, <em>Helmantica</em> 11 (1960), 233-248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBN</td>
<td><em>Studi bizantini e neoellenici</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Sources chrétiennes (Paris, 1924-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author/Title</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soteropoulos, Θέματα θεολογίας</td>
<td>Ch. Soteropoulos, Θέματα θεολογίας τοῦ 1Δ’ αἰώνος (Athens, 1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Studi e Testi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stobaeus, Anthology</td>
<td>Stobaeus, Anthology, eds. O. Hense and C. Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei anthology, vols. 3-4 (Berlin, 1894, 1909)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas, CEG</td>
<td>Thomas Aquinas, Contra errores Graecorum, editio Leonina Manualis (Rome, 1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia</td>
<td>Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, ed. P.M. Pession, in Quaestiones Disputatae, vol. 2 (Rome, 1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas, ST</td>
<td>Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, editio Leonina Manualis (Rome, 1888)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLG</td>
<td>Thesaurus Linguae Graecae®, A Digital Library of Greek Literature, University of California, Irvine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBS</td>
<td>Wiener Byzantinistische Studien</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Plates

Plate 1a Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 28r
Plate 1b Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 28v
Plate 2a Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 29r
Plate 2b Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 29v
Plate 3 Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 1r
Plate 4 Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 4v
Plate 5 Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 155v
Plate 6 Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Laur. Pluteus 5.12, f. 1r
Plate 7 Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Laur. Pluteus 5.12, f. 74v
Plate 8 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 1284, f. 42r
Plate 9 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 1284, f. 17r
Plate 10 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 1284, f. 7r
Plate 11 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 1284, f. 40r
Plate 12 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 1284, f. 1r
Plate 13 Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1109, f. 59r
Plate 14 Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1109, f. 78r
Plate 15 Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1109, f. 135v
Plate 16 Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1109, f. 2v
Plate 17 Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1109, f. 115v
Introduction

Part I: The Author and the Dialogue

The Author of the Dialogue

The late Byzantine period (1261-1453) was characterized by intense doctrinal and ecclesiastical disputes interconnected with political conflicts which divided Byzantine society. Broadly speaking, two major groups represented the extreme positions that dominated social and political life in the declining Empire. The anti-Latin party, represented by the majority of the Byzantine people and the Orthodox Church, particularly the monastic community and the lower clergy, refused to negotiate the issue of union between the Greek and Latin Churches with the papacy. This intransigent attitude against the Latins emanated from the bitterness on the part of the Byzantine people after the Latin conquest and occupation of the Empire in 1204, an attitude which persisted after the re-conquest of Constantinople by Michael Palaiologos in 1261 and the re-establishment of Byzantine imperial authority under his dynasty. The proselytising and pro-unionist activities of the members of the opposite, Latinophile, party, coupled with their expressed esteem for Latin scholastic thought, increased the distrust and hostility of their opponents, for in their eyes they had betrayed their faith and country, often to serve their own financial and political interests.


2 The most important controversies involved the Arsenian schism (13th c.), the hesychast controversy (14th c.), and the question over the Union of the Churches which dominated the foreign policy of the Palaiologoi emperors until the fall of the Empire to the Ottomans in 1453. See D.M. Nicol, Church and Society in the Last Centuries of Byzantium (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 1-30; J.M. Hussey, The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire (Oxford 1986, repr. 1990), pp. 220-247, 252-286.

In this climate, exacerbated by the consolidation of the Ottoman power in the Balkans, the Byzantine government opted to continue its negotiations with the papacy using the Union of the Churches as an instrument for securing military aid from the West\(^4\). A major obstacle in these discussions was the different views held by the two sides concerning the terms of a possible Union. For the Byzantines the basis of a genuine and lasting reunion should be the convening of an Ecumenical Council where the most important theological, ecclesiastical and liturgical points of dispute would be discussed between the Byzantine and Latin theologians in a spirit of equality and mutual understanding. The pre-condition of the reunion on the part of the papacy, on the other hand, was the submission of the Byzantine Church to Rome in return to financial and military help for the defence of the Empire\(^5\). This pre-supposed the acceptance by the Eastern Churches of the Latin addition in the Creed of the *filioque* clause stating that the third Person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, proceeds from the Father and the Son, as the Latin theologians taught, against the Orthodox view that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, the only source in the Trinity\(^6\).

The second issue that prevented an agreement for Union involved papal primacy. For the anti-unionist party, the Bishop of Rome was considered *primus inter pares* in spiritual matters, as indeed stipulated in the decrees of the Ecumenical Councils\(^7\). The papacy, under the influence of German theologians, insisted that this primacy entailed also ecclesiastical affairs, a view which the Orthodox refused to accept, as this went counter

---


\(^7\) Second Ecumenical Council, Constantinople I (381), canon 3; Fourth Ecumenical Council Chalcedon (451), canon 2; Quinisext Council (691-692), canon 36. In general see Hussey, *The Orthodox Church*, pp. 27, 77, 133-6, 167-73, 179-83, chapter VII, passim; Maximus, Metropolitan of Sardes, *Τὸ Οἰκουμενικὸν Πατριαρχεῖον ἐν τῇ Ὑπὸ Ορθοδόξῳ Ἐκκλησίᾳ*, AB, 52 (Thessalonike, 1989), pp. 100ff.
to the system of Pentarchy, that is the ecclesiastical equality and independence of each of the five Patriarchates of the ancient Church (Rome, Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem; in this order). These different views over doctrinal and ecclesiastical matters, together with certain different liturgical customs and practices, inevitably created tension between the two sides. For the Byzantines felt that Church Union on these terms would be used as an instrument for the gradual Latinization of the Empire.

Apart from such aims and needs the attempts for Union also reflected, to a certain extent, a real desire to re-join the divided Church of Christ. The increasing encounters among Byzantine and Latin intellectuals, and translations of Greek and Latin texts, particularly from the thirteenth century onwards, encouraged the exchange of ideas, also in the field of theology, and laid the foundations for mutual understanding and admiration among the highest intellectual circles. It is in this context that elements of Latin scholastic thought

---

8 On the dispute over the primacy of the Pope and the arguments employed by both sides, see F. Dvornik, The Idea of Apostolicity in Byzantium and the Legend of the Apostle Andrew (Cambridge, MA, 1958); Sherrard, Greek East and Latin West, pp. 73-107; F. Dvornik, Byzance et la primauté romaine (Paris, 1964), English trans. by E.A. Quain, Byzantium and the Roman Primacy (New York, 1966); J. Darrouzès, ‘Les documents byzantins du XIIe siècle sur la primauté romaine, REB 23 (1965), 42-88; J. Spiteris, La critica bizantina del primo Romano nel secolo XII, OCA, 208 (Rome, 1979); Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, pp. 97-101; Maximus, Metropolitan of Sardes, Οἰκουμενικον Πατριαρχείον; J. Meyendorff, ‘St Peter in Byzantine Theology’, in The Primacy of Peter: essays in ecclesiology and the early church, ed. J. Meyendorff (Crestwood and New York, 1992), pp. 67-90; A. Papadakis and J. Meyendorff, The Christian East and the Rise of the Papacy. The Church 1071-1453 A.D. (New York, 1994); T.M. Kolbaba, ‘Barlaam the Calabrian. Three Treatises on Papal Primacy. Introduction, Edition, and Translation’, REB 53 (1995), 41-155. It should be noted that according to Fourth Ecumenical Council Chalcedon (451), canon 9, Constantinople reserves the right to hear appeals from bishops or clergy in other Patriarchates. Cf. the comment on this canon by the twelfth-century canonist Alexios Aristenos (PG 133, col. 88D): ‘This privilege, that is, that a metropolitan under the authority of one Patriarch can be judged by another one, is not granted by laws or canons to any of the other Patriarchs apart from that of Constantinople’. I would like to thank Prof. Richard Price for drawing my attention to this.


were introduced into Byzantium through the translation into Greek of certain theological works by Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225-1274)\textsuperscript{12}, by the Kydones brothers, Demetrios (ca. 1324-1397)\textsuperscript{13} and Prochoros (ca. 1330-ca. 1370/71), around 1354, a project supported by the theologian Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos (1347-1354)\textsuperscript{14}. These translations became popular and led a number of distinguished Byzantine intellectuals to convert to Roman Catholicism, including Demetrios Kydones himself, Manuel Kalekas (d. 1410), Manuel Chrysoloras (ca. 1350-15.IV.1415) and Maximos Chrysoberges (d. 1410-1429)\textsuperscript{15}. Moreover, these translations, which proved instrumental in invigorating the

\begin{footnotesize}


\end{footnotesize}
discussions among the Orthodox, Latin and Latinophile theologians, gave rise to a large number of works in defence of, or in opposition to, Thomistic thought.\(^{16}\)

It is in this historical, cultural and theological environment that the eminent theologian Neilos Kabasilas (ca. 1300-1363) undertook to defend the Orthodox position against the Latin doctrine of the double procession of the Holy Spirit\(^{17}\). Neilos composed three separate works, which can be considered as a single work in three parts, composed some time between 1358 and 1361, before his elevation on the Archiepiscopal throne of Thessalonike (1361-1363): (1) the *Five Discourses on the Procession of the Holy Spirit* (DPSS I)\(^{18}\); (2) the *Refutation of the Thirty-Four Premises of the Latins on the Procession of the Holy Spirit* (DPSS II)\(^{19}\); and (3) the *Discourse against the Syllogisms of the Latins on the Procession of the Holy Spirit* (DPSS III)\(^{20}\). The last work (DPSS III), focusing on Thomas Aquinas' teachings, was in turn refuted by Demetrios Kydones in his *Antirrhetic* (also known as *Defensio Sancti Thomae Aquinatis adversus Nilum Cabasilam*)\(^{21}\) shortly after Kabasilas' death. Kydones' *Antirrhetic* was refuted yet again by Demetrios Chrysoloras some decades later. By then, Kydones, too, was dead. It is this last, hitherto unpublished, text that is edited in the present thesis.


\(^{21}\) In the introduction of the present thesis (pp. 17-176) we refer to Kydones’ text as *Antirrhetic*, while we keep the Latin abbreviated title *Defensio* in the edition (below, pp. 190-397).

The information we have about Demetrios Chrysoloras is scanty. The assumption that he was a relative of the distinguished scholar, teacher and imperial ambassador Manuel Chrysoloras (ca. 1355-1415), needs to be re-examined. Demetrios was born in Thessalonike sometime before 1360. We know nothing about his early education. His close friendship with the scholar and theologian Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos (1391-1425) remained uncontested even when he served, between 1403 and 1408, as representative (μεσάζων) of Manuel’s nephew and contestor of the imperial throne, John VII Despot in Thessalonike. Manuel’s personal letters to Demetrios offer an insight into their characters and personalities. During Manuel’s journey to the West (1399-1403) Chrysoloras corresponded with him from Constantinople where he remained, serving John VII. It appears that at some point Chrysoloras travelled to the West. This information derives from one of the letters Manuel sent him from Paris in 1403. The reason for this journey remains unknown. What is certain is that Demetrios was in Constantinople on 28 July 1403, when he delivered his Thanksgiving Sermon to the Theotokos (Προσφώνημα εἰς τὴν ὑπεραγίαν Θεοτόκον εὐχαριστήριον) on the first anniversary of the battle of Ankara, which ended the siege of Constantinople by Bayezid.

In his account of the Council of Union of Ferrara-Florence (1438-1439), the Grand Ecclesiarch of the Church of Constantinople Sylvester Syropoulos recorded an incident related to Demetrios’ occupation with astronomy and astrology, which reflects Chrysoloras’ loyalty to Manuel and his son and successor as well as his anti-unionist stance. When he was sent to Constantinople by John VII around 1407, Demetrios stayed in the palace. One evening, at dinner, he was asked by the Emperor whether he could foretell anything important about the future. Demetrios responded that according to his calculations the seventh Palaiologan emperor would bring about the Union with the Latins, which would result in suffering for the Christian people. Manuel remarked that the seventh Palaiologos was his nephew, John VII. Demetrios replied that actually it was Manuel’s son, John VIII Palaiologos (1425-1448). Demetrios finally appears, as an imperial delegate, in the Acts of the Synod of April/May 1416, held to elect a new patriarch.

Demetrios composed a number of works. Most of them have already been published while some still remain unedited. His philosophical interests are reflected in two short compositions. The first concerns Jesus’ saying about Judas Iscariot during the Last Supper (Matthew 26:24). This scriptural citation became the subject of a philosophical discussion between Chrysoloras and Antonio d’Ascoli, some time around 1409. This work, written in the form of a debate, focused on the question: If it is better to be than not

---


to be, how could Christ say of Judas that it would be better for him if he had never been born?\textsuperscript{33}

In his second philosophical work, composed in the form of a fictitious dialogue, Chrysoloras examines Platonic and Christian perceptions of right (δίκαιον) and wrong (ἀδίκον) and the role of faith and philosophical reasoning in the process of investigating questions concerning man and God. The title of this work in the codex unicus (Vat. gr. 1109) contains a lacuna and therefore the title in the printed edition is incomplete (Dialogue by Demetrios Chrysoloras […] that it is not right for Orthodox to accuse other Orthodox for any reason)\textsuperscript{34}.

Demetrios also composed a number of rhetorical works. These include two panegyrics dedicated to the Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos: the first, entitled Comparison between the old emperors and the new Emperor Manuel Palaiologos, written shortly after the construction of the Hexamilion in 1415\textsuperscript{35}, became the source for his second encomiastic work addressed to the Emperor, composed in the form of centuria and entitled A Hundred Encomiastic Letters addressed to Manuel II Palaiologos, dated around 1417\textsuperscript{36}. The latter work met with the Emperor’s disapproval as Manuel found it flattery; this is recorded in a letter the Emperor sent to his friend\textsuperscript{37}. Chrysoloras also composed a progymnasma under the title Encomium of the flea (Ψύλλας ἐγκώμιον)\textsuperscript{38}, and more


\textsuperscript{34} Ed. D. Koutsoures, Διάλογος Δημητρίου τοῦ Χρυσολωρά, Ού δίκαιον ἔστιν ἐτέρων ὀρθόδοξαν ἐτέρων ὀρθόδοξον κατηγορεῖν, ἐν σέδεν πράγματι (Athens, 1998), pp. 11-32. In the edition correct the erroneous repetition of the word ἐτέρων: FOR ἐστίν ἐτέρων ὀρθόδοξον ἐτέρων ὀρθόδοξον READ ἔστιν ὀρθόδοξοι ἐτέρων ὀρθόδοξον (front cover pages and p. 11). See below, p. 147.


\textsuperscript{37} Manuel II, Letters, 61, pp. 170-171.

importantly an *Encomium on St Demetrios* and an oration *On the Dormition of the Virgin*.

Chrysoloras also composed three theological texts. The first is a *Dialogue on the primacy of the Pope and the procession of the Holy Spirit* between two anonymous interlocutors, a Byzantine and a Latin theologian, who so far remain unidentified, if indeed they are not fictitious persons. The other two works defend Neilos Kabasilas' arguments against the Latin teachings on the procession of the Holy Spirit, as presented in his DPSS II-III: (a) an *Abridged exposition of Neilos Kabasilas’ refutation of the Latin teachings on the procession of the Holy Spirit*, in which Chrysoloras summarises Kabasilas' arguments in DPSS II-III; and (b) a *Dialogue on Demetrios Kydones’ Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas’ Refutation of Thomas Aquinas’ teachings*, which supports Kabasilas' arguments in DPSS III. It is the latter work that, as already mentioned, is the subject of the present thesis.

Composed in the form of a fictitious dialogue, this text criticizes Kydones’ stance towards Neilos Kabasilas and their compatriots in general, and refutes Kydones’ arguments (as expounded in his *Antirrhetic*) concerning the *filioque* question and the use of the syllogistic method in theology, presenting the Orthodox position in these matters. Thus this imaginary dialogue, conducted among the author and three eminent deceased theologians —Kydones (†1397), Kabasilas (†1363) and

---

39 Ed. B. Laourdas, 'Τὸ ἐγκώμιον τοῦ Δημητρίου Χρυσολορᾶ εἰς τὸν Ἁγίον Δημήτριον', *Γρηγόριος ο Παλαιάς* 472-473 0'-t' (1957), 342-354.

40 Ed. I. Rocca Meliá, *Demetrio Crisoloras y su Homilía inédita sobre la dormición de María* (PhD thesis, Pontifical University of Salamanca, 1960), which I have been unable to consult. For a Spanish translation see Rocca Meliá, *Demetrio Crisoloras*, 233-287.


44 In the *Dialogue* it is stated that Kabasilas was by then dead [13,17]: Ἐτε, διατί μὲν ἐκείνον ξόντος σιγᾶ, ὅτε δὲ μηδὲν ἀπολογούμενον κατανοεῖς, τότε σοι τὸ ιατ’ ἐκείνου πόνημα, βουλεύῃ γίγνεσθαι παντὶ γνῶριμον.
Aquinas (†1274)\textsuperscript{45}—involves no less than three theological treatises and two perspectives, which reflect the content, method and general atmosphere of the, often forceful, theological dialogue and the reception of Thomistic thought in late Byzantium.

\textsuperscript{45} See above, note 12.
Date and circumstances of the composition of the Dialogue

An internal clue that allows us to date the composition of the Dialogue is the personal remarks Chrysoloras makes against Kydones, especially in the Preface [1.72-124]. The strong tone of these remarks suggests that the Dialogue postdates Manuel II’s death, for the simple reason that Chrysoloras’ offending comments on the Emperor’s friend and mentor, who was by then dead, would have provoked Manuel’s dissatisfaction. In the Dialogue Kydones, who had died in 139746, appears to have joined Thomas and Neilos in the afterlife. If this hypothesis is correct, the Dialogue must have been written sometime after the Emperor’s death (21 July 1425), most probably towards the end of Chrysoloras’ life, as implied by his remark in the Epilogue of the Dialogue that he would soon join the other three interlocutors47.

Another clue is that Chrysoloras makes no mention of the Council of Florence in the Dialogue. It seems highly unlikely that Demetrios would have failed to comment on, or allude to, such a significant event concerning the Union of the Churches48. If this assumption, too, is correct, it seems that Chrysoloras must have composed the Dialogue sometime before the proclamation of the Union of the Churches on 6 July 1439.

External evidence seems to support this hypothesis. Gennadios Scholarios, in his Response to Mark Eugenikos’ syllogisms on the Procession of the Holy Spirit49, which he must have composed just before the Council of Florence50, refers to Neilos Kabasilas’ DPSS III and to Kydones’ Antirrhetic, adding that up to that time no theologian had attempted to produce a refutation of Kydones’ argument on the distinction of the

46 See above, note 43.
47 Dialogue [13.106-111]: ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν, ὡς θαυμάσιος ψυχοσώφον, καὶ Θωμᾶς, καὶ Νεῖλος ὁμοί, νόμιμος ἄλλος, δουλευέτε νῦν Θεοϋ καὶ τὴν αὐτω πρέπουσαν, ἑκατὸς εὔσεβες γνώσιν, οἷς, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν βραχεὶ συνεσόμεθα, καὶ γνωσόμεθα ταύτην, ἄν Θεός θέλῃ σοι δὲ, εἰτε βουλευμένῳ, εἰτε καὶ μή, λέγειν ἐπελθὲν ἃ μὴ χρεῖον, ἔλεος ὁ δυνατός μόνος, καὶ ἡμῖν, ἁμα σοι γένοιτο.
48 I would like to thank Professor John Monfasani for drawing my attention to this.
Persons in the Holy Trinity[51]. Given his deep involvement in the theological dialogue between the Byzantine and scholastic theologians, it would have been highly unlikely for Scholarios to have omitted referring to Chrysoloras’ *Dialogue*, had he known it. In such case an identification of the anonymous person who instigated the composition of the *Dialogue* [13.111-120] with Scholarios must be ruled out.

In the light of this evidence it seems that Chrysoloras must have composed his *Dialogue* sometime after 21 July 1425 and shortly before 1439. This is confirmed by palaeographical evidence, namely the period in which Stephanos, Bishop of Medeia (1412-1442), the scribe of the text in the extant codex *Vaticanus graecus* 1109 (V), was active[52].


The structure and content of the Dialogue

The Dialogue comprises three sections: Preface [1]; a main section divided into eleven Syllogisms (συλλογισμοί), in which Aquinas, Kabasilas, Kydones and Chrysoloras debate over the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity and the Filioque [2-12]; and an Epilogue [13]. Each of Chrysoloras’ eleven Syllogisms refutes the respective syllogism put forward by Kabasilas (in his DPSS III) in response to Aquinas’ teachings, which is in turn refuted by Kydones (in his Antirrhetic). In this way Chrysoloras follows the structure of Kabasilas’ and Kydones’ refutations.

The title of the Dialogue reflects the aim of the work, namely to refute Demetrios Kydones’ refutation of Neilos Kabasilas’ refutation of Thomas Aquinas’ views on the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity and the procession of the Holy Spirit. One of the main difficulties the reader of the Dialogue faces in following the argument is the highly selective approach the author employed in citing verbatim passages of the two texts in question (Kabasilas’ DPSS III and Kydones’ Antirrhetic), dissecting and rephrasing sentences, inevitably at the expense of appreciating the full theological and philosophical implications of the argumentation put forward by the interlocutors in the original texts. On the other hand, this approach has its merits in providing a lively dialogue among the interlocutors, which often reveals the author’s humour and inventiveness.

In his Preface [1] Chrysoloras provides the reader with the background of the composition of the Dialogue. He spares no arrow in criticizing Demetrios Kydones’ stance, which, in his eyes, clearly reflects that of a man who does not hesitate to betray his country and faith, without giving the specific circumstances of Kydones’ conversion. At this point Chrysoloras juxtaposes what he believes to be the proper stance of a true Orthodox Christian in accordance with the traditional principles and values inherited from classical and Late Antiquity and the Roman past, including honouring one’s family, friends, country and, above all, one’s faith and freedom which should be defended at all costs. The Preface also examines a fundamental question over the use of philosophical reasoning in investigating theological questions, including the infinity, energy/actuality and potentiality of God. This question, which permeates the
discussion of the various issues examined among the interlocutors, reflects the Byzantine attitude towards the use and limits of man’s innate ability to use reason in order to explore divine truths in his attempt to attain knowledge of God. Chrysoloras expresses the standard Orthodox view that rhetoric and the exercising of human reason through syllogisms, though useful and indeed necessary in examining theological questions, should be used with caution, for the simple reason that, unless they are in conformity with the teachings of the Church and the decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, they can lead to heretical views. Thus, Chrysoloras draws attention to the dangers to which Latin theologians are exposed by placing absolute trust in philosophical reasoning in search of divine truths, a method employed in scholastic theology crystallized in Thomas Aquinas’ teachings.

The main section of the Dialogue [2-12] comprises eleven Syllogisms, which, as already mentioned, examine major points of dispute between Greek and Latin theologians concerning the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity and the procession of the Holy Spirit discussed in the corresponding first eleven syllogisms in Kabasilas’ DPSS III. The same eleven syllogisms are briefly presented and refuted by Chrysoloras in his Abridged exposition of Neilos Kabasilas’ refutation of the Latin teachings on the procession of the Holy Spirit53, in which he summarises Kabasilas’ arguments in DPSS II-III.

Each Syllogism in the Dialogue begins with a presentation of an argument put forward by Aquinas in Summa contra gentiles (SCG IV, 24) and its refutation by Kabasilas in the DPSS III, followed by a debate on the specific points under discussion between Kydones and Chrysoloras. As mentioned above, Chrysoloras cites either verbatim sections of Aquinas’ arguments from Kydones’ Greek translation as they appear in Kabasilas’ DPSS III, or the summary of the argument Kabasilas gives in the same work in cases where Aquinas’ argument is too long. In addition, Chrysoloras quotes Kabasilas’ arguments from DPSS III either verbatim or sometimes in summary. Kydones’ sections from his Antirrhetic are quoted also verbatim in the Dialogue. Occasionally, Chrysoloras takes the liberty to make some changes in the phraseology or syntax of the sentence by introducing words, changing the tense of the verb or even

---

compressing a long argument, especially by Kabasilas or Aquinas, often reducing it to a few lines.


54 As in the Greek word πνεῦμα I have employed the neuter to refer to the Third Person in the Trinity (Πνεῦμα). For this convention, see Sherrard, Greek East and Latin West, p. 63, n. 1.
55 To avoid confusion over the words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις I am using the terms essence and hypostasis, and not substance which can be translated as either οὐσία or ὑπόστασις. Similarly, we have translated ὑποστάσεων as coessential (i.e., consubstantial). For the interchangeable use of the Latin term substantia to render the terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, see Thomas Aquinas, CEG 1, Preface, and Joseph Bryennios, Sixth Oration on the Holy Trinity, ed. Voulgares, Ἱωσήφ μοναχὸν, I, p. 105.11-17; cf. Dendrinos, ‘Co-operation’, p. 12 with notes 49-50.
The content and argumentation in the Preface and each Syllogism is analysed separately below. Some passages of minor significance in terms of argumentation are summarized while those which are more important in content, approach and argumentation are presented more analytically. In the latter case we have closely followed the text, sometimes translating it *verbatim*, in order to give a better picture of the dialogue as it unfolds while at the same time revealing the author’s style, attitude, feelings and personality. Greek passages and terms in the commentary appear exactly as in the text (not always placed in the nominative) so that they are more easily traced in the edition. Concerning terminology, we have translated εἶδος as *species* in sections of the *Dialogue* where this term is used with reference to logical syllogisms [2.1-4], while in section [2.5] where the discussion concerns metaphysics we have translated εἶδος as *form* and μορφή as *shape*. In sections [1.5, 2.4, 6.1, 7 and 10] we have translated ἐνέργεια as *energy/actuality* in order to render the Greek term both in juxtaposition to οὐσία and in conformity with the conventional rendering by modern scholars of the term ἐνέργεια in Aristotelian works as *actuality*. Finally, to avoid repetitions, with a few exceptions, references to patristic and other sources cited or alluded to in the *Dialogue* appear in the *apparatus fontium* of the respective sections in the edition (below, pp. 190-397).

[1] Preface

There is a war, Chrysoloras states, and this war is waged against us by our own compatriots (ὁμοφύλων). This introductory statement reflects the state of Byzantine society in this period with regard to attitudes concerning the Union of the Churches. This war, Chrysoloras continues, is great and far more forceful than that waged against us by foreigners (ἀλλογενῶν) [1.1-2]56. For this reason it is the duty of the Orthodox people to fight for their faith and country at all costs while those (namely Kydones) who abandon their Mother Church and homeland are not only disgraced but they also deserve confiscation of their property and death! [cf. 1.1.63-67]. The reason for this war, Chrysoloras explains, is not the great ability of the opponents to argue in defence of their views nor the inability of the Orthodox to refute these arguments, but the fact that the Latins and their supporters feel humiliated unless they straightaway

56 All translations of passages from Chrysoloras’ *Dialogue* or other works are mine, unless otherwise indicated.
expresss the possibility of refuting the Orthodox arguments, which ‘is difficult for a foreigner, since he is totally incapable of having experience of what pertains Greek’ (πάντη πείραν τῶν ἐλληνικῶς ἥμιν ἐνόντων ἔχειν οὐ δυναμένω) [1.3-7]. Stressing the superiority of the Byzantines over foreign people, Latins included, Chrysoloras states that it is the duty of every Orthodox Christian to fight for his faith even if this means that he has to sacrifice his own life (ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀγωνίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, ἢ ζῆν). No one is allowed to remain silent, he says, for he who is capable of speaking in defence of the true faith and fails to do so implicitly joins the enemy [1.7-18]. To substantiate his opinion Chrysoloras uses a syllogism based on Aristotle’s opposites (ἐναντία)57 [1.18-21] as a prelude to what will follow later in the Dialogue.

[1.1] Chrysoloras continues with commenting on the virtue of silence, a subject which he revisits further down. Rest, silence and peace, he says, are preferrable to movement and quarrel (ἐρίν), for peace, even though it can be extremely harmful, is safer than war [1.1.22-27]58. Nevertheless Kydones’ writings in defence of Thomas Aquinas, Chrysoloras remarks, do not allow him to remain silent, for, from what he had read, he has come to the conclusion that these are all incorrect. Criticizing Kydones’ motives Chrysoloras states that his own desire to change Kydones’ mind is greater than Kydones’ desire to defend foreign (i.e. Latin) doctrines and launch accusations against his compatriots. All that Kydones said from the very beginning, Chrysoloras continues, were unfriendly (ἄφιλα) against our race (γένει) and country (πατρίδι), inimical towards friends, fathers and everyone akin by blood, and moreover hostile to ‘the blessed Neilos of Thessalonike and the Church of Christ’. Ultimately Kydones is not really interested in finding the truth, Chrysoloras concludes, but only in showing off his intellectual ability (πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν μᾶλλον, ἢ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν) [1.1.27-39].

In his attempt to defend his country and faith Chrysoloras refers to the classical and Christian tradition of his people. It is the law of God and the people, he remarks, both of Greeks and barbarians, to fight for one’s country and faith to death (μέχρις αἰματος)

(Hebrews 12:4)\textsuperscript{59}. He who defends our faith and race, our fatherland, our friends and relatives, he continues, deserves a crown in recognition of his actions, especially when he chooses to kill (φονεύειν) or die (θανείν) for their sake, no matter whom he has to oppose, even his nearest and dearest (φιλιτάτοις). At this point he uses the example of Horatius who killed his sister Horatia in Rome because she wept for her country's enemies, as Livy relates\textsuperscript{60}. This shows another, opposing, aspect of Chrysoloras' character, which links with the section that follows presenting pairs of opposites.

Freedom is good, he says (quoting Philo of Alexandria), while slavery is shameful; and good things befit excellent men while what is shameful befits base people [1.1.]\textsuperscript{59,55}. It is everyone's duty (χαρέος) to support his race and country. For those who do not want to do so the law stipulates the death penalty (νόμος θανατον ἀπειλῶν)\textsuperscript{61}. This punishment applies also to the family of the guilty person, who remains dishonoured even after his death. Implying Kydones, Chrysoloras wonders how many punishments would one who has gathered together all these disgraced actions deserve. The death of such a man would not be unjust, Chrysoloras concludes [1.1.]\textsuperscript{56-71}. And there is more!

\textsuperscript{59} We cannot be certain to which laws or customs of Greeks and barbarians Chrysoloras might refer to in this case. It is possible that he refers to the laws attributed by Stobaeus to Charondas, the legislator from Catana (today Catania, Sicily). See Stobaeus, Anthology, eds. O. Hense and C. Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei anthologiae, vol. 4 (Berlin, 1909), ch. 2, § 24, pp. 152.24-153.7: 'Let the contempt of Gods and the voluntary ill-usage of parents be the greatest wrong done... Let the one who dies for the fatherland be more revered than the one who longs for living, he abandons her [i.e., his country] and the good. Stobaeus, Anthology, vol. 3 (Berlin, 1894), ch. 1, §173, p. 128.3 cites Periander: Θυγατέρες υπέρ πατρίδος. Lycurgus and Stobaeus also cite the oath ephebes use to take in preparation of their assuming the Athenian citizenship: Lycurgus, Oratio against Leocrates, ed. N.C. Conomis (post C. Scheibe and F. Blass), Lyurgi oratio in Locratem (Leipzig, 1970), § 77, p. 60, and Stobaeus, Anthology, vol. 4, ch. 1, § 48, p. 14.7-17: ἀμνιν δὲ καὶ υπέρ ἑαυτῶν καὶ οὐκ ἔλλυ ραδικώς τήν πάτριδα, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀκείω κατὰ τα ἐμαυτῶν καὶ μετὰ ἀπαντῶν· καὶ εὐμακηνοῦ τῶν ὅτι καρθοντῶν ἐμφρόνως καὶ τῶν ἔθεσιν τῶν ἤδισμον καὶ οὕς ἀν τὸ λοιπόν ἐνδούσονται ἐμφρόνως· ἔναν δὲ τις αναιρεῖ, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψῃ κατὰ τα ἐμαυτῶν καὶ μετὰ πάντων, καὶ τμῆσιν ἱερὰ τὰ πάντα; trans. by P. Siewert, 'The Ephebic Oath in Fifth-Century Athens', JHS 97 (1977), 102-111 at p. 103: I will defend our sacred and public institutions and I will not hand over (to the descendants) the fatherland smaller, but greater and better, so far as I am able, by myself or with the help of all. If anyone seeks to destroy them, I will not admit it so far as I am able, by myself or with the help of all. I will honour the traditional sacred institutions.


What follows is a long monologue (once more heavily quoting Philo of Alexandria), in which Chrysoloras criticizes Kydones’ intensive pro-Latin activities in Constantinople also alluding to the latter’s *Apologia*. Turning his attention to the present situation Chrysoloras wonders what kind of punishments should be imposed on him (i.e., Kydones), who ‘uses every possible way, in secrecy or openly, to destroy our race’ while he seeks the victory of foreigners over his fellow people, upsetting (ἀνάστατον) the city with his actions. It is absurd, Chrysoloras exclaims, that this man, despite his attitude, prefers to live with his compatriots rather than with those whom he supports (i.e., the Latins). His personal and common opinion, Chrysoloras repeats, is that for this reason it would not be regarded injustice if it was possible for this man to die a thousand times (μυριάκις ἀποθανεῖν) [1.2.72-80]. Juxtaposing Kydones’ stance with that of those who pursue quietude (ἡρεμίαν μεταδιώκοντες) either for God’s worship or for securing what is necessary for their very life (φύσεως ... ἐπιτηδειότητα), Chrysoloras unhesitatingly condemns Kydones, this ‘remarkable man’ (ὁ θαυμάσιος) who causes an earthquake all over the world and violently shakes the souls of everyone, which in some way or other have fastened upon him, gratifying them with immortal death — yet only the senseless souls, since for the pure and sensible souls the infinite circle of saints and martyrs is enough for salvation and knowledge [1.2.80-92].

Kydones’ leading role among the Latinophile Byzantines of his generation and his personal conversion to Roman Catholicism (probably in 1357)⁶², are strongly criticized by Chrysoloras: ‘parents and motherland brought up a snake rather than a child, and an enemy rather than a friend’, worse than dogs, ‘for even dogs defend their master’s house in the face of danger!’⁶³. These harsh words and criticisms reflect the deep resentment of the anti-Latin and anti-unionist circles in reaction to the proselytizing activity of the Latinophiles in Constantinople, which had gained new momentum from the end of the fourteenth century. In his *Apologia* Kydones mentions these activities as

---

⁶² For the year 1357 as an approximate date of Kydones’ conversion to Catholicism, see Loenertz, ‘Démetrius Cydonès II’, 10 with note 3; F. Kianka, ‘Byzantine-Papal Diplomacy: The Role of Demetrius Cydones’, *The International History Review* 7.2 (1985), 175-213 at p. 178-181 (with primary sources); Russell, ‘Palanism and the Circle of Cydones’, p. 156.

⁶³ *Dialogue* [1.2.92-94]: Ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐσκεν ἐλάθε πατέρας καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, τρέφοντας ὃν ἀντὶ παιδός, καὶ ἀντὶ φίλου, πολέμιον; [1.2.98-100]: κύνες γάρ, οίκου τῶν δεισιδαιμόνων προσπήρων, ὅταν αὐτοῖς κίνδυνος τις ἐξαπειθεῖτο παρῆ.
well as his own discussions with members of the Orthodox party concerning his translations of Latin texts which, in his view, they failed to appreciate\textsuperscript{64}. Around the same period (ca. 1396) Manuel II wrote his lengthy Epistolary Discourse on the study of theology addressed supposedly to his oikeios Alexios lagoup\textsuperscript{65} but in reality to Kydones’ student Manuel Kalecas, in which he defended the Orthodox reaction to the propaganda and proselytizing activities of Latinophile circles in Constantinople\textsuperscript{66}. In his Epistolary discourse the Emperor stated that to clear their name those accused of suspected disloyalty to the Orthodox Church should simply make a profession of faith before the standing Synod\textsuperscript{67}. There are a number of such cases recorded in the Patriarchal registers in this period\textsuperscript{68}.

Chrysoloras’ verbal assault on Kydones goes even further. Paraphrasing the words Jesus said of Judas Iscariot during the Last Supper he remarks that \textit{it would be better for him if he had not been born}, or die immediately after his birth, and if he survived either to be barren (\textit{άκαρπω}) or never give birth to children (\textit{μὴ … εὐπορήσαι καρπῶν}) [1.2.102-104]\textsuperscript{69}. A person who betrays his country, family and friends, Chrysoloras says, cannot replace these, for the simple reason that as a result of this he is accepted by no one [1.2.104-108]. Through a series of rhetorical questions which present pairs of opposites in relation to Byzantines and Latins (insult-praise, hostile-ally, hatred-friendship, loss-saving), and further insulting Kydones, Chrysoloras concludes that one who does not worship God, would neither respect his own parents and motherland. The duty of every Christian, he stresses once more, is to honour God in every possible way: in his mind, words and deeds [1.2.104-119]. Partially quoting his favourite source, Philo of


\textsuperscript{66} See Manuel II, \textit{Letter to Alexios lagoup}, p. 349.11.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p. 352.7-9.

\textsuperscript{68} See \textit{Regestes} I/6, no. 3021, pp. 284-285; no. 3022, p. 285; no. 3056, p. 318; no. 3083, pp. 341-42.

\textsuperscript{69} The same citation was the subject of a debate between Chrysoloras and Antonio d’Ascoli: see above, pp. 23-24 with note 33.
Alexandria, Chrysoloras closes his monologue giving as an example the Greek city-states (πόλεις) of Sparta and Athens and ‘barbarian’ peoples, who had their own customs and no citizen of one city or country would honour the other’s customs unless he were a citizen of a city subjected to monarchy\textsuperscript{70}. Kydones is accused of doing the opposite, for he honours the customs of others and shows disrespect to those of his own fatherland! [1.2.\textsuperscript{120-124}].

At this point enters Kydones. He categorically denies that he is hostile toward his most beloved people and way of life (Ἐχθρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐγὼγε, ἄ πρὸ πάντων φιλῶ, καὶ ἃν ἐφίεμαι καὶ οἶς χαίρω; Μὴ γένοιτο! [1.2.\textsuperscript{125-126}]), and declares his position: his country is Old Rome, her Bishop is his teacher (διδάσκαλος) and his family and friends are those who live there for the sake of whom he is prepared to die fighting for each one of them [1.2.\textsuperscript{125-130}]. The specific passage is not found in Kydones’ Antirrhetic. However, the words Chrysoloras puts in Kydones’ mouth in the specific part of the Dialogue echo the latter’s conviction of the superiority of Old Rome over the decaying New Rome and his acceptance of papal authority over the Church as expressed in his Apologia\textsuperscript{71}. Chrysoloras responds by accusing Kydones of lying and goes on to prove it. Your country is the city of Thessalonike, Chrysoloras says, or rather the glorious city of the noble Emperor Constantine. The first city simply begot you while the second honours and breeds and rewards you with wisdom and civic offices, and embellishes you with many other privileges, from which you wish to remove yourself without showing the least consideration [1.2.\textsuperscript{135-140}].

Chrysoloras continues explaining the reason for Kydones’ behaviour, despite the fact that the latter wants to remain silent. Having used evil reasoning and a demon (Κακῷ χρησάμενος λογισμῷ τε καὶ δαίμονι), Chrysoloras says, your faith was unstable from the very beginning. At first, you tried to discuss privately and briefly (ἰδίᾳ καὶ βραχύ) about the Orthodox faith to exercise your opinion (γυμνάζειν τὸ δοκοῦν ἑαυτόν). Later on, however, he continues, you decided to refute it in public and without


restraint, arguing that the faith of the others (i.e., Latins) is sound (ὑγιαίνουσαν) while ours is unsound (νόσῳ περικειμένην). This, Chrysoloras remarks, becomes the cause of all your evils! [1.2.141-146].

Closing his argument Chrysoloras asks Kydones where the foundation of the Church is placed, implying the passage in Matthew (16:16-18) where Peter confesses that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God and in reply Jesus pronounces that you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not overcome it (Matthew 16:18-19). This passage was the fundamental argument the Latins used to support the ecclesiastical primacy of the Bishop of Rome [1.2.146-147]72. Once Kydones replies that the foundation of the Church is close to the Italians (εἶναι πρὸς Ἰταλούς), implying Rome, Chrysoloras directly asks Kydones why does he simply not go and live with the Latins, whom he believes hold the right belief. Kydones responds that he prefers to stay in his homeland for he loves both his country and friends [1.2.148-152], echoing once more his remarks in the first Apologia73.

Chrysoloras objects that this is a contradiction to what he had said a few lines above [cf. 1.2.126-129], namely that he considers Rome as his country and the Latins as his friends. Kydones replies that his love of Greek education (παιδεία τῶν Ἑλλήνων) would not permit him to stay away from his country [1.2.153]. Chrysoloras points out to Kydones that he should not turn away from the Latins if he is convinced that their doctrine is correct. Chrysoloras wonders how it is possible for Kydones to attack his fellow countrymen (i.e., the Byzantines) if indeed he wishes to be with them and to hold firm in the Orthodox faith. Why does he not leave if he thinks that his compatriots are not Orthodox? In any case, Chrysoloras remarks, Kydones has sinned. For leaving the fellowship of his compatriots is the same as being in communion with the heretics [1.2.155-163]. Expressing his intention to avoid a lengthy speech, Chrysoloras stops at this point to turn attention to what Kydones states in his Antirrhetic.

72 See above, pp. 18-19 with note 8.
73 Demetrios Kydones, Apologia I, p. 400.2-7; my trans. based on Kianka, ‘The Apology of Demetrius Cydones’, 70-71: I think that my fatherland is the worthiest and most sacred thing after God and I hold it as the most honoured thing from what in any way whatever belongs to me, from all that I have even from myself, after the first principle, as I said, principle and home. And I would stay with pleasure in it bearing with patience many difficulties rather than allowing myself to live with foreign people, enjoying the greatest pleasures.
This part of the Dialogue begins with Kydones criticizing Neilos for his zeal against the Latins, comparing his passion with the destructive motion of the most violent torrent sweeping everything away with a whistling noise (ῥοίζῳ). Kydones believes that Neilos’ work is simply an abuse, slander and insolence against the Latins, offering nothing important [1.3.167-171]. Chrysoloras points out that instead of trying to conceal his wicked actions, as he ought to, Kydones opted to bring his work and deeds into the open. Referring to Kydones’ Antirrhetic he criticizes its quality. Your entire introduction (προοίμιον) is simply irony, Chrysoloras says, the narrative (διήγησις) is just arrogance, the proof (ἀγώνας) is full of pretension and the end (τέλος) can be apprehended by anyone who wishes. On the basis of Kydones’ criticism that though Neilos desires to speak against the Latins he is incapable of doing so (a view shared by Kydones), Chrysoloras gives Kydones a moral lesson of how a fair contest should be conducted between two opponents. According to custom, Chrysoloras says, each competitor praises his opponent on two counts: to be admired if he is victorious or not to be dishonoured if he is defeated. By censuring one’s fellow combatant, as Kydones does to Neilos according to Chrysoloras, one makes the defeated a wretched man and even more wretched if he is victorious. In this way (paraphrasing Basil of Caesarea, without however naming his source), Chrysoloras points out to Kydones, he who wins in worthless contests is more wretched than the one who loses. Continuing on this subject, Chrysoloras (partially quoting again Philo of Alexandria) states that it would be thoughtful of Kydones to test his own powers before entering a fight in order to assess whether he is able to prevail against the enemy or, in case he finds his power unequal to the contest, never dare to descend into the arena at all, for it would be not disgraceful for vice to be defeated, but it would be a shameful thing for virtue.

Chrysoloras then asks Kydones to tell him the purpose of such effort put on his part for something that is completely worthless [1.3.172-193]. In response Kydones goes back to

---

74 For the four parts of a rhetorical speech and their subcategories, see John Doxapatres, Prolegomena in Aphthonii progmmsnata, ed. H. Rabe, Prolegomenon sylloge, in Rhetores Graeci 14 (Leipzig, 1931), pp. 131.11-133.5; Anonymi in Hermogenem, Prolegomena in librum περὶ στάσεων, ed. Rabe, Prolegomenon sylloge, pp. 212.6-8, 214.3-12; cf. Joseph Rhacendytes, Summation of Rhetoric, ed. C. Walz, Rhetores Graeci, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 1834), p. 482.18-19.


the past, when Neilos started speaking openly against the Latins. As recorded by Kydones in his *Apologia I*, at first Neilos was an enthusiastic admirer of Kydones, Thomas Aquinas and his works. But suddenly he changed his stance and begun opposing Kydones\(^\text{27}\). Despite Kabasilas’ anti-Latin works Kydones preferred in the beginning to remain silent leaving the refutation of these works to the Latins. However, when Neilos attacked Aquinas’ ‘wisdom, precision of thought and holiness’, Kydones considered appropriate to refute Kabasilas and not allow him to behave as if this great man was dishonoured or even a schoolboy\(^\text{28}\). Kydones states that Kabasilas thought highly of himself and resembles him with a champion who prefer to fight with the most excellent opponents in this way proving his own excellence [1.3.194-206].

Chrysoloras accuses Kydones of lying [1.3.207-208], in saying that he kept himself silent when Neilos was speaking in public against the Latins because he wanted to defend a single person (ἐνός) (Aquinas) and that he would not have taken the part of Aquinas, unless he cared to defend all (παντὸς) among the Latins. To substantiate this Chrysoloras forms a syllogism concerning the one (ἐν) and the whole (πᾶν), with reference to Aquinas and the Latins respectively: one ought to do the same for the whole’s sake as he has done for the one’s sake. For when the whole (πᾶν) is taken for nothing (οὐδέν) then at any rate the one (ἐν) would be reckoned as nothing (οὐδέν).

This analogy, which refers to the validity of Latin theology *vis-à-vis* Aquinas’ theology, is reminiscent of Aristotle’s analogy with reference to the human body and its individual component parts\(^\text{29}\). Chrysoloras wonders how Kydones could possibly remain silent when Neilos attacked (ἀπτομένου) all Latins expressing in every opportunity his excessive eagerness to discuss with everybody, even if some did not wish to. The reason behind Kydones’ attitude, Chrysoloras concludes, was simply his passion against his compatriots, the same passion which became the cause of Kydones assaulting Neilos and of supporting Aquinas [1.3.207-230].

---


Expressing his admiration for Kabasilas, whom he calls friend and teacher, Kydones acknowledges the important role he played in his life, especially when he was taught by him as a young student in Thessalonike. Responding to those who might criticize him for ingratitude, Kydones says that his purpose was neither to criticize Neilos nor to oppose his wisdom, excellence and all other virtues. This is far from truth, Chrysoloras replies, for in Kydones’ Antirrhetic Neilos’ praise was soon replaced by accusation, eulogy by blame and excellence by utter evil. It is not appropriate for a wise man like Kydones, Chrysoloras remarks, to mix up everything and confuse the truth with lies and the spoken with the unspoken, and much more so since Neilos did the opposite things of what he is accused.

To Kydones’ reply that he is unaware where he criticizes Neilos, Chrysoloras tells him, not without irony, that he does not know what his own work contains and he goes on quoting some phrases from the Antirrhetic to prove his point. According to Chrysoloras, Kydones criticized Kabasilas of playing (προσπαίζεις) and of considering a particular opinion very obscure and childish, that he writes a long nonsense (μακρὰν … φλυαρίαν) and that he is defrauding, crafting and cheating against the obvious truths. Finally Chrysoloras remarks that Kydones said that Kabasilas’ treatise would be conceded ‘even by Scythians and by anyone else even more ignorant than them’. It is absurd, therefore, Chrysoloras says, and inappropriate for a wise man to turn the flows topsy-turvy like Euripus and mix the opposites, both praises and censures, for it is impossible for both to be true.

According to Kydones, the reason for his Antirrhetic was not to attack Neilos’ personality but to speak freely to a friend about a friend. Expressing his profound admiration for Aquinas’ theology and philosophy, Kydones declares that Neilos is his friend just as Thomas is, and that both are wise. However, Aquinas surpasses Neilos, for his superiority is so much greater that it is impossible to compare the two. Starting from Kydones’ statement that Aquinas and Kabasilas are both friends of

---

his, Chrysoloras points out that what Kydones has said is weak. He attempts to prove this by making use of the Euclidean principle (omitting some words and his source), that things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to each other (Τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν ἴσα)\(^{83}\) and in turn what is equal to some things makes these things equal. Moreover, if one thing is equal to another, the latter is equal to another or the reverse, and thus the two ends (τὰ ἀκρα) will be equal. In response to Kydones’ confirmation of this demonstration, Chrysoloras goes on to expound his argument on the friendships between Aquinas-Kydones and Kabasilas-Kydones, establishing his argument on the basis of the Aristotelian category of relatives (τὰ πρός τι). According to Aristotle, we call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else\(^{84}\). On these grounds Chrysoloras puts forward the following argument: If Thomas and Neilos are friends to you, as you admit, then you are friend of theirs; for friend is a relative term. Yet, if Thomas is your friend and you are friend to Neilos, and Neilos is a friend of yours and you are friend to Thomas, it is necessary for Thomas and Neilos to be friends. Thus, we accept that the two extreme ends are equal! [1.3.\(^{280-285}\)]\(^{85}\) However, Chrysoloras points out, things appear to be the opposite. For Neilos is an enemy of Thomas with reference to their writings and thoughts and in addition there is a gap that separates them (i.e., their faith). Chrysoloras sees no hope for reconciliation between the two sides. As he says, a middle point would never be found through which the two will share likeness with one another [1.3.\(^{285-290}\)]. My support to Aquinas, Kydones states in humility, resembles that which an ant offers to a lion [1.3.\(^{291}\)]. At this point Chrysoloras refers to the Latin claim of papal primacy\(^{86}\). Actually behind these humble words, he says, there


is much arrogance, which reminds the arrogance of the bishop of Rome who calls himself bishop of no city at all (μηδεμιᾶς) in order to be considered bishop of all cities and not of just one [1.3.293-302].

To castigate Kydones for his mixed allegiance to his former teachers (Kabasilas and Aquinas), Chrysoloras uses an example from Physiologus borrowing from the previous ant and lion simile [cf. 1.3.294]. Your actions, Chrysoloras says to Kydones, resemble those of the ant-lion (μυρμηκολέοντι), one of the whelps of a pregnant lioness, a mixed creature with the head, chest and front feet of a lion and the rest of an ant, which is unable to feed itself properly because of its dual nature (the lion is carnivorous while the ant is not) and, as a result, it dies soon after its birth. You compare yourself with an ant, Chrysoloras says to Kydones, and the Latins with lions [cf. 1.3.294], offering them the privilege of casting the final vote, since lions are superior to ants. But since you cannot feed yourself from either food (being an ant-lion) you easily do what you naturally do and die. For you have become a fearsome judge (δικαστής ... δεινότατος) to those whom you called teachers (διδασκάλους) (i.e., Aquinas and Kabasilas) and you offer the casting vote to whomever you wish, skipping some arguments while defending others. Such things are proper for a teacher rather than a student, as in your case. For this reason, Chrysoloras concludes, you oppose not only the others but also yourself and truth [1.3.298-321].

[1.4] The use of syllogisms in our attempt to attain knowledge of God

The next section of the Dialogue examines the employment of syllogisms and the use of philosophical reasoning in things divine, with Kydones putting forward the Latin, scholastic and Byzantine Latinophile view that the syllogistic method is the way to seek and find God87. Kydones starts by stating that the human soul has been placed by

---

87 On views held on this issue by Latinophiles and Orthodox in Byzantium, see Neilos Kabasilas, DPSS III, ed. Candal, Nilus Cabasilas, pp. 188-244; Demetrios Kydones, Antirrhetic, Vat. gr. 614, ff. 110v-116v; Manuel II, DPSS, pp. 4-24. Kabasilas, Kydones and Manuel II examine the issue of the use of philosophical reasoning and syllogisms in theology in the first part of their treatises, which Chrysoloras imitates in the Preface of his Dialogue. For the relation between Greek philosophy and Christian theology in Byzantium see in general B.N. Tatakis, La philosophie byzantine (Paris, 1959), Greek trans. E.K. Kalpourtze, Η Βυζαντινή Φιλοσοφία (Athens, 1977); H. Hunger, Βυζαντινή λογοτεχνία, vol. 1, Η λόγια κοιμική γραμματεία των Βυζαντινών, Greek trans. L.G. Benakis et al. (Athens, 20013), pp. 41-122; K. Ierodiakonou,
its Creator between the intelligent (νοερᾶς) and sensitive (αἰσθητικῆς) nature; hence the knowledge of the human soul exists between the knowledge of the two natures, intelligent and sensitive. The first nature (i.e., the intelligent) has the species (εἴδη) of the intelligible beings that are close to its essence (οὐσία) and for this reason it does not suffer any change, while the latter nature (i.e., sensitive) applies directly through itself to the species of the sensible beings (αἰσθητῶν) and knows through itself each one of the sensibles, receiving a particular (μερικὴν) knowledge of them. The human soul is related to the intelligent nature and therefore it is always able to think, teach and learn by means of pre-existing knowledge [1.4.322-334]. Having said that, Kydones goes further to explain what thinking (διανοεῖσθαι) and using syllogisms (συλλογίζεσθαι), in other words reasoning, is. Using syllogisms is what distinguishes and makes human beings superior to irrational beings. Therefore, it cannot be separated from human nature, for in such case the logical nature is removed and human beings fall into the state of the irrational. Inferring syllogistically and thinking, Kydones continues, is the best gift God gave to human beings and it is a characteristic of our nature, which must be used by all men towards others and especially in order to seek and find God. For this reason, by removing the dialectical syllogism from the discussion on things divine human mind is driven away, too, for it seeks things divine. In addition, in this way communication among human beings is interrupted and thus it would be impossible to seek God. Kydones closes his argument summarising what he said, emphasizing that the use of the syllogistic method is characteristic of the logical soul (τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς) and its purpose is to find truth and knowledge [1.4.335-368].

Chrysoloras’ counter-argument begins with a partial acceptance of Kydones’ saying that reasoning is a gift from God. However, Chrysoloras distinguishes reasoning into

---

90 On the dialectical syllogism, see Aristotle, Topics 100a.27-100b.25; cf. Ross, Aristotle, pp. 54-57.
91 On Kabasilas’ views with reference to the use of dialectical syllogism in theological questions see his DPSS III, pp. 206-210, 214 and 226. Chrysoloras follows the same line.
two kinds: first, the common syllogism, namely ratiocinari sine scientia (τὸ χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης συλλογίζεσθαι) and secondly, ratiocinari cum scientia (τὸ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης συλλογίζεσθαι)\(^93\). As he says, the first (i.e., ratiocinari sine scientia) constitutes the very nature of man and when present it makes the human nature, while when being absent it cancels it. This is a characteristic property of man, both general and particular, which God gives this to men from the beginning [1.4.378-382]. The latter reasoning (i.e., ratiocinari cum scientia), on the other hand, cannot be shared with the first and is a privilege only for a few people who possess it by studying it (σπουδάζουσι) (apparently as a science). Both kinds of reasoning can only confirm that God exists and nothing more beyond this. Chrysoloras’ view is that ratiocinari cum scientia cannot be the proper way for people to pursue theology and find God for, if this were the case, then God would be considered as cause of evils. If knowledge, which is total good, cannot be shared equally to all, then God, Who grants knowledge, is not good. This is absurd since God is totally righteous. By contrast, ratiocinari sine scientia is the best gift given by God and shared by all. Chrysoloras continues his argument attributing ratiocinari cum scientia an element of good and evil. Although he acknowledges that indeed this kind of reasoning is a gift from God, too, it is not the perfect one, not because of God but because of human beings, when we treat it in a malicious way resulting in great harm [1.4.382-403].

Chrysoloras proceeds to the second part of his argument against syllogisms in speculating on things divine. The question is whether the wisdom of this world could be the way to know God. His argument is based on the analogy wise not wise people (σοφοὶ ... μὴ σοφοί). To prove that believers in God are those who are rather those who are not wise while wise people are not more faithful, Chrysoloras makes a long excursion to the past, often quoting from Philo of Alexandria (once more without mentioning him). He begins from the times before the incarnation of Christ up to the times of the apologists and heresies. In the case of the gentiles, wise people were giving worship to idols and statues made of wood and stone, even animals, removing from sight the most supreme and ancient Begetter (ἀνωτάτω, καὶ πρεσβύτατον γένετην),

\(^93\) On the translation of ratiocinari sine scientia (τὸ χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης συλλογίζεσθαι) and ratiocinari cum scientia (τὸ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης συλλογίζεσθαι), see Demetracopoulos, ‘Thomas Aquinas Impact’, pp. 401-403.
the Commander of the megalopolis (ἄρχοντα τῆς μεγάλης πόλεως)\textsuperscript{94}, the General (στρατάρχην) of the invincible army, the Governor (κυβερνήτην), the true living God (ὤντως ὄντα Θεόν). They did so either because of their ignorance or not being eager to learn. After the incarnation of Christ wise people, this time Christians, fell into heresies concerning the nature of Christ and the Trinity\textsuperscript{95}. For Chrysoloras there is only one possible conclusion: there is no benefit from the wisdom of this world\textsuperscript{96} and wise people cannot attain the knowledge of God [1.4.\textsuperscript{416-479}]. On the contrary, countless people who do not use the knowledge of this world (i.e., philosophy) are faithful to God and they speak with Him as to a genuine friend, for example the Prophets, the Apostles and many others who believe in the living God\textsuperscript{97}. As a model, Chrysoloras uses the people of Asine\textsuperscript{98}, in the peninsula of the Peloponnese, and the Essenes\textsuperscript{99} in Judaea, focusing mainly on the latter and their communal way of life. The Essenes, he says (quoting from Philo) left the logical and natural parts of philosophy to those who love to converse and devoted all their attention to the moral part of philosophy [1.4.\textsuperscript{492-494}]\textsuperscript{100}. Without using Greek literature (λόγων ἑλληνικῶν) and syllogisms (συλλογισμῶν) they prevailed over those who philosophise (φιλοσοφοῦντας) in order to receive the knowledge of God in a more familiar way (οἰκειοτέρας) than the others [1.4.\textsuperscript{499-502}]. At this point Chrysoloras refers to ‘our Greek nation’ (Ἐλληνες το ἡμέτερον) making use of the ethnic and not religious connotation of the term [1.4.\textsuperscript{417-419}]. It has been suggested that the meaning of the term in its ethnic connotation first appears in intellectual circles

\textsuperscript{94} The source of this passage is Philo of Alexandria, De decalogo (for μεγαλόπολεως Chrysoloras uses μεγάλης πόλεως). For the use of the word μεγαλόπολις as the cosmos in Philo of Alexandria, see D.T. Runia, ‘Verba Philonica, Λαγαλματοφορεῖν, and the authenticity of the De Resurrectione attributed to Athenagoras’, in idem, Philo and the Church Fathers: A Collection of Papers (Leiden, New York and Cologne, 1995), pp. 102-116 at 105.

\textsuperscript{95} Dialogue [1.4.\textsuperscript{465-466}].

\textsuperscript{96} 1 Corinthians 3:19.

\textsuperscript{97} The idea of God being friend to those who believe in Him and follow His commands can be found in the Old and the New Testament. In Exodus 33:11 Moses spoke with God as friend-to-friend and in John 15:12-15 Jesus calls His disciples ‘friends’.


\textsuperscript{100} For the three parts of Philosophy (natural, moral and logical), see Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, I, § 57.14-15, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1896; repr. 1962), p. 75.
in mid-fourteenth-century Thessalonike\textsuperscript{101}, where Chrysoloras was born and brought up\textsuperscript{102}. Actually, the ethnic connotation of this term goes back to the thirteenth century, if not earlier\textsuperscript{103}.

Kydones agrees with Chrysoloras’ view that philosophy may lead to man’s detriment in terms of faith in God and asks him what is the instrument of knowledge God gives to all people irrespective of their intelligence and education. Chrysoloras replies that God has given human beings the \textit{rational soul} (ψυχὴ λογικὴ). Reason (λογιστικόν), he says, has the leading role in controlling the other two parts of the soul (i.e., spirit and appetite) and when this happens, man is blessed, for this can result in the knowledge of truth (ἀλήθεια), and anger (θυμὸ) is accompanied by courage (ἀνδρία) and appetite by prudence (σοφία), and these are mixed with justice (δικαιοσύνη). When the two irrational parts rule over reason the result is the \textit{σωφροσύνη}, man is blessed, for this is the condition of the soul (νοῦς), vol. 114. Republic\textsuperscript{113}.

See above, p. 22.


\textsuperscript{104} The idea there are three parts of the soul (reason, spirit and appetite) comes from Plato (\textit{Republic} 4, 426c-445a). This is a rather different psychology from that offered by Aristotle on the theory of \textit{prohairesis}. It seems that Chrysoloras is simply conflating the two. I would like to thank Professor Anne Sheppard for pointing out this to me.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Prohairesis} cannot exist without the \textit{nous}: see Gregory of Nyssa, \textit{Antirrhetic against Apollinaris}, ed. F. Mueller, \textit{Gregorii Nysseni opera}, vol. 3.1 (Leiden, 1958), p. 213.1


contrary is in accordance with Aristotle’s and the Church Fathers’ teachings [1.4.515-532].

[1.5] God’s infinity, energy/actuality-potentiality

In the final section of the Preface, Chrysoloras and Kydones debate on infinity (ἄπειρον), potentiality (δυνάμει) and energy/actuality (ἐνέργεια) of God. Kydones presents Aquinas’ teachings on God’s infinity and power, which he distinguishes between infinity by way of privation (κατὰ στέρησιν) and infinity by way of negation (κατὰ ἀπόφασιν), the latter being the one that befits God. This is so because infinity by way of negation is closest among all things to knowledge (μάλιστα πάντων πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην οἰκείως ἔχει), since infinity (i.e., God) is form par excellence (μάλιστα εἶδος) for it is not subject to anything and therefore it contracts what is in itself (συστέλλει τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ), and makes something to be and something not to be (καὶ ποιεῖ, τόδε μέν, εἶναι, τόδε δὲ, μὴ εἶναι). The statement about infinity by way of negation being closest to knowledge is unclear, unless it refers to the ascetic life. By contrast, Kydones says, infinity by way of privation cannot possibly be demonstrated. For, privation is the negation of form, which implies imperfection and this does not exist in God.

To illustrate the perfection of the divine nature Kydones gives the example of the whiteness of snow and of the swan, which is not purely white (οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἐστι λευκόν) but is limited to a subject [i.e., snow or swan] and becomes partial and finite in the nature of the snow. If there was whiteness, Kydones continues, which was not confined at all to a certain subject, then it would be infinite whitness above all kinds of whiteness. However, this does not apply to God for in Him there is no room for

---

108 Aristotle, Nicomachian Ethics 1111b.4-30, 1163a.21-23; Rhetoric 1367b.21-24.


110 For the teachings of Thomas Aquinas on infinity, potentiality and energy/actuality of God, see his SCG I, 43; De Potentia q. 1 a. 2 co; ST Ia q. 3, Ia q. 7 a. 1, cf. Ia q. 25 a. 2. See also Davies, Thomas Aquinas, pp. 80-82; R.A. te Velde, Aquinas on God: The 'Divine Science' of the Summa Theologiae (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 77-85; J.F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, 47 (Washington, D.C., 2007), pp. 131-134.

potentiality (δυνάμει) since He is only pure energy/actuality (ἐνέργεια ... καθαρά)\(^{112}\), which cannot possibly be perceived in any subject. Therefore, God is only form (εἴδος μόνον) and pure entelechy (ἐντελέχειαν ψυλήν) in which absolute infinity (ἡ ἄπλως ἀπειρία) is inherent (συνέζευσκται) \(^{1.5.533-554}\).

Chrysoloras’ counter-argument focuses on God’s infinity related to the incarnation of Christ, on the energy/actuality and potentiality, and entelechy of God. Although there are things and beings that one could call infinite, such as the circle, number and line, which are continuously and, therefore, endlessly divisible, the only truly infinite being is God for He is above all beings \(^{1.5.568-580}\). God is infinite for He has neither beginning nor end. Even in the Incarnation of the Logos the two natures of Christ became one hypostasis with the divine nature becoming finite in the human body but without being confused with the human nature \(^{1.5.581-617}\). As for what Kydones said about infinite whiteness, this can never be the case, Chrysoloras remarks. Nevertheless, if indeed this were possible, namely a whiteness not being confined into a subject, this still would not be called infinite, for infinite is without beginning and is endless, and the coming to be and passing away of such whiteness would take place within the limits of the created world \(^{1.5.619-630}\).

With reference to the potentiality and energy/actuality in God, Chrysoloras eventually agrees with Kydones since he denies God the imperfect lack of potency (ἀτελῆς ἀδυναμία) but not the power to accomplish extraordinary things such as the resurrection of the dead. Chrysoloras reprimands Kydones for calling God form (εἴδος) and pure entelechy (ψυλή ἐντελέχεια) \(^{1.5.651-655}\)\(^{113}\). Thus, God is called and us being and goodness, wisdom and justice, truth and life for these appear in the Scriptures and are stated by the theologians. To say that God is form and pure entelechy is absurd, Chrysoloras says, for this has not been said by the Fathers \(^{1.5.670-679}\). Chrysoloras clarifies his argument giving a definition of entelechy according to Aristotle, namely the fulfillment of what is potentially, as such, is motion\(^{114}\) and habitation in a state of

---

\(^{112}\) Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, 43, no. 361: relinquitur quod Deus, qui est actus purus; 43, no. 362: Deus autem est actus purus absque omni potentia.


completion (κατὰ τὸ ἐντελὲς ἐξις) [1.5.688]. Therefore, Chrysoloras continues, a human being is in a state of entelechy not when arranged in the womb (κατὰ τὸ μήτραν οἰκονομούμενον) but when completed and brought into the world (ὁ ἀπαρτισθείς, καὶ τεχθείς). Accordingly, the soul is an energy/actuality of a natural and instrumental body having life potentially (δυνάμει) not because the soul is energy/actuality but because the perfection of the body is related to it (i.e., the soul). And the perfect energy/actuality (τελεία ἐνέργεια) is called entelechy. Therefore, by a misuse of language the unqualified energy/actuality is called also entelechy in so far as each one expresses its energy/actuality according to its nature, whether perfect or imperfect. In this sense motion (κίνησις), too, is called entelechy [1.5.691-697]. If there are so many ways to signify what entelechy is, Chrysoloras concludes, it would be impossible to give a proper meaning of entelechy in God. Moreover, since potentiality (δυνάμει) does not befit God, as Kydones said, and potentiality is attached to entelechy, therefore entelechy and God are not identical [1.5.699-705]. The statement that potentiality is attached to entelechy seems initially very odd but Chrysoloras seems to connect motion and potentiality on the basis that motion can be called entelechy, as Aristotle does [cf. 1.5.688]. At this point Aquinas enters the Dialogue and urges Kydones and Chrysoloras to listen to his syllogisms.

[2] First Syllogism on the distinction in the divine Persons

Following his Preface, Chrysoloras proceeds to refute Kydones’ arguments against Neilos’ objections concerning the question of the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity, particularly the way these are distinguished, as expounded by Aquinas in SCG IV, 24, no. 3612 and refuted by Kabasilas in his DPSS III115. In terms of structure the First Syllogism refutes Kydones’ arguments as they appear in the Antirrhetic116. Following the introductory statements by Aquinas and Kabasilas [2.1-10], Kydones and Chrysoloras examine the distinction between a ram and a he-goat [2.1-3], the distinction among angels [2.4] and souls [2.5], concluding with a discussion on the relations among the divine Persons [2.6].

---

116 Cf. Demetrios Kydones, Antirrhetic, Vat. gr. 614, ff. 116r.28-118r.25.
The Syllogism begins with Aquinas’ statement that the Son and the Spirit are distinguished between themselves and that this distinction is not according to the matter but by way of opposition (ἐνὶ τρόπῳ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως διακρίνονται). For otherwise, using an example, to be white and to be triangular can be simultaneously in something identical [2.1-4]. For reasons of economy, one assumes, instead of citing Aquinas’ full quotation Chrysoloras cites only a short section of Neilos’ summary of, and conclusions on, Aquinas’ teachings. As a result, Chrysoloras does not provide a clear and succinct exposition of Aquinas’ views on the relative opposition concerning the distinction among the Persons in the Trinity, which refers to the Aristotelian category of relation (πρὸς τι)119, as cited by Neilos120. In the Dialogue Kabasilas puts forward the objection that Aquinas’ verdict cannot be applied to all things, for example to angels and souls or corporeal beings, such as the ram and the he-goat [2.5-10]. Chrysoloras takes Kabasilas’ argument and Kydones’ refutation as a point of departure.

[2.1-3] Distinction of corporeal beings

The debate proceeds with Kydones expressing the view that the distinction between the ram and the he-goat turns on the following differences: (a) the one is wild and the other tame [2.1], (b) the one has hard and the other soft hair [2.2], and (c) the former grows a beard while the latter is beardless [2.3]121. Though in the Antirrhetic Kydones puts forward his arguments in a single sentence122, Chrysoloras refutes each of these three points separately [2.1-3].

Based on the aforementioned example, Kydones defines how things can be distinguished. Things are called properly distinguished (κυρίως λεγόμενα διακρίνεσθαι), when they can be divided (διαιροῖτο) from something which is common and by necessity differ according to the species (εἴδος). Things which do not

---

117 Thomas Aquinas, SCG IV, 24, no. 3612, in Kydones’ translation as cited by Neilos Kabasilas, DPSS III, pp. 244.19-246.35.


119 Aristotle, Categories 6a.36-8b.24. For relative opposition concerning the distinction of the divine Persons in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, see Emery, The Trinitarian Theology, pp. 96-99.

120 Neilos Kabasilas, DPSS III, p. 246.13-14: Λείπεται τοίνυν ἀλλήλων τὰ θέμα πρόκειται διακρίνεσθαι τῇ τῶν πρὸς τι μόνον αντίθεσιν αὐτῷ γὰρ ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς διακρίνεται κατὰ τὴν αντίθεσιν τῆς πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα τοῦ ὑπὸ ἀναφορᾶς.

121 Cf. Dialogue [2.1.32-33], [2.2.108-109], [2.3.150-151].

122 Cf. Demetrios Kydones, Antirrhetic, Vat. gr. 614, f. 116v.4-6.
differ according to their species, Kydones continues, are distinguished according to their matter and subject (κατὰ τὴν ὑλὴν καὶ τὸ ύποκείμενον), while those distinguished from one another contain an opposition within them and by necessity the first is not like the other and by no means would they be predicated of each other. That one thing (τὸ τὸδε) by necessity is not the other thing (τὸ τὸδε), is made clear from the fact that a battle between the subject and predicate (κατηγορουμένου) would then take place. For if these did not fight each other, Kydones continues, by necessity they would not be distinguished and occasionally the subject and predicate might coincide. However, since this is impossible—for it is taken as granted that their distinction is necessary—it is clear that things distinguished by necessity have an opposition in them which prevents reciprocal coincidence (κωλύεται συνδραμεῖν ἀλλήλοις) [2.16-29].

Chrysoloras ironically addresses Kydones as a ‘remarkable philosopher’ (θαυμάσιε φιλοσόφων), who speculates on things not even an idiot (ἰδιώτη) believes in, and either unwillingly or, even worse, willingly expresses such inappropriate views that need to be substantiated by truths universal and necessary in themselves (καθόλου πάντως καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ καθ’ αὐτὰ) and not by sophistries (σοφίσμασι). This address sets the tone of the section that follows. In a vivid stichomythia [2.1.49-107] Chrysoloras forces Kydones to contradict himself [2.1.62-66]. Species of the same genus, he says, in this case ram and he-goat (both are animals) can be compared. Two opposite things, however, such as black and white, cannot be compared. It follows that if we were to compare the ram and the he-goat we could call them tame and tamer respectively. In addition, wild and tame beings can be distinguished but cannot be compared, unlike two tame things [2.1.50-60]. Basing his arguments on Porphyry (Isagoge, chapter IV, On difference), Chrysoloras proceeds further to establish the difference between wildness and tameness. The ram differs from the he-goat, he states, on the grounds of an inseparable accidental attribute (ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκὸς)123. Hence these two beings differ properly (ἰδιώς) but not most properly (ἰδιαίτατα), as for example a man differs from a horse [2.1.66-78]124. Moreover, the ram and the he-goat are not associated in terms of


124 On the terms ἱδιώς and ἱδιαίτατα in Porphyry see his Isagoge, p. 8.12-21.
essence. However, we can attribute to them a variation more or less (τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἕττον) based on their accidental differences (e.g., one animal may have a longer tail than the other), which make these animals otherlike (ἀλλοίοιον) and not other (ἀλλο), the latter being a characteristic of per se differences [2.1,80-94]125. The same line of refutation is applied by Chrysoloras to the other two points [2.2-3], namely the distinction between the ram and the he-goat according to (b) the hardness and softness of their hair, and (c) the existence or lack of a beard. Tacitly using Porphyry once more, Chrysoloras argues that it is impossible to distinguish the hair of these animals, for this is not soft in the one case and hard in the other, but in both cases is soft [2.2,108-149]. Hence these animals cannot be distinguished on the grounds of their growing a beard or not [2.3,150-73].

[2.4,206-468] Distinction of incorporeal beings — angels

Having refuted Kydones’ arguments on the distinction of material beings, Chrysoloras now proceeds to examine and refute Kydones’ views on the distinction of incorporeal and immaterial beings, first angels and then souls. He begins by refuting Kydones’ view (cf. Aquinas, ST Ia, q. 50, a. 1-4) that since angels are immaterial and incorporeal beings by necessity they are solely species subsisting in themselves and therefore they are distinguished solely on the basis of their species, hence their number is equal to their species [2.4,206-210]126. Chrysoloras puts forward the following counter-arguments: though by necessity angels, who by virtue of being immaterial and incorporeal transcend matter, have species, nevertheless it is unknown whether they are distinguished on the basis of species. Moreover, those who differ according to their species, as Aquinas taught (SCG IV, 24, no. 3612) have an opposition (ἐναντιότητα) within themselves [2.4,211-216]127. Kydones asks whether on the basis of this argument there is no difference perceived either in terms of matter or species. To this Chrysoloras responds that unless a distinction is

126 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia, q. 50, a. 4. On the teachings of Thomas Aquinas on angels, see Gilson, Thomism, pp. 189-203.
perceived in terms of their species they are not distinguished by any opposition [2.4.217-221].

Kydones states that angels are associated according to their genus, which is the reason why they are called angels, and since all numbers are associated (κοινωνούντων), the distinction among numbers is based on their species. Chrysoloras replies that numbers are associated in terms of sharing the same genus, because they have the unit as their genus, which unit generates the other numbers and when it is subtracted it also subtracts all numbers, but this hardly applies to angels, for they do not share the same genus through which they could easily unite or be distinguished, and moreover, numbers do differ according to species since they have the unit as their genus. Tacitly using John Damascene’s exposition on genus and species, Chrysoloras continues arguing that such a view expressed by Kydones (and Aquinas) is unfamiliar (γνώριμον οὐδενί) with reference to angels, for they do not have another angel as their genus except their common essence, one might say. If this were the case their genus might have been other than angel, in the same way that the unit is not a number. Similarly, it is not true, Chrysoloras continues, that, on account of all angels being called angels, they are associated according to their genus. Indeed all human beings are called human beings having their essence as their genus, through which they are distinguished. However, angels, though they are distinguished through their being rational and immortal, do not accept any middle genera (μέσα γένη) and so-called species of the essence, including rationality [2.4.222-239].

Kydones remarks that by the term nature (φύσις) we mean genus, for (according to Basil of Caesarea whom he does not name), just as angels have one name they have one nature. By applying this to animals, he continues, it is possible to say that they share the same nature, that is genus, and differ especially (μάλιστα) according to species [2.4.240-244]. This, Chrysoloras objects, cannot be said with reference to angels, for actually the statement cited shows the contrary, namely that all angels are of the same species, as

---


Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite and Cyril of Alexandria confirm through their views on the *sameness of species* (ὁμοειδία) with reference to angels [2.4.248-253]\(^{131}\). To say that *animals* are of the same *genus* and that they are distinguished *especially* (μάλιστα) according to *species* is true, except that this is because they are separated (διαιροῦνται) from the common *genus* of this *essence* and it seems that the *opposites* are present in them some times through their *potentiality* and other times through their *energy/actuality*. These two (*potentiality* and *energy/actuality*) do not apply in the case of *angels* as they always act and pursue *potentiality* and the opposite (i.e., *energy/actuality*) in all cases. If indeed angels are distinguished according to their *species*, which is contrary to what the saints state, Chrysoloras argues, what is this *opposition* existing among angels? [2.4.255-264].

Kydones uses the example of numbers. As *numbers* differ one from another by being closer and farther to the *unit*, likewise *angels* differ from one another by being *more perfect* (τελειοτέρου), *less perfect* (ἀτελεστέρου), or *multiplied* (πεπληθυσμένου), in terms of the way each angel’s *mind* (νοῦς) perceives the divine truths (τὰ θεῖα νοήσει), others with greater humility (ταπεινότερον), others in a higher way (ὑψηλότερον) and with greater unity (ἑνοειδέστερον) [2.4.265-272]. In the latter point Kydones follows Aquinas, who distinguishes between *superior* and *inferior* angels, the former having a more universal knowledge of the truth and being nearer to, and more like, God\(^{132}\).

Chrysoloras responds that since there is no imperfection among material and visible animals as being created by God much more so there is no imperfection among angels since they have the same Creator. Kydones argues that if one says that angels are *perfect* in their nature, it is unreasonable that some of them are *perfect* while others are *less perfect*. Nevertheless nothing prevents each one of the angels from being *perfect*

---


\(^{132}\) Thomas Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q. 108, a. 1, resp.: dum de cognitione Angelorum ageretur, quod superiores Angeli habent universaliorem cognitionem veritatis quam inferiores; ibid., Ia, q. 55, a. 3, resp.: Respondeo dicendum quod ex hoc sunt in rebus aliqua superiora, quod sunt uni primo, quod est Deus, propinquiora et similiora; cf. ibid., Ia, q. 106, a. 1, resp.
within his own species and less perfect when compared to another angel, for it is reasonable that there are degrees of intellectual life (βαθμοὺς νοερᾶς ζωῆς), in the same way that there are degrees of perceptive life (βαθμοὺς αἰσθητικῆς ζωῆς) among human beings and irrational beings, in the sense that each one of them is perfect in itself while less perfect vis-à-vis what is beyond and closer to the logical life (λογικῆς ζωῆς) [2.4.273-289].

Chrysoloras agrees with Kydones that there are degrees (βαθμοὺς), in the sense of order/s, in the immaterial world, as the Fathers teach, particularly Ps.-Dionysius133. Which these are, however, and how they differ among themselves, no one knows except God, and perhaps not even the angels themselves, he says. Chrysoloras also accepts that nothing prevents a species that is perfect per se—for all that God created is perfect—from being imperfect when compared to another species, angels included. To argue, however, that angels are far more inferior to the divine nature than human beings are to angels, and that God is far superior to angels than angels are to human beings, and that for this reason human beings are imperfect with relation to angels and angels are imperfect with relation to God, hence angels can be less perfect if compared to one another, is impossible and totally unknown134. For no Church authority has ever identified this difference. At this point Chrysoloras criticizes Kydones for lacking the ability to perceive subtle distinctions. By way of example, Chrysoloras refers to Ptolemy’s theory (Harmonics I, 10) concerning the imperceptible distinction between a semitone and an interval of the 128th degree (ἐκατοστοεικοστογδόῳ), which became clear, as he says, through scientific reasoning (ἐπιστήμης λόγος). In addition, since this principle does not apply to composite human beings—for there is no imperfection in composite human beings, except perhaps in foetuses, which though imperfect, on account of their being unborn, being human beings only in potentiality but not in entelechy135, yet they are entirely perfect in the eyes of God, since they come from non

---

133 Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, Celestial hierarchy, 6, §§ 1-2, pp. 26.1-27.3.
being into being and will rise with a rational soul (λογικὴν ψυχὴν) — how can it be true with reference to the nature of angels? [2.4.290-323].

Chrysoloras proceeds to examine this question further using similar argumentation with that in the section describing the distinction between the ram and the he-goat (cf. [2.1-3]). Through a series of arguments based on Plato (ὁ δεινὸς Πλάτων) and Aristotle (ὁ Φιλόσοφος), Chrysoloras succeeds in convincing Kydones that it is impossible to compare two opposite things, in this case perfect and imperfect, for these are simply contrary and therefore have nothing in common. In response to Kydones’ suggestion to examine in a comparative approach the pairs perfect/more perfect and imperfect/more imperfect, Chrysoloras cites Plato, of two wretched persons one could not be happier than the other, but could perhaps be more wretched\(^\text{136}\), and paraphrases Aristotle’s view that contraries are never to be compared\(^\text{137}\) [2.4.323-350].

Despite the fact that he made Kydones accept that angels cannot be compared in terms of perfect and imperfect, for the sake of the argument Chrysoloras accepts for a moment that it is indeed possible for angels to be distinguished into perfect and imperfect in order to expound on this through a series of brief arguments [2.4.350-418] based once more on Porphyry’s Isagoge. The first group of arguments [2.4.351-375] deals with the kind of relations angels have to one another, which echoes the section from the Isagoge examining things most general (γένει), most special (εἴδει ... εἰδικωτάτῳ) and individual (ἄτόμῳ), and the way these are related\(^\text{138}\). The second group of arguments [2.4.376-395], also based on the Isagoge, examines differences between other (ἄλλος) and different (ἄλλοιος)\(^\text{139}\). The last section of arguments [2.4.396-418] concentrates on the order of the angels in relation to their proximity to the Trinity and the transmission of the divine truth to them.

To say that the angel who is closer to God, Chrysoloras argues, is more perfect and has a better knowledge of His mysteries, contradicts the fact that Gabriel, who belongs to

---

\(^{136}\) Plato, Gorgias 473d.9-473e.1.


\(^{138}\) Cf. Porphyry, Isagoge, p. 5.1-16; Barnes, Porphyry, pp. 112-114.

the eighth order of the Archangels\textsuperscript{140}, has a better knowledge of the mysteries of God than the angels who come before him in hierarchy, since he is the one who assisted the great mystery of the Incarnation \[2.4,406-407\]. Linking the sixth number after the \textit{unit}, that is \textit{number seven}, the \textit{perfect number} among all \textit{imperfect numbers} close to the \textit{unit}\textsuperscript{141}, Chrysoloras refutes Kydones’ analogy between \textit{perfect} and \textit{less perfect} numbers and angels with reference to their proximity to the unit and God respectively. If \textit{number seven}, he says, is \textit{more perfect} than the previous numbers, then the same applies to angels, who, therefore, cannot be distinguished into \textit{perfect} and \textit{imperfect} in terms of their proximity to God \[2.4,403-409\]. Moreover, Chrysoloras remarks, who would be bold enough to say that among the numberless angels it is impossible to find two of them sharing the same knowledge of God? These two angels would both be distinguished from one another and prove the absurdity of Kydones’ view concerning the distinction of angels into \textit{perfect} and \textit{imperfect}. For this seems to apply not only for two angels but tens of thousands (\(\mu ν \nu \nu \varepsilon \varepsilon \alpha \delta \varepsilon \alpha \sigma \alpha \varepsilon \delta \\alpha \varepsilon \varepsilon \)) of them as there is nothing to prove the opposite. In any case to distinguish angels into \textit{perfect} and \textit{imperfect} introduces opposition among them, which is impossible in this case \[2.4,410-418\].

Kydones accepts Chrysoloras’ views, stating that angels cannot be distinguished either through the \textit{contradictory opposition} (\(\alpha ν τι φ \acute{a} s e \acute{e} s \omega s \ \alpha n t i \theta \acute{e} s e i \)), or the \textit{relative opposition} (\(\pi r \acute{o s} \ \tau i \)), or the \textit{opposites} (\(\acute{e} ν \alpha \alpha ν t i o c s \)), or even \textit{opposition by habituation} (\(\acute{e} \xi \iota n \)) or \textit{privation} (\(\sigma t e \acute{f} \rho \acute{s} h \sigma n \)), for the \textit{inferior} angel is not deprived of the \textit{perfection} of the \textit{superior} angel by not possessing this \textit{perfection by nature} (\(\mu \nu e d e \ \acute{e} p e \phi \acute{u} k e i \ \acute{e} k e i \iota n h \ \acute{e} \chi e i n \)). In other words, all angels are \textit{perfect by nature}. By presenting Kydones as contradicting himself and being inconsistent, Chrysoloras proves that instead of Kydones defending Aquinas in fact he supports Kabasilas’ arguments. This section closes with a recapitulation of the main arguments and Chrysoloras’ conclusion that either Kydones forgot what he had said in his \textit{Antirrhetic} or someone else interpolated his work (\(\acute{e} \tau i s \ \acute{a} l l o s \ \tau o s \ \sigma \nu \ \pi o n \acute{h} \acute{e} m a t i \ \pi r o s t i \acute{t} \acute{h} \acute{e} n a i \),) for there is no other explanation for these contradictions.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{140} Cf. Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, \textit{Celestial hierarchy}, \S\ 4, pp. 22.25-23.5. \\
\textsuperscript{141} Cf. Philo of Alexandria, \textit{Allegorical Interpretation}, I, \S\ 15, p. 64.17-22: \(\acute{e} \tau i \ \pi r \acute{o s} \ \acute{e} s t i n \ \acute{a} \pi o \ \tau e l e i o n \) το\(\acute{e} \) και \(\mu \nu o n \acute{d} i \) κατ\(\acute{a} \) τινα \(\lambda \acute{o} g \iota n \) ὁ αὐτός, ο\(\iota \) τε \(\acute{e} n t \acute{o s} \ \delta e k \acute{a} d o s \ \alpha r \acute{i} \theta \acute{m} \iota n \) ἢ \(\gamma e n \nu \acute{n} \iota n \) το\(\acute{i} s \) \(\acute{e} n t \acute{o s} \ \delta e k \acute{a} d o s \) καὶ αὐτήν, ἢ \(\acute{e} \ \acute{e} b \acute{d} o m \acute{a} s \) ὅτε \(\gamma e n \nu \) τινα τῶν \(\acute{e} n t \acute{o s} \ \delta e k \acute{a} d o s \) \(\alpha r \acute{i} \theta \acute{m} \iota n \) ο\(\iota t e \) \(\gamma e n \nu \acute{n} \acute{a} t i a \) ὑπ\(\acute{o} \) τινος; Matthaios Blastares, \textit{Syntagma}, eds. G.A. Rhalles and M. Potles, \textit{Συνταγμα των θειων και ιερων κατιουν των τε άγιων και πανευφημων Αποστολων και των ιερων οικουμενικων και τοπικων συνοδων και των κατα μερος άγιων Πατέρων}, vol. 6 (Athens, 1859), p. 461: Ο γαρ μόνος τελειος ἐν μονάσιν ἐκτὸς ἀριθμὸς.
\end{footnotesize}
Kydones admits that he does not know how this statement concerning the distinction of the angels was found in his work [2.4.419-468].

[2.5.469-642] Distinction of incorporeal beings — souls

The discussion now turns on the distinction among souls [cf. 1.4.322-334]. Chrysoloras urges Kydones to avoid repetitions and focus on this subject [2.5.469-479]. Kydones begins by examining how the soul is related to the body, drawing on Aquinas’ teachings that the soul (anima) is the first principle of life (primum principium vitae)\(^\text{142}\) and that this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect (intellectus) or the intellectual soul is the form of the body (forma corporis)\(^\text{143}\). Moreover, that the multiplicity of souls (multitudine animarum) is in proportion to the multiplicity of bodies (multitudinem corporum), and after the dissolution of bodies, souls retain their multiplied being (remanent ... in suo esse multiplicatae)\(^\text{144}\). In order to explain the condition of the soul following death and the resurrection of the body\(^\text{145}\), a fundamental teaching of the Church\(^\text{146}\), Aquinas states that the soul can exist separately from the body, contrary to Aristotle’s view that the soul and the body are inseparable\(^\text{147}\), and, this time in agreement with Aristotle\(^\text{148}\), that a specific soul is joined only with one specific body.

Kydones argues that each soul, being the entelechy of a concrete, individual body and of no other body at all, by nature tends to be united and fits only with the soul’s own body. This property of the soul remains in it even when it is separated from matter (i.e., body) [2.5.487-490]\(^\text{149}\). This, Kydones concludes, is the cause of the distinction of souls, not

\(^{142}\) Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia, q. 75, a. 1, resp.

\(^{143}\) Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia, q. 76, a. 1, resp. On the soul and its relation to the body in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, see Davies, *Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 207-220.

\(^{144}\) Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia, q. 76, a. 2, ad 2.


\(^{149}\) See Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia, q. 76, a. 1, ad 6: anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem; cf. Davies, *Thomas Aquinas*, p. 217. For Kydones’ translation of the specific passage, see codex Vat. gr. 1925, f. 540r.23-25: οὐτὼ καὶ ή ἀνθρωπινῆς ψυχῆς μένει ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῷ εἶναι, ὅταν τοῦ σώματος χωρισθῇ, ἐχουσα ἐπιπεξεύητα καὶ ἐξαιτήθην φυσικήν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἐνσώνια. Cf. Gennadios Scholarios, *Epitome of Thomas Aquinas’
in terms of form (κατ’ εἶδος) but in terms of numbers (κατ’ ἄριθμον) [2.5.490-491]. Chrysoloras responds that no one except God, not even angels or saints, knows what happens to the soul after death. Even men who came back from the dead (like Lazarus) cannot say anything about this, as it is not permissible to say what they saw (ἀπειρεν εἶπεῖν οὐκ ἐὰ) [2.5.492-493]. Chrysoloras refutes Aquinas’ teaching that the soul is the form of the body. Through a series of arguments concerning species, genera and the soul, based on the Isagoge, he demonstrates that the soul is not the form of the body. Philosophers (i.e., Porphyry), Chrysoloras states, define as form the shape (μορφή) and what is under the genus (τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ γένος ὄν). Therefore, if Kydones’ statement is valid, he continues, then the soul, by virtue of its being form of the body (as Aquinas teaches), should be either shape or what is under the genus. However, since the soul (according to John Chrysostom and John Damascene153, whom Chrysoloras does not name) does not have form (σχῆμα) it cannot be called shape (μορφή), as this applies only to material things, and consequently form. Similarly, soul is not a form which is under a genus and therefore cannot be absolutely specific (εἰδικώτατον) form, as in the case of individual human beings, for example George (ἄτομα ... ὁσπερ ἀνθρωπος, Γεωργίου), or subordinate (ὑπάλληλον), for this would mean that the soul is at the same time form and genus for such are subordinate [2.5.514]. For these reasons it is wrong to say that the soul is form of the body.

The next two arguments concern the way genus and form are predicated, namely with reference to what the soul is [2.5.531-534]. Citing almost verbatim the Isagoge Chrysoloras adapts Porphyry’s views on the difference between genus and form to the question over the distinction of the soul. A form is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’ of several items which differ in number155, Chrysoloras says, and the soul could be said to be part and


150 Cf. 2 Corinthians 12:2-3: οἶδα ἄνθρωπον ἐν Χριστῷ πρὸ ἐτῶν δεκατεσσάρων — εἶτε ἐν σώματι οὐκ οἶδα, εἶτε ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ Θεὸς οἴδει.

151 Chrysoloras does not name the sources he used for this section but uses expressions such as, ‘the philosophers define’ [2.5.515-516]; ‘certain people said’ [2.5.571-572]; ‘the people who lived in the past say’ [2.5.582], or he refers to ‘the Platonists’ and ‘the Peripatetics’ [2.5.579-580].

152 Porphyry, Isagoge, pp. 3.22-4.4.


154 Cf. Barnes, Porphyry, p. 113.

155 Porphyry, Isagoge, p. 4.10-12; trans. Barnes, Porphyry, p. 5.
whole; part of something else and whole not of something else but in something else. This view, however, does not apply to the soul, Chrysoloras concludes, without however giving any explanation [2.5.535-536]. Referring to the relation of the soul and the body in analogy to form and matter (ὕλη), Chrysoloras argues that if the soul was form of the body on account of the form coming after matter (ὕλης ... τὸ εἰδός ὑστερον), then it could be said that the soul naturally (εἰκότως) follows the body (ὑστέρα ... ἡ ψυχή τοῦ σώματος). This is impossible, Chrysoloras affirms, for both soul and body exist simultaneously (ἄμα γάρ ἔστιν ἰμφω) . The two arguments that follow are influenced by Aristotle’s view on change in natural things, namely coming into being (γένεσις) and corruption (φθορά) , in relation to the immortality of the soul [2.5.540-541]. There are three principles (ἀρχαὶ) in natural movements (φυσικῶν κινήσεων): matter, form and privation (στέρησις). Since privation is opposite (ἀντίκειται) to form, Chrysoloras continues, and not opposite to habituation (ἐξις) as Aristotle taught in his Categories (in reality Topics 124a.35-124b.6), and the soul is form of the body according to Kydones (and Aquinas), it follows that privation is opposite to the soul, which is impossible [2.5.540-541]. Similarly, the soul cannot be form of the body for in this case during the process of the reciprocal transformation of matter and form (εἰς ἀλλήλα τούτων μεταβολήν) it is necessary that their coming into being (γένεσις) and their corruption (φθορά) takes place. But this is impossible, for the soul is immortal (ἄθανατος) and as such cannot be called form [2.5.544-545]. In addition, to say that the soul is form and that this form is made known (γινώσκεσθαι) naturally (φύσει) in/through matter (ἐν ὕλῃ), and therefore that the soul is made known (γινώσκεσθαι) and manifested (φαίνεσθαι) in/through the body (ἐν τῷ σώματι), would be impossible. For the soul is entirely unknown (ἄγνωστος) and unseen (ἄφανῆς) [2.5.547-551].

Following Aristotle’s theory of primary essence (κυρίως οὐσία) and secondary essences (δεύτεραι οὐσίαι), according to which form is classified as secondary essence (Categories 2a.11-19), Chrysoloras argues that the soul could be said to be form if form was a primary essence. Since form cannot be called more essence (μᾶλλον οὐσία) (cf. Categories 2b.7) (because it is immaterial), how could the soul be form? If the body is analogous to matter in the soul and matter is the cause of the form, it follows that the body would be a cause of the soul, which is absurd [2.5.554–555]. Moreover, matter is that from which something comes into being as from the earliest pre-existing thing, which accordingly has shape and form and exists after the matter. Therefore, the soul exists after the body, which is impossible, for, as we have said, body and soul co-exist [2.5.556–559]. Matter is the principle, cause and first movement of all form, and matter is followed by form, for example stones and wood in relation to each house, in which case matter (stones and wood) come after the houses (form). Therefore, the body comes first and causes the soul. This, of course, is absurd. For a human being is produced from an altered seed and all beings produced are composite, consisting of the form from which they are produced and of the being which is produced. This is twofold, namely matter is the subject, in which there is form and privation. However, in this case the soul is the cause and principle of human life, in the same way as the body is. Therefore, there is no room for privation, for this exists per accidens as in the case of the house (which consists of wood and stone and for this reason there is no privation) [2.5.560–570].

The next argument states that some say that all matter is incorporeal (ἀσώματον), unbegotten (ἄγεννητον) and incorruptible (ἀφθάρτον), none of which apply to the human body and therefore the body cannot be the matter of the soul [2.5.571–573]. Now, form and privation are opposites; in other words there is only room for one or the other. If so, it is impossible to say that the body is the matter of the soul [2.5.574–575]. When matter exists it accepts the form and when it removes itself by necessity matter remains in its previous state. This cannot be said with reference to the body and the soul [2.5.576–578]. According to the Platonic tradition (Πλατωνικοὶ) matter is unchangeable while the Peripatetic philosophers taught that matter is entirely changeable.161 In both cases, any

reference to the body is unseemly [2.5.579-581]. Philosophers in the past (οἱ πάλαι) called the composite essence (σύνθετον οὐσίαν) form in matter (εἶδος ἐν ὑλῇ), while human beings are not composites (σύνθεσις) of this kind, and therefore the body is not matter for the soul [2.5.582-583]. With relation to permanent (τὸ μόνιμον) and subordinate (τὸ ὑποκείσθαι), matter is thought to be essence more than form is (cf. Categories 2b.7; above, 2.5.544-555) (i.e., the soul is more essence than the body). If the soul, therefore, is form and the body is matter for the soul, then bodies are more essences (μᾶλλον οὐσίαι), which is absurd [2.5.584-586]. Inasmuch as it is customary (ηὐ ὀνομάζεται), which is absurd [2.5.584-586]. Inasmuch as it is customary (ηὐ ὀνομάζεται), which is absurd [2.5.584-586]. By the same token the soul is not the form of the body and the body is not matter of the soul. The true opinion (ἀληθὴς δόξα) is, Chrysoloras concludes, that the entire soul through the sowing of the sperm (τῇ καταβολῇ τοῦ σπέρματος) comes from outside by a divine power, restoring man (τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀναπληροῖ) as a perfect living being (ζῷον τέλειον), leaving nothing of those prior to its existence behind (οὐδενὸς αὐτοῦ καταλειπομένου προτέρου), be it principle (ἀρχῆς) or cause (αἰτίου) [2.5.587-594].

In response to Kydones’ statement that the soul is the entelechy of the body, as Aristotle teaches (Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ; cf. [2.5.487-490]), and that once the soul/entelechy comes forth (ἐξελθοῦσαν) it follows the inclination (ῥοπῆς) of the body, Chrysoloras states that pious Christians should not follow Aristotle’s views on the human soul. For the Philosopher’s doctrine that the human soul is unable to exist without the body and therefore when the body dies the soul also ceases to exist, goes contrary to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead [2.5.595-615]. At this point Chrysoloras introduces an original argument concerning foetuses (i.e., imperfect human beings). Two foetuses partake of a single form of virtue (ἀρετῆς εἶδος), he states. This virtue follows (ἕπεται) two souls and nothing else. Two other souls partake of the same form of evil (κακίας εἴδος ταυτόν). Do these four souls have the same relation (σχέσιν) and inclination (φοσπῆς) in their individual bodies or different? [2.5.616-620]. If you say that the relation and inclination is the same in all four souls, then the distinction of the souls does not depend on the difference of inclination. On the other hand, if you say that the relation and inclination is not the same in all four souls, then it would be unjust for
those souls which are exposed to the same sin not to have the same inclination in their bodies. Also, God would be unjust, by demanding from them equally the wrong doing (ἀδικήματος) of the inclination and relation which exist in their bodies unequally, or by crowning the others which have worked equally in the present life (ἐν τῷ παρόντι), but have unequal inclination in their bodies. This would be impossible. Therefore, it is absurd to suggest that there is equality of action (τὸ ἰσόν ἐργάζεται) in equal souls (ταῖς ἰσαῖς ψυχαῖς) which are different through their unequal inclination (ἀνίσου ἰσοπής), or that a lack of difference (μὴ διαφέρειν) is able to produce a distinction between souls [2.5.621-635].

[2.6.643-716] Distinction of the divine Persons

After this long introduction, which presents various views on the subject of distinction of corporeal and incorporeal beings, Chrysoloras turns, at last, to the main issue of the Dialogue, namely the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity. Expressing the Orthodox teachings on this Kabasilas poses the following question: Those who say that whatever the Father has, belongs also to the Son, except the cause (αἰτία) and the unbegotten (ἀγέννητος)162 or that the Son alone is begotten, or that the Spirit alone is projected163, do they not distinguish them by means of contradiction (τῇ ἀντιφάσει)? In other words, Kabasilas states that the unbegotten (ἀγέννητος) Father is the only cause (αἰτία) in the Trinity, that the Son is begotten (γεννητὸν) from the Father, and that the Spirit is projected (ἐκπορευτὸν) from the Father164. In this way not only are the divine Persons distinguished by relative opposition, as Aquinas contends165, but they can also be distinguished by means of contradiction (ἀντιφάσις) [2.6.643-646].

Kydones replies that distinguishing the divine Persons by means of contradiction — bringing up the example of two men, a white and a not white — is not enough to prove

---


164 Cf. Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, p. 183; Sherrard, Greek East and Latin West, pp. 62-63.

165 Thomas Aquinas, SCG IV, 24, no. 3612.
but only to indicate that there is a distinction in the Persons of the Trinity\(^\text{166}\). Therefore, a distinction by *relative opposition* is indeed required. For otherwise, if the Father is not related to the Son (by *paternity*) then it will not be possible for them to be two Persons, Father and Son\(^\text{167}\). The *unbegotten* is not the cause of anything in the Father, Kydones says, but is a contrivance of thought (διανοίας ἀνάπλασμα) which excludes his being *begotten* [2.6,647-653]. Chrysoloras points out that *white* and *not white* cannot distinguish *essences* since these (*white* and *not white*) are only *accidents* (συμβεβηκότα)\(^\text{168}\). To say that the Father is *unbegotten* is not an *affirmation* that can be deduced from philosophical speculation but a mystery taught by the Fathers. To refute Kydones’ argument concerning the *unbegotten and begotten* [cf. 2.6,647-653] Chrysoloras changes his mind and takes refuge in Aristotle, admitting that it is not absurd to follow Aristotle’s opinion for the sake of orthodoxy (ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας, Ἀριστοτέλει ψηφίζεσθαι τα δοκοῦντα) [2.6,672-673]. Since *unbegotten* is an *affirmation* it follows that *not unbegotten* is its *negation*. Chrysoloras continues with his argument by stressing the apophatic character of Christian theology, as the way to reach the knowledge of God\(^\text{169}\). He accuses Kydones on the grounds that his eagerness to defend Aquinas and attack Kabasilas led him to pass over the teachings of the Fathers concerning the *unbegotten* and subsequently to contradict and refute both Aquinas and himself [2.6,674-711].

Chrysoloras concludes the First Syllogism by pointing out Kydones’ selective approach with regard to Neilos’ arguments, criticizing him for omitting large sections of Kabasilas’ First Syllogism in *DPSS III*. More specifically, he states that out of the ten chapters of Neilos’ treatise against Thomas, Kydones used only four. Not without a dry sense of humour, Chrysoloras makes Kydones answer: Each one fights with what he wants. Get on with the next syllogism, so that we understand! [2.6,712-715].

---


[3] Second Syllogism on relative opposition and alternation

Chrysoloras proceeds with further examining the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity focusing on Aquinas’ statements that the Son and the Spirit are distinguished by means of relative opposition [cf. 2.1-4] and that there is no other relation but the one in according to causation [3.4]. This section begins by investigating this question on the basis of mathematical theories. Aquinas supports his views, first by applying the mathematical method of alternate ratio or alternation (alternando), according to which

\[(a): (b) = (c): (d) \text{ alternates to } (a): (c) = (b): (d), \]

where (a) is the Projector, (b) is the Projected, (c) the Begetter, and (d) the Begotten. On the basis of this method the distinct hypostatic properties of the Persons appear to be the following:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
(a) \text{ Projector} & = & (c) \text{ Begetter} \\
(b) \text{ Projected} & \text{ the ratio transforms to } & (d) \text{ Begotten} \\
(c) \text{ Begetter} & = & (d) \text{ Begotten}
\end{array}
\]

According to the above alternation, the Projector and Begetter is identified in a single Person (i.e., Father), while the Projected (Spirit) and Begotten (Son) should be identified also in a single Person. What prevents the confusion of the Son and the Spirit, Aquinas stresses (ST Ia. 36, 2 resp.), is the relative opposition (oppositio relativa) in terms of causation (ad originem, κατ’ αἰτίαν), which distinguishes the divine Persons and at the same confirms that they are also inseparable since one Person cannot exist without the other [3.1-4].

Kabasilas refutes Aquinas’ argument on the grounds that these alternations are only valid with reference to magnitudes and numbers of the same kind (πλὴν δέ, καὶ τούτων ὁμογενῶν) and cannot be applied to things divine and often to created beings. To substantiate his views he gives some examples. Proportions of things

---


referring to the divinity cannot retain similar relation (ὁμοίαν σχέσιν) after alternation [3.5-13]. For just as unbegotten is opposed to begotten (τὸ ἁγέννητον τῷ γεννητῷ), similarly incorruptible is opposed to corruptible (τὸ ἀφθαρτὸν τῷ φθαρτῷ). According, however, to the alternation the reverse would not retain a similar relation (ἀλλ’ ἐναλλάξ, οὐκ ἂν σῴζοιε τὴν ὁμοίαν σχέσιν), for the angels are begotten but incorruptible:

(a) begotten = (c) corruptible
(b) unbegotten = (d) incorruptible

The ratio transforms to

The same applies for the pairs animal/not animal (ζῷον/οὐ ζῷον) and animate/inanimate (ἐμψυχον/οὐκ ἐμψυχον):

(a) animal = (c) animate
(b) not animal = (d) inanimate

The pairs astronomer/astronomy and general/strategy is another such example, in the sense that though astronomy (ἀστρονομικά) has nothing to do with strategy (στρατηγικά), a general (στρατηγός) can also be an astronomer (ἀστρονόμος). The same applies with the straight line in analogy with its own part (πρὸς τὸ μέρος τὸ ἑαυτῆς) and the circumference in analogy with its own part (πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον), but the reverse is impossible. For a straight line is divided in analogy with its own part (e.g., 1/3) and a circumference is divided in analogy with its own part (e.g., 1/3), while the reverse does not retain the analogy, for if these parts are analogous to each other these are called magnitudes/lengths, which if multiplied would exceed each other, which is impossible [3.5-13].

[3.1.14-60] The issue of the unknown Byzantine author

At this point Kydones observes that the passage concerning the alternation argument attributed to Aquinas by Kabasilas [3.14] is not actually found in any of the extant Thomistic works. Consequently, Kydones attributes this argument to a certain Latin
(Λατίνου τινός), who at some stage discussed this with a Byzantine theologian (πρὸς τινὰ τῶν ἤμετέρων)\textsuperscript{174}. If this is correct then it appears that, according to Kydones (as cited by Chrysoloras) Kabasilas must have heard (ἀκούσαντα) this argument during discussions with this person, and must have assumed that this passage actually belongs to Aquinas and treated it as such in his DPSS III [3, 14-19]\textsuperscript{175}.

The question arises who this anonymous Byzantine might be. This short passage is cited almost verbatim no less than four times by Barlaam the Calabrian in his Second Treatise against the Latins, where he discusses relative opposition and alternation with reference to the divine Persons\textsuperscript{176}. Barlaam, too, states that ‘I have often heard these said by certain people’ (Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν λεγόντων πολλάκις ἀκήκοα)\textsuperscript{177}. It is highly likely, therefore, that Kabasilas simply borrowed this passage from Barlaam, as he did with other theological arguments Barlaam used in his treatises without naming him\textsuperscript{178}, one assumes because Barlaam had by then changed sides (converting to Roman Catholicism). It is also possible that both Kabasilas and Barlaam shared the same anonymous source. In the latter case this person must be the papal legate Francesco da Camerino with whom Barlaam held theological discussions in 1334\textsuperscript{179}. Nevertheless Chrysoloras points out to Kydones that nothing prevents this passage dealing with this specific question (πρόβλημα) from being actually by Aquinas, thus linking it with Aquinas’ similar statement in the next Syllogism [4]\textsuperscript{180}.

Responding to Chrysoloras (in reality to Kabasilas), Kydones criticizes him for failing to have explored enough the thought of the person responsible for this argument and for wrongly considering that this passage concerns the analogy between

\textsuperscript{174} Dialogue [3, 17-19]: ἀλλ’ ἐσκε Λατίνου τινός, πρὸς τινὰ τῶν ἤμετέρων διαλεγομένου.
\textsuperscript{175} Cf. Neilos Kabasilas, DPSS III, p. 276.9-24; Candal, Nīlus Čabasīlas, pp. 108-110.
\textsuperscript{177} Barlaam the Calabrian, Against the Latins, Tractatus B, II, § 16, p. 278.188.
\textsuperscript{178} It has been already pointed out that Kabasilas’ anti-Latin works are extensively influenced by Barlaam’s arguments against the Latins: G. Schirò, ‘Il paradosso di Nilo Cabasila’, SBN 9 (1957), 362–388; Kiklas, Nil Cabasilas, pp. 159-164; Demetracopoulos, ‘Thomas Aquinas’ Impact’, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{180} Dialogue [3, 34-44].
beget/begotten (γεννᾶν καὶ γεγεννηθαί) and project/projected (προβάλλειν καὶ ἐκπορεύεσθαι). This is not the case, Kydones says, for the Latins would have never agreed that the begetter (γεννῶν) is proportionate to the begotten (γεγεννημένον) and that the projector (προβάλλον) is proportionate to the projected (ἐκπορευόμενον). For if so, the first analogy (begetter/begotten) ought not be related to one genus while the reverse (ἐναλλάξ) (projector/projected) to another but both ought to be related to the same genus. This means that if the first analogy (begetter/begotten) is related to a genus by quantity (ἐν τῷ τοῦ ποσοῦ γένει), the reverse ought to be related again to the same genus by quantity (ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ πάλιν ληπτέον) [3.1.45-56]. This could be illustrated as follows:

(a) begetter   (c) projector
(b) begotten   (d) projected

the ratio transforms to

(a) begetter   (b) begotten
(c) projector   (d) projected

In so far as numbers and magnitudes are concerned, Chrysoloras concludes, this argument is correct, actually confirming Kabasilas’ statement (cf. [3.5-16]). This, however, does not apply to things divine. This is explored in the section that follows [3.1.57-60].

[3.2.61-109] Affirmations and negations

The debate continues with Kydones agreeing with Kabasils that the principle of alternation cannot be accepted as universal and that can be misused (παραχρῆσθαι) as in the case of the terms employed in the examples above (cf. [3.5-16]). Chrysoloras stresses that, contrary to what Aquinas claims, this principle above all cannot be applied to the pairs beget/begotten and project/projected [3.2.66-70]. Unbegotten, Kydones replies, does not oppose begotten in every possible case. For if begotten happened to refer to something intellectual (νοερῷ) then the unbegotten, because of the opposition, would be mindless (ἀνουν). Similarly, if unbegotten is the cause of begotten this does not mean that also incorruptible is the cause of corruptible, for it is clear that the alternate pairs are opposed only as negation (ἀπώφασις) and affirmation (κατάφασις). Therefore, by interchanging negation with affirmation, Kydones concludes, the ratio
will be between the negations unbegotten/incorruptible and the affirmations begotten/corruptible, as illustrated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) unbegotten</th>
<th>(c) incorruptible</th>
<th>(a) unbegotten</th>
<th>(b) begotten</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td>the ratio transforms to</td>
<td>=</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) begotten</td>
<td>(d) corruptible</td>
<td>(c) incorruptible</td>
<td>(d) corruptible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same can be said about the astronomer and the general [3.2,71-81; cf. 3.5-13]. Clearly mathematical theories (ὁσα τοῖς ἀφθάρτω καὶ τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ συμβαίνει), Chrysoloras continues, cannot explain questions concerning the modes of generation (γεννήσεως τρόπων) and procession (ἐκπορεύσεως). The reason Kabasilas used such theories, he says, was simply to prove the absurdity of Aquinas’ thesis (Θέσεως)181. Neither was Thomas’ purpose to discuss negations and affirmations since beget and begotten and project and projected are affirmations. But he reckoned to apply (ἐφαρμόζειν) to the divine nature four magnitudes opposing one another (τέσσαρα μεγέθη πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντιστρέφοντα), which is impossible. To argue that unbegotten/incorruptible are both negations and affirmations in relation to begotten/corruptible is absurd. For these are affirmations, as in the case of beget/begotten and project/projected. The negations of incorruptible/unbegotten are not incorruptible/not unbegotten (οὐκ ἄφθαρτον καὶ οὐκ ἀγέννητον) and the negations of corruptible/begotten are not corruptible/not begotten (μὴ φθαρτὸν καὶ μὴ γεννητὸν). This is what also Aristotle thinks (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ; cf. Prior Analytics 52b.31-32). So, what you consider to be negations, Chrysoloras concludes, are actually affirmations, which confirms Neilos’ argument. Besides, the principle of alternation relates (a) with (b) and (c) with (d). Therefore, it is wrong to compare unequal to equal things and vice versa, and claim that there is equality among them [3.2,82-104].

[3.3,105-222] Mathematical theories and alternation

The discussion over *alternation* now expands to include mathematical theories\(^{182}\). Taking as a point of departure Kabasilas’ earlier argument [cf. 3.\(^{12-13}\)]\(^{183}\), Kydones and Chrysoloras put forward and defend their own views concerning the analogy between a *straight line* and the *circumference* and the *squaring of the circle*. According to Kydones, though a *rational analogy* (ῥητὸς λόγος)\(^{184}\) between a *straight line* and the *circumference* may exist, as for example there is certain analogy between a *diameter* and a *side*, yet it is impossible to prove this mathematically. And it is clear that it is possible to find a third analogy, analogous to the two given ones while the three analogies make a single analogy [3.3,\(^{105-112}\)] (Plate 1a). But the *diagonal* (of a parallelogram) is not equal to the *side*, Chrysoloras says, in the same way that a *straight line* is not equal to the *circumference*. This is quite clear, he remarks, to everyone who knows well the principle of mathematical proportion. Moreover, the analogy of these three (*diagonal*, *straight line* and *circumference*) has nothing in common with Neilos’ argument that there is no analogy between a *straight line* and the *circumference*. For a *straight line*, a *diagonal*, a *side* and the *circumference* are not the same but unequal [3.3,\(^{113-120}\)].

Similarly, though the *squaring of the circle* may be possible, Kydones argues, it has not yet been mathematically demonstrated (οὔδὲ γὰρ ἀποδέδεικται τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς). According to Archimedes’ demonstration (ἑὑρηται καὶ Ἀρχιμήδους ἀπόδειξις), there is analogy between the *circumference* and the *diameter*, which measures 3 1/7\(^{185}\). If Archimedes succeeded in perceiving such accurate measurement, Kydones states, it is not impossible to find a *rational analogy* between these two. Archimedes also proved that the *space* under the *circumference* of the circle and its *diameter* is double the surface of the circle\(^{186}\). Moreover, those mathematicians who attempted to square the circle used a figure, enclosed by lines surrounded by two circumferences, which is equal to a linear rectangle. It is clear, Kydones continues, that this rectilinear figure and


\(^{183}\) Cf. Neilos Kabasilas, *DPSS III*, p. 280.4-11.

\(^{184}\) On ῥητὸς signifying quantity expressible as a ratio of whole numbers, see Heath, *History of Greek Mathematics*, II, p. 537.


even those straight lines at some point will extend *ad infinitum*, the figure bounded by a curved line (περιφερόγραμμον) beyond the linear rectangle (εὐθυγράμμου) and the circumference over the straight line. In this way, they will be analogous to each other, not by a *rational analogy*, which may never be found (καὶ ἔξωσι πρῶς ἄλληλα λόγον, ὡς τὸ μὲν, οὐδαμῶς, ἴσως δὲ καὶ τούτον, ποτέ). Though mathematicians have not proved that this analogy is impossible nor have they completely ruled out (απειρηται παντελῶς) the possibility that the circle can be squared, as in the case of the side and the diameter, it remains plausible and not yet discovered. Therefore, Kydones concludes, it is very contentious (λίαν φιλόνεικον) to try to cancel the *alternation* [3.3.121-140].

Chrysoloras responds by questioning Kydones’ degree of understanding of these theories put forward by ancient Greek mathematicians. It is at this point that Chrysoloras feels the need to stress once more the important cultural aspect of Byzantine identity, that is Greek paideia (τῇ δὲ παιδείᾳ, καὶ ἡμεῖς Ἕλληνες), which enables him and his compatriots to understand and discuss these theories without being easily deceived by sophistries, even though they cannot achieve the greatness of the mind of the ancient Greeks (καὶ εἰ μὴ τῶν μεγάλων). At the same time Chrysoloras points out that Byzantines are not at all Greeks in faith (τῇ πίστει μὲν, οὐδαμῶς), highlighting the religious connotation of the term Ἕλλην [3.3.141-146][187]. In what follows Chrysoloras presents a series of theories by ancient authors, including Archimedes[188], Bryson of Heracleia (5th c. BC) Antiphon the Sophist (480-411 BC)[189] and Hippocrates of Chios (and not of Kos as in the MSS) (ca. 470-ca. 410 BC)[190].

Starting from Bryson, Chrysoloras remarks that he unsuccessfully attempted to square the circle, for he argued that greater and lesser are equal to what he sought to prove (ἰσον τοῖς ζητομένοις ἀποφαίνεσθαι δίκαιων ἐλογίζετο), which applies not only to geometry but also to many other subjects, though properly only to dialectic (διαλεκτικῇ μόνῃ) [3.3.151-155] (Plate 1b). Antiphon, too, unsuccessfully attempted to square the circle, this time using lunes (μηνίσκων), simple figures (μονοειδῶν) which

---

[187] See also above, pp. 46-47 with notes 101, 103.
[188] On Archimedes’ measurement of the circle, see Heath, *History of Greek Mathematics*, II, pp. 50-56. For his attempts to square the circle, see ibid., I, pp. 230-231.
[189] On the squaring of the circle by Bryson and Antiphon, see ibid., I, pp. 221-224.
[190] On Hippocrates of Chios, see ibid., I, pp. 183-200, 221.
cut through part of the circle through the circumference. Similarly, Hippocrates of Chios, in his attempt to square the circle, Chrysoloras continues, designed the circle dividing it into triangles applying the principles of geometry as it seemed good to him (τὸ δοκοῦν ἐτήρει, γεωμετρικὰς τὰς ἀρχάς), drawing lines and triangles. As a result he was wrong in assuming that it is possible for the surface of the circle to be divided into triangles (Plate 2a). There were also many others who were unable to prove this mathematical question [3.3,141-163].

Turning to questions concerning diameter and circumference, Chrysoloras states that Antiphon claimed to have drawn a straight line touching the circumference, while Archimedes attempted not only to draw the diameter on the circumference (as Kydones mentioned above [3.3,121-123]) but also, as Theon of Alexandria states in his Commentary on Ptolemy’s Syntaxis (τῆς συντάξεως Πτολεμαίου ύπομνήματα), Archimedes applied a similar method of calculation, according to which one half of the circumference of the circle and one half of the distance from the circumference to the centre of the circle cannot possibly be greater or lesser. A number of mathematicians attempted to demonstrate this on the basis of diameter and circumference being of the same kind (ὁμογενέσιν). It is clear that this is impossible by using two lines which form a 90° angle and two semi-circles that touch upon each other [3.3,163-174] (Plate 2a).

Therefore, Chrysoloras continues, Neilos’ argument that there is no analogy between the circumference and a straight line is valid, for these two are dissimilar: (a) the line lacks breadth while the circle possesses breadth; (b) a line has two points as limits (πέρατα σημεία) while the limit of the circle is the line itself; (c) the line has a beginning and an end marked by the two points it consists of, while the circle has no beginning or end; (d) the line has two points as its ends (πέρατα δύο) while the circle has none; (e) the line is visibly limited when extended in our mind and invisible when it is infinite (μὴ φαινομένη, ἄπειρος), while the circle is visible when it is infinite (καὶ όρθωμενος, ἀπειρος) and invisible when it is limited (καὶ μὴ όρθωμενος αὐθίς, πεπερασμένος); and (f) the line is shapeless while the circle has a shape. All these observations prove that the circumference is the opposite of the line as the straight line is the opposite of the curved one. This is confirmed by Aristotle (Φιλόσοφος) in the
fourth chapter of the seventh book of his *Topics*, for any accident belonging to the one must belong also to the other, and if the one belong to anything as an accident, so must the other also. If in any of these respects there is a discrepancy, clearly they are not the same. Therefore, Chrysoloras concludes, not only is the line dissimilar to the circumference but it is completely its opposite [3.3.174-191]. Hence, there is no mutual analogy (λόγος κοινός).

Kydones replies that, though this is true, nonetheless the diameter does have an ineffable (i.e., imperceptible) analogy (λόγον, ἄρρητον) to the circumference. On the contrary, Chrysoloras suggests (making a pun), this analogy is *rational* (ὄντον), and he proceeds with examining the above propositions. Neilos says that the *line* has nothing in common with the *circumference* while Archimedes affirms that the *diameter* has common elements with the *circumference*. These two views are clearly opposite. If the *circumference* is not identical to the *line* then one cannot oppose Neilos. In this case there are two options: either the *line* and the *diameter* are identical or they are different. However, these two are not equal to each other. For the *diameter* has a shape and limits on the basis of which one can imagine it, while a *line* is *shapeless* and *limitless*. The *diameter* is an active line (ἐνεργείᾳ γραμμή) while a *line* is a potential (δυνάμει) and not active *diameter* (Plate 2b). Therefore, these two are not identical. Accordingly, the *diameter* is different from the *line*, which proves Neilos’ argument.

For this reason, Chrysoloras continues, you were right to say before that there is an ineffable analogy between these two, for you always apply what is ineffable to what is rational! Though you claimed that these things are possible but not yet discovered [cf. 3.3.135-136], he says to Kydones, you must know that up to now mathematical discoveries are obscure (ἄδηλος) and will not become easy in the future. For life is too short! If the *diameter* has something in common (τι καὶ κοινωνεῖ) with the *line* that does not exist (οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων), and there is no such thing, what is greater in antithesis than irrational and rational (ἀλόγου καὶ λογικοῦ)? he asks. If these were living beings (ζώα) they would be in communion with one another. Therefore it is not absurd to state that a *circumference* has nothing in common with the *line*, as Neilos argues, while they do have common elements in other cases according to Kydones. Whatever the case, Chrysoloras concludes, you must explain why you used only a few among the nine arguments put

---

forward (τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐννέα προβαλλομένοι) by Neilos. One can visualise Kydones as he turns to Chrysoloras responding: I will do as I like! Tell me another syllogism [3.3.192-222].

[4] Third Syllogism on the distinction in the divine Persons

The third Syllogism examines further the main theme of the Dialogue, namely the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity. In comparison to the previous Syllogisms [2-3], this one is rather short. It begins with Aquinas’ statement concerning the reciprocal relations between the Father and the Son on the one hand, that is paternity (paternitatis/πατρότητι) and filiation (filiatio/υἱότητι), and between the Father and the Spirit on the other, namely spiration (spiratio/πνοῇ) and procession (processio/ἐκπορεύσει), and that paternity and spiration are one Person (ἔν ἕστι πρόσωπον), the Father. If we apply the principle of alternation (cf. [3]) to the pair filiation and procession, they, too, according to Aquinas, should constitute one Person192.

What prevents, however, the confusion of the Son and the Spirit, Aquinas stresses, is the relative opposition in origin (oppositio originis, ἀντίθεσις ... αἰτία) [4.1-5]193. Kabasilas’ objection to Aquinas’ view is that the principle of alternation (ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς) does not apply in this case, for the distinction of the divine Persons is not subject to mathematical principles and theories. Aquinas’ statement, according to Kabasilas, infers (συνάγειν) that the Son and the Spirit cannot be distinguished between them through filiation and procession on the basis that paternity and spiration do not constitute two Persons [4.7-10]. It is as if, Kabasilas continues, one would claim that theology and mathematics cannot be distinguished on the basis that two persons are both mathematicians and theologians, as in the case of Hierotheus and Dionysius [4.10-12].

Though Kabasilas and Chrysoloras associate Hierotheus with Dionysius, they do not refer to their relation. In his Advisory Oration on the Union of the Churches, however,

---

Joseph Bryennios refers to Hierotheus as ‘the teacher of Dionysius the Areopagite’. In reality this person is identified with the hieromonk Hierotheos (2nd half 13th c.) who opposed the Union of Lyons\textsuperscript{194}. More importantly, Bryennios refers to Hierotheos’ hitherto unpublished anti-Latin \textit{Dialogue}, where he puts forward a theorem employing geometrical diagrams to demonstrate the distinction of the Persons. It seems that Hierotheos’ theorem was the ‘irrefutable argument’ Bryennios claimed to have been developing towards the end of his life, which according to him would bring about the Union of the Churches\textsuperscript{195}. No mention of this, however, is made in the \textit{Dialogue}.

\textbf{[4.1] Refutation of Kydones’ argument}

Chrysoloras then proceeds with refuting the argument Kydones put forward in his \textit{Antirrhetic} [4.1] and with further examining the \textit{relative opposition of origin} with reference to the divine Persons [4.2]. Chrysoloras first presents Kydones’ view, according to which Kabasilas’ argument actually agrees with Aquinas’ syllogism, thus implying that \textit{filiation} and \textit{procession} alone cannot form the basis of the distinction between the Son and the Spirit, unless the \textit{relative opposition in origin} is applied. Kydones gives the example of the aforementioned Dionysius and Hierotheos. Though theology and mathematics are joined in these two individual persons, nevertheless the two sciences do not divide each of the two persons into another two persons (i.e., two Dionysioi and two Hierotheoi). Similarly, a student of either of them would not be himself divided into two human beings (δύο ὑποκείμενα ἀνθρώπων), but he would be the very same human being possessing both sciences (ἐπιστήμας) as his teacher does, and he would not be distinguished more or less (μᾶλλον ἢ ἦττον) according to the distinction of persons (προσωπικὴν διάκρισιν). For this reason, Kydones concludes, Kabasilas’ argument does not oppose but rather agrees with Aquinas’ view.


Kydones also points out that Kabasilas has omitted certain arguments by Aquinas, which he considered of minor importance [4.13-28].

Chrysoloras responds by criticizing Kydones’ attitude and chides him for his inability to fully understand Kabasilas’ and Aquinas’ arguments. On the basis of the principle that contradictions can only be true or false and cannot both be true or both be false 196, Chrysoloras concludes that Kabasilas either agrees with or opposes Aquinas, for it is impossible to agree with him and oppose him at the same time. In any case, Chrysoloras says, it is not Kabasilas who should be criticized for the absurdity of Aquinas’ arguments which Kydones simply adopts [4.29-50].

[4.2] Relative opposition in origin with reference to the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity

The Syllogism closes with Chrysoloras refuting the principle of relative opposition in origin as a basis for the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity 197. Kydones’ argument that the terms to beget and to project are not sufficient to distinguish the Son and the Spirit, is followed by a stichomythia with Chrysoloras, concerning the authorities in doctrinal issues including the distinction of the divine Persons. The Apostles and the saints, Chrysoloras stresses, did not need to prove this distinction on the basis of scientific abstract arguments and dialectics or arguments based on natural philosophy (φυσικῶν). In order to emphasize that the hypostasis of the Father is the only source and cause in the Trinity, and that the Son and the Spirit are solely distinguished by way of existence, as the Greek Fathers teach 198, Chrysoloras cites ‘Dionysius, the source of theology’, who states that the divine Persons are distinguished with reference to the source, which he identifies with the Person of the Father (the only source of divinity is the Father) 199. In addition, he quotes Ps.-Justin Martyr (whom he does not name), who affirms that as the Son is from the Father,

198 Cf. Lossky, Image and Likeness of God, pp. 76-88; Papadakis, Crisis in Byzantium, pp. 85-88; G.P. Theodoroudes, Η ἐκπόρευσις τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος κατὰ τοὺς συγγραφεῖς τοῦ Π’ αἰώνος (Thessalonike, 1990), pp. 23-44.
199 Ps-Dionysius Aeropagite, On the divine names, 2, § 5, p. 128.11-12; § 7, p. 132.1.
similarly the Spirit <is from the Father> except that they differ in the way of existence. This is what all theologians follow, except you!, Chrysoloras exclaims to Kydones. Moreover, he continues, though in the present Syllogism Kabasilas put forward seven arguments (ἐπτὰ ... ἐπιχειρημάτων) you only refute one and ignore the rest, among which one should be mentioned: If one were to place filiation first, procession next, and paternity and spiration in between these two, this would clearly refute Aquinas' and Kydones' axiom (ἀξίωμα) [4.51-77]. This unclear argument does not appear in Kabasilas' DPSS III. Hence, it seems that his criticism that Kydones intentionally omitted mentioning and refuting it seems unfounded, unless this argument is contained in a MS other than the one the editor of Kabasilas' treatise consulted (Vat. gr. 1117), that is, if such a MS survives.

[5] Fourth Syllogism on the distinction in the divine Persons

Introducing the next Syllogism, Chrysoloras presents Aquinas’ arguments concerning the distinction of different species belonging to the same genus with reference to the distinction of, and relations among, the divine Persons. When things come together by something common to them (Quaecumque conveniunt in aliquo communi/τὰ εἰς ἐν τι κοινὸν συνιόντα), according to Aquinas, if they were to be distinguished between themselves it is necessary that they be distinguished by differences per se and not accidentally (differentias per se, et non per accidens/διαφοραὶ καθ’ αὐτὰς, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς), as for example in the case of man and horse. Thus, the Son and the Holy Spirit, both being from the Father, can only be distinguished by per se differences with reference to the cause (αἰτία) (SCG, IV, 24, no. 3614) [5.1-5]. Chrysoloras does not cite the complete Syllogism as it is cited by Kabasilas in DPSS III, but he chooses to summarize it, failing in this way to enlighten the reader that per se differences with reference to the cause means that one Person should be from the other, as Aquinas stated in support of the doctrine that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

---


201 See Neilos Kabasilas, DPSS III, p. 290.6-21: ἄξις δὴ διαφορᾶς αὐξάνασθαι εἰναι πλὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, τούτως, πρὸς τὸ κατ’ αὐτὰν αναφερομένας, ὥστε δηλονίζει τὸ ἔτερον αὐτῶν εἰναι ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου. Λείπεται τούτων πρὸς τὸ διακρίνεσθαι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἄγιον τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι παρά
Neilos responds that though it is true that being from the Father is common to the Son and the Spirit, nevertheless it is unclear in what way the distinction between man and horse applies, by analogy, to the distinction between the Son and the Spirit. Besides, he continues, the distinction among animals is not true in all cases. For example, the aforementioned ram and the he-goat [cf. 2.1-3] come together in a kind of a single animal (ἐν τι κοινὸν ἐχεται τὸ ζῷον). Yet, the Apostles Peter and Andrew\textsuperscript{202} are distinguished both from their father Jonah and the (generic) man (ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου). In this case, where is the difference per se? (καθ’ αὐτό), Kabasilas asks [5.\textsuperscript{6-12}]. In other words, according to Chrysoloras, though Kabasilas agrees with Aquinas’ affirmation that rational and irrational are per se differences with reference to man and horse respectively, nonetheless Aquinas’ syllogism cannot be applied to species which are similar or individual human beings, for these cannot be distinguished by per se differences.


Kydones criticizes Kabasilas’ preference to counter-argue (ἀντειπτεῖν) by using the ram and the he-goat as a useful example (χρησιμόν) lest it appear that he totally lacks a counter-argument (ἀντιλογίαν). He also challenges Kabasilas, who states that because the distinction of these two animals is not very clear (μὴ πάνω πρόθηλον) he thinks that he refutes the universal statement (καθόλου λόγον) [cf. 2.2.\textsuperscript{193-197}]. Chrysoloras considers Kydones’ response to his objections (τῶν ἐνστάσεων) insolent (Ὑβρεῖς). I agree, Kydones answers, for we must not abolish clear arguments (πρόθηλος τῶν λόγων) because the distinction between certain things is obscure (ἀδηλὸν εἶναι). One should seek (ζητεῖν), and will probably find (εὑρήσει), a solution concerning this

\textsuperscript{202} In all extant MSS of the Dialogue the text here states ‘Πέτρος καὶ Παύλος, ἐκ τοῦ Ἰονᾶ’ [5.11], though further down [5.1.35, 45 and 50] the name Παύλος is replaced by that of Ανδρέας, which agrees with Kabasilas’ text (DPSS III, p. 292.15-16): Καὶ Πέτρος δὲ καὶ Ανδρέας διακεκριμένους καὶ εἰς ἐν τί κοινὸν συνιόντων ἢ τὸν άνθρωπον ἢ τὸν Ἰονᾶν, ψῆφι ὁ δὴ γεγέννηται. Kabasilas clearly refers to the Apostles Peter and Andrew sons of Jonah (cf. Matthew 10.2, 16:17; John 1:40-42). It seems, therefore, that the erroneous use of the name Paul in the specific passage of the Dialogue in all four extant MSS (K, f. 31\textsuperscript{v}; L, f. 40\textsuperscript{v}; P, f. 66\textsuperscript{v}; and V, f. 109\textsuperscript{v}) could be attributed either to lapsus mentis by the author or, most probably, to lapsus calami by the scribe of a now lost MS of the β transmission; see below, pp. 175-176.

79
distinction. Chrysoloras agrees with this and defends his position on the basis of previous arguments concerning the distinction of the ram and the he-goat [see 2.2.198–199]. It is absurd, he argues, to refute the universal because we are ignorant of the partial, in the same way that we cannot say that there is a minor difference where there is no difference nor is it possible for one to exist. Otherwise, Kydones says, by removing any difference things would become identical. This, Chrysoloras remarks, would necessarily refer all things (πάντα), in which this difference exists inappropriately (οὐ προσήκον αὐτῆς κειμένης), to a worse situation [5.1.13-31]. If we refer to the four-footed (τετραπόδου) genus, Kydones answers, or any other genus closely associated with it, and we divide this according to per se differences (καθ’ αὑτὸ ... διαφοραῖς) we will find differences and thus distinguish these animals. Similarly, though Andrew and Peter share rationality (τῷ λογικῷ) we will distinguish one from the other in terms of their individual souls and bodies [5.1.32-37]. One should be cautious with these examples, Chrysoloras points out, for this argument is worst than the similar one used in the First Syllogism [cf. 2.1-3], where Kydones distinguished the ram and he-goat into wild and tame, with hard and soft hair, bearded and beardless. We have proved that these cannot be properly distinguished (καλῶς γε διακεκρίσθαι), he says. Moreover, by referring (ἀναγαγὼν) these two animals to the four-footed genus, you necessarily accept that there is a distinction between Peter and Andrew in terms of the rationality of the soul (λογικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς) and the thickness of the body (τὸ παχὺ τοῦ σώματος). This is not only even more absurd than the previous statements but also ridiculous (γελοῖον)! Chrysoloras remarks. For this distinction is not opposed to the genus of the animal, for each of the two (ram and he-goat) is irrational (ἀλογὸν) and essence (οὐσία), living (ζῶον) and animate (ἔμψυχον). Similarly, Chrysoloras continues, each of the two persons (Andrew and Peter) is rational and essence and living (λογικός ... οὐσία ... ζῶον). But the opposing difference Aquinas referred to is not the per se difference, for it is clear that he meant the distinction between man and ox, rational and irrational, animate and inanimate, and similar things. This is how we should interpret Aquinas’ thesis (θέσει), Chrysoloras affirms. Therefore, Kabasilas’ and Aquinas’ views are actually in harmony, in the sense that it is necessary for these things to be distinguished only according to species (εἴδει) in which there is no natural distinction (τέφυκεν). The four-footed animals are like this. Therefore, what you consider discordant (ἀσύμφωνα) we
do not think of as opposite (ἐναντία). As far as I can understand, Chrysoloras concludes, you put forth these arguments against us not because you believe they are fair (δίκαια) but only for the sake of the argument, which is unfair (οὐ δίκαιον) [5.1.38-64]!

Turning to the distinction of the divine Persons, Kydones counter-argues that to beget (γεννᾶν), to project (προβάλλειν) and to create (δημιουργεῖν) are not associated with the Father in the same way they are associated with a common genus (アウστέρ ΕΙς ΚΟΙΝΟΝ ΓΕΝΟΣ ΣΥΝΙΑΣΙ), and that to consider God as the genus of the Father and the Son is ill-considered (ἀνεπίσκεπτον, as in Kydones’ Antirrhetic, corrected from the opposite reading [ἐπίσκεπτον] transmitted in all MSS of the Dialogue) [5.2.65-67]. Chrysoloras accepts this view and points out to Kydones that here he omitted an important argument of his which was mentioned above, namely that things which come together by something common to them are referred to as in a genus [cf. 5.1; D, f. 120r.4]. This proves, Chrysoloras concludes, that Kydones contradicts himself and omits the majority of the eleven arguments (ἐνί καὶ δεκάτῳ ... προβλήμασι) put forward by Neilos in the Fourth Syllogism. To this criticism Kydones responds with confidence: This seems to me better. Come on then, tell me another syllogism! [5.2.68-82].

[6] Fifth Syllogism on the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity

The Fifth Syllogism begins with Aquinas affirming that the generation (generatio, γέννησις) and the projection (processio, προβολή) are emanations that differ (diversa originem, πρόοδοι διαφέρουσαι) either in origin (per principium, τῇ ἀρχῇ), like animals that belong to the same species, or by subject (per subiectum, τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ), as in the case of the generation of this or that horse, or by term (per terminum, τοῖς ὅροις), like the difference between the horse and the cow. Therefore, the emanation of the Spirit does not differ from the emanation of the Son, unless the Spirit is also from Him (i.e., from the Son) (SCG IV, 24, no. 3615) [6.13]. In other words, the generation of the Son and the projection/procession of the Spirit are emanations distinguished in origin (τῇ ἀρχῇ). What Chrysoloras omits (contrary to Kabasilas) is that Aquinas excludes by induction that the origins of the Persons of the Trinity are distinguished either by term (τοῖς ὅροις) or

---

by subject (τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ). According to Aquinas, the immateriality of the Persons in the Trinity excludes any distinction in their origin by subject or by term since the divine nature is one and the same for every Person in the Trinity.

Kabasilas agrees that the minor premise (ἡ ἐλαττῶν <πρότασις>) of Aquinas’ syllogism, namely that the origins (πρόοδοι) of generation and emanation are distinct, is true. However, the major premise (ἡ μειώσων <πρότασις>), that the Spirit is from the Father and the Son, is false, he says, for with reference to living beings the reverse does occur (ἐν τοῖς οὖσι δὲ, τὸ ἀνάπαλιν) [6.67]. The debate proceeds with Kydones presenting a summary of Kabasilas’ views on Aquinas’ syllogism and refuting Kabasilas’ arguments. Though Kabasilas accepts the validity of the minor premise, Kydones repeats, namely that the origin of the Son and the Spirit differ from one another, he does not accept the major premise, namely that the Spirit is from the Father and the Son, as this is not stated in the Scripture or declared by divinam naturam quam οὐ προσαρμόζει ταύτη γένη κατ’ αὐτούς τάς ἐκκλησίας. For this reason Kabasilas accuses Aquinas of being no less than robber and villain (ἀρσαγα ... καὶ κακούργον), and that he invented (ἀφ’ ἐαυτοῦ ... παρενείραντα) the major premise with reference to the teaching concerning the Holy Spirit (τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τοῦ Πνεύματος) [6.81415]. At this point Chrysoloras intervenes to defend Kabasilas stressing that when a major or minor premise is false then the syllogism is imperfect.

In addition, Chrysoloras criticizes Kydones’ attitude in refuting (ἀνεσκεύσας) Kabasilas’ argument, on the grounds that both the saints and scientia itself (καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτῆς), namely dialectics, support Kabasilas’ position. This stance has led you, Chrysoloras says, to blame Neilos alone for wrongly refuting Aquinas, thus

---


launching an accusation (κατηγορία) instead of offering a solution (λύσις) to the issue, which is easy to do for one who wishes to mock but difficult for wise and kind men. So, speak forth, he says to Kydones, the rest in your insolence, which Neilos cannot possibly hear (οὐδαμῶς ἀκούει) (since he is dead and gone) but you and, with you also God, can [6.15-26]!

Kydones commends Kabasilas for speaking solemnly (σεμνολογεῖται) and for showing remarkable zeal (ζῆλον ἐπιδείκνυται θαυμαστόν), as is appropriate in such cases. But when the time comes, he says, to respond (ἀπολογίας) he has nothing substantial to say (οὐκ εὐπορῇ), taking refuge in the hidden and ineffable aspects of the divinity (θεότητος), saying that we should not dare to consider or say something about God beyond what is proper, that is when he considers himself to be orthodox (εὐσεβής) confusing truth with ill-timed piety (παρὰ καιρὸν εὐλαβείᾳ). Taking hold of an insignificant point (ἴχνος) of a refutation, he says, he mumbles (τὴν τῶν χελιδόνων λαλιὰν παρελαύνει) putting forth absurdities (παραλογιζόμενος), sophistries (σοφιζόμενος) and lies (ψευδόμενος) against what is clearly true.

Defending the scholastic method, Kydones remarks that sometimes Kabasilas takes the liberty to legislate (μετ’ ἀδείας νομοθετῶν), as in this case, laying down laws such as the one that commands that we should not infer (ἀνάγεσθαι) knowledge of things divine (θείων) from existing beings (ὄντων) or deduce from them indications (ἐνδείξεις), on which grounds he unhesitatingly accuses Thomas of using this knowledge to ascend towards God (πρὸς Θεόν τῇ ἀνόδῳ). By saying these things, Kydones continues, it seems that Kabasilas clearly alienates the creation from the Creator, removing any likeness at all between the Creator and His creatures —for any craftsman (τεχνίτου) wishes to put into the artifacts he creates the form (εἶδος) of his art, as much as possible—, thus entirely removing (παντελῶς ἀναιρεῖσθαι) anything that we can say or think about God. Human beings, Kydones continues, by nature desire God because the divine image (θείας εἰκόνος), according to which they were created\footnote{Cf. Genesis 1:26: καὶ εἶπεν ὁ Θεός ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ’ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ’ ὀμοιότητα.}, urges them to do so. Many other absurdities follow this opinion, which does not allow man to ascend towards God, as much as this is possible for human beings,
through the created beings. If, therefore, Kydones continues, Kabasilas thinks that there is nothing worthy to say about things divine which transcend nature (ὑπερφυῶν), then he is the first who ought to shut up (σιγάτω), thus giving the example to the rest! On our part, he goes on, we would be grateful to him for releasing us from such random talking (εἰκασιολογίας, as Kydones says in his Antirrhetic and not δικαιολογίας as in the MSS). If, on the other hand, Kabasilas is so uncontrollable in his desire to speak of things divine (θεολογεῖν) that he composes his theology (τὴν αὐτοῦ θεολογίαν ψφαίνειν) even from the slightest things and most dissimilar to God, he ought to grant Thomas forgiveness for attempting through nature to indicate what concerns its Creator [6.27–58].

In turn Chrysoloras reproinds Kydones because, instead of putting forward arguments (ἐπιχειρήματα) or solutions (λύσεις) to refute Kabasilas’ views, he limited himself to accusing and abusing him with insolence. On these grounds Chrysoloras refuses to reply to Kydones’ arguments in order not to make, as he says, the same mistake he is accusing Kydones of! Chrysoloras’ sole criticism is that Kydones refuted only one among the nine arguments Kabasilas put forward in his DPSS III, and even this objection is not real but only apparent (οὐκ οὖσαν, ἀλλὰ δοκοῦσαν), namely that Neilos erroneously objects to Aquinas. Discussion (διαλέγεσθαι) offers no solution but rather a refutation for him who deliberates and is not the way wise men follow. There is only one among the latter (Pyrrho of Elis?) who seemed to do so, refuting all without considering saying anything else on the matters for which he is reproached. Actually, Chrysoloras says, Kydones looks like this man for though he refutes some of Kabasilas’ arguments he does so without pure knowledge (οὐ σὺν ἐπιστήμῃ). According to Chrysoloras this is because Kydones puts forward brief arguments that have little power or are irrelevant, while he underestimates the power of Kabasilas’ arguments. Chrysoloras closes this section introducing the next theme involving the virginity of the Mother of God [6.59–63].

[6.1] On the terms virginity, corruption and mother with reference to the Theotokos

The next point of discussion concerns Kydones’ statement that Mary can be *virgin* and *mother* (παρθένον τὲ εἶναι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μητέρα) at the same time. There is nothing harmful in this statement, he affirms, for the term *virginity* (παρθενία) is not in itself opposed (οὔς ἀντίκειται) to that of *mother*, though people consider it to be so. It is impossible for the two terms to tally (συμβαίνειν), he continues, not for the opposition of the terms but for the weakness of nature, as in the case of *habitation* after *privation* (ἡ μετὰ τὴν στέρησιν ἔξις) which is impossible for nature but is not impossible for a greater power (μείζονι δὲ δυνάμει). Since therefore, the term opposed to *virginity* is not that of *mother* but that of *corruption*, it is not impossible for a *virgin* to be *mother* as well, for this is the result of the divine power for which nothing is impossible. For human beings, however, because of the weakness of their nature and since one of the two parents is not enough by himself/herself to give birth to a child, this seems impossible and contains an opposition (*virginity* vs. *motherhood*). Therefore, if *childbirth* opposed *virginity*, it follows that God would not have made this and it would be impossible for opposites according to their terms (τὰ κατὰ λόγον καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀντικείμενα) to make God be joined in one (συνελθεῖν) (through the incarnation), in the same way that a person who is *virgin* cannot be *corrupted* (ἐφθαρμένην) in respect of the same thing (κατὰ ταὐτὸν), a *mother* cannot be in principle always childless (ἀεὶ ἄτεκνον, according to Kydones’ *Antirrhetic*, instead of τέκνον in the MSS). For everything is within God’s power, except those whose terms are opposed (ἀντικείμενοι) Christ, Kydones states, was God and man at the same time in his Person (προσώπῳ) and not in respect of the same thing according to nature (φύσει), for the nature in which He is God is not the same as that in which he is man. Therefore, Thomas’ teaching is not uncouth and crude, he concludes, but it is courteous (προσηνές) and philosophical (φιλόσοφον) [6.1.7-29].

Chrysoloras begins his refutation by attacking Aquinas as being not only bold and unphilosophical but also ridiculous (γελοῖος), since his arguments are absurd, especially the last of the three [cf. 6.1.24-25], for Paul declared that there is only one thing impossible for God, namely to deny Himself (2 Timothy 2:13). But you, Chrysoloras reprimands Kydones, claim that there is another inability in God,

---


namely that He has no power to join the terms of the opposites, for apparently God granted you greater grace than Paul! This results, according to Chrysoloras, from Kydones’ eagerness to follow Aristotle instead of following God Who is greater (πρεσβύτερος) and incomparable to Aristotle and all human beings [6.1.46-51]. What follows is a dense stichomythia between Chrysoloras and Kydones, with the former asking questions and the latter responding. We give a full translation of this section below, in order to show how this vivid debate unfolds [6.1.54-161].

CHRYSOLORAS: Is not hot (θερμόν) opposite to cold (ψυχρῷ) and dry (ξηρὸν) opposite to wet (ὑγρῷ)?

KYDONES: Yes.

CHRYSOLORAS: How is it that earth, being cold, corresponds to fire, and water to air? We see that though completely opposite, through an ineffable analogy (ἀρρήτῳ λόγῳ), they are also in complete harmony, the first through those in between and the latter through the extremes.

KYDONES: But these are simple things.

CHRYSOLORAS: If these apply to simple things then it follows even more for those which are composite, namely all living beings (ζῴοις ἅπασιν), each one of whom, body and all opposite powers, God joins wholly (ὅλῳ) with His ineffable voice. This is clear in combining the opposites. Similarly, the same exists in both rational and irrational beings.

KYDONES: These things (contrary properties) coexist in an animal not in energy/actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ) but only in potentiality (δυνάμει).

CHRYSOLORAS: This is true. But what would you say about desire (ἐπιθυμίας) and anger (θυμοῦ), both of which are irrational? These coexist with the reasoning faculty (λογιστικῷ), or more precisely these and the intellectual faculty (λογικὸν) fight one another for one and the same soul at the same time. The same principle (αὐτός … λόγος) of body and soul is visible for both mortals and immortals. In this way, God, Who is great in wisdom and for Whom nothing is impossible, joined the opposites in a kind of unbroken bond because He wanted it. This is impossible solely in our case.

given our own human weakness. Indeed, these things, which God made before in harmony, and are simply mightier and more remarkable, are now visible to us fighting one another.

KYDONES: I cannot see your point.

CHRYSOLORAS: Would you ever say anything about similarities, equalities or qualities for things which do not exist (οὐκ ὄντων)?

KYDONES: Certainly not.

CHRYSOLORAS: Then what can we say about these things that is appropriate?

KYDONES: Clearly that they lack quality, are unequal and dissimilar.

CHRYSOLORAS: Look now: from things which do not exist God creates beings in which the quality, equality and similarity are contemplated (ἐνορᾶται). Their analogy, therefore, is much higher than the joining of the opposites. Hence who would say that He Who has the power to do what is greater lacks the power to do what is lesser? It is not true, therefore, that God cannot join opposites in respect of the same thing (κατὰ ταὐτόν). Don’t you agree?

KYDONES: Of course.

CHRYSOLORAS: Well then, one must examine next the arguments concerning the Blessed and Most Pure <Theotokos>. What do you have to say?

KYDONES: I say, the term virginity does not at all oppose the term mother but only the term corruption, and rightly so.

CHRYSOLORAS: But corruption is opposite to birth, while virginity and birth are not identical. Therefore, corruption is not opposite to virginity. Moreover, birth is some kind of motion while virginity is not, and therefore these are not opposite. Again, birth is not different (οὐκ ἀλλοίον) but other (ἀλλο), while virginity can be different, and therefore these two are not identical, nor is corruption opposed to virginity. If you have some other corruption in mind, what would be the opposite to men’s virginity?

For the corruption you have in mind does not exist.

KYDONES: But what else could be the opposite to virginity if not corruption?

CHRYSOLORAS: If we are incapable of finding this, it is not because this is necessary, as you say. For many things have no opposite at all. Now, virginity (παρθενεία) is opposite to not virginity (μὴ παρθενεία) rather than to corruption (φθορά). However, we do not stop you from giving a try. Let’s say that virginity is opposed to corruption,
as you say. We must, therefore, examine whether everything which is opposite to just this one thing or these things that oppose this thing and to those who follow it, oppose all things, as the Philosopher (i.e., Aristotle) demands (πᾶν, ὅτινι ἀντικείμενον αὐτῶι μόνον, ἥ καὶ ἃ τούτω, καὶ οἷς αὐτῶ ἐπεται, πάσι μάχεται, ὡς ὁ Φιλόσοφος ἄξιοι)\textsuperscript{214}.

**Kydones**: It is clear that it opposes all things.

**Chrysoloras**: Consider, then, what you are saying. Do you confess that virginity is opposed to corruption alone?

**Kydones**: Indeed.

**Chrysoloras**: Is it ever possible for a child to be born without corruption?

**Kydones**: This is impossible.

**Chrysoloras**: Therefore, it is necessary that childbirth follows corruption and no one would say otherwise.

**Kydones**: Of course.

**Chrysoloras**: Is childbirth identical or different from the term mother? Answer me.

**Kydones**: I confess it must be identical, for wherever the one is the other necessarily follows it.

**Chrysoloras**: Since then mother follows childbirth while childbirth again follows corruption, and, according to you, the term virginity is opposed to corruption, similarly virginity must be opposed to the term mother as it is to corruption. Indeed, the term virginity is much more strongly opposed to the term mother than to corruption, for childbirth is something further (ἐπὶ πλέον) than all corruption since corruption is always where childbirth is but the reverse is not necessary.

**Kydones**: I cannot contradict one who who speaks the truth. Not at all.

**Chrysoloras**: But what you were saying, speaking the truth, that Christ, the same in personhood (προσώπῳ), was God and man, and not in identity of nature — while you think to loosen in Him the definition of virginity and that of mother, which are utterly dissimilar (i.e., to remove their incompatibility) —, and that Christ in His personhood was God and man but not the same with reference to the nature, is absolutely true. Except that He has two natures but only one hypostasis, while the term virginity is completely dissimilar to corruption and mother, for these three things were manifest with reference to the one and only nature of the Blessed one (the

\textsuperscript{214} So far I have been unable to trace this saying in the Aristotelian Corpus.
Moreover, even if it were possible for the same things to be found in another woman before or after Her, even so your argument would not be true. But what are these things that concern Her? She is born according to a promise and this was followed by other events. She is brought to the temple at the age of three and eagerly follows solitude. She is fed with heavenly food. She sees the angel Gabriel as he was by nature (.ὡς εἶχε φύσεως). She conceives through the power of the Spirit. She straightaway conceives the babe perfect in Her womb. She gives birth at the appropriate time without the pangs of childbirth (./octetων). She kept virginity before and after childbirth. She sees Gabriel once again as he was by nature at the time of her death (τελευτῇ). She sees with her corporeal eyes Her glorified Son and the whole army of the incorporeal hosts before Her death. Are all these things not beyond nature? Are they not greater than the power of the opposites? What, therefore, is new if the terms virginity and mother were joined in Her, so that this term partakes of an opposite power; this term, which your teacher, Thomas, and you, who support him, attack as being opposite to the blessed Virgin, although you are wrong in doing so?

**Kydones:** I confess that these points are fair and necessary. Except that you omit what I have said about the projector. This is not fair.

**Chrysoloras:** What have you said about this?

At this point Chrysoloras turns once more to discuss briefly the terms concerning the emanation of the Persons in the Trinity [6.2]. Since projection (προβολή), Kydones says, does not oppose either fatherhood (πατρότητι) or filiation (υἱότητι) it is possible that to project (προβάλλειν) belongs to both Father and Son and that they are one projector (ἐνα προβολέα), and when we refer to projector we apprehend (νοεῖν) both and at the same time each one of them on his own (ἰδίᾳ). In addition, Kydones continues, if in the projector we perceive also the Son—for the Father alone is not another projector beside the Father and the Son, but both Father and Son are one and the same projector (εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτός, ἀμφοτέρων προβολέας)—, therefore the Father alone and the projector, that is the Father and the Son, are not at all two things (οὐδαμῶς ... ὕπο πράγματα). Chrysoloras simply avoids refuting this argument, referring Kydones

---

215 In this section of the Dialogue Chrysoloras draws information on Mary’s life from the Gospel of Luke and, mainly, the Protevangelium or Infancy Gospel of James. For references see edition below, p. 322.
(and the reader) to Kabasilas’ refutation, according to which, only if the Son were to be called *projector* this leads us to introduce two causes and two principles into the Trinity [6.2.1-13]216.

[7] Sixth Syllogism on the Holy Spirit

The next point of discussion concerns Aquinas’ fundamental teaching of the *generation* of the Son perceived as the *act of intellect* and the *procession* of the Holy Spirit as the *act of will* within the *intellectual nature* of God217. Aquinas states that *Love* (*amor*, ἀγάπη) is the name proper for the Spirit218 and *Word* (*verbum*, λόγος) is the name proper for the Son219. In his SCG Aquinas states the following: There is more. From the very fact of saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds *by way of will* (per modum voluntatis) and the Son *by way of intellect* (per modum intellectus) it follows that the Holy Spirit is *from* the Son. For *love* proceeds from a *word* (*amor procedit a verbo*): since we are able to *love* nothing but that which a *word* of the heart conceives220. In other words, in analogy to human beings, *love* proceeds from the *word* and human beings cannot *love* something before they conceive it with their *intellect*. Therefore, Aquinas affirms, the Spirit proceeds from the Son [7.1.5]221. Chrysoloras cites this passage *verbatim* from Kabasilas’ *DPSS III*, but with a significant change. Instead of *by way of will* (per modum voluntatis) Kabasilas (and subsequently Chrysoloras) state *by way of love* (ὡς ἀγάπην προϊέναι). It is possible that Kydones’ (hitherto unpublished) translation contains the word ἀγάπην

---


218 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q. 37, a. 1 resp.: Respondendo dicendum quod nomen amoris in divinis sumi potest et essentialiter et personaliter. Et secundum quod personaliter sumitur, est proprium nomen spiritus sancti; sicut verbum est proprium nomen filii.

219 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 2 resp.: Respondendo dicendum quod verbum proprium dicturn in divinis personaliter accipitur, et est proprium nomen personae filii. Significat enim quandam emanationem intellectus, persona autem quae procedit in divinis secundum emanationem intellectus, dicitur filius, et huuiusmodi processio dicitur generatio, ut supra ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod solus filius propri re dicatur verbum in divinis.


instead of θέλησιν. If so, he must have translated from a Latin MS which contains the phrase *per modum amoris* instead of *per modum voluntatis*. Kabasilas seems to be aware that the two terms, *love* and *will*, refer to the procession of the Holy Spirit. His objection to the above statement is established on the Greek patristic tradition, which stressed that the *generation* and the *projection* are ineffable (ἀρρητον) and inexpressible (ἀνέκφραστον) for the human mind [7.6-10]222. The most extensive refutation of Aquinas’ teaching on this point, to our knowledge, was produced by Manuel Moschopoulos (1265-1316) in his treatise *On the Generation of the Son and the Procession of the Holy Spirit*223, sections of which are quoted often *verbatim* by Matthaios Blastares (ca. 1290- ca. 1350) in his treatise *On the Errors of the Latins*224.

The Latin teaching that *word* and *love* are the names proper for the Son and the Spirit respectively originates in Augustine’s *De Trinitate* Book XV, ch. xvii225. This is pointed out to Kabasilas by Kydones who criticizes him on the grounds that though he is aware of this he accused Augustine of blasphemy [7.11-20]226. Chrysoloras remarks that if this theorem (θεώρημα) is wrongly attributed to him, then Augustine is totally innocent. Otherwise Augustine is blameworthy even more, because though he was a wise man (σοφὸν) yet he did not wish to seek the truth but fought against it [7.21-34].

The debate continues focusing on the attribution of the name *Word* (Λόγος) explicitly to the Son [7.35-65]. Kydones defends this view by explaining that the Gospel thrice

---

222 Neilos Kabasilas, *DPSS III*, pp. 312.21-314.25, cites passages from Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, Gregory Nazianzene and John Damascene, which stress this view. See Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology*, p. 181.


226 *Dialogue* [7.18-19]: ὅν δ’ οὖν ἡμεῖς ἴσην, Αὐγουστίνος ἐστὶν ὧ σοφώτατε, ὅν, αὐτὸς ταλμᾶς, βλασφημίας διώκειν.
states God the Word (John 1:1, 2, 14)\textsuperscript{227}. Chrysoloras adds that there is a fourth quotation which he does not specify. This must be the passage in John’s Book of Revelation (19:13)\textsuperscript{228}. Kydones remarks that it is common Christian belief that the Son is Word in respect of the truth of God (κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τοῦ Θεοῦ), not metaphorically as is the case with many other such names, but He is the Word of God essentially (οὐσιωδῶς), properly (κυρίως) and transcendentally (ὑπεροχικῶς)\textsuperscript{[7,35-44]}. Drawing from John Damascene’s Exposition of faith, Chrysoloras responds that this is far from truth, for some names that refer to God state what He is not (τί, οὐκ ἔστι)\textsuperscript{229} while others indicate a relation with things that are different from Him (σχέσιν, ἐν τοῖς διαστελλομένοις)\textsuperscript{230}. Again, some names are consequential to His nature (τῇ φύσει παρέπεται)\textsuperscript{231}, others have mutual relation (πρὸς ἀλλὰ τὴν σχέσιν ἔχει), and others refer to His energy and others are symbolical (συμβολικά) which are also called metaphorical (μεταφορικά). Among all these names, Chrysoloras continues, no one can be related to one another as the names Father/Son/Spirit, unbegotten/begotten/projected, uncaused/caused. These are the only names accepted by the saints as being relative (σχετικά), and are also called distinguished (διακεκριμένα) (a reference to the distinct personal/hypostatic properties of each Person in the Trinity). All the other names should be understood as referring to the whole Godhead (πᾶση θεότητι), identically (ταὐτώς), simply (ἀπλῶς), indivisibly (ἀμερῶς) and in unity (ἡνωμένως)\textsuperscript{232}. For these reasons, Chrysoloras concludes, the names God and Word are common to the Trinity. Otherwise, the dictum the Logos was with God (John 1:1) would have not been reasonably said (οὐκ εἰκότως ἂν λέγοιτο)\textsuperscript{[7,45-56]}. But the Word, Kydones answers, belongs to things which are in a relation (τῶν ἐν σχέσει) and which are related to something (πρὸς τι)\textsuperscript{233}, and necessarily seeks the One Whose Word is; and the Word is the Word of no one else but God\textsuperscript{[7,57-59]}. This is valid with reference to human beings, Chrysoloras counter-argues, and not with reference to God. For if the Son were called the Word of God and the name God were a common

\textsuperscript{227} Cf. John 1:1-2: ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, αὐτὸς ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν; ibid., 1:14: Καὶ ὁ λόγος εἰσε ἐγένετο καὶ ἐκκήνθη ἐν ἡμῖν.

\textsuperscript{228} John, Book of Revelation 19:13: καὶ περιβεβλημένος ἰμάτιον βεβλημένον αἴματι, καὶ κέκληται τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ.

\textsuperscript{229} John Damascene, Exposition, § 9, pp. 31-32.

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., § 9, pp. 31-32.

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., § 9, pp. 31-32.

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., § 10, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{233} Cf. Aristotle, Categories 6a.36-8b.24.
belief (κοινὴ δόξα) among Christians as it is a common name with reference to the Holy Trinity, according to you, Chrysoloras remarks, the name Word would denote all three Persons, which is absurd and impossible. Chrysoloras adds that, as said above, the name Word is common (κοινὸν) and therefore it should be considered far from denoting a personal property (ιδιαξόντων) [7.60.63].

Further explaining Aquinas’ teaching, Kydones comments on the Son being the Word (verbum, λόγος) and intellect (intellectus, νόησις) conceived by the mind (νοῦς) of the Father, in analogy to the intellectual process in human beings. He supports this view on the basis of Gregory Nazianzene’s well-known dictum, according to which the Word of God is the impulse of the great mind (Λόγε Θεοῦ ... Ω νοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου ... ὀρήμα) [7.71-72]. Gregory’s purpose, Chrysoloras states, was not to consider God as mind and His Son as word and intellect. His aim was to show that the Son is offspring (γέννημα) and that He eternally emanates ineffably (ἀορῆτως ἀεὶ προέκυψεν) from the Father. When intellect refers to the essence (οὐσία) of God each of the three Persons is equally (ὁμοίως) intellect and when intellect is compared to the divine energy then it is common (κοινὸν) to the three Persons [7.73-77]. To Kydones’ question, who is responsible for this interpretation, Chrysoloras names Maximus the Confessor ‘in one of the chapters of his theology’ (Capita de caritate), whom he cites verbatim: God perceives (νοεῖ) Himself and His creatures; and <He conceives> of Himself in virtue of His blessed essence while <He conceives> of His creatures in virtue of His wisdom, through which and in which He made everything [7.78-87]. Therefore, Chrysoloras concludes, the name mind is not a personal name for the Father and intellect is not attributed only to the Son. This is clear, since mind (νοῦς) is not the same as intellect (νοησεῖ) [7.78-87].

Kydones agrees on this point, adding that with reference to God, on account of His absolute simplicity (ἄκρας ἀπλότητα) His intellect coincides with His essence and therefore by necessity the Word that emanates (προϊόν) from the divine intellect is Son by nature (φύσει), because He comes into being (γενόμενος) from the essence of God. In this case essence and intellect are the same. Indeed, Kydones asks, which

234 Gregory Nazianzene, Homily on Easter (Or. 45), § 30, PG 36, col. 664A: Λόγε Θεοῦ, καὶ φῶς, καὶ ζωή, καὶ σοφία, καὶ δύναμις! χάρις γὰρ πάσι σου τοῖς ἀνήμασιν. Ω νοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου γέννημα, καὶ ὀρήμα.
among things divine (ἐν τοῖς θείοις) would be equal to God and would not be essence (οὐσία), being (عالج) and God [7.98-93]? To ask this question is contrary to orthodoxy (εὐσεβείᾳ), Chrysoloras replies. For to say that everything asserted in relation to God is identical with God (ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ) has been shown by saints numerous and great to be other (έτερον) than it should be; and none of the names is able to express His essence (οὐσίαν). Chrysoloras prefers to leave this subject at that point as the purpose of this treatise is other. Kydones protests, stating that the opposite is evident to him and that Chrysoloras’ argument is doubtful (ἀφανῆ). Chrysoloras, nonetheless, responds that in his view his argument is entirely convincing! [7.94-103].

The Syllogism closes with Chrysoloras refuting Kydones’ argument that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son for It is the Love with which both Father and Son love each other, according to Aquinas’ teachings [7.104-108].236 Since the emanation of intellecction is Word and Son it remains that the emanation of Love is of the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is the divine love in which (ἵ) the Father and the Son love each other (ἀλλήλους ἀγαπῶσιν). For this reason, therefore, Kydones concludes, it is necessary to say that the Holy Spirit is from both (εξ ἀμφοτέρων) Father and Son. Chrysoloras objects once more on the grounds that since has been proven [cf. 7.56-103] that the Son and the Word is not emanation of the intellecction (τῆς νοήσεως πρόοδον) but the Son is an offspring of the hypostasis of the Father and the Word is word of the One Father who speaks forth (τὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦ λέγοντος), it follows that the Holy Spirit would not be distinctively (ἰδιαζόντως) called love, for this is common to the other two Persons as well. This is because we simply call God love and Christ calls Himself love237. For all these reasons, Chrysoloras remarks, your conclusion (συμπέρασμα) is incorrect, for the Son is not cause (αἴτιος) of the Spirit. Among the six arguments (προβλήμασιν ἓξ) Neilos put forward against Thomas, Chrysoloras complains, you only refuted two of them, which is what you usually do! I do as I please, Kydones responds sharply. Let us listen to another syllogism! [7.109-119].

[8] Seventh Syllogism on the order of the Persons in the Trinity

236 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia, q. 37, a. 1-2.
237 Cf. 1 John 4:8.
The next question examined in the *Dialogue* concerns the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity by order of *causation* (αἰτία). According to Aquinas, the distinction in immaterial essences (*substantiis immaterialibus, αὐλοῖς <οὐσίαις>*) can be that according to order (ordinem, κατὰ τὴν τάξιν). However, in the divine Persons, who are entirely immaterial, there can be no other order than that of *cause* (originis, αἰτίας). Therefore, there are not two Persons emanating (procedentes, τηροϊόντα) from one, unless one of those proceeds (procedat, τηροἶει) from the other. Therefore, Aquinas concludes, the Spirit proceeds from the Son (spiritum sanctum procedere a filio). Aquinas’ conclusion reads differently in the *Dialogue*: therefore, Chrysoloras states, the Son is *cause* (αἴτιος ὁ Υἱὸς ἀρχή) [8.1-5] 238. Kabasilas states that he cannot deny that there is order in the Godhead and again there is not, in the sense that order does not exist in God’s *essence* (οὐσία) which is common to the three Persons but it does exist only in the Persons in order to keep the hypostatic properties unmixed (ἀμιγῆ) and incommunicable (ἀκοινώνητον) among each other [8.6-10]. At this point Kydones intervenes thanking Kabasilas for conceding to the existence of order among the Persons but at the same time criticizing him because though he placed the Son and the Spirit’s order with reference to the Father he failed to place order between the Son and the Spirit, thus rendering order only half way (ἐξ ἡμισείας) with reference to God [8.11-17]. Why should order of cause be granted to the Son and the Spirit with reference to the Father while no order at all, or dissimilar order, should be granted between the Son and the Spirit vis-à-vis each other? Kydones asks. Chrysoloras enters the debate stating that Kydones’ last statement is in fact quite the opposite. There is a remarkable and familiar (θαυμαστὴ καὶ οἰκεία) order between the Son and the Spirit. To accept that these two Persons come from one another (ἐξ, ἀλλήλων) as the principle (ἀρχήν) and hence that they come from this principle leads to many absurdities. This introduces disorder (ἀταξία) in the Trinity with reference to the *essence* itself (περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτήν) and much confusion (σύγχυσις) with reference to the Persons. For, if two

\[238\] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, SCG IV, 24, no. 3618: Item. Si quis diversas species rerum consideret, in eis quidam ordo ostenditur: prout viventia sunt supra non viventia, et animalia supra plantas, et homo super alia animalia, et in singulis horum diversi gradus inveniuntur secundum diversas species; unde et Plato species rerum dixit esse numeros qui specie variantur per additionem vel subtractionem unitalis. Chrysoloras cites this: Unde in substantiis immaterialibus non potest esse distinctio nisi secundum ordinem. In divinis autem personis, quae sunt omnino immateriales, non potest esse alius ordo nisi originis. Non igitur sunt duae personae ab una procedentes, nisi una earum procedat ab altera. Et sic oportet Spiritum Sanctum procedere a Filio.
Persons are the cause of one and the latter is cause of no one, it is clear that the Persons would be totally unequal and utterly disorderly. In addition, the Person (Spirit) that emanates from the other two (Father and Son) would be much lesser (ἐλαττών) in honour and its dishonour would affect the other two. For the dishonour and degradation of the caused, Chrysoloras continues, is not honour and elevation of the causes but the glory of the former is rather glory and honour of the latter. Therefore, Chrysoloras concludes, as Kabasilas says, order is that each Person keeps its own property (ἰδιότητα) [8.18-29]. This view, maintaining that if two Persons are the cause of one and the latter is cause of no one it will eliminate the equality of the three Persons, degrading the one and elevating the other two in terms of honour, is a basic argument in the Orthodox arsenal[239]. Kabasilas’ argument, Kydones responds, seems to contradict his principle of separating questions concerning things divine and things that fall outside this area. Neither he nor any one else, Chrysoloras says, would ever prove anything by taking beings (ὄντων) as a point of departure and then advance to things divine on the basis of similarity (ὁμοιότητα) [8.30-37]. Kydones adds that it is not true that the cause of the order existing among things (πράγμασι) is the fact that each one of these preserves its own property. In fact, as regards simply distinguishing them it is sufficient that each abide in its own property, but as regards order and their relation to each other (πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν) the opposite is the case. For instance, what sort of order could be conceived between man and circle in terms of the former possessing rationality and the latter possessing the property of having equal distance from the centre? If therefore there is order between the Son and the Spirit we should not say that this order refers to the Father alone, for this means that a Person is placed in order (τετάχθαι) with reference to another Person and not each with reference to the other. In order to place order among all three Persons (ἐν ἀλλήλοις) we must refer to another order, which Kabasilas intentionally omitted, Kydones remarks, but Aquinas together with Gregory of Nyssa (μετὰ τοῦ Νύσσης) pronounced, namely that of cause and caused (τὴν τοῦ αἰτίου ... καὶ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ). This is the only kind of order that we can perceive in the divine Persons [8.38-50].

239 Ch. Soteropoulos, Θέματα θεολογίας τοῦ ΙΔ’ αἰώνος (Athens, 1990), pp. 206-208.
You propose here, Chrysoloras responds, something which was not the purpose of Neilos and you draw wrong conclusions, blaming him, who cannot put up with these arguments (δισχευαίνοντι πλείστα), namely that we advance from worldly beings to things divine, which Kabasilas mocks rather than believes and which is supported by the sayings of the saints. The aforementioned example, concerning man’s rationality and the distance of the centre in the circle, leads to great absurdities, for it has nothing in common when applied to the cause of distinction among the divine Persons. For circle and rationality, Chrysoloras continues, are opposites not only by being completely different (ἀκρᾳ διαφορᾷ) to one another but also by being unable to be implanted (ἐμφυτεύεσθαι) in the essence. Even if the divine Persons have a relative opposition (ἀντίθεσιν ... ἀναφορικὴν) in themselves nevertheless they are perfectly united (ἐνούται) in their essence and they are dissimilar to the rationality/circle analogy. Therefore, Chrysoloras concludes, this argument is inappropriately used here. It is true that the argument put forward by Aquinas and Gregory of Nyssa concerning the distinction in God, which you find convincing (ἀσφαλῆ), Chrysoloras says, is omitted by Kabasilas. However, he remained silent on this because a far greater theologian than him expounded on the distinction of the divine Persons. To Kydones’ question who is this man and what did he say concerning this subject, Chrysoloras presents Dionysius, who (in his treatise On the divine names) states that the only source of the supra-essential Godhead is the Father and that the divine Persons are distinguished with relation to their source and cause. Such is the canon (κανόνος) which Christian faith should follow, articulated (φιλοσοφήσαντι) by the greatest of theologians, Chrysoloras declares. It should be noted that the authority of Ps-Dionysius in Byzantine and Western theological thought remained undisputed in this period.

Kydones continues by arguing that even if one accepts that between the Son and the Spirit there is order in terms of cause and caused, it is does not necessarily follow that the Spirit is (εἶναι) also from the Son. However, it is plausible to say the reverse, namely that the Son is from the Spirit. By maintainig (τηρουμένη) this order, as Aquinas said, we do not draw the conclusion which he rather does not wish to, for he says that this is not at all necessary. First, if this argument is valid, it follows that the

---

240 Ps-Dionysius Aeropagite, On the divine names, 5, p. 128.11-12; 7, p. 132.1.
241 So far I have not traced this citation, which is not included in the Corpus Dionysiacum.
Spirit is Father, that is, if indeed the Spirit has the analogy of *cause* with reference to the Son. Hence it is absurd, Kydones argues, to perceive the order of *cause* and *caused* between the Son and the Spirit in this way [8.77-86]. Chrysoloras proceeds to ask Kydones whether he is unaware that the absurdity in both cases is similar even though it might be perceived in different things (διαφόροις). For inasmuch as it is totally inappropriate to say that there are two *fathers* to a single Son in the Trinity, in the same way it is no less absurd to say that there are two *projectors* to a single projected Person (ἐνὸς προβλήματος). Each of these absurdities necessarily follows your and Thomas’ thesis (θέσει), Chrysoloras affirms. On our part we reject both in order to follow the correct faith. Only a mad person, Kydones answers, would understand that the Son is (εἶναι) from the Spirit, since the Spirit is from the Father *through* the Son. If *through* the Son defines the *projected* (ἐκπορευτοῦ), how would one assume that the Spirit is *cause* of the Son, since the Spirit clearly is *from* and *through* the Son? This is a wrong question, Chrysoloras responds. It is even more wrong when one intentionally manipulates arguments leading them to opposite conclusions, for this is what you are accusing me of, he continues, since you deliberate on this axiom (κανόνι) without taking into consideration the saints or *scientia* (ἐπιστήμης). The sayings of the saints, he continues, will suffice. It is clear from all their sayings that the Spirit is not from the Son and that the expression *through the Son* does appear but not as *cause* (αἴτιον). Leaving aside the abundant testimony of the saints, Chrysoloras says, Neilos solved the present syllogism (συλλογισμὸν) through his fourth argument (τετάρτῳ ... ἐπιχειρήματι) while you charge him with two arguments. Kydones’ response is similar as previously: I do what I like! Let us listen to another syllogism [8.97-109].

**[9] Eighth Syllogism on the hypostatic properties**

Having established that the basis of our perception of order in the Trinity depends on *causation*, Chrysoloras proceeds with the next Syllogism which examines the hypostatic properties of the Persons. First, Aquinas presents his view. The Father and the Son, he states, do not differ in the *unity of essence* (ad unitatem essentiae) and

---

therefore anything other than this (i.e., paternity and filiation) is common to the Father and the Son. Hence to be the origin (principium) of the Spirit is common to the Father and the Son [9.14]244. It is true, Kabasilas responds, that there is an origin (ἀρχήν) of the Holy Spirit apart from the paternity and filiation analogy. To argue, however, that the Father and the Son cannot be distinguished in any other way except that the one is Father and the other is Son, is not true. For in this way there is no room left for the cause (αἰτίαν), the source (πηγήν) and the origin (ἀρχήν), which are the properties of the Father (πατρικὰ ᾕδιώματα) [9.59]. The arguments Kabasilas uses to confirm (κατασκευάζειν, but ἀνασκευάζειν in Kydones' Antirrhetic) the truth, Kydones says, to support that the Father is distinguished from the Son only by His paternity and nothing else—for Thomas says that everything except paternity are common to both Father and Son—are not worthy of response and therefore should be omitted, as these have been refuted by many theologians. Your insolent accusations, Chrysoloras says, are not worthy of a reply, for your argument is not a refutation (ἀνασκευὴ) which would invite an objection but is an insult which deserves to remain in silence [9.10-22]. Let me say only this, Kydones adds. If the Father differs from the Son in something else apart from paternity (πατρότητα), by necessity this will be property of the Father (ἴδιον ἐσται τοῦ Πατρὸς). Therefore, since paternity is a hypostatic property of the Father every other property of His (πᾶν ἄλλο αὐτοῦ ῖδιον) is added to Him with relation to the analogy of paternity (πατρότητος λόγον), in the same way that laughing is a property of man which is added to him with relation to the analogy of humanity. Also, according to the same analogy, the fact that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, which is a property of the triangle, is added to the triangle universally (πρόσεστι καθόλου), qua triangle (ἡ, τρίγωνῳ). Therefore, if to be the cause of the Holy Spirit is a property of the Father and is not shared with the Son, it is necessary to be added to the Father according to the analogy of paternity, and surely then qua Father, He will directly project (προσεχῶς προβαλεῖται) the Spirit. In this way the Spirit will be Son!

---

These views are entirely absurd, false and impossible, Chrysoloras states, and it would be better if these, too, remained in silence. Human laughter and geometrical properties in the triangle cannot possibly help us to understand the properties of the divine Persons. The ability to laugh belongs to the whole human nature and is not characteristic of a single hypostasis alone, on account of which it belongs to all identically at once, and is joined to one (ἐνι σύνεστι), and what is common is personal and vice versa. The reverse is also the case. The ability to laugh is human and what is human would be called (καλοῖτο) having the ability to laugh. This, however, is not the case with reference to the divine Persons, but is totally different. The characteristic property (χαρακτηριστικόν) of one hypostasis is extremely incommunicable (ἀκοινώνητον) to the other two hypostases, and what is common (κοινόν) should never be called personal (ἴδιον). This, however, is not reversible with reference to another hypostasis, with respect to what belongs to another hypostasis. Therefore, there is nothing common between the personal characteristic (χαρακτηριστικῷ) of those hypostases and man’s ability to laugh [9.23-56]. Kydones agrees with these arguments but is not convinced about the reversible properties (ἀντιστροφήν). For all else that is said with reference to the Father except paternity, is reversible, one to another and all belong to the Son, except paternity. To Chrysoloras’ question whether the source, cause and origin are different from, or identical with, paternity, Kydones responds that though they are different they are common to the Son, for He, too, is also source, origin and cause of the Spirit. In this case, Chrysoloras continues, would the unbegotten (ἀγεννήτου), without beginning (ἀνάρχου) and uncaused (ἀναιτίου) be different from, or the same as paternity? He gives the answer himself: these are different and belong to the Father as the previous properties (source, origin and cause). Are origin and cause convertible (Ἀντιστρέφει) to without beginning and unbegotten? Chrysoloras asks. There are two options he says: if without cause is not convertible (μὴ ἀντιστρέφει) then the cause does not belong to the Son, since it is other than paternity, the opposite of what you reluctantly professed before; if, on the other hand, without cause and cause are reversible to one another, then the Son will be uncaused, without beginning and unbegotten, as well as origin, source and cause. On these grounds we would say that the Son is Father. What would be more absurd than this? Besides, if these are common to the Father and the Son, then they should either be or not be common to the
Spirit. Even if this negation (ἀπόφασις) is valid, then the degradation of the Spirit follows as the Spirit does not share those properties which belong to the Father and the Son. This, too, is clearly absurd. If, on the other hand, the affirmation (κατάφασις) is valid then the Spirit would be without beginning and uncaused, which is even worse. Therefore, for both reasons your conclusions about God are unsound, Chrysoloras chides Kydones, and your thesis is dissimilar (ἀνόμοιος), for all belong to the Son apart from paternity, and according to the analogy of paternity they refer to the Father but they are not reversible. Inasmuch as paternity refers to the Father, all else follows and inasmuch as paternity does not refer to the other Persons, this is precisely what makes Him Father ( quam Patrī, καὶ τάλλα πάντως ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἢ δὲ τάλλα, κατὰ τούτο Πατήρ). Your present argument, Chrysoloras remarks with confidence, has vanished (οἴχεται). Though Kabasilas, he repeats, used many arguments to refute this syllogism, you chose to fight with few. Kydones responds in his usual calm manner: It seems to me better this way. Let another syllogism come to us [9,37-90].

[10] Ninth Syllogism on the origin in the Trinity

The discussion proceeds with questioning Aquinas’ statement concerning the Son being also the origin of the Spirit (SCG IV, 24, no. 3620). Whenever one thing is not opposed to the term (in the sense of essential intelligibility) (rationem) of another, Aquinas states, there is no impossibility about their coming together [10.1.1-2]. But to be the origin (principium) of the Holy Spirit is not contrary to the term (rationem) Son. Therefore, it is not impossible for the Son to be the origin of the Holy Spirit, and therefore it is possible. In things divine (divinis) being (esse) and possibility (posse) are identical. Therefore, the Son is the origin (principium) of the Holy Spirit, Aquinas concludes.

Chrysoloras replaces the term origin (principium, ἀρχή) used by Kydones and Kabasilas (ὁ Υἱὸς ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος) with cause (αἴτιος ὁ Υἱός

245 Thomas Aquinas, SCG IV, 24, no. 3620: Amplius. Quicquid non est contra rationem alicuius, non est impossibile ei convenire, nisi forte per accidentes. Esse autem principium Spiritus Sancti non est contra rationem Filii. Neque inquantum est Deus: quia Pater est principium Spiritus Sancti. Neque inquantum est Filii: eo quod alia est processio Spiritus Sancti et Filii; non est autem repugnans id quod est a principio secundum unam processionem, esse principium processionis alterius. Relinquitur igitur quod non sit impossible Filium esse principium Spiritus Sancti. Quod autem non est impossible, potest esse. In divinis autem non differt esse et posse. Ergo Filius est principium Spiritus Sancti.
If the Father, Kabasilas replies, is not opposed to the term Son it follows that is not impossible for the Son to become (γενέσθαι) Father. If, however, the Father is opposed to the term Son, this is also false. For it is possible that these terms are opposed and that the Son would become Father [10.6-10]. Kydones criticizes Kabasilas’ hostile attitude, without leaving any point of Aquinas’ teachings unrefuted. On his part Chrysoloras advises Kydones to change his tone towards Kabasilas in order to proceed with the discussion. Kydones states that Aquinas’ first statement (i.e., Whenever one thing is not opposed to the term of another there is no impossibility about their coming together [10.1-2]) is evident even to barbarian Scythians and even more ignorant people. Chrysoloras reprimands Kydones for this characterization, which he finds offensive [10.11-28]. Kydones continues arguing that according to Aquinas’ statement beget and begotten cannot be distinguished on account of this or that man being both father and son. This last statement, attributed to Kydones by Chrysoloras in the Dialogue, though cited verbatim from Kabasilas247 and is also found in Demetrios Chrysoloras’ Abridged exposition248, is not found in Kydones’ Antirrhetic (as transmitted in codex D)249. To assume, Kydones continues, that the possibility of the same person being both father and son with reference to human beings (ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις) refutes this statement (i.e., that it is possible for those things which are not opposed to come together), is childish (παιδική). For the same person is both father and son, but not in relation to the same person [10.29-35]. This is correct, Chrysoloras affirms, but to accuse Kabasilas of being ‘childish’ and for stating ‘We wonder what we should think about you’ (Ἀποροῦμεν, τί ἂν περὶ σοῦ νομιοῦμεν), this is unfair. Again this last phrase is not found in D. For this reason, Chrysoloras remarks, we should honour your insolence with our silence! No man, or angel, or God Himself, Chrysoloras continues, has ever stated that whatever happens to created beings usually (εἴωθεν) happens to things divine. Therefore, it is you, Chrysoloras exclaims, who devotes yourself to childish things! [10.36-45].

246 Cf. Neilos Kabasilas, DPSS III, p. 336.4-5.
248 Demetrios Chrysoloras, Abridged exposition, § 43.17-20, p. 163.
249 Cf. Demetrios Kydones, Antirrhetic, Vat. gr. 614, f. 124v.14-17: τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὴ εἶναι τὸν πρόδηλον ὡς δία τινα μάχην καὶ ἐναντίον αὐτῶν συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλληλοῖς κοινωνήσας κοιλίνθοι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅσα συνήσαισιν ἀλληλοίς· ὧν δὲ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἐναντίον τῳ τοῦ ἑτέρου, οὐκ ἀδύνατον συνελθεῖν ἀλληλοῖς.
Kydones insists that this statement is confirmed by the theologians and philosophers (σοφοί), who agree that there is no place for *potentiality* (τὸ δυνάμει) in the divine essence. *Potentiality* is twofold (Διπλοῦν), Chrysoloras replies: (a) the *potentiality* which human beings partake of is *imperfect* and has no place in God, while the other (b) is *perfect* and is often fitting (ἀρμόζεται) both to us human beings and to God. It is true that the former is far removed from God while the latter is not so. To state that in God (ἐν τῷ Θεῷ) possibility (δύνασθαι) does not differ from being (εἶναι) is not only false as it opposes the teachings of the saints, but also blasphemous because God brings all that do not exist to existence and *vice versa*, a *potentiality* (δύναμις) God has simply by His will (βουλομένῳ). God does not do so using *righteousness* (δικαιοσύνη) and *love for mankind* (φιλανθρωπίᾳ), but He brings about everything He wishes at the appropriate time. Therefore, Chrysoloras concludes, *possibility* and *being* are not identical in the great Father (τῷ μεγάλῳ Πατρί) [10.66-62]. Kydones points out that in his discourse (διαλέξει) (SCG IV, 24, no. 3620), Aquinas did not put forward this argument especially with reference to what is outside God, that is to say things *begotten* (γεννητῶν). What God has the *potential to do* (δύναται ποιεῖν ὁ Θεός) He does straightaway (εὐθὺς) but what, as he says, God has the *potential to be in Himself* (δύναται ὁ Θεὸς εἶναι ἐν ἑαυτῷ), this He is necessarily through energy/actuality [10.63-67]. I think Thomas does not want to say this, Chrysoloras remarks, but the opposite. This is clear from what he assumes. For to say that ‘Whenever one thing is not opposed to the term of another there is no impossibility about their coming together’ [10.1-2], this does not mean that *being* is *to exist* (ἐστίν), but what is *possible to come into being* (δυνατὸν γίνεσθαι) is *not impossible* not to come *into being* (μὴ γενέσθαι). It follows that the Father being the *origin* (ἀρχὴν) of the Spirit does not oppose the term *Son*. Therefore, it is not impossible for the Son to be the *origin* of the Spirit. What follows these assumptions should necessarily apply to things divine. You should clarify therefore, Chrysoloras says, what *being*, *is* and *potentiality* are with reference to God [10.68-77]. If *wisdom* and *goodness* are possible and necessarily present in God, Kydones responds, then He is *wise* and *good*, for *to do* is one thing and *to be in Himself* (εἶναι ἐν ἑαυτῷ) is a different thing [10.78-81]. There are three errors in this argument, Chrysoloras argues. First, you say that Aquinas contradicts himself; secondly, that you are the only one who is able to understand his
writings (γεγραμμένα) and we are entirely incapable of this; and finally, the things that you say exist around God (περὶ τὸν Θεὸν ὄντα), are non-existent (οὐκ ὄντα). It is difficult, therefore, Chrysoloras continues, to attribute to the divine essence what is not essence (μὴ ἐστιν οὐσία). Kydones abstains from responding to the first two points and concentrates on the third [10.82-92]. The following stichomythia follows:

KYDONES: Do you not consider that wisdom (σοφόν) and goodness (ἀγαθόν) refer to God?

CHRYSORTORAS: Correct. It cannot be otherwise.

KYDONES: But what shall we call these?

CHRYSORTORAS: Things that follow (Ἐπόμενα) and are attached (προσόντα) to God.

KYDONES: And who among the saints spoke about this clearly in this way? Tell me.

CHRYSORTORAS: Almost all of them.

KYDONES: Tell me just one saying.

CHRYSORTORAS: If being (εἶναι) is different from inherent (ἐνυπάρχειν), and the essence of God exists (ὑπάρχει) while His will exists within (ἐνυπάρχει) Him, therefore these (being/existing and inherent) are not identical.

KYDONES: Who said so?

CHRYSORTORAS: Justin the Martyr and philosopher.

KYDONES: If he were a saint he would have never said such things. But since he did it is clear that he is not a saint at all [10.93-106].

Kydones’ last remark is not found either in D or Kabaslas’ DPSS III. Unless this statement is included in another extant MS transmitting the Antirrhetic, we could argue that this implies that Chrysoloras suspected that this passage (by Ps.-Justin) is an interpolation. What follows in the Dialogue is a valuable piece of evidence concerning an actual dialogue Chrysoloras had with Kydones. You also replied to me in this way, Chrysoloras says, when you were alive (ζῶν). To honour you, I will not say what I said at the time but I will omit these points since these are beyond the scope of the present debate. Chrysoloras proceeds with analyzing his argument. What does not exist by nature (ὁ, μὴ πέφυκεν εἶναι) we know in terms of potentiality

250 Dr John Demetracopoulos expressed to me a similar view about Kydones.
(Δυνάμει μὲν ἰσμεν) as a result of our imperfect human organs of perception (ὁργάνων ἀτέλειαν) as is the case with all human sciences and arts (ἐπιστήμαι, καὶ τέχναι πάσαι), while God being utterly good (ἀκρως ἀγαθός) always makes (ποιεῖ). What might not be good He does not make, despite the fact that He has the potentiality (δυνάμενος) to do so. God simply has the potential (δύναται) to do everything but He makes each one at the appropriate time, as for example the raising of the dead (ἀνάστασιν τῶν νεκρῶν) and many other things. Therefore, Chrysoloras continues, we call these potential in God (Δυνάμει ...) αὐτὰ καλοῦμεν εἰς τὸν Θεόν until they are led on to energy/actuality (ἐνέργειαν) (in the sense of action). This is entirely different from potentiality with reference to human beings. What is present (πάρεστι) in God clearly is always attached (προσόν) to Him, and one could prove it by the fact that this follows God altogether (διόλων) through the energy/actuality (ἐνεργεία) in the divine nature (φύσει) and not through the potentiality (δυνάμει) in Him, as you said. For these reasons, Aquinas did not have the same aim (σκοπὸς) as you, namely to speak about being and existing within oneself with reference to God (περὶ τὸν Θεόν) [cf. 10.71], but to speak about being and potentiality. Therefore, Chrysoloras concludes, having proved the absurdity of these three points we find you guilty! [10.107-124].

To state that the term Spirit, Kydones replies, is not opposed to its being the origin of the Son is not only erroneous but indeed the opposite of truth. The term Spirit is Its being (τὸ εἶναι) from the Father through the Son. How is it possible for the Spirit to be the origin of the Son through Whom the Spirit proceeds? For in this way the Spirit would be origin of Its own origin [10.125-130]. Chrysoloras objects, stating that through the Son does not refer to the cause at all, as it has been proven in many cases. Therefore, it is not impossible (οὐκ αἴτιον) to be caused (αἰτιατὸν). Accordingly, it is not impossible to assume that these terms state that the Son is from the Spirit [10.131-135]. But if through does not signify the cause, Kydones asks, what else could it mean? The circle of the saints (Κύκλος ὁ τῶν ἁγίων), Chrysoloras responds, declares to all that the Holy Spirit is from the Father (ἐκ Πατρός ἐστι) through the Son (δι’ Υἱοῦ), that is to say with the Son (σὺν τῷ Υἱῷ, ἃμα ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός), or they declare the coessentiality (i.e., consubstantiality) (ὁμοούσιον) and
nothing else. Therefore, he concludes challenging Kydones, the present hypothesis is not impossible (in other words is possible), namely to state that the Son is from the Spirit [10.136-141]. If this were the case, Kydones replies, there would be two Fathers and two Sons, which is impossible! Similarly, Chrysoloras responds, we believe that to say that the Spirit is from the Son is no less absurd. For to have two projectors as causes and origins, and the greatest absurdity, to have two Spirits, it follows that to project (τὸ προβάλλειν) is again not simple (οὐχ ἀπλοῖν), for it belongs to the Father and is not opposed to the term Spirit. Similarly, without beginning (ἀναίτιον), uncaused (ἀναίτιον) and unbegotten (ἀγέννητον) belong to the Father and are not opposed to the term Spirit. Therefore, the Son would be without beginning and uncaused, and, worst of all, unbegotten. But this is impossible. Chrysoloras closes his refutation of this Syllogism reminding Kydones that once more he refuted only three out of five arguments by Kabasilas. In his usual style Kydones responds: This seems fair to me. Listen to another syllogism [10.142-157].

[11] Tenth Syllogism on the hypostatic properties

Continuing the discussion on the properties of the hypostases in the Trinity, Chrysoloras cites Aquinas’ teachings as presented by Kabasilas. To beget (Τὸ … γεννᾶν) is characteristic property (χαρακτηριστικόν) of the hypostasis of the Father but to project (τὸ … προβάλλειν) is not so. Therefore, to project is not personal property of the Father. Hence, to project is common to the Father and the Son and it could be common also to the Spirit, but this is impossible. Therefore, the Spirit is from the Son [11.1-7]. According to this argument, Kabasilas states, to beget characterizes (χαρακτηρίζει) the hypostasis of the Father by virtue of which (ἐξ οὗ) He is called Father, while to project is characteristic and personal (ἴδιον) and therefore it would be personal to the Father [11.5-7]. To beget, Kydones says, is indeed a constituent property (ἰδίωμα συστατικόν) of the Father. But the statement ‘to project is characteristic of the Father’ is not found in Aquinas’ works. Nor would Aquinas have said that to project is personal property of the Father. For, in this way, he would have said straightaway that the Spirit is only from the Father, which Kabasilas would have accepted. Chrysoloras responds by confirming that, in his view, Aquinas would not have said
this. If one deliberates on Aquinas’ statement and Kabasilas’ response, Chrysoloras continues, he would have to find out that what Aquinas meant was the opposite, namely that to project is attached (συνόν) also to the Son and the Spirit, for as he says this is not a property of the Father. This is what Kabasilas proved, which reveals Kydones’ intentions, Chrysoloras says, namely to slander Kabasilas and through him Aquinas [11.7-37].

Kydones summarises Aquinas’ teaching to the best of his knowledge: with reference to the divine Persons some things are personal (ἰδιαί) and other common (κοινά). Among these personal some are absolutely personal (ἰδιαίτατα) and not shared (ἀκοινώνητα) with the other Persons, what Aquinas calls personal (personalia, προσωπικά) and also hypostatic (υποστατικά), namely Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Among those which are common, some are common to all three Persons, for example wise, good, life and similar ones, which Aquinas calls essential (naturalia, οὐσιώδη), while others are restricted to (ἀφωρισμένα) a single Person or Persons [11.38-45]251. It is clear, therefore, Chrysoloras responds, that with reference to that essence (οὐσίαν), to which nothing is equal and which is beyond all visible things, you call absolutely personal and essential names which define (ἐφαρμοζόμενα) things we experience (τοῖς παροῦσιν). I think, Chrysoloras continues, you easily attribute to the nature of God the rest of things visible (φαινομένων) and in other cases you also call these essence. But each of these two is unfitting (ἀνοίκειον) to God. Therefore, Chrysoloras says, you need to define what you believe is simultaneously constituent (συστατικὸν), hypostatic (υποστατικὸν) and characteristic (χαρακτηριστικὸν) with reference to God. Kydones responds that this is nothing else than the Father. To Chrysoloras’ question what is personal but not constituent, Kydones replies ‘the unbegotten’. Chrysoloras asks his interlocutor to substantiate this with some examples. As rationality (λογικόν), Kydones says, is man’s constituent — for this constitutes (συνίστησιν) and subsists (ὑφίστησιν) as his own essence (οὐσίαν ... ἰδικήν)—, the same is true of the name Father. The ability to laugh (γελαστικόν) is a human property without subsisting as the essence (οὐσίαν) of a human being but by being already added to the hypostasis, not in terms of time (χρόνῳ) but in terms of cause (αἰτίᾳ). The same stands with reference to

251 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia, q. 13, a. 1-2, Ia, q. 32, a. 2.
the divine Persons, Kydones continues. Some names are personal since they are constituent, like those we have said before (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) and some are observed (ἐπιθεωρούμενα) in one Person or Persons, just as the unbegotten with reference to the Father is personal but not constituent [11.46-67]. These examples, Chrysoloras replies, are inappropriate with reference to God. For, according to you, rationality with relation to man indicates (δηλοί) at one and the same time all the hypostases together and the essence itself. However, the Father with reference to God indicates only His hypostasis and not any other hypostasis and certainly not His essence. Rationality does not seem to be more universal (καθολικώτερον) than the hypostasis on account of belonging to human beings. For where a human being is, rationality is present, while the opposite is not necessary. The opposite happens with God. What is Father is also hypostasis while what is hypostasis is not necessarily Father. Similarly, the ability to laugh is not the same with reference to human beings as the unbegotten is with reference to God. For the ability to laugh comes after the whole hypostasis (ἀπάσῃ τῇ ὑποστάσει) and it is called ability to laugh even if laughter (γελᾶν) is not by nature (μὴ ... ἐπεφύκει). The unbegotten, on the other hand, is always attached (σύνεστι) to the hypostasis of the Father and the not by nature is never stated. The ability to laugh can be convertible (ἀντιστρέφει) —for man and the ability to laugh are identical (ταὐτόν)— while this is not at all the case with reference to God. In virtue of being Father He is also unbegotten, but it is not in virtue of being unbegotten that He is Father. Therefore, your examples, Chrysoloras concludes, are unfitting to God and actually prove the opposite [11.68-84]. The unbegotten, Kydones replies, does not indicate what unbegotten is for it is only privation of the begotten, and unbegotten follows after begotten, for negations follow affirmations. The removal of the begotten indicates the uncaused as Jews or others might have said, Kydones continues (partly borrowing from Ps.-Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzene)252. The unbegotten is said to be the only distinctive property (μόνον γνώμομα) of the Father. Accordingly, whatever else in the Trinity is not common to all Persons or constituent of a single

Person, as we said, Aquinas calls *personal*. This argument, Chrysoloras replies, is much weaker and more absurd than the previous. For the *unbegotten* is not part of human beings (who are *begotten*) and is *a posteriori* (ὕστερον) true following an *affirmation* (i.e., human beings are *begotten*); while with reference to God it is false in either case. For in God *unbegotten* is *not posterior* (οὐτε ... ύστερον) to *affirmation* because all that pertains to God exists simultaneously (ἅμα). *Unbegotten* with reference to the Father rather indicates *existence* (Ὑπάρξιν), Chrysoloras continues, and not only this but also the *uncaused* and *cause* and other things that belong to the Father. If what we are saying is consistent with the sayings of theologians, *affirmation* with reference to God is much more valuable and better. What you say, Chrysoloras says to Kydones, befits the nature of human beings (ἀνθρώπων). Therefore, it is not true that it is impossible to perceive the term *unbegotten* with reference to God except only by refuting an *affirmation* (καταφάσεως).

Chrysoloras concludes by asking Kydones to clarify what he calls *distinctive property* (γνώρισμα) in the Trinity, which does not belong to one Person nor is it *common* [11.85-105]. To *send* (πέμπειν) or *send forth* (ἀποστέλλειν) the Spirit, Kydones replies, is *common* to the Father and the Son, and it is neither *hypostatic* (ὑποστατικόν) nor *personal* (προσωπικόν). Similarly, both Father and Son are the *source* of the Spirit and the Spirit is *from* both (ἀμφοῖν). To *send* and *send forth* (ἀποστέλλειν as in Antirrhetic and not ἐπιστέλλειν as in the MSS), Chrysoloras argues, is *common* to the three Persons as has been proved by the saints and the irrefutable arguments (ἀσφαλῶς δέδεικται). To state, however, that the Father and the Son are the *source* of the Spirit is erroneous. For, by refuting the prior argument (that to *send* and *send forth* is *common* to the three Persons) it necessarily follows that the posterior argument (that the Father and the Son are the *source* of the Spirit) is not valid. To be Spirit from both the Father and the Son, he continues, does not produce *procession* (ἐκπόρευσιν). For many other things are said and are *property of* others but this does not mean that these are *from* them. Kydones replies that Aquinas includes in these the *spiration* (spiratio, προβλητικόν), saying that this is *distinctive property* (γνώρισμα) of the Father and the Son. This is contrary to what the orthodox (ἐνθεόβοι) believe, Chrysoloras replies, and in any case if *spiration* is *common* to both Father and Son it should be also *common* to the Spirit [11.106-121]. This is impossible, Kydones affirms! This is ridiculous,
Chrysoloras responds! If this is wrong, he continues, it is impossible for God to be wrong and it is not appropriate also for the Son to be wrong. If, on the other hand, this is right how could it be impossible? For everything that is simply so wrong is far removed from God and what is so right is attached to Him. If the third Person is not in communion (ἀκοινώνητον) with the other two Persons who know that they are in communion (κοινωνεῖν οἴδεν) does this not do wrong and dishonour the third Person as being lesser (ἐλαττόν) than the other two? This is clearly wrong. It is, therefore, necessary for the Spirit to be equal to the Father and the Son. In such a case, the Spirit would be the cause of the other two Persons and of Itself, which is even worse than the previous statement! Therefore, Chrysoloras affirms, it is impossible for what is common to the Father and the Son not to be common to the Spirit as well. If this is right then it is not impossible and if it is impossible then it is wrong. Chrysoloras concludes: this is the only proper law (οἰκεῖος ... νόμος) concerning the divine Persons.

Aquinas, Kydones replies, would have said that the caused is common to the Son and the Spirit as it is not their constituent (συστατικὸν) but only their distinctive property (γνώρισμα). That the caused is shared by the Son and the Spirit, Chrysoloras conter-argues, refers to the Father as the cause and therefore it is necessary that there are two caused Persons. If the projection (προβλητικὸν) is common to the Father and the Son it is necessary that there are two projectors (προβολεῖς), two sources (πηγάς), two origins (ἀρχάς) and two causes (αἴτια), which is totally impossible! Chrysoloras closes the refutation of this Syllogism with his usual observation that though Kabasilas used a number of arguments against Aquinas, Kydones made use of only a few of them. Kydones’ reaction is, as always, short and full of confidence: My privilege! [11.123-145].

[12] Eleventh Syllogism on the divine essence and hypostases

The last Syllogism concentrates on the procession of the Holy Spirit with reference to the common essence and the distinct hypostases in the Trinity. Chrysoloras begins by presenting Aquinas’ teaching as it is cited by Kabasilas253: The Spirit, the theologians say (i.e., Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus de sancta consubstantiali trinitate, PG 75, col.

253 Neilos Kabasilas, DPSS III, p. 346.5-14.
588A), is from the essence of the Son (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ᾿Ιησοῦ) and, therefore, it is necessary that the Spirit is also from (ἐκ) the hypostasis of the Son as It is from the essence and hypostasis of the Father. Therefore, also the Son is the cause (αἰτίως) of the Spirit [12.14]. Though the Spirit is from the essence of the Son, Kabasilas responds, by virtue of Its being coessential (i.e., consubstantial) (ὁμοούσιον) with the Son, nevertheless if something is coessential to something else it does necessarily follow that it is also from it (ἐξ ἕκκεινου εἶναι) [12.56]. The following statements have also been attributed to Thomas, Kydones continues, namely that the Spirit is from the Son since It is from His essence and It is confessed to emanate from Him (καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ προϊέναι, instead of καὶ παρ’ αὐτῆς [scil. οὐσίας] προϊέναι as in Kydones’ Antirrhetic as transmitted in D)255. To say that the Spirit is from the essence of the Son and emanates from His essence, Kydones continues, is commonly accepted and explicitly stated by all eastern Church fathers (Ἀνατολῆ διδαξάντων ἁγίων), who also state that the Spirit emanates from the Son and is from Him as It is from the Father (cf. Aquinas, CEG 2, 31) [12.713]. The first statement, Chrysoloras says, is true but the second is not. For no one denies that the Spirit is from the essence of the Son as the theologians have said. The same applies for the terms being sent (πέμπεσθαι) and being granted (χορηγεῖσθαι). On the contrary, all the saints, like solid pillars (ἀρραγεῖς κίονας), Chrysoloras says, categorically oppose the saying that the Spirit is from the Son as It is from the Father. John the exegete (ἐξηγητής) (i.e., Damascene) states that the Spirit is not from the Son256. The same is stated by Maximus the Confessor257. Kydones expresses some doubts about the authenticity of Aquinas’ statement. As far as I know, he says, neither Thomas nor any Latin theologian stated this, perhaps because they were not so familiar (ἐμπείρους) with works of the fathers

254 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, CEG 2, 31: Item Cyrilus dicit in libro thesaurorum: necessarium salutis nostrum est confiteri spiritum sanctum de essentia fillii existere, tanquam ex ipso secundum naturam existentem.


written in Greek (ἕλληνικῶς ... συγγεγραμμένων) in order to use them as evidence (μαρτυρίαν). Therefore, Kydones concludes, I think it is better not to have to speak in support of what Aquinas has not said. However, if it is necessary I will speak about this [12.14-25]. You ought to remain silent, Chrysoloras responds, rather than to object, for it seems you forgot what you were saying just before. In the Second Syllogism, Chrysoloras continues, this statement was used as a pretext by you to counter-argue, perhaps reasonably, that Aquinas did not state this but someone else among the Latins with whom you agreed (cf. [3.1]). This is clearly a contradiction. If the theorem (θεώρημα) is valid, Chrysoloras says, then let it be attributed to Thomas or another Latin theologian and let it have your support. However, if it is invalid, unable to draw the necessary conclusions and unfamiliar to the Latins, why do you belabour the point which is of no use to any one? For it is absurd to fall into the errors of those you criticize and be in communion with those you accuse. Nevertheless, Chrysoloras concludes, despite all this, tell us your opinion. With reference to things subsisting (ὑφισταμένων) which consist of matter and form (ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους), Kydones replies, it is evident that essence (οὐσία) is different from person (πρόσωπον). For humanity (ἀνθρωπότης) —that is the essence of a human being which is its essential form (οὐσιώδες), as indicated by its definition (ὁρισμοῦ)— is different from the subject (ὑποκείμενον) or the person. The person, exactly as in a subject (ὥσπερ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ), contains (περιέχεται) many other things that do not belong to the essence of man, such as white, two cubits long (δίπηχυ), and similar qualities or things which complement (συμπληροῦται) the subject. With reference to immaterial things (ἀνεύ ὕλης), subject and essence are identical. For an angel and his essence are identical as are the circle and its circularity (κυκλότης). This certainly applies with reference to God on account of his total simplicity (ἀκραν ἁπλότητα). In other words, according to the Latin teachings God is identical with his essence [12.26-51]. This, Chrysoloras counter-argues, is inconsistent with theological and scientific (ἐπιστήμης) arguments. For to say that there is distinction between human essence and hypostasis but there is no distinction at all between essence and hypostasis with reference to circles and angels is absurd. Drawing from Aristotle’s Categories256, Chrysoloras states that the essence is and appears to be (γενομένης ... φαινομένης) twofold: first, the universal essence

256 Cf. Aristotle, Categories 2a.11-14, 2b.7, 3a.33-3b.23.
(καθόλου) on the basis of which the distinction of beings is manifest, up to individuals (ἄτομων); and secondly, the essence which signifies nothing else but the individuals, called also primary essences (μᾶλλον οὐσίαι), and this essence is not of a subject (καθ’ ύποκειμένου) or in a subject (ἐν ύποκειμένῳ). To the question which one of the two essences is similar or dissimilar to the hypostasis, Chrysoloras himself replies that the individual essence is similar, for one’s essence does not really differ from his hypostasis but is the same, while the universal essence is dissimilar to the hypostasis even in angels. Kydones’ argument, therefore, is refuted on the basis that the hypostasis is different from the essence in matter (ἐν ὕλῃ) but identical in immaterial beings (ἀϋλίᾳ), for as far as the distinction is concerned the essence of angels is like the essence of human beings. To substantiate his argument Chrysoloras draws from Porphyry (whom he does not name). Essence has as principle the genus (γένος) and under the essence comes the body (σῶμα), then the living being (ζῷον), the rational, under which the human being is placed, and finally the individual (ἄτομον). The genus of angels is immortal and incorporeal and each of these two (immortal and incorporeal) is the essence of angels. It follows then that each and every angel is immortal, incorporeal and essence. Yet, not every incorporeal being is angel and each angel is essence, and vice versa. The same applies to the circles, whose shape is their genus, Chrysoloras continues, as with the aforementioned example about human beings. Therefore, your argument, Chrysoloras concludes, seems to be a sophistry [12.52-76]. Not at all, Kydones responds. With reference to angels and men what you said is true, but with reference to God it is not valid. In God not only are subject and essence identical but also His essence and being are identical and one in number (ταὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ἕστι τῷ ἀριθμῷ). Therefore, Son and the essence of the Son are identical. This assumption, Kydones continues, prevents us from wrongly assuming that there is a distinction of things in this case, and attributing composition to God (σύνθεσιν τῷ Θεῷ διδόντες), for in the Trinity everything is identical and one in number, namely essence (οὐσία) and existence (ὑπαρξίας) on account of God’s infinity (ἀπειρίαν) and absolute simplicity (ἄκραν ἁπλότητα). This is the same argument, Chrysoloras says, as the one you put forward before with reference to God’s essence and energy/actuality (cf. [1.5]). Unless essence and energy/actuality in God are identical, Kydones repeats, it follows that there is composition (σύνθεσις) in God. If identity (ταὐτόν) depends on things similar
(ὁμοίων) then we have to accept that divinity is necessarily comprehensible (ληπτόν), which is more absurd than any composition in God. For there are many things that are comprehensible (ληπτά) and compounded (σύνθετα) while in all beings nothing uncompounded (οὐδὲν ἀσύνθετον) is comprehensible (ληπτόν). Thus, fearing that there is composition in this, Chrysoloras states to Kydones, you say that the essence is identical to hypostasis. Examine this differently, Chrysoloras states: Is hypostasis identical to the essence in God? Kydones replies affirmatively. Since there are three hypostases, Chrysoloras goes on, it is necessary that there are three essences. Moreover, the Father, Son and Spirit, according to you are identical according to their opposition (καθ’ ὑμᾶς τῇ ἀντιθέσει ταύτα), which is blasphemy! If the Son and the essence of the Son are identical, Kydones responds, and the Spirit is said to be from the essence of the Son, then by necessity the Spirit has to be also from the hypostasis of the Son. My purpose, and yours and Thomas’, Chrysoloras says, is not to speak about the Son and the essence of the Son but simply about the Son and the essence. These two are proved not to be identical (οὐ ταύτον) for this leads to great absurdities. We do know from the saints that there are three hypostases and Persons (πρόσωπα). However, the saints never perceived three essences (οὐσίας) or natures (φύσεις) or forms (μορφάς) or origins (ἀρχάς). Therefore, hypostasis is not identical to essence. This is clear not only because it is entirely absurd but also because it has been explicitly declared by the entire chorus (χορὸς) of the saints. Therefore, there is great difference (διάφορον) between essence and hypostasis in God. Thus, the proposition (πρότασιν) which states that the Holy Spirit is from the hypostasis of the Son because It is said to be from the essence of the Son (cf. [12.1-4]) is proved to be unnecessary (μὴ ἀναγκαίαν). Therefore, your objection is refuted, Chrysoloras concludes.

If one examines the complete argument (τὸν ἐντελὴ λόγον) with reference to this, Kydones responds, he will find not only Thomas but also before him Augustine and other fathers and theologians who had spoken adequately about this. Yet, no one would be able to convince us, Chrysoloras affirms. Perhaps Augustine is in accordance with what you and Aquinas say. As for the fathers (πατέρας) and the theologians (θεολόγους), Chrysoloras continues making a word play, I am not entirely convinced unless we remove two letters from the former (πατέρας, fathers, minus πα = τέρας, monster) and three from the latter (θεολόγους, theologians,
minus θεο = λόγους, arguments) (ἀφαιρεθέντων στοιχείων πέντε) to form the word that reflects the nature of those who put forth such arguments (i.e., τερατολόγους)! What Kabasilas attempted to prove through many arguments, Kydones replies, namely that the saints’ statement that the Spirit is from the essence of the Son is not identical to the statement that the Son is the cause of the Spirit essentially (οὐσιωδῶς), but only that the Spirit is coessential with the Son, is valid. However, Kabasilas used very careless proofs in his argument, which are refuted by themselves. Indeed, he will bear (οἴσεται) this argument at such leisure (ὡς, τοσαύτη σχολῇ) in order to read his long treatise against the Latins (κατὰ Λατίνων)! Kydones exclaims. That your view is not valid, Chrysoloras continues, is clear from the fact that Neilos put forward many arguments to refute the present syllogism but you criticize Neilos on the basis of only two of them. The first, which actually remains unexamined, will be refuted once it is set before us, while the second is full of insolence against Neilos and for this reason we will honour it by omitting it (τιμῶμεν ... σιγῇ). But you ignore the most important argument (κεφάλαιον), Chrysoloras states, which you first considered to be weak but then you saw that it is strong. Since both Persons (Father and Son) send (πέμποντες) and spring forth (πηγάζοντες) the Spirit, Kydones replies, as if they are one source (πηγή), it follows that there is one projector but not one Person. This is not even close to the truth, Chrysoloras replies, for the Father and the Son spring forth not the hypostasis of the Spirit, which is defined (ἀφωρισμένην) only with reference to the Father but the grace (χάριν) of the all-Holy Spirit (παναγίου Πνεύματος), of which grace the Paraclete is also provider (χορηγός) together with the Father and the Son at the same time. To think otherwise would lead to many absurdities, Chrysoloras concludes [12.101-150]. Here Chrysoloras follows the standard orthodox view that spring forth, and similar words signify the eternal manifestation of the divine energy which is common to the three Persons and not the mode of being of the two caused Persons, Son and Spirit.259

[12.1] The purpose of Kydones’ Antirrhetic

Chrysoloras devotes the next section of the Syllogism [12.151-230] to chiding Kydones’ aims and attitude in the *Antirrhetic*. He begins by citing Kydones’ comments expressed towards the end of his own treatise. There is no need for me, Kydones says, to proceed further, for Thomas’ superiority and Kabasilas’ inability to refute him have been amply demonstrated. Chrysoloras responds that Kydones’ statements and arguments are often contradictory. Most importantly, he continues, though Kydones disputes the authenticity of the arguments attributed to Aquinas in the Second and Tenth Syllogism (cf. [3.1], [11]), nevertheless he places great emphasis on defending these very arguments against Kabasilas’ refutation. You have come to us again, Kydones responds, bringing with you something inescapable and new, dearest Roman (φίλτατε Ῥωμανέ), mentioned yesterday by certain men, as you say, who were much irritated if one states that the Holy Spirit proceeds by/from (παρὰ) the Father and the Son. You urge me to invent a solution (on the *Filioque*) more difficult than Prometheus’ bonds! If you were still willing to examine the truth you would agree with me (συνάδεις) insofar as the study and investigation of theological questions (περὶ τὰ θεῖα σπουδὴν καὶ γυμνασίαν) are concerned. This would give you a reason to force me to share with you my labours on these subjects. But now, Kydones concludes, it seems that you ignore my whole work (πᾶν τὸ ἀγνοεῖς). You keep the same offending stance against Kabasilas as in your Preamble, Chrysoloras replies, and he invites Kydones to concentrate on the crucial (καίρια) points leaving aside what is superfluous and insolent. Kydones’ subsequent comment on keeping silent as a sign of respect for his teacher (διδασκάλῳ), namely Aquinas [12.154-157] is linked with the *argumentum ex silentio* that follows.

[12.2] On Nestorius’ teachings concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit and on the Third Ecumenical Council (431)

---

260 To the best of our knowledge the use by Chrysoloras of the form Ῥωμανέ, in the sense of the inhabitant of Ῥωμανία and not of a proper name, is an *hapax*. For Ῥωμανία as an appellation of the Roman Empire, see *TLG* sv (including Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, George Pachymeres, John Kantakuzenos and Manuel II Palaiologos); see also this use of Ῥωμανία in John V Palaiologos’ imperial document confirming imperial privileges over ecclesiastical affairs: *Régestes* I/7, no. 3299, 10; V. Laurent, ed., ‘Les droits de l’empereur en matière ecclésiastique. L’accord de 1380-1382’, *REB* 13 (1955), 5-20 at p. 16.
The last section of the Syllogism is devoted to a lengthy discussion of the reaction by the fathers of the Third Ecumenical Council held in Ephesus (431)\textsuperscript{261} to Nestorius’ teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit. It should be pointed out that Nestorius, the first theologian according to Aquinas who rejected the Filioque (ST Ia, 36, 2-3)\textsuperscript{262}, is entirely absent from Kydones’ Antirrhetic as transmitted in the ten recorded extant MSS\textsuperscript{263}. The fact, however, that in three of the four extant MSS containing the Dialogue (K, L and V) Kydones’ passages on Nestorius are marked by the same quotation marks as in the other passages of the Antirrhetic cited \textit{verbatim} by Chrysoloras in the Dialogue, would suggest that it is possible that these passages on Nestorius are not fictitious but may be contained, if they survive, in a version of the Antirrhetic other than those transmitted by the ten MSS consulted by the current editor\textsuperscript{264}. More importantly, Chrysoloras focuses not on Nestorius’ actual teaching, which confirms the Orthodox position (on account of which the Latin theologians accused the Orthodox of heresy), but on the reaction by the fathers of the Third Ecumenical Council on listening to Nestorius’ teaching on this. The same approach was adopted by Kabasilas in his brief section in DPSS III (XV, p. 370.8-23) and the lengthy discussion in his DPSS I (Discourse IV, pp. 387-468). Kabasilas was in turn followed by Joseph Bryennios\textsuperscript{265}.

The main point Chrysoloras makes in this section of the Dialogue is that Nestorius supported the view that the Spirit does not have its existence from the Son (μὴ μέντοι καὶ δι’ Ὕιοῦ τὴν ὑπαρξιν εἰληφέναι)\textsuperscript{266} and that the fathers of the Council tacitly


\textsuperscript{262} Chrysoloras quotes in Greek translation (by Kydones?) this section of ST in his Dialogue on the primacy of the Pope and the procession of the Holy Spirit, ed. Basilicos, 29, p. 182, col. b: Θεομᾶ — ἄλλα μὴ εἶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, πρῶτον υπὸ τῶν Νεστοριανῶν εἰσῆλθεν ἐν τῇ κατ’ Ἐφεσον, ὥς Θεοδοτοῦς ἡκολούθησε καὶ πολλοὶ ἄλλοι, ἐν αἷς καὶ ὁ Δαμασκηνὸς ἦν’. Cf. ST Ia, 36, 2-3: Ad tertium dicendum quod spiritum sanctum non procedere a filio, primo fuit a Nestorianis introductum; ut patet in quodam symbolo Nestorianorum damnato in Ephesina synodo. Et hunc errorem securus fuit Theodoretus Nestorianus, et plures post ipsum; inter quos fuit etiam Damascenus.

\textsuperscript{263} I would like to thank Dr Denis Searby for this information.

\textsuperscript{264} Florence, Laurent. Plut. 59.17; Moscow, Synod. gr. 423; Oxford, Barocc. gr. 90; Rome, Vallic. 67; Vatican City, Vaticanici graeci 614, 1103, 1756 and 1949; Venice, Marc. gr. 157; Vienna, Vind. theol. gr. 260.


accepted this view without condemning it (ἀνεπιτίμητα σιωπῇ, παρελθεῖν) [12.231-235]. According to Kydones, however, the fact that the Fathers did not comment on this during the Council does not mean that they accepted Nestorius’ teaching but that they remained silent because they considered that the condemnation of Nestorius’ heretical doctrine on the Incarnation (namely, that the hypostasis of the Son and the Incarnate Christ are to be perceived as being separate) had priority over the doctrine of the Trinity (θεολογίας μὲν αὐτοῖς οὐδόλως, οἰκονομίας δὲ, σκοπὸς ἦν) [12.360-361]. Kydones’ interpretation is simply not acceptable to Chrysoloras, who supports the view that should the saints opposed Nestorius’ view on the Filioque they would have openly condemned it as they always do, and would have not remained in silence on such an important issue [12.362-380].

It is worth noting that the text cited by Kydones was not actually by Nestorius. It is contained in a creed preserved in the Acts of the Third Ecumenical Council in Ephesus (431) without attribution to a particular author, but known to have been written by Theodore of Mopsuestia (see Acts of the Fifth Ecumenical Council in Constantinople [553], ACO 4.1, pp. 70-72). In the context of asserting the full divinity of the Holy Spirit, it denies that He ‘received existence from the Son’, which could be interpreted as reducing Him to the level of the creation. This creed was condemned in the so-called Canon 7 of the Council of Ephesus, with specific reference to its defective Christology. It is impossible, however, to say whether the Fathers of the Council of Ephesus remained silent about the Trinitarian issue, since their discussion of this creed is not recorded in the Acts.

[13] Epilogue

Chrysoloras proceeds with the final section of the Dialogue, further questioning the validity of Kydones’ arguments against Kabasilas’ refutation of Aquinas’ syllogisms, and at the same time expressing some thoughts on the anonymous person who commissioned his own work. We have said enough, he says, and these things were said because they were necessary and not simply to show off (ἐπιδείξεως χάριν). The

---

267 On Nestorius and his teachings, see McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria, pp. 126-174.
268 I would like to thank Prof. Richard Price for pointing out this to me.
question arises, Chrysoloras continues, as to why Kydones used in his Antirrhetic only three or at most four arguments from each syllogism Neilos put forward in his DPSS III to refute Aquinas and omitted the rest? Kydones responds that it seemed better to him to concentrate on the stronger and more plausible arguments. Actually the opposite is the case, Chrysoloras responds, for in his view Kydones focused on Kabasila’s weaker arguments avoiding the irrefutable ones (ἀναγκαῖα). More importantly, Chrysoloras asks Kydones why he remained in silence while Kabasila was still alive and why he decided to promote his own work (the Antirrhetic) against Kabasila’s treatise, once he realized that his opponent could not reply as he was by then dead and gone [13.1-19]? Kydones responds that he did so in order to examine Kabasila’s text better (καλῶς ἐπισκέψωμαι) and to avoid trouble (φύγω ... ταραχήν). Chrysoloras finds both excuses unreasonable, for it is much easier to examine a work than to compose it. Besides if what is said in this work is right and good (δίκαια καὶ καλὰ) it should be made known to all, while if it is base and wrong (φαῦλα καὶ ἄδικα) then it should not have been composed in the first place. These are simply pretexts, Chrysoloras says to Kydones, in order to excuse yourself from doing something wrong. Even if no one else checks you, he continues, your conscience does. Chrysoloras wonders why Kydones forcefully criticizes Kabasila in some cases while praises him in other instances. This is not at all shameful for one who speaks the truth, Kydones responds. Which of the two should be allowed for one who speaks the truth, Chrysoloras asks: praise or criticism (Ἐπαίνῳ, ἢ τῇ κατηγορίᾳ)? For you offer Kabasila both of them. It is absurd for those who rightly praise others to be found guilty of error. Kydones responds that by criticizing Kabasila he speaks the truth. The opposite would be better, Chrysoloras suggests. For no one knows anything for any one even if necessity (ἀνάγκη) prevails over love for mankind (φιλανθρωπίαν) in what concerns dubious matters. If indeed you were sincere when you praised someone, Chrysoloras continues, he would be excellent (ἀγαθός) and you would have done what is proper (εἰκὸς). But now, since you are speaking the truth by criticizing, as you say, it follows that the one whom you criticize is wretched (ἄθλιος) and you, who criticize, are even more wretched (ἀθλιώτερος). Nevertheless, Kydones responds, the truth is higher than all. Or often worse than a lie, Chrysoloras adds, namely the lie that causes other to die preferring
one’s own freedom or the freedom of others, if need be. I do not wish anyone’s death now, Kydones states. It would be better for you, Chrysoloras responds, to demand the death of others rather than yours. For to do wrong, he says (quoting Callicles from Plato’s Gorgias, 482d) is more shameful than to be treated wrongly, while it is better to deliver yourself from sickness rather than to deliver someone else. Do I wish my own death without being aware of it? Kydones asks. Yes, Chrysoloras replies, and indeed the death of your soul which is far worse than that of the body! Kydones responds that according to Plato no one is ashamed when he speaks the truth (Ps.-Plato, Epistula I 310d). At this point Chrysoloras reprimands his interlocutor for mentioning Plato with such enthusiasm while willingly forgetting Jesus’ commandments, Do not judge, in the same way you judge others (Matthew 7:1-2) and if someone strikes you on the right cheek (Matthew 5:39), and if one who says to his brother, You fool! (Matthew 5:22), and all that we hear and regard as important every day. Kydones agrees with Chrysoloras, who continues to say that since we do not know when we or others will die it is not right to criticize them. Moreover, he says, thousands were godly while others willingly became servants to Satan (Σατᾶν) and vice versa. Citing Philo of Alexandria (without naming him) Chrysoloras states that nothing remains the same and thus it is wrong to criticize others. Moreover, the Father has entrusted all judgment to the Son (John 5:22) and therefore the prosecutor seizes his verdict before the time comes. Besides, Chrysoloras continues, it is unjust for a wise man, like you, to criticize another wise man (i.e., Kabasilas), who is virtuous. This makes it even more unjust for if this man is dead injustice is far greater, for no dead should be treated with malice, for there is no envy for those who have departed (as Philo states). Last but not least, Chrysoloras says, Kydones’ criticism against Neilos passes over to God.

I agree with all that you have said except for the last point, Kydones replies. Does one who criticizes another man directly accuse God as well? Evidently yes, Chrysoloras affirms, for as one who insults the servant dishonours the master in the same way one who does not honour the archpriest of God (Neilos Kabasilas was

---

270 Ibid., § 17, p. 64.
Archbishop of Thessalonike) also dishonours God whom the archpriest serves. Therefore, in every possible aspect it is wrong to criticize. However, Chrysoloras concludes, each one of us should introspect (ἐφευρησάτω) and would be able to do so without my advice (τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων), especially if he happens to be an older man (πεσοβύτερος) (Kydone died at an advanced age). Kydones agrees with this and asks Chrysoloras why he criticizes him since they are friends. Quoting Socrates’ words (Plato, Apologia 29d), Chrysoloras replies, I salute and welcome you but I obey truth rather than you. Finally, Chrysolras remarks, I converse with you honourably (μετ’ εὐφημίας). Kydones is surprised. Why is this? he asks. First, for the sake of the Church of Christ, Chrysoloras replies, and secondly, I obey a great man who demanded this from me in particular (πρὸ παντὸς). Playing with the word χάρις which can mean both gratitude and grace, Chrysoloras adds that this (anonymous) man cares about all and, on account of other things as well, we owe him gratitude/grace (χάρις), which the cherubs enjoy among the rest of the heavenly hosts. Let these be dear to God. For having said what the occasion demanded it would be wrong to repeat myself. Then he addresses the deceased Kydones: You, remarkable philosopher, along with Thomas and Neilos, are now subjected to God’s other laws (of physical mortality) and each of you has found the appropriate knowledge for himself, knowledge in which I will soon be joining you and if God wishes (as Plato says in Phaedo 80d) I will partake of. As for you, Chrysoloras continues, who, either willingly or not, thought of saying these things, let there be mercy on you and also on me.

Chrysoloras concludes by addressing the anonymous person who commissioned the Dialogue: As for you, man of God (ἄνθρωπε τοῦ Θεοῦ), who now demanded me to engage in this struggle, having fulfilled my undertaking for your sake, if this composition seems good to you my thanks are due to you and God; to Him for giving me the power of words (λόγων δύναμιν) in order to articulate arguments of some worth and to you who gave me this responsibility (αἰτίῳ μοι καθισταμένῳ). If this work has not been accomplished according to your aim, Chrysoloras remarks, bear with me, as you have wisely already done along with the others (μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδη). For God demands from all only what they are capable of. You should,
therefore, imitate God and the Lord of souls for it is totally improper to do otherwise, for anyone else (πᾶς τις ἄν ἄλλος), using another reasoning (ἄλλω χρώμενος ... λόγῳ) would have said other things (ἄλλο) rather than this. This is where Chrysoloras closes his Dialogue, leaving, as it seems, the possibility of different interpretations and argumentation open to other authors who might like to undertake a similar task [13.85-120].
Conclusions

Demetrios Chrysoloras’ *Dialogue* involves a theological and philosophical debate over the doctrine on the procession of the Holy Spirit as part of a wider discussion on the relation and distinction of the Persons in the Trinity. This debate, which goes back to the ninth century\(^{271}\), gained fresh momentum in the last three centuries of Byzantium as part of a closer encounter between Byzantine and Western intellectuals and theologians in the context of the discussions between the Byzantine government and the papacy over the union of the Churches. This *rapprochement* culminated in the Council of Florence (1439), a momentous event, which took place shortly after the composition of the *Dialogue*\(^{272}\). Thus reading Chrysoloras’ fictitious *Dialogue* one gets a reflection of the real atmosphere in which the whole debate was conducted in this period.

The aim of the author was to defend the Orthodox position on the distinction of the divine hypostases and the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone, by selecting specific passages and arguments from Neilos Kabasilas’ *DPSS III*, composed as a refutation of Aquinas’ teachings (mainly in *SCG* IV, 24), which were in turn supported by Demetrios Kydones in his own *Antirrhetic* against Kabasilas’ work. By selecting various passages and leaving out others, Chrysoloras served his own purpose, in the process deconstructing these works. In this sense, Chrysoloras’ *Dialogue* is a partial refutation of Kydones’ refutation of Kabasilas’ refutation of Aquinas, which promotes the author’s aim at the expense of a more complete investigation of Thomistic theology. At the same time this imaginary *Dialogue* gives the opportunity to four successive generations and three different groups of Latin and Byzantine theologians (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Orthodox who converted to Roman Catholicism) to discuss questions that were at the centre of the theological discussion during Chrysoloras’ own times.

The analysis of the arguments put forth by Chrysoloras in defence of Kabasilas’ teachings and the Latin views expressed by Aquinas and Kydones, shows that

\(^{271}\) Siecienski, *The Filioque*.

\(^{272}\) See above, pp. 27-28.
Chrysoloras essentially has nothing original to offer to the specific and wider theological discussion. Chrysoloras actually bases his refutation on passages from Kabasilas and Barlaam the Calabrian and well-known patristic sources, some of which are used also by Kabasilas. Chrysoloras also fails to give an overall appreciation of the reasons that led to the different Trinitarian views held by the Greek and Latin Churches. In their attempt to understand what lies behind the *filioque* question, twentieth-century theologians of both sides concentrated on the supposedly different perceptions of the Trinitarian Godhead in East and West. According to their views, the Latin fathers perceived the Trinitarian God primarily as essence, with the three Persons united in their common essence and identified through their relations with one another. Hence, the Father and the Son project the Spirit as one principle through a single act. On the other hand, the same modern theologians suggested, the Greek fathers perceived the Trinitarian God primarily as a unity of three distinct and unconfused Persons united in their common essence through the Father Who is the only source in the Trinity. The Latin doctrine of the double procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, according to the Greek theologians, introduces two sources in the Trinity even if the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as one principle as the Latins taught\(^\text{273}\). This simplified scheme of the two different theological views over the life in the Trinity, namely the ‘existential Christian East’ and the ‘essentialist Christian West’, though helpful in our efforts to understand the major differences between the Greek and Latin teachings, does not seem to reflect the actual development of the Trinitarian theology of the fathers\(^\text{274}\), who did not formulate a similar theological scheme but simply responded to specific theological questions and debates raised through the centuries\(^\text{275}\). In this sense, by defending the Orthodox position on specific points raised in the treatises under discussion, rather than lacking originality Chrysoloras consciously follows a long tradition.


Apart from its theological aspects the *Dialogue* also touches upon methodological issues. In more than one instance Chrysoloras criticizes scholasticism as a method of approaching theology and God [1.4.474-478, 1.4.503-511]. Evidently, however, Chrysoloras himself employed the syllogistic method and dialectics in formulating his own theological arguments in response to Kydones’ refutation, making good use of Aristotle’s *Categories* and *On Interpretation* and above all Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, the standard textbook introducing Aristotelian *Logic* to the Byzantine student. It is true that in some cases [2] Chrysoloras seem to be conflating two or three slightly different definitions of the soul given by Aristotle in his *De anima* 2.1, as the Neoplatonist commentators of late antiquity have already done. Nevertheless, Chrysoloras stressed the need to be aware of the limits and dangers of using philosophical reasoning and theories in the process of investigating questions on Christian doctrine. For otherwise, one could be led to develop heretical beliefs. The only way for theologians to avoid this is to check their views against the teachings sanctioned by the Church and declared by the fathers and the Ecumenical Councils. Also in this respect Chrysoloras follows the mainstream Orthodox view that Latin scholastic theology has led itself astray by trusting Aristotelian philosophical theories more than the teachings of Scripture and the saints. This also shows that, with rare exceptions, Orthodox theologians did not succeed in appreciating Aquinas’ method and approach, for his teachings, too, are firmly based on Scriptural and patristic citations. It is clear, therefore, that no serious effort was made on Chrysoloras’ part to understand Aquinas’ theology. The same stands also in the opposite direction, with a difference. For, Aquinas was the first theologian, to our knowledge, who explicitly stated that the problem over the *filioque* is primarily linguistic:

... many things which sound well enough in Greek do not perhaps, sound well in Latin. Hence, Latins and Greeks professing the same faith do so using different words. For among the Greeks it is said, correctly, and in a Catholic way, that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three *hypostases*. But with the Latins it does not sound right to say that there are three *substantiae*, even though on a purely verbal basis the term *hypostasis* in Greek means the same as the term *substantia* in Latin.

---


277 I would like to thank Professor Anne Sheppard for drawing my attention to this.
The fact is, *substantia* in Latin is more frequently used to signify *essence*. And both we and the Greeks hold that in God there is but one *essence*. So where the Greeks speak of three *hypostases*, we Latins speak of three *personae*, as Augustine in the seventh book on the Trinity also teaches. And, doubtless, there are many similar instances (CEG 1, Preface).278

The same was pointed out later by Chrysoloras’ contemporary, the Orthodox theologian Joseph Bryennios, who repeated (without naming Aquinas) that the interchangeable use of the Latin term *substantia* to render the terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις led to the misinterpretation of scriptural and patristic sayings and finally to the schism.279 Ultimately, the mysteries of the Trinitarian Godhead remain beyond human understanding. This is what Gregory Nazianzene and, closer to Chrysoloras’ times, Barlaam the Calabrian had stated280. The fact that this view is not cited in theological treatises of the period is indicative of the confrontational and intransigent stance held by both sides. This *argumentum ex silentio* leads us to briefly examine the political and psychological aspects of Chrysoloras’ *Dialogue*.

Reading this work one gets a feeling for the social and psychological tensions between the Latins and the Orthodox Byzantines as well as between the Orthodox and the Latinophile Byzantines, including those who converted to Roman Catholicism like Kydones. Chrysoloras indirectly accuses the Latins of heresy [1.2.162-163] and criticizes Aquinas for his bold statements [6.1.34-35]. The language, however, Chrysoloras uses against Kydones is much stronger, which reflects how Latinophiles and converts were perceived by their Orthodox compatriots. In this case Chrysoloras does not hesitate to express his hatred and contempt. It would be easy to accuse Chrysoloras of lack of manners, excessive hostility and base vindictiveness. However, on another level this stance reflects the realities and spirit of the time. A staunch Orthodox, Chrysoloras is not prepared to sacrifice his orthodoxy and support the unionist cause, which for some sections of Byzantine society seemed the only possible way to save the Empire from the

Turkish menace. Together with the majority of the Byzantine clergy and people Chrysoloras believes that there is no real hope for true reconciliation and therefore those who attempted to act as mediators, like Kydones, not only cannot bridge the gap between the two sides but by attempting to do so they endanger the very existence of the Empire by causing a deeper division within society, as Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos had actually pointed out to his son Emperor John VIII a decade earlier (in 1422)\textsuperscript{281}. Indeed, the survival, development and prosperity of every society presuppose unity of values, principles and ideals. The memory of the Latin occupation of the Empire in 1204 and its subsequent partition into Latin principalities, accompanied by systematic efforts by the Latin Church to convert the Orthodox people, were still vivid in Chrysoloras’ times. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that he expressed such disappointment and bitterness towards Kydones, who, in his eyes, had abandoned his country in such critical times when the Byzantine people were fighting for their survival and freedom. Chrysoloras’ Dialogue is undoubtedly a first-class source on how Kydones was perceived by a section of Byzantine people while he was still alive and shortly after his death. The recording in the Dialogue of an actual debate between Kydones and Chrysoloras while Kydones was still alive [10.107], enhances the value of the Dialogue in this respect.

Above all, the Dialogue reveals aspects of the author’s character and personality. In the personal letters addressed to him by Manuel II and John Chortasmenos\textsuperscript{282}, it is clear that Demetrios was highly esteemed in this circle of friends and intellectuals. Both comment on Demetrios’ erudition and rhetorical ability. Moreover, in his letters (41 and 43) Manuel presents Chrysoloras as a shrewd politician, a conscientious official, an

\textsuperscript{281} Cf. George Sphrantzes, Chronicon Minus, ed. R. Maisano, Giorgio Sfranze, Cronaca, CFHB, XXIX (Rome, 1990), XXIII 5-6, p. 82.1-15: εἶτεν ὁ αὐτίκος βασιλεὺς πρὸς τὸν νῦν αὐτὸ τὸν βασιλεῖα κόσμῳ ἐν αὐτῷ μόνον Ἰσταμένου καὶ ἔμοι ἐμπροσθεν εὐθύς, ἐμπεδοῦντος λόγου περὶ τῆς συνόδου· ὡς μὲν βέβαιος καὶ λαθέας ἐπιστάμεθα ἐκ μέσης τῆς καρδίας αὐτῶν δὴ τῶν ἀσέβον ὑπὸ πολλά τους φοβεῖ, μὴ συμφωνήσωμεν καὶ ἐνοθῶμεν μὲ τοὺς Φράγγους· ἔχουν τὸ γάρ ὅτι, ἀν τούτῳ γένεισθαι, θέλει γενεῖν μέγα τι κακὸν τῶν τῆς Δύσεως Ἰστιτουντὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς. Αὕτων τὸ περὶ τῆς συνόδου, μελέτα μὲν αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνακάτων, καὶ μάλιστ’ ὅταν ἔχεις χρείαν συνεχεῖς τοὺς ἀσέβεις, τὸ δὲ νὰ πούρης αὐτόν, μὴ ἐπιχειρήσῃς αὐτὸ, διὸτι οὐδὲν βλέπω τοὺς ἡμεῖς ὅτι εἰναὶ ἀρετοὶ πρὸς τὸ εὑρέτην τῶν τροπῶν ἐννέας καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ ὀροφῶν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι νὰ ἐσμὲν ὡς ἀργυρίην, τούτου δὲ ἀδικαντὸν ὅταν σχεδον, συνέχαι μὴ καὶ χείρον σχείμα γένεια, καὶ ἤδη ἀπεσκεπάσθημεν εἰς τοὺς ἀσέβεις (my italics).

experienced judge and a scholar devoted to his studies. This latter aspect is reflected in Chrysoloras’ references in the Dialogue to the quadrivium, concerning arithmetical, geometrical, musical and astronomical theorems [e.g., 2.4.310-313, 3.3.151-191, 6.1.54-59], and his citations from, or allusions to, non-Christian philosophers, scientists and writers such as Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Porphyry, Ptolemy, Euclid, Archimedes, Theon of Alexandria, John Philo and Philo of Alexandria, as well as Church Fathers including Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzene, John Damascene and contemporary theologians such as Barlaam the Calabrian. In one case he blends Aristotelian views and patristic teachings over the discussion of prohairesis, which he characterizes as ‘the leader of the soul’ responsible for man’s actions, good or evil, including belief or disbelief in God [1.4.515-532]. This subject needs further investigation.

In one of his letters to Chrysoloras Manuel describes his friend as a generous person with an aversion to luxuries, and above all a man with a sense of humour. This latter aspect of Chrysoloras’ character is also reflected to some extent in the Dialogue, especially at the end of each Syllogism where he presents Kydones answering in an amusingly abrupt way. One would imagine Chrysoloras smiling while composing these lines and the audience being amused at hearing Kydones’ imaginary reaction, especially those among them who knew him personally. Chrysoloras’ playful attitude is also revealed in word plays such as the synthesis of parts of the word πατέρας and θεολόγους to produce the word τερατολόγους [12.119-126].

In the Dialogue Chrysoloras stresses that in principle he dislikes confrontation. This is confirmed by Manuel’s description of him in his letter to Konstantinos Ivanko284, as ‘a man who knows how to speak, how to be silent, how to act’285. Similarly, Theodoros Potamios286, in his letter addressed to Manuel II’s uncle, Theodoros Kantakouzenos287,

284 On Konstantinos Ivanko, see PLP 7973; Dennis, Manuel II, Letters, p. xlvi.
286 On Theodoros Potamios, see PLP 23601; Dennis, Manuel II, Letters, pp. xlviii-l.
287 On Theodoros Kantakouzenos, see PLP 10966.
praises Demetrios’ gentleness (ὁ καλὸς Χρυσολωρᾶς). An opposite, uncompromising and often harsh, side of his character, however, is reflected in his ceaseless and insolent attacks against Kydones.

The very fact that Chrysoloras chose to ‘resurrect’ Aquinas, Kabasilas and Kydones to take part in a discussion in which the author also participates, instead of composing yet another refutation similar to theirs, shows his creative spirit. In this way he succeeds not only in bringing back to life these eminent scholars and their teachings but in vividly recreating the atmosphere in a theatron, a private or public gathering, where authors used to recite their poetry and deliver their compositions, including theological works. Public debates of this kind are attested in the sources of the period, as for example the debate between Joseph Bryennios and the Greek Dominican Maximos Chrysoberges that took place before the ‘whole Metropolis’ in Crete sometime between 1399-1401, and the one held in 1422 (or 1423) in Constantinople between Bryennios and certain Latinophiles whom he does not name in case they wished to change their minds and return to Orthodoxy, as he says. Indeed, the dialogue as a literary genre has a long tradition in Greek literature and remained popular through the centuries. Chrysoloras often refers in his works to the Platonic dialogues (including Cratylus, Phaedrus and Gorgias), which marked ancient Greek literature with their deep philosophical messages conveyed in a lively style ornamented with humour and wit. The use of the dialogue in antirhetical and polemical works in the Palaeologan era is also attested in other distinguished thinkers.

---

291 A. Kazhdan, ‘Dialogue’, ODB, vol. 1, p. 618; M.Ch. Bakalopoulou, Φιλόθεος Σηλυβρίας, Βίος και Συγγραφικὸ Ἐργα (PhD thesis, University of Athens, 1992), pp. 122-129. A survey of works composed by Greek authors in the form of dialogue (covering the period from the classical times to the Byzantine era) in TLG enumerates no less than 148 titles. In so far Christian authors is concerned, apart from the genre of Erotapokriseis (for example those by Anastasius of Sinai and other collections by anonymous authors) theological dialogues were composed by Justin Martyr, Origen, Athanasius of Alexandria, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor and John Damascene.
such as Nikephoros Blemmydes, Nikephoros Gregoras, Gregory Palamas, Barlaam the Calabrian, Gregory Akindynos and George Scholarios and Manuel II. In composing these texts the Atticising style was regularly employed by the Byzantine authors in imitation of the great Greek orators, mainly Demosthenes, Aelius Aristides and Libanius. As is often the case in Byzantine compositions employing this style, Chrysoloras’ Dialogue presents certain deficiencies in syntax and a tendency to employ pleonasmos. Another important stylistic feature in Chrysoloras Dialogue is the use of rich punctuation in the principal MS (L), which indicates that the text in this codex was intended to be delivered aloud and hence the numerous punctuation signs marking shorter and longer pauses, which help the orator to control the rhythm of the text often at the expense of its understanding.

In addition, the Dialogue contains important information on perceptions of Greek identity in this period. Chrysoloras refers a number of times to the term Ἕλλην and its derivatives. In some cases he uses the adverb ἐλληνικῶς with reference to Greek paideia. He also places the ancient Greeks, typically, in juxtaposition to the barbarians. More importantly, he refers to the Greeks as ‘our nation’ (Ελληνες τὸ ἡμέτερον). This bears witness to the increasing awareness, among the highest Byzantine intellectual circles in this period, of their Hellenic past and the gradual evolution of the meaning of the term Ἕλλην, which together with its religious and educational/cultural connotations has acquired also an ethnic connotation. There are other similar examples from this period, including Manuel Chrysoloras, Isidore of Kiev and Manuel II. This movement culminates, as we know, with Pletho who declared in his Oration to Manuel II that Ἕλληνες ἐσμὲν τὸ γένος.

In the absence of any reference to Chrysoloras’ Dialogue in Byzantine and Latin literature it is impossible to assess its reception by contemporary audiences. The fact, however, that the text has survived in no less than four manuscripts dated to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, bearing no later annotation, shows that its readership

---

292 For editions of these dialogues see TLG.
294 See Dendrinos, ‘Co-operation and friendship’, p. 15 with note 63.
in this period was limited to a small and select group of scholars with theological interests. It seems, therefore, that theologically speaking the impact of this work most probably was not extensive.

Modern scholars have remarked that Chrysoloras’ literary production ‘n’est ni très abondante, ni très importante’\(^{296}\) and that he ‘is not a first rank author’ but ‘one of the minor Byzantine anti-Thomists’ whose ‘philosophical and theological equipment … although not poor, is mediocre’\(^{297}\). It is true that Chrysoloras does not excel among other distinguished authors of his period, nor does he claim the honour of being included among them. What, in my view, Demetrios Chrysoloras tried to do through his *Dialogue* was to show that the theological dialogue between the Byzantine and the Latin theologians in his own times was part of a continuous process of discussion between the two Churches, at the heart of which remains the theological question on the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity and the procession of the Holy Spirit. It is for this reason, I think, that apart from a single allusion to papal primacy, Chrysoloras made no reference to other secondary points of divergence. Unfortunately, we do not know whether the person who instigated Chrysoloras to compose his *Dialogue* appreciated the fruit of Demetrios’ labour, as he says in the Epilogue, unless of course the identity of this anonymous Byzantine is revealed in the future.

It is hoped that the present edition and study of Demetrios Chrysoloras’ *Dialogue*, which is part of the International Research Project *Thomas de Aquino Byzantinus*\(^{298}\), offered an opportunity to look again at Chrysoloras as an author and theologian in the wider context of the reception of Thomistic thought in Byzantium, and to some extent contribute to the present dialogue between the two Churches.

\(^{298}\) Updated information on the texts and editors is accessible online at: [http://www.rhul.ac.uk/Hellenic-Institute/Research/Thomas.htm](http://www.rhul.ac.uk/Hellenic-Institute/Research/Thomas.htm) and [http://www.elemedu.upatras.gr/labart/dimitr/index1.html](http://www.elemedu.upatras.gr/labart/dimitr/index1.html) (last accessed on 3 November 2012).
Part II: The manuscript tradition

Description of the extant manuscripts

The text of Demetrius Chrysoloras’ Dialogue is preserved in four MSS (K, L, P and V) which are described in some detail below. The description of the extant MSS is followed by a palaeographical and textual examination of the text before their relation is examined and a stemma codicum is constructed.

K  Hauniensis GkS 1985, 4\(^{299}\) (examined through digitised facsimiles)

2\(^{nd}\) ½ 14\(^{th}\)-15\(^{th}\) c.; paper; 217x142mm; ff. 236 (ff. 135\(^{r}\); 141\(^{r}\) blank) + <l>; 12-26 (1)

Contents: this is a miscellaneous codex comprising theological and religious works and letters by John Chrysostom, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzene, John Damascene, Theodore Studite, Photios, Michael Psellos, Demetrios Chrysoloras as well as letters by Libanius.

1. (ff. 1-57) Demetrius Chrysoloras, Dialogue on Demetrios Kydon’s Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas, + Διάλογος τοῦ σοφωτάτου κ(αὶ) λογιωτάτου κυροῦ Δημητρίου τοῦ Χρυσολωρᾶ, ἀναιρετικὸς τοῦ λόγου, ὃν ἔγραψε κυρός Δημήτριος ὁ Κυδώνης | κατὰ τοῦ μακαρίου Θεσσαλονίκης, κυροῦ Νείλου τοῦ Καβάσιλα :

   ἡνίκα παρ’ ἐκείνου δι’ εὐλαβῶν διακόν(ῶν) ἐπιστολ(ὴν) ἐδέξατο τοῦ γνωρίσαι αὐτὸν καθ’ ἡμ(ῶν) πόλεμος …, des. … λόγω μάλλον, ἦ τούτο :| + l + l
dόξα τῶ Θ(ε)ῶ : | + Ed. below pp. 190-397 (see Plate 3).

2. (ff. 57-58) John Damascene, On the right belief, + λίβελ<λ>ος τοῦ ὁσίου πατέρας Ἰω(άννε)ν τοῦ Δαμασκηνοῦ γραφεὶς καὶ ἀποσταλεῖς ἐς Ἱεροσολύμ(ων), πρὸς τὸν ἀγώναταν π(ατ)σιώ(χο)ν Κωνσταντινουπόλ(εως) ἐν τῇ πανευδαιμονίᾳ ἡνίκα παρ’ ἐκείνου δι’ εὐλαβῶν διακόν(ῶν) ἑπιστολ(ὴν) ἐπιστολ(ὴν) ἐπερχόμενον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ· καὶ μήν καὶ παντὶ τῷ | λαῷ καὶ τῇ καθολικῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ,

\(^{299}\) The codex was briefly described by C. Graux, Notices sommaires des manuscrits grecs de la grande Bibliothèque royale de Copenhague (Paris, 1879), pp. 71-75, and more analytically by B. Schartau, Codices graeci Haunienses. Ein deskriptiver Katalog des griechischen Handschriftenbestandes der Königlichen Bibliothek Kopenhagen (Copenhagen, 1994), pp. 205-213.
ὁπως ὁμολογεῖ καὶ πιστεύει :, cod. Inc. Όυ μικρός ἀμφιβολοθετεῖν ... des. ... ἀκαταληψίας γνώφω καλυπτόμενον, ἀμήν : Ed. PG 94, cols. 1421-1424.

3. (f. 58v) Photius (?), De divino sacrificio, + Φαστίου π(ατ)ριάχ(ον): περὶ τ(ῆς) θεί(ας) ἱερουργ(ίας): cod. Inc. Ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ ἡ ἀκριβὴς τῶν πραγμάτ(ων) κατανόησις ... des. ... διαγράφειν τὴν φύσιν :+ Unpublished.

4. (f. 58r) John Damascene, Epistle to Zacharias, Περὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ αἵματος τοῦ Κ(υρίο)υ ἡμ(ῶν) Ἰ(ησο)ῦ Χ(ριστο)ῦ, Ἰω(άνν)ο τοῦ Δαμασκηνοῦ cod. Inc. Περὶ τοῦ κυριακοῦ σώματος ..., des. ... οὕτω φρονοῦμεν, κ(αὶ) οὕτω πιστεύομεν :+ Ed. PG 95, cols. 401-404.

5. (f. 59r) <Anonymous>, <On the Holy Spirit> Title omitted, cod. Inc. Ὁ μέγας Βασίλειος ... καὶ οὕτω πιστεύομεν :

6. (ff. 59v-92r) John Chrysostom, Letters
   i. (ff. 59v-68v) Letters 94, 96, 110, 112, 118-121, 155, 174, 189, 195-196, 200-202, 234, + τοῦ ἐν ἄγιος π(ατ)ρ(ῷ)ς ἡμῶν Ιω(άνν)ου ἀρχ(ῆ)ς ἐπισκ(ῶ)ς ἔς ἐπισκόπους κ(αὶ) πρεσβυτέρους. ἐπιστολαὶ ἐπισκόποις κ(αὶ) πρεσβυτέροις· ἐν φυλακῇ ὦσοι. (f. 59v) ep. 118, PG 52, cols. 673; (f. 60r) ep. 174, col. 711; (f. 60v) ep. 200, col. 723; (ff. 60v-61r) ep. 201, col. 723; (f. 61v) ep. 202, cols. 723-724; (f. 61r) ep. 234, cols. 739-740; (f. 61v-62r) ep. 119, cols. 673-674; (ff. 62v-63r) ep. 120, cols. 674-675; (ff. 63v-64r) ep. 121, cols. 675-676; (f. 64r) ep. 110, col. 668; (f. 64v) ep. 112, cols. 668-669; (ff. 64v-65r) ep. 155, cols. 702-703; (f. 65v) ep. 189, cols. 717-718; (ff. 65v-66r) ep. 195, cols. 120-121; (f. 66v) ep. 196, col. 121; (ff. 66v-68r) ep. 94, cols. 657-659; (f. 68v) ep. 96, cols. 659-660301.
   ii. (ff. 69r-72r) Ps-Chrysostom, Letter to bishop Kyriakos, in top margin + ἐπιστολή πρὸς Κυριακὸν ἐπισκόπου ὁμαδικῶν ἐξορίσατον καὶ αὐτῶν :, cod.


301 The end of Letter 96 in the codex is incomplete and different than that in PG 52, col. 660.26-29.
Inc. Φέρε δή ἀπαντήσω ..., des. ... πρὸς τὸν Θ(εό)ν : Ed. PG 52, cols. 681-685\(^{302}\).

iii. (f. 72\(^{v}\)) Excerpt from the letter to bishop Kyriakos, + τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τ(ῆς) πρ(ος) 
Κυριακῶν ἑπίσκοπον ἑπιστολής : in top margin, cod. Inc. Μὴ εἴη τοι ὁ λογισμός ... ἡκουσα γὰρ περὶ ... τὸν πλούσιον ..., des. ... τὸν θρόνον τῆς ἐκκλησίας : Ed. PG 52, col. 685.11-21\(^{303}\).

iv. (ff. 72\(^{v}\)-78\(^{v}\)) Excerpts from his Letter to those scandalised, τοῦ αὐτοῦ περὶ 
τῶν σκανδαλισθέντων : cod. Inc. Ὅταν οὖν ἴδῃς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ... τῶν αἰών(ων), ἀμήν : Ed. PG 52, cols. 500, 507, 509, 516, 518-521, 525-528.

v. (ff. 78\(^{v}\)-80\(^{v}\)) Excerpts from the first letter to Olympias, ἐκ τῆς <δευτέρας> 
πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐπιστολὴ <πρώτη> πρ(ος) τὴν Ὀλυμπίαδα : cod. Inc. Φέρε δὴ πάλιν ..., des. ... δόξη τ(ῆν) παράκλησις(ν) : Ed. PG 52, cols. 549-552, 554, 555.

vi. (ff. 80\(^{v}\)-81\(^{v}\)) Excerpts from the second letter to Olympias, ἐκ τῆς <δευτέρας> 
πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐπιστολὴ <πρώτη> πρ(ος) τοῦ Χρυσοστόμου : cod. Inc. Τί δε τούτο ἐστι ..., des. ... ἔσται πλέ(ον) αὐτ(οῖς) : Ed. PG 52, cols. 556-557, 567-568.

vii. (f. 81\(^{v}\)) Excerpts from the third letter to Olympias, in top margin τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τ(ῆς) <πρώτης> : cod. Inc. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ βουληθείης ..., des. ... καρπωσώμεθα τὴν εὐφροσύνην : Ed. PG 52, cols. 573, 582, 589-590.

viii. (ff. 81\(^{v}\)-82\(^{v}\)) Excerpts from the fifth letter to Olympias, τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρ(ος) 
αὐτὴν ἑπιστολὴ <πέταση> : cod. Inc. Επετάθη τὰ τῆς θλίψεως ..., des. ... ἐπετάθη τὰ τῆς θλίψεως ..., des. ... ἐπετάθη τὰ τῆς θλίψεως ..., des. ... ἐπετάθη τὰ τῆς θλίψεως ...: Ed. PG 52, cols. 599-601.

---


\(^{303}\) The passage Μὴ εἴη τοι ὁ λογισμός ... τὸν πλούσιον (f. 72:8-13) has not been found in this Letter or in any other Chrysostomic or Ps.-Chrysotomic work.
x. (ff. 84v-87v) Excerpts from the seventh letter to Olympias, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν <δευτέρας> ἐπιστολῆς - cod. Inc. Τί φῆς· οὐκ ἔστησα …, des. ... ἀδάμαντος στερότερον ποιοῦσα - Ed. PG 52, cols. 601-606.

xi. (ff. 87v-88v) Excerpt from the eighth letter to Olympias, in marg. τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν δεύτερας ἐπιστολῆς: - cod. Inc. Τί φῆς· οὐκ ἔστησα …, des. … ἀδάμαντος στερότερον ποιοῦσα - Ed. PG 52, cols. 607-608.

xii. (f. 88r) Excerpt from the eleventh letter to Olympias, εκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν δεκάτης ἐπιστολῆς: - cod. Inc. Ὅσω τὰ ὑών πειράσματα:· Ed. PG 52, col. 609.


xiv. (f. 89r) Excerpt from the fifteenth letter to Olympias, in margin + ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν δεκάτης τετάρτης ἐπιστολῆς: - cod. Inc. Εἰ γὰρ οἱ κοινωνοὶ …, des. … ἐντεύθεν σοι ταμιευομένων:· Ed. PG 52, cols. 619-620.

xv. (f. 90r) Excerpt from the sixteenth letter to Olympias, in top margin + ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν δεκάτης πέμπτης ἐπιστολῆς: - cod. Inc. Ἀμφότερα τῆς ἀφάτου …, des. ... ἐργαζόμενος γαλήνην: - Ed. PG 52, col. 620.

xvi. (f. 90r) Excerpt from the fourth letter to Olympias, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν δεκάτης ἐκτῆς ἐπιστολῆς: cod. Inc. Μὴ δὴ μικρὰν …, des. ... φανώσι(ν) ὑποσυρόμενοι: - Ed. PG 52, cols. 595-596.


304 In PG 52, col. 739 the Letter 233 is addressed to the Bishop of Antioch (Πρὸς τὸν Ἀντιοχείας). Cf. Aldama, Repertorium, no. 79, p. 31.
xix.  (f. 92) Excerpt from the letter to Aravios, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς προ(κ) Αρᾶβιον ἐπιστολῆς ὑμεῖς ... des. ... τῆς ἐκκλησίας λυμάνεται : Ed. PG 52, col. 675.

7. (ff. 92v-93r) Basil of Caesarea, Excerpts from the letters of Basil the Great, ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιδοσίαν ὑμεῖς ... τῆς ἐκκλησίας λυμάνεται : cod. Inc. Μὴ διαλήπτητε καὶ ὑμεῖς ... des. ... τῆς ἐκκλησίας λυμάνεται : Ed. PG 52, col. 675.


9. (ff. 94v-113v) Libanius, Letters, including interlinear glosses and grammatical notes. ἐπιστολῆς Βασιλείου τοῦ μεγάλου Βασιλείου cod. (f. 94v) ep. 1205; (f. 94v-95r) ep. 235; (f. 95r) ep. 280; (f. 95v) ep. 313; (f. 95v) ep. 414; (f. 95v) ep. 645; (f. 95v-96r) ep. 570; (f. 96r) ep. 1079; (f. 96v) ep. 707; (f. 96v) ep. 266; (f. 96v-97r) ep. 975; (f. 97r) ep. 247; (f. 97v) ep. 700; (f. 97v) ep. 11; (f. 97v) ep. 608; (f. 98r) ep. 1138; (f. 98r) ep. 323; (f. 98v) ep. 538; (f. 98v-99r) ep. 51; (f. 99v-100v) ep. 331; (f. 100v-101r) ep. 333; (f. 101v-102r) ep. 352; (f. 102v) ep. 499; (f. 103r) ep. 547; (f. 103v) ep. 56; (f. 103v) ep. 920; (f. 103v-104r) ep. 1041; (f. 104r) ep. 167; (f. 104v) ep. 1089; (f. 104v) ep. 525; (f. 105r-105v) ep. 511; (f. 105v-106r) ep. 54; (f. 106v) ep. 22; (f. 106v) ep. 466; (f. 106v-107r) ep. 693; (f. 107r) ep. 711; (f. 107r) ep. 189; (f. 107v-108r) ep. 670; (f. 108v) ep. 84; (f. 108v-110r) ep. 379; (f. 110v-111r) ep. 327; (f. 111v) ep. 72; (f. 112v) ep. 1330; (f. 112v-113r) ep. 410. Ed. R. Foerster, Libanii opera, vols. X, XI (Leipzig, 1963, 1972).

10. (ff. 113v-118v) Basil of Caesarea and Libanius, Correspondence, in top margin ἐπιστολῆς Βασιλείου τοῦ μεγάλου Βασιλείου : cod. Inc. Μὴ διαλήπτητε καὶ ὑμεῖς ... τῆς ἐκκλησίας λυμάνεται : Ed. PG 52, col. 675.
11. (ff. 118v-130v) Libanius, Letters, Ἐπιστολαι ἑτέρ(αι), Λιβανίου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, πρὸς τινας : (ff. 118v-119v) ep. 1155; (f. 119r) ep. 366; (f. 119v) ep. 647; (ff. 119r-120v) ep. 512; (f. 120v) ep. 442; (f. 120r) ep. 388; (f. 120v) ep. 1466; (ff. 120v-121v) ep. 238; (f. 121r) ep. 382; (ff. 121v-122r) ep. 26; (f. 122v) ep. 377; (ff. 122v-123v) ep. 1039; (f. 123v) ep. 1048; (ff. 123v-124v) ep. 808; (f. 124v) ep. 184; (ff. 124v-125v) ep. 636; (ff. 125v-126v) ep. 736; (f. 126v) ep. 269; (ff. 126v-127v) ep. 509; (f. 127v) ep. 64; (f. 127v) ep. 197; (ff. 127v-128v) ep. 107; (f. 128v) ep. 317; (f. 128v) ep. 84; (f. 128v) ep. 318; (ff. 128v-129v) ep. 8; (f. 129r) ep. 1; (f. 129v) ep. 42; (ff. 129v-130v) ep. 754; (f. 130v) ep. 49; (f. 130v) ep. 141. Ed. R. Foerster, Libanii opera, vols. X, XI.

12. (ff. 130v-134v) Gregory Nazianzene and Basil of Caesarea, Letters with interlinear glosses, + ἐπιστολαι τοῦ ἀγ(ίου) Γρηγορίου τοῦ θεολόγου : Εὐδόξιω ὡς τοῦ ἑτέρ(α) : Letters by Gregory Nazianzene: (ff. 130v-131v) ep. 180, ed. PG 37, col. 296; (f. 131v) ep. 34, col. 76; (f. 131v) ep. 35, col. 77; (f. 131v) ep. 36, col. 77; (ff. 131v-132v) ep. 80, col. 153; (f. 132v) ep. 19, col. 53; (f. 132v-133v) ep. 164, cols. 272-273; (f. 133r) 155, col. 261; (f. 133v) ep. 133, cols. 228-229; (f. 133v), ep. 15, cols. 48-49. Inc. ЕЎ γε ὅτι ... , des. mut. ... ὑπερ αὐτ(ῶν); (f. 134v) part of ep. 111, col. 209. Inc. mut. τὴν σωπήν ..., des. ... ἤσσερ ἐνθε(ον) ...; (f. 134v) ep. 236, col. 232; (f. 134r) ep. 83, cols. 156-157; (f. 134r) ep. 165, cols. 273-276A. Inc. Πυνθάνομαι σε ..., des. mut. ... κακαίζομενον. Letter by Basil of Caesarea: (f. 132v) ep. 186, ed. PG 32, cols. 661-664.

13. (f. 135v) blank with pen trials of the ligature epsilon-ksi and the note ἐξ ύμ(ῶν) τελεοῦσει.

14. (ff. 136v-140v) Gregory Nazianzene, Poetry, a) (ff. 136v-137v) ἀκροστιχῆς τοῦ ἐν ἄγιοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου τοῦ θεολόγου | κατὰ στιχεῖον δι’ ἰάμβων ἐκάστου τελείαν παραίνειν | ἔχοντος cod. Inc. Αρχὴν ἀπάντων καὶ τέλος ..., des. ... θ(εό)ν μὴ διστάσῃς. Ed. PG 37, cols. 908-910305, b) (ff. 137v-140v) Γνώμαι δίστοιχοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ cod. Inc. Αρχής καλῆς κάλλιστον ..., des. ... ἡ ἀνθοῦς χλόης : Ed. PG 37, cols. 916-927. c) (f. 140v) +++ αἰ ἡλικίας τοῦ ἀν(θρώπ)ου: +++ in margin ἡ κ(αί) μεθηλικίας : cod. Inc. βρέφος λέγεται ..., des. ... κ(αί) κόρης μόρος : Ed. L. Franco, A Study of the Metaphrastic Process: the case of the unpublished Passio of St James the Persian (BHG 773), Passio of St Plato (BHG 1551-1552), and Vita of St Hilarion (BHG 755) by Symeon

305 The text in this MS is longer than that in the PG edition.
15. (f. 141v) blank.


20. (ff. 228v-234v) <Michael Psellus?>, Τοῦ αὐτοῦ στίχος οἱ πολιτικοὶ ὅτε ὁ μαθητής αὐτοῦ ὁ Ρωμαῖος καὶ ἀνασινοῦσα διαβολᾶς έκκινησε καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πολιτικοῦ τὸν βασιλέα τοῦ ἁγίου ὁ δὲ οὗ πρὸς ἔσχεν αὐτοῦ: cod. Inc. Ἡδείν καὶ πρότερον ..., des. ... βούλεται πάροχος: Unpublished?


---

306 On the attribution of this work to Symeon Seth, see L.G. Westerink, Michael Psellus De omnifaria doctrina. Critical Text and Introduction (Nijmegen, 1948), p. 2.
Material and layout of the text: the text is copied on Western paper by six different hands (A, B, C, D, E, and F) in single columns of approximately 12-26 lines per page. Hand A copied the major part of the codex (ff. 1-134v), Hand B: ff. 136r-140v, Hand C: f. 141v, Hand D: ff. 142r-155v, Hand E: ff. 156r-195v, ff. 196r-234v and f. 236r, Hand F: ff. 195v-196r. The text on f. 235v most possible was copied by Hand B as the two hands look similar. The main text in the codex was copied in black ink while red ink was used in certain cases for the titles, initials, marginal quotation marks, interlinear glosses as well as for the names of the interlocutors in Chrysoloras’ Dialogue.

On f. 1r a later hand copied a table of contents in Latin. At the bottom of this folio the stamp inscribed DET STORE KONGELIGE BIBLIOTEK is imprinted in blue ink, while on the front pastedown leaf the stamp of the BIBLIOTHECA REGIA HAFNIENSIS is also imprinted, this time in black ink.

The paper on ff. 1r-4v was damaged and subsequently part of the text was destroyed. The damaged paper was replaced most probably by Hand E, who pasted a new piece of paper on the existing one and restored the text, possibly from the damaged section of another MS (Plate 4).

Numbering: a later hand numbered with pencil each recto folio, on the upper right-hand margin, in Indian numerals.

Colophon: on f. 155v Hand D subscribed the month, the day and indiction without stating the year: τέλος, ἀμήν | ἐν μηνὶ μαίῳ ἡ ίν(δικτιῶν)ος ϊβς (Plate 5).

Scribes: so far the hands that contributed to the copying of the MS remain unidentified.

L Laurentianus Pluteus 5.12 (examined through digitised facsimiles)

15th c.; paper; 200 x 285 mm; ff. I-II (blank) + 76 (74v-76v blank); 22-24 (1) (Plate 6)

---

307 Between the second half of the fourteenth and the end of the fifteenth century, the 12th Indiction coincides with the following years: 1374, 1389, 1404, 1419, 1434, 1449, 1464, 1479, and 1494. See V. Grumel, La Chronologie, ouvrage publié avec le concours du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Traité d’Études Byzantines, I (Paris, 1958), pp. 261-264.
Contents: the codex contains solely Demetrius Chrysoloras, Dialogue on Demetrios Kydones’ Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas.

(ff. 1-74r) Διάλογος, [eras. τοῦ σοφώτατος καὶ λογισμάτου κυροῦ Δημητρίου τοῦ Χρυσολωρᾶ (ex codd. K et V)], ἀναιρετικός, τοῦ λόγου, ὃν ἔγραψε κυρὸς Δημήτριος ὁ Κυδώνης, κατὰ τοῦ μακαρίου Θεσσαλονίκης, κυροῦ Νεῖλου τοῦ Καβάσιλα. Inc. Μέγας μὲν ὁ τῶν όμοφύλων..., des. ...εἰποι λόγῳ μᾶλλον, ἥ τούτο: +

The codex belongs to the collection of the Laurenziana Biblioteca and appears in Bandini’s catalogue as cod. Plut. V.XII. A loan note to a certain Lorenzo Ciati shows that the codex was in the Medici’s private Library by July 1484. Prior to this date the codex was in the possession of Theodore Gaza.

Interestingly, part of the title of Chrysoloras’ Dialogue has been washed out: Διάλογος, [eras. τοῦ σοφώτατος κ(αὶ) λογισμάτου κυροῦ Δημητρίου τοῦ Χρυσολωρᾶ, ex cod. K] ἀναιρετικός, τοῦ λόγου, ὃν ἔγραψε κυρὸς Δημήτριος ὁ Κυδώνης, κατὰ τοῦ μακαρίου Θεσσαλονίκης, κυροῦ Νεῖλου τοῦ Καβάσιλα. The same title in Latin was added by a later hand on the top margin of folio I in black ink: ‘Dialogus evertens orationem quam scripsit Dominus Demetrius Cydonensis contra Dominum Nillum Cabasilam Thessalonicensem’. The same Latin hand added on the top margin of the same folio (f. I) the number of the codex in Indian numerals (‘N<umero>. 12’) and on the front pastedown leaf, with pencil this time, the name and the number of the codex, ‘Plut. 5.’ and below ‘Cod. 12’. The erasure of the author of the Dialogue seems to have been intentional, though it is difficult to tell at this stage what were the motives behind this, for Chrysoloras’ name appears in the list of persons of the dialogue right below the title, and it is Chrysoloras who begins the Dialogue (Plate 6). Another hand dated the MS on the upper right hand margin to the fourteenth century (‘XIV saec.<ulum>’)

The codex bears the stamp of the Laurenziana Biblioteca, ‘R<EGIA> BIBLIOTECA

310 Ibid., p. 512. For Theodore Gaza see D.J. Geanakoplos, ‘Theodore Gaza, a Byzantine Scholar of the Palaeologan “Renaissance” in the early Italian Renaissance (c. 1400-1475)’, in Geanakoplos, Constantinople and the West, pp. 68-90.
Collation: the codex consists of 9 quaternia ($\alpha^{\text{ov}}$-$\theta^{\text{ov}}$) and a ternion ($\iota^{\text{ov}}$). The original first leaf of the first quaternion ($\alpha^{\text{ov}}$) is missing, as is the original last leaf of the ternion ($\iota^{\text{ov}}$). Thus, $\alpha^{\text{ov}}$ 1x4 (one leaf, preceding folio 1, missing + 1-7v), $\beta^{\text{ov}}$ 2x4 (8-15), $\gamma^{\text{ov}}$ 3x4 (16-23), $\delta^{\text{ov}}$ 4x4 (24-31), $\varepsilon^{\text{ov}}$ 5x4 (32-39), $\sigma\tau^{\text{ov}}$ 6x4 (40-47), $\zeta^{\text{ov}}$ 7x4 (48-55), $\eta^{\text{ov}}$ 8x4 (56-63), $\theta^{\text{ov}}$ 9x4 (64-71), and $\iota^{\text{ov}}$ 10x3 (72-76 + one leaf, following folio 76, missing). The quaternia are numbered in Greek numerals, most probably by the scribe who copied the text, in the middle bottom margin of either the first recto or last verso folio, while in two cases in both the first recto and last verso folio. With the exception of quaternion $\iota^{\text{ov}}$ which is signed in red ink, the rest are signed in black.

Material and layout of the text: the text was copied on Western paper by a single hand (A) in single columns of approximately 22-24 lines per page. Two different modern hands numbered the folios in Indian numerals. Hand B numbered ff. 1, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70 and 74 on the right-hand top corner in black ink, while Hand C numbered ff. 1-76 in pencil on the bottom right-hand margin.

Script and Ink: the entire text, marginal notes and diagrams were copied by a single hand (A) in mixed minuscule using black ink. The script is regular, clear and legible, disciplined and carefully written in a rather thin ductus. The letters are of medium size and well formed with a slight inclination to the right. In some cases some words were re-inked in a thin black ductus. Most probably the hand who is responsible for this belongs to the scribe himself, for the ink is similar to the one used by the scribe to copy part of the text on f. 63v.

Decoration: the codex bears simple decoration on folios 1v and 74v. Before the title on folio 1v three small crosses appear in red ink while the horizontal stroke of the last one ends in a tail. The text on the last folio (74v) ends in a cruciform shape, with the four
blank squares created by the cross bearing the inscription ‘Ἰ(ΗΣΟ)Ŷ Χ(ΡΙΣΤΟ)Σ ΝΙΚΑ in red ink (Plate 7). The erroneous contraction ΙΥ for Ι(ησο)ῦ, instead of ΙΣ for Ι(ησοῦ)ς, is not unique in Byzantine MSS315, though it is difficult to explain, unless it is simply due to lapsus calami. The text does not contain vignettes or major initials.

**Binding:** when Laurenziana was opened to the public in 1571 all codices that belonged to the Medici private collection were rebound in red leather bearing the coat-of-arms of the Medici and arranged on shelves (Plutei), with safety chains placed on the front cover of the codices to prevent possible removal of the codex from the library. This applies also to our codex (Plut. 5.12) which also preserves the fastening strap. On the top of the front cover a label has been placed with the content of the codex in Greek and Latin.

**Scribe:** so far the hand that copied the MS remains unidentified.

**P  Parisinus graecus 1284**316 (examined through printed facsimiles)

16th c.; paper; ff. 276 (16v, 92-96, 143-144, 175 and 199 blank); 23-28 (1) (Plate 8)

**Contents:** a collection of anti-Latin and anti-Jewish works and treatises on the procession of the Holy Spirit by Matthaios Blastares, Gregory Palamas, Demetrios Chrysoloras and George Scholarios.

1. (ff. 1-16v) **Matthaios Blastares,** *First Oration against the Jews,* τοῦ ἐλαχίστου ἐν ἱερομονάχοις Ματθαίου, πρὸς Ἰουδαίους λόγος πρῶτος· Ματθαῖος εἴργει τῶν ἰουδαίων θράσος· ὥσπερ χαλινοῖς πέντε φιμώσας λόγοις· ὅστις δὲ τούτων τὴν ἐπίρρητον πλάνην· πλάνην ἀτεχνῶς ἐξελέγξει τῷ λόγῳ ἄρδην ἅπασας συγκαθεῖλε αἱρέσεις, μήτηρ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ θεοκτόνων ἐρίς cod. Inc. Ὅτι

---

315 Cf. Athos, Vatopedi 59 (AD 1064), f. 167.1: ὁ Κ(ύριος) ἡμ(ῶν) Ι(ησοῦ)Χ(ριστοῦ)Σ; facsimile of this folio reproduced in K. and S. Lake eds., *Dated Greek Minuscule Manuscripts to the Year 1200,* vol. III: *Manuscripts in the Monasteries of Mount Athos and in Milan,* Monumenta Palaeographica Vetera (Boston, MA, 1935), MS. 106, Plate 182. Interestingly, the text of Chrysoloras’ oration On the Annunciation preserved in the codex Laurentianus, Pluteus 10.31 (15th c.) ends (f. 164r) in a cruciform shape as the text of the Dialogue in Laurentianus, Pluteus 5.12. However, this time the inscription is copied correctly, that is Ἰ(ΗΣΟΥΣ)Χ(ΡΙΣΤΟΣ)Σ ΝΙΚΑ. See online facsimile of the MS at [http://teca.bmlonline.it/TecaViewer/index.jsp?RisIdr=TECA0000613382](http://teca.bmlonline.it/TecaViewer/index.jsp?RisIdr=TECA0000613382) (last accessed on 3 November 2012).


2. (f. 16v) blank.


6. (ff. 92-96) blank.

7. (ff. 97v-198v) <Gennadios Scholarios>, <On the procession of the Holy Spirit>


ii. (ff. 143-144) blank.


iv. (ff. 174r-175v) blank.


vi. (ff. 198v-199v) blank.


318 F. 174 is incomplete. The scribe copied the text until ‘...πρῶτω δὲ τῷ ἕθει’ and left the rest of f. 174r and ff. 174v-175v blank. On the right-hand bottom corner of f. 175v he wrote the beginning phrase of the next folio ‘ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις γενέσθαι αἰτί(α) ...’, apparently to remind himself from which point he should resume the copying of the text.

319 The title is omitted. On the bottom of f. 200r the scribe copied the name of the author, Gregory Palamas Archbishop of Thessalonike (Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης).
Material and layout of the text: the codex is copied on paper by three different hands (A, B, and C) in single columns of approximately 23-28 lines. Hand A copied the text on ff. 1-16r, Hand B: ff. 17r-41v, ff. 42r-85v, ff. 85r-91v and ff. 200r-276v, Hand C: ff. 97r-142v, ff. 145r-174r, and 176r-198r. The text in the entire codex was copied in black ink, while red ink was used for the titles and initials. The folios were prepared to receive marginal scholia, notes and diagrams with reference to the text. The diagrams in Demetrios Chrysoloras’ Abridged exposition of Neilos Kabasilas’ refutation of the Latin teachings on the procession of the Holy Spirit were not completed (Plate 9). In several cases the title of the texts is omitted while the name of the author appears in the bottom margin of the introductory folio of these works (e.g., ff. 17, 42, and 200). The stamp of BIBLIOTHECA REGIA appears on ff. 1 and 276v.

On ff. 7 and 13r Hand A wrote the word δοκίμιον on the top right-hand margin and on the bottom margin, as a pen trial. A cross (+) appear on the top margin in all recto and verso folios in the codex (Plate 10). Catch words appear in the bottom corner of the last verso folio of each quaternion in the right hand margin in order to guide the binder in assembling and binding the gatherings in the correct order (Plate 11).

Numbering: Indian numerals in black ink were written by a later hand on the upper right-hand margin of each recto folio. Folios 42 and 43 bear double numbering on the upper right-hand margin, most probably added by another hand.

Decoration: the title on f. 1 is preceded by a decorated pyle while the text on the same folio is introduced by a major ornamented initial which occupies 7 lines (Plate 12). On f. 97r a floral vignette precedes the title and the text is introduced by a major initial occupying 5 lines. Minor initials, sometimes ornamental, appear throughout the text.

Scribes: so far remain unidentified.

---

320 Ff. 56, 103, 107v, 116v, 135.
321 Ff. 8v-9, 24v-25, 32v-33, 40v-41, 48v-49, 56v-57, 64v-65, 72v-73, 80v-81, 88v-89.
322 Ff. 3v-4, 7v-8, 16, 98v-99, 104v, 112v.

For the dating of this MS see Candal, Nilus Cabasilas, p. ix; R. Devreesse, Le fonds grec de la Bibliothèque Vaticane des origines à Paul V, ST, 244 (Vatican City, 1965), pp. 470-482; G. Mercati, Per la storia dei manoscritti greci di Genova di varie badie Basiliane d’Italia e di Patmo, ST, 68 (Vatican City, 1935), p. 226, note 2.

Koutsoures’ edition of the text ends on f. 47r:22 (p. 180): ‘… λόγων καὶ μετὰ τοῦ Ιούδα, τάπτομεν αὐτοὺς’. However, it seems that the text in the MS continues until f. 49r:4: ‘… τοὶς εἰδέναι βουλομένοις’ as Koutsoures’ description of the MS indicates (p. 37). Cf. Par. gr. 1284, ff. 17-41v where the text ends with ‘… τοῖς εἰδέναι βουλομένοις’.

In his description of the codex Koutsoures, Δημητρίου Χρυσολωρᾶ, Κατά Λατίνων λόγος συνοπτικός, pp. 37-38, erroneously states that ff. 49r-58r contain two different works by Chrysoloras: (a) Dialogue on the primacy of the Pope and the procession of the Holy Spirit (f. 49r:5 until f. 50r:14, inc. ὁ πάπας Πέτρου τοῦ ἀποστόλου ... des. ... ὁ ἡμείς ἐποίησαν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ... des. ... τοῖς εἰδέναι βουλομένοις. and (b) an untitled work on the Procession of the Holy Spirit (f. 50r:15-f. 59r, inc. Το Πνεύμα τῆς ἀληθείας ... des. ... το ὁ). In this text he included the passage from Ps.-Dionysius.

146

ἀρπέμπαν ἔνε ἐγώ, δύνατο πν(εύμ)α τὸ δὲ τὸ πν(εύμ)α.
εἰκὼν καὶ ἔδειξεν εὕρηται, ἀθανάσιος τίς ἡ ἀνάγκη χ(ριστὸς)·
ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς οὐσίας μαρτυρεῖται δι' υἱοῦ, ἀμέσως ὀφθαλμῶν τῶ π(ατ)ρὶ.
δεικνὺς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τῶ πν(εύματ)ι, ὡς ἔχει ὡς δύναμις ἴδιον.
πάντα ὢν στέργει ἀνάθεμα, διακρίνεται ἐναλλὰξ ὁ π(ατ)ὴρ.
τὰ εἰς ἔν τι ἡ γέννησι τὸ πν(εύμ)α, ἐν τοῖς ἀΰλοι τὸ π(ατ)ὴρ ὃ μη τὸ τινὸς.
τὸ γεννᾶν τὸ πν(εύμ)α, ὁ π(ατ)ὴρ προβάλει, ὁ πάπας δὲ πάλιν ὅδε φασὶν.

5. (ff. 59v-66r) Demetrios Chrysoloras, *Encomium on St Demetrios*, τοῦ σοφωτ(ά)τ(ου) καὶ λογιωτ(ά)τ(ου), Δημήτριου τοῦ Χρυσολωρᾶ, εἰς τὸν μέγαν Δημήτριον, καὶ εἰς τὰ μύρα:

εὐ(λόγησ)ον δέσποτα:

6. (f. 67r-v) blank.

7. (ff. 68r-76r) Demetrios Chrysoloras, *Dialogue [...] that it is not right for Orthodox to accuse other Orthodox for any reason*, + Διάλογος Δημητρίου τοῦ Χρυσολωρᾶ | [.....] | Οὐ δικαιών ἐστιν ὁρθόδοξι ἐτέρων ὁρθόδοξων κατηγορεῖν, ἐν ουδενὶ πράγματι, cod. Inc. Τί δὲ τὸ κατηγορεῖν ..., des. ... δοκεῖ τὰ λεγόμενα :- Ed. D. Koutsoures, Διάλογος Δημητρίου τοῦ Χρυσολωρᾶ, ὃν δικαίων ἐστιν ὁρθόδοξων κατηγορεῖν, ἐν ουδενὶ πράγματι (Athens, 1998), pp. 11-32.328.

8. (f. 77r-v) blank.

9. (ff. 78r-135r) Demetrios Chrysoloras, *Dialogue on Demetrios Kydones’ Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas*, Διάλογος τοῦ σοφωτ(ά)τ(ου) κ(αί) λογιωτ(ά)τ(ου) κυρ(οῦ) Δημητρίου τοῦ Χρυσολωρᾶ, ἀναφέρετικός τοῦ λόγου, ὃν ἐγγάφη κυρ(ός) Δημητρίου(ος) ὃ Κηδώνης κ(α)τ(ά) τοῦ μακαρί(ου) | Θεσσαλονίκης, κυρ(οῦ) Νείλου τοῦ Καβάσιλα :- | + τὰ πρόσωπα :- | + Θεομάς Νείλος Κυδώνης: 327

327 So far I have been unable to decipher this transliterated Latin phrase.
328 See above, p. 24 with note 34.
Provenance: according to a note on f. 135v the codex was in the possession of Francesco Akkidas who brought it from Messina to Rome and presented it, along with three other manuscripts, to Pope Gregory XIII on July 1583329 (Plate 15).

Material and layout of the text: the text is written on parchment by four different hands (A, B, C, D) and in a single column of approximately 14-26 lines. Hand A copied ff. 1α-59r, Hand B: ff. 59v-66v, Hand C: ff. 68r-76v and Hand D: ff. 78r-135v. The main text was copied in black ink while red ink was used in certain cases for the titles, initials, marginal quotation marks and notes as well as for the names of interlocutors in the last two dialogues (ff. 68r-76v and 78r-135v).

Collation: the codex consists of 15 quaternia and 3 bifolios, while at least 2 gatherings are missing. The gatherings are signed in Greek numerals in the middle bottom margin of either the first recto or last verso folio. Thus, αον1x4 (1-7), βον2x4 (8-15), γον3x4 (16-23), δον4x4 (24-31), εον5x4 (32-39), ζον6x4 (40-47), ηον7x4 (48-55), θον8x4 (56-63), ιον9x2 (64-66), μον9x2 (68-69), νον10x4 (70-77), ον11x4 (78-85), πον12x4 (86-93), ρον13x4 (94-101), σον14x4 (102-109), τον15x4 (110-117), υον16x4 (118-125), κον17x4 (126-133), ζων18x4 (134-135).

Numbering: the codex bears double numbering in Indian numerals added by two different, later hands (E and F). The codex was trimmed when it was rebound and as a result in some cases the first numbering is lost or barely legible330; some of these trimmed numbers were replaced in the margin by another hand331. This first numbering, added by Hand E in the right-hand bottom corner of each recto folio, is legible from the present f. 6 onwards (f. 6 corresponds to no. 110, f. 7 corresponds to no. 111, etc). This means that the present folio 1α must have been numbered by Hand E as f. <105>. If so, at some stage

330 Ff. 41r, 47r, 59r, 72r.
331 Ff. 3, 4, 5, 49, 56, 68, 69, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82.
the codex must have consisted of at least 104 further folios. Among these, ff. <97-99>, 100-101 and <102-105> were re-arranged in the codex in the present ff. 68-76. It seems, therefore, that at some stage the folios containing item 7 (old no. ff. 97-<105>, presently ff. 68-76) ought to have been placed at the front of the codex. This, however, is not possible, for evidence in the original signatures of the gatherings, as mentioned in the previous section above, shows that this item is contained partly in gathering ιβ’ (present numbering ff. 68-69) and ιγ’ (present numbering ff. 70-76). In the light of this evidence it seems that the codex went through different stages of rebinding. This is confirmed by the second numbering in Indian numerals (ff. 1-135) added on the right-hand top corner of each recto folio in black ink by Hand F. According to P. Canart, our codex (Vat. gr. 1109) and Vat. gr. 1108 (both of which belonged to Akkidas) were rebound sometime in the nineteenth century. It is possible that the missing folio following f. 83, was either absent or removed during the rebinding.

Decoration: the codex bares simple decoration consisting of vignettes, major and minor initials and schemata (Plate 16).

Subscriptions: a table of contents in Latin appears on the front fly-leaf, accompanied with the inscription 1109 Vatgr. On the same fly-leaf the number 02 has been deleted and was replaced by number 1. On f. 1a the number 1109 appears in the left-hand top corner while the same number is placed at the bottom of the same folio along with the inscription Vatgr. The stamp of BIBLIOTHECA APOSTOLICA VATICANA is imprinted also on the same folio.

Scribe: Hand D belongs to the scribe Stephanos, σκευοφύλαξ, of the Monastery of St John Prodromos-Petra in Constantinople and later Metropolitan of Medeia (1431-1442).

333 For the part of the text missing in V, see edition below, pp. 210.299-213.349.
Palaeographical and textual examination of the Dialogue

The text of Demetrios Chrysoloras’ Dialogue is preserved in four codices (K, L, P and V) (a single folio is missing in V)\(^{335}\). The title preceding the text appears in K, L and V while it is omitted in P: Διάλογος τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ λογιωτάτου κυροῦ Δημητρίου τοῦ Χρυσολωρᾶ, ἀνακριτικός τοῦ λόγου, ὃν ἔγραψε κυρὸς Δημήτριος ὁ Κυδώνης κατὰ τοῦ μακαρίου Θεσσαλονίκης, κυροῦ Νείλου τοῦ Καβάσιλα (Dialogue composed by the wisest and most learned Lord Demetrios Chrysoloras, refuting Demetrios Kydones’ work against the blessed <archbishop> of Thessalonike, Lord Neilos Kabasilas).

The text of the Dialogue in all four extant MSS was copied continuously in mixed minuscule with a number of majuscule letterforms, without any indication of paragraph division in the text itself. The beginning of each syllogism in codices K\(^{336}\), L and V is marked by a Greek number (α\(^{oc}\) – α\(^{ec}\)) in red ink in the margin, while this is omitted in P. Both K (f. 37v) and V (f. 115v) wrongly marked the beginning of the Sixth Syllogism numbering it as Syllogism number five (ε\(^{ec}\)). Additional Greek numbers (α' – κδ') appear in the margin of K, L and V marking the beginning of a series of arguments in Chrysoloras’ long section on the soul. These numbers, too, are omitted in P.

The scribes of K, P and V employed more or less similar punctuation. They employed a number of signs to indicate progressive degrees of pause, including lower point (.), middle comma (,), comma (,), middle point (·), upper point (·) and full stop (:+). Though the scribe of L adopted the same signs he used them far more extensively, often every few words and in some cases even every other word, thus making it difficult at times to understand the text. This shows an intention in L to facilitate the oral delivery of the text in front of an audience, with the punctuation signs guiding the orator in pausing, highlighting and colouring his voice, especially since the text is in the form of a dialogue\(^{337}\). With the exception of P, where the title is omitted, the scribes of K, L and V employed similar signs or a combination of them to indicate the end of the title: a colon (:) by K; a colon and a cross (:+) by L; a colon and a wavy dash (:~), a colon and a cross

---

\(^{335}\) See above, p. 149 with note 333.

\(^{336}\) In three cases the marking of the beginning of the Syllogism is omitted in K: First Syllogism (f. 12v); Fourth Syllogism (f. 31v) and Ninth Syllogism (f. 43v).

\(^{337}\) Cf. above, p. 130.
(+•) by \textit{V}. The end of the text is indicated by a colon and a semi colon (,:) by \textit{K}; a colon (:) followed by a monocondyile by \textit{L}; a colon and a wavy dash (~:) by \textit{P}; a colon and a cross (:+) followed by a monocondyile and three crosses by \textit{V}.

Patristic citations in the text are indicated in \textit{K}, \textit{L}, and \textit{V} by single quotation mark (\textit{haplē}) (\textbullet) and double quotation marks (\textit{diplē}) (\textbullet•) added in red ink in the left hand margin. Single quotation marks were also used in \textit{K} and \textit{L} to indicate quotations from Neilos Kabasilas’ \textit{DPSS III} cited in the text, while \textit{V} employed double quotation marks for this purpose. A wavy line (~:) in red ink is used extensively throughout the text in \textit{K}, \textit{L} and \textit{V} to mark Aquinas’ and Kydones’ \textit{verbatim} sections from Neilos Kabasilas’ and Demetrios Kydones’ works\textsuperscript{338}. In \textit{P}, however, the use of quotation marks is limited to two cases (ff. 55\textsuperscript{r} and 73\textsuperscript{r}) to indicate Patristic quotations added in black ink in the right hand margin. In some cases the scribes or the rubricators of \textit{K}, \textit{L} and \textit{V}, apart from quotation marks, added the names of the fathers of the Church whose testimonia are cited in the text, either in the right hand margin (\textit{K}: f. 17\textsuperscript{v} and \textit{L}: f. 22\textsuperscript{v}) or next to the quotation marks (\textit{V}: f. 94\textsuperscript{v}).

The words \textit{γν(ωμικὸν)}, \textit{ὡραῖον ὅλον} and \textit{ὡρ(αῖον)} added in red ink in the margin of \textit{K}, \textit{L} and \textit{V} draw attention to proverbs and certain passages of particular rhetorical and theological importance. The word \textit{γν(ωμικὸν)} appears only once in \textit{P} (f. 84\textsuperscript{v}) while the words \textit{ὡραῖον ὅλον} and \textit{ὡρ(αῖον)} are omitted. The abbreviated form for \textit{ση(μείωσαι)} which denotes an important passage in the text is used twice only in \textit{P}\textsuperscript{339}. The abbreviated instruction \textit{γρ(άφε)} in the left hand margin followed by the word which should replace the one marked in the text is employed in \textit{K} once by the scribe (f. 25\textsuperscript{v}) and once by the corrector (f. 4\textsuperscript{v}). Transposition of words in the text are marked with superscribed Greek numbers (α’, β’ and γ’) in \textit{V}. Unfortunately, a long note written in the same hand in \textit{V} (ff. 102\textsuperscript{v}, 115\textsuperscript{r}) is entirely illegible in the reproduction of the facsimile I have consulted (Plate 17).

In \textit{K}, \textit{L} and \textit{V}, the names of the interlocutors in the \textit{Dialogue}, with the exception of Neilos Kabasilas, are usually abbreviated and copied in red ink: Thomas Aquinas: \textit{θωμᾶς},

\textsuperscript{338} A preliminary textual examination of the sections of Kydones’ \textit{Antirrhetic} cited \textit{verbatim} in the \textit{Dialogue} shows that Chrysoloras most probably consulted a tradition closely linked with \textit{Vat. gr. 614 (D)}. Cf. variant readings under siglum \textit{D} in the \textit{apparatus criticus} accompanying the edition below.

\textsuperscript{339} P: f. 56\textsuperscript{r} \textit{ση(μείωσαί) περὶ ἀγγέλ(ων)} [2.390]; f. 60\textsuperscript{v} \textit{ση(μείωσαί) περὶ ψυχ(ῆς)} [2.391].
θωμ(ᾶς) or θωμ(ᾶς) (e.g., K: ff. 12v, 26, 30, and 43; L: ff. 17, 33, 38v, and 40v; V: ff. 90v, 103v, 117v, and 123v); Demetrios Kydones: κυδώ(νης) or κυδ(ώ)ν(ης) (e.g., K: 3v, 13, 31 and 44v; L: ff. 13, 17, 45 and 62v; V: ff. 80v, 89, 114 and 129v); and Demetrios Chrysoloras: χρυσο(λω)ρ(ᾶς) or χρυσολωρ(ᾶς) (e.g., K: 7, 11v, 15 and 40v; L: ff. 1, 14, 19v, and 42v; V: 81, 92, 105v, and 131v). Neilos Kabasilas’ appears in as νεῖλος or νεῖλος (e.g., K: ff. 13, 26, 30, and 37v; L: ff. 17, 49, 55v, and 62v; V: ff. 90v, 103v, 115v, and 117v). It seems that the rubricated names were added after the copying of the text in blank spaces left for this purpose by the scribe. The names are omitted in P though blank space was reserved for this purpose.

Ligatures, contractions of nomina sacra (and their derivatives), abbreviations, suspensions and superposition of letters were extensively employed by all scribes in the copying of this lengthy text. A dash is placed over contracted names in all codices. L also used the dash over proper names (e.g., ff. 33v, 35, and 36v).

Regarding the mute iota, this is usually omitted by all scribes, with some exceptions where it appears in its subscript form. Double accents were placed in certain cases over μὲν, δὲν, and ἄν by the scribe of L to denote antithesis and rhetorical emphasis. All scribes employed infrequently and inconsistently the diplē stigmē over iota and upsilon, usually to distinguish these letters in ligatures. The sign of diaeresis was occasionally omitted (e.g., L against KPV: ἀύλοις for ἀΰλοις [8.1]; P against KLV: ἀυλία for ἀϋλία [12.66]).

The scribe of L has a tendency to place the acute accent instead of grave over the words οὐδεὶς (oūdeίς) (e.g., 1.412, 2.180, 2.308) and οὐδὲν (oūdέν) (e.g., 1.96, 2.230, 3.30, 8.81) even when these words are not placed before a punctuation mark.

The type of errors in K, L, P and V are examined separately below.

A. ERRORS FOUND IN THE TEXT

1. Errors due to confusion of sounds

---

340 The name of Χρυσολωράς in full appears whenever adequate space was left for the rubricator in K (e.g., ff. 4, 11v).

341 An asterisk (*) has been placed against entries which appear in more than one cases of error.
i. itacisms (affecting ι, ει, η, οι, υ):


**L**: καὶ λήματος for λείμματος [2.311]

**L** against **KPV**: ἄγρικον for ἄγροικον (PV): ἅγροικον (Κ) [6.1.28]*; ἀντιπεῖν for ἀντειπεῖν [2.19, 13.10]; αὐτοῖς for αὐτῆς [2.472]; βραχὺ for βραχεῖ [11.38]; γέμην for γέμει [1.176]; δοκεῖ for δοκῆ [1.10, 6.1.36]; ἔποιη for ἐποίει [2.221]; ἐνσέβεσει for ἐνσέβεσι [1.596]; ἐφησυχάζοντι for ἐφησυχάζοντι [1.24]; ἕρτιτο for ἕρτιτο [2.482]; ἰεροῖς for ἱεροῖς [1.596]; μόνη for μόνοι [1.487]; οἰκίαν for οἰκείαν [2.588]; παιδία for παιδεία [1.153]; παντί for πάντη [1.6]; παντία for παντία [2.430]; πλεονεκτήσασιν for πλεονεκτήσασιν [1.139]; πολεμής for πολεμεῖς [7.117]; πρόεισι for πρόεισι [12.13]; σαρκωθεῖσαν for σαρκωθεῖσαν [1.598]; συγκρινῆ for συγκρινεῖ [2.107]; χεληδόνων for χελιδόνων [6.34]

**P** against **KL**: προσικουσα for προσήκουσαν [1.309]


**KP** against **LV**: εἰσεται for οἴσεται [12.133]*; παιδία for παιδεία [3.145]

**KPV** against **L**: εἴδε for οἶδε [12.34]*; κροκοδύλου for κροκοδείλου [1.459]; φύσει for φήσει [2.282]

**KLPV**: ἀπολέλιπε for ἀπολέλοιπε [6.1.41]; ἀφοσιεῖς (KPV) : ἀφοσιῇ (L) for ἀφοσιοῖς [10.45]; ἐρῆς for ἐρεῖς [2.622]; κροκοδύλους for κροκοδείλους [1.456]; οἰκίας for οἰκείας [2.588]

---

ii. confusion of ε and αι:

**L** against **KV**: ἀφεραίσει for ἀφαιρέσει [11.87]*
L against KPV: αἰσθητὲς for ἐσθῆτες [1.497]
K against LPV: λυμένεται for λυμαίνεται [6.1.8]*; σημένειν for σημαίνειν [2.665, 7.98]
P against KL: ἐσθῆτων for αἰσθητῶν [1.328]
P against KLV: ἀνεσθήτων for ἀναισθήτων [1.96]; ἀπόκρινα for ἀπόκρινε [2.621]; ἀποφαίνεσθαι for ἀποφένεσθαι [2.598]
KPV against L: ἐξαπινάως for ἐξαπινέως [1.99]

iii. confusion of o and ω:
K against LPV: ἀγονίζεσθαι for ἀγωνίζεσθαι [1.31]; ἀγωνιζόμενος for ἀγωνιζόμενος [1.45]; ἀγωνιζόμενῳ for ἀγωνιζόμενῳ [1.49]; ἡμικυκλίων for ἡμικυκλίων [3.173]; χρώμενος for χρώμενος [10.60]
L against KV: ἐκατοστοεικοστογδόω for ἑκατοστοεικοστογδόω [2.312]*
P against KL: γεννωμένον for γεννωμένων [1.304]*
P against KLV: ἀγνιζεσθαι for ἀγωνιζεσθαι [1.17]*; ἀθλιώτερος for ἀθλιώτερος [3.42]; ἀλλοιωτὴν for ἀλλοιωτήν [2.580]*; ἀμφισβῆναι for ἀμφισβητῶν [7.108]; αὐτῷ for αὐτῷ [1.359]; ἐδορεῖτο for ἐδορεῖτο [1.411]; ἔρωτα for ἔρωτα [6.10]; ἦτε for ἦτο [2.197]; ἱσοὺς for ἱσοῦς [1.294, 1.439, 1.675, 3.34]; μαλακότεραι for μαλακότεραι [2.144]; παρέδοσαν for παρέδοσαν [1.432]; πεποιημένον for πεποιημένον [12.374]; παράδειγμα for παράδειγμα [1.426]; πρόσωπον for πρόσωπον [12.42]; πρῶτε for πρῶτε [3.135]; συμφωνῶν for συμφωνῶν [1.631]; τέος for τέος [1.661]; τῷ for τῷ [1.24]; ταυτάκερα for ταυτάκερα [1.175]; τρώπω for τρόπῳ [1.73]; υβρίς for ὑβρίς [1.170]; φοιτών for φοιτῶν [1.206]; χρωμάτων for χρωμάτων [13.82]; χορός for χορός (K) : χορός (L) [1.481]*; χρῶ for χρό [7.52]
KPV against L: ὁμολόγεις (PV) : ὡμολόγοι (K) for ὁμολόγεις [1.281]*; σοφῶν for σοφῶν [1.470]*
KLP: τῷ for τὸ [1.347]
KLPV: ἄκρος for ἄκρως [10.112]; τῷ for τὸ [10.49]; ὑποπτεύθη for ὑποπτεύθη [8.97]

iv. confusion of β and υ:
P against KLV: ἐπελαύοντο for ἐπελάβοντο [3.170]

v. single for double consonants:
L: λήματος for λείμματος [2.311]*
L against KV: παλιλογεῖν for παλιλλογεῖν [13.105]
L against KPV: ἔρριψεν for ἐρριπεῖν [12.53, 12.182]; πόρω for πόρρω [2.346]
P against KLV: ἔλατον for ἔλαττον [8.90]; ἐνοεῖν for ἐννοεῖν [6.31]; θαρροῦντες for θαρόουντες [12.352]; συλλογισμὸν for συλλογισμόν [6.2.13]
LP against KV: ἐννοεῖν for ἐννοεῖν [12.107]; παλιλογεῖν for παλιλλογεῖν [2.479]
KPV against L: παραβάλλωμεν for παραβάλλωμεν [6.68]
KLPV: ἀσυρίων for Ἀσσυρίων [1.418]

vi. double for single consonants:
K against LPV: καλλεῖτε for καλεῖτε [12.92]
L against KPV: ἀπορρῶ for ἀπορρῶ [6.1.39, 6.1.41]; γενέσει for γενέσει [6.1.95];
γέννεσις for γένεσις [6.1.96, 6.1.97]; διακεκριμένα for διακεκριμένα [2.25, 2.31, 7.53]
P against KV: παλιλλογεῖν for παλιλλογεῖν [13.105]*
P against KLV: προβολεῖς for προβολεῖς [11.141]*
LP against KV: προβαλλοῦμαι for προβαλλοῦμαι [12.1]
KLPV: ἀτιθάσσου for ἀτιθάσσου [3.142]; μέλει for μέλει [13.6, 13.103]

2. Errors in accentuation

i. faulty accents:

L against KV: κάν for κάν [12.74]*


P against L: τί for τί : τί (KV) [3.115]*

P against KLV: ἀντιφῶν for ἀντιφῶν [3.156]; εἰθ’ ὡσπερ for εἰθ’ ὡσπερ [1.246]; ἐκείνοι for ἐκείνοι [1.281]; ἐκποδῶν for ἐκπόδων [13.84]; ἐστί for ἐστί [7.58]; ἐστίν for ἐστίν [1.121, 6.1.15]; ἐστίν for ἐστίν [1.12]; θανόν for θανῶν [2.501]; ἰδία for ἰδία [1.231]; ἰσόν for ἰσόν [2.626, 2.628]; κάν for κάν [2.32, 12.91, 12.187]; μεμνημένη for μεμνημένη [1.118]; οὕτη for οὕτη [6.7]; πάς for πάς [1.79]; τί for τί [2.148]

V against KLP: τίς for τίς [1.190, 1.192]

KP against LV: τίς for τίς (τίς corr.) [5.22]

LP against KV: ἁπλὴν for ἁπλῆν [2.352]; διπλὴ (Ρ) : διπλή (L) for διπλὴ [12.253]; ὡς for ὡς [12.71]*

LV against P: ἀληθὲς for ἀληθές [12.60]*

LV against KP: τί for τί [2.149]

LP against KV: τίς for τίς [2.232]

PV against KL: τί for τί [10.136]

KLV against P: ἀλλοιωτὴν for ἀλλοιοτήν [2.580]*; ύας for νάι [1.657]; ὴθην (LV) : οἰκεία for οἰκεία [3.173]*


KLPV: εἰσὶ for εἰσι [2.144]; άσπάζεσθαι for ἀσπάζεσθαι [1.15]*

V against LP: τελειότερον for τελειότερον [2.340]*
iii. accents on wrong syllable:

L against KPV: διδασκαλος for διδάσκαλος [10.41]; ἐνεργεία for ἐνέργεια [1.692]; ἐστι for ἔστι [11.59]; ἐστιν for ἔστιν [2.552]; οὐδεμια for οὐδεμιᾶ [2.219]; οὐδεμιᾶ (KV) : οὐδὲ μιᾶ (P) for οὐδεμιᾶ [12.241]

P against KLV: ἀμφότερον for ἀμφοτέρων [4.47]; ἀνθρώπων for ἄνθρωπον [1.100]; ἀρτέμιν for ἄρτεμιν [1.430]; ἐντελεχεία for ἐντελέχεια [1.689, 1.700]; καταβάλεσθαι for καταβαλέσθαι [1.191]; περὶ for πέρι [6.1.68]; προσχήμα for πρόσχημα [12.28]; συναύξησειν for συναυξήσειν [1.123]

KPV against L: ψευδῆ for ψεύδη [3.29]

KLPV: ἔξελῆς for ἐξέλῃς [12.123]; ἔστιν for ἐστὶν [1.563]

iv. omission of accents:

K against LPV: ἀληθές for ἀληθες (P) : ἀληθές (LV) [12.60]*; ἔστιν for ἐστὶν [12.306]; εὐχερὲς for εὐχερες [2.187]; θατερον for θάτερον [2.101]; κἂν for καν [6.1.36]; μη for μή [2.112]; σοι for σοι (P) : σοι (LV) [13.99]; τὸ for τὸ [2.686]; ύβρεως for ύβρεως [10.25]


P against KL: πέττειν for πέττειν [1.308]

P against KLV: ἀναγκη for ἀνάγκη [11.129]; ἀντικης for ἀντικης [2.256]; βελτιστα for βελτιστόν [2.423]; έστι for οἷόν τε [1.191]; ἕξεγερτό for ἐξεγερτό [2.679]; ήκιστα for ήκιστα [2.82]; λέγειν for λέγειν [8.80]; παρέλκον for παρέλκον [4.28]; σύνθεσις for σύνθεσις [12.87]; συνὰ for συνὰ [2.418]; τίς for τίς [1.422, 1.488]; χαρίτες for χάριτες [1.65]

KV against L: τί for τί : τί P [3.115]*

KPV against L: ἦστι for ἔστι [2.474];

v. wrong use of enclitics:

L against KV: οἰον τε for οίον τε [2.631]*

K against LPV: ἀναχθον τε for ἀναρχόν τε [1.623]; λεγόμενα σοι for λεγόμενα σοι [7.101]

P against KLV: ἀδιάκριτα ἐσται for ἀδιάκριτα ἔσται [2.43-44]; γάρ ἐστι for γάρ ἐστι [1.587]; γίνεται τι ἐστι for γίνεται τι ἐστι [2.556]; δὲ ἐστὶν for δὲ ἐστιν [7.104]; ὤμοιον γε for ὤμοιον γε [2.110]; πῶς ποτὲ for πῶς ποτε [2.190]

KPV against L: τοῦτο γε for τούτο γε [11.123]; ὡς γε μοι for ὡς γε μοι [13.2]


3. Errors in breathings

i. faulty breathings:

K against LPV: ἀγροικον for ἄγροικον (PV) : ἄγρικον (L) [6.1.28]; ἁμάρτωσ for ἠμάρτωσ [8.62]; ἀπλῶς for ἀπλάς [1.694]; ἀτοπα for ἀτοπα [1.407]; ἐπόμενα for ἐπόμενα [1.359, 2.514]; ἐπομένη for ἐπομένη [8.75]; ἐπόμενον for ἐπόμενον [2.173, 10.119, 11.112]; ἐπόμενος for ἐπόμενος [8.70]; ἐπομένως for ἐπομένως [1.601, 1.675]; ἐπτά for ἑπτά [4.69]; ἴν for ἴν [1.546, 1.550, 1.622, 9.16]; ἰσχυρός for ἰσχυρός [12.229]; οὕτω for οὕτω [3.8]
iii. omission of breathing in crasis:

L against KPV: προὔβη for προὔβη [1.97]; προὔλεγες for προὔλεγες [1.670, 2.466, 623]; προὔτεινεν for προὔτεινεν [12.156]

P against KLV: κακείνα for κακείνω [1.236]*

iv. omission of the elision apostrophe:

L against KPV: ἀλλ οὐδὲ for ἀλλ' οὐδὲ [11.72]; ἐνυποκειμένω for ἐν υποκειμένω [12.59]*; ἐνυποκειμένω for ἐν υποκειμένω [12.45]; καθ αὐτὸν for καθ' αὐτὸν (KV) ; καθ' αὐτὸν (P) [6.1.9]; καθυποκειμένω for καθ' υποκειμένου [12.59]

KPV against L: δὲ ἀνωτάτου for δ’ ἀνωτάτω [1.465]*

v. redundant breathings:

L against KPV: θάτερου for θατέρου [1.517]

P against KLV: ἀῤῥήτοις for ἀρρήτοις [1.599]

KL against PV: σαυτοῦ (L) : σαὑτοῦ (K) for σαυτοῦ [2.424]

4. Omission of diaeresis sign

L against KPV: ἀύλοις for ἀΰλοις [8.1]

P against KLV: ἀυλία for ἀ/ayía [12.66]

5. Other errors due to lapsus calami

K against LP: δικαστή for δικαστική [1.313]


L against KPV: ἀντικειμένους for ἀντικειμένους [12.273]; διαμένουσα for διαμένουσα [2.476]*; ἐπειδὴπερ for ἐπειδήπερ [12.8]; τίνες for τίνες [2.141]; ὡ for ὡς [7.53]

161

KV against LP: δὲ for δὲ [1.253]

6. Errors due to misinterpretation of abbreviations

K against LPV: ήμως for ήγουν (ἡγουν PV) [2.566, 7.105, 10.64, 10.138]
KPV against L: κλήματος for καὶ λήματος [2.311]*

7. Erroneous words

K against LPV: ἐνδοξεν for ἐδοξεν [6.2.10]; περιμέτρως for περιμέτρου [3.122]; φιγμένων for ἀφιγμένων [2.499]
L against KPV: ἀτιμάζει for ἀτιμάζει [1.123]; διακεκρίσθαι for διακεκρίσθαι [5.43]; ἐνυπαρχόντως for ἐνυπάρχοντος [2.556]; ἐνορωμένους for ἐν ὁρωμένοις [1.528]; ἐνυποκειμένου for ἐν ὑποκειμένω [12.59]*; προσφέρεισ for προσφέρεις [1.172]; φαινομένων for φαινομένων [2.276]
P against KLV: ἀλήθευες for ἠλήθευες [13.47]*; ἐκατοεικοστογδόω for ἐκατοστοεικοστογδόω (ἑκατοστοεικοστωγδόω L) [2.312]*; ἐλελογίζοιτο for λογίζοιτο [9.35]; ἐλελογίζετο for λογίζετο [2.615]; ὁντι for ὁντι [1.374]; συμβεβὸς for συμβεβηκὸς [5.3]; τὶ for τίς [1.14]
KPV against L: τετραχιλίους for τετρακισχίλιοι [1.487];

8. Omission of letters

P against KLV: πόλ’ ἐμόγησε for πόλλ’ ἐμόγησε [1.233]
V against KLP: ἔμελεν for ἔμελλεν [1.210]

9. Redundant use or omission of the euphonics –ν
K against LPV: ἔστιν for ἐστι [9.25]
P against KLV: ἄλλον for ἄλλο [1.61]; ἀνάγκην for ἀνάγκη [4.31]; δυσι for δυσιν [2.667]; ἔστιν for ἐστίν [1.609]; ἔστι for ἐστιν [1.100, 2.128]; ἔστι for ἐστιν [1.534, 1.559]; ἔστιν for ἐστι [10.76]; ἔστιν for ἐστίν [2.599]; ἔστιν for ἐστί [2.232]; λέγουσι for λέγουσιν [1.654]; νομίσασι for νομίσασιν [1.286]; σὺ for δς [6.2.8]; παντάπασι for παντάπασιν [12.331]; φασι for φασίν [1.575];
LP against KV: πρόσεστι for πρόσεστιν [1.389]

10. Dittography
P: post οὐδὲν scr. οὐδὲν [5.57]; ante τὸ scr. τὸ [2.253]*
V: post διάμετρος scr. et cnc. καὶ διάμετρος [3.116-17]*

11. Wrong separations of compound words
L against KPV: ἐξ ἐγένετο for ἐξεγένετο [1.373, 7.37]*; μὴ δὲ ποτὲ for μηδέποτε [2.170]; οὐδὲ ὅλως for οὐδόλως [2.417, 12.360]; οὐδὲ μιᾶ for οὐδεμιᾶ [2.443]; οὐκ οὖν for οὐκοῦν [1.577, 2.53]; πάν τὰ for πάντα [12.302]; υπ’ ἄλληλον for υπάλληλον [2.528]
P against KLV: ἀνθυπουργοῦντες for ἀνθαυπουργοῦντες [1.492]; ἔξεγένετο for ἔξεγένετο [13.116]
LV against KP: οὐδὲ μιᾶ for οὐδεμιᾶ [2.549]
LP against KV: οὐκ ἔτι for οὐκέτι [12.277]

12. Wrong joining of words
K against LPV: ἐπειδὲ for ἐπεὶ δὲ [1.608]; ὡς ἂν for ὡς ἂν [1.541]
L against KPV: ἐπεινὼν for ἐπ’ ἐνίον [5.20]; παρόλον for παρ’ ὅλον [12.291]; προσεκάτερον for πρὸς ἐκάτερον [12.317];
P against KLV: ἐπάπειρον for ἐπ' ἄπειρον [3.132]; ἐπειδὲ for ἐπεὶ δὲ [1.551]; καίτοιγε ἐν for καίτοι γ' ἐν [2.148]; οὐκαγαθόν for οὐκ ἀγαθόν [2.609]

KV against L: τοῦ ὑστερον (K) : τοῦ ὑστερον (V) for τὸ ὑστερον [1.223]*

KV against LP: οὐκεναντία for οὐκ ἐναντία [2.704]; ταπολλά for τὰ πολλὰ [12.262]*; τοπρότερον for τὸ πρῶτον [1.102]*

KLV against P: τουνῦν for τοῦ νῦν [3.211]; τοπρότερον for τὸ πρῶτον [12.234]*

KPV against L: καθὸ for καθ' ὃ [1.697]; τοπρότερον for τὸ πρῶτον [1.223]*

KLPV: ὡς ἂν for ὡς ἂν [1.236]

B. ERRORS CORRECTED

1. Errors due to confusion of sound affecting η, ι, υ, ει, οι, ο, ω, ε, αι)

K: ἁγωνιζομένους from ἁγονιζομένους (?) [1.60]; ισχὺν from ισχήν (?) [1.399]

L: εἴδοτα from ήθιστα [5.75]*; θνητῶν from θνητὸν [6.1.71]; τις from τη [4.4]; τοιτ et sscr. ὦ for τῶ [12.14]*; τῶ from τὸ [10.51]*

P: αμεταστρεπτι from αμεταστρεπτι [1.81]; αὐτῷ from αὐτο(?) [2.400]; ήδιον from ἠδιον [1.225]*

V: βούλει et sccr. η for βούλη [2.707]; οἴσεται from εἴσεται [12.133]*; συνωμολογήσειεν from συνωμολογήσειεν [1.79]; τελειώτερον from τελειότερον [2.340]*; φήσονταί from φένωσοντα [1.232]*; ὡς from ὃς [10.71]*

KV: ἐχοι from ἔχει [1.77]

LP: ἀπεκρίνου from ἀποκρίνου [10.107]

2. Accents and breathings

NB. Corrections of accents and breathings were made by the scribes either by altering them or crossing them out. In few cases the correct accent or breathing was added next to the wrong one or above it. In the entries below letters bearing an accent which was crossed out by the scribe are underlined.

L: ἀλοήσαι from ἀλοήσαι [1.453]; ἀπὸ from ἀπό [2.258]; γεννᾶ from γεννά [2.154]; ἐθέλων from ε'θέλων [2.445]; ἐξ, ἐγένετο from ἐξεγένετο [7.37]*; ἐπελάθετο from
ἐπελάθετο [8.33]; εὐφόρον from εὐφόρων [13.12]; κάκεινος from κάκεινος [12.246]; μηχανὴ from μηχανὴ [12.241]; οίαν from οίαν [1.14]; περί from περί [3.83]; συγχωρούση from συγχωρούσι [6.50]; τῶ from τὸ [10.51]*
P: γεννωμένον from γεννώμενον [1.304]*; πλῆθος from πλήθος [2.486]; χρεῶν from χρεῶν [6.67]; ταύτα from ταύτα [1.408]
V: ἀπιθάνων from πιθανῶν [13.14]*; αὐτῶν from αὐτῶν [8.9]*; ἐπεί from ἐπεὶ [1.608]; ἐρεῖς from ἐρεῖς [6.82]; ἡ τινος from ἡ τινὸς [2.500]; πατρός from πατρός [1.657]

3. Word endings

NB. Corrections in word endings were made by the scribes by overwriting or altering letters, or usually adding the correction above the line.

L: ἐναντίω from ἐναντίον [2.53]; τὸ from τὸν [1.535]
V: ἐκεῖνο from ἐκεῖνος [11.5]*
KV: τούτου from τούτων [12.25]*

4. Word crossed out and replaced

V: post νῦν scr. et del. εἰρημένων et scr. ὁρωμένων [6.1.75]

5. Words and phrases crossed out

P: post εἶχετο scr. et del. οὐδ’ οὕτω σε τῆς ἀληθείας εἶχετο [1.131]

6. Words written above the line

K: ὁ [9.1]; τὸν [13.116]*
L: τῆς [2.396]; τὸ [2.516]
P: ἀλλ’ [1.393]; καὶ σώματος [2.578]; οὖν [1.43]

7. Other superscribed corrections

K: θαεῖν et post sscr. ν for θανεῖν

P: βουλομένοις et sscr. ευ cum sign. sup. lin. for βουλευομένοις [1.474]; βουλομένω et sscr. ευ for βουλευομένω [1.25]; εὑρίσκεται et sscr. κ sup. lin. for εὑρίσκηται [1.159]; συχωρήσαι et post sscr. γ for συγχωρήσαι [10.23]*

V: λογικῶ et sscr. στι for λογιστικῶ [6.1.69]*; ὧν et sscr. οὗ [7.99]

8. Transposition of words indicated by superscribed Greek numbers (α, β, γ)


9. Words or letters in rasuram

NB. Letters in ras. appear italicised


K: δημιτρίου τοῦ χρυσολωρᾶ [Tit.]; δημιτρίους [Tit.]; τῇ [2.249]

P: θάτερον [2.101]


10. Corrections given in the margin

K: ὄρμηθήναι in textu et γράφε ἀποκλίναι in marg. al. man. [1.222]
V: βουλομένοις in textu et scr. [βουλευο]μένοις in marg. [1.474]; ante συμφωνώ scr. et del. χρυσολοφάς et scr. κυδώνης in marg. [2.150]; ante καὶ scr. et del. κυδώνης et scr. χρυσολοφάς in marg. [2.152]; ante οὐκοῦν scr. et del. κυδώνης et scr. χρυσολοφάς in marg. [2.158]; ante ὀρῶμεν scr. et del. κυδώνης et scr. χρυσολοφάς in marg. [2.160]; ante λοιπόν scr. et del. κυδώνης et scr. χρυσολοφάς in marg. [2.163]; ante τί scr. χρυσολοφάς in marg. [2.335]; scr. ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς per sscr. sign. in textu et add. ἐκ [τού πνεύματος?] in marg. [8.95]*

KV: τοιάδε in textu et scr. τοιαῦτα in marg. [2.15]*; προσηγορίαν in textu cum signum et add. γράψα τὴν προφορὰν cum signum (K) : προσηγορίαν in textu cum signum et add. τὴν προφορὰν cum signum (V) [2.702]

11. Part of the text added in the margin


V: ante κύκλος scr. αὐτῶ in marg. [2.680]

12. Other errors corrected

L: ῥοίζω from ῥοΐζω [1.169]; λαμβανόμενος, from λαμβανόμενος. [6.34]

V: ἐξειλήλεγκται from ἐξειλήλεκται [9.14]*

13. Significant correction concerning a nomen sacrum

V: ἐκ [τοῦ πν(εύματο)ς?] from ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς [8.95]*

14. Lacunae due to damage on the paper

15. Corrections and replacement of the text by another hand due to damage of the paper


16. Erasures

L: τοῦ-Χρυσολωρᾶ] [Tit.]; post αὐτὸς scr. et eras. 3 litt. [1.217]

C. READINGS

1. Variant forms of the same words

K against LPV: ταυτὸν for ταυτὸν [10.33]
L against P: φήσοντάς με for φήσοντάς μοι [1.232]
L against KV: φήσοντάς με for φήσονταί μοι [1.232]*
L against KP: μόνης for μόνος [1.302]
L against KPV: ἀδικώτερον for ἀδικώτερος [8.101]; ἀδύνατον for ἀδύνατος [6.1.13]; ἀναφείν for ἀναφεί [5.16]; αὐτῷ for αὐτό [6.1.110]; γένει for γένους [5.49]; δ' ἀνωτάτῳ for δ' ἀνώτατον [1.465]*; δήλον ὅτι for δηλονότι [3.188]; διὰ ταύτα for διατάτα [10.140]; διὰ τι for διατι [5.78]; εἰπόντος for εἰπόντες [3.58]; εἰς ἅπαν for εἰς ἅπαν [1.371]; ἑκόντα for ἥκοντα [12.270]; ἑκτεινόμενα for ἑκτεινόμεναι [2.132]; καθ' ἡμέραν for καθημέραν [7.38, 13.69]; κοινωνοῦντας for κοινωνοῦντα [1.600]; μηδὲ for μὴ δὲ [1.272]; μόνω for μόνον [2.292]; ὅπερ ἐστίν for ὅπερ ἐστίν [8.95]; οὔτως for οὔτω [2.598, 3.1, 6.1.89, 8.80, 11.143]; παραπλησίας for παραπλησίας

342 Readings adopted in the present edition are given first.
πολέμιος for πολεμίος [1.123]; πορφυρότερον for πορφυρότερῳ [2.397]; προσαναγκάζει for προσαναγκάζειν [12.225]; πῦρ for πυρὶ (KV) : πυρὶ (P) [1.228]; σοφῶν for σοφῶν [1.470]*; τὰ for τὸ [1.366]; τὸ πρῶτον for τοῖς πρῶτον [1.223]*; τὸ ύστερον for τοῦ ύστερον (K) : τοῦ ύστερον (V) : τοῦστερον (P) [1.223]*; τοῦτο for τούτῳ [10.116]; τύχων for τύχοι [1.50]

P against KL: προϋπαρχούσαις for προ ὑπαρχούσαις (K) [13.33]
P against KLV: αὐτὰ for αὐτῷ [1.359]; διὰ ταῦτα for δια ταῦτα [7.55]; διὰ τοῦτο for δια τοῦτο [1.296, 2.193, 304-5, 6.40]; (έγώμαι) ἐγ' ᾦμαι for ἐγῶμαι [2.696]; μηδὲ for μὴ [1.352]; τὸ πρότερον for προτρότερον [12.234]*
V against KLP: τὰλλα for τ' ἄλλα [2.714; 13.7]
KL against P: γεννωμένων for γεννωμένῳ [1.304]*; νομίζεται for νομίζεται [1.302]; παραδεχόμενον for παραδεχομένου [1.309]

KP against L: τὰλλα for τ' ἄλλα [1.347]
KL against PV: οὕτως for οὕτω [1.131]

KV against L: ἀποδεικνύουσιν for ἀποδεικνύοις [3.129]
KV against P: ἀποδεικνύουσιν for ἀποδεικνύοις [3.129]

KV against LP: πρὸ παντὸς for προπαντὸς (Ρ) : προπαντός (L) [13.102]; τὰλλα for τ' ἄλλα [2.298, 9.85 bis, 11.49, 11.98]; τάναγκαία for τ' ἀναγκαία [12.37]
LP against KV: εἶ ἀρχής for ἐξαρχής [1.355]; εὔσεβεῖς for εὔσεβης [2.710]; τ' ἄλλα for τὰλλα [4.71]; τὰ πολλὰ for ταπολλὰ [12.262]*; τὸ πρῶτον for τοπρῶτον [1.102]*; τοῦ νῦν for τούνυν [1.673]; τοῦτο for τούτῳ [12.25]*

LV against K: λογιστικῶ for λογιστικῶς [6.1.69]*
LV against KP: γίγνεται for γίνεται [1.602]; ἐξ ἀνάγκης for ἐξανάγκης [6.1.105-6]
PL against KV: τὸ πλέον for τοῦ πλέον [1.506]

VP against LK: ἄλλος τε for ἄλλωστε [1.235]


1a. Different spelling or forms of foreign names and places

L against KPV:
2. Different readings

L against K: βουλευομένους for βουλομένους [1.341]
L against KP: ὁ τοίνυν τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι for ὁ τοίνυν αὐτὸ τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι [1.336]
KLV against P: πιθανῶν for ἀπιθανῶν (P) : ἀπιθανῶν (V) [13.14]*
LP against KV: εῖς for εἰς [2.320]
LV against KP: μήτραν [μήτραν] V) for μέτρον [1.689]

KPL against V: οὗ for ὧν [7.99]*

KPV against L: γνώμην παρενεγκεῖν for νικῆσαι γνώμην [1.30-31]; προσόν ἐστιν for πρὸς ὃν ἐστιν [10.118]

LPV against K: ἄψασθαι for ἅψεσθαι [6.92]; ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος for ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ πατρὸς [8.95]*; ἐνοῦσαι for ἐνοῦσα [4.18]

3. Different word order

L against KPV: πιστεύει ζῶντι θεῶ for πιστεύειν θεῶ ζῶντι [1.483]; τό θείον ἐν τούτῳ πεπέρασται for ἐν τούτῳ τό θείον πεπέρασται [1.604]; συγγνώμην διδόναι for διδόναι συγγνώμην [6.57]; ψιλῆς καὶ for καὶ ψιλῆς [6.63-64]; αὐτῶ φανερὸν ἐποίει for φανερὸν ἐποίει αὐτῶ [11.29-30]; προϊέναι ὁμολογεῖται for ὁμολογεῖται προϊέναι [12.9]; ταυτόν, καὶ ἐν ἄριθμῳ for ταυτόν ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄριθμῳ [12.80]; ὁμας ἐδει γενέσθαι for ἐδει γενέσθαι ὅλως [13.27]

KL against P: ἢ ἄλλοι τυχόν for ἢ τυχόν ἄλλοι [11.88]*

KL against V: ἢ ἄλλοι τυχόν for τυχόν ἢ ἄλλοι [11.88]*

KLV against P: ἢ ἄλλοι τυχόν for τυχόν ἢ ἄλλοι [11.88]*

KL against V: ἢ ἄλλοι τυχόν for τυχόν ἢ ἄλλοι [11.88]*

LV against KP: ἵσος ἢν for ἢν ἵσος [3.118]*

4. Addition of words

P: καὶ [1.657]; ante ταύτα scr. τὰ [3.92]; post καὶ scr. τὸ [5.65]; ante αὐτοῦ scr. αὐτῆς [7.89]


5. Omission of words


172
6. Omission of phrases

K: Θαμάς-χαρίσαιντο [1.706-708]; Χρυσολωρᾶς-διηγουμένου [1.709]; τὰ-διακρίνεσθαι [4.11];

P: Titulus; πρὸς-φθαρτόν [3.91]

V: τὸ δεινὸν-συνεξελαθήσεται [1.299-349]

γένει-ποσοῦ [3.55-56];

7. Missing words or part of words due to damage on paper

K: εἴη [1.14]; ἐπίδειξίν [1.38]; πάντων [1.13]

8. Omission of phrases due to homoioteleuton

K: ἄφασι χώσεως [1.337-344]; εἶναι-διάφορα [2.18-19]; ἄτοπον-βουλόμενον [2.426-427];
9. Marginal glosses and notes

К: γράφε ἀποκλίναι [1.222]; <συλλογισμός> ε in marg. [5.81-82]
П: τά δ' εἰσ[.] in marg. inf. [1.462]; ἦδιον in marg. inf. [1.225]; σημείωσαι περί ἁγγελ(ων) in marg. [2.290]; στε<ρος> in marg. [2.358]; σημείωσαι περί ψυχῆς in marg. [2.591]; ἐν μ<ὲν> in marg. inf. [4.6]; αὐτῶ in marg. inf. [8.68]; αὐτός in marg. inf. [12.196]
V: ὡραῖον [1.16-18]; <συλλογισμός> ι[α] in marg. [12.1-4]
KV: ὡραῖον ὅλον [1.108-12]; <συλλογισμός> ε in marg. [7.1-5]; <συλλογισμός> ζ in marg. [8.6-10]
LV: <συλλογισμός> ε in marg. [6.1-5]; <συλλογισμός> θ in marg. [10.1-5]
KLP: γνωμικόν in marg. [13.77]
Relation of the manuscripts

The autograph of Demetrios Chrysoloras’ Dialogue (α) has not yet been found, if it has survived. The textual and palaeographical examination of the text in the four extant codices (K, L, P, and V) show that L (datable to the 15th c.) represents the best transmission of the text, with a few minor omissions and a number of mistakes, mainly due to confusion of sounds, accents and breathings. This would suggest that L is linked with α through an intermediary transmission (β).

V (also datable to the 15th c.) share similarities but also a number of differences with L, mainly variant and different readings, word order, omissions of words and passages of the text. Thus, V seems to be linked with β through an intermediary tradition (γ).

K (15th c.) shares the same variant and different readings, omissions and additions in the text with V. In addition, K adopted the corrections made in V. However, additional omissions in K and further mistakes (due to confusion of sounds, accents and breathings) in K suggests that these two traditions are closely linked through an intermediary transmission (δ). This supposition seems to be confirmed also by the fact that K misinterpreted the abbreviated form of ἤγουν in V, erroneously expanding it as ἦως [e.g., 7.105, 10.64, 10.138]. Similarly, the word μῆτραν] in V was misinterpreted as μέτρον by K [1.689].

P (datable to the 16th century) shares a large number of variant and different readings, additions and omissions with both K and V. At the same time P introduced a large number of errors not found in K and V. The fact that P adopted the word ἤγουν (without misinterpreting it as ἦως as in K) but adopted the word μέτρον (as in K) shows that P is linked with δ through an intermediary tradition (ε).

On the basis of these observations the relation of the MSS can be reconstructed in the following stemma codicum:
Stemma codicum

Before 6 July 1439

15th c.

16th c.

P

Stemma codicum

Before 6 July 1439

15th c.

L

16th c.

P

176
Edition
The present edition

The present edition of Demetrios Chrysoloras’ Dialogue on Demetrios Kydones’ Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas is based on the principal codex L, though occasionally readings from K, P, V and D have been preferred.

The punctuation system in L is followed throughout the text, in accordance with the conventions adopted in the Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, with very few modifications (converting middle commas or upper points in the MS to commas in our edition), to show the extent to which the principal MS was copied with the intention of facilitating the oral delivery of the Dialogue, hence its rich punctuation, often at the expense of the clarity of the text. For the same reason in certain cases we have used dashes (——) instead of commas to indicate parenthetic sentences in long, convoluted passages. Classical, scriptural and patristic citations, as well as proverbs are marked by italicised characters, while citations within citations and words used as terms in the text are placed within Greek quotation marks « ». Verbatim sections of Kydones’ and Kabasilas treatises appear in bold characters, while sections of Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles (in Kydones’ translation cited in Kabasilas’ DPSS III) are placed in bold underlined characters. In the present edition we have adopted the conventional title (Defensio) of Kydones’ Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas.

Acute accent has replaced the grave on oxytones followed by a punctuation sign. The accentuated personal pronouns, the indefinite pronouns τίς, τι, and the particle τὲ have been treated as enclitics. Joined words used as adverbial expressions (e.g., διατοῦτο etc.) have been separated, while μὴ δὲ(ν), and μὴ δ’ have been joined. The iota subscript in the dative and certain adverbs (e.g., πάντις κοινῆ) has been tacitly introduced. The diplē stigmē over iota and epsilon, used infrequently in the four extant MSS, has been retained only as a diaeresis sign over the second of two consecutive vowels not forming a diphthong.

To facilitate the reader in following the arguments in the Dialogue, section and subsection division has been introduced, marked by Indian numerals in bold characters placed within square brackets: e.g., [3], [3.1], [3.2] etc. Each section is
numbered (every five lines) in the margin separately. The subject of each syllogism, which is omitted in the MSS, is described in the title included in pointing brackets (e.g., [2] Συλλογισμός πρώτος <περί θείας διακρίσεως>.

Finally, the apparatus is divided into five sections:


(b) apparatus with parallel passages in Chrysoloras’ Dialogue and other works of his.

(c) apparatus Thomisticus recording passages from Thomas Aquinas’ works.

(d) apparatus fontium recording Classical, Scriptural and Patristic sources, as well as proverbs, cited or alluded to in the text.

(e) negative apparatus criticus, recording all variant and different readings, emendations, corrections, additions, omissions, erasures, deletions, interlinear and marginal notes in the MSS. In sections of the Dialogue citing verbatim Kydones’ Defensio readings from codex D (Vat. gr. 614) have been adopted and recorded in the apparatus criticus\(^3\).
**Sigla Codicum**

Demetrii Chrysolorae Refutatio

**K**  Codex Hauniensis GkS 1985 4° (XV s.), ff. 1v-57v

**L**  Codex Laurentianus XII, Pluteus V (XV s.), ff. 1v-74v

**P**  Codex Parisinicus graecus 1284 (XVI s.), ff. 42r-85r

**V**  Codex Vaticanus graecus 1109 (XV s.), ff. 78r-135v

Demetrii Cydonis Defensio

**D**  Codex Vaticanus graecus 614 (XV s.), ff. 110r-126v

**Abbreviationes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>add.</td>
<td>addidit, -erunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al. man.</td>
<td>altera manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cf.</td>
<td>confer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cnc.</td>
<td>cancellavit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>codd.</td>
<td>codices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>del.</td>
<td>delevit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ed.</td>
<td>edidit, editio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eras.</td>
<td>erasit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>folium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ff.</td>
<td>folia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ibid.</td>
<td>ibidem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>illeg.</td>
<td>illegibilis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in marg.</td>
<td>in margine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in marg. inf.</td>
<td>in margine inferiore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in ras.</td>
<td>in rasuram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lac.</td>
<td>lacuna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lin.</td>
<td>linea, -am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>litt.</td>
<td>littera, -ae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ll.</td>
<td>lineae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>om.</td>
<td>omisit, -erunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>op. cit.</td>
<td>opere citato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p.</td>
<td>pagina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pp.</td>
<td>paginae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post cor.</td>
<td>post correctionem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prim. man.</td>
<td>prima manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>recto (folium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scil.</td>
<td>scilicet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scr.</td>
<td>scrisit, -erunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sign.</td>
<td>signum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sscr.</td>
<td>superscripsit, -tum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subscr.</td>
<td>subscripsit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sup.</td>
<td>supra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suppl.</td>
<td>supplevit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>titul.</td>
<td>titulus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>versum (folium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vid.</td>
<td>vide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Signa Typographica**

‖ lineolae derecta in textu transcribendo finis codicis L foliis simulque initium foliis insequentis significatur

( ) uncis lunatis in *apparatum* littera vel litterae per contractionem aut suspensionem in codice omissae significatur

[ ] uncis quadratis in *apparatum* lacunae includuntur

< > uncis angulatis suppleta ab editore includuntur

**Sigla Sacrae Scripturae**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act.</th>
<th>Actus Apostolorum</th>
<th>Luc.</th>
<th>Evangelium secundum Lucam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apoc.</td>
<td>Apocalypsis</td>
<td>Marc.</td>
<td>Evangelium secundum Marcum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>ad Colossenses Epistula</td>
<td>Matth.</td>
<td>Evangelium secundum Matthaeum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Cor.</td>
<td>1 ad Corinthios Epistula</td>
<td>Od.</td>
<td>Odae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deut.</td>
<td>Deuteronomium</td>
<td>Prov.</td>
<td>Proverbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exod.</td>
<td>Exodus</td>
<td>Ps.</td>
<td>Psalmorum liber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heb.</td>
<td>ad Hebraeos Epistula</td>
<td>1 Regn.</td>
<td>I Regnorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen.</td>
<td>Genesis</td>
<td>Rom.</td>
<td>ad Romanos Epistula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ier.</td>
<td>Ieremias</td>
<td>Sus.</td>
<td>Susanna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iob</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Tim.</td>
<td>II ad Timotheum Epistula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ioh.</td>
<td>Evangelium secundum Ioannem</td>
<td>Tit.</td>
<td>ad Titum Epistula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Ioh.</td>
<td>I Iohannis Epistula</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Abbreviations used in the *apparatus fontium*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Cyrill. Alex., *Thesaurus*  
Cyrillus Alexandrinus, *Thesaurus de sancta consubstantiali trinitate*, CPG 5215, PG 75, cols. 9-656

Dem. Chrys., *Cent. epist.*  

Dem. Chrys., *Compar.*  
Demetrius Chrysoloras, *Comparatio*, ed. S. Lampros, ‘Σύγκρισις παλαιών ἀρχόντων καὶ νέου τοῦ νῦν αὐτοκράτορος Μανουήλ Παλαιολόγου’, *ΠΠ* III (1926), pp. 222-245

Dem. Chrys., *Dial.*  


Dem. Chrys., *Synop.*  

Dem. Cyd., *Defensio*  
Demetrius Cydones, *Defensio Sancti Thomae Aquinatis adversus Nilum Cabasilam*, ex cod. Vat. gr. 614, ff. 110v-126v


Dion. Halicarn., *Ant. Rom.*  

Ps.-Dion. Areop., *Cael. hier.*  

Ps.-Dion. Areop., *Divin. nom.*  
Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, *De divinis nominibus*, CPG 6602, ed. B.-
Epan. Aucta
Epanagoge Aucta, ed. P. Zepos, Ecloga Privata Aucta, Jus Graecoromanum, vol. 6 (Athens, 1931), pp. 57-216

Epiph., Pan.

Eus. Caes., In Psalm.
Eusebius Caesariensis, Commentaria in Psalmos, CPG 3467, PG 23, cols. 66-1396


Ps.-Galen., Ad Gaur.

Gesta Eph.
Gesta Ephesena, Concilium universale Ephesenum (431), ed. E. Schwartz, ACO, 1.1.7 (Berlin, 1929), pp. 84-117

Greg. Naz., Carm. de se ipso
Gregorius Nazianzenus, Carmina de se ipso, CPG 3036, PG 37, cols. 969-1029 et 1166-1452

Greg. Naz., In S. Pascha
Gregorius Nazianzenus, In sanctum pascha (Orat. 45), CPG 3010, PG 36, cols. 624-664


Greg. Naz., In S. Lum.

Greg. Naz., In Theoph.


Ps.-Gregorius Nyssenus, *Ad imaginem dei et ad similitudinem*, CPG 3218, PG 44, cols. 1327-1345


Greg. Nyss., *C. Eun.*  

Greg. Nyss., *In Cant.*  

Greg. Nyss., *Or. Cat.*  

Ioh. Chrys., *Pecc. fratr.*  
Iohannes Chrysostomus, *Peccata fratrum non evulganda*, CPG 4389, PG 51, cols. 353-364

Ioh. Dam., *Contra Jacob.*  

Ioh. Dam., *Dial.*  

Ioh. Dam., *Exp. fid.*  

Ioh. Dam., *Inst. elem.*  


Ioh. Dam., *In Dorm.*  

Ioh. Dam., *Sacr. parall.*  
Iohannes Damascenus, *Sacra parallela*, CPG 8056, PG 95, cols. 1040-1588 et PG 96, cols. 9-441

Ioh. Dam., *Trisag.*  


Liban., Decl. Libanius, Declamationes 1-51, ed. R. Foerster, Libanii opera, vol. 6 (Leipzig, 1911), Declamatio 30, pp. 617-658


Max. Conf., Quaest. et dub. Maximus Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium, CPG 7688, eds. C. Laga et C. Steel, Maximi Confessoris quaeestiones ad Thalassium, CCSG, 22 (Turnhout, 1980), Quaest. 63, pp. 145-185

186
Michael Glycas, Quaestiones in Sacram Scripturam, ed. S. Eustratiades, Μιχαήλ του Γλυκα. Εἰς τας ἀποριας της Θείας Γραφῆς (Athens, 1906)


Nil. Cab., Proc. S. S.  
Nilus Cabasilas, De Processione Spiritus Sancti, ed. E. Candal, Nilus Cabasilas et theologia S. Thomae de Processione Spiritus Sancti, ST, 116 (Vatican City, 1945), pp. 188-384

Pappus Alex., Comm. in Ptol.  
Pappus Alexandrinus, Commentaria in Ptolemaei syntaxin mathematicam 5-6, ed. A. Rome, Commentaires de Pappus et de Théon d’Alexandrie sur l’Almageste, vol. 1, ST, 54 (Vatican City, 1931)

Pausan., Graec. Descr.  
Pausanias, Graeciae descriptio, ed. F. Spiro, Pausaniae Graeciae descriptio, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1903), Liber 9, pp. 1-98

Phil. Jud., De Abr.  
Philo Judaeus, De Abrahamo, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 4 (Berlin, 1902), pp. 1-60

Phil. Jud., De virt.  
Philo Judaeus, De virtutibus, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 5 (Berlin, 1906; repr. 1962), pp. 266-335

Phil. Jud., Dec.  
Philo Judaeus, De decalogo, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 4 (Berlin, 1902; repr. 1962), pp. 269-307

Phil. Jud., Joseph.  
Philo Judaeus, De Josepho, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 4 (Berlin, 1902; repr. 1962), pp. 61-118

Phil. Jud., Leg. all.  
Philo Judaeus, Legum allegoriarum libri i-iii, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1896; repr. 1962), Liber I, pp. 61-89

Phil. Jud., Plant.  
Philo Judaeus, De plantatione, ed. P. Wendland, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1897; repr. 1962), pp. 133-169

Phil. Jud., Spec. leg.  
Philo Judaeus, De specialibus legibus, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 5 (Berlin, 1906; repr. 1962), pp. 1-265

Phil. Jud., Omn. prob. lib. sit  
Philo Judaeus, Quod omnis probus liber sit, eds. L. Cohn et S. Reiter, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 6 (Berlin, 1915; repr. 1962), pp. 1-45

Phil. Jud., Vita cont..  
Philo Judaeus, De vita contemplativa, eds. L. Cohn et S. Reiter, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt vol. 6 (Berlin, 1915; repr. 1962), pp. 46-71


Demetrii Chrysolorae Refutatio operis Demetrii Cydonis *Contra Nilum Cabasilam* sub forma dialogi, in quo auctor ipse cum personis Thomae Aquinatis, Nili Cabasilae et Demetrii Cydonis loquitur

**EDITIO PRINCEPS**
Διάλογος

τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ λογωτάτου κυροῦ Δημήτριον τοῦ Χρυσολωρά, ἀναιρετικὸς τοῦ λόγου, ἃν ἐγγαφῇ κυρός Δημήτριος ὁ Κυδώνης κατὰ τοῦ μακαρίου Θεσσαλονίκης, κυροῦ Νείλου τοῦ Καβάσιλα.

Τὰ πρόσωπα: Θωμᾶς, Νείλος, Κυδώνης, Χρυσολωράς.

[1] Προοίμιον

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Μέγας μὲν ὁ τῶν ὁμοφύλων καθ’ ἡμῶν πόλεμος, καὶ πολὺ τῶν ἀλλογενῶν ἵσχυστερος τὸ δ’ αἰτίων, οὐχ ὅτι δύναμις ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀκρα λόγων, οὐδ’ ὅτι ἂν ἀδύναμι τοῖς ἡμῶν ἐποιοί, ἀλλ’ ὡς θεòν ἂν ἡμῖν ἂν καθ’ αὐτῶν ἐνυπασίας ἀληθῆς ἢ, μεγίστη ἂν αὐτοῖς αἰσχύνη νομιζόμεθα, ἂν μὴ τὴν λύσιν εὐθὺς καθ’ ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ πιθανῷ σκοπότατοι, ὃ χαλεπῶς ἀλλοτρίων, πάντῃ πεῖραν τῶν ἑλληνικῶς ἡμῖν ἑνώτων ἔχειν οὐ δυναμένως. ἀλλ’ ὧς, οἰς ὃν ὁ Θεὸς συμμαχεῖ ἐθέλοι, μικρὸν ἂπαν ὃσον τῶν ἑναντίων, καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν ἀσθενὲς ἀπεργάζεται, κἀν δυνατὸν καὶ μέγα δοκή’ εἰ μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορά συνεβαίνει εἶναι

KLPV


τὸν πόλεμον, οὐ μικρὸν ἂν τις ἠσυχάζων ἦδικε. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἀφθάρτων αὐτῶν ἐστιν ὁ ἄγαν, καὶ τοὺς μακάριους ἐκεῖνος ἐτοιμος ἄνδρας περιπλέκεσθαι, τέλος δὲ ἀπτεται καὶ τοῦ πάντων ὑπεραγαθοῦ Πατρός Θεοῦ, τίς ἂν εἰ μὴ μαινόμενος εἶπ. τὴν σιγήν ἀσπαξεσθαί βούλοιτο, ἢ πώς ἂν τὴν δίσην ἐκ-ῃφύγοι τοῦ Θεοῦ ώδίον; Ὁθεν ἀπαντό μὲν εὐσεβεῖ, χρέος ἀνάγχης ύπέρ αὐτῶν ἀγωνίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, ἢ ἐγὼ ἂν δὲ τις δινάμενος σιωπά, δήλων ὡς οὐ λαλῶν, ὁμολογεί, καὶ τῷ διώκοντι κοινονεῖ ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐναντίων ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἂν οὐ μισεῖται, φυλείται, τὸ δὲ φυλούμενον, ἐπαινεῖται, ὃ δὲ ἐπαινῶν οὐκ ἀνέχεται σιωπάν, ἀτιμαζομένου τοῦ κρείττονος· ὁ μᾶλλον ἀπάντων πρέπει Θεῷ.

[1.1] Ἐμε τοίνυν φεύγειν οὐ μόνον ἂει τὴν ἐρήν ὁ Θεός οἴδει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς αὐτῆς χρομένους πολλάκις ἐθέλοντα μέμφεσθαι, καὶ μὴν μηδένας μάχεσθαι πῶτοτε, οὐ μόνον ἐφησυχαζοῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ παρά τὸ ἐσδόν ἡμῶν ἀπτεωθαι βουλευομένως, ἀσπαζόμενον ἠρεμίαν,
οὕσαν ἀσφαλεστέραν κινήσεως—εἰρήνη γάρ, κάν ἡ σφόδρα ἐπιζήμως,
ἀσφαλεστέρα πολέμου—, σοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ τὰ γεγραμμένα σιγάν
οὐκ εὖ, ἀδικα πανταχόθεν ὀρώμενα, καὶ μηδαμῇ τὸ δίκαιον
ἐχοντα. ἈΛ' εἰ σοι μὲν ἐφεσίς καθ' ἡμῶν ἡ μεγίστη, πολλῷ γε
μάλλον ἡμῖν ἀριστον ἢ σπουδῇ τὴν σήν εἰς τοῦτο γνώμην
παρενεγκείν· ἀτοπον γάρ, σὲ μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀλλοτρίων ἀγανίζεσθαι
τῶν δογμάτων, ἡμᾶς δ' εὐλαβεῖσθαι τοις οἰκείοις συνηγοεῖν, καὶ
σοι μὲν τῶν οἰκείων κατηγοεῖν βέλτιστον, ἡμῖν δὲ χαλεπὸν κατά
τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰπεῖν ἄπορῳ γάρ τῶν σών, τί ἂν πρῶτον, τί δ' ἂν
teleutaiōn thauμαζόμι. Πάντα μὲν ἀρχὴν ἄφηλα τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ
πατρίδι, ἐξθάδα δὲ φίλοις, πατράσι, καὶ παντὶ τῷ καθ' αἴμα
προσήκοντι, πολέμια δὲ, καὶ τῷ μακαρίῳ Νεῖλῳ Θεσσαλονίκης,
ἄνδρι, καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ Χριστοῦ, τάς δὲ παρασκευάς, πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν
μᾶλλον, ἢ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἢδη πεποιημένα. Νόμος οὖν Ἑλληνὶ καὶ
βασιλέω παντὶ, μέχρις αἵματος υπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀγανίζεσθαι, καὶ Θεός

ΚĽPV


τόν παρόντα νόμον, διά τοῦ μεγαλοφωνοστάτου στηρίζει Παύλου εἰ
gάρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μάλλον ὡς τό ἐαυτοῦ χρή σκοπεῖν, πώς ἀν εἴη
dίκαιον ἀπάντων καταφρονεῖν; Τεττάρων οὖν ὃντων, γένους, πατρίδος, φίλουν, καὶ συγγενέων, καὶ τέλος πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τῆς
eὐσεβείας αὐτῆς, οὐ μόνον ὁ τούτων ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων ἀγανιζόμενος,
ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς φυλίαν ἀρρηκτον εἰς τούτων ἐαυτῶν ἑφαρμόζων
πολλάκις, τοῖς ἄλλως βαθιῶς πολεμεῖν προθυμεῖται, καὶ ἡ
φονεύειν, ἢ βανείν εὐτοίμως αἴρεται, ἐκάτερον δὲ, τοὺς στεφάνους
οὐ μικροῖς τῷ ἀγανιζόμενῳ χαρίζεται, καὶ ταῦτα, τοῖς φιλτάτοις
αὐτοῖς εἰ τυχεῖν ἐναντιουμένω. Καὶ μαρτυρεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅ τιν 
ἀδελφήν ἀποκτείνας ἐν Ῥώμῃ, τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος
αὐτὸ γενέσθαι βουλευομένου, καὶ τῇ βουλῇ τοῦ καίσαρος
στεφανούμενος, ἢν καὶ ἀποθανόντες, ἐν ἑλευθέρῳ τῷ τῆς πατρίδος
ἐδάφει ταφώσιν; ὅτι καλὸν μὲν ἑλευθερία πράγμα, αἰσχρόν δὲ
δουλεία· καὶ τὰ μὲν καλά, πρόσεστιν ἡ ἀγαθοῖς, τὰ δὲ αἰσχρὰ, φαύλοις.

KLPV

Dem. Chrys., Encom. pulic., § 15, p. 66

41-42. εἰ-σκοπεῖν] cf. 1 Cor. 4:6 | 48-49. τοὺς-χαρίζεται] cf. 2 Tim. 4:8 | 50-53. καί-

41. παύλου] P | 42. ἀν bis acc. L | 43. post τεττάρων sscr. οὖν cum sign. P | 45. ἀγανιζόμενος K | 48. αλ. man. add. θαεῖν et post sscr. ν per βανείν K | 49. ἀγανιζόμενο
K | 50. τυχεῖ KPV | 51. ἀδελφήν K | 52. βουλευομένου P | 54-55. ὅτι-
dουλεία] ὧν(αὖν) in marg. L.
Καίτοι γε στεφανοῦσθαι μέν, ἀδικον τοῖς ὑπὲρ αυτῶν ἀκρὰ χρῆσθαι βουλευομένοις σπουδῇ, τιμωρεῖσθαι δὲ μᾶλλον, οὐ βουλομένοις δίκαιον τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκης χρέος, γένει συμμαχεῖν καὶ πατρίδι, τοῖς δὲ μὴ προθυμουμένοις, νόμος θάνατον ἀπειλῶν. Τὸ γοῦν τοὺς ἀγονιζομένους στεφανοῦσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν, ἢ ὡς εἰ τις ἀποδεδωκὼς ὀφειλόμενον, δωρεάς, καὶ ὁ μὴ φονεύων, ἀπαίτει χάριτας. τῷ δὲ, τὴν ἀνατάτου τιμορίαν θάνατον ὀφειλαν. ΑΛΛ’ ὅμως, ἵνα μὴ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἡ τάξις ἀνατραπῇ, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ἁθυμία κρατῆσθαι, τοῖς μὲν σπουδαίοις, στεφανοῦ, χάριτες, καὶ τιμαῖ, τοῖς δὲ ἁθυμοῖς, δήμευσι, καὶ τέλος ὀρίζεται θάνατος, καὶ τὸ γένος ύστερον ἀτιμον αὐτοῦ μένει. Εἰ γοῦν αὐτὰ πάσχειν ἀνάγκης ὦς τὸν ἀγώνα φεύγειν ἡ προθυμία, πόσων ἀν εἰ ἡ τιμορίων ἄξιος, ὁ συλλαβὼν εἰς ἐν ἀπαντα, καὶ πάσι διὰ πάντων μαχόμενος; Οὐ μὴν, ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τὴν ἁρχὴν μετὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐγένετο, ἡ συμπλοκῆς ἡτομομολῆσθη γενομένης, οὐδ’ οὗτος ἀν ἀδίκως ἀπέθνησεν.

**KLPV**


[1.2] Νυνὶ δὲ, τὸν μὲν βουλόμενον ἐνείναι τοῖς ὀμοφύλοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀφίστασθαι, παντὶ δὲ χρώμενον τρόπω τῆς ἀπωλείας τοῦ γένους παντὸς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλων ἄλλοις τῶν ἵδιων περιγενέσθαι, πάσαν δὲ τὴν πόλιν ἀνάστατον γίνεσθαι, ταῦτα || καὶ λάθρα καὶ φανερῶς ἐργαζόμενον, τίνος ἀν τις εἴδους κολάσεων ἄξιον ὕπακι αὐτοὶ τεκμηριώσασθαι; Ἐγὼ μὲν οίμαι, καὶ πᾶς τίς τῶν ἀντικρησίμως, ὡς εἰ δυνατόν ἦν αὐτῷ μυριάκις ἀποθανεῖν, οὐκ ἀν ὕπακι ἐλογίζειν φεύγουσιν ἄνδρες ἀμεταστρέπτι, καταλιπόντες, ἀδελφοὺς, γονεῖς, συγγενείας, φιλίας, διαθέσεις, πατρίδας, ἐν αἷς ἐγεννήθησαν καὶ ἐτράφησαν, οὐ δὲ τίνα μισαθρωπίαν ὕπαῖ ἐπιτετηδευμένην, ἀλλ' ἡρεμίαν μεταδιώκοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ λατρείαν, ἢ διὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν ἑπιτεθειότητα. Εἰτα, εἰ μὲν ἀπωλείας σωμάτων ἢ χρημάτων

KLPV

80-84. φεύγουσι-μεταδιώκοντες| Phil. Jud., Vita cont., §§ 18 et 20, p. 51

ὁ πόλεμος αὐτὸς ἐγεγόνει, ἔπαυεν ἄν αὐτὰ χρόνος, ὁ πάντων εἰς μήκος πατήρ ἐκτεινόμενος ἁμαθανάτω, ὦ νόμος, πάντα ποιεῖν ἠρέμειν. Σεισμὸν δὲ νῦν ὁ θαυμάσιος ἐγείρει παγκόσμιον, καὶ τὰς ἀπάντων διασεῖει ψυχάς, καὶ θάνατον αὐταῖς χαρίζεται τὸν ἀθάνατον, ταῖς ὅπωσον ἀφαμέναις αὐτοῦ. Πλὴν, ὃς ὃς αὐτὸς ἀνοίητος· ἐπεὶ ταῖς καθαραῖς καὶ φρονίμοις, εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ γνώσιν, ὁ τῶν υἱῶν καὶ μαρτύρων ἀπειρὸς κύκλος ἀρχή. Ἀλλ’ ἂς ἔοικεν, ἔλαβε πατέρας καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, τρέφοντας όφιν ἀντὶ παιδός, καὶ ἀντὶ φίλου, πολέμιον. Τὸν ὑπὸ Θεοῦ γενομένων ἀπάντων, ὡς μὲν ἔλεγεν ἀκινήτου, ‖ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ μένει, ὡς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνασθῆτων ὥστε κινούμενα, οὐκ ἔδέν ἄνθρωπον δὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιλαθόμενον, ὥστε αἰχρῶν ἐστιν.
ἀίσχιστον, ἐν χαρίτων ἀμοιβαῖς ἤπτασθαι κυνὸς θηρίου κακίστου; Ἡν ἄν τῷ πεποιμένῳ κρείττον, ἢ μη γεννηθήναι τὸ πρῶτον, ἢ θανείν αὐτίκα γε τικτομένοι καὶ ἢ μένειν ἀκάρτῳ ἦντι, ἢ μη τοιοῦτον εὑπορήσαι καρπῶν τις γὰρ ἄν αὐτῷ φυλιᾶν, ἢ πόλιν ἀλλήν θαρφήσει πῦφοτε; Καὶ τίς ἄν θέτοι πατήρ, ἢ καὶ συγγενῆς γένοιτο; Οὐδείς οὐδεμίαν οἴμαι. Τὸ δ’ αίτιον, ὡς οἱ ταῦτα δράν ἐθελήσαντες, οὐ τὸ δι’ ὅ μόνον, ἀλλὰ ἄρα αὐξάζει καὶ τὸ εἶναι προσαπολέσουσιν ὁ γὰρ τὴν ἴδιαν ὑβρίδαν πόλιν, πῶς ἄν ἐπαινέσειν ἀλλοτρίαν; Καὶ ὁ τοῖς ὀμοφύλοις πολέμιος, πῶς ἄν τοῖς ἀλλογενέσιν ἀληθῆς σύμμαχος; Καὶ ὁ φίλος ἐχθρός, πῶς ἄν φίλος τοῖς ἐχθροῖς γένοιτο; Καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν, οὐκ ἄν ἀλλότρια σώζειν δύνατο, ὁ ἀπολέσας τὰ ἴδια. Οὕτως αὐτῷ τὴν ἀπιστίαν ἡμουλήθη παντὶ ποιεῖν γνώριμον, οὐ μή, ἀλλὰ τῷ μη σέβοντι Θεόν ἐπεται, μητε γονεις, μητε πατρίδα τιμᾶν ὁ δὲ πρὸς τῷ μη σέβειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν τολμῶν, τινα μοχθηρίας ὑπερβολῆν ἀπο-παλέσω.
Θεόν γὰρ χρεών ἀπασιν εὑσβέσι, παντοίας ἁμείβεσθαι δωρεάς, καὶ νῦ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ πράγματι, τῷ μὲν, αυτὸν εὐλογεῖν ὡς κοινὸν εὐεργετήν ἀεί, τῷ δὲ, μετ’ εὐφημίας ἁκωλύτως αὐτοῦ μεμνήσθαι τὸν δωρεῶν, τῷ δὲ, τὸ κάλλιστον προσάγειν, ὁνπερ ἀπῆλαυσε.  

120 Καὶ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ βαρβαρον ὡς ἔπος εἶπεν, ὀψίμα πῶλις ἐστίν, ἢ τὰ ἐτέρας νόμιμα τιμᾶ, ἄν μή τις μοναρχίᾳ τούτῳ κρατή, καὶ πολιτίς ἐκαστὸς οἰεται, ιὲ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀτιμάζει συναιζῆσθαι σὺ δὲ τούτοις μόνοις πολέμιος ἀπασιν ἀντικυρίοις εἰ ὦ τί ἂν ἀτοπώτερον εἴη;

125 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐχθρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐγὼν, ἁ πρὸ πάντων φιλῶ, καὶ ἁν ἐφίεμαι καὶ οἰς χαίρω; Μή γένοιτο! Ἐμοὶ γὰρ πατρίς, ἡ παλαιὰ Ρώμη, καὶ διδάσκαλος, ὁ ταύτης ἁρχιερεύς, καὶ γένος ἂπαν αὐτῶν, καὶ πατέρες, ὅσοι πρεσβύτεροι, καὶ ἀδελφοί, καὶ φίλοι, καὶ συγγενεῖς, οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ τούτων ἁγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ ἐκάστοιν, μᾶλα φιλοτίμως ἀποθανοῦμαι.

ΚΛΡV


116. εὑσβέσι Π \ 118. μεμνήσθαι Π \ 120-124. Καὶ-εἰ] ὁχ(αίον) ὅλον in marg. L \ 121. ἐστίν Π \ 123. συναζῆσθαι Π \ 124. καὶ bis acc. L \ 125-130. Κυδώνης-ἀποθανοῦμαι] signa in marg. KV \ 126. post χαίρω sign. interrogationis codd.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Εἴ ταῦτα σοι τῆς ἀληθείας εἶχετο, οὐδ’ οὕτως σὲ ἀν αἰτίας δίχα παρεκαλύφαντο, τὸ μὲν, ἡς τὸ εὐλογινῆς ἐρευνήσαι μὴ βουλευσάμενον, τὸ δὲ, καὶ ἢς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μαχόμενον. Ἐπει δὲ καὶ ψευδὴ περιβαλνὴ πάντα, ποιον ἀν σοι τὸν ἔλεγχον οὐ παράσχοι τὸν μέγιστον; Σοι γὰρ πατρὶς μὲν, ἢ πόλις Θεσσαλονίκη, ἢ μᾶλλον, ἢ περιβαλνὴς αὐτὴ βασιλέως τοῦ τοῦ Κωνσταντίνου ἢ μὲν γὰρ, ἐγέννησε μόνον, ἢ δὲ, καὶ τιμᾶ καὶ τρέφει, καὶ σοφίας καὶ τῶν ἐν τέλει γενομένων αὐτῶν αξίως, καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις καλωσίζει πλεονεκτήμασιν ἀ γνωθίνες σε αὐτὸν ἐξελεύσαι βουλεύ. Τὸ δ’ αἰτίων ἑρῷ, καὶ αὐτὸς σιωπᾶν ἐθέλης. 

Κακῷ χρησάμενος λογισμῷ τε καὶ δαιμονί, ἀβέβαιος ἦσθα περὶ τὴν πιστὶν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ἰδίᾳ καὶ βραχὺ τὶ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐτειρῶ διαλέγεσαι, γυμνάζειν τὸ δοκικὸν ἑαυτῶν, τὰ δ’ ὑπερευκά, ἀναίδην ἀνατρέπειν αὐτὴν ἐβουλεύου καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἢς ἄλλοις μὲν χρησίμουσαν, ἢμιν δὲ νόσῳ περικειμένην. Τούτῳ σοι τῶν κακῶν ἀπάνταν αἰτίων γίγνεται. Ἀλλ’ εἴ μὲν εὑστεβεία κοσμεῖται τὰ κατὰ σέ, ποῦ τὸν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐχει θεμέλιον, ἢς οὐ κατίσχοισαν Αἰδον πύλαι;

KLVP

147. οὐ-πύλαι] Matth. 16:18

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐφην, εἶναι πρὸς Ιταλοὺς.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Διατι οὖν αὐτοῖς οὐ βουλεύῃ συνεῖναι σαυτῶν, οἷς
πρόσεστιν ἡ εὐσέβεια;
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐρωτήσετε δὲιον κατεχόμενος καὶ πατρίδος.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ προῦλεγες εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην εἶναι.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ ἡ παιδεία τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμᾶς οὐκ εἶναι.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Σοι τὰ μηδενὸς ἀξία, μάλα τίμια, χρυσόν
ἀνταλλάττοντι φαυλοτάτοις εἰ κέκαψί τε 
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ ἡ παιδεία τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμᾶς οὐκ εἰσὶ:
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Σοὶ τὰ μηδενὸς ἀξία, μάλα τίμια, χρυσόν
ἀνταλλάττοντι φαυλοτάτοις εἰ κέκαψί τε

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐφην, εἶναι πρὸς Ιταλοὺς.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Διατι οὖν αὐτοῖς οὐ βουλεύῃ συνεῖναι σαυτῶν, οἷς
πρόσεστιν ἡ εὐσέβεια;
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐρωτήσετε δὲιον κατεχόμενος καὶ πατρίδος.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ προ khiểnες εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην εἶναι.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ ἡ παιδεία τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμᾶς οὐκ εἰσὶ:
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Σοὶ τὰ μηδενὸς ἀξία, μάλα τίμια, χρυσόν
ἀνταλλάττοντι φαυλοτάτοις εἰ κέκαψί τε

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐφην, εἶναι πρὸς Ιταλοὺς.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Διατι οὖν αὐτοῖς οὐ βουλεύῃ συνεῖναι σαυτῶν, οἷς
πρόσεστιν ἡ εὐσέβεια;
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐρωτήσετε δὲιον κατεχόμενος καὶ πατρίδος.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ προῳλεγες εῖς τὴν Ῥώμην εἶναι.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ ἡ παιδεία τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμᾶς οὐκ εἰσὶ:
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Σοὶ τὰ μηδενὸς ἀξία, μάλα τίμια, χρυσόν
ἀνταλλάττοντι φαυλοτάτοις εἰ κέκαψί τε

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐφην, εἶναι πρὸς Ιταλοὺς.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Διατι οὖν αὐτοῖς οὐ βουλεύῃ συνεῖναι σαυτῶν, οἷς
πρόσεστιν ἡ εὐσέβεια;
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐρωτήσετε δὲιον κατεχόμενος καὶ πατρίδος.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ προ⸱
τοιούτων, πῶς οὐκ ἀφίστασαι; Ταύταν γάρ σοι τὸ ἄτοπον ἐξ ἀμφοίν ἐπείπερ εἰς ἀμαρτίαν, ἵσον ἰσχύει τὸ τῶν αἰρετικῶν κοινωνεῖν, τῷ τῆς κοινωνίας ἀφισταμένῳ ἀσπασάμενος δὲ τὴν κενὴν δόξαν, οὐ τὰ φύσεως τίμια τούτων ἤψω. Ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν ἔστεον, ἐπ’ αὐτὰ δὲ τρεπτέον τῶν προοιμίων τὰ λόγια, ἰνα μακρολογίαν ἐω. Λέγε οὖν, ἀ σοι φαίνεται δίκαια.

165 [1.3] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἡ μὲν κατὰ Λατίνων προθυμία τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τούτου, μεγάλη καὶ θαυμαστή, καὶ οία ἄν γένοιτο, χειμάρρου φορὰ σφοδροτάτη ὁδόιων πάντα ἀπλῶς παρασύροντος οὐ γάρ ἂν οἰμαί τις εὐφοι ὑδίως λοιδορίας ἢ βλασφημίας ἢ ὑβρεος εἰδος, ὅπερ ὀκνησθὲν ἀπορρίση κατ’ ἐκείνων ἄνηρ.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΟΡΑΣ. Δέον ἐφ’ ὀις ἦμαρτες ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι, προφέρεις εἰς μέσον, ἀνεξαλείπτους στήλας σοι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα, ἄν ἦδικης ὁδοίας ἀλλ’ ὅμως ὅν ἡ ἀρχὴ μὴ καλή, καὶ τὸ πέρας ἀνάγκη τοιούτον εἶναι. Επεὶ οὖν ἄπαν σοι τὸ προοἰμόν εἰρωνεία,
τὴν μὲν διήγησιν τύφων, τοὺς δ' ἀγώνας, γέμειν ὁγκών ἀνάγκη τὸ
δὲ τέλος ἀπάντων, ἔξεστι νοεῖν ἀπαντῆσαι βουλόμενον τοὺς γὰρ τῆς
ἀλαζονείας καρποὺς, τρυγάν αὐτῆς χρεῶν τῷ ψευδώ· ἴσω καὶ
γεωργῷ καὶ πατρὶ φῆς γὰρ τὸν μακάριον ἄνδρα Νείλου, ἐφέσθαι

180 μὲν κατὰ Λατίνου εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύνασθαι. Νόμος οὖν ἀγωνιζομένων ἐκάστω, τὸν ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἐπαίνειν, δυὸν ἑνεκα ἢ
νικῶντι θαυμάζεσθαι, ἢ καὶ ἠττηθέντι μὴ ἀτιμάζεσθαι. Εἰ δὲ τις
μάλα μέμφεται οἷς συμπλέκεσθαι μέλλει, ο καὶ νῦν σὺ φαίνη
πεποιημένος, ο τοιοῦτος καὶ νικώμενος ἀθλιός, καὶ νικῶν
ἀθλιώτερος, εἰ γε ἀληθές τὸ ἐν ταῖς πονηραῖς ἀμίλλαις, ὁ νικῶν
ἀθλιώτερος. Κατοι γε φασίν, ἐπὰν eἰς χείραν ἀμιλλαν iέναι τις
μέλλῃ, τῆς δυνάμεως πρῶτον ἀποπειράσθαι ἵν' εἰ μὲν ἱσχύει
καταγωνίσασθαι, συνήσθηται, εἰ δ' ἀσθενεστέρα χρῶτο δυνάμει, μηδὲ
συγκαταβήναι τὴν ἀρχήν εἰς τὸν ἀγώνα θαρρήσῃ κακία μὲν γὰρ

190 ἡττάσθαι, οὐκ οἰσχρον ἀρετῇ δὲ, ὀνειδος. Όθεν ἀπορο, τίς ο sc*αντος

KLV


ἔξεγένετο σοι, τοσαύτην καταβαλέσθαι σπουδήν ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν ἀξίων; Ἕν γὰρ ἂν ἐποιήσο ὑπὸ καθή τε, βατράχων ἢ ἄλλων εὐτελῶν ἄρχοντι;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐγὼ δὲ, μέχρι μὲν οὕτως κοινῆ κατὰ πάντων ἐφέρετο, σιγή καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν βλασφημῶν ἥκρομήν, πολλοὺς ὄντας παρὰ Λατίνως εἰδὼς, οἷς ἀκουόσαι τῆς ἀντιλογίας μελήσειν, καὶ συνεχώρουν ὡς ἄν βουλεύτω, τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ὀρμῆς ἐμφορεύσθαι. ἔπει δὲ καὶ τῷ μακαρίῳ Θωμᾶ τῇ βίᾳ τῆς ὕμης φερόμενος ἐπετρήδησε, καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου περί τὰ θεία σοφίας καὶ ἀκρι-βείαις καὶ ἀγιότητος κατεφρόνησεν, ἡσύχη τις ἐφ᾽ ἕαυτῷ μέγα φρονύν ἀθλητής, οὐ λαμπρὸν τι νομίζει, εἰ πρὸς τοὺς τυχόντας ἀγανακτισμένος στεφανώσεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀξίων καὶ τοῖς ἀρίστοις συμπλέκεσθαι, ἰκανὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρέτης τῆς τῶν ἐνδόξων ἦτταν ποιούμενος, ἀδικον ἠγηγόμην, σωτηρὶ τὴν εἰς ἐκείνον παρελθεῖν παροινίαι, καὶ ἡσύχη τινα ἀτίμον, ἢ πάθα τῶν ἀρτι φοιτῶντων, ύπὸ τοῦτο τοῦτο συγχωρηθήσαι καταγελάσθαι.

KLPV

194-206. Ἐγὼ-καταγελάσθαι] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 110r.3-9


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τῇ μὲν εἰρωνείᾳ τῶν προοιμίων, ἐναργεῖς τὸ σείδος ἀκολουθεῖ: οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἐσῆλας ὑβρισμένον ἀπάντων, ἐπεί σοι μέλλει τῆς ἀντιλογίας ὑπέρ ἑνός, οὔτε ἂν ἐνι συμμαχεῖν ἐβουλεύσαι, εἰ σοι μὴ τοῦ παντὸς ἐμελλέν· ὥ γάρ ἑνός, καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀντιποιεῖσθαι χρεῶν· ὃ δὲ τὸ πάν οὐδέν, τὸ ἐν οὐδέν ἂν λογίζοιτο πάντως.

Ἀλλ' οὖν ὁ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμὸζει τῷ Θωμᾷ λόγος, ὅπερ ἔθελες τρέφειν αὐτῷ ὧ γὰρ Πατὴρ τοῦ παντὸς Θεος συναγαγόν εἰς ἐν ἀπάντα, ἐς ἄρρητον τῖνα φιλίας συνήρμοσε τὸν δεσμόν· καὶ φίλοι μὲν ἀπαντες εὑσεβεία τῷ πρὸς Θεὸν ἔρωτι, κἀκεῖνος ἄλλοι περὶ τι ἄντικειται. Ἀλλ' ὁμοὶς, αὐτὸς μὲν, ὃς οὔτε σιγώντων ἄλλον ἡσύχαζες πῶστε, ἀλλ' ἐφεσίν ἑτρέφεις σφοδροτάτην παντὶ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ βουλομένω, πῶς ἂν ἢρέμεις, Νείλου πάντων ἀπτωμένου Λατίνων; Ὅψι ἂν διὰ τούτων ἡσύχαζες, ὅτι μὴ καὶ Θωμᾶς

ΚΛΡV


Το παραγενόμενός σοι κατά τι, εσούστηται τὸ μπροθυμία. Τούτο σοι καὶ τρυφῇ καὶ πόσις, καὶ πάν ἄλλο τίμιον ἐλογίζετο. Καὶ ὁ παραγενόμενός σοι κατὰ τι, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐσίγα, κακῶς εὐθὺς ἦκουν, ὅτι μὴ καὶ λαλεῖ· εἰ δὲ ποτ' ἐφθέγγετο, σκαλεύειν ἑνεχείρη μαχαίρα πιρ. Τούτο σοι καὶ νῦν αἰτίων ἐπιπεδάν, ἐγενόντο τῷ Νεῖλῳ, καὶ ψεύδει ἡμῶν λογίζεσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ συνηχορεύειν.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Παρατούμαι δὲ, τοὺς ἱδία τὸν παρόντα λόγον μοι μεμψιμένους, καὶ φήσοντας μὲ μὴ δίκαια δρᾶν, φίλον ἄνδρα ἐλέγχοντα, καὶ τὴν συγγραφῆν ἐφ' ἢ πόλ' ἐμόγησε πειρώμενον ἀκυροῦν, ἢ προσήκον ἤν, καὶ ἄλλων ἐξώθεν ἐγκειμένων αὐτόν, διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἀμύνειν. Ἀλλὰς τε, καὶ ὃν ἐχὼ τοῦτων λόγων,
κάκεινω τού μέρους χάριν ὑφείλοντα, ώς ἂν ἐν νεότητι παρ’ ἐκείνου περιοικτῆτο, καὶ παρ’ ἐκείνου δεξαμένου τά τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης μαθήματα’ πρώτον μὲν γὰρ, οὐκ ἐπίτηδες προελόμενος κακῶς ἐκείνον εἰπεῖν, οὐδ’ ὡς ἂν τις ἐχθρὸς τῆς ἐκείνου σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλεονεκτημάτων, ἄ μετὰ πολλῶν αὐτῶ σύνοιδα, καὶ ἐφ’ οίς βουλοίμην ἂν αὐτῶν παρὰ πάσιν εὐθυκιμεῖν, ἠ φίλον τε ἐμὸν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φημὶ, καὶ διδάσκαλον γεγονότα, οὐ ταύτα τοῖνυν σκοπῆν, ἐπὶ τούτον ἠλθὼν τὸν λόγον. Ἐπιμένωσε. Καὶ τὸ παρὸν σοι, πόρρω πάνυ τῆς ἀληθείας· φίλον γὰρ αὐτῶν καὶ διδάσκαλον σόν, καὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφία χρώμενον ὁμολογεῖς· εἴθ’ ὡσπερ ἐκ μεταμέλους γενόμενος, ἔν βραχεὶ χρόνῳ ταῦτα πάντα παραβάλλεις αὐτῷ καὶ συναρμόζεις· κατηγορίᾳ μὲν, ἐπαινον, ἐγκωμίῳ δέ, ψόγων, ἀρετῆς δέ, κακίαν ἀκραὰν ἄτοπον γὰρ ἀνδρῖ σοφώ, συγχέειν ἀπαντα, καὶ φύρειν ἄληθεις ψευδή, καὶ ῥητοὶς ᾠρητα, εἰς ἄνδρα πάλιν σοφόν, ταῦτα σοι κάκεινω πεποιημένος.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐκ οἴδα ὡς τούτου κατηγορῶ.

ΚΙΛΡΥ


236. κακείνα P ὡς ἂν] ὡσάν codd. ἂν ὡσάν bis acc. L ἂν bis acc. L ἂν ὡσπερ P v 250-251. κακείνων πεποιημένον P
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Αγνοεῖς ἐν οἷς αὐτῷ λέγεις, σοὶ δὲ καὶ προσπάτειες, καὶ φῆς οὐδεμιᾶν μοι τοὺς λόγους ἔχειν ισχύν; Καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ, ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ὡς λιαν ἀδόξου καὶ παιδικῆς ἁμελητέων; Καὶ πάλιν, μακρὰν δὲ δοῦσομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς φλυαρίαν συγγράφεις; Ἑτὶ τὰ μὲν, παραλογιζόμενος, τὰ δὲ, σοφιζόμενος, τὰ δὲ, ψευδόμενος περιφανῶς, καὶ κατὰ τῶν δήλων ἀναισχυντῶν; Πάλιν οὖν ἔλεγες τούτ’ ἀν οίμαι συγχωφήσαι καὶ Σκύθας, καὶ εἰ τὶς ἄλλοις αὐτῶν ἀμαθέστερος; Καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, ὅν τὸ σὸς γέμει πόνημα, ὅν καὶ μεμνήσθαι μόνον, οὐ μικράς ἐστί χλεύης ἅξιων; Οὐ ταύτα πάντα σα ὃματα καὶ φωναί; Πώς οὖν ἐνιαυτία ψόγους ἁμα καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους παραβάλλεις αὐτῶς; Ὅλη ἀδικοί ἀνδρὶ σοφῆς, τοιαύτα λέγειν ἀνάμορφοτα, καὶ στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω, δίκην Ἐφίτων τὰ ρείματα, καὶ συναρμόζειν ἐναντία, σοὶ τε κάκεινα ἁμα· σοὶ μὲν, ὡς βάλλοντι, ὡς δεχομένῳ δ’ ἐκείνῳ ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐκάτερα ἀληθεύειν ἀλλ’ ἕ τοις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπαίνους, ἕ τας ὑβριδες ψεκῦσαί ἀναγκαίον.

ΚΛΡΥ


207
ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Ἐγὼ μέν, οὐ ταῦτα σκοπῶν, ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἠλθον τὸν λόγον ἀλλ’ ἀξιὼν, ὅπερ φίλον πρὸς φίλον παρρησιάζομαι, καὶ τῷ δοκοῦντι συκοφαντείσθαι συνηγορῶν· φίλος μὲν γὰρ οὗτος, φίλος δὲ καὶ Θωμᾶς, καὶ σοφὸς μὲν ἀμφοῖ, ἢ δ’ ὑπερβολή, παρ’ ἐκεῖνος καὶ τὸσούτῳ πλέον, ὦστε μηδὲ παραβάλλειν ἐξείναι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀσθενεῖς σοι καὶ τὸ παρόν, καὶ τοῖς πρότοις παρόμοιον· ἀπόκριναι γὰρ μου οὔ τὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἱσα, ἀλλήλοις ἱσα, καὶ ὁ τισὶν αὐθεὶς ἱσον, ἱσα πάλιν αὐτὰ ποιεῖ;

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Πάνυ γε.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Καὶ εἰ τι μὲν ἵσον ἀλλα, τοῦτο δὲ ἀλλα, ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἵσα τὰ ἀκρα εἶναι;

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ μάλια γε ἵσα.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐκοῦν, τὸν λόγον ἐπισκεψόμεθα· εἰ γὰρ σοι μὲν, ὡς ὀμολόγης, ἐκεῖνοι φίλοι, καὶ σὺ ἄρα φίλος αὐτῶν· ὁ γὰρ φίλος, τῶν πρὸς τί. Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ σοι μὲν ὁ Θωμᾶς φίλος, σὺ δὲ τῷ Νεῖλω, καὶ σοι μὲν ὁ Νεῖλος· τῷ Θωμᾶς δὲ σὺ, διὰ πάντων, Ἰωμᾶν ἄμα καὶ

ΚΛΡV

268-272. οὐ-ἐξείναι[ Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 110r.15-18


208
Νείλον φίλους ἀνάγκη εἶναι οὕτω γὰρ ἵππος, ἦν ὁ ὀμολόγημα ἦν καὶ γράμματι γὰρ καὶ νοήματι, ἐχθρός ὁ Νείλος Θωμᾶ, καὶ μεταξὺ τούτων, ἡ μεγάλη τῶν δογμάτων διάστασις, καὶ οὐδέποτε ἄν εὑρεθείη μέσων, ὃ κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλων εἰς ὀμοίωτητα· ἀπερ ὦκ ἄν συνεβαινεν, εἰ φίλος ἦσθ᾿ ἀληθὴς ἐκατέρου, ἢ βέβαιος ἐκάτερος σοῦ.

Εἶτα καὶ πῶς ἂν τις ἐφαρμόσειεν ἀλλήλους τὰ ἐναντία, ὥν τὸν μέν, συνοφαντείθαι, τὸν δὲ, συνοφαντεῖν ὀμολογεῖς. Ἀδύνατον.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλ᾿ ὃμως ἂν περὶ τὸν Θωμᾶν ἐμοὶ γε βοήθεια, μικρὰ μὲν καὶ οἰα ἐὰν παρὰ μυρμῆκος γένοιτο λέουσιν ἵσως δ᾽ ἐτι δυνησομένη, προσλαβούσα τὴν τῶν ἀκρωμένων πρὸς τάληθες καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εὑνοιαν. Διὰ τοῦτο, τὸν παρόντα λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἐμαυτῷ γενέσθαι φημὶ.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Παραπλήσια τοῖς προτέροις τὰ εἰσημένα, μηδαμῇ τάληθες ἐχονταὶ ὁμοιαί γὰρ χρώμενος ταπεινοῖς, τὸ δεινὸν τῆς ἀλαζονείας ἀρπάζεις σχῆμα, τὸν ἀρχιερᾶ Ρώμης κἂν τοῦτο μμοῦμενος· ἐπίσκοπον ἑαυτὸν πόλεως καλοῦντα μηδεμάς, ἰνα πασῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μόνης νομίζεται παραπλήσια δέ, καὶ δράν ἐθέλεις μυρμηκολέοντι οἱ φυσικοί γὰρ φασιν, ἐπειδὰν ἡ λέανα μέλλη τίκτειν, ἐν τῶν αὐτῆς γεννωμένων, εὐφύσκεσθαι θηρίων, ἐφημικτὸν, κεφαλή, καὶ τὰ πρὸς αὐτῇ, στήθος, ἢ καὶ τοὺς ἐμπροσθόντας πόδας, ἔχον, ἀπαντα λέοντος· τὰ δὲ λοιπά, μύρμηκος· ὦ, τροφῆς μὲν, οὐ μεταλαμβάνει πρεποῦσης λέοντι, κρέατος· ὡς μὴ δυνάμενον αὐτὴν, πέπειν· τὴν δὲ γε κρίθην αὐθίς, ὡς προσήκουσαν μύρμηκα, παραδεχόμενον οὐδαμῶς, ἦς οὐσιν ἀπρεπὴ τῷ στόματι λέοντος· διό, καὶ θνήσκειν εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη τικτόμενον. Ὁ, καὶ οὐ ποιεῖς νῦν τοῖς γὰρ ἀνδράσιν ἐκείνοις παραβαλλόμενος ἑαυτὸν, ὀνομάζεις, αὐτὸν ὡς εἰς λέοντας μύρμηκα, τῇ δὲ πρὸς αὐτούς ἀποφάσει, καὶ δικαστικὴ ψήφω, τοιαύτῃ.

KLP et V (ad lin. 299: ταπεινοῖς)


302-311. καὶ-τικτόμενον [cf. Physiol. (redactio prima), § 20, pp. 73-76; lob 4:11]

καταχρθῃ, οίαν ἄν τις δικαίως τεκμηριώσαιτο, λέοντος ἐν τοίς μύριμηςιν. Ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις νοημάτων οὐκ εὔποροὶ ἐκατέρας τροφῆς, ὡδίως τὰ σὰ ποιεῖς οἰχεσθαί οὐς γὰρ διδασκάλους ἐκάλεις, διακατῆσαι αὐτῶν ἐγένους δεινότατος, καὶ τὴν ψήφον, ὃ ἂν βούλῃ παρέχεις καὶ τῷ μὲν, ἐπιρηδάς, τῷ δὲ, συνηγορεῖς ἢ διδασκάλω δίκαιον ἐν εἰ, δρᾶν αὐτὰ μάλλον, ἢ μαθητὴς οὕτως αὐτός, οὐ μόνον ἅλλοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ σαυτῷ, καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δοκεῖς μαχόμενος.

[1.4] ΚΥΩΝΗΣ Ἔγω νομίζω, τὸν δημιουργὸν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς, μέσην αὐτήν, τῆς τε νοερᾶς, καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς συστήσασθαι φύσεως διά τοῦτο, καὶ τὴν ταύτης γνώσιν, μέσην εἶναι τῆς ἐκατέρας τῶν φύσεων γνώσεως ἢ μὲν οὐν νοερὰ φύσις, τὰ τῶν νοητῶν εἰδὴ τῇ ἐαυτῆς οὐσίᾳ ἐγκείμενα κεκτημένη, ἢ οὐδεμίαν ἐν τῷ νοεὶν μετάβασιν πάσχει καὶ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δὲ φύσις, τοῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδέσι, δι’ ἐαυτῆς ἀμέσως προσβάλλουσα, δι’ ἐαυτῆς ἐκαστὸν γινώσκει τῶν αἰσθητῶν, μερικὴν γνώσιν αὐτῶν δεχομένη.

KLP

322-332. Ἐγὼ·φύσει] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, ff. 110v-34-111r.2

ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχή, διὰ μὲν τὴν πρὸς τὴν νοερὰν φύσιν συγγένειαν, ἔχει τι καὶ αὐτή ἐν ἑαυτῇ, ἀμέσως καὶ ἀκινήτως καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ γινωσκόμενον φύσει οὕτω καὶ διανοεῖται, καὶ διδάσκει, καὶ μανθάνει, ταῖς προϋπαρχόντος γνώσεις αἱ, τὰ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἐπόμενα ταῦτας συνάπτουσα· ἐὼ τὰ μέσα, ἵνα μὴ χρώμαι μακρολογία. Τοῦτό ἐστι καθαρώς τὸ συλλογιζέσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι· ἐὰν τοῖνυν τὸ συλλογιζέσθαι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἀφαίρων, αὐτὴν τὴν λογικὴν φύσιν λέληθην ἑαυτὸν ἀναφέρων, καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπου οὐδὲν τῶν ἀλόγων ἔχειν ἀποφαινόμενος καὶ τὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν ἀνθρώπων σύνδεσμον καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν παντελῶς διαλύων· καὶ δηλοῖ, τὸ πάντα καὶ πρὸς πάντας ἀπλῶς χρῆσθαι συλλογιζω· καὶ βουλευομένους, καὶ δικαζομένους, καὶ πωλοῦντας, καὶ ὄνομαν, καὶ πάντα ἀπλῶς πράττοντας ἑιδὰ τὲ καὶ κοινῆ. Ἐπει τοῖνυν τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ συλλογιζέσθαι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἱδιον, καὶ μετὰ τούτου ἐαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασίν ἄνθρωπος χρῆται, δῆλον, ὡς τούτο ἀν

ΚΛΠ


εἰς παρὰ Θεοῦ δῶρον τὸ κάλλιστον, καὶ ἀναγκαίωτατον· καὶ
πρὸς τάλλα μέν, μάλιστα ἢ δὲ, πρὸς τὸ τὸν Θεὸν ἦτειν καὶ
εὐφησείν· ἀνόητον τοίνυν, τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ τῶν
θείων· οὕτω γὰρ, συνεξελαθήσεται καὶ ὁ νοῦς, ὦ μόνῳ τὰ θεῖα
θηρεύεται, καὶ τὸν διαλεκτικὸν συλλογισμὸν ἐκ μέσου ποιῶν, οὐ
τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινωνίαν δήλος ἐστὶ
dιαλύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Θεὸν μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπιτρέπων
ζητείσθαι· ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ἢ καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι,
καθὼς ἔφθην εἰπὼν, τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἔστιν ἰδιον, παρὰ Θεοῦ
dιὰ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας εὐθείαν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς συμπεφυτευμένον αὐτῇ.
Καὶ δηλο, τὸ πάντας καὶ πρὸς πάντα σχεδὸν αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ὡς
κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἰδίως ἐπιτηδεύομεν· τούτῳ δὲ
ποιούμεν, ὅταν βουλόμενοι τι μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν ἦτεῖν, τὰ τε
ἐπόμενα τῷ ἦτείκειν, καὶ οἷς αὐτῷ ἐπεται, αὐτῷ τε πρὸς ἑαυτὸ
καὶ πρὸς τάλλα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, πρὸς τε ἐκεῖνο, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὰ

KLP et V (ab lin. 349: καὶ ὁ νοῦς)


213
καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· ὡςαντὸς δὲ, καὶ τὶ ὦχ ἐπεταί ἐκεῖνῳ, καὶ τὶ μὲν ἐπεταὶ πῇ, τὶ δὲ πῃ ὦχ ἐπεταὶ τοῦτο γοῦν εἰ τις οἷος <τ’> εἰ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν πραγμάτων εὐφύσειν ἢ διακρίνειν, ἐπιστήμην ἂν ἔχοι πάντων τῶν ὑπομένων πραγμάτων.

365 Διαφόρως δὲ ὅνωμάζεται, διαφόροις εἰδεῖ πραγμάτων συμπλεκομένη γεωμετρία μὲν γὰρ καλεῖται, τὰ ταῖς γραμμαῖς καὶ τοῖς ἑπτέδους σχήμασι συμβαίνοντα θεωροῦσα· τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀστρονομίας ποιοῦσα, ἢ καὶ τὰλλα τῶν μαθημάτων.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ ὁ θεωρός τοις, καὶ τὸ πῦν εὐρημένον σοι, πολλῶν ἀτόπων ἐστὶ μεστὸν ἐκεῖνῳ γὰρ καταχρῇ, οἷς καὶ τὸ γένος ἀπαν ἔχαι τῶν Λατίνων· ἢ καὶ διέλυσεν ὡς αράξην ἒς ἀπαν, ὁ μακάριος Νεῖλος κάλλιστα, περὶ ὧν ἠμὲν ἐπιλέγειν οὐκ ἀναγκαίον.

370 Ἐπεὶ δὲ σοι καὶ τὶ περισοστέρον αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν ἐξεγένετο ἀρλωτή ὡς τὸν συνολογισμὸν ἀνθρώπως εἶναι Θεοῦ δῶρον κάλλιστον καὶ δέ’ αὐτοὶ μόνου τῶν Θεῶν εὐφύσκεσθαι, ἢ καὶ

ΚΛΡΥ


214
ἀναφέρσθαι μή ὄντος, μικρὸν ὅσον τὴν ἐμὴν οὐ φεύγῃ διάνοιαν ἐπιχειρητέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον. Φανερῶν, ὡς διπλοῦν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος τὸ συνλογιζεσθαι τὸ μὲν, ἐπιστήμης πόρφιρο, τὸ δὲ, σὺν αὐτῷ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον, συστατικὸν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάθης φύσεως καὶ παρὸν, συνεισφέρει καὶ συνιστά, καὶ ἀναφορέομεν, ἀναφερόμενος καὶ ἤδην ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅλῳ καὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτίας διά, καὶ Θεός ἄρχη τὸν ἀνθρώποςς αὐτὸ ἐχοίκται τὸ δ᾽ ὑποτεθέν. Οὐ καὶ χαίρει τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, τοῖς πρῶτοις παντελῶς ἀκοινώνιτον οὔτε γὰρ ἀναφορέομεν ἀναφερόμενον, οὔτε παρὸν συνεισφέρει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ προσεστιν, οὔτε ἓξ ἀρχηγοῦ ἄλλῳ ὑποτεθέν ἑπιρρέομεν, ὅλῳς ὑσταταὶ πάνυ, καὶ τούτοις σπουδάζουσι. Τούτων ἑκάτερον τοις ἅρων, οὔτε ἐστὶ γνῶσιν ἵσχύει Θεοῦ, ἵστατος πάνω πάνω προσεστιν, οὐκ ἐξαρχηγεὶς ἄλλῳ ὑποτεθείσῃ ἑπιρρήσῃ, ὅταν μὴ τὸν ἔστὶν κακῶν αὐτῶν νομισθῇ εἰ γὰρ ἑταὶ ἐπικεφήλη τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄκρων, οὐ παντὶ δὲ προσεστιν, τὸ ἔστὶν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἅρων ἄλλῳ ἀπότομον ἄκρως γὰρ ἐστὶ δύσαιος.
Ἦπι, εἰ τὸ χωρίς ἐπιστήμης συλλογίζεσθαι, τοῦ μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης ἐλαττὸν ἀγαθόν οἰονίτι τις, Θεός ἀρα τὸ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ὀλίγος 
χαριζέται, τὸ δ᾽ ἐλάχιστον, ἀπαντᾷ ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον, ἤπει δίκαιος. 
Δήλον οὖν, ὡς ἀκρον ἂν εἰπ, μόνον τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἄναγκαιότατον, 
καὶ Θεοῦ δόρου κάλλιστον, οὐ μετέχουσιν ἀπαντεῖ τὸ δὲ μετ᾽ 
ἐπιστήμης, καλὸν μὲν καὶ τούτο, καὶ Θεοῦ δόρου, οὐπω δὲ 
tέλειον, ὥστε δὲ ὁ ἄλογος καὶ καὶ θυσία, τὸ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ἡ 
σοφία, οὔτε πιστεύον ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἅπαν καὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον 
καὶ ἄνθρωπον, ἢ καὶ ἀναγκαῖότατον, οὐ 
μικρὰς πολλάκις ἐγένετο. Σὺ δέ, τῷ υἱότερῳ τὰ τίμια καὶ τὴν ἱσχὺν 
ἀπασαν ψηφίζῃ, ὥστε οὐ δίκαιον.

Ἦπι, εἰ κάλλιστον ἀπαντῶν ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν γνώσις, αὐτῆς δ᾽ αἰτιῶν ἢ 
tου κόσμου σοφία, οὕτω πιστοῖς ὁ στέφανος δίκαιος, οὕτω κόρασις 
tοῖς ἀπίστοις ὁσία.

Ἦπι, οὐδὲ Θεός τὸ ἱσμὸν ἀπήτει πάντας, τὸ ἁμαρτὸν τῆς γνώσεως ἔν 
ἐαυτοῖς ἑξόντας.

KLPV

401-402: ἡ-σοφία] 1 Cor. 3:19

392. Θεός] ὁ(ε)ν P 1 393, post ἀπαντᾷ sc. sup. lin. ἀλλ᾽ cum sign. P 1 399, ἵσθιν post 
cor. (ex ἵσθις?) K 1 404. ἁμαρτοῦ] ἁμαρτὸν P
Ἐπὶ, σοφοὶ ἃν εἴεν μόνοι πιστοὶ Θεῷ, τὸ δ’ ἀλλο πᾶν, ἀπιστον ἀληθῶς· ἀλλ’ ἄτοπα καὶ ἀδύνατα· εἰ γὰρ ὡσα περὶ τὸ σῶμα γε ἀληθῶς κοίνα πάσι πάντα, καὶ ταύτα γε τῇ φθορᾷ περικείμενα, πολλῷ μάλλον ἄν, ὡσα περὶ ψυχῆν ἐποίει ὡδίνον ὁ Θεὸς· ὁ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἔτος ἀφθονίαν διδοὺς, καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸ εὐ ἔτη, ἀφορμὰς ἐδωρεῖτο· πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ ἔτος, συτίαν ἔδει || καὶ πιστῶν καὶ ἐνδυμάτων, ἄν οὐδείς ἀπορεῖ, κἂν οὔχ ἐτοιμασάμενος ἤ λόγων δὲ περὶ Θεοῦ γνώσιν ἀνάγειν ἐκαστὸν δυναμένως, ἐκάλυψεν ἄν ὁ Θεὸς ἀπαντας οὐ κεκτήσθαι; Τούτο, φθονοῦντος ἄν εἰς μάλλον, οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ.

Ἀλλ’ ὅτι πιστοὶ Θεῷ μάλλον οἱ μη σοφοὶ, δήλον ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ὡς γένος τῶν σοφῶν, οὐ πιστὸν ἐπὶ πλέον. Σοφὸν Αἰγυπτίων γένος, καὶ Ἀσσυρίων, πολὺ δὲ τούτων σοφότερον, τὸ Χαλδαῖων ἁμα καὶ τῶν Περσῶν· ἄν Ἐλληνες τὸ ἠμέτρου ἐν ἀπασίν ἐβασίλευεν οἱ,

Δημόκριτον καὶ Αναξαγόρας καὶ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Σωκράτην, καὶ

**KLPV**


πολλοὶς ἄλλους ἄδοικον ἐπὶ σοφία, οὕς, μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις γένεσιν, πλάνος τίς, ἐκάκωσε καὶ διεφθείρειν οὐ μικρὸς, καὶ διεσκόρπισεν ἅμα, ὡς εἰ τοὺς αὐτούς οὐρανόθεν ἤδη καταπεισόντας τοῖς μὲν γάρ, ὅλα στοιχεῖα, τοῖς δὲ, μόνον ἕν, ὡς Θεὸς ἐθαυμάζετο. Καὶ ἄλλω μὲν, ἡλιοκ, ἄλλω δὲ, σελήνῃ ἄλλῳ δὲ πάλιν, ἄλλων ἀπλανών ἄλλοι καὶ πλανομένων, ἐπιτίθεμαι πίστεις καὶ φευγοπνεύσεις προσφήνης, αὐτοῖς ἐπιφήμισαντες, ἐτέρας ἑτέροι, καλοῦσιν, τὴν μὲν γην, Κόρην, Δήμητραν, Πλοῦτανα, τὴν δὲ θάλασσαν, Ποσείδώνα, δαιμόνιας ἐναλίους. Ἡραν δὲ, τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὸ πῦρ, Ἡφαίστον καὶ ἠλιον μὲν, Ἀπόλλωνα, σελήνην δὲ, Αρτέμιν καὶ ἐσωφόρον μὲν, Ἀφροδίτην, Ἑρμῆν δὲ, στιλβοντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων ἐκάστων, μυθογράφοις ταῖς ἐπανυμήσεις παρέδοσαν. Τί δ’ ἂν τις καὶ ἦ τὰς ἀσέμνους οἴσοις γεννήσεις αὐτῶν, ὥν ἀξιῶται μὲν ὁ Ἑρμῆς, τριῶν ἄλληλοις διαφερόντας, ὃ δὲ Κρόνος, πλειώνοις; Τρίς γὰρ φασι τὸν μὲν, γεννηθῆναι, τὸν δὲ, καὶ πλειώνων εὐπορήσαις γεννήσεων.
Καὶ ἄλλων, ἄλλας ἀπιθάνους γεννήσεις, ἀτόποις ἄλλοις παραβαλλόμενοι χαίρουσι. Τι δὲ τοὺς ἦμιθέους, ο καὶ χλεύης ἄξιον οὐ μικρᾶς; Πῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἄθανατος τε καὶ θυητὸς ἁμα, δίχα τοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν αὐτῶν ἀνεπίληπτον εἶναι; Καὶ οὕτωι μὲν, ἵσως, ἠττὸν ἀδίκουσι τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσιοι ξύλα καὶ λίθους, χρυσὸν ἁμα καὶ ἄργυρον, καὶ τὰς παραπλησίους ἀλας μορφώσαντες, ὡς φίλον ἐκάστῳ, ἢ θεοὺς σέβονται, καὶ ὑγογράφιαν τιμᾶν ἔθελονν ὡς θεὸν, ἢς, πλαστικὴ καὶ δημιουργία χειρῶν, ἀνθρώποις τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ἄν ὁ μὲν Εὐφράνωρ, ποιητῆς Ἡρας, ὁ δὲ

Πολύγνωτος, ἄλλης· καὶ τῆς μὲν Αφροδίτης, ὁ Πραξίτέλης; ὁ δ' Ἀλκαμένης, τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς· καὶ ἄλλοι πάλιν ἄλλοιν, ὁν τὸ πάν, γέλως. Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ, μὴ μοῦν ὁ τοιοῦν ἐγκλήμα τόδε, ἁλλα καὶ ἔτερον χειρὸν ἐπάγεσαι ὧν ᾤα γὰρ ἄλογα, παρέσυραν εἰς θεῶν τιμᾶς· τάφων, καὶ κρίσιν, καὶ τράγους· καὶ τὸν μὲν, Ἀππίν ὀνομάξουσι, βοῦν ὅντα δίχροναν καὶ ταύτα μὲν ἵσως, ἔχει τινά λόγον,
ἡ μάλλον, ἀλογίαν οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαν ἁμερώτατα γὰρ καὶ ὁφελιμότατα βίω ἀρτήρ ό βους, αὐλακας ἀνατέμνειν, καὶ τὰς σπορὰς ἀλοησαι πάλιν ὅτε καιρὸς· δυνατώτατος δὲ κρῖς, τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν σκεπασμάτων ἐσθήτα παρε-illezμενος τῷ δυναμένῳ.

Νυνὶ δὲ, προσυπερβάλλοντες ἀσεβεία, καὶ τῶν ἀνημέρων τὰ ἀγριώτατα, λέοντας, κροκοδέιλους, καὶ τῶν ἐρπετῶν ἱβόλων ἀσπίδα, γεραίρουσιν, ἱεροῖς καὶ τεμένσι, ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ πανήγυρες καὶ σπορὰς· οὐδὲν οὖν χερσαίων, θηριώδετερον λέοντος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἱβόλων, ἀσπίδος χείριστον· πολλὰ μέντοι καὶ ἀλλὰ ζώα, κύνας, αἰλουροὺς, λύκους· πτηνά, ἵερακας, ἱβιδας· καὶ πάλιν, ἵθυων, ἡ ὀλὰ τὰ σώματα, ἡ μέρη τοιτῶν σέβουσι καὶ τιμῶσι. Τὰ δ’ εἰρημένα τούτων, ἐνοι περί τὰς κρίσεις ἀπονοίᾳ τοσαύτη κέχρηνται, ὡς οὖ τόν αἱ θεοὺς νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτων ἑκαστῶν, μέγιστον καὶ πρῶτον θεόν.

Τὸν δ’ ἀνωτάτω, καὶ πρεσβύτατον γενέτην, τὸν ἁρχοντα τῆς μεγάλης

KLPV


πόλεως, τὸν στρατάρχην τῆς ἀρτητίου στρατίας, τὸν κυβερνήτην, τὸν ὄντως ὄντα Θεόν, παρεκαλύπταντο, ἢ οὐκ εἰδότες ἀδιδακτοτάτῳ φύσει, ἢ μὴ σπουδάζοντες μαθείν. Ὡν, τί ἂν γένοιτο καταγελαστότερον; Ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν, τὰ πρὸ τῆς οἰκονομίας Χριστοῦ τίνα δὲ, καὶ τὰ μετ᾽ αὐτήν, ὡστερά; Οὐ σοφῶν γένος τυχὸν ἀπειροῦν, εἰς αἰρέσεις ἐτράπη, ὡν οἱ μὲν, τῇ σαφείᾳ, οἱ δὲ, τῇ μακαρίᾳ Τιμᾶί κακῶς εὐφημίζοντο, αὐτὴν ἐνούντες οὐχ ὡς ἐδει καὶ διακρίνοντες; Ο, τισὶ καὶ νῦν ἐνοράται, μὴ καλῶς ἐκάτερον, ἢ ἐτερον σέβειν βουλευομένοις. Τί πάντας ὠςησεν ἢ τῶν κόσμων σοφία; Τίς ἡ γνώσις αὐτοῖς περὶ τὸν Θεόν; Πάντα πάντῃ πάντας οὐδὲν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ παρέσυρε καὶ ἐξημώσεν οὐ μικρόν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἢν ἀπάντων ἢ δόξα, μανιώδης μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀνεπίσκεπτος. Πόσους δὲ ἄν τις καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῶν λόγων οἰόιτο πόρῳ, πιστοῖς δὲ πάλαι καὶ νῦν Θεῷ Ἀπείρους πάντως ἑρείς.

Καὶ Θεῷ μὲν ὀμιλοῦντας, ὅτε γνησίῳ φίλῳ, Θεῷ δὲ, καὶ χαίροντας.

**KLPV**


221
υπερ παντα τοιωτος χορος ο των προφητων, αυτοις ο των αποστολων παρομοιος, και πληθος άλλο των ανθρωπων απειρον πιστευει ζοντι Θεω, και της έν κοσμοι σοφως ου κοινωνει. Όθεν, θαυμαζεται γενος Εσοπιων, άμα και Ασιων το μεν, Ελληνων, ο, και μεχρι του νυν, ένοριαι δυκαιοσυνη, το δε, παλαι μεν ευδοκιμησεν εν Ιουδαιοις: νυν δε ουκ έστι πληθος υπερ τετρακισχιλιον μονοι μεν εξ άπαντων ανθρωπων αχρηματι και ακτημονες γεγονοτες ουδεναι αν ευροι τις παρ' αυτοις, δημιουργον, η οπλωνων, η συνολως, τα κατα πολεμον επιτρεποντα, άλλ ουδ' όσα κατ' ειρηνη εις κακιαν ενολισθα, ορκους, η κατηλεια, η την έμποριαν, ουδ' άναρ ισαιου δουλος παρ' αυτοις, ουδεις ην άλλ άνθυπουργουντες άλληλοις, παντες ελευθεροι. Φιλοσοφιας δε, το μεν λογικον τε και φυσικον, τοις βουλομενοις άπελπον, το δ' ήθικον, ευ μαλα διεπονουν' επαιδευντο ουν, την δοκουσαν ενσεβειαν και επιστημην, των προς άλληθειαν αγαθων οικια, ουδενος

**KLPV**


222
ἡν, ἵδια, ἢν, οὐ πάντων εἶναι συμβεβῆκεν ταμεῖον ἐν, ἀπασὶ κοινὸν ἢν· καὶ δαπάναι· καὶ κοινὰ μὲν ἐσθῆτες, κοινὰ δὲ τροφαὶ ὡσα γὰρ ἄν λάβωσιν ἐπὶ μισθῷ, κοινὴν τοῖς ἐθέλοντι χρήσθαι παρεσκεύαζον τράπεζαν τοιοῦτος ἀθλητὰς ἀρετῆς ἀπεργάζεται φιλοσοφία, ἡ δίχα λόγων ἐλληνικῶν, καὶ συλλογισμὸν ὡσον ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἔνικησαν, καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ γνώσεως, ἔτυχον οἰκειοτέρας μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων.

Πολλοὶ οὐκοῦν διδέσκαται, ὡς συναφός ἡ τοῦ κόσμου σοφία, γνώσεως αἰτίων περὶ τὸν Θεόν γίνεται οὐδ' ὡσοι πόρρω τῆς ἐπιστήμης, πιστεύειν οὐκ ἐθέλουν τῷ Θεῷ τούναντίον δὲ μᾶλλον, ὡς οἱ μὲν ἰδιῶται, πιστοὶ Θεῷ, σοφοὶ δὲ τὸ πλέον, ἀπιστοὶ.

Σὺ δὲ, τῷ μὲν σὺν ἐπιστήμῃ συλλογίζεσθαι, πάν ἀγαθὸν ἐμφυτεύειν ἐθέλεις· καὶ τὴν εἰς Θεόν ἐπιτρέπεις γνώσιν· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον, ὃ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ παντὶ πάρεστι, καὶ ὡς πάλιν ἀπαν ἀγαθὸν ἐπεται, ἐπιστήμας γε καὶ περιπτύπτεις· τὸ δὲ, ἀδικον, οὐ μόνον σοι τῷ λέγοντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμῖν γε, καὶ τῷ Θεῷ. Ὄμολογεὶς ταὐτ' οὔτως ἔχειν ἢ οὐ;

ΚLPV


497. αἰσθῆτες L ἢ 498. ἄν αἰσθῆτες L ἢ 499. ἀπεργάζετο L II 506. τοῦ πλέον KV II 508. post ἐθέλεις sign. interrogationis P II post ἔχειν sign. interrogationis codd.
Κυδώνης. Υπερφυσίς γε ὀμολογώ ἀλλ' ὁμως ἦμν εἶπε, τί Θεὸς εἰς γνώσιν ἀπαντὶ χαρίζεσθαι βούλεται;

Χρυσολώρας. Ψυχήν λογικήν· αὕτη γὰρ, τῇ καταβολῇ τοῦ σπέρματος, ἔωθεν ἀφικνεῖται, ἀφαντῷ δυνάμει θείᾳ, προτέρου θατέρου μηδενὸς ὄντος· καὶ σώματι μὲν, ισοθῆςες, τῇ ψυχῇ δὲ, νοῦς ἑστὶν ἤγεμον καὶ προαίρεσις κάλλιστα· ἔπεται δὲ αὕτη, καὶ τριμέρεια, ὧν, τὰ δύο μὲν, ἄλογα, λογιστικὸν δὲ, τὸ ἐτερον, ὅ καὶ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, ὡς φασίν, ἱδρυται· τῶν δὲ Λοιπῶν, τὸ μὲν, ἐν στέρνοις, τὸ δὲ, κάτωθεν. Οὕτων τῶν ἀλογῶν, τὸ λογιστικὸν ἔβασιλεύει, μακάριος· ἑφαρμόζεται γάρ αὐτῶ, γνῶσις τῆς ἀληθείας· καὶ θυμῷ μὲν, ἀνδρία, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ, ἐπιθυμίᾳ· καὶ πάσας περιτλέκται δικαιοσύνῃ ὦ δὲ τὸ ἄλογον ἀρχής, άθλιος ὦτος, ὡς τῶν προτέρων οὐδενὸς εὐπορῶν. Τούτων δὲ πάντων, καὶ τῆς περὶ Θεὸν ἀπιστίας καὶ πίστεως αἰτίων, ἡ προαίρεσις μόνη· μένουσα γὰρ ἐν ἀγαθῷ, γεννᾷ, πίστιν· περὶ δὲ τὸ κακὸν, ἀπιστίαν· ἡ δὲ τῶν κόσμου σοφία, γνώσιν οἶδε φύειν ἐν ὀρφιμένοις·

Κλρν

518-521. ἔπεται-κάτωθεν] cf. Plat., Republica 440e-441a; 528. ἡ-σοφία] 1 Cor. 3:19

ὡσπερ οὖν σοφία καὶ προαίρεσις τὰ γεννώντα διάφορα, οὕτω πίστει καὶ γνώσει τὰ φυόμενα παρ' αὐτῶν, οὐ ταυτά οὖτω καὶ τρός ἀλλήλους κἂν τῷ Θεῷ τοῖς μὲν, τὸ ἱσόν, τῷ δὲ, τὸ δίκαιον ἀν καὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν ἐποιεῖ.

[1.5] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐδὲν οὖτω μὴ ἐναργεῖς ὡς αὐτό. Πλὴν ὁ Νεῖλος, κἂν τούτοις ἔστιν ἡ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ φαίνεται κεχρημένος, ὡς ὅταν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ τὴν ἀποδείξει διὰ τὸ αὐτὸν ἄπειρον εἶναι ἐλαύνη. Οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ τῇ ἀποδείξει τὸ ἄπειρον ἐναντίον τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ στέρησιν ἄπειρον, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀποδειχθεῖ ἃ ἂν ἄπειρος ἀπὸ ἀπόπτωσις ἢ στέρησις ὅν, ὁ, τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις ἀρχῇ τοῦ ἐπισταθῆσαι γίνεται, εἰκότως καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐκπίπτει. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν, ἄπειρον, οἶον, τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι πιστεύομεν, μάλιστα πάντων πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην οἰκείως ἔχει· ὡς ἂν μάλιστα ἄπειρος ὁ, διὰ τὸ ἔν μηδὲν εἶναι ὑποκειμένος, εἰς τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι τὸ ἔν ἐαυτῷ, καὶ ποιεῖ, τὸδε μὲν, εἰναι, τὸδε δὲ, ἢ μὴ εἶναι τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ χώνι λευκόν, οὐχ ἀπλώς ἔσται λευκόν οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ κύκνῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ συστέλλεται, καὶ μερικῶν γίνεται λευκόν

KLVP


καὶ πεπερασμένον, πρὸς τὴν τῆς χιόνος φύσιν· ὡς εἰ γέ τις ἦν λευκότης, ἐν μηδενὶ περικλειομένη ὑποκειμένῳ, ἢν ἂν ἀπειρος λευκότης, πάντα τὰ τῆς λευκότητος γένη περιλαμβάνουσα καὶ προέχουσα καὶ μάλιστα ἢν ἦν εἴδος, υπὲρ παν εἴδος λευκότητος· καὶ τοῦτ' ἢν ἦν μάλιστα, τῇ περὶ ταύτης ἐπιστήμης οἰκείον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, τῷ μὲν δυνάμει παντελῶς, οὐδεμία χώρα, ἐνέργεια δὲ μονὸν ἐστὶ καθαρά, ἐν οὐδευί παντάπασι νοουμένη ὑποκειμένω, εἰδός μόνον αὐτὸν καὶ ἐντελεχειαν ψιλὴν εἶναι λείπεται, ἢ, καὶ ἡ ἀπλῶς ἀπειρία συνέζευκται.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἰδοὺ σοι τῶν συλλογισμῶν ὁ θαυμαστὸς ἔπαινος, ὅν ἄρτιος ἐφαρμόζειν αὐτοὶς ἐβουλεύου, θαυμαστὸν σοι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπέδωκεν ἀδικίας τὸ σύμπτωμα, λέγειν εὐθὺς περὶ Θεοῦ γε βουλευομένω καὶ ὰματα μὲν ὀλίγα, πολλά γεννᾶ τὰ νοήματα, καὶ δεινα' τὸ γὰρ παρὰν εἰρημένον σοι, πολλὰν οὐ μικρῶν ἐστίν ἀτόπων ἢδη μεστὸν. Ἀὐτίκα Νεῖλος διώκει τὸν συλλογισμὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ,
ού τότο, τῆς ἀπειρίας ὅρον οἰόμενος, ἢ, μηδενὶ περικλειομένου
tῶν ὅντων, ἀλλ’ ὡς Θεοῦ καὶ πανταχοῦ, καὶ μηδαμῇ, καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ
πᾶν ὅντος· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅν, λέγεται μὲν ἀπειρον, οὐχ ὦτι ἐστιν, ἀλλ’
ὅτι, οὐκ ἐστιν ὦ, μηδεμία χώρα τῆς ἀπειρίας ὑποτευνται πάσσοτε.

565 Περὶ οὖ καὶ Νείλος, οὐδόλως ὕετο, λογίζεσθαι συλλογισμὸν
φεύγειν· ἐπεὶ τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι, τῶν ὅντων ἐστίν, ἥκιστα δὲ Θεώ
πρέπει, φανερῶς ὑπὲρ τὸ πᾶν ὅντι. Ὅν αὐτὸς, ἐνῷ μοιον ἔλεγεν
εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῷ μὴ ὅντι ἀλλ’ ἀποτελοῦν. Καίτοι γε, ἐστιν ἄττα, καὶ
ὅντα ἐστι, καὶ ἀπειρα πολλοὶς τρόποις λέγεται ἀρχὴν τὸ σημείον
τὸ νῦν, καὶ τῷ κίνημα· δεύτερον, τὰ κυκλικὰ τε καὶ σφαιρικά·
τρίτον, ἢ λεγομένη λαβύρινθος· τέταρτον, ἢ διακεκαυμένη καὶ
κατεψυγμένη γῆ καὶ πέμπτον, ὃ ἀριθμὸς τε, καὶ ἡ γραμμή· πᾶν
γὰρ συνεχές, ἐπ’ ἀπειρον ὑπάρχει διαμετέριον· καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ,
pροστίθεναι πάντως ἐστιν ἄει· αὐτὰ οὖν ἀπειρα πάντα λέγεται,
ὡς φασίν οἱ ἐν τούτοις δεινοὶ ἀλλ’ ὅμως, ἐπεὶ τούτων ἐστι τὶ μείζον,
οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀπειρον, ἀληθείᾳ. Εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἐστὶ διάκειν συλλογισμόν, πῶς ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἑλαύνομεν; Οὐκοῦν μόνος ἀπειρὸς ὁ Θεός.

Ἔτι, καὶ τὸν Θεόν ὑμολογεῖς ἀπειρον, ἐν τῷ μηδενὶ τῶν ὄντων εἶναι; Οὕτως, ἢ ἄλλως;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὕτως ἔχει.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀπόκριναι μοι τοιγαρούν ἐν σκοτῷ, ὡσ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ἀντιφατικῶς ἐνεστίν, ὅποια εἶναι φαμέν.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀντικείμενα.

585 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τῷ γοῦν μηδενὶ, τί ἐστιν ἀντικείμενον; Ἀνάγκη γὰρ κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον εὑρεθήναι τί.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦτῳ ἀντίκειται, ἢ τὸ τί αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐστι, τῷ μηδενὶ ἑναντίον.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐκοῦν, εἰ τῷ μηδενὶ παρὸν ἀπειρον, τό, τίνι ἄρα προσόν, οὐκ ἀπειρον.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ ἔχει.

ΚΛΠΒ

579-580. Ἐτι-εἶναι] vide supra, linn. 541-543


228
ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Οὕτως ἔχει.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Εἰ θεὸς ἀρα τινὶ παρὼν εὐθεῖᾳ, ἐν τούτῳ πεπέρασται κατὰ σέ, καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀπειρος.

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Αλήθη λέγεις πλήν, ἐν οὐ-ιδενί ἀν εὐθεθεὶ τῶν ὀντῶν ὑποκειμένῳ πώποτε.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Δήλον, ὡς οἰκε, τοῖς εὐσεβεῖσθαί τῶν ὀρῶν ἐπελάθουν παντάπασιν ἀκούομεν γάρ, τὴν μακαρίαν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Υἱοῦ, τῇ μακαρίᾳ παραγενομένῃ Παρθένῳ, καὶ σαρκωθείσαν ὡς ἠμβολήθη λόγως ἀρρήτος, τὸν δὲ Πατέρα καὶ τὸν Παράκλητον, κοινωνοῦντας μόνη τῇ εὐδοκίᾳ οὐκ ἀπειρος ἐν αὐτῷ ο Ὑιὸς ἀρα ἐπομένως δὲ τούτῳ, καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας μεταλαμβάνει σαρκὸς θεός, καὶ δύο φύσεις, ὑπόστασις μία γίγνεται ὁ, καὶ νῦν ὀρᾶται δεδοξασμένον ἐν οὐρανοῖς καὶ σύνεσιν ἦ τὸν θεὸν φύσις, ἐν περιγραπτῷ σώματι οὐκοῦν, τὸ θείον ἐν τούτῳ πεπέρασται.

Ἔτι, καὶ δέχα τούτων, ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ χρομένος ὁ θεός, τῶν αὐτοῦ δούλων,
οὐ μόνον ἐνί, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶς, ἢ μᾶλλον ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀπαντή,
καὶ πανταχοῦ πάρεστι πληρῶν ἀπαντᾷ ὁ, ἐκ τῶν ἀλογήτων
σοι πρότερον, εἰκότας ἢν οὐκ ἀπειρον εἰποιμεν· ἐπεὶ δὲ, καὶ δυσὶν
ὡς ἔφημεν ἐνεπείν ὑποκειμένοις, πολλῷ γε μᾶλλον οὐκ ἀπειροῦ.

610 ἄλλῳ ἄτοπῳ, καὶ ἀδύνατου· ᾗ συνεβαίνει ἢν οὐδαμῶς, εἰ τῇ
ἐπιστήμῃ πρεπόντως, ὡς ἦν περὶ Θεοῦ ἀπειρίας ὁρος ἐλέγετο.
Ἀληθῆ λέγω ἢ οὕ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Πειθομαί πλὴν εἰπὲ σοι πρὸ τοῦ οὐκείδου, τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ
τοῦ Θεοῦ.

615 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐδένα μὲν ἢν τις ἄλλων ὅρον ἔχοι λογίσσομαι, ἢ
τὸν οὐ τέλος οὐδ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἔχοντα· τὸ γὰρ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα καὶ μὴ ἐν
τούτως, ἀπειρον τις ὑπη, τῶν ἐπὶ θεολογία πάλαι θαυμαζομένων.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ὁμολογῶ ἐγὼγε.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐτι, καὶ περὶ τῆς λευκότητος, ἢν ἐλεγες ἀπειρον

619-620. περὶ-ὑποκειμένων] vide supra, linn. 546-548


τὸ μὲν, ώς ἀδύνατον, ὅπερ ἔλεγες συμβαίνειν αὐτῇ, τὸ δὲ, καὶ εἰ δύνατόν ἦν, τῶν ὄντων αὐτῆς οὐδενὶ περικλείεσθαι, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἂν ἀπειρος ἐκαλεῖτο· ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀπειρον, ἀναρχὸν τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητον, ὥν ἐκάτερον, ἣκιστα προσήκον αὐτῇ· λαβοῦση μὲν ἄρχην τῆς ἑν τῷ κόσμῳ γενέσεως, τέλει δὲ, συνοίση πάλιν αὐτοῦ τελευτήσαντος.

Καίτοι γε, μείζον λόγῳ κοσμοῦνται μᾶλλον, ἄ ἐλέγομεν ἀρτίως ἂπειρα, ἢ αὐτῇ ἢ λευκότης· ἂλλ’ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀπειρον εἶδοκε τῇ ἄληθειᾳ· εἰ γούν τά βέλτιστα πόρρῳ τῆς ἀπειρίας, πῶς ἂν τις αὐτής ἀξιώσει τὸ ἐλάχιστον; Οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν ὄντων ἀπειρον, πλὴν Θεοῦ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Συμφωνῶ σοι, ἄληθῇ λέγοντι.

ΧΡΥΣΩΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐπεὶ δὲ, καὶ τὸ δυνάμει παντάπασιν οὐ λογίζῃ Θεῶ, ἂλλ’ ἐνέργειαν ὅλον εἶναι καθαρὰν ὠμολόγεια, εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀτελῆ λέγεις ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι εἰ δὲ παντελῶς ἀποστρέφῃ τὸ δύνασθαι τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, πειθέτω σε λόγος.

ΚΛΡΥ


ὁ τῆς ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν δύναται γὰρ αὐτὴν καθ’ ἡμέραν ὁ Θεὸς δρᾶν, ἀλλ’ οὐ βούλεται ἐνεργῆσει δὲ αὐτὴν, όταν αὐτῷ φανῇ δίκαιον. Οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ τούτο γε ἀναγκαῖον;

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Πάνυ γε.

640 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Λείπονται λοιπὸν ἐπισκέψασθαι, τὸ τελευταῖον ἡμᾶς. Τὸν Θεόν, εἰδος μάλιστα καλεῖς, καὶ ψυλῆν ἐντελέχειαν εἰπὲ οὖν ἡμῖν πολλῶν ὀντῶν, ἢ περὶ Θεοῦ λέγεται, ἐστιν ὁ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ σημαίνει;

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Οἰμένουν.

645 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ Θεῷ πρέπον ὄνομα;

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Οὐχ ἐν, ἀλλὰ δύο τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν.

L 16ος ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐ τῇ φύσει δὲ ὃ καὶ ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὡς τὸ σοφόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ἢ τε ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ ζωή;

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Ναί πλὴν, μειζόνων ἄξιον σε λόγον οἱ θεολόγοι τὰ πρότερα, τὸ ὄν καί τὸ ἀγαθὸν.

ΚΛΡΩ

641. Τὸν-ἐντελέχειαν] vide supra, linn. 553-554


637. δὲ] γὰρ) P 1 638. post ἀναγκαῖον sign. interrogationis codd. 1 643. post σημαίνει sign. interrogationis codd. 1 645. post ὄνομα sign. interrogationis codd. 1 648. αλήθεια K 1 post ζωῆ sign. interrogationis L 1 649. vai bis acc. L
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἄ μέν, αὐτοὶ φασιν, ἀνάγκη στέργειν εὐσεβεῖς ἀπαντας· ἀ δὲ μηδεὶς ἔλεγεν, ἡκιστα πρέπον εἰπεῖν οὐδενί τὸ μὲν γάρ, ἀκίνδυνον, ὡς τοῖς ἁγίοις καὶ λεγόμενον καὶ νοούμενον, τὸ δὲ, τοῖς λέγουσιν οὐ μικρά ἐτήμια, καίνοσομεῖν ὑνόματα περὶ τὸν

655 Θεόν βουλομένοις.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἁγίοις γνώριμον, εἰδος λέγειν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ναὶ πλήν, κοινὸν Πατρός, Ἱού τε καὶ Πνεύματος· ὡς καὶ μορφὴν καὶ υὐσίαν καὶ σχήμα. Τὸ δ’ αἰτίον, ἵνα μὴ τις αὐτῶν ἐπερότητος λόγος, περὶ τὴν ἀκραν ἀπλότητα σύνθεσιν ἀπεργάσηται τὸ δὲ μάλιστα μὲν εἰδος λέγεσθαι τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ ψιλὴν ἐντελέχειαν, οὐδ’ ὑποπτευεται λέγεσθαι πῶπτοτε. Τέως καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ όντος, οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἰδιαίτερον, οὐδ’ οἰκειοτάτον τε Θεῷ, κἂν τις οἴσιτο προτιμᾶσθαι τῶν ἀλλῶν ὑνομάτων αὐτά.

660 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Εἰκότα λέγεις.

ΚΛΡΥ


233
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐκοῦν, εἰ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς θεολόγοις βέλτιστα νομιζόμενα καὶ μεγάλα, οὐδὲν οἰκείον Θεῷ, ἃν αὐτοῖς οὐδεμία μνήμη, πῶς ἂν κατανοήσαμεν ἄρα τὰ κρείττως;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐδαμῶς πλὴν εἰπέ, τίνα τάυτα.

670 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Αὐτὸ προδέλεγε τὸν Θεὸν εἰδος μάλιστα καὶ ψυλῆν ἐντελέχειαν, ὡς αὐτῷ μόνα μόνον οἰκεία, καὶ βέλτιστα καὶ ἀρέσκοντα—τούτῳ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὸ μάλιστα βουλεταὶ—, ᾧ μέχρι τοῦ νῦν, οὐδαμόθεν ἔμαθομεν· σοὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν εὐφορον ἔξεγένον, ἡ, λείπεται, καὶ ὅρον καὶ γένος καὶ διαφορὰν ἐπομένως εἰπεῖν Θεοῦ καὶ τὸτ' ἂν ἱσως, εἰδος κυρίως λέγοιτο, γένος ἔχον ἄλλα πάντων ἀναιρουμένων, οὔτε ἂν εἰδος, οὔτε ψυλῆν ἐντελέχειαν, εἰκότως ἂν τις Θεὸν λογίζωτο κατὰ σέ, ἢ καλοῖτο ἀτοπον γὰρ, ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λέγειν ὁνόματα πρέποντα ἀλλὰ, παρὰ τὰ θειώδως ἂμιν ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν λογίων ἐκπεφασμένα.

ΚΛΡΥ

679. παρὰ-ἐκπεφασμένα| Ps.-Dion. Αἰσχ., Divin. nom., 1, § 1, p. 108.7-8

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἡδον, πάνω μοι νῦν ἐπέπληξας εἰπάντι αὐτά· περὶ μὲν τοῦ εἴδους, οὐκ ἀντιλέγω, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐντελέξειαν, ὅποιαν, καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν οἱεὶ λέγεσθαι; Ἔγω γὰρ νομίζω, ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὣμα Θεῷ.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐντελέξεια μὲν, ἡ κίνησις τῶν ἀγγέλων καὶ τῶν ψυχῶν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄπαντων λέγεται τῶν μὲν, ὡς ἐνεργοῦντων ἀεὶ καὶ τελείαν, τῶν δὲ, ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμει φερομένων εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ὃθεν αὐτὴν ὀρίζομεν, φασίν, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ἐντελέξεια κίνησις· καὶ πάλιν, ἐντελέξεια, ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἐντελεῖς εἰς· διό, καὶ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐντελεχεία, οὐ κατὰ τὸ μήτραν οἰκονομοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀπαρτισθεὶς, καὶ τεχθεὶς.

Ἔτι, καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἐντελεχείαν ὀρίζοντα τοῦ φυσικοῦ καὶ ὀργανικοῦ καὶ δυνάμει ζωήν ἐχοντος σώματος· οὐχ ὅτι ἐνεργεια ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλ' ὅτι, κατ' ἑκείνην ἡ τελειότητις τῶ σώματι· καὶ ἡ τελεία ἐνεργεία, ἐντελέξεια καλεῖται· καταχρηστικῶς δὲ, καὶ ἡ ἀπλῶς ἐνεργεία, λέγεται ἐντελέξεια, καθότι έπαιστὸν ἀποδίδωσι τὴν ἐνεργείαν

KLPV

αὐτοῦ, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἵνα τελεία φύσις, ἵνα καὶ ἀτελής ἐις καθ’ ὅ σημαινόμενον, καὶ ἥ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια λέγεται. Ἡ γοῦν ἀπλῶς ἐνέργεια τοιαύτη ἢν εἰπὶ πάντως, ὅποιον καὶ τὸ δυνάμει. Τὸ δὲ, ἀτελές· καὶ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἡ ἐντελέχεια, ἀτελής. Τοιούτων δὲ καὶ τοιούτων σημαίνεσθαι δυναμένων ἐντελεχεία, τίς ἂν ὡς ὁ τολμηρὸς εἰς, περὶ Θεόν, δόσις ἂν ὁ ὁμοίως μάλιστα λέγεσθαι, καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐντελεχεῖν αὐτὴν καλοῖς Θεοῖς; Αὐτοῖς.

Ἐπὶ, εἰ τῷ δυνάμει μὲν, ὡς ἐλέγες, εὐθυμία χώρα Θεῷ, τῇ δ’ ἐντελεχεία πρόσεστι καὶ τὸ δύναμες, ἐντελεχεία καὶ Θεός· οὐ ταύτον ἄρα.

ΘΩΜΑΣ. Ἐγώ βουλομαι μὲν ὡς ἴσον ἰκανονὸς διακρίνειν ὃς ἐκλεφθὼν αὐτοῖς ἰσοῦς ἐν θεωρήσῃ παντός, ὁ δ’ ἐντελεχεία πρόσεστι καὶ τὸ δύναμες, ἐντελεχεία καὶ Θεός· οὐ ταύτον ἄρα.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Λέγε· ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσαμεν διηγουμένου.
[2] Συλλογισμός πρώτος <περὶ θείας διακρίσεως>

ΘΩΜΑΣ. Ο Υίός καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα διακρίνονται εἰ γοῦν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑλὴν ἢ διάκρισιν, ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως διακρίνονται τὰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως, δυνατὸν ἃμα εἴναι ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι οἴοι, λευκόν, τρίγωνον.

5 ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. Εἰ μὲν δὴ μὴ πάντα, ἀληθῆς μὲν ὁ λόγος, μερικὸς δὲ ἄν, ἀσυλλογιστὸς ἔσται εἰ δὲ πάντα ἔρουσι, τί ἂν εἴτοιεν περὶ ψυχῶν ἢ ἀγγέλων, ἐξηρημένων τῆς ὑλῆς, καὶ διακεκριμένων μὲν, μὴ καταδεχομένων δὲ, τὴν κατὰ τὴν ὑλὴν διάκρισιν; Καὶ μὴν καὶ κατ’ εἴδος διαφερόντων κριοῦ καὶ τράγου, ποία ἐν τούτοις ἑναντίοτης, ἡ διαφέροι ἂν, εἴδος εἰδους;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐτός, πρὸς τὸν Θωμᾶν ἐνίσταται, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγγέλων καὶ τῶν ψυχῶν κομίζων τὴν ἐνστάσιν ταύτα γὰρ ἀσώμαται ὑντα καὶ ἀνά, τί μὲν ὑλὴ, φησίν, οὐκ ἂν διακρίνοιντο, ἀντετέθει ταύτα ἂν διακρίνεσθαι. Τὰ μὲν οὖν τούτον, τοιαῦτα. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ἰνα τι

KLPV


σαφέστερον περὶ τοῦτον διαλεχθῶμεν, φαμέν, ώς εἰ τινα, ἀπὸ τινος κοινοῦ διαμορίτο —ταῦτα γὰρ εἰσὶ τὰ κυρίως λεγόμενα διακρίνεσθαι—, ἀνάγκη διάφορα εἶναι κατ’ εἰδος. Τα γὰρ μὴ κατ’ εἰδὸς ὑντα διάφορα, κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὴν διάκρισιν ἔχει, τὰ δὲ κατ’ εἰδος ἀντιδιηρημένα, ἀντίθεσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς περιέχει καὶ ἀναγκαῖος οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔτερον, οἶον, τὸ ἔτερον οὐδ’ ἄν τινι μηχανήν, ἀλλήλον κατηγορηθείν. Τὸ γὰρ τόδε ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὴ εἶναι τόδε, δήλον, ὡς διὰ της μάχην τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ κατηγορομένου συμβαίνει εἰ γὰρ μηδεμία ἐν τοῦτοις περιέχον νὰ μάχη, οὐτ’ ἀν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἵν διακεκριμένα, καὶ συνέτρεχεν ἀν ποτ’ ἐνδεχομένως εἰς ταύτον ὑποκείμενον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον —ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἀναγκαῖαν εἶναι τὴν τοῦτον διάκρισιν—, φανερὸν, ὅτι τὰ ἀναγκαῖας διακρινόμενα, ἀντίθεσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς περιέχει, ὡς’ ἦς, κωλύται συνδραμεῖν ἀλλήλοις.

20 [2.1] Εἰ δὲ τὸν κριόν καὶ τὸν τράγον ἀντιστῆσει τῷ λόγῳ, ἀ καὶ διακεκριμένα ἢς ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐδεμία τούτοις ἀντίθεσις ἐνορᾶται, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν, κὰν τούτως ἐστὶν ἀντίθεσιν εὑρεῖν, ἢ διακρίνονται οἶον, τὸ ἄγριον, καὶ τὸ ἥμερον.

KLPV


ΧΡΥΣΩΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ θαυμάστει φιλοσόφοι, || δοκοῦντα σοὶ λέγεις
35 αὕτ᾽, ἢ ἡμῶν ἀποτειχιᾷ· Ἀδικὸν ἀνδρὶ σοφὶ, ἐκεῖνα λογίζεσθαι, ἃ
τιστευεῖν οὐδὲ χρεῶν ἰδιώτη· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄκων ἔρεις, ἄτοπον ἀνὴρ
γὰρ σοφός εἴ· εἰ δ᾽ ἐκὼν, ἀτοπώτερον· πόρῳ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ,
λέγειν ἑπίτηδες, ἢ μὴ δέον· ὁ γὰρ τάναντια λῦειν ἐπιχειρῶν,
καθόλου πάντως καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ καθ᾽ αὕτα, καὶ άεὶ ἰσαντως
ἐχοντα προβάλλεσθαι δει. Σὺ, οὖν, οὐ πιθανοῖς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ
πάντῃ σοφίσμασι φανεροῖς, ἀναίδην ἐθέλεις χρησθαί. Νεῖλος μὲν
ἐν τῷ παρόντι συλλογισμῷ, πολλὰ τὸν Θωμὰν αἰτιώμενος, καὶ
τούτο, μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐφῃ, ὡς ὁ κρῖος καὶ ὁ τράγος, ἢ ἀδιάκριτα
ἐσται, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον, ἢ· ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ ἀντιθέσει διακρινοῦνται ὡς, σὺ
μαχόμενος νῦν, ὄμολογεῖς αὕτα διακρίνεσθαι, τῷ ἀγρίῳ, καὶ τῷ
ήμερῳ. Κοινὴ οὖν τὸν λόγον ἐπισκεψάμεθα· καὶ ἦ πείθου τάληθη
λέγοντι, ἢ ἀντίτεινον, εἰ σοὶ μὴ δοκεῖ ἀναγκαία. Ἐστί ζῶα, κρῖον
καὶ τράγον, ἡμερὰ, ἢ καὶ διακρίνεσθαι, καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι δύναται;

KLPV


34. δοκοῦντα σοὶ codd. || 36. οὐδὲ] οὐ P || 37. σοφὸς L || 39. καθάλω<ω> PV || 43-44.
ἀδιάκριτα ἐσται P || 48. post δύναται sign. interrogationis codd.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Πάνω γε.

50 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τὴν δὲ σύγκροισιν ὁμογενέσιν οἰκεῖαν, ἢ τοῖς ἀλλογενέσιν ἐφοίμεν;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Μόνοις ὁμογενέσιν.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐκοῦν, ἐναντίω τὸ ἐναντίον, ἀκοινώνητον ἐν συγκρίσει, ὡσπερ, οὐδὲ λευκόν, μέλανι.

55 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Φανερὸν γε.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Πῶς δὲ καὶ συγκρινόμενα ἂν αὐτὰ καλοῖτο; ‖

L 18v

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ· Τὸ μὲν, ἡμερον, τὸ δὲ, ἡμερώτερον.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερα τῶν ἄγριων, διακρίνεται μὲν, ἀλλ’ οὐ συγκρίνεται, τὰ δ’ ἡμερα, πρὸς ἀλληλα καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὔτως ἔχει.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀρα ἐξ, ὁ ὁμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, φανερὸν ἐστὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὡς ἡμερα ζωα κριῶς καὶ τράγος, οὐδόλως τῷ ἄγριῳ διακριθήσεται, καθὼς ἐλεγες· ἡμερον γὰρ ἐκάτερον.

ΚΛΡΥ

64. καθός ἐλεγες] vide supra, [2] 33

55. ἐναντίω-ἐναντίον] Arist., Τοπικά 113b.27, 114a.3

50. οἰκεῖαν L ‖ 53. οὐκ οὖν L ‖ ἐναντίῳ post cor. (ex ἐναντίον) L ‖ 57. μὲν bis acc. L ‖ 63. ζωα] deest KPV
65 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Φαίνεται.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἡ ἑτεροτοιχία τῶν κρυστάλλων αὐτά διαφέρειν ἑρόους συμβεβηκός;
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αχώριστον γε.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τούτω δὲ ἐστὶ χώρα, τάναντία δέχεσθαι πώποτε; Ἡ οὐδαμῶς;
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὔδαμῶς γε.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀρα καὶ τούτω, οὗ τῷ ἀγρῷ διακρινοῦμεν αὐτά. Ἡ ἑτεροτοιχία τῇ ἰδιαιτατῷ, κρύος καὶ τράγος ἡμέρα πώποτε κοινωνεῖ; ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐμενον. 
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀνθίζει, τῶν ἐναντίων ἐφιλοσοφεῖτο γεννητικὰ, ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος, διαφόρα ἰδιαιτατος; Ἡ πῶς ἄλλως;
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὔτως, οὐκ ἄλλως.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὔκοιν, οὗ τῷ ἀγρῷ ταῦτ’ ἂν διακριθεί, ἡς ἄμαλογεις.

ΚΛΡΥ


67. post συμβεβηκός sign. interrogationis KLV: deest P | 69. τούτω] τούτ(ων) P | 73. post τούτω sign. interrogationis codd. | 72. διακρινούμεν] κρινούμεν P | 73. post κοινονεί sign. interrogationis codd. | 76. post ἰδιαιτατος sign. interrogationis codd. | 78. ἄν bis acc. L
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αληθή λέγεις.

80 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐτι, παραλαμβάνονται ποτε ἐν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὰ ζώα ταῦτα;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἡκιστά γε.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τὰ δ’ ἑναντία παραλαμβάνονται;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ μᾶλα γε.

85 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐκ ἀληθές ἁρα, ὡς τῷ ἀγρίῳ ταῦτα διακρινοῦμεν. Ἐτι, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἕττον ἑπιδέχεται τὰ ζώα ταῦτα, ἢ οὐ;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Φανερὸν ὅτι ἑπιδέχεται.

L 19' ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ, πάντως οὐκ ἑναντία, ἢ ὡς ὁ Φιλόσοφος ἀξίων.

90 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Φαίνεται.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐκοῦν, οὐδ’ οὕτως τῷ ἀγρίῳ, διακριθήσεται.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐτι, ἄλλοιον, ἢ ἄλλο τὰ ζώα ταῦτα ποιεῖ;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλοιον. Τὰ δ’ ἑναντία πάλιν ὁποῖον;

ΚΛΡΥ

81. post ταῦτα sign. interrogationis codd. | 82. ἡκιστά γε Ρ | 83. post παραλαμβάνονται sign. interrogationis codd. | 93. post ἄλλοιον scr. et del. κυδ(ῶν)ις V: post ἄλλοιον scr. κυδ(ῶν)ις L
ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλο.

95 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ὡ ταῦταν ἄρ Scripture, ἀλλοίον ἄλλως;

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Ὡ ταῦταν.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐπεὶ οὖν, ἄλλο μὲν τάναντια, ἀλλοίον δὲ τὰ ξώα ταῦτα ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἡ τῶν ἄγριων ἀρὰ διάκρισις· καὶ ἀληθεύει Νεῖλος οὐκοῦν, εἰπὼν αὐτὰ μή τῷ κανόνι τοῦ Θωμᾶ διακρίνεσθαι ὑπ' ᾧ, καὶ συνηγορεῖν σπουδάζων αὐτός, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἡμέρων, τὸ ἐν, τῶν δ' ἄγριων θάτερον ἀναλαβὼν γένος, συνήψας ἀλλήλοις περὶ διάκρισιν, ὡσπερ ἄλλου μὴ εὐπορῶν. Καίτοι, εἰ καὶ μόνα τὰ δύο γένη τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ παρῆν, οὐκ ἂν τις εἰκότως ἐτέρῳ θάτερον ἐφήμουσε πῶποτε ἐναντίον ὁν ἐναντίῳ, περὶ τε διακρίσεως, καὶ συγκρίσεως εἰδὸς ἀμα. Επεὶ δὲ, καὶ γένος αὐτῶν ἄμφοτερ ἡμέρων, καὶ ἄγριον τῶν αὐτῶν, πῶς ἂν τις ἡμέρῳ τὸ ἄγριον συγκρίνει; Δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαία;

ΚΛΡV


[2.2] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Πάνυ γε ἵκανός καὶ δεδειγμένον. Πλὴν, ἢ τῶν τριχῶν σκληρότητι καὶ μαλακότητι, τὰ ζῶα ταῦτα διακρίνει.

110 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Αλλὰ καὶ τὸ παρόν, ὀμοίως γε τῷ προτέρῳ ὂμως, ἀποκρίνοι μοι, τίς ἐστιν ὁ τῆς σκληρότητος ὄρος;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τὸ μὲν σκληρὸν λέγεται, τῶν δύναμιν ἔχειν του μὴ ρᾴδιως διαρείσθαι, τὸ δὲ μαλακόν, τῶν ἀδύναμιν ἔχειν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου.

L 19ο

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. ‖ Εὐγέ σοι: ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα διακρίνει καὶ συγκρίνει τῷ βουλομένῳ, ὡς καὶ τὰ ἄγρια καὶ τὰ ἡμέρα;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐξεστί μάλα γε.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Πῶς δ’ ἀν τις καὶ καλέσει συγκρινόμενα;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τῶν μὲν σκληρῶν, σκληρότερον, τῶν δὲ μαλακῶν, μαλακότερον.

120 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὔκοιν, σκληρῷ τὸ μαλακόν, ἀκοινώνητον ἐν συγκρίσει μόνης δὲ τῆς διακρίσεως, κοινωνεῖ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Εἰκός, μέντοι γε, οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΚΛΡΥ

108-109. ἡ-διακρίνει| Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 116v.5-7

110. προτέρῳ| vide supra, [2] 32-33

112-113. Το-τούτου| Arist., Categoriae 9a.25-27

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ὡταν οὖν, τὰς τῶν κριῶν καὶ τράγων τις τρίχας ἀποκερή, τί ἂν αὐτάς καλοῖτο;

125 ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Τὶ ἄλλο ἢ μαλακάς;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐκοίν, τὸ σκληρὸν αὐτὰς φεύγει, καὶ οὐ τοῦτῳ ἄρα διακρίνονται.

Ἐτὶ, καὶ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν ἀχώριστον ἐν αὐταῖς, οὕτως πόρῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ὁ λόγος, σκληρὸν τε καὶ μαλακὸν.

130 Ἐτὶ, οὐδὲ διαφορὰ ἱδαιτατος ἐν αὐταῖς, ἢς, μετελάμβανεν ὁ λόγος τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ τῷ σκληρῷ ἄρα διακριθήσονται.

Ἐτὶ, οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ τῆς ὀψίας λόγῳ παραλαμβάνονται, ὅ, τοῖς ἐναντίοις προσήκει.

Ἐτὶ, τὸ μᾶλλον, αἱ τρίχες ἐπιδέχονται, καὶ τὸ ἤττον ἢν, τἀναντία, μακρῷ ὡς μικρῶν.

Ἐτὶ, καὶ ἄλλοιον αἱ τρίχες ἐποίουν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἄλλον ἃ πάντα προοιμολόγεις ἀρτίως, ἐναντία μηδόλους εἶναι. Οὐκ ἄρα τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ τῷ μαλακῷ ταῦτα διακρινοῦμεν ἀμφοὶ γὰρ μαλακά. Πείθη τοῖς λεγομένοις;

ΚΛΡV


ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Πάνυ γε.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Απόκριναι μοι καὶ ἐτερον· τίνες σοι τῶν τριχῶν

ἐδόκουν σκληρότεραι;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τῶν τράγων οίμαι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Όρας; Αὕτη μᾶλλον τῶν κριῶν εἰσὶ μαλακώτεραι

ἀφαίρετοι καὶ θάτερον αὐτῶν εἶναι σκληρόν ἐνδεχόμενον ἢν, οὐδ’

οὕτως ἂν ἐκοινώνει συγκρίσεως, ἀλλὰ μόνη τῇ διακρίσει προσήν

σὺ δὲ, ταύτων αὐτοῖς ὡς κατὶ τῶν ἀγρίων ἐποιεῖς καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων;

καίτοι γ’ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν, τῆς ἐναντιότητος ἐδόκει τί σχῆμα,

ἐνταῦθα δὲ, οὐδὲ τούτο. Τί φής;

150 [2.3] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Συμφανώ σοι, ἀληθῇ λέγοντι πλήν, ἐτέρῳ τρόπῳ τὰ

ἐξαίτα διακρίνομεν· οἴον, τὸ πώγωνα φύειν, καὶ ψιλόν εἶναι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Καὶ τὸ νῦν, χαλεπώτερον τῶν προτέρων

ἐκαλλωπίζετο γὰρ ἐκείνα, τῷ πιθανῷ, τὸ δὲ παρὸν, οὐδὲ τούτῳ. Ἀλλ’

ὁμοις εἰπέ, ἃ ἂν σοι φαίνηται δίκαια τράγος μὲν, γεννᾶ

πώγωνα, κρίσις δὲ, οὕτω καὶ κατ’ είδος εἰσὶ διαφέροντα. Τοῦτο οὖν

eἶναι λέγεις, τὴν τούτων ἐναντιότητα;

ΚΚΡΠ

151. τὸ-εἶναι] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 116° 6

141. τίνες L Π 144. post ὤρας sign. interrogationis KPV || ante αὕτη scr. et del.

κυδ(ο)ν(η)ς V || εἰσι codd. || μαλακώτεραι P Π 146. ἀν bis acc. L Π 148. καίτοιγε ἐν

P || τι P Π 149. τι LV Π 150-151. συμφωνοι-εἶναι signa in marg. KV Π 150. ante συμφωνοί

scr. et del. χρυσο(λωράς) et scr. κυδ(ο)ν(η)ς in marg. V Π 151. τὸ-εἶναι signa in marg. L

Π 152. ante καὶ scr. et del. κυδ(ο)ν(η)ς et scr. χρυσο(λωράς) in marg. V Π 154. γεννᾶ post

cor. (ex γεννᾶ) L Π 155. οὗ KV 156. post ἐναντιότητα sign. interrogationis codd.

246
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ούκ ἄλλο.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐκοῦν, ἕναντία τοῦτω γε ταύτα.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Σφόδρα γε.

160 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οργόμενοι οὖν ταύτα, λόγῳ πάσοπε λαμβανόμενα τῆς ὀψίας, οἶον, ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τοῦ φύειν πῶγονα, καὶ ψιλὸν εἶναι;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Λοιπὸν, οὐδὲ ἕναντία.

Έτι, καὶ ἄχώριστον αὐτοῖς τὸ συμβεβηκός, ὅπερ οὐκ ἐφαρμόζεται ἕναντίῳ.

Έτι, καὶ τὸ ἄλλοιν αὐτοῖς, ἄλλ᾽ οὖ τὸ ἄλλο προσήν, ὅπερ ἐποίει τὰ ἑναντία.

Έτι, οὐδὲ τῆς ἰδιαιτάτου διαφορᾶς κοινωνεί, ἢ πρόσεσται τάναντία.

170 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐδὲ εἰς τῆς ἰδιαιτάτου διαφορᾶς κοινωνεῖ, ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἑναντίοις συμβαίνει μηδέποτε οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ψιλὸν εἶναι, καὶ πώγονα φύειν, ἢ τούτων ἑναντιώτης.

ΚΛΡΥ


158. ante οὐκοῦν sc. et del. κυδ(ῶ)ν(ης) et sc. χρυσο(λωρᾶς) in marg. V ‖ 159. σφόδρα γε L ‖ 160. ante ὀργόμεν sc. et del. κυδ(ῶ)ν(ης) et sc. χρυσο(λωρᾶς) in marg. V ‖ 170. μηδέποτε] μὴ δὲ ποτὲ L
Ἄτι, μὴ μόνον οὐ κοινονεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἀδικον ὡς ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐπόμενον, ἀδικώτερον παιδία γὰρ καὶ παῖδες, ἀμα ἐναντία πρεσβύτῃ γυμνὰ ὁντα, πολιὰν ἔχοντι.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐδαμῶς χρόνου γὰρ ἡ βραχύτης, αὐτὸ ποιεῖ μόνη ἐπείπερ ἀνδροθέντα, γενναὶ πώγωνα καὶ αὐτά.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν εἴτοις περὶ τε γυναικῶν, καὶ εὐνοϊχων παραβαλλόμενων ἀεὶ πρεσβύτη, καὶ μενόντων ἀεὶ γυμνῶν; Θατέρῳ θάτερον. Οὐκοίν ἀκοινώνητον ὡς ἐναντίον· ἀλλ’ οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτὰ φαίη, ὡς ἄτοπα καὶ ἀδύνατα πρεσβύτης γὰρ, καὶ γυνῆ καὶ εὐνούχος, τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ λογικά ἱσα γελαστικά, καὶ οὐδεμία σφίσιν ἐναντιότης καὶ δ’ ἂ πρότερον εἰπομεν, καὶ δ’ ἂ νῦν αὐτοῖς ἐνοράται.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ὅσος δὲ τίς, καὶ ἀλλα εὐφήσει ἐτετα ἀντικείμενα, ἀπερ ἀναγκαίως τὰ ἱσα ταῦτα διακρίνει ἐπείτα καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πολλοῖς ἐνόντα λανθάνει, ἀπερ ἐκ τοῦ ὑψωμα οὐκ εὑρῄσε ἀπα τὴν ἐνίων πολλῆς ὁμοιότητα.

ΚΛΡΥ

184-187. Ὅσος-ὀμοιότητα] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 116v.6-8


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Εἰ τὰ γνώριμα σοι καὶ κάλλιστα, τοσοῦτον εἰς ἄτοπα
dῆλα γέγονε, τί ἄν τις σε περί τῶν ἀδήλων, ἢν ἔφης
190
tεκμηριώσατο; Καὶ εἰ ἢ μὲν οὐ λανθάνει τοιαύτα, πώς ποτὲ, περὶ
tῶν λανθανόντων σε νομιοῦμεν; Π θῆλον, ἡς χείρονα τῶν
προτέρων.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ οὐ χρή διὰ τούτο τὸν καθόλου λόγον ἀποδεδειγμένον ὄντα, λύειν ἑπιχειρεῖν ἄλλα καὶ ὁ φησιν οὕτως
tράγον, καὶ κρῖνον εἰποῖς κάν φάτταν καὶ περιστερᾶν, εἰ μόνον
ἀναγκαῖως διακρίνοιτο, ὁ μὲν καθόλου λόγος, ἔφησται αὐτὸς δὲ
ζητεῖτω τὴν ἀντίθεσιν, καὶ πάντως εὑρήσει λανθάνουσαν.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὡς ἁτοπον ἀναφεύγοιτο τὸν καθόλου
λόγον, διὰ τὴν τινῶν ἀγνοιαν ἄλλα πολὺ τούτων ἐστίν
195 ἀτοπώτερον, ὄντα μερικὸν αὐτῶν, ἀποφαίνεσθαι ὡς καθόλου·
oúde γὰρ ἂν τὰ εἰδὴ γενικώτατα ποτὲ εἰπ, ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, οἷς
αὐτῶς συνηγόρεις ἀρτιὰς, ἢν μάλιστα κατηγορεῖν ἔδει, καὶ ἥξιος
ἀνομοίας ὁμα παραβάλλεσθαι. Ἐπείτα, εἰ λανθάνει μὲν ἢ
ἀντίθεσις, λόγον ἄν τινα ἰῶσις ἔχοι. Μὴ οὐσαν δὲ, πῶς ἄν τις εὑροὶ
200 ζητῶν; Πάντως, ἀδύνατον.

KLPV

193-197. Καὶ-λανθάνουσαν] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, l. 116'8-10
196. καθόλου λόγος] Arist., Analytica priora 24a.16-18
189. τὶ ἄν τις σε codd. Π 190. πῶς ποτὲ Π 193-197. Κυδώνης-λανθάνουσαν] signa in
αὐτὸς L.
[2.4] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων, αὐτοὺς μὲν ἀῤῥητοὺς ὄντας, καὶ πάντῃ σωμάτων κεχωρισμένους, ἀνάγκη εἰδῆ μόνον εἶναι καθ’ ἐαυτὰ ύφεστώτα, κατ’ εἴδος τὲ μόνον καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν εἶναι διάκρισιν· ὥστε, καὶ τοσούτους εἶναι συμβαίνει τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὃσα ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν εἴδη.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ὄσον ὑπερβαίνειν οἶδεν ύλὴν ἀῤῥηταὶ φύσει, τοσοῦτον σοι καὶ τὸ δεινὸν χεῖρον, ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀμαρτάνοντι τὸ γὰρ ἀγγέλους ἔχειν εἴδος, ἀνάγκη, τὸ δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ διακρίνεσθαι τούτους, ἀδηλὸν.

Ἐπείτα, καὶ ὡς τὰ κατ’ εἴδος διαφέροντα, σύ τε καὶ Ἰωάννας ἐλεγεν,

ἐν αὐτοῖς, περιέχειν ἐναντιότητα. Ἐἰπὲ οὖν, τίς ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐναντιότητα;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐσται λοιπὸν, ὃ διοίκουσι, μήτε διὰ τὴν ὕλην, μήτε διὰ τὰ εἴδη τῆς διαφορᾶς νοουμένης.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Καὶ εἰ μὴ τῶ εἴδει τούτων ἡ διαφορὰ νοοῖτο, οὐδεμιὰ
tῶν ἀντιθέσεων ἃρα διακρίνονται· αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ’ ὕμας, ἢ κατ’ εἴδος ἐποίει μόνῃ διαφορὰ· ὃ νῦν ταύταντα δοκεῖ.

ΚĽPV

206-210. Ἐπὶ-εἴδη] cf. Thom. Aquin., ST, Ia, q. 50, a. 1-4; suum, De Pot., q. 3, a. 4, arg. 14, q. 1, a. 8, arg. 18
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Κατά μέντοι τὸ γένος τούτος ἢ κοινωνία, καθό καὶ πάντες ἀγγελοὶ λέγονται ἄσπερ καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, πάντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν κοινωνοῦντας, κατ᾽ εἶδος αὐτῶν ἢ διαφορά.

225 ἩΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἀριθμοὺς, ὃ γεγναίε, τῷ αὐτῷ γένει κοινωνεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἐπεὶ γένος αὐτῶν ἢ μονᾶς, ἢ καὶ γεννᾶ κινουμένη τοὺς ἄλλους· καὶ ἀναιρουμένη πάλιν, ἁπαντας, ἀναιρεῖ ἃ, τοῖς ἀγγέλοις ἡκατὰ χώρα σευδέ γάρ γένος κοινὸν αὐτοῖς, ὃ, ἂν ἐνοίντο θαδίως, ἢ διακρίνοιντο. Ἡτὶ καὶ κατ’ εἶδος εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν τὴν διαφοράν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ἐχόντων γένος μονᾶδα ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων αὐτῷ, γνώριμον οὐδενί ἐπεὶ μηδὲ γένος, ἀγγελον ἄλλον ξοῦσιν, εἰ μὴ τὴν κοινὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν, ἵππος τίς ἐφεὶ γένος ὁμιώς, εἰ καὶ δυνατόν ἢν αὐτό, ἢν ἂν καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἀγγελο τὸ γένος αὐτῶν, ἄσπερ, οὐδ’ ἢ μονὰς ἀριθμός. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ γένος εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἀγγελοὶ πάντες λεγόμενοι, ἢ οὐδὲ τούτῳ γε ἀληθεῖς ἀνθρώπου γάρ πάντες λεγόμενοι, γένος ξοῦσι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἂφ’ ἢς καὶ διήρηταν’ οἱ δ’ ἀγγελοι, εἰ καὶ τῷ λογικῷ διαφοροῦνται καὶ ἀθανάτῳ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπιδέχονται ὅσα μέσα γένη, καὶ εἴδη λεγόμενα τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ αὐτοῦ γε τοῦ λογικοῦ.

L. 22' 235

ΚΛΡΒ


240 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ τοῦτο βούλονται καὶ οἱ εἰπόντες, ὃσπερ προσηγορίας μίας, οὕτω καὶ φύσεως μίας τοὺς ἀγγέλους εἶναι, «φύσιν» λέγοντες, τὴν κατὰ τὸ γένος· ἡ στίς εἰποὶ πάντα τὰ ζώα τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως εἶναι, δηλαδὴ κατὰ τὸ γένος, καίτοι κατ᾿ εἰδος μάλιστα διαφέροντα.

245 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐ τοῦτο σκοπὸς ἀγίοις, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον ἀντικυρίως· ταῦταν γὰρ εἰδός εἶναι τοῖς ἀγγέλοις ὀμολογοῦσιν ἑκεῖνοι, σὺ δ᾿ ἐτερον ὅθεν, σὺ μὲν εἰσάγεις ἑνα, ἐγὼ δὲ, παράσχομαι δύο μάρτυρας καθαρώτερον εἰπόντας αὐτὸν ὅν, ὁ μὲν, τὰς αὐτῶν ὀμοταγεῖς ἐλεγεν εῖναι τάξεις, καὶ μόνας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν, τῇ μεταδόσει τῆς χάριτος τοῦ φωτὸς· ὁ δὲ, ἀγγέλου δὲ οἴμαι, διώσει κατ᾿ οὐδὲν ἐτερος ἀγγελος, κατὰ γε τοῦ εἶναι τοῦθ᾿ ὅπερ εἰσὶν ἀγγελοι δηλαδὴ, διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὀμοειδίας μίαν ἀπαντῆς ἀναδεσμούμενοι φύσιν. Τι φής; Τι τὸ ὀμοειδῆς αὐτοῖς εἶναι βούλεται; Πάντως, οὐδέν ἐτερον, ἥ το αὐτὸ πάντων εἰδος, ὡς καὶ μορφῆ καὶ οὐσία· σὺ δὲ λέγας ἐτερον αὐτῶν εἰδος, οὐ τῷ λόγῳ τῶν

**KLPV**

240-244. Καὶ-διαφέροντα] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 116v.14-16  
248-250. τὰς-φωτος] cf. Ps.-Dion. Areop., Cat. hier., 9, § 2, p. 36.11-23  
250-253. ἀγγέλου-φύσιν] Cyril. Alex., Comm. in Ioh., Lib. II, § 1, p. 176.5-8  
240-244. Κύδωνης-διαφέροντα signa in marg. KLV  
240. ante (καί) scr. sign. et scr. κιδ<άνης> in marg. P  
248. μὲν bis acc. L  
249. τῇ] [τῇ] K  
250. δὲ bis acc. L  
251. οὐδὲν L  
253. TÔ] τὸ P  
254. οὐδὲν L
ἁγίων ἀντικρυς πολεμεῖς; Τὸ δὲ καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους εἶναι τὰ ζῶα λέγειν σε, διαφέρειν δὲ μάλιστα κατ᾽ εἰδος αὐτή, ἀληθές. Ἡ πλήν τὸ αἵτιον, ὡς ἀπὸ κοινοῦ διαφοροῦνται γένους τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, καὶ τάναντία, ποτὲ μὲν δυνάμει, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐνεργεία τούτως παρεῖναι δοκεῖ ἕκατερον δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων, οὔτ' ὑποτεῦνεται πώποτε, ὡς ἐνεργοῦνταν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τούναντιόν ἐν ἄπαντι διωκόνται. Ἐπεὶ δὲ σὺ κατ᾽ εἰδος αὐτοῦς ὀμολογεῖς διαφέροντας, ἐναντίως τοῖς ἁγίοις πεποιημένοις, δεῦρ' εἰπέ τὴν τούτων ἐναντιότητα.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Εἰ δὲ τις ζητεῖ, τίνι τῶν τῆς ἀντιθέσεως εἰδῶν, ἢ τῶν ἀγγέλων διάκρισις ὑπαχθήσεται, ἐρώημεν τῇ τοῦ τελειοτέρου καὶ ἀπελευθέρω καὶ ἱνομένου, καὶ πεπληθυσμένου διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ κάτι τῶν ἀρίθμων ἐφαμεν τοὺς μὲν, ἐγγιόν, τοὺς δὲ, πορρώτερον τῆς μονάδος εἶναι νοῦς γὰρ ἐκαστὸς ἄν, ὁ μὲν, ὀλικώτερον καὶ ἐνικώτερον, ὁ δὲ, μάλλον πεπληθυσμένος, καὶ μερικώτερον τά θεία νοησει καὶ ἀκολούθως, ὁ μὲν, ταπεινότερον, ὁ δὲ, υψηλότερον, καὶ ἐνοειδέστερον.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Εγώ μέν, οὐδαμῶς ἀν θαυμάσαμι, καὶ τούτως ἀνάμμοστά σε πεποιημένον εἰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ὀρθομένων ὀσμηραῖς ἤμων, κριῶν καὶ τράγων διάκρισις οὐ ὁπλία σοι γέγονεν, ὅποια τίς ἀν ἡ τῶν οὐ φαίνομένων ἀγγέλους γένοιτο; 
Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ Θεοῦ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔργων οὐδὲν ἀτελές, πολλῷ ἂν μᾶλλον ἀρμόσειν ἀγγέλους ἡ τελειότης· εἰ γοῦν ἀτοποῖν ἐν αἰσθητοῖς ἀτελές, οὐκ ἀτοπώτερον ἂν εἴη ἂν μᾶλλον περὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων εἰπεὶν αὐτό; 
Καὶ γὰρ ἀγγελοῖ, μεγάλα τοῦ Θεοῦ κτήματα, τὰ δ’ ἀτελῆ, συνθέτων ἀνθρώπων ἔργα, καὶ τοῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ παντελῶς ἀκοινώνητα. 
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Εἰ δὲ φήσει πάντων ἐκείνων τελείων ὄντων, οὐκ εἰκός, τοὺς μὲν, ἐκείνων τελείως, τοὺς δὲ, ἀτελετέρως εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν κωλὺει ἐκαστὸν τούτων, ἐν τῷ αὐτῶι εἰδεὶ τέλειον ὄντα, πρὸς ἄλλον παραβαλλόμενον ἀτελεστερον εἶναι εἰκός γάρ, καὶ τούτως εἶναι βαθμοὺς νοερὰς ᾗς, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις δὲ ὀμοίως, βαθμοὺς αἰσθητικῆς ᾗς· οὐν ἐκαστον, καθ’ αὐτό μὲν, τέλειον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὑπερβεβηκός, καὶ τῆς λογικῆς ᾗς ἔγγιον, ἀτελές.

ΚΛΡV


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Είναι μέν ἐν τοῖς ἄουλοις βαθμοίς, οὐκ ἂν ἀρνηθείην· οὕτω γὰρ, καὶ τῇ πηγῇ τῆς θεολογίας τῷ Διονυσίῳ δοκεῖ ὁποίοις δὲ, καὶ τίνας καὶ πάσας, οὐδενὶ γνώριμον, εἰ μὴ Θεὸς μόνω, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἰσώς, τοῖς ὑπακοέσι διαφέρειν ἀλλήλον, ἐπινοοῦσι. Νυνὶ δὲ καὶ σοὶ τρίτω γε μετ' αὐτούς, ἀτελές ἃμα καὶ τέλειον αὐτοῖς παραβάλλοντι, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν καλύειν ἐκαστον, ὅντα καθ' ἑαυτὸν τέλειον, πρὸς ἀλλον παραβαλλόμενον ἀτελέστερον εἶναι, πείθουσα πλὴν, ὑπόσι λεγομένοις —ὡς πάσα μὲν ἄψυχος καὶ ἀκίνητος ὄλη καὶ τάλλα πάντα μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων, καθ' ἑαυτὰ μὲν ὡς δημιουργήματα Θεοῦ, τέλεια, πρὸς ἀλλο δὲ γένος ἀλλο παραβαλλόμενον, ἀτελές, οἰον ἄψυχος μὲν ὑλή φυτοῖς, αὐτὰ δὲ, ζωοφύτοις, κακείνα μὲν, ζώις, τὰ δὲ, ἀνθρώποις, καὶ οἱ μὲν, ἀγγέλοις, οἱ δὲ, παραβαλλόμενοι τῇ φύσει τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀτελεῖς ὅλον μείζονι γὰρ τῆς θείας ἀγγελοὶ λόγῳ λείπονται φύσεως, ἡ τούτων ἡμείς καὶ μειώνως ἀγγέλους υπερβαίνει Θεὸς, ἡ ἡμᾶς ἀγγελοὶ διὰ τοῦτο, πρὸς μὲν αὐτοὺς, ἡμείς, πρὸς δὲ τὸν Θεόν, αὕτου ἀτελεῖς ὦτοι,
τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς παραβαλλόμενον ἐκαστὸν ἑκάστῳ, ἀτελέστερον ἀμα, καὶ τελειότερον εἶναι—, ἀπίθανον καὶ ἀφανὲς ἀπαντὶ παντελῶς: οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν αὐτῶν ὅποιαν εἴπε διαφορὰν ἄχρι τῆμερον· ὑπὸ σοῦ δὲ καὶ μόνου, κακῶς νῦν ἔνοικται καὶ διακρίνονται. Πτολεμαῖος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ πάλαι τὴν διαφορὰν, ἡμιτονίου καὶ λείμματος, ἀλητὸν ἐλεγεν εἶναι τῇ ἀκοῇ, ὡς ἐκαστοποικοστοιγόνῳ, θατέρου θατέρου ὑπερβαίνοντος, ἐποιεὶ δὲ φανερὰν αὐτήν, ὡς τῆς ἐπιστήμης λόγος· σὺ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀπαντὶ φανερὰ, διὰ τῶν λεγομένων, ἄδικα πάντη ποιεῖς, τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφανεὶ κείμενα, γνώριμα καθιστάν ἐθέλεις τῷ βουλομένῳ· ὁ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐρείς ἀξίωμα, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συμβαίνει. ἂν περὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐρείς ἀξίωμα, διὰ τῶν λεγομένων, ἄδικα πάντη ποιεῖς, τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφανεὶ κείμενα, γνώριμα καθιστάν ἐθέλεις τῷ βουλομένῳ· ὁ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐρείς ἀξίωμα, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συμβαίνει. ἂν περὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐρείς ἀξίωμα, διὰ τῶν λεγομένων, ἄδικα πάντη ποιεῖς, τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφανεὶ κείμενα, γνώριμα καθιστάν ἐθέλεις τῷ βουλομένῳ· ὁ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐρείς ἀξίωμα, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συμβαίνει. ἂν περὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐρείς ἀξίωμα, διὰ τῶν λεγομένων, ἄδικα πάντη ποιεῖς, τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφανεὶ κείμενα, γνώριμα καθιστάν ἐθέλεις τῷ βουλομένῳ· ὁ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐρείς ἀξίωμα, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συμβαίνει.
πάντη σαφῶς, τὸ μὲν, ὡς ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγενόμενα, τὸ δὲ, ὡς καὶ ἀναστήσεται, λογικὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα· εἰ γοῦν ἀνθρώπους ἀδύνατον ἀτελεῖ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ τελεῖ, πῶς ἄν αὐτὸ δοἵμην φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀγγέλων; ἈΛΛὌς ὁμως, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν κατ' εἰδος, οὗτῳ σὲ καὶ τοῦν ἐπιχειρήματος ἐπιτρέπομεν· καίτοι γε, πρῶτον μὲν, ἀτοποῦν σοι τὸ ζητοῦμεν ὑποτίθεσθαι, ὅτι κατ' εἰδος ἀγγελοὶ διακρίνονται, καὶ ὡς ἀτελεῖ καὶ τελεῖ περὶ ἄν, οὐκ ἀνθρώπος, οὐδὲ τῶν διακρινομένων αὐτῶν ἀγγέλων, οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς ἐφι ἐπείτα, καὶ πολλὰ τὰ ἄτοπα ἔσται. Ὁν ἐγγὺς ἑόντες, πειρώμεθα, εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις· τῇ ἀντιδεῖσει τῶν ἀτελεστέρων καὶ τελειοτέρων, καὶ ταπεινοτέρων και ψηλοτέρων ὁμολογεῖς διακρινεῖς θαυματία ἐν ἄγγέλους· ἔφη· ἔπειτα, καὶ πολλὰ τὰ ἄτοπα ἔσται.

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Πάνω γε.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐξεστὶ τοῖνυν ἡμῖν, αὐτὰ καὶ συγκρίνειν ἔθέλουσι; ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Πῶς γὰρ σοῦ;

ΚΛΡΥ


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τί οὖν αὐτοῖς καὶ παραβαλοῦμεν συγκρίνοντες, Δήλου, ὡς ἀτελέσι μὲν, ἀτελή, τελείοις δὲ, τέλεια ἐπεὶ μή τελεῖ τό τέλειον ἀκοινώνητον ἐν συγκρίσει. Ὅταν ἔχει;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Πῶς ἢ οὖν αὐτά καὶ συγκρινόμενα ἄν καλοίμεν;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τῶν μὲν τελείων, τελείστερον, τῶν δ' ἀτελών, ἀτελέστερον.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· πλῆ, ἀτοπον ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἐμοὶ τε καὶ σοὶ διακρίνεσθαι τοὺς ἀγγέλους, ἀτελεί καὶ τελείῳ ἢ γὰρ ἀτελείς ὄλοι, εἰ θατέρου θάτερος ἀτελέστερος, ἢ τέλειοι πάντως, εἰ ἄλλος τελείστερος εἰς καὶ τελείων ἀτέλεα πόρῳ πάντη· καὶ μαρτυρεῖ τοὺς λεγομένους, ὁ δεινὸς Πλάτων, εἰς τούτον· δυο πάντως μέντοι ἀγγέλους, εὐδαιμονέστερος δὲ, οὐκ ἂν εἰς, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ἰσως. Βεβαιοὶ δὲ τούτο, καὶ ὁ Φιλόσοφος, λέγων, οὐδέποτε συγκρίνεσθαι τὰν αὐτὸν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀρτιώς ἢστῳ δὲ κατὰ σέ, τὸ ἀτελές γε καὶ τέλειον, αὐτοῖς

ΚΠΡ


258
διακρίνεσθαι. Ἡδομεν οὖν τὸν πρῶτον ἀπάντων ἁγγελόν καὶ τὸν ὤστερον, ὡς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· δήλον οὖν, ὡς ἀπλὴν ἐχει τὴν σχέσιν ἐκάτερος· οὗ μὲν, εἰς τοὺς μετ' αὐτόν, ὃ δέ, εἰς τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ, οἱ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀπαντεῖ, οὐχ ἀπλὴν ἀλλὰ μίαν μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀνω, θατέραν δέ, ἐν τοῖς κάτω ἀλλ' ἄτοπον ἄνομοις εἶναι τὰς σχέσις εἰκε, οἷς ἀπασα ὁμοιότης εἴπερ ἀλλὸ τί.

Τετί ὁ μὲν πρῶτος, τελειότερος ἀν εἰῃ μόνων, ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος ὑπεροβεβηκότος ἐτέρου; ὃ δὲ τελευταῖος, ἀτελεότερος μόνον, ὡς οὐδένα κάτωθεν ἀλλὸν ἔχων αὐτοῦ, οἱ δὲ μέσοι τούτων, ἀτελεότεροι κατὰ σέ καὶ τελειότεροι ἄμα τὸ μὲν, τοῖς ἀνώ, τὸ δέ, τοῖς κάτω παραβαλλόμενοι ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τῶν ἐναντίων, μή τὰ ίσα τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέχεσθαι· ἢ γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὤστερος ὄσπερ οἱ μέσοι, ἢ σφίσιν οὕτω παρόμοιοι.

Τετί, ἐπει μόνος ὁ πρῶτος τελειότερος, ὃ δ' ὤστερος, ἀτελεότερος, τὸ δὲ τελειότερον ἀντικείμενον ἐστὶν ἀτελεστέρῳ, ὁ ὤστερος, ἐναντίος τῷ προτέρῳ ἁγγέλῳ ἄρα· ἀλλ' ἀμήχανον.
Ἔτι, πάντες οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων, ἀτελεότεροι τε καὶ τελεώτεροι τὸ μὲν, εἰς τοὺς ὑπερβεβηκότας, τὸ δὲ, ἐν τοῖς ὑποβεβηκόσιν ἔχοντες ἀλλ᾽ ἑναντία ταύτα καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνορᾶται ἁμα, ὅπερ οὐ δυνατόν.

370 Ἔτι, σὺν τῇ διπλῇ σχέσει, μεταλαμβάνει καὶ τρίτης μόνος οἱ Γαβριηλ, τοῦ μυστηρίου τῆς οἰκονομίας Χριστοῦ καὶ μιὰ μὲν, ὑπεβαίνει τῶν ἀλλῶν ὕλων, δυσὶ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον ὑπεβαίνει, καὶ τελευταῖον ταῖς σχέσεσι καὶ τὸ ἀτοπον, δήλον.

375 Ἔτι, γένει μὲν, οὐ πρότου, ὁ δὲ τελευταῖος ἔοικεν, εἰδεί πάντως, εἰδικωτάτῳ, ἡ καὶ ἀτόμῳ κατὰ τὰς σχέσεις ὁ, χαλεπώτατον.

380 Ἔτι, ὁδίως ἂν ἐν τῷ τῆς σωσίας λόγῳ παραλαμβάνοντο πάντες ἄγγελοι, εἰ τῷ σῷ κανόνι τῆς ἀντιθέσεως διακρίνοντο ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον.

385 Ἔτι, δήλον ἄξ ὁν ὁμολογεῖς, ὡς ο μὲν, ταπεινότερος, ὁ δὲ, υψηλότερος καὶ ο μὲν, τέλειος, ὁ δὲ ἀτελής, ὡς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἢττον ἐπιδέχονται ἦ τὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπιδεχόμενα, οὐκ ἑναντία. Τὰ αὐτὰ ἀρὰ καὶ ἑναντία καὶ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἢττον φαινόμενα, ὅπερ οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον.

**KLPV**


376. ἐν-παραλαμβάνοντο] vide supra, [2.1] 86


Ἐπὶ, καὶ ἀχώριστὸν ἔστιν, δὲ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πάντως ἐκείνῃ συμβεβηκός
πέφυκε· τῶν δ’ ἀχωρίστων συμβεβηκότων, οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐναντίον·
ἀτελεὶ δὲ τέλειον, ἐναντίον οὐκ ἀρα τούτῳ διακρίνομεν ἀγγέλους.

Ἐπὶ, οὐδόλως ἂν αὐτοῖς οἰκεία ἡ ἱδιαίτερος διαφορὰ λέγοιτο, ἢ, νόμος τάναντι ποιεῖν, ὡς τὸ λογικὸν τε καὶ ἄλλον· τὸ δὲ ἡμιαμένον καὶ πεπληθυσμένον, καὶ ἀτελές τε καὶ τέλειον, ἐναντία
οίς, οὐκ ἄν ἀγγελοι διακριθέιειν.

Ἐπὶ, τούτων ἡ διαφορὰ κατὰ σέ, ἀλλοίους, ἀλλʼ οὖν ἄλλους· τὸ δ’ ἀτελές τε καὶ τέλειον, ἄλλους, ἀλλʼ οὖν ἀλλοίους ἐποίειν οὐ ταύτων
dὲ ἄλλοιον ἄλλω· καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄγγελων ἃρα διάκρισις, ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ
καὶ μὴ ἐναντίῳ, συμβαίνει τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.

Ἐπὶ, τὸν μὲν ἔγγιον τῆς μακαρίας Τιμίδος, τελειότερον, τὸν δὲ
πορφυρότερον αὐτῆς ἄγγελον, ἀτελέστερον ἰμακαρίας· οὐκοίν, ὁ
mὲν Γαβριήλ, ἡ μὲν τάξεως ὡν ὑγιός, ἀτελέστερος τῶν ἐν τοῖς
ἐπτά, ἢ δὲ τὸ μέγα μυστηρίον ἐξευπηρετέων, μείζω τῶν ἄλλων ἐγὼ
καὶ ὑψηλότερα γνώσεις ἃρα μείζων καὶ ἑλάττων αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀτελές
tε καὶ τέλειον ἐνοράται· ἐναντία δὲ ταύτα καὶ περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἁμα

L 26′ ὅπερ ἄπιθανον.

KLPV


Ἐτὶ, τελείους μὲν τοὺς ἐγγύτερον ὡμολόγεις, ἀτελεστέρους δὲ, τοὺς πόρως Θεοῦ, ὡς τοὺς ἁριθμοὺς ἐν μονάδει τοὺς μὲν αὐτῆς ἐγγιον, τελείους, ἀτελεῖς δὲ, τοὺς πόρως τὸ δὲ, συμβαίνει παντάπασι τοιναντίον: μόνος γὰρ ἀπὸ μονάδος ὁ ἐκτος τελείους τῶν αὐτῆς ἐγγιον ὡλων ἀτελῶν ὄντων. Ἐτὶ δὲ τῆς ἀγίας Τριάδος, τὸν ἐγγίος, ἔλεγες τελείτερον. Οὐκ ἄρα τῇ ὑποθέσει οἰκείον, τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῶν ἁριθμῶν τὸ παράδειγμα.

405 Ἐτὶ, τίς ἂν ὁ τούτῳ βεβαιώσασθαι τολμηρὸς εἰπ. ὡς τοσούτων ὄντων ἀναριθμητῶν ἀγγέλων, ἀδύνατον ἐστὶν εὐφρέθηναι δύο, τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ γνώσιν ἐχοντας; Οἱ καὶ διακρίνονται καὶ τὸν σὸν κανόνα φεύγειν ἐσχύσουσιν ἐγὼ δὲ, καὶ μυριάδας αὐτῶν οὕτως ἐχοντας οἴμαι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν ἄτοπον τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθεῖ, τὰ δὲ σὰ, μὴ μόνον ἀδύνατα, ἀλλὰ καὶ γελοία· ἄ συνεβαινεν ἄν οὐδαμῶς, εἰ μὴ τὴν ἁρχὴν αὐτοὺς ἐνεχείρεις εἰπεῖν, ἀτελεῖ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ τελεῖς ὅ καὶ ἐναντία, καὶ τοῖς ἄγγελοις οὐδόλως χώρα. Εἴπερ οὖν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡμολογημένοις ἀκολουθήσομεν, οὐκ ἂληθὴ ταύτα;

**KLPV**


406. μόνος-τελείουσαν cf. Phil. Jud., Leg. all., I, § 15, p. 64.17-22

410. τὸ KPV I ἂν bis acc. L ἀν 412. θ(ε)οῦ L ἀν 415. ἀν bis acc. L ἄν 417. οὐδ' ὄλως L ἄν 418. ταῦτα P ἀν post ταῦτα sign. interrogationis L.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Πάνω γε ὡστε, οὔτε τῇ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἀντιθέσει, οὔτε
toῖς πρός τι, ἢ τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἄλλ’ οὔδε τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν καί
στέρησιν’ ὁ γὰρ ὑποδεέστερος ἀγγέλος, οὔκ ἐστέρησθαι λέγεται
tῆς τοῦ ὑπερέχοντος τελειότητος, ὅτι μηδὲ ἔπεφυκε ἐκείνην ἐχειν.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. ἄλλ’ ὥ βελτιστ’ ἀνδρῶν, ἀποφήσειν ἃν τις εἰκότι
λόγῳ, πότερον ἔκαν, ἢ ἂκων αὐτὰ ποιεῖς; σαυτοῦ γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ
tοῦ Νείλου κατηγορεῖς, καὶ Νείλῳ μᾶλλον, ἢ συνηγορεῖς τῷ
Θωμᾷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐ βουλόμενον, ἀτοπὸν ἐκεῖνα δράν, ἡ καὶ
ἰδιώτη δήλων ως ἀπρεπὴ’ εἰ δὲ καὶ βουλόμενον οἴοιτο, ὡς
ἀκραν αὐτῷ χαριέται, ἄλλοις ἄλλως ἄλλοτε χρωμένω τοῖς
ἐναντίοις, καὶ τὸν λόγον ἄνω καὶ κάτω δίκην αέρος τό ὄρημα
φέροντι ταυτόν γὰρ ἐστὶν, ὡς εἰ τὶς ὀπλα παντοτινὰ παρασκευάζειν
ἀρμοδία τῷ πολέμῳ βουλοίτο, καὶ λαμπρὸν ἴππον, ἵνα δόξης καὶ
tῆς ἐλευθερίας ὁμοῦ κοινωνήσῃ εἰτα καιρῶν ἐπιστάντων, ἦς
ἐνθύς ἀναφέρει, τῆς ἀτιμίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου μάλα φιλοτίμως ἢδη
μεταλαβὼνς οὕτως αὐτὸς, οίς ἀρτίως συνηγορεῖν ἐβουλεύειν
Θωμᾷ, τῷ Νείλῳ μαχόμενον, τοῖς αὐτοῖς νῦν ἐλέγχη Θωμᾷ, τῷ
Νείλῳ γε συμμαχῶν.

KLПV

419-422. ὡστε-ἐχειν] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 116v.23-25


419-422. ὡστε-ἐχειν] signa in marg. KЛV II 423. βελτιστ’ P II 424. σαυτοῦ L: σαυτοῦ K II
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐγὼ μὲν, οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι τήδ', ἔχει γνώναι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Αναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐκ ἀρχής τὸν λόγον. Οὐ Θωμᾶς ἔλεγε, τὰ μή κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην διακρινόμενα, ἕνι τρόπῳ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως διακρίνεται;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὕτως.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐ Νεῖλος ἔλεγε πάλιν μαχόμενος τῷ Θωμᾷ, ὡς ἀγγελοὶ διακρίνονται μὲν, τῇ οὐδεμια ἀντιθέσει;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ τούτο, οὕτως.

445 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐ σὺ δὲ πάλιν ἐθέλων συνηγορεῖν τῷ Θωμᾷ καὶ τῷ Νείλῳ γε ἡ πολεμεῖν, διακρίνεις αὐτοὺς, ἐν ἀντιθέσει τῶν ἀτελῶν καὶ τελειῶν;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ομολογῶ.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Πῶς δὲ νῦν ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιστρόφου γενόμενος, φῆς αὐτοὺς διακρίνεσθαι, οὐ τοῖς πρὸς τί, οὐ καταφάσει καὶ ἀποφάσει, οὐ στερήσει καὶ ἔξει, οὐ τοῖς ἐναντίοις αὐτοῖς; Καὶ εἰ μὴ τοῦτοι, τίνι

ΚΛΡV


450. πρὸς τί] vide supra, [1.3] 282

ἂν ἀγγελοὶ διακριθείεν ἐτέρῳ; Ἐγὼ γε οὐχ ὄρῳ, ἐπεὶ, μηδὲ ἐστι
φιλοσοφεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ἄλλην ὅλως εὑρεῖν αντίθεσιν. Εἰ γοῦν
ταῦτα σοὶ τὴν ἁρχὴν εἰρηται, ἡδίως ἄν ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
κόπων ἄπιθλαττεῖς συμφωνεῖς γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τῷ Νεῖλῳ
παντάπασιν ἀνάγκη σοὶ τοιγαροῦν, ἢ τὰ πρῶτα μὴ ἀληθῇ εἶναι, ἢ
tὰ ύστεραν ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀληθεύειν ἑκάτερα ἑναντία ὑντα.
Καὶ πάλιν, ἢ λήθη σοὶ γέγονε τοιαῦτα λέγειν, ἢ τις ἄλλος τῷ σῷ
πονῆματι προστιθέναι, τοῦτο πεποίηκεν ἀντικρος γὰρ ἐστίν
ἐναντία καὶ ἀλλήλοις μαχόμενα.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐκ οἶδα πῶς ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐφέβη; τῇ δὲ τοῦ τελειοτέρου,
καὶ ἀτελειοτέρου, καὶ τὸ ἐγγιόν, ἢ ποροφέρον τοῦ πρῶτον καὶ
ἐξηρημένου νοῦ, τὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων διοίσει.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τούτῳ σοι, τοῖς μὲν πρῶτοις, ἵσον, ἑναντίον δὲ τῷ
ἀρτίως σοι προειρημένῳ τὸ γὰρ ἀτελές τε καὶ τέλειον ἑναντία: ἄ
προφῆτας μικρὸν ἀνουθεν, ὡς τούς ἀγγέλους οὖ τούτῳ διακρίνεις,
νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτοῖς αὐτῷ διακρίνεις. Περὶ οὖ, τί τις ἄν φαίη; ΑΛΛ' Ἡμῖν ὅμως, ἀρκεῖ περὶ τούτων ἡ παρούσα τούτων ἡ διάλογος.

ΚΛΠΒ

461-463. τῇ-διοίσει| Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 116v 25-26

[2.5] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ψυχῶν, ἢ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία, καθὼς εἰρηται, μέση τις ἔστι τῆς τε πάντη Ἀσωμάτου καὶ νοερᾶς· καὶ αὖ, τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ συμπεφυμένης τοῖς σώμασιν. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν, κατὰ τῶν σωμάτων παντελῶς δύσα, καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῆς τούτων ἔχουσα χωριστῶν, ἀεὶ τε σώμασι σύνεστι, καὶ μετ’ αὐτῶν ἔστι καὶ φθείρεται ἢ δὲ νοερά, οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τε τὴν ὑλήν, καὶ τὰ σώματα σχέσιν· ἀλλ’ αὕτη ἐφ’ ἀπάντησιν ἔστιν, ἀμνῆς, ἐκείνων παντελῶς διαμένουσα.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Δέομαι σου, τὰ περίτα μὲν ἕαν, τὰ δὲ καίρια, λέγειν πλάτει γὰρ συνήψας ἁρχὴν αὐτά, νῦν δὲ τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς διακρίσεως τῶν ψυχῶν, λέγειν ἀνάγκῃ ἀνδρὶ γὰρ σοφὸ παλλολογεῖν, ἀδικον.

470 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ ἑκάτη λέγατο ὡς εἴδος μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο δὲ ὡς ὑλὴ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχον, καὶ ἀλλήλως καὶ ἀνάλογον ὑπάρχει, εἰ μὲν τὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ σώματος ἡρτηστο, ἢν ἀν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παρὰ τῶν σωμάτων τὸ πλῆθος. Επεὶ δὲ τούτο οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐσονται μὲν αἱ ψυχαὶ πολλαὶ κατὰ τὰ πλήθη τῶν σωμάτων, τουτέστιν

ΚΛΡΥ


480. ὡς-σώμα[ cf. Thom. Aquin., ST, Ia, q. 76, a. 1 co

485 ὁμοῦ, μετ' αὐτῶν οὐ μὴν ὡς τοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν τὸ τῶν σωμάτων πλήθος αἴτιον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρισθείσαι πρὸς αὐτὰς, ἐσονται διακεκριμέναι καὶ τούτων αἴτιων, τὸ, σώματος ὄρισμένου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντελεχείαν οὕσιν, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός, τὸ πρὸς μόνον τὸ οἰκεῖον σῶμα ὄσον ἐχειν καὶ συμμετρίαν ὁ καὶ χωρισθείσῃ τῆς ὑλῆς, αὕτη παραμένει καὶ τούτῳ, τής διακρίσεως αὐτῶν γίνεται αἴτιων, οὔ τῆς κατ' εἴδος, ἀλλὰ τῆς κατ' ἀρίθμον.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΑΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ' ὁ γενναίος, πολὺ τὸ παρόν σοι τοῖς ἐν ἀγγέλοις διακρίσεως ἀτοπώτερον, καὶ εἰκότως ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων αἱ ψυχαὶ μᾶλλον σύνθετοί. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἄτοπόν σοι τὸ ἐξητούμενον, ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι λέγειν ἔπειτα καὶ ἀτοπώτερον, εἰς φυσικὸν ἀγείν ἑκείνα λόγων, ἢ τῇ κοινῇ πρόσεσιν ὑπερφυῶς ἀναστάσει μὴ κατὰ φύσιν· οὕτε γὰρ τις νεκρῶν ἀφίκται χρόνου πολλοῦ ἐκείθεν, ὡστε ἂν ἀγγείλαι σοι τι σαφές περὶ τούτων, ὅποια δῆθεν ἐκάστη συνήρμοσται ὧσπερ τῇ ψυχῇ δυνατός ἢν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀφιγμένων πάλαι νεκρῶν Λαζάρου τυχόν, ἢ τινος ἄλλου, οὐδὲν οὐδείς ἔφη.
πλὴν, ὅτι θανῶν, ἀνέστη· τὰ δ’ ἄλλα φράζειν οὐδόλως ἠδύνατο· τὸ δ’ αἰτιον, ἡ στέργαν ὡρον τῆς φύσεως, ὡς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν νοερῶν ἐν αἰσθητοῖς ἱκοντας, ἀπερ εἰδον εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐδα, ἢ καὶ πειθόμενος θείω, ὥς πᾶσαν φύσιν ὀρόμεν ἀνάγκη συνεχομένην. Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄγιων, οὐδὲ τῶν ἁγγέλων αὐτῶν, οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἔφη πώποτε. Πόθεν σοι τοιγαροῦν ἡ ἑξουσία τοῦ λέγειν τὰς ψυχὰς διακρίνεσθαι, τῇ πρὸς τὰ σώματα ϊστή μόνη, καὶ ὡς εἰδος μὲν αὐτὰς ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, αὐτά δὲ πάλιν ὡς ϊλη πρὸς αὐτὰς εἶναι;

Οίσθα ἡ οὐν, ὡς ὁ τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἀναφέρων, ἡ καινότερα λέγων αὐτῶν, ἂν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀναγκαία, θαυμάζεται ἃν δὲ ψευδή καὶ ἀπίθανα ἢ, οὐ μικρὸν ἀτιμάζεται. Ὅθεν, εἰ τις οὐκ ἀληθῆ χρῶτο δόξη καὶ περαινείν ἀτόπον οἴστο δ’ αὐτῆς, ἀδικίαν ἄκραν αὐτὸν ἀδικεί. Ἄ σοι τοιγαροῦν ἑρείς, ἃ καὶ φιλοσόφους καὶ τοὺς εὐσεβείσιν ἀνοίκεια ὡς πολλοῖς ἀτόπων ἑπόμενα, τί ἂν τις προσηκόντως καλοίτο; Ἀλλ’ ὅμως, οὕτως ἐπισκεπτέον αὐτά. Διπλοῦν τὸ εἰδος φασίν

**KLPV**


515-516. Διπλοῦν-όν] cf. Porphy., Isag., pp. 3.22-4.4


268
οἱ φιλόσοφοι τὴν μορφήν, καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ γένος ὁν. Ανάγκη οὖν τὴν ψυχήν κατὰ σὲ τοῦ σώματος εἰδος οὖσαν, ἢ ὡς μορφήν, ἢ ὡς τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀποδοθὲν εἶναι γένος. Αλλὰ μορφὴ, ἀδύνατον ἡ ψυχὴ λέγεσθαι τὸ γὰρ ἐκάστον σχῆμα γε φανερόν, τὸ καὶ τὴν ἐλην ἐπιδεχόμενον· ὁ ψυχὴ παντάπασι ἀπομεῖναι, τὸ μὲν, ὡς ὑμῖν ἀμορφοὺς, κἂν ἄλλας καὶ ἐαυτῇ γινώσκοιτο σχῆμα φέρουσα, τὸ δὲ, ὡς καὶ τῇ αὐτῇς ὕλη σύνεστιν ἀμα. Λείπεται λοιπὸν αὐτῆν, τὸ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εἰδος εὐφυικέσθαι, ὅπερ ἀδυνατετειχον· ὅν γὰρ ἐλέσθαι, θάτερον ὑμῖν ἀναγκαῖον· ὥς εἰδικώτατον, ἢ ὡς ὑπάλληλον αὐτὴν εἰδος εἶναι ἀλλ’ εἰδικώτατον μὲν εἰπεῖν αὐτήν, ἀτοποῦν ὡς γὰρ ἐστιν, ἀτομα, οἷς ἃν λέγοιτο, ὡσπερ ἀνθρώπος, Γεωργίου, καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀπάνταν· τὸ δ’ ὑπάλληλον, ἀτοπώτερον· ἀμα γὰρ τῷ εἴδει, καὶ γένος ἢ αὐτῇ · ἔσται, τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ ὑπάλληλα. Εἴς ἐκατέρου σοι τοιγαφοῦν ἀδικον, ὡς εἰδος ἡ ψυχὴ σώματος.

KLPV

‘Ετι καὶ γένος αὐτῆς, ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορηθῆσει· παντὶ γὰρ εἰδει νόμος αὐτὸς. Ὁ χαλεπώτατον.

‘Ετι, καὶ αὐτῇ κατὰ πλειόνων τῷ ἁριθμῷ, καὶ διαφερόντων, καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται. Ὅ καὶ τοῦ προτέρου, πολὺ χαλεπώτερον.

535 ‘Ετι, μέρος ἃν καὶ ὅλον ἡ ψυχή καλοῖτο· μέρος μὲν, ἄλλον, ὅλον δὲ, οὐκ ἄλλου, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· τὰ δὲ, ψυχῆς, πόρρω.

‘Ετι, ψυχή μὲν τοῦ σώματος εἶδος οὐδα, ἐπεὶ τῆς ὑλῆς ἀπάσης τὸ εἶδος ύστερον, ύστερα ἀν εἰκότως ἡ ψυχή τοῦ σώματος λέγοιτο. Ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον ἀμα γὰρ ἐστιν ἁμφό.

540 ‘Ετι, ἐπεὶ τῶν φυσικῶν κινήσεων εἰσίν, ἀρχαι τρεῖς — ἢ τε υλή καὶ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ ἡ στέρησις—, αντίκειται δὲ τῷ εἰδε, ἡ στέρησις, οὐχ ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις τῇ ἐξεί, εἶδος δὲ κατὰ σε τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχή, ὅδηλον, ἡς ἐναντίον ἂν εἰς στέρησις τῇ ψυχῆ ἀλλ’ ἀμήχανον.

‘Ετι, κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἄλληλα τούτων μεταβολὴν υλῆς καὶ εἴδους, ἀνάγκη τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἐπιτελείοσθαι καὶ τὴν φθοράν. Ἀλλ’ ἀπίθανον· ἀθάνατος γὰρ οὐσα πάσα ψυχή, οὐκ ἂν εἶδος λέγοιτο.
Ἐτὶ, εἰ ἡ ψυχή μὲν εἴδος ἐστίν, αὐτῷ δὲ φώσι πρόσεστιν ἐν ὡλῃ γινώσκεσθαι, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι, γινώσκεται ἄρα ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ φαίνεται ἡ ψυχή. Ἀλλ' οὐδεμιᾶ μιχανή τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν· ἀγνῶστος γὰρ καὶ ἀφανῆς παντὶ πάντῃ.

Πάλιν, εἰ τὸ σῶμα λόγον ἔχει τῆς ὡλῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, κατὰ σὲ, ἢ δὲ ὡλὴ τῷ εἰδεί αἰτία, τὸ σῶμα ἄρα τῆς ψυχῆς αἰτιῶν ἀν εἰη.

Ἐτὶ, ὡλὴ μὲν τὸ εἶ, οὖ, πρῶτος ἐνυπάρχοντος γίνεται τι ἐστὶ, σχήμα δὲ καὶ εἴδος τὸ καθὸ ἔχει καὶ τῆς ὡλῆς ἐστὶν ύποτερόν· ἡ ψυχή ἄρα τοῦ σώματος ύποτέρα, καὶ τὸ αὐθανατον δῆλον· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τοῖς εὑστισέι καὶ ἀμα.

Ἐτὶ, ὡλὴ μὲν ἀρχή καὶ αἰτία καὶ πρώτη κίνησις παντὸς εἴδους, αὐτῇ δὲ τὸ εἴδος ἀκολουθεῖ, ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, τῆς οἰκίας ἐκάστης.
τὰ δὲ εἰδη, τῶν οἰκίων, ὑστερα. Τὸ σῶμα ἄρα, καὶ πρῶτον καὶ αἰτιον, καὶ ἁρχὴ ψυχῆς. Ἀλλ' ἀτοπον' ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρωπος, ἐκ στέρματος πέφυκεν ἀλλοιουμένου γίνεσθαι τὰν δὲ γινόμενον, σύνθετον ἔστιν, ἐκ τε τοῦ οὐ γίνεται εἰδους, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ γινομένου. Διττὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἤγουν, ὅλη μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, εἰδος δὲ καὶ στέρησις ἐν αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ, οὕτως αἰτιον καὶ ἁρχὴ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ζωῆς, ὡσπερ δὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ κατὰ στέρησιν αὐτῶν πόρον κατὰ συμβεβηκός γαρ, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας, μὴ οὐσῆς αὐτῆς.

'Ετι, πᾶσαν ὅλην, τινές, ἀσώματον καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον εἰπόν ὅν, οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐφαρμόζει τῷ σώματι οὐκοῦν, οὐδαμῶς αὐτό ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ὅλη.

'Ετι, εἰδος καὶ στέρησις ἐναντία· ὅπου γὰρ τὸ ἐν, διώκει τὸ ἔτερον· πῶς οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντων, ὅλη ἂν τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς λέγοιτο;

ψυχής όλην. ἈΛΛ' ἡ τοῖς εὐσεβείσιν ἀληθῆς δόξα, ὡς ὅλη ψυχή τῇ καταβολῇ τοῦ σπέρματος ἐξωθεὶν ἁφικνεῖται δυνάμει θεία, καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἀναπληροῦν ςῴον τέλειον, οὐδένος αὐτοῦ καταλείπομένου προτέρου, οὐδ' ἄρχης, οὐδ' αἰτίων.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ ἡμῖν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀρι-||στοτέλει δοκεῖ, τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν δηλονότι, ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι τοῦ σώματος, καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ὅποις ἐξελθοῦσαν ἑχεσθαι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις, οὕτως περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν οὐδόλως αὐτῶν Θεῷ δὲ καὶ τοῖς εὐσεβείσιν ἐπεσθαί, μᾶλλον ἀν εἰ ὁδίκαιον ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν ἀποδείξει γὰρ μόνῃ τοῦτον ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκαῖον συλλογιζομένῳ παντὶ, εἰς πάν δὲ τούτῳ ψηφίζεσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀτοπον ἀλλ' ἀντικεῖσθαι περὶ τὰ μεγάλα, καὶ μάλι' τι γὰρ εἰς ἀσέβειαν χείρον, τοῦ μὴ πιστεύειν ἀνάστασιν; Εἴ σοι δοκεῖ τοίνυν, ἀκολουθήσωμεν αὐτῷ, μηδόλως τῇ ἀναστάσει πιστεύοντι. ἈΛΛ' ἀτοπον.

ΚΛΠV

595-596. Τοῦτο-σώματος] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 117:16-17
603-604. τι-ἀνάστασεν] cf. 1 Cor. 15:12-14

Ἐπὶ, οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν, ἀλλὰ λογίζεται μόνον αὐτῷ δόξαν αὐτῆν, ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ δέ, καὶ δεδειγμένον ἑρώ. Τοῦ λόγου τοῖνυν ἐπιλαβοῦ τοῖνοι αἱρή κρείττον; Ψεύδεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐν ἀποδείξει καὶ πλανηθήναι, ἢ φαίνεσθαι τὸν ἀληθῆ Θεόν, οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὖδὲ δίκαιον;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐγὼ καὶ πάς τις ἂν ἀλλός εἴποι δικαίως, οὐ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντας ἄλλους πλανάσθαι μᾶλλον, ἢ τι συμβήναι Θεῷ τὸ βραχύτατον, ἄδικον, ἢ ὅλως ἀκαριαίον· ἀλλ' ὅμως, οὐ δύναμαι γνώναι, ποιόν ἂν τις ἄτοπον ἐν αὐτοῖς Θεῷ γε λογίζοιτο.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΟΡΑΣ. Ὡχὶ ἐν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν παρούσῃ δόξῃ. Ακονε τοιγαρουν' ἀρετῆς εἴδος ἐν τοῖς μετεληκότων ἐμβρύων δύο, δυσὶ ψυχαῖς ἐπεταί, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτερον' δυσὶ δὲ πάλιν ἄλλας, κακίας εἴδος ταύτων. Τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσιν αὐταὶ σχέσιν καὶ ὄστην εἰς τὰ ἴδια σώματα, ἢ διάφορον;

610 ὁὐκ ἀγαθὸν KLV: οὐκαγαθὸν P ‖ 610. post δίκαιον sign. interrogationis L ‖ 611-615. Κυδώνης-λογιζοίτοι signa in marg. KV ‖ 611. ἄν bis acc. L ‖ 615. λογιζοίτοι ἔλελογιζοτο P ‖ 618. οὐδὲν L.

ΚΛΡΥ

609. οὐκ ἀγαθὸν KLV: οὐκαγαθὸν P ‖ 610. post δίκαιον sign. interrogationis L ‖ 611-615. Κυδώνης-λογιζοίτοι signa in marg. KV ‖ 611. ἄν bis acc. L ‖ 615. λογιζοίτοι ἔλελογιζοτο P ‖ 618. οὐδὲν L.
Ἀπόκριναι μοι δυοὶ γὰρ ἐλέσθαι σε θάτερον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον. Ἀλλ’ ἀν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐν αὐταῖς ἔρεις, οὐκ ἀρα τῇ διαφορᾷ τῆς ὥστης ἡ διάκρισις τῶν ψυχῶν, ὅ προῆλεγες ὡς ἀναγκαῖον· ἀν δὲ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν εἰπης, πρῶτον μὲν, ἄδικον, ψυχὰς τῷ ἀυτῷ παρακειμένας ἁμαρτήματι, μή τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν ὥστην ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἐπειτα, καὶ Θεὸς οὐ δίκαιος, ἀπαιτῶν αὐτάς τὸ ἴσον τοῦ ἀδικήματος τῆς ὥστης καὶ τῆς σχέσεως τῶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι κειμένας ἐν ἀνισότητι, ἢ στεφάνουν τὰς ἄλλας, ἴσον μὲν εἰργασμένας ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἄνισον δὲ τὴν ὥστην ἐχούσας περὶ τὰ 630 σώματα· ἄδικεῖ τοῖς αὐτάς ἐν τούτῳ Θεός. Ἀλλ’ ἄτοπον καὶ ἀδύνατον· Ἰσος γὰρ, οὐδαμήν οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος· ἀλλ’ ὡς οἰόν τε δικαιότατος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὑμοίοτατον οὐδέν. Εἴ έκατέρου σοι τοιγαροῦν, ἀτόπον δικαίως ἀκολουθεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς ἴσαις ψυχαῖς, τῇ διαφορᾷ τῆς ἄνισου ὥστης, τὸ ἴσον ἐργάζεται, οὐτ’ αὕθες τὸ μὴ 635 διαφέρειν ποιεῖν ἴσχυς τὴν διάκρισιν τῶν ψυχῶν.

ΚΛPV

Ἐπὶ, καὶ τούναντίον, ἄγιοι σοι ψηφίζονται τὰς μὲν γὰρ ψυχὰς τῶν ἁγίων καὶ τῶν δικαίων, τῶν παρόντων φασὶ μεμνήσθαι, καὶ τρόπον τὸν ὑπατὸν, αὐτὰς σαφῶς ἐπισκέπτεσθαι τῶν δ’ ἀμαρτωλῶν, μόνας καθ’ ἕαυτάς ἐὰν μένειν, οὐδένος τῶν ὄντων φροντίδος πεποιημένας, οὔτε ἄλλων, οὔτε σωμάτων ἱδίων ὀλως. Σὺ δὲ ταλμᾶς λέγειν, ἢ χρεών οὐδενί, ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον ἐφ’ ἀπαντα φθάνειν ἄνθρωπον φύσιν;

[2.6] ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. Οἱ λέγοντες, πάντα τὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς, καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν ἔχειν, πλὴν τῆς αἰτίας, καὶ ἀγεννησίας, ἢ μόνον γεννητῶν τὸν Υἱὸν, ἢ τὸ Πνεῦμα, μόνον ἐκπορευτὸν, οὐ τῇ ἀντιφάσει ταύτα διακρινοῦσιν; Πῶς οὖν αὐτοὶ τῆς θεολογίας ταύτῃ ἑλαύνουσι; ΚΥΑΩΝΗ. Διαφέρειν μὲν τὴν ἀντιφάσιν ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ψεύδος, παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται οὐκ ἄρκει μέντοι ἢ ταύτης ἀντίθεσις, καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῆς διακρίσεως αἰτία δείξαι εἰ γὰρ δύο τυχόν ἀνθρώπων, ὁ μὲν, εἰπ λευκός, ὁ δὲ, οὐ λευκός, δηλοὶ

ΚΛΡV


277
μὲν αὐτοὺς δύο εἶναι οὐ ποιεῖ μὲντοι τούτο αὐτοὺς δύο. Καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἀγέννητον, οὐδενὸς αἰτίον ἐν τῷ Πατρί, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐστὶ διανοίας ἀνάπλασμα, τὸ γεννητὸν ἀναιροῦσης.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἡδοὺ σοι τοῖς πρωτέροις καὶ τῷ θεολογεῖν ὁμοιον τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τε καὶ μὴ λευκόν, ἡ ἀλλα τοιαῦτα, κἀν μυρία γινώσκοιτο, διακρίναι τὰς οὐσίας οὐ δύναται τὸ δ’ αἰτίον, ὅτι συμβεβηκότα ὁις, οὐ θέμις συστατικὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν εὑρίσκεσθαι πώποτε ἀλλ’ αὐτή ἡ μὲν αὐτὰ πάντως ἐπεταί ἡ, καὶ χωρισθέντων, οὐδὲν ἐλαττον αὐθικς μένει, καὶ ἀναιρουμένων, οίδε πάσχειν οὐδὲν μὴ οὕς ὃ δὲ ἡ οὐσίας, ἀπαντα δίκαιον ἀναφείτσαθι. Τὸ δὲ ἀγέννητον ἐπὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς τῶν ἀπάντων Θεοῦ, οὐκ ἀδιάκριτον αἰτίας ἐστίν, οὐ μὴ ὑπό, οὐκ ἀποφάσει τῶν ὄντων ὁμοιον οὐκ ἀνάπλασμα διανοίας, ὡς μαρτυρεῖς, τῷ Θεῷ, ἀλλὰ τρόπος ὑπάρξεως αὐτῶς μέγας· καὶ μαρτυρεῖ χορὸς ὁ τῶν ἀγίων αὐτά, Θεῷ, μηδὲν ἀλλο σημαίνειν τὸ ἀγέννητον αἰτίον εἰπών, ἡ Πατέρα·

ΚΛΠΒ


654. ἡδοὺ σοι τὸ 658. ἡ] ἤ KPV  ἤ 659. οὐδὲν 660. οὐδὲν KV  ἤ 665. μηδὲν L ἀνείπευ Κ
παντὶ δὲ χρεῶν εὐσεβεῖ ταύθ' οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ὅρους· εἰ γὰρ ὁ πέρφυκεν ἐκάστῳ ζώῳν ὄνομα φύσει δύο τις θοῖτο δυσίν ὄνόματα,
δύο ἡμέρα ταῦτα ποιεῖ, πολλῷ γε μᾶλλον, ἢ τοῦ ἀγεννητοῦ φωνῆς
μόνῳ πρέπουσα τῷ Πατρὶ τοῦ παντὸς Θεοῦ.

670 Ἔτι, καὶ κατάφασις ἔστι τὸ ἀγέννητον. Εἰ δὲ τις φαίη, καὶ ποιὰ τῶν
ἀποφάσεων αὐτῆς μάχεται, ἐρωῦμεν, ὡς καὶ τῷ Φιλοσόφῳ δοκεῖ, τὸ
μὴ ἀγέννητον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτοπον, ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας, Ἀριστοτέλει
ψηφίζοιται τὰ δοκοῦντα.

675 Ἔτι, μὴ τούτῳ μόνον, ἄλλᾳ καὶ καταφάσεις ἀπάσης ἄλλον τρόπον,
ὑψηλότερον καὶ κρεῖττον ἐπὶ Θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον, ἦπερ ἄλλο τι
ψηφιζόμενον κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ πολλῷς τὸν παρόντα λόγον, ἢ πιγή
τῶν λόγων, ὁ Διονύσιος βεβαιοί, τὰς ἀποφάσεις περὶ Θεῶν βελτίως
eἶναι τῶν καταφάσεων ἀπασών· καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτὰς ἀρμόζειν οὐ
θεῶ μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ πάσιν εἰπῶν, ἄδειος ἀμα δυνάμεων· καὶ
πολὺς μὲν ὁ τῶν ἁγίων αὐτῷ κύκλος ἐν τούτῳ συνηγορεῖ, πολὺς δὲ

ΚΛΡΨ


in marg. L. 667. πιγή K 679. καὶ] deest P 680. ante κύκλος σερ. αὐτῷ in
marg. V
καὶ τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς, οὐκ ἀ-ἐνγαγεῖον ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ παρόντι 
μεμνήσθαι, φιλούντας βραχυλογιάν. Σὺ δὲ, ἡ συνηγορεῖν 
τῷ Θωμᾷ, ἢ καὶ τῷ Νείλῳ προθυμούμενος ἐπιπηδᾶν, ἐπελάθου 
τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγίως ἢ ἐκὼν παρατρέχεις, καὶ τὸ ἀγένητον ἐπὶ Θεοῦ, 
τὴν μεγάλην ταύτην φωνήν, ἢν παντὶ κόσμῳ τρέμειν εἰκός, 
ὁμολογεῖς διανοίας ἀνάπλασμα, καὶ μὴ ὡς, ἀπερὶ τὸ λευκὸν, καὶ 
τὸ μέλαν, ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἢ τὸ ἀγένητον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: ἀπερ 
uδύλως χώρα Θεω. ΑΛΛ’ οὐ πάντα τῇ θνητῇ φύσει γνώριμα ὦ 
γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γεγονότων περὶ τοῦ ἀγένητου νοεῖν τι 
πουδαξοντες, ὁμοίων τι δρῶσι, τοῖς ἀπὸ δυάδος μονάδος φύσιν 
ἐπιζητοῦσιν ἐδεν ὄν ἐμπαλίν, ἀπὸ μονάδος δυάδα: αὕτη γάρ, ἢ 
ταύτης αρχή. Τὸ δὲ μείζον, ὁ, μηδὲ σύγκρισιν ἔχει πρὸς τὰ λοιπά: 
σὲ γὰρ μετὰ βραχὺ βλέπομεν ἀντικεῖμεν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ τοῖς νῦν 
eιρημένοις σοι, πολεμεῖς καὶ τάναντια λέγεις παντάπασι περὶ τῆς 
tοῦ ἀγενητοῦ φωνῆς, σαύτῳ μαχόμενος μᾶλλον, ἢ ἄλλοις. Τὸ δ’ 
αἰτίου, ἢς ἐγώμαι, νῦν μὲν, ἵνα Νεῖλου κατηγορήσει, ἐκεὶ δ’ ὅπως 
συνηγορήσῃς Θωμᾷ ἀλλ’ ἀτοπον ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ, ταῦτα δράν. 
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐκ ἔχω ὀφαίως γνώναι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἢν μὴ σὺ 
ἀναμνήσῃς με.

KLPV


με] sign. in marg. Κ

280
ΧΡΥΣΩΛΑΡΑΣ. Οὐ μνημονεύεις ἐν οἷς ἔρεις; Τὸ γὰρ γεννητὸν καὶ ἐκπορευτὸν, κοινωνίαν βουλεῖται ἕχειν ἵππος τὸ ἀγέννητον, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὴν προφορὰν τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ ἀγεννήτου, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀγέννητον αἰτίου εἶναι, Υἰόν καὶ Πνεύματος; Οὐ ταῦτα νοήματα καὶ γράμματα σά; Οὐκ ἐναντία σοι τοῖς προειρημένοις; Εἴ γὰρ τὸ ἀγέννητον ἀνάπλασμα διανοίας, ὡς ἔλεγες, πῶς νῦν αἰτίου αὐτὸν νοεῖσθαι δύνασθαι λέγεις, Υἰόν τε καὶ Πνεύματος; Ἀδύνατον ἐκάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἐλού τοῖνυν, ὅποιαν ἀν βοῦλῃ δοέαν, καὶ θάτερον ὁμολόγησον, ψεύδος εἶναι καὶ βουλεύομαι σοι τό, τὸ ἀγέννητον ἀδιάκριτον λέγειν, καὶ διανοίας ἀνάπλασμα, καὶ μὴ όν, ἐξελέσθαι σοι ἵππος γὰρ, ὡς οὐ μόνον οὐκ εὐστεβὲς, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θωμὰν, καὶ σαῦτον αὐτοῦ ἀναιρεῖς ὀμίως.

Ἀπόκριναι μοι καὶ τοῦτον Νείλος μὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι συλλογισμῷ, δέκα κεφαλαίους γενναίους ἔχρησατο κατὰ τοῦ Θωμᾶ, σὺ δὲ, μόνοις τέσσαρις, ἐπιτηδέας Νείλος, τάλλα παραλίπων.

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Ἐκατός οἷς ἀν ἑθέλη, καὶ μάχεται λέγε συλλογισμὸν ἐτερον, ἵνα γνώμεν.
[3] Συλλογισμός δεύτερος <περί θείας διακρίσεως>

ΘΩΜΑΣ. Ὅς τὸ προβάλλον, πρὸς τὸ προβαλλόμενον, οὕτως τὸ
γεννῶν πρὸς τὸ γεννώμενον, καὶ ἐναλλάξ, ἀνάλογον ἦσται ἂλλὰ τὰ
πρώτα, ἐν ἐστὶ πρόσωπον, καὶ τὰ δεύτερα ἄρα, εἰ μὴ τις σχέσις ἐν
αὐτοῖς ἢ ἂλλῃ δὲ οὐκ ἦστιν, εἰ μὴ ἢ κατ’ αἰτίαν.

5 ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. Τούτο, ἕτι μεγεθῶν καὶ ἀριθμῶν ἀληθές, πλὴν δὲ, καὶ
tούτων ὁμογενῶν· οὐ μόνον δὲ ψεύδος ἐπὶ τῶν θείων, ἢ ἂλλα καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων πολλάκις, καὶ δῆλον ἀντίκειται γάρ, ὡς τὸ
ἀγέννητον τῶ γεννητῶ, οὕτω τὸ ἄφθαρτον, τῷ φθαρτῷ ἂλλ’
ἐναλλάξ, οὐκ ἂν σφόδρα τὴν ὁμοιαν σχέσιν γεννητοί γὰρ
ἀγγελοί, ἂλλ’ ἄφθαρτοι. Ἕτι, ζωον, οὐ ζωον, ἐμψυχον, οὐκ
ἐμψυχον. Ἕτι, ὡς ἀστρονόμος, ἀρχος ἀστρονομικά, στρατηγός,
πρὸς στρατηγικά. Ἕτι, ὡς ἡ εὐθεία πρὸς τὸ μέρος τὸ ἑαυτῆς,
οὕτως ἢ περιφέρεια πρὸς τὸ ὀικεῖον, ἂλλ’ ἐναλλάξ, οὐκ ἦστιν.
[3.1] ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Ἐγὼ δὲ, ἐκείνου μὲν εἶναι τοῦτο, οὐ πάνυ τοι
peeθομαι οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς οἰς, τοῖς ἐκείνου συγγράμμους ἐνέτειχον,
toûτ' ἐγκείμενον εὑρόν, οὔτ' ἀλλού τινὸς ἥκουσα ἐπὶ θωμάν τοῦτ' ἀνάγοντος· ἄλλ' ἐοικε Λατίνου τινὸς, πρὸς τινα τῶν ἡμετέρων
diaλεγόμενου, τοῦτ' εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἄνδρα τούτου ἀκούσαντα, τῷ
θωμά, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀναθείναι, καὶ μετ' ὀργῆς ἀντειπεῖν.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐγὼ νομίζω τὸ σὸν οὐκ ἄληθες εἶναι μᾶλλον,
ὡσπερ καὶ τοῦ θωμάν· ἂν μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρόβλημα τῶν ἒκεῖνων ἦ,
diατ, μὴ καὶ θωμάς αὐτοῦ ποιητῆς ὁ σοφώτατος; ἂν δὲ φαὐλον,
diατι λογίζη τούτῳ λατίνων, ἄλλω; τὸ γὰρ καλόν, ἀγαθὸν ἀπαντῆ
tὸ δὲ κακῶν, οὐδενὶ καλὸν ἄλλή όμως, ὀμολογοῦμέν σοι
χάριν, ὅτι μὴ καὶ ἡμέτερον ἐρείς εἶναι.

'Ετι, διατί σοι καὶ τῆς ἀντιλογίας αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐμέλησεν ἄνδρον διαφώς, φαύλων ὄντων, καὶ μὴ γνωρίμων θωμᾶ;

L 34ρ

'Ετι, ποιὸν ἄν καὶ τῷ Νείλῳ κέρδος ἐγένετο πρὸ-βαλλομένῳ τα
ψευδὴ, καὶ τὴν εἰς ἄλλους ἐνστασιν τῷ θωμᾷ παραβάλλοντι;

30 Πάντως οὐδὲν έτερον, ἢ καὶ ἀληθεύοντι μὴ πιστεύεσθαι, ἅ πλάττειν

KLPV

14-19. Ἐγὼ-ἀντειπεῖν] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, l. 118.27-29
oüdèn L
αὐτὸν ἀδύνατον ὅντα σοφόν, οἷος φαίνεται, πᾶς τις ἂν φαίη ἂν δὲ τὸ πλήθος ὡρῶν αὐτὸς ἢ ἡτὶ τῶν ἀτόπων, τῆς παρούσης θέσεως οὐκ ἀνέχῃ; Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν οὐδὲν Λατίνων συνέβαινε πώποτε, ἄλλος ἂν ὁ λόγος ἰσως ὡς εἰρημένος εἰπ' πλήν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίος, οὐδὲ καθόλου ἐπεὶ δὲ νόμος αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἀληθεύειν ἂει τὰ πλείστα καὶ θεολογεῖν, καὶ ἀπλῶς διαλέγεσθαι βουλευομένοις, τί καλύει καὶ τούτον εἶναι Θωμᾶ τὸν συλλογισμόν; Οὔκ ἔστιν ὁ τρίτος συλλογισμός τοῦ Θωμᾶ παραπλήσιος τῷ παρόντι; Μάλλον δὲ καὶ πολὺ τοῦ δευτέρου χείρων; Διατι οὖν, τοῦ μὲν χείρονος κακοῦ προτρέπεις σαυτόν, τοῦ δὲ ἐλάττονος, οὗ; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ τρίτος βελτίων ἦν, ἰσος εἴχεν ἂν τίνα λόγον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου σαφῶς ἀθλιώτερος, οὐδὲν ἀπότομον, ὦ ἂν τις τὸ μεῖζον κακὸν ψηφίζοιτο, καὶ τὸ ἐλάττον, εἰ λογίζοιτο σὺ δὲ πάλιν ὁ τὸ χείριστον δοὺς, ἀνέχου τοῦ χείρονος.

ΚΛΠV

31. ἃν bis acc. L ‖ 32. αὐτοῖς L ‖ 33. ἀνέχῃ sign. interrogationis L: deest KPV ‖ 34. ἃν bis acc. L ‖ 35. ἀνέχῃ Ρ ‖ 38. ἃν τις τὸ μεῖζον κακὸν ψηφίζοιτο sign. interrogationis codd. ‖ 39. ἃν τὸ χείριστον δοὺς sign. interrogationis codd. ‖ 42. ἀθλιώτερος P ‖ 44. οὐδὲν L.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, τής τοῦ εἰπόντος διανοίας, ὡστε ποτὲ ἢν ἐκεῖνος, οὐ πάνυ τοις στοχασάμενος, διό καὶ τοὺς ἱδίους καὶ έαυτὸν μάλλον ἐλαθεν ἐξελέγξας· οὕτως μὲν γὰρ, νομίζει τὸν Λατίνον, ώς αὐτῷ δοκοῦσαν τὴν τοῦ γεννῶν καὶ γεννάσθαι, καὶ προβάλλειν, καὶ ἐκπο-τευσθαι ἀναλογίαν προτείνατι ἐστι δὲ οὖξ οὕτως: οὐδ’ ἄν Λατίνοι ποτὲ συγχωρήσαιεν, εἶναι δηλονότι, ὡς γεννῶν πρὸς γεννώμενον, προβάλλον πρὸς ἐκπορεύόμενον.

Λέγομεν τοῖνυν, ὡς ὅταν ἢ, ὡς πρῶτον πρὸς δεύτερον, τρίτον πρὸς τέταρτον, οὐκ ἐτ’ ἄλλου μὲν γένους ληττέον τῇ πρώτῃ ἀναλογίαν, ἐτ’ ἄλλου δὲ τῷ ἐναλλάξ, ἄλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὦν, εἰ ἡ πρώτῃ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ γένει λαμβάνοιτο, καὶ τῷ ἐναλλάξ, ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ πάλιν ληττέον.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ ἐπιχειρήτευον, τὴν κατὰ τοῦ Ἅντων διαβολήν ἐξελέσθαι σου τὴν ἀρχήν, ταῦταν εἰπόντως, ὡς σὺ νῦν συνηγορεῖς· ἡς τοῦτο μὲν, ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ ἀριθμῶν αληθές, χάρις σου τοῖνυν τὸν αὐτοῦ βεβαιοῦντι λόγον.

KLPV

45-51. φαίνεται-ἐκπορεύομενον] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 118r.29-32 || 52-56. ἀγομεν-ληττέον] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 118r.6-8


285
[3.2] Κυδώνης. Ἀλλ' ὁ φήσιν ὁ ἀνήρ οὗτος ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου καὶ γεννητοῦ· καὶ ἀφθάρτου καὶ φθαρτοῦ· καὶ ζῶου, καὶ οὖν ζῶου· καὶ ἐμψύχου, καὶ οὖν ἐμψύχου, ὡς μή καὶ ἐναλλάξ λέγεσθαι δυναμένων, φανερὸν· ὡς διὰ τὸ ἐκάτερον τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ παραχρήσθαι συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοπον.

Χρυσολώρας. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις· πλὴν, ἢ τῆς ἀντιλογίας παράχρήσεις, οὐδὲν ἢ ἄλλω ἢ τῷ κανόνι τοῦ σοφίσματος ἐφαρμόσειε τοῦ Θοῦμα, τῷ περὶ τοῦ προβάλλειν καὶ ἐκπορευεθαί, καὶ γεννάν, καὶ γεννᾶσθαι, καὶ μετ' αὐτῶν, αὐτῷ· σοι, τῷ τοίς ἐκείνου συνηγοροῦντι· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἄτοπων, οὐ μικρὰ ἢν ὑμῖν ἔποιοτ.

Κυδώνης. Τὸ γὰρ ἀ-‖γεννήτος τῶν γεννητῶν, οὐ κατὰ πάντα τὰ δυνάμενα συμβιήναι τούτως ἀντίκειται· οὖ γὰρ εἰ συμβέβηκε τῷ γεννητῷ, νοερῷ εἶναι, τὸ ἀγέννητον διὰ τὴν ἀντίθεσιν ἔσται ἄνουν· οὔτε μὴν, εἰ τὸ ἀγέννητον αἰτίον τοῦ γεννητοῦ, καὶ τὸ ἀφθάρτον αἰτίον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ· ἄλλα δῆλον, ὡς ἀπόφασις καὶ

ΚΛΡV


286
κατάφασις μόνον ἀντίκεινται, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀφθαρτον καὶ τὸ φθαρτόν ὡστε καὶ ἐναλλάττοντας τῇ ἀποφάσει καὶ καταφάσει,
ἐπόμενον ληττέον καὶ ἐσται ὡς ἀγέννητον πρὸς ἀφθαρτον —ἀμφω
γὰρ ἀποφάσεις—, γεγνητὸν πρὸς φθαρτὸν —ἀμφω γὰρ παλιν
καταφάσεις— τὸ δὲ ὁμοὶον ῥητέον, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀστρονόμου, καὶ
στρατηγοῦ.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐδενὶ σοι πρέπει λέγειν ἐπέρῳ, ἢ Θωμᾶ τοῦτο,
ἀξιοῦντι, περὶ τῇ γεγνήσεως τρόπων καὶ ἐκπορεύσεως, όσα
toὶς ἀριθμοῖς, καὶ τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ συμβαίνει: Ἡνίοχο γὰρ τῇν θέσιν
αἰτιώμενος τὸν Θωμᾶν, τοῖς παροῦσι νομίσαι κοινωνεῖ, ἵνα τῇ
ἀλὸγου θέσεως δείξῃ τὸ ἀτόπον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Θωμᾶ σκοπὸς ἢν
ἀποφάσεων ἢ καταφάσεων, ἐπεὶ τὸ γεννᾶν καὶ γεννᾶθαι, καὶ
προβάλλειν καὶ ἐκπορεύεσθαι, ἀπαντά καταφάσεις· ἀλλ᾽
ἐλογίζετο, τέσσαρα μεγέθη πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντιστρέφοντα, ἐφαρμόζειν
τῇ θειᾷ φύσει, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ ὑπ᾽ ὕπος, ἀγέννητὸν τε καὶ

ΚΛΡV

76. ἀντίκειται P | 83. περὶ post cor. (ex περὶ) L

287
ἄφθαρτον, πρὸς γεννητόν, καὶ φθαρτόν, ἀποφάσεις εἶναι καὶ καταφάσεις, ἣν ἀληθὲς ἄλλα καταφάσεις καὶ ταύτα, ὡς τὸ γεννᾶν καὶ γεννᾶσθαι, καὶ προβάλλειν καὶ ἐκπορεύεσθαι ἂν δὲ τις τὰς αὐτῶν ἀποφάσεις ἦτη, εὐφρησεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγεννητοῦ, τὸ, οὐκ ἄφθαρτον καὶ οὐκ ἀγεννητόν, τοῦ δὲ φθαρτοῦ καὶ τοῦ γεννητοῦ, τὸ μὴ φθαρτόν καὶ μὴ γεννητὸν οὕτω γὰρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ οὕτως, ἃς ἀποφάσεις ὁμολογεῖς, ἀπασάει καταφάσεις, καὶ τῷ Νείλῳ μάχεσθαι βουλόμενος, συμμαχεῖς.

Ἐπὶ, φανερὸν, ὡς οὐδὲ τὸ παρὰπαν αὐτοῖς ἡ ἀναλογία γνώριμος ἦσται τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ θεώρημα, ἢν, ὡς πρῶτον, πρὸς δεύτερον, τρίτον, πρὸς τέταρτον, τὸ δὲ σόν, οὐχ οὕτως. Ἀνάμορφα τοῖνυν σοι, ἀνίσοις ἰσα, ἡ τοῖς ἰσοῖς παραβαλῶν ἁνίσα, τὸ ἰσον ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπαιτοῦντι. Ταῦτα δὲ, καὶ στρατηγῷ, καὶ ἀστρονόμῳ, συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη.

ΚΛΡΠ

97. Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ] cf. Arist., Analytica priora 52b.31-32: τὸ γὰρ ἄγαθον τὸ οὐκ ἄγαθον ἀπόφασις

98. πρὸς-φθαρτον] deest P \[ 92. ante ταύτα scer. τὰ P \[ 99. τὸ, παρὰπαν L: τοπαρὰπαν

K V \[ 103. ταυτά] ταύτα K

288
105 [3.3] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Πάλιν τὴν ἐναλλαξ ἀντιστροφήν οὕτω δῆλος ἐστὶ δυσχεραίνων, ὡστε, κατὰ τῶν μεγεθῶν ταύτην ἀπαξιοῦν, καὶ φάσκειν, μηδένα εἶναι λόγον εὐθείας πρὸς περιφέρειαν. Ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι τὸν μὲν λόγον καὶ οίον ἀποδειχθῆναι, οὐδ’ ἂν, οὐδ’ αὐτὸς εἰποίμη, σχέσιν μέντοι τινὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν ἔχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλα, ὥσπερ καὶ διαμέτρου πλευράν, ἐστὶ τίς λόγος· καὶ δῆλον, δυνατὸν καὶ τρίτην εὐφειν ἀναλογον τῶν δύο δοθεισῶν, καὶ τὰς τρεῖς, μίαν ποιεῖν ἀναλογιάν.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔσον, ἡ διαμέτρος, τῇ πλευρᾷ, ὡς ἡ περιφέρεια, τῇ γραμμῇ. Ἡ Καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ἀπαντῇ τῷ τῇ ἀναλογίαν ἐπισταμένῳ ἀλλ’ οὔδε τῶν τριῶν ἡ ἀναλογία, ἔχει τι κοινῶν τοῖς εἰρήμενοις τῷ Νείλῳ εἰ μὲν γάρ ταύτων ἡ γραμμὴ καὶ διαμέτρος καὶ περιφέρεια καὶ πλευρά, ἢ τῶν εὐθειῶν ἢ ἀναλογία, Νείλῳ ἴσως ἢν ἴλεγχες αὐτῶν δὲ παντάπασιν ἀνομοίων ὄντων, οὐκ ἀντίπαλος εἰ τῷ Νείλῳ. Λέγε τοῖνυν, ἢ ἂν σοι τούτων ἱσχυρότερα φαίνηται.

KLPV


Κυδωνης. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲνὶ καὶ Ἀρχιμήδους ἀποδείξεις, λόγον εἶναι τῆς περιμέτρου πρὸς τὴν διάμετρον, ἢν ἔχει τὰ τρία, καὶ ἐξὸδον ἐγγίστα πρὸς τὸ ἐν· εἰ δ᾿ ὁ μαθηματικὸς τοῦ ἐγγὺς ἑστοχάσατο, φανερὸν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐκ ἀδύνατον τοῦτων, καὶ ὄρθων εὑρεθήναι λόγον τῷ γὰρ, εἰ ὁ γεωμέτρης οὐκ ἐξίκετο πρὸς τὴν εὐφεσίαν· Ἀλλαξοῦ δὲ ὁ αὐτός οὕτω Αρχιμήδης ἀποδείκνυσι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς περιμέτρου τοῦ κύκλου, καὶ τῆς τούτου διαμέτρου, διπλασίον εἶναι τοῦ ἐμβαδοῦ τοῦ κύκλου. Ἀλλα καὶ οἱ τὸν κύκλον τετραγωνίζειν βουλόμενοι, ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἀκριβῶς χωρίον ὑπὸ δύο περιφερεῖσθαι περιεχόμενον, ἠοὶ, ὁρθογώνως εὐθυγράμμως καὶ δῆλον, ὡς τὸ εὐθυγράμμων ἐκεῖνο, ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖναι αἱ εὐθείας, ὑπερεξεύσι ποτὲ ἐπ᾽ ἀπειρον ἑκτενομένα, τὸ μὲν περιφερόγραμμον τοῦ εὐθυγράμμου, ἢ δὲ περιφέρεια τῆς εὐθείας· καὶ ἐξουσὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα λόγον, ὄρθων μὲν, ὀνδαμῶς, ἵνα δὲ καὶ τοῦτον ποτὲ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποδεικται τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς.

KLPV

121-140. εὐφεσίας-φιλόνεικος] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, ff. 118º.31-119º.3

121-123. λόγον-ἐν] cf. Archim., Dimensio circuli, p. 236.8-11; Pappus Alex., Comm. in Ptol. p. 253.6-8; Theon Alex., In Ptol., p. 394.13-14 L 126-128. τῷ-κύκλου] cf. Pappus Alex., Comm. in Ptol., p. 253.8-10

ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὴν τούτων παραβολήν· οὔτε γὰρ οὔτε ὁ τοῦ
cύκλου τετραγωνισμὸς ἀπείρηται παντελῶς, ὡσπερ τῆς
πλευρᾶς, καὶ τῆς διαμέτρου· ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων μέν,
oὔτω δὲ εὑρέθητον τούτοις μέν οὐν πειρασθαι τὴν ἑναλλάκ
ἀντιστροφὴν ἀκυροῦν, λίιαν φιλόνεικον.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐ δύναμαι συνιδεῖν ἐτι, εἰ ἐκών ἢ ἄκων ἑρείς αὐτά
tο μέν γὰρ ύστερον, ἀφιλόσοφον, τὸ δέ πρῶτον, ἀτιθάσου και
ἀνημέρου ψυχῆς· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρίτον οὐκ ἔστι, τῶν κακῶν ἐρούμεν τὸ
ἔλαττον, ὡς οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοίς συμπλέκεις αὐτὸν τῇ πίστει
μέν, οὐδαμῶς, τῇ δὲ παιδείᾳ, καὶ ἡμεῖς Ἑλληνες· καὶ εἰ μή τῶν
μεγάλων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἶοι ύστερον ἀπατάσθαι. Ἐπεὶ δὲ και
tετραγωνισμῶν ἐμνήσθης καὶ Ἀρχιμήδους, καὶ περιφερείας καὶ
eὐθείων, σκεπτέον οὔτως ἡμῖν· πάντα μέν οὖν τὰ ὠνθήντα σοι
ἀναπόδεικτα, καὶ ζητούμενα· ὧν, εἰ καὶ δήλα τὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως
αὐτῶν ἴν, οὐδ' οὔτως ἀν ἐφθέγγετο Νείλῳ τὰ ἑναντία, περὶ ὄν ἐλεγεν

KLPV

142-143. ἀτιθάσου·ψυχῆς] Phil. Jud., De virt., § 132.5, p. 306

139. οὔτω P ‖ 142. ἀτιθάσου] ἀτίθασιν codd. ‖ 145. παιδεία] παιδία KP ‖ 150. ἀν bis
acc. L
ἀληθεύοντι. Βρύσων, ἐτετραγωνίζει κύκλον, ἀλλ' οὐ καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ μεταξύ μειώνος καὶ ἐλάσσονος, καθὸ τετραγωνίζειν ἔδωκεν, ἵσον τοῖς ζητουμένοις ἀποφαίνεσθαι δύκαιον ἔλογιζε, οὐκ ιδιον τούτο γεωμετρίας, ἀλλά καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων· ἢ μάλλον εἰπεῖν ἀληθέστερον, ἣκαστα πρέπον ἄλ- BLLοις, ἢ διαλεκτική μόνη. Καὶ Ἀντιφὼν δὲ πάλιν, ἐτέρῳ τρόπῳ, τούτον ἐπειράτο τετραγωνίζειν, διὰ τῶν μηνίσκων αὐτῶν, σχημάτων μονοειδῶν διὰ περιφερείας κύκλου, μέρος ἀποτεμνόντων αὐτοῦ, ὡς καὶ ἀδύνατον· Ἡπικράτης δὲ πάλιν ὁ Χῖος, ἐτετραγωνίζει καὶ αὐτὸς κύκλον· κατέγραφεν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἔν αὐτῷ, τρίγωνα περιέγραφε, καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐτήρει, γεωμετρικὰς τὰς ἀρχὰς, ὡς γραμμὰς ἀγών, καὶ τρίγωνα καταγράφων ἐφεύδετο δὲ, καθόσον ἔλεγε τὸ ἐμβαδὸν τοῦ κύκλου, δυνατὸν εἰς τρίγωνα διελεῖν· καὶ πάλιν ὁ Ἀντιφῶν, ἐφαρμόζει γραμμὴν εὐθείαν, περιφερεία, ὡς ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε· καὶ πολλοὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω γαθῶν ἐνοχοὶ δεδειγμένων· καὶ ὅτι σὺ νῦν Ἀρχιμήδην

KLPV


292
ἐφείς, οὐ διάμετρον εἰς περιφέρειαν ἐνεχεῖται μόνον ἐνδείξεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς φησιν ὁ Θέων, ἐν τῇ συντάξει τῶν Ὄποιμημάτων αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔτερον ὁμοιον ἐνεχεῖται τούτῳ λογίζεσθαι λέγων, ὡς τὸ ἣμιον τοῦ ἐκ τῆς περιμέτρου τοῦ κύκλου καὶ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ κέντρου, οὐ μεῖζον οὐκ ἔλαττον εἶναι δύναται ἢς, οὐ μικρὸν τινες ἐπελάβοντο δείξεως, εἰπόντες ὁμογενέσιν ἁμοῦξειν αὐτά, καὶ τοῖς ἔτερογενέσιν, οὐδόλας· καὶ δῆλον, καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τεκμήριον, δύο γραμμαί περιέχουσα γωνίαν ὀρθήν, καὶ δύο ἡμικυκλίων ἐφαπτομένων αὐτῶν, ἀδύνατον εὑρεθῆναι τί ἢ ὀν ἄτοπον, εἰ καὶ Νεῖλος ἔλεγε, μηδένα λόγον εἶναι, γραμμή καὶ περιφερεία κοινόν; Ὅτι γὰρ ἐτέρῳ θάτερον αἰκοινώνητον, ἐντεύθεν δῆλον· ἀπλατείς μήκος, καὶ πλάτος ἔχει· καὶ τῆς καὶ πέρασα σημεία, τοῦ δὲ, πέρας ἡ γραμμή· καὶ τῇ μὲν, αὐτά, σύστασις καὶ ἀρχή, τῷ δὲ, οὐδέτερον· καὶ τῆς μὲν, πέρατα, δύο, τοῦ δὲ, μηδέν· καὶ ἴ μὲν, ὀρθμένη πεπέρασται, ἐκτεινώμενή δὲ νῦ καὶ

ΚΛΠV

168-170. ὡς-δύναται] cf. Theon Alex., In Ptol., pp. 362.11-364.8
μή φαινομένη, ἀπειρον ὁ δὲ, καὶ ὁρώμενος, ἀπειρος, καὶ μὴ ὁρώμενος αὕθις, πεπερασμένος· καὶ τῇ μέν, οὐδόλως σχήμα, τῶν δὲ, καὶ σχηματίζεσθαι δίκαιον· καὶ τί δεί τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν· Ἕναντίον περιφέρεια τῇ γραμμῇ, ὡς εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ. Ὁ γοῦν Φιλόσοφος

185

περὶ τούτων οὖν ὕψω τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἐν τετάρτῳ κεφαλαίῳ τοῦ ἐβδόμου τῶν Τοπικῶν· ὁσα γὰρ θατέρω συμβέβηκε, καὶ θατέρω συμβεβηκέναι δεῖ· καὶ οἷς θατέρων αὐτῶν συμβέβηκε, καὶ θατέρων συμβεβηκέναι δεῖ· εἰ δὲ τι τούτων διαφωνεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι, οὐ ταῦτα· ἢ δὲ γραμμή, τῆς περιφερείας οὐ μόνον οὐ διαφωνεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντάπασιν Ἕναντία· οὐδέις ἢρα γραμμῆ καὶ περιφερεία, λόγος κοινὸς.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· πλὴν ἡ διάμετρος πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν, ἔχει λόγον, ἀρρητον.

L 38'

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐγὼ οὐ λογίζομαι σοι καὶ ὑποτὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

190

Ἐπιλαβοῦ τοῖνυν τῶν λεγομένων· Νεῖλος μὲν ἔλεγεν, ἀκοινώνητον

KLPV

186-188. ὡσα-ταυτά Arist., Topica 152a.34-37

εἴναι γραμμήν τῇ περιφερείᾳ, ὁ δ’ Ἀρχιμήδης, τὴν διάμετρον, κοινωνεῖν τῆς περιφερείας: σκεπτέον οὖν, κἂν μὲν τῇ γραμμῇ ταύτὸν ὁ διάμετρος ἢ, φησίν Ἀρχιμήδης ἐναντία τῷ Νεῖλῳ τότε ἐι δὲ μὴ ταύτὸν ὁ διάμετρος τῇ γραμμῇ, οὐ τῷ Νεῖλῳ ψηφίζεται τὰ ἐναντία· οὔτε οὐ, οὔτ᾽ ἂλλος. Ανάγκη τοῖς ἐλέσθαι σε δυοῖν θάτερον καὶ ὁ ταύτων εἰπεῖν γραμμήν τε καὶ διάμετρον, ἢ ἔτερον ἂλλ᾽ ἵσα μὲν ἄλληλοις, οὐδαμῶς ἂν εἴποις σχῆμα γὰρ ὁ διάμετρος ἔχει, καὶ πέρατα, ἃν ἐφαπτομένη φαντάζεται, γραμμὴ δὲ, οὐδέτερον καὶ ᾗ μὲν διάμετρος, ἐστὶν ἐνεργεία γραμμῆς, ἢ δὲ γραμμήν, δυνάμεi διάμετρος, οὐκ ἐνεργεία· οὐκ ἂρα ταύτων. Ὁμοίως, ἔτερον ὁ διάμετρος τῇ γραμμῇ, καὶ μακρὰν ὁ Νείλος τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ παρὰ σοὶ νῦν ἑνστάσεως διό, καὶ καλῶς ποιῶν, ἀρχὴν ἔλεγες ἄρρητον αὐτῶν εἶναι λόγον· ἂει γὰρ τοῖς ὑποτέις, ἐφαρμόζεις τὰ ἄρρητα! Ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δίκαιον ἀνδρὶ σοφῶ, σοφὸν αἰτιᾶται παρὰ τὸ δέον· ἔλεγες δὲ αὐτὰ, καὶ τῶν ἑνδεχομένων μὲν,
οὕτω δὲ εὑρεθέντων. Ἡσθι οὖν, ὡς ὅν ἀχρι τοῦ νόν ἢ εὔφρεσις τῶν
μαθηματικῶν ἀδηλος, οὔδὲ ὑπάδια ἀν εἰς τὸ ἐξής γένοιτο· ἦραμχὺς
γάρ ὁ λοιπός, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις χρόνος: εἰ γάρ τι καὶ κοινωνεί
diάμετρος τῇ γραμμῇ, οὐδὲν τῶν ὑντων, ὅ μὴ τοιοῦτον, τί μεῖζον
εἰς ἀντίθεσιν ἀλόγου καὶ λογικοῦ; Ἀλλ’ ἦ ᾐσα, πρὸς ἀλληλα
κοινωνεὶ ἀλλ’ ἀπρεπὲς ἐν αὐτῷ λύειν, τὸν τής ἐναντιότητος
λόγον· οὔδὲν ὑκοῦν ἄτοπον, εἰ γραμμὴ περιφέρειαν, ὡς φησι
Neίλος, ἀκοινώνητον εἶναι, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ κοινωνεῖν κατὰ σέ.
Αλλὰ καὶ τούτῳ μοι ἀποκρίνου· διατί Νείλου, κὰν τῶν ἄλλων
συλλογισμῶ τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐννέα προβαλλομένου, ὁλίγοις
αὐτῶς ἐπιχειρεῖς αὐτῷ μάχεσθαι;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ὅ βουλομαι, καὶ ποιῶ· λέγε συλλογισμόν, ἄλλον.

ΚΛΡΥ

211. τοινύν KLV | 212. ἐξής P | 213. τί| τοι K | 214. τί| τὸ P | 217. οὐδὲν L | 219. τούτῳ
μοι| τούτῳ μοι codd. | 221. αὐτῶς L | 222. Κυδώνης-ἄλλον| signa in marg. K
ΘΩΜΑΣ. Ὁ Πατήρ, πρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν ἀναφέρεται καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα· τὸ μὲν, πατρότητι, τὸ δὲ, πνοὴ· αὐτὰ δὲ, πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα, ὁ μὲν, ύπότητι, ὁ δὲ ἐκκορεύσεις ἀλλ’ ἡ πατρότης καὶ ἡ πνοὴ, ἐν ἐστὶ πρόσωπον. Ἐν ἀρα, καὶ ἡ ύπότης, καὶ ἡ ἐκκορεύσεις, εἰ μὴ τις ἀντιθεσις ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐστὶ δὲ, ἡ αἰτία.

ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. Ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀνάγκης πρόσχημα ἢν, τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς, ἐνταῦθα δὲ, οὔδὲ τούτοις οἴεται δὲ ὁμοίως συνάγειν, μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν ύπότητα καὶ τὴν προβολήν, διακρίνειν τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα, ὅτι μηδὲ ἡ πατρότης, καὶ ἡ πνοὴ, δύο ποιεῖ πρόσωπα· ὥσπερ ἐν εἰς τις ἡμῖν, μὴ δύνασθαι

τὰ θεολογικά, τῶν μαθηματικῶν διακρίνεσθαι, ὅτι Ἱερόθεος, ἢ Διονύσιος, καὶ μαθηματικός, καὶ θεολόγος ἐκάτερος.

ΚΛΡV


[4.1] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ο δὲ, πρὸς ἐπος μὲν οὕδεν ἀποκρίνεται Διονύσιον δὲ, καὶ Ἱερόθεον εἰπὼν, μαθηματικά τέ τινα καὶ θεολογικα προσθεῖς, καὶ δειξας ἐκάτερον τῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ θεολόγον, καὶ μαθηματικόν, οίεται τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχειν ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως ὁ Θωμᾶς λέγει. Τὸ δ᾽ ὁμοιον συμβαίνει, καὶ ἐφ᾽ οὔ νῦν οὕτως λέγει ἡσπερ γὰρ ἡ θεολογία, καὶ ἡ μαθηματική, ἐννοοῦσα τῷ Ἱεροθέῳ, ἢ τῷ Διονυσίῳ, οὐ διαφοροῦσι τούτων ἐκάτερον εἰς δύο ἀνθρώπους, οὕτω, καὶ εἰ τίνα ἔσχεν ὁ ἐπορός μαθητήν, τῶν αὐτῶν τοιτῶν ἐπιστήμων, οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνος δημοτήθη εἰς δύο ὑποκείμενα ἀνθρώπων άλλ᾽ ἢν ἂν ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνθρώπως ἀμφοτέρας ἔχων τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἡσπερ καὶ ὁ τούτων διάδικος· καὶ οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ μαθητής μάλλον ἢ ἡτὸν διεκρίνετο, κατὰ τὴν προσωπικὴν διάκρισιν. Οὕτω τοινυν, εἰ με δεὶ τοιμὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐλαθεν ὁ ἄνήρ, δι᾽ ἃν ἐπεχειρησεν ἀντειπειν, μάλλον συνεπών, τῷ τοῦ Θωμᾶ λόγῳ, ἢ ἐλέγξας αὐτὸν. Προσπαραγαγάφει δὲ τινὰς καὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχους, οὐς δι᾽ εὐτέλειαν, εἰς εὐθυνᾶς ἄγειν παρέλκουν.

ΚLPV


298
ΧΡΥΣΩΛΩΡΑΣ. Ὅρας; Σοὶ μᾶλλον, τὰ πρὸς ἀπάτην ἀληθῶς ἐπεται, ὡς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀτόπων βουλευόμενῳ συνηγορεῖν, καὶ δικαιώς· τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν σοι τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων, ὥμοιαν ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, πέρατε ὑβρίς γὰρ ἐκάτερον, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ὅπερ, ὡς σοφὸς μόνον, οἶος αὐτός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πόρῳ σοφίας, ἥμεστα πρέπον σὺ δὲ χαίρεις, πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοῖς εἶτα, καὶ διαβάλλεις, ἄλλον, ὡς αὐτός, βουλευόμενον καὶ ἀγνοοῦντα μὲν, ἕπεται, οὐ κατανοοῦντα δὲ, καὶ τὸν αὐτῷ γε διαλεγόμενον καὶ ταυτὰ φθέγγεσθαι τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ Θωμᾶ.

Εὗρε, μηδὲ τὸν σκοπὸν εἶναι τοῦ διαλεγομένου, ὅν οὗτος τὴν ἐνστασίν ἀπαιτεῖ διό, σὺ μᾶλλον, καὶ Θωμᾶ, καὶ Νείλῳ, καὶ σαῦτῷ μαχόμενος ἁμα εἰ, τοὺς ἰσοῖς ὑψιζώμενος ἁνίσα, καὶ ἐξεῖν αὐτοῖς ἱσον, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον ὁμως, ἢ ἀντίκειται, ἢ συμφωνεῖ Θωμᾶ Νείλος ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἐπεῖ, ἀδύνατον ἐκάτερα, ἀληθεύειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοήματι, ἀμα τοῦ οὖν, δυοί ἔλοι θάτερον· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐρεῖς ἀληθές, ἢς ἀντίκειται, ψεῦδος ἀνάγκη τῷ, «συμφωνεῖ·» εἰ δὲ τῷ ὑπερευον ἀληθές, ψεῦδος τὸ πρῶτον. Ἀλλὰ σὺ, τοῖς αὐτοῖς

ΚΛPV

τὸν αὐτὸν ἑφαρμόζεις, καὶ συνηγορεῖν καὶ ἀντιλέγειν ὀμολογεῖς τῷ Θωμᾶ, ἃ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτων, ἡ ἀμφοτέρων ὑβριζεῖς, ὅπερ οὐ δίκαιον. Ἡ δὲ καὶ φής ἄτοπα, Θωμᾶν αἰτιῶ, πάντων αἰτίων ὄντα· καὶ σαῦτον ἰσως ἐν υστέρῳ, τοῖς ἐκείνου

50 παραβαλλόμενον ὁ δὲ Νείλος, οὐδενὸς ὅλος αἰτιῶς.

[4.2] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἕμοι μὲν, ἡ φωνὴ τοῦ γεννᾶν καὶ προβάλλειν, οὐχ ἴκανή πρὸς διάκρισιν, ὕιοῦ τε καὶ Πνεύματος.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Σοι καὶ Θωμᾶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἡ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑμᾶς πείθεσθαι ἀναγκαίον;

55 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἡμᾶς ἀνάγκη, τοῖς πάλαι πλήν, οὐκ ἐσμέν, ἐγὼ τε καὶ Θωμᾶς μόνοι, ἀλλὰ πλῆθος ἀπειρον ἰσως.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Πάσιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἄν ἀρμόσει λόγος.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αλλ’ οὐδὲ τούτοις ἡ φωνὴ πείθει.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀρεσκέτωσαν οὖν, τῷ κύκλῳ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν ἀγίων, ἡ μάλλον, ὁ κύκλος αὐτοῖς ἐκείνων, μηδενὸς ἄλλου δεόμενος

51-52. Ἕμοι·Πνεύματος] cf. Dem. Cyd., Defensio, l. 119.1: ταῦτα γὰρ κωλύειν τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ γεννᾶν καὶ προβάλλειν πρός ἄστων διακρίνειν


πείθει] sign. in marg. K ‖ τούτως K
εἰς διάκρισιν, τῶν θείων ἐκείνων προσώπων καὶ θαυμαστῶν· οὐ λόγων ἐπιστήμης ἐν ἄποδείξει, οὐ τὸ δώτιν· οὗ διαλεκτικῶν τινῶν, οὐ τῶν ἐπιστήμων, οὐ τῶν φυσικῶν ὑπονόμως τῶν ὄντων. Καὶ μαρτυρεῖ Διονύσιος, ἢ πηγὴ τῆς θεολογίας φωνή μεγάλη, τῇ πηγῇ, τὰ θεία πρόσωπα διακρίνεσθαι· ἐτι, μόνη πηγαία θεώτητας, ὁ Πατήρ καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἔτερος· ὡς ὁ Υἱός ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός, οὕτω καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός· πλὴν γε δὴ τοῦ τρόπου τῆς ὑπάρξεως· καὶ αὐτοὶς εὐθὺς, πάντες ἔπονται· πλὴν, ύμεις μόνοι. ΑΛΛ᾽ ὁμοι, ἐπτὰ γενομένων ἐν τῷ παρόντι συνολογισμῷ Νείλῳ τῶν ἑπιχειρημάτων, ἕνι καὶ μόνῳ σὺ πο-πλεμεῖς, παρακαλυφάμενος, τάλλα, ὅπως ἐγώ ἐνός μνημονεύεις καὶ μόνος· παύσωμαι· εἰ τις θοῖτα, ἡσύχασε· πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἐκπόρευσα, καὶ μέσον αὐτῶν πατρότητας καὶ τελευτάιον πνοήν· οὐκ ἐξελέγχει σαφῶς· τὸ σὸν ἄξιωμα, καὶ Θωμᾶ· Σὺ δ᾽ ἐκών αὐτῶν· οὐ μνημονεύειν ἑθέλεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνός· μόνου· καὶ τοῦτον, μετὰ πολλῆς ἐβρείας, καὶ τύφων· ἐν τῷ μακαρίῳ Νείλῳ· ὅπερ· ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ· χαλεπῶν.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ταῦτα μὲν, ἐατέον. Ακούομεν· δὲ, συνολογισμόν ἐπερον.

ΚΛΡV

64-65. τῇ-διακρίνεσθαι cf. Ps.-Dion. Areop., Divin. nom., 2, § 5, p. 128.8-13 II 65-66. μόνη-

64-67. τῇ-ὑπάρξεως] signa in marg. KLV I 69, ἐπτὰ K II 71. ταῖ ἄλλα LP II 73. εξελέγχει
[5] Συλλογισμός τέταρτος <περὶ θείας διακρίσεως>

ΘΩΜΑΣ. Τὰ εἰς ἐν τῷ κοινὸν συνιόντα, εἰ πρὸς ἄλληλα διακρίνοντο, ἀνάγκη, διαφοραίς καθ’ αὐτάς, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς διακρίνεσθαι οἴνον, ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος ὁ Υἱὸς ἄρα καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός ὄντα, τῇ καθ’ αὐτὸ αἰτίᾳ διακριθήσεται, οἶνον, τῇ αἰτίᾳ.

ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. Κοινὸν μὲν Υἱῷ καὶ Πνεύματι, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός, ἁληθῆς· ὁτι δὲ ἡ τοῦ ἄνθρωπου καὶ ἵππου διαφορὰς ἐπὶ Υἱῷ καὶ Πνεύματος ἐποθήκει τοῦτο λαβῶν; Ἕπειτα, καὶ ἡ διαφορὰς εἰς τὰ ζῶα, οὐκ ἐν ἄπασιν ἁληθῆς· αἰτίκα, κρίσις καὶ τράγος, εἰς ἐν τῷ κοινὸν ἔχεται τὸ ζῶον.

Ἐτὶ, Πέτρος καὶ Ἄνθρεας, ἐκ τοῦ Ἰωάννα, ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ἄνθρωπου, διακρίνονται μὲν· ποὺ δὲ ἡ καθ’ αὐτῷ διαφορά;

[5.1] ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Ἐκ παντὸς βουλόμενος ἀντειπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ πάντῃ λόγῳ κεχωρίσαται τὴν ἀντιλογίαν αὐτῷ, χρησίμων αὐτῷ, πάλιν εὑρίσκει τὸν κρίσιν || καὶ τὸν τράγον. Καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ πρόδηλον εἶναι τῶν ζώων τούτων διαφοράν, ἀναφεῖν ὀιείται τὸν καθόλου λόγον.

KLPV


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ὅρας: Ὄψεις πρὸ τῶν ἐνστάσεων ἀπαντᾷ.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἔγω δ’ ὅπερ φθάσας εἶπον, τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ἕρως ὅτι, οὐ διά τὴν διαφορὰν ἐπ’ ἐνίων ἄδηλον ἡμῖν εἶναι, δεὶ καὶ τοὺς προδήλους τῶν λόγων ἀναφεῖν ἀλλὰ ἐπειτείν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἴσως, εὐφημεῖτο τις.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις: πλήν, ἐρώ κάγω πάλιν, ἀ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον· ὅσπερ γὰρ ἀτοπον ἀναφείσθαι τὸν καθόλου λόγον διὰ τοῦ μέρους τὴν ἄγνοιαν, οὔτως οὐδὲν αὖθις ἐλάττων διαφορὰν εἰπεῖν, οίς οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἐνδεχέται. Δήδειται οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτὰ πρότερον, ἂς δυνατὸν ἦν.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ ὡς γὰρ, πάσης διαφοράς ἀναφορωμένης, εἰς ταύτων, ἐξεῖ τὰ πράγματα.
30 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν εἰς χείρον ἀνάγκη, φέρεσθαι πάντα, οἶς, οὐ προσήκον αὐτῆς κειμένης.

ΚΛΡΒ


Κυδώνης. Ἀλλὰ νῦν, εἰς τὸ τοῦ τετραπόδου γένος ἀναγαγόντες, ἢ, εἰ τι ἄλλο προσεχέστερον, κάκειν ταῖς καθ’ αὐτὸ διαιρούσαις τοῦτο διαφοράς διελόντες, εὐφήσομεν, καὶ οἶς, τὰ ἡμα ταῦτα διακρίνομεν καὶ τὸν Ἀνδρέαν δὲ καὶ τὸν Πέτρον, τῷ λογικῷ, καθὼς φησὶ, κοινωνοῦντας, ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλήλοις διακρίνομεν.

Χρυσόλορας. Ἡδοὺ ἤ καὶ πάλιν ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐστε, ἀποτειχώς χείρονι γάρ τῶν διακρίσεων ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἢ, τοῖς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ συλλογισμῷ φαινομένῳ ἐνέτυχε· ἐκεί γὰρ τὸν κριόν καὶ τὸν τράγον ἀνεπισκέπτως ἁγριόν ἡμέρῳ, καὶ μαλακῶς τὸ σκηνήριον, καὶ τὸ πώγωνα φύειν, καὶ ψυλόν εἶναι, διακρίνειν ἐβουλεύουσας γενναίως· καὶ δεδεχθαι τῇ ἀλήθεια, μὴ καλῶς γε διακεκρίσθαι. Ἐνταῦθα δὲ, οὐδὲ τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν, εἰς τὸ γένος τῶν τετραπόδων ἀναγαγόν, διακρίνεις, Πέτρον δὲ καὶ Ἀνδρέαν, τῷ λογικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ παχῦ τοῦ σώματος ἃμα προσίεσαι διακρίνειν· ὁ, τῶν προτέρων οὐ μόνον ἐπίτωτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ

ΚLPV

32-37. εἰς-διακρίνομεν| Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 119r.28-30

39-43. vide supra, [2.1]. [2.2] et [2.3]

32-37. Κυδώνης-διακρινομεν| signa in marg. KL: illeg. V || 35. τῶν| τὸν L || 42. πώγωνα| πῶγωνα P || 43. διακεκρίσθαι| διακεκρίσται L || 44. μὲν bis acc. L
γελοίον· οὔτε γὰρ τὴν παρούσαν διάκρισιν ὑράμεν ἑναντίαν, τῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φερομένῳ γένει· κριός γὰρ καὶ τράγος, ἐκάτερον ἄλογον, καὶ οὐσία, καὶ ἰόν, καὶ ἐμψυχον· ὡμοῖς, Ἀνδρέας καὶ Πέτρος, ἐκάτερος λογικός· καὶ οὐσία, καὶ ἰόν· ὁ δὲ Θωμᾶς, οὐ τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτὴν ἔλεγε τῶν ἑναντίων τὴν καθ’ αὐτὸ· ἀλλὰ δῆλον, ὡς τὴν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ βοῶς, ἡ λογικοῦ καὶ ἄλογου, ἡ ἐμψυχοῦ καὶ ἀψύχου, ἡ τινῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοῖς ὡμοῖον· οὔτω γὰρ ἐν τῇ θέσει τοῦ θωμᾶ κεῖται ἀ, σὺ μὲν ἑκὼν παρατρέχεις, εἰσάγεις δὲ, τὰ βραχύ τι πρὸς ἀλληλα διαφέροντα· καὶ τῇ καθ’ ἠ αὐτὸ διακρίνειν βουλεύσει διαφορά, οἰς, οὐδὲν κοινὸν καὶ Θωμᾶ· διό, τὰ σὰ τῆς διακρίσεως δόγματα, συμφωνεῖ μᾶλλον ἀλληλος, ἡ ὅλως ἑναντιοῦται εἰδε γὰρ καὶ μόνον αὐτὰ διακρίνεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον, οἰς, οὐ καθ’ αὐτὰ πέφυκεν ἡ διάκρισις· τὸ δὲ τετράτους αὐτῶν οὐ μακράν ὀλίγον. Ὄθεν, ἀπορώ τοιοῦτον ὄντα σὲ, τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦντα· ἂ, σοὶ μὲν ἀσύμφωνα, ἦμιν δὲ πάλιν, οὐκ ἑναντία. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὅσον ἐμὲ εἰδέναι, οἴμαι σε ψηφίζεσθαι ταῦτ’ ἡμῖν, οὖχ ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ δίκαια, ἀλλ’ ἀποπειράσθαι καὶ μόνον, ὅπερ, οὐ δίκαιον.
65 [5.2] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αλλά τὸ γεννάν καὶ προβάλλειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν, οὐκ εἰς τὸν Πατέρα, ὥσπερ εἰς κοινὸν γένος συνίασο καὶ πάλιν, τὸ Πατρὸς, καὶ Υἱὸν γένος οἰεσθαι τὸν Θεόν, λιαν ἐστίν ἡν<ἀν>επίσκεπτον.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΑΡΣ. Ἀληθή λέγεις πλήν, ἀνάθες τὴν αἰτίαν τῷ διδασκάλῳ σοι καὶ σαῦτάρ τῷ μὲν, ὡς πεποιημένω τὴν αὐτοῦ θέσιν, ἀτοπον σοι δὲ, ὡς ἐπιλαθομένω τῶν σῶν.
67 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐκ ἔχος θαδίως αὐτῶν μεμνήσθαι, ὅν, ἐπελαθόμην ἐμών.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΑΡΣ. Ἐν οἷς νομοθετῶν ἐλεγες τα εἰς ἐν τί κοινὸν συνιόντα, ὥσπερ εἰς γένος ἀνάγεται γνώμομος ἡ φωνή σοι καὶ δήλῳ διό, σαῦτάρ αἰτίως μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡμᾶς, δικαίως τοῖς ἀτόποις καὶ συνηγοφεῖν καὶ θαρεῖν βουλευόμενον εἰδισταί γὰρ σοι πρὸ τῶν ἠλλάν αὐτά καὶ μέμφεσθαι μὲν τὴν ἀρχήν οἰς διαλέγῃ καὶ παραλογίζεσθαι δὲ, καὶ καταψηφίζεσθαι τελευταῖον.
68 Ἀλλ' ὅμως, κὰν τούτω πάλιν ἑρῶ διατί Νεῖλος ἐν τῷ παρόντι συλλογισμῷ, ἐνὶ καὶ δεκάτῳ χρῆται προβλήμασι, σὺ δὲ, ὀλίγος τοῦ Νεῖλου πάνυ τοι καταχρῆτω;
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὔτω μοι δοκεὶ βέλτιον. Ἐφι τοίνυν, εἰπὲ συλλογισμὸν ἐτερον.

KL PV


306
[6] Συλλογισμός πέμπτος <περί θείας διακρίσεως>

ΘΩΜΑΣ. Η γέννησις και ἡ προβολή, πρόοδοι διαφέρουσαν· αἱ, ἡ, τῇ ἁρχῇ, ως τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἴδος ζώων, ἡ, τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, ως ἴσπον ἢ τούτου γένεσις, ἢ ἐκεῖνον τοῖς δὲ ὄροις, ως ἢ τοῦ ἴσπον διαφορά, τῆς τοῦ βασικοῦ. Η τοῦ Πνεύματος ἀρα πρόοδος, οὔ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ Υίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἰπ. 5

ΝΕΙΛΟΣ: Περὶ μὲν Υίου καὶ Πνεύματος, ἀληθῆς, ἢ ἐλάττων, ἢ δὲ μείζων, ψευδής· ἐν τοῖς οὕσι δὲ, τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. 10

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀρχόμενος τῆς ἀνασκευής, τὸ μὲν διαφόρους εἶναι τας τοῦ Υίου καὶ Πνεύματος προόδους, ἐλάττωνοι οὕσιν πρὸς τας, συγχωρεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς· περὶ δὲ τῆς μείζονος ἔρωτα, ποθεν, ταύτην λαβὼν ὁ Θωμᾶς εἰς τὸν βιον εἰσήγηγε; Καὶ ὃς μὴτε παρὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος, μήτε παρὰ τῶν τῆς ἐκκλησίας διδασκάλων ἀκούσαντα, ἄρταγα καλεί, καὶ κακούργουν· ἀφ’ ἕαυτοῦ ταύτην παρενείραντα, τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τοῦ Πνεύματος.

ΚΛΠΒ


307
ΧΡΥΣΩΛΩΡΑΣ. Καὶ ἀληθεύειν εἰτε ἵνα ἑλάττονος εἰτε μείζονος
ψευδομένης προτάσεως, ἀδύνατον εἰναι συλλογισμόν τέλειον· καὶ
tοῦτο, δήλον παντὶ σὺ δέ, τίνι τὸ παρὸν ἀνασκευάζας χρώμενος;
Λόγοις ἀγίων, ἣ, καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτῆς; Πάντως, οὐδέτερον
εἰποῖς ἀν’ ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυσὶ μέν, ἢ καὶ τούτων ἐν, πάντας πείθεσθαι
ἀναγκαίον σὲ μόνον, ὡσπερ ἐκτὸς τῆς φύσεως ὄντα, βλέπομεν
αὐτοῖς οὐ πειθόμενον Νεῖλον δὲ καὶ μόνου, μάλα κατιγκούντα,
ὡς τὰ περὶ τὸν Θεομᾶν ἀνασκευάζοντος, οὐ καλῶς ὡσπερ ἡ λύσις
ην, ἡ κατιγκοία: τὸ δέ, παντὶ ἀν ἐιράδιον, βουλομένω
μέμφεσθαι τοῖς δὲ σοφοὶς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὶς, χαλεπῶν. Οὐκοῦν, εἰπὲ
τῶν ὑβρεῶν τὰ λοιπὰ, ἃ, Νεῖλος μὲν, οὐδαμῶς ἀκούει, σὺ δέ, καὶ μετὰ
σοῦ γε, Θεός.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ τοιοῦτος δὴ τισι, σεμνολογεῖται· καὶ ζῆλον
ἐπιδεικνυται θαυμαστόν, τὸ εἰσθῶς κάντανθα ποιῶν· ὅταν
ἀπολογιας ὀπωσοῦν δοκοῦσης τι λέγειν, οὐκ εὔπορη, ἐπὶ τὸ
κρύφιον καὶ ἀπόφρητον τῆς θεότητος καταφεύγων, καὶ φάσκων

ΚΛΡΥ


μὴ δειν περὶ Θεοῦ τολμᾶν ἐννοεῖν τι, ἢ φθέγγεσθαι πέρα τοῦ δέοντος, ὅταν αὐτῷ δοκῇ γενόμενος εὐσεβῆς, καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῇ παρὰ καὶ ρόν εὐλαβείᾳ συγκέχον ἐπεὶ, ἰχνους γέ τινος ἀνασκευής λαμβανόμενος, καὶ τὴν τῶν χελιδόνων λαλιάν παρελαύνει τά μέν,  

L 43v 35  παραλογιζόμενος, τά δέ, σοφιζόμενος, τά δέ, ψευδόμενος περιφανῶς καὶ κατὰ τῶν δήλων, ἀνασχυντῶν ἔστι δὲ ὅτε, καὶ  

µετ’ ἀδείας νομοθετῶν, οἶον, ἔστι καὶ τὸ παρόν ποιοῦ γὰρ, οὐκ αὐθαδέστερον νόμου, ἐπιτάττειν, μη δεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀντῶν ἐπὶ τὴν  

τῶν θείων γνώσιν ἀνάγεσθαι, μηδ’ ἐντεύθεν ἐνδείξεις ἐπ’ ἐκείνα  

κομίζειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, μηδὲ ὅκενειν ἐπιτιμάν καὶ Θωμά ταύτη  

χρωμένῳ πρὸς Θεὸν τῇ ἀνόδῳ; Καὶ ἂς ἐοικε ταύτα λέγων, σαφῶς  

tοῦ δημιουργοῦ τὴν κτίσιν ἀλλοτρίῳ, μηδεμίαν παντελῶς πρὸς  

ἐκεῖνον καταλυπάνων τοῖς κτίσμασιν ὁμοιότητα —καίτοι παντὸς  

tεχνίτου, τὸ ἐν τῆς αὐτῶ τέχνης εἰδος βουλομένου τοῖς ἀποτελέσμασι,  

καθόσον δυνατὸν ἐντιθέναι —, ὡς ἐντεύθεν καὶ τὸ περὶ  

KLPV

34. χελιδόνων λαλιάν] cf. Aeschylum, Agamemnon 1050-1051
31. ἐννοεῖν P 34. χελιδόνων L 1 µὲν bis acc. L 1 35. δὲ1 bis acc. L 1 36. δὲ2 bis acc. L 1 37. ποιούν P 38. µὴ L 1 τὴν] deest K 1 39. µηδ’] µὴ δ’ LP; µὴ δ’ KV 1 40. διατοῦ KLV 1 44. τῆς] τοῖς P
Θεοῦ τί λέγειν, ἢ ἐννοεῖν, παντελῶς ἀναιρεῖσθαι οὐ, φύσει οἱ ἀνθρώποι πάντες ὄρεγονται, τῆς θείας εἰκόνος, καθ’ ἥν γεγόνασιν, ἐπὶ τούτο αὐτοὺς ἐπειγούσης. Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πολλὰ ἀτόπα τῇ δόξῃ ταύτῃ ἄκολουθεί, τῇ μὴ διὰ τῶν κτισμάτων, ὅσον ἐφεκτὸν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὸν Θεὸν ἀνάγεσθαι συγχωρούσῃ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἄξιοι, περὶ τῶν θείων καὶ ὑπερφυῶν τί λέγειν, αὐτὸς πρῶτος, σιγάτω τοὺς ἄλλους τῷ καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ὑποδείγματι σωφρονίζων καὶ ἡμεῖς, χάριν αὐτῷ τῆς σημείως ταύτης εἰσόμεθα εἰκασίας τοσαύτης, ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάττοντι εἰ δ’ ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀκαθέκτως ἵνα πρὸς τὸ θεολογεῖν, ὡς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων καὶ ἀνομιοστάτων τῷ Θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ θεολογίαν ύψαίειν, δίκαιος ἄν εἰ καὶ Θωμᾶ συγγνώμην διδόναι, πειρωμένω διὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ περὶ τὸν δημιουργόν ταύτης ἐνδείκνυσθαι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ λίαν θαυμάζω, τί ἂν σοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων εἴποιμι, καὶ τί ἂν αὐτὰ καλοίμεν· ἐπιχειρήματα, ἢ λύσεις?

ΚLPV

50. ἀναγεσθαι L I post cor. συγχωροῦσῃ (ἐκ συγχωροῦσί) L II 54. εἰκασίας D] δικαιολογίας codd. I 56. αὐτοῦ KPV II 57. ἂν bis acc. L I διδόναι συγγνώμην KPV II 60. ἂν bis acc. L.
Δοκεὶ μοι, τούτων, οὐδέτερον ἀληθές· ὃρις γὰρ ἀπαντᾷ καὶ μόνη πρὸς ὅν γὰρ ἢ ἤ δίκαιον λόγοις ἁγίων ἐνίστασθαι, ἡ συλλογισμοῖς, ἢ καὶ πιθανοῖς μόνοις, σοὶ τούτων ἐμέλησεν οὐδενός, ἄλλα ψυλῆς και μόνης κατηγορίας, δὴ αὐτῆς οἰομένῳ τὸν μακαρίων ἐξελέγξαι τὴν ἡμῶν ἡμῖν, τούτων, οὐδὲνός ἀλληλῶς· ὑβρις γὰρ ἀπαντᾷ καὶ μόνης κατηγορίας, δὴ αὐτῆς οἰομένῳ τὸν μακαρίων ἐξελέγξαι τὴν ἡμῶν ἡμῖν, τούτων, οὐδὲνός ἀλληλῶς· 

Neilon καὶ ὁ ἄρτιός σοφὸν καὶ ἀρετὴ χρώμενον ὑμολόγεις, νῦν, παντοίαις πλύνεις ταῖς ὑβρεις. Περὶ ὁν ἡμῖν, οὐδὲ ἀπολογεῖσθαι χρεῶν, ἵνα μὴ σοὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς περιτέσωμεν· καὶ οἶς ἀγανακτοῦμεν, αὐτοῖς παραβάλλωμεν· μικρὸν δὲ καὶ μόνον εἰπόντες, παυσόμεθα. Ἐρεῖς, ἀνεπισκέπτως Νείλον ἀντιλέγειν Θωμᾶ· σὺ δὲ, σαῦτον ἐπιτηδέαν, οἷει Νείλῳ δικαίως. Σκεπτέον οὖν· ὁ μὲν Νείλος, ἐννέα τῶν προβλημάτων ψηφίζει Θωμᾶ, ὁν· ἐκαστον, θαυμάστων· σὺ δὲ, κατὰ Νείλου, πόσας τῶν ἐνστάσεων ἐτοιμασάμενος εἰ, τῷ παρόντι συλλογισμῷ· Πάντως, ἔρεις, οἰδεμίαν, ἢ, μίαν ἱσώς, καὶ μόνην, οὐκ οὔσαν, ἄλλα δοκοῦσαν· ἢ δέ ἐστίν, ὡς οὐ καλῶς ὁ Νείλος τῷ Θωμᾷ τάς ἐνστάσεις λογίζεται. Τὸ δὲ, οὐ λύεις, ἄλλα μάλλον.
ἀναίρεσις διαλέγεσθαι βουλευομένω καὶ οὐδὲ σοφοῖς δρόμος· εἰς γάρ καὶ μόνος ἐφάνη πάλαι τοῦτο ποιών, ἀναιρών ἀπαντα, καὶ μηδὲν εἰπεῖν ἔτερον ἐν αὐτοῖς βουλευομένους, ὅσιος, καὶ κακίζεται σὺ οὖν, ἐκεῖνος, νῦν ἐσικεῖς ἀναιρεῖς γὰρ τινὰ τοῦ Νείλου πλήν, οὐ σὺν ἐπιστήμῃ. Τὸ δ’ αἰτιον, ὅτι σοι πολλὴ μὲν ἡ προθυμία, ὀλίγη δὲ κατ’ ἐκείνου δύναμις πέφυκε· καὶ σὺ μὲν, τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ὡς ἀπιθάνων τῷ Νείλῳ καταφρονεῖς, ὡς ἐρείπες, τὸ δέ, οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἐπεὶ λαβὼν τὸ βραχύτατον ἀντιλογίας, πολλοὺς καὶ μεγάλους τοὺς ἀγώνας εἰσάγεις, τῶν δὲ, βραχὺ καὶ μόνον ἀπτόμενος, παύῃ καὶ τούτῳ, ἐστὶ σοι τὸ πλέον κατηγορία, ἄλλαις ἐξ ἄλλων ἡδὴ χρωμένως κατηγορίας, καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων οὐδόλως, οὐδένα λόγον πεποιημένων ἀρχῆς ἡμᾶς ανάγκη σιγῆ, αἰών, τῇ πρὸς σὲ χρωμένους. Ὅ δὲ καὶ φῆς, ἀκαθέκτως περὶ τὴν θεολογίαν ἐκείνον ἐχεῖν συλλογισμοῖς χρώμενον, οὐδὲν ἀτοπον. Ὄρα γὰρ, πότε, καὶ πρὸς τίνας, καὶ πῶς, αὐτῷ χρῆται· πρὸς υἱὸς, καὶ μετρίως, καὶ τὸν καθαρὸν τοῦ πολέμου.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ σοι δίκαιον ἐδοξέ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀψεθαί καὶ τῆς μακαρίας Παρθένου, ἐν τούτῳ, σιγῆν ἡμᾶς, οὐ χρεών. ||

ΚΛΡΥ

82. ἐρείς post cor. (ex ἐρεῖς) V || 84. δὲ bis acc. L || 92. ἀψεθαί K
[6.1] <Περί τῆς παρθενίας τῆς Θεοτόκου>

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τήν ἀγίαν ἐγὼ Παρθένον· Ἡι μηδὲν ἰσον ἐν τῷ παρόντι, καὶ ἡ, τὰ χερσοβιμὶ ὑπερβέβηκε; Μή γενοίτο!

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Καὶ ὡς έοικεν, ἄκον ἡψω, τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγων καὶ ἡ, συνηγορεῖν ἐθέλων ἰσως τῷ κακῷ διδασκάλῳ σοι, ἡ, καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, οὔδεν ἐὰν ἐθέλων ἀνεπηρέαστον. Λέγε δ’ οὐ ὃμως, ὡσα σοι περὶ αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δοκεῖ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῆν μακαρίαν Μαρίαν, παρθένον τὲ εἶναι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μητέρα, οὔδεν τῷ λόγῳ λυμαίνεται ὁ γὰρ τῆς παρθενίας λόγος, τῷ τῆς μητρὸς, οὐκ ἀντίκειται καθ’ αὐτὸν ἀλλ’ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώπων, ἀντικεισθαι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο συμβαίνειν· οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων ἀντίθεσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀσθένειαν, ὡσπερ, καὶ ἡ μετὰ τὴν στέρησιν, ἔξις, τῇ μὲν φύσει, ἀδύνατος, μείζονι δὲ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἀδύνατον. Επεὶ τοίνυν, τῷ τῆς παρθενίας λόγῳ, οὐχ ὁ τῆς μητρὸς, ἀλλ’ ὁ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐστιν ἀντικείμενος, οὔδεν ἀπλῶς ἀδύνατον, τὴν παρθένον, εἶναι

KLAV


[6.1] 2. τα-ὑπερβήκης] cf. Thom. Aquin., ST, 1a, q. 25, a. 6 arg. 4: Beata etiam virgo Maria est super omnes choros Angelorum exaltata

καὶ μητέρα, τῆς θείας δυνάμεως τούτῳ ποιούσης, ἢ, μηδὲν ἀδύνατον. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, διὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀσθένειαν, καὶ τὸ μηδέτερον τῶν γονέων ἁρκεῖν ἵδια πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τέκνου γέννησιν, ἀδύνατον δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀντίθεσιν περιέχει. Οὐς εἰ γε ἀπλῶς ὁ τόκος τῇ παρθενίᾳ, ἀντέκειτο, οὐδὲν ὁ θεός τούτῳ ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲν ἄν ὁ θεός τούτῳ ἐποίησεν, ποιήσας τὸν Θεόν συνελθεῖν, ὡσπερ, οὔδὲ τὸ, τὴν αὐτὴν κατὰ ταύταν εἶναι παρθένον, καὶ ἐφθαρμένην, οὔδὲ μητέρα, καὶ εἴ ἄρχης, ἀεὶ ἄρχον ὁ γὰρ Θεός, πάντα μὲν ἀπλῶς δύναται, πλὴν, ὅν, οἱ λόγοι, ἀντιφατικῶς εἰσίν ἀντικείμενοι. Καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς δὲ, ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν τῷ προσώπῳ, Θεός, καὶ ἀνθρωπος, ἄλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ ταύταν, τῇ φύσει, οὐ γὰρ ἤ φύσι Θεός, ταύτη καὶ ἀνθρωπος· οὐκ ἄρα, ὡς φησι, καὶ τούτῳ τοῦ Θωμᾶ τραχύ καὶ ἀγροικον, ἄλλα καὶ λίαν προσηνεῖς, καὶ φιλόσοφον.
30 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Κρείττον σοι τού παρόντος ἀφίστασθαι διηγήματος· ἐγὼ γὰρ, τῆς μακαρίας Παρθένου τὸν λόγον ἁμην ἀπεσκεπάσαι μόνης, ὁ δὲ, καὶ Θεοῦ ἐγὼ δὲ, καὶ τάναντο νομίζω τοῖς λεγομένοις, καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγξῳ, τῷ δυνατῷ τρόπῳ καὶ ὁν ὑν φής προσηνῇ τε καὶ λίαιν φιλόσοφον, ὁμός μόνον τολμηρός τε καὶ ἀφιλόσοφος, ἀλλὰ καὶ γελοῖος, τῷ γε νοῦν ἐξετάσει τολμηρά γὰρ τὰ σά, καὶ δεινὰ πάνυ, καὶ ἀξιωματὰ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ τῆς ἀληθείας, ἦκιστα φίλα γεννᾶ δὲ, τρία ὑπ' ὅν, τὸ μὲν, ἀτοπον, καὶ τολμηρὸν μόνον, τὸ δὲ, τολμηρότερον τε καὶ ἀτοπώτερον τὸ δὲ τελευταίον, ἀπορώ, τί ἀν καλέσαιμι; Ἐστι γὰρ καὶ τῶν δύο χείρων τὸ γὰρ Θεοῦ οὐ δύνασθαι τάναντα ποιεῖν ἐφ' ἐνι συνδραμεῖν, ἀποτελοῖτο. Καὶ Παύλου μὲν ὁ μεγαλοφωνότατος, ἐν, ἐλεγε μόνον, ἀδύνατον τῷ Θεῷ, τὸ ἕαυτὸν ἀφείσθαι καὶ σοι νῦν, ἄλλην ἀδύναμιν ἐξεγένετο λέγειν, Θεῷ, τοὺς λόγους τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐφαρμόζειν ἀλλήλοις οὐ δύνασθαι, μείζονος Παύλου χάριτος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐντυχόντι.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ποῦ ταῦτα ἐγερές;
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ὡσπον Θεὸν ἔλεγες πάντα δύνασθαι, πλὴν, ἃν οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶν ἀντικείμενοι. Ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν αὐτὰ βουλόμενος ἐπεσθαί τῷ Φιλοσόφῳ, Ἀλαῖς Θεός δὲ, πολὺ τούτοι πάντως πρεσβύτερος, καὶ μηδὲν παραβάλλεσθαι δυνάμενος πώποτε· καὶ Θεῷ μὲν ἀπαντας, αὐτὸν δὲ προσήκον, ἀκολουθεῖν οὐδὲνί. Ἀλλῳ δὲ τούτων ἄλλως ἄλλων οἰομένων τῷ τρόπῳ, κίνδυνος, οὐ μικρὸς, οὐδὲ τὸ κακόν μέτριον· θεῖον, δεικτέον, οὐδὲν ἀλήθες σοι τῶν λεγομένων. Οὐ ψυχρῷ μὲν θεμόν, ὑγρῷ δὲ τὸ ξηρὸν ἐναντίον;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ναι.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Πῶς οὖν ἀρμόζεται, γῇ μὲν, οὕση ψυχρῷ τὸ τύρ, ἀέρι δὲ, ὑδὼρ; Τὰ μὲν, διὰ τῶν μέσων, τὰ δὲ, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἄκρων, καὶ ἄστερ ἄκρας ἀντικείμενα, οὕτως ἀρρήτῳ λόγῳ, πάλιν ἄκραν αὐτοῖς συμφωνίαν ὁρώμεν.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αλλὰ ἀπλὰ ταῦτα.

ΚΛΠV

47-48. Θεον-ἀντικείμενοι vide supra, [6.1] 24-25

54. ψυχρῷ-ἐναντίον] cf. Arist., De generatione et corruptione 329b.17-31

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Εἰ τοῖς μονοειδέσιν αὐτά, πολλῷ ἀν μᾶλλον τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔποιοι συνθέτοις, ζῷοι ἀπασιν· ἄν ἐκαστον, σώμα καὶ τὰς ὀλας ἀλλήλας ἀντικειμένας ἐν ὅλῳ δυνάμεις ἀφρήτῳ φωνῇ συνέχει· καὶ φαίνεται τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις σαφῶς ἵππως, καὶ λογικοῦ πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῷ ζῷῳ εἶναι.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὰ μὲν, οὐκ ἐνεργεία, δυνάμει δὲ μόνον ἐν τῷ ζῷῳ.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀληθεύεις. Ἀλλὰ τι ἀν εἴποις, ἐπιθυμίας πέρι καὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ, ἄ, καὶ ἄλογα; Καὶ τῷ λογιστικῷ σύνεστιν ἄει, ἢ μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἀκοφέστερον, αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ἄμα, περὶ τὴν αὐτήν καὶ μιᾶν ψυχήν, ἀλλήλοις μαχόμενα. Ο δ᾿ αὐτός, καὶ θνητῶν ὀμοῦ καὶ ἄθανάτων, ὀρᾶται λόγος, σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς· υἱῶ τε τῶν ἑκαστῶν, σωματικῶς καὶ ψυχικῶς ὑπὸ γε τἀναντία συνήρμοσεν, ἐς ἄρρητον τινὰ τὸν δεσμόν, ὁ πολὺς τῇ σοφίᾳ Θεός, ὃς μηδὲν ἀδύνας, ἀθελήσαντι μόνον· ἡμῖν δὲ μόνος, ἡ πολὺν ὡς ἀσθενεῖν ἁδυναμία· καίτοι γε, τῶν νῦν ὀρθομένων, καὶ μαχομένων ἀλλήλους, εἰς ἀρμονίαν ἀπότερον ἐποίει Θεός ἀστερὰς, ἵσχυρότερα, καὶ θαυμασιώτερα.

ΚΛΠΒ

73. ἀρρητόν-δεσμόν] Phil. Jud., Plant., §§ 9-10, p. 135

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐκ ἔχω ταύτα εἰδέναι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τὸν οὐκ ὄντων, ὁμοιότητας, ἢ, ἰσότητας, ἢ ποιότητας ἔρεις πώποτε;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐμενουν.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλὰ τί σφίσι πρέπει;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἀποιόν τε καὶ ἄνισον, καὶ ἀνόμοιον.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ὁρά τοῦν, ὡς ἐξ αὐτῶν δή τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὄντα ποιεῖ Θεός, οἷς, ἡ ποιότητας καὶ τὸ ἴσον, καὶ τὸ ὀμοιότητας ἐροῦται: ὁ τούτων

85 ἢποιότητας ἢ ποιότητας ἐρευνητέον ἐξ ἡς, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ μακαρίᾳ Πανάγνῳ λόγους. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Φημί, τὸν τῆς παρθενίας λόγον, τῆς μητρὸς μὲν, οὐδόλως, τῷ δὲ τῆς φθορᾶς ἀντικείσθαι δικαίως, καὶ μόνῳ λόγῳ.

ΚΛΡΨ

93-94. Φημὶ-λόγῳ] vide supra, [6.1] 13-16


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. ἈΛΛ' ἡ φθορά, τῇ γενέσει ἐστὶν ἐναντίον· παρθενία δὲ καὶ γένεσις, οὐ ταυτόν· οὐκ ἀντίκειται ἅρα, τῇ παρθενίᾳ φθορά. Ἐτι, ἡ γενέσεις, κίνησις τίς ἐστιν, ἡ παρθενία δὲ, οὔν οὔδε ἐναντία ἅρα.

ἲτι, ἡ μὲν γένεσις, οὐκ ἄλλοιον, ἄλλ' ἄλλο, ἡ δὲ παρθενία, ποιεῖν οἴδεν, ἄλλοιον· οὐκοῦν, οὐ ταυτόν· οὐδὲ ἐναντίον τῇ γενέσει ἐστὶν ἐναντίον· Οὔδε γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ λογιζομένη σοι φθορά.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. ἈΛΛ' εἰ μὴ φθορὰ τῇ παρθενίᾳ, τί ἂν ἠτέρον ἀντικείμενον εἴη;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν εὑρεῖν ἀπορούμεν, οὐδ' οὕτως ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὁ λέγεις, ἐσταὶ πολλοῖς γὰρ τῶν ὀντῶν, οὔδαμως, ἐναντίον. Τέως, ἡ παρθενία, τῇ μὴ παρθενίᾳ μᾶλλον ἀντίκειται, ἡ τῇ φθορᾷ· ἲτι ἄλλῳ· οὐκ ἀποφοίτησαν σε τοῦ ἐγχειρήματος· ἡ παρθενία τῇ φθορᾷ, ἐστώ κατὰ σὲ ἐναντίον. Ἐπισκεπτέον οὖν· πᾶν, ὅτινι ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ μόνον, ἢ, καὶ ἂ τοῦτο, καὶ οἷς αὐτῷ ἐπεται, πάσι μάχεται, ὡς ὁ Φιλόσοφος ἄξιοι.

ΚΛΡΠ

110-111. πᾶν-μάχεται] locum non invenit

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ὅλοις δήλον, ὡς ἑναντίον ἐστί.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ἃ, λέγεις· ὀμολογεῖς, ὡς ἡ παρθενία τῇ φθορᾷ καὶ μόνον ἀντίκειται;

115 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὔτως.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Χωρὶς δὲ φθορᾶς, τόκον γίνεσθαι δυνατόν πώποτε;
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀδύνατον.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τῇ φθορᾷ ἄρα, τόκον ἐπεσθαί ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀν ἄλλως εἴποι.

120 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Πῶς γὰρ ὦ;
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ο τόκος δὲ ταύτων, ἢ ἔτερον τῷ μητρὸς λόγῳ;
Ἀπόκριναί μοι.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ταύτων, ἀνάγκη, ὀμολογεῖν μὲ ὅπου γὰρ ἀν τὸ ἔτερον εἶη, ἀνάγκη ἑπακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἔτερον.

ΚΛΡΥ

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν, ὁ μὲν τόκος ἀκολοθεῖ τῇ μητρὶ, ἢ δὲ φθορά πάλιν ἔπεται τόκῳ, ὁ δὲ τῆς παρθενίας λόγος ἀντίκειται κατὰ σὲ τῇ φθορᾷ, ὁμοίως ἀρα, καὶ τῷ μητρὸς ἀντίκειται λόγῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ· μᾶλλον δὲ, καὶ ἰσχυρότερος ὁ λόγος τῆς παρθενίας πρὸς τὴν ἀντίθεσιν τῆς μητρὸς, ἢ τῆς φθορᾶς φθορᾶς γὰρ ἀπάσης, ἐπὶ πλέον ὁ τόκος· ἐνθὰ γὰρ οὕτως, καὶ φθορά, τὸ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐ δύναμαι ἀντιλέγειν, ἀληθῆ λέγοντι οὐδαμῶς.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπερ ἔλεγες τάληθη ἴ τοῖς λεγομένοις σοι ψηφιζόμενος, ὡς ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢν τῷ προσώπῳ Θεὸς καὶ ἀνθρωπός, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ ταύτον τῇ φύσει, τὸν λόγον τῆς παρθενίας καὶ τῆς μητρὸς οἰόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ λυεῖν, ἀνόμοιον παντελῶς, καὶ ὅτι μὲν ὁ Χριστὸς τῷ προσώπῳ Θεὸς καὶ ἀνθρωπός ἦν, καὶ οὐ τῇ φύσει ταύτον, ἀληθεύσατον πλῆν, αὐτοῦ μὲν, δύο φύσεις, ὑπόστασις δὲ, μόνη, μία ὁ δὲ τῆς παρθενίας λόγος, πρὸς τῇ φθορᾷ, ἢ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ, παντελῶς ἀνόμοιος· περὶ μίαν γὰρ καὶ μόνην ἐφαίνετο φύσιν τῆς μακαρίας αὐτᾶ.

ΚΛΡΥ


130. ἐπιπλέον P ἵ 133. λεγομένοις σοι L ἵ 137. μὲν bis acc. L ἵ 138. μὲν bis acc. L ἵ δὲ bis acc. L
Ἐτὶ, ἂν μὲν πρὸ αὐτῆς, ἢ καὶ μετὰ αὐτὴν ἄλλην εὐφύσκεσθαι
dυνατὸν ἦν, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἂν τὸ σὸν ἄλλης ἐπιχείρημα ἦν ἄλλα
tίνα τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν; Εἴ ἐπαγγελίας γεγέννηται καὶ τούτο, μὲν
ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπόμενον τριμέτης, ἐγένετο περὶ τὸν ναόν, καὶ τὴν
ἐφημίαν ἀσπάζεται τροφὴν οὐφάνιον τρέφεται ὀρα τὸν ἄγγελον,
ὡς εἰρὲ φύσεως, Γαβριήλ: συλλαμβάνει, δυνάμει Πνεύματος: ἐχει
tο βρέφος, εὔθυς ἐν γαστρὶ τέλειον ἐγέννα κατὰ καρφὸν, πόρῳ
πάντων ὠδίνων ἐτήρει τὴν παρθενίαν, πρῶτον, καὶ υἱότερον τὸν
Γαβριήλ ὀρα πάλιν, ὡς εἰρὲ φύσεως ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ καὶ τὸν Ἅιὸν
αὐτῆς γε δεδοξασμένον καὶ τῶν ἄδικων, ἀπαν τὸ στράτευμα,
σωματικοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, πρὸ τῆς τελευτῆς: οὐχ ὑπὲρ φύσιν ἀπαντὰ
tαῦτα; Οὐ μείζονα τῆς τῶν ἀντικειμένων δυνάμεως; Τί οὖν
καὶ τὸν, εἰ καὶ ὁ τῆς παρθενίας λόγος καὶ τῆς μητρός, συνέδραμεν
αὐτῆς, μετέχον, ἀντικειμένης δυνάμεως, ὁν, ὁ σὸς διδάσκαλος, ὁ
Θαμᾶς, καὶ σὺ ἁμα, τούτῳ συνηγοροῦν, τῆς μακαρίας αὐτῶν, ὡς
ἀντικειμένον ἐδώκετε Παρθένου, οὐ καὶ γε περὶ τοῦτον
πεποιημένοι;

ΚΛΠΒ


ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ὄμολογῷ καὶ ταύτα, δίκαια εἶναι καὶ ἀναγκαία. Πλὴν,
ὅσα μοι περὶ τοῦ προβολέας εἰρήνη, σιγῆ τιμᾶς· ἀλλ’ οὐ δίκαιον.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τίνα ταύτα;

[6.2] <Περὶ τῆς προβολῆς τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος>

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐπειδή, οὕτε τῇ πατρότητι, οὕτε τῇ νότητι ἀντίκειται
ἡ προβολή, δύναται τὸ προβάλλειν καὶ ἀμφοτέροις Πατρὶ καὶ
Ὑἱῷ προσεῖναι, καὶ ἀμφοτέρους, εἶναι ἕνα προβολέα· καὶ ὅταν
λέγωμεν προβολέα, ἀμφοτέρους καὶ ἰδία ἑκάτερον νοεῖν.

5 Καὶ πάλιν· εἰ καὶ ἐν τῷ προβολεῖ νοεῖται καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς —οὐ γὰρ ἄλλος
προβολέας, μόνος ὁ Πατήρ, παρὰ τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν, ἀλλ’
eis, καὶ ὁ αὐτός, ἄμφω προβολέας—, σιγαμὼς ἅμα δύο πράγματα,
ὁ Πατήρ μόνος, καὶ ὁ προβολεύς, ὡς ἑστιν, ὁ Πατήρ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τούτων, σιγαμώς ἐπελαθόμην, ἀλλ’ ἐκάν ἑσιώπησα·
καὶ περιττὸν ἐδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἀνασκευάζειν ἑκέινα, οἷς ὁ μακάριος
ἐνυστάμενος Νεῖλος, ὑπερφυώς ἐλυσε, καὶ φανερῶς ἐδειξεν εἶναι, δύο,
καὶ αἰτία καὶ ἀρχάς, εἰ μόνον ὁ Υἱὸς λέγοιτο προβολεύς καὶ ἄλλοι ὁ
σιγάς, ἐνθα Νεῖλος ἔρει. avra ἑπεννήσαμεν ὑποκοῦν, συλλογισμὸν ἑτερον.

L 49r

ΚΛΡV

Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 121v.5-7 ǁ 5-8. Καὶ-Υἱὸς] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 121v.10-12 ǁ 11.


323
[7] Συλλογισμός ἐκτος <Περὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος>

ΘΩΜΑΣ. Ἑτί, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο τοῦ λέγειν τὸ μὲν Πνεῦμα, ὡς ἀγάπην προϊέναι, τὸν δὲ Υἱὸν ὡς λόγον, ἐπειτα καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἢ γὰρ ἀγάπη, πρόεισιν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ἐπει, μὴ δυνάμεθα τι ἀγαπάν, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ λόγῳ τούτῳ συλλάβοιμεν.

ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. Πόθεν ὑμῖν, νόσησιν μέν, τὴν τοῦ Υἱοῦ γέννησιν, ἀγάπην δὲ, ἢ θέλησιν, τὴν τοῦ Πνεύματος προβολήν λέγειν; Οἱ μὲν γὰρ θεολόγοι, ὡσπερ ἀπὸ μίας γλώττης τὴν γέννησιν καὶ τὴν προβολήν, ἀρρητὸν φασί, καὶ ἀνέκφραστον ὑμεῖς δὲ, καὶ εἰδὲναι λέγετε αὐτήν, καὶ ἄγαπην, ἢ θέλησιν καλείτε.

ΚΥΑΩΝΗΣ. Ἐφεξῆς δὲ, καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λόγου καὶ τῆς ἀγάπης, θεώρημα, τίθησιν ὡς καὶ τούτο, τῆς τοῦ Θωμᾶ διανοιᾷς ὡς εὐθύμηται καὶ τὸ εἰσοθές, διασάρδη μὲν, πρώτῳ αὐτῷ, καὶ γέλωτα ἀποφάινετί ὡς τι, νηπίας φρένος ὄν, διήγησα· ἑπείτα, καὶ κατηγορεῖ τοῦτον πολλὰ ὡς ἁσβεοῦς, καὶ πολλαῖς αἱρέσει καὶ ἀτοπίας ἐνεχομένου.

KLPV


324
Ἐγώ δέ, εἰ μὲν Θωμᾶς ἦν ὁ τούτῳ πρῶτος εὐφών, ἡ καὶ εἰπὼν, ἴσως ἄν ἐπεισώμην ἐκείνῳ συνηγορεῖν· ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ Θωμᾶ ἐτέρος ἦν, ὃν δ’ οὖν ἦμεις ἴσμεν, Ἀὐγουστῖνος ἐστίν ὁ σοφώτατε, ὅν, αὐτὸς τολμᾶς, βλασφημίας διώκειν, οὐ, πολλή μὲν παρὰ πάσιν, ἡ ἐπ’ ἀρετὴ καὶ σοφία, δόξα, μείζων δὲ ἡ θεολογία.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἰδοὺ, πολλὰ μὲν ἐφείς· ὃν, τὰ μὲν, ὑβρις Νείλῳ, τὰ δ’ ἑπανος, Ἀὐγουστῖνῳ καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ἀεὶ σοι όδιον ψηφίζεσθαι Νείλῳ, καὶ νόμους ποιεῖν ἀλλ’ ὁμος ἑκάτερον, ὃ τε ψόγος καὶ ἑπανος πρὸς ἑκάτερον, τῇ ὑποθέσει, πάντως ἀνοίκειον.

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἤγιες τὸ θεώρημα, ἔστο καὶ τοῦ Θωμᾶ· εἰ δ’ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ σαθρὸν, τὸ προβάλλῃ τὸν Ἀὐγουστῖνον, ἡ ἄλλον; Τὸ γὰρ κακὸν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίον ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο, ὡστε ἂν ὁ εἰπὼν εἰς Θεῷ μόνῳ, πάς ὁ τῶν ἀγαγελῶν ἁμα, καὶ τῶν ἀγίων κύκλος ἀκολουθεῖ· οἷς, εἰ μὲν Ἀὐγουστῖνος συνηγορεῖ, χάρις τούτων, αὐτῷ, εἰ δ’ ἀντίκειται, εἰ μὲν διαβαλλόμενος, πόρφος πάσης αἰτίας· ὄντα δὲ

ΚΛΡΓ


φανερόν, μάλλον ἀν τις εἰκότως, ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπανταὶς αἰτιάσατο, σοφὸν ὅντα τὸ μὲν, ὡς ἐρευνῆσαι, μή βουλευσάμενον τάληθες, τὸ δὲ, καὶ ὡς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μαχόμενον. Διό, φροντίζειν ἀνάγκη σοι, τῶν ἀναγκαίων.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ ἤδη λέγω, ὡς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, τρις ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ, λόγος εἶναι, γέγραπται.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΟΡΑΣ. Λήθη σοι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐξεγένετο· οὐ τρις γὰρ, ἀλλὰ τετράκις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γέγραπται· εἰ γοῦν ἡ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀκούεις αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς οὐ κατανοεῖς, πῶς ἂν, ἂ, μὴ φιλοτίμως εἰδεῖς,

βέλτιον εἴποις;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Κοινὴ δὲ τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἐστὶ πίστις, τὸν Υἱὸν, Λόγον εἶναι, κατὰ ἀληθεῖαν τοῦ Θεοῦ· οὐ μεταφορικῶς τοῦτο ὀνομαζόμενον, ἡ ὠσπερ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, ἄλλῃ οὐσιωδώς, καὶ κυρίως, καὶ ὑπερφορικῶς, τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι Λόγον.

ΚΛΡΒ


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Καὶ τούτῳ σοι πόρῳ τής ἀληθείας· τῶν γὰρ ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγομένων ἀπάντων, τὰ μὲν, τί, οὐκ ἦστι, τὰ δὲ, σχέσιν, ἐν τοῖς διαστελλομένοις, σημαίνει· καὶ τὰ μὲν, τῇ φύσει παρέπτεται, τὰ δὲ, πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν σχέσιν ἔχει· καὶ τὰ μὲν, ἐστὶν ἐνεργείας, τὰ δὲ, συμβολικά, ἃ, καὶ μεταφορικά, λέγεται. Ὁν ἀπάντων, οὐδὲν ἦστιν ὃ, πρὸς ἄλληλα, δύναται σχέσιν ἔχειν· Ἡ, Πατήρ, Υἱός, Πνεῦμα· ἀγέννητον, γεννητόν, ἐκπορευτὸν, ἀναίτιον, καὶ αἰτιατὸν αὐτὰ καὶ μόνον ἵσμεν, ὑμνούμενα τῷ χορᾷ τῶν ἁγίων ὡς σχετικά, ἃ, καὶ διακεκριμένα καλεῖται· τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα, κοινά ληπτέον, ἐν πάσῃ θεότητι· καὶ τὰ ἁγίας, καὶ ἀμερῶς καὶ ἡνωμένως. Διὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ, Θεός, καὶ τό, λόγος, τῇ Τριάδι, κοινά· καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἀρπάζων Θεόν, οὐκ ἐκόπτως ἄν λέγοιτο.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ ὁ λόγος, τῶν ἐν σχέσει, καὶ πρὸς τι, καὶ ἀναγκαίως ἐπιζητεῖ, καὶ τῶν, οὐ ἦστι λόγος· ἄλλου δὲ, οὐκ ἂν εἶη ὁ Θεός Λόγος, πλήν τοῦ Θεοῦ.
60 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ περί Θεον τούτοις γὰρ ὁ μὲν Υἱὸς καλοῖτο Λόγος Θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἔκτος κοινῆ δόξα Χριστιανοῖς, ὡς κοινὸν ὄνομα, τῇ μακαρίᾳ Τριάδι, ὁ Λόγος ἀρα κατὰ σὲ, καὶ τῶν τριῶν ἐν εἴη λόγος· ἀλλ' ἄτοπον καὶ ἀδύνατον.

L 50 v

Εἶτα, κοινὸν ἐφαμέν καὶ τὸν Λόγον, ὔς οὕτως ἀν πάντως τῶν ἰδιαζόντων νομίζοιτο.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος, πρὸς νοῦν ἰδίως, ἀνάγεται.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τῶν αὐθαύνων, οὐ τοῦ Θεοῦ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ τίνος ἀν ἀλλού καλοῖτο λόγος, εἰ μὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἴη; Λέγε.

70 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐδενός, ἢ τοῦ λέγοντος.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ὁ θεολόγος φησὶ Γρηγόριος, ὃ, νοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου ὄρμημα.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐ τῷ θεολόγῳ τούτῳ σκοπός, ὡς τὸν μὲν Θεόν, νοῦν, τὸν δὲ Υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, λόγον καὶ νόησιν οἰεσθαί, ἀλλ' ὅτι γέννημα, καὶ ἀφρήτως αἰεὶ πρόεισιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ. Ἡ δὲ νόησις, τῇ μὲν

ΚΙΛΡ

66. ἀλλ' ἀναγέται| Dem. Cyd., Defensio, l. 122:19-20

71-72. ὁ-ὄρμημα| Greg. Naz., In S. Pascha (Or. 45), § 30, PG 36, col. 664A

οὐσία φερομένη Θεοῦ, πρόσωπον ὁμοίως ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ νόησις τῇ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ παραβαλλομένη, κοινὴ, τρισὶ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ τίς ο ταῦτα νομοθετῶν;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Μάξιμος, ὁ τὰ θεία μέγας, καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τὴν
θεολόγου φωνήν, ἢν σὺ προτείνεις, ὡς εἰκὸς ἐρμηνεύων.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ποῦ δὲ ταῦτα;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐφ' ἔνι τῆς θεολογίας τῶν αὐτοῦ κεφαλαίων, οὕτωι λέγων. Ὡς ὁ Θεός, νοεῖ ἑαυτόν, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότα καὶ ἑαυτὸν μὲν, ἀπὸ τῆς μακαρίας οὐσίας αὐτοῦ, τὰ δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ
gεγονότα, ἀπὸ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ δ' ἢς καὶ ἐν ἣ, τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν. Ὡς ἀρα νοῦς ἰδίαζων ὄνομα τῷ Πατρί, οὐδὲ μόνη τῷ Υἱῷ, νόησις καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον, ἐπεὶ νοῦς, οὐκ ἐστιν ὁμοιός τῇ νοῆσει.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν, συμφωνῶ σοι ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ, διὰ τὴν ἀκραν ἀπλότητα, τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντος τῆς αὐτοῦ νοῆσεως τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἀναγκαῖος, ὅ τῇ θεία νοῆσαι προῖς λόγος, Υἱὸς ἐστι φύσει, ὡς

ΚΛPV

88-91. ἐπὶ-γενόμενον| Dem. Cyd., Defensio, l. 122: 26-27

89. ἀκραν ἀπλότητα cf. Thom. Aquin., ST, Ia, q. 3, à. 7 co: manifestum est quod Deus nullo modo compositus est, sed est omnino simplex

83-85. ἐαυτόν-ἐποίησεν| Max. Conf., Cap. de car., p. 152

ἀν ἐξ ἀυτῆς, τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίας γενόμενος· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐκεῖ, οὐσία, καὶ νόησις. Τι γὰρ ἄν εἰπ ἐν τοῖς θείοις ἰσον Θεῷ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ οὐσία, καὶ ὅν, καὶ Θεός;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τοῦτο μὲν, ἀντικρούσετ τὸ ζητοῦμενον ὑποτίθεσθαι, ἢ μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἀληθέστερον, ἐναντίον, εὐσεβείᾳ παντάπασιν· τὸ γὰρ ταῦταν εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ, πάν, ὁ περὶ αὐτὸν εἰρηκαί, πολλοὶ καὶ μεγάλοις τῶν ἁγίων ἑτερον δέδεικται, καὶ οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ σημαίνειν, τῶν ἄνθρωπων οἵδε οὕδεν περὶ οὐ νῦν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν· ἄλλος γὰρ τῇ πραγματείᾳ ταύτῃ σκοπός.

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Αλλ’ ἐμοὶ τούναντιν δήλον, καὶ ἀφανῆ τὰ λεγόμενα σοι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἡμᾶς δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀμφιβάλλειν, ἵσθι, μὴ δυνατὸν, πώποτε, ἀλλὰ πεπεισμένους, ἕκ παντὸς εἶναι.

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Ἐπει δὲ ἐστίν ἡ τῆς νοῆσεως πρόοδος Λόγος καὶ Υἱός, λείπεται τὴν ἑτέραν, ἤγουν τὴν τῆς ἀγάπης, εἶναι τοῦ ἀγίου

---

ΚLPV


91-92. το-νόησαν] cf. Thom. Aquin., ST, la, q. 14, a. 4 co: Respondeo dicendum quod est necesse dicere quod intelligere Dei est eius substantia

Πνεύματος· καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἁγιον, εἶναι τὴν θείαν ἁγάτην, ἢ, ὁ Πατήρ καὶ ὁ Ὕιός, ἀλλήλους ἁγαπώσιν. Ἐπομένως δὲ διὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἁγιον ἐξ ἀμφιτέρων λέγειν ἀνάγκη.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἐδείχθη, μὴ εἶναι τῆς νοῆσεως πρόοδον τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ τὸν Λόγον, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν, τῆς πατρικῆς ὑποστάσεως γέννημα, τὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦ λέγοντος, οUidὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἁγιον, ἀρ' ἁγάτη ἂν ἰδιαζόντως καλοίς κοινών γὰρ καὶ τούτο. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν Θεὸν ἀπλῶς καλούμεν ὦτῳ, καὶ Χριστὸς αὐτὸς, ἁγάτην ἐαυτὸν λέγει. ǁ Διὰ ταῦτα μᾶλλον, οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη σοι τὸ συμπέρασμα, οUidὲ τὸν Πνεύματος αἴτιος ὁ Ὕιός. Νεῖλω πολλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦτον κατὰ τοῦ Θοῦμα φερομένῳ, καὶ προβλήμασιν ἔξ ἡχομένῳ, ἐν δυσκολοίς καὶ μόνοις αὐτὸς πολεμεῖς, τὰ εἰσίν τούτα κάνταθα πεποιημένῳ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐξεστί μοι πλῆν, ἄκουε, συλλογισμόν ἐτερον.

**ΚΛΡV**

106-107. καὶ-ἀγαπώσιν] cf. Thom. Aquin., ST, Ia, q. 37, a. 2

113-114. Ἐπεὶ-λέγει] cf. 1 Ioh. 4:8: ὁ Θεὸς ἁγάτη ἐστίν

ΤΟΙΣ ἌΓΛΟΙΣ, ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΑΞΙΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ ἘΣΤΙΝ, Η ΔΙΆΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΌΥΝ ΘΕΙΟΙΣ, ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΟΥΣΙΝ ἌΓΛΟΙΣ, ἈΔΤΥΝΑΤΟΝ ἈΛΛΗΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΑΞΙΝ, ΠΛΗΝ ΤΗΣ ΑΙΤΙΑΣ ΌΥΚ ἈΡΑ ΔΥΟ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ <ἐξ> ἘΝΟΣ ΠΡΟΪΟΝΤΑ, ΕΙ ΜΗ ΘΑΤΕΡΟΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ, ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΠΡΟΪΕΙΝ ΑΙΤΙΟΣ Ο ΥΙΟΣ ἈΡΑ.

ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. ΕΙΝΑΙ ΜΕΝ ΤΑΞΙΝ ἘΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΘΕΙΟΙΣ, ΚΑΙ ΠΑΛΙΝ ΜΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΟΥΚ ἘΣΤΙΝ ἈΡΝΕΙΟΘΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ, ΟΥΚ ἘΣΤΙ ΤΑΞΙΣ, ΤΑΙΣ Δ’ ὙΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΙΣ ΤΡΙΩΝ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ, ΚΑΙ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΑΞΙΝ ΦΑΜΕΝ ΑΥΤΗ ΔΕ ἘΣΤΙ, ΤΟ ΤΗΡΕΙΝ ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΙΔΙΩΤΗΤΑ ΑΜΙΓΗ ΚΑΙ ΑΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΣΤΟΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΕΤΕΡΑ.

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. ἘΤΕΙ ΔΕ ΕΥ ΠΟΙΩΝ, ΤΑΞΙΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΜΟΛΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΤΟΣ ΣΥΝΕΧΩΡΗΣΕΝ ἘΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΘΕΙΟΙΣ, ΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΜΕΝ ΧΑΡΙΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ ἈΛΛΑ ΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ ΥΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΠΝΕΥΜΑ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΠΑΤΕΡΑ ΤΑΞΙΑΣ, ΠΡΟΣ ἈΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΔΕ ΤΟΥΤΟΥΣ ἈΤΑΚΤΟΥΣ ΑΦΕΙΣ, ΕΞ ΗΜΙΟΙΑΣ ΤΩ ΘΕΩ, ΤΟ ΤΗΣ ΤΑΞΕΩΣ ἈΠΕΔΩΚΕΝ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΔΙΑΤΙ ΓΑΡ, ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ ΜΕΝ, ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΠΑΤΕΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥ ΑΙΤΙΟΥ ΔΩΣΟΜΕΝ ΤΑΞΙΝ, ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΔΕ ΠΡΟΣ ἈΛΛΗΛΑ, Η, ΟΘΕΜΙΑΝ, Η, ἈΝΟΜΟΙΑΝ;

ΚΛΠΒ


332
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τούναντιον μᾶλλον, οίς αὐτὸς λέγεις συμβαίνει τάξις καὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς θαυμαστή καὶ οἰκεία, τὸ ἀφ’ ἐνός εἶναι. Ἡ δὲ τις αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ὡς τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ τὸ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς χαρίζωστο, πολλὰ τὰ ἀτοπα ἔσται πρῶτον μὲν, ἐν τῇ μακαρίᾳ Τριάδι περὶ τὴν οὖσιαν αὐτήν, ἀταξιὰ ἐπειτα, καὶ σύγχυσις ἀν ὡς μικρά, περὶ τὰ πρόσωπα νομισθεῖη’ εἰ γὰρ τὰ δύο μὲν ἐνός αἰτία, τὸ δ’ ὑστερον οὐδὲνος, ἀνίσα πάντη καὶ ἀτάκτα παντὶ δήλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτο προσώπων, οὐ μικρὸν ἐλαττον’ ἢ δ’ ἀτιμία τούτου, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀκολουθεῖ οὐ γὰρ τιμή καὶ αὐξῆσις τοῖς ἐξ ὧν, ἢ τοῦ ἐξ ὧν, ἐλάττωσι καὶ ἀτιμία, ἄλλα δόξα καὶ τιμή τούτους μᾶλλον, ἢ τούτου δόξα: τάξις ἀρα, τὸ τηρεῖν, ὡς φησι Νείλος, ἐκαστὸν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἱδιότητα.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τὸ λέγειν, τάξιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς θείοις <προσώποις>, τὸ τηρεῖν ἐκαστὸν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἱδιότητα, εἰ μὲν ἀπό τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὕσιν ἐπαγωγῆς τούτο λαβὼν ἐπὶ τὰ θεία τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἰλκυσῆ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπελάθητο τῶν λοιδοριῶν, αἰς πλῦνει, τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὕσιν εὐρισκομένων πειρωμένους εἰκάζειν τὰ θεία.

KLPV

30-34. Ἀλλὰ-θεία] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 124’ 10-12


ΧΡΥΣΩΛΙΨΑΣ. Ἡ σαυτα οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος, οὔτε ἄλλος, τόδε
τήδε βουλόμενος εὔσεβείν, ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ τὰ θεία προβαίνειν
εἰς ὁμοιότητα, τεκμηριώσαστο πώποτε.

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Ἐπειτα γε, καὶ ψεύδος, τάξεως αίτιον εἶναι πρὸς
ἀλληλα τοῖς πράγμασι, τό, τηρεῖν ἐκαστὸν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἱδιότητα:
πρὸς μὲν τὸ διαφεῖν μόνον, μάλιστα ἰκανόν, τὸ μένειν ἐκαστὸν,
ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἱδιότητος πρὸς δὲ τάξιν, καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἀλληλα
σχεσίν, παντα-παιν ἐναντίον, διὰ γὰρ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν
τηρηθῆναι τὸ λογικόν, κύκλῳ δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον, τίς ἂν
ἐπινοηθεὶς τάξεις ἀνθρώπου καὶ κύκλου πρὸς ἀλληλα; Ὡστε, εἰ δεὶ
καὶ Υῖοι πρὸς τὸ Πινεῦμα τάξιν εἶναι, οὐ τὴν πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα
δει μόνον λέγειν αὐτῶν — τοῦτο γὰρ, πρὸς ἄλλον, ἂλλ’ οὐ πρὸς
ἀλληλα τετάχθαι σημαίνει —, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀλλήλοις τετάχθαι,
ἀλλην δει λέγειν, ἣν οὕτος μὲν έκὼν ἐσιώπησε, Θωμᾶς δ’ ἂν
εἶπε, μετὰ τοῦ Νύσσης, τὴν τοῦ αἰτίου, εἶναι καὶ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ·
ἀλλην γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θείοις οὔδ’ ἐπινοεῖν δυνατόν.

ΚLPV

Cyd., Defensio, f. 124:20-22

48. οὕτος] scil. Nilus Cabasilas

49. μετα-αιτιατοῦ] cf. Greg. Nyss., Ad Abl., p. 56.1; suum, Ad Graec., p. 25.6-8

αὐτοῦ KPV || αὐτοῦ] ἐκαστοῦ D || 41. αὐτοῦ KPV || αὐτοῦ] ἐκαστοῦ D || 42. μὲν bis acc. L || 43.
ΧΡΥΣΩΛΩΡΑΣ. Σὺ μὲν ύποθέμενος, ἀ μὴ τῷ Νείλῳ σκοπός, ἀ μὴ δέον περαίνεις, τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνατιθείς τῷ ἀνδρὶ, καὶ ταύτα δυσχεραίνοντι πλείστα, εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων, ὡς σὺ φῆς, ἐπὶ τὰ θεία προβαίνειν ἐθέλοι, ὦ, μέμφεται μάλλον, ἡ θαρρεῖ, ἐπόμενος δὲ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν ἁγιῶν εἰρημένοις, στηρίζεται σὲ δὲ τοῦ καθ’ ἡμῶν ἢ προθυμία λέγειν, οὐ μικρὸν ἀτοπον ἀναγκάζει, κύκλου καὶ λογικοῦ τὸ παράδειγμα πεποιημένον, καὶ τῷ ἐν ἀλλήλοις τῶν θείων προσώπων αἰτίῳ τῆς διακρίσεως ἐφαρμόζοντι, οῖς, κοινόν, οὐδὲ τὸ βραχύτατον πώποτε· κύκλος γὰρ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν, ἐναντία· οὐ μόνον ἀκρα διαφορά πρὸς ἀλληλα διαφέροντα, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐμφυτεύεσθαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ δυνάμενα πώποτε. Τὰ δὲ θεία πρόσωπα, κἂν τὴν ἀντίθεσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναφορικήν ἔχῃ, ἀλλ’ ἀκρα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τούτων ἐνοῦται, καὶ ἀνόμοια τῷ λόγῳ, κύκλου καὶ λογικοῦ. Αναφορικῶς σοι τοιγαροῦν εἴρηται ἀξίωμα τὸ παρὸν.

ΚΛΡΥ

πεποιημένην ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, Νεῖλον δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν ἐκόντα σιγὰν, ἀληθεύεις· πλὴν, οὐχ ὡς ὑπέλαβες τὴν σιωπὴν αὐτοῦ, ἢν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλου, πολὺ μείζονος ὄντος αὐτῷ, καὶ μᾶλλα φιλοτιμομένου περὶ τὰ θεία, ποιεῖν ἰκανήν καὶ ἀναγκαίαν διακρίσιν, ἢ, καγὼ καὶ Νεῖλος, καὶ πάς τις ἀν ἄλλος ἑπομένος, οὐχ ἀμάρτοι.

**ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ.** Τίς αὐτή, καὶ τίς ὁ λέγων;

**ΧΡΥΣΟΛΟΡΑΣ.** Θεολόγων, ὁ Διονύσιος, ἐν οἷς φησί, μόνη πηγαία, τῆς ὑπερονοσίου θεότητος, ὁ Πατήρ καὶ πάλιν· τῇ πιστῇ καὶ τῷ αἰτίῳ, τὰ θεία πρόσωπα διακρίνεται τοιούτου κανόνος πίστις ἢ τῶν

Χριστιανῶν ἑχεται, θεολόγων ἑπομένη κρατίστω, περὶ τούτων, ἀριστὰ γε φιλοσοφησάντι.

**ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ.** Ὡς ἀντιτίθησιν, ώς, εἰ καὶ τις συγχωρήσειν, Υἱὸν καὶ Πνεύματος, πρὸς ἄλληλα, αἰτίου καὶ αἰτιατοῦ τάξιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη λέγειν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἡγίου εἶναι τὸ Πνεύμα ἀλλ’ ἑνδέχεσθαι

**ΚΛΡΡ**

77-86. Ὁ Πνεύματος | Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 124r:24-28

73-74. τῇ-διακρίνεται | Dem. Chrys., Dial., facs. 20, p. 160a


68. αὐτῶν L | scr. αὐτῶ in marg. inf. P | 69. ἀναγκαίαν L | 70. ἢν bis acc. L | ἑπομένος K | 72-74. μόνη-διακρίνεται | signa in marg. codd. L | 74. θεία L | 75. θεολόγῳ P | ἑπομένη K | 77-86. Κυδώνης-Πνεύματος | signa in marg. L | 77. Κυδώνης] deest V
καὶ τοῦναντίον τὸν Υἱὸν ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος λέγειν· καὶ οὕτως τηρουμένης ἢς εἰπεν ὁ Θωμᾶς τάξεως, οὐδὲν μάλλον ὁ βουλεῖται συμπεραινεθαι, οὐδαμῶς ἀναγκαῖον φησίν πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τούτου ὄντος, ἐξέται, τὸ Πνεῦμα εἶναι Πατέρα, εἰπερ τὸν τοῦ αἰτίου λόγον ἔξει πρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν. Καὶ διὰ τούτο, ἀτοπον λέγειν, τὸν ἀξιοῦντα οὕτω νοεῖν τὴν τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ αἰτιατοῦ τάξιν πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Εἶτα σε τούτο διεθυγεν, ως τὸ ἀτοπον ἐκατέρωθεν ὅμοιον, κἂν ἐν διαφόροις γινώσκοιτο; Ὡς γὰρ εἰς τάξιν ἡκιστα πρέπει Ἰησοῦς, πατέρας δύο λέγειν ἐφ’ ἑνι τῷ Υἱῷ, οὕτως οὐδὲν ἐλαττῶν ἀτοπον, ἑνὸς προβλήματος ὄντος, δύο προβολείς εἶναι. Τὸν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἀτόπων ἐκάτερον, ἀναγκαῖος ἀκολούθει, τῇ σῇ, καὶ τῇ Θωμᾶ θέσει ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ τὰ δύο μεμφόμενοι, πῶς ἂν οὐχ ὑγιαίνομεν ἐν τῇ πίστει;

KLPV

80. λέγειν P ‖ οὕτω P(KPV) ‖ 81. οὐδὲν L ‖ 82. μὲν bis acc. L ‖ 84. ἔξει L ‖ 88. post γινώσκοιτο sign. interrogationis codd. ‖ L(53) 89. οὐδὲν L ‖ 90. ἐλαττὸν P ‖ 92. τῇ τῷ P
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐπειτά, τίς ἂν εἰ μὴ μαίνομενος, ὑπέλαβε τὸν Υἱὸν ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐκ Πατρὸς δι᾽ Υἱοῦ; Εἰ γοῦν δι᾽ Υἱοῦ, καὶ τούτο ἐστὶ λόγος τοῦ ἐκπορευτοῦ, πώς ἂν ὑποπτεύθη αἰτίων εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ, σαφῶς ὅν ἐξ ἑκείνου, καὶ δι᾽ ἑκείνου;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀδικῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ὑποτίθεσθαι. Εἰ δὲ τις οὐ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δεδειγμένον ἀγείν οἰδὲν εἰς τοῦναντίον ἀεί, πολὺ τοῦ προτέρου μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἀδικώτερον, ἄ, λογίζῃ νῦν ἡμῖν, οὔθ' ἀγίων, οὔθ' ἐπιστήμης χρησθαι βουλευόμενος τῷ κανόνι ἄλλ' ἡμῖν ἀρχηγῶν, ἢ τῶν ἀγίων φωνῆς καὶ φανερῶν ἐκ παντός, ὡς οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεύμα, τὸ δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ, δήλον, ἄλλ' οὐχ ὡς αἰτίων καὶ πολλή καὶ μεγάλη τοῦτον ἡ μαρτυρία ἢν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι λέγειν εἰς πλάτος, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. Καὶ τὸν μὲν παρόντα συλλογισμὸν ὁ Νεῖλος, τετάρτῳ διέλυσεν ἐπιχειρήματι, σὺ δὲ Νεῖλον, αἰτίᾳ, δύο.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὕτω βούλομαι ἁκούωμεν δὲ συλλογισμόν, ἑτερον.

**KLPV**

94-98. Ἐπειτα-ἐκείνου] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 124r.28-30

[9] Συλλογισμός ούγος <Περὶ τῶν ὑποστατικῶν ιδιωμάτων>

ΘΩΜΑΣ. Ο Πατήρ καὶ ὁ Υἱός, τῇ φωνῇ ταυτῇ, οὐ τῇ ἐνότητι τῆς οὐσίας διακρίνονται ὁπερ τοῖνυν παρὰ τοῦτο, κοινῶν ἐστι Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ τὸ ἀρχὴν ἀρα τοῦ Πνεύματος εἰναί, κοινῶν ἐστι Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ.

ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. Τὸ εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοῦ ἄγιου Πνεύματος, παρὰ τὸν τῆς πατρότητος καὶ ἡ νοῦτητος λόγον, ἀληθῶς τὸ δὲ μὴ διακρίνεσθαι τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸν Υἱόν, κατ᾽ ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ καθόσον οὕτως μὲν ἐστι Πατήρ, ἐκείνος δὲ Υἱός, ψεῦδος. Ποῦ γὰρ θῆσει τὸ αἰτίον, καὶ τὴν πηγὴν καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, τὰ πατρικὰ ιδιωμάτα;

ΚΥΩΝΗΣ. Δὲ ἄν οὕτως κατασκευάζειν οίεται τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὴν λέγουσαν τὸν Πατέρα τοῦ Υἱοῦ διακρίνεσθαι, μόνη τῇ πατρότητι, ἄλλω δὲ οὖδεν —πάντα γὰρ τὰ παρὰ ταυτὴν ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι κοινὰ φησιν ὁ Θωμᾶς—, ταῦτα, οὐδὲ ἀπολογίας ἄξια ὄντα, παραλιπέτειν βέλτιον· ταῦτα γὰρ, ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἐξελήλεγκται, μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην ἔχοντα.

ΚΛΡΕV


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Κρείττων ἦν σοι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων σιγᾶν, ἢ ταῖς καθήκοντα λέγειν, καὶ ψεύδει λογίζεσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τῶν δεδειγμένων κατηγορεῖν. Διό, τὰ σὰ μᾶλλον ἀν ἐγὼ φαινὴν εἰκότι λόγῳ, σιγὴ τιμᾶσθαι χρεῶν, καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχειν ἀπολογίαν, ὡς ὑβριστικὰ πάντα. Διό, καὶ σιγῶμεν, ἵνα μή σου φανώμεν κατηγοροῦ, ὡς σὺ ἄλλων· οὐκ ἀνασκευὴ γὰρ τὸ σὸν, ὥ, τις ἀν ἐνίστασθαι πειραθεὶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλέον ύβρις, ὥ, καὶ τιμήσωμεν τῇ σιγῇ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ῥητέον, ὡς εἰ τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῳ παρὰ τὴν πατρότητα ὁ Πατὴρ διακρίνεται τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκαῖος, ἵδιον ἕσται τοῦ Πατρὸς ωστε, ἐπεὶ ἡ πατρότης, ἵδιον ὑποστατικὸν ἐστί τοῦ Πατρὸς, πάν ἄλλο αὐτοῦ ἵδιον προσέσται αὐτῷ, κατὰ τὸν τῆς πατρότητος λόγον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ γελαστικὸν, ἵδιον ὅν ἀνθρώπου, κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος λόγον αὐτῷ πρόσεστι. Καὶ τὸ τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας δυσὶν ὀρθαὶς ἱσας εἰναι, ἵδιον ὅν τοῦ τριγώνου, κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον, αὐτῷ πρόσεστι καθόλου, ἵ, τριγώνῳ.

ΚΛΠΥ

23-34. Τοσοῦτον-Υἱὸς] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, ff. 124r.33-124v.4

28-29. Καὶ-εἶναι] cf. Arist., Analytica posteriora 90b.8-9


25. ἐστιν K

340
Ὡςτε, εἰ καὶ τὸ αἰτίον εἰναι τοῦ ἀγίου Πνεύματος, ἰδιὸν ἐστι τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ ἀκοινώνητον τῷ Υἱῷ, ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι τῷ Πατρί, κατὰ τὸν τῆς πατρότητος λόγον, οὐκοῦν, ἢ Πατήρ, καὶ προσεχώς προβαλεῖται τὸ Πνεύμα· καὶ οὕτως, ἐσται τὸ Πνεῦμα, Υἱὸς.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ ὁ θαυμάσιος, πολὺ ἂν σοι βέλτιον ἐλογίζετο, εἰ θατέρῳ συνέβαινεν ἔτερον, ἢ, Νείλου κατηγορεῖν, ἢ, καν τούτῳ σηγάνο τὸ γὰρ τοιαῦτα σε λέγειν, ὑπερβαίνειν οἰδεν εἰς ἀτοπίαν τὰ πρῶτα· καὶ γὰρ αὐτό, μὴ μόνον οὐκ ἀληθεῖς τε καὶ βλαβερόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατον· τῶν δὲ προτέρων, τὸ μὲν, τὸ ψεύδος, εἰχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τὸ δὲ τῆς σηγῆς, οὐδέτερον.

Τέως, τίνι τούτῳ τίς ἀνάγκη φερόμενος οὕτως ἐρεῖ, ὡς ὅσα πρόσεστι τῷ Πατρὶ, κατὰ τὴν πατρότητα αὐτῷ προσείναι, ὡς τὸ γελαστικὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, καὶ τῷ τριγώνῳ, τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας δυσίσας, ἢ τριγώνῳ; Τίνος ὅθοντος ἐπὶ

ΚΛΡV


35. ἐλογίζετο ἐλεγίζετο P I 39, μὲν bis acc. L I 43. γελαστικόν L.
τούτον ἦκειν ἀνάγκη τινὰς τὸν λόγον; Εἰ δὲ καὶ τις ἀνάγκη
βιάζοιτο, τί ἂν τὸ κέρδος γένοιτο πειθομένως; Ὅθεν, ὅρα τὸ
ἲσοντον· τὸ μὲν γελαστικὸν, ἀπάσης φύσεως τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' ὦ
μᾶς χαρακτηριστικὸν ὑποστάσεως μόνης· διό, καὶ παντὶ κατὰ
tαυτὸν ἄμα, καὶ ἐνι σύνεστι, καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἱδιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν.

Εἰτα καὶ ἀντιστρέφει ο γὰρ γελαστικόν, ἀνθρώπος, καὶ ὦ ἂν
ἀνθρώπος, καλοῖτο γελαστικόν. Όὐχ οὕτω δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θεία, ἀλλ' ἀν
ἀνόμιοι παντελῶς· καὶ τὸ μᾶς χαρακτηριστικὸν ὑποστάσεως,
ἀκοινώνητον ἄγαν ταῖς περὶ λοιπὰς, καὶ τὸ μὲν κοινὸν, οὐδὲντ' ἂν
ἱδιον λέγοιτο. Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀντιστρέφειν οἰδεν εἰς ἄλλην, ὡσα περὶ τὴν

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τοῖς μὲν προτέροις, συνηγορῶ, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν
ἀντιστροφὴν, ὥσα πειθομένως γὰρ ἄλλα παρὰ τὴν πατρότητα
λέγεται τῷ Πατρὶ, ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ πλὴν τῆς
πατρότητος, καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ πάντα σύνεστιν.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Απόκριναι τοιγαρούν μοι ἡ πηγή καὶ τὸ αἰτίον καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἄλλα παρὰ τὴν πατρότητα λέγεις, ἢ ταύτα;
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐτέρα: πλήν, καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ γε κοινά· πηγή γὰρ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἀρχὴ, καὶ αἰτία τοῦ Πνεύματος.

65 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τί δέ, καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγεννητοῦ, καὶ ἀναρχοῦ, καὶ ἀναίτιον, νομιοῦμεν; Ἐροῦμεν ἄλλα παρὰ τὴν πατρότητα, ἢ ταύτα; Πάντως, ἄλλα πάς τις ἂν εἴποι σύνεστι δὲ καὶ τῷ Πατρὶ μόνον, ὡς καὶ τὰ πρότερον. Ἀντιστρέφει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρχῇ, καὶ τὸ αἰτίον, εἰς τὸ ἀναρχὸν, καὶ ἀγέννητον, ἡ, οὖκ ἀντιστρέφει; Δυον γὰρ ἑλέσθαι εἰς θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἀντιστρέφει τὸ ἀναίτιον καὶ ἡ αἰτία, οὐδὲ τῷ Υἱῷ σύνεστιν, ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν πατρότητα ὡς, οἷς οὖ θαρσόν αὐτός πρότερον, ὑπαχνοῦ τὰναντία. Εἰ δὲ ἀντιστρέφει ταύτα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὁ Υἱός, ἀναίτιος τε καὶ ἀναρχος, καὶ ἀγέννητος ἄρα ἔσται, ὡς καὶ ἀρχὴ, καὶ πηγὴ, καὶ αἰτία· ἐπομένως δὲ τούτῳ, καὶ

70 Πατέρα ἂν αὐτὸν εἴποιμεν· οὐ, τι ἂν ἀτοπώτερον εἰς;

κλπν

Ἔτι, εἰ ταύτα Πατρὶ ‡ καὶ Υἱῷ κοινά, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ Πνεύματι, ἢ εἶναι, ἢ μὴ εἶναι κοινά: κἂν μὲν ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀληθεύῃ, ἡ ἐλάττωσις ἐπεται δήλη τῷ Πνεύματι, ἐκείνους ὅτι ἀκοινωνήτω, οίς, τὰ δύο σύνεστι πρόσωπα· καὶ τὸ ἄτοπον δῆλον ὁ νὲ ἡ κατάφασις ἀληθῆς ἢ, ἀναρχὸν καὶ ἀναίτιον τὸ αὐτὸν ὁ τοῦ προτέρου πολὺ χαλεπῶτερον. Εἰ ἔκατέρου σοι τοίνυν, ἀνοίκεια τὰ περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ συναγόμενα, καὶ ἡ θέσις, ἀνόμοιος· ὡς, ὅσα παρὰ τὴν πατρότητα καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ σύνεστι καὶ κατὰ τὸν τῆς πατρότητος λόγον, τῷ Πατρὶ φέρεται, ἀλλ’ οὔδ’ ἀντιστρέφει, πρὸς ἀλληλα’ ἢ γὰρ Πατρὶ, καὶ τὰλλα πάντως ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἢ δὲ τὰλλα, κατὰ τοῦτο Πατήρ.

Ὡθεν σοι καὶ τὸ παρὸν τῆς ἀνασκευῆς ἐπιχείρημα, οἴχεται: Νείλου πολλῶν διώκοντος, καὶ τὸν παρὸν συλλογισμὸν ἐπιχειρημάτων, ὅλγοις τούτου, σὺ πολεμεῖς.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὕτω μοι δοκεὶ βέλτιον ἐλθέτω, οὐν συλλογισμὸς ἔτερος.

ΚΛΡΒ

77, κἂν bis acc. L ‡ 79, σήμερος in ras. L ‡ post δῆλον scr. ἄρα KPV ‡ 80, προτέρου[όν] in ras. L ‡ πολύ K ‡ 85, τὰλλα τ’ ἀλλα LP ‡ τὰλλα τ’ ἀλλα LP ‡ 89-90. Κυδωνησ-ἔτερος] signa in marg. K
[10] Συλλογισμὸς ἐνατος <Περὶ τῆς ἁρχῆς ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ Τριάδι>

ΘΩΜΑΣ. Ἡ, μη τῷ τινὸς ὀρισμῷ ἐναντίον, οὐκ ἀδύνατον αὐτῷ συνελθεῖν: τὸ δ' εἶναι ἁρχήν τοῦ Πνεύματος, οὐκ ἐναντίον, τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ Υἱοῦ οὐκ ἀδύνατον ἀρα, ἁρχὴν εἶναι τοῦ Πνεύματος τὸν Υἱόν, τὸ δ', δυνατόν. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς θείοις, τὸ εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι ταύτων αἰτίος ὁ Υἱὸς ἀρα.

ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. Εἰ μὲν ὁ Πατήρ, οὐκ ἐστίν ἐναντίος τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, λειπεῖται, μη ἀδύνατον εἶναι Πατέρα γενέσθαι τὸν Υἱὸν· εἰ δ' ἐναντίος ὁ Πατήρ τῷ τοῦ Υἱοῦ λόγῳ, καὶ τούτῳ ψεῦδος· ἐστὶ γὰρ, καὶ τὸν λόγον μάχεσθαι, καὶ τὸν Υἱόν γενέσθαι Πατέρα. □

ΚΥΑΩΝΗΣ. Θαυμάζω τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἀντιλέγειν μόνον τοῦτου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς προσθημαν̣ ἀπαξ, γὰρ ὡς ἐσικεν ὃμωμοκάς, μηδὲν καταλιπεῖν τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θωμᾶ ὑπήκεντον ἀνεπηρέαςτον, καὶ πρὸς τὰ γνωριμώτατα, διὰ τὸν πρὸς ἐκείνον πόλεμον ἀποδύεται.

KLPV


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Σὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὅρκῳ βεβαιῶν ἑαυτὸν, οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνῳ δίχα τής ὑβρεως, ἀτιμᾶζεις αὐτὸν ἄεν ὁν, μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν ἑδει, ἢ μέμφεσθαι εἰ δὲ τὸν ἐπαινον αὐτοῦ διώκειν ἑθέλεις, οὐδὲ κατηγορεῖν ἑδει, ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι μόνον τὸ γὰρ κατηγορεῖν, καὶ τὸ μετ’ εὐφημίας διαλέγεσθαι, ὃδιον ἐκάτερον, ἀπαντὶ βουλομένῳ ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν, ἐπαινοῦς, τὸ δὲ, μεγάλας ὑβρεῖς τῷ πεποιημένῳ χαρίζεται σὺ οὖν, τὸ κάκιστον ἐμφυτεύεις αὐτῷ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ τινι μὴ ἀντίκειται, δυνατὸν εἶναι συνελθεῖν ἐκείνῳ, τοῦτ’ ἃν οἶμαι, συγχωρήσαι, καὶ Σκύθας, καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος αὐτῶν ἀμαθέστερος.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ὅρα τοῦτο, καὶ πολὺ περισσότερον ὑβρεως ὃιγαρ ἐκεῖνος Σκυθῶν ἀμαθέστερος, σέ, τί αν τις ἔχων τεκμηρίωσασθαι διαλεγόμενον τῷ ἄνδρι; Ἡ τίς ἃν ἐποιτό σοι δόξα, νικήσαντι Ἀνόσιον ἄνδρι τοιούτῳ λέγειν αὐτά.

ΚΛΡΥ


ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐτι ἔπεται, μή διακρίνεσθαι τὸ γεννάν καὶ γεννᾶσθαι, διὰ τὸ τῶν δεῖνα, ἢ τῶν δεῖνα, καὶ πατέρα εἶναι καὶ υἱόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ δεῖ. Τὸ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ πατέρα καὶ υἱόν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οἴσθαι τὸν λόγον ἀναιρεῖς, τὸν ἀξιοῦντα τὰ μὴ ἀντικείμενα εἰς ταύτων δύνασθαι συνιέναι, σαφῶς ἐστὶ παῖζοντος καὶ γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, πατήρ καὶ υἱός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐν τούτῳ μέν, ἀλήθη λέγεις, ὡς οὐ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλον ὁ πατήρ καὶ ὁ υἱός, ἀμα παῖζοντα δὲ τὸν Νεῖλον εἰπών, «Ἀποφοίμεν, τι ἄν περί σοῦ νομιούμεν», ἄδικείς. Ὡθεν, σιγὴ τὴν ὑβρῖν ἀνάγχη τιμᾶν.

Τὸ δὲ τοῖς οὐδ᾽, ὅσα συμβαίνειν εἰώθην ἀξίοὺν αὐτὰ καὶ τῶν θείων, τὶς αὐτῶν διδάσκαλος γέγονεν; Ἀνθρώπος, ἄγγελος, ἢ Θεός; Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδένα ἄν τούτων εἰποῖς· ἐπεὶ μηδεὶς αὐτῶν αὕτα ποιεῖ τινὶ γνώριμα· σὺ οὖν ὑποθέμενος τὰ ζητούμενα, καὶ περαίνων ἃ, μητ᾽ ἐδε, μήτε παρ᾽ ἄλλων ἐμαθεῖς πώποτε, παιδιάν ἀπεχώς ἀφοσιώθησαν πάντως.

KLPV


ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο πάνυ φιλόνεικον, ἀσθενὴ πειράσθαι δεικνύναι τὸν λόγον τὸν ἄξιοῦντα, πάν, τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐκεί πάντες γὰρ καὶ θεολόγοι καὶ σοφοὶ, οὕτω, συντιθενται, διὰ τὸ τὸ δυνάμει, μηδεμίαν χώραν εἶναι, ἐν τῇ θείᾳ ὀνοσίᾳ.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Διπλοῦν ἔστι, τὸ δυνάμει τὸ μὲν, ἀτελές, οὐ μετέχουσιν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὁ, µὴ χώρα Θεῷ τὸ δὲ, τέλειον, ὁ, καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ Θεῷ πολλάκις ἀρμόζεται. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον, ἀληθές ἔστιν, ὡς πόρρω Θεῷ, τὸ δὲ-ὅ-ἐστερον, οὐ τὸ δὲ µὴ διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι, οὐ µόνον ψεύδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βλασφημία μεγίστη τὸ μὲν, ὡς τούναντιον ἐφασαν ἄγιοι, οἷς ἄλλων ἀντικειµένων σοφῶν, ἡµεῖς οὐ φροντίζοµεν τὸ δὲ, καὶ παντὶ ὑάδιον, ἔθελοντι συνιδέον αὐτά, Θεῷ µόνον· πάντα γὰρ τὰ µὴ ὄντα ποιεῖν ὡς ὄντα· ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, δύναµες, βουλοµένω καὶ µόνον· οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ, δικαίασθαι χρωµενος καὶ φιλανθρωπία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ καιρὸν ἐργάζεται, πάν, ὁ ἀν αὐτῷ δοκή· οὐ ταῦτον ἀρα τῷ μεγάλῳ Πατρί, τὸ εἶναι τοῦ δύνασθαι.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἄλλ' ὁ Θωμᾶς, ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ διαλέξει, οὗ ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον ἰδίως περὶ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἢγουν, τῶν γεννητῶν ὡς λέγειν, ὃ, δύναται ποιεῖν ὁ Θεός, τούτῳ καὶ εὐθὺς ποιεῖν, Ἀλλ' ὃ, φησὶ, δύναται ὁ Θεός εἶναι ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἔγνω δὲ, οὗ τούτῳ βούλεσθαι τὸν Θωμᾶν οἴμαι, Ἀλλὰ τούναντιον. Καὶ δῆλον, ἐκ τῶν ὑποτεθέντων αὐτῶ τῷ γὰρ ὁ μὴ τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὑπάρχοντος ἀνάγκης εἰναι ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τοῦ ὑπὸ τὸν Θεόν γεννῆται· ὡς λέγειν, ὃ, δύναται ὁ Θεός εἶναι, Ἀλλὰ φησὶ, δύναται ὁ Θεός εἶναι ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τούτῳ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

Ἀλλὰ ὁμώς, εἰπὲ ἵππεις, ὃ εἶναι καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ Θεῷ.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οίον, ει μη ἀντίκειται αὐτῷ τὸ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ, παρεῖναι εἰ δὲ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ πάρεστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ ἔστι σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθός ἄλλο δὲ ἔστι ποιεῖν, καὶ ἄλλο εἶναι ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Σκόπει οὖν, τούτων πέρι τῶν λόγων. Τρία σε τῶν ἀτόπων ὅρωμεν περιπλέκεσθαι βούλευόμενον ἄνθρώπος τὸ μὲν, ὡς τὸν Θαμάν διαβάλλεις ἀλλα λέγειν οἰόμενον, παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ θέσιν τὸ δὲ, καὶ ἢμον ὡς ἀγνοοῦντων, κατανοῆσαι μόνος δυνάμενος, ὡς συνιδεῖν τὸν Θαμάν τὰ γεγραμμένα μὴ δυναμένων. Τὸ δὲ τελευταίον, ὦ, καὶ τῶν προτέρων οὐ μικρὸν ἀτοπώτερον, ὡς ἂ περὶ τὸν Θεόν ὄντα λέγεις, ἐστιν οὐκ ὄντα χαλεπῶς οὐν, ἂ μὴ ἔστιν οὐσία, τῇ οὐσίᾳ προσάγειν ἐκείνα τῇ θαυμαστῇ γε καὶ μακαρίᾳ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τοῖς μὲν πρώτοις, οὐκ ἀντιλέγων οὐχ ὅτι μὴ δύναμαι, ἄλλ᾽ ὅτι, μὴ βουλομαί τῷ δ᾽ ύστερῳ, μάχομαι παντελῶς τὸ σοφὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν, οὐκ ὄντα ψηφίζῃ περὶ Θεόν;

ΚΛΡΥ


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὕτως, οὐκ ἄλλως.
95 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἂν αὐτὰ καλοῖμεν;
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐπόμενα καὶ προσόντα Θεῷ.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ τῖς ἁγίων, οὕτω, περί τοῦτον φανερῶς ἔλεγεν; Εἰπέ.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Σχεδὸν ἄπαντες.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐνα λέγε καὶ μόνον.
100 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Εἰ ἄλλο μὲν ἑστι τὸ εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνυπάρχειν,
καὶ ὑπάρχει μὲν, τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ οὐσία, ἐνυπάρχει δὲ || αὐτῷ ἡ βουλή,
οὐκ ἄρα ταῦτα.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὁ λέγων;
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἰουστῖνος, ὁ μάρτυς ὁ μῦκα καὶ φιλόσοφος.
105 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἁγιός, οὐ τοιαύτ' ἂν ἐφθέγγετο πώποτε·
εἰπών δὲ, φανερῶν ὡς οὐδαμῶς ἁγιός.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὕτω μοι περὶ τοῦτου καὶ ζῶν ἀπεκρίνου ἐγὼ δὲ σοί
tὴν τιμήν ἀφοσιωσάμενος, οὐκ ἑρῶ, ὡς τότε· σιγῶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, ὑπὶ

ΚΛΡV

100-102. εἰ-ταυτὸν] Ps.-Justin. Mart., Quaest. christ. ad gent., p. 286.19-21


351
καὶ σκοπὸς ἐμοὶ, περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ παρόντι. Αφικόμενοι δὲ εἰς ἐκεῖνα περὶ ἃ νῦν ἐλέγομεν, ὑμιλῶμεν. Δυνάμει μὲν ἴσιμεν, δὲ μὴ πέφυκεν εἶναι, διὰ τὴν τῶν ὀργάνων ἀτέλειαν, ὡς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπιστήμηα, καὶ τέχναι πάσαι ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἄκρος ἄγαθὸς ἂν, ἂεὶ ποιεῖ ὁ δὲ ἄν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἰπη, δυνάμενος οὐ ποιεῖ καὶ πάντα μὲν ἀπλῶς δύναται, ποιεῖ δὲ κατὰ καρόν ἑκαστον, ἡς και τὴν ἀνάστασιν τῶν νεκρῶν, καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα. Δυνάμει τοῖς αὐτὰ καλοῦμεν εἰς τὸν Θεόν, ἄχρις ἄν, εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἁχθή. Καὶ τοῦτο πάντως ἀνόμοιον, τῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δυνάμει. Ὁ δὲ πάρεστι τῷ Θεῷ, φανερόν, ἣς προσον ἐστιν ἄει, καὶ ἐνεργεία τῇ φύσει τούτῳ Θεοῦ, διόλαν, ἐπόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τις αὐτῷ δυνάμει, τεκμηριώσασθαι, πάσοτε, ὡς περὶ τούτων ἔλεγες ἁρτίως αὐτῶς. Ὄτε διὰ ταύτα, οὐδὲ τῷ Θωμᾷ σκοπὸς ἦν, ὅπως νῦν ἔρεις, τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ τὸν Θεόν, ἄλλα τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ δύνασθαι. Τριῶν ἁρα τῶν προει-ἴσημεν ἀτόπων ἐνοχον σαυτὸν εἰπόντες, οὐχ ἀμαρτάνομεν.

**KLPV**


113. πάντα-δύναται] cf. Matth. 19:26; Marc. 10:27


352
125 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αλλὰ τὸ λέγειν μὴ ἀντικείμενον εἶναι τῷ τοῦ Πνεύματος λόγῳ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ, οὐχ ὡσὶς εἰρηταί, καὶ σφόδρα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντικείμενον τοῦ Πνεύματος λόγος ἐστὶ, τὸ εἶναι ἐκ Πατρός, δι᾽ Υἱοῦ πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἀντικείμενον τῷ Πνεύματι, ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ, δι᾽ οὐ εἰκορεύεται; Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Πάλιν, καταχωρὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς· τὸ γὰρ δι᾽ Υἱοῦ, τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδόλως οἶδε σημαίνειν, ὡς πολλαχοῦ δεδεικταί ὁ γοὺς οὖν αἰτιον, αἰτιατὸν οὐκ ἀδύνατον κατὰ σὲ γίνεσθαι οὐκοῦν, οὐκ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἡμῶν ὑποθεμένων αὐτὰ, λέγειν τὸν Υἱὸν ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ εἰ μὴ δηλοῖ τὴν αἰτίαν ἢ διὰ, τι ἄλλο βούλεται;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Κύκλος ὁ τῶν ἁγίων, αὐτὸ ποιεῖ παντὶ γνώριμον, εἰπὼν οὕτως· ἐκ Πατρός ἐστὶ δι᾽ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἁγιον, ἤγουν, σὺν τῷ Υἱῷ, ἡ μετὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἡμὰ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός· ἡ,

140 δηλοῦν, τὸ ὁμοούσιον, ἄλλ' οὐκ ἄλλο. Διὰ ταῦτα, ὑπόθεσις ἡ παροῦσα, οὐκ ἀδυνατεί τὸν Υἱὸν εἰπεῖν ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος.

KLPV

125-130. Αλλὰ-ἀρχής] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, l. 125:7-9

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αλλ’ εἰ τούτο, δύο Πατέρες ἔσονται, καὶ Υἱὸς, δύο· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡμεῖς χρώμενοι, νομοῦμεν ἀτοπον
οὐ μικρόν, εἰ τὸ Πνεῦμα, ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ εἰπ.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τί τούτο;
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Δύο προβολεῖς καὶ αἰτία καὶ ἄρχαι, καὶ τὸ μείζον, ὡς
dύο Πνεύματα, καὶ τὸ προβάλλειν, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν αὐθικ. Ἡ το γὰρ
Πατρὶ πρόσεστι, καὶ οὐδ’ ἀντίκειται λόγῳ, τῷ τοῦ Πνεύματος·
άλλα καὶ τὸ ἀναρχον, καὶ ἀναίτιον, καὶ ἀγέννητον, ὡμοίως ἐν τῷ
Πατρὶ, καὶ οὔδὲ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἑναντίον οὐκοῦν,
ἀναρχος καὶ ἀναίτιος ὁ Υἱός, καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς καὶ ἀγέννητος· ἂ,
μή μόνον ψεύδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατον. Νείλου δ’ οὖν ὁμοί, καὶ τὸν
παρόντα συλλογισμὸν ἐν πέντε διαλύσαντος ἑπιχειρήμασι, τρισὶ
kαὶ μόνοις, Νείλον αὐτὸς αἰτιά.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὕτω μοι ὁκεὶ δίκαιον· ἀλλ’ ἄκουε συλλογισμὸν
ἐπεφερον.

ΚΛΡV

diaκρίσεως>

ΘΩΜΑΣ. Τὸ μὲν γεννᾶν, χαρακτηριστικών ἐστι, τῆς αὐτοῦ
ὑποστάσεως, τὸ δὲ προβάλλειν, οὐ δὲ ἰδιόν ἄρα κοινὸν οὐκοῦν,
Pατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ, καὶ ἢν ἂν καὶ Πνεῦμα, εἰ μὴ ἀδύνατον, ἢν ἐκ τοῦ
Ὑιοῦ ἄρα τὸ Πνεῦμα.

ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. Ὡστε κατὰ τὸν λόγον ύμῶν, ἐκεῖνο χαρακτηρίζει τὴν
ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Πατρὸς, εἴ τι, δὴ καλεῖται τὸ δὲ, χαρακτηριστικών
καὶ ἰδιόν, ἰδιόν ἂν εἴῃ τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸ προβάλλειν.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αλλὰ τὸ μὲν γεννᾶν, ἰδίωμα συστατικῶν εἰναι τοῦ
Πατρὸς τὸ δὲ προβάλλειν αὐτοῦ χαρακτηριστικῶν, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπου
tὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, ἀνέγνω ἄλλα ὦν ἂν φησιν αὐτὸς, τὸ
προβάλλειν ἰδιόν ἂν ποτ' εἴπεν ὁ Θεός τοῦ Πατρὸς οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
ἀντικρισι, ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρὸς, εἰπεν εἰναι τὸ Πνεῦμα καὶ οὐδὲ
αὐτὸς ἂν ἀντιλέγειν ἡμῖν ὦν ἐκεῖνο ταύτα τούτο λέγοντι.

KLVP


Chrys., Synop., § 44, p. 165.8-12

codd.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀπαλλάγηθι κόπων τῶν περὶ λόγους, μὴ ἵππαρχε
πράγματα σαντάρ ὅτι γὰρ οὖς ὑποπτεύειν δύνασθαι τὸν Θωμᾶν
αὐτὸ φάναι, τὸν λόγον σοι βεβαιῶ, ὅποιον δὲ σὺ τῶν ἐν τῷ
Νείλῳ ὤμοι τῶν ἐτυχεῖν, οὐτοὶ περὶ τούτων εἰπότε, παντάπασιν, ἀγνοῶ
οὔτε γὰρ οὖς μαίνομενος οὔτος ἦν, ὡς καὶ τὸν Θωμᾶν διαβάλλειν,
καὶ τοῖς καθ’ ἐαυτοῦ χαίρειν, καὶ τοῖς ύπέρ αὐτοῦ μάχεσθαι αὐτῷ
γὰρ, καὶ πέρα παντὸς οὐ εἰς τῶν μαίνομενον· διὸ σοι, μᾶλλον
οἰκεία διαβολή, τοιαύτῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἢ δὲ βουλεύσῃν.
Ἐπὶ, καὶ τὸν συλλογισμὸν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς τὸν Θωμᾶ, καὶ τὰ
πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρήματα Νείλου· καὶ πάν ἀπλῶς, εἰρηταὶ σοι
πάντως, ἀνεπισκέπτας. Εἰπόντος γὰρ τὸν Θωμᾶ, τὸ μὲν γεννάν,
χαρακτηριστικὸν ἐστὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσεως, τὸ δὲ προβάλλειν,
οὔτε οὖν ὁ ἱδιὸν ἁρα τούτο μὲν, οὔτε ἱδιὸν τῆς προβολῆς τοῦ
Πατρὸς, ἐστὲ νοεῖν ἐνταῦθα τῷ βουλευόμενῳ μᾶλλον δὲ
τούναντιν ἀντικροσίας, ἢς καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ, ἢ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι, συνόν,
ἐπεί, μὴ ἱδιὸν τοῦ Πατρὸς. Καὶ Νείλος αὐτοῖς ἐνιστάμενος, αὐτῷ
φανερὸν ἐποίειν· ἢ δὲ σή κατὰ Νείλου μὲν ἐνστάσις, ὑβεθεῖς ἀρχήν

ΚΛΠV


ἐγεμε, καὶ διπλῆς, ἐν ύστερῳ διαβολῆς τῆς μὲν, ὡς διαβάλλεις, αὐτὸν δὴ Νεῖλον ἄλλο λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦντα, ἢ, τούτῳ προσήκον ἤν, τῆς δὲ, καὶ διαβάλλειν ἐφιέμενον ἄλλους, ὅν ἐκάτερον, ἡκίστα πρέπον Ἰ οὔτε Νεῖλῳ ποιεῖν, οὔτε σοι λέγειν. ἈΛΛ’ ὅμως οἶμαι σὲ ταύτα δράν, δυοῖν, οἰόμενον έτερον ἢ τα ἡ σὰ μηδενί γίνεσθαι γνώριμα δυνάτων πώποτε, ἢ τὰ Νεῖλου, πάντως ἐν ἀφανεὶ κείσθαι φανεροὶ δὲ γενομένου θατέρου, τὸ ψεύδος, ἀπαντή δήλον.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐν βραχεὶ γονὸν εἴπειν, τὴν τοῦ Θωμᾶ δόξαν, ὅπου ἐμὲ εἴδεναι, τῶν ἐν τοῖς θείοις προσώποις, τὰ μὲν, ἴδια φησί, τὰ δὲ, κοινὰ καὶ τῶν ἵδιων, τὰ μὲν, ἴδιαίτατα καὶ ἀκοινώνητα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ, προσωπικά, καλεῖ καὶ ταύτα ἐστὶ τὸ Πατὴρ, καὶ ὁ Υἱός, καὶ τὸ ἄγιον Πνεῦμα· τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ, καὶ ὑποστατικά, λέγει τῶν δὲ κοινῶν, τὰ μὲν, πᾶσι τοῖς προσώποις κοινὰ, ἃ, καὶ ὑσιώδη καλεῖ οἷον, τὸ σοφὸν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἡ ἄλλη καὶ ὃσα ἄλλα τούτου τοῦ τύπου τὰ δὲ, ἀφορισμένα ἐνὶ προσώπῳ, ἣ προσώποις.

KLPV


49-45. τα’-προσώποις] cf. Thom. Aquin., ST, Ia, q. 13, a. 2-3, Ia, q. 32, a. 2


357
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Δήλων οὖν, ὡς τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκείνην, ἢ, μηδὲν ἰσόν, καὶ ἢ, τῶν ὀρθομένων ἀπάντων ύπερ λόγον ἀπήλλακται, ἱδαίτατα, καὶ οὐσιώδη καλεῖς, ὑπόματα τοῖς παρούσιν ἐφαρμοζόμενα. Όθεν, σοι καὶ τάλλα τῶν φαινομένων, οἶμαι ὃ ἐδιν ἀνατίθεσθαι τῇ φύσι Θεοῦ, ἄλλη δὲ πάλιν, καὶ οὐσίαν ὀνομάζεις αὐταὶ ἂν ἐκάτερον, ἀνοίκειον τῷ Θεῷ ὅμως ἰδι, εἰπέ· τὶ περὶ Θεόν ὀμολογεῖς ἢ ὃ, καὶ συστατικὸν καὶ ὑποστατικὸν καὶ χαρακτηριστικὸν ἐστὶν ἀμα; ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐδέν ἐτερον, ἢ τὸ Πατήρ.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ποίον δὲ τὸ προσωπικὸν, ἂν οὐ συστατικὸν;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τὸ ἀγέννητον.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐχεις μοι εἰπείν ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ παραδείγματα τῇ ὑποθέσει οἰκεία;

ΚΛΡΥ

48. οὐσιώδη P 49. τ’ ἄλλα LP 55. προσωπικὸν L 58. οἰκεία L 58. οἰκεία sign. interrogationis KV; post οἰκεία sign. interrogationis L.
Κυδώνης. Πάνω γε· ὠσπέρ τὸ λογικὸν ἰδιον ἄνθρωπον ἐστὶ καὶ συστατικὸν αὐτοῦ —τούτο γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ἄνθρωπον οὐσίαν τὴν ἰδικὴν συνιστησιν ἢ ύψιστησιν—, οὕτω καὶ τὸ Πατήρ· τὸ δὲ γελαστικὸν, ἰδιον μὲν ἄνθρωπο, οὐ μὴν ὡς ύψιστον τὴν τοῦ ἄνθρωπον οὐσίαν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡ ὑποστάσει ἐπαγινόμενον, οὐ χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ αἰτία. Οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θείων προσώπων τὰ μέν, ἰδια αὐτῶν, ὦτι καὶ συστατικά, ὠσπέρ ἄ εἰπομεν, τὰ δὲ ἐστίν, ἐπιθεωροῦμεν ἐνι προσώπῳ, ἢ προσώποις ὠσπέρ, τὸ μὲν ἄγεννητον ἐπὶ τοῦ Πατρός, ἰδιον μὲν αὐτοῦ, πλὴν, οὐ συστατικὸν.

Χρυσολωρας. Ἀλλ’ ἀνάρμοστά σοι τὰ παραδείγματα περὶ τὸν Θεόν, ὦ σοφώτατε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ λογικόν, ἐπ’ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ μίαν ἀμα, καὶ πάσας πάντων ἡδὴ τὰς ὑποστάσεις καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς, κατὰ σὲ δηλοὶ τὸ δὲ Πατήρ εἰς Θεόν, τὴν ὑποστασιν αὐτοῦ μόνης, οὐκ ἄλλην οὔθε τὴν οὐσίαν ἄπλως αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ καθολικώτερον ὑποστάσεως εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὡς ἄνθρωπον τὸ λογικὸν· ἢ γὰρ, ἄνθρωπος, λογικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη· ἀντιστρόφως δὲ τὰ Θεοῦ· ὁ γὰρ Πατήρ, καὶ ὑπόστασες, οὐ μὴν, ὁ

ΚΛΡV


ὑπόστασις, καὶ τὸ γελαστικόν, οὐχ οὕτως ἀνθρώπως, ὡς Θεῷ τὸ ἀγέννητον ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν, ἐπιγνόμενόν ἔστιν ἀπάση τῇ ὑποστάσει, καὶ λέγεται, κἂν μὴ γελάν ἐπεφύκει, τὸ δὲ ἀγέννητον, ἀεὶ σύνεστιν ὑποστάσει τῇ πατρικῇ καὶ τὸ μὴ πεφυκέναι, λέγεται μηδαμῶς καὶ τὸ μὲν, ἀντιστρέφει—ταῦτόν, γὰρ ἀνθρώπως, καὶ γελαστικῶν—, περὶ δὲ τῶν Θεῶν, οὐδαμῶς ἢ γὰρ Πατήρ, καὶ ἀγέννητος, οὐ μὴν ἢ ἀγέννητος, καὶ Πατήρ· ἀλλὰ τὸ γελαστικόν, οὐδαμῶς· καὶ τὸ μὴν ἀνοίκει τῷ Θεῷ παραδείγματα, καὶ τοῖς ὑποτιθεμένοις, ταναντία περαίνεσθαι δύκαιον. ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὔτε γὰρ εἶναι τὶ δηλοῖ τὸ ἀγέννητον, ἀπόφασις μόνον, ὅν τοῦ γεννητοῦ, καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑστερον—αἱ γὰρ ἀποφάσεις, τῶν καταφάσεων, ὑστερεῖ—καὶ τῇ τοῦ γεννητοῦ μόνον ἀφαιρέσει, δηλοῖ, τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς ἂν, Ιουδαίοι, ἢ ἄλλοι τυχόν, εἶποιεν· καὶ λέγεται τούτῳ μόνῳ γνώρισμα τοῦ Πατρός ἀκολούθως δὲ τούτῳ, καὶ πάν ἄλλο, ἐν τῇ Τριάδι, ὦ, μήτε κοινὸν ἐστὶ πάσι, μήτε ἐνὸς μόνου συστατικοῦ, καθὼς ἔφημεν, γνώρισμα τοῦτο καλεῖ.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τούτο σοι, τῶν προτέρων, ἀσθενεστεροῦν ἄγαν καὶ ἀτοπώτερον τό γὰρ ἀγέννητον, οὐδὲν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ καταφάσεως ἀληθῶς ὑστερον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ψεύδος ἐκάτερον ἀληθῶς· οὔτε γὰρ ὑστερον ἐκεῖ καταφάσεως· ἀμα γὰρ ὅλα τῇ θείᾳ τῶν ὑποστάσεων ὅσα πρέπει. Ὕπαρξιν δὲ καὶ μάλα δηλοῖ, τὸ ἀγέννητον II ἐπὶ τοῦ Πατρός· καὶ οὐ τούτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀναιτιῶν καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ τάλλα σημαίνειν οἶδεν, ὅσα τῷ Πατρὶ πρόσεστιν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς θεολόγοις ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ ἡμέτερα, καὶ καταφάσεως τῆς περὶ Θεόν, πολὺ, τιμιώτερα καὶ κρείττων. Α δὲ σὺ φής, τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀρμόζει φύσει. Οὐκ ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, μηδὲν τὴν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου φωνὴν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ δύνασθαι, πλὴν, καταφάσεως νοεῖσθαι μόνης ἀναίρεσιν. Ἀπόκριται οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ τούτο ποῦν ἐν τῇ Ἰχάδι καλεῖς γνώσιμα, ὃ, μηθ’ ἐνός προσωποῦ, μήτε κοινὸν ἐστι; 

ΚΛΡΥ

92. τούτο σοι codd. εἰ 96. δὲ] deest K εἰ 98. τ’ ἀλλὰ LP εἰ 103. καὶ] deest P
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τὸ πέμπειν, ἢ ἀποστέλλειν τὸ Πνεῦμα, κοινὸν ὁν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ, γνώρισμα τούτων οὕτε δὲ ὑποστατικόν, οὕτε προσωπικόν. Ὡμοίως δὲ, καὶ τὸ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι πηγὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀμφοῖν, εἶναι ἐκεῖνο, Πνεῦμα.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ὡρὰς τὴν ἀπάτην; Τὸ πέμπειν καὶ ἀποστέλλειν, κοινὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τρισὶν, ὡς ἁσφαλῶς δέδεικται, μὴ μόνον ἁγίοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ἀνάγκῃ τῶν λόγων ἐπόμενον τὸ δὲ καὶ ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοῦ, πηγὴν εἶναι, ψεύδος τῶν γὰρ προτέρων ἀναφορομένων, καὶ τὸ ὑστερὸν ἀναγκαῖος οἴχεσθαι τὸ δ’ ἀμφοῖν εἶναι ἐκεῖνο Πνεῦμα, τὴν ἐκπόρευσιν οὐ ποιεῖ πολλά γὰρ ἄλλα, καὶ λέγεται, καὶ ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρὰ τούτο καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τούτως ὁ Θωμᾶς, συναριθμεῖ, καὶ τὸ προβλητικόν, γνώρισμα τούτο λέγων ἵνα τοις καὶ ὑποστατικῶι,

χρυσολωρας. Οὗ Θωμᾶς μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὡσοις ἀν εἶπεν, οὐδένα ἀν εὑροῖ τῶν εὑσεβῶν, ἐθέλοντα πείθεσθαι ποτὲ ὡμοὶ εἰ κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν, διατὰ, μὴ καὶ Πνεῦματι;

ΚΛΡΥ


ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. ጂτι ἀδύνατον.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Καὶ οὐ γελοῖον τοῦτό γε; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἁδικον, οὐ χώρα τοῦ ἁδικου Θεῷ, καὶ οὐδὲ τῷ Υἱῷ προσῆκεν· εἰ δὲ δίκαιον,

πῶς ἀδύνατον; Καὶ γὰρ, πάν ὅσον ἁδικον ἀτεχνᾶς, Θεοῦ πόρρω καὶ ὅσον δίκαιον, αὐτῶ, σύνεστιν. Οἷς γοῦν τὰ δύο πρόσωπα κοινωνείν οἴδεν, εἰ τοῦ τρίτου ἐστὶν ἀκοινόνητον, οὐκ ἀδικεῖται καὶ ὡς ἐλαττὸν ἀτιμάζεται; Ἀλλ' ἁδικον· διὸ καὶ τὸ Πνεύμα, τῶν ἵσων ἔχεσθαι ἀνάγκη, Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ ὁν γενομένων, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν αἵτιον ἐσται προσώπων, καὶ ἕαυτον ὃ, τοῦ προτέρου χείρον. Οἵκ ἀρα τὸ κοινὸν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ, μὴ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι, ὡς ἁδύνατον· εἰ γὰρ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἁδύνατον καὶ εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν, ἁδίκον οὕτος γὰρ ὁ τοῖς θείοις οἰκείοις προσώποις νόμος, οὐκ ἄλλος.

135 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἁλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ὁ Θωμᾶς ἂν εἶποι, τὸ αἵτιατόν, κοινὸν εἶναι, Υἱῷ καὶ Πνεύματι μὴ συστατικόν εἶναι αὕτων, ἄλλα γνώσιμα μόνον.

ΚΛΠΒ

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Πρώτον αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, ὡς πρὸς αὑτῶν ἀναφέρεται τὸν Πατέρα καὶ δύο ταῦτ’ εἶναι πάντως ἀναγκαῖον αἰτιατα’ εἰ γοὺν καὶ τὸ προβλητικὸν κοινὸν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ, ἀνάγκη ἀρα, καὶ προσολεῖς εἶναι δύο, καὶ πηγάς, καὶ ἀρ—χάς, καὶ αἰτια’ ἀ πάντα, καὶ χαλεπά καὶ ἀδύνατα καὶ οὐδέποτ’ ἀν τις αὐτὰ, καλεῖν οὕτως δύναιτο. Καὶ τὸν Θωμάν ἐν τῷ παρόντι συλλογισμῷ, Νεῖλος πολλῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐδώξε· σὺ δὲ Νεῖλον, ὀλίγων.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀδειά μοι.

ΚΛΡΥ

141. προβολλεῖς P || post ἀρα scr. et del. τῷ V || 143. αὕτω ΚΡΥV || 145. scr. sign. in textu et scr. in marg. κυδ<ώνης> P || ἀδιὰ P
[12] Συλλογισμός ενδέκατος

ΘΩΜΑΣ. Εγώ προβαλούμει συλλογισμόν ὑμῖν ἑτέρον. Τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τῆς ὀψίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ λεγόντων τῶν θεολόγων, ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ εἶναι ὡστερ ἐκ τῆς ὀψίας τοῦ Πατρὸς, καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ· αἰτίος ἀρα, καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος ὁ Υἱός.

ΝΕΙΛΟΣ. Τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τῆς ὀψίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ὡς ὀμοούσιον· οὐκ ἀνάγκη δε, εἰ τι περὶ ομοούσιον, καὶ εἰ εἰκόνου εἶναι.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ τούτῳ δὲ, Θωμᾶ λογίζεται, ὡς ἂν εἰπόντι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ εἶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα, ἐπειδήπερ ἐκ τῆς ὀψίας αὐτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ προϊέναι ὀμολογεῖται. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς ὀψίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ αὐτῆς προϊέναι, κοινὴ ἐστι δοξα πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀνατολῇ διδαξάντων ἁγίων, διαφοράν ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν λόγοις ἀναγινωσκόμενον· καὶ ὡς τοῦτο μόνον φασίν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ προϊέσι, καὶ εἰ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, ὡστερ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς.

KLPV


365
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τούτων, τὸ μὲν, ἔστιν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ, οὔ. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοὺς θεολόγους εἰπεῖν, οὐδέις ἀντιλέγει· ὁμοίως, καὶ τὸ πέμπτεσθαι καὶ χορηγεῖσθαι τὸ δ’ ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός, πάντας ἄν εὑροί τις ἀνθισταμένους ὡς ἀφφαγεῖς κίονας· ἃν ἀπάντων, ἕξηγητίς, Ἰωάννης, ἢ καὶ Μάξιμος, οἱ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ εἶναι λέγοντες ἐξ Υἱοῦ.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν, οὐτε Θωμᾶς εἰρήκεν, οὐτέ τις τῶν ἄλλων Λατίνων, ὅσα ἐμὲ εἰδέναι καὶ τοῦτο ἰσως, διὰ τὸ μὴ τοσοῦτον ἐμπείρους εἶναι, τῶν ἐλληνικῶς, παρὰ τῶν ἀγίων, συγγεγραμμένως, ὡστε καὶ πρὸς μαστυρίαν χρησθαι· διὸ, καὶ αὐτὸς βέλτιον ἡγούμαι, μὴ πράγματα ἐχεῖν ἀπολογούμενος, ὑπὲρ ἃν ἐκείνος οὐκ εἰρήκεν· ὁμοίως εἰ τι δέοι, καὶ περὶ τούτου εἰπεῖν.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Σιγῇ χρησθαι σε μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐδει, ἡ ἀντικείσθαι· ἐπελάθου γάρ ὡς έοικε, τῶν ἀρτίως σοι λεγομένων. Ἐν γὰρ τῷ δευτέρῳ συλλογισμῷ, καὶ πρόσχημα σοι τῆς ἀντιλογίας ἐγένετο, ὑπότυπον, ἰσώς εὐλογον, οὐ Θωμᾶ τοῦτον εἰπόντι, ἀλλ’ ἄλλου Λατίνων εἶναι προβαλλομένως οἷς δή, καὶ συνηγορεῖν καὶ

ΚΛΡΠ


366
συμμαχεῖν, εἰκὸς ἦν νυνὶ δὲ, οὔτε Θωμᾶ τὸν παρόντα συλλογισμὸν ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι, οὔτε Λατίνων ἄλλου. Εἶτ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἀνατρέπειν τὰ Νείλου καὶ ταύτα λέγων ἁρχὴν, ὡς ἤ τοῦ Θωμᾶ σε φιλία, τούτων οἴδε προτρέπειν. Ἔγω δὲ οὐ ταύτα καὶ πάλιν ἐρώτει μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ θεώρημα, ἔστω καὶ Θωμᾶ καὶ Λατίνων ἄλλου, καὶ τῆς παρὰ σοῦ γε συμμαχίας τυχέτω εἰ δὲ μὴ καλὸν, καὶ τάναγκαια μὴ περαίνειν δυνάμενον, καὶ Λατίνων οὐδὲν γνώσιμον, τί κόποις αὐτῷ παρέχεις, οἷς, οὐδὲν ὑπελογίζεις. Αὐτὸν γὰρ, οἷς μεμφεσθαί, περιπίπτειν, καὶ ἄν κατηγορεῖν, κοινωνεῖν

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐξ ὥλης καὶ εἰδοὺς ψυφισταμένων, φανερὸν, ὡς ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐσία, καὶ ἄλλο, τὸ πρόσωπον ἄλλο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνθρωπότης, ἢτις ἐστὶν αὐτή ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐσία, ἢ ἐστὶν οὐσιώδες εἰδὸς αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ δηλοῦται, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἢ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐν ὧ, ἡστερ ἐν ὑποκείμενῳ

ΚΙΡΠ

33. ἀρχὴ Π 45, εἰς KPV 1 ταῦτα codd. 1 καὶ deest P 1 35, μὲν bis acc. L 46, γε] σὲ P 1 37, τ' ἀναγκαία ΛΠ 1 41-51, Κυδώνης-ἀπλότητα] signa in marg. KL. illeg. V 1 36. πρόσωπον P 45, ἐνυποκείμενῳ L
καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ περιέχεται, μὴ οὖν τής τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐσίας· οἶον, τὸ λευκὸν, καὶ δίπηχυ, ἢ τί τοιοῦτον, ἢ ὁ ὁ οἷς συμπληροῦται τὸ ύποκείμενον. ἕπι δὲ τῶν ἄνευ ὑλῆς, ταῦτάν ἐστι τὸ ύποκείμενον καὶ ἢ οὐσία ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστιν ἀγγελος, καὶ ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ κυκλος, καὶ αὐτή, ἢ οἶον ὑ' εἶπεν, κυκλότης καὶ τούτο ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ μάλιστα θεωρεῖται, διὰ τὴν ἀκραν ἀπλότητα.  

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἰδοὺ σε τοῦ ἀντιλεγένον ἡμῖν ἢ ἐφεσις, ἢξω τῶν θείων, καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῶν λόγων, ἐφοίσεν. Αὐτοπόν γὰρ οὐ μικρόν, ἀνθρώπων οὐσίας καὶ ύποστάσεως, λέγειν διαφοράν, κύκλων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων, οὐδόλως. Διπλής οὖν τής οὐσίας ἐν παντὶ γενομένης, ἢ φαινομένης, τῆς μὲν, καθόλου, ἢ ἦς τῶν ἄλλων ἡ διάφορας δήλη, μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων τῆς δὲ, μηδὲν ἄλλο σημαινοῦσης ἢ, ἀτομα, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον οὐσία ἐλεγονται, καὶ μήτε καθ' ύποκειμένου τινός, ἢ ἐν ύποκειμένω σὺ οὖν, ὁποιαν ὁμολογεῖς

KLPV


47. ἢ deest KP I ante συμπληροῦται ssr. οἷς V: deest L I 48. ταυτών codd. I 49. ταυτών codd. I 52. [χευστολ(ω)φ[άς]] illeg. V I 53. ἐφοίσεν L I 54. ύποστάσεως P I 57. δὲ bis acc. L I 59. καθὑποκειμένου L I 59. ἐνὑποκειμένου L I σὺν deest KPV I ὁποῖαν LP

368
ἀνομοιαν εἰναι τῇ ὑποστάσει; Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἄτομον, οὐκ ἀληθὲς· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ τοῦ δεινος οὐσία τῆς αὐτοῦ δήθεν ὑποστάσεως διαφέρει, ἀλλ’ ἢ αὐτή ἐστιν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τὴν καθόλου φής ἀνομοιαν τῇ ὑποστάσει, τούτου μὲν χάρις σοι, καὶ ἀληθένωντι συμφωνούμεν· πλήν, ὅσθι τούτο, κἂν τοίς ἄγγελοις εὐφρίσκεσθαι.

Εἰς ἐκατέρου σοι τοίνυν ἄτομον ἐπεται, λέγοντι μὲν, ἀλλὸ τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐν ὑλῇ, τῇ δ’ αὐλίᾳ ταύτων ὡς γὰρ ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐσία, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἄγγελων, ὅσον εἰς τὴν διαφέσιν. Καὶ δῆλον ἐνετέθην γένος ἁρχὴν ἢ οὐσία ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτην, οὐμα: υψ’ ὁ, τὸ ζῶον ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ ζῶον, λογικὸν· υψ’ ὁ, ὁ ἀνθρωπός· καὶ τέλος, τὸ ἄτομον· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄγγελων γένος, ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀσώματον, ἐκάτερον δὲ τούτων, οὐσία· καὶ πᾶς μὲν, ἄγγελος, ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀσώματος καὶ οὐσία· ἀλλ’ οὐ πᾶν ἀσώματον, ἄγγελος, καὶ πᾶς, οὐσία, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν· ταύτων δὲ κἀν τοῖς κύκλοις ἀκολουθεῖν σχῆμα γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ γένος· οὕτω δὲ, καὶ περί τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐλέγομεν. Οὖκοιν, ἐπιχειρήμα τὸ σόν, εἰκότας ἄν εἰ ἐφι σόφισμα.

ΚΛΠV


60. ἀληθὲς LV; ἀληθὲς K II 65. μὲν bis acc. L II 66. αὐλία P I ταυτὸν codd. II 71. μὲν bis acc. L II 74. ταυτὸν codd. II κἂν L: κ(α)ι P II 76. μὲν bis acc. L
ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. ὁδαμῶς ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἁγγέλων καὶ τῶν ἁνθρώπων, ἀληθῆ λέγεις, Θεοῦ δὲ τούτο, μακράν ἐν ὑ, μὴ μόνον τὸ τε ὑποκείμενον, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ταύτὸν ἐστὶν, ἄλλα καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ταύτων, καὶ ἐν ἑστὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ. Ταύτων τοινῦν ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ, Υίος καὶ οὐσία Υίου, ίνα μὴ διαφορὰν πραγμάτων νοούντες ἐκεῖ, λάθωμεν, καὶ σύνθεσιν τῷ Θεῷ διδόντες πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖ, ἐν, καὶ ταύτων τῷ ἀριθμῷ, οὐσία δηλονότι καὶ ὑπαρχεῖς, διὰ τῇ τὴν θείαν ἀπειρίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀκρανίαν ἀπλότητα του Θεοῦ.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις σοι, τὸ παρὸν ὁμοιον, ὅτε περὶ τῆς οὐσίας Θεοῦ καὶ ἐνεργείας ἐθεολογεῖς.

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτων ἐκεῖ οὐσία τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, σύνθεσις ἁρα.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐκ τῶν ὁμοιών εἰ ταύτων, ληπτὸν ἀνάγκη τὸ θεῖον ὁμολογεῖν, ὃ, πάσης συνθέσεως ἀποτούτερον πολλὰ γὰρ ληπτά, σύνθετα, ληπτὸν δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἐν ὅλως, οὐδὲν ἀσύνθετον ὦτω κἀς τούτω φοβοῦμενοι σύνθεσιν, ταύτων, ὑπόστασιν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καλεῖτε.

Σκόπει δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ταύτων ὑπόστασις ἐκεὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ;

KLPV

78-84. ἐν-Θεοῦ] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 125v:22-25

87. Εἰ-ἄρα] vide supra, linn. 78-84

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ούκ ἄλλως.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Υποστάσεις δέ, πάντως τρεῖς. Καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, δήλον τρεῖς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὰς ὑσίας.

Ἕτε, Πατήρ καὶ Υἱός, καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα, καθ’ ὑμᾶς τῇ ἀντιθέσει ταύτα· οἶκ, οὐκ οἶδα, τίς ἃν ἐποίητο μείζων, ἡ βλασφημία!

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Εἰ δὲ ὁ Υἱός καὶ ἡ ὑσία Υἱοῦ ταύτων, κακὸς τῆς ὑσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ τῷ Πνεῦμα λεγόμενον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ εἶναι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ οὐθ’ ἡμῖν, οὕτε σοὶ τε καὶ τῷ Θεῷ σκοπός ἦν, ὡς λέγειν Υἱόν, καὶ ὑσίαν Υἱοῦ, ἀλλ’ Ὑιόν καὶ τὴν ὑσίαν ἄπλως· ὅπερ οὐ ταύτων δέδεικται πολλάν καὶ μεγάλων ἀτόπων τρεῖς γὰρ παρὰ τῶν ἁγίων, τὰς τε ὑποστάσεις καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα, σαφώς ἵσμεν· τρεῖς δὲ τὰς ὑσίας ἡ τὰς φύσεις, ἡ τὰς μορφάς, ἡ τὰς ἀρχάς, οὐθ’ ὑποπτεύουσιν ἡξίωσεν οὐδεὶς πάντοτε, οὐθ’ ἐννοεῖν θλάσας. Οὐκ ἄρα ταύτων ὑποστάσεις τῇ ὑσίᾳ· οὐ μόνον διὰ τῶν ἀτόπων τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφοράς ἂν ἄπας ὁ τῶν ἁγίων αὐτὸ χρόνος εἰπών, οὕτω φαίνεται. Πολὺ τοῖνυν ὑσίας καὶ ὑποστάσεως τὸ

ΚΛΠV


98. ταυτὰ codd. ll ἕν ἐν acc. L ll ἡ deest P ll 99-101. Κυδώνης-ἐναὶ signa in marg. KLV ll 99. ταυτὸν codd. ll 104. ταυτὸν codd. ll 107. ἐννοεῖν LP ll 108. ὅλως codd. KPV ll ταυτὸν codd.
διάφορων εἰς Θεόν δέδεικται ἄρα, τὴν πρώταν εἶναι μὴ ἀναγκαίαν, τὴν ἑκ τῆς ύποστάσεως τοῦ Υἱοῦ λέγουσαν εἶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἁγιον ὅτι, καὶ ἑκ τῆς ὑσίας αὐτοῦ, εἶναι λέγεται. Καὶ τῆς ἑνστάσεως τὸ δοκοῦν σοι μέγεθος, ἄρα λέλυται.

115 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. ἈΛΛ᾽ εἰ τὸν ἐντελή λόγον περὶ τοῦτον ἔμπειρον, εὐρήσει, οὐ μόνον Θωμᾶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τοῦτο Αὐγουστῖνον, καὶ τοὺς ἀλλούς πατέρας καὶ θεολόγους, ἰκανοὺς περὶ τοῦτον διαλεχθέντας.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. ἈΛΛ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἀν περὶ τούτων, οὐδεὶς πείσαι πώποτε, δύνατον καὶ τοῦτο μὲν, Αὐγουστῖνος ἑσεὶς ἐρεί καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ἁμα σοι καὶ Θωμᾶς τοὺς δὲ πατέρας καὶ θεολόγους, οὐ πάντω τοι πείθομαι, ἂν μὴ ποὺ, τοῦ πρῶτου μὲν, ἡ δύο, τοῦ δευτέρου δὲ, τρία, τὰ πρῶτα, δῆθεν ἐξέλης γράμματα, πείθομαι τότε λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ἂ σὺ νῦν ἐρείς ἢ μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἀληθέστερον, ὅτι καὶ συνηγορεῖν σοι ὁμοίως καὶ ταύτα φθέγγεσθαι, ἂν ἐφιν ἀφαφεθέντων στοιχείων πέντε.

ΚΛΡΥ

115-118. ΑΛΛ᾽-διαλεχθέντας] Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 125v. 30-31

ΚΥΩΝΗΣ. ΑΛΛ’ ὁ φησιν οὕτως, διὰ πλειόνων προαποδείξαι τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὕσιας τοῦ Υίου εἶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα παρὰ τῶν ἀγίων λεγόμενον, οὐ ταύτων εἶναι τὸ τὸν Υίον οὐσιωδῶς αἰτιον εἶναι τοῦ Πνεύματος, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι ὁμοούσιον ἐστὶν αὐτῷ τὸ Πνεῦμα, ἀληθὲς μὲν, ὡς ἐπεχείρησεν ἀποδείξαι πάνω δὲ ἡμελημέναις ἀποδείξεσιν εἰς τὸν λόγον ἐχρήσατο, καὶ ψῆ ταυτῶν ἀνατρεπομέναις καὶ τούτο οἴσεται, ὡς τοιαυτὴ σχολή, ὡστε τὴν μακρὰν κατὰ Λατίνων αὐτοῦ συγγαφῆν ἄναγγέναι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Καὶ τούτῳ σοι δῆλον αὐτόθεν οὐχ ὑγιαίνειν. Πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶν, ὅ νῦν ἔρει Νεῖλος, εἰς ἀνατροπὴν τοῦ παρόντος συλλογισμοῦ, σὺ δὲ, Νεῖλον αἰτια, δύο ὢν, τὸ μὲν, ἀνεπίσκεπτον ἀληθῶς, ὅ, καὶ παραπτιθέμενον ἡμῖν, ἀναφέσαι, τὸ δὲ, μόνον ὑβρεων γέμει κατὰ τοῦ Νεῖλου ὅ, καὶ τιμῶμεν ἡμεῖς, σιγὴ. Τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον, οὐκ ἀν ἀνεπιρρέαστον εἰςα, οἰόμενος ἀσθενὲς εἶναι ἀλλὰ δυνατὸν ὅρων, ἐκρίνας παρακαλύπτεσθαι δίκαιοιν.

ΚΥΩΝΗΣ. ΑΛΛ’ ὡστερ εἰς πέμπον, καὶ μιὰ πιηγῆ, ἀμφω πέμποντες καὶ πηγάζοντες, οὕτω καὶ εἰς προβολεῦς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἐν πρόσωπων.

ΚΛΡV

127-134. ΆΛΛ’-ἀναγγείλοντα: [Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 125v:32-34 | 142-144. ΆΛΛ’-πρόσωπον]
Dem. Cyd., Defensio, f. 126v:21-22

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν, Ἡ ἀληθείας ἐγγύς πηγάζει γάρ
Πατήρ καὶ Υἱός, οὗ τοῦ Πνεύματος τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἀφωνισμένην
οὐσάν τῷ Πατρὶ μόνῳ, τὴν χάριν δὲ τοῦ παναγίου Πνεύματος, ἢς,
καὶ ὁ Παράκλητος χορηγός, Υἱῷ τὲ καὶ Πατρὶ ἁμα. Καὶ οὐδὲν
αὐτοῖς χαλεπῶν ὅλως ἐπεται ἄλλως δὲ λεγομένους ἢ νοουμένους,
πολλὰ τὰ ἄτοπα ἔσται.

150 [12.] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἀχι μὲν τούτων, τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρός πρὸς Θωμᾶν ἀντιλογίας
τὸ πέρας τὰ δ’ ἐπέκεινα, οὔτε τῶν συγγραφεὶ κόσμον ἔχει, οὔτε τοῖς
ἀντιλέγουσι δόξαν δεινότητος μαρτυρίης, ὡς ἄν, πρὸς τὰ τῶν
ἀξιολόγουν ἡγονισμένους. Ὡσπε, οὐδὲ ἐμὲ δεῖ λοιπὸν, ὑπὲρ ἄν οὔτε
Θωμᾶς εἶπεν ἀπολογείσθαι, οὔθ’ οὕτως, ἰσχυρὸν τι κατ’ ἐκείνου
προστείνειν ἀγονίζεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὅσον δίκαιον ἀφοσιωσάμενον τῷ
didaσκαλῷ τὴν τιμὴν, σωπήσασαι ἐπεῖ, καὶ τούτῳ ἦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῷ
παρόντι βιβλίῳ σκοπός, τοὺς τε κατ’ ἐκείνου γέλωτας καὶ τὰς
συκοφαντίας δειξεῖ τιμήν ἔστε, καθ’ οὗ γέγραπται συγκαθαρισθῆναι
dυνάμενα, καὶ πείσαι τοὺς ἄλλους τῆς τῶν λόγων τοὺτων ἀσθενείας

ΚΛΨ


151-162. Κυδώνης-χρήσαιντο] signa in marg. KLV l 151, μὲν bis acc. L l 152. κόσμος L l
ἀν bis acc. L l 155. ἰσχυρόν τι L l 156. προστείνειν L l 157. ἦν deest K
καταφρονήσαντας, ἐτέρους ἱσχυρότερους ζητεῖν, οίς, πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιτεταγμένους ἀγωνιζόμενοι χρήσαιντο.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐ ταύτα σοι τῆς σιγῆς αίτια, ὡς οὔτε Θομᾶ τά λοιπά, οὔτε δυνατόν τι περὶ τούτων ὁ Νείλος ἔρει. Καὶ δῆλον,

165 ἐντεῦθεν τὸν γὰρ δεύτερον καὶ δέκατον συλλογισμὸν, ὁμολογεῖς, εἶναι μή τοῦ Θομᾶ· ἥψω δὲ ἡ τῶν ἁγίων, ὡς σοι δύναμις· Νείλον δὲ πάλιν ἀνατρέπειν ἔβουλευσον σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ καίρια, οίς, οὐκ ἂν ἐσίγας ἐν ἀπιθάνοις προσάγεις δὲ καὶ τῷ διδασκάλῳ σοι τὴν ἀτιμίαν μᾶλλον, ἢ τὴν τιμήν, οὐ καλῶς γε τούτῳ συνηγορῶν· ἑτερον, τοῦτος ἂλλος, τοῦ Θομᾶ πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν ζητεῖν οὐδὲν ἔτερον, ἢ, τῷ Νείλῳ. Τέως, ἡμεῖς, λογιζόμεθα σοι χάριν οὐ μικρὰν τῆς σιγῆς ἔνεκα τὸ μὲν, ὡς τῆς περὶ τὸν μακάριον Νείλον παυομένῳ κατηγορίας, τὸ δὲ, καὶ ὡς ἐμὲ τῶν περὶ λόγους ἀπαλλάττοντι κόπων καὶ τέλος, ὡς τῶν πρώτων οὐκ ἐλαττων, ὡς καὶ τοῦ συνηγορεῖν ἀπέστης Θομᾶ, πολλὴν ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἡ τὴν ἁδυκάν,

ΚΛΡΨ


163. ταύτα σοι codd. || 168. ἁν bis acc. L || 172. μὲν bis acc. L || περὶ deest P || 173. δὲ bis acc. L
πολλὴν δὲ καὶ υπὲρ τὰ ὀντα λαλήσαντε ὅθεν σοι τὴν σιγήν ἐπαινούμεν, ὡς πάντων ἢδη λεγομένων βελτίων. Τὰ δὲ μεγέθη τῶν ὄβρεων, ἂ, τῷ Νείλῳ καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ψηφιζῃ Χριστοῦ, καταλημμένωμεν σιωπή τὸ μέν, ὡς ἀπεχόμενοι τῆς περὶ σε μάχης, τὸ δὲ, σοὶ καὶ τῶν μακρῶν ἐκεῖνον ἀκαίρων ἀμα ὑμματῶν οὐ μνημονεύοντες. Θομᾶ δὲ τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εὐφῶν ἀσθενεῖς ἄπαντας καὶ περιπλακεῖς ὁ Νείλος, ἐρρίψεν εἰς βυθὸν, ὑποβρυχίους ὡς ἐδει πεποιημένος οὐς, συνθετευεῖν ἐθέλων, ἀντὶ φαρμάκων ἐμφυτεύεις τὰ δηλητήρια καὶ εἴ τι σφίσιν ὡστὸν ἐνοράται, συντριψας, υπὲρ ἄν, οὐχ ὡς ἐδεί τὰς ἐννεάδες ἐτοιμασάμενος· ὥδε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔδωσεν ἐν τοῖς προσομίοις, αὐτῷ κἂν τῷ τέλει ἤ τῶν λόγων, τῷ ψεύδει συντίθεσαι.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐκ ἔχω γνώναι, ὅτι τῇ ἡ ποιῶ.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ὁ ἄρτιώς ἔλεγες, οὐ δεί σε λοιπὸν, υπὲρ ἄν, οὔτε Ὁσμᾶς εἴπεν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, οὔτε Νείλος ἵσχυφον ἔλεγεν ἀγωνίζεσθαι.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Γνώριμά μοι.

ΚΛΡΒ


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τί οὖν; Οὐ τὸ ἀξίωμα ἢ πανταχοῦ ἢ οὐδαμοῦ, κατὰ τὸν Φιλόσοφον εἶναι δεῖ;

195 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὔτως.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Διατί οὖν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ καὶ τῷ Φιλοσόφῳ δοκεῖς ἐναντία πεποιηκέναι, καὶ δρᾶν ἀντικείμενα, οίς πρότερον ὑπισχνοῦ; ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Πού ταύτα;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Συλλογισμοῖς ὁμολόγεις εἶναι μὴ τοῦ Θωμᾶ εἰτα συνηγόρεις αὐτοῖς, καὶ πολὺ τῆς ἀντιλογίας ἐφρόντιζες· νῦν δὲ, σιωπᾶν ἐρεῖς, ὅτι νομίζεις τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς εἶναι μὴ τοῦ Θωμᾶ. Οὐ ταύτα τοῖς προτέρους ἐναντία; Ἡ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἔδει σιγᾶν, ἢ, καὶ περὶ τούτων λαλεῖν. Οὐκ ἀρα σοι τούτο, τῆς σιγῆς αἰτίον, οὐδ' ὅτι Νείλος, ἵσχυρόν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἥδυνατος οὔτω μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, καὶ πρότερον ἐλογίζου τοιαύτα, καὶ τὰς ἀντιλογίας αὐτῶν ἀπῆτεις.

Αλλὰ καὶ τὸν Φιλόσοφον οὐ μικρὸν ἀτιμάζεις, ἐπεί, τοῖς ἐναντίοις πανταχοῦ καταχρή ἐνθα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὀρᾶς βοηθοῦντα σοι, καὶ καλεῖς,
καὶ τιμᾶς, καὶ βλασφημοῦντι πολλάκις, συνηγορεῖς ὅπου δὲ σοι
tοῦτον ἐναντιοῦμενον, ἀποστρέφῃ τὲ καὶ διώκεις, πλῦνεις δὲ καὶ
πολλάκις· ἃ, χαλεπῶν ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πάντως.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐώμεν αὐτὰ· λέγομεν ἔτερα· ἠ, συλλογισμῶν εἰδή
μέν, οὐδαμῶς, ἐπόμενα δὲ ὑμῖν, ἄλλως ἄτοπα.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Λέγε πάν ὅσον σοι καθ’ ἧμιν ἔτερον ὑποπτεύεται.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Πάλιν ἡμῖν ἥκεις, ἀφικτόν τι καὶ νέον κομίζων, φίλτατε
Ῥωμανέ, χθές σοι παρ’ ἄνδρων, ὡς φής, εἰρημένον, τοῦτον δὴ τῶν
σφόδρα ἀγανακτοῦντων, εἰ τις παρὰ Πατρός καὶ Υίου λέγοι, τὸ
ἀγιον ἐκπορεύεται Πνεύμα. Προτρέπεις δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν ἆγείρεται,
καὶ τῶν Προμηθέως δεσμῶν, οίς ὁ μύθος ἐκεῖνον προσέδησε,
χαλεπώτερον λύσιν ἐπινοεῖν· ἐκείνοις γὰρ λέγειν τὸν δεσμὸν
tοῦτον, εἰκάζειν, τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐξευρόντας. Ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν, ἀρκεῖον
τῆς περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐξετάσεως, καὶ προθυμίας ὑπ’ ἀνθιμοὺν, οὕτω δὴ
κάμοι τὴν περὶ τὰ θέια σποουδήν καὶ γυμνισαίαν συνάδεις, εἰχεν ἄν
σοι λόγον τὸ κάμε τῶν περὶ ταύτα πόνων κοινωνείν σοι
προσαναγκάζει. Νῦν δ’ ὡς ἔοικε, πάν τούμον ἀγνοεῖς.

ΚΛΡΩ

215-225. Πάλιν-ἀγνοεῖς] locum non invenit in Defensio


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Καὶ τὸ παρόν, ὁμοιον ἀρχῇ σοι τῶν προοιμίων, καὶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἐφ' ὑβρεὶ Νεῖλον τούτων ἐκάτερον· ὁ, μὴ δίκαιον εἰς ἀνδρὰ σοφὸν, ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ δράν. Λέγε ὅπω, ὅσα σοι δοκεὶ μόνα καθ' ἦμῶν καίρια, ἵνα τὰ μὲν ἀσθενῆ, λύσωμεν, τοῖς δ' ἵσχυροίς καὶ πεῖσαι δυναμένοις, συνηγορήσωμεν. Ἐσ τὰ περιττὰ καὶ τὰς ὑβρεῖς.

[12.2] ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Νεστόριος εἶπε, τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον, Θεὸν μὲν εἶναι, καὶ δεῖν συναριθμεῖσθαι Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ, ἐν ἰδίᾳ τῇ παρ' ἑκείνους ὑποστάσει νοεῖσθαι, μὴ μέντοι καὶ δ' Ἰσιοῦ τῆν ὑπαρξίν εἰληφέναι· ὅ, τοὺς ἔφεσι τὸ πρῶτον συναθροισθέντας ἁγίους πατέρας ἄκουσαντας, ἀνεπιτίμητα σιωπῇ, παρελθεῖν. Τῇ περὶ τούτων τοῖνυν σιωπῇ, τὴν τῆς Ρώμης, ἠλεγκαν δόξαν. Τοιαύτα μὲν τὰ παρ' ἑκείνων· ἐγὼ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων θαυμᾶζων, ἐν τούτων μᾶλλον τεθαύμασα, ὡς, σοφίσμασί τισι καὶ μῦθοις μᾶλλον, ἣ λόγοις θαρροῦντες, ἃ, μηδὲ αὐτοὺς πειθεῖν οἷον τέ εἰσι, τοῦτοις, τοὺς ἀκούσαντας, παράγειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν· ὡς εἰ τις,

ΚΛΡΩ

---

231-250. Νεστόριος-βεβαιώσασθαι] locum non invenit in Defensio


379
τὴν σιωπήν ἐπιτάξειε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδεμία μηχανή τὰ παρ᾿ ἀλλήλων εἰσεσθαί ποτ᾿ αὐτούς· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ἀνδριάντας ἔξωσιν, ἀλλήλους μόνον, ἡς πρὸς λίθους ὑπόκοιτες. Οὐ τοῖνυν, οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν τῶν πατέρων ἓφ᾽ οἷς οὕτωι φασὶ σιωπῆ, σαφὲς ἂν εἰς τῆς ἐκείνων διανοίας τεκμήριον· ἦν, εἰ μὴ λόγοις, ἄλλως οὐκ ᾗν δυνατὸν ἂν ἐκείνους ἐνδείξεσθαι. Καὶ μὴν, εἰπερ οὕτοι τοῦ κάκεινος συνδοκεῖ τὴν Νεστορίου περὶ τούτου δόξαν τὴν σιωπήν ἀπόδειξεν οἴονταί, τί καλύπτε, καὶ ἄλλους ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὡς οὐ γε τοῖς παρὰ Νεστορίου περὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος εἰρημένους οἵ πατέρες ἠρέσκοντο, ἐχρῆν, καὶ ἐταῖνοις αὐτὴν βεβαιώσασθαι;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΙΦΡΑΣ. Ὡ γενναίε, πολλὰ μὲν ἔρεις παρακαλύψαι τὴν σιγήν τῶν ἀγίων βουλόμενος, καὶ μηδὲν ἡμῖν δεῖξαι δύνασθαι ἀλλ᾽ εἰς κέντρα λακτίζεις. Διπλὴ τίς, ἐστιν ἡ σιγή· οὐκ ἂν πάντες σιγώσιν, ἡ δὲ, ὅταν μέρος αὐτῶν λαλήσῃ· ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη, ἀληθεῖς ἐστιν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἵσχυε τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἐχῃ τεκμηριώσασθαι, μηδενὸς

ΚΛΡΥ


λαλούντος; Πάντως οὐδέν. Ἡ δὲ τελευταία, καὶ μάλα δύναται, καὶ πολλὰ τοῖς αὐτῇ χρωμένοις, παρέχειν ἐγνὸς δεινὸς καὶ δῆλον, ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων αὐτῶν καὶ θεάτρων, καὶ βουλευτηρίων, καὶ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν, καὶ τῶν συλλόγων, καὶ τῶν θιάσων ἀπάντων ἁμα, ὅταν, οἱ μὲν, διώκοντο καὶ ἀπαιτοῦντο, οἱ δὲ ἀπαιτοῦσι καὶ διώκουσιν ὡς ἄν βούλωνται τότε γὰρ οἱ σιγόντες, οὐ χρήματα μόνον, οὐδὲ κτήματα, οὐδὲ ἄλλην ἄλλου βίου αφαίρεσιν, ὡς τὰ πολλὰ γίγνεται, ἄλλα καὶ αἰδίους έξορίας· καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, σιγώντες ἡ δὲ, καταψηφίζονται θάνατον. Πάς οὖν οὐδὲν ἰσχύει περὶ τὸν βίον ἡ

σιωπῆ; Αὐτὴν ἄν τις εὕρῃ πανταχοῦ φαινομένην καὶ δυναμένην τὰ μέγιστα αὐτῇ καὶ τότε, Νεστορίου λαλούντος, ἐφαίνετο περιπλεκομένη, τοὺς μακαρίους ἐκείνους ἄνδρας· καὶ μεγάλα παρ᾽ ἡμῖν δύναται σὺ δὲ ὡς ἔοικε, τούτων ἀπάντων ἁμα, καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν νόμων, καὶ αὐτοῦ δὴ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὅν, πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐφίλεις, οὐ μνημονεύεις; οἴμαι δὲ σε ταῦτα πεποιημένον ἐκόντα.

KLPV

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Εἰπὲ σαφείστεραν, ὅτι ταῦτα.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐν μέν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ἂν σηγώσων οἱ διωκόμενοι, πραγμάτων εὐθὺς ἀπαλ-Πλάττουσι τοὺς δικαστάς, ἁμα, καὶ τοὺς ἀντικειμένους αὐτῶς, αὐτοὺς δέ, τῇ ψήφῳ τῆς δίκης χαρίζονται. Νόμοι δὲ φασι πάλιν οὕτως ὁ τὸ ἱδιὸν ὅρων πιπρασκόμενον και σηγόν, αὐτὸς δοκεῖ πιπράσκειν αὐτό, καὶ οὐκέτι δύναται ἀνακαλεῖσθαι Σωκράτης δὲ Μελίτων διαλεγόμενος και βλέπων αὐτὸν ἐν τίνι μὴ λαλοῦντα, τίθεμαι σε φησιν ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδή οὐκ ἀποκρίνη. Οὐκ ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ πρότερα, καὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος τὰ παρόντα; Οὐ πάντα μαρτυρεῖ τῇ σηγῇ μεγάλα δύνασθαι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἑστιν ὅτε καὶ ἵσχυρότερα; Πῶς οὖν αὐτὸς αὐτὴν ἀπίασες, καὶ μηδὲν ἐν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖς δύνασθαι; ἈΛ ἡμᾶς, ἀναγκαίον ἵσθι, τιμᾶν αὐτὴν ὑπερβαλλόντας μᾶλλον, ἢ λόγους.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Εἰς τὸν σηγώντα, καὶ τούτῳ ἐφηται ἐκ τοῦ λόγου σου δικαιωθησθη, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου σου κατακριθησθη.

KLPV

285-286. Eἰς-κατακριθῆσθαι] locum non invenit in Defensio


ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἡθι καὶ τοῦτο σκεφώμεθα. Τοῖς μὲν ἀνθρώποις, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲδεικταῖ γάρ, μεγάλα τὴν σηγὴν δύνασθαι. Τοῦτο, λείπεται περὶ Θεοῦ λοιπὸν λέγεσθαι, ὃ, μὴ ὑποπτεῦειν δίκαιον, εὐσεβεῖ πῶποτε. Καὶ δῆλον εἰ γὰρ τις ἐκών ἢ ἀκών ἀσθενεῖα φύσεως, παρ’ ὅλον αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον ἀφονὸς εἰ, πάσαν δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἀνομίαν ἐπινοεῖ, καὶ κατὰ Θεοῦ φέρεται, τί ἂν γένοιτο τελευτήσας; Δῆλον, ἵ ὡς τιμωρίας ἂν ἀκρας ἄξιος εἴη, Εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῷ παρόμοιος τοῖς αὐτοῦ μὲν <οὐκ> ἀγανάκτε, χαίρει δὲ πάσι τοῖς ἐναντίως εὐλογῶν ἂεί τὸν Θεόν, τί περὶ αὐτοῦ τελευτήσαντος νομιοῦμεν; Ἄρ’ οὐ τὰ βέλτιστα; Καὶ τίς ἂν ἄλλως εἰπεῖν ἔχοι πῶποτε; Θεὸς γὰρ, οὐ δεῖται σηγῆς διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ὁ σοφὸς τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἔλεγε νομοθέτης, ἐν τῷ στόματί σου καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου καὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσί σου· δηλών, πράξεων καὶ λόγων καὶ διανοημάτων, ἀληθέστατον δικαστὴν μόνον τὸν Θεόν εἰναι· μόνος

KLPV

298-299. ἐν-χερσί σου] Deut. 30:14
γὰρ οἶδε τὰς καρδίας καὶ τοὺς νεφροὺς. Διὰ τούτο, καὶ Μωσέως,
οὗ λαλοῦντος, ἀκούει καὶ δικαίως: πάντα γὰρ οἶδε πρὶν γενέσεως
αὐτῶν. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀληθὲς τὸ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου σου δικαιωθῆσῃ, ἢ περὶ Θεοῦ, ἢ
παρ' ἡμῖν, ὡς τούτο βούλεται, τὴν σιγήν, οὐδὲν δύνασθαι. Οὐκ
ἀναγκαία σοι δοκεῖ ταῦτα;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ναὶ πλὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐστιν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μέν, ὡς
οὗ ἀντικρούσα τὴν περὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος συκοφαντίαν, ὁ Νεστόριος
προοίμισας, τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐτάραττεν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ἐν
προσθήκης ἔλεγε μέρει τὸ δ' ἀληθές, καὶ ὁ μᾶλλον ἐσκόπει καὶ
πρὸς ὁ πάντα ἡρσύετο, τὴν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ τῶν προσώπων,
ἐμμισθάνατο διαφέρειν, αὐτὸν ἀντικροῦσα, τὸν τῆς πίστεως θεμέλιον,
ὑποστῶν· καὶ τὸ καθ' αὐτόν, τὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἡθοποιηθείσα, πείθων,
ἀληθείσθαι.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ' ὁ βέλτιστε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσον ὑπερέχει 315 θεός, τοσοῦτον ἢ τῶν θείων προσώπων ἀναίρεσις, τήν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἀναίρεσιν υπερβαίνει καὶ μαρτυρεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ πρὸς ἐκάτερον ὡς ὁ χρεὼν ἀτιμώμενος, εἰπὼν, ὁ βλασφημήσας εἰς τὸν Θεόν, ἀφεθῆσαι, ὁ δὲ βλασφημήσας εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον, εἰς ἀφεθῆσαι. Εἰ γοῦν ὁ τῶν μακαρίων ἐκείνων κύκλος μεγάλων ἀνέχεται τῶν ἁγίων ἐν τῇ σαρκώσει Χριστοῦ, τί ἂν εἰς τὸ μείζων ἐποίη ἡ τῆς θεολογίας μέρος αὐτοῦ; Δὴ λοιπὸν, ὡς παῖδα καὶ μεγάλα. Οὐκ ἂρα σηγῶσιν, ὅτι Νεστορίῳ τῆς θεολογίας οὐ σκοπὸς ἦν, ἀλλ' ὧτι δίκαιον αὐτοῖς καὶ εὐσεβεῖς τὸ λεγόμενον ἐλογίζετο.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις δυοὶ ὦντοι κακοί, ύπὸ τοῦ κουφιτέρου μᾶλλον τοὺς ἐχοντας ἐνοχλεῖσθαι καὶ τοσοῦτον, ὥστε πολλάκις τοὺς νοσοῦντας, οὐδ' αἰσθησίνας λαμβάνειν τοῦ χείρος, καὶ ἵπτοι δὲ τοῖς κάμνουσιν εἰσιόντες, οὐκ ἐν τι καὶ ἄλλο πρότερον παρηνώθηκεν, τοῦτο εὐθὺς θεραπεύειν πειρόνται, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο πρὸς τὸ παρόν μένειν ἐάσαντες, τοῖς κατεπείγουσιν ἑπάγουσι τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης βοήθειαν. Οὕτω κάκεινοι ἀνδρεῖς οἱ μακάριοι.

ΚΛΡΠ

324-330. Συμβαίνει-μακάριοι] locum non invenit in Defensio

317-319. ὁ βλασφημήσας-ἀφεθῆσαι] cf. Mat. 12:32; Luc. 12:10

317. προσεκάτερον L ‖ ἀτιμώμενος 1 ῥήματιον 1 ΚΠ ‖ 320. σαρκώσει χριστοῦ αὐτοῦ 1 ΚΡ: σαρκώσει αὐτοῦ et post sscr. χριστοῦ V 1 ἀν ϑις ν. L ‖ 324-330. Κυδώνης-μακάριοι] signa in marg. KLV 1 329. ἐάσαντες L
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ ὦ γαθέ, τούτο μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, παντάπασιν

|-- L 70ν

οἰληθέστατον, ὡστά, καὶ σάρκας, καὶ νεῦρα περικειμένοις διὰ τούτο,
καὶ ὃ κάμνων πολλάκις ἐνοχλεῖται μειζόνως, τῷ ἐλάττονι νοσημάτων,
ἡ μείζον καὶ ἰατροὶ δὲ κατασκευής δεόμενοι πρακτικῆς, πειρώνται

335 θεραπεύειν τὸ ἐλάττον· τὰ δὲ ψυχῆ προσόντα νοσήματα, τοῖς
tῶν σωμάτων ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἀνίσα παντελῶς· ὡς γὰρ μειζόν,
ἐνοχλεῖ πλέον, καὶ κάμνουσι μὲν, ἀριστον αὐτὸ πρότερον
θεραπεύειν· καὶ ἰατροὶ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ θεραπεύειν ἐθέλουσιν, ἢ τὰ
ἐλάττον· λόγος γὰρ ἐστιν, ὃ καὶ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ μεγάλα τῆς

340 ψυχῆς δυνάμενος ἵασθαι νοσήματα, ἐπεὶ καὶ λόγοι μόνοι ψυχῆς
tὰ νοσήματα. Ὄνικ ἂρα σοι τὸ παράδειγμα ἀληθές, τινὶ ἐσίγων οἱ
μακάριοι ἀνδρεὶς ἔχειν, τὸν Θεὸν ἀκούοντες βλασφημούμενον·
οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὁμοίως ἦσαν, τῆς βλασφημίας ἐνοχοί Νεστορίου.

ΚΛΡΥ

331. ὦ γαθέ P ¶ παντάπασι P ¶ 332. διατοῦτο codd. ¶ 343. ἀν bis acc. L.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αλλὰ πολλάκις ύπονοούντες καὶ ἄλλους οίς συνεδόκει μὴ καὶ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἁγιὸν Πνεῦμα καὶ δῆλον, ὡς ὁ Θεοδώρητος καὶ ὁ Ἀντιοχείας Ἰωάννης, οὐκ ἡβουλήθησαν κινῆσαι, τὸν περὶ τοῦ Πνεῦματος λόγον, εὐλαβοῦμενοι, τὰς τινῶν ἀντιλογίας καὶ ἔριδας.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕς φῆς ἐδόξαζον τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ψεύδος φαίνεται γὰρ Θεοδώρητος, μηδὲ τὸ δὲ Υἱοῦ παραδεχόμενος πῶς τοῖς καὶ δῆλον, ἐξ ὥν ἐπολέμει Κυρίλλῳ. Οἱ δὲ άλλοι μὲν οἱ θαρσοῦντες αὐτῷ, αὐτοὶ δὲ σηγῶσι φοβοῦμενοι, οὐδὲ τούτῳ ὃς γὰρ τούτου Κυρίλλῳ κοινωνεῖν οὐκ ἔβουλετο, πῶς ἄν εἶπετο Νεστορίῳ; Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρητος, καὶ Ἰωάννης, μὴ δεχόμενοι τὸ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τῆς σηγῆς αἵτω γεγόνασι τῶν λοιπῶν, ἀδύνατον οὐ μόνον, ὃτι δύο μόνους ὁμολογεῖς, ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τούς ἐκατόν ἁμα τίς θοίτω ύπονοούντας, ἡ καὶ λέγοντας βλασφημίαν, οὐ διὰ τούτῳ ἄν ὁ λοιπὸς ἔσινα τῶν ἁγίων χορός, Θεοῦ γε βλασφημοῦμένου, ἡ ἀνθρώπων σέβεται οὐ καλῶς βουλευομένων αὐτῶν.

ΚΛΠΒ

344-348. Αλλὰ-ἐριθάς] locum non invenit in Defensio

360 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Αλλὰ θεολογίας μὲν αὐτοῖς οὐδόλως, οἰκονομίας δὲ, σκοπός ἦν.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Οὐδὲ τούτῳ γε ἀληθές, ἀλλ’ ἦν αὐτοῖς ἀπασα προθυμία, πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀποδύνασθαι βλασφημίαν, εἶτε μικρὰ, εἰτε μεγάλη εἰθ, καὶ πᾶσαν αἰφεσιν τῆς εὐσεβείας διώκειν, ὡσ δύναμις αὐτοῖς ἦν καὶ τὸ κατὰ Χριστοῦ βραχύτατον, οἴεσθαι μέγα· καὶ πάντα μὲν ἐν δευτέρῳ, πλήθες εὐσεβείας. Αλλὰ καὶ Θεὸς αὐτοῖς, οὐδαμῶς ἀνέχεται βλασφημοῦμενος. Κάν τῷ πρώτῳ σοι τῶν ἐπιειρήματος, καὶ τούτῳ, μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἦν, ὡς ἔξην ύμῖν αὐτὸ παραγχάσασθαι, τὸ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ εἶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα, ὡς παρὰ τῶν ἀγίων οὐκ ἐπαινοῦμενον· τὸ δ’ ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον· ἢ μᾶλλον, οὐκ ἀληθές εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον· εἰ δ’ οὖν, οὐδὲν κωλύει, καὶ ἡμᾶς τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένους Ι ἐπείν, ὡς ή τοῦ Νεστορίου περὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ πρώτῃ γενομένῃ θεολογία οὐκ ἀγαθή, οὐδὲ δικαία· τῶν ἀγίων οὐδένα καὶ περὶ ταύτης πεποιημένων τὸν λόγον· οὐδ’ ἐπαινεὶν αὐτὴν γε βουλευμένων. Αλλ’ ἀτοπον αὐτὰ λέγειν, καὶ

KLPV

360-361. Αλλὰ-ἡν] locum non invenit in Defensio

χλεύης οὐ μικρὰς ἀξιον.

Δέδεικται τοίνυν σοι διὰ πάντων, ἡς οὐκ ἂν ἐσίγων οἱ ἁγιοι, περὶ Θεὸν ἀναφέσεως γενομένης οἰς γὰρ καὶ τῶν βραχυτάτων ἐμέλησεν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς ἐκκλησίας, πῶς ὁ οἱ περὶ τὰ μεῖζονα λόγος, οὐδὲν ἔλογίζετο:

KLPV

377. ἄν bi acc. L. I 379. ἄν bi acc. L.
[13] <Επίλογος>  

<ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ.> Τοσαῦτα μὲν ἀπόχρη περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔπιστεν ὡς ἐπιδείξεως χάριν, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς γε μοι φαίνεται ἃ δὲ καὶ μικρὸν ἀποφεῖν ἐπήλθε, ὡς ἔφη δ’ οὐκ, ἡμισε, ὡς εἰκός. Διετί πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων τῷ Νείλῳ γενομένων ἐνστάσεων, ἐν ἀπασί Θομᾶ τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, πάνυ μὲν, ὀλίγων σοὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν, βραχυτέρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐνστάσεων μέλει, τριῶν ἡ ἐκ τῆς πλέον εἰς ἐκαστὸν, τάλλα πάντα καταλιπόντι; 

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὕτω μοι δίκαιον ἐφαίνετο καὶ καλὸν τοῖς μὲν ἰσχυροῖς, ἀντειπείν, τῶν δὲ μὴ τοιούτων, ἀφίστασθαι. 

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ, τοιναντίων ἂπαν λογίζεται σὺ γάρ, ὡς καὶ τὸ βραχύτατον εὐρών ἰχνος ἀντιλογίας, οὐκ ἔδει πανταχόν ἔπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ βραχυτάτου εὐρών ἰχνος ἀντιλογίας, ἀρχις ἂν ὀσοι τῷ δοκοῦν διαλύσης, πῶς ἀν περὶ τῶν ἀσθενῶν σοὶ δοκοῦντον ἐσίγας. Αἰτίθανον. 

15 Ἀλλὰ τοιναντίων μᾶλλον, ἐφάπτεσθαι σε τῶν ἀσθενῶν, τὰ δ’ ἀναγκαία φεύγειν ὡς γάρ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπαίτει λόγος. 

KLPV  

Ἐπι, διατὶ μὲν ἐκείνου ζώντος σιγᾶς, ὅτε δὲ μηδὲν ἀπολογουμένου κατανοεῖς, τότε σοι τὸ κατ’ ἐκείνου πόνημα, βουλεύῃ γίγνεσθαι παντὶ γνώφιμον;

20 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τὸ μὲν, ἵν’ αὐτὸ καλῶς ἐπισκέψωμαι, τὸ δὲ, ἵνα φύγω καὶ ταραχήν.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ τούτων ἐκάτερον, ἀποτοποῦν εἶναι νομιζῶμεν. Ὡς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, οὐκ ἀληθές· ὃ γὰρ τὸ γεννᾶν τοὺς λόγους εἰπερ ἄλλο τι ὑάδιον, πολλῷ μᾶλλον εὐκολώτερον αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέπτεσθαι. Τὸ δ’ ύστερον, ἄδικον· εἰ μὲν γὰρ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα, διατὶ, μή καὶ παντὶ δῆλα; Εἰ δὲ φαῦλα καὶ ἄδικα, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅλως ἔδει γενέσθαι. Ἀλλ’ ὅμως σοὶ προφάσεις αὐτά, αἰς αὐτὸν ἀμύνῃ μηδὲν ὅλως ἡδικηκότα· τὸ δὲ συνειδός ἐλαινόμενον ὀρθοὶς ὀμμασίν, οὐκ ἔδει σε μὴ προσβλέπειν ὡς αὐτὸν ἄδικείς· κἂν οὔδεις ἔτερος αἰσθηταί σοι, μηνυτῆς οὖδὲν ἤττον, αὐτὸς γενήσῃ κατὰ σαυτόν.

KLPV

Ἀπόκριναι μοι καὶ ἔτερον· διατὶ πολλῶν ἐβρεων τὸ σὸν ἐστὶ μεστὸν καθ᾽ οὐ γέγραπται, ἄλλοτε δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπαίνων αὐτῶ κατὰ ταύτων παραβαλλομένων;

35 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Εγὼ μέν, ούδεμιαν αἰσχύνην εἶναι νομίζω τῷ ἀληθεύοντι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Εἰπέ οὖν ἐπιτρέπεις τίνι τὸ ἄλη-θευείν; Ἐπαίνω, ἢ τῇ κατηγορίᾳ; Αμφότερο γὰρ ἐπαινόν, καὶ κατηγοριαν αὐτῷ ψηφίζη. Ατοπον οὖν ἀμαρτήμασιν ἐνόχους εἶναι, τοὺς τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ δίκαια βραβεύειν ἀξιόντας.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Εγὼ κατηγορῶν ἀληθεύω.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἡν ἃν σοι βέλτιον, ἀντιστρόφῳς εἰπεῖν αὐτὰ γε βουλευομένων.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Διατί;

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐγὼ κατηγορῶν ἀληθεύω.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἡν ἃν σοι βέλτιον, ἀντιστρόφῳς εἰπεῖν αὐτὰ γε βουλευομένων.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Διατί;

33-34. κατατευτῶν L II 37. [χρυσολ(ω)ρ(ας)] illeg. V I 38. τῇ deest P I ψηφίζει P II 42. αὐτὰ γε L
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τὸ μὲν, ὡς οὐδεὶς οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν οἶδε, κἀν τοῖς ἀμφιβόλοις νυκάν ἀνάγκη φιλανθρωπίαν τὸ δέ, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἠλήθευες ἔπαινον, ὁ μὲν ἐπαινούμενος ἀγαθός, καὶ σὺ ἄν τὸ εἰκός ἐποίεις. Νῦν δ’ οὖν, ἔτει κατηγορῶν ἠλήθευες, ὡς φῆς, ἐκείνος μὲν, οὐ κατηγορεῖς, ἀθλίος, σὺ δὲ κατηγορῶν, ἀθλιώτερος.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Άλλ’ ἢ ἀλήθεια, πάντων ψηφιστήρα.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐστιν αὐτή, ψεύδους πολλάκις χείρων.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Πότε καὶ ποία;
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἡ τὸν θάνατον ἄλλοις πεποιημένη, τοῦ τῶν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτοῖς, ἢ καὶ ἄλλοις ψηφιζομένου, καὶ ὅταν γένηται.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Έγώ νῦν, οὐδενὶ βουλεύομαι θάνατον.
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἡν ἄν οἱ κρείττον, ἄλλους μᾶλλον, ἢ σαντὸν θάνατον ἀπαιτοῦντε ἐπει, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν, αἰσχρὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, τὸ δ’ ἀπαλλάττειν ἑαυτὸν νόσου, τοῦ ἀπαλλάττειν ἔτερον, βέλτιον.
ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὕκοιν, ἐμαυτῷ βουλεύομαι θάνατον ἀγνοὸν ἐγώγη;
60 ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ναί καὶ ταῦτα γε, τὸν ψυχῆς, ὄντα σῶματος, πολὺ χείρον.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ἐφη Πλάτων, οὐδεὶς ἀληθεύων αἰσχύνεται.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ιδού, μεμνήσθαι μὲν ἐθέλεις μετὰ προ- ἱθυμίας τοῦ Πλάτωνος, τῶν δὲ νόμων, ἐκών ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι τοῦ Θεοῦ.

65 ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Ποῦ ἐν οἷς ἐστιν ἀ σὺ λέγεις;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ραδίως οὐ σφόδρα ποθεῖς λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, κατανοήσεις προστάτει Χριστοῦ, μὴ κρίνετε καὶ ἐν ὧν κρίματι κρίνετε καὶ ζὲ σε ῥαπίσει εἰς τὴν δεξιὰν καὶ ζὲ τις εἰποί τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ μοφὲ καὶ ἂ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀκούομεν ἀλλα, πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὄντα.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Οὐ δύναμαι σοὶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, τάληθῃ λέγοντι.

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐπὶ νόμος ἐκάστῳ μὴ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ὀποίον ἀγνοεῖν τέλος καὶ ἂ ἃν οὕτω, κάκεινος τελευτήσαντες φέροντο διό, μάλλον οὐ δίκαιον ἀλλὼν κατηγορεῖν.

ΚΛΡV

62. οὐδεὶς-αἰσχύνεται | cf. Ps.-Platonem, Epistula I 310d II 67, μὴ κρίνετε | Matth. 7:1 || 67-68. εν-κρίνετε | Matth. 7:2 1 68. ὃς-δεξιόν | Matth. 5:39 || 68-69. ὃς-μοφὲ | Matth. 5:22

60. [χρυσολ(ω)(ρ)] illeg. V || vai bis acc. L I ταῦτα γε codd. | 61. χείρῳ KPV II 63. τοῦ] deest KPV II 65. εν οἷς ἐστιν L I 69. καθημέραν KPV II 71. τάληθῃ| αἰσχῦνεται KPV
Ἔτι, μυρίοι μὲν ἐνήσαν Θεῷ, ἄλλοι δὲ τῷ Σατάν ἐκόντες ἐδουλευον· εἰτα, Θεῷ μὲν, οἱ δαίμονες, τῷ δὲ Σατάν, προσήλθον οἱ τοῦ Θεοῦ μεμένηκε γὰρ οὐδὲν, οὐδαμον τὸ παράπαν, ἐν ὠμοίῳ διό, τοὺς ἄλλους μεμψεθαί, ἀδικον.

Ἦτι, πάσαν τὴν κρίσιν δέδωκεν ὁ Πατὴρ τῷ Υἱῷ ὁ οὖν κατήγορος, τὴν αὐτοῦ ψήφον, ἀρπάζει πρὸ τοῦ καιροῦ.

Ἦτι, καὶ ἀδικον ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ, οἷος σύ, κατηγορείν ἄλλον γε σοφοῦ ὄντος· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴ χρηματίνου, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀδικότερον· εἰ δὲ καὶ νεκροῦ, πλέον· οὐδείς γὰρ μνησικακεῖται νεκρῶς· ἐπει, πρὸς τοὺς ἐκπολοῦν, οὐδεὶς φθόνος.

Τὸ δὲ τελευταίον, ὁ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὗ μικρῶν χείρον, ὡς ἡ πρὸς τὸν Νείλον κατηγορία, καὶ Θεοῦ διαβαινει.

ΚΥΔΩΝΗΣ. Τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις, συμ-ιπταμένῳ πᾶσι, τοῦτο δὲ οὕτω πάνυ τοι πείθομαι· ὃ γὰρ ὑφοίζων ἄλλον, εὐθὺς κατηγορεῖ καὶ Θεοῦ;

KLPV

81-82. ἀδικον-ὕμνος] vide supra, [1] 263-266


77. μεμένηκε-ὕμνος] γνω(μικόν) in marg. KL: γνωμ(ικόν) in marg. P l 81. καὶ deest P l 82. χρημάτων P ll 83-84. οὐδείς-φθόνος] ὁρ(αίον) in marg. L ll 84. ἐκπολοῦν P l 88. post θ(εοῦ) sign. interrogationis KLV
ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ναί, καὶ δὴλον ὡς γὰρ ὁ τὸν ὑπηρέτην υβρίζων αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀτιμάζειν δοκεὶ τὸν ἀρχόντα, οὔτως ὁ μὴ τιμῶν ἀρχὴ τὸν ἀρχιερέα Θεοῦ, αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀτιμάζει Θεὸν· ὡς τὸν προσταγμάτων ὑπηρέτης ἀρχιερεύς. Ὄψον, πανταχόθεν, τὸ κατηγορεῖν ἀδικον. Ὄμως, ἐαυτὸν ἐκαστὸς ἑρευνησάτω, καὶ τὸν ἑλεγχον οἰκοθέν, ἀνευ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων εἰσεται, καὶ μάλιστα, πρεσβύτερος εἰ τις γεγονός τυγχάνοι. Οὐκ ἀναγκαία ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ ταῦτα;

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Καὶ πάνυ δίκαια· πλήν, σὺ, πῶς ἔμοι γε κατηγορεῖς, ὑψος φίλου;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Ἐγώ, σὲ μὲν ἀσπάζομαι καὶ φιλῶ, πείθομαι δὲ, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μᾶλλον, ἢ σοὶ τέως, καὶ μετ' εὐφημίας σοι διαλέγομαι.

ΚΥΛΩΝΗΣ. Διατὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο;

ΧΡΥΣΟΛΩΡΑΣ. Τὸ μὲν, ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκκλησίας Χριστοῦ, τὸ δὲ, καὶ πειθόμενος ἀνδρὶ μεγάλῳ, τοῦτο μὲ πρὸ παντὸς ἀπαιτήσαντι ὡς, μέλει μὲν ὅλων, πρόσεστι δὲ καὶ χάρις περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ, τὰ χεροβίμα ἐν τοῖς λοιποὶς χαίρει τάγμασιν. Αλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἢτο, ὅτι

ΚΛΡΨ


105 τῷ Θεῷ φίλον εἰρηκὼς γὰρ διὰ ὁ καιρὸς ἀπήτευ, παλιλλογείν, οὐ δίκαιον. Ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν, ὁ θαυμάσει φιλοσόφων, καὶ Θομᾶς καὶ Νείλος ὁμοί, νόμοις άλλοις δουλεύετε νῦν Θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν αὐτῷ πρέπουσαν, ἔκαστος εὐφράστσθαι, οῖς, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν βραχεὶ συνεσίμωθαι, καὶ γνωσομεθα ταύτην, ἃν Θεὸς θέλη. Σοι δὲ, <ὡ> εἶτε

110 Βουλομένῳ, ἢ εἶτε καὶ μὴ, ταξιδεύει ἐντόθιν ὁ μὴ χρεον, ἴδεως ὁ δυνατός μόνος, καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀμα οἱ γένοιτο. Σὺ δὲ ἀνθρωπε τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὁ τοποί καὶ τὸν αὐγόνα νῦν ἀπατήσας, κάγω, σὺν χάριν πεποιημένος αὐτῶν, ἂν μὲν οὖν ἄγαθός σοι φανηται, καὶ Θεῷ, καὶ σοί χάρις τῷ μέν, ὡς χαρισμένῳ μοι, λόγον δύναμιν, τὶ λέγειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ μυκρὸν ἁξίου, σοί δὲ, τούτων ὡς αὐτίῳ μοι καθισταμένῳ.

115 Εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸν σὸν οὖν εὐγεγένετο μοι σκοπὸν, ἀνέχου, σοφῶς καὶ τοῦτο, μετά τῶν ἄλλων ἥδη πεποιημένος ὁ γὰρ Θεός, τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν, ἀπαντᾷς ἀπιτεί: καὶ σοὶ οὖν αὐτοῦ μιμητῇ γενομένῳ καὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἀρχομένη, ἕκαστα πρέπον ἄλλας, ἀλλὸ πᾶς τις ἄν ἄλλος ἄλλῳ χρώμενος εἰποὶ λόγῳ μάλλον, ἢ τούτῳ.
Bibliography

I. Manuscripts

Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vatican City
Vat. gr. 614
Vat. gr. 615
Vat. gr. 1103
Vat. gr. 1109
Vat. gr. 1925

Bibliotheca Medicea Laurenziana, Florence
Laurent. Plut. 5. 12

Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris
Paris. gr. 1284

The Royal Library, Copenhagen
GkS 1985 4

II. Printed works

A. Reference works, Catalogues and Collections of sources


Clavis Patrum Latinorum, eds. E. Dekker and A. Gaar, CCSL (Steenbrugis, 1995)


Demetrakopoulos, A.K., Ὀρθόδοξος Ἑλλὰς (Leipzig, 1872)

Devresesse, R., Codices Vaticani graeci III: 604-866 (Vatican City, 1950)

Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, eds. A. Vacant with E. Mangenot et. al., 17 vols. (Paris, 1923-72)


__________, Repertorium der griechischen Kopisten, 800-1600, vol. 2, Handschriften aus Bibliotheken Frankreichs und Nachträge zu den Bibliotheken Grossbritanniens, 3 Parts (Vienna, 1989)


Graux, C., Notices sommaires des manuscrits grecs de la grande Bibliothèque royale de Copenhague (Paris, 1879)

The Greek New Testament, eds. B. and K. Aland, B.M. Metzger et al. (Stuttgart, 20014)

Lake, K. and S. Lake eds., Dated Greek Minuscule Manuscripts to the Year 1200, vol. III: Manuscripts in the Monasteries of Mount Athos and in Milan, Monumenta Palaeographica vetera (Boston, MA, 1935)


Lambros, S., Catalogue of the Greek Manuscripts on Mount Athos, vols. I-II (Cambridge, 1895, 1900)


Omont, H., Inventaire Sommaire des Manuscrits Grecs de la Bibliothèque Nationale, Première Partie (Paris, 1886)


B. Primary sources of individual authors


Ps.-Athanasius, *Against Sabellians*, PG 28, cols. 96-121


__________, *Homily against those who are prone to anger*, PG 31, cols. 353-372

__________, *Homily explaining that God is not the cause of evil*, PG 31, cols. 329-353


_________, *Syntagma*, eds. G.A. Rhalles and M. Potles, *Σύνταγμα τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων τῶν τε ἁγίων καὶ πανευφήμων Ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκουμενικῶν καὶ τοπικῶν συνόδων καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἁγίων Πατέρων*, vol. 6 (Athens, 1859)


_________, *Seventh Oration on the Holy Trinity*, ed. Voulgares, Ἰωσὴφ μοναχοῦ, I (Leipzig, 1768; Thessalonike, 19912), pp. 120-133

_________, *Sixth Oration on the Holy Trinity*, ed. Voulgares, Ἰωσὴφ μοναχοῦ, I (Leipzig, 1768; Thessalonike, 19912), pp. 105-119


_________, *Comparison between the old emperors and the new Emperor Manuel Palaiologos*, ed. S. Lampros, ‘Σύγκρισις παλαιῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ νέου τοῦ νῦν αὐτοκράτορος Μανουὴλ Παλαιολόγου’, ΠΠ III (Athens, 1926), pp. 222-245

_________, *Dialogue on Demetrios Kydones’ Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas’ Refutation of Thomas Aquinas’ teachings*, edited above, pp. 189-396


_________, *Dialogue that it is not right for Orthodox to accuse other Orthodox for any reason*, ed. D. Koutsoures, Διάλογος Δημητρίου τοῦ Χρυσολωρᾶ, Ὡν δίκαιων ἔστιν
ὀρθόδοξοι ἑτέρων ὁρθοδόξων κατηγορεῖν, ἐν οὐδενὶ πράγματι (Athens, 1998), pp. 11-32


_________, Encomium on St Demetrios, ed. B. Laourdas, ‘Τὸ ἐγκώμιον τοῦ Δημητρίου Χρυσολωρᾶ εἰς τὸν Ἅγιον Δημήτριον’, Γρηγόριος ὁ Παλαμᾶς 472-473 θ΄- ι´ (1957), 342-54


_________, If it is better to be than not to be, how could Christ say of Judas that it would be better for him if he had never been born?, ed. F. Tinnefeld, ‘“Es wäre gut für jenen Mensch, wenn er nicht geboren wäre”. Eine Disputation am Hof Kaiser Manuels II. über ein Jesuswort vom Verräter Judas. Einleitung, kritische Ersteditio und Übersetzung (II)’, Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik 45 (1995), 115-158 (text: Version I, pp. 118-124; Version II, pp. 124-131)


Doxapates, John, Prolegomena in Aphthonii progymnasmata, ed. H. Rabe, Prolegomenon sylloge, in Rethores Graeci 14 (Leipzig, 1931), pp. 80-155


Flavius Josephus, The Wars of the Jews, ed. B. Niese, Flavii Iosephi opera, vol. 6 (Berlin, 1894, repr. 1955)

Ps.-Galenus (Porphyrius), To Gaurus on how Embryos are Ensouled, ed. K. Kalbfleisch, ‘Die neuplatonische, fälschlich dem Galen zugeschriebene Schrift Πρὸς Γαύρον περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐμψυχοῦνται τὰ ἐμβύτησι’, Abhandlungen der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin, 1895), pp. 33-62

402


______, *Homily on Easter* (Or. 45), PG 36, cols. 624-664


John Chrysostom, *Against the opponents of monastic life*, PG 47, cols. 319-386

______, *Homily on the resurrection of the dead*, PG 50, cols. 417-432

______, *On Genesis*, Homily 21, PG 53, cols. 175-185

______, *To the people of Antioch*, PG 49, cols. 15-222


______, *Epistle to Zacharias*, PG 94, cols. 401-404

______, *On the right belief*, PG 94, cols. 1421-1432


Kydones, Demetrios, Antirrhetic against Neilos Kabasilas, Vaticanus graecus 614, ff. 110-126° (Critical edition under preparation by Dr Denis Searby, University of Uppsala)


Maximus the Confessor, Chapters on Love, ed. A. Ceresa-Gastaldo, Massimo confessore. Capitoli sulla carita (Rome, 1963), pp. 48-238

_______, Questions to Thalassius, eds. C. Laga and C. Steel, Maximi Confessoris quaestiones ad Thalassium, CCSG 22, vol. 2 (Turnhout, 1980), pp. 3-325


_______, Epistolary discourse on theology addressed to lord Alexius Iagoup, ed. Dendrinos, Annotated, pp. 326-373

_______, Funeral Oration on His Brother Theodore, ed. J. Chrysostomides, Manuel II Palaeologus, Funeral Oration on His Brother Theodore, CFHB, XXVI (Thessalonike, 1985)


Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, I, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1896; repr. 1962), pp. 61-89

_______, Every Good Man is Free, eds. L. Cohn and S. Reiter, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 6 (Berlin, 1915; repr. 1962), pp. 1-45


_______, On Joseph, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 4 (Berlin, 1902; repr. 1962), pp. 61-118


Philoponus, John, Commentary on Aristotle’s analytica priora, ed. M. Wallies, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis analytica priora commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 13.2 (Berlin, 1905)

Planoudes, Maximos, Αὐγουστίνου Περὶ Τριάδος βιβλία πεντεκαίδεκα, ἀπέρ ἐκ τῆς Λατινῶν διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα μετήνεγκε Μάξιμος ὁ Πλανούδης, eds. M. Papatommopoulos, I. Tsavari and G. Rigotti, 2 vols. (Athens, 1995)

Plethon, Georgios Gemistos, Oration to Manuel Palaeologos on the affairs in the Peloponnese, ed. S.P. Lampros, ΠΠ, III (Athens, 1926), pp. 246-265

Porphyry, Isagoge, ed. A. Busse, Porphyrii isagoge et in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 4.1 (Berlin, 1887), pp. 1-22

_______, To Gaurus On how Embryos are Ensouled and On What is in Our Power, English trans. J. Wilberding (London, 2011), pp. 31-56, 141-147


Rhacendytes, Joseph, Summation of Rhetoric, ed. C. Walz, Rhetores Graeci, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 1834), pp. 478-569


C. Secondary studies


Andriopoulou, S., *Diplomatic communication between Byzantium and the West under the late Palaiologoi (1354-1453)* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2011)


Anagnostopoulos, G., ed., A Companion to Aristotle (Chichester, 2009)


Bakalopoulou, M.Ch., Φιλόθεος Σηλυβρίας, Βίος καὶ Συγγραφικὸ Ἔργο (PhD thesis, University of Athens, 1992)


________, Kirche und theologische Literatur im Byzantinischen Reich (Munich, 1959)

Berschin, W., Griechisch-lateinisches Mittelalter: von Hieronymus zu Nikolaus von Kues (Berlin and Munich, 1980)


Buonocore, M., Bibliografia dei fondi manoscritti della Biblioteca Vaticana (1968-1980), ST, 319 (Vatican City, 1986)

Cammelli, G., I dotti bizantini e le origini dell’umanesimo, vol. I: Manuele Crisolora (Florence, 1941)


Canart, P. and V. Peri, Sussidi bibliografici per i manoscritti greci della biblioteca Vaticana, ST, 261 (Vatican City, 1970)

Candal, E., Nilus Cabasilas et Theologia S. Thomae de processione Spiritus sancti, ST, 116 (Vatican City, 1945)


Chivu, M., Ἡ ἐνώσεις τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἰωσήφ Βρυέννιον (PhD thesis, University of Thessalonike, 1985)

Chrysostomides, J., ed., Καθηγήτρια: Essays presented to Joan Hussey for her 80th birthday (Camberley, 1988)

Constantinides, C.N., Higher Education in Byzantium in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries (Nicosia, 1982)


Darrouzès, J., ‘Les documents byzantins du XIIe siècle sur la primauté romaine, REB 23 (1965), 42-88

Davies, B., The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford and New York, 1992)


_________, ‘Thomas Aquinas’ Impact on Late Byzantine Theology and Philosophy: The Issues of Method or ‘Modus Sciendi’ and ‘Dignitas Hominis’’, in Knotenpunkt Byzanz, pp. 333-410


_________, Πλήθων και Θωμᾶς Ακυνάτης (Athens, 2004)


________, ‘Ἡ ἐπιστολὴ τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος Μανουήλ Β’ Παλαιολόγου πρὸς τὸν Ἀλέξιο Ἰαγού καὶ οἱ ἀντιλήψεις τοῦ περί τῆς σπουδῆς τῆς θεολογίας καὶ τῶν σχέσεων Ἐκκλησίας καὶ Πολιτείας’, Φιλοσοφίας Ανάλεκτα 1 (2001), 58-74


Devreesse, R., Le fonds grec de la Bibliothèque Vaticane des origines à Paul V, ST, 244 (Vatican City, 1965)


________, The Idea of Apostolicity in Byzantium and the Legend of the Apostle Andrew (Cambridge, MA, 1958)


Feldherr, A., Spectacle and Society in Livy’s History (Berkeley, 1998)

Fyrigos, A., ‘La produzione letteraria antilatina di Barlaam Calabro’, OCP 45 (1979), 114-144


Geanakoplos, D.J., Byzantine East and Latin West (Oxford, 1966)

_________, Byzantium and the Renaissance (Hamden, CN, 1973)

_________, Constantinople and the West: essays on the late Byzantine (Palaeologan) and Italian Renaissances and the Byzantine and Roman churches (Madison, WI-London, 1989)

_________, ‘Theodore Gaza, a Byzantine Scholar of the Palaeologan “Renaissance” in the early Italian Renaissance (c. 1400-1475)’, in D.J. Geanakoplos, Constantinople and the West, Essays on the Late Byzantine (Palaeologan) and Italian Renaissances and the Byzantine and Roman Churches (Madison, WI, 1989), pp. 68–90


Ginsburg, Ch.D., The Essenes: their history and doctrines (London, 1955)


Grumel, V., La Chronologie, ouvrage publié avec le concours du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Traité d’Études Byzantines, I (Paris, 1958)


Hunger, H., Βυζαντινή Λογοτεχνία, vol. 1, Η λόγια κοσμική γραμματεία τῶν Βυζαντινῶν, Greek trans. L.G. Benakis et al. (Athens, 2001)


Kakoulides, E., ‘Ἡ βιβλιοθήκη τῆς μονῆς Προδρόμου – Πέτρας στήν Κωνσταντινούπολη’, Ελληνικά 21 (1968), 3-39


Kazhdan, A., ‘Dialogue’, *ODB*, vol. 1, p. 618

Keyt, D., ‘Deductive Logic’, in *Anagnostopoulos, Companion*, pp. 31-50


_______, ‘Demetrios Kydones and Italy’, *DOP* 49 (1995), 99-110


_______, ‘Demetrius Cydones and Thomas Aquinas’, *B* 52 (1982), 264-286


Lambros, S., ‘Die Werke des Demetrius Chrysoloras’, *BZ* 3 (1894), 599-601


_______, ‘Démétrius Cydonès I. De la naissance à l’année 1373’, *OCP* 36 (1970), 47-72

_______, ‘Démétrius Cydonès II. De 1373 à 1375’, *OCP* 37 (1971), 5-39


_______, Les recueils de lettres de Démétrius Cydonès, ST, 131 (Vatican City, 1947)


Lundström, V., ‘Ramenta Byzantina VIII’, *Eranos* 6 (1906), 50-54


Mercati, G., *Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota ed altri appunti per la storia della teologia e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV*, ST, 56 (Vatican City, 1931)

Maximus, Metropolitan of Sardes, *Τὸ Οἰκουμενικὸν Πατριαρχεῖον ἐν τῇ Ὑστοδόξῳ Ἐκκλησίᾳ*, AB, 52 (Thessalonike, 1989)


Necipoğlu, N., *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins: Politics and Society in the Late Empire* (Cambridge, 2009)

Nicol, D.M., *Church and Society in the Last Centuries of Byzantium* (Cambridge, 1979)


Papadakis, A., ‘Beyond the Filioque Divide: The Late Thirteenth Century Revisited’, *St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly* 55.2 (2011), 141-163


Papadopoulos, S.G., Ἑλληνικαὶ μεταφράσεις θωμιστικῶν ἔργων. Φιλοθωμισταὶ καὶ ἀντιθωμισταὶ ἐν Βυζαντίῳ (Athens, 1967)


‘Mathematics’, ODB, vol. 2, pp. 1313-1314

Podskalsky, G., ‘Die Rezeption der Thomistischen Theologie bei Gennadios II. Scholarios (ca. 1403-1472)’, Theologie und Philosophie 49 (1974), 305-323


Rijen, J., Aspects of Aristotle’s Logic of Modalities (Dordrecht, 1989)

Roca Meliá, I., ‘Demetrio Crisoloras y su homilía inédita sobre la dormción de María’, Helmantica 11 (1960), 233-248

Ross, W.D., Aristotle (London, 1923)


‘The Last Byzantine Renaissance’ (Cambridge, 1970)


_________, ‘Palamism and the Circle of Cydones’, in Porphyrogenita, pp. 153-74


Saradi, H., Byzantium and the Origin of the Modern Greek National Consciousness (Toronto, 1992)


Searby, D., ‘Demetrius Kydones: Defending Thomas or Defending Himself?’, in Knotenpunkt Byzanz, pp. 439-451

Sherrard, Ph., The Greek East and the Latin West (London, 1959)


Soteropoulos, Ch., Θέματα θεολογίας τοῦ ΙΔ’ αἰῶνος (Athens, 1990)


Spiteris, J., La critica bizantina del primato Romano nel secolo XII, OCA, 208 (Rome, 1979)

N.G. Svoronos, To ελληνικό έθνος, γένεση και διαμόρφωση του νέου ελληνισμον (Athens, 2005)


Theodoroudes, G.P., Η ἐκπαρενσιά τοῦ Αγίου Πνεύματος κατά τοὺς συγγραφείς τοῦ ΙΓ’ αἰῶνος (Thessalonike, 1990)


_________, ‘Intellectuals in Late Byzantine Thessalonike’, DOP 57 (2003), 153-172


Treu, M., ‘Demetrios Chrysoloras und seine hundert Briefe’, BZ 20 (1911), 106-128

Verpeaux, J., ‘Contribution à l'étude de l'administration byzantine: ὁ μεσάζων’, *Byzantinoslavica* 16 (1955), 270-296

Ware, K., *The Orthodox Way* (New York, 1995)


Plates
Plate 1a
Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 28r

Plate 1b
Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 28v
Plate 2a
Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 29r

Plate 2b
Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 29v
Plate 3
Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 1r
Plate 5
Copenhagen, Royal Library, GkS 1985, f. 155v
Plate 6

Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Laur. Pluteus 5.12, f. 1r
Plate 7
Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Laur. Pluteus 5.12, f. 74v
Plate 8
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 1284, f. 42v
Plate 9
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 1284, f. 17r
Plate 12
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Par. gr. 1284, f. 1r
Plate 13
Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1109, f. 59r
Plate 14
Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1109, f. 78r
Καὶ Παρθένως ὁ Ἀγγείος εὐφυὴς, Ἐρρυμεν 
καὶ Ἄρτεμις, Ἐρρυμεν ἐποίημεν, ὅπως ἰδοὺ 
τὸ θεὸν ἀνεύρῃ ἐρρυμένα 
ὑπὸ γαστρίου τοῦ ἄνδρος ἀναιρεῖ.

Πρὸς τοὺς ἁγίους ἀδρεὶς ἡ ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ γυναικὶ,

Plate 15
Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1109, f. 135v
Plate 16
Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1109, f. 2v
Plate 17
Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. gr. 1109, f. 115v