ANGLO-DUTCH RELATIONS
A Political and Diplomatic Analysis of the years 1625-1642

"Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests"

Lord Palmerston
Britain’s Prime Minister
1855 and 1859-65

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Supervised by Professor Pauline Croft, MA (Oxon) DPhil. FSA FRHistS, to be submitted in fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Declaration:

I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis,

**ANGLO-DUTCH RELATIONS**
**A Political and Diplomatic Analysis of the years 1625-1642**

is my own.

Signed:

Name: Anton Poot

Date: 2013
For my wife Jesmond
ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to analyse Anglo-Dutch relations in this highly volatile period, as perceived and interpreted by both sides, and it also closes the gap between the notable theses of Grayson\(^1\) and Groenveld\(^2\). On 23 August 1625 Charles I and the Dutch Republic concluded a partnership agreement for joint warfare at sea and a month later a treaty for war against Spain. In December 1625 England, Denmark and the Republic signed treaties to establish the nucleus of an alliance against the Austrian Habsburgs. Charles wanted an active role in continental politics. Also to compel Spain to support his aim to restore his exiled sister Elizabeth and husband Count Elector Frederick V to their Palatinate estates and Frederick to his Electoral dignities in the Empire. The Dutch wanted England as an active partner in their war with Spain. It was a partnership of convenience, with different objectives but with the intention that success would serve the interests of both. The perceptions of the partnership were also different. Charles saw it as a continuation from Dutch dependence on England in 1585 but in 1625 the Dutch saw themselves as strong enough on land and sea to withstand mighty Spain. However, their objective to have their sovereignty internationally acknowledged contrasted with Charles’ wider foreign policy objectives.

The successful diplomacy of the first nine months was followed by a premature Anglo-Dutch attack on Spain at Cadiz which met with defeat; it remained England’s only military action against Spain. In 1627 England went to war with France in support of the Huguenots but had to withdraw. After the Cadiz expedition Charles expected the Dutch to join the Danes at war in the Empire and his own war against France, an atavistic notion that the Dutch in some vague sense were indebted to the English crown and would serve English interests.


The Anglo-Spanish peace treaty of 1630 removed any misunderstanding. Part of the treaty was that in return for Spain’s subsidies and support for the restitution of the Palatinate, England would persuade the Dutch to end their war and in a secret treaty, if necessary, by force; the latter was clearly an English negotiating ploy. Charles’ foreign policies were governed by insularity, dynastic interests and by his deep rooted concepts of family honour and reputation. He hoped to satisfy his interests with the Republic’s acquiescence and by co-operations with others, Spain or France and finally again with Spain.

Persuading the Dutch was concentrated on the North Sea area. It started with the English navy ensuring the neutrality of the narrow seas, putting pressure on the Dutch who could not attack Spain’s military supply lines when they were protected by neutral English ships. This was extended by returning to unsolved matters of previous reigns and ongoing trade rivalry, maritime and fisheries issues and Charles’ claim to sovereignty of the surrounding seas; extending his dominion to the opposite shores, to the entrances and exits of the Republic’s ports, the Southern Netherlands and France.

Matters came to a head when Spain sent a new fleet to attack the Republic. It was defeated by the Dutch in the battle of the Downs, despite the English navy’s threat to intervene. This battle was the catalyst needed to expose the always unlikely assumption that Spain and England could serve each other’s interests. Both faced compelling domestic issues; England with the Scottish war and Spain with an uprising of Catalans and Portuguese. After Charles’ last attempts to come to an alliance with either Spain or France failed in 1640, the political Anglo-Dutch relations started to change. In February 1641 Charles told the House of Lords that a confederation with the Republic would be as useful as with any of his neighbours; the process to heal the Anglo-Dutch relations began. The first steps were the marriage on 2/12 May 1641 in London of Charles’ eldest daughter Mary with William II, Prince of Orange, and discussions commenced for a mutual defence treaty to replace the expired Treaty of Southampton. No longer were the Dutch the petitioning side; the tide was changing, it marked the beginning of the next phase of Anglo-Dutch political and diplomatic relations.
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Convention designates that acknowledgements be placed amongst the first pages of a thesis but these can only be completed when all research is finished, the thesis has been written, and it is known how others have provided support during the entire process.

Foremost is Professor Pauline Croft who taught me at Royal Holloway for my M.A. degree and fortuitously agreed to be the supervisor for my Ph.D. research. I am greatly indebted to her as without her I could not have completed this study. Following university procedures, Professor Blair Worden agreed to be my advisor. Without diminishing my thanks to the staff of the Royal Holloway College in Egham and the Senate House libraries in London, I want to compliment the archivists and staff of the English and Dutch national archives and libraries on their welcoming institutions and thank them for their readiness to advise me and their efficient assistance. The not to be forgotten Royal Holloway general staff deserve thanks and particularly Mrs. Marie-Christine Ockenden, our Graduate Administrator.

My gratitude goes to Professor Simon Groenveld of the University of Leiden for his encouragement to concentrate on the 1625-1642 phase in Anglo-Dutch relations and for sharing his knowledge on literature and Dutch sources. I also want to express my thanks to Drs. Mieke and Henri van Leeuwen in The Hague for their gracious hospitality during my frequent visits and their advice on the intricacies of the Dutch archives. Dr. K. Masters of Charlottenlund deserves my gratitude for his help with the Danish language and literature.

Last but not least, in fact, my greatest thanks go to my wife Jesmond, without her nothing could have been achieved. She accompanied me during the uncomfortable early seventeenth century years and had to live with the ghosts of the past that I continuously brought home. Furthermore she read many pages of text and kept a watchful eye upon my Anglo-Dutch grammar. So, as a matter of course, I dedicate this thesis to my wife Jesmond.
SOURCES

Primary sources.


Manuscripts: State Papers (Denmark, SP75; SP78 (France); SP81 (German States); SP 84 (Holland); SP94 (Spain); SP16 (Domestic); Treaties.


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Primary printed Sources.

England.

Proceedings in Parliament 1625-1642 in House of Lords and Commons; Proceedings in Parliament 1626-1642; Lords Proceedings 1628; Commons Debates Vols. I – IV; Commons Debates; Calendar of State Papers, Domestic series, Charles I (1625-1641/3); High Courts of the Admiralty.

Netherlands.

Other Archives and sources

England.


Netherlands.


Literature.

Please consult the full list in the bibliography.
CONVENTIONS and ABBREVIATIONS

Conventions

Dutch names are anglicised except where no equivalents exist. The old and new
dating styles are used as ‘old/new’ unless only a month is indicated. In Dutch and
other continental documents only the new dating style is used. Translations into
the English language are my own except from Danish. My rusty French needed
some assistance with the translations.

Abbreviations

BL    British Library    London
Car, 1.  Statutes
HHM    HoogMogende, The deputies of the sovereign provinces,
       members of the States General.
ING    Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, Onderzoek, Projecten,
       Besluiten, Staten Generaal 1626-1630 (Institute for Netherlands
       History, Research, Resolutions States General 1630)
Instr. Instruction book
Inv. nr. Inventory number
JHC    Journal of the House of Commons
KB    Royal Library    The Hague
NA    National Archive    The Hague
Procs. In Parl. The Lords Journal
Res. Resolution
RvS    Council of State in the Republic
Secr. Res. Secret Resolution
SG    States General
SvH    States of Holland
TNA    The National Archives    Kew, Richmond, London
Tr. Treaty
Verb. Report (Verbaal)
Z.E.  Zijne Excellentie, His Exellence
INTRODUCTION

The eighteen-year period covered by this thesis is short in historical terms but of great importance in early modern history. It was a watershed both in political relationships between European nations and between their rulers and subjects. Continental Europe was in turmoil: the Austrian Habsburg empire was convulsed by the Thirty Years’ War, France had a weak regency and conspiracies after the assassination of Henry IV in 1610, then subsequently hostilities against Louis XIII and his first minister Cardinal Richelieu. Spain had been at war since ca. 1565 with the emerging United Provinces, and in the Iberian Peninsula the Spanish monarchy was faced with rebellion in Catalonia and also in Portugal which had been taken over by Philip II in 1580.

James VI had kept peace between Scotland and England and other states. After accession to the English throne as James I, he made peace with Spain in 1604. He promoted good relations between nations both by diplomatic means and by dynastic marriages. His daughter Elizabeth was married to the Calvinist Elector Palatinate Frederick V, and James hoped that his son and heir Charles would marry the daughter (Infanta) of the staunchly Catholic Spanish king Philip III who died in 1621. This marriage plan failed because of unacceptable Spanish demands, which did not break off but significantly changed Anglo-Spanish relations. In 1619 Frederick and Elizabeth initially accepted the throne of Bohemia, which was an electoral kingdom, but were driven out and then deposed from their hereditary Palatinate estates. Frederick was deprived of his status as an Imperial Elector. They were given sanctuary in April 1621 in the Dutch Republic and by the Prince of Orange, Maurits, who was also Frederick’s uncle. James had not recognised Frederick as King of Bohemia but declared that he would make the restitution of the Palatinate estates his primary objective.

Before he ascended the throne, the future Charles I decided not to continue his father’s policy of non-alignment and instead to adopt an active continental policy. In addition to pursuing the restitution of the Palatinate estates, Charles also wanted his brother-in-law’s electoral status and the crown of Bohemia restored to him.
After his abortive visit to Spain in 1623 with his favourite the Duke of Buckingham, Charles planned to go to war against Spain to compel King Philip IV to support the restitution of the Palatinate and also to form a grand anti-Habsburg alliance. For the first Charles needed to revitalise the existing relationship with the Dutch who were already at war with Spain and for the second he would need alliances with his uncle Christian IV, king of Denmark and Norway, with the Dutch Republic, and with other anti-Habsburg nations, in particular France. The Dutch would welcome re-activating the relationship which had evolved from Dutch dependency on England in 1585 to a partnership in 1625 as described by Dr. Grayson in his thesis. However, on both the English and the Dutch sides different impressions remained of the actual nature of the relationship since 1585 and of the eventual partnership, impressions that affected relations from 1625 onwards. Chapter one gives a summary of the developments and relations during the preceding forty years to provide the background and better understanding of the developments after 1625.

This thesis aims to elucidate the complex period in Anglo-Dutch relations, paying attention to English sources in balance with the Dutch sources which have tended to be neglected by British historians. It places side-by-side the English and Dutch sources and literature, predominantly manuscript sources in The National Archives in Kew, London and the National Archive in The Hague which includes the archive of the States of Holland and of the VOC. This thesis also uses printed sources and literature in the Institute of Historical Research and the Warburg Institute. It will also present English and Dutch interpretations and perspectives of the policies, diplomacy and actual courses of events.

After he ascended the throne, Charles lost no time in taking the first steps towards implementing the plan he and Buckingham had made for war against Spain. This was also wanted by the Dutch but had been thwarted by James I. However, well-orchestrated English diplomacy secured an Anglo-Dutch maritime agreement in the first nine months of Charles’ reign, rapidly followed by a wider treaty for joint war on sea and land against Spain.
Treaties were also signed with Denmark and the Republic to form the nucleus for the planned grand anti-Habsburg alliance. England would field an army of 35,000 men for the war against Spain and provide the king of Denmark with substantial subsidies for his campaign in the Empire. After the successful English diplomacy to conclude the treaties, the implementation was less successful.

Chapter 1 summarises the development of Anglo-Dutch political and diplomatic relations from their beginning in 1585 to 1625 with the English and Dutch perceptions of their evolution and influence on the period of this study. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 describe England’s policy changes and the end of the Anglo-Dutch partnership. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 cover the development of England's pro-Spanish and anti-Republic policies and a Dutch-French alliance. Chapters 8 and 9 describe how after a narrowly averted Anglo-Dutch war at sea, new but different relations between England and the Republic emerged. The Appendix in the Dutch and English languages, quote the States General’s instructions to its ambassadors for a special missions to England in 1639 for new political and diplomatic Anglo-Dutch relations after the Battle of the Downs.

Charles had to persuade Parliament to vote the subsidies needed both for the war against Spain and for Christian who had to extend his own plan of strengthening his position around his Schleswig-Holstein Duchy in northern Germany but had to take his armies deep into the Empire. Although the Dutch had signed the Triple Alliance treaties, they excluded going to war on two fronts against the Spanish as well as the Austrian Habsburgs and confined themselves to financially supporting the Danes. All treaties bear the stamp of Charles’ dynastic objectives but this alone is too narrow a description of his objectives. Whereas dynastic succession is a major issue in monarchical rule, linked with the concept of honour and reputation at the time; both determined much of Charles’ domestic and foreign politics and the Anglo-Dutch relations in the period of this thesis.

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CHAPTER ONE

Beginning and development of the Anglo-Dutch relations 1585-1625

The first formal Anglo-Dutch political and diplomatic relations commenced when Elizabeth I and the States General\(^1\) concluded on 10/20 August 1585 a ‘treaty of assistance’\(^2\) to provide 4,000 soldiers on foot and 400 on horse. This was initially meant ‘to stem the Spanish threat against Antwerp’\(^3\). However, the town and port could not be held and capitulated to the Spanish on 17 August 1585. Elizabeth wrote to the States General on 25 August/4 September 1585 expressing her ‘very great regret at receiving the news of the surrender of the town of Antwerp’\(^4\). The retention of the town and port of Antwerp would have given England a strategically situated enclave and port on the continent to replace Calais, lost to the French in 1558. The setback at Antwerp may have influenced Elizabeth to approve an increase of her army to 5,000 on foot and 1,000 on horse and a second ‘treaty of increased assistance’\(^5\) was concluded. The two treaties in combination became known as the Nonsuch Treaty of 1585 and provided the Dutch with military support at a critical time in their war against Spain.

The Nonsuch Treaty was not a partnership and neither a political nor a conventional diplomatic relationship but a contractual arrangement to be funded by the Dutch. As collateral for repayment of her expenses, Elizabeth demanded the right to station at her costs, garrisons in the ports of Flushing (\textit{Vlissingen}) and Brill (\textit{Den Briel}) and the fortress Rammekens, named ‘cautionary towns’.

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\(^1\) The States General was a non-sovereign intergovernmental College, its members deputed by the sovereign Provincial States and charged with responsibilities where coordination was essential, predominantly, foreign affairs, the war and finance. The Provincial States held the sovereignty of their provinces after the rejection on 26 July 1581 of the Spanish monarch as their overlord with the \textit{Placaat van Verlatinge}, Declaration of Renunciation, NA, 1.01.01.01, SG, inv. nr. 254 G.

\(^2\) NA, 1.01.01.01, SG 1576-1588, inv. nr. 101A, 10/20 August 1585, \textit{Traktaat van Secours}.

\(^3\) F.G. Oosterhoff, \textit{Leicester and the Netherlands 1586-1587}, (Utrecht 1988) p.44. Hereafter, Oosterhoff, \textit{Leicester and the Netherlands}.


\(^5\) NA, 1.01.01.01, SG 1576-1588, inv. nr. 102, 4/14 September 1585, \textit{tractaat van vermeerderd secours}. 

Elizabeth’s army would ‘remain in her service during the troubles; she would send for their command a gentleman of high standing’\textsuperscript{1}. With the cautionary towns England had been provided with ‘an excellent position on the continent ‘at the mouth of the rivers Meuse and Schelde’\textsuperscript{2}. Together with her garrisons in Flushing and Brill, commanded by English military governors, Elizabeth had moved her first line of defence to the other side of the North Sea. The Dutch gained an active ally in their war for full independence from the Spanish monarch as overlord and might have seen the English garrisons as an indication of the queen’s commitment to support them. But Elizabeth’s Spanish policies were not to support the Dutch to become an independent republican state but to keep Spain and also France militarily out of their provinces across the narrow seas. For her the Dutch only needed to be strong enough to accept the Spanish monarchs in a personal union as the overlord of each of the provinces but without his armies and religious inquisition.

Elizabeth’s choice to command her army was Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester (1531-1588) who arrived on 20 December 1585 with a large retinue and accorded a grand welcome in The Hague. By invitation of the sovereign provinces, the States General offered Leicester the position of Governor General, even before this was clearly defined. The negotiations to determine Leicester’s powers and responsibilities lasted from 7 to 26 January 1586, the minutes in the Dutch language cover thirty-one printed pages. Leicester, knowing only the monarchic form of government, and being by nature an autocrat, had negotiated near single-handed centralised authority particularly with his additional appointment as Chairman of the Council of State, Raad van State (see Note).

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1} Brugmans, The Earl of Leicester, \textit{entretenuz à nostre proper solde Durant les trouble et vous envoyer un seigneur de qualité}, Vol.1, pp.2/3.
\end{flushright}

\textit{Note}: The Council of State was an advisory college with some statutory powers, originally between an overlord and the earlier States General which could only convene with prior permission of the overlord. As Governor General and Chairman of the Council of State, Leicester had negotiated powers akin to those of the Spanish overlord who the United Provinces had formally rejected already in 1581.
In addition, the Council’s membership of provincial delegates was to be extended by two English members but Leicester would ‘not be bound by the Council’s advice’; he had fully used his unexpected appointment as Governor General. The States General had to mitigate the possible consequences of its too early ‘very ill-considered step’ of Leicester’s appointment. The agreement with him had gone considerably further than contracted under the Nonsuch Treaty and the provinces’ rights and privileges had to be safeguarded with the final statement. It read that all the powers were granted without prejudice to the rights, freedoms, pre-eminences, privileges, treaties, contracts, statutes, ordinances, decrees and customs of the above mentioned provinces in general, or of each province, city and member of each in particular, which, ‘notwithstanding anything above, shall remain in their full vigour’. The centralising instincts of Leicester soon led to confrontations with John van Oldenbarnevelt (1547-1619) who was Advocate of the States of Holland. He was also a prominent member of the States General and a meticulous guardian, of Holland’s but also of the other provinces’ rights and of the remaining powers of the States General.

Before he left for a visit to England in 1586, Leicester conveyed Elizabeth’s request that the States General join her in peace negotiations with Spain. The States General refused her request and asked Leicester to make certain that no peace negotiations would take place. She did not accept the States General’s refusal and Leicester returned with instructions to make the Dutch participate in peace talks with the Spanish in the southern Netherlands. Leicester took the fateful decision to use his military powers to execute his orders but knew that he did not have the forces for a full-scale take-over. He aimed to occupy strategic towns and to arrest the most important leaders, van Oldenbarnevelt and Maurits, Prince of Orange (1567-1625) but did not find the support he needed; he failed to win over any significant towns or to arrest any leaders.

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1 Gosses and Japikse, *Political History of the Netherlands*, was aan ’s Raads adviezen niet gebonden, p. 395.
2 Ibid., *zeer onberaden stap*, p.395.
By mid November Leicester had to admit defeat and left for England on 6 December 1587. After the States General received Leicester’s letter of resignation and, ‘with a joint decision [of the provinces] of 12 April 1588 all officials were released of their oath to Leicester. A Federal State emerged, the Republic of the United Netherlands’: the Dutch Republic.

Between 1589 and 1595 the military position of the Republic improved which may have been a reason for Elizabeth to demand in 1595 that the States General pay the expenses of her military assistance since 1585. But negotiations had to be postponed as the political situation changed. France declared war on Spain in 1595, Elizabeth decided to join France and an alliance was formed that on insistence of Henry IV (1553-1610) included the Republic. The Triple Alliance was short lived; it lasted only two years. Henry withdrew from the alliance and unilaterally concluded a Franco-Spanish peace treaty in May 1598.

In August 1598 the postponed 1595 Anglo-Dutch meeting on payment of the debt took place but now in the shadow of the Franco-Spanish peace treaty. England’s relations with the Dutch had to be changed, which meant for Elizabeth that these had to be brought back to the pre-Triple Alliance status of the Republic, to dependence on England and with minimal or no relations with France. Henry’s insistence on the Republic as a partner in the Triple Alliance had set an unacceptable precedent. The Dutch, with their republican form of government for which she had an ‘unconquerable dislike’, could not, in her opinion, be partners of monarchs. It became a fraught meeting, with Elizabeth threatening to follow France and conclude her own peace treaty with Spain, raising for the Dutch the spectre of the withdrawal of the English regiments and the garrisons in the cautionary towns being replaced by Spanish ones.

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2 Oosterhoff, Leicester and the Netherlands, p. 41.
The States General was forced to accept an unsubstantiated debt of £800,000 and a stringent payment schedule, to assume the cost of the garrisons in the cautionary towns and, humiliatingly, had to be content with the help Elizabeth would deign to provide. Grayson wrote, ‘the treaty was possibly the most unequal yet forced upon the United Provinces. It did not free them from the fear of betrayal by England, yet it increased their obligations very heavily’. Elizabeth had not changed her high-handed approach to the Dutch since her 1585 Nonsuch Treaty; always on her terms for the security of her realm and not at her costs. ‘In part this high-handedness was the expression of a natural monarchical lack of respect for and inability to believe in a republican headless commonwealth’. The imprints of her perceptions of relations with the Dutch remained and continued to influence Anglo-Dutch relations in England and the Republic.

Elizabeth’s successor, James I of England who also reigned as James VI of Scotland (1566-1625), was personally more inclined to peace than war. He endorsed the ongoing efforts of his inherited Secretary of State Sir Robert Cecil (1563-1612), from 1605 Earl of Salisbury, to end the war against Spain. Cecil had started to prepare for peace before Elizabeth’s death and the ‘Elizabethan momentum, personified by Cecil would bring about peace in 1604 without his [James] doing much more than agreeing to it’. An Anglo-Spanish peace and commercial treaty was signed in August 1604, it was the unilateral end of both the Nonsuch Treaty of 1585 and the Triple Alliance of 1596. The Dutch could continue to raise troops in James’ realms and consistent with his aim of neutrality and non-alignment of his realms, he permitted the same right to the Habsburg ruler of the Southern Netherlands, Albert, Archduke of Austria (1559-1621).

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1 Grayson, From Protectorate to Partnership, p. 34.
James, expected to be the defender of the Reformed religion in Europe, had personally taken the decision to allow his subjects to join the Catholic Archduke’s forces to fight the Republic’s protestant armies that included many of his own subjects. The assumption that recruitment by the Archduke would have little success was proven dramatically wrong. The majority of the unexpected large numbers of those enlisted were recusant English and Scottish Catholics. James’ peace treaty not only affected Anglo-Dutch relations but also strengthened the anti-popery sentiments in his own realms after the Gunpowder Plot. Robert Cecil was not neutral over the struggle in the Low Countries and after the conclusion of the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty he sent a message to van Oldenbarnevelt ‘reassuring him that its clauses would be interpreted by England in the manner most favourable to the United Provinces’¹. The Archduke’s right to recruit volunteers could not be withdrawn but Cecil decided to use the anti-popery sentiments in Parliament to stem the flow of volunteers. The first step was taken on 22 January 1605 with Parliament’s first reading of a bill ‘that all persons above the age of fourteen years, going beyond the seas, shall take the Oath of Supremacy before their going’². It not only listed those departing but also made them liable to prosecution if they gave an oath of allegiance to a foreign monarch. The flood of recruits was reduced and Cecil had honoured his promise to van Oldenbarnevelt.

The Dutch-Spanish war had reached a stalemate in 1606 when the Spanish and the Dutch lacked the financial resources to mount significant offensives; both sides had to accept that neither side could force a conclusive end to the war. Archduke Albert made the first approach for talks about peace in 1606. Three years of cumbersome negotiations and two short but failed cease-fire periods followed. Finally, on 9 April 1609 a twelve-year cease-fire, Bestand, was concluded, guaranteed by England and France.

Those who wanted to do so, read in the text that the Republic was recognised as an independent State but, whether for the period of the Bestand was left ambiguous; the Spanish said that they had only treated with the Dutch as if they were independent, but for the Dutch it meant independence forever 1.

The cease-fire reduced the Republic’s financial burden of active warfare and improved the income from the Republic’s trading activities after the Spanish embargoes were lifted in 1609. After several years into the cease-fire it became financially possible to address the long vexing question of the cautionary towns Flushing and Brill with their English garrisons and governors. Van Oldenbarnevelt instructed Dutch ambassador Noël de Caron in 1616 to open discussions for a final settlement of the debt and the return of the cautionary towns. James’ Privy Council recommended redemption of the towns but Sir John Coke (1563-1644) objected and wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘they are pledges not so much for our monies, as for the fidelity and allegiance of that people who thereby are not only confederate, but obliged and interested to run their fortunes with us. But if we leave this advantage over them, henceforth they will treat us of even feet and not as subservient but rather opposite and ready to make their profit not only of our strength as before, but of our weakness or any difference or management that may fall out betwixt us and other Princes’2.

Coke did not write to the Chancellor that ‘the cautionary towns had been a useful if not essential pledge for the English in the Netherlands: they ensured a port for the landing of troops in case of need and thus gave some point guarantee of the Truce [twelve year cease-fire]’3. But the need of this guarantee had diminished and the cost of maintaining the towns with their English governors had increased. James followed the recommendations of his Privy Council and accepted a payment of £ 250,000 for the redemption of the cautionary towns.

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1 S. Groenveld, Het Twaalfjarige Bestand 1609-1621, (2009) pp. 59-60 (The twelve year cease-fire). Published to mark the 400th anniversary of the cease-fire.
2 TNA, SP 84/72 f. 105, 14 April 1616, Coke to Chancellor, reasons against rendering cautionary towns. John Coke served in the treasury of the navy and as Commissioner, was knighted by James in 1624 and appointed by Charles as Secretary of State in 1625 and later as intermediary between the Republic’s ambassadors and the Privy Council and himself.
3 Grayson, Protectorate to Partnership, p. 168.
But the Dutch had to accept that an English member retained a seat in the Council of State; the English ambassador in The Hague. The garrisons in the towns, to be formed into a regiment under English command, could remain in the Republic but at the States General’s expense serving as part of the Dutch armies that had been kept at minimum strength during the cease-fire with Spain. Referring to the financial settlement, Grayson wrote that ‘the indigent James could hardly refuse’\(^1\). The redemption of the cautionary towns and the end of England’s own military presence on the continent can be considered as consistent with James’ foreign policies which had as an important, perhaps even dominant element, his realms’ clearly recognisable neutrality and political non-alignment. Van Oldenbarnevelt’s timing for opening the Republic’s debt settlement had as much to do with James’ political position as with his financial position. James’s shortage of funds was no secret and was a factor in the Dutch timing and settlement offer (See Note).

The political unity required for the resumption of the war with Spain had been relaxed and deep-seated political and religious differences in the Republic re-emerged. Maurits pro-England stance and van Oldenbarnevelt’s pro-France inclinations would have to be co-ordinated to retain the support of the two major powers but neither leader showed any flexibility. Maurits, lacking the political acumen of van Oldenbarnevelt decided to strengthen links with England and he and the English Ambassador, Sir Ralph Winwood (1564-1617), forged a stronger relationship than Winwood had with the States General and van Oldenbarnevelt. According to Professor van Deursen, this was influenced by Winwood’s ‘fantasies about a Spanish-Roman Catholic complot with van Oldenbarnevelt’\(^2\), more likely another of Winwood’s attempts to curb any French influence in the Republic.

\(^1\) Ibid., p.170.

\(^2\) A. Th. van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau De Winnaar die faalde (Amsterdam 2000) (Maurits van Nassau The Victor who failed) fantasieën over een Spaans-Roomse samenzwering met medeplichtigheid van Oldenbarnevelt, p. 244. Hereafter, van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau.
Whereas Maurits and van Oldenbarnevelt could still maintain their political inclinations and retain the support of both major powers, they also maintained different religious standpoints: but a resolution by the States of Holland broke all ties between the two Dutch leaders. In order to forestall Maurits using his military powers to implement his political thinking and religious views, van Oldenbarnevelt inspired the States of Holland to conclude the so-called scherpe resolutie, sharp resolution, of 4 August 1617. The main point of the resolution was that Holland could advise the towns to have their own waardgelders, militia, to keep order and to be under the command of the town authorities. This could lead to a provincial military force beside or contrary to the Republic’s armies under the command of Maurits, the Republic’s de facto commander in chief. Maurits could not accept this resolution and its consequences and on 29 August 1618, armed with an illegal warrant from the States General, his troops arrested van Oldenbarnevelt and three of his closest collaborators which enabled him to assume the political leadership of the Republic.

Maurits could now politically move towards England and had finally removed the obstacles to calling a National Synod, persistently demanded by the orthodox Calvinists who wanted a church order binding the government on religious and political issues. The orthodox Calvinists also wanted to expose the ‘heresy’ of Leiden University Professor Jacobus Arminius and his followers who held less strict views of the predestination theology. These were the Remonstrants, fiercely contested by the Dutch orthodox Calvinists, the Contraremonstrants. The Synod was convened in Dordrecht in 1618; in addition to representatives of the seven provinces, a large number of theologians from Switzerland, England and German States participated. The predestination theology was enshrined; Remonstrants were expelled from the Synod and, as expected so-called Arminianism condemned.

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After the formal ending of the Synod, the Dutch participants continued on their own and formulated a Calvinist church order for the religious and political governance of the Republic and called for Remonstrant ministers to recant or to be forced to leave the Republic.

James had supported Maurits, he had appointed him Knight of the Garter not only as he was ‘a convinced opponent of van Oldenbarnevelt’ ¹ but also as he saw the prince as a more appropriate future leader of the Dutch instead of their abhorrent populist government. Whether he had wanted to support an orthodox Calvinist Synod or merely to support Maurits politically remained unclear. In his own realms he did not permit open arguments on predestination theology as it could lead to controversy and division and would not tolerate the imposition of a church order, yet, his interference in the Republic’s domestic affairs and, by implication its political direction, contributed to Dutch internal divisions ².

Van Oldenbarnevelt faced trial for treason by a special court arranged by the States General without an explicit mandate of the provinces. Maurits had removed van Oldenbarnevelt from office so that he could create his own ‘new order in Church and State’ ³; he had to eliminate any chance of his return to power. Only when a trial, ‘as Maurits expected, clearly proved the Advocate’s treason would the Prince regard himself safe and justified’ ⁴. The trial had to achieve two objectives, to go down in history as fair and the removal of van Oldenbarnevelt. Even according to the norms of the time, the trial failed the first objective. Treason could not be proven; however, the second objective was achieved with a political verdict on 12 May 1619. The 71-year-old statesman, who had given a life-long service to his country and even can be seen as the architect of the Dutch Republic, was judicially condemned and executed the following day.

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³ van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau, nieuwe orde in kerk en staat, p. 268.
⁴ Tex den, Oldenbarneveld, als een process, het land verraad van de Advocaat klaar zou aantonen, zou de Prins zich geheel veilig en gerechtvaardigd achten, Vol. III. p. 654.
The political and religious upheavals in the Republic were followed by even more serious conflicts in the Empire. Ferdinand, Archduke of Styria (1578-1637) had been named by Emperor Matthias (1557-1619) as his successor and meanwhile to succeed the deceased king of Bohemia. However, ‘in the protestant assembly there was a knot of men, headed by Count Henry of Thurn, which was bent on the dethronement of Ferdinand’¹. The rebellious nobles and their armed followers went to the castle of Prague and removed their opposition by ejecting two Regents and their secretary through the windows of the castle. Thirty Directors were appointed and a Diet convened to form a new government. Messages of support for the Prague uprising were received but not for active help. Also Count Frederick V (1596-1632), Elector Palatinate, married to Elizabeth (1596-1662) the daughter of James I of England, ‘offered every encouragement to the Bohemians but for the time held back from giving them actual assistance’². The Directors failed to impose taxes but with forced loans from the rich and financial support from the Dutch they raised a badly needed army which, with military support of the Protestant Union, inflicted several defeats on Ferdinand the deposed king of Bohemia. Hostilities moved to and fro but the political background changed when Emperor Matthias died and his nephew was chosen as Ferdinand II (1578-1637) on 28 August 1619, two days earlier, the Bohemians had ‘chosen Frederick to fill the vacant seat’³.

Supported by his wife Elizabeth but strongly advised by his father-in-law against accepting the crown, Frederick accepted and was crowned at Prague on 4 November 1619. Gardiner called it the last act of the Bohemian revolution but it was also the first act that would continuously and profoundly affect the Anglo-Dutch relations. Frederick and Elizabeth were king and queen of Bohemia for only one year when Emperor Ferdinand deposed them in November 1620; they had to flee but could not return to their Palatinate that had been captured by the Spanish forces on behalf of the Emperor.

² Ibid., p.30.
³ Ibid., p.37.
King James did not offer the ‘Winterking’ and his family sanctuary which left them no alternative but to seek refuge in the Republic where they were received on 13 April 1621 by a representative of the States General and Frederick’s uncle, Prince Maurits of Orange. James had not recognised Frederick as king of Bohemia, he envisaged that when his policy of a dynastic marriage of his son Charles and the Spanish Infanta was achieved, he would persuade her father, Philip III (1576-1621) to prevail on the Emperor to restore the Palatinate.

The Republic’s relations with England and France were at low ebb when the cease-fire ended in 1621. Van Oldenbarnevelt’s execution had damaged the link with France while relations with England had become increasingly strained by disputes on fisheries, whaling and trade rivalry in Europe and the Far East. James had decided in 1609 to prohibit foreigners, meaning the Dutch, from fishing ‘in the seas and along the coasts of his realms’¹ or to pay taxes to obtain permission. His fisheries edict could not be enforced at the time but was not withdrawn; it would remain a threat and would become a major policy issue during the reign of his successor. The freedom to trade with the Iberian Peninsula during the twelve years of the cease-fire had been rewarding for the Dutch. Their ‘shipping costs for all European destinations fell dramatically as they resumed their former massive traffic with the Iberian Peninsula’² in direct competition again with England’s traders who had been free to trade after the 1604 peace treaty. Competition in the European cloth trade had become very fractious; the Dutch imported English semi-finished cloth and doubled its sales value by dying and dressing in the Republic. Alderman Sir William Cockayne persuaded James to ban the export of undyed cloth to the Republic to compel producers to finish their product at home; the so-called ‘Cockayne project’³.

It led to the States General banning the import of all dyed and dressed cloth supposedly because of inferior quality but ‘avoiding any mention of England, English cloth or retaliation’\textsuperscript{1}. The English ban on exports of cloth to the Republic was lifted in 1617, not least as the English merchants had their own establishment in the Netherlands, but the Dutch did not respond by lifting their own ban on the import of dyed and dressed cloth.

Anglo-Dutch trade relations in the East Indies were supposed to be regulated by an agreement made in Europe between the Directors of the trading companies, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the English East India Company (EIC). The EIC had asked its government’s support against the Dutch and the VOC directors were aware that the States General would be in favour of any action against Spain and Portugal, also in the Indies\textsuperscript{2}. But the agreement inspired and influenced by European politics, soon proved to be unworkable in the Indies as both companies demanded changes and concessions but without any own compromises. New negotiations had taken place in London between 1619 and 1623 where James restricted himself to acting as an arbiter adhering to his earlier instructions that the companies had to settle their differences between themselves; but no agreement was reached.

Anglo-Dutch trade relations worsened when information reached England of a serious incidence on the East Indies island of Amboyna. It was reported that the Dutch Governor of the VOC fortress and establishment on the island claimed to have received reports that the EIC traders had conspired with their Japanese mercenaries to overwhelm and destroy his garrison and establishment.

\textsuperscript{1} Israel, Dutch Primacy.
\textsuperscript{2} Grayson, Protectorate to Partnership. ‘Both the companies in both countries were also eager to find a way of negotiating a settlement, and in this way had the support of their respective governments, who thus became involved in the course of 1611-12. The idea of an actual union of the companies, in much the same way as the Dutch “pre-companies” had merged in 1602 [into the VOC], seems to have come from the politicians rather than the East India traders themselves. The difficulty in practical terms was to be that neither James nor the English company had any desire to be committed to war with Spain and Portugal, which in the eyes of the Dutch was to become the most attractive feature of the scheme’, p.251.
The Governor had the alleged conspirators arrested and brought before an ad hoc Court where the judges found them guilty of treason and sentenced them to death. They were executed together with ten Japanese and one Portuguese. Dutch historian Gaastra called it ‘an over hasty execution of ten English company servants on the grounds of a doubtful accusation of treason’¹. The reports of the incidence were widely spread amongst the population in England as the ‘Amboyna massacre’ and became a political tool which for much of the seventeenth century would be added to any anti-Dutch argument.

While the Anglo-Dutch discussions on trade issues, exacerbated by the Amboyna incident were going on, the Republic was also facing severe problems in its war against Spain. Despite the largest-ever military expenditure on army extensions and equipments, Maurits had no longer the energy to do more than fight a defensive war against Spinola’s much larger forces. However, it was not the Republic's military situation that led to changes in English and French policies and bringing the two nations back to the side of the Republic. James’ attempts to forge a dynastic link with Spain had failed and the Spanish king, Philip IV (1621-1665) and his First Minister Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares (1587-1653) had started a policy of re-establishing the grandeur of Spain. At the same time that new military offensives of Spain could be expected, forces loyal to the Emperor neared the borders of France and the Republic. England and France considered that their interests were threatened and decided to forge closer links with each other with an Anglo-French mutual defence treaty and both to renew their support for the Republic. On 5 June 1624 a new Anglo-Dutch mutual defence and subsidy treaty was concluded which was signed on behalf of England and the Elector Count of the Palatinate, his family and successors², clearly indicating James’ interests in the restitution of the Palatinate estates to his daughter Elizabeth and her husband, the Elector Count Frederick.

² NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 12576. 37B and 12589.39, Tr. 5 June 1624.
James had agreed to provide the Republic with an army of 6,000 infantry divided into four regiments and to be maintained for two years. The Anglo-Dutch treaty was followed on 10 June 1624 with the Franco-Dutch treaty of Compiègne for three years, not for mutual defence but for French subsidies which were linked with extensive commitments for the Republic. France’s interests had little to do with the Republic’s aim to achieve its independence from the Spanish Habsburgs more that its armies continued to engage the Spanish forces on its northern borders. England’s interests never changed, it was to keep Spain and France from dominance in the Low Lands.

The Dutch had never ceased their efforts to retain the direct or indirect support of both powers but never at the expense of their own interests. In the meantime they had build-up their own military resources which had with-stood the might of Spain and allowed Grayson to end his thesis with this conclusion: ‘The United Provinces emancipated themselves from foreign tutelage, to take their place among the European powers. The consequence was a transformation which has been characterised in this study as a change from protectorate to partnership’. The Dutch had become emancipated, in particular militarily, but England continued to see the Republic as needing succour, as a protectorate as James showed by his relations with the Republic. It was the Elizabethan perception of Anglo-Dutch relations he inherited. It raises the question whether Grayson’s conclusion of the change from protectorate to partnership was not too optimistic. How would Charles act, would he have different Anglo-Dutch policies and relations than those of his predecessors or also consider the Dutch, the Republic, as a protectorate as his predecessors?

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1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 12574.48 and 12587.36, Tr. 10 June 1624.
2 Grayson, Protectorate to Partnership, p.315.
CHAPTER TWO
Politics, Diplomacy and Treaties

Political treaties and changing objectives

King James I and VI died on 27 March 1625. He had kept his realms at peace but his foreign policies had failed to lessen political tensions and foster religious tolerance through dynastic links with the Protestants of Germany and with Catholic Spain. His support for the Synod of Dordrecht had led to the formation of religious decrees, to which ‘he did not give official standing in England, [as they] would introduce in England some of the contagion which had threatened the Netherlands with terminal illness’ ¹. After the failed marriage negotiations of Charles and the Spanish Infanta, James pledged to concentrate on the restitution of the Palatinate estates to his daughter and son-in-law but had refused to expose England to the dangers of a war against Spain or to participate in the conflicts in the Empire.

Maurits, Prince of Orange died on 23 April 1625 in The Hague. His half-brother Frederik Henry (1584-1647) inherited the title of Prince of Orange but succeeding him in his military and other functions had to be decided by the States of each of the seven sovereign provinces. Maurits’ death left the Republic’s armies without a commanding officer at the time that the Spanish forces were closing-in on Breda. The day that Maurits died, the States General took the unprecedented step of appointing Frederik Henry ‘Captain-general and Admiral of the Union’ ², reporting directly to the States General. Maurits had not reported directly to the States General but had commanded the Republic’s armies as general and as the Captain-general of the provinces where he was Stadholder ³.

¹ W.B. Patterson, King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom, (Cambridge 1997) p. 281. Hereafter, Patterson, King James VI and I.
² NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3184, Res. 23 April 1625, Kapitein-generaal en Admiraal van de Unie.
³ The Captain-general of a province had no military rank but was an official, coordinating political and military interests. However, in addition, he could also be a serving general.
After the death of van Oldenbarnevelt in 1619, Maurits had unilaterally made political decisions but failed to emulate his illustrious predecessor. His political activities had seriously weakened the position of the States General which it was determined to restore by, as a first step, instituting a direct line of command with the Republic’s forces. As Maurits’ second in command, Frederik Henry had proven to be an excellent commander, strategist and tactician. Blok described him as a ‘great general, a great statesman and a charming person’\(^1\). Israel added that he ‘possessed his half-brother’s cautious, methodical temperament but without his brooding, vengeful undercurrent’\(^2\). Contrary to Maurits’ undisguised support for the Contraremonstrants, Frederik Henry was ‘satisfied with the protection of freedom of conscience’\(^3\).

Charles inherited his father’s intention to concentrate on the restitution of the Palatinate estates. However, as heir to the throne he had decided not to follow his father’s political and diplomatic methods. He wanted the Electoral status of his brother-in-law Frederick re-instated and also his restoration as the king of Bohemia. James had considered Frederick’s policies unwise and irresponsible; he had not recognised him as king of Bohemia. Whatever policies Charles decided upon, they would deviate from James’ strictly observed neutrality and certainly from his rejection of any war on land. In consequence Charles would usher in a third phase in Anglo-Dutch relations. He himself would set the agenda for these relations, as his predecessors had done. The Dutch would continue to accept, acquiesce but also reject where it endangered their principal objective, their independence.

Charles was convinced that not only war against Spain was needed for the restitution of the Palatinate estates, Frederick’s electoral dignities and the Bohemian throne, but also for an anti-Austrian Habsburg alliance in the Empire.


\(^{3}\) Blok, Frederik Hendrik, *tevreden met de bescherming der vrijheid van geweten*, p. 85.
The 1624 Parliament had not supported an anti-Habsburg alliance, certainly not a land war and only a possible war at sea against Spain. When the Commons voted the two subsidies, they used the cautious phrase ‘towards support of the war, which is likely to ensue’\(^1\). However, Charles’ interpretation was for war not only against Spain but also against the Austrian Habsburgs. James had confined his support for the restitution of the Palatinate to funding a proxy army led by the *condottiere* the Count Mansfeld (1580-1626) and financially supporting his brother-in-law Christian IV (1577-1648), king of Denmark and Norway to attempt restoring the Palatinate by military means. This would leave England neutral and not a party in the war in the Empire.

Charles lost no time in ensuring Christian’s continuing involvement. Sir Robert Anstruther, England’s ambassador in Denmark, could write already on 5 April 1625 to his colleague in The Hague, Sir Dudley Carleton (1573-1632), that he had from Charles a warrant under his own hand ‘to continue to present his treaties which I have already begun according to my former instructions and that his Majesty will ratify the same in all particulars’\(^2\). Anstruther asked Carleton ‘to put his Majesty of Bohemia in mind to write to his Majesty of Denmark and to others as his Majesty shall think fit to desire their constancy in what they have already begun’\(^3\). Charles’ warrant to Anstruther was still consistent with James’ policy ensuring that the momentum was maintained.

A month later, Charles was ready to take the first step towards implementing his interpretation of Parliament’s conclusion that a war was likely to ensue. He instructed Carleton to start negotiations in The Hague with the ambassadors and deputies of certain kings and princes and the States General, ‘for the formation of a league for the restoration of our dear brother and sister and their children and other princes unjustly dispossessed of their estates’\(^4\). Charles described in great detail the rights and obligations of the confederates to be, but he made no reference to the restitution of the Bohemian crown to Frederick.

\(^1\) JHC, 6 Car. I., p.744.
\(^2\) TNA, SP 84/126 f.142, 5/15 April 1625, Anstruther to Carleton about Denmark.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) TNA, SP 84/127 f.50, 10/20 May 1625, Charles’ instructions for Carleton.
Charles left no doubt about the leagues objectives, they were ‘to be to the most advantage of affecting our ends propounded of recovering the Palatinate and stabilising a just and equal peace in Germany’\(^1\). He continued his father’s policy of promoting religious tolerance with the second objective but he will also have considered that a just and equal peace would be essential for restitution of the Palatinate estates and Frederick’s Electoral dignities. Charles did not mention that his ends included Frederick’s reinstatement as king of Bohemia as he must have known that the States General would not support it, in view of its own policy to avoid any action that could lead to war on two fronts with both Habsburg Houses. Charles’ aim was for his personal ends and honour to be achieved by the continental powers while restricting his own involvement against the Austrian Habsburgs to subsidies for Christian and Mansfeld and the participation of others in the league. Charles decided that the combined forces will be commanded by the King of Denmark and Carleton was to impress on the confederates that ‘as a matter of principal importance, he was to insist that the allies shall bind themselves and their heirs and estates to the finishing of their quotas during the war and that no one shall enter into any treaty or make truce or peace without the consent of the rest’\(^2\).

Charles’ Spanish policy plans were different, they would involve England’s direct military participation, he instructed Carleton to inform the States General that England was going to war against Spain. He was to negotiate an agreement to form a combined fleet to be deployed at his discretion ‘to the detriment of their common enemy’\(^3\). England at war with Spain would be of great importance for the Republic, even if it was restricted to war at sea. It indicated a decisive further change from English neutrality in the continent’s political affairs during the preceding twenty years. An Anglo-Dutch partnership for a war at sea could lead to a more important partnership for the war on land after the loss of Breda.

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) TNA, SP 84/128 f.73, 23 Aug./ 2 Sept. 1625, Treaty touching the fleets, au dommage des ennemis communs.
Carleton’s message that England was going to war against Spain was very welcome in The Hague and, as expected, would make the States General responsive in any further negotiations. The ambassador received instructions on policy matters from his monarch and from Buckingham on how to conduct his diplomacy while at the same time emphasising the king’s instructions. In a personal letter to the Prince of Orange, the Duke wrote that ‘there is no man who can better judge than you, the great occasion and reason that, that State [the Republic], has to comply with his Majesty in his royal designs for restoration of his dear sister and her children for the notable advantage they will bring to them, not only in connection with their defence but also in their progress upon the common enemy”. Buckingham’s letter was intended to convey to Carleton that he could conduct his negotiations diplomatically but always against the background that ultimately the Dutch had to comply with the king’s wishes. The Duke echoed Coke’s perception of Anglo-Dutch relations which he expressed when he objected in 1616 against the redemption of the cautionary towns Flushing and Brill.

According to the preliminaries of the maritime agreement, it was agreed that the two countries were to put to sea a combined fleet of 82 English and 20 Dutch warships. The result would not be a wide offensive and defensive treaty; it was a temporary agreement ‘operating against Spain and the Indies’. The Dutch squadron would sail under its own flags and be commanded by a Dutch admiral, who would have a voice in the deliberations concerning the whole fleet but he ‘shall receive and follow the orders and commands of the Admiral or General of the Royal fleet’. It was also stipulated that of any captures that might be made at sea or in the ports and harbours of the enemy, the twenty Dutch ships would have the fifth part as their share.

1 TNA, SP 84/127 f.15, 4/14 May 1625, Buckingham to Carleton.
2 TNA, SP 84/72 f.105, 14/24 April 1616, Coke to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for full quote see page 19 of this thesis.
4 TNA, SP 84/128 f.73/4, 23 July/2 August, recevra et suivra les ordres et commandements de l’Admiral ou General de la flotte Royale.
Before the negotiations in The Hague were finished, Buckingham wrote to his protégé Sir Edward Cecil, an experienced soldier, that he would command ‘a fleet of ships and ten thousand land soldiers to do notable efforts to move those that have dispossessed his Majesty’s dear sister of her inheritance’¹. Carleton was instructed to ask the States General to increase the number of soldiers on Dutch ships from 1,000 to 2,000 and to license ‘any of their subjects which may be proper to make officers in the army as engineers, commissaries of the ordinance and conductors of work or mariners with his Majesty’s subjects serving with them’². The first strike against Spain required enforcement with seasoned officers for England’s navy but also for its army. Charles wrote to Frederik Henry asking whether the Earl of Essex and Sir John Prowde could be given ‘leave of absence from their service of your State for the space of four or five months so as to employ them in our service’³. The States General agreed, since it welcomed any agreement with the specific purpose of a joint war against Spain. However, it was not Buckingham’s assertion about the obligation to support his king’s designs but of having England on the Republic’s side that was important. The request for more manpower could not be met but the first Anglo-Dutch agreement of Charles’s reign was concluded. On 2 August 1625, Carleton and the States General Deputies signed it as the maritime agreement. The limited agreement merely strengthened the English navy for ad hoc deployments at Charles’s discretion against the as yet unnamed common enemy.

The Dutch saw the maritime agreement as the first step towards a more formalised partnership against Spain. The States General decided to send ambassador extraordinaire Francis van Aerssen, Lord of Sommelsdijk (1572-1641) and two of its Deputies to England to persuade Charles to break openly with Spain and to negotiate an Anglo-Dutch treaty for the war on the seas and particularly on land where the Spanish threat was the greatest for the Republic.

¹ TNA, SP 84/127 f.22, 5 May 1625, Buckingham to Sir Edward Cecil, later Viscount Wimbledon.
² TNA, SP 84/127 f.15, 4/14 May 1625, Buckingham to Carleton.
³ TNA, SP 84/127 f.282, 29 June/9 July 1625, Charles I to Prince of Orange, congé de s’absenter du service de vostre Estat pour l’espace de 4 ou 5 moys pour les employer en nostre service.
Whether the States General was aware of Charles’ own much wider plans is not known but the Dutch anxiety to conclude a treaty certainly strengthened the English negotiators’ negotiating position. The contemporary Dutch historian Lieuwe van Aitzema recorded that an offensive-defensive agreement was quickly concluded and signed by the three Dutch Envoys and seven English negotiators, led by Buckingham, on 7 September 1625 and would, after their ratifications, be ‘named the Treaty of Southampton’1. The maritime agreement had not mentioned Spain by name as the common enemy; the Treaty of Southampton left no doubt. It created an Anglo-Dutch partnership for a joint war against Spain, effectively meaning that England joined the Dutch in a war they had been waging already for decades.

The first four of the forty clauses set out the objectives but were also political statements to different factions and interest groups in both countries. Clause 2, of immediate and future importance, read, ‘The alliance shall continue for as long as the King of Spain shall continue to lay claim, by wars, acts of aggression and other ambitious manners and attacks on the liberty and privileges of the United Provinces and the Elector’s dignities, lands and to other patrimonial estates of the Palatinate remain occupied by him or his associates, at least for the time of fifteen years’2. The first clauses confirmed the change of England’s Spanish politics and the end of neutrality in the continent’s political affairs. The imminence of an Anglo-Spanish war met the wishes of those in Parliament who favoured war with Spain; but only if it was a war at sea. These clauses were welcomed by those who favoured closer links between the two Protestant countries and wanted support for their German co-religionists, but also without direct participation in any war on land. All but two of the remaining thirty-six clauses dealt in detail with the strategy and conduct of the war at sea and land.

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2 Ibid., laquelle dite Alliance durera si longuement que le Roy d’Espaigne continuira de pretendre, par guerre, voyes de fait, et autre ambitieuses menées sur la liberté et droits desdizctes Provinces Unies, et que la dignié Electorale, Terres, et autres Estats patrimoniaux du Palatinat demeureront occupez par lay ou par les adherants, au moins pour le term de quinze ans.
For large expeditions the Dutch would provide one quarter of the required warships under the overall command of an English general or admiral. Charles would provide and fund a land army of 35,000 men for the war against Spain; whether this would include Mansfelt’s army already campaigning in Germany was not mentioned. But, if included and as stipulated Charles and the States General would jointly decide the army’s deployment, there could be a clash of interests. A joint deployment of English and Dutch forces for the restitution of the Palatinate would be against the Republic’s policy of not going to war in the Empire and risking having to fight both the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs.

The last two clauses were not relevant for an anti-Spanish offensive and defensive treaty and were also outside the negotiating mandate of van Aerssen’s mission. They represented a separate aspect of Anglo-Dutch relations which concerned long-standing ‘frictions on issues of trade and navigation which had started already in the early 1590s’, and well before that time also on fisheries. The first of the two, clause 39, read, ‘All letters of reprisals, rulings, arrests and other such acts that have been hitherto granted and given against the subjects of one or other of the confederates for whatever cause shall not become effective on either side but shall as of now and henceforth be null and void and in the future, no such letters shall be granted, rather shall justice be given and administered as the law shall provide’. The final clause read, ‘Neither in specific nor in general terms, nor in understanding nor intention in any innovation, interruption or change in the freedom of Navigation and Commerce is agreed’. The clause ended, stating that no changes had been agreed on the payment of tolls, duties, subsidies, rights and the laws of the Admiralty.

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1 Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, p. 40.
2 Aitzema, Saken van Staat, Toutes Lettres de Represailles, marques, arrêts, & autre semblables, qui ont esté cy devant Octroyées & decernées contre les subjects de l’un ou autre des confedezes pour quelque cause ce soit, n’auront lieu de part & d’autre ains sont des maintenant & demeureront nulles & de nul effect, & pour l’avenir n’en feront aucun Octroyée, mais justice sera rendu & administrée, ainsi de droit appartienra.
3 Ibid. ny par aucunes paroles y continues, générales ou spéciales, n’est pas compris ny entendu qu’il y ait aucune innovation, interruptions, ou changement en la liberté de la Navigation & Commerce.
Although clause 39 appeared to be an English concession, it did not make letters of reprisal illegal; they were to be subject to English law while clause 40 stressed that all existing laws remained in force. England’s present and also future laws were assumed to be the final arbiter, extending the jurisdiction of the English monarch beyond his realm. Van Aerssen and the two Deputies had, as instructed, concluded an Anglo-Dutch treaty for a joint war against Spain but this included the last two clauses which were not covered by their mandate. The Dutch delegates’ agreement that the deployment of the promised English army combined with Dutch forces would be decided by Charles and the States General could not be implemented if Charles would want to deploy the joint forces for the restitution of the Palatinate and his wider anti-Austrian Habsburg policy. Both objectives would draw the Republic into the conflicts in the Empire.

The day after the negotiators signed the agreement, Charles wrote to the Dutch delegates that he did not feel himself bound by clause 39. Referring to the highly politicised so-called ‘Amboyna massacre’ of 1623 and invoking lèse majesté as his unassailable judgement, he demanded justice ‘within the space of eighteen months for what we have suffered by way of insult to our honour through the excesses committed in Amboyna against our subjects’. Failing that, Charles continued, ‘We shall be free to seek our revenge for the lives and property of our subjects, whether it be by a letter of reprisal or by means of our forces that we seek justice for the injuries and losses that they have suffered in Amboyna or anywhere else on this or that side of the line [Equator], notwithstanding any general or particular non-observance clauses contained in and counter to the said treaty from which we feel and declare ourselves to be exempt before God and man’.

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1 TNA, SP 84/129 f.31, 8/18 September 1625, Charles to Dutch delegates and States General, Protest concerning Dutch excesses in the East Indies.
2 Ibid. dans le terme de dix-huit mois de ce que nous avons souffert de nostre honneur par les excès qui ont esté commis en Amboyna à l’encontre de nos Subjects.
3 Ibid. nous sera toujours libre de chercher nostre renonce pour les vies et biens de nos subjects. Et soit par lettres de represailles ou par nos propres forces nous faire raison des injures et dommages qu’ils ont souffert en Amboyna ou autre part deça ou dela la Ligne nonobstant aucunes clauses générales et particulières continues au contraire dudit Traitée, de inobservation desquelles nous nous senions et déclarons estre exempt devant Dieu et les hommes.
Charles’ letter raises the question whether there had been any intention to implement the clause introduced by Buckingham and his six co-negotiators. The first 38 clauses met Charles’ objectives for an offensive-defensive partnership with the Republic for his enmity with Spain, and by the States General to have England as an active ally in its already ongoing war with Spain. In addition, the Treaty of Southampton served England’s continuing geo-political interests of keeping the Spanish out of the United Provinces. The treaty also reflected a change in Anglo-Dutch relations since 1585, when the Dutch needed military support; forty years later England required the support of the Dutch navy and manpower. However, what had not changed was that both the 1585 and the 1625 treaties reflected the same perception of the Anglo-Dutch relationship and the dominance of the English monarch. There was little evidence of a partnership, which was what Charles needed to accomplish his extensive objectives.

The last two clauses were introduced as add-ons by the English negotiators with England’s explicitly stated position and jurisdiction. Presumably, these were left by the Dutch envoys for the States General to consider before ratification. However, the opportunistic claim to their king’s right to extend his authority to be the final arbiter in matters affecting also the Republic’s interests had already been rejected forty years earlier. Even at the time of the greatest need for English support in 1587, the States General had rejected Elizabeth’s extension of her sovereignty and order to sue for peace with Spain being against the interests and sovereignty of the (at that time) six United Provinces. Leicester’s failed attempt to use force to implement his queen’s order led to the Dutch ending his tenure as Governor General of the provinces in 1587 and a year later to the emergence of the Republic of the United Netherlands. Charles also appeared to be determined to install his perception of Anglo-Dutch relations and of the extent of his royal authority. Also the English negotiators concluding and signing the Treaty of Southampton had no doubt about their monarch’s views concerning the extent of his jurisdiction and royal prerogatives.
When an English merchant vessel was taken to Flushing and before any processes of law had taken place in the Republic or England, Charles wrote to Carleton in The Hague that he had taken the owners ‘into our royal protection and to own them as our subjects; and to require you to promise them the benefit thereof, in this case without delay in their just claim of their goods and merchandise’.

Charles had assumed costly commitments, greater than those needed for a war at sea, as envisaged by the Commons in James’ last Parliament in 1624. His entire strategy rested on the ability to meet the financial commitments, and to honour these he called his first Parliament on 18 June 1625. At the opening of Parliament the Lord Keeper spoke on Charles’s behalf in the Lords. His address was dominated by the restitution of the Palatinate and the king’s finances. He stressed the importance the late king James, and now Charles, attached to the restitution and informed the Lords that ‘all the subsidies are spent, and much more for which his Majesty now desires supplies’. After the Commons had passed a bill for only two subsidies, Sir John Coke was commanded by the king to give the Commons the true information of the king’s estate. Coke’s statement included that he is to pay the king of Denmark 40,000 pounds to draw him into Germany besides the monthly payment of 20,000 pounds to him and [the subsidies to] Mansfeld. (See Note). Yet the Commons adhered to two subsidies as they had started to realise what the king’s aims actually were; they were much less compliant than they were in 1624, when only a sea war was intended.

Plagued by considerable delays, the first joint seaborne attack against Spain could be launched on 8 October 1625 with an expeditionary force of 82 English and 20 Dutch ships and an army of some 5,000 men. These would mount simultaneous attacks on the mainland and on the seas to capture a Cadiz-bound silver fleet from the Americas.

1 TNA, SP 84/127 f. 284, 30 June/10 July 1625, Charles to Carleton.
2 JHC, 6 Car.1. Vol. 3, p. 190/1
Note. A footnote on pp. 470/1 of 6 Car.1. Vol. 3 read that the Lord Keeper informed the Lords on 18 June 1625 that the king was to pay the king of Denmark and Norway 30,000 pounds monthly.
The fort Puntal at the entrance of the harbour was captured by the Dutch squadron but the main fleet could not enter the harbour itself and failed to intercept the silver fleet. The army had been disembarked some distance from Cadiz but the delay of the expedition’s departure gave the Spanish time to prepare themselves and to launch a counter attack which prevented the army from reaching the city. What was left of it had to be re-embarked. The expedition had failed to achieve either objective and came home on 11 December 1625. It was premature and over-ambitious, poorly planned and executed. It lacked adequate financial resources although even the Queen’s ‘dowry was used in large part to finance the expeditionary force at Plymouth’¹ (See Note). Buckingham was blamed for the failure, by many as the Lord Admiral and by others as an individual. He had expected that with a quick successful outcome the venture would increase support for his king’s foreign policies and improve his own popularity; the failure of the Cadiz expedition resulted in the opposite for both expectations. While the fate of the Cadiz expedition unfolded and Parliament declined to vote all the subsidies Charles needed, Frederik Henry as the new Captain general of the Republic had to prepare for an offensive strategy for the war against Spain on land.

The Republic’s return to offensive strategies

Half a year before the end of the Dutch-Spanish cease-fire of 1609-1621, the States General raised 8.6 million guilders to bring the armies up to war strength. These funds, two million more than the previous year, could achieve no more than increasing the standing army from 30,000 to 48,000 men just to hold the defensive ring while the Spanish general Ambrogio Spinola (1569-1630) had 60,000 men facing the Republic.


Note. Charles I married, by proxy, in May 1625 Henrietta Maria (1609-1669) daughter of the late King Henry IV of France and Marie de Medici, her brother was at the time King Louis XIII of France. The formal wedding took place later but their different religions precluded the traditional joint crowning ceremonies.
The economic circumstances and the already high level of taxation precluded asking the provinces to raise funds for any further extension of the armed forces. The earlier decision of the States General and Prince Maurits that the Republic’s military strategy had to be a defensive one was tested in 1622 when Spinola laid siege to Bergen-op-Zoom. This siege was broken but not Spinola’s siege of Breda, which resulted in the loss of Breda, the most important gateway to the provinces of Holland and Zeeland.

After the fall of Breda, Carleton wrote to Lord Conway that he had arranged a Council of State resolution to advise the States General on the deployment of the forces available after their failed attempt to save Breda. The resolution read ‘both the Dutch and Mansfeld’s armies should immediately go up to a siege of Wesel’ in Germany. Carleton continued that he had discussed with Frederik Henry ‘instructions to advance this design that do the most concur with the affairs of Germany and jointly with the good of this State’. He added that he ‘should be glad if we could begin with the capture of Wesel now at his Majesty’s first coming to the throne, the loss of this place in 1614 was made injuriously and so still lasts as a wound to the king his father’s reputation in the voice of the world’. Carleton had obtained the Council of State’s resolution by using his membership of the Council and his knowledge of some members’ inclination to favour support for their German co-religionists. He had used his dual position in the Republic to blatantly interfere with the Republic’s policies, military strategies and interests. He ignored the fact that involvement in Germany was known to be against the Republic’s interests and policy. Carleton’s position as member of the Council was a remnant of the Nonsuch Treaty of 1585 but had lost its legal justification when the Republic paid its debt in 1616 and regained the cautionary towns Flushing and Brill.

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1 TNA, SP 84/127 f.52, 10/20 May 1625, Carleton to Conway.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
English membership of the Council of State had become a courtesy and not one to influence the Republic’s matters of state. In this case to obtain a Council’s resolution to direct the Republic’s war strategy to restore the late king’s honour and reputation or to achieve his son’s dynastic objectives. The States General and Frederik Henry rejected the advice and adhered to their long standing policy of avoiding any direct military involvement in the conflicts of the Austrian Habsburgs.

The States General recognised that urgent military and often, political decisions would have to be taken in the field. It re-enforced the system of secret committees, secrete besognes that accompanied the army. Together with the highest military officer, these committees were empowered to make political and even tactical decisions on behalf of the States General. ‘It was these gentlemen who, although not without consultation with the prince, formally had the highest authority’1. The implementation of the Republic’s new military strategy had to be preceded by extensive deliberations on priorities that took place in other special committees to prepare the military campaigns of the next year.

With all the Republic’s borders under threat, the provinces’ demands on the States General’s forces were legitimate but impossible to satisfy simultaneously. Fortunately for the Dutch, Spain’s financial problems had compelled Olivares to order a defensive strategy of Spinola’s armies in the Southern Netherlands. This allowed the Republic’s High Command to concentrate on the threat facing the land provinces where across their eastern borders a major conflict loomed between the Emperor’s Catholic forces and an invading Danish army joined by James’ proxy army led by Mansfeld. Carleton’s advice for Dutch forces to join Mansfeld for an attack on Wesel in the Empire would have brought the Republic at war with the Austrian Habsburgs.

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Before the fate of the Cadiz expedition was known in England, Charles had decided to send an extraordinarily large mission to The Hague, led by Buckingham and Henry Rich, Earl of Holland. Officially, ‘Buckingham’s purpose in going to The Hague was to bring the ratified Treaty of Southampton and conclude treaties, which would bring a grand alliance of anti-Habsburg states into formal existence’¹. Buckingham and Holland were to negotiate an alliance of England, Denmark and the Republic and to invite France, Sweden, Venice and the Protestant princes of Germany to join. Political or religious reasons would be of less importance than the need to provide armies or financial support.

Buckingham and Holland were given detailed instructions at a special audience with Charles. They received their credential letters and specific instructions to convey Charles’s affection for the States of the United Provinces, but also a reminder that the Treaty of Southampton was under correction. This presumably referred to the unilateral withdrawal of clause 39 in the treaty and the protest about the alleged Dutch excesses in the Indies. Charles’ briefing continued with a summary of ‘the grounds of their mission to consist of four points: first, the return of the king and queen of Bohemia to their thrones and to restore them and their children to their ancient dignities and estates; second, the peace of Germany; third, surety of his Majesty’s neighbours and his own kingdoms; fourth, the maintenance and establishment of the reformed Religion’².

The ambassadors had to convey his thanks for the assistance the States gave the king and queen of Bohemia and for the refuge and good treatment they had given them in the United Provinces. They were also to express his wish that the States should continue it and lend their helping hand for their restitution.

¹ Lockyer, Buckingham, p.278.
² TNA, SP 84/130 f. 74, November 1625, Points to be touched on in audience of Buckingham and Holland.
In connection with the third point of his briefing, Charles referred to the discovery that the Spaniards were planning to establish a chain of Almirantazgos, admiralties, along the North Sea east coasts threatening the English and Dutch commercial fleets. Charles may not have known at the time that Olivares had announced in the Spanish Council of State that the only proper response to the English attack on Cadiz was to send a new fleet to be launched from Cadiz with ‘a hundred ships and some twenty thousand men. The invasion force would be supported by another fleet from Flanders which would ravage the English coast, or even attempt to establish a base on English soil’1. The Count-Duke’s ambitious plans and timetable had to depend on the approval of a ‘Union of Arms between the Cortes of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia’2. Despite Olivares’ political manoeuvres and ambitious rhetoric, the inconclusive Union of Arms’ negotiations prevented the implementation of his grand scheme. Charles’ pre-departure briefing to Buckingham and Holland ended with his recommendation that the Dutch should end their religious differences by adopting the religious arrangements in his kingdoms. His patronising attempt to interfere in the Republic’s domestic affairs was not only resented by the Dutch but also ignored the fact that the States General did not have the powers of a monarch with unassailable royal prerogatives. Charles had also ignored the important fact that his father had supported Maurits on one side of the religious divide in the Republic which had aggravated the damaging political and religious troubles during the twelve year cease-fire.

Buckingham and Holland and their extended entourage were received with all the pomp and splendour befitting royalty. They were welcomed by Frederik Henry and representatives of the States General and the States of Holland but, not surprisingly, speculations abounded about the purpose of this large and stately visit.

2 Ibid. p.249.
It hardly warranted bringing the English copy of the ratified Treaty of Southampton to the Republic by this large delegation. Dutch historian Poelhekke advanced one reason, ‘Charles and his alter ego Buckingham considered it important to surround the generally popular protestant alliance with as much power and importance as possible’\(^1\). But the Dutch were not party to the mission’s real instructions which were to be revealed when the republican Dutch peoples were duly impressed by the power and splendour of their English ally.

After the ceremonial of the treaty exchanges and with the Danish delegation already in The Hague, ‘treaties linking England, the Republic and Denmark were signed on 4 December 1625’\(^2\). A Triple Alliance was formed but, despite the extravagant opening phrases of the treaties, they were in essence English and Dutch contracts to provide Christian IV with subsidies for the campaign he had already started in Germany. The treaties started with an assessment of the situation in Germany and a statement of intent, ‘in as much as that by common consent and in consideration of the wicked and highly dangerous subversion, outrages, violent acts and oppression’\(^3\), the alliance partners intended to arrest, ‘these dangerous intentions and oppressions and aim for the re-establishment of the freedoms, rights and constitution of the Empire’\(^4\). The confederates agreed in clause 2 that Denmark would keep in the field forces of 28,000 to 30,000 soldiers on foot and 7,000 to 8,000 on horse. In clauses 3 and 4 it was confirmed that, while Christian and his armies were campaigning in Germany, England would pay a monthly subsidy to Christian of 30,000 pounds and the Republic agreed to pay 5,000 pounds per month.

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\(^2\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 12589.42, Tr., 4 December 1625.

\(^3\) Ibid. *Comme ainsy soit que d’un commun consentement et en consideration des mauvaises et tres dangereuses menées, outrages, violences, et oppressions.*

\(^4\) Ibid. *Ces mauvaises intentions et oppressions, et pour le restablissement de liberté et constitution de l’Empire.*
Aitzema related a conversation he had with William Boswell, English Resident in The Hague, who told him that Buckingham, was the cause of the promised exorbitant subsidy. He ‘in every possible way tried to make himself popular with the people at home, to show himself to be anxious to return the king of Bohemia to his hereditary estates and that he was a real enemy of Spain and Austria’. Boswell’s remarks said more about his personal opinion of Buckingham than about his knowledge of the commitments his king had already made to Christian. They were disclosed in Charles’ first Parliament six months before the treaties were supposedly negotiated and actually signed in The Hague.

The final clause of the treaties specifically stated, ‘this treaty shall not make any innovation or change in the treaties which his Majesty of Great Britain has separately made with the Gentlemen of the United Provinces which are understood to be kept in full according to the form they have been agreed and contracted’. The implications of the final clause were clear: Charles wanted to maintain all his favourable conditions in the amended version of the Treaty of Southampton for his foreign policies, leaving him free for separately dealing with the Republic on trade, fisheries and shipping issues. For domestic purposes the treaties had to give the impression that the three Protestant nations had formed a league to wage a confessional war against the Emperor’s Catholic forces, obfuscating the fact that it was only Denmark going into battle. Invitations to Sweden, the Republic of Venice but also to Catholic France to join the alliance needed a different gloss; they were part of Charles’s foreign policy objective to form and lead a wider alliance to oppose the dominance of the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs. Whilst expressing sympathetic sentiments, all the invited countries declined to participate.

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1 Ibid., die in alle manier pooghde zich in Engeland by de Gemeente aenghenaem te maeken: thoonende zo yverigh om den Koningh van Bohemia weder in sijne Erf-landen te stellen: ende met eenen dat hy was recht vyand van Spagnien en Oostenryck.

2 Ibid. dit verbond sal geen innovatie noch alteratie geven in de verbonden, die zijn Majesteyt van Groot-Brittannie besonderlijck gecontracteert heeft met de geseyde heeren Staten Generael, de welcke men verstaet dat in hun geheel sullen bewaert worden, near de forme, in de welcke sy besloten en gearresteert zijn, Folio, Vol 1, pp.1264-7.
The king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus (1594-1632), was preoccupied with his own objective: to extend his realms to the other side of the Baltic Sea. Louis XIII (1601-1643) declined to join as he and his first minister Richelieu first had to build political unity in France with the Huguenot part of the population. They also had to conciliate those influential French nobles who opposed Louis himself and Richelieu as his first minister.

The day after the delegates had signed the treaties, they also signed a separate Ad Referendum\textsuperscript{1}. The opening explained that the deputies who had negotiated, more precisely, had been presented with the Ad Referendum, found it proper to use phrases in general terms for many reasons and considerations. However, ‘it has to be a precondition that the Upper and Lower Palatinate, with all their dignities and dependencies must be included and that the confederates should be compelled to procure by all possible means restitutions to the Prince Elector Palatinate and his children since they were unjustly dispossessed of them. The said confederates shall not enter into any agreement with the opposing party without involving the said Elector Count\textsuperscript{2}. The carefully worded Ad Referendum did not rule out support for the German Protestants, but avoided stressing that the real task of the partnership was to achieve Charles’s dynastic objectives. The mandatory involvement of the Elector as leader of the German Calvinists and exiled king of Bohemia, could draw the Republic not only into the war in the Empire but also onto one side of the Calvinist-Lutheran divide. However, the States General had specifically excluded in the treaties any Dutch military actions other than, at its own discretion, diversionary ones, and only if its own military situation permitted.

\textsuperscript{1} NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 12589.42, Tr., 4 December 1625 and French and Dutch text in, Aitzema, Saken van Staet, Folio, Vol. I. pp. 1262/3.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid. si est ce qu'il faut presupposer que le Palatinat haut et bas, avec toutes ses dignités et dependences doibt estre tenu pour compris expressément a ce que les confederéz soyent obligés de procurer et obtenir par toutes voyes possibles la restitution au Prince Electeur Palatin et ses enfants puis qu'on les en a depossedez injustement, et que lesditz confederéz n'entreront point en aucun accord avec la contrepartie sans y comprendre ledit Seigneur Electeur.
The Danish State Council, the Rigsrad, also opposed participating in the German wars. It did not support its king and exercised its constitutional right to withhold funds, but had been powerless to prevent him from going to war as his personal wealth and foreign subsidies permitted him to do so without the Council’s agreement and its subsidies. However, the ‘Council, had warned the king that such a war in Germany would only lead to the absolute ruin of the king and his subjects’.1

In case the Commons’ vote of a mere two subsidies and the failed Cadiz expedition had left Charles’ treaty partners with doubt about his commitments, decisive remedial action was started. Buckingham assured the Prince of Orange that his king ‘remains firm and resolute in his intention of pursuing his quarrel against Spain on land and on sea’2. Also Christian was assured that Charles’ commitments to him would be met by Conway’s letter to Sir Robert Anstruther3 and, after concluding the Triple Alliance treaties, Buckingham gave the same assurances to Christian4. The concerted efforts to garner full support for the treaties and Ad Referendum continued with Buckingham’s letter to Frederik Henry in which he asked the prince ‘to let me know the time, places, number of men and the provisions necessary for some exploits worthy to be undertaken better known to the mature experience of your Excellency than to anyone else’.

Whether Frederik Henry was impressed by Buckingham’s compliment is not known but consistent with his rejection of Carleton’s attempt to divert his armies to join Mansfeld to lay siege to Wesel, he ignored the duke’s equally opportunistic attempt to use him in order to involve himself in the Republic’s military affairs.

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2 TNA, SP 84/130 f.110, December 1625, Buckingham to the Prince of Orange, demeure ferme et constante de poursuivre sa querelle contre l’Espagne tant par mer que par terre.
3 TNA, SP 75/6 f.161, 12/22 September 1625, Conway to Anstruther.
4 TNA, SP 75/6 f.218, 15/25 December 1625, minute from Buckingham to Christian IV.
5 TNA, SP 84/130 f.110, December 1625, Buckingham to the Prince of Orange, de me faire entendre les temps, les lieux, les nombres d’hommes, les provisions necessary à une telle affaire mieux cогнue à la meure experience de vostre Excellence qu’à aucun autre.
Buckingham and his large delegation had not travelled to The Hague only to
hand over the ratified Treaty of Southampton or to negotiate the treaties with the
Republic and Denmark. An impressive English delegation had been considered
appropriate to stress to the Dutch the importance of England as an ally and to
persuade them to embrace the roles of active supporters of the new monarch’s
foreign policies. The concluded treaties had left no doubt about the importance of
the restitution of the Palatinate and for the Republic to be in the vanguard of an
anti-Habsburg alliance. But besides co-opting the Republic into his policies and
strategies, Charles had charged Buckingham and Holland with the delicate task
of borrowing some two million guilders in the Republic, if necessary with
personal and crown jewels as collateral. He urgently needed money; the two
subsidies the Commons had voted would only amount to 160,000 pounds and
were already absorbed by existing debts.

Charles expected the Dutch to lend him the money to pay for his proxy wars in
the Empire, but even if the States General had been willing to do so, the cost of its
own war did not permit it. Funds could only be raised in the Dutch money
market with Charles’ jewels as collateral; the Amsterdam financiers were weary
of lending money on the crown jewels. Pawning the jewels may have been an
onerous task for the two high nobles, particularly for Buckingham who ‘had
appeared in The Hague in astonishing splendour, adorned with pearls and jewels
not only at dance parties but displaying on all occasions’\(^1\). At the same time the
two nobles had to pawn their king’s jewels ‘they were pleased with themselves as
they would demand the fortress of Sluys as price for the Treaty of
Southampton’\(^2\). Whether this demand was made is not recorded in the Dutch
records. However, acquiring a foothold on the continent was a recurring theme in
English foreign policy.

\(^1\) Vreede, G.W., *Inleiding tot eene Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Diplomatie* (Utrecht 1861), *Hij was te ’s Hage met verwonderlijke luister verschenen, parelen en edelgesteenten niet slechts op danspartijen, maar alom ten toon spreidende*. p.84. Hereafter, Vreede, *Nederlandsche Diplomatie*.
\(^2\) Ibid. *de vesting Sluis als prijs te verlangen voor de treaty [of Southampton]* p.85. Professor Vreede had based this quote on reports by French ambassador Charles D’Espesses to his monarch in Paris.
A demand for the fortress Sluys is also mentioned by Professor Poelhekke\(^1\). He quoted a Spanish informant, evidently living in Antwerp, who derived his information from his agents in the Republic. It requires a circumspect appraisal not only in view of the manner in which the information was acquired but also because the agents’ own interpretations and the possible embellishment to ingratiate themselves with their superiors. However, demands for cautionary towns and fortresses in the Republic had been part of English policies from the beginning of Anglo-Dutch political relations. See Note.

\textit{English and Dutch interests diverge}

Buckingham and Holland returned to England with minimal political success. The exchange of the Treaty of Southampton ratification documents was part of the near pageantry of their appearance, and for the Danish delegation the confirmation of Charles’ commitments already made to their king. The Republic’s participation in the Triple Alliance was restricted to only monthly subsidies in support of the Danish armies. France and Sweden could not be persuaded to extend the Triple Alliance into a grand anti-Habsburg alliance and money could not be borrowed in the Republic, only raised by pawning Charles’ personal jewels. After Buckingham and Holland returned, Charles showed his views of their results when he instructed Carleton ‘to make clear to the States and the Prince of Orange\(^2\) that they had not been sufficiently prompt in providing the money ‘to supply and maintain what has been undertaken’\(^3\).

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\(^1\) Poelhekke, \textit{Frederik Hendrik}, p.121. based on a report written by Manuel Suero to his Spanish superiors.

\textbf{Note}. Elizabeth I demanded Flushing, Brill and the fortress Rammekes as part of the Nonsuch Treaty of 1585, James did the same as part of his 1624 treaty but withdrew his demand and accepted a bond signed by the States General as well all seven provinces of the Republic. In 1672/4, in the Republic’s negotiations with England in the Anglo-French war against the Republic, Charles II wanted Sluys Cadzand, Walcheren, Schouwen and Voorne.

\(^2\) TNA, SP 84/131 f.68, February 1626, Charles I to Carleton, Instructions concerning pawning of jewels, \textit{vous remonstrerez aux Estats et au Prince d’Orange}.

\(^3\) Ibid. \textit{supplier et maintenir ce qu’on a pris en main}. 
Charles did not blame the provinces and the Prince of Orange personally, but mainly the States General, the Republic’s executive committee. He omitted that ‘what has been undertaken’ was undertaken by him to further his own foreign policies and dynastic objectives, for which his first Parliament had so far declined to provide the necessary subsidies. His instructions to Carleton showed that he expected the Republic to be the nucleus of the anti-Habsburg alliance and to pay the whole or most of his share of the cost of implementation. The Dutch did not need to be negotiated with; as Sir John Coke had written to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1616, they owed him fidelity and allegiance. England, the Republic and Denmark had signed treaties with diplomatically worded objectives which obfuscated the confederates’ different interests, aspirations and policies until the Ad Referendum stated that the restitution of the Palatinate was paramount.

Charles had justified the restitution of the Palatinate as an essential part of supporting the German Protestants and arriving at a just peace in the Empire. However, restoring with military force the Calvinist Elector Frederick to his Palatinate would aggravate the divisions and hostilities in the Empire and seriously impede creating the conditions for a just peace. Creating the right conditions would require, in support of Charles’ policy, a wide and fully committed alliance against the Austrian Habsburg in the Empire in parallel with the Republic’s ongoing war against the Spanish Habsburgs. Although Charles’ contention about the essential restitution of the Palatinate was to meet his personal objective, it did appeal to those whose priority was the protection of the Protestant religion against the always threatening Counter-Reformation. The Protestant religion, however, provided only a conditional unity since the religious disparity between the Lutherans in Denmark, Sweden and Germany and the orthodox Calvinists in Germany and the Republic, was as unbridgeable as that between the Remonstrants and contra-Remonstrants in the Republic.
Charles faced in his own realms the disparity between the Presbyterian Kirk in Scotland and the Episcopalian Anglican Church. Only the threat of the Counter-Reformation provided a semblance of unity, but this was endangered for many by James’ attempted dynastic marriage link with Catholic Spain.

Elizabeth had changed her original Spanish policies after the 1588 Armada and ceased her attempts to coerce the Dutch to make peace with the Spanish monarch. She stayed at war with Spain and supported the Dutch until her death but on her terms and with her perception of the Anglo-Dutch relations. Although less stridently, Elizabeth’s perceptions of Anglo-Dutch political and diplomatic relations prevailed during James’ reign and had become in evidence again since Charles ascended the throne of England. After an interval of 40 years and in a stronger position than in 1585, the Dutch still needed England as an ally and remained prepared to compromise politically where possible, but not when the sovereignty of the seven provinces, their judiciary and Dutch principal objectives were endangered.

The Treaty of Southampton, the Triple Alliance treaties, the Ad Referendum and an anti-Habsburg league were Charles’ manifesto for his foreign policies, dynastic objectives and the honour of his House and his own. The treaties would leave Charles in charge of the implementation and relations with confederates, but also with the responsibility for his own very considerable commitments. The treaties reflected Charles’ wishes and ambitions but had not taken into account the reality of the domestic and foreign conditions needed to achieve them. He had to convince the Commons to vote the funds for Christian and Mansfeld, who were at war already, while the Republic awaited the English army of 35,000 men committed in the Treaty of Southampton. Christian had to extend his original plan of only strengthening the Danish position in northern Germany by taking his army much further into the Empire for the restitution of the Palatinate. The Republic had restricted itself to only supporting him financially.
The formation of a grand anti-Habsburg alliance had, at best, stalled when France and Sweden refused to join the Triple Alliance and the Dutch refused to depart from their existing policy to refrain from military involvement in the Empire. The political and diplomatic efforts of the first nine months of Charles’ reign were extensive and in great contrast with previous English policies. However, the actual implementation of his foreign policy plans and achieving his personal ambitions would require more than persuasive diplomacy. They would need the support of Parliament and a better understanding of the interests, policies and ambitions of partners and prospective partners abroad.
CHAPTER THREE
The La Rochelle affair and political consequences

New policies and changing relationships

Before Charles ascended the throne, England and the Republic were both drawn into Huguenot affairs, with unforeseen domestic consequences in both countries. Cardinal Richelieu, held firm views that there was no room in a united France for what he considered a diverging political activity of the Huguenots in virtually independent regions and towns. Henry IV’s Edict of Nantes of 1598 had not only granted the Huguenots religious but also political rights. However, during the last twenty-five years, ‘hundreds of the Huguenots’ so-called places de sûreté had lost their special positions1. The political rights, not the religious ones, were withdrawn. The more important of the remaining two places was the town of La Rochelle. Its remarkable geographical position and special status had existed for centuries. It had changed several times from English to French in the Hundred Year War, and it had assumed a virtually independent status. ‘The town could be seen as a republic having shed the yoke of a monarchy’2. In political and religious matters the Rochellois still behaved in an independent manner. The Huguenots of La Rochelle sent their own deputies to the French Synod while the town’s government officials maintained direct relations with England and the Republic, on both political and religious matters. The inhabitants of La Rochelle and one of the leaders of the French Huguenots, Benjamin de Rohan, Count of Soubise (1580-1642), feared that Richelieu’s perception endangered their religious privileges but also the political near-independence of the town itself. The Rochellois saw the French fortifications, particularly Fort Louis outside their town as a potential threat to their status.

2 Ibid. de stad kon doorgaan voor een republiek die het juk der monarchie had afgeschud, p.8.
Soubise did not wait for what he considered Richelieu’s inevitable attack on La Rochelle. Towards the end of 1624 with a fleet of five ships and some troops he occupied the strategically situated Ile de Ré, off the port of La Rochelle, to maintain access from the seas. To the Rochellois ‘It appeared a critical adventure and the town’s officials asked him to leave the island as it could bring war to the gates of the town’. Soubise did leave the port of La Rochelle but in January 1625 he captured the nearby port and citadel of Blavet and the French navy ship, the St. Jean. ‘Soubise claimed to be acting for the sake of religion, but in practice he seemed more like a rebel and pirate’.

Louis regarded Soubise’s aggressive actions as an attack on his realm. He invoked his 1624 mutual defence treaty with England and the Compiègne treaty of the same year with the Republic. England was asked to lend seven ships equipped for war to augment the French navy and the Republic for the support of the twenty ships Louis knew to be ready for an already planned Franco-Dutch blockade of the port of Genoa. This blockade was intended to prevent Spanish forces being moved through Genoa to the Duchy of Milan, and further through the Valtelline to the southern Netherlands. Although Louis claimed that his realm was under foreign attack and that he could invoke the treaties with England and the Republic; this was legally questionable. Soubise and his brother the Duke of Rohan were French, yet both England and the Republic agreed to come to his aid. The reasons for the positive responses were self-serving but different for England and the Republic. Buckingham wanted to end Soubise’s revolt ‘because he knew that Louis would never commit himself to fighting the Habsburgs abroad while he was threatened by unrest at home’. The States General and Maurits had felt that they had no choice than to accede to Louis’ request as the Compiègne treaty compelled the Dutch to aid France in an emergency with troops and ships. In any case, they needed the best possible relations with France.

1 Ibid. het scheen een hachelijk avontuur en de stad La Rochelle verzocht hem, daar deze daad de strijd voor haar poorten zou brengen, het eiland te verlaten, p.10.
2 Lockyer, Buckingham, p.230.
3 Ibid. p.230.
After Maurits’ death, Frederik Henry also supported the States General’s political decision despite the growing opposition of the Dutch Calvinist ministers and his own ‘hesitation to give aid against co-religionists’\(^1\). Having convinced himself of the validity of Louis’ contention that Soubise’s actions were an attack on his kingdom, James had already consented to give aid. A combined French, English and Dutch fleet defeated Soubise off the Ile de Ré in September 1625 and ‘Soubise, with a handful of ships fled to Falmouth, where he was given protection against his French pursuers’\(^2\). By giving sanctuary to Soubise after having participated in his defeat, England seemed to have changed policies. Meanwhile Louis’ army occupied Ré and the neighbouring island of Oléron, clearing the way for the blockade of La Rochelle itself. Buckingham claimed in the House of Lords on 13 May 1626 that had ‘the Prince of Orange lived, he [Buckingham] would have so wrought with him that the Dutch had not gone hither where they wrought all the mischief while our ships lay at anchor and did nothing’\(^3\). The Duke’s statement that the English ships were at anchor and did nothing was disingenuous, and was intended to pacify Parliament. By inference blaming Frederik Henry, Maurits’ successor, for what he called the mischief at La Rochelle, Buckingham had been dishonest.

The combined fleet had served French policies but ‘Soubise’s defeat altered English policy in one stroke. Charles was horrified that the French had made us the means to overthrow our friends and he felt honour bound to ensure that no permanent hardship befell them’\(^4\). The seemingly open ended pledge to support the Rochellois risked a political or even hostile confrontation with Louis and Richelieu. Whether Charles regarded his duty of honour to the Rochellois as a personal expense or a raison d’état, the perilous state of his finances made him issue soon after his pledge, a message under the Privy Seal to unnamed ‘trusted

\(^1\) Blok, Frederik Hendrik, *aarzelde toch om hulp te verlenen tegen de eigen geloofs-genooten*, p.86.
and well beloved, asking for personal loans to be repaid within eighteen months\textsuperscript{5}.

\textsuperscript{5} TNA, SP 16/11 f.53, 9/19 November 1625, a Message By The King.
Charles’ pledge to support the Huguenots of La Rochelle might alter his foreign policies as Cogswell noted, but it did not alter his existing objectives; he had merely added a new one. England’s war against Spain, support for hostilities in the Empire to capture the Palatinate, and also support for the French Huguenots, did not deter Charles and Buckingham from pursuing the formation of a general anti-Habsburg alliance, including France. After concluding the Triple Alliance treaties in The Hague, Buckingham intended to travel to Paris to negotiate also France’s membership of the alliance. However, his intended visit was unwelcome to Richelieu who probably considered that Louis’ views, and also his own priority to unite France under its monarch, had been clearly stated in previous discussions. Buckingham’s interpretation for not being welcome was different; he suspected that it was the Cardinal’s policy to avoid joining what he considered a covert anti-Catholic alliance as he was under the influence of the French Dévots, the hard-line Catholics. Buckingham was right that Richelieu did not want negotiations but the reason he attributed to it was wrong. This did not mean that Richelieu did not have domestic opposition, not only from the Dévots but also from other sources, but what Buckingham ignored was that Richelieu had priorities for France which were incompatible with his priorities for England. Richelieu considered that France had to form a fully united home front in support of its king before direct involvement in any major international conflict. Therefore, when any group did not fully accept his concept of a united France, he would come with ‘such groups into conflict: a conflict with political powers, not with persons or religions’¹. His priority was to unite France under its monarch before embarking on his ‘one great objective, the restriction of the powers of the Habsburgs’². Roelink compared Richelieu with a chess player who used where possible the Protestant nations as chess pieces on the board but always only ‘to checkmate the Habsburg king’³.

² Ibid. Richelieu had één groot doel voor ogen: het beperken van de macht van de Habsburgs, p.6.
³ Ibid. het matzetten van de koning van Habsburg, p.6.
Spain’s ambassador to the French Court did not share Buckingham’s suspicions that Richelieu was under the influence of the Catholic Dévots. The German historian von Ranke wrote that the ambassador meant the opposite when he exclaimed, ‘Richelieu will leave to posterity not the name of a Cardinal of the Church but of Hell’. But neither the Spanish Catholic diplomat nor the English Protestant nobleman, starting from their own narrow religious perspectives, could accept the possibility that the Cardinal did not start from any religious perspective but first and foremost from commitment to the State of France and his unshakable conviction of its enduring greatness.

The reactions in England and the Republic about La Rochelle

While England and France manoeuvred for their political positions, the Republic needed both as allies and had to seek a political and diplomatic balance in its relationships that did not alienate one or the other, or both. However, the Treaty of Southampton and the Triple Alliance treaties had changed the balance towards England, while the only offensive-defensive link with France was the 1624 Compiègne treaty which was due to expire in 1627. After van Aerssen had participated in the negotiations for the treaties with England, the States General sent him as its roving ambassador to Paris to negotiate extending or replacing the Compiègne treaty. He also had to prepare the French for the decision that the States General would shortly withdraw the Dutch fleet from La Rochelle. The latter had been prepared already and Willem de Zoete of Haultain, Vice Admiral of Zeeland, had his secret instructions from the States General to use any excuse to take his fleet home to Flushing. The information had to be kept secret so as not to prejudice van Aerssen’s forthcoming negotiations in Paris, but the consequence was that it increased the stridency of the demands from the Dutch religious leaders to call Haultain’s fleet home.

The religious leaders stridency reached a peak when orthodox Calvinist ministers attacked the States General and its foreign policies from their pulpits. They had failed to acquire direct political influence by imposing a binding church order on the provincial States. They now felt that they were left no other choice than using their pulpits to censor the Republic’s foreign policies; particularly the decision to send ships to La Rochelle to assist Louis in his suppression of the true reformed religion. An orthodox Calvinist minister, Adrean Smout, launched on 28 January 1626 an attack from his pulpit on the Republic and the king of France. He accused the States General of sending ships of war to suppress the true reformed religion and preached about ‘the child of damnation, child of devils, and ‘so that you know of whom I speak, I mean the king of France, Louis XIII son of Henry IV, the Apostate’. His sermon could have inflicted lasting damage to relations with this important ally of the Republic as it had gone far beyond acceptable criticism and elementary political realism; he had demonstrated that his allegiance to his religion transcended national patriotism and any other allegiance. Smout’s attack on the monarch of the Republic’s ally and, by implication on the States General, ignored the basic fact that the prevailing governance of the Republic made it possible for him to speak without restraint from his pulpit. Fortunately, Smout’s diatribe was delivered some weeks after van Aerssen had the opportunity to inform Louis and Richelieu about the impending withdrawal of the Republic’s fleet.

At the time that Smout preached his sermon, patriotism applied to often arbitrarily defined nation states, a still underdeveloped concept. It did not make the Republic a common fatherland, patria, for all inhabitants or a united political nation. The seven provinces of the northern lowlands only became the United Provinces because they were bound by the common battle against Spain and the Church of Rome. For many inhabitants of the United Provinces their patria was their town or their province but that did not apply to all inhabitants.

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1 Evenhuis, Dr. R.B., Ook dat was Amsterdam – De kerk der hervorming in de gouden eeuw, (Amsterdam 1965-1978) 5 Vols. (Also Amsterdam-The church of the reformation in the Golden Century)

The Republic’s population included others for whom the ‘nation, *patria*, covered a wider area than only their towns or provinces: merchants and artists, academics and members of some churches, as well as Catholics and Calvinists\(^1\). For most people their *patria* remained very small and personal, for others it included also their wider interests; for Erasmus it included the whole world\(^2\). Smout’s *patria* was orthodox Calvinism wherever and expressed in border-crossing patriotism.

Ambassador van Aerssen had started his first report to the States General by conveying Louis’ extreme displeasure at the withdrawal of Haultain and his fleet\(^3\). He reported that Louis desired decisions on one of several different proposals. First, could Haultain and his fleet remain in the service of Louis; if not, could the king buy or borrow six ships of Haultain’s fleet? If neither could be agreed, it was asked whether he could buy eight, ten or twelve of the ships but without their crews. The States General was aware that any of the proposals could lead to the ships being used against La Rochelle and the Huguenots, but also that the 1624 treaty gave France the right to buy ships. A comprehensive refusal meant unilaterally breaking the Compiègne treaty thereby severely damaging Franco-Dutch relations. The States General decided to go no further than the sale of six ships but without crews. This compromise settlement was accepted with little grace by the French and was seen by them as an unwarranted restriction on France’s right by treaty to buy ships. It was seen as an interference with their king’s policy to build up the strength of his own navy. Louis and Richelieu needed time to build-up a French navy, in the meantime and for the same purpose, they tried to retain the use of the seven English ships and had not complied with Charles’ demand for their return.

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\(^1\) Groenveld, *Verlopend Getij*, *Er waren in de Lage Landen mensen wier natie een veel groter verspreidingsgebied had dan deze gewesten alleen: kooplieden en kunstenaars, geleerden en aanhangers van sommige kerken, katholieken en calvinisten met name*, p.56.


\(^3\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res., 9 January 1626.
The English and Dutch involvement in Soubise’s defeat had provided Louis with an outcome he could not have achieved without the help of the English and the Dutch, but had left them with an unwanted domestic aftermath. All three countries had acted as always with diplomatic and political self-interests. Louis had claimed a foreign attack on his realm, but it was essentially a domestic affair; the attack was by one of his own nobles. The Dutch had not questioned Louis’ assertion as they needed France to extend the Compiègne treaty. James had wanted France’s assistance for the restitution of the Palatinate. England was left with Charles’ pledge to support the Rochellois and the Republic with a refuelled anti-French sentiment of part of its population.

Anglo-French relations had been affected by Richelieu’s refusal to receive Buckingham in Paris and the aftermath of the Soubise affair. Considering that this state of affairs was not in his interests, Charles had already decided in December to send a special mission to Paris led by the Earl of Holland (1590-1648) and ambassador Carleton. Charles’ instructions started with the vexing issue of the loan ships. After having with earnestness pressed for the restitution of these ships, his ambassadors had to convey their king’s displeasure with Louis’ lack of any response to his demands. Yet, after what amounted to an admonition of Louis, they were to persuade him and Richelieu to join the Triple Alliance and to press that part of the league which was offensive and defensive. This instruction left Holland with the unenviable task of persuading Richelieu to reverse his standpoint, expressed to himself the previous October that an offensive treaty would ‘not be in writing’.

However, the most detailed instructions were not only for negotiation with the French and about the situation of the Huguenots but also about La Rochelle, the for England strategically situated port on the mainland of France.

1 TNA, SP 78/76 267, 30 Dec./9 Jan. 1625, Instructions by Charles to Holland and Carleton.
2 TNA, SP 78/78 93, 7/17 October 1624, Earl of Holland to Sir Edward Conway principal Secretary of State.
The ambassadors were ‘above all things to have attention for that king’s proceedings with those of his subjects of the Protestant religion and the course he takes against La Rochelle’\(^1\). The ambassadors were instructed to do more; they had to inform themselves on the general situation in La Rochelle, in particular on the need for victuals, munitions, security on the landside and also on the chance of the port being closed. The ambassadors were to know from the Rochellois ‘in case that we shall engage ourselves into war for their sakes what their offers will be to encourage us to defend them’\(^2\).

Charles’ instructions indicated that his pledge to the Rochellois could include England’s military intervention on their behalf. However, the possibility of military intervention receded when in January 1626 the news reached London that the Rochellois had accepted a peace agreement with their king. With the victorious fleet in their harbour they had to acknowledge that the Soubise revolt had failed. They had to ‘recognise a Royal Commissioner, return the islands Ré and Oléron and were not allowed to keep any navy vessels’\(^3\). Protestant worship was not forbidden, but ‘ecclesiastical properties had to be returned and the free worship of Roman Catholicism had to be permitted’\(^4\). Both the Dutch and English ambassadors to Paris claimed to have mediated in the Huguenots’ peace agreement with Louis. The Dutch historian Roelink recorded that van Aerssen ‘had made himself useful as an intermediary between the town and the king’\(^5\).

Holland and Carleton reported ‘they had persuaded the Rochellois to come to terms with their king’\(^6\). Whatever influences the English and Dutch ambassadors claimed, the Rochellois had no alternative to settling with their king, but it meant for them and also for Charles, only a moratorium in view of his pledge to support the Huguenots.

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\(^1\) TNA, SP 78/76 f.267, 30 Dec./9 Jan. 1625, Instructions by Charles to Holland and Carleton.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Roelink, Kerk en Staat in Conflict, *een koninklijke commissaris erkennen, ze moesten de eilanden Ré en Oléron teruggeven en mochten geen oorlogsschepen houden*, p.29.
\(^4\) Ibid., *geestelijke goederen moesten worden teruggegeven en de vrije uitoefening van het Rooms-Katholicisme moest worden toegelaten*, p.29.
\(^5\) Ibid. *hij maakte zich tevens verdienstelijk door in de onderhandelingen tussen de stad en de koning als bemiddelaar op te treden*, p.23.
\(^6\) Lockyer, *Buckingham*, p.296.
Anglo-Dutch relations were supposedly intended for a partnership in a joint war against Spain. Both sides knew that their objectives were different; however, forcing the Spanish to enter into realistic negotiations would serve the requirements of both partners. However, at the close of 1625, only the maritime agreement had been enacted with the failed Cadiz expedition while the Treaty of Southampton was still a mere diplomat’s document. The Triple Alliance treaties, with their far-reaching Ad Referendum, and the pledge to support the Rochellois, had greatly widened the scope of Charles’ foreign policy and with it, his already large financial commitments. He needed money not only for the war against Spain, but also to meet ongoing commitments to Mansfeld. Funds were needed urgently for the payment of overdue wages of mariners and shipyard workers.

The diplomatic tour de force of 1625 and the pledge to the Huguenots had large financial consequences and so far, Charles and Buckingham had failed to understand, or to accept, that their own ambitions and political objectives were not necessarily paramount for others. The Dutch had accepted the Ad Referendum to the Triple Alliance treaties but with the caveat that the Republic would not enter into the wars in the Empire. Richelieu’s contention was that France had to settle its Huguenots’ problems first, and Louis was not inclined to enter into an open anti-Catholic war in the Empire. In short, France did not commit itself to the Triple Alliance because it was militarily and politically not ready for a major conflict. Whether England was ready and able to meet its commitments in the Treaty of Southampton and the Triple Alliance would depend on the Commons.

Charles had to call Parliament which was opened on 9 February 1626 against the background of the still uncertain Mansfeld and failed Cadiz expeditions and the unresolved issue of the loan ships still at La Rochelle.
The Commons had no doubt why the king had called his second Parliament; they were to vote substantial subsidies for his ‘Majesty’s pressing occasions and urgent affairs of state at home and abroad’\(^1\). Early in the session the Commons were addressed, on the king’s behalf, by the Vice Chamberlain who informed them of the terms and results of Holland’s and Carleton’s mission to Paris. They had been charged ‘to demand the sending home of our ships, to procure the peace of the Protestants and to engage the French in the wars of Germany’\(^2\).

The Commons were told that the return of the English ships was agreed and that the ambassadors had recommended the Huguenots to make peace with Louis ‘for the present “but had been made aware by them” that their wants were great both in money, and all other provisions’\(^3\). The Commons were further informed ‘that the French king had promised to march towards Germany, with 25,000 men, so as, we would not leave them’\(^4\). The latter left the Commons with an ambiguous impression; it did not mean that France joined the Triple Alliance and neither that France itself would go to war in Germany. The French had merely reiterated Louis’ promise to provide Christian and Mansfeld with subsidies when campaigning in Germany. But the Vice Chamberlain’s positive report of Holland and Carleton’s mission failed to create a cooperative mood in the House.

The Commons were more concerned with their own grievances, mainly centred on their rights, the humiliating military failures and the loan ships affair. They could not question their monarch’s royal prerogative to conduct his realm’s foreign policies. Instead, they formed a Grand Committee to petition Charles to address the evils and causes and remedies concerning the kingdom, but effectively to charge Buckingham for alleged financial improprieties, his actions as the Lord Admiral and his lack of suitability to conduct the kingdom’s foreign relations. While the Commons used their concerns for the kingdom to attack Buckingham, the Earl of Bristol\(^5\) added his own attack.

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1. Procs. in Parl., p.21.
2. JHC, 6 Car.1. p.845.
3. Ibid., p.846.
4. Ibid., p.846.
5. John Digby, first Earl of Bristol (1586-1653) was James’ ambassador in Madrid during the negotiations for the marriage of Charles and the Infanta.
Bristol accused the Duke in a petition to the House of Lords of complicity in being barred from taking his seat in the House and other serious misdemeanours. When he heard of Bristol’s petition, Charles demanded that Bristol be sent for as a delinquent to answer for his ‘offence in scandalizing the Duke of Buckingham immediately, but mediatory and by reflection scandalizing his Majesty with whose privity, and by whose direction, the Duke did guide his action and without which he did nothing.\textsuperscript{1}

The Commons had found time to discuss subsidies, but no bill had been passed when Charles demanded on 9 June 1626 that the Commons ‘bring forward their bill of subsidy to be passed without delay or conditions so as it may fully pass that House by the end of next week.’\textsuperscript{2} However, the Commons did not comply and without any subsidies granted, Parliament was dissolved on 15 June 1626, leaving Charles no other option than to resort to a highly unpopular system of raising funds by imposing forced loans to the Crown.

When Parliament was still in session, rumours reached The Hague that Du Fargis, France’s ambassador in Madrid, had negotiated with Olivares a peace treaty in the Franco-Spanish war for control of the Valtelline in northern Italy. The valley was the important route from Spain to Habsburg Austria and also for the movement of troops and materials to the Spanish Netherlands. When the States General requested information from D’Espresses, the French ambassador in The Hague, ‘initially denied the rumour and discredited Du Fargis\textsuperscript{3}. He assured the Dutch that in any case such a treaty would not be ratified; however, ‘after some changes the treaty was accepted by the Cardinal\textsuperscript{4} and was signed at Monçon on 6 March 1626. It was a compromise solution as the valley had to remain open for both France and Spain. The States General received confirmation of France’s treaty with disappointment but also with anxiety.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] JHC, 6 Car. 1, p.296.
\item[2] Ibid. p.593.
\item[4] Ibid., later evenwel keurde de Kardinaal, onder enkele wijzingen het Traktaat goed, p.88.
\end{footnotes}
Buckingham, as the principal architect of a prospective Anglo-French alliance, felt he had more cause than other men to feel betrayed. In his view, the Monçon treaty was again a French deception and ‘he came to the conclusion that there could be no hope of any friendship with France so long as Richelieu was Chief Minister’¹. However unwelcome the Monçon treaty was for the English and the Dutch, it was not a deception; it was France’s right to act as it did. But unwelcome for the Dutch was Buckingham’s over-reaction as it could bring the Anglo-French relationship into difficulty, leaving the deteriorating relations between the Republic’s two allies as a matter of deep concern for the Republic.

The peace between France and Habsburg Spain, and Parliament’s omission to vote the required subsidies in support of Charles’ continental policy, meant the end of the planned anti-Habsburg alliance or a different policy for its achievement. Cogswell concluded that the Monçon treaty and the dissolution of Parliament forced Charles and Buckingham to face the facts that their actions and ambitious plans had ‘produced disasters abroad and disarray at home’². He continued, ‘from the debris they had to fashion a more realistic foreign policy’³. However, Charles’ and Buckingham’s objectives were ambitious but intrinsically correct. Attempting to restore Elizabeth and Frederick to their Palatinate estates was in the customs and conventions of the times. Instigating a wide anti-Habsburg alliance was needed to counter the Habsburg hegemony and danger to the reformed religion. But the precipitate action against Spain at Cadiz had contributed to the disarray at home and ignoring the prospective partners’ own interests had led to the failure to secure the necessary support to achieve the objectives.

Political re-alignment of England, the Republic and France

The suppression of the Soubise revolt was followed by the peace agreement imposed on the Rochellois and the French occupation of Ré and Oléron.

¹ Lockyer, Buckingham, p.300.
³ Ibid.
The events at La Rochelle and the Monçon treaty seemed to confirm the suspicions of the Dutch and English Protestants of the Cardinal’s intentions to extirpate Protestantism in France. They were based on the premise that the creation of a unified France with a Catholic king and a Cardinal of the Roman Church as first minister, meant the total suppression of Protestantism; an understandable but singular perspective at a time of little or no religious tolerance. In Catholic Spain the Inquisition held sway and in Protestant England Catholicism was proscribed. In the Republic Catholicism was proscribed; while it was less stringently enforced than elsewhere, any dissent from Calvinist orthodoxy was deemed unacceptable. France’s confessional policies were not the same. Protestantism was not proscribed in France and a Huguenot minority was acceptable, even given its own places de sureté, but only as part of a politically united France. It made it possible for Louis to have a Huguenot, the Duke of Lesdiguières, as the Constable of France. But the removal of the Huguenots’ political privileges was considered by Louis and Richelieu a pre-requisite for the building of domestic unity and essential in order to play an international role, given their view of France as a major European power.

Domestic union in France, however, was not the only pre-requisite. Louis also had others; the strengthening of France’s military capabilities on land and at sea, as shown by France’s inability to force a decisive conclusion in the Valtelline conflict. Louis decided to send his envoys to the Republic to negotiate the supply of warships. His ambitions were not restricted to strengthening his navy but also his commercial interests. A new trading company was to be established and Richelieu was appointed as France’s highest authority for navigation and trade; Richelieu lost no time in adding merchant vessels to the warships that had to be bought in the Republic. The developments in France added urgency to the need for a revision of English foreign policies. On Charles’ command, the Treasurer, Buckingham, Carlisle and Conway considered the situation in France1.

1 TNA, SP 78/79 f. 299, August 1626, Resolution on built-up of French navy.
The Councillors concluded that the French with their plans ‘should not only be able to master their own sea towns and ports which are of the party of the reformed religion and do admit our entrance such as would give nourishment and assistance to that party’\(^1\). These facilities had to be maintained to support Charles’ pledge to the Huguenots and particularly as he had not ruled out the possibility of going to war with France to defend them, as he had written to Holland and Carleton\(^2\). The Councillors suggested that a new political initiative was needed, affecting not only the immediate situation but with wider implications for France and the Republic. They suggested that they should also look at ‘the mastership of the narrow sea, and honour, rights and surety, which your Majesty’s crowns had enjoyed many ages’\(^3\). They considered that their suggestions should be put into practice without delay. ‘They judged it more advantageous for your Majesty to enter into war now that you have advantage at sea in a superlative degree, than to be constrained to make or suffer one when there should be more equality of shipping’\(^4\). The Councillors ended their opinion that it was the right time ‘with war in France between the nobility and the king and some other parties’\(^5\) to send a well-qualified person to France to foment this further. He should assure the nobles and those of the religion that ‘his Majesty will employ all his industries and force to the uttermost for their security’\(^6\). The Councillors’ advice was well timed. Richelieu’s appointment as first minister was not well received by many members of France’s nobility, and neither by Louis’ mother Marie de Medici and his brother, Gaston the Duke of Orleans. Despite Louis’ support for him against their opposition, Richelieu’s position was far from secure. Louis and Richelieu were not only threatened by a \textit{coup d’état} by members of the royal family but also by a conspiracy of some high nobles and the Huguenots\(^7\).

\(^{1}\) Ibid.
\(^{2}\) TNA, SP 78/76 f. 267, 30 Dec. 1625/ 9 Jan. 1626 1626, Instructions by Charles to Holland and Carleton.
\(^{3}\) TNA, SP 78/79 f. 299, August 1626, Resolutions on built-up of French navy.
\(^{4}\) Ibid.
\(^{5}\) Ibid.
\(^{6}\) Ibid.
English participation in a conspiracy to undermine Louis and his first minister was an astonishingly high-risk strategy. If successful, it would be unlikely that the Huguenots would gain power in Catholic France, but it could bring Gaston to the throne and greater influence of the French nobles and the Dévots. Whether it would make France more amenable to join Charles’ objectives would be uncertain. If the conspiracy failed, Richelieu would strengthen his king’s and his own positions leaving Anglo-French relations damaged and England drawn further into continental politics which Parliament had declined to support.

The pre-occupation of Charles and his Council with La Rochelle and relations with France had restricted England’s war against Spain to the seas nearer home. The navy concentrated on the lucrative interception of merchant vessels suspected of carrying contraband to Spain. The Dutch complained that the zeal of the navy was resulting in indiscriminate impounding of their merchant vessels and, extraordinarily, to the confiscation of documents of one of the States General’s servants. The Governor of Dover Castle had arrested a Dutch official returning from the East Indies as a passenger on an English vessel. The official was carrying a package of documents which ‘the Governor had taken away and broken open, has read all the letters in the presence of eight or ten men’\(^1\). The States General requested Conway that the governor be ordered to deliver all ‘letters, writings and papers into the hands of the ambassador of the United Provinces’\(^2\). Whether by direct orders or acquiescence of his superiors in the Admiralty, the Governor had openly intercepted the mail to the government of a friendly nation and treaty partner in the war against Spain. Anglo-Dutch relations were severely tested by the English navy’s actions at sea which had more to do with prize money than anything else and were akin to the actions of the Dunkirk freebooters. The damages inflicted by the navy forced Frederik Henry, to write to ambassador Albert Joachimi (1560-1654) in support of the States General’s protest.

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1. TNA, SP 84/130 f.228, December 1625, Joachimi to Conway on interception of a Dutch official.
2. Ibid.
Frederik Henry asked Joachimi to convey to the king that the English navy’s procedures ‘seem to me to sit ill with the alliance that this State made with the Crown of England’ ¹.

The end of English membership of the Republic’s Council of State

The Republic had been accorded a role as partner in Charles’ original foreign policy. But the failed Anglo-Dutch attack at Cadiz and Parliament’s refusal to support military activities on land had all but formally ended the joined war against Spain as agreed in the Treaty of Southampton. The navy’s actions at sea had created more volatile Anglo-Dutch political relations and uncertainty about England’s new foreign policies. There was no longer an active partnership and England’s perceptions of Anglo-Dutch relations changed, as did that of the Dutch. The Republic had to return on its own to an offensive war against Spain and needed to determine its own strategies requiring unimpeded military and political freedom of action which would only be possible without any representative of a foreign monarch as a member of its Council of State.

English membership of the Council of State had often led to the Republic having to compromise in favour of the English requirements. The States General made the overdue decision to face the membership case and asked some of its Deputies and the Prince of Orange to consider the issue and formulate an opinion. On 28 March 1626 the Deputies and the prince presented their opinion to the States General that the English ambassador’s membership of the Council of State should be ended and France’s request for a similar position should be rejected. They had concluded that the States General should instruct Joachimi to convey to Charles that the long expired right of English membership of the Council would end.

¹ TNA, SP 84/131 f.84, 11/21 March 1626, Prince of Orange to Joachimi, procedures me semblent peu s’accorder avec l’alliance que cet État fait avec la Couronne de la Grande Bretagne.
Separately, the prince wrote to the States General that if it supported the opinion, they should take ‘a firm decision and adhere to it’ 1. Neither the States General nor Frederik Henry wanted a repeat of England’s ambassador using his membership of the Republic’s Council of State to direct the nation’s foreign policy or military strategy. The timing for ending the membership had to coincide with the forthcoming departure of Carleton. The States General instructed its ambassador to inform Charles about its decision and to stress that his ambassador would be accorded the same dignities and access as the ambassadors of France, Venice and other allies 2.

Joachimi reported that he had conferred with Carleton and after that with Buckingham and Conway, and that ‘all three became very alarmed when acquainted with the exclusion’ 3. In his subsequent meeting, Carleton quoted from his instructions that ‘his Majesty cannot be but greatly upset by the message’ 4. Ignoring the fact that his king had failed to meet any of his treaty obligations, he said ‘his Majesty is all the more astonished to see this change put to him now, who believed that he had deserved better of their Lordships of the States than his predecessors’ 5. Carleton maintained that English membership of the Council of State was now even more justified so that ‘his Majesty may be continually kept aware and advised of how their business is being conducted in the management of their domestic business and in the establishment of the Union between their Provinces ’ 6. Carleton had expressed his views and presumably also those of his king, that the Republic was not seen in England as a politically independent state. Its domestic affairs had to be open for Charles scrutiny and even interference.

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1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 28 March 1626.
2 Ibid.
3 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 3 May 1626, ende dat deselve gehoort hebbende daervan d'openinge hen ontstelt hebben.
4 TNA, SP 84/131 f.152, May 1626, Declaration on refusal to admit ambassador to Council of State.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., Sa Majesté peut avoir connaissance et information continuelle de la conduite de leurs affaires et la constitution de leurs affaires domestiques que pour l’establissement de l’Union entre leurs Provinces.
Partnerships in foreign affairs were to support Charles’ policies and conducted at his discretion. Ironically, it was precisely these perceptions that led to the Republic’s decision to end the English ambassadors’ membership of the Council of State. The Dutch saw it as the means to interfere in their domestic affairs and to exert undue influence on political and military decisions. It had led to James’s involvement in the Republic’s religious problems in the 1610s, and his support for prince Maurits that had contributed to the increased political and religious tensions in the Republic. Joachimi was instructed on 25 June 1626 to confirm the States General’s decision of 28 March 1626 1, the end of English membership of the Council of State, the last step in the redemption of the cautionary towns which had started in 1616.

The return of Flushing, Brill and the fort Rammekens to the Dutch had closed an at the time highly visible phase in Anglo-Dutch relations. However the final step, the cessation of an English presence on the Council of State was less visible but equally important. It ended the long overdue influence of an English ambassador as a full member of one of the Republic’s highest political institutions. Dutch uncompromised political independence was essential at a time of near enmity between its allies England and France and Christian’s war in Germany drawing large Imperial armies ever closer to its eastern borders.

Christian’s timing for his war in the Empire could not have been less propitious. He believed that he only had to face the Catholic League forces of Count John Tilly Tserclaes (1559-1632), but the Emperor had decided to raise also his own army, to be commanded by Count Albert of Wallenstein (1583-1634). They were facing a numerous Danish army but of dubious quality. Danish historian Birger Mikkelsen wrote, ‘Christian IV began his military campaign with an army consisting mainly of peasants scraped together by his professional officers’ 2.

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1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 25 June 1626.
2 Mikkelsen, Christian IV, p.79.
In a letter from Bremen by a contemporary correspondent, either in or close to the Danish army, the infantry was described as ‘not of the best’ \(^1\) and it was noted that Christian had to command his ‘captains to replace their companies with other soldiers who were more capable’ \(^2\). In a meeting with the French ambassador, Christian was promised ‘large French divisions, not only in Italy and in Switzerland but also in Alsace and on the coasts of Picardie’\(^3\). The French ambassador’s promise was of little help to Christian as it did not mean direct military support, but at best a diversion of some of the Austrian and Spanish Habsburg forces when what he needed most was real military help to stem the advances of his opponents.

Christian had started his campaign paying the cost out of his personal resources and further relying on England and the Republic for their subsidies as agreed in the Triple Alliance treaties, but only the Dutch paid their agreed monthly subsidy of £5,000. Whether shortage of funds or over-estimation of their own might, or both, neither the Danish army nor Mansfeld with the late king James’ proxy army were matches for those of Tilly and Wallenstein. Mansfeld was heavily defeated by Wallenstein at Dessau Bridge in April 1626 while Bethlen Gabor, the Protestant Duke of Transylvania, who had planned to join his forces with those of Mansfeld, had to withdraw from the Empire because of threats to his own Duchy. Even before Wallenstein could join Tilly’s Catholic League forces, Tilly defeated Christian on 26 August 1626 at Lutter-am-Barenburg.

After his first defeat, Christian instructed his ambassador in The Hague to request Dutch troops to strengthen his forces. The States General considered that it was not only militarily impossible to release any troops, but also that the Republic was not prepared to endanger its neutral position with the Emperor \(^4\).

\(^1\) TNA, SP 84/128 f. 148, 11/21 August 1625, Letter from Bremen, touching King of Denmark, \(n’est pas de plus belles\).

\(^2\) Ibid., \(capitaines de remplacer leurs compagnies avec d’autres soldat plus capables\).

\(^3\) Ibid., \(grandes divisions, non seulement en Italie et en Suisse, mais aussi en Élsace et es costes de Picardie\).

\(^4\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 11 September 1626.
Frederik Henry had prepared his strategies for an offensive war on the Republic’s southern borders, but Christian and Mansfeld’s defeats and the massing of Tilly’s and Wallenstein’s forces close to the eastern borders of the Republic demanded changes in strategies. It meant an increase in manpower and an even more dispersed deployment of troops at a time of the States General’s severely strained financial resources. The threat on the Republic’s eastern border increased when Spinola’s general, Count Henry van den Bergh, enlarged his garrison in the strategically situated town and fortress of Grol in Gelderland after the Dutch had captured the central fortress near Oldenzaal, some twenty miles north of Grol. The States General had to meet the threat but had to find the resources for urgent action at either Grol or Lingen. An enemy incursion from either town would be difficult to stop as the surrounding terrain did not lend itself to flooding as was usually done to protect the western part of the Republic. The choice between Grol and Lingen was delegated by the States General to a committee of seven of its members attached to the army High Command to decide without further reference to the States General. Together with Frederik Henry they decided that the fortress of Grol formed the greatest threat as it was the easiest to be re-enforced from Germany. Frederik Henry captured the town and fortress in the summer of 1627, allowing him to claim his first military success since his appointment in 1625. The successful but costly action at Grol was both defensive and offensive to protect the borders east of the river IJssel.

The actions at Grol was far from the offensive war against Spain on land that was expected in conjunction with an English army of 35,000 men as pledged in the Treaty of Southampton which could not be honoured. Charles’ objectives had not changed; in fact he had extended them by his pledge to aid the French Huguenots, but he had changed his priorities. The failure of the Cadiz expedition had been followed by Parliament’s refusal to provide subsidies for more than a sea war and the inconclusive negotiations for the formation of a multi-nation anti-Habsburg alliance.

1 Ibid.
Charles was forced to reconsider not so much his objectives but his negotiating and political strategies to achieve them. The war with Spain was no longer his first priority and neither was the partnership with the Republic as was formally concluded in the Treaty of Southampton; the consequences for the Anglo-Dutch relations had already become apparent. The English navy’s actions at sea were not reflecting a partnership and the Republic’s expectations for a joint war against Spain had to be put on hold and meanwhile adjusted to a return to fighting this war on its own but no longer hampered by any involvement of England’s ambassadors on its Council of State.

Despite the fact that the Treaty of Southampton had lost its extensively worded rationale, England’s war against Spain, it suited both sides to ignore it with the States General awaiting the development of Charles’ changing foreign policies and strategies. The relationship between its two allies, England and France was of particular concern for the States General. Both Charles and Louis had to review their foreign policies for domestic reasons; Charles to accommodate his Parliament’s lack of support for his foreign policies, Louis and Richelieu to improve the internal cohesion between their government and a number of nobles and the Huguenots.
After his settlement with the Rochellois and the Monçon treaty with Spain, Louis made the first move to improve his relations with Charles. He sent a high profile mission to England led by the Marshall Francis de Bassomiêrre. The Marshall and his extensive delegation were received in London on 27 September 1626 where he and Buckingham soon achieved agreement on most outstanding issues. However, Louis repudiated the agreement; it may have been genuine discontent with the agreement itself, but undoubtedly it was also influenced by an incident at sea during his ambassador’s mission in England. The English navy had captured three French merchant vessels, suspected of carrying contraband. The Council of Rouen, their homeport, had retaliated by confiscating the goods of the English merchants in the town. Louis or Richelieu also retaliated and ordered the impounding of the English wine fleet of some two hundred vessels which were ready to sail from Bordeaux.

Impounding the large wine fleet had serious commercial consequences in England. The wine trade was an important part of London’s business, financially for the merchants and the king and providing much employment. Charles decided to send Buckingham on a special mission to Paris with his instructions contained in a seven-page letter. He was charged to demand that the ‘release of ships and goods seized upon this occasion shall forthwith be made’ 1, but adding in his instructions that he ‘cannot forebear to proceed to grant them [the ships’ owners] letters of reprisal if redress may not be had by other means’. Charles was also specific in his demands concerning the Huguenots in general and La Rochelle in particular.

1 TNA, SP 78/80 f.240, December 1626, Charles’ instructions to Buckingham for negotiations in France.
Buckingham had to insist that the Huguenots should ‘enjoy the benefit of their former edict, the soldiers in the fort before Rochelle should presently be withdrawn, and no more be placed there in garrison than seven hundred at the most, the greatest number were to be Switzers¹. In addition, no new fortifications were to be raised and no land or sea forces were to affect the Rochellois’ ancient freedoms and trade. Charles ended his instructions by telling Buckingham to press Louis for the ‘dispatch of a fit contribution to aid our dear uncle the king of Denmark and if you find sympathetic inclinations towards the efforts of the Confederacy [the proposed anti-Austrian Habsburg Alliance], you may offer to our dear brother to be head of that League’². Buckingham was given the unenviable task of convincing Louis and Richelieu that Charles’ affairs of state, his personal commitments to the Huguenots precluded Louis and his first minister from retaliating by impounding the English wine fleet and conducting their own domestic politics but would allow the monarch of France to head the Triple Alliance league. Charles’ instructions left neither his emissary Buckingham nor Louis and Richelieu in any doubt that he did not accept France’s right to take retaliatory actions and that he would not need to deviate from his own pledge to support the Rochellois.

While the diplomatic relations between the Republic’s main allies were at this low ebb and near breaking point, the States General had to start negotiations with its French ally to renew or extend the 1624 Compiègne treaty which would soon expire. The States General preference was to have the present treaty extended for a period of three or four years but Richelieu wanted a new, wider ranging one³. Without an explicit mandate from the States General, Gideon of Langerak, the long serving Dutch ambassador in Paris, had endorsed a draft Franco-Dutch treaty. At his most Machiavellian, Richelieu had foisted a singularly one-sided draft on the rather inept ambassador, which was not accepted by the States General.

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
³ NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 19 January 1627.
In addition to all the conditions of the Compiègne treaty, Richelieu’s draft not only contained clauses in possible conflict with the Treaty of Southampton but also the unacceptable condition that the Republic would need prior French agreement for any Dutch-Spanish peace agreements. With a barely disguised threat, Richelieu insisted that future French subsidies would be contingent on the Republic’s acceptance of his draft treaty. Richelieu exerted further pressure on the States General by making use of the Republic’s need to have strong links with both its allies and by continually reminding the States General of the need to appease his monarch because of the recall of Haultain and his ships. Despite his strong-arm tactics, Richelieu wanted a new Franco-Dutch treaty. The Dutch knew that it was in France’s political interest for the Republic to remain at war with Spain for as long as there were large, potentially hostile Spanish armies on France’s northern borders and its domestic order was not established.

Richelieu also wanted a Franco-Dutch treaty for political reasons, to counteract, or at least balance Anglo-Dutch relations. The Republic wanted to maintain close, preferably treaty-based relations with France as a second major ally. The Dutch were always aware of the vicissitudes of their political relationships with England and France. In 1598, after two years Henry IV had left the Triple Alliance with England and the Republic and concluded his own peace treaty with Spain. James I left the Nonsuch Treaty of 1585 with the Dutch and concluded his peace treaty with Spain in 1604. James’s neutrality had gone even further, since he had permitted the Spanish commanders in the southern Netherlands to recruit soldiers in his realms, a facility also enjoyed by the Republic; it meant that James’ subjects fought in the opposing armies of the Protestant northern and Catholic southern Netherlands.

When the 1624 Compiègne treaty with France was due to expire and the legal enforcement of its clauses would end, both sides expected that relations would be maintained until a new treaty was concluded. In any case, the forthcoming negotiations would be protracted and would need an active diplomatic link between Paris and The Hague.
An active link between The Hague and Paris would benefit both sides, it would provide Richelieu with the time needed to secure Louis’ and his own political position in France and for the States General and Frederik Henry to improve the Republic’s military situation and thereby its negotiating strength with France.

England’s politicians would not welcome any new Franco-Dutch treaty; from the beginning of Anglo-Dutch relations they had considered Dutch links with France as incompatible with English geopolitics. James’ peace treaty with Spain had precluded open military support for the Dutch but he had decided to forge a personal relationship with Maurits, the Prince of Orange, by appointing him Knight of the Garter in 1613. Maurits was considered to be an Anglophile and was expected to counterbalance the more Francophile policies of van Oldenbarnevelt. James’ move had given him a new personal but also political link with the Dutch in parallel with his formal links with the States General.

Charles decided to follow his father’s example; it would be a useful link with Frederik Henry, who might have the same aspirations as his half-brother Maurits to play an active role in Dutch foreign policies but also, as in James’ time, to counter any Francophile tendencies and to keep the Republic politically independent from France. Anglo-Dutch relations were strained at the time, seen on the English side by the termination of the ambassador’s seat on the Council of State and on the Dutch side by the aggressive actions of the English navy. This was further aggravated by the impounding of three VOC vessels returning from the East Indies\(^1\). When diplomacy failed to have these vessels released, the States General decided to deploy naval squadrons with strict instructions to ‘use every measure necessary to prevent the impounding’\(^2\) of its merchant vessels and navy ships. Despite the existing controversies, or because of them, Charles appointed Carleton, now Viscount Dorchester, as his Ambassador Extraordinary for a special mission to the Republic.

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\(^1\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 7 October 1627.
\(^2\) Smit, De Buitenlandse Politiek, *met alle middelen daartegen te verzetten*, p.75.
Charles' instructions to Carleton started with a detailed analysis of the situation in France and his concerns about Louis and Richelieu’s politics and relations with their Huguenots, perceived as threats to them and also to the Protestant Religion in general ¹. Charles’ views would be shared by many in the Republic, both for political and religious reasons and would give the right opening for the principal reason of Carleton’s special mission. He was to discuss with the States General whether his Monarch could appoint Frederik Henry a Knight of the Garter. The States General decided ² that the prince could accept the honour providing that he would be exempted, like Maurits, from that part of the oath requiring loyalty to the English monarchs ³. Although anecdotal information exist, there appears to be no record of discussions whether Charles’ title ‘King of France’ would be used in the investiture ceremony, only that Carleton stressed that the ceremony should take place as soon as possible.

Frederik Henry who was with his armies at Grol was delayed at the battlefield and arrived in The Hague the day before the investiture on 5 July 1627. He left immediately after the investiture because the battle was in a crucial phase and his main priority was to be with his armies in the field. The prince’s late arrival and early departure deprived Carleton of the diplomatic opportunity to extend the celebrations to demonstrate to France the existence of a special link between the English crown and the Republic and with Frederik Henry in particular. Carleton wrote to Charles, that the prince ‘came here late on Monday night; for since his return from the field, he has entertained the time most at Arnhem; viewing and visiting that and other towns on the IJssel, hither he came on monday late, purposely to avoid the solemnities of a reception’⁴. It does require any cynicism to conclude that at the time of tense Anglo-French relations, the policies of both countries were aimed at estranging the Republic from their opposing side.

¹ TNA, SP 84/133 f.162 & f.186, May 1627, Instructions for Counsellor Dudley, Lord Carleton.
² NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4563, Secr. Res. 1 July 1627.
⁴ TNA, SP 84/135 f.6, 3 October 1627, Lord Carleton to Charles I.
When Charles forged a personal bond with his Order of the Garter, Richelieu used the prospect of a new Franco-Dutch treaty and the promise of large subsidies, knowing that Charles could not match them. But Frederik Henry was politically neither an Anglophile nor a Francophile; his goal was the Republic’s independence. Ambassador Carleton had written to Conway in January 1626 about the ‘indifferent and moderate course which his Excellency has hitherto holden was little satisfactory to either side’¹. Carlton’s observation was correct on religious issues where Frederik Henry promoted tolerance like his father Prince William I of Orange (1533-1584). But he did not report that his course in politics was also moderate, in the sense that he did not try to dominate politics but accepted the authority of the States General and restricted himself to give advice, albeit influential, on formation and execution of policies.

**England and France at war with the Republic neutral**

Before Anglo-French hostilities erupted, Anthonie Duyck, Grand Pensionary of the States of Holland had already posed the question, how would the Republic react when it was ‘enclosed by a conflict between Louis XIII and Charles I to protect itself against incalculable damages to its successful trade and shipping besides the political forfeiture of its neutrality?’². Duyck suggested that under those circumstances the States General offer mediation to the monarchs of England and France. The States General resolved to offer its services after the English ambassador had indicated that his king would accept this mediation³. The French king also accepted the offer but the time had passed for mediation. An English sea borne expeditionary force, commanded by Buckingham, had opened hostilities at La Rochelle; England and France were at war.

In its meeting of 27 August, the States General had deliberated on a letter from Louis dated 4 August 1627 in which the king thanked the States General for its offer to mediate.

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¹ TNA, SP 84/131 f.6, 8 January 1626, Carleton to Lord Conway.
² Vreede, Nederlandse Diplomatie, Hoe zou Nederland, bij een strijd tussen Lodewijk XIII en Karel I als het ware ingesloten, naast het politisch nadeel der verbeurte van de neutraliteit, zijn bloeienden handel en scheepvaart voor een onberekende schade behoeden? p.91-2.
³ NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. of 7, 9, 10 and 11 July 1627.
Louis made it clear that ‘the attack by the English on our realm without any reason or pretext, cannot lead to a settlement unless the English fleet has returned to its port, or be forced which, with God’s help, will shortly happen’\(^1\). He assured the States General that, despite these hostilities, France would continue to support the Republic and would not take decisions that could alienate it from France. Louis finished his letter by expressing his conviction that as France was attacked, the States General must adhere to the already expired Compiègne treaty and supply the four navy ships built in Holland, paid for and ready to sail. Through his ambassador D’Espresses, Louis insisted that the States General allow his ships to leave while Carleton remained adamant that it must not permit their departure. Both England and France expected the Republic’s full compliance with their request or at least acquiescence, but neither nation’s interests served the interests of the States General and it was decided that no definitive answers were given.

In a letter of 6/16 August 1627 to the States General, Charles explained why he had been compelled to make a break with France. ‘We beg you to consider how very disadvantageous it would be for us if we were to permit the plans made by our brother His Most Christian Majesty to make use of ships and preparations for sea in order to make himself master of it to our disadvantage and to oppress good and faithful subjects of the reformed religion’\(^2\). Charles’s letter to the States General gave an indication of his new foreign policies from which the States General could only deduce the certainty that these policies left no room for a continuation of an Anglo-Dutch partnership in a war against Spain.

\(^{1}\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 27 August 1627 and transcript of Louis’ letter in Aitzema, Saken van Staet, Vol. II, p.547,
\(^{2}\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 15 September 1627, the original of Charles’ letter attached to the Resolution and the following quotations taken from the printed text in Aitzema, Saken van Staet, Vol. II, 554-555, nous vous prions de considérer, combien ce nous seroit chose préjudiciable, si nous admettions les desseins qu’a projetés nostre frère le Roy Treschrestien, de se prévaloir de navires et preparations de mer pour s’en rendre maistre a nostre prejudice. Et de supprimer ses bons et fidelles subjects de la religion reformée.
England could not be at war against Spain and France at the same time. Charles’s justification to start his war against France was an amalgam of geopolitics, preventing France from becoming a naval power which he combined with his solidarity with the French Huguenots and, astonishingly, still expecting to persuade France to join the Triple Alliance for the restoration of the Palatinate. But nothing in Charles’s justification could be used to call upon the Anglo-Dutch partnership for support of his new foreign policies. Although he did not ask directly for support, the last part of his letter was an appeal for protestant solidarity, in particular aimed at the anti-France orthodox Calvinist part of the Dutch population. Charles’ instructions to his ambassador and his own letter to the States General were not only to prevent the four ships leaving for France, but also for the Republic to accept a shared responsibility for the protection of the French Protestants. Charles was aware that the Dutch orthodox Calvinists would support his call for Protestant solidarity but he also needed the support of Frederik Henry. However, the States General, and also the prince, knew that it would bring the Republic into England’s war with France which would be against the Republic’s interests.

The acceptance by both monarchs of the States General’s offer to mediate had been unconvincing. They had indulged in self-serving gesture politics with the States General showing good will to both its allies but to stress its own neutrality in their conflict. Neither Louis nor Charles could or would compromise. Louis felt that there was no alternative to defending his kingdom and Charles considered that he was the first to be offended against. In case ‘our brother reveals to us his intention of arriving at a settlement, we shall be ever ready to do everything that might be advantageous for the public weal and for the safety of Germany’. Charles’s objective to prevent France having a navy that could challenge English mastery of the seas was a statement of long-term English foreign policies, also immediately urgent to prevent the sailing of four warships.

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1 Ibid. *si nostre dit Frère nous fait voir son intention d’accommodement nous sommes portés à faire tout ce qui pourra estre advantageux au bien publicq et pour la sureté d’Allemagne.*
Anglo-Dutch relations under increasing strain

England’s war against Spain and subsequently also against France, presented the English navy with a reason, or an opportunity, to greatly extend the search for contraband which seemed to be mainly on Dutch vessels. Impounding three VOC vessels returning from the East Indies and the spurious reasons for the Admiralty’s detention of the vessels for long periods were seen by the Dutch more as reprisals for the Amboyna incident and as attempts to influence the faltering treaty negotiations between the English and Dutch trading companies. When protests by the Dutch ambassador remained unanswered, the States General despatched a special mission led by Jacob Cats, Pensionary of Dordrecht, to acquaint Charles with the serious situation and the complaints ‘the inhabitants of our country are making concerning the ill-treatment that they receive from his Majesty’s subjects both at sea and in his realms’1. Frederik Henry also wrote to Carleton asking for his support for Cats’s mission, stressing that he was quite sure that his Majesty was not aware of ‘the disorderly acts that are being committed at great risk to the alliance with which his Majesty was pleased to honour this State’2.

When neither Cats’s mission nor Frederik Henry’s intervention brought any changes, the States General called a meeting with ambassador Carleton which took place on 10 September 1627. Carleton faced deputies of the States General and also of the States of Holland and Zeeland who were present to convey the protests of their merchants against the inspection, long detention and particularly the impounding of the VOC vessels. Carleton reported to Conway, whether meant euphemistically or sardonically, that the Holland and Zeeland ‘deputies were much moved’3 and added that the merchants ‘hoped there would be justice to repair the wrong and to restore their ships and goods’4.

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1 TNA, SP 84/133 f.5, 4/14 January 1627, States General to Charles I, les habitants de nostre pais font du mauvais traictement qu’ils reçoivent des subjects de Sa Majesté tant en mer qu’en ses royaumes.
2 TNA, SP 84/133 f.19, 10/12 January 1627, Prince of Orange to Lord Carleton, les désordres qui se commettent en prejudice de l’alliance dont il a plieu au Roy honorer ces Etats.
3 TNA, SP 84/134 f.185, 31 Aug./10 Sept. 1627, Lord Carleton to Conway.
4 Ibid.
Carleton continued to Conway that he had told the deputies of Holland and Zeeland that he ‘no way doubted not only of the restitution of those ships and goods and that the persons that had committed the offence would be duly punished’. In a postscript to his letter he reported ‘rumours that the French ambassador has found merchants in Amsterdam who would undertake to furnish him fourteen ships of war if he can find the money for them’. Already the following day Carleton wrote to the States General that he was reliably informed that certain Amsterdam merchants are preparing fourteen ships to go to war against my master, the King. I am sure; he added ‘that you will not be surprised if your merchants who are carrying out such hostile preparations against His Majesty do not meet with all the satisfaction that they desire’. He had left the diplomacy of the 1625 treaty negotiations and increasingly adopted the more high-handed stance of bygone periods.

The States General had to be persuaded to abandon its neutrality and to accept its role to support his king’s foreign policy ambitions. He gave one message to the deputies of the provinces and a different one to the States General. He used unmitigated attempts to foster disarray between the States General and the Provinces, Frederik Henry and Holland’s merchants. Charles however justified his navy’s actions as necessary ‘for reasons of state and our mutual protection and because of the offensive and defensive alliance between us, we should be excused any ill-will you have towards us in this matter’. He assured the States General that those of his subjects that had caused any harm or disorder would meet ‘with all the necessary severity and justice’. Charles’ explanations and assurances were unconvincing and contradictory; the impounding of Dutch vessels had as much to do with strengthening his negotiating position on political and trade issues with the Dutch as with the navy’s quest for prize-money.

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 TNA, SP 84/134 f.199, 1/11 September 1627, Carleton to States General.
4 Ibid., je m’assure que vous ne trouverez point estrange sy vos marchants faisants tels préparatifs de guerre contre S.M. n’ont point tout le contentement qu’ils désirent.
5 Ibid. raison d’État et nostre mutuelle conservation et plus estroitement par la ligue offensive et défensive qui est entre nous, Nous ne demeurnons justifiés et affranchis de la jalousie que vous avez concue sur ce point.
6 Ibid. avec la sévérité et justice requise.
Neither the Dutch mission to England nor Carleton’s efforts in The Hague had led to any changes in the strained Anglo-Dutch relations or to successes for his diplomatic efforts. Carleton’s failure to discharge his duty was not due to lack of his diplomatic fervour but to the unattainable tasks set by his monarch1. An exasperated Carleton wrote to the President of the States General asking him ‘to obtain for me, that I might have discharged my duty, either written replies or resolutions outside the records of the Gentlemen of the States, to the various proposals and memoranda that I have put forward to the Gentlemen since I arrived here; this has not been done for a single point of my negotiations’2.

Carleton had been persistently urged by his master the king to prevent the States General from concluding a new treaty with France and to arrange the Republic’s military support for England’s foreign policies. He also urged a re-instatement of English members on the Republic’s Council of State. The States General had to be persuaded to order the Dutch navy to patrol the Spanish coast and for all the Dutch armed freebooters ‘to join with their whole strength our Admiral the Duke of Buckingham’3. Carleton had to remind the Dutch that ‘the door is always open to us for conjoining with their enemies’4 and also that they were indebted to his king because of the Amboyna affair where those in the VOC, ‘have in effect utterly dispossessed our subjects trading into those parts of all manner of commerce’5.

Yet, Charles needed the Republic’s support for his geopolitics and realising his personal objectives while the Dutch needed England as an ally as ‘it gave them a more advantageous international position than they had ever enjoyed before’6. A position initially enhanced by partnership in the Anglo-Dutch treaties but then eroded by the failure to implement the treaties.

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1 TNA, SP 84/133 f.162 & f.186, May 1627, Instructions for Councillor Dudley, Lord Carleton.
2 TNA, SP 84/134 f. 210, 6/16 September 1627, Lord Carleton to President of the States General, vous priaing pour ma descharge de procurer ou response par escrit ou resolutions hors des Registres de Messieurs Les Etats aux diverse propositions et mémoires que j’ai présenté a leurs Seigneurs par escrit depuis mon arrivée icy: ce qui n’a pas esté fait encor en un seul point de ma negotiation.
3 TNA, SP 84/133 f. 162 & f. 186, May 1627, Instructions for Councillor Dudley, Lord Carleton.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Grayson, From Protectorate to Partnership, p.298.
The partnership that existed when Charles came to the throne and the implementations of the treaties that were signed lasted only two years. Charles ignored his own commitments; instead he saw the Republic’s role as that of a dependant and used pressure diplomacy to obtain its compliance with his changing policies. Charles no longer accepted even the conditional form of partnership and with it a commensurate diplomacy. Little seemed to have changed in English attitudes towards the Dutch since Sir John Coke, now one of Charles’ Secretaries of State, had expressed his views about relations with the Dutch when he objected to the redemption of the cautionary towns in 1616. Then he had asserted that these towns were not only pledges for repayment of debts but also to assure Dutch fidelity and allegiance. A decade later and with Coke in a more influential position, his views appeared to be the basis of Charles’s relations with the Republic, as a protectorate with fidelity and allegiance duties to his Crown.

Carleton’s persistent attempts to persuade the States General to comply with what appeared to be the continuing English perception of the Anglo-Dutch relationship had not met with success. The States General was for the ambassador a main obstacle to the success of his missions. His request to the President of the States General for information outside the records of the Gentlemen of the States, could have disclosed to him who, or which of the Provinces, could be influenced to support his demands; a barely disguised attempt to divide the States General. Support for his efforts was unlikely to come from the provinces depending on trade and fisheries but could come from provinces with strong orthodox Calvinist minorities who might be in favour of aiding their French co-religionists. Carleton, well versed in internal relations in the Republic, not only tried to by-pass the States General Deputies, he also wrote to the Prince of Orange¹, asking him to use his influence to change the Republic’s policies.

¹ TNA, SP 84/134 f.243, 12/22 September 1627, Lord Carleton to Prince of Orange.
The first main issue Carleton raised concerned a possible new Franco-Dutch treaty. Carleton wrote, ‘having no confederation at all since the expiry of the last Treaty of Compiègne, the closer people here move towards France for a new treaty, the further they move away from England and this is, in effect, to exchange certainty for uncertainty and, like Aesop’s dog that barked at shadows, to lose touch with reality’. He implored Frederik Henry to persuade the Gentlemen of the States not to ratify the ‘alliance, which is said to have been drawn up by your ambassador in France and not allowing the French any further naval fitting-out here’. Carleton had ended his letter to the prince, ‘in conclusion, I would beg Your Excellency in particular to lend your support to the urging that I have made to the Gentlemen of the States to join their fleet to that of His Majesty against the declared enemies and not allow the confusion of affairs by false friends to turn you aside from the duty of the alliance solemnly contracted between His Majesty and these Provinces’. Carleton’s letter to Frederik Henry was one of surreal diplomacy; his reference to Aesop’s dog was made in the wrong context. He cannot have been unaware that Charles’s first Parliament did not vote the funds to honour his contracted commitments to the Republic under the Treaty of Southampton and to Christian under the Triple Alliance. Neither could he have been unaware of the impounding of Dutch merchant vessels under the pretext of carrying contraband nor the illegal impounding of the three VOC vessels. The urgent request to merge the Republic’s navy with the English navy, effectively joining England’s war against France, was a clear reflection of Charles’s short term policy; support for his war against France and the long term curtailing of the Republic’s sea power.

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
But also as part of his policies, he needed the Dutch to frustrate Louis’ plans to make France a major naval power. The States General ignored the request about its navy, maintained its neutrality in the Anglo-French conflict and, assuming that it would soon be ended, resolved on 20 September 1627, ‘considering everything, it is better not to give the ambassador definitive decisions and to delay any answer’\(^1\).

Carleton was persistent and sought an urgent meeting with the States General. This time he demanded answers on his outstanding questions and also on yet another important demand of his king. He said that he had information that the Republic’s ambassador in Paris was negotiating a new treaty with Richelieu; the king wanted to know the plans of the States General. Carleton stressed that his questions were of great importance when first raised but presently even more so since the joining of the Spanish and French fleets was beyond any doubt\(^2\); the French king’s mother denied this according to a report from the Dutch ambassador in Paris\(^3\). He also wanted to know whether the Republic would release the four ships prepared for the French king and lastly, he insisted on being told the States General’s reaction about the ships apparently being prepared by the Spanish in Dunkirk for use of the French king\(^4\).

In the afternoon of the same day, four Dutch deputies discussed with Carleton the release of the Dutch merchant vessels. Carleton set out the conditions to achieve their requests; it required the willingness to refrain from accepting the draft Franco-Dutch treaty, not allowing the four French ships to sail and prohibiting this for the future. Finally the Dutch navy should be merged with the English navy. Carleton had left no doubt that the merchants’ vessels had been captured for no other reason than to promote political divisions in the Republic.

\(^{1}\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 20 September 1627, *sulx dat alle it selve overwogen sijnde geoordeelt is beetter te zijn aan de heeren ambassadeurs geen finale resolutie te geven ende d’antwoord te dilayereren*

\(^{2}\) Ibid.

\(^{3}\) TNA, SP 84/135 f.78, 21/31 October 1627, Langerak, Dutch ambassador in France to the States General

\(^{4}\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 6 October 1627.
The four deputies wanting Carleton’s intervention had presented him with the opportunity to by-pass the States General and to repeat the conditions of his monarch to individual members as he had already done in the same manner to Frederik Henry. Accepting his conditions was a quid pro quo for the release of the impounded vessels; Carleton had gone beyond high handed diplomacy and blatantly resorted to coercion and threats. However, whether the Dutch released the four ships and any ships prepared in Dunkirk for France or not, neither would have affected the battle at La Rochelle; this was not decided at sea but on land. When Buckingham failed to capture the Citadel of St. Martin on the Ile de Ré and had lost more than half of his men, he had to accept defeat and returned to England on 8 November 1627.

Charles’ demands and his ambassador’s diplomacy were not only incompatible with the Republic’s neutrality; they were also a direct threat to the Republic’s own objectives. Charles had overestimated his ability to impose acceptance of his excessive demands and had taken for granted that he had the Republic’s continental armies, its naval capacity and its geographic situation on his side for the safety of his realms. This had been considered important by his predecessors and had been an important reason for Anglo-Dutch relations since 1585. The awareness by the Dutch of this importance and the States General’s mode of diplomacy was used to withstand the pressures of the French and English monarchs and their ambassadors to compromise the Republic’s own policies and objectives. The States General had not changed its position in relations with its allies despite Richelieu’s threats to withdraw French support if his proposed new treaty was not accepted. Neither had the States General changed its contention that the Treaty of Southampton for the war against Spain did not constitute any Dutch commitment to support Charles into a misconceived war against France. The different English and Dutch perceptions of their relationship were not only divisive in the political sphere but equally, or even more so, in issues of trade rivalry and general maritime affairs.
Both Charles and Buckingham considered English affairs of state and diplomacy important and powerful enough to pursue simultaneously separate Anglo-Dutch policies of partnership and confrontation. The war with France did not deter Charles and Buckingham from their efforts to induce France to join the Triple Alliance for the restitution of the Palatinate and the Dutch were implored to merge their navy with the English navy and join the war against France. At the same time Dutch merchants’ vessels were taken to English ports under the pretext of searches for contraband. Three VOC vessels each carrying a cargo of some million guilders were impounded in Plymouth, in effect hijacked, presumably in protests against the VOC. But also needed to enforce Charles’ demand for justice for the ‘insult to our honour for the excesses that were committed in Amboyna against our subjects’; and to exact punitive damages. The French and Dutch refusal to comply with Charles’ wishes and demands at the time of his own forceful diplomacy and the aggressive actions of his navy was not surprising but what was surprising was the English expectation of even the possibility of the two countries’ compliance. Charles’ instructions to Carleton left it to his ambassador to persuade the Dutch to accept support for the English side in the Anglo-French war but also to deter the Republic from giving any support to Louis’ and Richelieu’s ambitions to strengthen the French navy. However, the even greater impact on the Dutch of the detention of the merchant vessels was the seizure of the three VOC vessels. Combined with the pre-judged Amboyna incident it seemed to be the prelude to a return to the Anglo-Dutch trading controversies in the Indies.

In most meetings with the States General, Carleton had stressed the Dutch indebtedness to his king because of the Amboyna incident. He had never omitted that the required justice would have to satisfy the king and had to include satisfaction for the EIC as the VOC had ‘in effect utterly disposed our subjects trading into those parts of all manner of commerce’. The Dutch had been given by Charles eighteen months to give him full satisfaction.

1 TNA, SP 84/129 f.31, 8 September 1625, Protests concerning Dutch excesses in the E. Indies.
2 TNA, SP 84/133 f.162 & 186, May 1627, Instructions for Councillor Dudley, Lord Carleton.
When the time had passed and the Dutch had failed to do so, he appointed a special committee of Privy Councillors. ‘They were to debate and treat touching the complaints made by the subjects trading to the East Indies for damages and injuries to their estates or persons “especially that of the execution of his Majesty’s subjects at Amboyna” as likewise for an accommodation and ruling to be made for the governing of trade there for the future’¹. Hitherto, justice for the Amboyna incident had been linked with recompense for the losses allegedly inflicted on the English traders. However, the remit of the Privy Council committee included that a ruling was to be made for the governing of trade there for the future. Charles had prejudged the Amboyna incident and wanted his honour vindicated. He also wanted the Amboyna judges duly punished and also, henceforth, to have rules to govern the trade in the East Indies which could only mean to be subject to English law and ultimately his royal prerogatives.

The Amboyna incident was not only used for political purposes and diplomatic leverage but also as an opportunity to strengthen England’s position in any negotiations to further the EIC’s commercial interests. Anthony Milton called it ‘marketing a massacre’ and added ‘the Amboyna massacre was dredged up endlessly whenever anti-Dutch sentiment was required’².

Dutch lawyers’ responded in June 1628 with a ‘summary of reasons why it is concluded that the three [VOC] vessels arrested in Plymouth must be released’³. The VOC had accepted the requirement of the late king James to ‘bring back from the Indies those who had taken part in the trial at Amboyna to answer on their own behalf’⁴. Those still alive had arrived in the Republic in 1627 and ‘having communicated several times with his Majesty’s ambassador’⁵ judges were appointed.

¹ TNA, SP 84/133 f.120, April 1627, Answer of Privy Council to Dutch Ambassador concerning the East Indies.
³ TNA, SP 84/137 f.174, 3 June 1628, Reasons for release of E. India ships.
⁴ Ibid. au jugement en Amboyna pour tous ceux qui avoient assisté responder de leur proper faict.
⁵ Ibid. aient faict communiquer a diverses fois avec l’ambassadeur de Sa Majesté.
The judges’ verdict was that the accused were ‘not guilty in this matter of having committed any wrong’\(^1\). At that time the Dutch and English trading companies protected their interests in the East and West Indies, often by force, which had led to the incident and the judges to rule that pre-empting the attack had been justified. The Dutch lawyers argued that James’ requirement about the Amboyna incident had been met by the judges’ verdict which left any claims and counter-claims to be settled by the companies using their long-standing procedures.

The three VOC vessels were impounded ignoring these procedures, the Treaty of Southampton and the continuously repeated assurances of friendship. The lawyers wanted to end the controversy and have the three VOC vessels released but their arguments fell on deaf ears. To avoid further illegal arrests, ‘Dutch navy squadrons were deployed to protect its shipping, the captains were inculcated not to allow visitations, not of their convoys nor of the escorting warships, on the contrary, they had to use all means to defend themselves’\(^2\).

**The ending of three fruitless wars**

While the Anglo-French war had reached an impasse, France and Spain were involved in the disputed succession of the late Duke of Mantua and Montferrat. The two countries backed different contenders in the strategically situated Duchy and both rushed troops to the area to protect their interests. What had started with a stand-off developed into an armed conflict, the so-called Mantuan Succession War (1628-1631). It required a massive diversion of Spain’s restricted financial resources urgently required elsewhere, particularly from the war against the Republic, extensively described by Elliott \(^3\).

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\(^1\) Ibid. *il apert clairement qu’ils ne sont coupables en ce fait-la d’aucune chose commises.*

\(^2\) Smit, *De buitenlandse politiek van Nederland, kruiseskaders met de beveiliging der Nederlandse scheepvaart belast, de kapiteins werden ingescherpt geen visitatie, noch van hunne konvoeien noch van de konvoeierende oorlogschepen, te gedogen, doch zich integendeel met alle middelen daartegen te weer te stellen.* p.75.

With the conflict occupying France and Spain, Charles considered the time propitious to launch another attack on the French at La Rochelle. He ordered a fleet to be prepared but his exhausted financial resources compelled him to call his third Parliament, which he opened on 17/17 March 1628. The Commons concentrated on general business and their grievances but were told by Secretary Coke on 3/13 April that his Majesty wanted them to know that ‘there could be no conjunction, where there is no contentment on both parts’\(^1\). Charles agreed to prolong Parliament’s session ‘so as the Petition of Right, and the bill for the subsidy, may go hand in hand together’\(^2\). However, the Commons were preparing a new remonstrance but were prevented from presenting it when the king ended ‘this session some few hours before I meant it, being not willing to receive any more remonstrances, to which I must give a harsh answer’\(^3\).

A new fleet was prepared and ready to sail, again commanded by Buckingham; Charles came to Portsmouth to be present at his departure. Fate decided otherwise. On 23 August/2 September 1628 an English army officer, Lieutenant John Felton, stabbed Buckingham to death. John Felton had many reasons to be aggrieved by real and perceived injustices inflicted by the state and Buckingham. As acting captain of his company, he felt deprived from confirmation in this rank by a lower ranking ensign who was the nephew of Sir Edward Conway, one of Buckingham’s many clients. Felton was wounded during the battle at the Ile de Ré, but after his return and recuperation he was able to resume his duties in the army. His frequent requests, including to Buckingham personally were left unanswered. Living in London, he was aware of the attacks on the Government and the Commons’ attempts to impeach Buckingham. John Felton fused his own judgement with that of the Commons and many others and became the instrument of public retribution as Thomas Cogswell plausibly argues in his comprehensive essay\(^4\).

\(^1\) JHC, 6 Car. I. p.878.
\(^2\) Ibid. p.911.
\(^3\) Ibid. p.919.
The second fleet did sail to La Rochelle in September but also failed to breach the barrage; it ended attempts to bring aid to the Rochellos and they were left with no other option than to accept Louis’ conditions for a settlement. He had ‘subdued the Protestant party after the siege of La Rochelle and the Edict of Clemency’¹ of 28 June 1629. Richelieu had achieved his political objectives to quash the political aspirations of the Rochellos and to bring them under their king and his government. Contrary to the fears of many English and Dutch Protestants, but ‘after subjugation of La Rochelle, Richelieu’s stance was extraordinary mild in relation to the Huguenots as persons and dissenters’².

The second session of Charles’ third Parliament could start without the shadow of the Commons’ petition in the first session which had named Buckingham as ‘the principle cause of the evils and dangers of the realm’³. Also some attempts had been made ‘to defuse criticisms of the government’⁴ made in the first session and ‘former enemies of Buckingham were restored to favour’⁵, including the Earl of Bristol. Whether Charles wanted to distance himself from what the Commons had seen as Buckingham’s politics or whether he wanted to create the right atmosphere for the second session could only be answered by him; certainly it started with high expectations on 20/30 January 1629, but it ended in disarray. Charles’ third Parliament was dissolved on 2/12 March 1629. ‘No bill had been passed; no definition of orthodoxy arrived at; no resolution to the tonnage and poundage found’⁶; his Personal Rule without Parliament commenced on 2/12 March 1629 and he needed peace. Lack of financial resources had thwarted Charles from a direct role in continental politics and had left him dependent on the support of France, the Republic and Denmark to achieve his objectives.

² Roelink, Kerk en Staat in Conflict, Als hij straks La Rochelle volledig op de kniën heeft, blijkt zijn houding tegenover de Hugenoten als personen en andersdenkenden buitengewoon mild te zijn, p.6.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid. p.55.
Charles had not fulfilled his commitments under the Treaty of Southampton and changed the Anglo-Dutch partnership whereby the Republic’s role would be merely to support his foreign and dynastic policies. However, the States General had resisted all English attempts to draw the Republic into the Anglo-French war. It had adhered to the terms of the Republic’s participation in the Triple Alliance treaties and the *Ad Referendum* to financially supporting Christian with possible limited covert military help, but without any formal participation in his war in the Empire.

The military conflicts with Spain and France had failed and whatever gloss was put on them, England had to make peace with both countries. However, Charles’ main interest in continental affairs had been and remained dynastic. It was ‘to recover the Palatinate, the object which he had set before him, and it was a matter of indifference to him whether he recovered it by the aid of France or Spain, or Protestant or Catholic’\(^1\). Parliament and the English people did not share Charles’ commitment to recover the Palatinate; for them it was a purely dynastic affair but Charles was determined to make it an integral if not dominant part of his foreign politics. Ending the war with France was a first priority. Louis and Richelieu also wanted peace. Having achieved their objective at La Rochelle, they needed to concentrate on consolidating their positions in France and in the Mantuan conflict with Spain. An Anglo-French peace treaty was concluded and signed at Susa and published in London on 10/20 May 1629. Peace with France, however, would not end Charles’ attempts to thwart Louis’ policies to strengthen his navy and would not free the Dutch from continued political and diplomatic pressures to refrain from concluding a new treaty with the French.

Ending the equally fruitless war against Spain was Charles’ next priority. Tentative peace negotiations with Spain had already started in 1627 with the Flemish painter Peter Paul Rubens as mediator and were followed by formal negotiations in July 1628.

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The defeat at Cadiz and the navy’s failure to intercept the Spanish silver fleet from the Americas meant that Charles did not have the planned strong negotiating position. He needed peace with Spain without admitting defeat, yet, he had to build the best possible political relations with Europe’s most powerful nation. It would strengthen England’s position in continental politics and counterbalance relations with other large nations, particularly France. Also, Spain would remain important for its ability to support the restitution of the Palatinate as its capture by Christian’s armies and Mansfeld’s forces had failed.

Christian realised that he could not win and decided to end his war despite pleas to continue by the Republic as well as England and France. After his first defeat on 26 August 1626 at Lutter am Barenberg, Christian had tried to hold the line at the river Elbe but the combined Catholic League and Imperial forces captured his Duchy of Holstein and the whole of Jutland. He was forced to withdraw to the Isle of Funen and decided to seek peace with the Emperor. Negotiations started at Lübeck in March 1629. The Dutch Resident at the Hanse towns, Foppe van Aitzema tot Allsem, was instructed by the States General to go to Lübeck to remind Christian and his negotiators that the Republic, having regularly paid the contracted subsidies, was entitled to expect Danish adherence to clause seven of the Triple Alliance treaties about consultation with the treaty partners. In any case, he was to watch ‘that no points detrimental to the Republic were included in a treaty’.

Resident Aitzema was authorised by the States General to declare to the Emperor that the Republic fully intended to maintain its neutrality with him as it had always done with his predecessors. He was to pursue diligently his earlier instructions to negotiate multi-lateral agreements with the Emperor, and the Hanse towns, particularly Hamburg, to ensure that no party would build forts along the rivers Elbe and Wesel, which could restrict trade.

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1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 3188, Res. 28 April 1629.
2 Ibid.
3 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 25 January 1629.
It was not in the Emperor’s interest to weaken Denmark any further than the war had done already; Denmark had to remain a counterforce against Sweden on the Empire’s northern borders. A better treaty than could be expected was concluded and signed at Lübeck on 12 May 1629. The Emperor restored Holstein and Jutland but Christian had to withdraw from the secularised bishoprics. He was allowed to retain control of his Baltic fleet on condition that he ‘refrained from any future involvement in the German States’\(^1\). The lenient peace treaty was not driven by the Emperor’s magnanimity. In reality it was the Swedish threat to move into Denmark at a time of Danish weakness that prompted the Emperor to restore the Holstein Duchy to Christian and Danish sovereignty in Jutland. These conditions enabled Christian to regain his authority at home and also to maintain open sea passages into the Baltic for continuance of the Hamburg-based trade\(^2\).

The failed attempt to restore the Palatinate and to achieve his own ambitions had left Christian and his country ruined financially. Denmark’s influence as a regional power was at least temporarily reduced. Christian’s peace treaty had immediate consequences for the States General and Frederik Henry. Large, potentially hostile, Habsburg forces remained on the Republic’s eastern borders requiring strengthening of the defences at the time that the States General’s financial resources were severely overstretched. In addition to paying Christian 5,000 pounds per month, the States General had paid 600,000 guilders on Charles’ behalf to Mansfeld\(^3\) which so far had not been repaid. When Christian signed his peace agreement with the Emperor, he ended the Triple Alliance treaties and with it the *Ad Referendum* which had the sole purpose of recovering the Palatinate for the Count Elector. This lost opportunity had to be replaced in conjunction with others, France or Spain, Protestant or Catholic.

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\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 3188, Res. 12 January 1629.
England’s initial coveted friend or feared foe position had lost much of its political and negotiating impact; Charles could no longer negotiate with other major nations requiring their firm commitments for his objectives without definitive and reliable commitments of his own. He needed a new but active foreign policy with commensurate commitments or a return to James’ political neutrality in continental affairs after he concluded his peace treaty with Spain in 1604.

English perceptions of Anglo-Dutch relations were revealed by the fact that peace negotiations with Spain were taking place despite the solemnly concluded Treaty of Southampton. This was to last at least fifteen years or until the agreed objectives were achieved; but only three years had expired and nothing was achieved. England’s unilateral negotiation with Spain and the Republic’s refusal to join England in its war with France ended any vestige of partnership and redefined the political but also diplomatic relationship. The Dutch wanted to maintain England as an ally but not having any influence on the king’s foreign policies meant that the States General’s own foreign policy had to concentrate on protecting the Republic’s interests but with revised relations with England and changing conditions on the continent.
CHAPTER FIVE
The end of the Anglo-Dutch partnership

English and Dutch interests in conflict

The Republic’s States General and its Commander in Chief, Frederik Henry, had to consider the consequences for the Republic if England, its Treaty of Southampton partner, concluded a peace treaty with the Spanish Habsburgs. Denmark, its Triple Alliance partner, had already signed a peace treaty with the Austrian Habsburgs. The States General’s difficult financial position had restricted Frederik Henry’s campaigns to the capture of the fortresses of Oldenzaal and Grol in 1626 and 1627. Any improvement of the Republic’s finances would have to await the arrival of a captured Spanish silver fleet. In September 1628 Peter Heyn (1577-1629) Admiral of the WIC (West Indies Company) and Lieutenant Admiral of Holland, had surprised the yearly Cadiz-bound silver fleet, lying at anchor in the Bay of Matanzas in Cuba. On his way home his fleet dropped anchor at Plymouth and Falmouth in December 1628. A Dutch Resident in London, Philip Jacobsz, informed the States General that seventeen Dunkirk ships with double crews were lying off Falmouth awaiting Heyn’s departure1. The States General ordered Admiral van Dorp and Vice Admirals Lieffhebber and Berchem of the Zeeland and Amsterdam admiralties, to take their fleets to the Channel and, if the enemy threatened Heyn’s fleet to engage and destroy them2. The well-escorted fleet reached the Republic with Heyn’s prize, officially valued at 11,509,524 guilders3, which, after deduction of expenses and damages, was divided into ten percent for the States General, ninety percent for the WIC’s shareholders, which included the States General, and a dividend for Frederik Henry.

1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 3188, Res. 2 January 1629.
2 Ibid.
3 Boer, M.G. de, Piet Heyn en de Zilveren Vloot (Amsterdam 1946) p. 110.

Note. The Kroniek van Nederland (Amsterdam 1987) (Chronicle of the Netherlands) based on the contributions of ninety Low Lands historians, listed Heyn’s prize as consisting of 117,000 pounds weight of silver, 66 pounds of gold and many chests and crates of other valuables p.391.
The Republic’s war chest, augmented by the unexpected additional tax income and its share of the prize money, made it possible to deploy some 30,000 men to lay siege to ‘s Hertogenbosch in 1629. This strongly fortified town had never been part of the United Provinces and, with Breda, was the greatest threat to the Republic’s southern borders.

The loss of the silver fleet had a devastating impact on Spain’s already overstretched exchequer because of the war in the Netherlands and the Mantuan conflict. It was equally devastating for the king and Olivares personally who ‘felt the disgrace deeply’\textsuperscript{1}. Olivares had to ‘yield at least momentarily, to the desire of the overwhelming majority in the Council of State for an immediate settlement with Dutch’\textsuperscript{2}. He had already instructed Archduchess Isabella to withdraw the Spanish troops from their strongholds on the Republic’s eastern borders, but that did not relieve Frederik Henry from keeping his garrisons at full strength as they were still facing the Emperor’s armies after the Lübeck peace treaty. However, Olivares had to go further and gave Isabella permission to open discussions with the States General for a new cease-fire. The discussions were to lead to negotiations for a cease-fire for thirty years, or even for peace, but the Spanish monarch’s claim to sovereignty of the United Provinces was specifically excluded from any negotiation. Frederik Henry and the deputies of the States General who accompanied him in the field, decided to defer negotiations until after the battle at ‘s Hertogenbosch as a victory would considerably strengthen the Republic’s forthcoming negotiating position.

Olivares’ instructions to vacate the strongholds on the eastern borders of the Republic and his first step towards peace talks with the Dutch demonstrated that, if not he himself but certainly the Spanish Council of State, considered peace. Spain needed peace as much if not more than England, but a settlement of Charles’ Palatinate objective had to be preceded, or at least accompanied, by an agreement with the Dutch that had to include the Spanish king’s claim to sovereignty of the Seven Provinces.

\textsuperscript{1} Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares, p.366.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p.366.
Charles’ departure from confrontational continental policies implied that henceforth he would need persuasive diplomacy and negotiations to achieve his dynastic objectives, for which he also needed a revised Anglo-Dutch partnership. Even before the Anglo-French and Danish-Empire peace negotiations were concluded, Charles had started a campaign of rapprochement with the Dutch, strained during the Anglo-French hostilities. He selected Sir Henry Vane (1589-1654) for a ‘special occasion of service in Holland’¹. He was sent as Charles’ personal envoy, not as an ambassador to the States General but only accredited to Frederik Henry. It was an unusual procedure to accredit Vane only to the prince, who was a high ranking official and the senior noble in the Republic but did not have the authority of the States General. Vane was to treat with the prince and ‘others of the States whom you shall understand to have power amongst them and to be well affected’² and ‘to prevent false reports’³. He was to explain why his king had not thought it ‘fit to lend a deaf ear’⁴ to propositions of peace made to him by the monarchs of France and Spain. Vane was specifically instructed by Charles to convey only to Frederik Henry and his brother-in-law and sister that ‘the chief aim of our foreign action and treaties was to bring their restitution to their patrimonial estate and dignities’⁵.

Vane was also to assure those he spoke to, as well as the President of the States General, that before entering into a treaty, Charles would communicate with the prince and the States General. He told Vane that he had no obligation for such communications but he would do so out of affection. He was correct in the case of an Anglo-French peace treaty, but certainly not in connection with a unilateral Anglo-Spanish peace treaty to end his war against Spain which he had started in a formal partnership with the Dutch. The Treaty of Southampton committed him the same as it committed the Republic.

¹ TNA, SP 84/139, f.60, February 1629, Instructions for Sir H. Vane.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
Charles summarised the objective of Vane’s mission when he wrote that ‘after making a good impression of our intentions and gaining concurrence’ he was to return to England. Without an English representative on the Council of State, the Republic no longer merited a permanent English ambassador, but Charles used Vane as his special envoy for the same purpose. He was to use this status to influence directly Dutch public opinion and politics, and through that, the less compliant States General’s conduct of the Republic’s foreign affairs. Previous ambassador but now Secretary of State, Sir Dudley Carleton, recently ennobled as Viscount Dorchester, wrote to Vane on 10/20 April 1629 that an Anglo-French peace treaty had been agreed and would be published in London and Paris on 10/20 May. Vane was to communicate this preliminary information to the king and queen of Bohemia. The same information was to be given to the States General where he was to add that his Majesty would appoint an ambassador extraordinary in Paris to assist those of the religion, which the king considered could be better done by ‘friendly negotiations’, presumably instead of by waging war.

Vane’s mission was to prepare the Dutch for new Anglo-Dutch relations based not on a partnership, but on their active support of new English policies for the restitution of the Palatinate. Neither the president of the States General nor Frederik Henry would have forgotten that Charles’ old policies were also aimed at the restitution of the Palatinate. It was the reason for the partnership in the Treaty of Southampton, from which he was about to withdraw without any consultation with his partner. However, Vane could tell the prince that Charles would give information about a possible treaty, out of affection not because of obligation. This ignored his solemnly concluded treaty and his undertaking to provide an army of 35,000 men. When Vane conveyed his king’s messages to the president of the States General and the prince, he not only conveyed Charles’ new policies but also his perception of the Republic as a state and of future Anglo-Dutch relations.

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1 Ibid.
2 TNA, SP 84/139, f.96, 10/20 April 1629, Dorchester to Vane.
3 Ibid.
Vane had no instructions to treat or discuss the vexing issue of the Dutch merchant vessels detained in English ports and the three VOC vessels impounded in Plymouth. Dutch lawyers who had wanted to discuss their reasons why the three impounded VOC vessels should be released had to send their submission to Charles’ Privy Council. They had based their arguments not only on the Treaty of Southampton, but also on the late king James’ decision that the Amboyna incident had to be dealt with by the trading companies. However, the Privy Council’s reply had made clear that the king had made the execution of his subjects an insult to his honour. He thereby raised the entire Amboyna incident, including the VOC-EIC rivalry to the level of his royal prerogatives, which his father had avoided. A trial at the highest level of those who had participated in the Amboyna court proceedings, took place in The Hague in a Grand Council of Justice of delegated senior judges appointed by the States General. The judges ‘considered that the witnesses should be heard and confrontations be made in this alleged criminal case by those who have to pronounce sentence, without this it is difficult for persons of conscience to condemn men to death on the basis of hearsay evidence or of third parties’. Joachimi wrote on 17/27 April 1629 to Charles asking him ‘to give orders that the witnesses who have made depositions in England and who have accused the judges of Amboyna should be sent to Holland to be confronted with the judges of the Grand Council so that the truth may the better be clarified’. The ambassador justified his request with extensive quotes from the Roman law, which formed the legal foundation for the Grand Council’s Judges’ request to hear the English witnesses in their Court. At the same time, the Court had to separate the trial of those involved in the alleged miscarriage of justice from the demands for compensation for the EIC traders who, Charles claimed, were ‘utterly prevented from trading into those parts of all manner of commerce’. This definitive claim appeared to have pre-judged the outcome of forthcoming VOC-EIC negotiations.

1 TNA, SP 84/133 f.120, April 1627, Privy Council to Dutch Ambassador concerning the E. Indies.
2 TNA, SP 84/139 f.103, 17/27 April 1629, Joachimi to Charles I.
3 Ibid.
4 TNA, SP 84/133 f.162, May 1627, Secret instructions for Lord Carleton.
The two issues were conveniently linked and used as one affair against the Dutch, politically and diplomatically. But the Amboyna incident had not prevented the EIC from trading in those parts; linking them served to dramatize the continuous Anglo-Dutch trade disputes with their roots in the past and more recently in the failed VOC-EIC treaty of 1619. During the 1609-1621 Dutch-Spanish cease-fire, the VOC and EIC directors in Europe had completed a ‘Treaty of Defence with the English East India Company after years of negotiations. They were to fight the enemy in Asia together; each company was allowed to purchase half the pepper offered for sale; two thirds of the spices from the Moluccas was to go to the VOC and one third to the EIC. The EIC was to provide ten ships for a common Anglo-Dutch defence fleet’. But the 1619 treaty, inspired by the directors and politics in Europe, did not work in the far-away Indies. The English fleet commanders in the Indies suspected the Dutch of trying to involve them in their own war against the Spanish and Portuguese while England was at peace. John Peter Coen (1587-1632), the Governor General of the Dutch Indies, was furious when he got the message of this agreement in 1620 and feared that the new allies would take advantage of the agreement: he had been forced ‘to embrace the serpent’. The treaty agreement was an undeserved gift to the EIC. The 1619 treaty led to interminable new negotiations that ended inconclusively in 1623 when news of the Amboyna incident reached London.

However, agreement was reached in 1628 to re-start the stalled negotiations but this met with unusual problems. Aware of the widespread public hostility against the VOC and the illegal arrest of its three vessels, the VOC directors wanted guaranteed safeguards for their persons and belongings before setting sail to England. Once these were provided, the VOC delegates would be faced with EIC delegates who knew that the direct involvement of their monarch had greatly increased the strength of their position in the new negotiations with the VOC.

1 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, p.40.
2 Ibid., p.40.
3 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 3187, Res. 10 November 1628.
Charles had set the stage for them when he had repeatedly made it known that the Amboyna incident had made the VOC guilty of a crime, the ‘foul murder’ of EIC people, his servants. He had left no doubt that he considered that the VOC had deprived the EIC from its trading position in the Indies in violation of the 1619 treaty between the two companies. It was no longer an issue between the two companies but also an affront to his honour.

The VOC delegates’ negotiating position was not only weakened by Charles’ involvement and his pre-mature judgement and pronouncements, but also by the knowledge that the States General’s political imperatives demanded the best possible relationship with its English ally, which could force the VOC to make unwarranted concessions. The EIC delegates set pre-conditions for the negotiations to start. The English language was to be used instead of the customary French language, also in the treaty itself. Further, at the outset the main issues had to be agreed and the details to be negotiated later; this precondition meant that the outcome had to be agreed before real negotiations commenced. Ambassador Joachimi wanted to avoid a collapse of the negotiations before they had started and appealed to Charles to intervene. He wrote to the king that the companies ‘have always dealt in French, including the treaty made in 1619 during the reign of king James and must be used again to deal with the differences arising between the two companies’.

Joachimi had been empowered to promise in writing that when the trading companies had reached an agreement, it would be ratified. However, the VOC delegates did not accept the EIC’s pre-conditions and, as in 1619, they refused to merge the VOC and EIC into a jointly owned and managed company. After ten months of fruitless talks, they wrote through Sir John Coke to Charles and through Joachimi to the States General, explaining the reasons for the failure.

1 TNA, SP 84/140 f.101, 18/28 October 1629, Instructions for Sir H. Vane.
2 TNA, SP 84/139 f.103, 30 April/ 10 May 1629, Joachimi to Charles I.
3 TNA, SP 84/139 f.151, 9/19 June 1629, Joachimi promise to ratify accord between E. Indies companies.
4 TNA, SP 84/140 f.202, 13/23 December 1629, Dutch commissioners’ account of differences between the E. Indies companies.
When the war of words about the Indies reached a stalemate, the Republic’s war against Spain reached a critical phase. While Frederik Henry besieged the town and fortress ‘s Hertogenbosch with an army of some 30,000 men, Count Frederik van den Bergh with his Spanish army, re-enforced by Austrian Habsburg forces, invaded the Republic from the east. The Habsburgs’ objective was clear, breaking the siege by threatening the coastal provinces in Frederik Henry’s rear. Holland’s traditional defences of flooding strategically situated areas were immediately deployed. The States General delegates representing the highest authority in the army together with Frederik Henry decided not to be diverted from the siege. The invading forces could not get beyond Amersfoort, which they plundered, and Hilversum, which they torched. The invaders had to withdraw when Dutch forces severed their supply line by capturing Wesel on the Rhine. Van den Bergh had not only lost a stronghold in his rear but also an entire army’s stock of food, weapons and munitions.

‘s Hertogenbosch surrendered to Frederik Henry on 14 September 1629 with the signing of the *lecture capitulatiën*, a listing of the capitulation details. On 18 September an exodus of the defeated started with ‘1100 baggage wagons, followed by officials and clergy, artillery, 1.100 foot soldiers, four companies cavalry, Grobbendonck and 12 ton ammunition’. The clergy were allowed to keep their possessions, the *Bagijnen* [lay-nuns, usually widows and spinsters] could remain but had to live in areas determined by the provincial States. There would be a ‘*fieat vrijheyt consciëntie*’, freedom of conscience for the remaining population. This did not mean that open Catholic worship could continue, but it was an astute political concession and reflected Frederik Henry’s moderate stance in religious affairs.

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2 Gosses and Japikse, *Political History of the Netherlands*. As part of a wider analysis of Frederik Henry’s religious inclinations, the authors wrote that Frederik Hendrik, zich wel wachtte voor een overhaaste bevoordeling der Remonstranten, maar toch bevorderde, dat geleidelijk de vervolging tegen hen ophield (Frederik Henry held back from a hurried preference for the Remonstrants, yet, gradually promoted ending their persecution) p.467.
After the expense of the capture of ‘s Hertogenbosch, the States General’s depleted finances were further weakened when the orthodox-Calvinist-dominated provinces threatened to withhold payment of their share of the war expenses if anything was done that favours the Catholics. Withholding payment was averted by placing the newly acquired territories under direct administration of The Hague, as so-called Generality lands, but without Deputies in the States General, a system in use for east Flanders since 1600.

In addition to bearing the financial burden for their own war, the Dutch were also owed large sums of money lent to Charles. The debt had grown to some one million guilders; 600,000 guilders for an advance to Mansfeld, covered by an obligation signed by Viscount Carleton, 181,000 guilders for the payment of the four regiments Charles had made available to the king of Denmark, and a loan with his jewels as security plus the accrued interests. No payment had been made which had compelled the States of Holland to extend the period of their loan of 600,000 guilders to the States General, needed to pay, on Charles’s behalf, his proxy-army led by Mansfeld. The Amsterdam financiers considered court action for settlement of the pawn contract of Charles’ jewels. Actual proceedings were postponed after Viscount Rochester wrote to ambassador Joachimi that the king wanted to avoid a court case and that the money would be found within two months. Joachimi was frequently urged by the States General to ‘negotiate’ for payment of the different debts but without success. Even ambassador Carleton’s formally signed obligation to repay the 600,000 guilders and the promise to settle the advance for the expenses of the four regiments lent to the Danish king were ignored. Extraordinarily, Joachimi needed a *quid pro quo* to negotiate for the repayment of Charles’ debts, even for those that were covered by a bond signed by his ambassador. No debts were settled and the year ended with the English returning to the 1616 settlement for the restitution of the cautionary towns.

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2 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3188, Res. 8 May 1629.
3 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3188, Res. 10 December 1629.
The bizarre request for details of the agreed arrangements, all undoubtedly well known in England, was a barely disguised indication that no settlement of the debt was contemplated. It had left the Dutch with the impression that the unpaid debts were to compensate for the fact, as seen by some in England, that a higher price should have been paid, or other Dutch obligations negotiated, for the restitution of the cautionary towns. Maintaining England as an ally was generally accepted in the Republic, but the views differed of the concessions usually needed. Although the States General was charged by the provinces with the conduct of foreign policy, it needed consensus among the provincial Deputies in the States General. Besides inter-provincial differences, even rivalries, dislike by some provinces of the overbearing province Holland and the always-present wishes of the Dutch orthodox Calvinists to maintain close links with their English co-religionists made achieving consensus or compromise always a laborious process, and often not possible.

Orthodox Calvinist-dominated towns and provinces regarded strong links with Protestant England of such importance that the requests or demands of its monarch could take preference over those of mercantile Holland. This situation had been well known in England from Elizabethan times and was often used in political and diplomatic relations, facilitated by English members of the Council of State. It was particularly the case in Charles’ time because of his propensity to select issues that demanded settlement which he saw as impinging on his honour.

War weariness and searches for Dutch-Spanish peace

The loss of ‘s Hertogenbosch and the failure of van den Bergh’s invasion were additional reasons for Archduchess Isabella to continue her search for peace or a new cease-fire agreement with the Republic. At the same time the States General was faced with a growing war-fatigue by the Dutch which partly negated its firm negotiating position after the recent victories.

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1 John Coke had voiced in 1616 objections against the restitution and returned again to the subject in a letter of 1633 to Resident Sir William Boswell in The Hague. For Coke’s 1616 objection see Chapter One, page 19. Coke’s letter to Boswell is quoted in full at the end of Chapter Six.
The position of the States General was complicated further by the emergence of distinct divisions between those that wanted peace, and those that wanted the war to continue. Friesland, Groningen and Zeeland considered their borders still to be too insecure and wanted the war to continue. The three land provinces that had suffered most of the war wanted peace and also the main trading towns Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Dordrecht showed a strong preference for peace. Confessional considerations were important, particularly for a number of towns in Holland and for the States of Zeeland. Holland was divided; it had to bear fifty-eight percent of the Republic’s war expenses and, as frequently happened, had to advance any shortfalls when other provinces did not pay their shares in time. The wealth-creating merchants and industries of Holland were greatly affected by the enduring economic depression that enveloped the whole of Europe. Wars were raging on land throughout the region, costing uncounted lives and treasure, and through the war on the seas the fishermen and merchants had lost some thousand vessels. These had been sunk or captured by the Dunkirk pirates and others often detained for long periods by the English navy.

Madrid empowered Isabella to broker a cease-fire or peace agreement. The negotiations started in the Dutch border town of Roosendaal but the Spanish negotiators’ opening positions, demands appeared to be determined to leave no room for compromise. They were reported to the States of Holland and recorded in records as in the footnote: ‘no disclosure of discussions to other potentates; no molesting of Catholics; all rivers to be opened; the East-Indies trade could continue; the West-Indies trade had to stop; all nobles’ domains to the king; clerical goods unblemished returned; free trade on all the king’s lands; acceptance of the king as overlord; no other recognised as heer, overlord’ 1.

Trading on the East Indies was not a Spanish concession: the Dutch were doing so already and Spain lacked the power to prevent it.

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A States of Holland’s deputy’s first reply was that he did not think that there was any inclination on the Dutch side for talks even to begin, so long as there were any Spanish forces west of the river IJssel ¹.

The Spanish ignored the conditions under which the 1609-1621 cease-fire treaty was concluded. After the protracted negotiations for that treaty appeared to end in failure, it was finally ratified but the treaty was ambiguous and could be interpreted differently; whether the Spanish had negotiated with the Republic as an independent State, but only so for the negotiations, or had negotiated with the Republic as a de facto independent State. The French-language version of the treaty reflected the first interpretation and the Dutch language version reflected the second that the Republic had negotiated as an independent State². The different interpretations had prevailed and were in evidence again in 1629 in Roosendaal. The Spanish offer in the new negotiations to allow the Dutch to trade with all Spanish lands, which Spain also needed for its own economy, was aimed at the general war weariness in the Republic and in particular at the hard pressed Dutch traders. However politically, it was not enough for the States General.

The defeat at ‘s Hertogenbosch had left the Spanish negotiating position in 1629 much weaker than it had been at the negotiations for the 1609 cease-fire treaty. Yet the Spanish delegation in Roosendaal seemed to assume that a long term cease fire or a peace treaty could be negotiated, but with unchanged Spanish demands. While Isabella earnestly wanted an equitable peace for her provinces of the Southern Netherlands, the Madrid negotiators had come to Roosendaal to make clear that the Dutch had to accept nothing less than a return to their previous situation. They were subjects, as had prevailed before the revolt against the Spanish king and the war against Spain. Philip II, Isabella’s father, had bequeathed the Low Lands to her and husband Albert but if there was no male issue, all the provinces would return to the crown, it was the Spanish opening of the new negotiations.

¹ Ibid., September 1629, p.265
² S. Groenveld, Het Tweaalfjarig Bestand 1609-1621 – De jongelingsjaren van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, pp. 59-60 (The twelve year cease-fire 1609-1621 – The Republic from youth to adult). Published for the commemoration of the 400th anniversary of the cease-fire treaty.
Dutch had to accept their overlord Philip II’s rejection in 1576 of the Pacification of Gent, *Pacificatie van Gent*; they had to disband the 1579 Union of Utrecht, *Unie van Utrecht*; and, above all, they had to repeal their 1581 Law of Separation, *Plakkaat van Verlatinge*. All three had already become fundamental parts of the young Dutch Republic’s constitution. The States General used its more advantageous situation to avoid immediate confrontations on these three fundamental differences between the two sides. As the States General’s commander of the armed forces, Frederik Henry had to secure the nation’s borders and could not be in favour of a cease-fire before this was achieved. The Republic would be left in the same defensive position as it had found itself in 1621, after the first cease-fire, when his half-brother Maurits’ had decided to assume a defensive strategy for the Republic. Before the siege of ‘sHertogenbosch and the peace negotiations had started, Frederik Henry had said that, should the new negotiations fail and the States General decide to continue the war, it should not be a defensive but an offensive one as merely ‘defensive was the ruination of the country’.

*The Republic between the conflicting interests of England and France*

In an attempt to keep the Republic at war with Spain, the French king offered the States General a new subsidy agreement and authorised his ambassador, Nicolas De Bar of Baugy, to amend secretly the conditions of the treaty Richelieu had proposed in 1627.

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1 NA, 3.01.04.03, States of Holland, inv.nr.26, Ratification of the Pacification of Gent, 1576. The main points were that the Netherlands provinces jointly expel the Spanish forces; the Inquisition halted; no actions against the Catholics; no changes in Holland and Zeeland where the Catholic religion is banned already.

2 NA, 1.01.19, Council of State, inv.nr.2623. The most important points are that the signatories undertake to joint defence against foreign rulers and lands and pay the costs by raising taxes.

3 NA, 1.01.01.01, SG 1576-1588, inv.nr. 254G. In three sections it reasoned, explained and decided why Philip II fell short of his promises and he and his heirs could no longer be accepted as lawful overlords.

4 S. Groenveld and others, *De Tachtigjarige Oorlog – Opstand en Consolidatie in de Nederlanden (ca. 1560-1650)* (Zutphen 2008) (The Eighty Year War – Rebellion and Consolidation in the Netherlands) defensie de ruijne van ‘t Landt was, p.258. Hereafter, Groenveld, *The Eighty Year War*.

5 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 26 December 1629.
France’s anxiety to keep the Republic at war was not the only reason for the decision to depart from the often-called immutable proposals of 1627. England’s peace treaty with Spain was an unwelcome development in Richelieu’s policies, which he considered best served when other European nations were occupied by internal strife or external hostilities.

Charles had different plans for his continental policy. Besides wanting the restitution of the Palatinate he wanted to prevent the formation of continental alliances that could threaten his realms; therefore Dutch-French coalition would be unwelcome. To arrange Dutch support Charles sent Vane back to the Republic again with specific instructions¹. He also wrote to Frederik Henry informing him that he was sending his ‘ambassador extraordinaire, the Chevalier Vane to negotiate with the States General on matters that I have entrusted him with, which we have particularly charged him to make known to you asking for your trust and support’². Vane was to ascertain whether disaffected persons in the Republic had ‘gained so much that there is a purpose in that State to proceed apart’, meaning that in their politics and negotiations they were ignoring the restitution of the Palatinate, the king’s foreign policy objectives and moving towards France. Vane was to remind the Dutch, in private and in public, about their obligation under the Treaty of Southampton’s first three clauses, particularly clause two⁴, ignoring his own obligations of the same clause in the solemnly concluded and ratified treaty.

Without his permanent ambassador as a member of the Republic’s Council of State, Charles asked his Knight of the Garter the Prince of Orange, to influence the politics of the States General. Undoubtedly, Dutch ambassador Joachimi used similar diplomacy with English Councillors to influence their king’s policies.

¹ TNA, SP 84/140, ff.101/107, 18/28 October 1629, Instructions to Vane.
² TNA, SP 84/140, f.99, 18 October 1629, Charles I to Prince of Orange. Nous envoyons....nostre Ambasadeur Extraordinaire [Le Chevaquier Vane] pour traitier avec Messieurs Les Estates sur les choses gue luy avons commises, lesquelles nous luy avons donné charge particulé de vous communiqué, vous priants de la favoriser en cela de vostre assistance et luy donner toute creance.
³ TNA, SP 84/140, ff. 101/107, 18/28 October 1629, Instructions to Vane.
⁴ Clause two is quoted in full on page 34 of this thesis.
Vane had special instructions for the trial of the Amboyna judges. The English witnesses brought to the Republic were not to be interrogated as their evidence had been documented in an Admiralty Court, implying that an English court had already accepted their evidence. Further, ‘before pronouncing sentence, the king must have knowledge of the opinion of such judges the States have appointed for that process’¹. Charles’ instructions to his ambassador left no doubt about his views of the status of the Republic and the jurisdiction of its courts. Whereas he appeared not to recognise the Republic’s jurisdiction and the sovereignty of the Provinces, he did conclude formal treaties and alliances with the Republic, signed and sealed by the States General and representatives of the sovereign provinces. On France, Vane was to continue his efforts to make the States General refrain from entering into a treaty with France.

The States General received Vane on 20 November 1629 and the short formal meeting was closed with the appointment of a committee of delegates to confer with the ambassador. Their report was presented to the States General on 28 November². Vane had opened his discussions with a proposal by the merchant Philippo Burlamacchi, established in London and Amsterdam, to supply canons and munitions to the Republic over a period of years, requiring a pre-payment of 1.2 million guilders. The States General rejected any prepayment and a new proposal was submitted but was also rejected; however, finally an agreement was reached. The canons and other ordnance would have to come to the Republic, their value assessed for use by the Dutch army or navy or the amount to be realised by their sale. These funds, and additions if needed, were to be used to redeem the king’s jewels and to settle the pawn account of 181,626 guilders.

Vane continued with his mission with conveying his king’s instructions concerning the treatment of the English witnesses at the trial of the Amboyna judges, and his demand to be informed of the States General’s judges’ opinions before sentence was pronounced.

¹ TNA, SP 84/140, ff. 101/107, 18/28 October 1629, Instructions to Vane.
² NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3188, 28 November 1629.

The complete report is printed in French and Dutch in Aitzema, Saken van Staet, Vol. II, pp.907-909 and 930-933.
Ambassador Vane formally confirmed that the monarch of Great Britain did not accept the jurisdiction of the States General’s court and preferred to accept immediate satisfaction before employing other means. Vane’s task was to convey in diplomatic but unequivocal terms that Charles, supported by well-orchestrated public opinion, considered the Amboyna judges guilty. They were not only guilty of the massacre of his subjects, but also of the ultimate crime of *lèse majesté*, punishable in English courts with the death penalty. Charles with his ‘very strong sense of personal honour’\(^1\) can only have meant by preferring immediate satisfaction that he wanted the judges to be sentenced as in an English court, the only one he recognised. The implied threat of employing other means clearly refers to reprisals in one form or another.

Vane had ended his meeting with the delegates by informing them about the Anglo-Spanish peace discussions. Charles had sent his ambassadors to Spain to get definitive answers, but he was not prepared to listen to any Spanish proposals if they were not respecting his honour, not leading to the restitution of the Palatinate and were in conflict with his treaties with the Dutch. Vane’s first diplomatic encounter with the States General had left no doubt that his king’s new continental policies had not altered his perception that Anglo-Dutch relations had to be governed by his objectives. Burlamacchi’s proposals were to provide the exchequer with urgently needed funds, despite the certainty that the supply of armaments could not be maintained with England neutral and the Republic at war, and if shipped by neutrals would be considered contraband. In his meeting with the States General, Vane had concentrated on the issues inherited from his predecessor but these were not the main purpose for his embassy. In his assignment to the Republic, his main task was to persuade the Dutch to support his king’s continental policies, still dominated by his dynastic objective of the restitution of the Palatinate, which, as Charles had written to Vane ‘on which our consideration stands, as it were on two feet’\(^2\).

\(^1\) Cust, Charles I, p. 466.
\(^2\) TNA, SP 84/141, f.5, 5/15 January 1630, Charles I to Vane.
Spain’s support for the restitution of the Palatinate was inextricably linked with an end of its war with the Republic. This made it essential for Charles that the Dutch made peace with Spain and so freeing them to actively support his anti-Habsburg policies in the Empire. Vane’s so far relatively disguised attempts to influence the Dutch internal peace discussions was discarded when he asked for a meeting with the States of Holland. Here he could directly address Holland’s merchants who were in favour of peace, and the representatives of the orthodox Calvinist dominated towns and others who were opposing peace with Spain. However, he failed to bring the two sides together and finally; Holland did not join the three land provinces that favoured peace.

Charles had offered to mediate in the Dutch-Spanish peace negotiation, but in his instructions of 5/15 January 1630 to Vane he went well beyond mediation. He was to propose to the States General that an Anglo-Dutch ‘joint capitulation for the rendering of the Palatinate’ should be formed. Charles was more explicit in another communication when he wrote actually ‘to conjoin with us in recovery of the Palatinate’. These proposals were effectively to accept Charles both as a highly unlikely impartial mediator for a peace agreement which he needed for his own negotiations with Spain, and, at the same time, to ask the Dutch to enter into an agreement with him to join him in whatever his policies were and would be in future for the restitution of the Palatinate. Following the often used English procedure to by-pass the States General, Vane had made the proposals known to the States of Holland and his other contacts in the Republic, stressing that, as the restitution of the Palatinate was his king’s main objective, the Dutch were ‘equally to feel obliged for the same to be brought to effect’. In a further meeting with the States General he reminded those present that the Spanish king had given Charles a procuration to treat for an agreement with Spain for either peace or a truce. His king now demanded a prompt and categorical reply in writing whether the States General accepted or rejected the Spanish proposals.

1 Ibid., capitulation ‘an agreement or set of conditions’ (Oxf. English Ref. Dictionary).
2 TNA, SP 84/141, f.284, 5/15 July 1630, Instructions for Sir H. Vane.
3 Ibid.
4 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 3189, Res. 14 August 1630.
The States General did not reply to Charles’ unsuitable demand for he could not act as an impartial mediator. He was only interested in a specific outcome which served his policies and which was totally against the Republic’s interests.

England’s special ambassador Sir Francis Cottington, negotiating an Anglo-Spanish peace treaty in Madrid, failed to reach an agreement within his terms of reference. Olivares did not give him any binding commitment for the restitution as it could bring Spain into war not only with the Austrian Habsburgs but also with Elector Maximilian I, Duke of Bavaria, who had been endowed by the Emperor with the Upper Palatinate and the banned Elector's dignities. Olivares referred all further negotiations about the restitution to the Imperial delegates, who were gathering at Ratisbon (Regensburg) where the Emperor had called a Diet for July 1630. Olivares had promised Cottington that Spain would support the English emissaries whom Charles had sent to the Diet to negotiate with the Emperor for the restitution of the Palatinate. But the Diet was overshadowed by a conflict between the Catholic Electors and Wallenstein, which forced the Emperor to dismiss the general and to place his imperial armies under the command of Tilly. Adding to the Emperor’s problems was the news that the Lutheran king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus (1594-1632), had landed with his armies in June 1630 in Peenemünde, Pomerania. Given all these circumstances, it was inconceivable that the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria would even consider restoring the estates and dignities to a banned Calvinist prince, who had sparked the revolt in the Empire and who still called himself the king of Bohemia from his court-in-exile in the Republic.

Cottington had regarded his mission as failed and returned to England. Charles sent him back with new instructions; he was no longer to demand a Spanish commitment for the restitution of the Palatinate before agreeing to a peace treaty. On 5/15 November an Anglo-Spanish peace treaty was signed in London and Madrid and a month later published in England¹.

¹ TNA, SP 16/175, f.23, Articles of Peace and Trade, (Capitula, Pacis et Foederis).
Olivares’ references to the restitution of the Palatinate in the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty were confined to vague promises of Spain’s support, in return for England’s pressure on the Republic to make peace with Spain. Cottington wrote to Vane on 12/22 November that, ‘in the articles [of the treaty] there is little or no alteration from what they avowed in the time of King James’¹. In a letter of 5/15 January 1631 to Dorchester, Cottington described in great detail how the Spanish royal family and a multitude of guests celebrated the signing of the treaty. He ended his letter by thanking Dorchester for conveying that the king had found his ‘endeavours acceptable’².

The Anglo-Spanish peace treaty did not mean the end of Cottington’s mission; on 12 January 1631 he signed a secret treaty with Olivares. ‘By the terms of this treaty England and Spain would join in an offensive and defensive alliance against the United Provinces, with Spain promising England 100,000 escudos a month for the duration of the war, and the cession of the isle of Zeeland on its successful conclusion’³. Kevin Sharpe had suggested that Cottington was ‘probably acting more on his own initiative than on direct instructions’⁴. But his assumption can be questioned; there is no reason to assume that Cottington had less specific instruction for his important mission than Charles usually gave to his ambassadors to the Republic and to France. It is more likely that Charles’ new instructions to Cottington had provided him with a wider negotiating mandate. However, Charles neither ratified nor abrogated the near-nefarious treaty with Olivares, but he elevated Cottington to the peerage. Charles’ concessions to the Spanish did not mean that he departed from his objectives; but for the doubtful support of Olivares the Republic would have to satisfy the Spanish demands and abandon its long war for its own independence. Acquiescence of the Dutch was even more unlikely than Olivares’ vague promises of support to achieve Charles’ Palatinate objectives. However, Charles’ own dynastic objective seemed assured when his Queen Henrietta Maria gave birth to a son in May 1630.

¹ TNA, SP 84/142, f.187, 12/22 November 1630, Cottington to Vane.
² TNA, SP 94/35 f.133, 5/15 January 1631, Cottington to Dorchester.
⁴ Sharpe, The Personal Rule, p.68.
The birth of his crown prince meant that the continuity of the Stuart dynasty was no longer confined to the children of his sister Elizabeth and Frederick. They did retain, although now more distantly, the rights of succession to the throne of England. The birth of his son did not diminish Charles’ efforts for the restitution of the Palatinate. He was upholding his personal honour and that of the Stuart House, which remained at the core of his foreign policies. Although Gardiner wrote that ‘Charles’ interest in continental affairs was purely dynastic’\(^1\) he did not enlarge on the fact that Charles’ continental interests did go further. Charles maintained political and diplomatic relations with France, a powerful neighbour but never wholly trusted. Although his plan for an anti-Habsburg alliance was largely driven by the restitution of the Palatinate, it was also to serve his interests in continental political and religious affairs. With Spain, Charles upheld his dynastic reasons but also intended to counterbalance his relations with France, and with the Republic as the major sea power as well as the greatest trade rival of his own merchants.

The arrival of a Swedish army in the Empire offered Charles a new opportunity for the restitution of the Palatinate by force of arms. Gustavus Adolphus appeared in the Empire at the time that the role of the Elector Palatinate as Germany’s leading Protestant could be nearing its end. Vane had written to Charles that the Count Elector Frederick was ailing and appeared to suffer from consumption. He compared his condition with that of ‘the late Duke of Richmond when he died’\(^2\). The redoubtable Swedish king and general with his well disciplined army could mean new and stronger leadership of the German Protestants and another attempt at the restitution of the Palatinate. But this required the Republic’s backing, either by military support for Gustavus Adolphus or, failing that, by facilitating English negotiations with the Emperor and the still mandatory condition of coming to terms with both Habsburg Houses.

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\(^2\) TNA, SP 84/141, f.83, 6/16 March 1630, Vane to Charles I.
Vane’s diplomacy in the Republic covered the two possibilities, but ignored that both could be against the other sides’ own interests. He was directed to persuade the States General to conclude a peace treaty, but also to convey his king’s view that the States General’s policy of only employing diversionary military tactics in Germany, as had been accepted in the Triple Alliance treaties, was now deemed ‘unjust and unreasonable’\(^\text{1}\) policies. Vane’s mission to the Republic had lost the veneer of diplomacy and negotiation; he was merely conveying Charles’ demands that the Dutch abandon their own objectives in favour of Charles’ dynastic affairs and foreign policies. The Dutch should either return to Spanish sovereignty or maintain their war against Spain and also go to war against the Austrian Habsburg in support of Charles’ personal objectives. Despite the fact that Vane’s diplomacy had failed to obtain any commitment from the States General, Charles instructed him that the last acts of his employment in the Republic were that ‘in taking leave of that State, to leave behind you in sweet and friendly terms as well as by assuring them of our affection’\(^\text{2}\). His other task was to inform his brother-in-law and sister, as well as the prince of Orange and the States General, that he had appointed John, Marquess of Hamilton, to raise an army of 6,000 men to support the king of Sweden\(^\text{3}\). Charles had taken the decision to re-enter the war in the Empire, again by proxy. In parallel, he would negotiate for the restitution of the Palatinate with the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria.

The Dutch-Spanish peace negotiations had made no progress whatsoever by the end of 1630. Frederik Henry had kept his middle position; peace if the States General’s most important conditions were met, if not, to continue the war. After the Republic’s successes with the silver-fleet, the capture of ‘s Hertogenbosch at home together with Recife and Olanda in Brazil, and assuming the captaincy of the entire Pernambuco region, the States General adhered to its basic requirements.

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\(^1\) TNA, SP 84/141, f.284, 5/15 July 1630, Instructions for Sir H. Vane.  
\(^2\) TNA, SP 84/142, f.238, 1525 December 1630, Charles I to Vane.  
\(^3\) Ibid.
The Spanish remained adamant over the Dutch withdrawal from the West Indies. They insisted on freedom for the Catholic religion and at least one Catholic Church in every town in the Republic. Most particularly, they demanded acceptance of their monarchs’ sovereignty in perpetuity. The gulf between the parties appeared to be as wide as ever. Spain’s foreign policies and diplomacy were still governed by the perception that as the most powerful nation of the time, it was not for Spain to make any concessions, certainly not to the rebellious Dutch. England had never fared any better; Philip II had answered Elizabeth I’s anti-Spanish policies with his Armada of 1588, James’s negotiations for the marriage of Charles and the Infanta had failed and Charles’ negotiations for the restitution of the Palatinate had ended with meaningless Spanish promises.

Although the Dutch remained divided, the Spanish demands were such that the side opting for peace started to lose support. However, a decision by the States General to continue the war would have to be taken while its finances were severely stretched, not least by increased requirements for the army. The Spanish war efforts were expected to be invigorated after inconclusive negotiations while the incursion of the joint Habsburg forces at the time of the ‘sHertogenbosch siege had shown the vulnerability of the Republic’s borders with the Empire. The States General had to find the funds to deploy the necessary troops to safeguard the borders and to prepare for new actions.

*Political and strategic adjustments with enduring own interests*

The Dutch could not expect any military support from England and had no formal treaty links with France, but close links with both its traditional allies remained of great importance under these new circumstances. England had to remain an ally, at the very least as a benign neutral, but this greatly increased the Republic’s need of a strong and active relationship with France. Although a Catholic nation like the Empire, France was politically anti-Habsburg and needed the continued Dutch engagement of the Spanish forces in the southern Netherlands, an essential requirement for the protection of its northern borders.
France’s incentive for the 1624 Compiègne Treaty was for its own protection. After its expiry, that had remained the basic reason for the protracted negotiations for its renewal or replacement. These negotiations had not been approved by Charles and had led to requests, barely concealed demands, to refrain from concluding a new Dutch-French treaty during the Anglo-French war and insisted that the Republic merge its navy with the English one. He had invoked the Republic’s commitment under the Treaty of Southampton, the self-same treaty he ignored with his Anglo-Spanish peace treaty. War with Spain was no longer in England’s first interest and Charles had decided that his royal prerogatives allowed him to end it. The French king Henry IV had acted similarly in 1598 when he left the Triple Alliance partnership and concluded his peace treaty with Spain.

Charles’ earlier made suggestion of merging the two navies, undoubtedly to be under the command of an English admiral or general, as with the 1625 maritime agreement and Cadiz expedition, showed that Charles’ perception of the Anglo-Dutch relation was not one of partnership but one of Dutch inferiority. The States General ignored what had been more than mere requests to merge the navies; which did not put to rest the English suspicion that in any Dutch-French treaty the Dutch could help France to build-up a navy that could threaten the English mastery of the seas.

Even the possibility of a Dutch-Spanish cease-fire or peace agreement had greatly disquieted the French. They not only offered a new subsidy agreement but their king had also given his ambassador a mandate to amend the French treaty proposals of 1627 which the Dutch had not found acceptable. Ambassador De Baugy was authorised to offer the Republic a yearly subsidy of one million francs for as long as it was at war with Spain, on the conditions of an offensive-defensive treaty and that no peace with Spain could be concluded without the French king’s agreement. Should France break with Spain, the subsidy would be replaced by a very large-scale French attack on the Spanish in the southern Netherlands; but if France entered into a peace agreement with Spain, the subsidy would be increased to two million francs per year.
The States General insisted that before a treaty was concluded, the Dutch and French must first understand each other very well. Until France was at war with Spain, the Republic remained free to enter into a cease-fire with Spain. They were also told to press the French for payment of the remainder of the Compiègne subsidies\(^1\). The French ambassador had initially addressed only the subsidy conditions and had referred negotiations for the amendments of the treaty to Dutch and French negotiators. These would meet in Paris where a new treaty would be solemnly signed at an early date. The ambassador returned to the States General for an urgent answer to his question whether the Dutch would sign a treaty before a French break with Spain\(^2\); he was informed that the States General intended to do so\(^3\). After weeks of negotiations in Paris and with De Baugy in The Hague, agreement was reached on most points and recorded in secret articles. The first clearly stated that the Republic might unrestrictedly negotiate with Spain about a cease-fire or peace until such time as the king of France’s breach with Spain had started with military actions in the southern Netherlands.

Louis XIII and Richelieu had brought a new urgency for further treaties with the Dutch, and had also offered financial support to the Swedes to protect their interests in the Empire. Gustavus Adolphus had not yet gone into battle but concentrated on gathering the support, or neutrality, of the Protestant princes; the Marquess Hamilton sought recruits for an English army. Gustavus Adolphus was assuming the leadership of the German Protestants. With his own army and Hamilton’s participation he had re-opened the possibility of the restitution of the Palatinate by force of arms. If this failed there still was in abeyance the Cottington treaty to force the Dutch to make peace with Spain. Charles had not committed himself by ratifying the Cottington treaty, leaving the suggestion that it was only intended as a negotiating ploy with Spain.

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\(^1\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 29 December 1629 and in Aitzema, *Saken van Staet*. Vol. III, pp.82-84.
\(^2\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 31 December 1629.
\(^3\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 3 January 1630.
Charles was aware of the domestic implications of even considering Protestant England, together with Catholic Spain, going to war against the Protestant Dutch. He had confined himself to reminding the Dutch that restriction to only diversionary tactics in the war in Germany was ‘unjust and unreasonable’¹, preparing the Republic for his call to support Gustavus Adolphus and Hamilton. But even if the Habsburg forces were expelled from the Palatinate territories, an end of the Dutch-Spanish war would be needed for any negotiations with the Emperor to restore the Electoral status of Frederick or his heir. But Charles’ immediate interests would be served if the ongoing Dutch-Spanish peace negotiations ended in a peace treaty. In any case it would obviate an uncertain and highly divisive Anglo-Spanish attack on the Republic and a Dutch-French alliance. Charles could claim that the demand for an end of the war, consistently made by both Habsburg Houses, had been met, and as a result serious negotiations could start with the Emperor. However, Madrid’s immutable demands precluded a Dutch-Spanish peace treaty, and even a cease-fire with these demands left in abeyance.

The political and diplomatic relations between England and the Republic at the beginning of 1630 bore little resemblance to those of 1625. The Treaty of Southampton had lost its essence after the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty. The Anglo-French war had accentuated the political differences between the two nations, while the Anglo-Spanish peace was bringing the Republic and France close to a renewal of the Compiègne treaty or an even closer alliance of the two countries. The thrust of Charles’ politics had not changed and remained aimed at the restitution of the Palatinate. He would prevent alliances on the continent that could endanger his realms’ interests, particularly an alliance of France and the Republic. The latter could be forestalled with a peace agreement between the Dutch and the Spanish but, although the negotiations had been serious, in reality there was never a chance for a breakthrough.

¹ TNA, SP 84/141, f.284, 5/15 July 1630, Instructions for Sir Henry Vane.
Whereas Archduchess Isabella with her own and her late husband’s long tradition of diplomacy wanted peace or a cease-fire, her negotiators with instructions from Madrid were not permitted to depart from their king’s sovereignty claim and from the demand for religious freedom for the Catholics in the Republic.

The Anglo-Dutch operational partnership had ended in 1625 at Cadiz, and the political partnership in 1630 with the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty. France had taken the first step towards joining the Dutch in their war against Spain. Louis and Richelieu were not ready for the next step, meanwhile they had to give financial support to the Republic to continue engaging the Spanish forces providing protection for France’s northern borders. While the Republic remained locked in war against Spain, both France and England were making changes, not in their underlying policies and interests but in their strategies to achieve them. England’s peace with Spain, a Dutch-French alliance as well as Sweden’s invasion of the Empire and France’s campaign in the Alsace had only one aspect in common; they were governed by their own interests.
CHAPTER SIX
Revision of Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-Dutch relations

English and Dutch interests move further apart

The Dutch-Spanish peace negotiations in Roosendaal continued with the Dutch negotiators’ task hampered by the lack of a definitive mandate and the Spanish side with little room to negotiate. The provinces were divided; three by majority in favour of peace and three more or less against, with Holland initially divided. Opinions were not only determined by political arguments but also by religious and economic ones. One group adhered to the Calvinist tradition and another to the tradition of Holland with very different views about war or peace, the so-called Trevistes. The Calvinist tradition was uncompromisingly anti-Catholic, the anti-Trevistes, and considered that the war was before anything else a religious war to protect and spread the true reformed religion. This required unrestricted freedom from the Spanish monarchs and their realms.

The Calvinist tradition considered that the war was for the freedom of both the Northern and Southern Netherlands as was enshrined in the 1579 Union of Utrecht. The Holland tradition with its Erastian principles of tolerance reflected both its pragmatism and mercantilism. Holland also wanted freedom but no continuation of the war for religious reasons. It wanted expansion of territory in Brabant for greater security and extending the colonies to serve its own mercantile interest. This could be served by a thirty-year cease-fire but this would meet fierce resistance from those of the Calvinists tradition. The mandate of the Spanish negotiators had ruled out any chance for an acceptable Dutch-Spanish peace treaty, but not for a long-term cease-fire, which would have considerable merits for the adherents of the Holland tradition.

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However, even when a conditional freedom was accompanied by recognition of independence, as during the 1609-1621 cease fire, it might have been acceptable again for war-weary Dutch but was mistrusted by those of the Calvinist tradition. A thirty-year cease-fire would relieve Holland from most of its heavy contributions to the war expenses and give time to strengthen its trading and industrial positions but have as a consequence a strengthened contra-reformation activity in the southern provinces. Frederik Henry refrained from taking sides, but it can be assumed that his personal options were for peace but on very favourable conditions or for continuing the war to force such conditions; for both options he needed the support of the two traditions. However, the consequence of the prince keeping his own counsel was that the Dutch negotiators had been left without a clear mandate from the States General and without the influential guidance of the prince.

The lack of progress was of concern for both the Archduchess Isabella and Charles. Isabella needed peace. Her armies were underpaid and demoralised after the loss of 's Hertogenbosch and there was growing discontent amongst the general population in her southern provinces because of high taxation, deteriorating economic conditions and the devastation of the land. Many southern nobles 'felt their honour was slighted by the overbearing influence of the Spaniards on the governance of their country – who in addition, according to them, governed with unacceptable policies'. Charles’ concern was for the political consequences of a breakdown of the peace negotiations; he was committed to the Spanish to persuade the Dutch to end their war. In order to keep the negotiations going, Isabella was permitted by Philip IV to ‘suggest [to the Dutch negotiators] the exchange of the Brazilian Pernambuco for the town of Breda’. The capture of Pernambuco by the Dutch West Indies Company had shown the Spanish their own vulnerability in their American colonies.

1 Groenveld, The Eighty Year War, voelden zich weer in hun eer gekrenkt wegens het sterke overwicht van Spanjaarden in hun landsbestuur – Spanjaarden die bovendien naar hun oordeel een onaanvaardbaar beleid voerden, p. 259.
2 Ibid., Philip IV suggereerde de ruil van het Braziliaanse Pernambuco tegen Breda, p.259.
The concerns of Isabella and Charles were of lesser relevance for the Dutch than their own internal divisions; these remained and so did the divisions between the Dutch and Spanish negotiators. Neither side wanted to be the first to admit failure, but after further perfunctory meetings the inevitable end of the negotiations came in January 1631. The gulf between the two sides had been too wide, also for Frederik Henry. He had adhered to his earlier expressed view that he favoured peace but only if the Republic’s fundamental objectives were satisfied and not merely deferred. The States General’s decision to continue the war had to be taken against a background of changes in the European political and military environment. The Empire had erupted into even greater violence after the arrival of Gustavus Adolphus and his Swedish armies. The impending arrival in the southern Netherlands of the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand (1609-1641), younger brother of the Spanish king, to head the Spanish forces, meant the more direct military and high-level political involvement of Madrid.

Louis and Richelieu were restricted to only promises of subsidies to the Dutch and the Swedes, while the cardinal was still occupied by internal struggles to secure his own position as first minister. England’s peace with Spain, and the Republic continuing its war, meant in practice the end of the Anglo-Dutch partnership, but neither side wanted a formal ending of the entire Treaty of Southampton. Not only was the treaty to last until 1640; it also contained a number of clauses directly or indirectly related to unresolved trade and maritime issues which were only temporarily submerged by Charles’ need for a partnership for the war with Spain. All other clauses in the Treaty of Southampton, with their commitments and limitations, would therefore remain intact as neither side wanted to repeal the treaty for their own political reasons and interest.
The partnership in the war with Spain and the Triple Alliance treaties had made the Republic an integral part of England’s first foreign policies, but had in practice ended with their failure. Whether a new partnership would be needed in future remained to be seen; but in the meantime, Anglo-Dutch relations would be affected by Charles’ new foreign policies and separately by a specific Dutch policy governed by convenient clauses of the Treaty of Southampton. Yet determined to maintain the best possible relations, the States General provided London with a copy of a subsidy treaty with France, to indicate that nothing impinged on what was left of the Treaty of Southampton.

The end of England’s wars against France and Spain should also have ended the navy’s search for contraband and the general impairment of the Republic’s shipping. Only the search for contraband ceased, but infringements of the Southampton Treaty increased manifold. The States General instructed Joachimi to appeal directly to the king to intervene, reminding him that England was equally obliged to adhere to the treaty. Joachimi did not want to trouble the king ‘with a recital of each and every one of these causes for complaint, nor shall I relate the clauses of the conventions, rather shall I solely and most humbly beg Your Majesty that it should please him to remove a stumbling-block that presented itself in the form of the procedures and claims carried out and maintained at Plymouth against Captain Johan van der Becque of Flushing and a certain ship brought by him to the sea or its harbour.’

The captain who carried a commission from the Prince of Orange to make war against the Spanish was taken to an English port, his prize ship was impounded and he was arrested, facing charges in the High Court of the Admiralty.

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1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3189, Res. 26 June 1630.
2 TNA, SP 84 /142 f.59, Joachimi to Charles I, 29Aug/8 Sept. 1630, Je n’importunerai pas vostre Majesté sacrée maintenant par la deduction de toutes et chacune des plaints, ni déduira les causes désdites contraventions, ains priera seulement treshumblement vostre Majesté que son plaisir soit de lever un achoppement laquelle s’offre par les procedure et pretensions tenues et faictes à Pleimouth contre le Capitaine Johan van der Becque de Flissinge et certain navire amané par lui à la rade ou havre dudit Pleimouth.
Joachimi continued his letter to the king and ‘humbly begged him that it should please him to command that orders should be despatched to the effect that the said arrest should be lifted and the said captain allowed to take away the said ship of about one hundred and eighty tons, the share that the commission orders him’. In addition he wrote ‘that [English] Vice-Admirals, Port Captains and their Lieutenants should be forbidden to carry out such procedures but that they should be governed rather according to the spirit of the said Treaty of Southampton’\(^1\). At that time it appeared to the Dutch that the navy’s actions were only governed by the doctrine of mastery of the seas and the pursuit of prize money.

The case against van der Becque in the Court of the Admiralty appeared to confirm information of a new English law. Spanish ships captured by the Dutch and entering English ports for replenishment could be re-claimed by the ‘oldest owners’\(^2\). The new law was not used directly in van der Becque’s indictment, but instead another new law that he, being of French extraction, had no legal right to use commissions from the Republic’s States General or the Prince of Orange. Consequently, under England’s new law, he had acted as a pirate against a friendly nation and therefore, his prize would belong to the oldest owners, in this case, the Spanish. Joachimi’s intercession remained unanswered, which compelled the States General to write to the king. The States General re-iterated that van der Becque, using the captain’s Dutch surname Le Clercq, had acted correctly under his lawful commissions. See Note.

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\(^1\) Ibid., *humblement qu’il plaise de commander que orders soient depeschiez par lesquels ledit arrest soit levé et permis audit Captaine Johan van der Becque d’emener ledit navir cent quatre vingts tonneaux, la part ou la commission le layordonne.* In addition that, *Vice Admiraux, Captaines des Ports et leurs Lieutenants d’user de telles procédures ains qu’ils soient à régler selon la teneur dudit traité de Southampton.*

\(^2\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3190, Res. 6 June 1631, *outste eygenaers.*

**Note.** Joachimi referred to the Captain under the surname of Becque and the States General used the surname Clercq. It is the same person who, most probably, adopted the more Dutch sounding surname Clercq after he took-up residence in Flushing, Zeeland. Henceforth, I will use the name Le Clercq.
Le Clercq was a citizen of Flushing in the province of Zeeland where he lived, and was employed, for the last six or seven years. ‘That he could be regarded as a pirate - a position that we find so strange that it ought to be rejected immediately and without discussion because several subjects of Your Majesty and of other princes and potentates our friends and allies, transport themselves from one day to the next from towns of sovereign princes to these United Provinces to bear arms, both by sea and land against our enemy without encountering the least accusation of being a pirate or thief’

The States General asked the king to command the judges in the Court of Admiralty to throw out the case without further delay adding that should the case be allowed to continue and the Court rule against Le Clercq, the Spanish would ‘gain as much as if they had obtained of your Majesty directly a ban on Dutch access to the harbours of your kingdoms’. If the Spanish were successful in this first case they ‘will never fail to find inventions and subtleties to make [your in fact neutral harbours] useless to our subjects’.

In its political capacity, the States General had reminded Charles of his commitments under the Treaty of Southampton, Frederik Henry joined the States General and wrote to Charles in his personal capacity. He asked Charles to intervene ‘with the kind of equity and justice that all, whether subjects of Your Majesty or foreigners have become used to’. He addressed Charles again, but this time in his capacity as Captain-General of the Republic’s armies.

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1 TNA, SP 84/144 f.25, States General to Charles I, 5/15 August 1631, mais qu’il pourroit ester tenu pour pirate, laquelle position nous trouvions si estrange qu’elle sur le champ devroit ester rejectée sans débat pour ce que plusieurs subjects de vostre Majesté et des autres potentats, nos amis et alliez se transportent de jour à aultre de bourgs Souverain vers ces Provinces Unies pour porter les arms que par terre contre nostre enemy sans encontre la moindre de pirate ou valeur.

2 Ibid. nostre enemy gaigneroit aultant comme s’il obtienoit de vostre Majesté une défense générale de l’accès ès havres de vos royaumes.

3 Ibid.

4 TNA, SP 84/144 f.23, Prince of Orange to Charles I, 4/14 August 1631, cette sorte d’équitée et de justice indifférente don’t tous, autant estrangers que subjects de vostre Majesté ont accoustume.
Frederik Henry wrote to Charles that the Cardinal-Infante was expected to arrive in the Southern Netherlands with many Spanish troops on a number of vessels. It was said that the king of Great Britain had sent some of his ships to him which, ‘over here we would not wish to believe or hope’\(^1\). Frederik Henry’s *cri de coeur* was understandable from the Dutch point of view, but ignored the fact that England’s originally strong negotiating position had been weakened. Charles would have to employ different strategies and policies to regain the lost momentum even if wholly against existing treaties and the interests of the Dutch his erstwhile partners.

At the time of Charles’ peace treaty with Spain, the situation on the continent was very different from that prevailing when James made peace with Spain in 1604. James could afford a foreign policy of diplomacy while keeping his realms strictly neutral, but his son was in a different situation. His diplomatic influence was limited and his rule without Parliament tied his hands financially. A close Anglo-Spanish relationship would keep England within the political circles of the continent and serve as a political counterweight against France. However, the need to maintain, indeed strengthen, amity with Spain could mean England accommodating many if not all of Spain’s wishes in relation to the war against the Dutch. Complying with many of the Spanish wishes also served English mercantile interests against the Republic as the major trade competitor; after all, the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty was for ‘Peace, Entrecourse and Commerce’\(^2\); a potent threat for the Dutch traders.

*From partnership to diverging national interests*

Adriaen Pauw, Grand Pensionary of the States of Holland presented the States General with a summary of unresolved issues of great importance for Holland\(^3\).

\(^1\) TNA, SP 84/143 f.221, Prince of Orange to Charles I, 23 June/3 July 1631, *ce que par deça ne sçaurions bonnement ny espérer*.
\(^2\) Treaties, Charles I, 1625-1649, STC (2nd ed.) 9251.3.
\(^3\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3190, Res. 3 December 1631.
Pauw listed restrictions on the movement of its merchant vessels and navy ships; issues on prize ships and goods; the engaging of English mariners by Brussels licensed privateers and the protracted negotiations between the trading companies. He raised the non-payment of the English debt, now amounting to 1,200,000 guilders, half of which was lent to the States General by Pauw’s province, and finally, that at all times the Amboyna incident was being used to influence every negotiation. The repeated issues were well known to the States General but, significantly, Pauw had emphasized them as the senior Advocate of the States of Holland, the main provider of the Republic’s war expenses.

The States General had to accept that it could not challenge or change its senior treaty partner’s policies, but neither did it want to compromise its own policies and actions aimed at gaining the Republic’s independence. When Dudley Carleton\(^1\) was going on a visit to England, the States General asked him to convey a special memorandum to his uncle Viscount Dorchester. The States General not only intended to inform Dorchester of the pressing issues affecting the relations between England and the Republic, but through him also other Council members who were not aligned with Cottingham’s pro-Spanish faction. The memorandum started with the request for ‘payment of the loan of 600,000 guilders and interest, confirmed in writing by Viscount Dorchester himself when he was ambassador in the early part of Charles’ reign’ \(^2\). This was followed by the urgent request that no additional permission was given to the Spanish for the recruitment of troops and seafarers, to fight against the Republic. It dealt in detail with the impediments placed on the Republic’s merchant vessels and navy ships and ended with the request for a speedy conclusion of the re-started negotiations between the English and Dutch trading companies. Whether the States General expected Carleton to use the special memorandum as suggested is not known, but in any case it would serve as a record of the view of the States of Holland about the state of the Anglo-Dutch relations.

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\(^1\) Dudley Carleton, the nephew of previous ambassador Sir Dudley Carleton, later Viscount Dorchester, acted as England’s representative after Carleton’s departure until the appointment of William Boswell in 1633, then as Resident Sir William Boswell, England’s representative in the Republic.

The States General looked for support from at least part of the Council if not to reverse then to improve a damaged relationship, and change what appeared to be little short of a generally engendered anti-Dutch tide. The Anglo-Dutch political relationship had changed; the maritime treaty and the Treaty of Southampton had provided both sides with a military partnership of convenience, which faded away with the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty. The Triple Alliance treaties had lost their meaning with Christian’s peace with the Emperor. Charles no longer needed an Anglo-Dutch partnership. Peace with Habsburg Spain (with which the Republic was at war) made it incongruous and also a possible impediment in England’s relations with other nations such as the Austrian Habsburg and France.

The Anglo-Dutch diplomatic relationship had also changed. Ambassador Carleton was not replaced at the same level, leaving it to his nephew who resided in the Republic, to convey London’s communications to the States General. The Dutch were faced with the reality that they were in a different relationship with England. In future the States General would have to conduct its relations with the king and his Council from a different position for redress of their grievances under the Treaty of Southampton. At the same time, Charles’ demands for justice for the Amboyna incident and compensation for the alleged losses of the EIC in the East Indies remained unresolved.

Charles had demanded justice for the Amboyna incident within an unrealistic period of eighteen months from September 1625 ¹, but he had to wait an equally unrealistic six years for the outcome of the indictment of those involved in the incident. Finally, the States General had received the ‘judgment and sentences arrived at by its delegated judges in the specially convened Court’². The decisions were not what Charles had already decided they should have been. It was not only that Charles did not recognize a Dutch judiciary but also that the Republic’s judiciary did not recognize lèse majesté and the ensuing mandatory death sentence in English courts.

¹ TNA, SP 84/129 f.31, Charles to States General, 8 September 1625. Detailed on page 36 of this thesis.
² NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 5 February 1632.
The States General had considered the judgements and sentences of the special Court and had ‘decided that implementation had to be with all circumspection in order that on his Majesty’s side nothing affects his reputation. It was for that reason that the verdicts and sentences had not been published but that Deputies [of the States General] will be charged to inform his Majesty or his Councillors. At the same time, to suggest that it could be better to consider whether maintaining the friendship of the two Nations would not be better and that on the side of his Majesty’s subjects orders were given not to pursue the affairs further, rather let them slip into abeyance and out of mind. The States General realised that it could become an issue at the highest level between the Crown of England and the Republic and asked the Prince of Orange for advice. He suggested sending a special embassy to England, but at the same time also to the king of France, to inform him that the Republic continued its war and to urge him to undertake something against Spain.

The prince’s suggestions were accepted and the States General appointed Govert Brasser, one of its members to head a special embassy. He left for England on 5 March with an extensive negotiating mandate and comprehensive instructions. These were specifically on the Amboyna affair, the stalled EIC-VOC negotiations and the impending trial of Le Clercq in an Admiralty Court. His instructions had frequent references to the Treaty of Southampton, but did not conceal the Dutch views of the deterioration of the relations after the first year of the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty. Perhaps not meant to be conveyed as such to Charles, the States General wrote to Brasser that apparently to the English, ‘friendship with Spain was preferred to the faithful affection of this State for his Majesty’.

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2 Ibid., Vol. 3, pp.121-128.
3 Ibid., Vol.3, p.123, vriendschap met Spaengien voor de ghetrouve affectie van desen Staet tot syn Majesteyts dienst wert gheprefereert.
In the first report to the States General, Brasser wrote that the king had appointed Secretary of State Sir John Coke as intermediary between him and the king and his Council. His appointment, and the non-replacement of Carleton as ambassador, added a changed conduct of diplomatic relations to the already changed political ones. Coke’s role as intermediary was particularly significant as his views of Anglo-Dutch relations were already made explicitly known when he objected in 1616 against the redemption of the cautionary towns. Brasser also reported that Coke had warned him that his negotiations would take place against a background dominated by the Amboyna affair, and asked the States General for more information on it. Brasser was instructed to proceed according to his instructions, but in a special presentation to Charles himself. He was also to convey to his Majesty that a conviction of Le Clercq would have serious consequences and that ‘great misunderstandings could arise’¹. Ostensibly to avoid this occurring, the States General had already decided that the VOC could deploy the State’s warships to provide convoy protection for their vessels through the Channel from ‘the Heads (hooffden) [presumably the headlands around Dover] to England’s end’².

The States General continued to use the Treaty of Southampton and the traditional, but increasingly hollow, exchanges of friendship between the two countries. Charles’ assurances of affection for the United Provinces, and frequent references to the common cause for protection of the shared reformed religion, were more aimed at the usually pro-English orthodox Calvinists in the Republic than at the States General and the Republic as a whole. But the professed friendship had become part of the diplomatic phraseology, in stark contrast with the political and actual developments of the relationship. Charles’ foreign policies were, if not dominated then at least deeply influenced, by his dynastic objectives. His general foreign objectives aimed at exerting maximum possible influence on continental politics and developments.

¹ NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 4 May 1632, including letter to Brasser of 5 May 1632, groote misverstanden souden connen ontstaen.
² NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3191, Res. 4 May 1632, de hooffden aff tot Engelandts eijnde.
The attempt to achieve this by military means had failed, but England’s geographic position and latent powers together with amity with Spain could return England to its earlier political position of being a coveted friend or feared foe against an always-mistrusted France. Both dynastic and general objectives needed close Anglo-Spanish relations, with the consequence for the States General seeking closer relations with France to protect the Republic’s interests. The divergence of English and Dutch political interests, the re-emerging of earlier trade and fisheries frictions and the Amboyna incident left the States General in the difficult position of maintaining the best possible Anglo-Dutch relations while safeguarding the Republic’s own interests.

*The Amboyna incident augmented by earlier Anglo-Dutch trading issues*

Although Charles had accepted that the incident had to be tried in the Republic, he had expected that the accused would be condemned for the most serious offences of treason and *lèse majesté* applying in his own realms but these had to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for the citizens of the sovereign United Provinces. The Amboyna judges were found guilty in the Republic’s Court of a serious offence; but, as neither treason nor murder could be proven beyond doubt under Dutch law, the delegated judges had no justification for death penalties and imposed prison sentences. The sentences imposed by the Amboyna judges left special envoy Brasser and ambassador Joachimi with the task of convincing Charles that justice had been done. It exposed the different constitutions and judicatures of the two countries although these had not prevented the formal conclusions of agreements and treaties.

Combining the Amboyna incident with all alleged EIC losses and foregone profits that could have been made according to the EIC traders own estimate, had been interpreted by the Dutch as a political and mercantile move for negotiating advantage.
The losses as a direct consequence of the Amboyna incident itself had been merged, not surprisingly but still incorrectly, with the older and wider alleged EIC trading and opportunity losses. The EIC arguments rested on the accusation of the VOC’s consistent failure to renegotiate the 1619 VOC-EIC treaty, and the company’s direct responsibility for not accepting the EIC’s demanded concessions. To strengthen the EIC’s case, punitive reprisals against the VOC had started before the eighteen months’ period imposed by Charles had expired. They continued with the impounding of three VOC vessels returning from the Indies even while the special court in the Republic was still in session. The negotiating tactics became clear when serious attempts were made to negotiate but again stalled on procedural questions and references to Amboyna.

The trial of the Amboyna judges was followed by an offer of settlement of the losses incurred by the incident itself, for which the VOC was to provide 75,000 guilders. This amount was increased to 150,000 guilders when the States General agreed to waive a large part of this increase in lieu of the VOC’s future expenses and taxes. However, the enlarged amount was to include all ‘outstanding and known questions and differences, negotiations and decisions after the treaty of 1619’\(^1\). Also an agreement was to be made on conditions for new negotiations. The delegates of the States General and directors of the VOC were charged to formulate these conditions and to convey them to Brassé and Joachimi. The conditions had to include that the negotiations be in the French language and in all other aspects as the 1619 treaty and any further negotiations. Formal undertakings had to be given by his Majesty and the States General that no reprisals be made during the lifetime of the treaty, that all existing reprisals be annulled, and that the negotiations be free from the influence of Amboyna\(^2\).

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\(^1\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 4 May 1632, including the resolution on the settlement of the alleged losses, *openstaende ende bekende questien ende differenten in onderhandelinge ende decisie nae’l Tractat van den Jare 1619*.

\(^2\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 25 February 1632 incorporated in Secr. Res. of 5 February 1632.
The extended terms of reference for Brasser and Joachimi indicated that the States General did want to clarify, and if possible improve, Anglo-Dutch relations, accepting that the widely diverging English and Dutch interests would lead to a different relationship. However, the States General needed a clear indication from the English side that such a new relationship would honour what was left of the Treaty of Southampton, which both sides wanted to maintain. The religious bonds between the English and Dutch peoples remained and the treaty, when honoured, would link the two countries until 1640. However, England’s foreign policies, with the distinctly separate policies for relations with the Republic and the ongoing Dutch-Spanish war, left the issues dividing England and the Republic more exposed and greater than those uniting them.

Peace with the Spanish Habsburgs had not deterred Charles from supporting Gustavus Adolphus’ war against the Austrian Habsburgs; merely supporting the Swedish king did not mean at the time that England participated in his war. In order to safeguard the position of the Count Elector Frederick in the meantime, Charles had dispatched Sir Henry Vane to Gustavus Adolphus to negotiate an alliance treaty to that effect. But the Swedish king’s demands for an alliance were considered by Vane to be so extravagant that he thought them as ‘not intended as a serious basis of negotiation’\(^1\). The Swedish king had left Vane in no doubt that he would not commit himself to the restitution of the Count Elector’s Palatinate but, he suggested, only restoration to his estates as a conditional donative of Sweden. France supported the Swedish king’s campaign in the Empire, not for the restitution of the Palatinate but for its own political reasons. The French and the Swedish monarchs entered into an offensive/defensive treaty. France would pay 400,000 thalers a year for a Swedish army of 35,000 men to remain in Germany for five years \(^2\) diverting the Imperial forces from France, or more precisely, leaving the French the opportunity to move their frontier to the Rhine.

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\(^1\) Sharpe, The Personal Rule, p.81.
The Anglo-Spanish amity raised the possibility of a withdrawal of the Spanish forces occupying part of the Lower Palatinate or, at least not forcibly preventing Frederick’s decision to return in 1632. The States General provided him ‘with horses, a military escort and the promise of a subsidy of 150,000 guilders’\(^1\). There is no evidence that Frederick was aware that he would not be returning to his own estates, but to one designated by Gustavus Adolphus as a *donative* of Sweden. The Swedish king’s extraordinary suggestion can only have meant that he was convinced of his ability to inflict a military defeat on the Emperor or, at least, that he would be able to dictate the conditions for a settlement in the Empire. However, Gustavus Adolphus was killed at the battle of Lützen in November 1632. His death ended the high expectations of the German Protestants and the chance of a decisive change in the Thirty Years’ War. Ironically, in the same year the Count Elector Frederick V died, being more than anyone else responsible for the start of that war. Frederick’s death did not change Charles’ policies for the restitution of the Palatinate. If anything, the protection of his widowed sister’s inheritance and that of his nephew Charles Louis (1617-1680), for Charles the new Count Elector, became even more important for his honour and that of his House.

*Revolt in the Southern Provinces and new Dutch-Spanish peace negotiations*

During the 1630/1 Dutch-Spanish peace negotiations, the Republic’s war efforts had been restricted to only minor sorties. The Spanish forces had been depleted by their support for the Emperor’s armies, and the southern provinces were near to rebellion against their Habsburg overlords. The States General considered the time ripe to launch a major offensive and appointed an ad hoc secret committee of its members to prepare with Frederik Henry a new campaign. These committee members were to accompany the prince on the forthcoming campaign as deputies-in-the-field.

\(^1\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3191, Res. 25/26 January 1632.
Whereas the States General retained the ultimate responsibility, its deputies-in-the-field were empowered ‘to take strategic [and political] decisions on behalf of the States General on the battlefield itself. Although not without consultation with the prince, it were these gentlemen who were in charge of the operations’ ¹. While considering various options for a renewed offensive Frederik Henry was presented with an opportunity for a major military coup.

Frederik Henry’s cousin, Count Henry van den Bergh, one of the commanders of the Spanish forces, allowed the Dutch army passage along the river Maas (Meuse) where it captured Roermond, Venlo and Maastricht, leaving Brussels itself within reach. Van den Bergh wrote to Isabella, not to explain giving the Dutch armies a free passage, but to express his personal and general dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the Southern Netherlands. Henry van den Bergh felt dishonoured by not having been appointed Spinola’s successor, and detailed the general resentment at the overbearing presence and actions of the Spaniards in his homeland. He omitted the fact that, together with other nobles, he was trying to foment a revolt. With the support of the Dutch armies, he hoped to transform the southern Netherlands into an independent Catholic republic under the protection of the Dutch Republic and France.

Charles had personally instructed his envoy Balthazar Gerbier in Brussels to support the revolutionary nobles². It was in his interest to support independent southern provinces but without Spanish troops, which could lead to the end of a Dutch-Spanish war, obviating a Dutch-French league and keeping the French out of the southern Netherlands. Peter Geyl added another reason for Charles’ interest in keeping the northern and southern provinces apart. ‘England feared the accession of power which reunion with Flanders and Brabant would mean to the young Republic, her rival in trade and colonisations’ ³.

¹ Groenveld, Verlopend Getij, p.77. namens de generaliteit op het kreigsterrein zelf beleidsbeslissingen te nemen. Het waren deze heren die, weliswaar niet zonder overleg met de prins, formeel het opperbevel voerden.


However, for the first time since 1600 and without the consent of Madrid the Archduchess convened the States General of her Southern Provinces to garner support for rapid and decisive actions to prevent a full-scale uprising. Unbeknown to her, Frederik Henry had decided already not to support an uprising in the southern Provinces; he had termed it a ‘droombeeld, an unreal vision’¹. The planned revolution failed; the scheming nobles had not received the necessary support in the provinces and the indigent Gerbier sold to Isabella the details of the plan and ‘the names of the nobles’².

The new military situation was favourable for the Dutch despite the fragile long supply lines for their armies, but for Isabella distinctly threatening for Brussels. These factors, together with growing war weariness on both sides led to a new search for peace, at least between the North and South. Archduchess Isabella sent her envoys to Frederik Henry’s army camp at Maastricht, where they were presented with a nine point proposal which had to serve as the basis of the negotiations ‘not with free southern provinces but with Spain’³. Frederik Henry proposed a mutually defensive alliance between the North and South, the latter as a semi-independent State with the Spanish king as its distant overlord. Brussels was to negotiate this alliance with Madrid but with the withdrawal of all Spanish forces on land and sea as a non-negotiable condition. Moreover, ‘those in the South must guarantee whatever the King of Spain agrees’⁴. Frederik Henry had called the planned revolt an unreal vision and had replaced it by one of his own which was going well beyond his mandate; Smit described his proposals as ‘not empowered’⁵. The Southern delegates considered Frederik Henry’s proposals as excessive but wanted to continue the negotiations, which were transferred to the States General in The Hague, not least as the States General could not permit the prince to stray into the Republic’s political arena.

⁴ Ibid., die van het Zuiden moesten instaan voor alles wat de Koning van Spanje op zich nam, Vol.1, p.42.
⁵ Ibid., ongemachtigd, p.42.
The negotiations in The Hague started with the original nine point agenda but, as the southern delegates had expected, with an opposite side as usual divided between the *Trevistes*, in favour of a cease-fire or peace, and the strong Calvinist *anti-Trevistes* faction.

Whereas a semi-independent neutral southern Netherlands State could still serve England’s interests, France’s interests were different, a withdrawal of the Spanish armies would be very welcome in Paris but the southern Netherlands’ remaining link with Spain meant that the Republic had to stay at war with Spain. France’s ambassador Hercule de Charnacé (1588-1636), a general-*cum*-diplomat, was instructed to explore with the Dutch the possibility of capturing the South and a division of the southern provinces between the Republic and France. He was given a mandate to offer subsidies, and if necessary, military assistance, in any case he had to frustrate any development that could lead to a Dutch-Spanish peace or a long-term cease-fire.

The Dutch-Spanish negotiations in The Hague reached an impasse after the death of Gustavus Adolphus and an improvement in the standing of the Austrian Habsburgs. The position of the southern delegates had hardened and they only wanted to negotiate on behalf of the king of Spain. This was a fundamental change from the negotiations started in Maastricht and led the States General to table a new all-encompassing agenda of twenty articles. Fruitless negotiations continued until the States General handed the southern delegates an ultimatum in April 1633, demanding a reply within a month. However, Madrid ‘considered Holland’s conditions unacceptable and Philip IV decided no longer to negotiate through the Belgian states’. The differences between the Dutch war and peace parties narrowed and more *Trevistes* decided ‘not to compromise their interests for the sake of peace’; continuing the war appeared to be the only option. The southern delegates returned to Brussels where the Archduchess Isabella, daughter of the late king Philip II, died on 1 December 1633.

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The States General voted on 9 December 1633 to break off the peace talks¹. It ended the vision of a union of the northern and southern provinces as envisaged in the, Pacification of Gent, of 1576. It was a poignant reminder for Frederik Henry as it was his father, Prince William I of Orange who had inspired the Pacification and the Union of Utrecht treaty of 1579. The attempt to keep the original seventeen Provinces of the low lands together was both a principled and political attempt but too late; ‘the last chance was lost for a re-union of North and South into the United Netherlands, history took a definitive turn towards the formation of a Petit-Netherlands [the smaller part of the low lands] and the Southern Netherlands as separate political entities’². Smit added, perhaps somewhat euphemistically, that the articles negotiated in the 1632-3 peace talks would later prove to have provided ‘the achievable basis for the peace of 1648’³, which ended the Dutch-Spanish Eighty Year war.

The States General’s vote to continue the war brought Anglo-Dutch differences into a sharper focus. The Republic’s military position required an active ally which, after the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty could only be France. Although Charles could not prevent a Dutch-French alliance, the States General wanted to maintain the best Anglo-Dutch relations possible and would avoid any commitments that impinged on the Treaty of Southampton.

The Anglo-Spanish peace treaty had strengthened Charles’ negotiating position with France, but his strategic and diplomatic strength would need greater and deployable military power, if not on land then at sea. He needed new policies to increase his naval strength and improve the perilous financial state of his realms. For these demands he needed the customs receipts of a flourishing English trade, often the same trade the Dutch needed to finance their war with Spain.

¹ NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 12548.203, Tr. 9 December 1633.
³ Smit, De Buitenlandsche Politiek, In 1648 den bereikbare grondslag voor den vrede heeft opgeleverd, Vol. 1, p.44.
Anglo-Dutch frictions had worsened with England’s reprisals and more recently with what Sharpe euphemistically called, offering Spain ‘the “favour” of its fleet’; even ‘to provide a fleet to keep open the sea routes to the Spanish Netherlands’. Charles suggested that Spain could also ‘hire twenty or thirty ships [from England] in return for the Emperor’s declaration that his nephew Charles Louis was not affected by the ban under which Frederick was placed’. But Olivares wanted more for Spain’s support of the restitution of the Palatinate and the lifting of the ban; he wanted a treaty to bring England into war with the Republic. Charles had not conceded the Spanish request to activate the Cottington treaty but this did not exclude using the Anglo-Spanish friendship to strengthen his own sea power. He appointed ‘the three men who were most in favour of a Spanish alliance - Portland, Cottington and Windebank - to treat with [Spanish envoy] Don Michael Necolalde in secret’.

Windebank and Cottington discussed with Necolalde the equipping of a fleet, partially financed by Spain, to secure the coast of Flanders and provide Spain with an open channel of communication. England’s envoy in Madrid, Sir Arthur Hopton, advised the Council that this would impair Charles’ freedom to act independently and strongly suggested that the king ‘should put to sea a fleet at his own cost’. Hopton’s advice appealed to the Council of War, but in the absence of a Parliament to vote funds another source of finance had to be found to raise and equip a fleet. There were precedents where port towns had been charged to supply ships for the defence of the realm. According to Gardiner, they were going back to the times of the Plantagenets but also to ‘as late as 1626’. Discussions started to use again these evidently established principles, but now not with levies for the supply of ships but for funds, exclusively for the navy’s use to protect the realm.

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1 Sharpe, The Personal Rule, p.88.
2 Adams, Simon, ‘Spain or the Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy’ in, Before the English Civil War, ed. Howard Tomlinson (1983) chapter 4, p.100. Hereafter, Adams, ‘Spain or the Netherlands’, Before the English Civil War.
4 Ibid., p.349.
5 Sharpe, The Personal Rule, p.73.
6 Ibid., p.74.
These levies became known as ‘ship-money’ and the first writs were issued in 1634. However, devising the legal basis for the writs was only the first step. Convincing the people of the justification of what amounted to a new tax in peacetime was still to be addressed by Charles and his Council. Meanwhile, in January 1635 Hopton received authorisation to sign an Anglo-Spanish maritime treaty. Charles had avoided sharing control of his navy with the Spanish and, as usual, he had kept all his options open. With this maritime treaty, as with the Cottington treaty, the Spanish had made promises unlikely to be kept and Charles agreed commitments that he could not implement, as it would lead England into an unwanted, in any case untimely, sea war with the Republic and possibly France. It did not deter Charles from continuing to give Spain the ‘favour of the fleet’. Joachimi wrote to Charles in November 1634 ¹ complaining that a Dutch vessel, the Fortune van Hoorn, was captured and taken to Plymouth. When an Admiralty judge was about to order its return to the Dutch owners, he was informed by a letter, said to be from the king, that Necolalde claimed to be the owner; the court ruled in his favour.

Charles’ new foreign policy did not mean a change of his interests and objectives but different strategies for their realisation. Strengthening the navy was a clear prerequisite for both England’s negotiating position in foreign affairs, but also for relations with the Republic. Although Anglo-Dutch relations were part of England’s foreign policy, they were governed partly by the consequences of Charles’ commitments to the Spanish, and partly by domestic policies to strengthen his realms’ trade and fisheries positions in confrontation with the Republic. Yet Charles made it a point to tell ambassador Joachimi that ‘he wanted the treaties and the friendship to continue’² He added that he had ‘prevented implementation of the sentence’³ of Le Clercq and ‘permitted the Dutch to recruit men in his realms’⁴.

¹ TNA, SP 84/148 f. 234, 28 October/7 November 1634, Joachimi to Charles I.
² NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 5892 LE, 20 August 1633, de tractaten en de vriendschap wil continueren.
³ Ibid., gerechtelijk vonnis belet heeft.
⁴ NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3193, Res. 20 February 1634.
The professed sentiments did not mean an easing of the present trade disputes, which entered a new phase when the EIC presented the VOC with its statement of alleged damages amounting to 2,662,555 R\textsuperscript{1}. The EIC’s claim was contained in a detailed statement of thirty points, which appeared to be an amalgam of alleged specific losses, and merely estimated foregone profits on trade that the EIC assumed would have been made if no disputes with the VOC had existed. However, Brasser, still in England, made no progress with the negotiations between the two trading companies and requested permission to return. The States General granted his request and he returned in June 1634.

Brasser’s mission had served to demonstrate that Anglo-Dutch political and also diplomatic relations had changed; there was no vestige left of partnership and both sides needed only a relationship to serve their own interests. The Dutch had always needed England as an ally and had accepted its seniority, short of jeopardising their own objectives. But they also knew that England’s own foreign policy objectives were regarded as paramount, even if wholly detrimental to those of the Republic. The changes in England’s foreign policies, and the Republic continuing its war against Spain, had widened the gap between their respective foreign policies, objectives and the order of importance of the issues binding and separating the two countries. Sir John Coke gave an insight in the English perception of Anglo-Dutch relations in his fourteen-page letter to the newly knighted Resident William Boswell in The Hague; the letter was written in Coke’s own hand and only dated 1633. Boswell resided in the Republic from before Charles ascended the throne and had acted as secretary of Sir Dudley Carleton and after his ennoblement and departure, Boswell became England’s representative in the Republic. Coke had written to him as Charles’ Secretary of State and in his recently appointed capacity as intermediary between the Dutch diplomats and Charles and his Council.

\textsuperscript{1} NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 6 November 1633. The currency was indicated as “R”, presumably Dutch rijksdaalders, usually 2.5 guilders.
Coke’s letter not only revealed English perceptions of the relations with the Republic but it also gave a rare written insight of English past and forward political thinking and to serve as a manifesto for future English actions and Anglo-Dutch relations. Coke had started his letter with a summary of the origin of the link between England and the United Provinces. Ruefully he noted, ‘If the two countries had united they would not fear the assault of any prince at sea and would trade in all countries with exclusion of others’. Coke’s combination of unity at sea with unity in trading and, seen together with the common reformed religion, would have meant an Anglo-Dutch relationship Coke had considered appropriate when he objected to the redemption of the cautionary towns in 1616. But with the exception of the short-lived Anglo-Dutch maritime treaty of 1625, the Dutch had refused to unite their navy with the English Navy during the Anglo-French war. This would have brought the Republic into war with France and neutralised its navy in its own war against Spain.

Coke argued that the league defensive and offensive [the Treaty of Southampton] must be kept in life and vigour by the care of both governments, but he ignored his king’s ‘favours to Spain’. He finished the first part of his letter with a frank admission that many complaints by the Dutch ambassador were caused by ‘outrages and spoils committed by our men of war at sea and the dilatory and partial justice in our Admiralty Courts’. Coke wrote to Boswell that the king had instituted a special commission to review the situation and to give redress and exemplary punishment where necessary but omitted that this not happen and the navy’s actions against the Dutch intensified. He also told Boswell about the lack of respect by the Dutch for the Crown with the restitution of the cautionary towns in 1616 and, undoubtedly well known to Boswell as ex-secretary of ambassador Carleton, about the exclusion of the English representatives from the Republic’s Council of State.

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¹ TNA, SP84/147 f.213, Coke to Boswell, 1633. In view of the importance of Coke’s letter and also for further quotations in this thesis, his letter has been transcribed in modern English and is printed in full at the end of this Chapter Six. Further quotations will be indicated in footnotes as: Coke to Boswell 1633, followed by the page number in this thesis.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
Coke continued by concentrating on trade and fisheries issues, particularly the latter, and listed in detail what he saw as wrongs committed by the Dutch and the steps to change the situation. He stressed that the wrongs must be rectified so that the good relations were restored and maintained. Also Charles had expressed the wish for good relations to remain grounded in the Anglo-Dutch treaties and friendship. However, it was his own policy changes which were actually aiding the Spanish that were driving the two countries further apart. Charles had decided that England’s neutrality could be consistent with his maritime treaty with the Spanish who were at war with the Republic, at the same time that good relations had to remain grounded in Anglo-Dutch treaties and friendship. For his new policy however, he saw peace with Spain, even aid for Spanish’s war efforts as essential elements in his continental policies, and for the restitution of the Palatinate. However, even in the unlikely event that Olivares supported Charles’ dynastic objectives, the decisions would have to be made in the Empire where the death of the Swedish king meant that political and military matters would be largely determined by the governments in Stockholm and Paris.

The Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna of the regency government of Queen Kristina, the six year old daughter of Gustavus Adolphus, presented the Council with an extensive memorandum ‘concerning the correct foreign policy to be followed now that the king has died’¹. It contained only six clauses on Sweden and the Empire. He proposed to abandon the late king’s general warfare and much of his conquests in southern Germany, but to maintain the occupation of Pomerania and Prussia to secure the Baltic. A strong military presence was to be maintained at a ‘vast fortified camp, the “Gustavsburg” at the junction of the Main and the Rhine’², a major re-distribution made of Catholic lands to loyal Protestants and the Lutheran hierarchy, and general order introduced.

² Ibid.
Oxenstierna sought to ‘atomise Germany into a host of loosely organised but mutually suspicious independent units’, thereby avoiding anyone but Sweden dominating the western side of the Empire. The Chancellor’s ambitious plans for Sweden’s position in the Empire were accepted, with the caveat that Sweden alone could not bear the costs involved when attempts to find sufficient support from the Protestant German princes failed. Oxenstierna’s entire plan remained just that after combined Imperial and Spanish forces defeated Sweden’s main army on 6 September 1634 at Nördlingen. The Imperial army commanded by the Emperor’s son Ferdinand, king of Hungary, was strengthened by 15,000 Spanish troops led by the Cardinal-Infante who arrived in time from Italy via the Tirol gateway. The Swedish army, under the joint command of Gustav Horn (1592-1657) and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar (1604-1639), was out-numbered and out-maneuvered and after the battle, ‘some 12,000 Protestants lay dead on the field and some 4,000 more, including Gustav Horn, were captured’.

The reverberations of the Habsburgs’ victory were felt throughout Europe. In the Empire itself it led to the Treaty of Prague on 30 May 1635, which, as Gardiner described, was not a treaty in the strict sense of the word but more an agreement, a territorial arrangement to serve as ‘a starting point of a general pacification and Lutheranism alone was recognised as the privileged [Protestant] religion’. ‘It was not an agreement which any one was to be enthusiastic about’; all existing disputes remained for continuing hostilities in the Empire. The Treaty of Prague left the Calvinists isolated; the Emperor’s Council and the predominantly Catholic Diet were even more reluctant to restore the Palatinate and his late father’s former dignities to the young Calvinist Charles Louis. It made Charles wholly dependent on Spain’s support to fulfil his dynastic objectives, but he found the Republic’s war with Spain in the way. His relations with the Dutch had to be adjusted to meet the minimum requirement of both Habsburg Houses; he needed an end of the Republic’s war with Spain.

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Gardiner, The Thirty Years’ War, p.181.
4 Ibid
The strict confederacy between this Crown and the United Provinces [States] is careful to be performed and corroborated for these reasons. It is a branch and continuation of the ancient intercourse with Burgundy which supported both States against their most potent enemies at all times. It is now grounded upon the union of religion, the surest ground of a firm league. By it on their part their Estate has been built and raised to that strength and opulence they enjoy, and on our part our peace has been maintained by making their country the seat of war. As the subjects of the States whether merchants or men of war, they cannot keep the seas in foul weather without succour of our ports, and will be easy prey to an enemy that harbour there, so the danger is no less to our country and subjects if an enemy be master of their ships and ports. If our forces be united, they would not fear the assault of any prince by sea, and may command both the sea and the trade in all countries with exclusion of others when they see cause. This union will keep them in respect with other princes and encourage the well affected to join with their party who if we should divide, would fail and be easily drawn to the enemies of both.

Now this accord [the 1625 Treaty of Southampton] though grounded upon a strict league offensive and defensive, yet must be kept in life and vigour by the care of both governments, to cherish good affection between their subjects and redress such wrongs and oppressions as may alienate their minds. A want of which care has already much loosened and threatened the dissolving of this ancient bond between us if speedy remedy is not applied. The wrongs complained of by them and the outrages, and spoils committed by our men of war, and the dilatory and partial justice in our Admiralty Courts, the grounds whereof are these.
First, our men of war are too apt, and too much encouraged to make booty of all that comes to hand and secondly, the Ministers of Justice, in regard of the benefit that comes to themselves in their places are not willing by severity of justice to discourage reprisals and therefore many times draw further impositions by delays from the parties, as the law would not enforce. For redress of those evils (upon complaints made by the ministers of his allies) his Majesty has most graciously established a Commission of Review to give a just redress in all such cases by a summary hearings. This may give due satisfaction if the Ministers will attend to it, and by the exemplary punishment of some few who bridle which otherwise will make us hateful in all the world. So those injuries being always disavowed by our King and State and more easily to be reformed.

But the violence we complained of, and not the wrongs of private men subject to ordinary justice, but those as are directed and countenanced by the States and openly avowed. First for the fishing, his Majesty has the same undoubted right his ancestors ever had to command the narrow seas and the fishing upon all his coasts. This the States themselves acknowledged when they sought leave of the late King of Happy Memory to fish upon the Scottish seas and obtained it with such restrictions as his Majesty thought fit. But being thus admitted they encroached more and more and drive the King’s subjects from their own waters which they complained of. With His majesty, in his gracious and peaceable disposition seeking redress by treaty, they took the boldness of both to desert the interests they might have by his licence and to assume a proper right in the common freedom of the sea [Mare Liberum] and in defence thereof caused books to be divulged. Finding no further stop, they attempted by private contract, to possess themselves of an island amongst the Orkneys without his Majesty’s knowledge or consent. And since from those usurpations upon the coasts, they have proceeded to dispossess him in his new discoveries in Greenland (where his subjects had taken possession and planted his standard and settled in his right their fishing and trade).
[They continued] not only by intrusion but by plain hostility killing his people and seizing their ships and goods and when his Majesty upon a second treaty had contended himself at the present with a recompense of 2200 pounds, they not only delayed but refused to give any satisfaction. They continued by strong hand both to fish on all his coasts, to make use of his ports, to dry their nets on land and to victual both their ships and their armies from all parts of his country. This giving way in the fishing has both encouraged and enabled them to do us more prejudice and injustice in the matter of trade in their own towns and to draw thither the staple of our merchants who have ever been forward to enrich foreign states rather than their own. With our staple they became masters not only of our fish but of the most important commodities for traffic in all countries, of our cloth, lead and tin which they have now so improved that they raise double the profit our merchants made thereof. Firstly, by dyeing and dressing cloth which our merchants had not done before but could not accept [which led to English reprisals] but the industry and skill of that people deserve much commendation and our intractableness much blame. Secondly, by a damnable device of taxing which followed as a just punishment [for the reprisals] upon our merchants for opposing the public good for private ends. The taxes laid upon the cloth being as great a burden as the customs they were made to pay here. They do not offer the higher prices to any nation but ours and thereby discrediting our chief commodities in all the world and so disgrace our nation and government and may not be endured.

Yet this extortion upon our trade in their own country is not so heinous as that cruel violation of divine and human laws in the East Indies where they have not only destroyed in hostile manner the ships and persons of our men and taken the goods from them. But contrary to the stipulation and oath upon the treaty have assumed a sovereignty and tormented and put to death by way of justice his Majesty’s innocent subjects. And after seven years pursuit by dilatory pretence refused to do justice, and contrary to their promise have not sent back the authors of that most wicked murder to do more mischief in those parts.
Other wrongs and affronts though not of this high nature and worthy of consideration show plainly not only their ingratitude but that they resolve without any retribution to make us serve their terms. It is something that they were so hasty to get from us their cautionary towns [in 1616], but for that we have more cause to blame ourselves than them. It may be presumed that in time they will have cause to repent it as well as us. A more palpable act of alienation is the exclusion of our ambassador from their Council of State, alleging that the French will then require the same facility and so putting both in equal balance and acknowledging no nearer relation to us. Another act of disrespect is that notwithstanding his Majesty’s proclamation and remonstrance by his ambassador and the States promise to the contrary, they debauch our people to send [employ?] them on land and sea. To which may be added lastly their project of freedom of the seas published in print which is both an assumption of sovereign power in our seas and an opportunity to provoke us to war. By that which has been said it may be sufficiently apparent both how necessary it is to maintain our strict alliance with the States of the United Provinces and how for the present it is infringed on both sides and by them in a high degree. It remains to propound such remedies as may be fit and require speedily to be applied and they must be of strong application in regard of the height of the distemper. They must be ordained only to rectify and not break any article of the peace. It may be presumed that such misunderstandings have drawn them from the former due respect, caused by the mischief they draw upon themselves, which [the remedies] will bring them by degrees from that height they are now on.

First, for the fishing, the proposition now in hand, and by his Majesty referred to a special committee is effectually to pursue raising a fleet of busses and merchant vessels which, together with the fishermen already upon the coasts, may be able to take the fish and serve the markets with that advantage of anticipation which God gives us by sending fish on our coasts. If any foreigners will continue to fish amongst them, who in regard of late usage and our alliance we shall not think fit to prohibit, yet we must suffer them no longer to encroach upon our shores for drying their nets.
We will not enable others to ease our own people out of this gainful trade as hitherto we have done without satisfaction and duty to His Majesty for which by ancient right they ought to pay. And whereas in the Treaty of Southampton the embassy of the States got an article inserted which give to their subjects the rights to succour themselves and victual in our ports; under colour thereof, they relieve themselves from storms and refresh their men with victuals, which is doubtless the uttermost extent of that article. They make provisions on all our coasts in England, Scotland and Ireland for their merchants’ voyages, for their men of war and for their armies, and their towns to the great detriment of the king and his people and contrary to the laws and policies of the realms. It will be most necessary either wholly to restrain this liberty of carrying any victuals out of the land or at least to lay such an excise upon them for his Majesty’s benefit, as the States do in their country, which they cannot except against and will make them afford their fish no cheaper than ours.

For his trade his Majesty may be pleased to call home his merchants from Delft [their headquarters in the Republic] and plant their staples in his own country where formerly they had been settled to the benefit of this kingdom. And then the great magazine of the trade of all the world which is now drawn to Holland will be transferred into his Majesty’s kingdom which is better seated for it. Whereas now his merchants’ goods are in their power to seize upon in all cases of offence, their goods will then be at his devotion which will much change the case and make proceed with us upon more fit terms. The way and reasons thereof may appear more at large in a special treaty made of this subject.

When our busses are set up, their encroachment removed and our traders home whereby we may have means to employ our own people. Then will our mariners withdraw themselves from their service from their service and twenty thousand of his Majesty’s subjects inhabiting amongst them will repatriate and help to do our work. These fishermen, merchants and artificers with their treaties and commodities and free from insecurities, joined with our manufacture and our flock of wealth will eat them [the Dutch] out faster in all places than they have eaten us.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Dutch-French offensive-defensive treaty in 1635

From Anglo-Dutch alliance to French-Dutch alliance

When the Dutch voted to continue the war against Spain in December 1633 and France’s ambassador de Charnacé offered a new French subsidy, neither side could have foreseen the Habsburg victory at Nördlingen. However both knew then that a closer and active Dutch-French relationship had to be formed. The Dutch had their own reasons to continue the war but would need an active ally. Richelieu wanted to leave nothing to chance in pursuing his anti-Habsburg policies; he needed the Republic and Sweden and they needed France.

De Charnacé had come to The Hague to forestall a Dutch-Spanish cease-fire or peace and to negotiate a subsidy treaty, he had a mandate to promise financial, and some military, support but both would cease if France itself went to war against Spain. The Republic would not be allowed to make peace with Spain within one year without ‘permission, consentement, of the French monarch’\(^1\) which the Dutch refused and replaced by sans intervention. Richelieu wanted more time for the consolidation of his own position as well as for France’s foreign policies. The Dutch negotiators were instructed to reduce the period to eight months, to press de Charnacé for the payment of a number of French debts and that the treaty might not have any clauses, directly or indirectly ‘disadvantageous for the Crown of Great Britain’\(^2\). On 18 April 1634 a subsidy treaty to last seven years was signed in The Hague with the agreement that for ‘eight months from 1 May 1634 no Dutch-Spanish peace negotiations would take place and no peace or cease-fire agreement would be concluded in the following four months’\(^3\).

Richelieu decided to send a French envoy, Monsieur de Poigny, to Charles to ask him to consider joining the Dutch-French alliance and also to ask him ‘to support the Republic in view of its heavy war expenses’\(^4\).

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\(^1\) Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, p.419.
\(^2\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3193, Res. 9 March 1634.
\(^3\) Smit, De buitenlandse politiek, Vol.1, p.45, voor acht maanden vanaf 1May 1634, met Spanje niet te onderhandelen en binnen een jaar vanaf die datum geen vrede of bestand te sluiten.
\(^4\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3193, Res. 31 July 1634.
Ambassador Joachimi reported to the States General that Charles had informed him that he was willing to come to the Republic’s aid to lessen the unbearable war expenses. Considering the foreign policies pursued at the time by all three countries, de Poigny’s mission and Charles’ reaction to Joachimi can only be seen as empty political and diplomatic gestures.

All sides were well aware that the treaty was only meant to be temporary. Within days of signing it the States General sent a special embassy to Paris to negotiate the next phase in its relationship with France. Adrian Pauw, the powerful Grand Pensionary of the States of Holland and John de Knuyt, the representative of Zeeland’s first nobles and confidant of Frederik Henry, led the embassy; they were to ‘persuade France to openly declare war on Spain. They were successful. In 1635 (8 February) an offensive-defensive alliance was concluded. The States General had given the prince, with a new secret committee, a prominent position in the negotiations; a wide mandate but not a free hand. The negotiating advantage the Dutch had enjoyed when de Charnacé came to The Hague to offer a subsidy treaty, had clearly moved to the French when the Dutch emissaries came to Paris to make the French change from their war by proxy to going to war themselves. Richelieu proposed to Frederik Henry a French plan to ‘help the Provinces to shake off the yoke of the Spanish tyranny’ and, incidentally, serving French interests. If the peoples of the southern provinces were not able, or willing, to free themselves from the Spanish, France would provide an army of 4/6,000 men on foot and 2,000 on horse to be added to Dutch forces to attack Flanders’ coastal towns, beginning at Dunkirk and Gravelines. These would then be handed to the French king. After their capture the Dutch could keep the service of the French army, at the king’s expense, to deploy at places of the States General’s choice along the Republic’s southern borders. Richelieu still wanted to continue hostilities by proxy; this time to obtain strategic ports in return for the help of a minimal French army.


2 TNA, SP 84/148 f. 146, June 1634, proposal by Richelieu.
In his reply to Richelieu¹, Frederik Henry dismissed the possibility of the southern provinces being able to rid themselves of the Spanish, or even wanting to do so. He did not mention that most of the inhabitants, including many of the nobles, disliked and mistrusted the Protestant Dutch even more than the Spanish. The prince did not reject Richelieu’s proposal to attack Dunkirk and Gravelines and to hand them over to the French monarch, but the offer of support was wholly inadequate. He wrote to Richelieu that he also needed 14 to 15,000 troops on foot and 5,000 on horse, paid for by the king but under Dutch command for diversionary actions and asked for the French force to remain in Dutch service until France’s open break with Spain. In addition, France should station an army of 25,000 on foot and 3,000 on horse on its northern borders to commit Spanish forces on the other side. Frederik Henry wrote to Dirk Heuft, chargé d'affaires and special envoy de Knuyt in Paris, extensively informing them of his negotiations with Richelieu. Van Aerssen added his political advice not to ‘waste time on finding support from the southern people and nobles’² and that the States General was unlikely to permit its forces to be deployed as far afield as Dunkirk. In a separate letter van Aerssen stressed the States General’s separate instructions to the envoys ‘to try by all possible means to commit them to an open break with Spain’³. Richelieu’s reluctance to commit France changed after the Swedish defeat at Nördlingen, and the imminent arrival in the southern Netherlands of the Cardinal-Infante with his victorious army.

On 8 February 1635 a French-Dutch offensive-defensive treaty⁴ was signed, ‘one of the most important treaties ever concluded by the Republic’⁵. Louis and Richelieu could no longer defer further decisive action and on 19 May 1635 France formally declared war on Spain. A French-Swedish offensive-defensive treaty had been signed earlier in April but, although France was de facto at war in the Empire, there was no formal declaration.

¹ TNA, SP 84/148 f. 146, June 1634, reply by Prince of Orange.
² TNA, SP 84/148 f. 128, 16/26 June 1634, Prince of Orange and François van Aerssen to Heuft and de Knuyt.
³ TNA, SP 84/148 f. 126, 16/26 June 1634, François van Aerssen to Heuft and de Knuyt.
⁴ NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 12574.61 and inv.nr. 12587, Tr. 8 February 1635.
⁵ Gosses and Japikse, Staatkundige Geschiedenis van Nederland, een der allerbelangrijkste verdragen, die de Republiek ooit sloot, p.473.
The French-Dutch treaty stipulated that ‘both countries should field armies of 25,000 soldiers on foot and 5,000 on horse, and whether jointly or not, campaign in the Southern Netherlands’. If the southerners joined the confederates, they could form a free state under the protection of France and the Republic. If not, their territory would be divided between France and the Republic. In either case, the French would keep a number of ports and the Dutch a series of strongholds on land. Finally, the parties agreed not to make peace with Spain unless ‘together and with agreement of the King and the States General’. Groenveld considered that this agreement was ‘not unintelligent after the negative experience of 1598 when France unilaterally made peace with Spain’, referring to the 1596 Triple Alliance of England, France and the Republic.

The first few months of 1635 saw the end of a period of political ambivalence in Western Europe, which had started with the Anglo-Spanish peace and Charles’ agreement to persuade the Dutch to end their war with Spain. The Dutch had gone through two Brussels-initiated but ultimately fruitless peace negotiations, less to accommodate Charles’ agreement with Spain than the war weariness in the Republic and in the southern Provinces. France was compelled to do more than only paying subsidies for others to implement its own anti-Habsburg policy. The Nördlingen victory and the Treaty of Prague had brought some respite for the Emperor, but none of the underlying issues were resolved. Sweden had lost a battle but was not conclusively defeated. Anglo-Dutch relations had become fragile but not broken; nothing in the 1635 Dutch treaty with France could be seen as contrary to the letter or spirit of the Treaty of Southampton. However, whereas the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty had effectively annulled that part of the treaty concerning the joint war against Spain, the remaining two clauses are of specific importance for England and the Republic with the potential to serve or to divide the two countries.

1 Groenveld, The Eighty Year War, p.263, elk van beide staten zou een leger van 25,000 man voetvolk en 5,000 ruiters op de been brengen om, al dan niet samengevoegd, onder één bevelhebber in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden te opereren.
2 Ibid., gevoeght ende met ghemeene toestemminge des Koninghs ende Heeren Staten.
3 Ibid., niet onverstandig na de negatieve ervaring van 1598 toen de Fransen eenzijdig vrede hadden gesloten.
Charles’ message of goodwill and support for the Dutch war expenses to Joachimi was misleading at the time of his navy’s favours to Spain, his Anglo-Spanish maritime treaty and his impeding the Republic’s shipping and arresting its mariners. The diplomatic exchanges of goodwill and support did not extend to actual political, maritime and trade relations. These were governed by his interests which had never been as remote from the Republic’s as they had become in 1635. The continuing maritime, trade and fisheries frictions were straining Anglo-Dutch relations. This was to come even more to the fore as extensively foretold by Coke in his letter of 1633 to Boswell in The Hague.\(^1\)

Charles had chosen to use the freedom of his non-aligned status to concentrate on the financial and economic issues he faced in his realms, and of particular importance, to concentrate on strengthening his navy. When this was achieved and with the strategic position of the British Isles and his own perception of neutrality, he would regain his earlier negotiating position as a coveted friend or feared foe. The Dutch were vying to maintain their traditional use of English and Scottish ports and to have England as a neutral ally. France sought an alliance with England against Spain. The Spanish wanted the opposite; they needed Charles’ support to safeguard their sea passage to the southern Provinces and the use of the port of Dunkirk, as through ‘that gate men and munitions flowed into the Spanish Netherlands under Charles’ protection’\(^2\) with an important role for the port of Dover.\(^3\) The Spanish envoy Necolalde tried to use the maritime treaty to change what Gardiner called Charles’ protection into a firm remit for a joint Anglo-Spanish fleet. Charles and his Council had rebuffed this barely disguised attempt to bring England into war with the Dutch and, after the Dutch-French defensive-offensive treaty of 1634-5, also with France. Whether Charles rejected such a war altogether or regarded the timing inopportune is not known, but he certainly could not allow it to be determined by Spain.

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\(^{1}\) Coke to Boswell 1633. pp. 151-152 of this thesis.
\(^{3}\) Kepler, J.S., The Exchange of Christendom: The international entrepot at Dover 1622-1641 (Leicester 1976)
Charles could not risk open war with the Republic, particularly not when the Dutch were in an offensive-defensive alliance with France and his own navy’s requirement of funding was not met. The first ship money writ had covered the cost of bringing the existing navy to greater strength but to increase the fleet further more funds were needed. Charles decided to extend the source of ship-money by a second writ, this time not only from the port towns but from the entire country. Justification for the first writ could be found in precedents in the nation’s history but the second writ, also by precedent, would need a national emergency and Parliament’s vote for subsidies. However, Charles appeared determined to build up his navy to the extent that he could take a dominant position in pursuing his foreign policies. He could also implement Coke’s predicted actions against the Dutch maritime strength, trade competition and fisheries. In the meantime, Spain clamoured for England’s help in its war against the Republic while the Dutch needed English ports for their shipping.

The short-lived Anglo-Dutch partnership in the war against Spain, and the States General’s perception of England as an ally, had ended with England’s peace treaty with Spain and the Dutch-French alliance. That left the Anglo-Dutch relationship based on little more than the slender links of its long history, the common Protestant religion and the Treaty of Southampton. The latter both sides wished to maintain, for different political and mercantile reasons. The States General wished to avoid the presently strained relations from escalating into unwanted hostility on the sea. However, Joachimi’s relentless diplomatic efforts to get redress for the treaty transgressions against Dutch shipping in English ports and waters had remained unsuccessful. At the same time, the so-called favours to Spain included protection for the Dunkirk freebooters licensed by Brussels, and the transport in English vessels of Spanish soldiers and war material to Dunkirk and other Flemish ports. In addition, Frederik Henry’s direct appeal to Charles to order a cessation of the flagrant breaches of the Treaty of Southampton had no effect, and neither did the States General’s efforts to re-start the negotiations between the English and Dutch East Indies trading companies.
During the time of England’s war with France, and with the Republic being neutral in the conflict, Charles had written in 1627 to the States General asking the Dutch for their understanding of the necessity of his navy’s searching and even impounding Dutch vessels under the pretext of carrying war material to France\(^1\). This pretext had lost its justification after England’s peace with France in 1629 and with Spain in 1630. Joachimi’s requests for the same understanding with England being neutral remained unanswered. Indeed, it appeared to be replaced by additional actions amounting to actually aiding and abetting the Republic’s enemy.

Within weeks after the appearance of the enlarged fleet, England’s increased naval strength was used to impress and to attempt enforcing a settlement of an old disagreement with the Republic. Charles wrote to the States General on 31 July 1635 that an incident at sea in 1630 near the Madeira Islands had to be satisfactorily resolved within a month or he would be compelled to issue reprisal letters\(^2\). He described in detail an English merchant’s testimony of how a Dutch man-of-war deprived him from his Portuguese prize-ship, a testimony that was disputed by the Dutch captain. The conflicting testimonies remained unresolved during and after the Anglo-Spanish peace negotiations. However, Charles’ sudden personal interest in this five-year old specific incident, his threat of reprisals and reminders of his dominion of the seas had come at the time of his growing naval strength, his favours to Spanish policies and also his need to negotiate a Spanish subsidy. The effects were that the already tense Anglo-Dutch relations deteriorated in the second half of 1635. Relations worsened further and ‘led to more serious situations between the English and the Dutch’\(^3\) at Scarborough and Yarmouth. Sir Francis Windebank wrote to Joachimi that a Dutch warship had arrived at the port of Scarborough with the intention of seizing a foreign vessel under the protection of His Majesty.

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\(^1\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 4562, Secr. Res. 15 September 1627.
\(^2\) TNA, SP 84/150 f.47, Charles I to the States General, 31 July 1635.
\(^3\) Smit, De Buitenlandse Politiek, p.75, en leidde tot nog ernstiger botsingen between de Engelsen en de Nederlanders.
The foreign vessel Windebank referred to was a Dunkirk freebooter that had destroyed many Dutch fishing vessels and had reached the sanctuary of Scarborough before being apprehended by the Dutch man-of-war. Windebank stated that the Dutch captain ‘had put ashore in the port itself eighty of his men armed with pikes and arquebuses’. After being confronted by the regular guard of the town, Windebank wrote, the Dutch withdrew ‘but not before they had compelled the inhabitants of Scarborough to truly dishonourable submission’ which he did not describe. Similar outrages had compelled the Lords of the Council to give orders to the Earl of Lindsey, Admiral of the navy, ‘to take note of this transgression and to prevent such affronts and outrages in the future, in order that His Majesty’s ports and harbours not be exposed to pillaging by these little men of war’. For the Dutch this implied that English neutrality included protection of foreign pirates, for England this meant protection of freebooters licensed by the Spanish government in Brussels. Windebank’s letter was extraordinary in several respects. Not only was the accusation of a Dutch armed attack on Scarborough and other English towns unfounded, and rejected by the Dutch, but also that it was he who wrote the letter and not Secretary Coke after his appointment by the king as the intermediary between himself and the Council and the Dutch. His reference to the orders of the Lords of the Council raised the question whether the whole Council gave Lindsey his instructions or Windebank himself and the numerically small pro-Spanish faction. The latter questioned Gardiner’s contention that any connection between the pro-Spanish and Dutch policies had to be kept ‘strictly secret and separate’. Whether this could be maintained in England can be doubted but not in the Republic. The Dutch knew that Anglo-Dutch relations had lost their veneer and had become confrontational. It began with Charles’ letter to the States General and Windebank’s to Joachimi after the navy was ready to coerce or force Dutch compliance with English interests which Coke had already predicted in his letter of 1633 to Boswell in The Hague.

1 TNA, SP 84/150 f.61, Sir Francis Windebank to Joachimi, 12 August 1635.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
Windebank’s letter gave the impression of an integrated political approach, of undisguised pro-Spain anti-Republic strategies. This could be one step short of an armed conflict, as wanted by Spain, and those who had negotiated with Necolalde, but not by Charles and the States General. However, Charles’ personal involvement and Coke’s letter to Boswell seemed to confirm that Anglo-Dutch relations were conducted separately from England’s main foreign policies. In any case, relations with foreign monarchs had to be conducted with time honoured diplomacy; relations with the Republic were conducted differently.

Ambassador Joachimi had to write to Charles that ‘having heard a rumour around town that letters of reprisal had been decreed against the warships of the Lords States on account of outrages that were said to have been committed by sailors in the service of the States and being unable to believe that this was so, since it was something that flew in the face of all law’¹ and of course against the Treaty of Southampton. Joachimi added that he had been assured that the rumours were unfounded; yet this appeared to be contradicted by yet another serious incident off the coast of Yarmouth. A Dutch warship commanded by captain Jan Vordius encountered three English warships, two miles off land, on 17 August 1635. Being in what can be termed territorial waters, the captain did the customary honours of lowering his mainsail and firing three cannon shots. The English admiral called captain Vordius on board and accused him without proof of the recent violence at Scarborough. Notwithstanding the captain’s uncompromising denial, he and his ship were taken to Hull where they were detained, as ‘he had orders from Your Sacred Majesty to examine all warships belonging to the Lords States that he could find’². Joachimi did not believe that the Dutch deserved such treatment and asked the king to order the Admiral and his commanders, or, in their absence, the magistrates of Yarmouth, to release the Republic’s captain and his ship.

¹ TNA, SP 84/150 f.69, Joachimi to Charles I, 25 Aug./6 Sept. 1635, aïant ouv un bruit de ville que lettres de represailles estoient décretées contre les navires de querre desdicts Seigneurs Estats pour des excès qu’on disoit ester par des gens de marine estans au service desdicts Estats et ne le pouvant croire, comme estant une chose contre tout droit
² Ibid., qu’il avoit charge de Vostre Majesté Sactrée d’examiner tous les navires de querre des Seigneurs Estats lesquelles il pourroit atteindre.
The fact that Joachimi wrote to Charles himself and not to Windebank or the Council was to convey that he could not believe that the king gave the orders to examine all Dutch warships. Charles could have been unaware of excessive actions of his Admiralty, or that the orders to Admiral Lindsey emanated from some Councillors’ personal interpretations of the king’s policies. In either case, it forced the States General to call on the king to give redress for his subjects’ violation of the Republic’s territorium.

The States General and its ambassadors had persisted with their usually conciliatory diplomacy when seeking solutions for English actions, which were considered inappropriate between friendly nations and contrary to the Treaty of Southampton. There is no record of Charles’ response to Joachimi’s letter of 25 Aug/6 Sept. However, there is a manuscript that could be the draft for a formal reply, suggested by one or more Councillors. The document itself is not signed but opened with a reference to Joachimi’s letter to Charles, ‘regarding the matter that the Ambassador raised with his Majesty on the 27 August at Woodstock, a definitive answer cannot be given since his Majesty’s Admiral has not yet confirmed the truth and nature of the matter in question. But, as soon as he has clarified it, the Ambassador may be sure that his Majesty will do everything that is fair and in accordance with his customary grace and favour’. With some irony the writer, or writers of the document, added ‘His Majesty is right to require, both in the present and in other similar events, the justice demanded by the mutual interests and treaties between His Majesty and the States’. The writer, or writers, failed to define these mutual interests and omitted in its, or their, reference to treaties that the king had ignored these since the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty and his favours to Spain.

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1 TNA, SP 84/150 f.70, 27 August. 1635, *A ce que Monsieur l’Ambassadeur a représenté à SA Majesté le 25 Aoust à Woodstock ne se peut encore faire une response absolute d’autant que l’Admiral de Sa Majestén’a point encore signifié la vérité et qualité du fait don’t il est question. Mais dès qu’il la fera poroistre, l’Ambassadeur se peut bien promettre de Sa Majesté tout ce qui est juste et aggréable à grace et faveur ordinaire*

2 Ibid., *Sa Majesté a raison de requérir tant en ce cas qu’en semblabes accidents, la justice requisite par les traictrez et interests mutuels d’entre Sa Majesté et les Estats.*
The document stressed that the English admiral had not yet confirmed the truth and nature of the incident at Scarborough, yet it did not stop the arrest of the captain of a Dutch warship at Yarmouth and his ship being taken to Hull where it was impounded.

The charge was that he was suspected of having committed the alleged outrage at Scarborough, which the captain denied, or had ‘come to that place [Yarmouth] with the same intention in mind’\(^1\). The assumption of what may have been in the mind of the Dutch captain was sufficient for the admiral to impound one of the Republic’s ships of war, arrest its captain and place him in the hands of the king’s justice. The States General rejected the claim that the inhabitants of Scarborough had been attacked when Dutch sailors pursued Dunkirk privateers who had sought sanctuary in the town’s port after ‘a hundred large herring busses, as they were called, were destroyed or captured’\(^2\).

Whilst it was Charles’ prerogative to give sanctuary to whomever he chose, even to allow his own erstwhile enemy the Spanish this benefit, to do so to the direct detriment of his treaty partner and his professions of friendship, was considered by the Dutch as unfriendly. It was also in breach of the Treaty of Southampton which Charles wished to maintain. At the same time, the author or authors of the manuscript brushed aside the Dutch side of the alleged incidents. The document stated as facts that the outrage committed by the Dutch captain ‘was a weighty matter, a hostile act against His Majesty’s dominion. However, satisfaction was ‘not sought through reprisals but rather through the legal prosecution of the offender and of any similar offenders and assailants’\(^3\). Not employing reprisals and using legal proceedings were indeed enshrined in the Treaty of Southampton but not with the Republic’s acceptance that its own judiciary system was excluded.

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\(^1\) Ibid., ou qu’au moins en sa venue il avoit le mesme desseing.
\(^3\) TNA, SP 84/150 f.70, 27 August 1635, ne cherche pas satisfaction par voye de represailles, ains par uneprosecution legitime de l’offenseur et desemblables affronteurs et assailants.
Classing these so-called outrages as crimes against his majesty’s dominion and not recognising his sovereignty of the seas, could raise in English courts the severity of these outrages to challenges to the monarch’s prerogatives and honour; committed as individuals or as servants of the States General or, indeed the Republic itself.

The connection between Anglo-Dutch diplomatic and political relations had become surreal. Diplomacy was based on and conducted with the fragile bonds of treaties, the shared reformed religion and professed friendships; but the actual political and trade relations bordered on enmity. Although both sides continued to use convenient clauses of the Treaty of Southampton to further their respective interests, the treaty had lost most of its political value and was little more than a diplomatic convenience. The shared protestant reformation was mainly a shared anti-popery. Only the Dutch orthodox-Calvinists shared their religion with the English Puritans and those of the Scottish Kirk whilst Dutch Arminianism was a threat to both English and Scottish Protestantism. The Anglo-Dutch friendship was a euphemism for an opportunistic relationship between an established monarchy and what was seen by some as a Republic of rebellious commoners with an abhorrent system of government that posed a threat to rule by kings and princes.

Joachimi as the long serving ambassador and the States General through his dispatches were not insensitive to Charles’ foreign and in parallel Dutch policies with the impact of his domestic issues on relations with the Republic. But the different views of the Dutch provinces about relations with England and France did not allow the States General to deviate from its carefully balanced relations with both its allies. While facing the Cardinal-Infante with his enlarged armies on its southern borders, the States General could not risk any confrontations with the English navy. Joachimi was instructed to continue to use the only diplomatic approaches at his disposal: the Treaty of Southampton and Charles’ professed wish to maintain links of friendship with the Republic.
On the first day of 1636 the ambassador used both possible openings and wrote to the
king to bring new infringements by his subjects to his attention. He cited the most
recent cases of three Spanish frigates that could attack a Dutch merchant vessel in the
port of Plymouth ‘in the sight of Your Majesty’s castle’ and also described in detail
how a Dunkirk freebooter was allowed to ‘carry off from the harbour of the town of
Yarmouth a Dutch merchant vessel that had arrived from Flushing in Zeeland’.
Joachimi used the treaty to seek compliance with those clauses in the treaty that suited
the Dutch, the same as Charles did to suit his policies but in reality, Anglo-Dutch
relations were no longer based on any treaty but governed by the Council’s reaction
of 27 August 1635 to Joachimi’s letter to Charles. This left no doubt that the claimed
sovereignty of the four seas was at the basis of the Admiralty’s aggressive actions
against the Republic’s shipping and Admiral Lindsey’s instructions ‘to exact
acknowledgements of Charles’ sovereignty from all ships’. This instruction implied
that all vessels and warships leaving the Republic’s ports and those leaving France’s
Channel ports immediately entered English waters. Dutch historian cum jurist C. Smit
attributed the reaffirmation of sovereignty of the seas which he termed a ‘pretence’, a
reaction to the Dutch-French alliance and Charles’ ‘fear that the entire coast opposite
England could fall in the hands of his competitors’.
The Dutch and French had never recognised the English claim of sovereignty of the seas
that washed their own shores. In earlier times there were no immediately compelling
reasons to enforce or oppose it. Ever since, all sides had lived with courteous greetings
at sea which the English accepted whilst knowing that it did not mean acquiescence. For
the Dutch and the French it was no more than a pragmatic principle of recognising at
sea only ‘powerful and less powerful, not owners and inferiors’, euphemisms for non-
acceptance of the claimed sovereignty.

1 TNA, SP 84/151 f.52, Joachimi to Charles, Jan. 1636.
2 Ibid.
4 Smit, De Buitenlandse Politiek, p.76, uit vrees dat de geheele zeekust tegenover Engeland in de handen zijner
mededingers zou vallen.
5 Muller, Samuel Fz., Mare Clausum – Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der rivaliteit van Engeland en Nederland in
de zeventiende eeuw (Contribution to the history of the rivalry of England and the Netherlands in the
seventeenth century) Published doctoral thesis (Amsterdam 1872), machtigen en zwakken, geen eigenaars en
onderhorigen, p.235. Hereafter, Muller, Mare Clausum.
But to Charles’ instinctive insistence on his prerogatives and royal honour must be added that enforcing his sovereignty appealed to the self-esteem of his subjects. It gave him public support for challenging the Dutch and supporting his own traders and fishermen, at the same time, it diverted attention from the controversial aspects of his Spanish policies and ship money writs.

The first and second ship money writs provided the funds for the Admiralty to begin the strengthening of the navy and already ‘during the course of 1635, a fleet of 45 ships appeared on the sea’. Part of the fleet was assigned to convoy duties between Dover and Dunkirk and part to seek out ‘Dutch boats and to compel them to accept a fishing licence from the King of England’. But even this fleet was not an adequate replacement for a joint Anglo-Spanish fleet discussed by Portland, Cottington and Windebank with envoy Necolalde. Charles needed a much larger naval strength to counter that of the Dutch-French alliance and also, to keep his option for an Anglo-Spanish attack on the Republic. This option had always been a remote possibility which became even more so after the Dutch-French alliance. Instead of disclosing his policies and options to the full, Charles decided to stress that a bigger navy was needed for the nation’s security for which enforcing his sovereignty of the surrounding seas was a pre-condition. Extending the navy even further while at peace would be difficult without subsidies from Parliament, and to join Catholic Spain in an attack on the Protestant Dutch would be well nigh impossible, in any case very divisive.

**The Freedom of the Seas – Mare Liberum – Mare Clausum**

In order to strengthen his subjects’ resolve but also to make his position known to other nations, Charles had decided in 1635 that a treatise, titled *Mare Clausum seu Dominium Maris* on the English monarch’s sovereignty of the seas, written by John Selden during the reign of James to justify claiming a tribute from the Dutch fishermen, be printed and disseminated as his definitive edict *Mare Clausum*.

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1 Smit, De Buitenlandse Politiek, p.76.
3 John Selden (1584-1654) was a distinguished lawyer, historian and linguistic scholar. His learned output was prolific but his treatise *Mare Clausum seu Dominium Maris* lacked an international dimension. The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography observed that his treatise ‘revealed fissures beneath the surface of the text’.
Two years earlier Coke had indicated to Boswell that decisive action on the sovereignty claim could be expected. Selden’s compilation of the rights claimed by early English sovereigns was historically correct but said nothing about the ‘interests of other nations’. Th. W. Fulton placed the sovereignty claims in the wider context of the ongoing evolution of the territorial waters, fishing rights and even naval salutations. Charles also ignored the interests of others and transformed the claims of his forebears into a *Mare Clausum*, effectively, claiming the four seas as his territorial waters. Copies of the printed version were deposited in the Court of the Exchequer, the Court of Admiralty and with the Privy Council ‘to be preserved for perpetual use’ and to be ‘issued to the world as a public manifesto’.

But Charles withdrew his instruction for a public dissemination. The printer was ordered not to issue any further copies, ‘the original was withdrawn and the publication boldly denied’. Nevertheless, Selden’s *Mare Clausum* was a tacit royal policy with all the consequences under English law for any transgressions.

Charles’ claim of sovereignty of the seas was preceded by similar claims of sovereignty by Spain and Portugal. Spain had claimed the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico and Portugal the Atlantic south of Morocco and the Indian Ocean. Both nations ‘claimed and sought the right of excluding all foreigners from navigating or entering these waters’. The English and the Dutch had not acknowledged the extravagant Spanish and Portuguese claims to half the world’s seas and lands. These were enshrined in their Treaty of Tordesillas. In subsequent years some discretionary exceptions were permitted.

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1 Coke to Boswell 1633, p.151 of this thesis.
5 Muller, *Mare Clausum*, het origineel werd terug genomen en de publicatie stoutweg ontkend, p.255.
In Iberia itself they were supported by Serafim de Freitas and rejected by Ferdinando Vázquez y Menchaca. Monica Brito Vieira continued, perhaps with some bias, ‘Grotius finds in Vázquez the perfect intellectual foundation for his defence of the Dutch claim to freedom of navigation and trade while de Freitas and Selden take this radical humanist jurist as one of their main adversaries’. Grotius, himself an international lawyer of repute extended existing ideas and principles. The fundamental premise that the sea as well as the sky above cannot be owned by anyone was on the basis of natural laws and the law of nations. In addition he argued that war would only be justified if the freedom of the sea was violated by any monopolistic claims of any nation or company. This reasoning led Grotius to distinguish between lawful and unlawful wars, *belle iusta et iniusta* and, particularly, to proportionality and restraint, the Christian ethical principle of *temperantia*; war without unnecessary damage. An important step towards international law on navigation was taken in an English court in 1817. Sir William Scott, later Lord Stowell, ‘rejected the claim of his country to the exercise of jurisdiction beyond a marine league from the British shore’. He argued that two principles of public law are generally recognised as fundamental; one is the perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct nations and two that all nations being equal, all have an equal right to the uninterrupted use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navigation.

Although the Spanish and Portuguese claims had been amended after the treaties of 1496 and special concessions granted when politically necessary, they remained ignored by the English and Dutch. Yet the directors of the VOC had wanted to be clear on their legal position. They had received their Charter to trade with the Indies from the States General of the United Provinces in 1602, but the Dutch were at war with Spain. The Amsterdam chamber of the VOC needed to know its right on taking prizes from the enemy and the Zeeland chamber on its legal rights to trade with the Indies. For the Amsterdam chamber, Grotius wrote his *De Iure Praedae*, the law on prizes, in 1606.

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2 Ibid., p.363.
3 Hugo Grotius, *The Freedom of the Seas*, pp. ix-x
For the Zeeland chamber of the VOC, he elaborated the law on prizes further in 1610 in his *Mare Liberum sive De Iure quod Batavis competit ad Indiciana Commercia Dissertatio*, the freedom of the sea, a dissertation on the law of the right of the Dutch to conduct trade with the Indies. Grotius’ *Mare Liberum* would re-appear in 1625 as chapter XII in his magisterial work on the law of nations, *De Iure Belli ac Pacis*, the law of war and peace\(^1\). Grotius’ dissertations were primarily written to justify the rejection of the Treaty of Tordesillas but the basic thinking was also applicable to Selden’s *Mare Clausum*. In his introductory note of a recent re-print of Grotius *Mare Liberum*, the editor called ‘the claims of England, less extensive but not less unjustifiable’\(^2\).

The States General and the French did not react formally to Charles’ claim of sovereignty. For them it was a re-stating of an old pretence which, as before, they would neither recognise nor reject the claim and continue with the old principle of respecting the strongest. Charles’ sudden withdrawal from international dissemination of his *Mare Clausum* edict appeared to indicate that he did not expect acceptance but did not want confrontation either; none of the three countries directly involved could afford it. But Charles had made an astute political move. The Spanish would see it as providing greater security for their sea transports to Dunkirk and the Dutch as a means to control their maritime and fisheries activities. For Charles’ own subjects it was a popular cause that would rally them behind their monarch.

The States of Holland decided to seek surety of its own and the States General for its legal position on the *Mare Clausum-Mare Liberum* issue. They asked for legal advice from professors of law Petrus Cunaeus (1586-1638) and Dirck Graswinckel (1600-1666) of Leiden University.

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Cunaeus and Graswinckel with their legal colleagues argued that Selden’s concept of *Mare Clausum* was against natural law and rights and at odds with other nations’ interests and also the *Mare Liberum* treatise of Hugo Grotius. The States requested Cunaeus and others at Leiden to put their opinion in writing and ‘to keep without wide publication but to be available in all instances when that could be necessary’¹. Having satisfied themselves of their legal position, only two days later the members of the States of Holland passed two resolutions of direct importance and with the potential for far reaching consequences.

*Preparations for conflict and new negotiations for peace*

The first resolution was for a subsidy of thirty-six thousand guilders to equip six large vessels of war with ammunition and other essentials for the protection of the large [herring] fishery, the second to seek quotations for four frigates for the protection of the small [cod, etc.] fishery. Better protection was needed considering the importance ‘for the state of the country, its people and the continuity, employing thousands of people’². The States of Holland did not want to deploy this relatively small fleet to challenge the English navy exacting licence fees from Dutch fishermen and certainly not to provoke conflicts. The tasks of the men-of-war were to protect the Dutch fishermen from the Spanish and freebooters from Dunkirk who had inflicted mounting losses on the Republic’s fishing fleet, such as recently off the coast at Scarborough. The Dutch losses had significantly increased since the favours to Spain had started to include providing sanctuary in English and Scottish ports to the Spanish operating from Dunkirk and by their licensed and not-licensed freebooters. Despite Charles’ non-alignment, England was apparently making a contribution towards Spain’s war efforts and implementing an anti-Dutch policy. It was an offensive against the Dutch fishermen, and the Republic’s fishing industry, resembling an English war by proxy and any Dutch retaliation could be subjected to prosecution in the Admiralty Courts with charges that could escalate to *lèse-majesté*.


² *Ibid.*, session L, 71. P and 73. P, 12, April 1636, pp. 765/6, *voor den state van ’t lant ende ingesetenen vandien aen de behoudenisse deselve is gelegen, hoeveel duysenden menschen sich daermede genereren.*
The impending actions of the States of Holland against the Spanish and the freebooters were aimed at protecting its interests. But possible consequences could lead to further political and diplomatic complications for the States General, as demonstrated by the Scarborough and Yarmouth incidents. It was not in the Republic’s interests to let the difficult Anglo-Dutch relations at sea escalate further and, in its time-honoured fashion, the States General, in close consultation with Frederik Henry, decided to send a new high-level embassy to London. Cornelis van Beveren was appointed as ambassador extraordinaire and introduced as Knight and Lord of Strevelshoek and IJsselmonde\(^1\). The importance of the embassy was indicated by the choice of van Beveren: he was an experienced politician and ambassador for special missions, a member of the States of Holland and the States General. He was several times Burgomaster of Dordrecht, hieratically the first town in Holland and personally, a scion of a patrician family. Van Beveren’s home province Holland was most affected by England’s maritime, trade and fisheries policies and needed solutions for, or at least amelioration of, Charles’ nationalist policies. Frederik Henry supported van Beveren’s appointment by writing to Charles asking him to grant the ambassador his favourable audience\(^2\).

The ambassador’s first letters to the prince and the States of Holland reflected the disparity between the reality of the political relations and pretentiousness of the diplomatic relations. He conveyed the appreciation of King Charles I and Queen Henrietta Maria to the Prince of Orange for the presents which the king gifted to his queen while he kept the horses for himself. To the States of Holland he wrote that the queen, the heir to the throne and many high nobles and other dignitaries were present at his first audience with His Majesty. He reported that the king had told him ‘that he had as good affection for the State of their Gentlemen of the States General as had ever any of his predecessors’\(^3\).

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1. TNA, SP 84/151 f.100, States General to Charles I, 27 Feb./8 March 1636.
2. TNA, SP 84/151 f.116, Prince of Orange to Charles I, 3/13 March 1636.
The political significance of van Beveren’s grand welcome was not only a recognition of his status in Holland and in the Dutch hierarchy but, perhaps even more, because of the expectation that he and his influential province could be persuaded to shape the States General’s political decisions. It would not be a new English political strategy. During the Anglo-French war ambassador Carleton told the deputies of the States of Holland that their impounded vessels could be released if they persuaded the States General to refrain from concluding a treaty with France and refused to release four French war ships. Elizabeth and James had also attempted to influence Dutch foreign policies by relating directly with the States of the Provinces or their Stadholders who were usually high nobles. Yet Anglo-Dutch relations had endured but seemed now endangered by Charles’ Dutch policies and de facto support of the Spanish, the enemies of the Republic.

The States General’s instructions for van Beveren’s mission ran to forty-four points but contained neither reference to the current shipping and fisheries issues nor to the attempted enforcement of the sovereignty of the seas claim. Only in the last few points were there instructions to try clearing the ‘dissatisfaction about Amboyna and VOC affairs’ and to press for payment of the large sums owing the Republic. The instructions left no doubt that the States General’s objective was not to re-open or continue negotiations on individual issues. Instead, its instructions for the ambassadors were to discuss with the Queen and the most influential Councillors alternatives to the king’s present Spanish policies. These alternatives were aimed at achieving Charles’ principal objective, the restitution of the Palatinate but were also to serve the interests of the Republic. Van Beveren and Joachimi would need all their skills to convince Charles that his Spanish policies for the restitution of the Palatinate had failed; there was clear evidence that the Spanish did not support the restitution. They had promised but had done nothing, even intrigued against it while the Republic had always made every possible effort to support the late Frederick, Count Palatine, and still provide his widow Elizabeth and her children with all facilities in the Republic.

1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 12455, Instr. 8 March 1636, Instructies voor van Beveren als ambassadeur extraordinaire naar de koning van Engeland. Hereafter, Instructions for van Beveren, inv.nr. 12455, instr. 8 March 1636.

2 Ibid., discontentment over Amboyna en de VOC.
In their initial approaches the Dutch ambassadors had to convey that their mission was to elevate Anglo-Dutch relations from dealing with incidents, to a level that could deal with the most important political issues for both England and the Republic. Charles had never left any doubt that the restitution of the Palatinate was an integral part of his foreign policies, while the Republic maintained its own objective, independence from Spain. The objectives had not changed since the days of the Treaty of Southampton and the Triple Alliance treaties; eleven years later, none of the objectives had been achieved. Charles did not need to be reminded; it was van Beveren’s task, to convince the king that the time had come not for a change of objectives but of tactics. When the ambassadors considered the ambience was opportune, they were to present firm proposals for the restitution of the Palatinate and for improved political relations between England, France and the Republic.

Whereas the king’s initial policies to negotiate with Spain for the restitution of the Palatinate had been right, the Spanish had continuously proved to be unreliable and, the ambassadors would argue, that the time was ripe to put pressure openly on Spain. England with its mighty fleet, together with France and the Republic could force Spain to honour its obligations. If the king would show any inclination for a change of relations with Spain, the ambassadors were permitted to propose the formation of a fleet of 75 warships, 30 English, 30 French and 15 Dutch with 20,000 well armed soldiers, to land this force at a strategic place in Spain and remain there until the Spanish meet the king’s demands about the Palatinate. Should Charles not be prepared to go to war against Spain, he could lend the 30 English ships to his nephew the Prince Elector and keep his realms neutral. If neither proposal would meet with Charles’ consideration, the ambassadors were to suggest that he lend the ships to the Prince Elector to fight Spain on his own and that he himself, together with France and the Republic, consider anti-Spanish strategies on land to add to those of the Prince Elector on the seas. The suggestion of jointly deciding actions on land to force Spain to become more responsive to his demands, repeated a clause Charles himself had insisted on in the Treaty of Southampton.
The minimum the States General hoped to achieve with van Beveren’s mission was for the king to end his favours to Spain and to adopt a neutral position, but better, to replace it with favouring the Dutch-French alliance to the same extent. The offer to provide 45 ships and 12,000 soldiers was unlikely to persuade Charles to completely reverse his Spanish policies, not least as it would be of great benefit for the Dutch-French alliance’s own war efforts. For Charles the spectre of getting France in Dunkirk was serious. However, the fact that specific offers were made by van Beveren and the French to support his Palatinate objectives and that France wanted to negotiate with serious intentions to seek an Anglo-French alliance might persuade him to reduce in the meantime his favours to Spain.

Windebank and Coke informed van Beveren on 5 April, on behalf of the king, that he was contemplating sending his fleet to sea “to conserve and maintain his sovereignty and birthright of the sea”\(^1\). Charles himself told van Beveren ten days later “in a few words that he rejected all their proposals but would continued to speak with him about the fisheries”\(^2\). Van Beveren replied that he had no instructions on fisheries but Charles assured him that he could give him *enough work* on that subject. Van Beveren and Joachimi were left in no doubt; Charles’ foreign policies were not for discussion or negotiation with them and his existing Dutch policies were to continue. What this meant became obvious from the instructions with which the English admiral took his fleet to sea. He was to enforce his king’s sovereignty and to provide “convoy for the protection of traffic and to ensure that no one was to fish in the king’s seas without a specific licence and proper acknowledgement”\(^3\). Charles’ peremptory dismissal of the Dutch-French proposals had left no doubt that he would not deviate from his insistence on his sovereignty of the seas and the consequences for the Republic and also France; in fact, he may have decided that his domestic and foreign negotiating position had been strengthened by the Dutch-French proposals.

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\(^{1}\) Muller, *Mare Clausum*, p.246.
\(^{2}\) Ibid., pp. 249/250.
\(^{3}\) Ibid., p.246.
Combining the need for licences to fish with ‘proper acknowledgement’, meaning recognizing his sovereignty of the four seas, could be seen by the pro-Spanish faction of the Council as one of the favours to Spain, and by many others in the Council and in the country as a defence of his sovereign rights and honour.

The implications of the fisheries policy were of great importance for the Dutch. Fisheries provided employment for thousands of people and made an important contribution to the coffers of the Republic, while also being a source of seasoned seamen for its trading activities and the Republic’s navy. The longer term implications, however, were of even greater concern for the Republic but also for France. Whereas the costs and conditions of the licences could be changed by the English at any time in the future, affecting mainly the Dutch, the implicit recognition of the English sovereignty of the seas bordering their countries’ shores remained unacceptable for both the Republic and France. Van Beveren and France’s special envoy, the Marques Henri de Seneterre (1599-1681) were instructed to ask for written notification but were referred to the Mare Clausum ‘written by charge and order of His Majesty’.

The Dutch and the French could not afford to risk a confrontation with England, or worse England openly siding with Spain. Van Beveren asked the States General for instructions on the dangerous and far reaching affair and de Seneterre, more directly, protested to the Council that the Mare Clausum edict appeared to be an ‘unspoken declaration of war’ and warned the Council not to push the Dutch too far. Pending detailed instructions from their governments, the ambassadors decided to gain time and insisted on further clarification which, during several meetings with the Council, remained unanswered. Despite Charles’ withdrawal from a wide dissemination, his Mare Clausum edict was law in England. However when Joachimi asked him directly for the actual meaning of his edict in relation to the Republic and their Treaty of Southampton and, by implication for the Republic’s treaty partner France, the king had ignored his questions and had ‘remained silent’. The Dutch were left between a non-committal English diplomacy and explicit actions at sea by an English navy.

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1 Muller, Mare Clausum, p.247, door last en bevel van sijne Majestiet geschreven.
2 Ibid., een stilzwijgende oorlogs verklaring, p.249.
The States General had realised that the Mare Liberum doctrine was regarded in England as an irrelevance, an irritation, and decided to take a first and visual step towards defending the freedom of the seas. The admiralties of Holland and West-Friesland were sanctioned to launch a large fleet, commanded by their lieutenant admiral Philip van Dorp. Still cautiously avoiding any open provocation, the States General instructed van Beveren to give the king advance information that a considerable number of warships would be deployed to blockade the port of Dunkirk. But van Dorp was also instructed to use part of his fleet to ‘keep a continuous watchful eye to maintain and protect the large and small fisheries against the Spanish and all others’. Van Beveren’s message to Charles and van Dorp’s orders were incompatible. Protecting the fishing fleets could not be done without confronting the English navy demanding the buying of fishing licences. The port of Dunkirk could not be blockaded without facing the English navy protecting the Spanish shipping between Dover and Dunkirk. Van Dorp’s incompatible orders and his cautious tactics to avoid any confrontation and provocation, together with his own limited capabilities, resulted in the failure of his mission.

Joachimi’s message to Charles and the circumspection in which van Dorp’s mission was cloaked indicated that the States General underestimated Charles’ resolve to enforce his sovereignty claims. The Mare Clausum-Mare Liberum dichotomy was for Charles not to be negotiated; Mare Clausum was for him a fait accompli to be enforced by his navy extending his realms to the shores of the Republic and northern Franc. It was Charles’ domestic politics and personal objectives that formed the justification of his anti-Dutch and pro-Spanish policies. The States General had taken the first step, although too tentatively, to show that it would defend its interests, but had at the same time indicated that the Republic would not be the first to destroy Anglo-Dutch relations. This was despite England’s neutrality and sovereignty of the seas claim having the consequences that they protected Spain’s military supply line to the port of Dunkirk.

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1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr.3195, Res. 15 August 1636, Instructions for van Beveren.
2 Aitzema, Saken van Staat, ghestadigh een waecent oogh te houden ap de bewaringhe ende bescherminghe van de groote ende kleyne visscherije deser Landen tegen de Spaanshe ende alle anderen, Folio, Vol. II, p.408.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Negotiations, Treaties and National interests

Anglo-Dutch relations in the balance

The significance of Charles’ Spanish policies is shown by the fact that since the beginning of the Dutch revolt against their Habsburg overlord, there were ‘twelve troop transports by sea from Spain between 1567 and 1630 and eight between 1631 and the end of 1638’\(^1\). Spanish funds in coin also reached Brussels by the same routes but Charles preferred to keep the silver in England, replacing it by letters of credit. In July 1636 Secretary Windebank earned his king’s opprobrium when he ordered a large sum in Spanish coins to be transported to Dunkirk in an English ship before Charles could have converted two-thirds of it into letters of credit\(^2\).

The supply of war material, fresh troops and, just as important, the funds to pay the soldiers, as well as the arrival of the Cardinal-Infante’s army after its victory at Nördlingen in 1634, had provided the Spanish with the opportunity to capitalise on the time needed by the Dutch and the French to coordinate their forces after concluding their alliance. Besides being the Governor-General of the Southern Provinces, the Cardinal-Infante was also an able military strategist and tactician, as already proven at Nördlingen. Strengthened with Imperial forces, in July 1635 he captured the very important fortress of Schenkenschans guarding the confluence of the Dutch rivers Waal and Rhine. This opened the waterways from Germany into the heart of the Republic and the maritime provinces Holland and Zeeland. Although far away from the theatre of war but very well informed, the Count-Duke Olivares knew the strategic importance of the fortress and ‘could scarcely contain his excitement’\(^3\) at the information of its capture. Olivares saw it as a ‘turning point in the war’\(^4\) and, he told his monarch that if the Cardinal-Infante built on this success, the war in Flanders would be over and he could concentrate on France, most easily attacked from Flanders.

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\(^1\) Groenveld, Verlopend Getij, Het is tekenend dat, terwijl tussen 1567 en 1630 twaalf zendingen militairen langs deze weg waren gegaan, alleen al van 1631 tot en met 1639 acht malen Spaanse infanteristen over zee werden getransporteerd, p.92.
\(^3\) Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares, p.492.
\(^4\) Ibid., p.493.
In April 1636 Frederik Henry re-captured the fortress Schenkenshans but only ‘by remaining active around the fortress during the winter’\textsuperscript{1}, unusual at the time, and by risking the withdrawal of troops from other parts of the Republic. He had closed access to two of the inland rivers, but the Republic’s eastern defence line was breached when Ottavio Piccolomini, Duke of Amalfi, with a Spanish force again ‘strengthened with Imperial troops’\textsuperscript{2}, captured Roermond and Venlo on the third major river, the Meuse. Fortunately for the Dutch, the combined forces failed to capture Maastricht, the main fortress upstream on the same river. The loss of Roermond and Venlo and the Spanish-Imperial incursion into the centre of the Republic to divert Frederik Henry’s siege from ‘s Hertogenbosch, had shown again the ever present serious danger of the two Habsburg Houses acting in concord.

The Cardinal-Infante did not wait for the war in Flanders to be over. While the French armies were still not well organised and had a serious shortage of experienced military commanders, he attacked northern France in June 1636 and forced the French to retreat behind the river Oise, threatening Paris. The Spanish victories over the Dutch and French and Olivares’ euphoria over the imminent end of the war changed Madrid’s attitude to the apparent failure of the negotiations with Charles for a joint naval operation against the Republic. But envoy Necolalde, soon to return to Spain, was awaiting his replacement and ‘playing for time’\textsuperscript{3}. He called the negotiations merely stalled, and concentrated on preventing an Anglo-French treaty by offering a large new subsidy for further fleet extensions. Necolalde’s offer and Charles’ own rejection of a French-Dutch offer of naval support for an attack on the Spanish at sea led him to believe that his position was strong enough to insist that ‘Philip IV honour his commitment to final restoration of the Palatinate’\textsuperscript{4}. But Necolalde’s replacement, the Conde d’Oñate (1566-1644), arrived in London with instructions that disappointed Charles and those of his Councillors who supported his Spanish policies. Oñate only wanted to revive the maritime treaty negotiations with insistence on a joint attack on the Dutch at sea, whilst merely confirming the possibility of a large Spanish subsidy.

\textsuperscript{1} Groenveld, De Tachtigjarige Oorlog, in actie te blijven rond de Schenkenschans gedurende de winter, p.270.
\textsuperscript{2} Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, met keizerlijke hulptroepen, p.450.
\textsuperscript{3} Sharpe, The Personal Rule, p.524.
\textsuperscript{4} Adams, ‘Spain or the Netherlands?’, Before the English War, Chapter 4, p.100.
On the restitution of the Palatinate Oñate had nothing more to offer than platitudes which closed the discussion about an Anglo-Spanish fleet on the narrow seas. For their own very different reasons, neither Charles nor the Republic and France wanted hostilities at sea, in any case not when the war on land was still going in the Cardinal-Infante’s favour. Charles did not want to be involved in any actual warfare, since he could not afford it and, as Gardiner wrote, ‘his mind was set on the attempt to turn the fleet which he had acquired at the risk of such weakening of the basis of his authority, to some practical service to himself’\(^1\).

Charles knew that even if the Palatinate lands were restored by military means, he would still need the Emperor’s support to have his nephew’s electoral dignities restored. He had set his mind to use his advantageous position to negotiate with all sides with the restitution as the one non-negotiable condition. His dynastic objectives were again dominating his foreign policy decisions. England’s already substantial navy was an important factor in his strength as friend or foe, and this would increase, Charles considered, with an even stronger navy. Another reason for a further movement to a larger, indeed dominating navy was the appearance of a Dutch fleet on the seas; previously it had not posed a threat but that could change. Ignoring the domestic opposition against the second ship-money writ, the process to launch the third writ was started in the summer of 1636 and issued on 9 October. Whether it was planned to coincide with a new series of negotiations with Spain and France or not, all other sides would know about the planned further enlargement of the English navy and also that negotiations were taking place with the other rulers.

For the negotiations with the Emperor, Charles selected Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel. On his way to Vienna, Howard stopped in The Hague and only called on Elizabeth as Queen of Bohemia, but he did use the opportunity to inform some Dutch individuals that the navy’s actions against the Dutch fisheries ‘had no other reason than to maintain His Majesty’s sovereignty of the four seas’\(^2\). This information fell far short of the much wider issues and objectives Coke wrote about to Boswell in 1633.

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\(^2\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 3195, Res. 24 April 1636 and Coke to Boswell 1633, pp. 151-152 of this thesis.
Robert Sidney 2nd Earl of Leicester (1595-1677) was sent to Paris with extensive instructions1 with the same objective as that of Arundel’s mission, but to be reached in a different manner. France’s immediate requirements were urgent and specific; cessation of England’s favours to Spain. Consequently Richelieu had to make a serious attempt to formulate a more desirable agreement. However both Leicester and Howard had to negotiate from an unrealistic starting point, as Charles had ‘insisted that all words binding him should be as vague as possible and that all words binding the King of France [which also applied to the Emperor] should be as strict as possible’2.

Van Beveren’s Dutch-French proposals to Charles had implied binding commitments for him, but they were not the only reason for their dismissal. When Charles told van Beveren that he had enough work for him on fisheries, he made a clear distinction between his Dutch policies and his other foreign policies and left no doubt that he did not negotiate with the Dutch on his foreign policy. They had no place in his negotiations with other monarchs. For these he had sent Howard to the Emperor in Vienna, and Leicester to Louis and Richelieu in Paris, to negotiate the same or similar proposals but with the same safeguards for himself. However, the ‘negotiations in Paris failed as hopelessly as the negotiations at Vienna’3 and also those in Madrid because of the demand that England go to war on the basis of mere Spanish promises.

Arundel had been in favour of an alliance with the Habsburgs, but came back from the Emperor with the opposite views. ‘He had felt his failure at Vienna almost as a personal insult’4, omitting that he had been given the impossible task of demanding firm commitments from the Emperor in return for Charles’ promises of inducing Denmark, the Republic and others to support the Emperor and for England to keep a mighty fleet at sea. The unlikely possibility that Denmark and the Republic could be induced to join the Emperor did not move him from his earlier limited promises, while the Duke of Bavaria, questioned the advantages of any alliance with England, adding that an ‘English fleet could not influence the fortunes of a campaign in Alsace’5.

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1 TNA, SP 78/101 f.31, Charles to Leicester, May 1636.
3 Ibid., p.163.
5 Ibid., p.160.
Howard’s feeling of failure ignored the fact that his instructions had precluded success. Instead he concentrated on the Spanish and their perfidy and advocated an alliance with France. He wrote to Coke, ‘I have been very sorry to be a witness of the offices of Spain which I have so much defended’\(^1\). Arundel’s change of political views was very welcome for the pro-France faction in the Council and Sharpe has argued that the ‘so-called Spanish faction began to dissolve’\(^2\). The Spanish faction may have been weakened but was unlikely to support any efforts towards ‘convincing Charles that an alliance with Louis XIII presented him with his best, indeed his only real, diplomatic option’\(^3\). An alliance with France would not only mean breaking with Spain, but also that he had to rely on France for the restitution of his nephew’s Palatinate and dignities. Spain and France were seeking alliances but with binding English commitments, while Charles considered his position strong enough for more than one option. At the same time, his claim of sovereignty of the four seas would continue to determine his Dutch policies, which for Charles were wholly separate from his foreign policies and negotiations with other monarchs. He had already decided to extend his navy on the premise that it would be welcomed by the Spanish, who were still clamouring for it to be used against the Republic. A substantially enlarged navy would also provide a strong basis for negotiations with France with one of its objectives being to change France’s relations with the Dutch and to isolate the Republic.

Charles’ own assessments of England’s strength and importance, together with his innate certainty that his objectives were honourable and his policies right, led him to the decision that there was no need to make any changes in his foreign and domestic policies. This also determined his perception of the Anglo-Dutch relations; if changes were needed, they had to be made by others. However, there was no evidence of any changes by the Emperor, as Howard had experienced in Vienna, and neither had the Spanish shown any inclination to deviate from their demand for England to join Spain in war against the Dutch. Charles’ dynastic interests were central to all his negotiations but these interests were either against, or of little, importance for others; for their support he would have to offer more than he was prepared or able to do.

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\(^1\) TNA, SP 80/10 f.29, Arundel to Coke, November 1636.
\(^2\) Sharpe, The Personal Rule, p.525.
\(^3\) Ibid., p.525.
The States General did not ask for special commitments to support Charles’ dynastic objectives. The Dutch had always supported the German Calvinists. They still provided sanctuary and facilities to his sister Elizabeth and family and her Bohemian Court in exile; they supported the young Count Elector with resources and money; more than Charles himself did. It was not Dutch magnanimity, it was driven by the country’s Calvinists’ sense of solidarity with their German co-religionists and also that the young Count’s late father Frederick V was Frederik Henry’s nephew. The States General wanted no more from Charles than adherence to the treaty he wanted to maintain, and a cessation of his pro-Spanish and anti-Republic policies. The instructions for van Beveren reflected the States General’s attempt to maintain its traditional conciliatory mode of diplomacy, shown by the point that van Beveren had to do everything ‘to clear the English discontent’\(^1\). In subsequent instructions he was to negotiate in the same mode a cessation of the harassment of the Dutch fishermen. The trade and fisheries issues and sovereignty of the seas claims determined not only much of the English relations with the Dutch but were of considerable importance for Charles’ domestic policies to justify the costly expansion of the English navy. Whereas Anglo-Dutch relations were conducted separately from foreign relations with other monarchs, yet they were integral to, or part of, Charles’ domestic as well as his foreign policies.

Charles showed his determination to force his claims when a squadron of 12 ships went northwards and ‘forced the Dutch fishermen to pay a small tax’\(^2\). The fishermen had to pay the tax and when there was no money on board, herring was taken in lieu and valued by the navy at ‘4 or 4.5 guilders a ton’\(^3\). Many fishermen paid, leaving the politics to their masters as long as they could take home their catch, or what was left. Gardiner noted, ‘The exploits of the King’s ships against the Dutch fishermen would, if the truth had been known, have awakened scorn rather than admiration’\(^4\). But the might of the English navy was not deployed to collect paltry sums or herring; it was to come to a decisive change in England’s relations with Republic by forcing the Dutch to acknowledge Charles’ sovereignty of the four seas and subsequent dependence on his grace and favours.

\(^1\) Instructions for van Beveren, inv.nr. 12455, instr. 8 March 1636.
\(^2\) Smit, De Buitenlandse Politiek, p.76, *dwong de Nederlandsche vissers een kleine belasting te betalen.*
\(^3\) Muller, *Mare Clausum*, p.270.
The existing ship-money fleet, to be further enlarged with the forthcoming funds of the third writ, was to be used to enforce Charles’ claim of sovereignty and to extend his realms’ borders to the shores of the low lands and France. This would leave the Republic, as a seafaring nation, in a position that no vessel or navy ship could leave its home port without the English kings’ grace and favour.

The Emperor’s refusal to meet Charles’ demands, the Spanish intransigence and the still inconclusive negotiations in Paris presented van Beveren with the opportunity to re-open the subject of Dutch naval support for the restitution of the Palatinate. However this time it was not in negotiations with Charles but with his nephew. Van Beveren suggested to the Count Elector that if a solution could be found in the fisheries issue, an English-Dutch naval alliance could be negotiated to further the cause of his restitution. Charles Louis expressed enthusiasm and through the intermediary of Archbishop Laud proposed several options to the king to come to some agreement with the Dutch on the fisheries issue. Charles’ reaction was that he would only consider any of his nephew’s suggestions if they were accompanied by a Dutch recognition of his sovereignty of the seas. The fisheries issue and aid for the Count Elector must be separately negotiated. Extraordinarily, the Dutch would be allowed to aid the Count Elector but only if they recognised Charles’ sovereignty claims. Alternatively, they had to agree to accept the empty promise of new negotiations, with undoubtedly the pre-condition of recognition of Charles’ sovereignty of the four seas; van Beveren did not accept any conditions and withdrew the States General’s offer of assistance for the Count Elector.

Anglo-Dutch relations had descended to an unprecedented low level. The two countries had their navies at sea to protect their perceived but opposing interests; neither side wanted hostile confrontations but none of the issues that divided them had been resolved. Van Beveren’s mission had so far achieved little more than to uphold the Republic’s diplomatic relations with the English Crown and Council. It had also exposed the English determination not to negotiate with the Republic or to change their Dutch policies. Also England’s relations with other foreign countries were governed by the increasingly threadbare belief that its strong negotiating position did not need to change any of its policies. But this position was less strong than assumed. It had not led to any concessions by the Emperor or to any favourable treaties.
The Spanish had adhered to their demand for Anglo-Dutch hostilities while being unable to pay the subsidies Charles needed for the extension of his navy, a situation exacerbated by growing domestic opposition against raising funds by means of ship-money writs. Whether Charles would see the need to adjust his foreign and Dutch policies remained to be seen, as no English policy had threatened the Republic’s existence as much as Charles’ Spanish policies and his concomitant, quasi domestic policy, to enforce his claims of sovereignty of the seas on the Dutch but not on the French. He had left van Beveren in no doubt that he was not changing his foreign policies and that he was not going to negotiate with the Dutch. They no longer served his interests; in fact, Anglo-Dutch political relations had become an encumbrance. Gardiner noted that Anglo-Dutch relations appeared to be defined in 1636 by the principle that ‘it was for him [Charles] to lay down the law, and for others to follow. He alone was disinterested, just, and wise: all others were selfish, pugnacious and grasping’. Van Beveren realised that he could do no more and asked to be recalled. This was refused by the States General as inopportune; it could be construed that the States General had accepted that Charles’ policies and the strength of his navy were unassailable. The Dutch had no longer a choice; they could not wait and had to put their own interests first, regardless of the consequences for Anglo-Dutch relations. The States General had finally accepted that it needed a clear and decisive maritime policy and strategy next to its long established policy and tactics for the war on land, where the first flushes of the Spanish military successes had started to fade.

*England and the Republic, confrontation or conciliation*

Strengthening the Republic’s own position had to be done first, but launching van Dorp’s fleet in 1636 had achieved no more than that it could raise a large fleet; the Republic had to show that it was able and prepared to use it and defend its interests.

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The States General decided on 30 December 1636 to re-organise and enlarge the Dutch naval forces for ‘the patrolling of the coasts of Flanders and the crossings of the narrow sea and agreed to share the costs by all provinces for thirty-five ship [of war], five yachts and five frigates for which the provinces had to provide two million guilders’.  

Twenty-two ships, five yachts and five frigates will be deployed in the summer along the coast of Flanders and ‘sixteen ships and five frigates will remain in the year-round service of the States General. The duties of the fleet were described in detail; they included strengthening the blockading of the Flemish coast, patrolling the Channel ‘from the Heads [Dover?] to England’s end’ and the ‘two ships and a yacht patrolling north from the Heads to the Sands’. The English navy had a similar task during the Anglo-French war for which Charles had asked the Republic’s understanding; the time had passed when the States General would have asked Charles for the same understanding. Resident Boswell had undoubtedly kept London informed making van Beveren’s stay in London pointless. He was instructed by the States General to take his leave and return home.

The admiralties which employed van Dorp decided not to renew his commission and asked him to resign. As a scion of a noble family close to Frederik Henry, he was given by the prince a positive noblesse oblige testimonial thanking him for his faithful service. The names of several more suitable successors were proposed to the States General and its Admiral of the Fleet Frederik Henry. They appointed Maerten Tromp (1598-1653) as the Lieutenant-Admiral and Witte-Corneliszoon de With as his Vice-Admiral. Tromp was born in a common sailor’s family and went to sea before he was ten years old. He served as flag captain under Lieutenant-Admiral Peter Heyn, famous as captor of the Spanish silver-fleet and he was promoted to Captain in 1630.

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1 Aitzema, Saken van Staet. Vol. IV, pp. 344-345, besetten van de Kuste van Vlaenderen ende beveylinge van de nauwe Zee ende maecken een repartitie van vijf en dertig schepen, vijf jachten ende vijf fregatten tot laste van de respective Provintien daer toe versocht sijn geweest te furneren twee millioenen guldens.
2 Ibid., kruysen in ’t Canael van de Hoofden af tot Engelandts Endt.
3 Ibid., ende twee schepen ende een jacht sullie. Kruysen van de Hoofden Noortwaerts op tot aen ’t Sandt.
4 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 3196, Res. 13 July 1637.
5 There were five separate admiralties in the maritime provinces of the Republic. They were in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Hoorn-Enkhuizen in Holland, in Middelburg in Zeeland and Dokkum & Harlingen in Friesland.
6 TNA, SP 84/153 f.55, 17/27 October 1637, Commission to Tromp as Admiral.
7 TNA, SP 84/153 f.57, 19/29 October 1637, Prince of Orange pass for Admiral van Dorp.
Tromp’s appointment made him de facto Admiral of the Fleet as Frederik Henry, fully engaged by the war on land, did not go to sea. His first action was to ask for ‘the appointment of a reliable person to report on all ‘English’ traffic from Dover to Dunkirk’\textsuperscript{1}.

The Cardinal-Infante had made good use of his improved supplies by sea, his army from Nördlingen and the initial disarray of combining the Dutch and French war strategies. Olivares’ euphoria at the Cardinal-Infante’s progress was short-lived. As we have seen, Frederik Henry re-captured after eight months the Schenkenschans fortress and Louis XIII ‘took to the field in person to recover the ground which had been lost by his commanders’\textsuperscript{2}. In early 1637 ‘the flag of Spain no longer waved over any corner of French soil’\textsuperscript{3}. In July 1637 Frederik Henry laid siege to Breda and accepted its surrender on 10 October 1637. Breda, the Nassau town of his forebears, was of particular importance for him as the Count of Nassau but also as he personally had to surrender the town in 1625 to the Spanish general Spinola. The capture of Breda was of strategic importance for the Republic as a whole and in particular for the maritime provinces Holland and Zeeland as the town straddled the highway between the Southern and Northern Netherlands. The Cardinal-Infante reported the loss of Breda ‘in a pathetic letter of self-exculpation to the Count-Duke and claimed that Breda’s military value had been exaggerated’\textsuperscript{4}. Olivares knew very well that the Cardinal-Infante was incorrect. Breda was militarily very important for the Republic and for Spain more than just a fortress: ‘it was a symbol of all that was most glorious in the reign of Felipe el Grande, Philip II, and the King and the Count-Duke took its loss very hard’\textsuperscript{5}. The capture of Breda and its hinterland, the Baronie, filled also the yawning gap in the southern border of the Republic between the towns and fortresses of Bergen op Zoom and ‘s Hertogenbosch. The French-Dutch alliance was needed by the Dutch for their war against the Spanish in the southern Netherlands and by the French for the protection of their northern borders.

\textsuperscript{1} NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 3196, Res. 30 October 1637.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. p.164.
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.
France’s own armies however, did not pursue the retreating Spanish into the southern provinces after having expelled them from French soil: they relied on the Dutch to continue the war against the Spanish. Louis and Richelieu’s priority interest was to support their Swedish league partner to expel the Imperial forces from Alsace, and their large fortress at Breisach, to prevent Austrian and Spanish Habsburg forces re-instating the Rhine crossing. They would also take possession of any Swedish gains in Alsace as part of their alliance with Sweden.

The timing was opportune for France as the Empire faced military misfortune and political changes. The Elector of Saxony and Imperial forces had been defeated by the Swedes at Wittstock and Emperor Ferdinand II died in Vienna on 15 February 1637. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Ferdinand King of Hungary and King of the Romans. Gardiner described the new Emperor as a ‘religious man without vices’¹. Although his father had revoked his damaging Edict of Restitution, which had pleased some, it had also more clearly defined the political and militarily vulnerability of the Empire. The new Emperor might make some changes but as a staunchly conservative Catholic, he was unlikely, like his father, to restore the Calvinist Count Elector to his estates and dignities. Nor would he endanger the already perilous balance achieved by the Treaty of Prague. The Spanish could not, even if they had tried, change the late Emperor’s mind and perhaps even less that of his successor.

France remained Charles’ only realistic option to achieve restitution of his nephew’s Palatinate and his Electoral dignities but Richelieu wanted more from Charles than what he offered. Also, France was in an offensive-defensive alliance with the Dutch, against whom Charles was little short of waging warfare on trade and fisheries to enforce his claim to sovereignty of the seas. Although the French had not been subjected to any attempts to enforce the sovereignty claims, they would be equally affected if the Dutch would succumb to or compromise on Charles’ sovereignty claims. But it it was not in Charles’ immediate interest to attempt to force his sovereignty claims on the French, and Louis and Richelieu were leaving it to the Dutch to protect their own interests leaving them free to negotiate with Charles.

¹ Gardiner, The Thirty Years’ War, p.190.
The actions of Admiral John Pennington and his squadron of 1636 against the Dutch were not repeated when the 1637 fishing season started. It is not recorded whether Charles found this expedient for his negotiations with the French, or to avoid naval confrontations with the Republic’s navy, or both, but it did not stop him from continuing to press his sovereignty claims. Resident Boswell was given instructions to continue communicating directly with the Dutch fishermen. He reported that they were not averse from taking fishing licences from the king but they wished to know ‘how the king of England’s licences were to protect them against the cruisers of the Cardinal-Infante’.

Boswell suggested that the fishermen could be protected from the cruisers if their English fishing licences were accompanied by a passport from the Cardinal-Infante. He was instructed to continue his efforts in the Republic and to coordinate with Charles’ special representative in Brussels, Balthazar Gerbier, who had to gain support for the principle of passports. Gerbier received 2,000 pounds ‘with Charles’ full approval’, to use as he thought best to prepare the ground but this was not needed. The Cardinal-Infante was in favour and promised to issue passports. He had nothing to lose and much to gain; the continued support of the English navy would protect his supply line of war material, soldiers and funds from Spain.

The States General did not want to risk any further transgressions of its fishermen and prepared a plakkaat, decree, making it illegal to take the passports. The decree was not required as the Marques de Fuentes who was the Spanish king’s admiral in those seas, ‘protested that he would pay no attention to any passports which did not come direct from Madrid’. The Marques’ intervention led to another attempt to induce the fishermen to buy fishing licences, but without the need of a Spanish passport. This time it was not the power of the English navy that was deployed but the peaceful intervention by a civilian English captain Fielding on a merchant vessel, who had to persuade the fishermen to buy fishing licenses.

3 Ibid.
Captain Fielding was not successful; he had to report to Windebank that the captains of the Dutch convoy guarding the fishermen ‘did not let my boat pass amongst the busses’¹ without specific orders from their superiors. When 1637 ended, no new fishing licences had been forced on the Dutch fishermen since Pennington’s tour-de-force. This was no more than a status quo while Charles attended to more pressing domestic and foreign policy issues. The domestic opposition to the third ship-money writ had not only grown during 1637 but also widened, from collecting issues that had followed the second writ to serious questioning of the very principle of this method to raise money for the Crown. Added to these, a simmering discontent on religious issues in Scotland had erupted into a serious riot in and around St Giles’ Cathedral in Edinburgh on 23 July 1637 ². The Dean had started a service using a new Prayer Book, considered by the congregation as incompatible with the established principles of the Scottish Calvinists.

Charles’ foreign policy situation had also started to change during the course of 1637, not necessarily to his disadvantage but certainly requiring even more attention. At the beginning of the year, Charles’ negotiating position had augured well for the alliance negotiations with the French. Leicester had not been allowed to offer Richelieu any more than a cessation of the favours to Spain, but Richelieu wanted an offensive and defensive alliance. He wanted England to break with Spain; in return he would not make peace with the Habsburgs without Charles’ consent, or even to treat for it ‘without assurance of the restitution of the Palatinate’³. Richelieu had to drop his demand for an offensive and defensive treaty. Instead, he proposed an alliance by which Charles was to engage ‘to give no help either directly or indirectly to Spain, the Emperor, or Bavaria, to allow the levy of 6,000 volunteers for the service of Louis, and to put to sea at least thirty armed vessels to guard the coasts of France and England and hinder the transport of money and munitions to Flanders’⁴.

¹ TNA, SP 16/364 f.89, Fielding to Windebank, 24 July 1637.
⁴ Ibid., p.205.
Richelieu’s proposals to Charles made no reference to the Republic but if accepted, would be of direct military benefit for the French and the Dutch but they would not deter Charles from continuing his anti-Dutch fisheries and trade policies nor pressing further his sovereignty of the seas claim.

Charles accepted Richelieu’s proposals but made some ‘minor changes’\(^1\). Leicester was instructed to sign a treaty with these included; however, these changes were not minor. He wanted the Dutch-French gains in the Southern Netherlands given as ‘securities in the power of his nephew’\(^2\). The Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria and also France and Sweden had ‘to return anything they had captured during the war in Germany’\(^3\). France was also to support the Count Elector when Charles provided him with a fleet to attack the Spanish at sea. After the treaty was signed by the French, the Count Elector would set sail ‘with fifteen English ships of war and an Admiral’s commission from the King of France’\(^4\). Charles was trying to give away no more than a possible conflict at sea, but even that not under his own flag but under the flag of his nephew as the Count Elector and commissioned by France. The entire convoluted plan could not change the ongoing wars and appeared to have only the merit of placing the young, inexperienced Count Elector in a prominent position.

England’s links with Spain would perhaps be bruised but not broken, the anti Dutch policies unaffected and France would have to deliver the Palatinates and the Elector’s dignities. Leicester appeared to have negotiated a treaty very much centred on his king’s dynastic objectives. The French did not sign the treaty as rapidly as was hoped in London and in early March ‘there were signs of impatience in England at the slow progress of the treaty’\(^5\), which led to new orders to Leicester in Paris to hasten the proceedings. The anxiety to have the treaty quickly concluded was ostensibly to allow the Count Elector to sail on the planned date of 15 April but, more likely, because of possible political changes in the Empire where negotiations had started for a peace settlement with Sweden\(^6\).

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\(^1\) Sharpe, *The Personal Rule*, p.533.
\(^2\) Muller, *Mare Clausum*, p.303, *als panden in de macht van zijn neef*.
\(^3\) Ibid. p.304, *teruggeven wat zij gedurende de oorlog in Duitsland hadden veroverd*.
\(^6\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3196, Res. 2 & 4 February 1637.
Before his return to the Republic, van Beveren had already written to Charles informing him that the Emperor contemplated offering the cash-strapped Swedish Crown ‘a large sum of money to leave Germany’\(^1\). In addition, allowing the Swedes ‘to peacefully annex the whole of Pomerania, to hold it as an Imperial Fief’\(^2\). Money was badly needed by Sweden, and remaining in Pomerania would meet Sweden’s important political objective to be on both sides of the Baltic Sea. The Emperor would give little away; Pomerania was already occupied by the Swedes and the State’s own government was at odds with Vienna. Sweden’s precarious financial situation could induce acceptance and would deprive France of its important ally, diminishing the chance to capture and retain the Palatinate estates. Van Beveren had ended his letter to Charles with the contention that much would be lost for the common cause, a term Charles frequently used, if the Swedes were to make peace with the Emperor. This could be averted if England would help them ‘with a good sum of money in order to encourage them to continue’\(^3\) to advance their arms and plans in Germany.

An end of the Franco-Swedish alliance would force France to re-consider its position. Louis had not rejected but not signed the treaty as he felt compelled to involve his existing treaty partners. There was also the need to search for a wider anti Austrian Habsburg alliance in a new treaty, which he had euphemistically called a *Ligue Auxiliaire*. The French ambassador in The Hague, De Charnacé informed the States General that a conference was proposed in Hamburg between the crowns of France, England, Sweden and Denmark and that he had orders from his king to invite a Dutch ambassador\(^4\). Richelieu’s original urgency to enter into a league with England appeared to have diminished, whether because of increased French self-confidence after expelling the Spanish armies from French soil, the uncertainty of the alliance with Sweden or, more likely, the consequences of Charles’ minor changes.

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\(^1\) TNA, SP 84/152 f.89, 8/18 March 1637, van Beveren to Charles I, à quitter l’Allemagne est en mis en avant de bailer à couronne de Suède une grosse somme d’argent. Hereafter, van Beveren to Charles March 1637.

\(^2\) Ibid., la faire posséder paisiblement toute la Pomeraine, la relevant et tenant de l’Empire

\(^3\) Ibid., d’assister et secourir les Suédois effectivement d’une bonne somme d’argent.

\(^4\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3196, Res. 14 & 27 May 1637.
Whatever Richelieu’s reasons, the treaty had not been concluded, which meant that a *Ligue Auxiliaire* would require new Anglo-French negotiations. A Swedish withdrawal from the war and the long-standing refusal of the Dutch to enter into open conflict with the Emperor would leave it to France, without English support on land, to deliver the Palatinates and the Elector’s dignities. Richelieu would be well aware of the Republic’s policy in relation with the Empire and could not ignore the possibility that Sweden could make peace with the Emperor. Louis’ and Richelieu’s priority was to have more certainty about their military position in the Empire, and to have the support of a wider coalition to be concluded in a *Ligue Auxiliaire*.

These developments were not what Charles had wanted. However, a large and strong anti-Habsburg force in Germany had a greater chance of capturing the Palatinates than his uncle Christian, king of Denmark, had had eight years earlier. Louis’ invitation for a four nations’ conference was accepted by Charles but declined by Christian as he was ‘acting as an intermediary between Sweden and the Emperor’\(^1\). Perhaps more importantly, Christian was not in a strong enough position to break the condition of his 1629 Lübeck peace treaty with the Emperor not to interfere in his internal affairs.

The Dutch were not invited but the States General accepted Louis’ request to send an ambassador and on 3 June 1637 designated Charles van Cracauw, Dutch Resident in Denmark. Pointedly, he was only to ‘attend the conference’\(^2\) as an observer. Consistent with the Republic’s policy not to engage in hostilities in the Empire, the States General had not drawn up any terms of reference for Cracauw and neither had it set a date for his departure to Hamburg. While England and France were negotiating for an alliance against the Austrian Habsburgs, the States General took steps to reaffirm its policy of neutrality in the conflicts in the Empire. The States General instructed its representative in Vienna, Foppe van Aitzema to continue according to his earlier instructions about ‘the basis and method to be agreed about the neutrality between the Emperor, the Roman Empire and this State’\(^3\).

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\(^1\) Muller, *Mare Clausum*, p.301,
\(^2\) Ibid. *om de conferentie bij te wonen*, p.298/9.
\(^3\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3196, Res. 9 January 1637, *waerop ende waernaer gereguleert soude worden de neutraliteit tussen den Keijser, ’t Roomse Rijck ende desen Staet.*
The Republic’s policy to remain militarily neutral in the conflicts in the Empire had not excluded giving financial support for the Protestant cause in Germany and providing sanctuary and support for the deposed queen of Bohemia and the Count Elector Charles Louis. The Swedes had also been paid subsidies which at the time was the right of neutrals without becoming a party in the conflicts. Van Beveren had written to Charles that it is for the Dutch ‘in no way within their powers to grant and continue to pay a considerable financial subsidy, still less in the form that the Swedes wish it’ 1. He could have added that these burdens were exacerbated by the consequences of England’s favours to the Spanish. Also not paying its debts to the Republic not only incurred by Charles but also the advanced expenses of the four regiments James provided in 1624. The States General’s instructions to Foppe van Aitzema and van Beveren’s letter to Charles had been clear indications that the Republic would not participate in the Anglo-French negotiations in Hamburg. It would not risk having to fight the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs at the same time.

The Republic had held that position after the end of the cease-fire in 1621, repeated in 1625 in the Triple Alliance negotiations and maintained with the Ad Referendum. However, in 1637 the stakes were even higher. Still Charles remained determined to persuade the States General to abandon its policies which were obstructing his own foreign and personal policies. He wrote on 20 June 1637 to the States General, addressing them as ‘our good friends, cousins and allies’ 2, that the Anglo-French alliance linked the Republic and other friends and allies together and promised much good to come for the common cause. Charles referred to links which did not exist and to a common cause which he did not define. He ended his unusually short letter by expressing that he did not doubt the States General’s affection for him and his nephew, the young Elector Count Palatinate Charles Louis, and that his Resident Sir William Boswell had been given adequate instructions and would make these known and to confer if necessary.

1 van Beveren to Charles 1637, à tout leur possible; mais puisqu’il n’est nullement en leur puissance de consentir et continuer un subsidy d’argent considerable, encore moins comme les Suédois le désirent.
2 NA, 1.01.0 2, SG, inv.nr. 5894. Charles’ letter was dated 20 June 1637 and filed in LE (Lias) England with written on it that it was geëxhibeerd (exhibited) in the States General’s meeting of 14 July 1637.
Boswell met with the States General on 14 July 1637 and started his presentation with a statement, later confirmed by letter which encapsulated his king’s instructions. The significance of Boswell’s presentation warrants a full quote. ‘In recent years, the King, my master, has been persuaded to enter into a new treaty of alliance with His Most Christian Majesty and Your Most Serene Lordships. He has negotiated for a long time with His Most Christian Majesty and finally a conclusion has been reached on both sides as to the articles [of the treaty] for the public weal, such that the time has now come to request the cooperation of Your Most Serene Lordships, just as it was promised in your name and with your assurance by Your Most Serene Lordship’s ambassador in England.’ Whether it was the instructions to Boswell or his interpretation thereof, but parts of his presentation were incorrect or, at least, open for misinterpretation. All van Beveren’s suggestions for new treaty negotiations had been rejected by Charles as irrelevant and replaced by the need to focus on the fisheries issues with demands for recognition of his sovereignty of the seas. The Republic was not involved in the Anglo-French treaty negotiations in Paris. Instead, the States General had persistently made representations for England’s adherence to the existing treaty of Southampton which Charles had wanted to be maintained.

Boswell’s suggestion that the Dutch ambassador had promised cooperation and Dutch assurance on behalf of the States General was incorrect. Joachimi and van Beveren, experienced diplomats, would not have gone any further without a specific mandate. They promised, perhaps even assured they would convey to their superiors in The Hague what had been disclosed to them in London. Boswell ended his presentation by asking the States General to declare its consent as soon as possible to enter into the Treaty of Alliance between their Majesties and to send someone with sufficient authority to Hamburg. Charles’ letter and his instructions to Boswell would draw the Republic again into supporting his continental politics and dynastic objectives.


Boswell’s letter was also ‘exhibited’ in the States General’s meeting of 14 July 1637 and filed in LE (Lias) England.
Boswell’ presentation to the States General was consistent with Charles’ approach to continental policies and his views of the role of the Dutch therein but also with his perception of England’s political and diplomatic relations with the Republic. His instructions to Boswell repeated the history of the 1625 Triple Alliance treaty which had failed in its objectives. It had contributed to Denmark’s financial ruin and to Charles owing the Dutch in 1637 in excess of one and a half million guilders, having advanced most of his war expenses, a debt still unpaid after twelve years.

The Triple Alliance was negotiated as an extension of the Republic’s commitments under the Treaty of Southampton but it was for the _Ad Referendum_ that Charles had sent an extraordinarily large embassy in 1625 to The Hague, led by Buckingham and Holland to commit the Republic to participate in full scale military activity in the Empire for the restitution of the Palatinate. The Dutch had refused to deviate from its policy to avoid war with both Habsburg Houses but twelve years later, Charles merely confined himself to a letter to the States General to accredit his Resident Boswell to bring the Republic for the same purpose into the _Ligue Auxiliaire_. It would again be an _Ad Referendum_ but not to an Anglo-Dutch treaty but an Anglo-French treaty, making the Republic co-responsible for France’s commitments concerning the Palatinate.

Boswell returned to the States General three times requesting an urgent reply, the third time he did not ask; instead he insisted on an answer\(^1\). The States General even lacked any formal information on the treaty it was asked to join but despite that, Boswell reported to London that the States General’s deputies had been told to consult with the States of their sovereign Provinces. This was not only a standard formal requirement, it also provided time for further internal discussion and, if necessary to defer any answer to the most opportune moments. Boswell may have thought that there was finally a breakthrough in sight which, it seemed, he had reported to London because Coke wrote that he was pleased that ‘deputies are consigned to bring us out of our suspense concerning their entrance into this treaty into which they were engaged by the French. Besides you must take notice that the assembly formerly designed for Hamburg will now be held at The Hague’\(^2\).

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\(^1\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3196, 22 August 1637.

\(^2\) TNA, SP 84/152 f.304, Res. 24 August 1637, Coke to Boswell.
Boswell left nothing to chance; he followed Coke’s instructions to communicate ‘as you find fit’\(^1\) by directly approaching Provincial States to gain their support for his king’s wishes. He also wrote to Frederik Henry, who was with his armies and asked him to persuade the States General to give him a ‘favourable decision’\(^2\) on joining the alliance. But Boswell did not get a favourable answer; Charles’ letter and his proposition were based on what can only be described as deliberate obfuscation, just short of misleading. He had told van Beveren that he was not negotiating with the Republic; instead, he had, or assumed he had negotiated with the French, which role would be allotted to the Dutch and now only wanted their acceptance or acquiescence.

Ending favours to Spain would not be a concession for the Republic; it would mean merely ceasing aiding and abetting the enemy of the Republic, England’s partner in the still current Treaty of Southampton. The Dutch did not need another treaty, only England, in their view, ceasing to flout the existing one. Accepting Charles’ concession would mean not only that it replaced his commitments under the Treaty of Southampton, but also that the Republic would share France’s commitments under an Anglo-French treaty. This treaty would include an extension into a \emph{Ligue Auxiliare} as proposed by France and presumably backed by Sweden but still to be negotiated in Hamburg. Boswell was informed by Coke that the conference would not take place in Hamburg but in The Hague, information which he ‘conveyed to Frederik Henry’\(^3\). However, neither the prince nor the States General had offered The Hague as a venue for the meeting planned in Hamburg. Yet Coke wrote to Boswell that ‘both the French and Swedes concurred in the accepting of that place’\(^4\); he may have thought that the States General could be persuaded to issue an invitation. Boswell was not given room for any negotiation or discussion, only to obtain general compliance and The Hague as the venue which would be regarded in Vienna as Dutch duplicity. With Dutch compliance obtained and The Hague as venue arranged the \emph{Ligue Auxiliare} could be finalised with the inclusion of the Republic.

\(^1\)TNA, SP 84/152 f.254, 6/16 July 1637, Boswell to Prince of Orange.
\(^2\)TNA, SP 84/153 f.16, 24 September 1637, Boswell to Prince of Orange.
\(^3\)TNA, SP 84/152 f.254, 6/16 July 1637, Boswell to Prince of Orange.
\(^4\)TNA, SP 84/152 f.304, 24 August 1637, Coke to Boswell.
The States General’s compliance would give additional military strength to the *Ligue* saving Charles from participating in active hostilities in the Empire and leaving him free to continue his existing fisheries policies against the Dutch and pursuing his claims of sovereignty of the seas. Charles’ political tactics had been guided again by what he wanted, not by what was attainable. But the States General did not comply and its reaction was unusually devoid of circumspection. Aitzema recorded that ‘the States General remained determined that it would not engage any further in the affairs of Germany, having enough to do with Spain; and not being well satisfied with that King and the demonstrations and pretences of the English at sea’\(^1\). The States General left it to Resident Boswell to inform his superiors in London.

Boswell reported to Coke that the conference would not be held in The Hague but in Hamburg. He queried where Coke’s information had come from that it would be in The Hague, which he had also conveyed to the States General\(^2\). Boswell informed Coke, prematurely, that ‘the treaty between Oxenstierna [the Swedish Chancellor’s son] and the French ambassador is ratified by the Swedes’\(^3\). This was not yet the case, it was still open for discussion and it was known that Sweden had to be first satisfied that financial support from its allies would enable it to continue the war. Sweden also wanted the Republic to honour its commitment for financial assistance. On behalf of Queen Kristina, daughter of the late Gustavus Adolphus, Chancellor Oxenstierna wrote to the States General that ‘the monthly succour was not paid for four months despite its promise of 16 June’\(^4\). He omitted that that was the time that Sweden was negotiating with the Emperor about conditions for ending its war in the Empire. When the conference started in January 1638, it was no longer to form the wider anti-Austrian-Habsburg alliance, for which the failed Triple Alliance of December 1625 was to be the nucleus. It would now be one restricted to France and England and, providing the right conditions were offered, to Sweden.

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\(^2\) TNA, SP 84/153 f. 61, 23 Oct. /2 Nov. 1637, Boswell to Coke.

\(^3\) Ibid., but only concluded on 6 March 1638, see Aitzema, *Saken van Staet*, Folio, Vol II, p.578.

\(^4\) TNA, SP 84/153 f. 72, 28 Oct., 1637, Chancellor of Sweden to the States General.
The Danish government had sent a representative to be no more than an observer. The States General, pressed by the French king, had instructed Karel Cracauw to go to Hamburg but only ‘to attend the meetings and to report the discussions confidentially to the Netherlands’\textsuperscript{1}; also only as observer. The Hamburg conference could only address a Ligue Auxiliaire which had become a euphemism for a re-negotiation of the Anglo-French treaty. Louis and Richelieu had not accepted Charles’ last minute alterations to the treaty which, with these alterations included, had not been signed. The Ligue Auxiliaire had to take into account that Sweden had its own demands which included that Charles’ requirements had to be matched with active English participation and financial support, meaning that ‘England’s breach with the Emperor had to precede concluding the Ligue’\textsuperscript{2}. Sweden was never beholden to Charles for the restitution of the Palatinate as Gustavus Adolphus had shown when he demanded large subsidies for his support. When refused, he made his suggestion that the Palatinate could be restored but as a donative of Sweden.

France and Sweden renewed their alliance\textsuperscript{3} but this did not mean that Sweden assumed any responsibilities for the restitution of the Palatinate. The Swedes argued that the absence of the Dutch and Danish armies made it necessary that England committed itself further than the negotiations with France. The Hamburg conference ended in May 1638; it had failed to negotiate the Ligue and with it collapsed the chance of an Anglo-French treaty when Sweden and its alliance partner France declined to give an undertaking not to make peace without the restoration of the Palatinate unless Charles ‘would bind himself to join them in war by land as well as by sea’\textsuperscript{4}. More than two years of negotiations had proven that there were no political or religious common causes for England, France and Sweden. The three nations’ foreign policies, as those of the Republic and Denmark, were determined by their national interests, in Charles’ case not only national but also dynastic.

\textsuperscript{1} Muller, *Mare Clausum*, p.301, maar alleen om de vergaderingen bij te wonen en het daar verhandelde onder belofte van geheimhouding naar Nederland over te schrijven.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. 305, de vredebreuk van Engeland met den Keizer het verbond zoude voorafgaan.
\textsuperscript{3} NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3197, Res. 7 April 1638. Conveyed to the States General by the new French ambassador d’Estampes who succeeded ambassador De Charnacé who was killed at the siege of Breda in his second capacity as Colonel of a French regiment in the service of the Republic.
The failed Anglo-French treaty negotiation had not changed the logic of Charles’ foreign policy. Even his persistent refusal to engage in actual warfare had not altered England’s importance as a partner, even a non-combatant partner, but it had reduced the fear of England being an active opponent. England’s ability to pose a military threat to France and the Republic had all but disappeared during 1638, not because of the growing strength of others but because of the consequences of Charles’ domestic policies in England and, even more seriously, the troubles in Scotland.

The riots of July 1637 in Edinburgh which had started with the introduction of the new Prayer Book had been channelled into a National Covenant in February 1638, its signatories and supporters calling themselves the Covenanters. ‘In Scotland after the signing of the Covenant the cry of religion and liberties flourished with political strength and purpose’¹. Its formulation invited support from all Scots, whether for religious, political or other reasons. It was uncompromisingly anti-Episcopalian, yet in one section it also professed loyalty to the king. As long as this section concurred with the wider cause of the Covenanters, Charles was right in seeing it as the most dangerous to his authority. Initially Charles underestimated the seriousness of the situation and restricted himself to demanding punishment of the rioters. He refused any compromise or negotiation with the Covenanters, but this was untenable and some dialogue became inevitable. A detailed repetition of the ensuing efforts to diffuse the situation is beyond the scope of this study but by the close of 1638 all efforts had failed. Preparations were started in England to resort to military intervention to end what had become the Scottish rebellion.

Whereas the Scottish troubles accentuated Charles’s inability to exert any direct influence on continental politics of France and Sweden, it did not change his ongoing Dutch policies on trade, fisheries and claims of dominion of the seas while the military developments in the Empire made him more important than ever for the Spanish.

¹ Donald, An Uncounsellled King, p. 79. The Dutch orthodox-Calvinists resolved at their Synod of Dordrecht in 1618/9 to impose a Church Order with binding restrictions on the States General; it was never implemented in the Republic. Although James had powerfully supported calling the Synod, he subsequently rejected its resolution for his own kingdoms; his contention was that ‘no bishops meant no monarchs’.
During the latter part of 1638 it had become impossible to move any troops, material and bullion from Italy and Spain along the Spanish road to the southern Netherlands. The Rhine crossing at Breisach was closed where the Swedish armies had captured the major stronghold while the French forces penetrated further into the Alsace. Moving men and supplies via the Tirol gateway would mean crossing the width of the Empire which was also impossible; the Spanish were left with only the sea route and the need of the English navy to protect this thoroughfare.

The failure of the Anglo-French negotiations in Hamburg to agree the *Ligue Auxiliaire* had ended the chance of the restitution of the Palatinate by military means. Charles had considered it the better of two options as it could also have been the beginning of a wider anti-Habsburg alliance. However, he had always kept the second option open; his relations with the Spanish and their support for the restitution. But he also needed to maintain good political relations with Spain to counterbalance his relations with France which were weakened after the failed negotiations in Hamburg. England and Spain would have to continue searching for a mutually beneficial relationship.
CHAPTER NINE
Foreign policies and national interests

While the Anglo-French negotiations were still going on in Hamburg, the new Spanish envoy in London Don Alonso Cárdenas, replacing the unpopular ambassador Count Oñate, had started a charm offensive to convince Charles and his Council of the greater benefits of strong Anglo-Spanish relations. After the collapse of the Anglo-French treaty, Charles responded by sending Sir Arthur Hopton as ambassador back to Spain\(^1\), and he indicated to the Spanish in Brussels that he intended to continue his favours by allowing the export of ‘3000 barrels of [gun] powder and to let his fleet convoy them safely to Dunkirk\(^2\). Ambassador Joachimi protested to the Council and subsequently to the king about this further extension of the support of the Republic’s enemies. However, both the Earl of Holland and the king himself maintained that the export of powder could not be prohibited and that the merchants who sold it were responsible for the transport \textit{als het buiten is}, ‘once it is outside’\(^3\). Their statements ignored the by-then-customary protection of the Dover-Dunkirk traffic by the English navy, justified as it was seen as maintaining England’s neutrality in the seas perceived to be its monarch’s dominion.

But Olivares needed more than the sale of gunpowder and the support of the English navy. He had to bring ‘the vacillating administration of Charles more firmly into the Spanish camp’\(^4\), which meant that England had to declare war on the Dutch. Charles’ reaction was that, in return, the Emperor and the Spanish had to return to his nephew the ‘Palatinate lands that were not already in their opposite sides’ hands\(^5\). The exchange of demands at the time was as unrealistic as the Count Elector’s assumption that he could take command of the Swedish armies at Breisach after the sudden death of its redoubtable general Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar.

\(^3\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 5894, LE, Joachimi to the States General, 17 June 1638.
The French had already taken control of the Breisach fortress and the Rhine crossing, and Richelieu had ordered the arrest of the Count Elector when ‘he travelled incognito through France’\(^1\). Despite the irritation in England, Charles continued with a semblance of negotiations with the French. France had control of much of Alsace, in marching distance from the Lower Palatinate estates and, as always, it was part of Charles’ policy of keeping his options open by negotiating with both Spain and France. Olivares, Richelieu and also Charles knew that their domestic problems had to be solved before any new and meaningful negotiations could take place, but as the year 1638 progressed the situation deteriorated. Preparations for an armed conflict with the Scots left no doubt that Charles would not tolerate what he saw as a challenge to his authority as the lawful king of Scotland. Military supplies were moved from London to Hull\(^2\) and arms were ordered from Holland. The States General granted Resident Boswell the licences he requested for the shipment of a large quantity of fuses and a consignment of weapons\(^3\) which was only part of further requests to Holland and to other parts of the continent. The strengthening of Berwick Castle and the mustering of troops which started in January 1639 could still be enough sabre-rattling for both sides to withdraw from the brink of what could only be a deeply damaging war.

Charles’ problems were not confined to a possible war over Scotland. His third ship money writ had given rise to constitutional opposition in England, less visible to the public at large than the Scottish troubles but more insidious and potentially very damaging politically. Although the judges of the Exchequer Court had declared that ‘if the Kingdom be in danger, the King may call for, and ought to have ship-money through the kingdom, and that the King is the sole judge when the kingdom is in danger’\(^4\), opposition did not lessen. Many considered it a tax that could not be raised without consent of Parliament. The continuing opposition led to a challenge in open court where seven out of twelve judges supported the king and five judges, in various degrees failed to give the king a clear affirmation.

\(^1\) Sharpe, *The Personal Rule*, p.833.
\(^2\) Ibid., p.795.
\(^3\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3197, Res. 13 October 1638 and 17 December 1638.
Whether caused by the lack of unanimous support of the twelve judges or to avoid inciting more dissent, the third writ was reduced ‘to £69,750, a mere third of the earlier writs’\(^1\) which ‘probably never reached the treasury of the Navy’.\(^2\)

**The second Spanish Armada**

Financial support from Spain to continue extending England’s navy could be ruled out because of Olivares’s own domestic problems. The long-standing attempt to raise funds by a Union of Arms of all the king’s realms was still without success. In addition, Olivares needed substantial extra funds to forestall or suppress looming revolts in Catalonia and Portugal, but he still needed England’s support to maintain the sea passage from Spain to Flanders. Charles had not interrupted his policy of favours to Spain while negotiating with the French, but the advanced stage this had reached had left Olivares in no doubt of his own far from secure position. He also had to make his own arrangements to keep the sea passage open. His agents were ordered to arrange charter contracts for manned vessels with neutral ship owners, ‘like the Englishman Benjamin Wright, for transporting men to Flanders’\(^3\) and preparations commenced in Spain and Portugal for a new fleet to keep the supply line to Flanders open.

Vice-Admiral Tromp reported from sea on 20 June that ‘twelve of the king’s ships had left for Spain to transport Spanish soldiers and money’\(^4\) and wrote again on 29 June that, while cruising off Portland, he had intercepted three English vessels on the way to Dunkirk with 1070 Spanish soldiers on board. He had taken the soldiers ‘and let the vessels undamaged go’\(^5\). Tromp had followed his orders and stopped the soldiers from reaching Dunkirk, but had released the three vessels on the assumption that they could have been part of the reported twelve king’s ships. The States General’s instructions had been to avoid confrontations with the king’s navy which, in his perception, included the king’s vessels.

\(^{1}\) Sharpe, *The Personal Rule*, p.588.
\(^{2}\) Ibid., p.589.
\(^{4}\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 3198, Res. 26 June 1639, f. 325, *twaelff Engelsche Conincx schepen near Spagnien souden zijn geseylt om ’t Spaens crijchsvolck ende gelt over te brengen.*
\(^{5}\) NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3198, Res. 4 July 1639, f.341/2, *schepen onbeschadigt hare reyse heft laten vorderen.*
The news of the release of the three vessels was not well received by Frederik Henry, who found the decision to let the vessels go *vreemd*, strange; they should have been ‘sunk, burnt or captured’¹. The prince’s dismay was the reaction of an army general who would face the enemy’s re-enforcements and sought to destroy, or at least damage their supply-line. His reaction had also shown that the States General’s policies of simultaneously appeasing England with its support for Spain and expecting the prince to fight the Spanish armies on land was due for reassessment.

By design or otherwise, Tromp had given the States General an advantageous diplomatic opening. Releasing the vessels meant that Charles could not accuse the Dutch of wilfully damaging his, or his subjects’ interests or property, a theme constantly being used by him and his Council in fisheries and trade disputes, followed by the threat and issue of reprisal letters. Joachimi was quick to write to Charles about his subjects’ extraordinarily unfriendly actions against their king’s treaty partner. He reminded the king that ‘we remembered well what your Majesty said last year: that the subjects of your Majesty who serve the Spanish with their ships by transporting war supplies and other contraband did so at their peril’². He added that the States General had been informed that his Majesty and the Lords of the Council were not involved in this and also that His Majesty had made it known that such was his will. The ambassador had carefully avoided casting any doubt on the king’s and Council’s veracity but urged Charles to give appropriate orders to prevent the use of his subjects’ ships to transport soldiers of the king of Spain. This implied that any further transports of Spanish troops by his subjects would not be treated ‘with all possible courtesy’³ as noted by Gardiner. Joachimi’s letter had no effect; the fall of Breisach and the loss of the Rhine crossing had made the sea passage from Spain the vital element that could determine the outcome of the Dutch-Spanish war. But supporting Spain was also important for Charles’ own policies. It gave him a strong position in his negotiations with France to support his general political and his dynastic objectives.

¹ NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv. nr. 3198, Res. 11 July 1639, f.356, *in de grondt geboort, ofte verbrandt, oft binnen dese Landen opgesonden.*
² TNA, SP 84/155 f.205, 15/25 August 1639, Joachimi to Charles I, *ramontoivent bien de ce que Vostre Majesté a dict l’année passée, que les subjects de Vostre Majesté lesquels servent aux Espagnols avec leur navires transportants munitions de guerre et autres choses de contraband le font a leur peril.*
Olivares knew that the use of chartered vessels would not provide security for the supply of all the Cardinal-Infante’s requirements and, in any case, it could not keep the supply line open if the Republic’s sea power was not neutralised or eliminated. The new fleet was meant to achieve this but Olivares left nothing to chance. Exhaustive diplomatic efforts were deployed in London ‘to secure the active naval cooperation of Charles in guarding the Channel passage’\(^1\). In turn, it gave Charles the opportunity not only to negotiate but to insist on binding Spanish commitments for the restitution of the Palatinate and the Count Elector’s dignities. At the same time, he could maintain his strong position in his relations and negotiations with the French.

After fifty-one years, the second Spanish fleet sailed from Corunna on 6 September 1639. This time it was not to attack England, but with England’s help to attack the Dutch Republic. The fleet was under the command of Don Antonio de Oquendo (1577-1640) and consisted of over a hundred ships, totalling 36,000 tons and carrying some two thousand cannon. In addition, it included eight English vessels transporting 2,000 Spanish soldiers. The fleet ‘was not quite as large as the Invincible Armada of 1588 but its firepower was greater. It carried about the same number of men, 20,000, of whom 6,000 were crew, 8,000 fighting men belonging to the warships and 8,500 infantry for Flanders’\(^2\), in addition to the 2,000 soldiers on the English vessels. These were disembarked at Plymouth and made their way overland to Dover, from where they were ferried to Dunkirk in protected convoys.

Oquendo took his fleet eastward in the Channel where he was attacked on 18 September by a Dutch squadron of twelve ships which was enlarged the same day by another squadron of fifteen ships which had been blockading Dunkirk. Tromp reported to the States General that the battle lasted several days and that the Spanish fleet had taken refuge in the Downs. One of his ships, de Grote Christoffel, had exploded and was lost and his Vice-Admiral de With’s ship had been disabled. It had then gone back to Zeeland, taking the wounded, the prizes and the captured Spanish seamen.

\(^1\) Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares, p.549.  
\(^2\) Ibid., p.549.
Tromp’s confidential instructions were that he was to attack the Spanish fleet ‘wherever found, disregarding the ports, roadsteads or the bays of the kingdoms. When he is the strongest and thinks to have the advantage over the Spanish and other enemies he is to attack. Should there be French, English, Scottish, Danish, Polish or Orientals who would try to prevent him, he should not be deterred from attacking and destroying. However, the Lt.Admiral [Tromp] should keep this part of his instructions secret from his captains and crew until he will have to go into action. He will then disclose the States General’s instructions in order that the enemy can be attacked fully united and courageously, also those who would try to defend them and stop this nation from defending itself with the force of its weapons’ 1. Until he was ready to attack, Tromp had to keep the Spanish confined to the Downs. He was repeatedly warned by Vice-Admiral Pennington’s emissaries that the Royal navy would not tolerate a Dutch attack on the Spanish in English waters. Having confined the fleet, Tromp needed time for the arrival of further enforcements, fire ships and supplies.

Charles also needed time. He was waiting for an answer from Madrid ‘if the King of Spain would give 150,000 pounds, his ships should be placed in safety’ 2. The French ambassador Pierre de Bellevières was offered the same favours by Charles as he had offered to the Spanish ambassador, but France had to give binding commitment that the young Count Elector could take command of the armies of the late Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. Even the Dutch were drawn into Charles’s need for time and his efforts to obtain financial or political advantages out of the Spanish predicament. Coke gave Joachimi a memorandum on 29 Sept. /10 Oct. proposing that the Republic join a possible offensive-defensive league between England and France, but gave no details.

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The States General found the memorandum duijster, unclear, and instructed Joachimi to ask Coke for clarification and a formal proposal. Coke could not elucidate but informed the ambassador that it would mean for the Dutch that the fisheries issue could be negotiated. Joachimi was instructed to reply to Coke that the Republic would not negotiate its fishing rights which, by inference meant negotiating the king’s claims to sovereignty of the seas. The States General had finally decided that it was too late for more spurious attempts at new negotiations.

Pennington’s warnings that he would not tolerate any combat in his ‘King’s Chambers’ and Tromp’s orders to keep the fleet confined at the Downs hid the fact that it was an interlude both sides needed. The Dutch had needed time to strengthen their fleet in case of English involvement, and the Spanish needed time to arrange transhipment of most of their soldiers and the silver bullion to Dunkirk. With his fleet outnumbering the Spanish and English fleets, Tromp could report on 11 October that he had disclosed his secret orders to destroy the Spanish fleet when he was ready. His war council had unanimously agreed to attack when the enforcements were in place and the weather conditions were right. On 22 October he wrote ‘after the first advantageous opportunity had presented itself the battle was successful, but as yet he could not report any specific details as the enemy’s fleet and his own were widely dispersed. Vice Admiral Pennington’s dire warnings were not backed by orders to use force against the Dutch, specific orders that could only be given by the king. Charles had not given such orders, ‘he was ‘waiting on the best bid’ in his barter diplomacy with Madrid and Paris. Also it would have then been undeniable that England had joined Spain in war against the Republic and, by implication, had risked drawing the Republic’s treaty partner France into the war at sea. In addition, Charles would have faced domestic problems if Protestant England had joined Catholic Spain in war against the Protestant Dutch.

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1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4563, Secr. Res. 21 October 1639.
2 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 4563, Secr. Res. 22 October 1639, f.514verso, sijnde de eerste advavtagieuse gelegentheyt geweest die sich heeft gepresenteert nopende het success van ‘t selve, connen vooralsnooch U Hoog MO. van alle bijsondere particulariteyten geen seecker bericht doen, alsoo des vijants Armada, gelijck mede de onse, seer is van den anderen verstroyt.
3 Sharpe, The Personal Rule, p. 832.
The English navy took no part in the Battle of the Downs where Tromp decisively defeated Oquendo on 22 October 1639. A detailed description of the battle is outside the scope of this study but the elation of the Dutch can be imagined. Elliott noted that Olivares attributed the defeat of the fleet to ‘God’s punishment for their presumptuousness’. The Spanish fleets of 1639 and of 1588 had in common that they were both defeated, although the 1588 victory was helped by tactical errors of the Spanish and bad weather. The second fleet was only defeated after a large part of its men, cargo and the equally urgently needed bullion had been conveyed to Dunkirk.

The battle of the Downs affected Anglo-Dutch political and diplomatic relations more than anything else in their fifty-five years relationship. Elizabeth’s Spanish policies were aimed at balancing France against Spain but she remained on a war footing with Spain until her death and had continued her support for the United Provinces’ revolt against the Spanish monarchs; but always strictly on her terms. The second fleet, however, did not change Charles’ Spanish policies which may have come close to being extended by the English navy joining Spain against the Republic. It certainly changed the Dutch perception of Anglo-Dutch relations.

**Negotiations after the battle of the Downs**

Immediately after the Battle of the Downs the States General wrote to the king that it was sending van Aerssen as extraordinary Ambassador to lay before him matters of importance ‘to his service and to our peace of mind and contentment’. Van Aerssen’s instructions did not aim at repairing the fraught relations since 1630 and Charles’s political manoeuvres which could have led to an Anglo-Dutch war at sea. See Note.

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2 TNA, SP84/155 f.229, Oct. 23/Nov. 3, 1639, States General to Charles.
3 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 12455, Instr. 30 October 1639 f. 328-334. Hereafter, van Aerssen’s *Instructions of 30 October*.

**Note:** The importance of van Aerssen’s mission warranted a complete transcription of the States General’s instructions which are printed in the Dutch and English languages in the Appendix.
The instructions were aimed at moving on and finding a friendlier, more appropriate and equitable Anglo-Dutch relationship. The States General wanted its ambassador to remind Charles that his policies had only served the Spanish requirements and not his own. Van Aerssen was to recall that Queen Elizabeth had adhered to her original foreign policies views and policies and maintained her support of the United Provinces. He was also to recall that King James had kept his realms neutral, which had not deterred him towards the end of his reign from supporting the Republic with four regiments at his expense. Both Elizabeth and James had acted in England’s enduring interest, which was to avoid Spanish or French military presence in the strategically situated United Provinces. Charles may have shared his predecessors’ enduring interest but had acted from the beginning of his reign under the firm conviction that he could maintain these interests with his own policies and at the same time achieve his personal objectives. However, Charles’ foreign policies had been too complex to guard the interests he inherited from his predecessors. Nor did they achieve his own objectives and his Spanish policies had led to near enmity with the Republic.

The States General observed in its instructions that the Dutch had not ‘earned to be treated as enemies but at least enjoying true neutrality’1. Tromp’s battle of the Downs and the possibility of armed conflict with the English navy had shown the States General that during the last nine years Charles’ perception of Anglo-Dutch relations had not changed. It had remained impervious to all Dutch interests. Van Aerssen’s instructions were to remind the king that, contrary to his father’s perception of neutrality, his perception of neutrality of his realms had led to the facilitating the Spanish to transport their troops and materials to Dunkirk despite the Treaty of Southampton which he wanted to maintain 2. Tromp’s attack of the Spanish enemy was justified, van Aerssen was to assert, not only by the treaty but also by the growing practice that an enemy previously engaged at sea may be pursued also when it seeks sanctuary in neutral waters.

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1 Ibid. niet verdient dat se als vijanden souden behooren te worden getracteert, maer ten minste blijven genieten oprechte neutraliteit.
2 Coke to Boswell 1633, p. 140 of this thesis.
The ambassador had to remind the king that, during the Anglo-French war the English navy took a French ship, the *St. Esprit*, even from within a port in the neutral Dutch Republic; the ship had never been to sea. The States General relied on the veteran diplomat van Aerssen to carry-out his instructions in the appropriate diplomatic manner and to find the right path to the main objective of his mission, to negotiate a new treaty. But when Joachimi had met van Aerssen at Gravesend he had told him that his reception at Westminster would be less than cordial. The Spanish and their English sympathizers had gone to great length to malign the Dutch for the affront to the king and his subjects with the battle of the Downs. But at their first meeting with the Council there was surprisingly little discussion about the battle. Muller suggested that the Councillors’ reticence was due to their uncertainty about ‘which way the king would react and waited before commencing with unpleasant official reactions’¹, or that they were waiting for the arrival of the Spanish envoys with new proposals from Madrid.

More emphatic was the Council’s reaction to van Aerssen’s complaint about England’s support for Spain’s transport of weapons to the southern Netherlands. It dismissed van Aerssen’s complaint with the reply that England was neutral in the Spanish-Dutch war, a statement that both sides knew had lost all credence during the years of favours to Spain, particularly giving convoy protection to shipments of war material. The Councillors had merely repeated the standard phrases while awaiting further direction from the king and remained reluctant to enter into any substantial negotiations. Van Aerssen and Joachimi were not deterred from reminding the Councillors that the Treaty of Southampton, which the king had often said he wanted to maintain and extensively repeated in Secretary Coke’s letter of 1633 to Boswell, was due to expire in the current year.

It brought van Aerssen to the main part of his mission, to propose a new Anglo-Dutch alliance to secure ‘mutual security and a continuation of true friendship’², to take effect after the expiration of the treaty in September 1640.

¹ Muller, *Mare Clausum*, p.310, *het was nog te onzeker, naar welke zijde de koning zich wenden zoude, dan dat men officieel met onaangenaamheden zouden begonnen hebben.*
² van Aerssen’s, *Instructions of 30 October.*
The ambassadors suggested four different possibilities for new alliances: an offensive alliance against Spain; a defensive league against all foreign aggression; a mutual agreement not to assist the enemies of either side and to agree a date to discuss the protection of the Republic and England against outside hostility. The Council remained non-committal but asked van Aerssen to submit his proposals in a memorandum. This he initially refused as it might be used in their forthcoming negotiations with the Spanish envoys whose arrival was due. However, van Aerssen changed his mind and expressed the purpose of his mission and proposals for a new treaty in a memorandum of 31 January 1640 for a meeting with the king. The Dutch ambassadors conveyed their superiors’ discontentment with the navy’s actions and the conveyance of enemy troops from Spain to Dunkirk in English vessels in the same diplomatic manner as at the time of the Anglo-French war; avoiding direct confrontation by implying that the actions of the king’s subjects were without his consent. Charles’ reaction was the same as at the time of the war with France. He accepted the diplomatic presentation of the Republic’s case and rejected the issues involved; he did not ban the navy’s action during the French war and refused to ban the leasing of English vessels to the Spanish and supplying them 1. The Dutch ambassadors should have expected this reaction as the States General had not stopped ‘shipments of munitions and soldiers to Scotland with which England was at war’ 2.

Whether Charles accepted or rejected the States General’s assertion that Tromp’s action against the Spanish fleet was justified he did not disclose. Neither did he make an issue of Tromp’s battle of the Downs. However, he did say that he ‘could not be pleased to see with satisfaction the sudden show of power of a near neighbour’ 3. It opened for van Aerssen the opportunity to reply that any one of the possible alliances in his memorandum could be negotiated to benefit the security of both nations; the choice was left to the king. The States General’s alliance proposals concerned Charles’ foreign policies. Any one was in both sides’ interests and would improve Anglo-Dutch political and diplomatic relations.

1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3198, Res. 27 December 1639.
2 Groenveld, *Verlopend Getij*, p.93, zendingen van ammunitie en soldaten werden naar Schotland, waarmee Engeland in oorlog was.
3 Muller, *Mare Clausum*, p.310-11, plotselinge machtsvertoon van een naburige mogendheid niet met goede oogen konde aanzien.
Addressing Charles’ personal objective, the restitution of the Palatinate, van Aerssen told the king that he was empowered ‘to receive all proposals for the restitution of the Count Elector and, once received, would be supported by a special States General commission, but he could only conclude anything after a further mandate and orders’¹. A strong Anglo-Dutch bond would serve both nations and their peoples, van Aerssen stressed in his last presentation to Charles. A friendly relationship could be strengthened even further if His Majesty consented to a marriage of his daughter Mary with the Prince of Orange’s son William II. Charles replied that ‘he was willing to marry his younger daughter Elizabeth into the House of Orange’² but he maintained his long held wish that his eldest daughter Mary, the Princess Royal, should marry the Infante Balthazar, the heir to the Spanish throne. A clear indication and reminder that Charles considered England to be neutral.

Charles’s reaction indicated a change in his perception of the Anglo-Dutch relations but not in his relations with Spain. A marriage of his second daughter Elizabeth into the House of Orange did not alter his dynastic objectives, but could ease political relations with the Republic. In any case, it would provide a closer link with Frederik Henry, his Knight of the Garter. Van Aerssen’s post-haste report to The Hague led to extensive deliberations between the States General and Frederik Henry who had most probably discussed a marriage between Mary and his son before the ambassador had left for London. It was decided that it would be politically unwise not to accept Charles’ second daughter; in any case, for Frederik Henry it would enhance the stature of his House of Orange. The States General instituted a secret committee to co-ordinate affairs and instructed van Aerssen to continue his efforts³. He did so in conjunction with Frederik Henry’s own delegation to Charles led by his confidant Johan Polyander van der Kerkhoven, Lord of Heenvliet. But progress was very slow, the war with Scotland overshadowed all other matters that those ‘of no less importance were wholly neglected’⁴. After several months van Aerssen decided that he could achieve no more at the time and with the king’s agreement returned home in March 1640.

¹ van Aerssen’s, Instructions of 30 October.
³ NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 12589.48, Tr. 6 February 1640.
⁴ Sharpe, The Personal Rule, p.834.
The ambassador did not return home with concrete results but was far from empty handed. He had successfully defused a political fall-out over the battle of the Downs and introduced the proposals of the States General for new treaties, which Charles neither rejected nor accepted. This was in sharp contrast with his refusal in 1636 to even consider negotiating with the Republic when he had told ambassador van Beveren to concentrate instead on the fisheries issues. In 1640 Charles’ position was different. At war with his Scottish subjects, facing a tense domestic situation in England, he had little or nothing to expect from Spain. He left the door open for treaty negotiations with the Republic and consented to the marriage of his daughter Elizabeth with William II of Orange. This was not the position that Sharpe outlined when he commented that van Aerssen received short shrift\(^1\), from the king, the same as the Covenanters in Scotland.

The Dutch had departed from their usual conciliatory diplomatic relations and Charles had changed from his previously commanding relations with the Republic. But he had not changed from his usual political strategy of negotiating with all sides without directly participating in any wars on land or sea. Anglo-French treaty negotiations were still going on in Paris, but England’s attraction as a coveted friend was weakened by Charles’ opportunistic policies, while his Scottish troubles weakened his negotiating position in continental politics. France and its treaty partner Sweden vigorously pursued their own interests in the Empire which did not include any support for the Count Elector. They left it to the Republic to deal with England, presumably considering that the Dutch were more directly endangered by England’s Spanish policies. Charles’ “divide and rule” political strategy had become narrowed to England itself, Spain and the Republic but ‘control of the northern waters was now definitively lost to the Dutch’\(^2\). The Republic could no longer be used as a pawn on Charles’ political chessboard.

\(^1\) Ibid., p.897.
The political developments did not make the Republic an equal in negotiations but its strength at sea could not be ignored, while Anglo-Spanish negotiations had to be conducted in the shadows of the rebellion of Catalonia and Portugal for Olivares and the Scottish troubles for Charles.

_England and Scotland at war_

The Scottish troubles had started to escalate at the end of 1639. An English army of some 16,000 men on foot and on horse had been assembled from all over England under the command of Charles personally. He had taken the right decision not to go in action against his Scottish subjects but to convene a meeting with representatives of the Covenanters which he chaired. The outcome, the so-called Berwick treaty, would have to be presented to the Scottish people in the presence of English representatives. Although Charles had made some concessions, none affected his position as the monarch of Scotland nor solved the basic reasons for the conflict.

After several months of fruitless efforts, the treaty was not accepted by the Scots as it failed under the weight of its own ambiguities and caveats. The failed Berwick treaty left no alternative to strengthening the existing army. Levying a new army was needed before the summer while the cost of enlisting the first 16,000 men had exhausted the substantial voluntary contributions that had been made by wealthy individuals. Charles was in urgent need of substantial funds which could only be supplied by the Commons; he decided to summon his first Parliament since the beginning of his Personal Rule in 1629. It opened on 13 April 1640 and the Commons were left in no doubt that the purpose of their first meeting after eleven years was to vote subsidies for the war against Scotland. In his opening address the Lord Keeper, Lord Finch of Fordwich, explained, ‘now that Ireland had been civilised, Scotland was the only quarter from which England was open to attack’ 1.

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The Irish parliament had already agreed to contribute four subsidies and Charles wanted from his English parliament a further twelve subsidies of no less than 840,000 pounds. The following few weeks were spent not so much on bargaining for which little room was available, but for the Commons to arrive at a reasonable consensus to refuse the king’s demands. The inevitable conclusion was reached and Charles dissolved Parliament on 5 May 1640. Gardiner noted in an epitaph, ‘The Short Parliament, for by that name this assembly is known in history, had sat for three weeks. As far as actual results were concerned it accomplished nothing at all’ 1.

The real importance of the Short Parliament is not only that it was called at all, after Charles’s eleven years of Personal Rule, but also that it had widened the gap into a chasm between the king’s policies and his subjects’ interests and political perceptions. One of the consequences was that levying new troops to bring the existing army on the Scottish border to full strength met difficulties, and required more time than was available. The Covenanters pre-empted the English armies’ deployment and invaded England in August 1640 2. The still-under-strength English army could not prevent the loss of Berwick and subsequently lost also Newcastle; the uneasy stand-off could hold no longer and ended abruptly. England and Scotland were at war. The time for more negotiations had passed; Charles needed more time and above all money and could only turn to Spain.

The expected Spanish delegation finally arrived, led by special envoy the Marquess of Velada, enlarged by the Marquess Virgilio Malbizzi and Spain’s envoy in England, de Cárdenas. Their first task was to persuade Charles to continue the support of his navy to protect their supply route to Dunkirk and further, to take conclusive steps to end Spain’s war with the Republic.

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1 Ibid., p.117.
Olivares was not interested in an alliance unless Charles ‘would actually declare war against the Dutch. In that case, the old secret treaty, negotiated by Cottington for the partition of the Netherlands, should be revived, and Charles might choose any part of the Dutch territory which suited him best. If this offer was accepted, the King of Spain would do that which had been asked in vain in the preceding summer’¹. The marquesses had been commissioned to offer Charles eight or ten thousand well-trained soldiers in addition to the same number of recruits while the English negotiators had talked about Spain supporting the king financially. Ambassador Sir Arthur Hopton however, had warned already that there was little to expect from the Spaniards, as they had few ships and no money. Olivares had allowed Velada to discuss Spain’s support while he ignored the precarious military situation at home or expecting divine help with Spain itself sliding into civil war. In his report Velada had ‘expressed scepticism about the possibility of a declaration of war on the Dutch, but seems to have felt that Spain would get a good bargain for 1,200,000 ducats’²; an amount evidently mooted by the English in their preliminary discussions with the Spanish delegation.

Olivares’ problems went further. His grand plan to take the war also to France was not developing as hoped. France was to be attacked from the south with the help of the French Huguenots and the conspiring anti-Richelieu French nobles and simultaneously be attacked from the north by the Cardinal-Infante’s armies. Richelieu pre-empted the attack from the south and had the conspirators arrested. In the north of France the grand plan also failed, the Cardinal-Infante could not break the French siege of Arras and lost the strategically situated town and fortress. The results were the opposite of what Olivares had planned; Richelieu strengthened his own position. The failure of the Spanish attack on France had not improved Olivares’s chances of convincing Charles of his ability to provide him with the extensive support he needed.

Even the small chance of a successful conclusion of the Anglo-Spanish negotiations diminished further when in October 1640 Spain was plunged into civil war with rebellions in Catalonia and Portugal. Olivares needed all his resources for Spain and also his own survival which was further aggravated by the death of the Cardinal-Infante in November 1641.

*The changing tides*

In parallel with the Anglo-Spanish negotiations, discussions took place between the English Privy Councillors and the Dutch ambassadors with Frederik Henry’s envoy Heenvliet. In June he reported to the prince that the decision had been taken for the marriage of the princess Elizabeth and his son prince William II. Months of discussions and negotiations followed and in November 1640 the wedding was announced in both countries, where co-ordinating committees were instituted. The States General and then prince decided to send a special delegation to London to negotiate the wedding contract and John Wolfert van Brederode, van Aerssen, Heenvliet and Joachimi were selected. The delegation consisted of members of the States General, Dutch Ambassadors and Heenvliet representing Frederik Henry personally. The leader of the delegation was States General Deputy van Brederode, brother-in-law of Frederik Hendrik. The mandate of the delegation specifically excluded political negotiations. After the troubles in England had been solved, a committee of Dutch Deputies would be appointed to negotiate a new treaty, whichever one Charles would choose of the four treaties van Aerssen had proposed in an earlier meeting with king. The composition and restricted mandate of the delegation was agreed in close consultation between the States General and Frederik Henry as also the prince accepted that the political factors were of great importance for the Republic.

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2 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 8391, ‘verbael Jan Wolfert van Brederode’ c.s., 1 January-18 June 1641.
The interests of the Republic would not be served with a successful marriage contract and an ambiguous political treaty with a divided England. The States General’s position was clear, any treaty should reflect the changed Anglo-Dutch relations and to serve the Republic’s dominant interests; an end of the war against Spain and independence from its monarchs.

The marriage of Charles’ second daughter with William II of Orange might strengthen the Stuart-Orange link but need not change his Spanish policies. His eldest daughter remained free for a dynastic marriage with the Spanish crown-prince Balthazar and Spain remained a dependant on his navy’s protection of its supply line. The Dutch delegation for the negotiation of the wedding contract left for England on 1 January 1641 and the Spanish delegation returned to Spain on 8/18 February 1641. They had come to England with offers of assistance which Spain could not fulfil and demanded concessions from Charles which he could not fulfil, a situation that had existed for the last ten years but had reached the stage where reality could no longer be concealed.

The States General’s proposals of October 1639 for a new Anglo-Dutch alliance had not been mentioned by Charles since his negotiation with the Spanish. However, it had not stopped him from buying considerable quantities of war material in the Republic and asking the States General to prohibit the export of weapons to his Scottish enemies. The States General forbade exports of weapons but did not, or could not enforce full compliance. Strict enforcement of the prohibition order on traders with their innate mercantile instincts was always difficult. It was made even more difficult by the possibility that Dutch orthodox Calvinists might have had greater sympathy for the Presbyterian Scots than for the Episcopalian English and the English navy continuing its favours to Spain thereby undermining the Republic’s own war efforts. The serious threat that the Scots could penetrate further into England demanded a large extension of the English army, for which no funds were available.

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1 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 3199, Res. 15 March and 24 March, 2 April and 2 July 1640.
Charles called his second Parliament since the end of his Personal Rule, the Long Parliament, which assembled on 3/13 November 1640. In his opening address, Charles called upon the assistance of Parliament to provide for the kingdom’s safety and wellbeing, ‘first by chasing out the rebels’ and secondly in ‘satisfying your just grievances’. The opening of Charles’s second Parliament was similar to the Keeper’s opening of the Short Parliament, first subsidies and then the Commons’ grievances, but without defining the subsidies needed. The atmosphere in the Commons did not bode well for success as the Dutch ambassador Joachimi’s report to the States General indicated. He explained that already early in the session the Commons concerned themselves with matters of the royal prerogatives and foreign affairs; and voices were heard expressing anti-Spanish sentiments and a preference for treaties with the Dutch.

Whether caused by the failure of the Anglo-Spanish negotiations or by the pressing need to find tangible support for the Scottish war, Charles was prepared after all to agree to a marriage of his eldest daughter Mary with Frederik Henry’s son William II. It is possible that he had considered that already as an option when he remained silent after the Dutch delegates had told him in a private audience that the States General and Frederik Henry still preferred the nine year old princess Mary instead of the seven year old Elizabeth. Charles’ apparent change of mind was an astute political move, the States General would see it as an important step towards the end of his Spanish policies which it always wanted. For Frederik Henry it was a further enhancement of the prestige of his House but it did not change his commitment to the restricted mandate of Brederode’s mission. Charles accepted the suggestion of his negotiators, who were dealing with the Dutch envoys, to ask Parliament to advise him on future relations with the Republic.

1 Sharpe, The Personal Rule, p. 920.
2 NA, 1.01.02, SG, inv.nr. 5895 LE, Joachimi to States General, 1 December 1640.
3 Groen van Prinsterer Archives, ou Correspondance, pp. 330-334, 8 February 1641, Johan Wolfert van Brederode to Frederik Hendrik.
Charles told the Lords that in his opinion ‘a strict and firm Confederacy will prove as useful to his Kingdom as with any of our neighbours; their vicinity and the way of their strength being well considered’ ¹. He may have felt the need to explain his change of policy but he did not mean political recognition and relations with the Republic as with the other neighbours but that it would be expedient at the time to adjust the Anglo-Dutch relations but still on his terms. The marriage of Mary and William II would be conditional on meeting his very specific demands. It would only be ratified if combined with the conclusion of a political Anglo-Dutch alliance, a condition supported by Parliament. In addition, Charles wanted such an alliance to contain a Dutch commitment to help his nephew, the Count-Elector with the restitution of his Palatinate and electoral rights. Finally, Mary would not go to the Republic until she was twelve years old and, under English law, the marriageable age had been reached. At that age she had the right to express her own decision to confirm the marriage contract or ask for an annulment; the latter would be more difficult if she was in the Republic. Charles had adhered to his usual dual foreign and dynastic politics. He kept his options open to negotiate with all sides and to maintain the restitution of the Palatinate and electoral dignities as one of his conditions.

The States General, Frederik Henry and the Dutch negotiators were unanimous in rejecting the coupling of the marriage treaty and political treaties. The failure of one would make the other impossible. Charles also realised that it would not serve his interests which were to persuade the Republic to give military support for his war with Scotland. He withdrew his demand to combine the treaties, which also meant that helping the Count-Elector had to be deferred, an implication he would not have accepted in any of his earlier negotiations. But Charles did not change his mind on one condition of the marriage; Mary was not to go to the Republic before she was twelve years old. Frederik Henry and the States General accepted this condition ².

¹ Procs. in Parl., Vol. IV, p.157, 10/20 February 1641.
² NA, I.01.02. SG, inv.nr. 4564 Secr. Res. 16 July 1641.
Some practical points of the marriage treaty had to await clarity in the difficult situation at the time in England. The Dutch negotiators’ mission had been accomplished and they returned home leaving the way open for the wedding to take place. William II came to England and on 2/12 May 1641 Mary and William were married in the Chapel of the Palace of Whitehall, ‘followed by the public but symbolic’ ¹, coucher, the tebeddelegging of the pair in the presence of the brides’ parents and many guests.

Before the Dutch envoys left England, one of the Secretaries of State, Sir Henry Vane Senior, had told them that ‘after the prevailing confusion in England had been settled, Parliament wanted to conclude an alliance with the Republic’². Secretary Vane had added a surprising new dimension to a complex situation; everyone knew that formally only the king could conclude alliances and Charles had already ‘proposed new discussions in November’ ³. Evidently, the king had accepted van Aerssen’s fourth suggestion; treaties for the protection of the Republic and England against outside hostilities; but first he wanted to go to Scotland where peace seemed to be possible. But his journey to Scotland was in vain, peace eluded him and on his return he found that friction with Parliament had deepened. ‘In November 1641, when the Parliament which would go to war with the king had been sitting for a year, the House of Commons passed a “remonstrance of the state of the kingdom”, “the Grand Remonstrance” as it would come to be called, which it soon published as a rallying call to the nation. It lists the deeds of misgovernment with which Parliament and the nation had to contend⁴. The Commons also concerned themselves with the formation of foreign policies when it appeared that many favoured parliament’s alliance with the Protestant Dutch, giving substance to Vane’s message to the Republic’s envoys.

¹ Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, p.526, gevolgd bij de publieke, zij het nog slechts symbolische.
² Groenveld, Verlopend Getij, p.99, dat het Parlement, na afloop van de wanordelijkheden, die er op dat moment in Engeland heersten, een alliantie met de Republiek wilde sluiten.
³ Ibid., p.99, stelde nieuwe besprekingen voor in November.
The apparent conflict between Charles’ wish to open new discussions on treaties with the Republic and Vane’s message to the Dutch envoys may have surprised the States General, but it was clear that no discussions could take place for as long as the uncertain political situation in England existed.

In January 1642 Charles took the fateful decision to have five members of the Commons arrested, with the consequence that open hostility between king and Parliament seemed unavoidable. With treaty negotiations indefinitely postponed and England at war with Scotland, the States General and Frederik Henry were concerned to bring Mary as soon as possible to the Republic. Unexpected help came from the queen who had said for some time that, for health reasons, she wanted to visit Spa on the continent and that in passing; she could leave her daughter in the Republic.

Parliament had considered that with the king in Scotland the queen should not leave the country. However, Charles took the decision to let his wife and daughter leave, also to enable the queen to secure, together with Frederik Henry, a supply of weapons and funds for which she had brought part of the crown jewels as collateral. Queen Henrietta Maria with Mary and a large retinue arrived in the Republic on 9 March 1642 and six days later the queen brought her daughter to the Court of Frederik Henry to further her education. Mary had maintained her right under English law that on having reached marriageable age she could still agree or not with the marriage; on her twelfth birthday she gave her ‘approval of the marriage’. It had made it impossible for the Spanish, not least for reasons of status ever to agree to a wedding of their crown prince Balthazar with Elizabeth, Charles’ second daughter. The formal wedding ceremony in May 1641 in the Chapel of the Palace of Westminster and Mary’s subsequent approval ended the wish of her father and late-grandfather for an Anglo-Spanish dynastic link.

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1 Aitzema, Saken van Staet, Approberende het Huwelijck, Folio Vol. II, p.917.
The marriage heralded changes in Anglo-Dutch relations but also in England’s relations with Spain, it ended the plans for an Anglo-Spanish dynastic link. Separating England from Spain had been the aim of the Dutch after the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty of 1630, but this was not achieved with the marriage of Mary and William II and neither with the battle of the Downs. Anglo-Spanish relations may have been affected but were not broken; it remained in Charles’ geopolitical interests to maintain a balanced political relationship with both Spain and France and in Spain’s interests as only England could provide protection for its supply-line to Flanders. Whatever Anglo-Spanish policies would be from 1642 onwards, both countries were engaged in their own civil wars. They would be unable to continue the pretence that mutually beneficial agreements could be negotiated for ending the Spanish war against the Dutch or for the restitution of the Palatinate.

The war with Scotland, the political situation in England and the frictions with Parliament left Charles no other choice than to ask the Republic for a new treaty and support for the queen to acquire money and weapons. Henrietta Maria’s attempts to raise money and buy weapons did not meet with the expected success after the marriage of Mary and William II. Frederik Henry did not give the support Charles and the queen wanted and the Amsterdam financiers were reluctant to accept the crown jewels as collateral which made Henrietta Maria move her attempts to raise funds to the Antwerp financiers. Yet, Dutch historian Pieter Geyl implied that the prince followed his personal interests and wrote that his ‘considerations were purely dynastic. He wished that the lustre of the kingship would shine on the name of Orange, hoping that it would enhance the might of his House in the Republic’¹. Groenveld did not endorse Geyl’s definitive assessment of Frederik Henry’s considerations.

¹ P. Geyl, Oranje and Stuart, het waren zuiver dynastieke overwegingen. Hij wenste de glans van het koningschap op de naam van Oranje te doen afstralen, in de hoop dat met het aanzien ook de macht van zijn huis in de Republiek zou stijgen, p.13. Hereafter, Oranje en Stuart.
He recorded in his extensive ‘revision’ of 1991 that ‘Geyl accentuates characteristics quite different from those of Orange’s earlier life time’\(^1\). Frederik Henry had not changed his support for the States General’s cautious policies about new Anglo-Dutch relations while the uncertainties in England lasted. He had joined the States General’s political approach to the marriage contract negotiations and also in rejecting Charles’ demand to link the marriage with a new Anglo-Dutch treaty. It was an agreed policy that it was not in the Republic’s interests to provide military support or to conclude an alliance with one of the two sides in a divided England; it could involve the Republic in foreign conflicts. The Republic had strictly adhered for decades to its policy to avoid war on two fronts and declined a political treaty with the king for as long as the uncertainty and tensions would prevail. For the same reasons the Republic would not consider a treaty with Parliament.

The Republic declared itself neutral for both sides and prohibited all exports of weapons to either side; a new situation had arisen: not the Republic but England had become the petitioning side. From the beginning of his reign Charles had not seen the Dutch as possible partners but had assumed the old Anglo-Dutch policies and Anglo-Dutch relations of Elizabeth and continued by his father James: Charles had persevered with these policies and relations until it was no longer possible. A new phase had dawned in Anglo-Dutch political and diplomatic relations, the subject of Dr. S. Groenveld’s thesis\(^2\).

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APPENDIX

Instructions for a special mission of ambassador extraordinary heer van Sommelsdijk (François van Aerssen) and ambassador Albert Joachimi to the King and Privy Council of England 30 October 1639. In the modern Dutch and English languages.

Na aankomst in Gravesend of elders in Engeland moet van Aerssen direct Joachimi op de hoogte stellen, opdat deze hun ontvangst ten Hove naar gewoonte en reputatie van deze Staat kan regelen.

Als dat niet direct mogelijk is zal Joachimi zich goed informeren van ‘s konings intrinsieke dispositie over de tegenwoordige stand van zaken, en zich dan naar Gravesend of elders begeven, om – na gezamenlijke lezing van deze instructie – zich samen te beraden op alles wat zich bij de audiëntie ten Hove (publiek of secrêt) over hoofdzaken en formaliteiten kan voordoen.

De ambassadeurs zullen namens HHM en Z.E. de begroetenis aan de koning doen, dan aan de koningin, vervolgens aan de koningin-moeder en tenslotte aan de prinsen en prinsessen.

Uit kracht van hun credentiebrief aan de koning of zijn koninklijke raad zullen zij uiteen zetten dat vanaf het begin van de Nederlandse beroerten en oorlog de Kroon van Engeland de eerste was die – ziende dat het ambitieuze voornemen van de Spaanse koning was door de ondergang van deze landen de zetel van de oorlog daar te plaatsen en van daaruit alle naburige rijken te bevechten en zo mogelijk onder zijn imaginaire monarchie te brengen – met bijzondere wijsheid heeft [Queen Elizabeth] getracht zo’n rampzalig voornemen buiten haar grenzen af te wenden, en daartoe deze staat heeft geholpen met successievelijk geld, mensen en loffelijke tractaten.

Koningin Elizabeth heeft in haar tijd – staande in onzekere vriendschap met Frankrijk, Spanje en Schotland, daarbij nog oorlog voerend in Ierland, dat tegen haar door Spanje gesteund werd, aan deze landen haar assistentie en gunst ondanks dreigementen, presentaties en andere persuaties niet willen onthouden, maar integendeel altijd doorgezet en vermeerderd, in dier voegen dat zij uiteindelijk deze landen met een Offensief en Defensief Tractaat heeft vereerd, en zelfs de oorlog is aangegaan en de Spaanse koning tot vijand heeft verklaard, nadat haar was gebleken dat deze, door verschijende attentaten jegens haar persoon en het sturen van een onoverwinnelijke vloot, als voornaamste oogmerk ook haar Rijk door zo’n zware en overwachte slag wilde overvallen, waarvoor God haar en ook onze Staat genadiglijk heeft beschermd, bij welke houding zij tot haar dood is gebleven.
Daarna kwam koning Jacobus, die, van mening zijnde dat een collaterale successie, voornamelijk door vermeerdering van macht, gewoonlijk jaloezie bij de buren verwekt, en die begerende dat wat door een oorlog teniet gaat door een vrede weer terecht komt, op verzoek van de omliggende rijken en republieken uit de oorlog is gescheiden maar niet zonder de wijze maxime om deze landen [de Republiek] in vrijheid en rechtmatige defensive te helpen conserveren.

Want zodra de vrede met Spanje was gemaakt ging Z.M. over tot een tractaat met Frankrijk, om deze landen met een jaarlijkse som geld bij te staan, waarvan Frankrijk het hele kapitaal zou verschaffen, en 1/3 deel op zijn schulden aan Engeland zou korten, wat aldus is geschied.

Maar het daarbij niet latende heeft Z.M. de belangen van zijn onderdanen met die van deze Staat gemeen willen maken, door het oprichten van een tractaat om in Oost-Indië de oorlog tegen de Spanjaarden te voeren en hen daaruit te verdrijven.

En naast vele andere gunsten en ondanks zijn natuurlijke geneigdheid tot rust heeft Z.M. zich niet ontzien om op het laatst van zijn leven een defensieve alliantie met HHM te maken, en openlijk 6000 man in vier regimenten met vier gekwalificeerde hoofden op zijn kosten naar dit land te zenden, daarbij meer lettende op het behoud van deze Republiek tot verzekerderdheid van zijn Rijk, dan op de gunst of vijandschap van Spanje, en daartoe heeft de huidige koning, die toen prins van Galles (Wales) was, zijn intercessie, redenen en motieven sterk ingebracht, zoals de beide ambassadeurs zelf hebben gezien.

Nadat Z.M. zelf koning werd, heeft hij voor alles goed gevonden een offensief en defensief ‘Verbond van Ligue’ met deze Staat aan te gaan, om de Spaanse heerschappij uit de Nederlanden te verdrijven, en tevens de koning van Bohemen in zijn landen, rechten en waardigheden te herstellen.

Deze en andere beneficiën door deze Staat van de Kroon van Engeland in alle zware occurentiën ontvangen, hebben HHM van hun kant alle occasiën gezocht en omarmd om ze met ware dankbaarheid en confidente correspondentie en eerbied tot dienst van Z.M. en rust van zijn Rijken te erkennen. Daarbij vertrouwende dat nooit deze onderlinge vriendschap zou veranden, ten opzichte van de grote ambitie en verschrikkelijke macht van de Spaanse koning, die ieder die niet deel van zijn gebied is als zijn vijand beschouwd.

Ondanks dit alles hebben HHM sinds enige tijd de indruk dat men daar in Engeland van dit standpunt is gaan wijken, zonder dat HHM de redenen daarvan kunnen bevloeden, zeker wetende dat zij zelf geen aanleiding daartoe hebben gegeven, noch dit in de toekomst zullen doen.
Daarom hebben HHM de heer van Sommelsdijk gezonden om samen met de heer Joachimi zich te beklagen dat de Spanjaarden – die door de hele wereld als vijanden beschouwd moeten worden – in Engeland zulk een speciale faveur genieten dat zelfs tegen de wil van Z.M. zijn onderdanen hun schepen en schippers lenen om de Spaanse koning te dienen voor het vervoer van soldaten, geld, vivres, munitie enz. naar de havens van Vlaanderen.

Hetwelk de Spaanse koning met zijn eigen macht niet zou durven ondernemen zonder faveur van Engeland, omdat de havens aldaar met de oorlogsschepen van deze landen voortdurend sterk bezet blijven. Dit alles overziende is metterdaad bevonden dat voor het overkomen van de laatste Spaanse vloot verscheidene Engelse schepen vol Spanjaarden bestemd voor Duinkerken door de oorlogsschepen van deze landen veroverd zijn.

Ook diene dat onlangs na een gevecht van de onzen met een onverwachte Spaanse vloot die van plan was in Duinkerken binnen te lopen en tien of twaalf duizend Spanjaarden aan land te brengen, dat die Spaanse vloot naar Duins is uitgeweken, en heeft weten te bewerken dat zulks de onzen is verboden, en op die schepen aangevoerd niet alleen allerlei vivres, munitie enz. maar dat ook Spaanse soldaten uit die schepen aan land zijn gegaan en naar andere havens zijn vervoerd en met Engelse schepen naar Duinkerken zijn gebracht.

HHM vinden dat hun groot ongelijk wordt aangedaan, want al heeft Z.M. vrede met Spanje, HHM hebben niet verdiend dat zij als vijanden worden behandeld, maar tenminste opzichte neutraliteit blijven genieten, bestaande aldus: tussen twee vijanden moet een derde niet de een tegen de ander gaan helpen.

Ook is het een gemeen recht onder volken, en door de Engelse Kroon zeker scherpelijk geëxecuteerd, dat toever naar de vijand van verboden waren zoals volk, vivres, schepen, ammunitie, voor goede buit worden beschouwd; men heeft gezien dat deze regel in Engeland vrij ver is geëxecuteerd, zelfs tot het beletten van de algemene koophandel van neutralen.

Daarom verzoeken HHM dat zulke excessen en alteratiën die tegen de wil van Z.M. en tegen het gemene recht van zo’n trouwe bondgenoot geschied zijn en nu Z.M. daarvan op de hoogte wordt gesteld – dat de schulden worden gestraft, en dat in de komende tijd de wetten worden gehandhaafd, zodat HHM zich onbekommerd op Z.M. kunnen verlaten voor een eind van de toegepaste procedures, die zo’n tegenstelling vormen en voor alle verstandige en vrome lieden onbegrijpelijk zijn en die niet zonder gevaar voor de Kroon zelf zijn door de onverwachte komst van zo’n machtige vloot.
Met deze conclusie moeten de ambassadeurs de zaak ‘sachtelijk laten berusten’ en Z.M. ter verstrooiing op een ander aangenaam onderwerp brengen. Maar als dat niet aanslaat en stel dat Z.M. of de heren van zijn Raad met klachten komen dat de admiraal van HHM’s vloot de Spaanse schepen op Engels gebied en tegen het verbod van Z.M. heeft aangevallen, en daarmee Z.M.’s respect en recht verspeeld heeft. Dan moeten de ambassadeurs declineren en ongemerkt het dispute over die zaken ontwijken ‘om niet te verwijderen buijten tijt ende noot’. Alleen simpelweg deduceren dat HHM – al geruime tijd gewaarschuwd door het plan van de Spaanse koning om tot meerdere zekerheid van zijn belangen in de Nederlanden duizenden ‘naturele’ Spanjaarden met vele miljoenen guldens naar Duinkerken te brengen en aldus een ‘ordinaris Veer’ tussen beiden te maken, maatregelen hadden genomen om zulks te beletten door tegen zware lasten een groot aantal schepen op zee te houden, wat naar hun overtuiging ook zeer tot nut van Z.M. zou zijn en daardoor zeker zijn gratie zou verdienen.

Daarop is die machtige vloot gevolgd, die bij de eerste toevallige ontmoeting twaalf van onze schepen aantrof, welke schepen zich zo heldhaftig hebben gedragen dat zij al hun kruit verschoten hebben en ter aanvulling bij de dichtstbijzijnde vrienden hun toevlucht hebben moeten nemen en na sobere aanvulling teruggestuurd zijn om de slag te hervatten tegen de Spaanse galjoenen. Deze zochten bescherming op de rede van Duins, waar zij van alles zijn voorzien, zelfs meer dan in Spanje zelf, dit om de trouwste bondgenoot van de Engelse Kroon te krenken.

Ook wordt Z.M. verzocht eens te bedenken wat Z.M. door zijn eigen order, niet op een open rede die gemeen ligt met de zee, gedaan is tegen het grote schip de Toeran dat midden in deze landen onder de ogen van de grote zeesteden is afgehaald en weggevoerd door de Engelse marine, niet ingevolge van enig voorgaand gevecht maar met koel voornemen, alleen omdat het hier te lande door zijn vijanden was gebouwd. Er zijn meer voorbeelden van gelijke aard voorgevallen, die deze staat bij zijn vrienden en naburen zo verdacht hebben gemaakt dat tot op de huidige dag de deegdelijkste schulden aan vele ingezetenen van deze landen hierom onbetaald blijven. Z.M. zou best weten te getuigen met wat groot respect en deferentie door deze staat daarin is gehandeld.

HHM vermoeden dat Z.M. in zijn hart blij is dat deze toevallige ontmoeting [van de Spaanse en Nederlandse vloten] buiten zijn toedoen zo is verloopen en gelukt is, en ook tot afbreuk van de gemene vijand, tot glorie van de Kroon en tot verzekerdheid van deze staat en om voortaan zulke vermetele aanslagen, waardoor men beiden in gevaar kan komen, te stoppen.
Ook is het Z.M. bekend dat in [de treaty van] Southampton expresselijk aan weerszijden toegestaan wordt de vijanden overall op de reden, in de rivieren en in de havens te bevechten en in te nemen, en al is Southampton zonder observatie genegeerd, het is echter niet naar behoren opgezegd, in ieder geval behoort, onderscheid gemaakt te worden tussen een vloot of schepen die alleen uitlopen om landen en mensen te verderven, zoals de Spanjaarden en Duinkerkers trachten, en zulke andere schepen, die zonder iemand aan te tasten slechts de koophandel met de naburige vrienden proberen te begeleiden en beschermen, en daarom ook toegang tot alle havens verdienen.

En om een afleiding van contestatie te vinden zullen de ambassadeurs Z.M. mogen vragen, tot bevestiging van wederzijdse zekerheid en continuatie van de oprechte vriendschap, om een tractaat van nieuwe alliantie en verbintenis te sluiten, geheel naar het oordeel van Z.M. offensief, defensief of van andere bepaalde vriendschap, en zij zullen daartoe met een goede commissie worden voorzien, zonder echter daarin te concluderen dan met nadere last en order.

Insgelijk ook mogen zij alle voorstellen tot herstel van de keurvorst ontvangen, met of zonder interventie van andere prinsen, om die aan HHM en Z.E. door te zenden, en hun besluit daarover af te wachten.

After his arrival in Gravesend, or elsewhere, van Aerssen must contact Joachimi in order that he can arrange their reception at the Court according to the custom and the reputation of this State. Should this not be possible on short notice, Joachimi shall well acquaint himself with the king’s intrinsic disposition concerning the present state of affairs. Then go to Gravesend, or elsewhere, to jointly study these instructions and to prepare themselves for whatever can happen concerning main issues and formalities at the audience at Court (in public or secret).

On behalf of HHM (See Note), Z.E., His Excellency Frederik Henry, Prince of Orange, the ambassadors shall convey greetings to the king, then to the queen after that to the queen’s mother and ending with the princes and princesses.

Note. HHM, Hunne HoogMogende, the Deputies of the sovereign provinces, members of the States General. No suitable translation is available and the abbreviation HHM and Z.E., Zijne Excellentie, will be used in the this Appendix.
Empowered by their credential letters to the king and his Council, the ambassadors shall recall that from the beginning of the Dutch troubles and war, it was England to be the first to recognise that it was the Spanish king’s ambitious plan to use the defeat of the Low Lands to place there his seat of war. It was from there to attack all neighbouring states and, if possible to bring these under his imaginary monarchy. With exceptional wisdom [Queen Elizabeth] has tried to avert this potential disaster outside her borders and for that purpose assisted this State successively with money, people and commendable treaties.

Queen Elizabeth has in her time, in insecure friendship with France, Spain and Scotland, while at war in Ireland that was supported by Spain, these countries not deprived of her assistance and support despite threats, petitions or other persuasions. On the contrary, she continued and increased in the sense that ultimately she honoured these countries with an offensive-defensive treaty. Even is gone to war and declared the Spanish king an enemy after it had appeared that through several attacks on her personally and by sending his invincible fleet with the principal objective to take over also her realms with this powerful and unexpected attack, for which God her and also our nation mercifully has saved, a stance she maintained until her death.

After that came king James, who held the opinion that collateral succession mainly through the increasing of power, usually create jealousies in neighbours and believed that what is lost through war is corrected by peace and who, by request of the surrounding realms and republics, has ended the war but not without his wise maxim to help conserve the liberty and lawful defence of these lands. [the United Provinces]

Thus, as soon as peace with Spain was concluded, H.M. entered into a treaty with France to support these lands with a yearly sum of money for which France would provide the whole capital and deduct 1/3 of his debts to England, as such concluded.

Not leaving it at the afore going, H.M. desired to conjoin the interests of his subjects with those of this state by establishing a treaty to go to war against the Spanish in the East Indies in order to expel them.

And besides many other favours and despite his natural leaning to peace, H.M. has towards the end of his life decided to conclude an alliance with HHM to openly send to these lands 6,000 men in four regiments with four qualified heads at his expense, more concerned about maintaining the Republic for security of his realm than the friendship or enmity of Spain. Strongly supported by the present king, then prince of Galles (Wales) by his intercessions, reasons and motives, as both ambassadors themselves had observed.
After H.M. himself became king, he first and foremost decided to conclude with this State an offensive and defensive Alliance of Ligue, to expel the Spanish rule from the Netherlands and also to restore the king of Bohemia to his lands, rights and dignities.

Having received from the Crown of England these and other favours in all important occurrences, the HHM from their side have sought and adopted all occasions to acknowledge with real thanks, trust, harmony and respect to serve his Majesty and peace of his realms. HHM was relying that this mutual friendship would never change in relation with the great ambitions and frightful power of the Spanish king who considers that all that are not in his realms are his enemies.

Despite all this the HHM have gather for some time the impression that many in England have started to deviate from these views. The HHM have not been able to fathom the reasons only knowing with certainty that they have not given the cause nor will do so in future.

For that reason the HHM have sent ambassador Sommelsdijk [van Aerssen], together with seigneur Joachimi to complain that the Spanish, who worldwide must be seen as enemies enjoy such special favours, even that against the will of H.M., his subjects loan their ships and mariners to serve the Spanish king to transport soldiers, money, supplies, munitions, etc., to the ports of Flanders.

The Spanish king could not have dared to attempt this under his own powers without the favour of England as the ports were strongly blockaded by ships of war of these lands. Seeing all this and also the actual occurrence that before the arrival of the Spanish fleet several English ships full of Spaniards were captured by this country’s ships of war.

Also to mention that after a recent battle of ours with an unsuspected Spanish fleet preparing to anchor in Dunkirk and to land ten or twelve thousand soldiers, this Spanish fleet diverted to the Downs and managed to achieve that the same was forbidden to ours. On these ships were not only transported supplies, munitions etc. but also Spanish soldiers who went on land were moved on land to other ports and transported by English ships to Dunkirk. HHM consider that they are being greatly ill-treated, even if H.M. is at peace with Spain, HHM have not earned to be treated as enemies but at least to enjoy true neutrality: between two enemies a third one should not help the one against the other.

It is a common practice amongst nations and also strictly applied by the English Crown, that the shipping of prohibited goods as of people, supplies, ships, ammunitions to the enemy is banned and when impounded kept as prize. It has been observed that this rule is rather far extended in England even to preventing the normal trade of neutrals.
Now that H.M. has been informed about the excesses and altercations against his will and the common practice occurred against a true partner, HHM request that the culprits are punished and that in future the law is observed. Allowing the HHM to unconcernedly rely on H.M. to be against these practices so contrary and not understandable for all devout people and also not without danger for the Crown by the unexpected appearance of a mighty [Spanish] fleet.

After these conclusions, the ambassadors must let these topics rest and try to introduce a less controversial subject. However, if that is not possible and H.M. or the gentlemen of his Council introduce complaints that the admiral of the HHM’s fleet had attacked the Spanish in English waters against the orders of H.M. and thereby lost his goodwill and rights. In that case the ambassadors should decline to respond to avoid controversies, divisions before its time.

The ambassadors should confine themselves to stating that the HHM had been warned already that the Spanish king had planned to bring thousands of Spaniards with many millions of guilders to Dunkirk to strengthen his position in the Netherlands and to establish a ferry connection between the two countries. In order to prevent this, the HHM kept at sea a great number of ships at great expense which, in their opinion, is also beneficial for H.M. and should earn his thanks.

The mighty Spanish fleet was the result of the king’s plans and was encountered by chance [in the Channel] by twelve of our ships. These attacked courageously and after having spend their gunpowder had to replenish this in a friendly port they returned to continue the battle against the Spanish galleons which sought refuge at the Downs. There they were fully provided, even better than in Spain itself, to attack the English Crown’s most trustworthy partner.

His Majesty is also asked to recall what happened under his orders with the great ship the Toeran, which not on an open bay from the sea but in full view of the large towns within these lands, was taken away [by the English navy]. The ship had not been in battle but removed with cold premeditation because it was built for his enemies. Following that, H.M. could certainly confirm the respect and deference with which this State in this case had acted. Other similar incidents have happened which have made this State suspect in the eyes of others and that to the present day due debts to many citizens of these lands remain unpaid.

It is for that reason that HHM think that H.M. is quietly pleased that the unexpected meeting [the battle of the Duins] has happened and succeeded to stop the common enemy, resulting in honouring the Crown, assuring the security of this State and preventing future audacious attacks which could endanger both our nations.
H.M. is also aware that [the treaty of] Southampton expressly permits that both signatories may engage and capture the enemies everywhere, in bays, outer-harbours, on rivers and in ports. Southampton may have been quietly ignored, it has never been repealed. In any case, it should distinguish between a fleet meant to destroy nations and peoples as attempted by the Spanish and those from Dunkirk and others who, without attacking anyone, are only convoying and protecting trade and deserve access to all ports.

In order to move away from controversies, the ambassadors were to propose a new treaty to confirm mutual security and continuity of true friendship. A treaty for a new alliance and bonds according to H.M. judgement offensive, defensive or otherwise defined friendly relations. The ambassadors had no mandate to conclude anything but would be provided with an appropriate special commission. They were also permitted to receive all proposals about the restitution of the Count Elector, with or without the intervention of other princes, to convey proposals to HHM and H.E. and await their reaction.
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