Don’t mention Europe: a study of the Europeanisation of party organisation in the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party and the German Social Democratic Party.

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Isabelle Hertner, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.
Abstract

This thesis examines how the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) have ‘Europeanised’ their organisations in three different arenas: (1) in the electorate and party system; (2) in central government and parliament; and (3) in their internal procedures and activities. ‘Europeanisation’ is defined as ‘a shorthand term for a complex process whereby national actors (in this case, parties) adapt to, and also seek to shape, the trajectory of European integration in general, and EU policies and processes in particular’ (Bomberg: 2002, 32). The underlying argument is that social democratic parties have to respond to challenges created by the European Single Market, which demands the reduction of state subsidies, and by the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which sets limits to public spending. Social democratic parties are expected to react to these challenges by Europeanising their organisations.

This thesis draws on the academic literature, party documents and contemporary newspaper articles, together with insights gained from 70 semi-structured interviews with EU experts at the European and national levels.

The central claim is that Labour, the PS and SPD have not become as Europeanised as might have been supposed for three ostensibly pro-European parties. Whilst successive party leaderships have paid lip service to the increasing importance of European integration, their party organisations have barely been involved in the formulation of European policy. The findings have serious implications for the three parties and domestic politics in Britain, France and Germany, since the memberships lack the enthusiasm and expertise to lead well-informed, critical, Europeanised debates and election campaigns.
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List of Abbreviations

BNP  British National Party
CDU  Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
COES  Cabinet Office European Secretariat
COSAC  Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union
CSU  Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern
EAC  European Affairs Committee
EEC  European Economic Community
EP  European Parliament
EPLP  European Parliamentary Labour Party
EPP  European People’s Party
EUA  Europaausschuss
FN  Front National
MEP  Member of the European Parliament
MP  Member of Parliament
MdB  Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages
MDC  Mouvement des Citoyens
PCF  Parti Communiste Français
PES  Party of European Socialists
PLP  Parliamentary Labour Party
PRG  Parti Radical de Gauche
PS  Parti Socialiste
S&D  Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
SGCI  Secrétariat Général de Coopération Interministérielle
SPD  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
UKIP  United Kingdom Independence Party
UMP  Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire
Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis examines the impact of Europe on centre-left parties in Great Britain, France and Germany. More specifically, it analyses the direct and indirect impact of European Union (EU) membership on their internal party organisations, defined broadly as ‘the informal and formal distribution of power within a party that will give power-holders the authority to pursue their preferred goals relating to office, votes and policy’ (Carter et al., 2007: 10). The thesis explores how political parties in EU member states have adapted and how their organisational structures have become ‘Europeanised’ to meet the demands of EU integration and EU policy-making, including the demands of Europeanised domestic institutions and practices.

Despite a general decline in levels of mass memberships in past decades, political parties remain fundamental to democratic governance in Europe and abroad (Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, 1994). They connect citizens with the institutions of the state and thereby represent ‘a central linkage between citizens’ preferences and actions of democratic governments’ (Poguntke, 2005: 43). Political parties in the European Union operate in a challenging system of multi-level governance: party politics take place primarily at the national level, whilst an ever increasing amount of policy is made at the European level. Parties have responded accordingly, but there is still much we do not know, especially in terms of the impact of EU membership on the internal workings of national parties.

The key analytical lens adopted by this study is the concept of ‘Europeanisation’, which is ‘a shorthand term for a complex process whereby national actors (in this case, parties) adapt to, and also seek to shape, the trajectory of
European integration in general, and EU policies and processes in particular’ (Bomberg: 2002, 32). Since parties are complex organisations that operate in a number of distinct arenas, this thesis follows loosely Key’s (1964) famous tripartite framework and examines the Europeanisation of parties in three senses: as parties in the electorate (i.e. the attitudes of their supporters and potential supporters); as parties in office (i.e. the actions and behaviour of individuals elected to governmental office); and as political organisations (i.e. the units that comprise the party and the individuals who staff them). Throughout the thesis, Europeanisation is interpreted as a multidirectional process. At times, it takes place in a top-down manner, with the party leadership pressurising (or encouraging) the lower levels of the party organisation to adapt to the process of European integration. At other times, Europeanisation can be a bottom-up process in which the lower levels of the party organisation actively engage with the EU and put pressure on the party leadership to keep them informed and involve them in the formulation of European policy. Last but not least, ‘horizontal’ Europeanisation can take place when sister parties across the EU discuss European policy, publish common statements, or organise campaign exchanges at different levels of the party organisation.

The Europeanisation of party organisations is an ongoing process in which parties adapt to a continuously changing system of EU governance. Europeanisation can be an active process in which party activists or politicians choose to actively engage with EU policy, for instance by setting up working groups, organising discussions and talks, organising exchanges with sister parties or visits to Brussels. In these cases, Europeanisation can be expected to be strong. Yet it can also be a passive process, forced upon parties by external pressures such as EU treaty change. The
Maastricht Treaty, for instance, has led national parliaments to set up European affairs committees and party working groups. Europeanisation can be strong, moderate or weak. The strength is measured differently in each of the three arenas according to a distinct set of indicators.

In simple terms, the ideal model of a fully Europeanised party would have a number of characteristics. First, it would include a leadership that recognises and stresses the relevance of the EU in its speeches, policy statements and interviews during and outside of election campaigns. By doing this, the party would actively involve and engage members and voters in EU debates. Second, it would involve a broad group of actors from different party levels in the formulation of European policy. Third, it would have close links to its Europarty and sister parties and make all party members aware of the existence of them and the possibility to engage with them. Finally, a fully Europeanised party would, when in government, push for institutional adaptation to make sure that central government and parliament can more effectively and efficiently deal with EU legislation. In practice, of course, there are likely to be gradations of Europeanisation; some parties will inevitably be more Europeanised than others.

This thesis analyses and compares the extent of the Europeanisation of the British Labour Party, the PS and SPD from 1997 until 2009. It does so by drawing on the academic literature, party documents and contemporary newspaper articles, together with insights gained from 70 semi-structured interviews with party officials at the European and national levels, MPs, MEPs, activists, former ministers, government advisors and other experts. Its central claim is that Labour, the PS and
SPD have not become as Europeanised as might have been supposed for three ostensibly pro-European parties. Whilst successive party leaderships have paid lip service to the increasing importance of European integration, their party organisations have barely been involved in the formulation of European policy. Leaders have made European policy, relying, when in government, on the expertise of advisers and civil servants. Top-down Europeanisation has not taken place, nor have the parties become Europeanised in either a bottom-up or horizontal process.

The findings have serious implications for the three parties and domestic politics in Britain, France and Germany, since the memberships lack the enthusiasm and expertise to lead well-informed, critical, Europeanised debates and election campaigns. It leads to a situation in which Europeanised party elites make policy whilst the broader organisation is not consulted and processes of democratic decision-making become wishful thinking. Moreover, parties spend little time and resources on educating members and the wider public about the EU. As successive Eurobarometer surveys show, citizens’ levels of knowledge about the functioning of the EU are already very low, particularly in Britain. This not only leads to Euroscepticism, but also perhaps contributes to citizens’ political disengagement. The low, continuously decreasing rates of participation in European elections demonstrate this trend.

1.1 Parties in Europe

For more than a hundred years, political parties have been a popular subject of research. This is unsurprising; after all, parties play a central role in both the theory and the practice of modern liberal democracy (Müller, 2000). In particular, the ways
in which parties organise has received much scholarly attention. From the advent of the mass parties in Western Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century (Duverger, 1964; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), through the development towards catch-all parties after the Second World War (Kirchheimer, 1990), to the rise of ‘cartel parties’ at the end of the twentieth century (Katz and Mair, 1995), party organisational change remains a fascinating research topic in Europe and abroad.

Like other institutions, political parties may seem to be resistant to organisational change. Yet empirical evidence shows that parties do change (Harmel, 2005: 119). As Luther and Müller-Rommel (2005) point out, political parties in Western Europe at the start of the twenty-first century are subject to six factors that prompt change: (1) substantial socio-economic changes; (2) shifts in citizens’ political values and behaviour and (3) in due course also national political cultures; (4) a radical transformation in the structures of political communication; (5) the rise of new political issues and policy agendas; and (6) the dynamics of European integration. Whilst most of these challenges are interlinked, this thesis focuses exclusively on the impact of the last, European integration, on social democratic party organisations.

EU membership is likely to impact on national party organisations for a number of reasons. Above all, ‘EU politics is party politics’ (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 137). Politicians at the European level share party ties and belong to sister organisations, which provide vital links between national and EU arenas. Party politicians define policy guidelines in the European Council, write EU treaties and make day-to-day policy in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Members of the European Commission are also party politicians. However, whilst
leading politicians are involved in EU policy-making, their national party organisations are limited in what they can do at the European level. Admittedly, national parties remain in charge of organising European parliamentary election campaigns, as will be demonstrated in the last chapter of this thesis. Moreover, they can mobilise citizens to support or oppose EU treaty changes in member states where referendums are held on such matters (like in France, as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). Yet, what national party organisations can accomplish at European level appears to be ‘rather modest’ (Ladrech, 2010: 134).

Nevertheless, parties are very much affected by European integration, if only indirectly. With the increasing number of policy areas that have been transferred to or shared with the EU’s jurisdiction, parties have less policy space available at national level. For example, according to an official parliamentary report, roughly a third (31.5 per cent) of all legislation pronounced and ratified by the Bundestag between 2005 and 2009 had EU origins (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03/09/2009). Although all parties are affected by EU membership, European integration places particular constraints on social democratic parties, which tend to promote equality through state activity. They have had to respond to challenges created by the European Single Market, which demands the reduction of state subsidies, and by the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which sets limits to public spending (Paterson and Sloam, 2006: 235). According to Mair (2007), this narrowing of the policy space can lead to a ‘hollowing out’ of policy competition between political parties. It can result in the convergence of main-stream centre-left and centre-right parties on economic issues (Ladrech, 2010: 137). Ultimately, this dampening down of differences between parties in government has led to an increasing de-politicisation of political competition at
national level (Mair, 2007: 160). It has created a situation in which ‘the EU makes policy without politics, [while] given the marginalization of national partisan politics, its member states suffer from having politics without policies’ (Schmidt, 2006: 5).

The Europeanisation of national party politics has found its place on the research agenda comparatively recently. Robert Ladrech (2002) identifies five potential areas of investigation: programmatic change; organisational change; patterns of party competition; party-government relations; and relations beyond the national party system. Research has progressed in all five areas, but the EU political environment is dynamic: as a consequence of European integration, new parties have emerged at the national level whilst existing parties and party systems have changed. In particular the transnational party federations that emerged at EU level (‘Europarties’) are young organisations and are undergoing significant organisational change. The power dynamics between them and their member parties are likely to evolve.

In this dynamic political context, there is a need for more systematic and comparative research of the Europeanisation of national party politics. Since the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, and in particular since 2005, when the Dutch and French voters rejected the European Constitutional Treaty, the EU has undergone a legitimacy crisis (Lord and Magnette, 2004; Føllesdal, 2006). The debate surrounding the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ has reached pro-European mainstream parties like the German Social Democrats. Even more recently, voters in many EU Member States have been very critical if not hostile to the way the Eurozone is managed. Citizens in wealthier countries have opposed the bailout of insolvent member states like Portugal,
Ireland and Greece. National parties clearly matter in this context. They could provide the crucial and missing link between citizens and the EU, providing up-to-date information on EU policy whilst promoting the debate amongst party members and the wider electorate. A Europeanised party organisation could be beneficial not only for parties’ internal democracy, but also for wider democratic debate on European issues.

1.2 The three cases

This thesis analyses the impact of EU membership on the party organisations of the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party and the German Social Democratic Party. The advantage of comparative research is that it improves the classification of political systems, policy processes and organisations such as political parties (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 84). In the case of this thesis, a comparative study allows us to analyse how the organisations of three major centre-left parties of government, operating in the three biggest EU Member States, have Europeanised. Whilst all three parties have had to deal with the challenge of EU-level politics and policy-making, they have operated in different national political systems and cultures. Moreover, they differ in their historical backgrounds and organisational structures. The historical background of their countries’ EU membership remains important for the three parties. It influences not only their approach to European integration in general, but also the political culture in which they operate (Krell, 2009: 42).
Britain, France and Germany joined the EU for different reasons\(^1\). For France, European integration offered economic prosperity and a means to contain Germany. For the West German political elite, it offered an opportunity to re-define German national identity after the horrors and crimes of the Second World War. France and Germany were amongst the six founding members of the EU and their relationship has been crucial for the development of the European Union. It has been described as the ‘tandem’ and ‘motor’ of European integration (Guérot, 2007). The British joined the EU two decades after its foundation for primarily economic reasons and were never comfortable with the notion of political union.

Much has been written about Britain’s complex and ambiguous relationship with the European Union (Gowland et al., 2010; Bache and Jordan, 2006; Geddes, 2004; Young, 1999; George, 1998). When the negotiations began in 1950 that led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Clement Attlee’s Labour government was invited to join, but it declined. Britain did not apply for membership in the 1950s for economic and political reasons. British rates of economic growth were extremely high by historical standards (Young, 1999: 7). This sense of economic well-being was only gradually undermined by the realisation that the ECSC member states were outperforming Britain from the mid 1950s onwards. Moreover, the realisation that Britain was no longer a global player only slowly took

\(^1\) Throughout this thesis the term ‘EU’ is used to describe the European Union (which was created with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993) and its predecessor, the European Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community.
hold over British governments. They reconsidered their approach when balance of payments crises became a recurrent problem as imports expanded faster than exports, and inflation rose more rapidly than in the French and German economies (Young, 1999: 7). The Suez Crisis of 1956 showed the British government that the special relationship with the United States, if it still existed, was, for Britain, the ‘relationship of a subordinate to a superior’ (Bogdanor, 2005: 693). Slowly, the end of empire convinced many Conservatives that there was no longer an alternative alignment which could sustain Britain’s role as a major power (Bogdanor, 2005).

For these reasons, Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government opened negotiations to see whether a basis could be found for British EU membership in 1961-1963. Because of French resistance, however, it took until 1973, and two further applications, before British membership could be achieved. When Britain finally joined the EU in 1973, both the institutions and policies had already taken on a shape that suited the six founding members far better than it suited Britain. Ever since its EU accession Britain has acquired the reputation of being a ‘reluctant European’ (Geddes, 2004), or a ‘semi-detached’ and ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1998). As George (1998: 40) outlines, in Britain there was no conversion to the ideal of a political union that was supported by the leaders of the six founding states. This has continually led to differences with other member states. It is true that Britain’s relationship with the European Union has been one of the most divisive issues of domestic British politics over the past fifty years (Baker, 2001: 276).

France’s relationship with the EU is no less ambiguous than Britain’s, and at times, France could also have been labelled an ‘awkward partner’. Krell (2009: 44) identifies two central doctrines that have shaped French foreign and EU policy since
the end of the Second World War. The first one is the attempt to contain Germany’s power. The second is the perception of the EU as a means to increase France’s political influence in Europe and the world.

French politicians have played a key role in the European integration process. After all, the European Coal and Steel Community was the brainchild of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. Its aims were economic growth whilst keeping the German coal and steel industries under control. However, French input was not always pro-integrationist. When Charles de Gaulle became President in 1958 he was keen to limit the power of supranational actors. He preferred an intergovernmental mode of decision-making in which member states could keep their veto power. In 1965 the European Commission put forward a proposal for funding the Common Agricultural Policy which would have allowed the Community to develop its own financial resources, independent of the member states. Moreover, the Council of Ministers would have taken decisions with a qualified majority, thereby ending the veto power of the Member States. De Gaulle’s opposition to these plans led to the ‘Empty Chair Crisis’, which was a French boycott of the Community institutions between July 1965 and January 1966 (Ludlow, 1999). His successors - Georges Pompidou (1969-1974), Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981), François Mitterrand (1981-1995), Jacques Chirac (1995-2007), and Nicolas Sarkozy (2007 until present) - have been less confrontational in their European policies. In particular socialist President Mitterrand advanced European integration through close cooperation with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and became characterised as ‘père l’Europe’ (Axt, 1999: 476). Both president Chirac and Sarkozy have displayed more continuity than change in their EU policies, and cooperation with the German authorities remains close. At the same
time, French politicians across the political spectrum continue to emphasise the gains through French leadership in the European Union, whilst the public is convinced that France no longer leads Europe and that the EU no longer protects France against globalisation (Schmidt, 2007).

In contrast to Britain and France, Germany’s engagement with the European Union has not been distracted by other international-role aspirations, whether of being a post-colonial global player or a sovereign nation-state (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 4). After its total defeat in the Second World War and partition, West Germany, supported and supervised by the Western Allies, sought to re-establish its political institutions and re-define its foreign policy paradigms. ‘The Federal Republic was therefore very deficient in “actorness” and European integration offered it an opportunity to expand its role as an actor’, as Paterson (2011: 60) writes. The West German political elite saw European integration as a means to transform its post-Second World War nation-state identity and develop a kind of ‘German Europatriotism’ (Risse, 2001: 209). West Germany was thus able to gain sovereignty through the European integration process, which went hand in hand with the foundation of the Federal Republic. It has since been argued that the German constitution was Europeanised in its infancy (Goetz, 1995). In the early 1960s a strong pro-integrationist, cross-party elite consensus emerged which was shared by the wider public. This has given domestic actors more discretion in exercising their power at European and national level. Germany has been able to upload its institutional model and policy preferences to the European level, and as a consequence, ‘the EU feels familiar’ to Germany (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 4).
So much for the three national contexts; what of the individual parties that operate in them? The British Labour Party was founded in 1900 as a federation of working-class organisations. Only in 1918 were individual members allowed to join the party. Until today, however, affiliate organisations such as trade unions and socialist societies play an important role. Although the unions’ shares of votes at the annual conference have been reduced and their block vote been ended (Ludlam, 2004: 102), they continue to push their weight during the annual party conferences and leadership elections (Webb, 2000). Compared to the SPD, Labour is a small party; the bulk of its members comprised affiliated trades unionists. Labour’s membership peaked at 405,000 in 1997 in the aftermath of Tony Blair’s election, but ten years later it had fallen back to 176,891, which is thought to be the lowest level since it was founded (The Guardian, 13/05/2010). The Labour Party operates at the local, regional and national level. Local branches constitute the party’s organisational grassroots, and both individual and corporatist members such as trade unions and socialist organisations can join a local branch. Several branches together make a Constituency Labour Party (CLP), which coincides with a parliamentary constituency. At the national level of the party organisation, four important bodies are worth mentioning:

The Annual Conference (which is the ultimate authority in the party); the National Policy Forum (NPF) which meets several times per year to unite the party’s views on policy; the National Executive Committee (NEC), which sets the party's objectives and oversees the running of the party, including the headquarters; and the party leader

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2 The role of these bodies in the Labour Party, PS and SPD’s formulation of European policy will be discussed in Chapter 7.
(who is elected by three distinct electorates: MPs and MEPs; individual party members; affiliated organisations such as trade unions and socialist societies).

Since the late 1970s the Labour Party leadership has become more autonomous from official party decision-making bodies for a number of reasons. As mentioned earlier, the unions’ weight in the policy-making process has been reduced. Moreover, since Neil Kinnock was in office (1983-1992), Labour party leaders had an increasing amount of staff including personal advisors at their disposal, which made them more independent from the National Policy Forum (NPF) and party conference. In addition, in a ‘somewhat paradoxical blend of democratization and centralization’ (Webb, 1999: 103), members were given the possibility to decide through referendums over issues such as election manifestoes or reforms of the party statutes. Ultimately, these referendums have contributed to the empowerment of the party leadership: Under Tony Blair, some fundamental decisions were taken by ordinary party members whilst MPs and formal policy-making bodies such as the NPF have lost influence on party policy. As Faucher-King (2003) highlights, the objective of these reforms was not only to increase the legitimacy of the leader, but, in the case of the PS, also to try to erode the power of the factions. Hence, what party leaders have sold as a democratisation and decentralisation of the policy-making process has instead led to centralisation (Mair, 1997).

The French Socialist Party (PS) was founded in 1969 as the successor to the French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO). It has never been a mass party in the Duvergerian sense because it could not count on the trade unions for membership and support. As a consequence, since the 1930s, the PS has lacked funding, a strong organisational structure and an industrial working-class clientele (Bell and Criddle,
Compared with many other Western European countries, party membership in France is generally low (Offerle, 2000). Yet, as French parties are not obliged to publish accurate membership statistics, their numbers tend to be unreliable and differ significantly from those published by newspapers and researchers (Billordo, 2003). In September 2009, the PS claimed 200,319 members (*Le Canard enchaîné*, 25/11/2009). However, this number is likely to be overstated.

Like Labour, the PS is organised at local, regional and national level. The local branches, called ‘sections’, were inherited from the SFIO but stripped of their former powers when the PS was founded in 1969. At regional level the party is divided into federations. Regional party conferences elect regional party leaders and select delegates for the national party conference which takes places only every three years. The party conference elects the members for the national council and bureau. However, the real power house of the party is the national secretariat, which can be compared to Labour’s NEC. It is elected on the party leader’s suggestions, and as a consequence, the leader is surrounded by confidants. This is particularly important because much of the party’s internal life is dictated by its different factions (*courants*) that organise around presidential candidates. As in the case of Labour, the PS leader has become more autonomous over the past decades. President Mitterrand officially yielded the party leadership but de facto continued to make the party’s policy without consulting the formal decision-making bodies.

The German Social Democrats (SPD) were founded in May 1875 as a highly complex, densely organised socialist workers’ party with a large membership. Like the Labour Party, the SPD is organised at the local, regional and national level. The local branches or *Ortsvereine* are where grassroots activism takes place. *Ortsvereine*
are integrated into sub-districts or *Unterbezirke*, which equal local council borders.

The next level is the regional party or *Landesverband*, which plays an important role especially in the recruitment of personnel. At national level, the party conference is the highest authority, but in practice, policy is made by the party leadership: the *Vorstand* (the party’s national executive committee) and the *Präsidium*, which has been described as the party’s ‘inner cabinet’ (de Deken, 1999: 84).

The SPD’s membership peaked at 1,022,200 in 1976 but has decreased to 540,000 in 2007 and continues to shrink (*Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, 22/02/2010). The SPD is no longer a party of workers; it has transformed itself into a party of employees and civil servants. However, change has not only occurred within the membership; the leadership has also transformed itself. In recent decades, it has become more autonomous from formal policy-making bodies such as the party conference. This tendency of the SPD to centralise power and follow an ‘iron law of oligarchy’ has already been observed by the sociologist Robert Michels (1962). Thus, the key player in the SPD’s policy-making process is the party leadership. Europeanisation has further enhanced the empowerment of the party leadership, as will be discussed in Chapter 7.

1.3 Conceptual framework, questions and methods

Any analysis of the Europeanisation of parties can be approached by thinking about the Europeanisation of ‘parties in the electorate’, ‘parties in government’ and ‘parties as organisations’. In each case, Europeanisation means something different and is driven by distinctive forces. Table 1.1 (below) summarises the nature and indicators of Europeanisation in each respect and also identifies the general and country-specific drivers behind the process.
Table 1.1: The Europeanisation of ‘the party in the electorate’, ‘the party in government’ and ‘the party as organisation’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Europeanisation and indicators</th>
<th>Parties in the electorate</th>
<th>Parties in government</th>
<th>Parties as political organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation</td>
<td>Top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation</td>
<td>Top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party system:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Format (number of parties);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mechanics (patterns of party competition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public opinion:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Level of EU knowledge;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Level of pro-European support.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Central government and parliament:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Institutional adaptation;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Strategic adaptation.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EU policy-making:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Involvement of party members.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European parliamentary election campaigning:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Adequate funding;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Close cooperation with PES;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of national and PES manifestoes and logos;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Common ‘top’ candidate at the EU level.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General drivers of Europeanisation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Salience of Europe amongst the public and parties;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Electoral system;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of referendums.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EU treaty change;</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government turnover;</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU attitudes of party leadership;</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The strength of parliament vis-à-vis government.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Whether the party is in government or opposition;</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU attitude of the party leadership and their attitude towards the PES;</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological coherence within the PES.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country or case-specific drivers of Europeanisation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Power constellations within coalition governments;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Divided government (in France).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of the party in the electorate, Europeanisation is expected to work in a bottom-up and top-down manner. The public arena is understood as comprising: (1) public opinion towards European integration and the effects this has on party organisational Europeanisation and vice versa; and (2) as the party system in which parties operate. A Europeanised public is one that displays a high level of knowledge of the political system of the EU. In such an environment, parties are expected to Europeanise. In return, if parties actively engage members and citizens in debates about the EU, they can contribute to the Europeanisation of the public. Yet, Europeanisation of party organisations also depends on whether European policy is a cleavage amongst parties and whether Europe is a salient issue. A Europeanised party system is one whose format – that is, the number of parties competing in elections – has been affected by European integration, but also the patterns of party competition.

In terms of the party in government, Europeanisation is again expected to be a two-way process. As central governments and parliaments adapt to the process of European integration, they are expected to affect the attitudes and behaviour of party elites, while in return, Europeanised politicians can drive forward the Europeanisation of executives and legislatures. A Europeanised central government is one that has adapted to the EU style of policy-making and can ‘upload’ its institutional model and policies onto the European level. In a similar vein, a Europeanised parliament is one that deals efficiently and effectively with EU legislation and has adapted its structures and strategies accordingly. This adaptation is expected to affect parliamentary parties and their engagement with European policy. General drivers for Europeanisation can be EU treaty change (e.g. when the EU extends its powers); government turnover; and the EU attitudes of the party leadership.
In terms of the party as organisation, Europeanisation can be expected to manifest itself in two core party activities, namely policy-making and election campaigning, both of which will reflect the informal and formal distribution of power in a party. A Europeanised policy-making process involves not only the party leadership, but also activists and EU ‘experts’, for example MEPs, in policy forums and party conferences. Moreover, a Europeanised party is expected to be geared towards leading Europeanised campaigns. European parliamentary election campaigns are good indicators of whether parties discuss EU policy within their organisational structures and with the wider electorate; whether they provide enough funding to lead awareness-raising campaigns; whether they cooperate closely with sister parties (to enhance bi-directional Europeanisation) and with Europarties (the Party of European Socialists or PES in the case of centre-left social democratic parties); and whether they nominate a top EU-level candidate in order to politicise the debate.

There is presently no shortage of literature on political parties and their European policies. Yet, the literature hardly grasps the informal processes of European policy-making that takes place within parties. Nor does the literature examine European networks within the parties. In order to shed light on these activities, in-depth interviews with elite members of the three parties were conducted and a period of participant observation undertaken. The interview fieldwork began with a six-week period of participant observation at the PES headquarters in Brussels during the final phase of the 2009 European parliamentary election campaign. Participant observation is ‘the process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the research setting’ (Schensul et al., 1999:99). It entailed participation in the day-to-day work of the PES whilst
maintaining sufficient distance to observe the situation. The headquarters of the PES, the general secretariat, is the nodal point where party officials discuss policy and campaign strategies. During the six weeks in May and June 2009, valuable insights into the workings of the PES were gained, most notably into the processes of policy-making and election campaigning. One of my tasks was to analyse and compare the European election campaigns of PES member parties and to liaise with the parties’ international departments. During this period of participant observation, insider information on national election campaigns was gained and the contact details of EU experts in the Labour Party, PS and SPD were obtained.

During the second phase of the fieldwork, 70 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with policy-makers and party activists were conducted in Brussels, Paris, Berlin and London. MPs, MEPs, PES activists and other EU experts, such as former ministers and researchers working on European policy for party-affiliated think tanks and trade unions, were interviewed. Table 1.2 (below) gives an overview of the number of interviews conducted in each country and the position of the interviewee. A full list of all interviewees can be found in the appendix.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position of interviewees</th>
<th>EU level</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party officials</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials and advisors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of parliament</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the European Parliament</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former ministers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party activists</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think-tank researchers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note*: All party activists interviewed were PES activists. At the same time they were members of a national party or several national parties.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, fewer interviews were conducted with Labour politicians. As a party used to being attacked by a Eurosceptic media, some Labour politicians took a defensive approach during the interviews, and many did not agree to being interviewed at all. Unfortunately, most MEPs and MPs either replied saying that they had no time for interviews or did not reply at all. One Labour MEP wrote in an e-mail:

Thank you for your request for an interview with me. Unfortunately due to the volume of such requests that I receive, and the nature of my work schedule, I
am unable to give any interviews for research projects. Please accept my apologies.

Given the apparent prevalence of such attitudes, there is inevitably a risk that those who did agree to be interviewed were unrepresentative of the broader population from which they were drawn.

PS politicians had been in opposition for a number of years and were more willing to being interviewed and apparently to speak their mind than their counterparts from the Labour Party. Moreover, PS politicians had more time to speak with researchers. An exception were (the few) socialist MPs with EU expertise who all replied that they had no time for interviews.

Working with asymmetrical data is a challenge for comparative research. Therefore, some sections of this thesis, mainly the ones dealing with the SPD, contain more original data and are therefore more detailed than the ones on the PS and Labour. In July and August 2009, when the majority of interviews were conducted, the SPD had just experienced its lowest result in European elections (20.8 per cent). In this context, many social democratic politicians agreed to being interviewed and saw this as a means to reflect upon the election campaign and the party’s Europeanisation more generally.

The majority of interviews, 61 out of 70, were conducted face-to-face, whilst the rest were conducted over the telephone. Face-to-face interviews were the preferred method: shaking hands, keeping eye contact and a friendly smile make it easier to establish a good rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee. Moreover, face-to-face interviews tended to last longer (over 30 minutes) and some interviewees
shared confidential documents or put me in touch with colleagues. Most face-to-face interviews took longer than expected. I asked for 30 minutes, but many interviewees spoke for longer, often for up to one hour. All interviews were semi-structured, following a catalogue of questions: opening questions, key questions and closing questions (Hennink et al., 2011: 109). Open questions were asked because they ‘provide a greater opportunity for respondents to organise their answers within their own frameworks’ (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 674). The questions were adapted to each person’s role and functions. For instance, all MEPs were asked the same two opening and two key questions, but those who were more experienced or were in leading positions were asked additional questions relating to their personal experience. Moreover, some questions were country or case-specific and related to national election campaigns, political events and politicians. This format left enough room for flexibility for both the interviewer and interviewee. As Legard et al. (2010) stress, ‘the first key feature of the in-depth interview is that it is intended to combine structure with flexibility’. Some interviewees asked for the questions to be sent in advance, and all agreed to being taped. In two interviews with Labour politicians, however, the most interesting experiences were revealed at the end, when the dictaphone was switched off.

As Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 673) explain, ‘Interviewing is often important if one needs to know what a set of people think, or how they interpret an event or series of events, or what they have done or are planning to do’. The interviews conducted for this study offered the unique opportunity to get information on personal experiences from the policy-makers about their roles, functions and views. This information cannot be found in the academic literature or official party documents. Most interviewees showed great interest in the research topic and were
willing to share their impressions. However, whilst in-depth interviews are a valuable research tool, they are by no means perfect (Richards, 1996). First of all, since interviewees share their personal views, much of the information is highly subjective and cannot always be taken at its face value. For example, many interviewees saw our discussions as an opportunity to share their frustration about their parties’ lack of interest in European politics. Secondly, interviewees can stir the conversation in other directions. For instance, elected politicians often used the interviews to criticise their opponents’ ‘bad’ European policies, and it was difficult to guide them back to the topic of interest. Thirdly, a number of questions related to events in the past, such as policy decisions or election campaigns. In some cases, memories were no longer fresh. Last but not least, conducting a good interview is also a challenging task for the interviewer. A good interviewer is well-informed about the professional background, role and functions of the interviewee and has carefully prepared the catalogue of questions. During the interview, and especially when open questions are asked, a high level of attention is required because such interviews have a conversational quality to it and answers can go in different directions. Relevant and intelligent questions need to be asked at the right moment, which is particularly difficult in a foreign language. The interviews for this study were led in English, French and German. All French and German interviews were later translated into English.
1.4 The structure of this thesis

The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 begins with a review of the Europeanisation literature. In its first part, the chapter explores the origins of the concept, its various definitions, and the problems related to its vagueness and diffuse meaning. In its second part, it examines how the concept has been applied to party politics in general and party organisation in particular. The third and final part of this chapter will present a definition of Europeanisation as it is understood in this dissertation. It will then discuss the process of party organisational Europeanisation and present an ideal model of a strongly Europeanised party organisation following Key’s (1964) tripartite framework, thereby examining the Europeanisation of the parties’ public face in the electoral arena; the Europeanisation of the parties in office; and as political organisations.

Chapters 3 and 4 look at the electoral arena and examine the public political environment in which the Labour Party, PS and SPD operate. Chapter 3 compares the Europeanisation of the British, French and German party systems and the effect this has had on Labour, the PS, the SPD and vice versa. In this context, a Europeanised party system is one where EU membership has led to the emergence of new parties or has changed the mechanisms of party competition. It is argued that within a Europeanised party system, parties have an incentive to Europeanise their organisations. After all, if EU policy is a cleavage, parties can be expected to prioritise it during election campaigns and internal debates. However, this chapter not only analyses EU policy divisions between parties, but also within parties.

Chapter 4 addresses the Europeanisation of public opinion and links this to the Europeanisation of Labour, the PS and SPD. European integration has become
increasingly contested since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and elites have found their autonomy curtailed. In this context, the interaction between voters and political parties has arguably become more important for the future of European integration. On the one hand, national parties can be expected to listen to the public’s opinions. After all, parties seeking election and office are expected to represent their voters’ policy preferences. On the other hand, parties are expected to influence the voters through their policies. Chapter 4 therefore applies a bi-directional model of mass-elite linkage to the Labour Party, PS and SPD. This model, developed by Steenbergen et al. (2007) is most helpful in explaining the way parties and voters influence each other and demonstrates that the strength of those linkages is contingent on factors such as the electoral system or national EU referenda.

In the next two chapters, the Europeanisation of the three parties in the governmental arena is explored. The governmental arena is divided into central government and parliament. Chapter 5 analyses the Europeanisation of central government in Britain, France and Germany and investigates how Europeanisation has affected the behaviour of party elites in government. After all, when a party is in government, the leadership (in particular the prime minister and senior cabinet ministers) are involved in EU-level policy-making. This experience is expected to lead to a more pro-European outlook. In return, party elites can actively Europeanise central government and parliament.

Chapter 6 analyses the degree of Europeanisation of the British, French and German parliament. It focuses on the three directly-elected lower chambers that determine government formation. As national parliaments are increasingly involved in EU policy-making, MPs need to pass EU legislation, be it in European scrutiny
committees or other expert committees. This requires both expertise and efficient working structures and should therefore have a Europeanising effect on the parliamentary party.

Chapters 7 and 8 shed light on how the Labour Party, PS and SPD have Europeanised as political organisations. Two of a party’s key activities are policy-making and election campaigning, and both activities will be examined regarding their level of Europeanisation. Chapter 7 analyses and compares the three parties’ European policy-making processes. The Europeanisation of party organisation can only be grasped if we understand which actors or networks of actors are involved in the formulation of European policy. Both the formal channels of policy-making (party conferences, policy forums etc.) and the informal ones are taken into consideration.

Chapter 8 analyses the Europeanisation of the 2009 European parliamentary election campaigns, a period when parties could be expected to display their degree of Europeanisation and prioritise their European policies. An ideal model of Europeanisation is applied to this campaign. It is argued that in a Europeanised campaign, the Labour Party, PS and SPD would have: (1) provided an adequate amount of funding; (2) used national manifestoes and campaign material alongside those provided by the Party of European Socialists; (3) discussed European themes, and (4) appointed a common top candidate for the presidency of the European Commission.

Chapter 9 brings together the evidence presented in the six empirical chapters. By applying the ideal model of a fully Europeanised party as introduced in Chapter 2, it discusses to what extent Labour, the PS and SPD have Europeanised in the electoral arena, in government and as organisations.
Finally, Chapter 10 concludes the thesis and highlights the findings of the study and the implications for social democratic parties in the EU.
Chapter 2: Europeanisation, political parties and party systems

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the concept of Europeanisation and to apply it to political parties. The first part provides a critical discussion of the Europeanisation literature of the past two decades, presenting the strengths and weaknesses of the concept. The second part examines the body of literature dealing with the Europeanisation of party politics. The third and final part of this chapter will present a definition of Europeanisation as it is understood in this dissertation. It will then discuss the process of party organisational Europeanisation and present an ideal model of a Europeanised party organisation examining the Europeanisation of the parties’ public face; the Europeanisation of the parties in office; and as political organisations. The overall aim of this dissertation is to find out whether the Labour Party, PS and SPD comply with this ideal type and can be characterised as strongly Europeanised party organisations.

‘Europeanisation’ is a popular yet contested concept which has become fashionable amongst scholars as a way to describe and analyse domestic change emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership. For decades, researchers had focused mainly on explaining the major institution-building steps in the EU project, and whether the construction of the EU followed from clear national interests, some more path-dependent process of ‘spillover’, or supranational entrepreneurship (Parsons, 2007: 1135). During the mid 1990s, however, attention shifted from explaining European institutions towards analysing institutional adaptation within member states to EU membership (Hanf and Soetendorp, 1998; Kassim, Peter and Wright, 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Green Cowles, Caporaso and Risse,
This process received increased scholarly attention because the emergence of a consolidated system of European governance made evident that traditional theories of integration were inadequate to describe or explain change within that system. In particular, new approaches were needed to explain change and adaptation in member states.

It has become conventional to trace and analyse the domestic impact of Europeanisation along three major dimensions: policies, politics and polity (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Some aspects of domestic government have received considerably more attention than others. For example, recent years have seen a growing interest in the processes by which European integration affects domestic policies and polities in the form of institutions. Numerous studies deal with the EU impact on governmental administration aspects and the substance and processes of public policy making. The European impact on domestic politics – such as political cleavages, voters, elections, parties, party competition, party systems and patterns of democratic legitimation - however, has received comparatively little attention (Hix and Goetz, 2001a). A reason for this research gap could be the difficulty in isolating the European effect on domestic politics from other effects, most notably globalisation. Another obstacle is the difficulty in measuring the Europeanisation of politics, which points again to the vagueness of the concept. It is also the case, as Hix and Goetz (2001a: 15) indicate, that ‘domestic polities and policies have been affected earlier and more profoundly by European integration than domestic politics.’ Indeed, as this thesis will demonstrate, EU policy continued to be a de-politicised item on the bottom of centre-left parties’ political agenda between 1997 and 2010.
2.1 Defining Europeanisation

An increasing number of writers use the term Europeanisation but the term lacks a precise meaning. Much of the literature remains vague. Furthermore, a shared definition of the term has not yet emerged, turning Europeanisation into an elusive concept. Featherstone (2003, 3) points out that this ‘faddish use of “Europeanization” in different contexts can easily obscure its substantive meaning.’ Europeanisation was initially viewed as a top-down process whereby European institution building caused changes at the domestic level. Robert Ladrech (1994: 69) provided one of the first and still widely cited definitions. He sees Europeanisation as an ‘incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’. By ‘organizational logic’, he means the ‘adaptive processes of organizations to a changed or changing environment (1994:71).’ Ladrech underlines the process of adaptation, policy learning and change. Inherent in this conception is the notion that actors redefine their interests and behaviours to meet the norms and logic of EU membership. Whilst this definition has the strength of incorporating both ‘politics’ and ‘policy-making’, it remains a somewhat loose definition, as Featherstone (2003, 12) points out. Moreover, this definition neglects the fact that national political actors, before adapting to EU political and economic dynamics, are often involved in the shaping and making of European politics in the first place.

A very different approach is taken by Green-Cowles, Risse and Caporaso (2001) who define Europeanisation as ‘the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct features of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative
rules.’ This definition diverges from the others because it does not relate to the process of adaptation at the domestic level. It also looks very similar to concepts such as European integration and Communitarisation, as opposed to an analytically distinct process triggered by European integration (Vink, 2003: 3, Bomberg and Peterson, 2000: 3-4). Radaelli (2000: 3) provides a more encompassing definition, viewing Europeanisation as:

processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.

However, Radaelli’s definition does not emphasise the multi-directional character of the Europeanisation process. To understand and analyse the complexity of European transformations, Europeanisation was gradually interpreted as a two-way-process, whereby actors at national level were not only subjected to change, but would also actively shape European politics. ‘European integration also elicits active responses or the “projection” of national priorities or practices into the mix of forces that determine the trajectory of the European project and its resultant policies’, as Bomberg and Peterson (2000: 6) stress. Börzel (2002) has introduced the notion of ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ to describe this complex two-way-notion of Europeanisation. She argues that EU member states (and other actors) may seek to ‘upload’ their policy preferences to the EU level in order to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs of European policies. According to Börzel, uploading reduces the
need for legal and administrative adaptation in downloading, that is: incorporating European policies into national policy structures (Börzel, 2002: 196).

In this thesis, Europeanisation is interpreted as an ongoing process, which is ‘circular rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather than one off’ (Goetz, 2002: 4, quoted by Bache and Jordan, 2006: 22). Bulmer and Radaelli (2004, 3) share this view, stressing that ‘neither the EU nor the member states are static, so Europeanisation is a matter of reciprocity between moving features’. Hence a key asset of Europeanisation is that it grasps the ongoing, dynamic exchange between different levels of governance.

Europeanisation research has become more refined over the past decade, yet one of its most obvious shortcomings remains: its failure to relate to traditional European integration theories (Vink, 2003: 7). Many studies focus on individual case studies of domestic adaptation, while they do not attempt to generalise and view the greater picture of European integration. However, as this body of literature becomes more sophisticated, Europeanisation is often couched within longer-established theoretical frameworks - such as ‘new institutionalism’, ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’, ‘multi-level governance’, or ‘policy networks’ - with Europeanisation as a loose epithet (Featherstone, 2003: 12). The comparison of definitions and approaches shows that the scope of the concept is very vast and that in different contexts Europeanisation can have divergent meanings. J.P. Olsen’s (2002) typology of the different processes understood as Europeanisation shows how vast the concept has become. Olsen demonstrates that the different conceptions of Europeanisation complement, rather than exclude each other. The result is a conception that seems too broad and vague. Olsen names five possible uses of Europeanisation:
(1) As changes in external territorial boundaries;

(2) As the development of institutions of governance at the EU level;

(3) As central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance;

(4) As exporting forms of political organisation and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory;

(5) As a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe.

It then becomes clear that the Europeanisation agenda was broad a decade ago and has broadened even further. Most notably, it has been extended to include the Europeanisation of national politics. Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (2004: 109) write that ‘because research interests extend to different dimensions and embrace divergent theoretical approaches it is not surprising that Europeanization remains a fuzzy concept.’ Europeanisation research therefore runs the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’ because it does not set boundaries (Radaelli, 2000: 1). Ill defined concepts lead to confusion and elusive language, and they ‘obfuscate the relations between genus and species. Concepts without negation are universal: they point to everything.’ (Sartori, 1970: 1042, quoted by Radaelli, 2000: 3) A solution to the problem could be to ‘unpack the concept and to distinguish between Europeanisation and other terms, thus showing what Europeanization is not’, as Radaelli (2000: 4) suggests. He then argues that Europeanisation should not be confused with convergence, harmonisation, or political integration, emphasising that ‘Europeanization is not convergence. The latter can be a consequence of Europeanization. Convergence is not Europeanization because there is a difference between a process and its consequences’ (Radaelli, 2000: 4.). In addition, Europeanisation should not be confounded with the harmonisation of
national policies. After all, Europeanisation has a different impact on policies across the EU, as empirical research suggests (Héritier et al., 2001). Finally, Radaelli (2000, 5) argues that Europeanisation is not political integration:

Europeanization would not exist without European integration. But the latter concept belongs to the ontological stage of research, that is, the understanding of a process in which countries pool sovereignty, whereas the former is post-ontological, being concerned with what happens once EU institutions are in place and produce their effects.

To sum up, Europeanisation research has become an increasingly popular concept over the past two decades. It remains contested as a growing number of often divergent definitions exist in parallel, making it difficult to determine what Europeanisation actually is. Moreover, many studies still fail to link Europeanisation to existing integration theories and do not attempt to present the greater picture of European integration, and therefore remain limited in their focus. Undoubtedly, though, the concept has contributed to the study of European integration, as it allows us to identify and understand processes of domestic change in relation to European integration which previously were difficult to grasp. Europeanisation has been a particularly useful tool to analyse the domestic implementation of European policies (Héritier et al., 2001; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004) and study transformations in the national polity. Only recently, Europeanisation has been applied to national politics.

Taking everything into account, Elizabeth Bomberg’s definition of Europeanisation seems most useful. She used it to analyse the Europeanisation of green parties. Bomberg (2002: 32) defines Europeanisation as:
A shorthand term for a complex process whereby national actors (in this case, parties) adapt to, also seek to shape, the trajectory of European integration in general, and EU policies and processes in particular.

To improve the definition’s utility, a transnational dimension of Europeanisation needs to be added. For instance, parties from across the EU can ‘Europeanise’ each other, as it was the case in the context of EU Eastern enlargement, when central and eastern European parties learned from their western sister parties. In general, bilateral relations between sister parties at different levels of the party organisation (party leader meetings resulting in common declarations, parliamentary exchanges, campaign exchanges at local level etc.) could also have a Europeanising effect on parties, as will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.3.

2.2 The Europeanisation of party politics

Until relatively recently, the Europeanisation of national party politics has been neglected by students of political parties. Robert Ladrech (2002), one of the first scholars to work on this topic, has suggested a basic framework for analysing this process. He identifies five potential areas of investigation: programmatic change, patterns of party competition, party-government relations, and relations beyond the national party system, and organisational change. We can utilise this framework to explore the literature more fully.

2.2.1 The Europeanisation of party programmes

Programmatic change that has resulted from European integration has been measured quantitatively by Dorussen and Nanou (2006). Using manifesto data for 1951–2001, they examine the convergence of party programmes across Western Europe, showing that European integration has increasingly constrained the range of policy platforms.
Paul Pennings (2006) compares national party manifestoes in the period between 1960 and 2003 according to phases of integration and policy sectors. He comes to the conclusion that ‘manifestos do not reveal the “real” degree of Europeanization of policy sectors (…) Europe is being deliberately underemphasized’ (Pennings, 2006: 268). Yet manifestoes are only one way of measuring programmatic change. Changes in what parties do and say in between elections can also be taken as an indicator of programmatic Europeanisation. In this way, there has been a growing interest in the European policies of individual political parties in EU member states. Among the three parties examined in this thesis, the British Labour Party has received most attention, more than the PS and SPD, probably due to the complicated relationship the Labour Party has had with the EU in the past. For instance, numerous studies have analysed the European policy of the Blair government by comparing Blair’s discourse with actual outcomes (Smith, 2005; Wallace, 2005; Bulmer and Burch, 2005). The EU is often examined as part of foreign policy. Only a few studies focus exclusively on European policy (Fella, 2002; Holden, 2002; Wanninger, 2007). There have also been few studies of Labour’s European policy under Gordon Brown, notable exceptions being Whitman and O’Donnell (2007) and Daddow (2011).

The SPD’s European policy has been analysed comprehensively by Stroh (2004), Lamatsch (2004) and Sloam (2004). Yet, in Germany, coalition governments are the norm and as a consequence, European policy is always a compromise between two parties. Perhaps for this reason, many publications do not explicitly refer to the SPD’s European policy (as it is the case in Britain with the Labour Party) but rather as ‘German European policy’ (Harnisch and Schieder, 2006; Göler and Jopp, 2007; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al., 2010), ‘red-green European policy’ (Ostheim, 2007) or the European policy of the Grand Coalition (Marhold, 2006). Also, the SPD’s
European policy is analysed in the bigger framework of foreign policy (Risse, 2004). Future comprehensive studies analysing the SPD’s role in European policy-making in different coalition governments from 1998 until 2009 would certainly be useful.

The nature of French politics has made it even more difficult for scholars to identify a PS European policy. Like the SPD, the PS formed a coalition government, but with four other left-wing parties (*gauche plurielle*) between 1997 and 2002. Moreover, this left government served in office with a centre-right President, a constellation the French have labelled ‘*cohabitation*’. Both Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and President Jacques Chirac were involved in European policy-making and frequently appeared shoulder to shoulder at European Council meetings. It might be due to this complicated constellation that only very few publications explicitly deal with the European policy of the PS in the most recent period of cohabitation. An exception is Leuffen’s (2007) well-researched study, in which he chose three case studies (the European Councils of Amsterdam and Nice, and Agenda 2002) to analyse the complex interplay within the French executive. However, a comprehensive and systematic overview of the European policy of the Jospin government is still lacking. More recent accounts of French European policy in general are written by Axt (1999) and Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2004 and 2005), yet they do not focus exclusively on the PS’ European policy. Because the PS has been in opposition since 2002, little scholarly attention has been paid to its European policy. One notable exception, however, is the 2004 internal referendum on the EU constitution which divided the party and received much attention in the national media. Markus Wagner (2008) presents a thorough analysis of the different views expressed by PS leaders in public statements, while Crespy (2008) examines the political opportunity structures that caused intra-party dissent. Last but not least, it is worth mentioning one recent study
comparing the European policies of Labour, the PS and SPD. In his published doctoral thesis, Christian Krell (2009) provides a useful if broad overview of the three parties’ European policies. However, this study is somewhat descriptive and neglects party organisation at the EU level.

2.2.2 The Europeanisation of party competition

Ladrech’s second area of analysis is party competition, which relates to how parties compete with each other on EU policy within a party system. Here, there have been a few studies investigating the nature and impact of Europeanisation. Peter Mair (2000 and 2007), who has probably done most to enhance our knowledge in this field, suggests there are two dimensions structuring the Europeanisation of party systems: first, the impact of EU integration on the format of the party system (the number of relevant parties in contention in national arenas); and second, the mechanics of party systems (the way in which parties interact with each other at the national level, either by modifying the ideological distance separating the relevant parties, or by encouraging the emergence of wholly new European-centred dimensions of competition). Mair argues that Europeanisation has very little direct impact on the format of national party systems. After all, very few parties have been established with the explicit and primary intention of mobilising support for or against the EU (an exception being UKIP, the UK Independence Party). Likewise, apart from a few exceptions, Europeanisation has had little direct impact on the mechanisms of party competition. ‘To be sure, a pro- vs. anti-European divide can sometimes be discerned; but given the character of the parties involved, Europe as such appears neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for that divide’, as Mair (2000: 35) states. Nevertheless, indirect effects of Europeanisation on national party systems cannot be denied. Mair argues that since European integration increasingly constrains the
national governments’ scope for action, it encourages a ‘hollowing out’ of competition among those parties with a governing aspiration by limiting their policy space. Furthermore, ‘by taking Europe out of national competition and by working within a supranational structure that clearly lacks democratic accountability, party and political leaderships do little to counteract the notion of the irrelevance of conventional politics’ (Mair, 2000: 48-49). Relying on Mair’s framework, Niedermayer (2003) and Poguntke (2007) conclude that one cannot speak of a Europeanisation of the German party system in the sense of a considerable impact of the European integration process on its development.

### 2.2.3 The Europeanisation of party-government relations

Ladrech’s third potential research area is the Europeanisation of party-government relations. He writes that ‘inter-governmental bargaining – either in an inter-governmental conference, European Council, or Council of Ministers/COREPER – may distance the government/party leader from party programmatic positions in an unintended fashion’ (2001: 10). In 2002, Tapio Raunio wrote that not a single study on the impact of European integration on power relations within parties had been published so far. He went on to argue that EU integration had the effect of consolidating the centralisation of decision-making through strengthening the agenda-setting powers of party leaders. He noted that intergovernmental bargaining provided the party leadership with an arena where the party organisation exercised little if any control over its representatives, since in most EU Member States, the scrutiny of European affairs by national parliaments was very weak (Raunio, 2002: 410-411). Since Raunio’s seminal article, parliamentary EU scrutiny across the EU has been researched more systematically and comprehensively (see, for example: Auel, 2005; O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007; Holzacker, 2008). Moreover, Carter and Poguntke
(2010) found out through surveys with parties’ EU experts that party elites receive only modest levels of instructions when they are involved in EU-level decision-making.

2.2.4 The Europeanisation of ‘relations beyond the national party system’

Ladrech identifies the Europeanisation of ‘relations beyond the national party system’ as a potential area for research, arguing that Europeanisation could result in increased transnational co-operation among parties across the EU. In practice, there have been three distinct modes of transnational co-operation, each with its own literature.

The first mode centres on the activities of Europarties. The relevant literature has examined their historical background and organisational development. Europarties attracted scholarly attention even more so after their constitutional recognition in the Treaty of Maastricht (see Hix and Lord 1997; Jansen 1998; Diez 2000; Hix and Lesse 2002; Day 2005). However, early studies of Europarties do not draw on Europeanisation as a framework and they do not identify a strong link between the Europarties and their member parties. This is not surprising because the link was very weak when the Europarties were created. Nevertheless, as they have become institutionalised and better resourced in the past five years, more attention has been paid to this link and the Europarties’ emancipation from the party groups in the European Parliament (Lightfoot, 2005 and 2006; Hertner, 2011). For example, van Hecke (2009) analyses the Europeanisation of the Spanish People’s Party through its links to the European People’s Party. In another, ongoing research project, Poguntke and van Deth (n.d.) are analysing the influence of Europarties on their member parties and party systems in Eastern Europe. Europarties are still relatively young organisations. As the European Parliament has become more powerful and politics at
European level become increasingly politicised, the roles and functions of Europarties certainly deserve further attention.

The second mode of transnational co-operation takes place within certain party families. The relevant literature has examined co-operation across the EU and at the EU level between green parties (Bomberg, 2002; Hine, 2003; Bomberg and Carter, 2006), Christian Democratic parties (Hanley, 2002) socialist or social democratic parties (Ladrech, 2000; Lightfoot, 2005), left parties in general (Holmes and Lightfoot, 2007) and Ethnoregionalist parties (de Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2002). All contributions have shed light on how different party families and their members adapt and shape European integration, and they are valuable contributions to an under-researched topic. However, they use different models (definitions) of Europeanisation and examine different aspects of party change, which makes a systematic comparison between party families difficult. A quantitative and qualitative study comparing the Europeanisation of the main party families across the EU 27 would be a challenging, but highly interesting project for further research (see table 3 which is explained below).

The third mode of co-operation evolves around bilateral relations amongst sister parties within the broader European context. Tanja Wielgoß (2002), for example, presents a thorough analysis of interactions between the SPD and the PS from 1989 until 2001. In the same vein, Joey-David Ovey (2001) examines the relations between the Labour Party and the SPD within the PES in the European Parliament between 1994 and 1999, framing bilateral relations in a supranational context. These kinds of studies, linking the national and European level of party activities, remain rare. Finally, in the context of EU Eastern enlargement in 2004,
policy transfer from western European parties to central and Eastern European parties has received scholarly attention (Pridham, 1999; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002; Paterson and Sloam, 2005; Sloam, 2005). Not surprisingly, a growing number of scholars are interested in how national parties from the twelve newest EU Member States deal with Europeisation (Katsourides, 2003; Brusis, 2004; Baun et al., 2006; Ishiyama, 2006; Octavian, 2008; Hloušek and Pšeja, 2009; Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2009). There has even been some interest in the Europeisation of parties in candidate countries (Komar and Vujović, 2007) and countries belonging to the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (Timuş, 2009).

2.2.5 The Europeanisation of party organisation

In a cross-national study, Poguntke et al. (2007a and 2007b) compare the impact of European integration on the organisation of political parties in six Member States of the European Union: Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden. This study provides new, valuable insight into the topic. The main findings reveal that the impact of Europeisation on national party organisation remains limited. However, the study also shows that party elites in general have become relatively more powerful within their parties, at the expense of the lower levels of the organisation, such as the members and activists. The study moreover shows that national-level EU specialists have not, as a rule, seen a perceptible increase in their intra-party standing. The exception seems to be the British Labour Party, where EU specialists, especially MEPs, have increased their influence over time. The authors (2007b: 206-207) conclude that:

Change induced by European integration has been limited and patchy. Not too much has really changed for national political parties, at least in terms
of EU specialists’ presence and influence. The power of party elites, on the other hand, does seem to have enhanced – even if only really in often governing parties.

We thus know more about the (limited) Europeanisation of party organisations in general. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the growing literature dealing with the Europeanisation of party politics, breaking down the studies on the basis of whether they focus on one party or multiple parties, and whether they focus on a single country or multiple countries. The first cell refers to single-party in a single country studies, such as Ladrech’s (2001b) and Cole’s (2001) studies on the Europeanisation of the PS, Heffernan’s (2001) study of the Labour Party. The second cell lists studies focusing on multiple parties within one country. Examples are Geddes (2006) and Niedermeyer (2003) who examine the Europeanisation of British and German party politics respectively. The third cell refers to studies focusing on parties from one family across different member states, for instance Ishiyama’s study of the Europeanisation of communist successor parties. The fourth and last cell lists publications comparing multiple parties in multiple countries, such as Kritzinger and Michalowitz’ (2005) comparison of the Europeanisation of Austrian, Finnish and Swedish parties.
Table 2.1: Illustrative list of publications on the Europeanisation of political parties by focus (up to July 2011)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Single-country studies focusing on single party</th>
<th>Single-country studies focusing on multiple parties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Socialist Party (Cole 2001)</td>
<td>Bulgaria (Stoychev 2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>French Socialist Party (Ladrech 2001)</td>
<td>Czech Republic (Baun et al. 2006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish Labour Party (Holmes 2009)</td>
<td>Czech Republic (Hloušek and Pšeja 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish People’s Party (Van Hecke 2009)</td>
<td>Germany (Niedermayer 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Labour Party (Daniels 1998)</td>
<td>Ireland (Hayward and Murphy 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Labour Party (Heffernan 2001)</td>
<td>Malta (Cini 2001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK Scottish National Party (Dardanelli 2003)</td>
<td>Montenegro (Komar and Vujović 2007)</td>
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<td>Serbia (Orlović 2007)</td>
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<td>Slovenia (Deželan 2007)</td>
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<td>UK (Geddes 2006)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Comparative studies focusing on one ‘party family’</th>
<th>Comparative studies focusing on multiple parties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist successor parties (Ishiyama 2006)</td>
<td>Austria, Finland and Sweden (Kritzinger and Michalowitz 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far-right parties (Taşkin 2011)</td>
<td>Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Brusis 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green parties (Bomberg 2000)</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe (Pridham 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green parties (Hines 2003)</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe (Taggart and Szczersiak 2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left parties (Holmes and Lightfoot 2007)</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe (Walecki 2007)</td>
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<td>Left parties (Lightfoot 2005)</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe (Whitefield and Rohrschneider 2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left parties (Hertner 2011)</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe (Whitefield and Rohrschneider 2009)</td>
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</table>
|                                                  | Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro (Fink-
Europe wide (Ladrech 2002)
Europe wide (Pennings 2006)
Europe wide (Conti 2007)
Europe wide (Mair 2007)
Europe wide (Poguntke et al. 2007)
Europe wide (Hanley 2009)
Slovenia and Bosnia (Lajh and Krašovec 2007)
Slovakia and Romania (Octavian 2008)
Europe wide (Caramani 2010)

*Note:* This list includes journal articles, books, book chapters in edited volumes and working papers. For a publication to be listed here it had to contain in its title the term ‘Europeanisation’ (or the adjective ‘Europeanised’) plus the word ‘party’ or ‘parties’. Instead of ‘party’ the name of a party or party family (e.g. Social Democracy, Greens) was also permitted. In the case of some of the publications listed here, ‘Europeanisation’ in mentioned in the book title but not in the title of the chapter. This list is limited to studies published in English. Hayward and Murphy’s 2010 study it italicised since it covers the whole of the island of Ireland, North and South.

As Table 2.1 illustrates, the literature focusing on the Europeanisation of political parties is growing, and this thesis aims to contribute to the analysis of the Europeanisation of parties within one family, focusing on the party organisation. However, the other research areas identified by Ladrech (programmatic change; party competition; party-government relations; and relations beyond the national party system) will also be analysed.
2.3 The Europeanisation of social democratic party organisation

In this last part of the chapter, an ideal model of a Europeanised party organisation will be developed. This model will then be used to provide a conceptual framework, which will be used to explore changes in the Labour Party, PS and SPD.

The Europeanisation of national political parties is often understood as ‘a shorthand term for a complex process whereby national actors (in this case, parties) adapt to, also seek to shape, the trajectory of European integration in general, and EU policies and processes in particular (Bomberg, 2002: 32). This is a rather broad definition relating to all party-related activities, including organisational and programmatic change. We need to be more specific and draw on the work of Carter et al. (2007: 5) who view Europeanisation as ‘intra-organizational change in national political parties that is induced by the ongoing process of European integration’. This definition is more useful since it emphasises the organisational aspect of Europeanisation. Furthermore, given the importance of bilateral contacts between social democratic sister parties we need to add a ‘horizontal’ notion of Europeanisation to the definitions given above. Horizontal Europeanisation can take place when sister parties across the EU meet to discuss their European policies, publish common statements, formulate common proposals at the European level, or campaign together. Taken together, these features help us to understand the Europeanisation of party organisations as a complex, multi-directional process in which parties change their organisations as a response to the process of European integration. This thesis adapts Carter et al.’s (2007) definition of Europeanisation, viewing it as a process of intra-organisational change in national political parties, including the development of inter-organisational cooperation between sister parties.
in different member states, that is driven by the broader process of European integration.

2.3.1 Europeanisation: one process amongst many

This definition interprets Europeanisation as a distinct and ongoing process, and not an end result. Europeanisation can be viewed from the level of the EU or the national political parties, and a full appreciation of the process needs to be understood from both levels. It is a process of change between moving features because neither the political system of the EU nor political parties are static. This first paragraph looks at the level of the EU; the next paragraph at the level of domestic parties.

The European system of policy-making is undergoing constant change and is reformed with every new EU treaty. A steadily increasing amount of policies are now made at the European level, leaving national parties in government a limited room for manoeuvre (Schmidt, 2006). We would expect national parties to react and adapt to this development by employing EU experts to monitor the EU legislative process and build up networks at the European level. For example, and as it will be discussed in chapter 8 of this thesis, the Party of European Socialists has become a more institutionalised organisation over the past decade and could have a Europeanising impact on its member parties. Moreover, the way policy is made at the European level has changed over the past decades. Highly relevant for national party organisations, the powers of the European Parliament have been increased significantly since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 52-53; Judge and Earnshaw, 2008). Together with the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament has become the co-legislator. Hix et al. (2007:3) even argue that the European Parliament is now ‘one of the most powerful elected
assemblies in the world.’ It is the only EU institution that is directly elected, and national parties select candidates to compete in its elections and organise the election campaigns. As the European Parliament has become more powerful, we would expect parties to empower their MEPs and make use of their EU expertise. In this sense, Europeanisation can be understood as a top-down process in which an increasingly powerful system of European governance puts pressures on national political parties to adapt their organisations.

At the same time, parties themselves change. Scholars of historical institutionalism argue that institutions (such as political parties) tend to be ‘sticky’, or resistant to change for extended periods of time, even if there are demands or pressures for change (Bell, 2011). Historical institutionalists see the adaptation process of both formal and informal institutions to a changing environment as an incremental one. Both internal and external pressures can lead institutions to change at ‘critical junctures’ in time. Thus, despite institutional stickiness, party organisations have changed significantly over the years. For example, two important aspects of change have been a decrease in members and the centralisation and professionalization of party organisations. To begin with, most parties across Western Europe have lost hundreds of thousands of members in the past decades (Van Biezen et al., 2012). The Labour Party lost 43 per cent of its members between 2000 and 2010, and the SPD lost 32 per cent during that time. An exception to the rule appears is the PS, which gained 35 per cent of members between 2000 and 2010 (Schlote, 2011). Van Biezen et al. (2012) demonstrate that today’s party members are no longer representative of the population in terms of age, sex, and occupation. As a consequence, many Western European parties have opened up to the wider electorate, for example by letting them participate in party leader elections and referenda.
However, not only have parties lost members; they have also become more centralised and professionalised (Farrell and Webb, 2000). For example, they invest more money into election campaigning as they hire specialist agencies and consultants. This development has led to more professional campaigns. Parties have also become more responsive to citizens’ opinions, as Farrell and Webb argue. An example for this development is the Labour Party who used focus groups, made up of voters, in order to track public opinion. This goes to show that despite institutional stickiness parties have changed their organisational structures in recent years, responding to social trends and the new media environment. These changes however do not directly relate to EU membership. How can we trace organisational change back to EU membership? In other words, how do we know that Europeanisation has taken place? As Haverland (2006: 137) points out, other inter-linked developments have taken place in recent years, such as Globalisation, the spread of neo-liberal ideas, new public management, new information and communication technologies. In particular, how can the effects of Europeanisation and Globalisation be distinguished from each other? Globalisation has become a catch-all concept to describe the accelerated movement of goods, capital, services, technologies, people, and ideas across borders (Meunier, 2004: 126). The primary consequences of this movement are ‘a transformation in the structures and practices of the world economy and a dilemma for established forms of authority such as national governments (Rosamond, 2000: 262). Europeanisation is often portrayed as a West European response to economic Globalisation (Wallace, 1996: 16). More specifically, the creation of the European Single Market and the Economic and Monetary Union is often understood to have been caused by global economic pressures (Verdun, 2000; Stone Sweet and
Sandholtz, 1998). However, this perspective underestimates the agency of the EU and its member states as one of the driving forces behind Globalisation. As Meunier (2004: 130) argues, ‘Europeanization has not only been a vector of globalization, it has also amplified its effects’. After all, European integration has reduced the margin of manoeuvre of national governments in vital areas such as monetary policy and competition policy. The EU therefore plays an active role in the liberalisation of the markets, and national governments have pushed for and agreed to this process. Separating the effects of Europeanisation on a particular policy area from the effects of Globalisation can therefore be impossible.

However, measuring the Europeanising effect on institutions such as party organisations is a more straightforward task: we can focus on the roles played by the parties’ EU experts such as MEPs, MPs and party officials with a EU brief. Thus, we can find out whether parties have increased the number of EU experts and whether they have empowered them formally in the policy-making process (for example by giving them seats on executive committees) or informally – (for example by consulting them on a regular basis). This empowerment is understood as Europeanisation, as it implies that parties have recognised the importance of European integration and adapted their organisations accordingly.

2.3.2 Critical junctures in the process of Europeanisation

If we identify Europeanisation as a particular process of party change, how can we identify the ‘critical junctures’ in time when parties Europeanise their organisations? Historical institutionalists view critical junctures as moments of pressure for change. Pressure for parties to Europeanise can be bottom-up and top-down. Bottom-up pressure can emanate from the public and the party organisation.
Parties operate in a dynamic domestic environment. In the words of Crotty (2006: 499) ‘the demands of society change, and the parties change to meet them’. Public attitudes towards European integration is measured regularly in surveys such as the European Commission’s *Eurobarometer*, the European Social Survey, national election studies etc. Party elites are therefore very much aware of what the public thinks about the EU, and we know that public opinion can influence party policy (Gabel, 2000; Carubba, 2001; Tillman, 2004; Bartle and Clements, 2009). Indirectly, changes in public opinion can also lead to party organisational change. For example, a very pro-European public could send an encouraging signal to a party to tighten its links with the PES and social democratic sister parties, from other EU member states. It could also encourage parties to hire more EU experts or to empower existing ones.

Moreover, pressures to Europeanise can come from within the broader party organisation: at critical junctures in time, grass roots activists can put pressure on the leadership to Europeanise the organisation. For example, after the French voted against the EU constitutional Treaty in a referendum in 2005 and the PS leadership was deeply divided over the issue, pro-EU-integrationist activists of the PS set up numerous PES activist groups across the country to showcase their Pro-Europeanness. The PES activist groups were then formally integrated into the party organisation.

Within the party, pressure to Europeanisation can also come from the very top. For example, a newly elected party leader might prioritise EU policy (as it has been the case with Tony Blair when he took over the Labour Party) and empower EU experts such as MEPs, MPs or party officials with a EU brief. As a consequence party statutes can be changed so that EU experts become part of the party leadership ex officio (e.g. members of the national executive committee) and EU experts can become more involved into the party’s policy-making process.
Top-down pressures for parties to Europeanise can take different shapes. Most obviously, EU accession is a critical juncture exerting external pressure on parties to Europeanise their organisations. Even before joining the EU, parties in candidate countries need EU experts in the party headquarters, in parliament and (possibly) in government. For the Labour Party, PS and SPD, EU accession happened decades ago. All three parties have seen the European Union growing in size and importance, so for them, Europeanisation has been a much slower process of adaptation than for the parties of the Central and Eastern European countries that joined in 2004 and 2007, when the EU was a much more developed organisation with far more competences than in the 1950s or even the 1970s. As a response to EU treaty change (and in particular the Maastricht Treaty) national parliaments like the Bundestag have set up EU scrutiny committees. Parties have created new posts for EU experts in their headquarters and set up EU committees and working groups at different levels of the party organisation.

Furthermore, entering government can be a critical juncture for a party’s Europeanisation: EU expertise is needed in the party headquarters, in cabinet and parliament. A newly elected party no longer needs to just scrutinise the government’s European policy; its cabinet ministers now participate in the Council of the European Union meetings, and the prime minister (or in the French case, the president) now participates in the European Council where the EU’s political guidelines are set. The government (and parliament) also translates EU legislation into national legislation. In brief, when a party enters government, the leadership will automatically be involved in the process of European policy-making, and EU expertise is required. The experience of being in government is thus expected to rub off on the highest levels of
the party organisation and should contribute to the Europeanisation of the party organisation.

A key asset of the concept of Europeanisation is that it can grasp this ongoing process of organisational change, triggered by bottom-up and top-down pressures. Yet we need to keep in mind that any study into Europeanisation is always a snapshot taken at a particular moment in time. As the EU evolves, party organisational Europeanisation can take different shapes. It could even be reversed if, for example, public opinion changes drastically or a Eurosceptical party leadership takes over and shifts European policy to the bottom of the political agenda. So far this has not happened in the case of Labour, the PS and SPD, but the possibility cannot be excluded. Furthermore, financial pressures could lead a party to reduce the money it spends on Europeanisation. For example, being in opposition often means that less funding is available to employ party officials, as the example of the PS between 2002 and 2012 will demonstrate.

As we analyse and compare the Europeanisation of three centre-left party organisations we need to bear in mind that Europeanisation is not to be confounded with harmonisation or convergence (Radaelli, 2000). Historical institutionalists have found that institutions change following their own patterns and traditions. We can therefore expect parties to Europeanise following their individual, organically grown organisational structures. As a result, a Europeanised Labour Party, PS and SPD will not look the same. Instead, they are expected to integrate the EU dimension into their pre-existing structures.
2.3.3 What would a Europeanised party organisation look like?

Having outlined the process of party organisational Europeanisation as it is understood in this study, we can finally identify the indicators and establish an ideal model of a strongly Europeanised party organisation. As outlined in the introduction, this thesis adapts Key’s (1964) tripartite framework and examines the Europeanisation of the party’s public face; of the party in office; and as political an organisation. The focus of this study lies on the party organisation, but we need to keep in mind that the Europeanisation of the party organisation is driven by the Europeanisation of the party in government and the Europeanisation of the party’s public face and vice versa. Europeanisation is therefore understood as an interlinked, triangular process: Europeanisation in one arena drives Europeanisation in another arena. The arrows in figure 2.1 (below) depict this interconnectedness. For example, a party that has experienced strong organisational Europeanisation will drive forward the Europeanisation of the party in government and its public face and vice versa.

Figure 2.1 Europeanisation: an interlinked process in three arenas

- The party as an organisation
- The party's public face
- The party in government
The following section will also outline what a party organisation looks like that has experienced weak Europeanisation. Contrasting weak and strong Europeanisation in the three arenas will allow us to be more differentiated in our overall assessment of the three parties’ response to European integration. If the degree of Europeanisation is at neither end of the extremes, it is referred to as ‘intermediate’.

A party with a strongly Europeanised public face is one that does not shy away from communicating its EU policy. Party leaderships regularly give speeches and interviews in domestic forums outlining the party’s EU policies. This would help to make European policy a more salient issue and increase the EU awareness and knowledge of the public. In contrast, a party leadership that avoids giving high-profile speeches and interviews about the EU has experienced weak Europeanisation.

Next, a strongly Europeanised party would make its European policy easily available on its website to those voters and party members who are interested to learn more. In practice, it means that there would be a separate, clearly visible section presenting the party’s general views on the purpose and future of European integration. In addition, more detailed information would be made available on particular aspects of EU policy. This could be done through authoritative policy documents such as national and European election manifestoes; press declarations, party leaderships’ interviews and podcasts on European policy. A party that has experienced weak Europeanisation in the electorate would make very little information on its EU policy available. Their website would focus on domestic politics, and if there was a small section covering the EU it would be part of the party’s broader international agenda.
A party that has fully Europeanised its public face would treat European policy as domestic policy, acknowledging that an increasing amount of formerly domestic policies have become Europeanised. The party would be open about the division of policy authority between the EU and the member states. It would explain that certain policies are now exclusively made at the European level, such as trade or competition policy; that some policy areas are the sole responsibility of the member states, such as defence, education, or health; and that in most policy areas the EU and member states share competences, for example in agriculture, consumer protection, energy or environment policy. This approach would be reflected in party manifestoes where the party would refer to the EU in each policy area. For example, when presenting its environmental policies the party would refer to the EU’s impact on this policy area and the policies it would support in the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. Furthermore, there would be a separate section in the manifesto where the party outlines its general views on the process and future of European integration. This section would be separate from foreign policy if the party has experienced strong Europeanisation and treats European policy as domestic policy. In contrast, a weakly Europeanised party would treat EU policy as part of foreign policy in its manifestoes. There would be a small EU section, which would be part of foreign policy. Little or no reference would be made to the EU in the other policy areas. Table 2.2 below contrasts indicators of weak and strong Europeanisation of a party in the electorate.

Table 2.2 The public face of the party: Indicators of Europeanisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of strong Europeanisation</th>
<th>Indicators of weak Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The party leadership regularly gives speeches and interviews explaining and defending the party’s EU policies.</td>
<td>The party leadership avoids speaking about EU policies in public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is little to no information on the party’s EU policy on the website.</td>
<td>There is little to no information on the party’s EU policy on the website.</td>
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</table>
Next, we need to identify the indicators of a strongly Europeanised party in the governmental arena. This refers to the party in central government and parliament. The leadership of a strongly Europeanised party would first of all drive forward institutional adaptation, making sure that central government and parliament are equipped to make EU policy. This is necessary if a government wants to ‘upload’ its policies to the European level and ‘download’ the policies made at the EU level to the domestic level. A strongly Europeanised party leadership in government would make sure that parliament is kept informed about upcoming EU legislation so it can scrutinise it effectively. It would also encourage plenary debates on EU policy in order to enhance the EU’s visibility in parliament and public. Last but not least, a strongly Europeanised party leadership would empower EU experts in government and parliament. For example, powerful positions in parliament (such as the position of the party group leader) would go to an MP with an EU brief, such as the chair of the EU scrutiny committee or the party’s spokesperson on EU affairs. This person would also be a statutory member of the party’s executive committee where she or he could bring in EU expertise.

In contrast, the leadership of a weakly Europeanised party would not put any efforts into the institutional adaptation of central government and parliament to the EU. It would try to make parliamentary EU scrutiny more difficult, for example by delaying information. It would also avoid plenary EU debates, fearing opposition to its policies and the politicisation of European policy in parliament. It would not
empower EU experts in government and parliament because European expertise would not be recognised as very important inside the party.

Table 2.3 below contrasts indicators of weak and strong Europeanisation of a party in government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of strong Europeanisation</th>
<th>Indicators of weak Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The party leadership in government drives forward institutional adaptation of central government to the EU.</td>
<td>Institutional adaptation of central government and parliament to the EU is neglected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leadership in government facilitates effective EU scrutiny in parliament</td>
<td>Party leadership in government tries to prevent parliamentary EU scrutiny (e.g. by delaying important information).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leadership empowers EU experts in government and parliament.</td>
<td>EU experts have junior-level positions in the executive or parliament without decision-making power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Last but not least we turn our attention to the party as an organisation. In a strongly Europeanised party organisation a broad range of actors would be involved in a democratic process of EU policy-making. This would involve the party leadership, but also official bodies such as the party conference and policy forums who would set long-term EU policy guidelines. We know that the party leadership plays a crucial role in the policy-making process. In recent decades, parties have become more centralised. Centralisation ‘describes the extent to which decisions are made by a single group or decision body’ (Scarrow, 2005: 6). Many parties have given members (and non-members) a greater say over the selection of candidates and the election of leaders. Policy-making remains however highly centralized and the party leadership retains strong control over policy, especially when a party is in government (Scarrow et al., 2002: 146). A strongly Europeanised party leadership would however involve
the broader organisation in the formulation of EU policy in order to increase EU awareness and knowledge across the party. The membership would also be involved in EU policy-making through referenda on important decisions on the future of European integration (e.g. new EU treaties or EU enlargement). This could encourage EU debates at all levels of the party organisation. Furthermore, EU working groups, committees or movements would be set up at the local, regional and national levels of the party organisation where views and expertise can be shared. Last but not least, a strongly Europeanised party organisation would engage actively with the Party of European Socialists in order to create pan-European networks and lead Europeanised election campaigns that focus on European issues. It would also encourage exchanges with sister parties from across the European Union at all levels of the party organisation. Table 2.4 below contrasts the indicators of a strongly and weakly Europeanised party organisation.

Table 2.4 The party as an organisation: Indicators of Europeanisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of strong Europeanisation</th>
<th>Indicators of weak Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A wide range of party actors, including formal policy-making bodies, are involved in European policy-making.</td>
<td>European policy is made by a narrow circle of party elites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leadership involves membership in EU policy-making.</td>
<td>Membership is excluded from European policy-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leads Europeanised European parliamentary election campaigns and interacts with the Party of European Socialists.</td>
<td>During European election campaigns the party focuses on national issues and does not make use of the Party of European Socialists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party has close links with sister parties across the EU at all levels of the party organisation.</td>
<td>Party shows little or no interest in sister parties from other EU member states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, a fully Europeanised party would be one that ‘thinks European’ and actively engages with the public and other parties at the domestic and European level.
In all three arenas – as the public face, in government, and as organisations - it would treat European policy as domestic policy.
2.4. Conclusions

This chapter has provided an overview of the Europeanisation literature. It has discussed the merits and weaknesses of the increasingly popular concept, arguing that despite its vagueness and fuzziness, Europeanisation can help us to better understand and analyse member states’ response to the process of European integration.

Secondly, this chapter has focused on the literature dealing with the Europeanisation of national parties with a focus on five areas of investigation identified by Ladrech (2002): programmatic change, patterns of party competition, party-government relations, relations beyond the national party system, and organisational change. The last part of this chapter has introduced the process of party organisational Europeanisation as it is understood in this study: an ongoing, multidirectional process of adaptation. Finally, an ideal model of a Europeanised party in the electorate, in government, and as an organisation was presented. The following six empirical chapters will examine the Europeanisation of Labour, the PS and SPD in these three arenas. Chapter 9 will pull together the empirical findings and assess the extent to which Labour, the PS and SPD have experienced strong, weak, or intermediate Europeanisation in the past decade.
Chapter 3: The Europeanisation of party systems

This chapter examines the Europeanisation of the British, French and German party systems. The party system forms part of the electoral arena in which the Labour Party, the Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) operate. If we want to understand how the three parties have Europeanised their organisations, we need to examine their interactions with other parties.

There exist many competing definitions of ‘party system’. For the purpose of this chapter, Giovanni Sartori’s (2005: 39) definition seems most helpful as it stresses the element of competition between parties:

Parties make for a ‘system’, then, only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition. That is, the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the other parties.

As noted in the introduction, Europeanisation refers to the impact of European integration on the number of relevant parties within the national party system and the mechanisms of party competition (Mair 2000; 2007). In a strongly Europeanised party system, new parties have emerged as a direct response to European integration. Their attitudes can be either pro-European or Eurosceptical. European integration has become a political cleavage, meaning that EU policy issues are contested within and between parties, and parties actively shift them on the political agenda. In a strongly Europeanised party system, parties can be expected to Europeanise their organisations and lead EU debates at different levels of the organisation, organise internal EU referendums, and lead Europeanised election campaigns. Europeanisation is expected
to be a two-way process between individual parties and the system they are part of. Parties can be agents and make EU policy salient during and outside of elections and thereby pressurise other parties to react and define their EU policies. They thereby contribute to the Europeanisation of the structure, which is the party system. In return, if the structure - the party system as a whole - is Europeanised, individual parties, whether they are old or new, can be expected to have Europeanised their policies and organisations.

Peter Mair (2000) was the first to research systematically the impact of EU membership on national party systems, and much of the relevant literature builds on his findings. He argues that there is very little evidence of any direct impact on the format and mechanics of party systems. The party systems of many EU member states have become more fragmented over the past two decades. Party system change is a continuous process in which the number of relevant parties and patterns of party interaction change. However, radical party system change takes place very rarely, and the number of new parties which can be linked directly to the issue of European integration is very small (Mair, 2006: 63). To be sure, the EU has generated a number of new parties, particularly Eurosceptical ones. However, most of them have confined themselves to contesting only in elections to the European Parliament.

The impact of European integration on the mechanics of party systems is perhaps less easily discernible. In the past two decades, party-based Euroscepticism has increased across the EU (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008). However, many of these Eurosceptical parties are anti-establishment parties, and regardless of their EU attitudes, these parties would still remain outside the mainstream, as Mair (2006) points out. Detecting elements of Euroscepticism in mainstream parties is more
complicated; especially because parties are more likely to Europeanise when they become involved in EU-level politics. A current exception to this pattern is the British Conservative Party, which is a deeply Euro sceptical mainstream party. This chapter will demonstrate that the British, French and German party systems vary significantly in their degrees of Europeanisation, both in terms of format and mechanics.

3.1 The Europeanisation of the British Party System

The British party system has been dominated for over a century by two major parties (though not always the same two), with smaller parties playing only a minor role (Birch, 1998: 58). Until 1918, the two main parties were the Conservative and Liberal Parties, but the latter was displaced by the Labour Party in 1922, when it was recognised as the main opposition party in Parliament. During the twentieth century, the Conservative Party has tended to be the governing party, with the Labour Party as its challenger (Seldon, 1994). The British party system has thus been described as a two-party system. However, Ingle (2008: 18-21) challenges this concept arguing that the two-party system of the 1950s and 1960s was not as ‘fixed, permanent and rational’ as it is often assumed. The end of the twentieth century saw a notable increase in the parliamentary representation of the Liberal Democrat Party, which in 2010 entered a government coalition as the junior partner of the Conservative Party. It seems that the British party system moves from being a typical two-party system to a two-and-a-half system: in addition to the two large parties, there is a considerably smaller party but one that may have coalition potential and that plays a significant role (Lijphart, 1999: 67). However, due to the first-past-the-post electoral system where the candidate with the majority vote wins, smaller parties find it difficult to win seats in Parliament.
Even though the EU issue has caused serious intra- and inter-party conflict, none of the relevant parties represented in Parliament were founded as a response to British EU membership. Their origins go back to the 19th century. However, there exist small but growing Eurosceptical parties at the fringe of the party system who tend to perform well in local and European elections, due to proportional representation. Taggart (1998) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2000; 2002; 2008) distinguish between hard and soft Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is defined as a ‘principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 4). Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is ‘where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that “national interest” is currently at odds with the EU trajectory’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 4). This categorisation is very useful as it helps structuring public and party attitudes towards the EU.

Since the beginnings of the 1990s, The UK Independence Party (UKIP) has been the most Eurosceptical party in Britain. Its primary objective is withdrawing the UK from the European Union. UKIP is a conservative, nationalist, populist anti-establishment party. Its status as a single-issue party for whom all policy preferences circle around withdrawal from the EU marks it out as something of an anomaly in British politics (Usherwood, 2008: 255). UKIP is represented in the European Parliament since 1999 and came third during the European elections in 2004 and second in 2009, when it beat the Labour Party and won for a second time 12 seats. For
a relatively small party, UKIP has an impressive campaign budget. During the 2009 EP election campaign it spent £1,270,855 (with the highest share of this amount going into advertising and publicity material) as against £2,482,536 spent by the Conservatives and £2,302,244 by Labour (Electoral Commission 2009). UKIP also ran for the 2010 general elections of 2010 and polled 3.1% of the votes. It was the party with the largest percentage of votes to win no seats in the House of Commons (BBC News, Election 2010). According to Usherwood (2008) the most obvious environmental factor for UKIP’s electoral success has been the British electoral system: the difference between First-Past-the-Post and Proportional Representation since 1999 has had a clear impact on UKIP’s strategy. Whilst the party aims to contest all elections at national level, it places more emphasis on EP elections, where its chances of election are higher. UKIP puts all mainstream parties under pressure, but in particular the Conservatives and Labour. After all, many of its members were previously members of the Conservative Party but left the party as an expression of their frustration over European policy. In order to keep a distinct profile, UKIP tries to highlight the differences between itself and the Conservatives, and party leader Nigel Farage has accused the Conservatives of not being ‘sufficiently Eurosceptic’ (The Independent, 01/06/2009). Yet, Labour has also lost some of its politicians to UKIP: former MEP Robert Kilroy-Silk and John Bufton (MEP) were previously members of the Labour Party. In the 2009 European parliamentary elections, the Labour Party lost a fair share of votes and a parliamentary seat (West Midlands) to UKIP.

It is also important to mention the far-right, anti-immigration, racist, populist and Eurosceptical British National Party (BNP). No BNP candidate has ever won a seat in the House of Commons. However, the party won two seats in the 2009 European parliamentary elections, taking long-standing Labour MEP Richard
Corbett’s seat. Therefore, the BNP should not be ignored in the debate on the Europeanisation of the British party system. The BNP claims it ‘loves Europe, but hates the European Union’, describing the EU as a ‘danger’ to British sovereignty and ‘threat’ to British democracy (BNP, 2010). The BNP demands an ‘immediate withdrawal from the European Union, which is an organisation dedicated to usurping British sovereignty and to destroying our nationhood and national identity’ (BNP, 2010). However, the BNP’s position on Europe may be seen as secondary to other concerns. It seems unlikely that voters for such parties are voting on the basis of their European policies, as Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002: 6) explain.

The presence of these deeply Eurosceptic parties has certainly contributed to the deepening of the EU cleavage in British politics. Unlike in Germany or France, general election campaigns in Britain have been fought on EU issues, for example by the Conservatives in 2001. Two-party systems tend to be one-dimensional, meaning that programmes and policies of the main parties differ from each other mainly with regard to just one dimension, that of economic issues (Lijphart, 1999). In Britain however, membership of the EU has frequently been a source of division both between and within the Labour and Conservative parties.

The most consistently pro-European party are the Liberal Democrats (LibDems). In their 2009 European elections manifesto, they write that joining the Euro would be in Britain’s long-term interest. ‘But Britain should join when the economic conditions are right, and with the present economic turbulence and volatility, they are not at the moment. If the government were to recommend joining the euro, Liberal Democrats believe this should only take place if that decision were supported by the people of Britain in a referendum’ (Liberal Democrats, 2009).
Furthermore, the LibDems were in favour of the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty. *Le Monde* (25/04/2010) hence labelled party leader Nick Clegg a ‘Euroenthusiast’. The LibDems’ senior partner in government is the Conservative Party whose Eurosceptic wing has time and again constrained party leaders from Margaret Thatcher to David Cameron (Budge et al., 2004). According to Norton (2001: 256) there are essentially four groupings within the Conservative party that can be identified on the issue of Europe: the anti-Europeans who oppose British EU-membership (Taggart and Szczesbiak would label them hard Eurosceptics); the Eurosceptics who support EU membership for the purpose of free trade, but are against political integration (‘soft’ Eurosceptics); the Euroagnostics who have no ingrained ideological stance on the issue; the Europhiles who are committed to European integration and campaigned for Britain to join the euro. The share of Europhiles seems to have dramatically decreased in the past two decades. The official conservative line is against the adoption of the Euro and the party also opposed the Constitutional Treaty and its successor, the Lisbon Treaty. Under pressure from the deeply Eurosceptical party group, David Cameron decided to leave the EPP-ED group in the European Parliament and found a new group together with a number of Eurosceptical Eastern European parties. In a survey conducted by Conservative politician Tim Montgomery in August 2010 (*Conservativehome*, 05/08/2010), members of the Conservative Party were asked to rate the greatest threats to the Conservative-LibDem coalition. ‘Anger from Tory MPs and conservative-supporting newspapers at Coalition policies on prisons, immigration and Europe’ came third. This survey cannot claim to be representative, but it indicates a certain mood amongst party members.
Like the Conservative Party, the Labour Party has been divided over issues of European integration in the past. Given Labour’s diverse ideological traditions and its constitutional complexity, its politics have always been prone to factionalism and infighting – especially within the party group (Peele, 2004: 289-290). In the 1950s, neither Labour nor the Conservatives wanted the UK to join the EU. Labour only changed its attitude during the 1960s. It was the Conservative government of Edward Heath that took Britain into the EU in 1973 whilst the left wing of the Labour Party had gradually become more influential and increasingly hostile towards membership. This was partly the result of President de Gaulle’s vetoing British membership. In the 1975 referendum on EU membership, intra-party divisions worsened. The Labour leader supported British membership whilst a number of cabinet ministers, the majority of MPs and party members were against it. It led the party into a kind of civil war (Geddes, 2004: 186). At the beginnings of the 1980s the party called for withdrawal from the EU, and this attitude made the pro-European moderates break away and form the Social Democratic Party in 1981. Only after a devastating electoral defeat in 1983 were anti-European views gradually sidelined, and from 1987 onwards, the party leadership began to be more pro-European (Carter and Ladrech, 2007: 59). During the period between the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty, Labour moved from anti- to pro-EU, whilst the Conservatives shifted in the opposite direction. This reversal in position was linked to the development of the EU’s social and regional policies, which provided new opportunities for the Labour Party (Geddes, 2006: 121). Throughout Major’s Premiership (1990-1997) the Labour leadership saw an advantage in exposing the divisions within the Conservative party and presented itself as both more united over Europe and as progressively more pro-European (Carter and Ladrech, 2007). The Blair government pursued this cautious
pro-Europeanism. Under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, Britain’s EU membership was no longer contested. Nevertheless, different views existed on issues such as the Euro, the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. There was a controversy over the content of both treaties as well as the question of whether they should be put to a referendum or not. Long-standing MP Gisela Stuart who was a member of the Convention setting up the Constitutional Treaty, voiced her criticism against the treaty and the unwillingness of the leadership to hold a referendum which had been promised by Tony Blair (BBC News, 12/12/2007). When the Conservatives presented a proposal to Parliament to hold a UK-wide referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, they were supported by 29 Labour MPs (BBC News, 05/03/2008).

European policy is thus heavily contested in the British party system, both at the centre and the far right margin. Labour was Eurosceptical during the 1970s and 1980s, but has drastically changed its EU attitude and become very Euro-friendly. The Conservatives, on the contrary, have become increasingly Eurosceptical since the 1990s whilst they were very pro-integrationist during the previous two decades. Only the LibDems have continuously been pro-European. Figure 3.1 (below) illustrates the support for the EU in British legislative elections since 1945 on the basis of Comparative Project (CMP) data. The CMP seeks to establish estimates of manifesto content according to a pre-determined set of policy-related categories. The whole approach is predicated on the concept of saliency theory, which is essentially the idea that the more importance a party attaches to a given policy, the more likely they are to mention it repeatedly (Budge et al., 2001: 78-85). The content analysis relies on the manual coding of manifestoes: Texts are broken down into ‘quasi sentences’, which are then coded on the basis of the pre-determined categories. To measure parties’ support for European integration, two coding categories were used: positive and
negative references to the EU. In all cases, the latter score (reported as a percentage of all quasi-sentences in the manifesto) was subtracted from the former (also reported as a percentage of all quasi-sentences). The result, which is illustrated by Figure 3.1, was a measure of ‘net’ support for Europe.

**Figure 3.1: British parties’ net support for the EU, 1945-2005 (CMP data)**

![Figure 3.1: British parties’ net support for the EU, 1945-2005 (CMP data)](image)

*Note:* The data span legislative elections for which CMP data were readily available. Elections between 1945 and 2002 were obtained from CMP publications (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). Data for the 2005 British and German elections were obtained directly from Judith Bara and Andrea Volkens.

### 3.2 The Europeanisation of the French Party System

The French party system is not a particularly rigid structure. It has been destabilised by frequent changes to the electoral rules, changing patterns of voting behaviour, and changing constituent parties over the last twenty years (Clift, 2003: 42). The party system is highly fragmented (with currently 12 parties in the *Assemblée Nationale*)
and most parties have split at least once, and some have merged over the past decades. Except the Communists (PCF) all parties have changed their name at least once. The classification of the French party system is therefore a challenge: ‘At times, indeed, and especially since the 1980s, observers have come close to detecting a new party system with each election’ (Knapp and Wright, 2006: 253).

After an initial phase of confusion from 1958 until 1962 linked to the consolidation of de Gaulle’s leadership, the French party system became simplified between the 1960s and early 1980s on account of the bipolarisation process, streamlining parties into two rival coalitions of the left and the right. In the 1978 elections, the structure of the party systems was that of a bipolar quadrille: four parties of roughly equal political strength together obtained over 90 percent of the vote and divided voter preferences evenly between the PCF and the PS in the left coalition, and the neo-Gaullist RPR and the liberal conservative UDF on the right. Since the mid 1980s, however, the structure of the French party system has become less balanced (Cole, 2003: 13-14). The bipolar structure has been challenged by the emergence of new political issues, such as immigration, security and the environment, and the difficulties experienced by the mainstream parties in articulating them (Cole, 2003). According to Cole (2003) the three main developments in the past two decades have been: (1) the emergence or breakthrough of small but significant parties such as the Greens (Les Verts) and Workers’ Struggle (Lutte Ouvrière, LO) on the left, and the National Front (FN) on the far right; (2) the changing dynamics of factional and coalition politics, most clearly demonstrated in the decline of the Communist Party (PCF) and the emergence of the PS as the dominant party of the left; and (3) growing electoral instability, such as increased electoral volatility and a voter’s disaffection towards traditional politics, as demonstrated in higher abstention
rates and the weakening of the mainstream parties. However, despite fragmentation, the left/right axis is still in place.

The most significant of these new parties is the *Front National* (FN), which at times could claim to be the second formation of the French right. In the first round of the 2002 presidential election, FN party leader Jean-Marie Le Pen polled 16.86%, outpolling the Socialist Candidate Lionel Jospin. The FN has forced issues such as immigration and security onto the political agenda, exploiting the weakness of the mainstream parties who failed to address those issues. The FN calls for an end of free movement within the Schengen area and the re-nationalisation of asylum and immigration policies (*Front National* 2010). As a response, the UMP has shifted under Nicolas Sarkozy to the right in certain policy areas, such as immigration and integration. Perhaps as a consequence of the UMP’s shift to the right, but also due to internal divisions, the FN could not repeat its 2002 success in the 2007 general elections, and due to the majoritarian electoral system did not win any seats.

Controversy over the direction of European integration has contributed to a number of minor shifts in the French party system. For example, the secessionist No campaigns by Gaullists Charles Pasqua and Philippe Séguin in the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, or Philippe de Villiers’ split from the centrist *Union pour la démocratie française* (UDF), and the salience of the former Socialist minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s *Mouvement des Citoyens* were all in direct response to Maastricht (Evans, 2007: 1100). However, none of these mouvements and parties was as successful as UKIP in electoral terms. Hence, European integration has not generated new parties, and with regards to its format, the French party system has therefore not Europeanised.
However, European integration has a visible impact on the mechanics of the French party system. Mainstream political parties in France have not been as critical towards the EU as their British counterparts; at least, EU membership has never been put into question. However, since the mid 1980s, with the ratification of the SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht, the European issue has become increasingly contested amongst parties at the centre and the left and right margins of the party system. The extension of EU competences in economic and social policy stimulated a public debate on whether the EU should develop into a large free market or whether it should be more regulatory and protectionist. Other controversial issues on the agenda were European security and EU enlargement. Moreover, during the 1990s, the parties had different views on the EU’s institutional design: while the PS supported greater powers for the European Parliament and an extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers, the Gaullists favoured a more intergovernmental approach (Guyomarch et al., 1998: 79). The adoption of a new EU Treaty has often divided parties. In particular, President Mitterrand’s decision to put the Maastricht Treaty to a national referendum in September 1992 has led to an intense level of conflict both within and amongst the parties.

CMP data (see Figure 3.2 below) reveals that the PS has been the most pro-European party. The degree of pro-Europeanness however varies significantly. The net support for European integration peaked when the PS had won the elections and entered government in 1997. Figure 3.2 also shows that among the relevant parties, the Communists have traditionally been the most critical towards the EU. However, when they entered government with the PS in 1997, they suddenly became highly supportive of the EU which points to a certain Europeanisation of parties in government. In contrast to Labour, thus, the PS did not have to interact with
Eurosceptical opponents when it was in government, and could therefore pursue its pro-igrationist agenda.

**Figure 3.2: French parties’ net support for the EU, 1945-2005 (CMP data)**

![Graph showing net support for the EU from 1945 to 2005 for different parties, including Socialists, Communists, Gaullists, and Centre-right.]

*Note:* The diagram relies on François Petry and Paul Pennings (2006), the leading experts on French party manifestoes, to determine which parties were Gaullist and which were Centre-right at any given election.

Yet it needs to be mentioned that Euroscepticism finds its expression in anti-globalisation movements like Attac with which many PS members sympathise, as will be explained below. The PS’ biggest enemy, however, is its own factionalism. It has led to deep divisions over the party’s European policy.

In general, internal factionalism plays an important role in almost all French parties. Parties are divided because of personal rivalries, political strategy and policy differences. Whilst the Gaullists have been divided over EU issues during the 1990s,
ultra-conservative EU-critics have become silent under Sarkozy’s presidency. For the
PS, the situation is bleaker. The party was reconstructed after 1971 as an explicitly
factional party. The right to free expression of factions (courants) was anchored in the
party’s constitution. Before each party congress, different courants present policy
motions that are voted on in party federation meetings, and each motion with more
than 5 per cent support receives representation in the national executive. Membership
of a courant is generally necessary if one wants to achieve any kind of political post
within the PS (Desmeuliers, 2005). Factionalism might entail certain advantages, such
as institutional flexibility, which can be important in France where different electoral
systems are in place at different levels of government. Factionalism can moreover
encourage lively debates within the party and foster new ideas. However, Angelo
Panebianco (1988) points to factionalism as the main criterion for institutional
weakness of political parties. Panebianco argues that as a consequence of its lack of
organisational and ideological cohesion, a party is not able to dominate its own
environment and its dominant coalition of elites running the party. In the case of the
PS, extreme factionalism has weakened the party, and some factions have behaved
like parties within a party during the 1980s. Ever since the 1950s, different left-wing
factions within the PS have rebelled against the party leadership’s pro EU Single
Market position, and every party leader had to accommodate these views. Even Lionel
Jospin could not successfully handle the tensions between the ‘party doctrinal identity
and its official pro-European line’ (Crespy, 2008: 26). After Jospin’s electoral defeat
in the 2002 presidential elections, a new courant was founded (Nouveau Parti
Socialiste) by EU-critics J.L. Mélenchon and H. Emmanuelli.

In 2004, with the approaching presidential elections in mind, former Prime
Minister Laurent Fabius decided to challenge the party leadership surrounding
François Hollande by voicing his opposition to the EU Constitutional Treaty. He argued that the Constitution was promoting economic liberalism, was too pro-market, and promoted free trade rather than the French social model (Der Spiegel, 13/06/2005). At the time, Fabius stroke a chord, because numerous PS activists were flirting with the anti-Globalisation movement around organisations like Attac, which accuse the EU for being a Trojan horse of Globalisation. The yes-camp, on the other hand, focussed on non-economic arguments, stressing that the Constitution would bring positive changes for EU foreign policy as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Fabius - a former prime minister, secretary of state, and MEP - was by no means a Eurosceptic, nor did he belong to the minority left wing of the PS. His move can be best understood as an attempt to become the PS’ leading presidential candidate for 2007.

The 2004 debate over the EU Constitutional Treaty thus split the PS into three camps: the left-wing minority factions, the opponents of the Treaty within the majority courant (such as Laurent Fabius), and the supporters of the Treaty, such as party leader François Hollande (Wagner, 2008: 262). The party leadership, unable to discipline the courants, decided to put the Treaty to an internal referendum, which took place on 1 December 2004. 83.2 per cent of party members participated and a majority of 58.6 per cent voted in favour of the Constitutional Treaty (BBC News 02/12/2004). However, this referendum did not settle the tensions within the PS. Despite of the pro-Constitution majority, the no-camp continued their campaign until the national referendum took place on 29 May 2005. The message sent by the PS to the French voters was thus very confusing. The party was once again divided over the Lisbon Treaty. The French Constitution had to be changed before the Lisbon Treaty could be adopted, and even though the PS leadership had recommended abstention,
only 142 socialist parliamentarians followed this advice, while 121 voted against and 32 in favour of the constitutional revision (Wagner, 2008: 272). Wagner (2008) concludes that elements of soft Euroscepticism can be found in the party leadership’s statements on the Constitution. Henri Nallet, a former minister and the party’s international secretary under Jospin (interviewed on 30/06/2009) states:

No, the PS is not a Europeanised party. I would even go so far as to say that – paradoxically – it is less Europeanised today than it was in the past.

I believe that EU issues were recently instrumentalised for internal power-seeking.

To sum up, the French party system has experienced weak Europeanisation: The EU has not generated new parties, and EU policy is not heavily contested amongst the mainstream parties. Hence, no Eurosceptical opposition has attacked the PS. It is the party’s very own courants that have put the pro-European leadership under pressure.

3.3 The Europeanisation of the German Party System

The German party system has changed significantly since the 1980s. However, these changes cannot be attributed directly to the process of European integration. West Germany’s relatively stable ‘two-and-a-half party system’ of the 1960s and 1970s (Blondel, 1968) – dominated by the SPD and CDU/CSU, the two ‘catch-all parties’ (Kirchheimer, 1990) and with the liberal FDP, acting as the kingmaker – has developed into a fluid five party-system (Niedermayer, 2008). However, this triangular dynamic of party competition was undermined by the arrival of two new parties. First, in 1983, the post-materialist Greens entered the Bundestag, and second, after German reunification, the socialist PDS. In 2005 the PDS entered an electoral alliance with the West German WASG (Electoral Alliance for Labour and Social
Justice), and in 2007 the two groupings merged to form the Left Party (*Die Linke*).

The German party system has thus become more fragmented over the past three decades, but neither the Greens nor the Left Party was founded as a direct response to European integration. In the period between 1965 and 1998, three new political parties explicitly referring to the EU integration process have taken part in national elections\(^3\), but none of these parties gained seats in the *Bundestag* or the European Parliament, and they disappeared quickly. In terms of its format, the German party system has not Europeanised.

Have the mechanics of the German party system been Europeanised?

Unsurprisingly, the five parties do not agree on all EU issues. However, there is no real conflict within the German party system over European integration (Poguntke, 2007). There is disagreement on Turkey’s EU accession and more recently, on Chancellor Merkel’s handling of the Eurocrisis. However, both major parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD are pro-integrationist. The CDU even calls itself Germany’s ‘European Party’ (*Europapartei*). The CMP data in Figure 3.3 (below) shows that the CDU has been the most supportive of European integration under the leadership of Chancellor Kohl during the late 1980s when the Single European Act was ratified. The CDU’s EU support has however decreased significantly since the mid-1990s. The same applies to the Social Democrats, who have always been pro-integrationist, albeit not to the same degree as the CDU.

\(^3\) The decidedly pro-European *Europäische Föderalistische Partei* in the 1960s, and the Eurosceptical *Bund freier Bürger – Offensive für Deutschland* (BfB) and the Initiative Pro D-Mark- Neue Liberale Partei (Pro-DM) in the 1990s.
Figure 3.3: German parties’ net support for the EU, 1945-2005 (CMP data)

Figure 3.3 also shows that in Germany, none of the relevant parties have been Eurosceptical. Even the Greens, like most Green parties across the EU, have become increasingly EU-friendly in recent years. The Green’s involvement in the coalition government with the SPD (1998-2005) has had little direct impact on the wider party’s attitude to the EU, as Bomberg and Carter (2006) argue. The party was already very pro-integrationist before and is commonly regarded as one of the most Europhile Green parties, even if their support is conditioned by sharp criticism for certain processes and procedures (Bomberg and Carter, 2006). Even the Left Party, a strong critic of the current market-oriented EU and a proponent of a more social Europe, is generally supportive of European integration. Amongst German parties, EU policy is simply not contested.

If anything, lines of conflict over European policy have existed between the parties at the federal level and the parties at the regional level. Some Länder have a more particularist view of European integration, and have on occasion – as in the case
of Bavaria under Edmund Stoiber (Minister-President from 1993-2007) – become vocal critics of the loss of powers to Brussels. However, the strong role of cooperative federalism with its pressures to achieve compromise between the two legislative chambers, and the fact that Germany is usually governed by a coalition of at least two parties, creates a powerful constitutional logic for consensual politics. These factors have acted as important constraints against Eurosceptical mobilisation in the German party system (Poguntke, 2007). Thus, in terms of party competition, ‘almost nothing points to the pro- vs. anti-European conflict line becoming a relevant cleavage dimension’, as Niedermayer (2003: 129) stresses. Elections have never been fought on European issues, and the EU issue has generally low salience in Germany. This situation seems to change; after all, the SPD and the Greens have voiced their critique against Chancellor Merkel’s EU policy and in particular her role in the management of the financial crisis since 2008. So far, however, real competition over EU policy has not taken place in Germany.
3.4 Conclusions

Of the three party systems examined in this chapter, the British has Europeanised the most, both with regards to its format and mechanics. With the emergence of UKIP, the format of the party system has changed. UKIP not only competes in European parliamentary elections, but also in local and general elections. EU policy is heavily contested in Britain amongst mainstream parties and at the right fringe of the party system. Major parties with a Eurosceptic outlook have not yet emerged in either France or Germany. In France, European integration has been contested since the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. However, EU membership is not contested amongst the mainstream parties, and hard Euroscepticism can only be found at the left and right margin of the party system. In Germany, up to now, European policy-making has taken place in a very consensual environment. Inter- and intra-party dissent on EU issues has been rather low and confined to a limited amount of topics such as EU enlargement. As a consequence, the German party system is the least Europeanised, both in terms of its format and its mechanics. Table 3.1 (below) summarises the findings. What are the implications of these findings for Labour, the PS and SPD? Whilst the SPD has never been in the position to justify its pro-Europeananness, the PS and Labour’s EU policies are closely scrutinised by Eurosceptical parties, social movements and, in the case of Labour, the press. This environment is expected to affect how the three parties make EU policy and lead European parliamentary campaigns, both of which will be examined later on.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Europeanisation of the party system</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Format (number of parties)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mechanics (patterns of party competition)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Europeanisation</td>
<td>Moderate To Strong</td>
<td>Weak To Moderate</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4: The Europeanisation of public opinion

This chapter examines the Europeanisation of the Labour Party, the Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) vis-à-vis the public. Parties perform a number of vital functions in linking individuals to the democratic process. Two of their most crucial functions are interest articulation and aggregation: Parties not only express the views of their supporters in the governing process; they also aggregate them by bringing the views of various groups together to form a comprehensive programme for government (Dalton and Watternberg, 2000). Parties are therefore thought to respond to public opinion. A Europeanised public, it is argued, could be an incentive for parties to Europeanise their policies and organisations. A Europeanised public would be one with a high level of knowledge of the functioning of the EU. It would be well-informed about basic facts such as the current number of EU member states, or the basic functioning of the EU’s political system (e.g. the role played by the European Commission, Parliament, and Council of Ministers). Various studies demonstrate that high levels of formal education – which are most likely to go hand in hand with high levels of EU knowledge – tend to be associated with positive attitudes towards European integration (Caplanova et al., 2004; Kritzinger, 2003; Munro, 2007; White et al., 2002). Hence, a Europeanised public is more likely to be pro-integrationist than Eurosceptic. This however does not deny the existence of highly educated Eurosceptics.

The Europeanisation of parties vis-a-vis the public is a bi-directional process. In a bottom-up process, a Europeanised public is expected to exert pressure on parties to speak about the EU. Yet, in order to speak knowledgably about the EU, parties need EU expertise and adapt their organisational structures accordingly. In turn, party elites are expected to influence public opinion. They can shift EU policy issues on the
political agenda and Europeanise the electorate through policies, speeches and other statements.

Public opinion in respect of European integration has become increasingly important for national governments. For many years, European integration was almost entirely an elite-driven process in which citizens’ attitudes were neglected by national governments. Many scholars therefore viewed public opinion as being almost irrelevant to the integration process (Hellström, 2008a). However, voters seem to have become more sceptical about the EU - both integration and enlargement - and the ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindbergh and Scheingold, 1970) that existed amongst European citizens in favour of European integration during the 1950s and 1960s is no longer present. Yet, it has to be kept in mind that the EU has changed significantly over the past decades and affects the citizens’ day-to-day lifes more strongly than it did during the 1950s and 1960s. It is often argued that since the Maastricht Treaty (1992), European integration has become a contested issue in EU Member States, and that the strictly elite-driven process has come to an end (Hellström, 2008a; Steenbergen et al., 2007; Hix, 2005). In this political context, the interaction between voters and political parties is becoming increasingly important for the future of European integration. This trend is reflected in the growing body of literature which examines the multidirectional links between public opinion and party positions regarding EU matters. Many studies measuring public opinion towards the EU draw on the European Commission’s Eurobarometer surveys, whilst the attitudes of political elites have been measured through surveys by scholars such as Leonard Ray (1999) and Liesbeth Hooghe (2001). Party positions, as explained in the previous chapter, have been mapped by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006).
One of the key questions recent research addresses is whether political parties are representing voters’ preferences towards the EU. Studies analysing public opinion on European integration show that although the public is generally badly informed and shows little interest, many voters do have opinions towards the EU (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel and Anderson, 2002; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004).

First, this chapter will provide an overview of the literature on mass-elite linkages with regards to issues of European integration. Second, it will examine the Europeanisation of public opinion in Britain, France and Germany on the basis of Eurobarometer data. In the third part, mass-elite linkages in the three countries will be analysed on the basis of the countries’ electoral systems and EU referenda.

4.1 A brief literature review: European integration and the mass-elite linkage

There are three basic models of mass-elite linkages, all of which can be applied to the issue of EU integration: the bottom-up, top-down and bi-directional models. The first of these models, the bottom-up perspective, argues that political elites primarily respond to public opinion towards EU integration. For political parties, strategic positioning is assumed to become more important as European integration becomes more contested in domestic politics (Clements and Bartle, 2009). From this perspective, voters are expected to prefer parties that best represent their own policy positions, and parties position themselves accordingly to maximise their votes (Downs, 1957). Authors like Gabel (2000) and Tillman (2004) have demonstrated that voters’ attitudes towards the EU influence their voting behaviour in national elections. Carubba (2001) compares party positions - using the data of the Manifesto Research Group - with voters’ opinions as expressed in Eurobarometer surveys. He claims that ‘politicians seem to anticipate public preferences and, thus, those preferences are
respected even when they are not overtly expressed’ (Carubba, 2001: 156). This perspective is questioned by van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) who argue that since a large part of the electorate has views on EU issues that are not represented by their respective parties, they cannot choose a party on the basis of its EU position while at the same time choosing on the basis of its left/right position. Hix (2005: 170-171) argues along similar lines. With reference to Eurobarometer survey 51 (spring 1999), he shows that the ‘EU political market’ is fragmented. While intra-class alliances such as those between manual workers and skilled workers, or between white collar-workers and professionals, may hold together on left-right issues, these alliances are likely to break down whenever the issue of Europe becomes salient in domestic politics. For social democratic parties, this feature of public opinion presents problems: their traditional constituency (manual and skilled workers) has declined and they have built new alliances with groups that are close to them on the left-right dimension, such as white-collar employees, students and members of the liberal professions (Kitschelt, 1994, quoted by Hix, 2005: 170). However, because of the different attitudes of these groups towards European integration, the cross-class alliance often breaks down over Europe. As a result, Hix (2005) argues that parties pursue one of two strategies to ensure that there is no party competition on EU politics: they either refuse to differentiate themselves from each other on this dimension, or they play down the differences between them by refusing to address the question of European integration.

In a similar vein, Mattila and Raunio (2006), drawing on data from the 2004 European Election Study survey, show that parties are closer to their supporters’ preferences on the left/right dimension than on the EU dimension. However, the data reveal significant cross-national variation. On attitudes towards EU integration, the
biggest gap between parties and voters can be found in Britain. Moreover, the authors show that parties are more supportive of European integration than their voters. Britain is amongst the group of member states where parties are far more pro-European than voters. It is also the case that parties in government tend to occupy more positive positions towards European integration than do opposition parties, which could point to a Europeanising effect of being in government. Party size is also related to responsiveness with larger parties being, on average, further away from their voters on the EU dimension than smaller parties (Mattila and Raunio, 2006: 444). The Labour Party, SPD and PS are all large mainstream parties with experience of governing that seek to appeal to a broad electorate. Perhaps not surprisingly, they are further away from their voters on issues of European integration than many smaller parties, such as the Greens in Germany and Britain. At this point it is also worth mentioning a study by Liesbeth Hooghe (2003) that draws on surveys and Eurobarometer data to demonstrate that elites are indeed more Euro-enthusiastic than the citizens. However, she also discovers that the degree of enthusiasm is less univocal when one poses the practical question of how, in particular policy areas, authority should be distributed between the EU and national governments. Whereas national and European political elites support a competitive European Single Market, citizens prefer ‘regulated capitalism’ as promoted by EU policies in the areas of agriculture, regional policy and social inclusion (Hooghe, 2003: 284). Interestingly even though the SPD and PS tried to focus their 2009 European election campaigns on ‘Social Europe’ and a stricter regulation of the financial markets, the elections were won by conservative and liberal parties.

A second general model of mass-elite linkages adopts a top-down perspective. It essentially argues that voters’ attitudes towards the EU are shaped by political
parties and, more broadly, political elites. Hellström (2008a), for example, draws on *Eurobarometer* surveys CMP and finds that voters’ opinions generally exert little or no influence on party positions. Conversely, he finds a unidirectional ‘causality’ from political parties to voters, meaning that political parties are to some extent able to influence public opinion. He writes that ‘parties do not seem to have responded to shifts in voter opinions by modifying their positions’ (Hellström, 2008a: 1128). Ray (2003) also demonstrates that party positions influence public opinion towards European integration. However, he shows that the influence that parties exert on voters depends on: the level of disagreement among parties; party unity; issue salience; and party attachment. Unsurprisingly, Ray finds that a party that emphasises EU matters will find its supporters increasingly interested in the topic. Secondly, a party that is united over EU policy is more persuasive. Thirdly, Ray demonstrates that the effect of party positions on their supporters is greater when there is EU contestation between political parties at national level. Moreover, the closer individuals feel to the party they support, the more they will be affected by the positions taken by the party. The elite-driven perspective on European integration provides plausible arguments. After all, political elites have more resources and expertise to understand the complex system of EU governance than the public.

The third and last general model of mass-elite linkages argues that causality runs in both directions simultaneously, meaning that voters’ attitudes are part cause, part consequence of party positions (Carubba, 2001; Ray, 2003; Schmitt and Thomassen, 2000; Steenbergen et al., 2007). For example, Steenbergen et al (2007) estimate the strength of a reciprocal relationship between parties and voters, using expert surveys and *Eurobarometer* data. They find a relatively strong effect of the voters’ EU opinions on the party elites, and a small but not insignificant effect of
party elite positions on voters. The strength of those linkages is contingent on several factors, however, and two of them will be examined in part three: electoral systems and national EU referenda. The next section will take a brief look at the Europeanisation of public opinion in Britain, France, and Germany.

4.2 The Europeanisation of public opinion in Britain, France and Germany

Various factors can determine citizens’ attitude towards European integration, for example: economic considerations (Hooghe and Marks, 2005); ideology (placement along the left/right axis, Hooghe and Marks, 2005); interest in and knowledge of the EU (which is related to educational background, Kritzinger, 2003); nationality (some nationalities have more trust in the EU than others, Kritzinger, 2003); and national identity (Vössing, 2005; Carey, 2002).

Since 1973 *Eurobarometer* has mapped citizens’ attitudes towards EU membership. The trend lines in Figure 4.1 (below) show the percentage of respondents in Britain, France and Germany who answered that EU membership was ‘a good thing’. They suggest that overall the British public is the least enthusiastic about EU membership. It also shows that in all three countries, enthusiasm for the EU peaked at the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s when the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty pushed for the acceleration of the integration process. Afterwards – presumably when the effects of the European Single Market started to kick in – levels of enthusiasm decreased continuously. Overall, the figure shows that British, French and German citizens are no Euroenthusiasts.
Figure 4.1: % Agreeing that membership of the European Community/Union is a good thing

Note: Data are from Eurobarometer surveys conducted between September 1973 and June 2010. The question was: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the European Community (Common Market/European Union) is …?’ See Eurobarometer interactive search system, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en.

Table 4.1 (below) provides further evidence in line with these findings.

Between November 2003 and October 2005, citizens in the three countries were asked about their feelings towards the EU. In France and Germany, the percentage of respondents saying that the EU gave them a feeling of hope was relatively high (on average 43 and 46 per cent respectively). On average, only 26 per cent of British respondents said that the EU gave them a feeling of hope, whilst the same share of
people (26 per cent) stated that they felt mistrustful towards the EU. However, the majority of British respondents (32 per cent) said they felt indifferent about the EU. Usherwood (2002: 216) explains that in Britain, public attitude towards European integration ‘can be argued to be one marked not by two peaks of pro and anti, but rather by widespread indifference or uncertainty’. Yet, although the French and Germans generally felt more hopeful about the EU, there was also a high share of respondents (33 and 30 per cent respectively) who said that the EU gave them a feeling of anxiety. Can we speak of a Europeanised public in countries where one third of respondents feels anxious about the EU, and where 21 per cent (of Germans) and 31 per cent (of French) say they mistrust the EU?

A Europeanised public would also show interest in EU politics. Between 1973 and 1995, Eurobarometer has measured citizens’ interest in EU politics. The trend lines in Figure 4.2 show combined responses of ‘a great deal’ and ‘to some extent’ to the question: ‘And as far as European politics are concerned, that is matters related to the European Community, to what extent would you say that you are interested in them?’ In all three countries, interest in EU politics was greatest during the late 1980s and early 1990s, thus at the same period of time when Euroenthusiasm peaked (see Figure 4.1). From 1995 onwards, citizens’ general interest in EU politics was no longer mapped by Eurobarometer. However, on the basis of the low rates of Euroenthusiasm we can assume that in general, interest in EU politics has decreased in Britain, France and Germany.
Table 4.1: Does the European Union give you personally the feeling of...?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Enthusiasm</th>
<th>Hope</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Indifference</th>
<th>Anxiety</th>
<th>Mistrust</th>
<th>Rejecting it</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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<td><strong>Britain</strong></td>
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*Note: Data are from Eurobarometer surveys. The tables report the percentage of respondents in Britain, France and Germany who selected each response category when asked: ‘Does the European Union give you personally the feeling of...?’ See Eurobarometer interactive search system, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en.*
Figure 4.2: % Interested in the European Community?


Interest in politics is generally linked to political knowledge, which can be defined as ‘the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has encountered’ (Zaller, 1992: 32, emphasis original). A Europeanised public would display a high level of EU knowledge. It would, for example, be aware of the EU’s political institutions and know basic facts about the EU, for example the number of member states. Through Eurobarometer standard surveys, citizens are regularly asked whether they have heard of the European Parliament, Commission, Council, etc. Figure 4.3 shows the number of British,
French and German respondents who have heard of the European Parliament. The pronounced dip in May 2002 is difficult to explain and is probably a result of some idiosyncrasy of that month’s Eurobarometer. Overall, the European Parliament seems to be relatively well-known by citizens in the three countries, and the share of people who say they have heard of the EP is relatively constant.

Figure 4.3: % Heard of the European Parliament?


Surprisingly, the line does not go up during European parliamentary election years. But then, a Eurobarometer survey from 2007 shows that less than half of the
population in the three countries was aware of the fact that the EP is elected directly by EU citizens (Britain: 46 per cent, France: 41 per cent, and Germany: 42 per cent). Thus, whilst the majority of people have heard of the EP and other EU institutions, they know very little about their functioning. Basic levels of EU knowledge are also fairly low. For example, in 2008, Eurobarometer asked citizens whether they knew how many member states the EU had. 26 per cent of British, 18 per cent of French, and 28 per cent of German respondents got the answer wrong. These numbers are only snapshots as Eurobarometer has only recently started to test public EU knowledge, and long-term trends cannot be identified yet.

Overall, low levels of interest in and knowledge of EU politics show that the British, French and German publics have not Europeanised. Moreover, the number of citizens stating that EU membership is a good thing is also decreasing since the early 1990s. The least Europeanised public is the British, where levels of mistrust and indifference towards the EU have been higher than in France and Germany.

4.3. The mass-elite linkage in Britain, France and Germany

Steenbergen et al. (2007) find a relatively strong effect of the electorate’s EU preferences on party elites, and vice versa. However, they notice that both the mass-driven and elite-driven connections were particularly significant in countries with proportional representation systems – such as Germany - in non-election years and in situations where parties were unified in their EU attitude. The next sections will examine the impact of the electoral system and referendums on the mass-elite linkage in Britain, France and Germany.
An electoral system is defined as ‘a set of procedures for translating votes received by candidates into shares of Parliamentary seats’ (Budge et al., 2004: 371). In accordance with Wessels (1999) Steenbergen et al. (2007) argue that party elites in proportional representation (PR) systems focus on representing the party median, whereas parties in plurality systems are more concerned with the median voter. They find that both bottom-up and top-down linkages between party elites and supporters are stronger in PR systems. Likewise, the effect of party elites on supporters is stronger in PR systems than in plurality systems (Steenbergen et al., 2007: 26).

It has been argued that the British electoral system (first-past-the-post, FPTP) decisively shapes parties’ EU policies (Aspinwall, 2000). The FPTP system counts votes into seats by awarding each seat to the candidate who gets most votes inside a small constituency. Aspinwall’s argument goes as follows: since FPTP penalises small parties, a person considering running for Parliament in the UK has a strong incentive to join one of the two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives. As a consequence, ruling parties need to accommodate both pro-European and Eurosceptical views. For the leaders of British parties in government, this implies a constant balancing act as they try to manage the wings of their party. For example, the Labour Party has had to balance a centrist opinion against leftist, anti-market, anti-integration opinion in the past (Aspinwall, 2000: 433). According to Usherwood (2002) this situation leaves managers of British parties with two options: They can either try to ‘actively manage policy outcomes’ or they can ‘fudge’ them. In most parties’ policy-making there are elements of both active management and fudging (Usherwood, 2002: 220-221). By ‘active management’ Usherwood means a number of techniques party managers can use, such as:
• organising parliamentary time so as to avoid an election taking place at the same time as a relatively important EU policy development;
• offering inducements in other policies to MPs with Eurosceptical positions in exchange for a moderation of their position on EU integration;
• threatening MPs with extreme positions with exclusion from the party if they do not moderate their opinions (this is a very extreme option, as Usherwoods acknowledges).

Active management can be dangerous in a Eurosceptical political environment, and fudging might appear to be a more attractive option. The idea is that party policy becomes flexible enough to accommodate most of the members’ and citizens’ opinions. Fudging measures include:

• formulating vague EU policy commitments in manifestoes;
• masking contentious decisions in Parliament by timing them to coincide with other policy initiatives or events;
• in the run-up to elections, party leaders can modify their positions when addressing different audiences;
• parties can avoid the issue completely by not producing any EU position at all – which would be the most extreme form of fudging.

Usherwood argues that neither strategy can result in a complete and persistent representation of all the positions on EU affairs, and that tensions remain. As a consequence, British parties have externalised the debate on EU integration in the past, leaving it to groups, movements and organisations that bring together elements of political parties and the general public. Since the 1960s there have been anti-
European non-party groups in the UK, such as *Keep Britain out* or the *Campaign for an Independent Britain* or *Business for Sterling* (Usherwood, 2002: 223).

The French electoral system has been changed several times. Currently, MPs are elected by direct, universal suffrage using a uninominal majority system in two rounds. In order to be elected in the first round, a candidate must obtain an absolute majority (i.e. more than half the votes cast) and a number of ballots equal at least to one quarter of the voters enrolled. If no candidate is elected, a second round is required. Only those candidates, who have obtained a number of ballots in the first round equal at least to 12.5 per cent of the voters enrolled, may stand in this second round, which requires a relative majority for election. Thus the candidate with the highest number of votes is elected (*Assemblée Nationale*, 2010). These rules present a hurdle to smaller parties and unleash incentives for larger parties, in the second ballot, to gain votes transferred from those eliminated in the first round (Clift, 2003: 43).

Knapp and Wright (2006: 474) argue that it appears that there is ‘a more or less perfect fit between voter attitudes and the behaviour of mainstream French politicians in relation to European integration – grandiloquently warm towards the principle, deeply cautious about the material implications’. The authors also highlight the fact that French politicians treat European elections ‘as a beauty contest for political parties and personalities rather than as a process designed to give some 700 MEPs a democratic mandate to legislate’. As the political elites generally do not stress the importance of EU-level decisions, voters do not consider EU issues equally important as national issues. The two-ballot voting system for general elections in France benefits the two major parties, the PS and UMP. Unlike in Britain, however, none of these have to accommodate hard Eurosceptical views amongst their leadership and members. Hard Euroscepticism is found only at the left and right margins of the party
system. Hence, both centre-left and centre-right voters with Eurosceptical views are not represented by the mainstream parties.

The current electoral system used for elections to the Bundestag is based on the principle of proportional representation. Each voter is given two votes and is hence able to vote for a person - that is, an individual constituency candidate - and a political party. The first vote is cast for a constituency candidate to represent the voter in the area where he or she lives. The winner is chosen on a simple majority, or first-past-the-post system as in Britain. The second vote is cast for a political party on a party list. The electoral system was designed to be a proportional one in terms of ‘fair’ representation. In general terms, that aim was achieved, because the electoral system today is still based on PR: if 40 per cent of those who vote in a particular Land voted for a particular party, then that party is allocated 40 per cent of the Bundestag seats available in that Land (James, 2003: 19). It needs to be added that only parties which gain at least 5 per cent of the valid second votes are eligible for parliamentary seats. Ever since the first federal elections of 1953 half the seats in the Bundestag have been distributed via the direct first-vote constituency results, and the other half via the second-vote party list results (James, 2003: 19). Many voters split their votes and by doing so cast their ballot in favour of a coalition government.

In no other large EU member state has the elite consensus on European integration been as stable as in Germany, with a pro-European media and public (Lees, 2002). According to Teschner (2000), however, growing disparity between the masses and the political elites regarding the EU integration has been visible since the mid-1990s. However, Chancellor Kohl stuck to his pro-Europeanism even in the face of a sustained drop in public support for the EU, and in particular the Euro. Gerhard Schröder’s more critical stances towards European integration seemed to
reflect more accurately the current mood of the German population. Schröder was less willing to act in the European interest and was more concerned about domestic factors (Hyde-Price and Jefferey, 2001). As explained in Chapter 3, there is still a pro-European consensus in German politics which encompasses all of the mainstream parties in the Bundestag. Recently, Die Linke has become Eurosceptic. Many disillusioned SPD-members have joined Die Linke, not primarily motivated by Euroscepticism, but as a consequence of the Schröder government’s labour market and welfare state reforms. Thus, for the SPD in government between 1998 and 2009, Eurosceptic members or voters were no major issue. This is partly due to the fact that Germany’s party system displays strong centralising tendencies: Polity-wide parties control almost all of the seats in the two chambers and exert a high degree of party discipline over their members (Lees, 2002: 253). Moreover, the German public does not show great interest in issues of European integration. EU issue voting effects for German parties are rather small, as de Vries (2010: 107-108) shows. Thus, in contrast to Britain, German mainstream parties do not (yet) compete on the EU issue, and it plays a marginal role during election campaigns.

Steenbergen et al. (2007) also argue that referendums strengthen the bottom-up linkage between parties and their supporters. They provide strong incentives for parties to align their policy stances with the positions of their voters. The negative outcomes of the French, Dutch and Irish referendums on the EU Constitutional Treaty show that party elites cannot count on their members and voters for blind support. Instead, parties may want to know what their supporters think before deciding which side to take in the referendum campaign. This puts supporters in an important position vis-à-vis the party elite. Moreover, if party elites know that EU treaty changes have to go through a referendum, they have a strong incentive to discuss the treaty with their
voters and persuade them – which strengthens the top-down linkage, as Steenbergen et al. (2007: 19) argue.

Hobolt (2009) differentiates between three types of EU referendums: those focusing on (1) EU membership; (2) treaty ratification; or (3) single policy issues. Her central argument is that political information plays a crucial role in mediating the importance of these factors. Political information concerns not only the type of information and elite cues that are available to the voters (supply of information), but also the handling of this information by individual voters (processing of information). Both processes can crucially determine the salience of European integration and the centrality of EU attitudes and moreover influence individuals' reception of elite cues and consequently their vote choice. Hobolt shows that intense campaigns (such as the one organised against the EU Constitutional Treaty in France in 2004/2005) will lead to more issue-voting, and reduce the importance of domestic politics. Not surprisingly, politicised voters are less dependent on the recommendations of politicians and instead rely more on their own opinions on European integration.

It is argued here that referendums on EU membership can contribute to the Europeanisation of the public: Parties campaign for their cause and discuss EU issues in public and with their members, and thereby raise EU awareness. Voters know where the party stands and can make up their mind and vote according to their convictions. However, if parties are deeply divided, they leave voters confused. Moreover – and this aspect is neglected by Steenbergen et al.: EU referendums are not necessarily about the EU. Other issues are at stake, such as the popularity of national governments. Governments and heads of state are aware of this and have used EU referendums as plebiscites. Maybe then, the potential of EU referendums to Europeanise the public should not be overestimated. Moreover, they rarely take
place. The German Basic Law does not provide for national referenda. German citizens have therefore no direct impact on EU treaty reform or other EU policy issues. Instead, both chambers of the Parliament, Bundestag and Bundesrat, share the power to ratify EU treaties and EU legislation. In Britain, only two national referendums have ever taken place, and the only one related to the EU was the United Kingdom European Communities Membership Referendum in 1975. It was held two years after the UK’s EU accession in order to gauge support for continued membership and keep the Labour Party from splitting. In its October 1974 manifesto, Labour under Prime Minister Wilson had promised a referendum on EEC membership (The Labour Party, 1974). On a 65 per cent turnout, 67 per cent of the voters were in favour of Britain’s EU membership and 32.8 per cent against. The Labour cabinet under Wilson was split and campaigned for both membership and withdrawal, which was only possible because Wilson suspended the constitutional convention of cabinet collective responsibility. The cabinet’s internal divisions did not come as a surprise; after all the party had been divided over EU membership ever since the topic was on the political agenda.

The Blair government promised two EU referendums: one on the Euro and the other on the EU Constitutional Treaty, yet none of them took place. After the French and Dutch citizens had rejected the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005, Blair decided to postpone the referendum. It was a tactical decision, as he did not want the EU issue to jeopardise his re-election in 2005. The Lisbon Treaty, which includes most of the reforms proposed by the Constitution, was never put to a referendum. Gordon Brown, who had just taken over the government, was too scared of the Eurosceptic public and opposition. In his role as Chancellor he also opposed the introduction of the Euro.
In France, there is no legal requirement in the Constitution for the country to hold a referendum on EU treaties. However, the electorate may be consulted by the President (usually in accordance with government and parliament, articles 11; 88-5 and 89 of the French Constitution). There have been ten referendums since June 1958, five of them under de Gaulle’s leadership. Out of these ten, three were related to the EC/EU: the first one was about EEC enlargement to Britain, Ireland and Denmark (1972), the second on the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the third on the EU Constitutional Treaty (2005). President Mitterrand put the Maastricht Treaty to a national referendum on 20 September 1992, which led to conflicts both within and amongst the parties. His key motivation was to ‘expose divisions on the right over the issue of further integration and to bolster his own standing’ (Guyomarch et al., 1998: 80). In France, referenda are often associated with the plebiscite tradition created by Napoleon the Third and enhanced by President de Gaulle.

For the first time in France, the EU was politicised during the campaign for the Maastricht referendum. The yes-camp, led by Mitterrand, won with a wafer thin majority of 51 to 49 per cent of the votes. The fact that Mitterrand was very unpopular at that point in time partly explains the extremely narrow victory (Franklin, Marsh and Mclaren, 1994: 467-468). Of socialist voters, 76 per cent voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty and 24 per cent against (Knapp and Wright, 2006: 517). Thus, as ‘good Europeans’ and loyal presidential backers, four out of five PS voters voted Yes in 1992 (Hainsworth, 2006: 106). Whether the referendum has strengthened the linkage between voters and party elites remains unclear; it was above all a (weak) confirmation of Mitterrand’s leadership. The third EU referendum took place on 29 May 2005. The reasons behind President Chirac’s decision to put the EU Constitutional Treaty to a referendum were multiple. The pressure emanating from the
increasingly critical public and his party, the UMP, was high. Moreover, the referendum on Maastricht had created an obvious precedent. Most importantly, however, President Chirac hoped to use the device of the referendum to ‘boost his popular approval ratings’ (Hainsworth, 2006: 99) – a miscalculation at a time when the government was very unpopular. Chirac and the entire yes-camp lost the campaign when the majority of French citizens (54.5 per cent) voted against the treaty on a relatively high turnout of 69.74 per cent. This time, 59 per cent of Socialist voters voted against the Treaty, with 41 per cent in favour (Hainsworth, 2006). In terms of its political mobilisation, the 2005 referendum can be compared to the one on the Maastricht Treaty. A significant difference, however, was that PS supporters switched from the yes to the no-camp, reflecting the split within the party rank and file. The PS leadership was deeply divided and therefore sent conflicting messages to the electorate. This referendum could hardly strengthen the linkage between PS elite and the public.

To sum up, EU referendums could potentially strengthen the linkage between party elites and voters. However, for this to happen, these referendums would have to be about the EU, and not about the popularity of the government or president. Moreover, the party leadership would have to send out a clear message to the electorate if it wanted to influence them. Last but not least, the electorate would have to be mobilised in a high-profile referendum campaign. In neither Britain nor France were all of these conditions fulfilled, and it remains doubtful whether they ever will. The German electorate has never been allowed to vote on EU issues. In contrast to France, there was no major public debate on the EU constitution which could have strengthened the EU linkage between the political elite and voters.
4.4 Conclusions

In this chapter it has been demonstrated that neither the British, French, nor German public has Europeanised with regards to their EU knowledge and level of pro-Europeanness. The mass-elite linkage is bi-directional but remains weak with regards to EU policy, regardless of the electoral system and EU referendums. Bottom-up Europeanisation pressures on Labour, the PS and SPD have therefore been very low. Party elites are more pro-European than the public and would be expected to give more importance to the EU in their speeches and programmes. However, the three parties did little to Europeanise the wider public and their supporters. This strategy can be in the parties’ short term interest. After all, as Hix (2005: 170) demonstrates, the cross-class alliance of centre-left supporters breaks down over Europe, and it is easier for parties to either refuse to differentiate themselves from each other on this dimension, or to play down the differences between them by refusing to address the question of European integration. In the long term, however, if Labour the PS and SPD do not address the lack of EU knowledge and enthusiasm, their supporters and the wider public might become more critical towards the EU, as Eurobarometer surveys for Britain, France and Germany indicate.
Chapter 5: The Europeanisation of central government

National political parties and their internal workings can only be understood in their political context. This chapter and the next examine parties in their institutional and governmental context. This chapter in particular focuses on parties in central government. After all, the executive is probably the single most important branch of government, and it is therefore crucial to understand how European integration affects parties in government. This chapter explores the ways in which the Labour Party, the Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) have Europeanised during their time in government in recent years. Since only the party leadership (the prime minister, cabinet ministers and high-ranking officials) is part of the executive, this chapter focuses on this group of people. For the party leadership in government, Europeanisation is a two-way process. Britain, France and Germany have been EU members for decades, and therefore central government in the three countries is expected to have Europeanised. A Europeanised central government is understood as one that has adapted gradually to the process of European integration. In other words, it continually incorporates EU policies into its structures. In return, it is also a government that seeks to shape the EU by uploading national institutional models and policy preferences to the European level. In this process, national executives have all given up a certain level of national autonomy in exchange for the shared authority and control of the EU (Schmidt, 2006a). Hence, the Europeanisation of central government is not perceived as a zero-sum game: loss at national level meets gain at European level. A Europeanised government is expected to have rubbed off onto the leadership of the three parties whilst they were in government between 1997 and 2009. Admittedly, the notion of a Europeanised party leadership is vague. It
could best be defined as a group of politicians who recognises the importance of the EU and communicates it to the party and the wider electorate. A Europeanised party leadership would also initiate institutional reforms in order to make national processes of policy-making compatible with EU-level policy-making.

The three parties were in office for different, partially overlapping periods of time (see Table 5.1, below, for details): The Labour Party between 1997 and 2010; the PS in a five-party coalition government from 1997 until 2002; and the SPD as a member of two very different coalitions between 1998 and 2009.

Bulmer and Burch (2001) argue that the EU’s style of policy-making is fluid, with shifting agendas and networks; open, with the European Commission being very receptive to external thinking; network-based, with the need for national actors to forge contacts; and rule bound and sectorised; with poor coordination within the Commission and between the institutions. Policy-making at European level is thus a highly complex process and is expected to challenge the workings of domestic institutions such as central government. However, some aspects of member state structures and activities seem to have been more deeply affected by the EU than others, and some member states have been more prone to institutional ‘misfit’ than others (Risse et al., 2001). Therefore, Europeanisation is by no means uniform across the EU (Héritier, 2001).
Table 5.1: The Labour Party, PS and SPD in Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Type and duration of government</th>
<th>Prime minister</th>
<th>Party leader</th>
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<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Single party government (May 1997 - June 2007)</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
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<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Five party coalition government (June 1997 - May 2002) with: French Communist Party (PCF), The</td>
<td>Lionel Jospin</td>
<td>François Hollande</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Greens, Radical Left Party (PRG), Citizens’ Movement (MDC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; government (October 1998 – September 2002) Coalition government with the Greens</td>
<td>Gerhard Schröder</td>
<td>Oskar Lafontaine (November</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1995 – March 1999)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; government (October 2002 - October 2005) Coalition government with the Greens</td>
<td>Gerhard Schröder</td>
<td>Gerhard Schröder (March 1999 – September 2002)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Franz Müntefering (March 2004 – October 2005)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Kurt Beck (April 2006 – September 2009)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Frank-Walter Steinmeier (September 2008 – October 2008)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Franz Müntefering (October 2008 – November 2009)</td>
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In the following pages, the Europeanisation of central government will be interpreted from a historical institutionalist perspective. Historical institutionalism is a useful concept that has been linked to Europeanisation because it analyses and explains institutional change over time. This chapter will first introduce the concept, and secondly, link and apply it to the Europeanisation of central government in Britain, France and Germany. This chapter will also analyse the coordination of European policy in the three countries. After all, a government can only upload its institutional model or policy preferences to the EU level if it has found an effective way of coordinating its European policy. Last but not least, this chapter will investigate whether the Europeanisation of central government has rubbed off onto the leadership of the three parties whilst they were in government between 1997 and 2010.

5.1 Theorising institutional adaptation

Within the Europeanisation literature, many studies seeking to explain domestic institutional change invoke one of the three variants of new institutionalism: rational choice, sociological or historical institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1989). This chapter draws on historical institutionalism, an increasingly popular middle-range theory used to analyse institutional change over time. Institutionalists claim that institutions matter because they shape political outcomes (Rosamond, 2000: 113). Historical institutionalism focuses on the effects of institutions over time, and in particular the ways in which institutions, once they are established, can shape or constrain the behaviour, objectives and values of the actors who established them. Scholars of historical institutionalism argue that institutionalist choices taken in the past can persist or become ‘locked in’, thereby shaping and constraining actors at later points in time (Pollack, 2004). Institutions, they claim, tend to be ‘sticky’, or resistant
to change for extended periods of time even if there are demands or pressures for change. This ‘path dependency’ means that ‘once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice’ (Levi, 1997, quoted by Pierson, 2000: 252). Paul Pierson (2000: 252-259) explains that ‘we cannot understand the significance of a particular social variable without understanding “how it got there” – the path it took’. Historical institutionalists see the adaptation process of both formal and informal institutions to a changing environment as an incremental one. Traditional institutionalism focused on formal institutions, but the new institutionalisms have widened the focus to include processes and procedures, codes and guidelines, and the cultural dimension constructed around and within institutions (Bulmer and Burch, 1998: 604). Some historical institutionalist studies examine particular moments in time when fundamental change occurs, when ‘periodic alterations, while not wholly breaking with the past, are sufficiently novel to be considered as significant’ (Bulmer and Burch, 1998: 605). In this context, internal or external factors can lead institutions to change. At ‘critical junctures’, institutional development moves on to a new path which is then followed until a new critical juncture follows and a new direction is taken (Bulmer and Burch, 1998). Could critical junctures at the EU level then lead to institutional change at the domestic level? EU membership is an external force putting pressure on national political institutions while at the same time opening windows of opportunity for reform.
How can the Europeanisation of central government be assessed in historical institutionalist terms? Bulmer and Burch (2001) suggest four levels for the analysis of institutional change:

1) The systemic level, which refers to the constitutional framework of states and governments;
2) The organisational level, which looks at key players involved in the government’s EU policy-making, their offices and networks, power positions;
3) The regulatory level, which refers to institutional rules and guidelines; and
4) The procedural level, which relates to the processes shaping how business is handled, including information systems and policy processes.

All of the above processes overlap and include a cultural dimension which concerns norms and values prevalent within national institutions (Bulmer and Burch, 2001). Norms and values are expected to impact upon all aspects of institutional change – a point which in particular sociological institutionalists stress. The following sections will examine all four levels of institutional change identified by Bulmer and Burch. It will be demonstrated that the way in which the British, French and German governments respond to the policy-making challenges of EU membership follows no single pattern. It would therefore be difficult to say which of the three is the most Europeanised. European integration has been incorporated into existing institutional structures, and change has been incremental rather than radical. The following three sections will analyse the ways in which the central governments in Britain, France and Germany have Europeanised, and how this affected the Labour, PS and SPD’s leaderships when the parties have been in government.
5.2 The Europeanisation of the British Central Government and Labour

In the past decade, the adaptation of Britain’s central government to European integration has attracted much scholarly attention. This process of adaptation can be dated back to the Britain’s first application for EU membership in 1961, but was accelerated after the EU accession in 1973. From this perspective, EC accession was not a ‘big bang’ event for the British government because adjustment had already begun in the 1960s (Bulmer and Burch, 2005: 861). The impact of European integration upon the British central government has developed slowly, but the overall effect of these changes has amounted to a substantial change in the pattern of UK government and policy-making, and Bulmer and Burch (2005: 862) label this transformation of the British government a ‘quiet revolution’. However, with the election of the Blair government in 1997, the Europeanisation of central government experienced a considerable shift in pace and direction. In a bottom-up process, the Labour leadership has accelerated the Europeanisation of central government.

Most scholars agree that from the outset of EU accession, there were numerous aspects of EU governance that did not fit well with British traditions, such as the multi-level, quasi-federal nature of the EU which contrasts with the UK’s unitary state (Schmidt, 2006b) or the need for coalition-building amongst EU governments in the Council of Ministers, which contrasts the often confrontational Westminster style of policy-making by one-party governments. This would suggest ‘systemic misfit’ between the EU and Britain. However, both Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major did little to actively Europeanise central government in a bottom-up process. They prioritised the assimilation of EU business into the existing patterns of UK central government. Europeanisation, it has been
argued, was constrained by the Eurosceptical views of the government rather than institutional misfit (Bulmer and Burch, 2005).

When the Labour Party came into office in 1997 a ‘step change’ in the British government’s approach to the EU took place. Part of this new approach was to improve and intensify the relationship with governments across the EU through an increased exchange of information, alliances on policy initiatives, and long-term coalition building. These initiatives were complemented by a project to Europeanise the UK’s public opinion by encouraging more dissemination of information on European politics, counteracting mis-information, and publicly campaigning on EU issues (Bulmer and Burch, 2005: 878). Hence, government turnover in 1997 can be interpreted as a ‘critical juncture’: it opened a window of opportunity for the Labour leadership to push for stronger Europeanisation of central government.

Successive British governments have used a model of decision-making on EU-affairs ‘which is often envied by other member states and has been emulated by not a few’ according to Sir Stephen Wall (2008: 190), the former head of the government’s European Secretariat and Tony Blair’s Adviser on Europe. One of the key developments under the Blair government was a significant centralisation of EU policy-making: more resources and powers of direction were given to the ‘centre’ of government. There was a streamlining at the very top through the closer integration of the work of the Cabinet Office European Secretariat (COES) and Number 10 Downing Street. The COES is located at the centre of the government’s EU network. It has a broad overview of all policy dossiers and fulfils four important roles: (1) recruiting departmental players on an issue-by-issue basis; (2) ensuring that departmental negotiating positions are consistent with government policy; (3)
providing neutral interdepartmental arbitration; and (4) articulating the Prime Minister’s longer-term objectives on Europe (James, 2009: 608). The COES and Number 10 Downing Street are closely linked with each other, but the COES is highly dependent on 10 Downing Street (James, 2009: 661). This centralised, directive approach to EU policy-making reflects the style of Blair’s administration in general. It was a system based on the sharing of information across government departments and on coordination between officials, ministers and Members of the European Parliament. For example, before each week’s meeting of the European Commission, the cabinet of the respective British Commissioner received a written briefing from Britain’s Permanent Representation in Brussels on issues on the agenda that were of concern to the UK government. ‘Britain is not unique in doing this but is particularly assiduous in providing such briefings’ (Wall, 2008: 202). The same procedure applied to British MEPs, who were all, regardless of their party membership, entitled to, and received, written briefings prepared by the government in London.

Unsurprisingly, one of the key players in Labour’s EU policy-making process was the prime minister. After all, he represents the UK in the European Council where the general political guidelines of the EU are defined. At national level, the prime minister has considerable influence over national, international and European policy. ‘The job has come to embody the almost universal breakdown in the old distinction between domestic and foreign affairs’ as King (1991: 33) remarks. In contrast to the German Chancellor or the French prime minister, the British prime minister is the leader of the strongest party in the House of Commons. As a consequence, ‘the prime ministership is a party job before it is a governmental or national job’ (King, 1991:

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4 The EU policy-coordination between the Blair government and Members of the European Parliament is discussed in Chapter 7.
25). Senior foreign policy and EU advisors, based in the Cabinet Office, reported directly to Tony Blair, not to the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, something further expanding the prime minister’s reach within these policy areas (Heffernan, 2006: 20). Instead of discussing European issues with the entire cabinet, Blair often preferred smaller circles of debate. British prime ministers might be very powerful, but they are highly dependent on the expertise of cabinet ministers and civil servants.

Patrick Diamond, former head of Policy Planning in Number 10 Downing Street (interviewed on 16/03/2011) states:

As a prime minister, Blair was dependent on other actors in his government, but in the British system, he is relatively independent, or interdependent of his party. He needs his party to be enthusiastic enough to campaign, and to do things in the election, but in most areas of policy he can secure his party’s support without having to acknowledge their dependency within the policy process.

Tony Blair’s EU advisor Stephen Wall (2008: 201) argues that a determining factor in Whitehall’s approach to the EU is the views of the Prime Minister. Tony Blair certainly showed greater interest in European affairs than most of his predecessors. In a speech to the European Parliament on 23 June 2005 he stressed: ‘I am a passionate pro-European. I always have been’. However, whilst a positive attitude towards the EU cannot be denied, his government often lacked decisive action, and Labour’s overall achievement with regards to European policy is at best mixed (Smith, 2005). Alongside Blair, the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor were amongst the most powerful players in the party’s European policy-making. In addition, Peter Mandelson played an important role, both as one of the architects of

The main actors with regard to EU policy-making are the government ministers with responsibility for European affairs. In our system, that’s predominantly the Prime Minister, followed by the Foreign Secretary. And I would say that they determine most aspects of EU policy. With important secondary roles played by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, particularly when you look at issues of financial regulation (...). And Peter Mandelson, when you’re looking at questions to do with industry, Single Market, the future of Lisbon. So I would say those people were by far the most important people in terms of shaping government policy towards Europe.

Blair got involved in highly politicised issues, such as Britain’s membership of the Euro or decisions of historical importance, such as EU enlargement or treaty reform. These were discussed in the Cabinet Office, whilst day-to-day EU policy was formulated in the different ministries. One of these ministries was the Treasury. Gordon Brown (Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1997 and 2007 and prime minister from 2007 until 2010) was initially considered to be one of the more committed pro-Europeans of the Blair government. Nevertheless he successfully managed to veto British membership of the Euro. In his role as chancellor he was the cabinet minister responsible for all economic and financial matters. It has furthermore been argued that due to his complex and complicated relationship with Tony Blair, Gordon Brown exerted more influence on British EU policy-making when he was Chancellor than any of his predecessors (Wanninger, 2007). Brown’s ambitions to
become Blair’s successor were well-known and contributed to the rivalry between the two politicians.

It was only when Blair and Brown came to their compromise on Britain’s policy towards euro membership that other members of the cabinet were consulted. Ministers were not permitted to directly influence the debate, let alone actually decide the matter collectively (Heffernan, 2006: 33). The relationship between Blair and Brown is crucial for understanding Labour’s approach towards the single currency and shows that the prime ministerial room for manoeuvre was strictly limited with regards to British membership of the Euro.

When Gordon Brown took over the premiership from Tony Blair, EU issues were not on top of the political agenda. Scared about the Eurosceptical opposition, Brown did not prioritise the EU in his speeches. Other issues were more pressing, such as the question of whether there would be an early general election. The next dominant issue on the agenda was the financial crisis in 2008, for which Brown envisaged a global solution (through the G20) rather than a European one. Patrick Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011) comments:

I think in some ways Brown probably gave more autonomy to the ministers of his cabinet than Blair had done. Brown had his own priorities at the centre. And obviously, as the financial crisis took hold in 2008, his priorities tended to be very much focused on how to stabilise the banking system, the reform of the financial sector. So I think in that context he probably was sort of more willing to trust other ministers in key areas of policy than Blair had been. There were particular periods where in foreign, European and security policy, Downing Street was probably less interested in a day-to-day settlement than it had been under Blair. But I
think the fundamentals remain the same. I don’t think that under Brown, for example, there was any fundamental shift towards giving the party a stronger voice in the policy-making process. To be honest, in a sense that this is a structural issue in the British system, when the party is in power, when it’s in government, the parliamentary and governmental leadership is fairly free to assert its will as it sees fit with very few constraints or veto points.

In Britain, France and Germany, the foreign secretary is one of the key players in the process of EU policy-making. The person holding the post represents his/her country in the ‘general affairs’ configuration of the Council of Ministers where the general work of the Council is coordinated. Under Labour, the foreign secretary introduced European issues into the cabinet and chaired the ministerial sub-committee on European issues in which differences of view among ministers were thrashed out (Wall, 2008: 190). The foreign secretary and the prime minister had the COES at their disposal, which was part of the Cabinet Office. The European Secretariat consisted of more than thirty members of staff under the leadership of a permanent secretary who is also the prime minister’s EU adviser. Under the chairmanship of the European Secretariat, committees of officials across the whole government meet regularly, covering all EU policy issues. Officials from the Permanent Representation in Brussels participate via video conference.

Which role did Labour’s Foreign Secretaries play in the party’s EU policy-making process? The answer is not a simple one, as the impact of the Foreign Secretary on European policy depends on a variety of factors: on the prime minister and his or her own views, ambitions and priorities when it comes to European policy;
on the views and ambitions of the Foreign Secretary; on the influence of other key players within and outside of cabinet (such as European advisers); and on political events. Jonathan Powell (2010: 244-245), who was Tony Blair’s chief of staff, writes:

The Foreign Office has a perennial worry that Europe will be removed from its purview. When he was Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook complained to me in May 1998 that Peter Mandelson, at that time Minister without Portfolio, was trying to turn the Cabinet Office into the Ministry of Europe. (...). Robin’s successor, Jack Straw, asked in 2004 if he could run the referendum campaign on the European Constitution from the Foreign Office. Tony said he could not and that it needed to be run from the Cabinet Office.

Powell’s quote suggests that, under Tony Blair, highly politicised EU policy matters (such as the Euro or the Constitutional Treaty) were discussed and planned by Cabinet Office civil servants and advisers, and not the Foreign Office. However, in day-to-day EU policy-making, the Foreign Office still played a crucial role. This has been confirmed by Patrick Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011) who argues that ‘in fact, 90 or 95 per cent of the policy is being determined in the usual way, with almost no interference from the centre [10 Downing Street]’.

For both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, political advisors played an important role in EU policy-making. ‘A good deal of the high-level policymaking and politicking in Europe is conducted among the network of European-affairs advisers’, Jonathan Powell (2010) notes. Helms (2005: 84) mentions, ‘the exceptionally large number of special advisers, and their unprecedented influence at the very heart of the
governing machine marked another, indeed for many the hallmark of the Blair administration’. Increasing the number of EU advisors has arguably strengthened Tony Blair’s influence on European policy-making. He has often overridden and bypassed the advice of the Foreign Office (Heffernan and Webb, 2005: 35; Powell, 2010: 244-245) – not to mention his full cabinet and the party organisation – when it came to key EU issues. Yet, whilst EU advisers did play a crucial role in the government’s overall European strategy, they had to interest in undermining the Foreign Office. As Patrick Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011) explains:

Stephen Wall was only able to give personal advice to the Prime Minister about the overall direction of European policy. Both he and also the Prime Minister were reliant on the Foreign Office for all sorts of advice and expertise and knowledge of different areas of European affairs. I think it would be quite wrong to suggest that somehow the Foreign Office was no longer a kind of relevant actor. It remained clearly very powerful in European policy, even if it was less powerful than it had been perhaps under previous Prime Ministers.

Another minister who could be expected to play a key role in Labour’s EU policy-making is the minister for Europe. The British government introduced the position after EU accession. Under both Blair and Brown, the Minister for Europe held a junior position, and the job was sometimes given to politicians without any significant European profile, and replaced every so often. There were eight incumbents under Blair, and four under Brown, so altogether twelve ministers for Europe in thirteen years (see Table 5.2 for more details).
Table 5.2 Labour’s Ministers for Europe between 1997 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minister for Europe</th>
<th>Time in Office</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doug Henderson</td>
<td>5 May 1997 – 28 July 1998</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoff Hoon</td>
<td>28 July 1999 – 11 October 1999</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith Vaz</td>
<td>11 October 1999 – 11 June 2000</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Hain</td>
<td>11 June 2000 – 24 October 2002</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis MacShane</td>
<td>28 October 2002 – 11 May 2005</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoff Hoon</td>
<td>8 May 2006 – 27 June 2007</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Murphy</td>
<td>28 June 2007 – 3 October 2008</td>
<td>Gordon Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroline Flint</td>
<td>3 October 2008 – 5 June 2009</td>
<td>Gordon Brown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Blair periodically attempted to exploit the position of minister for Europe more effectively. However their ill-defined role, a lack of resources and the high turnover prevented them from having a strong impact on EU policy (James, 2009). Roger Liddle (interviewed on 12/10/2010) confirms:

I don’t think our ministers for Europe have played a very dominant role in European policy-making. They have been important in implementing the policies and going to lots of meetings, making lots of speeches, but it’s never been a role... Because it’s a number two role in the Foreign Office. You have got an influence there, but you’re not a key player.
In other words, when Labour was in office between 1997 and 2010, the Minister for Europe held a junior position and played no key role in the process of European policy-making.

The British central government has thus Europeanised over the years, and this has rubbed off onto the Labour Party leadership. In a bottom-up and top-down process, a pro-active and pro-European party leadership has pushed for institutional and strategic adaptation. In return, a Europeanised central government has put pressure on the party leadership to Europeanise. The more European norms and ideas become imbedded in central government, the more they affect politicians.

5.3 The Europeanisation of the French Central Government and the PS

Up-to-date, systematic, theoretically and empirically informed research on the Europeanisation of the French polity is still in short supply, as compared to Britain and Germany. Some authors argue that the development of the EU has been one of the most important influences on the functioning of the French political process over the last decades (Elgie and Griggs, 2000). In return, since the beginnings of European integration, French governments have played a key role in shaping EU institutions, policy processes and policies.

For the time being, all French leaders have rejected the vision of a federal Europe. The country has a long history as a unitary state, beginning in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, and remains until today a largely centralised state, despite decentralisation reforms that started in the 1980s. Nevertheless, France

5 Notable exceptions are: Grossman (2007); Parsons (2007); Schmidt (2006); Smith (2005); Cole and Drake (2000); Guyomarch et al. (1998).
has not been spared the federalising effects of the EU (Schmidt, 2006: 77). Like its British and German counterparts, the French executive has given up a significant amount of autonomy to the EU in a wide range of policy areas such as economic and monetary policies (Smith, 2005; Howarth, 2007). As Schmidt (2007: 994) argues, the EU’s ‘lack of “fit”’ with French institutions poses a significant challenge to France’s traditional institutional order and disperses the concentration of authority in the French executive. This view is challenged by Szulaka (2003) who claims that while the French model of governance can still be considered state-centric or state-corporatist there have taken place major political and institutional changes since the ratification of the Single European Act. Hence, even though the French polity suffered and still suffers from ‘enormous system stress’, tensions have ceased to play a more important role in France than they do in other EU member states, according to Szulaka.

The political elite in France have used the EU to solve domestic conflicts and push through unpopular structural reforms without taking full responsibility (Howarth, 2007). In particular, since the end of the 1980s, EU integration has regularly been used to impose or accompany liberalisation in areas such as financial services, transport and most public utilities (Cole and Drake, 2000: 30). However, as the number of actors monitoring EU affairs increased, the government’s strategy of striking bargains and package deals behind closed doors became more problematic as the workings of the EU institutions became increasingly transparent (Grossman, 2007: 987). Smith (2005) claims that the basic administrative structure of the French state has largely remained untouched by Europeanisation. Mainly because of ‘the strength of administrative corps within the civil service, the weakness of party cohesion and a paucity of inter-ministerial bodies, divisions between ministries remain as strong as
ever’ (Smith 2005: 106). In the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, many ministries began to Europeanise by setting up specialised EU units, charged with liaising directly with France’s Permanent Representation in Brussels (Smith, 2005: 107). However, since the 1987 Single European Act, in most ministries responsibility for EU matters is now distributed throughout each administration and there is less pressure to centralise information flows through one single unit (Smith, 2005: 107). Within all French ministries, adaptations have been made to deal with the growing volume of EU legislation. In general, four kinds of changes have been made in the ministries (Guyomarch et al., 1998: 54): the creation of specialist European services; the designation of experts to participate in working parties in Brussels; the training of civil servants to deal with EU question; and the secondment of officials to the staffs of the Commission, the Council, or the Permanent Representation. Most ministries have established units to co-ordinate activities of the main ‘divisions’ which deal with EU affairs.

French civil servants are trained and their careers are made within individual ministries. Hence, EU issues are looked at primarily from the angle of such organisations ‘without even paying lip service to the notion, currently so in vogue in Britain, of “joined-up government”’, as Smith (2005: 108) highlights. In order to overcome the sectoral organisation of French ministries, the Secrétariat Général de Coopération Interministérielle (SGCI) was set up in 1948 as a bureaucratic agency of more than 175 elite civil servants (Schmidt, 2006: 78)6. When the PS was in government, the SGCI was the nodal point where French EU policy was formulated and the coordination between administrative bodies, the government and the EU

6 In 2005 the SGCI has been reformed and renamed ‘Secrétariat général des affaires européennes’ (SGAE).
institutions took place. However, the SGCI was not highly efficient in overcoming intersectoral differences. Most officials working in the SGCI were specialised civil servants sent from ministries as watchdogs to protect sectoral interests (Schmidt, 2006: 109). France’s Permanent Representation in Brussels seems to face the same problem, as most of its officials are seconded from ministries in Paris and remain loyal to them (Smith, 2005: 109). When the PS was in office, the SGCI was subordinated to the prime minister and the ministry for finance. Hence, Jospin oversaw the day-to-day process of European policy-making. Yet, like his British and German counterparts, the French Prime Minister got only involved in highly politicised issues whilst the day-to-day European legislative matters were dealt with by the SGCI (Menon, 2000). Hence, like his British and German counterparts, Jospin relied heavily on the expertise of civil servants and advisors in the process of European policy making. This was a certain advantage for the government: it had more staff at its disposal than President Chirac in the Elysée Palace.

Is the French central government Europeanised? Despite initial institutional misfit between the highly centralised state and European multi-level governance, the French executive has Europeanised. However, the 1997 government turnover does not appear to have accelerated the Europeanisation process. This cannot only be blamed on intersectoral differences, but also on divided government, as will be discussed below.

When the PS was in government, the key players in European policy-making were the prime minister, the foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, and, to a lesser extent, the minister for Europe, Pierre Moscovici (Krell, 2009: 357.) In the case of the PS (and the SPD), party leadership and premiership do not always overlap. Thus, whenever a Socialist became prime minister or president, he yielded the party
leadership to somebody else, usually a loyal colleague with a weak profile whom he could control. This was the case in 1997, when Lionel Jospin became prime minister and left the party leadership to his dauphin François Hollande (Clift, 2005: 226). No longer being the party leader gives the prime minister a certain degree of independence from the party organisation. At the same time, however, he can become more vulnerable to criticism from different party wings and the more radical party activists.

The role of the French prime minister in the formulation of European policy depends on a number of factors, such as his views on European integration; the views of other cabinet ministers and possible coalition partners; and political events. Most crucial however is the power constellation: is the executive unified, meaning that prime minister and president are from the same political party, or is it divided, a constellation that the French have labelled cohabitation? In the field of European policy, cohabitation imposes a form of ‘co-management’ (Cole, 2001: 19). The president retains an important role on account of his treaty-signing power, his function as chair of the Council of Ministers, and his status as directly elected head of state which guarantees his primacy in European and international summits.

During the 1997-2002 period of cohabitation, ‘competitive summity’ (Clift, 2005: 240) took place, with both Jospin and Chirac attempting to speak with the authoritative voice of France. Cole and Drake (2000: 32) take a different approach to the topic, arguing that the 1997-2002 period of cohabitation has left France’s polity surprisingly well equipped to manage Europeanisation as it has fostered a fragmentation and multiplication of actors in the French EU policy-making process, leaving greater scope to the Prime Minister and the SGCI. Jospin’s foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, has publicly stated that where EU policy is concerned he takes
responsibility, acting on the prime minister’s authority, with the assistance of the minister delegate of European Affairs (Pierre Moscovici) and with president Chirac’s agreement (Védrine, 1997, quoted by Cole and Drake, 2000: 35). Under *cohabitation*, considerable administrative and institutional resources are at the disposal of the prime minister. Whereas when the executive is united, the President tends to ‘borrow’ prime-ministerial resources (Elgie and Machin, 1991: 62). Prime Minister Jospin certainly made most out of his power resources with regards to European policy-making. Nevertheless, he was also limited by his ‘plural left’ coalition (*gauche plurielle*), made up of a motley crew of five parties. Jospin managed to contain divisions over Europe within his government but had to make certain concessions. For example, ‘the desire to placate the Communist coalition partner strengthened Jospin’s determination to postpone liberalizing electricity markets in 1999 and to defend the state electricity conglomerate EDF-GDF’ (Cole, 2001: 25).

In France like in Britain, the minister for Europe is a junior position in the Foreign Ministry, and it is usually filled by a party politician. During Jospin’s five-year premiership, Pierre Moscovici filled the post, who was a close confidant of Lionel Jospin. He had considerable EU expertise and was one of the longest serving ministers for Europe. Moscovici was mainly involved in working-level coordination of EU policy with the relevant ministries. It was the Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, who represented France in the Council of Ministers, and Jospin who attended EU summits alongside President Chirac. Jospin was not known to be

7 His successors filled the post for a very short time. Between 2002 and 2010 there were nine ministers for Europe, as Rozenberg (2011) reminds us.
particularly passionate about the EU. Henri Nallet, the PS’ international secretary under Jospin (interviewed on 30/06/2009) explains:

Jospin is an Européen de raison. He very much mistrusts the European Union because the European Union is not democratic. I remember very well our tensions between 1995 and 1997 when we prepared the election manifesto, in particular the section on the single currency and the stability pact. Jospin is much more reserved when it comes to the stability pact. We have had long discussions before bringing the topic up in the national bureau. Jospin asked me to see him at his place where we had long discussions. He asked me: “in the end, what is it about, this stability pact? Who created it?” I said: the European Council. And Jospin tells me: “When was it decided? And in particular, the three percent, the conditions…?” You and I. We were in government [Nallet replies]. “And when was it discussed?” [Jospin asks]. “Never’.

Neither Jospin nor party leader François Hollande was Européen de coeur. Nallet states:

When I was international secretary of the PS, François Hollande asked me to speak about EU affairs every three months at the national bureau. So every three months I delivered a report on European policy. They asked me to speak at the end of the meeting. There was general indifference. The majority of the party leadership showed very little interest in European and international policies. Those who were interested in those issues were the ministers - Hubert Védrine, Élisabeth Guigou, Pierre Moscovici.
In 1997, under the leadership of Jospin, the PS leadership was unified in its views on European integration whilst party activists wanted European policy to be more radical and were not always in line with the compromises negotiated by the Jospin government at EU level. At the EU summit meeting in Amsterdam on 2nd October 1997, Jospin was confronted with an ‘intransigent Anglo/German axis’ and Chirac’s urge to sign the treaty (Clift, 2003: 180). Jospin’s coalition was in no position to either renegotiate the single currency or to change the terms of engagement (Cole, 2001: 28). Nevertheless, Jospin secured the creation of a committee of Eurozone finance ministers to monitor the work of the European Central Bank. The second priority for the PS at national and European level was employment policy. However, the idea of establishing the 35-hours working week at EU level was contested and Jospin found himself isolated. Not even his social democratic colleagues, amongst them Tony Blair, supported the idea. Jospin did however achieve the inclusion of the employment chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty which led to the European employment pact (finally adopted under German EU presidency in Cologne in 1999). The latter was disappointing from the PS’ perspective as it did not involve additional spending or intervention commitments at EU level in line with Jospin’s employment agenda. In the meantime, and just before the European elections in 1999, Schröder and Blair had published their common statement called ‘The Third Way/Neue Mitte’ calling for a modernisation of social democracy. It caused controversy within the SPD’s left wing. Jospin also distanced himself from the Schröder-Blair-paper, as it had called - amongst other things - for the workforce to be more flexible, which did not match the 35-hours-week introduced by the Jospin government.
To summarise, central government in France has Europeanised. However, the process of European policy-making is less centralised than in Britain and as a consequence, France does not always speak with one voice in Brussels. The PS was more restricted in its actions than Labour because it governed in a five-party coalition and shared the responsibility for EU policy with President Chirac. Moreover, whilst Lionel Jospin and François Hollande were generally pro-European, they were less pro-active than the Labour leadership under Tony Blair. Top-down pressures to Europeanise were weaker.

5.4 The Europeanisation of the German Central Government and the SPD

It is often argued that European integration has not seriously challenged the defining principles of the German federal system. On the contrary, it has been claimed that ‘integration has tended to support, and, in some instances, reinforce those defining characteristics’ (Goetz, 1995: 93). After examining central government in Britain and France, Germany offers a rather distinct case study. When analysing the Europeanisation of the German central government from a historical institutionalist perspective, ‘critical junctures’ leading to institutional change are: the outset of European integration, EU Treaty change and government turnover. The study of the impact of European integration on the federal executive goes back until the early 1970s (Goetz, 2003). Within the literature, the German case has been debated controversially, with three different hypotheses evolving. One group of scholars

8 This chapter focuses – for the sake of comparison - on the federal executive. It would also go beyond the scope of this thesis to examine 16 Länder executives.
argues that the German system of EU policy-coordination is inefficient as a consequence of the segmentation of Germany’s political system and the incapacity to deliver a well-tuned, timely position on policy issues (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000; Sturm and Pehle, 2001). Segmentation refers to the system of power distribution, which refers to Germany’s compound, federal political system and power sharing, thus the fact that Germany is governed by coalition governments.

A second group of scholars argues that Germany is effective in uploading its structural and institutional preferences to the European level (Maurer and Wessels, 2001b). The latter hypothesis underlines the compatibility of the compound multi-level-governance of the EU and Germany, the ‘goodness of fit’ between Germany and the EU in constitutional order, norms and conventions, governance and policy goals (Bulmer, 1997). As Beichelt (2007: 422) points out, the two approaches are not antipodal. They can co-exist, because efficiency and effectiveness are to be seen as related but not identical phenomena: whilst EU policy-coordination might be considered inefficient, the outcome can still be effective, and vice versa. Beichelt (2007) presents a third approach and argues that German EU policy coordination is ‘over-efficient’ and completely functional to the needs of the German system. However, he stresses that the growing efficiency of German EU coordination has been achieved by circumventing the public, political parties, and the Bundestag despite the ever-growing importance of the EU level. This hypothesis will be discussed in more detail at the end of this section.

Since the beginnings of EU integration in the 1950s, the basic set-up of German EU policy coordination has remained similar, although it has undergone incremental change. It is much less centralised than in Britain or France, and no ‘German interest’ is ever defined by a central agency like the SGCI. One of the
ministries has traditionally been in charge of coordinating the German position on a given piece of EU legislation. This departmental autonomy (*Ressortprinzip*), which is a constitutional principle (Article 65 GG), leaves much independence to the ministry in charge. Like in France, sectorisation is strong in German European policy-making. Unlike in Britain, collective cabinet government and information-sharing are weak, and departmental norms prevail over collective ones (Bulmer and Burch, 2001: 88).

From the Treaty of Paris to the Treaty of Amsterdam, German EU policy-coordination was concentrated in the Ministry of Economics which had a big European affairs unit. The Maastricht Treaty, a critical juncture in Germany’s adaptation to the EU, induced change. It was seen as an opportunity by the *Länder* governments to ‘strike back’ (Jefferey, 1994) and reclaim some of the powers which they had conceded to the Federal Government in the process of Europeanisation. In Germany, the *Länder* implement the vast majority of European policies, thus bearing the ‘lion share of implementation costs’, whereas before Maastricht they could not participate in the formulation and decision-making at the European level (Börzel, 1999: 582-583). Due to the Länder’s pressure on the Federal Government, the Basic Law was amended (largely the new Article 23), giving the *Länder* comprehensive, legally-binding co-determination powers in EU policy-making. The transfer of both national and regional competences to the EU now require the consent of the *Bundesrat*; a two thirds majority of *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat* has to ratify EU Treaty changes, and when *Länder* interests are affected by an EU decision, the federal government has to take their opinion into account. The *Länder* have won greater rights of input into EU decision making than any other subnational governmental authority in the EU, apart from the Belgian regions (Bulmer, Jefferey and Paterson, 2000: 35).
When in 1998, after 16 years of Christian Democratic and Liberal rule, the SPD and Greens took over government, further changes were made. The EU policy-coordination system underwent further fragmentation when one coordination unit was transferred from the Ministry of Economics to the Ministry of Finance, and a second one was set up in the Foreign Ministry. On the eve of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the centre of economic policy coordination seemed to be shifting towards the Finance Ministry (Dyson, 2003). On top of these functional arguments for institutional change, political ones came into play. A change of coalition partners is a critical moment in the handling of EU policy (Bulmer and Burch, 2001: 88). Before the 2002 federal elections, Chancellor Schröder had mooted the creation of a Ministry of European Affairs, with the Minister based in Chancellery (Goetz, 2003: 67). After the elections, however, the plan was dropped as Foreign Minister Fischer strongly opposed it, fearing a loss of influence on EU policy.

This basic setup of EU policy coordination continued to hold until 2009, with the exception of a fall-back of economic coordination to the European division of the Economics ministry in 2005/2006. This decision, according to Beichelt (2007) supports the importance of coalition politics to the coordination system: in the 2005 Grand Coalition the Finance and Economics ministry were split between the CDU and SPD, whilst the Foreign Office was held by the SPD. Consequently, ‘leaving economic EU coordination in the Finance ministry would have meant leaving all EU policy coordination out of the chancellor’s reach’ (Beichelt, 2007: 424). Another feature of incremental reform dates from 2002. Until then, the high-level Committee of European Affairs State Secretaries (EStS) from the different ministries had been alternately chaired by state secretaries from the Finance and Foreign Ministries. As a consequence, the grip on this committee was rather weak, and alongside France,
Germany was one of the low performers in EU directive compliance. After the re-election of the red-green coalition government in 2002, the chair of the EStS was given to the Foreign Ministry and to a parliamentary state secretary in order to better include parliament into EU policy-coordination (Beichelt, 2007). This attempt failed, as in the case of conflicts, MPs got in contact directly with the cabinet (through their party group leader) rather than with an administrative committee headed by a parliamentary secretary of state (Beichelt, 2007).

Beichelt (2007) argues that this institutional triangle, even though it looks complex, is functional. Conflicts between the different ministries do occasionally arise; however, they are solved at the bureaucratic level. Beichelt concludes that even though neither interest groups nor parliament are formally and legally excluded from the coordination system, German EU policy coordination is steered by non-elected bureaucrats who circumvent the public. It has to be added, though, that in Germany there traditionally exists a close linkage between the political-governmental and the administrative spheres of the executive. Unlike in Britain, there is little concern about the demarcation between politics and administration in the executive, and the boundaries between them are fuzzy (Goetz, 2003: 63).

The German central government has thus Europeanised over the past decades, yet the question is whether this has affected the SPD leadership. Stroh (2004) and Lamatsch (2004) argue that in Germany, European policy is government policy. Historically, the German Chancellor has played a key role in the formulation of European policy. This is due to constitutional competences, but also to the strong interest of all Chancellors in Germany’s integration into Western Europe. After all, as Paterson (2011: 60) remarks:
Participation in supranational institutions allowed West Germany to modify its subject status, to resume access to export markets and to strengthen its impaired and weak state identity.

In terms of constitutional competences, the Basic Law spells out the Chancellor’s power to define the ‘general guidelines of policies’ (Richtlinienkompetenz). This constitutional privilege is rarely explicitly invoked, ‘but it underpins the Chancellor’s position as the paramount figure within the government’ (Goetz, 2003: 32). Yet, the Richtlinienkompetenz can hardly be taken at its face value, as Smith (1991: 49) notes. ‘It is directly juxtaposed by the entirely different principle of ministerial autonomy’, the Ressortprinzip; that is, ministers conduct the policy of their own departments on their own responsibility with a minimum of control as long as they don’t depart from overall government policy’ (Smith, 1991: 49.). However, it has been argued that foreign and European policies are ‘untypical’ in the sense that in both policy areas, the federal government plays a very strong role, and the Chancellor, with her or his closest advisers, is in a dominant position (Patterson, 1994; Schmidt, 2007: 311). The Chancellor disposes of his/her office, which is an important institutional resource (Goetz 2003; 33). Gerhard Schröder was the first Chancellor to create a division within the Chancellor’s Office devoted exclusively to monitoring European policy (‘Abteilung 5’, under the direction of Rainer Silberberg). Overall, however, this division remained rather small. It mainly followed what was happening in the ministries rather than steering European policy, except for subjects of special relevance to the Chancellor. For Schröder, most relevant and thus highly politicised issues were relating to the EU internal market (Lamatsch, 2004: 40). Hence, the role of the Chancellor’s Office also depends on whether the Chancellor places high
priority on EU policy, which Gerhard Schröder did not, at least not during his first term in office, 1998-2002. Schröder shared the responsibility for EU policy with his coalition partner, the Greens. Between 1998 and 2005, the SPD governed in a coalition with the Greens, with Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor and Joschka Fischer as Foreign Minister (and Vice Chancellor). Fischer was, according to Helms (2005: 119) the ‘true number one minister in Schröder’s squad’. He has been described as a ‘classical pro-integrationist’ (Harnisch and Schieder, 2003: 66) who did not hold back his ambitious views on a federal Europe. In speeches and interviews, Gerhard Schröder stressed that his government would put Germany’s national interest first, for example when it came to the negotiation the EU budget. In the end, however, his provocative rhetoric did not match his European policy. As Harnisch and Schieder (2003) argue, Schröder underwent a ‘learning process’: constrained by the Franco-German friendship, Schröder accepted in 2000 that Germany’s contribution to the EU’s 2000-2006 budget would not be lowered.

A closer look at Schröder’s leadership also reveals that his involvement in the more detailed, day-to-day aspects of EU policy remained rather modest, which also applied to most other policy areas (Helms, 2005: 119). In this regard, Schröder differed very much from Blair, who from the beginning onwards showed a strong interest in European policy. The majority of key decisions in German foreign policy were made ‘at least as much in the Foreign Ministry as in the Chancellery’, as Helms (2005: 120) states.

After the 2005 general elections, the SPD lost the chancellorship and became the junior partner in a grand coalition with the CDU/CSU. Angela Merkel (CDU)

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9 These are well documented in Fischer’s speeches to the European Parliament on 12 January 1999 and at the Humboldt Universität in Berlin on 12 May 2002.
became Chancellor, while the SPD still controlled the key ministries involved in EU policy, such as the Foreign Ministry (under Frank-Walter Steinmeier) the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs (under Franz Müntefering until November 2007, when Olaf Scholz took over) and the Ministry of Finance (under Peer Steinbrück). The SPD leaders were thus in a strong position to co-determine European policy alongside the Chancellor’s Office, and the Willy-Brandt-Haus and party group in the Bundestag could still rely on early information on EU legislation and expertise from the government where its European policy continued to be formulated. Dr. Eva Högl, MdB and former government official (interviewed on 20/07/2009) shares her impressions of Franz Müntefering, who was Minister for Work and Social Affairs at the time:

He recognised that decisions are made at EU level. He recognised that he had to travel to Brussels, even though he didn’t like travelling at all and does not speak any foreign language. He realised that he had to travel there in order to win support for his plans: good working conditions, fair salaries, gender equality, the fight against child poverty etc. He learnt that these topics were on the EU’s agenda, or that they needed to be shifted there. That was fantastic. It was my best time in the Ministry ten years ago, when Müntefering became such a great European. Now he mentions Europe in every single speech – not only during the European election campaign.

This statement points to a certain Europeanisation of SPD leaders in government. Some social democratic ministers were already Europeanised before they entered government, most notably Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, who before becoming a
minister for economic cooperation and development had been an MEP and the SPD’s EU spokesperson in the Bundestag. The most visibly Europeanised member of Schröder’s government, however, was Green foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. The example of Gerhard Schröder shows that Europeanised Chancellors are no longer the rule. Since the post-war generation of politicians has retired, a more self-confident German European (and foreign) policy has been made.

5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that Labour, the PS and SPD operated in Europeanised central governments. In all three cases, Europeanisation has been an incremental, ongoing process, triggered by external events such as EU treaty change, or internal events such as government turnover. European policy-making differed significantly between the three social democratic governments, which confirms the claim that Europeanisation does not led to a harmonisation of domestic policy-making processes.

In general, the party leadership in office were Europeanised, although for the PS and SPD leaders, European policy was clearly no priority: Neither Lionel Jospin nor Gerhard Schröder was a Européen de coeur. Amongst the three, Tony Blair was the most pro-active Europeaniser, although Labour’s overall EU policy achievements have been characterised as a ‘missed opportunity’ (Smith, 2005). The EU views of the prime minister, or in the German case, the chancellor, are very important for the Europeanisation of central government and the party. It has been demonstrated that the EU policy network at the top of the three parties was very small. Only a few ministers were key players in the parties’ EU policy-making process. Moreover, the party leadership heavily relied on the civil service and personal EU advisers. These
findings suggest that the Europeanisation of the leadership in government does not necessarily rub off onto the lower levels of the party organisation.
Chapter 6: The Europeanisation of parliament

The previous chapter examined the Europeanisation of central government and demonstrated how the party leaderships thereby become heavily involved in European policy-making. This chapter looks at another governmental arena in which political parties Europeanise: namely parliaments.

Generally, national parliaments are involved in EU decision-making in three main ways: they monitor the behaviour of their governments in the Council and the European Council; they have certain duties emanating from the EU Treaties (e.g. the ratification of Treaty amendments); and they are, together with the executive, responsible for the implementation of EU directives (Raunio, 2005: 319-320). However, the only way for national parliaments to influence EU decision-making is through their governments. Members of parliament can scrutinise their government’s EU policies by (1) obtaining information on EU affairs, (2) processing and following up on this information, and (3) making use of their scrutiny rights vis-à-vis the government (Neuhold and De Ruiter, 2005: 58). In practice, those MPs who are interested in scrutinising the government’s EU policy can sit on European Affairs Committees (EACs) or become experts on other committees dealing with EU policy. Moreover, every MP can get in touch with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), MPs from other EU Member States or EU officials to become better informed about upcoming and ongoing EU legislation.

This chapter investigates whether the House of Commons, National Assembly and Bundestag are arenas in which the parliamentary groups of a party Europeanises.
The focus lies on the lower houses since they are directly elected and determine government formation. In all three countries, the upper chambers do not. The basic assumption is that if national parliaments have Europeanised, MPs will perform Europeanised roles within the parliament, which, in turn, will frame their outlook on and knowledge of the EU and have party implications. Yet again, Europeanisation is a bi-directional process with a feedback loop: Europhile MPs can contribute to the institutional and strategic Europeanisation of parliament. Europeanised MPs are in a stronger position to scrutinise the government’s EU policy because they are well informed. In the long term, this can strengthen the position of national parliaments in the EU’s political system and reduce the democratic deficit. Moreover, Europeanised MPs can discuss current EU policy issues with members and activists in their constituencies, which can contribute to the Europeanisation of the parties at grassroots level.

After giving a brief overview of the literature, the notion of parliamentary Europeanisation will be defined and applied to the three parliaments. In its last section, this chapter will discuss whether parliamentary Europeanisation has rubbed off onto the Labour Party, the Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) party groups.

This chapter relies on academic literature and semi-structured interviews with MPs, party officials and a bureaucrat working for the Bundestag. Unfortunately, as is the case with other chapters, the data remain asymmetrical. For various reasons, a number of MPs from the Labour Party and PS did not agree to being interviewed. Therefore, more original data has been collected on the Europeanisation of the Bundestag than the House of Commons and National Assembly.
6.1 A brief literature review

The Europeanisation of parliaments first caught scholarly attention in the mid-1990s. Studies have tended to focus on two core themes: firstly, the impact of European integration on the role of national parliaments (Auel, 2005); and secondly, the transfer of legislative power from the national to the EU level, and from the legislative to the executive (Raunio, 2002; Raunio and Hix, 2000). The first comparative studies portrayed domestic parliaments as largely ineffective and passive institutions, uninterested in scrutinising their governments in EU matters (Laursen and Pappas, 1995). In the meantime, more sophisticated, comparative studies have been published, comparing the adaptation of national legislatures to the process of European integration (Maurer and Wessels, 2001a; Auel and Benz, 2005; O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007).

While early studies focussed exclusively on formal institutional adaptation (such as the creation of European affairs committees in national legislatures), more recent publications have looked at the bigger picture, examining the established routines and ‘ways of doing things’ that structure MPs’ behaviour in national parliaments into account. Other recent studies have focused on explaining why certain national parliaments invest more resources in holding their governments accountable in EU affairs than others (Raunio, 2005). While all national parliaments in the EU have set up a European affairs committee (EAC), the roles and powers of these committees vary. Parliaments often share best practice regarding EU scrutiny, and through COSAC (which is the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union) they can share the findings of their enquiries. This has led to a certain institutional convergence: EACs across the EU have similar functions. However, their status, role and legal powers still vary
significantly (Raunio, 2009: 319). Raunio (2005) examines the impact of five independent variables to explain cross-national variation in parliamentary EU scrutiny. These independent variables are: the role of the parliament independent of integration; public opinion on EU membership; party positions on EU integration; the frequency of minority governments; and political culture. He comes to the conclusion that ‘having a strong parliament and a Eurosceptic public opinion increases the probability of the legislature subjecting the government to tighter scrutiny in EU affairs’ (Raunio, 2005: 336).

Most scholars portray national and regional parliaments as passive institutions, exerting rather modest influence on government policy. After all, the technicality of most legislation, strong party government, the growing relevance of external pressures such as globalisation, and the delegation of policy-making authority to public or private agencies, all limit the influence parliaments exert today (Raunio and Wright, 2006; Norton, 1998). By the same token, many researchers argue that Europeanisation has weakened parliaments and portray them as victims of EU integration. From a purely constitutional perspective, this argument seems straightforward: increasingly, the law-making powers of national and regional parliaments have shifted to the European level. After all, national parliaments have to translate EU directives into national law, which set political goals but leave the choice of means to the member states. This puts parliaments in the paradoxical situation of being unable to exert much influence on the directive but of ‘still being politically responsible for its content to the people’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2002, quoted by Töller, 2006: 6).

Additionally, in areas where national parliaments might normally take legislative action, the EU Treaty and secondary EU law impose substantial restrictions on national policies, particularly in areas touching upon the European Single Market
In addition, the use of qualified majority voting in the Council of the European Union makes it difficult for parliaments to force governments to make commitments before taking decisions at the EU level. The extensive involvement of national ministers and civil servants in drafting and implementing EU legislation effectively ‘insulates or marginalises parliaments’ (Raunio and Wright, 2006: 282). The resulting information deficit reduces the ability of MPs to control their governments, while the ‘true winners of European integration have arguably been bureaucrats and organized private interests at all levels of government’ (Raunio and Wright, 2006: 282).

While national parliaments have certainly been late adapters to EU integration, they increasingly exercise tighter scrutiny of their governments over EU affairs (Holzacker, 2008). Since the Maastricht Treaty, parliaments across the EU have created new structures in order to control, influence and monitor better the decision-making of national governments. Hence, the popular thesis of ‘deparliamentarisation’ which suggests that national parliaments are inevitably losing influence in the process of EU integration, may underestimate those recent reforms (Benz and Broschek, 2010). The role of national parliaments in EU policy-making was one of the topics considered by the European Constitutional Convention (CONV353/02 on 22/10/2002), and the Lisbon Treaty was the first EU Treaty to mention national parliaments in the main text. There is however broad scholarly consensus that the reforms included in the Treaty will not significantly enhance the role that national parliaments play in the EU.

As the three case studies presented in this chapter demonstrate, parliamentary adaptation to EU integration has taken place, even if institutions like parliaments tend
to resist adaptational pressures (Hansen and Scholl, 2002: 8). It can be expected that parliamentary adaptation is shaped by the constitutional position (or: strength) of the legislature as well as by procedural, ideological and cultural factors (Norton, 1996, quoted by Auel, 2005: 309). This chapter will focus on Töller’s (2006) three dimensions of parliamentary Europeanisation: (1) legislative, (2) institutional and (3) strategic Europeanisation. Legislative Europeanisation refers to the amount of legislation passed by national parliaments with EU origins. It is a crucial aspect of parliamentary Europeanisation, and national politicians regularly refer to the high share of Europeanised national legislation. Legislative Europeanisation affects parties because the higher the share of Europeanised legislation, the more MPs have to deal with EU legislation in their day-to-day work. Institutional Europeanisation covers the ‘development of institutional and procedural provisions to organize and permit influence on the national government’s European policies’ (Töller, 2006). This refers to the constitutional powers of national parliaments as well as to the creation of European affairs committees and subcommittees, administrative bodies dealing with EU legislation, working groups etc. Being a member of a European affairs committee or EU spokesperson of an expert committee can Europeanise MPs. It makes them more aware of the importance of EU policy. Last but not least, strategic Europeanisation ‘consists in national MPs taking the European Union as a decision-making center into account – but also as an addressee for their action – and in adjusting action patterns and routines accordingly’ (Töller, 2006: 5). Strategic Europeanisation therefore relates less to parliamentary Europeanisation, but more to the Europeanisation of MPs. Europeanised MPs are in direct contacts with MEPs, EU institutions or sister parties from across the EU in order to have earlier access to information.
As throughout this PhD, this chapter interprets Europeanisation as a multidirectional process. It is recognised that national parliaments have lost legislative competences, and their remaining legislative powers are often further restricted by European law. In this context, Auel (2006) refers to *passive Europeanisation*. To be sure, though, national parliaments are not mere objects or victims of Europeanisation. They have adapted to EU integration through institutional and strategic reforms. Moreover, MPs have become more aware of the EU and in some cases have asked for stronger scrutiny rights. This process can be labelled *active or institutional Europeanisation* (Auel, 2006: 249). In other words: from being objects national legislatures have turned into subjects of Europeanisation (Töller, 2006: 19). Parties can play an important role in this process: they can put pressure on the government to enhance parliamentary Europeanisation.

In the following sections, the Europeanisation of the British, French and German Parliament will be examined and the impact of parliamentary Europeanisation on the Labour Party, PS and SPD will be analysed.

### 6.2 The Europeanisation of the House of Commons, National Assembly and Bundestag

In the ‘Westminster’ system of the United Kingdom, the parliamentary agenda is controlled by the government (Budge et al., 2004) and the *de facto* veto power of the House of Commons is minimal. When the Labour Party was in government (1997-2010) there was a strong competition in a two-party system between Labour and the Conservative Party. This adversarial political culture is a product of one-party governments, which stems from the majoritarian electoral system. The House of Commons has been described as an ‘arena legislature’ as opposed to a ‘transformative
legislature’ such as the US Congress (Polsby, 1975). Arena legislatures serve as ‘formalized settings for the interplay of significant political forces in the life of a political system’ (Polsby, 1975: 277). Committee work plays only a minor role in the House of Commons and it needs to be highlighted that the European scrutiny committee was one of the first permanent committee to be created. It has been strengthened since its creation in 1974. The House of Commons has experienced legislative, institutional, and – to a lesser extent – strategic Europeanisation over the past decades, as will be demonstrated below.

Europeanisation has not substantially altered the workings of the French Parliament either, but has confirmed and reinforced existing trends. The French parliament has a weak place in the political system under the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958) which transferred power from parliament to the executive. Grossman and Sauger (2007: 1118) therefore stress: ‘If there is no actual decline or “deparliamentarization”, it is mainly because the parliament is weakened from the outset’. France is also an example of a semi-presidential political system where the President has considerable powers, especially in the field of foreign policy. It is only in periods of Cohabitation that French parliamentary parties provide the foundation to the leadership of the country, as has been explained in the previous chapter. Hence, as Grossman and Sauger (2007) point out, EU scrutiny cannot be viewed as a chain of delegation from voters (via parliament) to government. The government cannot simply be perceived as an agent of parliament, negotiating France’s European policy at EU level, as it shares this role with the President who is elected directly by the people. Hence, Europeanisation has not fundamentally altered the working style of the National Assembly which from the outset was dominated by the executive.
In Germany, institutional reforms have confirmed the EU scrutiny powers of the Bundestag and have over the years improved the parliamentary infrastructure needed to apply these powers (Auel and Benz, 2005: 385). Compared to many other parliaments in the EU – and particularly the National Assembly - the Bundestag is considered a relatively strong legislature. It is much closer to what Polsby (1975: 277) labels a ‘transformative’ legislature, which possesses the ‘independent capacity, frequently exercised, to mould and transform proposals from whatever source into laws’. The Bundestag is characterised by a high degree of professionalisation which manifests itself in expert committee work. Europeanisation, it is argued here, has not changed the Bundestag’s working style. As has been discussed in Chapter 2, there is strong party competition in a system of five parties, and the parliamentary majority shares the power to control the agenda with the government. It has therefore considerable influence on the agenda. As European integration is no cleavage in German politics, it has not altered patterns of party competition in the Bundestag. It has rather been integrated into the already existing committee work.

6.2.1 Legislative Europeanisation

Legislative Europeanisation refers to the scope for policy and law-making affected by European integration. It is a crucial aspect of parliamentary Europeanisation and affects MPs’ day-to-day work, because the more policy areas have Europeanised, the higher the number of MPs dealing with EU policy in their committees. Measuring legislative Europeanisation is however easier said than done. European ‘prompts’ on national legislation include directives, regulations, Council decisions including framework decisions, judgements by the European Court of Justice, and stipulations
of the Treaty (Töller, 2006: 8-9). In 2011, no study existed measuring legislative Europeanisation across the EU.

Legislation passed by the British parliament has certainly Europeanised since Britain entered the EC. Unfortunately, there are no up-to-date data measuring the impact of the EU on UK legislation, and this chapter needs to draw on a study by Page (1998: 808) which assesses the scope of the impact of EU legislation on British public policy. He demonstrates that the policy areas of agriculture, trade and industry were the most Europeanised (with 51.1 per cent for agriculture and 28.6 per cent in trade and industry).

In 2007, Brouard, Costa and Kerrouche measured the shares of all French laws with EU origins during the period between 1986 and 2006. In their study, Europeanised laws are those that either ratify international treaties, directives that demand national transposition, agreements between Member States or judicial decisions by the European Court of Justice (Brouard et al., 2007: 19, quoted by Töller, 2010: 423). Brouard et al. come to the conclusion that across time, the yearly share of Europeanised laws increased from less than 3 per cent in 1986 to 13.3 per cent in 2006. The highest shares of Europeanised legislation can be identified in the fields of ‘space, science and technology’ (39 per cent), banking, finance and domestic commerce (28 per cent, Brouard et al., 2007). Hence, it can be concluded that French legislation has significantly Europeanised in the past decades.

According to an official report by the Bundestag, 31.5 per cent of all legislation pronounced and ratified between 2005 and 2009 had EU origins (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03/09/2009). To be sure, there are significant differences between policy areas. For example, 23 per cent of laws in the area of justice and home affairs emanated from the EU. In agriculture, 52 per cent were of EU origin. In the
previous legislative period, 34.5 per cent of laws emanated from the EU while in the 1990s, the share was approximately 25 percent. Looking at the overall amount of Bundestag legislation with European prompts, it can be claimed that legislative Europeanisation has taken place.

These findings confirm that parliamentary party groups need to deal with an increasing amount of Europeanised legislation across a wide range of expert committees. This should lead to the Europeanisation of MPs.

6.2.2 Institutional Europeanisation

Institutional Europeanisation refers to the development of institutional and procedural provisions to organise parliamentary EU scrutiny. It includes constitutional powers of national parliaments as well as the creation of European affairs committees and subcommittees, administrative bodies dealing with EU legislation, working groups etc. In a parliament that has created the infrastructure and know-how to effectively scrutinise the government’s EU policy, MPs are expected to Europeanise,

In the case of the House of Commons, institutional ‘misfit’ was obvious when Britain joined the EC: the non-existing committee system meant a lack of expertise, and parliament was ill-prepared to handle the increasing inflow of technical legislative acts from the European level (Hansen and Scholl, 2002: 6). Unsurprisingly, however, the House of Commons has experienced institutional Europeanisation over the years. EU documents are first examined by the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC), which reports its opinion on the legal and political importance of each document. The ESC also has the right to question ministers. However, it is not in the ESC where EU documents are discussed in depth. The ECS can defer documents to one of the (ad
European Committees, or – by a motion put down by the government - to the Committee of the Whole House, which gives the government the opportunity to avoid a plenary debate on EU affairs. The European Committees can discuss European decisions and the respective governmental motion and make amendments to this motion. However, for the motions to become effective, the committees rely on the government. It is the government that puts down the final motion on the floor of the House, where it is generally voted on without further debate. Even though a scrutiny reserve ensures that parliament can deal with EU policies before they are negotiated at the EU level, EU debates in the House of Commons are rather rare. Although the European Committees may decide to pass the government's motion, amend it or even reject it completely, their motions have no practical effect. If the government dislikes them it can move a different motion in the House (Auel and Benz, 2005: 381). As a result, the European Committees have no possibility of binding the government, which puts Parliament in a weak position. Its overall influence on the government's European policy is negligible.

However, even if formal scrutiny rights are modest, British MPs have developed informal scrutiny strategies. They continuously demand information on EU affairs and the government's position on them. Ministers are regularly invited before the committees so MPs can hold them to account, or receive letters in which the ESC asks them for information. Interestingly, this scrutiny mechanism is used by both the parliamentary majority and the opposition, and Labour MPs often attacked their own ministers during their time in government.

Like the House of Commons, the National Assembly has experienced institutional Europeanisation as an incremental process. It has gained considerable constitutional rights in the context of the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent Treaty
changes. Article 88-4 of the French Constitution obliges the government to transmit to parliament all legislative documents immediately after their reception in the Council. The legislature has moreover been granted the right to vote on resolutions regarding these documents. The so-called reserve d’examen parlementaire, obliges the government to enable the parliament to vote on a resolution before the Council’s decision (Sprungk, 2003: 9). Another turning-point in parliamentary scrutiny has been the debate on the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty. In this context, the constitutional amendment of 1 March 2005 recognised for the first time the existence of EU legislation, which means that parliament is now entitled to vote on resolutions on any European act adopted under the co-decision procedure (Grossman and Sauger, 2007: 1123). Like the House of Commons and the Bundestag, the National Assembly has an EU scrutiny committee, created in 1979. When the PS was in government, it was called Délégation pour l’Union Européenne (DUE) and was no fully-fledged parliamentary committee. The French Constitution limited the number of parliamentary committees to six. For the DUE, the procedure to adopt resolutions was somewhat complicated as it could do so on its own, but had to rely on the expert committees (Lequiller, 2005: 39, quoted by Grossman and Sauger, 2007: 1124). As a consequence of this complication, the average number of resolutions declined while the DUE made increased use of opinions and conclusions (Grossman and Sauger, 2007: 1124). In 2008, the DUE was made a proper parliamentary committee and was renamed Commission des Affaires Européennes (CAE). As Rozenberg (2011) writes, the CAE has more autonomy for adapting resolutions and no longer needs to consult with other committees.

The French system of EU document transfer has become more centralised. The Sécrétariat général des affaires européennes (SGAE, formerly SGCI) provides
the French Parliament with draft proposals for the former first and third pillar, while documents regarding CFSP are transferred by the Foreign Office. Hence, the National Assembly is well-informed about EU policy. Unlike their counterparts in the Bundestag, however, French MEPs does not receive explanatory memoranda to the documents, and get no information about deliberations at COREPER level or the negotiation processes in the Council (Szukala and Rozenberg, 2001: 238). What is more, members of government rarely reported to the DUE when the PS was in government. Compared to their German counterparts, French MPs have therefore put more formal pressure on the government to get information on EU matters (Sprungk, 2003: 12).

The National Assembly makes a regular, yet not excessive use of its possibilities to formally state an opinion and generally, the parliamentary majority supports the government (Sprungk, 2003: 14). Nevertheless, in the past the parliament has explicitly demanded from the government to provide them with more systematic information on the follow-up of resolutions (Hourquebie, 1999: 183, quoted by Sprungk, 2003: 16). Public debates on EU issues take regularly place on topics such as the scope of France’s financial contribution to the EU budget. In general, the number of debates is approximately as high as in the Bundestag, but the share of parliamentary initiatives for public debates on EU issues is higher. The reason is that the French government rarely reports about EU politics (Sprungk, 2003: 18).

The level of parliamentary EU scrutiny in France is generally very low. The role expert committees play is considered ‘weak’, and so was the DUE’s power in giving the government voting instructions. The access to information (in terms of scope and timing) was considered ‘moderate’ (Raunio, 2005: 324). Grossman and Sauger (2007) blame this weakness on three factors: institutional weakness, self-
restraint and governmental autonomy. Institutional weakness relates to the fact that
the French parliament is weak and that the DUE suffered from the same limitations as
the parliamentary committees. According to Raunio (2005) a strong parliament and a
Eurosceptical public opinion increase the probability of the legislature subjecting the
government to tighter EU scrutiny. The French parliament is a weak legislature,
which confirms Raunio’s findings. At the same time, however, Euroscepticism is on
the rise amongst the public, and this can explain the latest reforms aimed at
strengthening parliamentary EU scrutiny powers (Rozenberg, 2011).

The pro-European consensus in the Bundestag and the political elite in general
was seen as an integral part of the German ‘raison d’état’ after the Second World
War. Due to this ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) the main
questions of European integration are, until today, very rarely an issue for party
competition or intra-party division. Against this background it becomes more
understandable that the EU scrutiny system in the Bundestag only developed very
slowly. It took the Bundestag until 1994 to set up a fully-fledged European
Committee. The decisive break-through was facilitated by the Federal Constitutional
Court in the debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The Court
put pressure on the government to create a EU affairs committee which was set up in
October 1992 with the purpose of paving the way for the ratification of the Treaty.
The participation rights of the Bundestag and Bundesrat (the upper house) were laid
down in the course of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty through amendments to
Article 23, the so-called ‘Europaartikel’ and the related Article 45. Article 23 states
that any further transfer of sovereign rights to the EU requires ratification by a two-
thirds majority in both legislative chambers. Moreover, section two states that the
Bundestag cooperates with the government in EU affairs. Accordingly, the federal
government has the constitutional duty to inform both legislative chambers comprehensively and at the earliest point possible and enable the parliament to submit its opinion before a decision is adopted at European level. The federal government must take parliament’s opinion into account during negotiations at EU level. However, in contrast to the Danish Folketing, the Bundestag has no right to formally mandate the government’s bargaining position. The role of the Bundestag has been further strengthened in 2009, after Peter Gauweiler, a CSU politician who was supported by politicians from Die Linke, challenged the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty before the Federal Constitutional Court. In June 2009 the Court rendered its judgement (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 on 30/6/2009), holding that, while the Lisbon Treaty complies with the German Basic Law, the cooperation between government and parliament in EU matters needed to be reinforced so as to ensure that both the Bundestag and Bundesrat enjoy sufficient scrutiny powers. As a consequence, in September 2009, new accompanying laws were adopted by both chambers to this effect. The government is now obliged to get parliamentary consent before transferring new competences to the European Union. But major changes in the Bundestag’s EU scrutiny system were not expected. This was confirmed by Axel Schäfer MdB who explained in an interview (25/06/2010) that the new accompanying laws merely formalise what had already been practiced.

The Bundestag’s EU affairs committee (Europaausschuss, EUA) only deals with fundamental questions of European integration, such as Treaty amendments and decisions of historical importance, such as EU enlargement. Specific European policies are dealt with by the expert committees. Hence, the EUA does not usually translate European directives into national law, which is considered to be the task of expert committees. Nevertheless, the EUA enjoys a prominent role. There are
currently 22 standing committees in the *Bundestag*, and only four of them are mandated by the Basic Law, the EUA being amongst them. Its establishment is not subject to the *Bundestag*’s Parliamentary Standing Orders, which provided the EUA with the constitutional continuity needed to build up the necessary expertise and to provide a longer-term career perspective for EU specialists in the parliamentary parties (Saalfeld, 2003). The EUA’s composition is unique, as it not only consists of 33 MPs, but also 16 MEPs (the latter without voting rights). MEPs, however, rarely have the time to attend committee sessions, as the parliamentary schedules often overlap. In cross-national studies of the EU-15, Germany scores relatively high regarding its level of parliamentary EU scrutiny (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Bergman et al., 2003; Raunio, 2005). EU scrutiny rights of expert committees in the *Bundestag* are considered ‘strong’, and so is the access to information (in its scope and timing). Altogether, institutional Europeanisation is rather strong in the case of the German parliament. Especially in the last decade, the *Bundestag* has caught up and Europeanised its institutional settings. However, the question remains of whether the *Bundestag* makes use of its power. Strikingly enough, both the EUA and the expert committees only rarely make use of their formal scrutiny rights. They rarely issue opinions which could limit the government’s room for manoeuvre in EU negotiations. Dr. Eva Högl, SPD member of the EUA (interviewed on 20/07/2009) stresses that the work of the EUA was very consensual when the SPD was in government. Even a year later, when the SPD was in opposition, it hardly tried to attack the government’s EU policy or limit the room for negotiations (informal meeting with Dr. Eva Högl on 12/07/2010). This is confirmed by Axel Schäfer (MdB, interviewed on 25/06/2010). Asked whether being in opposition had changed the SPD’s EU strategy in the *Bundestag*, Schäfer said: ‘clearly not’.
There are various reasons for this seemingly passive role of the Bundestag. Some scholars argue that the lack of parliamentary opposition (and public opinion) to EU integration is one important variable to explain weak EU scrutiny (Raunio, 2005). Moreover, EU policies have to be dealt with by the expert committees, and MPs from those committees already suffer from a heavy workload and do not spend their time on EU scrutiny. In addition, there tends to be a lack of coordination between the specialised committees and the EUA, and members of the EUA are not always satisfied with the amount of time and expertise the specialised committees spent on EU legislation. Dr. Eva Högl (interviewed on 20/07/2009) explains:

Unluckily, Europe is not prioritised in the committees for health, work and social affairs, and business, for example. There are differences, and I notice that it very much depends on the individual. In almost every expert committee there is a member responsible for Europe, but they deal with it with very different degrees of intensity and knowledge.

Information overload is also seen as a cause of concern. Until recently the Bundestag had no ‘filter committee’. This shortcoming has been recognised and changed: in May 2006 the Bundestag set up an EU affairs unit which provides efficient service. Reasons for the set-up of this service were that ‘in the specialised committees, EU legislative documents were often not discussed on time, and MPs did not always know their participation rights (...). Moreover, the way the Bundestag dealt with certain issues such as the EU services directive was criticised’ (Interview with Dr. Sven Vollrath, head of the Bundestag’s EU affairs unit PA1 on 17/07/2009). It took the Bundestag one year to set up a new EU affairs unit (called PA1). Officials got in contact with other national parliaments across the EU (notably Finland) to share best practice for the creation of this unit which today consists of an office in Berlin and
Brussels. PA1 does the same job as the European Scrutiny Committee in the House of Commons: it forwards documents received by the EU institutions and the government to the different factions and saves them in a database. It also allocates the legislative projects to the relevant committees. As Dr. Vollrath explains: ‘in sum, we receive 15,000 to 16,000 documents per year which have to be forwarded, classified, and this is what the PA1 does’. Ten research assistants working in PA1 are responsible for the different parliamentary committees, supporting the committees when it comes to content and timeframe of EU legislative documents. They also assess whether an EU legislative proposal needs to be discussed in the Bundestag or not – which is done in cooperation with the different party groups who are all consulted on the matter. ‘This mechanism’, Dr. Vollrath points out, ‘became very popular and is less bureaucratic than it may sound. 50-55 per cent of all legislative proposals are no longer transferred to the expert committees because the party groups decide, on the basis of the PA1’s recommendations, that these documents are not relevant for the Bundestag and Germany. As a consequence, committees now focus on the really important projects’.

As mentioned earlier, before the set-up of PA1, Bundestag officials took examples of best practice from other national parliaments in the EU Member States into consideration, such as Finland. However, Dr. Vollrath argues that examples cannot simply be copied as parliaments ‘organise differently and have different constitutional competences. So we did take experience and ideas [from abroad] into consideration, but at the end, we had to bring them in line with our competences and the structure of our parliament’. This statement confirms institutionalist claims that when institutions change, they integrate changes into existing patterns. Dr. Eva Högl (interviewed on 20/07/2009) states that PA1 is doing ‘excellent work’ in presenting lists to the committees, estimating in which EU projects the Bundestag should get involved or
not, ‘because we MPs could impossibly keep an eye on all dossiers’. Thus, the problem of information overload has now been solved.

Another explanation for the *Bundestag*’s reluctant use of its institutional power could be that the procedures linked to the special rights (Article 23.3) are still too complicated, and therefore the EUA worked out a ‘semi-formal approach’: after deliberations amongst committee members had been completed and consensus on a specific topic reached, the federal government was notified in writing of the Committee’s position and requested to take it into account. The *Bundestag*’s rules committee, however, classified this practice as an unacceptable bypassing of formal procedures (Töller, 2006: 14). This is related to another explanation: since the composition of the EAC reflects that of the entire *Bundestag*, the government can rely on its support. Even if MPs have an incentive to influence their government, the majority parties have no incentive to do this publicly. German EU politics being largely consensual, the committee tends to avoid confrontation with the government (Töller, 2006: 15).

The overall involvement of plenary sessions with EU issues has been relatively low in the *Bundestag*, only increasing occasionally in periods when EU Treaties are amended (Töller, 2006). Moreover, as Saalfeld (2003; 76) argues, German MPs have little rational incentive to spend their time on EU affairs if their goal is re-election. EU affairs have a low electoral salience in Germany and are thus not a very attractive area of expertise for MPs. The same applies to British and French MPs. Thus, even if the three parliaments have experienced institutional Europeanisation, the majority of MPs shows little interest in EU policy.

Donald Searing (1994) applies motivational role theory to British MPs and distinguishes between MPs’ preferential and positional roles. Following his reasoning,
a MP sitting on the EAC will Europeanise because of his/her position as committee member, chair or spokesperson. Due to the daily involvement in EU affairs, Europeanisation comes with his/her positional role. Other MPs might not sit on the EAC or have any formal EU-related roles, but still show great interest in EU affairs by giving interviews on EU topics or publishing press releases. In this case, Europeanisation comes with their preferential role. It seems however that in all three parliaments, preferential Europeanists are a rare species.

6.2.3 Strategic Europeanisation

Strategic Europeanisation ‘consists in national MPs taking the European Union as a decision-making center into account – but also as an addressee for their action – and in adjusting action patterns and routines accordingly’ (Töller, 2006: 5). This type of Europeanisation relates directly to the MPs and their interest and engagement in EU affairs. A Europeanised MP would get in contact with European authorities or sister parties from across the EU in order to have a better, earlier access to information. This is the least researched aspect of parliamentary Europeanisation, but deserves more scholarly attention. First of all, a clearer definition of ‘strategic Europeanisation’ would be helpful. Secondly, more systematic, up-to-date, cross-country data measuring the awareness of MPs of European integration and their contacts to MEPs, MPs from their sister parties across the EU and the EU institutions could provide gainful insights into the Europeanisation of political elites.

Members of the House of Commons’ ESC are in direct contact with the EU institutions and with MPs across the EU via COSAC. Contacts between British MPs and MEPs tend to be informal and irregular. Whilst representatives of the
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) meet on a regular basis, MPs generally meet the MEPs from their constituencies on an ad-hoc basis, for example during election campaigns. Despite European integration being a political cleavage in Britain, few Labour MPs showed great interest in the topic when the party was in office. Europeanists amongst the parliamentary party, such as Denis MacShane, were exotics. This, however, was also true for the socialist and social democratic members of the National Assembly and the Bundestag.

Strategic Europeanisation not only involves contacts between MPs and EU-level actors, but also relations between sister parties. For example, exchanges took place between MPs of the House of Commons and Bundestag, especially after Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder got elected prime ministers. In 1999 they published their common declaration ‘Europe: The Third Way/Die neue Mitte’ in which they called for a renewal of Social Democracy. The declaration was harshly criticised by the left wings of the SPD, including the trade unions. Later on, the relationship between the two party leaders became complicated due to the antagonistic views on the Iraq invasion in 2003, but also due to the SPD’s leadership crisis after Gerhard Schröder had resigned as party leader in 2004 and lost the chancellorship one year later. Relationships between parties depend on their ideologies, the views and interests of the party leaders, but also the question of whether the parties are in government or opposition. Another important question is whether the party can gain positive publicity from its relations with a sister party. For Blair, a close friendship with the SPD and PS was difficult in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. For ten years, no more high-level political declarations were published by the Labour and SPD leadership, and the next declaration was made by MPs as a critical response to the Schröder/Blair...
paper. In April 2009, Labour MP Jon Cruddas and the SPD’s Andrea Nahles MdB published their ‘Declaration for a social Europe: Building the Good Society: The Project of the Democratic Left’. In it they declare that the ‘era of the Third Way is over’ and call for new, more democratic politics. The ‘Good Society’ debate has attracted a growing number of followers across Europe - mainly through the online version of the Social Europe Journal. The Good Society project is funded and promoted by the SPD’s affiliated think tank, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (interview with Karl-Heinz Spiegel, head of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s London office on 10/09/2009) and Compass, a think tank affiliated with the left wing of the Labour Party. This, however, is a recent project and its potential for the Europeanisation of MPs (and the Labour Party and SPD more generally) requires more in-depth research.

Like their British counterparts, some members of the Assemblée Nationale’s DUE were in direct contact with the EU institutions and with MPs in other EU Member States via COSAC. Yet, while 48 per cent of German MPs claim to be in contact with their MEPs, less than half of their French counterparts (23 per cent) say they keep regular contact with MEPs (Wessels, 2005: 460). A possible reason could be the high turnover of French MEPs. To facilitate the contact between the French Parliament and the EP both Senate and the National Assembly have set up a Brussels office in 1999 and 2003 – even before the Bundestag was present. Nevertheless, contact between MPs and MEPs remains very informal and irregular, as interviews with MEPs (in Chapter 7) reveal. Research suggests that French MPs are more critical with the EU than their German counterparts. While 75 per cent of French MPs are satisfied with the degree of democracy in their country, only 55 per cent are satisfied with the working of democracy at EU level (Wessels, 2005: 452). Overall, however,
French MPs do not take significant interest in EU politics. As Rozenberg (2011:11) writes:

Outside the small club of EU Committee members, French MPs do not seem to really care about the EU and hardly ever deal with Community matters. The enactment of EU resolutions is irregular. Committee hearings are poorly attended. Floor debates are scarce.

Only very few Socialist MPs were known for their EU expertise, and all of them were appointed ministers by Jospin: Pierre Moscovici, Elisabeth Guigou and Hubert Védrine.

As discussed above, German MPs make rare use of their constitutional rights. Instead, they explore informal channels of influence which appear to be effective. Party groups in the Bundestag have internal working groups dealing with all policy issues, including EU affairs. These working groups (Arbeitsgruppen) include MPs sitting on the EUA and other expert committees, but also party officials, representatives from trade unions and Länder. They offer a forum for the MPs to discuss EU matters from a party-political angle before they are debated in the EUA. Often, the EUA and the parties’ working groups invite experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to brief them on current EU issues (interview with Dr. Sven Vollrath on 14/07/2009). They do this because ‘the ministries are not always interested in a Europeanised Bundestag. The flow of information is not always the way it should be’ (interview with Dr. Sven Vollrath on 14/07/2009). This is confirmed by MdB Axel Schäfer (interviewed on 25/06/2010) who remarks that the conservative-liberal government did not inform the EUA early enough and sufficiently about its bailout plans for Greece. MdB Dr. Eva Högl (20/07/2009) complains that the Bundestag still
relies too much on the government for information, but does not blame the
government for this situation:

We need more imagination: which kind of regulation do we need, and
what should be dealt with at EU level? And these kinds of reflections
hardly take place in parliament, but mostly in the ministries, and
parliament relies too much on what the ministries are doing and in many
cases does not develop its own ideas, which I regret very much. In
European policy, we hold on tight to the executive, and I think that’s bad.
It needs to change: parliament would have to become more self-confident
in its European policy.

This statement suggests a lack of strategic Europeanisation. Surprisingly, in
2003, 48 per cent of German MPs claimed they were in contact with MEPs on a
monthly basis and 6 per cent said they had regular contacts with both the
European Commission and the European Council (Wessels, 2005: 460).
Interviews with MEPs carried out for this study have however revealed that
contact between MEPs and MPs remains loose and irregular. The fact that in
2005 the Bundestag finally set up a liaison office in Brussels certainly helps
MPs to get in touch with their MEPs, EU institutions and other EU-level actors.

To sum up, various factors could lead to the strategic Europeanisation of
Members of Parliament. They can exploit informal channels of influence by getting in
touch directly with MEPs, MPs from sister parties or EU institutions in order to not rely on the government for information. Whilst the data are patchy, they reveal that in the past, German MPs made more use of their contacts to MEPs and EU institutions than their French counterparts. Moreover, they can set up EU working groups to raise
the awareness of the party group, as the example of the SPD shows. Overall, strategic Europeanisation seems to be a very slow process in all three parliaments.

A topic for further quantitative and qualitative research could be the ‘Europeanising effect’ of MPs who, before being elected to national parliaments, have gained EU expertise as MEPs or held other positions that required EU expertise. Two prominent examples from the French Socialist Party are Élisabeth Guigou and Pierre Moscovici, both of whom became ministers in the Jospin government (1997-2002). In the SPD, before becoming an MP, Dr. Eva Högl was the director of the department of European labour market and social policy in the Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs. Labour’s Anne Clwyd, Wayne David, Geoff Hoon and Joyce Quin were all MEPs before becoming MPs. Moreover, Labour’s Minister for Europe Chris Bryant (2009-2010) was head of European affairs in the BBC before becoming a MP.

Judging from these few examples - which by no means can claim to be representative – MPs who have previously worked as MEPs or had other jobs requiring EU expertise could be more likely to join European Affairs Committees or even become (Shadow) Ministers for Europe. Whether and how their EU expertise and contacts contributes to the Europeanisation of parliament would be a topic for further research.

6.3 Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated that the British, French and German parliaments have experienced legislative and institutional Europeanisation. All three parliaments have set up EU affairs committees and a centralised filtering system to coordinate EU legislation. However, the powers of these committees vary significantly from one country to the other. The Bundestag’s Europaausschuss has strong constitutional powers, but does not make use of them for a variety of different reasons. Both the
French and British EU scrutiny committees, on the other hand, are in a weaker position vis-à-vis the executive, but still try to hold their governments accountable. Has legislative and institutional Europeanisation led to the Europeanisation of MPs? When the SPD was in government, the Bundestag’s EAC mainly supported, but did not control the government. Likewise, the House of Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee regularly held ministers to account, but could not mandate the government. It successfully identified matters which were of concerns to MPs (Lord and Harris, 2006: 74) and communicated them effectively, but its constitutional powers are very limited. Most of the MPs sitting on the British and French EACs are backbenchers. European politics, due to their low salience, are no prestigious area of expertise. As a consequence, there is little incentive for MPs to Europeanise despite the growing impact of the EU on national legislation.

Overall, the strategic Europeanisation of national parliaments remains a vague area of research, and this chapter has brought up more questions than answers. Nevertheless, the patchy data reveal that the three parties in parliament only experienced limited Europeanisation. Most of the MPs from Labour, PS and SPD who showed interest in EU policy did so because of their positional roles and are not representative of their parties. This goes to show that it also depends on the MPs’ willingness whether they Europeanise or not. The parliamentary arena can be an arena for parties to Europeanise, if they wish to use the opportunity.
Chapter 7: The Europeanisation of policy-making

This and the following chapter explore the Europeanisation of the Labour Party, the Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the organisational arena.

This chapter investigates how the three parties have Europeanised their organisations in the process of EU policy-making. After all, the formulation of policy programmes for government is one of a political party’s core functions. Policy-making processes differ among parties and between policy areas, depending on factors such as party organisation, rules as defined by statutes, or traditions. However, the most important determinant is whether the party is in government or opposition.

This chapter focuses on the actors involved in different stages of European policy-making in the Labour Party, SPD, and PS. The policy process can be divided into various different stages (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 377-384). For the sake of convenience, this chapter focuses on the early stages: initiation, formulation, and implementation. It explores formal and informal decision-making structures and highlights the key actors and networks involved in the European policy-making process within the parties. The aim is to examine power relations within the three parties with regards to the formulation of European policy. After all, the Europeanisation of party organisation can only be grasped if we understand which party actors or networks contribute to the making of European policy. In this context, a Europeanised party organisation is one in which not only the top leadership and their advisers are involved in the process of EU policy-making, but also the broader party organisation. Top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation of the party organisation can only take place if different levels of the party contribute to the making of EU policy. This includes institutions such as the party conference, national
policy forums, as well as MPs and MEPs. If EU expertise is spread across the party organisation, more politicians, activists and members may become interested in EU politics, which could contribute to the much-needed politicisation of the EU at the domestic level. This chapter explores whether there are differences in the way different types of EU policies are made (e.g. day-to-day policy-making versus highly controversial and politicised policy decisions, or decisions of historical importance, such as EU treaty revisions). Furthermore, this chapter investigates whether the policy-making process differs between parties in government and opposition. Two hypotheses guide the analysis:

(1) The process of EU policy-making empowers the party leadership vis-à-vis the party in central office and the party-on-the-ground; and

(2) Processes of EU policy-making differ between parties in government and opposition.

Both hypotheses have their basis in the existing literature, which will be discussed below.

7.1 A short literature review

For any party in government, EU policy-making is a challenging process (Wright, 1996: 149). Robert Putnam’s ‘two-level game’ concept attempts to capture the entanglement of domestic and international politics. Putnam (1988) posits that at the national level, domestic pressure groups lobby the government, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to ‘maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences for foreign developments’ (Putnam, 1988: 434). This situation applies to European Union policy-making, a process in which national politicians try to satisfy domestic pressures whilst pushing
for a European agreement. However, even if politicians are keen to represent their
party’s interests at the EU level, they retain room for manoeuvre and frequently take
decisions that are afterwards criticised by their party at home. It has therefore been
argued that the involvement in policy-making at European level strengthens the
agenda-setting powers of party leaders (Raunio, 2002). Arguably since the 1960s,
centralisation of power within parties has accelerated independently of the EU. The
party in public office, and particularly party leaders, have strengthened their position
at the expense of the central office and ordinary members. Membership of the
European Union, Raunio (2002) argues, consolidates this centralisation of power and
top-down decision-making by obligeing the party leadership (such as cabinet members)
to act in an arena (the EU) where the party organisation exercises little if any control
over party representatives. When a party is in government, the head of government
participates in European Council summits, where the EU’s political guidelines are set.
Parties generally exert very little control over prime ministers’ and presidents’
behaviour in the European Council. Moreover, the meetings of the Council of
Ministers, such as the highly influential Council of Economic and Financial Affairs
(Ecofin) where important decisions regarding the single currency are made, take place
behind closed doors. ‘Party representatives back home, even vice-chairs or ministers
in charge of less “Europeanized” portfolios, are thus restricted in their ability to
confirm these findings. The authors sent a questionnaire to key actors of all major
parties in 15 pre-2004 enlargement EU member states and found out that party elites
receive only modest levels of instructions when they are involved in EU-level
decision-making (Carter and Poguntke, 2010: 309). The vast majority of respondents
(around three-quarters) said that party elites enjoy very high levels of discretion in EU
politics. National parties are thus ‘caught between a rock and a hard place: they recognise that their party elites need to be given sufficient room for manoeuvre in order to negotiate meaningfully in Brussels, and yet the organisational structures of political parties demand that elites are held accountable to national party bodies’ (Carter and Poguntke, 2010: 320).

If national parties are limited in their attempts to hold their leadership to account, there is always the possibility of domestic parliamentary EU scrutiny. However, it has been demonstrated in Chapter 6 that parliamentary EU scrutiny is still relatively weak and inefficient across the EU. Even parliaments with relatively strong constitutional scrutiny powers, such as the German Bundestag, tend not to make use of them. The involvement in EU policy-making is therefore expected to empower the party leadership vis-à-vis the party organisation.

The second hypothesis relates to the resources that come from being in government. A party in government, unlike a party in opposition, is able to draw on the civil service (different ministries and the countries’ Permanent Representation in Brussels) for EU expertise and contacts. Officials working for the party headquarters, but also the formal party structures like party conferences and policy forums are expected to play minor roles in the policy-making process. The reason is that EU policy-making requires considerable technical expertise. Moreover, it is a dynamic environment where complicated policy decisions are often decided in the early mornings of Council meetings. Therefore, day-to-day EU policy can hardly be formulated at annual conferences or policy forums. At best, general guidelines can be defined in these formal party structures. Hence, it is the party leadership in office, relying mainly on the civil service, who is expected to be involved in EU policy-making. When a party is in opposition, it needs to draw on its own sources for EU
policy expertise. Such resources could mean party officials with relevant expertise (e.g. the international secretary), party MPs with an EU brief and party MEPs who are actively involved in the EU policy-making process. Moreover, as a party in opposition rethinks its policy programme, it might involve the broader membership through consultations or referenda.

Investigating processes of European policy-making within the three parties is both fascinating and challenging, especially because EU policy is distinct from other policies. Whilst all policy areas overlap to a certain extent, EU policy is increasingly a ‘crossover issue’ covering all policy areas - albeit to a different extent. Its crossover relevance is what distinguishes it from foreign policy. Over the past twenty years, EU policy has become domestic policy. At national party headquarters, however, there is still one single department dealing with EU policy as a single issue, and it is often subjoined to foreign policy. As a consequence, staff deals with EU policy and foreign policy at the same time, and the number of EU experts working for a party is expected to be small. Moreover, being an EU expert is still no promising career path for a politician seeking (re-)election due to the low salience of EU policy at national level. EU policy networks within the three social democratic parties are therefore expected to be small. Like other policy networks, EU networks are expected to be mostly informal, depending to a large extent on personal contacts. Some networks might be more formal, such as permanent working groups and committees, yet most of them are expected to be informal and ad-hoc.

While there exists a growing body of literature examining the European policies of parties in government or the formal processes of European policy-making of different member states, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the role of the
party organisation in the policy-making process. One reason for this might be that when a party is in government, it is very difficult to disentangle government and party organisation. Writing about the SPD, Stroh (2004) and Lamatsch (2004) argue that European policy is government policy. The party relies on government resources and areas of the personnel overlap. Moreover, the informal aspects of policy-making can only be revealed through interviews. This chapter analyses the literature on the three parties’ European policies and the formal structures of European policy-making in Britain, France and Germany. The following sections will examine the roles played by (1) the three parties’ formal policy-making structures (party conference and executive committee), (2) the parties’ international departments, (3) the parliamentary party, and (4) the Members of the European Parliament. The role of the party leadership in government has already been analysed in Chapter 5.

7.2 The formal policy-making structures of the Labour Party, PS and SPD and their role in the making of European policy

The Labour Party was founded on the basis that party policy was determined by its members, brought together in an annual conference, rather than by the party’s parliamentary leaders. However, as McKenzie (1955: 485) notes, in reality the party conference has no control over the parliamentary party or the government. In principle, between conferences the responsibility for policy fell to the National Executive Committee (NEC) which produced policy statements that the conference would be asked to agree (Russell, 2005: 129). The NEC was ‘the hub of a network of policy advisory committees and so oversaw the development of party policy in the longer term’ (Ingle, 2008: 82). The NEC’s influence began to wane under the party leadership of Neil Kinnock (1983-1992), John Smith (1992-1994) and Tony Blair
(1994-2007). In 1990, the National Policy Forum (NPF) was established to formally oversee the development of party policy and broaden the involvement of the party organisation. The aim was to give ordinary party members a chance to discuss policy more frequently outside the party conference, where policy decisions reached within the NPF would merely be ratified (Kelly, 2001: 331). Representatives serving on the NPF are chosen by the constituencies. According to Labour’s website ‘the NPF meets several times a year to make sure that policy documents reflect the broad consensus in the party’. Between these meetings policy is generated and processed via policy commissions (Ingle, 2008: 83). One of them – ‘Britain in the World’ - is responsible for international and European policies.

NPF members had direct access to ministers when Labour was in government, and ministers were sent to local party meetings and the NPF itself. This ‘kept government to some extent in touch with the concerns of the party’ (Russell, 2005: 158). Nevertheless, the government ‘remained very much in the driving seat’ (Russell, 2005: 158) and in some cases even ignored decisions made by the NPF. When Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were prime ministers, a small group of special advisers and public relations experts played a central role in Labour’s policy-making processes, at the expense of party bodies such as the NPF.

The National Executive Committee (NEC) is the governing body of the Labour Party that oversees the overall direction of the party and the policy-making process. The party leader, the deputy leader, and the leader of the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) sit ex officio. On Labour’s website it reads: ‘Throughout the year, NEC members participate with government ministers in Labour Party policy commissions that prepare reports on different areas of policy which are then presented to and consulted on with the party membership before going to annual
conference. This forms the basis of Labour’s general election manifesto’. In reality, the party leadership has ‘traditionally enjoyed considerable strategic freedom to devise election manifestoes and to govern relatively unimpeded by the extra-parliamentary party once in office’, as Heffernan and Webb (2005: 46) argue. This finding is confirmed by Bara (2006: 267) who highlights that for Labour’s 2005 election manifesto, ‘despite the semblance of consultation, most of the key decisions were taken by the leadership’. Labour’s 2010 election manifesto was officially written by Ed Miliband, minister for Energy and Climate Change. According to Patrick Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011) who was head of Number 10 Downing Street’s Policy Planning Unit at that time, the different chapters were written by government ministers and civil servants and then polished by Number 10 Downing Street. Ed Miliband was the senior minister responsible for ‘signing it off, in effect, or for approving the manifesto’ (Patrick Diamond, interviewed on 16/03/2011). He also wrote most of the introduction and contributed to each of the chapters. Diamond confirms that the formal party structures, such as the NEC or NPF, were not involved in the manifesto-writing process. Thus, Labour’s election manifestoes are written by the party leadership, and the official party structures are marginalised in the formulation of policy.

More generally, since the 1980s, policy-making and campaigning have become increasingly centralised within the Labour Party, and the NEC has often been circumvented and ‘stripped of many of its powers over the party’ (Foley, 2000: 304). Whilst the NPF and NEC certainly remain important forums for debates on party policy, day-to-day EU policy-making demands faster reactions and expert knowledge. In the Council of Ministers, negotiations demand a certain amount of flexibility, and
the government does not wait for the NPF and NEC to give them voting instructions. Patrick Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011) confirms these findings, stating:

It would be quite wrong to suppose that the formal policy-making structure within the party has very much influence at all how policy in the relation to the European Union is made when the Labour Party is in government. And obviously, the orientation shifts, so that the actors who control the process are obviously the senior ministers in conjunction with senior officials and civil servants. And I can think of almost no examples during the course of the 13 years when Labour was in government, when the policy-making process of the party was able to impose any particular positions on the government in terms of European policy.

It can therefore be concluded that when Labour was in government between 1997 and 2010, European policy was not formulated by either the party conference, the NEC or the NPF. Can the same be said about the PS and SPD?

The French Socialists have spent only five years in government since 1997. This has an important impact on the party organisation’s ability to influence European policy-making: Since 2002, the PS leadership has not been involved in EU negotiations in either Council of Ministers or European Council, nor did it appoint a European Commissioner. The centre-right President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed a Socialist foreign minister (Bernard Kouchner, 2007-2010) who was expelled from the PS after accepting the post. Hence, the PS did not even indirectly influence French foreign or European policy during that period. The PS was still represented in the
European Parliament, but the number of MEPs decreased from 18 (2004-2009) to 14 (2009-2014). Moreover, as it will be revealed, MEPs are not the key actors in the PS’ European policy-making process.

Formally, the party conference (congrès national) is the PS’ highest party organ. It rallies every three years to define policy guidelines and elect the party leadership: the national bureau (bureau national) and the national council (conseil national). MEPs are delegates of the party conference ex officio. However, they do not have the right to vote. In the past, some party conferences have united the party. Others - like the conference of Rennes in 1990 - were overshadowed by infighting between as many as seven different courants. If the party is united behind a strong leader - such as Mitterrand or Jospin - the conference is in a position to give policy guidelines. Unsurprisingly, however, they tend to remain broad, leaving enough room for interpretation to the party leadership. As the case of Labour, the PS’ conference is not the forum where day-to-day party policy is formulated.

According to the PS’ website the national council is the ‘party’s veritable parliament’. It executes the decisions made by the party conference and meets at least four times per year. Whilst this is a forum for discussion and networking between different levels of the party organisation, European policy is not formulated here. This, however, is not to say that the party at the departmental level (fédération) has no influence on European policy-making. The federations tend to support factions which in turn have been influential players in the party’s European policy-making. By supporting a faction, a federation supports a certain European policy, as has been demonstrated in context with the PS’ debate on the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2004/2005. Hence, the party federation has certain leverage over European policy. It is moreover involved in negotiations over EU structural and regional funding. Today,
almost all 102 PS federations have EU working groups. At least, they have one
elected representative for EU policy (interview with Maurice Braud on 22/06/2009).
The PS secretary for international relations and Europe, Jean-Christophe-Camhadélis
(interviewed on 18/06/2009), argues:

The European question is treated in a bottom-up and top-down manner,
even if it reserved to persons who are a bit specialised. What I mean is
that the sections [local party, I.H.] do not often discuss European
questions. They sometimes discuss them... it is part of their patrimony,
their genetic make-up. At the same time there are highly specialised
people who follow the subject. It’s a hybrid system and it is part of the PS
history, yet unfortunately, it remains reserved to a certain number of
specialists in the Socialist Party.

Hence, when the PS was in government between 1997 and 2002, the lower levels of
the party organisation had no significant impact on the party’s EU policy. The PS’
most important forums for policy-making are the national bureau and the national
secretariat. The first is elected by the party conference and comprises 54 members and
meets every Tuesday under the leadership of the party leader. According to the PS’
website, its role is to ‘assure the administration and direction of the party as decided
by the party conference’. Highly politicised EU issues are discussed by the national
bureau whilst day-to-day policy is rarely on the agenda. The appropriate forum for
this is the national secretariat (secrétariat national) which is the real power centre of
the Socialist Party. It is responsible for the management of the party. Chaired by the
party leader, it meets every Tuesday morning. In the national secretariat, the party
leader is surrounded by a group of close advisors and - in the case of Martine Aubry -
66 national secretaries. All extra-parliamentary wings of French parties have officials
referred to as national secretaries. In the case of the PS they are elected politicians (Ladrech 2007; 91). The secretaries’ work is coordinated by Harlem Désir, MEP. Under François Hollande’s party leadership, a secretariat for Europe and a separate one for international affairs were created and integrated into the national secretariat. Martine Aubry merged them into one, and since 2008, the head of the national secretariat for international relations and Europe is Jean-Christophe Cambadélis. The role of the national secretariat in the PS’ EU policy-making process role will be examined in section 7.2.

European policy-making has been an informal process ever since the PS has been in opposition. Whilst the party leader and his/her advisers in the national secretariat are the key players in the EU policy-making process, they lost their grip in 2004/2005. The leadership was deeply divided over the EU Constitutional Treaty and François Hollande let the members vote in an internal referendum. Does this mean that in opposition, the PS leadership has yielded EU policy-making power to the members? It might have done so, but it was not a deliberate decision. As discussed in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4, the controversy over the EU Constitutional Treaty was mainly a way for the factions’ presidential candidates to gain a stronger profile. In his weakened position as leader of a divided party, François Hollande let the members decide on the party’s official policy on the EU Treaty. Whilst the members voted in favour of the treaty, the leaders continued to be divided and campaigned in favour and against the treaty. Hence, the members’ empowerment in the policy-making process should not be overrated. It was born out of Hollande’s desperation rather than the genuine willingness to involve activists into EU policy-making.
In accordance with § 9 of the German party law, the SPD’s highest decision-making body is the federal party conference (Bundesparteitag) which meets every two years. It elects the executive committee (Vorstand), nominates the chancellor candidate, and also takes fundamental policy decisions. Importantly, it ratifies the so-called ‘principal guidelines’ (Grundsatzprogramm) in which the party formulates its core values. These principle policy guidelines remain general, and, most of the time, are based on suggestions made by the party executive. In line with § 15 of the SPD’s statute, ten percent of the party’s MEPs are automatically invited to the conference. However, their role is merely to consult, and they do not have the right to speak. In reality, the majority (three quarters) of the SPD’s MEPs attend conferences, since many of them are district delegates (Stroh, 2004: 131-132). Conferences are forums for networking and debate, where the leadership and party on the ground meet to exchange ideas. As Lösche and Walter (1992) argue, the party conference has been disempowered since the 1960s and replaced by federal conferences and symposia dealing with specific topics (including European integration). Hence, the conference plays no significant role in the SPD’s day-to-day policy formulation, just like Labour’s and the PS’ party conferences do not fulfil this role.

There have been identified three main actors or forums relevant to European policy-making within the SPD (Bellers, 1979). These are: the executive committee (Vorstand) and steering committee (Präsidium)\(^\text{10}\), the executive of the SPD’s parliamentary party group and their EU policy working group; and the MEPs.

\(^\text{10}\) In English, both 'Vorstand' and 'Präsidium' can be translated as 'executive committee’. However, Präsidium can also be translated as 'steering committee'. To avoid confusion, the German names will be used throughout this thesis.
The SPD’s executive committee (Vorstand) is elected by the delegates at the party conference and represents the different factions of the party. The party leader and four vice leaders, the general secretary, treasurer, and an EU advisor are the members of the Vorstand, plus a number of additional members as elected by the party conference. Amongst its members, the executive committee elects the Präsidium whose task it is to ‘implement the decisions made by the Vorstand’ (§ 23 Organisationsstatut der SPD, 14/11/2009). The Präsidium usually represents the different factions of the party, geographical zones, and, in equal measure, gender. It is, as Der Spiegel (23/11/2009) writes, ‘fastidiously balanced’. Both Vorstand and Präsidium are located at the SPD headquarters, the Willy-Brandt-Haus in Berlin. According to Lösche (1993: 40, quoted by Sloam 2005: 61), ‘the presidium is naturally the power centre, supported by the party bureaucracy’ (…) ‘the Vorstand however is more a centre of integration for the party, including different associations, wings and working communities, than a centre of power’.

Sloam (2008: 61) argues that the formulation and coordination of European policy is done by European policy groups under the Vorstand when the party is in opposition. This view is contrasted by Stroh, who stresses the role of the parliamentary party group in the day-to-day formulation of EU policies. According to Stroh (2004: 120-121), the Vorstand gives general policy guidelines while the party group works on the actual content of policies. She writes that in general, the party headquarters suffer from a ‘lack of efficiency and expert knowledge’, and EU policy – which is considered to be a less important topic - is neglected. In this chapter it is argued that when the SPD is in opposition, the party group and the Vorstand are both important players in the formulation of EU policy. However, when the party is in
power, EU policy was formulated in the relevant ministries and not by the party in central or public office.

When the SPD was in government, two high-profile EU experts were members of the Vorstand ex officio: Martin Schulz (MEP and head of S & D group in the European Parliament) and Angelica Schwall Düren (in her role as vice chairman of the party group). Schulz was also a member of the Präsidium, which was a novelty in SPD history. As Marc Jütten, policy adviser to Schulz (interviewed on 07/10/2009) explains:

It was for the first time that a SPD member dealing exclusively with EU affairs - who had a seat in the European Parliament - was striving for a seat in the Präsidium, demanding a seat for a European. It shows that the party is deeply rooted in Europe and cares for the European level just as much as it does for the other levels, the local, regional and federal. Thanks to this bridge-building he [Martin Schulz, I.H.] now plays a stronger role in national media. And now his position has been upgraded in the sense that the party said: we have a permanent Präsidium member responsible for Europe who is elected directly by the party conference. This means that his prominent position is once more confirmed.

The Vorstand has been involved in European policy-making through its international department (which will be explored in section 7.2) and an EU working group called Europa Kommission (Commission on Europe). It was created at the beginning of the 1980s after the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament. Name and membership have changed since, but its function remains the same: it complements the work of the Bundestag’s working group, and according to Stroh (2004: 126) it
tends to be dominated by the latter. Between 2005 and 2009, the Europa Kommission was co-chaired by Dr. Angelica Schwall-Düren and Bernhard Rapkay (MEP and leader of the SPD’s delegation to the European Parliament). The purpose of this dual leadership was to ‘bring Bundestag and European Parliament together at the highest party level’ (interview with Thomas Vaupel, Abteilung IV, 07/08/2009). When the SPD was in office, the Kommission had between 40 and 50 members and met approximately every six weeks (interview with Felix Porkert, head of Abteilung IV’s EU section, 15/07/2009). It brought together Members of Parliament, MEPs, civil servants of SPD-led ministries, academics close to the SPD and representatives of the Länder governments. According to Thomas Vaupel (interviewed on 07/08/2009), the Europa Kommission also discussed the SPD’s 2009 European election manifesto, but it was mainly drafted by a small number of Vorstand members, including Martin Schulz, Dr. Angelica Schwall-Düren and Achim Post, Abteilung IV’s director since 1999. Thus, in the SPD—like in the Labour Party—manifestoes are written by the party leadership.

To be sure, SPD EU working groups also exist at regional and—in an increasing number of cases—even local level. For example, Berlin’s SPD federation has set up a permanent EU working group (Fachausschuss Europa) which meets monthly and benefits from the fact that many of the SPD’s EU experts (party officials, civil servants, interest group representatives, MPs, advisors, academics) work in the capital. Asked whether he sees it as the Fachausschuss Europa’s role to Europeanise Berlin’s SPD, Dr. Philipp Steinberg (chair of the Fachausschuss Europa, interviewed on 15/07/2009) states:

Of course. It is a perpetual task, but I think that the results of the European elections [in 2009, I.H.] have demonstrated once again how important it
is. You can’t make European policy from top-down. My hope is that
European policy will increasingly be understood as domestic policy, and
therefore it is certainly one of our tasks to try to point to the relevance of
European policy as a crossover area for other policy areas.

Other EU working groups exist in North-Rhine Westphalia and other Länder.
Normally, however, ‘the lower levels of the SPD tend, quite naturally, to occupy
themselves with issues closer to home’ and it is the preserve of the federal level of the
party with its greater resources and inclination to look into EU policy (Sloam, 2005:
59).

In summary, when the SPD was in opposition, the party group and the
Vorstand were the key players in the formulation of EU policy. Whilst the Vorstand
gave general guidelines, the party group worked on the actual content of the policies.
However, when the party was in government, EU policy was mainly formulated in the
relevant ministries and not by the party in central or public office, but this has been
explored in Chapter 5.

7.3 Labour, the PS and SPD’s international departments and their role in
European policy-making

All national parties in the European Union have an international department where at
least one official deals with EU policy. These departments differ in terms of their
budget, size and role, which depend on the party’s budget and the importance it places
on European and international affairs.

Since 2003, Labour has employed an international manager working at the
party headquarters’ ‘International Unit’, dealing with European and international
issues. On Labour’s website it explains that the International Unit ‘maintains and develops relations with sister parties and represents the Party at the European and international level through the Party of European Socialists and Socialist International’. According to Patrick Diamond (interviewed on 16/03/2011),

The role of the international secretary has changed over the last 20 years. I think in previous eras the international secretary probably would have had more of a voice in some of the discussions about policy. But now they are employed by the party and their major role is to manage different relationships.

The international manager liaises with the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP), thus providing a channel of communication between the party leadership and the MEPs. He or she also attends meetings of the PES’ coordination team. In 2008, Labour’s international manager, Jo Billingham, managed a team of three people. Her employees were funded by the Foreign Office through the ‘Westminster Foundation for Democracy’ and worked specifically on a project building the capacity of political parties in developing countries and fragile and emerging democracies. Hence, these employees did not deal with EU policy at all. Instead, European issues were dealt with by the international manager herself and an international policy officer who was not part of the team but cooperated closely. Asked about the amount of time dedicated to European issues, Billingham (interviewed on 24/11/2009) states:

If you define EU as our bilateral relationships with parties in the EU as well as with our work with the Party of European Socialists at European level, probably it takes up maybe two thirds of my time, so the majority of my time. And I think our international policy officer… maybe it takes up half of her time, but it obviously depends.
Labour’s international manager is thus responsible for the coordination of the relationship with the PES and Labour’s sister parties, as well as the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP). EPLP official Brian Duggan (interviewed on 14/09/2009) explains:

Labour’s International Unit is a fairly small department, and obviously its reach is beyond Europe. We tend to do a lot of the European side of things and help them with the information and knowledge, briefings and material on the European side of things.

The EPLP also supports the International Unit with its work with sister parties. For example, if Labour’s sister parties’ branches in the UK want to invite a Labour MP or MEP to speak at a meeting or want to support Labour during an election campaign, the EPLP supports the International Unit (interview with Brian Duggan, 14/09/2009).

It then becomes clear that the International Unit is no key player in Labour’s European policy-making process - asBillingham (24/11/2009) confirms:

Well, I think – because we are a party in government – it’s obviously the government ministers who define our policies really. They take the lead in terms of policy-making. They and their advisers, and the Foreign Office.

So in terms of the policy-making, that’s mainly done by government ministers. But we obviously work closely with them, particularly when it comes to relations with sister parties.

The PS’ international secretariat is more loosely organised than the SPD’s Abteilung IV, which is mainly due to the lack of financial resources since 2002. For example, Alain Richard – a former defence minister and vice-president of the PES - represented the PS in the PES presidency without being a formally elected member of
the PS executive. The leader of the PS’ delegation to the European Parliament is also a member of secretariat for international relations and Europe. Furthermore, Cambadélis has two advisors. One of them works full-time and the other one is a volunteer who works part-time. Moreover, he has one administrator at his disposal.

The national secretariat’s EU working group meets every Monday at noon to discuss EU policy. Invited are: MEPs, MPs as well as former ministers. Two to three subjects are discussed every Monday, and the amount of people attending the meeting depends on the topics. Pierre Kanuty, an official working at the secretariat (interviewed on 23/06/2009) summarises: ‘we have a very good information network. There is nothing to rival it’. Asked whether EU policy-making within the PS is a formal process, the international secretary - Jean-Christophe Cambadélis - explains:

No, it is not a formal process because the MEPs are quite far away. We are trying to bring them closer but it’s always complicated because they meet at a time when we meet here in France and it is difficult to do both at the same time. Then again, I am in quite regular contact with Philip Cordery [general secretary of the PES, I.H.]. But it is not formal. (…) It depends on the subject.

In contrast, the SPD’s Abteilung IV: Internationale Politik was better staffed and had a section dealing exclusively with European politics. Thomas Vaupel, an official working for the latter (interviewed on 08/07/2009) describes its role as follows:

It is first and foremost our role to prepare general European policy guidelines for our party leadership in coordination with actors involved in the SPD’s European policy in the Bundestag and European Parliament in order to define the SPD’s general policy guidelines regarding those fundamental issues. We don’t need to deal in detail with every single
directive that is discussed at EU level. We rather enter the game when an issue is of a more fundamental political relevance. Moreover, we liaise with our European sister parties and organise the cooperation with the PES’.

Vaupel’s statement suggests that *Abteilung IV*’s not only liaised with the PES and sister parties, but was also in a position to provide the party leadership with general EU policy guidelines. It might have played a more prominent role in the party’s EU policy-making than Labour’s International Unit.

In 2009, when the SPD was still in office, four persons were working on European policy in *Abteilung IV*: one policy officer, one research assistant, an administrator and a secretary. Whilst this might not appear impressive, the SPD’s *Abteilung IV* is still better staffed than Labour’s International Unit, where two persons were dealing with EU policy, but not full-time.

According to Thomas Vaupel (interviewed on 08/07/2009), *Abteilung IV* is well-connected to the Foreign Ministry’s European policy unit, but the relationship is an informal one:

This relationship isn’t necessarily institutionalised. We occasionally go for lunch; we meet up when there is something on the agenda, or call each other on the phone. It happens very regularly, but there is no institutionalised working group.

Although *Abteilung IV* was comparatively well-staffed, ministries have greater resources, expertise and contacts to the European institutions. Hence, when the SPD was in government, European policy was mainly formulated by the relevant ministries (see Chapter 4 for more details). This was confirmed by Thomas Vaupel (interviewed on 08/07/2009):
The party leader cannot coordinate European policy alone. He needs support. We are his suppliers, but it’s mostly the Foreign Ministry, which is better resourced. I believe that at the moment we will no longer be in government, the political work of the department and the [Willy Brandt] Haus more generally, will become more important than it is at this point in time.

Of the three parties, the SPD had the biggest international department when it was in office. It was also the best-resourced party. In opposition it had to cut down the number of staff. Paradoxically, however - if the PS can be taken as an example - international departments play a more important role when the party is in opposition. With the party leadership no longer relying on the civil service, the international department becomes a hub of the party’s EU network.

7.4 The Party Group’s role in European Policy-Making

Members of Parliament sitting on the European Affairs Committee or other committees are also EU experts and could play an active role in the three parties’ EU policy-making process. Yet, it has been demonstrated in Chapter 6 that the House of Commons, Assemblée Nationale and Bundestag are not the environment in which party groups Europeanise.

Indeed, in the case of the Labour Party, the influence of the party group on the party’s European policy was very limited when the party was in government. Labour’s Members of the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) tended to support the government’s EU policy. Additionally, Labour MPs were sitting on backbench committees on European affairs. These committees, however, have no decision-making power and ‘really only act as a debating society for those (few) with an
interest in European matters’ (Carter and Ladrech, 2007: 64). The EU scrutiny powers of the House of Commons are relatively weak and EU debates in the House of Commons are rather rare due to the government’s firm control over the parliamentary process. There were only a handful of Labour MPs showing interest in EU policy. The most prominent were Denis MacShane and Gisela Stuart. MacShane was Minister for Europe (2002-2005) and represented Labour at the PES presidency. He was one of the more well-known and longer-serving Ministers and known for his very pro-integrationist views. Gisela Stuart was a steering committee member of the European Convention whose task it was to write the European Constitutional Treaty. Both MPs made public statements on EU topics and issued press releases, but their influence on Labour’s EU policy should not be overestimated. Labour’s parliamentary party staff did however entertain close links to the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) staff and met up regularly. However, as EPLP official Brian Duggan (interviewed on 14/09/2009) explains, MPs and MEPs rather keep informal contacts at regional level, especially during election campaigns.

In a similar vein, the PS’ party group was not much involved in the party’s European policy-making. The general weakness of the French Parliament is reflected in the weakness of the parliamentary parties: the extra-parliamentary party tends to be far more influential in the policy-making process (Thiébault and Dolez, 2000). As a consequence, becoming an EU specialist in Parliament is not an attractive career path for French politicians. Prime Minister Jospin tried to involve Parliament more and on 13th December 1999 wrote a circular to his cabinet ministers, reminding them of taking Parliament’s resolutions into account when negotiating policies at European level (Grajetzky, 2002: 18, quoted by Krell, 2009: 357). This goes to show that most of the time, Parliament’s influence on the government’s European policy was
marginal. This can also be explained by the fact that in France - unlike in Britain - ministers are not members of Parliament. Pierre Moscovici, the Socialist minister for Europe did not report to Parliament but took his instructions from government.

As already mentioned in Chapter 6, the SPD’s party group has set up a working group dealing with EU affairs (Arbeitsgruppe Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union) during the 1990s. Members of this group are:

- MPs sitting on the EU affairs committee and/or expert committees;
- Members of the European Parliament (who due to schedule overlaps do not attend meetings very often);
- The representative of the SPD party group in the Bundestag’s Brussels office;
- The representative of the SPD’s EP liaison office in Berlin;
- Officials from the party headquarters’ international department (Abteilung IV);
- A representative of the Foreign Ministry’s European department (when the Foreign Minister is a SPD politician);
- A representative of the German trade union federation Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB);
- Representatives of the Länder governments (who all have liaison offices in Berlin).

On its website (SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 2005-2009) the working group describes its role as follows:

On the one hand, the working group prepares European policy decisions - on topics such as EU enlargement - for the entire party group. On the other hand, it coordinates the SPD group’s positions on European crosscut topics such as the services directive.
Between 2005 and 2009, MdB Axel Schäfer was chair of this working group. At the same time he was the party group’s spokesperson for EU affairs. Sebastian Grüning, coordinator of the working group (interviewed on 14/07/2009) explains:

it is also our role to communicate European matters to the entire party group – even if it creates a certain overlap with the vice chairman of the party group’s role.

It needs to be highlighted that the SPD was the only party group in the Bundestag to have a vice chairman dealing exclusively with European policy. Since 2002, Dr. Angelica Schwall-Düren has fulfilled this role. With both Schwall-Düren and Schäfer holding important EU policy-related posts, there existed a ‘double executive’ in the SPD’s parliamentary group (Freitag, 2008: 59). Both politicians met regularly to coordinate their activities and find a common line.

Whilst the EU working group of the Vorstand and the international department get involved in the more politicised issues, the SPD’s parliamentary EU working group works on day-to-day EU legislation. This is essentially a reactive exercise (Sloam, 2005) as the EAC depended on the government for information and expertise.

It needs to be stressed that in Germany, political parties make use of much larger parliamentary research staff than parties in many other Member States of the European Union (Paterson, 1981: 231) including Britain and France. In her comparative study of the Europeanisation of party groups in the Bundestag between 2005 and 2009, Freitag (2008: 59) lists 250 people working for the SPD party group: 110 research assistants (Referenten), 50 administrators and 90 secretaries. Out of this number, 6 ¼ research assistants, 4 ¾ administrators and 2 secretaries were working on European issues. Amongst them, two research assistants, one administrator and one secretary were working for Dr. Schwall-Düren’s office. 3 ¼ research assistants, three
administrators and a secretary were working for the SPD’s EU working group which was chaired by Axel Schäfer. The SPD moreover employed one assistant and a secretary in its Bundestag liaison office in Brussels, which was subordinated to Mrs Schwall-Düren. Hence, as a party in government, the SPD’s parliamentary group was relatively well staffed to deal with European policy.

The SPD’s MPs sitting on the European affairs committee (and hence the working group) played a certain role in the SPD’s European policy-making process when the party was in office between 1998 and 2009. They might not have been key players, but in some instances they were able to influence the government’s European policy. One example was the party group’s influence on the EU directive on services in the internal market. However, according to Schwall-Düren (interviewed on 18/06/2010) this was an ‘informal process without formal resolutions’. The party group’s potential to influence government probably lay in the fact that one of the most prominent MPs involved in EU affairs – Dr. Schwall-Düren – also sat on the SPD’s executive committee (Vorstand) where she could push forward the party group’s positions. Hence, this overlap of personnel helped the party group to contribute to the government’s European policy.

7.5 The Members of the European Parliament’s role in European Policy-Making

The three parties’ most obvious EU experts are the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). In theory, all three parties have recognised the increasing power of the European Parliament in the past two decades by including MEPs into their executive committees ex officio. Generally, however, MEPs are still not considered
key players in the parties’ EU policy-making process. For this study, 16 MEPs have been interviewed: 2 from Labour, 6 from the PS, and 8 from the SPD.

The SPD and PS did not give their MEPs voting instructions, as will be explained later. Labour however introduced the so-called ‘link system’ under Tony Blair, which was still in place in 2009. In order to gain a more effective control over the MEPs’ voting behaviour whilst at the same time benefitting from their EU expertise, Blair’s team created a formal relationship of policy coordination between themselves and Labour MEPs. In the beginning, it was a system of carrots and sticks, which rewarded MEPs with increased influence over EU policy-making at national level, but limited their independence of vote within the EP (Messmer, 2003).

Under the link system, a ministry appoints MEPs to sit on the appropriate cabinet-level, ministerial team according to their policy expertise. To make Labour’s European policy and discourse more coherent, a European Parliamentary Labour official works at 10 Downing Street to coordinate the work between Labour’s MEPs and government. EPLP official Brian Duggan (interviewed on 14/09/2009) explains:

When a Labour Minister is delivering a speech on a key European issue, every MEP will know exactly what is going on. So this will be tied very closely together so we have a narrative that works from local to national to European level.

According to Messmer (2003: 206) the link system has created a Labour Party ‘team’ approach to European policy, encompassing its MEPs and its frontbenchers. However, if Labour’s MEPs have gained influence over the government’s EU policy between 1997 and 2010, they also lost independence. To create a sanctioning mechanism for disloyal MEPs, the Labour government changed the UK’s EP electoral system to a ‘closed list proportional representation system’ for the 1999 EP elections. It gave
Labour’s national party machine a certain amount of control over the selection and list rank order of all Labour MEP candidates and allowed the party leadership to punish disloyal or unruly MEPs by placing them further down the electoral list than they would otherwise have been. Party members’ criticism led to a change in the selection procedures, and since 2004, this sanction has been removed (Carter and Ladrech, 2007: 66). The link system was particularly appealing to the Labour government because it seemed to have enabled the party leadership to avoid situations in which government ministers negotiate one position in the Council, but MEPs support a different position in the EP. Since 2004, however, the link mechanism offers much more ‘of a carrot than a stick: while it offers MEPs the opportunity to be more involved in their party’s policy-making, they do little to discipline or sanction unruly or rebellious MEPs’ (Carter and Ladrech, 2007: 67). It can hence be concluded that since 1997, Labour’s MEPs have become more involved in the party’s European policy-making process.

The PS, in contrast, had no formal link system established between the party headquarters and its MEPs, neither in government nor in opposition. However, between 2004 and 2009, at least 6 out of 18 MEPs were at the same time national secretaries, which gave them the opportunity to retain close links with Solférino, the party headquarters. One example is Henri Weber, who is MEP (since 2004) and at the same time national secretary in charge of globalisation. He argues that because of this double function, he is more regularly in touch with the party leadership, Members of the National Assembly and Senate (interviewed on 03/07/2009). Bernard Poignant, MEP between 1999 and 2009 (interviewed on 09/07/2009) is more critical and argues:
MEPs were almost too much involved in the party leadership. Out of 31 MEPs, 10 or 12 were national secretaries, so the links were significant. However, after the difficult referendum [on the EU constitutional treaty, I.H.], the primaries and presidential elections, the PS delegation to the EP was divided.

Hence, even if MEPs were national secretaries, their divisions made them weaker as a group vis-à-vis the party headquarters. Kader Arif, MEP since 2004, contradicts Poignant and argues that even if many MEPs (including himself) are national secretaries, there is still too much distance between the EP and Solférino. Arif (interviewed on 05/10/2009) states:

I believe that the French Socialists need to make progress in this regard, especially when you look at the role played by MEPs within the SPD, and in particular Martin Schulz. The role he plays within the SPD is a very strong one when it comes to European policy-making.

Most scholars agree with Ladrech (2007: 99) that the PS’ MEPs, despite having been in high-level positions in the European Parliament (committee chairs or socialist group presidency) did not gain influence within the party at national level. As all six MEPs interviewed confirmed, the party leadership normally does not give them voting instructions; only on key decisions of historical importance such as the adoption of the Euro or EU enlargement (interview with Pervenche Bérès, MEP on 06/10/2009). The reason being - according to Bérès - that the party leadership trusts the MEPs:

The majority of delegation members are naturally part of the same faction as the party leadership, so this [trust] seems quite normal.
Sylvie Guillaume (MEP, interviewed on 06/10/2009) is more critical in her assessment and describes this phenomenon as ‘trust and distance’.

Bérès (interviewed on 06/10/2009) remembers that when the PS was in government, MEPs sometimes contacted both the government and the party headquarters for guidance before they voted in the EP ‘in order not to bring the government into difficulties when it had written a petition for the sake of compromise in the Council’. Hence, in some cases, MEPs were more cautious in their voting behaviour when the PS was in government, yet no formal link system was set up. Overall, Solférino did not seem to draw on the MEPs’ policy expertise very often. Only on very rare occasions were MEPs consulted by the party leadership— and this applied to times when the PS was in government and opposition. According to Bérès, examples of consultation were highly politicised issues such as the directive on services in the internal market, when MEPs were in high demand at national level. Bérès explains this phenomenon, stating:

Broadly, European issues are communicated by the national secretariat which reports our [the MEPs’] activities. And with regards to the technical issues I deal with, such as economic and financial questions or employment questions, the first ones to tackle those issues within the party are the ones at national level. Not really the Europeans.

All six socialist MEPs interviewed for this study confirmed that they were rarely consulted by the party headquarters, and that EU policy was generally made at Solférino. At the same time, their expertise seems to be more demanded at constituency level where they get invited to speak about certain aspects of European policy. Whilst the PS’ MEPs are rarely involved in the party’s EU policy-making process, the group of MEPs sitting on the national executive usually makes
contributions to early drafts of national and European election manifestoes. However, even when it comes to European matters, the key actors in the process of manifesto writing remains the party leadership which ‘constructs a final document from the contributions of the various factions’ (Ladrech, 2007: 97). The international secretary is part of the team who goes over the final text.

Prime Minister Jospin tried to involve the MEPs more into the European policy-making process. Shortly before the European elections in 1999, the PS organised its third extraordinary party conference on EU affairs within five years. The organisers of this conference, which was entitled ‘Nation – Europe’ were MEPs and party officials. During the conference, divisions between the party in government and activists became apparent. For example, motions brought forward by activists during the conference were far less pragmatic than the government’s European policy, calling for an EU-wide 35 hours week\(^ {11}\) and minimum wage - recalling the PS’ rhetoric in times of opposition (Wielgoś, 2002: 100-101). This goes to show that the involvement of party activists in EU policy-making is not always easy for the government. Nevertheless, the involvement of the party was more important for Jospin than for Mitterrand (Krell, 2009; Cole, 2001). François Mitterrand, like most of his predecessors, subordinated the party when it came to policy formation, personnel selection, policy selection and electoral campaigning (Clift, 2005: 225). Jospin has been characterised as a more inclusive leader who made a point of formally associating the party leadership, party group and the EP delegation with preparing the

\[^{11}\text{The 35-hour working week - the }\text{Loi Aubry'}, \text{named after Minister of Work Martine Aubry - was adopted at national level by the Jospin government in 2000. The reduction of the working week from 39 to 35 hours also involved reducing employers’ social contributions with the aim of creating jobs. For a detailed discussion of the Loi Aubry, see Clift (2003; 168-172).}\]
French EU presidency of July-December 2000 (Cole, 2001: 22). Overall, however, MEPs were not well integrated into the party. Henri Nallet, international secretary under Jospin and at the same time vice-president of the PES (interviewed on 18/06/2009) explains:

The MEPs were men and women who were parked in Brussels without any relationship to the party. Every once in a while we invited a MEP to speak about a certain directive at national bureau meetings. But this wasn’t a priority.

The situation has not changed much since 2002. Even in opposition, MEPs and MPs did not meet very often. Exceptions are party congresses (taking place every three years) and ‘journées parlementaires’ (parliamentary days), taking place every autumn. As Bérès (interviewed on 06/10/2009) explains:

Every time we [MEPs and MPs] meet, we criticise our lack of cooperation, but we still haven’t found a solution. Each assembly has its own calendar. It happens sometimes, in the case of specific texts, such as the debate on the services directive, when the issues discussed at European level will affect the national level in a highly politicised manner. At that point there is a well-organised interaction.

Sylvie Guillaume, MEP (interviewed on 06/10/2009) confirms this lack of regular cooperation between MPs and MEPs and criticises the lack of visibility of MEPs during parliamentary days:

Last week the PS delegation had a parliamentary day at Toulouse together with the party groups of National Assembly and Senate. I think we looked a bit like a subgroup… as if we were not a group in its own right.
The problem is also recognised by Solférino. Maurice Braud (PS party official, interviewed on 22/06/2009) acknowledges that MPs, being in the majority, dominate the agenda of parliamentary days, ‘so it becomes too difficult to Europeanise the debate’.

Robert Ladrech (2007) posits that French politicians generally pay little attention to the activities of the European Parliament, as there is a long-standing preference of intergovernmental action at the European level. He moreover writes that ‘the activities of MEPs have been ignored, at least among the party membership and mid-level leadership bodies’ (2007: 100). In addition, since the French parliament is already in a weak position vis-à-vis the executive, many MPs regard the European Parliament as an ‘unwelcome competitor for legitimacy’ (Ladrech, 2007: 99). It can thus be concluded that MEPs only played a minor role in the PS’ process of European policy-making between 1997 and 2009. They got involved in highly politicised issues, but day-to-day EU policy was made by the party leadership at Solférino.

The SPD leadership’s relationship with its MEPs is similar to the one of the PS, but with one notable exception. As explained earlier in this chapter, Martin Schulz (MEP and leader of the S & D group in the European Parliament) was member of the Vorstand ex officio and an elected member of the Präsidium, which was a novelty in SPD history. In the 2009 European election campaign he was the party’s top candidate and was later made the party’s official EU adviser. According to long-standing MEP Barbara Weiler (interviewed on 05/10/2009) Schulz’ role as EU adviser and membership of the Präsidium should not be treated as something exceptional, but taken for granted:

Members of the European Parliament are obviously the ones knowing most about the EU and what is going on at the moment.
With Martin Schulz, at least one MEP is represented at the highest level of the party organisation. It is the result of a long struggle for recognition. Jan Kreutz, a PES official (interviewed on 15/06/2009) argues that it was only possible because of Schulz’ rootedness in the domestic party organisation:

In the SPD Martin Schulz plays a crucial role. He is amongst the top 10 of the party leadership. But he plays this role not only because he is the chair of the S & D group in the EP, but because he is deeply rooted at grassroots level and has retained a close relationship with his regional party in North Rhine-Westphalia and still does a lot of work at home.

Thus, Martin Schulz acts as a bridge between the Willy-Brandt-Haus and the European Parliament. He also represents the SPD at PES presidency meetings and is one of the few MEPs to have taken over this role within the PES.

MEPs are invited to the Europa Kommission and the parliamentary EU working group, but rarely attend due to overlapping working schedules. Links between the Willy-Brandt-Haus and the SPD’s two leading MEPs (Martin Schulz and Bernhard Rapkay, who is the leader of the SPD delegation in the EP) were close and regular, whilst most other MEPs entertained close links to their constituency, but not to the party headquarters.

Contacts between MPs and MEPs are irregular and informal, often based on personal contacts. For example, many MEPs are in touch with the MPs from their constituency. MEP Barbara Weiler (interviewed on 05/10/2009) explains that contacts with MPs are mostly spontaneous and initiated by herself rather than the MPs. This was confirmed by three other MEPs. Some MEPs, like Jutta Haug, were in regular contact with members of the regional parliament, especially because they had an
official function at the regional party level. Asked about her European network within the SPD, Haug (interviewed on 07/10/2009) states:

    I cannot say that I have a European network within the party. Because I think that overall, our party is by far not Europeanised enough. In my opinion, everything that happens at the EU level in terms of legislation etc. has not yet reached the minds of the Members of the Bundestag, Members of the regional Parliaments or party members.'

In sum, with the exception of the two ‘leading’ MEPs Martin Schulz and Bernhard Rapkay, the SPD leadership made very little use of the MEPs’ EU expertise. Martin Schulz was a member of the Vorstand and Präsidium and could bring in the MEP’s perspective. It has to be kept in mind, however, that when the SPD was in government EU policy was primarily made in the relevant ministries and not the party headquarters. Therefore, MEPs were not able to be key players in the EU policy-making process.

7.6 Conclusions

This chapter has examined the Europeanisation of EU policy-making within the Labour Party, SPD and PS. A Europeanised policy-making process was described as one in which not only the top leadership and their advisers are involved, but also the broader party organisation. It was argued that top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation of the party organisation only take place if different levels of the party contribute to the making of EU policy. This includes formal policy-making bodies such as party conferences, national executive committees, and policy forums, as well as MPs and MEPs.
This chapter has found that within the three parties, a small circle of party leaderships and their EU advisers were the key actors in the European policy-making process. European policy was government policy, whilst the formal policy-making bodies were marginalised in the formulation of European policy. Even when the parties were in opposition, as the example of the PS suggests, the formulation of EU policy was left to a narrow circle of party elites. A Europeanised process of EU policy-making involving the broader party organisation therefore remains wishful thinking.

These findings do not come as a total surprise, given that party leaders have always dominated in the formulation of policy, and that the increasing centralisation of the party organisation is likely to accelerate this trend. Furthermore, we know that EU policy tends to be very technical in nature, and that - in contrast to the party organisation – party elites in government and highly specialised civil servants have access to the expertise needed to deal with it. The broader implications for the parties’ internal democracy should however worry Labour, the PS and SPD. As the party organisation is not enough involved in the making of European policy, decisions made by the leadership might not reflect the membership’s preferences. In the long term, the broader party organisation could lack the knowledge and expertise to lead well-informed EU parliamentary election campaigns, and EU policy might become even less salient in domestic politics. The party organisation could be expected to show less and less interest in EU policy – which can become detrimental for essentially pro-European parties like Labour, the SPD and PS.
Chapter 8: The Europeanisation of European election campaigns

Campaigning is one of the main activities political parties engage in, and election campaigns can tell us a great deal about a party’s Europeanisation. This chapter examines the 2009 European parliamentary election campaigns of the Labour Party, the Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The 2009 campaigns were chosen for a number of reasons. First of all, when would parties prioritise their European policies, if not during European election campaigns? These campaigns should thus be an indicator of the parties’ Europeanisation. Secondly, at the time of the elections, Labour and SPD were still in government whilst the PS was in opposition for already seven years. This contrast should be reflected in the parties’ campaign strategies and ultimately demonstrate whether parties Europeanise differently when they are in government or opposition. Thirdly, for the first time, the Party of European Socialists (PES) had a headquarters separate from the S & D party group in the European Parliament and their own campaigns budget. This could have led to a stronger involvement of the PES in national campaigns, and ultimately, increased the degrees of Europeanisation of the three national campaigns.

This chapter analyses the 2009 European election campaigns of the the Labour Party, PS and SPD in connection with the one led by the Party of European Socialists (PES). Applying the concept of Europeanisation to the 2009 campaign, it creates an ideal type of Europeanised election campaign. The underlying argument is that a Europeanised party organisation leads Europeanised election campaigns in which the politicians speak about EU topics and involve the PES. In turn, Europeanised election campaigns contribute to the Europeanisation of the party organisation. It is a bidirectional process with a feedback loop.
8.1 A Brief Literature Review

Since the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, European election campaigns have been fought primarily at national level, organised and lead by national parties. This is not surprising, considering that national parties put together the lists of candidates, formulate election manifestoes and fund the campaigns. One of the consequences is that European Parliament elections are used as mid-term contests for national parties to win national government office. There is an extensive literature focusing on the lack of ‘Europeanness’ of European elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004; Schmitt, 2005; Hix and Marsh, 2007; Franklin, 2006). Another body of literature analyses national election campaign strategies in different Member States of the European Union (EU) (Bicchi, Blondel and Svensson, 2003; Tenscher, 2005; Carlson and Strandberg, 2005; Niedermayer, 2005; Maier and Tenscher, 2009) because electoral campaigns work differently in each Member State. Indeed, ‘to speak about an “election campaign” in the singular when referring to European Parliament elections is an audacious choice’, as Gerstlé (2007) points out.

The fact that most national political parties are members of ‘Europarties’ has received far less attention (the exceptions being: Day and Shaw, 2006; Chan, 2005; Raunio, 2005; Moschonas, 2002; Smith, 1996). A Europarty can be defined as an institutionalised form of party organisation at the EU level that has seen a partial transfer of sovereignty from national member parties (Johansson and Zervakis 2002). However, the question if Europarties are political parties is contested. In the past, parties have only existed at the domestic level where they fulfil specific roles: vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking. Some scholars argue that Europarties cannot be regarded as parties in the traditional sense but as loose coalitions of national parties (Marsh and Norris, 1997) while others believe that Europarties need to be
interpreted within the context of the EU (Hix, 1993; Ladrech, 1993). The reason why
the campaign literature focuses on the national level is that in the past, Europarties
had neither the financial nor organisational means to organise large-scale pan-
European campaigns. They depended financially and organisationally upon their party
group in the European Parliament which brings together the members of the
Europarties’ national member parties and can be viewed as the parliamentary party.
Although linked to their party group in the European Parliament, Europarties like the
PES are distinct entities.

8.2 Europeanisation and European Election Campaigns

Europeanisation has never been systematically applied to European election
campaigns, and at first sight this idea might seem paradoxical: would not an election
campaign to the European Parliament be Europeanised by nature? For the purpose of
this chapter, the definition given by Radaelli (2000: 3) is most useful. He defines
Europeanisation as:

processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of
doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and
consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the
logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public
policies.

However, the multidirectional aspect of Europeanisation is not emphasised in this
definition. After all, a Europeanised election campaign would be a complex,
multidirectional process in which national parties upload their national and European
policy paradigms, values, knowledge and campaigning experience to the Europarties.
The latter, in turn, download their ‘European’ campaigning experience and policy expertise to the national level while also providing national parties with European networks. Moreover, sister parties from different EU Member States can Europeanise each other through campaign exchanges or policy learning processes. A Europeanised election campaign would therefore entail a constant dialogue between Europarties and their national member parties; an exchange of information, ideas and experience in all directions. Putting this concept into practise, it is argued that the interlinked prerequisites of a Europeanised election campaign would be: increased campaign funding; a campaign focussing on European topics; a widely supported and used common European election manifesto; close cooperation between the Europarties and their member parties at different levels of the party organisation; and a common candidate for the presidency of the European Commission.

8.3 The 2009 European Parliamentary Elections: the case of the PES

8.3.1 Campaign Funding

If Europarties and their national member parties want to fight a successful, modern, awareness-raising campaign, they need to have adequate resources and funding. The quality of campaigning is certainly linked to voter turnout, which in European elections is continuously decreasing.

For the Europarties, the funding situation has changed fundamentally over the last years. The fact that in 2009 the PES was able to lead an election campaign independently from its group in the European Parliament is a new and important development which is the result of the Europarties’ lobbying for constitutional recognition and funding regulation.
The European Parliament has achieved constitutional recognition of the Europarties in the Treaty as well as binding regulations on party funding. This has been a long, still ongoing process, starting in the 1990s with the inclusion of the Party Article into the Maastricht Treaty. The latter, however, specified neither the funding of Europarties nor their role in European elections and particularly in the nomination procedures, and can therefore be interpreted as an ‘incomplete contract’ (Johansson and Raunio, 2005: 522). Ever since, the Europarties kept up the pressure for a revision of the article. In 2003, the European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation which would lay out the rules for Europarty funding. This binding regulation (Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003) entered into force before the European elections in June 2004 and the rules of party funding applied from the date of the opening of the first session of the newly elected EP, although it took until October for the EP to distribute the funds (Lightfoot, 2006: 307). The regulation defines political parties at the European level and gives clear rules for party finance. The amount of money Europarties receive each year is now set from the general budget of the European Parliament. Therefore, the EP can increase the amount without Council approval. The clarification of their financial situation had an important impact on the activities of the Europarties and their internal organisation. In the past, the PES’ organisational and logistical infrastructure was very slight, which was an index of the party’s ‘weak institutionalisation’ (Moschonas, 2002: 270). The secretariat (or headquarters) depended on the parliamentary group. The regulation’s requirement for the Europarties to obtain a legal basis in a EU member state meant that they had to move into an office outside the European Parliament buildings and could no longer ‘borrow’ staff from the parliamentary group. All Europarties now have a permanent salaried staff, and this break with the European Parliament has significantly increased the
number of professional party workers. All the staff currently working for the PES has only been employed since the adoption of the regulation. In 2007, the regulation has been amended to clarify one crucial aspect: from the EP election campaign in 2009 onwards, Europarties could use the money from the EP budget to fund their electoral campaigns. In the past, party regulation specifically banned EP funds from being used to fund national election campaigns. The funding situation is transparent, as Europarties need to publish their accounts at the end of each year listing the different sources of income and all categories of expenditure in detail.¹² Not so surprisingly, the grant given by the European Parliament has increased over the years, from €2,580,000 in 2006 to €3,100,000 in 2009, so approximately 17 per cent in a period of three years. All Europarties rely heavily on this grant, which is their biggest source of income. The PES has spent €188,521 for the 2009 election campaign, which compared to some of the PES’ member parties is a very low budget. However, compared to general elections, European campaign budgets tend to be much lower, as the case of the SPD illustrates (see table 8.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of election, year</th>
<th>Campaign Budget of the SPD in €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General elections 2005</td>
<td>almost 24.000.000(^\text{13})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European elections 2004</td>
<td>12.500.000(^\text{14})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General elections 2009</td>
<td>27.000.000(^\text{15})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European elections 2009</td>
<td>9.000.000(^\text{16})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the PES Secretariat had a permanent staff of 20, it increased during the electoral campaign 2009 to around 34 (including trainees and voluntaries). This is a significant progress, but still a very small number of people compared to some national parties’ headquarters. For example, in 2009 the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) employed a total of around 180 people in its headquarters (while in government), and the Labour Party employed 80 people. Most striking is the fact that in 2009, the ‘Superwahljahr’ where local (in some regions only), European, and federal elections all took place; the SPD spent three times more on its federal campaign than on the European campaign. As Maier and Tenscher (2009: 23) point out, all German parties have reduced their campaign expenditures radically for European elections in the past, which had various consequences for the organisation and conduct of the campaigns. This clearly indicates that European elections continue


\(^{14}\) Maier and Tenscher (2009), p. 23.


Available at: [http://www.welt.de/politik/bundestagswahl/article4569370/Steuerzahlerbund-geisselt-hohe-Wahlkampfkosten.html](http://www.welt.de/politik/bundestagswahl/article4569370/Steuerzahlerbund-geisselt-hohe-Wahlkampfkosten.html) (19/10/2009)

to be treated as the ‘poor cousins’ of federal elections. It could be argued that 9 Million Euros is a surprisingly high budget for second order elections, given that a federal election was in the offing. Yet in the case of the SPD, the European elections on June 7\textsuperscript{th} were treated as a ‘warm up’ for the general elections on September 27\textsuperscript{th}.

The Labour Party spent a total of £2.302.244 on its European election campaign, thus less than a third of the SPD’s budget.\textsuperscript{17} Whilst it was the party leadership’s strategy to lead a low key European campaign with little focus on EU issues, the comparatively low campaign budget must also be interpreted in the context of Labour’s general financial malaise.

To sum up, the PES could for the first time lead an independent campaign in the 2009 European elections, although its campaign budget was very low compared to those of its biggest member parties. It amounted to approximately 2 per cent of the SPD’s budget. Under those conditions, top-down Europeanisation is difficult to imagine. Rather, the ‘richer’ member parties such as SPD and Labour relied on their own budgets, manifestoes, slogans and branding.

\subsection*{8.3.2 A campaign focussing on European topics}

A Europeanised election campaign would focus on ‘European’ topics, that is, topics which \textit{are or should be} in the sphere of control of the European institutions. At least, these topics should have a European dimension. However, it is obvious that a ‘European debate’ every five years and only during the election campaign cannot lead

\textsuperscript{17} For the Labour Party’s 2009 European election campaign budget, see :

to a Europeanised campaign. After the electoral defeat, PES President Rasmussen (2009) concluded on his blog that the voters ‘simply didn’t see the relevance of these elections. They did not see the political choices at European level - perhaps not surprising since these elections were mainly fought over national political disputes’. An analysis of the three campaigns’ content can only confirm Rasmussen’s statement. Indeed, most of the debates were not Europeanised. Moreover, the three parties did not share the same views and concerns, which lead to three very different campaigns. Ideological divergence within the PES is hardly a new phenomenon, and PES manifests traditionally represent continental social democracy (Moschonas, 2002: 275). In the 1994 EP election campaign, Labour had to ditch the PES manifesto as its commitment to the 35h week was seized upon by the Tories and the press (Lightfoot, 2005: 73). In 2009, trying to avoid this situation, the Labour Party negotiated the PES manifesto ‘with greatest attention to the detail’ (Duggan, 2009: 11).

Labour’s local and European election campaign lacked funding and visibility, and a European debate was missing. Party officials and MEPs blamed this lack of Europeanness on an expenses scandal among MPs in the House of Commons, which overshadowed the campaign. Labour, as the party of government, was under attack. The Guardian (14/05/2009) wrote that during the EP campaign launch event, in private, ‘cabinet ministers admitted their two major campaign themes - the need to end isolation in Europe and the government success in limiting the recession's impact - were going to be lost in the noise’. In an interview, Labour MEP Derek Vaughn, (interviewed on 03/02/2010) stated:

Unfortunately, the Westminster expenses scandal dominated the debate.

We wanted to talk more about European economic issues and European
structural funds. But well, we did talk about the economy, about investment in education and the environment.

Richard Corbett, the other Labour MEP interviewed for this study, confirmed that the Westminster expenses scandal dominated the debate (27/01/2010).

However, the party leadership did nothing to Europeanise the campaign, and the result was an invisible, defensive campaign. While a party-wide EP campaign was lacking, MPs and MEPs arranged their own local campaign activity around PES campaign days or independently. As usual during election campaigns in the UK, MEPs and activists knocked on doors, organised telephone canvassing and distributed leaflets.

The Labour Party hosted a PES campaign exchange and an ECOSY (Young European Socialists) campaign session. Mostly, MEPs and MEP-candidates campaigned together with local party activists and politicians who ‘are often closer to the people in their constituency’ (Interview with MEP candidate Silke Thompson-Pottebohm on 22/01/2010).

The SPD’s European election campaign was from the beginning perceived as a warm-up for the federal elections on September 27th 2009. The European, federal, and in some regions even regional and local election campaigns were fought at the same time, which is one of the main reasons why the debate was not Europeanised. Another part of the problem was the slogan ‘Social Europe’. Long-standing MEP Bernhard Rapakay, who is the SPD’s delegation leader to the European Parliament, (interviewed on 07/10/2009) stressed:

For the first time it wasn’t a purely national election. We preached social Europe, so the debate was necessarily European. However it looked as if
we had a social Germany, but no social Europe. And with hindsight, the topic was quite abstract.

The point is that ‘Social Europe’ has always been a vague and abstract slogan, one that is difficult to discuss with the voters because of its diffuse meaning. It has been chosen by the PES to ‘take refuge in rhetoric’ as Moschonas (2009: 177) remarks. The SPD’s credibility as a supporter of a social Europe had suffered in the past years. In government between 1998 and 2005, the SPD under Gerhard Schröder’s pragmatic chancellorship was very hesitant to support social legislation at EU level, which caused major rifts with the PS (Wielgoß, 2002: 74-112). In 2009, being the junior partner in a great coalition with the Christian Democrats, selling ‘Social Europe’ to the voters was no easy task for the SPD which had lost many of its core voters due to labour market and pension system reforms. It is hence not surprising that ‘Social Europe’ did not dominate the SPD’s election campaign. A number of MEPs interviewed stressed that the debates during the campaign were more Europeanised than in 2004, when purely national issues such as unemployment benefits dominated the debate. However, none of the interviewees labelled it a Europeanised campaign. As in the case of Labour, the SPD leadership did little to Europeanise the debate, and focussed instead on national issues. The fact that Martin Schulz, leader of the socialist group in the European Parliament, was head of the SPD’s list and played a more prominent role as top candidate was evaluated positively by most MEPs, with Barbara Weiler stating: ‘We tried to Europeanise the campaign by appointing a real front-runner’ (05/10/2009). Kerstin Westphal (MEP, interviewed on 07/10/2009) said: ‘Whenever I joined the campaign with Martin [Schulz] the discussions were very much Europeanised’, but this seems to be the exception. The SPD’s campaign television spot and posters were far more provocative than usual. ‘Funny and
polemic’, this campaign was meant to mobilise the voters, as campaign manager Kajo Wasserhövel (Der Spiegel, 25/04/2009) underlined. The SPD openly attacked the opposition parties as well as the co-governing Christian Democrats in this cartoon-like spot, which is an unusually provocative and confrontational strategy for a German election campaign. No European message or policy commitments were brought across in the spot and on the posters, and a link to ‘Social Europe’ was clearly missing.

The French Socialist Party, relying on the PES manifesto, wanted to lead a campaign on ‘Social Europe’. Since the 1970s, the PS has been one of the most ardent advocates of social legislation at EU level, even though the Jospin government took a more pragmatic approach than many activists had hoped (Wielgoß, 2002). Party leader Martine Aubry, very pro-European in her outlook, was certainly engaged in this campaign and supported the pledges of the PES manifesto - after all, the PS relied exclusively on the PES manifesto. From the beginning, however, the campaign focussed on attacking incumbent conservative president Nicolas Sarkozy; even the term ‘Anti-Sarkozysm’ was coined when Aubry called for a ‘sanction vote’ against the president. When this strategy proofed unsuccessful and the PS did not score well in surveys, Aubry called for a ‘useful vote’ and then for an ‘efficient vote’ in favour of the PS, trying to appear more ‘proposing rather than opposing’ (Libération, 18/05/2009). In the end, the PS did not manage to bring its European message across, although some long-standing MEPs interviewed stated that their campaign was more about European issues than previous ones.

To sum up, for a variety of reasons, none of the three parties led Europeanised debates during the 2009 election campaign. The processes of up- and downloading of policy issues between the PES and the three member parties was almost invisible, as the
three campaigns had a strong national focus. In neither France nor Germany, the message of a ‘Social Europe’ came across. The Labour Party did not even use the slogan – knowing how controversial EU social legislation was amongst the party and the general public. It failed to bring any European message across in its invisible campaign.

8.3.3 A common European election manifesto

In every campaign, manifestos are the document candidates can refer to when selling their parties’ past achievements and future commitments. Manifestoes are important documents with ‘a special standing as the only collective policy statement that parties as such ever make, and no other resource represents the combined views of the party as an organisation’ (Budge, 2001: 51). Moreover, manifestoes support party mobilisation before elections. In a Europeanised campaign, European, national, and subnational manifestos would be distributed and discussed on an equal footing by candidates, voters and the media. The Europarties’ manifestoes can be seen as a symbol of transnational values and policy commitments, while national and regional manifestos break down European topics to the national electorate in each member state, focussing on national and regional concerns and priorities.

All Europarties have common election manifestoes, formally agreed by all member parties. Yet, considering that Europarties are ‘broad churches’ with member parties of very different historical origin and political outlook, their election manifestoes tend to represent the lowest common denominator. In the past, they were written in very general and vague terms. For the 1999 PES manifesto, any issues that might have given rise to disagreement (such as measures to promote employment or the reform of the EU budget) were either avoided or dealt with in extremely vague
terms. The result was a minimalist document, which could not be transformed into an instrument of action or an authentically European campaign (Moschonas, 2002: 276). For the 2009 manifesto, the PES decided to launch an open consultation process. Instead of drafting the manifesto amongst party leaders behind closed doors, the PES decided to launch an open consultation process between October 2007 and July 2008, allowing for both online consultations and meetings across Europe. The PES collected contributions not only from the national member parties, but also from trade unions, NGOs, affiliated political foundations and PES activists. This consultation process could be interpreted as a means to indirectly empower the PES. While before, the leadership of member parties were the sole actors involved in manifesto-writing, the PES has taken away this monopole and opened up the process to other actors, trying to create a direct link with the electorate. Has this led to a centralisation of power for President Rasmussen and the PES in general? It is still too early for this assumption. The PES has no interest in circumventing its member parties, and after all, the parties were heavily involved in the manifesto-writing, drafting the chapters. Moreover, the ratification of the manifesto is consensus-based, meaning that the national parties have the final say. Nevertheless, the consultation process can be interpreted as a sign to member parties that the PES is now capable of maintaining a direct link to the grassroots level. It is a weak link, but it has the potential to grow stronger. ‘Yourspace’ – the campaign website, had 300,000 visitors, 500 posts, 100 videos, and the Facebook group counted 1350 members. There were more than 60 written contributions from PES member parties, NGOs, foundations and activists. Overall, 3000 activists from a cross-section of the PES joined the process, which involved

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18 These are the official numbers quoted on the PES website, see:

much organisational effort which in previous years the PES could not have made. Interviews with PES activists in Paris, Berlin and London show that at grassroots level, the consultation process was much appreciated. In Britain, PES activists together with Compass Youth (Compass is a think tank affiliated with the Labour Party’s left wing, and Compass Youth is their branch for young people) organised several meetings to collect written contributions to the manifesto. On their blog they appreciate ‘this creative space’ (…) and the ‘great opportunity and a great responsibility - to engage those around us (…) to join the debate so that we can build support across the European electorate because we will have reflected the needs of all our citizens’. Even if the contributions of the activists were small they could not be ignored by national parties.

According to a party official, Labour’s amendments to the PES manifesto were ‘reductionist in nature’ as the party approached the text ‘thinking that anything we give would be picked up and used against us’ (Duggan, 2009: 31). The PES manifesto practically played no role in Labour’s 2009 election campaign (see table 8.2), and one party official stated that after the PES manifesto negotiations ‘you end up with a deal to the left of Labour but you can use it to reassure the left of the party of our commitments on this side. It acts as a signifier to the trade unions and the Social Europe side of the party’ (Duggan, 2009: 32). Labour would have preferred a ‘values based’ text to the PES manifesto’s policy commitments which were more left-wing than the Labour leadership had wanted them to be. As a consequence, Labour fought its campaign on the basis of its own manifesto (‘Winning the Fight for Britain’s future’). Finding the manifesto on the party’s website was however a challenge and it

was only added after a complaint by the European Parliamentary Labour Party (interview with Giampi Alhadeff on 17/06/10). Labour’s manifesto addresses most of the issues tackled by the PES manifesto but puts greater emphasis on the party’s political achievements at EU level and Britain’s benefits of EU membership. Like in the past, Labour’s manifesto drew on the PES manifesto, picking up many of its themes and pledges, even if during the campaign it did not play a role. Asked why the PES manifesto was not used, Labour’s international secretary Jo Billingham pointed out that the material provided by the PES was often ‘not helpful’ in the British context as it does not break down European issues to the local level. Labour activists, the official stressed, do not feel the need to discuss European integration in general, but focus on local issues such as funding provided by the EU (interviewed on 24/11/2009). Yet, while the PES’ campaign material was criticised, Labour’s own manifesto was not used either. MEP candidate Silke Thompson-Pottebohm (interviewed on 22/01/2010) explained:

There were only very few printed copies of Labour’s European manifesto. While in theory, manifestos are important, they don’t play a big role during the election campaign, at least not when you speak to people at their doors. In that case, short leaflets are more useful.

Long-standing MEP Richard Corbett (interviewed on 27/01/2010) explained that he hardly ever used any manifesto during the campaign, stating:

Well, you don’t hand out manifestoes very much during the campaign but when people ask you for Labour’s policies you refer to it, and also when the press asks you.
Hence, Labour hardly used its own manifesto – not to mention the one of the PES. Like Labour, the SPD used its own manifesto (‘SPD Europamanifest’). Party leader Franz Müntefering (2008) praised the PES manifesto, saying ‘the manifesto is good, Europe is good’. All MEPs interviewed were aware of the PES’ manifesto and had a positive attitude towards it – yet none of them used it. Instead, they referred exclusively to the SPD’s manifesto. The content of the two manifestoes is similar; calling for a ‘Social Europe’, a stricter regulation of the financial markets and combating climate change, only that the SPD highlighted some topics of national concern, such as the principle of subsidiarity.

MEP Bernhard Rapkay (interviewed on 07/10/2009) said that during his campaign, the PES manifesto did not play a big role. However:

For the internal mobilisation of the party, it did play a role because for the first time a manifesto has been discussed; at least to a certain extent. It [PES manifesto] was more than the bulletins we used to have.

The SPD used its own branding for the campaign, a red cube which nevertheless resembled the PES cube (see Table 8.2). As PES official Jan Kreutz (interviewed on 15/06/2009) put it:

With the federal elections approaching, the SPD did not want to confuse its voters by using different logos and brandings. Also, the SPD did not see the added value of putting the PES’ logo on its posters because the voters would not notice it. Who would travel across Europe and compare?

The PS’ campaign relied exclusively on the PES manifesto and the party put the PES logo on posters, campaign material and the voting bulletins (see Table 8.2). For the
first time, the PS did not produce a separate manifesto. Long-standing MEP Pervenche Bérès (interviewed on 06/10/2009) commented:

I don’t see how we could have been more European in our approach to this campaign. The PES was very present in our campaign. Unfortunately this did not translate into better election results.

PES activist Aleksander Glogowski (interviewed on 10/06/2009) said that within the Paris federation of the PS, more than 200 party activists contributed to the PES manifesto, and expectations were high. ‘That’s why we are frustrated to see that many party leaders in other European parties have not used the manifesto’, the activist stressed. The question remains why the PS was the only party of the three to have used the PES manifesto. MEP Kader Arif stated that the PS used the PES manifesto to stress the difference between the left and right. Especially after the PS’ internal division over the EU Constitutional Treaty and the national referendum on the same matter in 2005, ‘Europe was a politically very sensitive topic’ and the ‘use of the PES manifesto seemed to be the most European thing to do’ (interviewed on 05/10/2009). Perhaps more importantly, the PS has always been ideologically much closer to the PES than Labour. For example, it wholeheartedly supported the PES’ commitments to the regulation of the financial markets - which were contested amongst the Labour Party. Moreover, as a party of opposition, the PS could commit itself to the PES’ policies more easily. Last but not least, being in opposition, the PS had a lower budget for campaigning and less staff working at its headquarters. The use of the PES manifesto and logo therefore seemed to be a rational and straightforward strategy.

Table 8.2: Use of election manifestoes and campaign material in 2009
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Party</th>
<th>Use of national election manifesto</th>
<th>Use of PES manifesto</th>
<th>Use of PES logo on posters and leaflets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>National manifesto existed, but was not used</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To summarise, the 2009 PES manifesto, created in an open consultation process, had the potential to Europeanise national election campaigns through the mobilisation of a larger part of the electorate. However, top-down Europeanisation has its limits, and the PES cannot enforce the use of its manifesto upon its member parties. It has been demonstrated that for ideological and practical reasons, both Labour and the SPD showed little enthusiasm for the use of the common manifesto. The PS, as a party in opposition that is ideologically closer to the PES, could commit itself more easily to the PES’ policies and exclusively relied on the PES manifesto.

### 8.3.4 Common Campaigning

A Europeanised election campaign would be an integrated one: Europarties and their national member parties would campaign *together* at all levels of the party organisation. In practice, this would mean that PES officials, MEPs, MPs, local politicians as well as activists from European sister parties would together attend campaign rallies, television shows, debates, online chats to name but a few.

In 2009, PES President Rasmussen campaigned in almost all 27 Member States alongside party leaders or MEP candidates. At local level, campaign exchanges have a tradition, most notably in border regions. The most interesting development however has been the introduction of a kind of individual PES membership, the ‘PES activists’
in 2006. In the past, party members did not feel that they belonged to a Europarty, as contacts in the PES were limited to a narrow circle of international affairs specialists in the national parties and thus remained an ‘elite exercise’ (Moschonas, 2002: 271). The PES tried to change this through the introduction of the ‘PES activists’. Every member of a PES member party is automatically a PES activist, but needs to register online with the PES. In 2009, there were over 70 PES activist city groups all over Europe. On the occasion of the PES activists’ forum in 2009, President Rasmussen said: ‘I see our activists as the bridge-builder between the national and the European scene’. For the PES, individual membership can foster increased legitimacy and contribute to the Europeanisation of national party organisations. The concept of individual membership is not new to the PES. During the 1990s the PES set up local associations, an example being the PES-London-Association which however failed to become officially recognised as a component part of the PES. Moreover, it did not receive funding from either Labour or the PES (Day and Shaw, 2006: 110-111). It remains to be seen whether the PES activists will become an integral part of the PES and be embraced by its member parties. Generally, a fear of ‘capture’ of the national parties by the Europarties still needs to be addressed (Day and Shaw, 2006: 103). During the election campaign, the PES provided the activist groups with information, whilst giving them the freedom to organise original campaign events. Most of the activists’ activities were coordinated online. In France, Germany and the UK, PES

20 A map listing all city groups and contact persons is available on the PES website, see: http://www.pes.org/en/pes-activists/city-groups (24/10/2009)

21 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen at the PES Activists Form 2009 in Dublin, see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ggn-uaU6f9Y (20/10/2009)
activists supported the election campaign, although to a different extent. The PS has fully embraced the concept and has integrated the PES activist groups into their party structure at regional level through a statute defining the cooperation between the PES activists and the PS. It is hence not surprising that in the beginning, the majority of PES activists were French. In the meantime the situation has diversified, and city groups are all over Europe, but mainly in capitals and bigger cities. In France, there were almost 30 ‘Commissions Europe’ (European committees at regional level) and overlapping PES city groups in 2009. The question is why the PS has been most enthusiastic about the introduction of the PES activists. The leader of the PS’ London branch, Axelle Lemaire, stressed that since the PS had been strongly divided over the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2004/2005, many activists now wanted to demonstrate their pro-Europeanness, and the PES activists offered a platform to express these feelings (interview on 14/09/2009).

In the beginning, the SPD leadership regarded the PES activists with suspicion, worrying about parallel structures outside the party organisation. In the meantime, at least at local level, attitudes seemed to have shifted, at least to a certain extent. PES activists supported the election campaign in 2009 either as city groups or alongside the Young Social Democrats (Jusos). However, the number of people involved is still limited and the SPD has not yet formally integrated the PES activists into their party structure.

The British Labour Party tolerates a somewhat loose cooperation with the PES activists who are affiliated with the ‘Labour Movement for Europe’ (London and South East branch) and ‘Compass Youth’, Like in Germany, the number of activists is still low, the organisation is very loose, and the activities seem to be focused
exclusively on London and the south eastern region of the UK. Moreover, as MEP candidate Silke Thompson-Pottebohm explained, PES activists from other European countries are not used to the British campaigning style, meaning door-knocking and telephone canvassing, and it was not easy to involve them in those activities (22/01/2010). Generally, efforts to include PES activists in the campaign were very low despite Labour’s predictable defeat.

To sum up, during the election campaign, there has taken place an exchange between the PES, the leaders of its member parties and the international departments of the member parties. As PES official Sandrine Bertin (interviewed on 17/06/2009) explained, smaller member parties, in particular from the new EU Member States in central and Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean, tend to rely more on the PES as a platform of exchange and expertise than parties from the EU 15. The SPD, Labour and the PS are part of the institutionalised dialogue with the PES. However, it alone cannot contribute much to the Europeanisation of the election campaign, as it does not reach activists at local level. To fill this gap, the PES has introduced the PES activists as bridge-builders between the European and national level. During the 2009 their number was still limited, especially in Germany and the United Kingdom. PES activists still rely on national parties’ willingness to integrate them and provide them with funding and membership lists. Both Labour and the SPD have been indifferent, if not hostile towards PES grassroots activism. A closer cooperation between the PES and its member parties could contribute to the Europeanisation of the campaign by raising awareness of European issues and the exchange of knowledge and information. The PES activists are a well-connected network of campaigners, working at grass roots level, offering European policy and campaigning expertise and therefore feeling comfortable discussing European issues. Many of them come from different
EU Member States, providing contacts and speaking several languages. They could strengthen national party members’ awareness of the PES and contribute to their Europeanisation.

**8.3.5 A Common Candidate for the Commission Presidency**

Vote-seeking is one of the goals of parties alongside office- and policy seeking. In the past, the PES was not seen as vote-seeking because European elections did not designate an executive at EU level (Lightfoot, 2005: 7). However, the situation has changed with the increasing powers of the EP regarding the investiture of a new Commission. The selection of a common candidate for the European Commission Presidency could contribute to the PES becoming a vote-seeking party – even if the direct link to the electorate remains weak. If Europarties could agree on a common candidate for the European Commission Presidency, there would be more rivalry during the election campaign. More would be at stake and the top candidate would give politics a face. Modernisation of election campaigns goes hand in hand with personalisation, whereby the campaign focuses on personalities rather than issues (Roper et al., 2004). Simon Hix (2008) posits that the EU needs a contest for political leadership, which could also lead to a personalisation of the campaign. If the Europarties could each agree on a candidate for the presidency of the European Commission, their campaigns could be better coordinated with the campaigns of their member parties. Confronted with a European top candidate, voters would become aware of the ‘Europeanness’ of the elections, which could lead to a more Europeanised debate.

In the case of the PES in 2009, there was no common candidate to compete with the EPP’s incumbent Commission president, José Manuel Barroso. The PES failed to
nominate a common candidate due to internal disagreements between PES president Rasmussen and the influential parliamentary group leader Martin Schulz, which shows that the party group exerts considerable influence on the PES. In addition, influential party leaders such as Gordon Brown and Franz Müntefering openly backed Barroso. The PS, under Martine Aubry, on the other hand, very strongly supported the idea of a common socialist candidate, and as her campaign manager and international secretary Jean-Christophe Cambadélis (13/06/2009) stated, a common candidate could have contributed to the bipolarisation of the campaign. All French MEPs interviewed for this study very much regretted the fact that the PES did not have a common candidate for the Commission presidency. Pervenche Bérès (interviewed on 06/10/2009) stressed:

We [the PS] did not manage to make our voice heard within the PES when we called for a common candidate. I am absolutely convinced that our campaign suffered from that.

The attitude amongst German MEPs was more diverse; most stated that in the future, a common candidate would be a positive development, leading to a more personalised campaign. However, MEP Petra Kammerevert (interviewed on 16/10/2009) argued that ‘a European top candidate can impossibely speak all EU languages which would make campaigning abroad quite difficult’ - a statement showing how low expectations are when it comes to European elections. Some German and most British MEPs interviewed saw no value in a common candidate for their campaign. Stated simply, the PES, including national party leaders could not agree on a common candidate for the presidency of the European Commission. As a result, national
politicians continued to be at the centre of the campaigns. A European top candidate, however, could lead to a top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation of the campaign. Campaigning in 27 member states, the candidate would automatically bring in the ‘European’ perspective and discuss European topics. At the same time, he or she could engage with the electorate and strengthen the direct links between voters and the PES. After the 2009 elections, the PES committed itself to select a common candidate for the European Commission Presidency for the next European elections. This could raise the European profile of future campaigns and politicise the debate, and as a result, the media and voters might pay increased attention to European politics, which is currently not the case.

8.4 Conclusions

This chapter has examined the 2009 European election campaigns of the PES, the Labour Party, SPD and PS. It has established an ideal-type model of Europeanisation, arguing that a Europeanised campaign would imply increased campaign funding, the use of the common pan-European manifesto, a debate on topics with a European dimension, a close cooperation between Europarties and national parties, and the selection of a common candidate for the presidency of the European Commission.

The Europeanisation of election campaigning cannot be achieved in a top-down manner; it can only happen when Europarties and national parties work together at all levels and exchange values, policy expertise and campaigning experience. Moreover, European topics would have to be on the agenda of national parties at all levels at all times and not just during the election campaigns. As Day and Shaw (2006) argue, the development of linkages between Europarties and party members at national level is
seen as the sine qua non for enhancing the Europarties’ legitimacy which may facilitate an enhanced pan-European role for Europarties. For this to happen, Europarties will need to enhance their significance at European and national level. The case of the Party of European Socialists demonstrates that, thanks to new funding regulations, Europarties can enhance their role as campaigners during European elections. PES secretary general Philip Cordery (interviewed on 16/06/2009) stated that before 2004, the PES was ‘really a coordination body between European social democrats, full stop. Now it has become much more of a party, we’ve had a real sort of common work to get a programme.’

By creating their 2009 manifesto in a more bottom-up approach through an open consultation process, the PES has demonstrated the willingness and need to involve a more diverse group of actors and provide the grassroots level with a sense of political ownership. The introduction of the PES activists follows the same trend: the establishment of a direct link between the PES and party activists at national level. So far, only national parties had a direct link with the voters, and ‘genuine Europarty development has suffered as a result’, as Bardi (2005: 296) puts it. The role of the activists has been strengthened after the European elections, as the PES has decided to recognise their role in the PES statutes, which implies a formal recognition. What it means in practice needs to be seen. These developments can certainly enhance the Europeanisation of future election campaigns.

Overall, however, the Europeanisation of election campaigning is only in its infancy. The 2009 European campaigns led by the British Labour Party, the French Socialists and the German Social Democrats were national contests and suggest that the party organisations were not sufficiently Europeanised. The underlying question
remains if national parties see a benefit in Europeanising their election campaigns. In 2009, this was not the case.
Chapter 9: The Europeanisation of social democratic party organisations

The purpose of this chapter it to bring together the empirical evidence presented in previous chapters. In Chapter 2 an ideal model of a strongly Europeanised party was developed. Table 9.1 (below) reminds us of the indicators of Europeanisation in the three arenas: the public face; in government; and as organisations. Now it is time to pull together the findings of the six empirical chapters and discuss the degree of Europeanisation the Labour Party, the Parti Socialiste (PS) and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) have experienced in the past decade.
### Table 9.1 Summary: Indicators of the Europeanisation of party organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>Indicators of strong Europeanisation</th>
<th>Indicators of weak Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public face</strong></td>
<td>The party leadership regularly gives speeches and interviews explaining and defending the party’s EU policies.</td>
<td>The party leadership avoids speaking about EU policies in public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European policy is easily available on the party’s website.</td>
<td>There is little to no information on the party’s EU policy on the website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In manifestoes, European policy is treated as domestic policy. In addition, there is a separate section on the party’s general stance towards European integration.</td>
<td>In manifestoes, there is little to no reference to the EU. European policy is dealt with together with foreign policy in one short section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behaviour of those in office</strong></td>
<td>The party leadership in government drives forward institutional adaptation of central government to the EU.</td>
<td>Institutional adaptation of central government and parliament to the EU is neglected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party leadership in government facilitates effective EU scrutiny in parliament.</td>
<td>Party leadership in government tries to prevent parliamentary EU scrutiny (e.g. by delaying important information).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party leadership empowers EU experts in government and parliament.</td>
<td>EU experts have junior-level positions in the executive or parliament without decision-making power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal workings of the party organisation</strong></td>
<td>A wide range of party actors, including formal policy-making bodies, are involved in European policy-making.</td>
<td>European policy is made by a narrow circle of party elites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party leadership involves membership in EU policy-making.</td>
<td>Membership is excluded from European policy-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party leads Europeanised European parliamentary election campaigns and interacts with the Party of European Socialists.</td>
<td>During European election campaigns the party focuses on national issues and does not make use of the Party of European Socialists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party has close links with sister parties across the EU at all levels of the party organisation.</td>
<td>Party shows little or no interest in sister parties from other EU member states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following three sections, each party’s Europeanisation in the three arenas will be examined individually, on the basis of the academic literature and original
interview data. In addition to what has been written on the Europeanisation of the parties in the electorate in Chapters 3 and 4, an analysis of the Europeanisation of election manifestoes will be presented. This analysis does not focus on the parties’ actual EU policies, or on the question of how pro-integrationist they were. This has already been done extensively by scholars contributing to the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP, see: Klingemann et al., 2006). On the basis of CMP data, Chapter 3 has demonstrated that Labour, the PS and SPD have been pro-integrationist throughout the past two decades. This chapter thus examines which significance the three parties gave to the European Union in their general elections manifestoes between 1997 and 2012. How often did they refer to the EU, and in which parts of the manifesto? Was European policy part of foreign policy, or was it treated as a policy area in its own right? This analysis can reveal how the parties presented themselves to the public. Furthermore, a brief analysis of the Europeanisation of the parties’ websites helps us to understand how Labour, the PS and SPD communicate their European policies to their members and the wider electorate. After all, next to manifestoes, websites have become an important instrument for parties to present their policies. They have become part of the parties’ public face.

The last section of this chapter will put the findings into a comparative perspective and discuss their broader implications.

9.1 The Europeanisation of the Labour Party organisation

It was established that in a Europeanised party organisation a broad range of actors are involved in a democratic process of EU policy-making. Chapter 7 has examined the Europeanisation of policy-making and revealed that Labour’s formal policy-making bodies, such as the annual conference or the National Policy Forum, had
no major formal or informal influence on the party leadership’s European policy. It therefore does not come as a surprise that election manifestoes were written by the party leadership, with the support of the civil service. Interviews with Labour politicians (such as a former head of Number 10 Downing’s Streets Policy Planning Unit; a former EU-adviser to Tony Blair; and the party’s international manager) revealed that the prime minister, the foreign secretary, the chancellor and their advisers were the key actors in Labour’s EU policy-making process when the party was in government. A top-down Europeanisation of the party organisation has not taken place. It is however true that under Blair’s leadership Labour’s MEPs got more integrated into the making of European policy. For the first time the party made systematic use of their EU expertise by letting them sit on cabinet-level, ministerial teams. At the same time, Members of the House of Commons seemed to have played only a minor role in the making of Labour’s European policy. They were under the tight control of the government and had very limited formal powers to influence the leadership’s European policy.

Labour’s International Unit played an important role in establishing and tightening links with social democratic sister parties and the Party of European Socialists. Already in the early 1990s, Labour’s relationship with its social democratic sister parties and the Party of European Socialists had improved (Hix, 1999). In 1994, the Labour Party had signed up to a PES manifesto that was ideologically adverse to its own policies. It committed to a 35-hour week (Lightfoot, 2005: 46). As a consequence of this embarrassment, Robin Cook, the then foreign secretary, was heavily involved in drafting the 1999 PES manifesto. He also became PES president in May 2001. Hence, under Blair’s party leadership, the working relationship between Labour, the PES, and sister parties across Europe became closer. Labour’s
International Unit certainly facilitated these networks by organising party leader and parliamentary committee visits across the EU. Yet it was too small a unit to have real influence on the government’s EU policy, which the international manager herself confirmed in an interview. The international manager also needed to deal with global and European policies and therefore had less time available for European policy. Compared to the SPD, Labour had less staff working in the party headquarters, so less funding was available for the Europeanisation of the party bureaucracy.

If European policy was up to the leadership – was there a role left to play for the rank and file members in the formulation of European policy? Has the Labour party leadership tried to Europeanise them by involving them in referendums or consultations? The answer is no. Nation-wide referendums on Britain’s EU membership and the European Constitutional Treaty were promised but never carried out. An internal party referendum or consultation on European issues was not on the agenda of either the Blair or Brown governments. It is therefore not surprising that at the local level the Labour Party has experienced little Europeanisation. Perhaps an exception to the rule was the Labour Movement for Europe (LME) which, according to its website,

is an organisation aiming to improve the quality of debate about Europe in the Labour Party, the wider Labour movement and the UK overall. Bringing together MPs, MEPs, progressive sister organisations and activists from all over the UK, we put the case for Europe in Labour and beyond (LME, 2012).

The LME is a bottom-up movement that is organised by pro-European party activists. The number of members is still relatively small according to the LME’s chair, David Schoibl (interviewed on 07/12/2009). Thus, whilst the leadership has done little to
Europeanise the party organisation in a top-down manner, there are attempts at the grassroots level to Europeanise the party organisation. However, this bottom-up Europeanisation appears to be in its infancy.

Unsurprisingly, Labour’s European election campaigns are not Europeanised. It is common knowledge that parties and voters treat European elections as second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). However we can still expect a pro-European party such as Labour to lead a pro-European campaign in which it showcases its EU policy. Chapter 8 has outlined an ideal model of a Europeanised election campaign and applied it to the 2009 European elections. It was argued that the prerequisites of a fully Europeanised election campaign would be: increased campaign funding; a campaign focussing on European topics; a widely supported and used common European election manifesto; close cooperation between the PES and its member parties at different levels of the party organisation; and a common candidate for the presidency of the European Commission. In 2009, the party leadership led an invisible, defensive campaign on domestic issues without reference to the PES. In fact the party leadership surrounding Gordon Brown had tried everything to contain the salience of European integration in a Eurosceptical domestic environment - just as Blair had done previously (Oppermann, 2008). Foreign secretary David Miliband was outspokenly pro-European but this seemed to have little impact during the invisible European election campaign. Unsurprisingly, neither top-down nor bottom-up, or even horizontal Europeanisation of the party organisation had taken place during the campaign. Overall, we can summarise that Labour’s party organisation has experienced only weak Europeanisation. Table 9.2 (below) summarises the findings.

Table 9.2 The Europeanisation of Labour as an organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Europeanisation</th>
<th>Degree of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

246
European policy was made by a narrow circle of party elites without much involvement of formal policy-making bodies.  ➔ Weak Europeanisation

Party membership was excluded from EU policy-making.  ➔ Weak Europeanisation

2009 European parliamentary election campaign focused on domestic issues. Little to no reference made to EU topics and the Party of European Socialists.  ➔ Weak Europeanisation

Labour had established links with sister parties at different levels of the party organisation.  ➔ Intermediate Europeanisation

The lack of organisational Europeanisation is reflected in a lack of Europeanisation of Labour’s public face. Chapter 4 has demonstrated on the basis of Eurobarometer data that the British public is generally unenthusiastic and indifferent towards European integration. It has also discussed how Labour had to face the deeply Eurosceptical conservative party and the UK Independence Party. In addition, the overwhelmingly Eurosceptic nature of the British newspapers (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999) contributed to an environment where pro-integrationist views were under attack. It is therefore not surprising to note that Blair and his colleagues rarely gave EU-enthusiastic speeches at home. According to Oppermann (2008) Labour used a mix of different strategies to contain the electoral salience of European policy in Britain. It (1) tried to defuse the European policy differences between itself and the conservative party; (2) it depoliticised its decision-making on EU issues by tying the decision to join the Euro to five economic tests; (3) it delegated the final responsibility for decision-making to the general public, e.g. through referenda on the Euro and the EU Constitutional Treaty; and (4) it deferred controversial decisions to some future date. Thanks to this fourfold strategy, ‘European policy was thus transformed from a decidedly high-salience issue at the beginning of the Blair government’s tenure into a
downright low-salience issue at the end of Tony Blair’s period in office’ (Oppermann, 2008: 177). Blair was however willing to stress his support for EU integration when he was overseas. For example, on the 24th March 1998 Blair told the French National Assembly (in French) that he shared the European ideal, stating: ‘L’avenir de la Grande-Bretagne, c'est d'être un partenaire à part entière de l'Europe’. Yet Blair’s greatest contribution to the European debate was expressed in a speech to the Polish stock exchange on 6th October 2000 in which he stressed the UK’s commitment to European integration and outlined a set of proposals for institutional reform. Thus, Blair engaged in a EU debate when he was abroad, giving speeches in Brussels, Paris and Warsaw rather than at home. Hence, the pro-European outlook of the party leadership in government did not contribute to the Europeanisation of the party’s public face. High-profile, pro-integrationist speeches to the British public were avoided.

Furthermore, Labour did not make its European policy easily accessible to the public via its website. On Labour’s website, European policy was treated as part of the party’s broader international activities. It was integrated into a section entitled ‘international’ where reference was made to Labour’s international unit, which maintains and develops links with the Party of European Socialists and the Socialist International. However there was no information available on Labour’s European policy. Not even European election manifestoes - which could be used as authoritative European policy statements – could be found in this section. In fact, an interview with a European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) official has revealed that the 2009 European manifesto was only uploaded to the website after the EPLP had complained. Hence, little effort was made by the Labour Party to communicate European policy through its website.
It was also argued that a party eager to fully Europeanise its public face would treat European policy as domestic policy, thereby acknowledging that an increasing amount of formerly domestic policies have become Europeanised. It would integrate European policy into all the policy areas mentioned in its manifestoes. Thus, instead of having a single section dealing with European and foreign policy, the European dimension of each policy area would be highlighted throughout the manifesto. Table 9.3 (below) shows how Labour dealt with the EU in its general election manifestoes between 1997 and 2010. The table depicts how often ‘Europe’ (or ‘European Union’ or ‘EU’) was mentioned throughout the document. This is only a very small indication of how Europeanised a manifesto is. Therefore the table also shows whether there was a separate section or chapter dealing with European policy, or whether European and foreign policy were tackled together in the same section. Table 9.3 also lists the other sections or chapters of the manifesto in which a reference was made to the European Union. Interestingly, none of the four manifestoes had a separate section or chapter dealing with the EU. Instead, European policy and foreign policy (issues such as global security, poverty, and the reform of international organisations such as the United Nations) were dealt with under the rubric global politics. The EU was referred to in other policy sections (e.g. business, productivity, immigration or environmental recovery) but this was done differently in each manifesto. Arguably, Labour’s most Europeanised manifesto is the one from the general elections in 2001. It includes 93 references to the EU in five different sections/chapters. The following two manifestoes refer to the EU less frequently, and the 2010 manifesto can be described as the least Europeanised according to the indicators outlined above. There are only 37
references to the EU and none of them in either the foreword or introduction. Apart from the chapter dealing with European and global affairs - which comes last - only two other chapters referred to the EU. It is striking that the chapters on global and European policies always come at the end of Labour’s manifestoes, namely as the last or second to last chapters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of the Manifesto</th>
<th>Mention of ‘Europe’, ‘European Union’, or ‘EU’</th>
<th>Is there a separate chapter/section on European policy?</th>
<th>In which other section(s) of the manifesto is ‘Europe’ mentioned?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1997 | ‘Because Britain deserves better’ | 40 | No. The section ‘We will give Britain leadership in Europe’ also deals with issues such as the reform of the United Nations and global development. | • Foreword  
• Introduction  
• ‘We will help create successful and profitable businesses’ |
| 2001 | ‘Ambitions for Britain’ | 93 | No. The section ‘Britain strong in the world’ also deals with global defence policy; development policy; and environmental policy. | • Foreword  
• ‘The productivity challenge - Staying better off’  
• ‘No one left behind - Helping everyone become better off’  
• ‘Responsibility from all: Winning the battle against Crime’ |
| 2005 | ‘Britain Forward Not Back’ | 47 | No. The section ‘International policy: A stronger country in a secure, sustainable and just world’. Also deals with the worldwide promotion of peace and human rights; defence; reform of the United Nations; climate change; and fair trade. | • Introduction  
• Economy: Rising prosperity in an opportunity society’ |
| 2010 | ‘A Future Fair For All’ | 37 | No. The section ‘A global future’ also deals with defence, global poverty; and the reform of global institutions. | • ‘Crime and Immigration’  
• ‘Green Recovery’ |

This decreasing Europeanisation also manifests itself in the findings of the CMP (see Chapter 3). The latter demonstrate that Labour was most pro-European during the mid-1990s but that EU support declined slowly at the beginnings of the 2000s. This trend is also confirmed by Julie Smith who writes that: ‘in
some ways it would be easy to characterize the Blair government’s first term as European in outlook, the second as Atlanticist’ (2005: 703). The Atlanticism certainly continued to dominate the rest of Labour’s time in office. When Gordon Brown took over the premiership in 2007 he tried to avoid confrontation over the EU with the opposition and the press, thus following Blair’s strategy of containment. Brown made sure there would be no referendum on the Lisbon Treaty and he missed the ceremony where the 26 other EU leaders signed the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007. Due to a small parliamentary majority, Brown ‘has arguably been more concerned than Blair at managing the electoral salience of the European issue’ (Bulmer, 2008: 606). The example of the election manifests demonstrates that the Labour government did not seriously attempt to turn around the Eurosceptic public. The party has not Europeanised its public face. Table 9.4 (below) summarises the findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Europeanisation</th>
<th>Degree of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European policy was not prioritised in party leaderships’ speeches.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was very little information on European policy available on Labour’s website.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In election manifestoes European policy was not always treated as domestic policy. Strong Europeanisation of 2001 manifesto, but weak Europeanisation of 2010 manifesto.</td>
<td>➔ Intermediate Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Last but not least, we need to establish to what extent Labour has Europeanised in the governmental arena. As chapter 5 has demonstrated, the Labour leadership accelerated the Europeanisation of central government. In 1998 Blair announced a ‘step change’ in the UK’s relations with the EU. It included the requirement that ministers, MPs and civil servants all step up bilateral contacts with their opposite numbers in other EU member states. Furthermore, a significant centralisation of EU policy-making took place under the Labour leadership: more resources and powers were given to the ‘centre’ of government. It was a system based on the sharing of information across government departments and on coordination between officials, ministers and Members of the European Parliament. The Labour leadership thereby made sure that Britain could speak with one voice in the different EU institutions and at home. The Cabinet Office European Secretariat was also strengthened in staff numbers, and Sir Stephen Wall was appointed in 2000 as its head. His office was moved into Number 10 Downing Street. Furthermore, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office integrated its European policy and bilateral relations into one large directorate. As Bulmer (2008: 614) writes, ‘the overall impact has been of facilitating a constructive European policy with partner states while making negligible impact upon public perception of the EU within Britain.’ Like central government, the House of Commons has experienced Europeanisation. Chapter 6 has demonstrated how legislative, institutional, and – to a lesser extent – strategic Europeanisation has taken place over the past decades. In the House of Commons, the process of EU scrutiny has been institutionalised over the past decades. However, the European Committees – which have the power to discuss European decisions and governmental motions and make amendments to these motions - have no possibility of binding the government. This puts Parliament in a weak position vis-
à-vis the government, and its overall influence on the government's European policy is negligible (Auel and Benz, 2005: 381). Moreover, as part of its strategy to contain the salience of European policy, the Labour government has avoided plenary debates on EU issues. As a reaction to their weak formal EU scrutiny powers, MPs have developed informal scrutiny strategies: they continuously demanded information on EU affairs and the government's position on them, and they regularly invited cabinet ministers before the committees. Overall, however, the strategic Europeanisation of Labour MPs was rather weak. On the basis of the interviews conducted with a Labour MP, a former MEP, and two officials from the European Parliamentary Labour Party, this thesis has found that contacts between MPs and MEPs tended to be informal and irregular. MPs seemed to meet the MEPs from their constituencies on an ad-hoc basis, for example during election campaigns.

We still know relatively little about the Europeanisation effects of exchanges between sister parties. We know that exchanges took place between MPs of the House of Commons and Bundestag, but whether they have led to a more Europeanised behaviour is far from certain. The overall logic would be that legislative Europeanisation leads to institutional institution, which – in an ideal case scenario - leads to the strategic Europeanisation of MPs. The House of Commons however was not a forum for the Labour Party to Europeanise. Its scrutiny powers continued to be weak, and the party leadership did little to encourage plenary debates on EU issues. Overall, the party has Europeanised only to an intermediate degree whilst in government. Table 9.5 (below) summarises the findings.

**Table 9.5 The Europeanisation of Labour in Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Europeanisation</th>
<th>Degree of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The party leadership drove forward institutional adaptation of central government to the EU.</td>
<td>➔ Strong Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leadership did facilitate EU scrutiny in Parliament. However the EU scrutiny powers of the UK Parliament remain weak. The government remained in control of the legislative process.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment of EU experts? The party leadership involved MEPs more in EU policy-making. Other elected EU experts (MPs with EU brief or minister for Europe) had junior positions within the party. Empowerment of civil servants and personal (unelected) advisers to the party leadership.</td>
<td>➔ Intermediate Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9.2 The Europeanisation of the Parti Socialiste (PS)

As an organisation, the PS has experienced only a low degree of Europeanisation over the past decade. In fact, Robert Ladrech’s (2007) finding that French party organisations remain ‘immune to EU adaptive pressures’ can be confirmed in the case of the PS. A strongly Europeanised party organisation is understood as one that involves a wide range of actors into the European policy-making process. However, as chapter 7 has demonstrated, the PS’ EU policy-making process was highly centralised. When the PS was in government (1997-2002) the party’s EU policy was formulated by Prime Minister Jospin who was supported by the party’s international secretary, the foreign minister and the minister for Europe. In opposition, the PS’ international secretary and the party leader became the key players in the formulation of EU policy. The formal policy-making bodies, such as the party conference, had very little impact on the party’s European policy. It only rallied every three years and was in no position to give guidelines on day-to-day European policy. The socialist MEPs were rarely consulted by the leadership. Long-standing MEPs have confirmed in interviews that European policy was formulated by the party leadership in Paris.
MPs were not included in the formulation of European policy either. The French Parliament has relatively weak legislative powers and EU scrutiny is no exception to this rule. Furthermore, MPs with a EU brief (e.g. the chair of the European Scrutiny Committee) had no particular statutory positions on national party bodies, which made it difficult for them to formally influence the party’s European policy. The PS was thus Europeanised at the executive level in the sense that European policy was formulated by the leadership, whilst the party conference, the parliamentary party and the European parliamentary party played no major roles in the EU policy-making process. Neither did the party at the lower levels. EU working groups have been created at the regional (departmental) level – although even Jean-Christophe Cambadelis, the international secretary, admitted in an interview (18/06/2009) that they do not often discuss European politics and that European policy remains reserved to the PS’ EU experts. However, there exists one exception to this rule: when the PS was divided and party leader Hollande put the EU Constitutional Treaty to an internal referendum in December 2004. The referendum led to an internal debate focussing not only on the Constitutional Treaty, but also on the PS’ general stance on the future of European integration and the European single market. As over 80 per cent of party members participated in the referendum, it had a Europeanising effect on the membership in the sense that it brought EU policy on the top of the policy agenda. In the end, however, the referendum did not empower the members because its outcome did not bind the party leadership. The latter continued to be divided and campaigned both in favour and against the Treaty. One interviewee - namely the leader of the PS London branch - suggested that the negative outcome of the nation-wide referendum on the Constitutional Treaty led the PS to fully embrace the PES activists and make stronger reference to the PES during their 2009 European election campaign. Perhaps
as a consequence, the divisions over European integration led to an initial degree of Europeanisation: the PS formally integrated the PES activists into their party organisation at the departmental level (*fédération*). In historical institutionalist terms, the French referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty can thus be understood as a critical juncture at which the PS further Europeanised its organisation. Since 2004, when the PES introduced the PES activists, the PS has created numerous PES activist city groups across France, some of which campaigned during the 2009 European elections. Yet, despite the close relationship between the PS and the PES and the use of the PES manifesto, the 2009 European election campaign focused on domestic issues and was targeted against the incumbent President Nicolas Sarkozy. We must however keep in mind that through the PES activists, campaign exchanges were organised between the PS’ Paris federation and the SPD in Berlin and in the border regions of West Germany and East France in 2009. PES activists from across Europe also supported the PS during the 2012 presidential election campaign. This goes to show that contacts with social democratic sister parties were not only maintained through the PES leaders’ conference, but also at the lower levels of the party organisation. There is hence a potential for horizontal Europeanisation between the PS and its sister parties which is facilitated by the PES activists scheme. However, more systematic research needs to be done into the Europeanising effects of party exchanges. We can conclude that as a party organisation, the PS has experienced only a limited degree of Europeanisation in the past decade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Europeanisation</th>
<th>Degree of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European policy was made by a narrow circle of party elites without much</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
involvement of formal policy-making bodies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Level of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal referendum on EU constitutional Treaty in December 2004: party membership was involved in EU policy-making.</td>
<td>Intermediate Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 European parliamentary elections: despite the use of the PES manifesto, the campaign focused on domestic topics.</td>
<td>Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS has established links with the PES and sister parties at different levels of the party organisation.</td>
<td>Intermediate Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that the Europeanisation of the party organisation was limited, has the PS Europeanised its public face? We need to remember that the salience of European policy is rather low in France, and Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the French are no Euroenthusiasts. Interest and trust in EU institutions tend to be relatively low amongst French voters. The hardest core of party-based Euroscepticism can be found amongst far left and far right parties whilst the parties with governing aspirations are pro-integrationist (Milner, 2004: 60). As CMP data has confirmed, the PS has been the most pro-European party in France, especially under François Mitterrand’s leadership. His successor, Lionel Jospin, who took over the party leadership in 1995, was generally pro-integrationist, but at the same time critical towards certain characteristics of EU governance and EU policies. For example, he repeatedly criticised the EU’s democratic deficit and the convergence criteria that were put in place for the Economic and Monetary Union at Maastricht (Krell, 2009). The interview with former PS European secretary Henri Nallet (30/06/2009) revealed that both Prime Minister Jospin and party leader Hollande focused their activities on national policy issues when the PS was in office between 1997 and 2002. At PS executive committee meetings, EU issues were at the bottom of the agenda. Both Jospin and Hollande were described by Nallet as ‘Europeéns de raison’ who were in
favour of European integration but thought nationally and put the national interest first in their speeches, interviews and campaigns. This attitude was reflected in Jospin’s slogan for the 1997 legislative elections ‘Faire l’Europe sans defaire la France’ (‘Doing Europe without undoing France’). Jospin’s most important speech on the EU was delivered in Paris in May 2001 under the title ‘L’avenir de l’Europe élargie’ (‘The future of the enlarged Europe’). Here he revealed his vision for the future of Europe, focussing on the European social model; the role of Europe in the world; and on the EU’s institutional reform. It was a pro-European speech but offered little innovative thinking, as Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2004: 228) notes. Neither Jospin nor Hollande gave more high-profile speeches focussing on the EU. Whilst an intense debate over the future direction of European integration took off inside the PS, Jospin neglected the topic during the 2002 election campaign (Krell, 2009: 366).

After Jospin’s defeat in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections, the PS experienced a crisis, with different factions competing for party leadership. The party was deeply divided over its EU policy (amongst other policy areas). These divisions became most visible in 2004/2005, when President Chirac had announced a nation-wide referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty. PS leader François Hollande was in favour of the treaty but could not discipline the other factions (Wagner, 2008). After the French electorate’s rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in May 2005, European policy was even less prioritised in the PS’ leaderships’ speeches and interviews. This could be interpreted as a rational response to a EU-critical electorate, but it was also due to the party’s deep internal divisions and ongoing leadership crisis. As a consequence, party leader Hollande did little to communicate EU policy to the electorate.
The PS makes its EU policy available to the public through its website. However, European and international issues are dealt with together in the section ‘Europe et International’. There is very little information on the PS’ long-term policy on the process of European integration, and there are no links to party manifestoes or other authoritative policy statements. Instead, statements made by PS politicians on current European and international issues are posted on this website. Interested voters or party members will therefore remain largely uninformed about the PS’ EU policy when they check the website.

It is therefore surprising to note that the PS’ election manifestoes from 1997 until 2012 are highly Europeanised. Table 9.7 (below) shows that all four manifestoes have a separate section dealing with the EU. European policy is not treated as part of foreign policy. Moreover, reference to the EU is made in many other sections of the documents, such as economic policy, justice and home affairs, Republican values, etc. The Europeanisation of the different, formerly domestic policy areas is highlighted in all four manifestoes. The most Europeanised manifesto is the one from 2012 which makes 99 references to Europe in nine different sections. This is not surprising, given the context of the European economic and financial crisis. François Hollande’s 2012 election campaign also had a much stronger focus on EU policy than any other campaign since 1997.
Table 9.7 PS legislative election manifestoes (1997-2012) and the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of the Manifesto</th>
<th>Mention of ‘Europe’, ‘Union Européenne’, ‘Union’, ‘Euro’</th>
<th>Is there a separate chapter/section on European policy?</th>
<th>In which other section(s) of the manifesto is ‘Europe’ mentioned?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1997 | Changeons d’avenir. Nos engagements pour la France. | 41 | Yes. | • Introduction  
• Economy  
• Home affairs  
• Justice |
| 2002 | Programme pour les législatives 2002. | 35 | Yes. | • Introduction  
• Public Services  
• Civic Rights  
• Global Politics  
• Conclusions |
| 2007 | Reussir ensemble le changement | 58 | Yes. | • Introduction  
• Employment and Sustainability  
• Constitutional Reform  
• Immigration |
| 2012 | Projet Socialiste 2012. Le Changement. | 99 | Yes | • Introduction  
• Understanding that the world is changing  
• The end of Capitalism  
• Broken Hopes  
• French leadership  
• Act in order to avoid suffering  
• A new model of development  
• The Republican promise  
• Conclusions |

Overall, the Europeanisation of the PS’ public face has been a mixed experience. Whilst the consecutive party leaderships were pro-European in their outlook, EU policy was rarely prioritised in speeches or during election campaigns. After 2002 there was no unified party line and the leadership sent conflicting messages to the voters. For those voters who wanted to learn more about the PS’ European policy the
party’s website did not provide much information. The election manifestoes however were strongly Europeanised, and it is surprising to note how little this is reflected in the party organisation. Table 9.8 (below) summarises the findings.

Table 9.8 The Europeanisation of the PS’ public face

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Europeanisation</th>
<th>Degree of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European policy was not prioritised in party leaderships’ speeches.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was information on European policy available on PS website but it was presented together with international issues.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In election manifestoes there was a separate section on European policy. Moreover, there were numerous EU references in other sections.</td>
<td>➔ Strong Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Chapter 5 it was demonstrated that in the past three decades French central government has Europeanised, following its own institutional paths. In order to overcome the sectoral organisation of French ministries, the 'Secrétariat général des affaires européennes' (SGAE) was made the nodal point for the formulation of European policy. When the PS was in office, the SGAE was subordinated to Prime Minister Jospin and the ministry for finance. Hence considerable administrative and institutional resources were at the disposal of the prime minister. A certain centralisation of European policy-making has taken place within the French executive, yet it needs to be kept in mind that most of the SGAE’s officials were sent from ministries as watchdogs to protect sectorial interests and as a consequence, France did not always speak with one voice at the European level. The 1997 government turnover does not appear to have accelerated the Europeanisation of central government. This cannot be blamed solely on the sectorial workings of the French government; rather, we need to take the complicated power constellation within the
French executive into account, which made it difficult for the prime minister to change institutional patterns. Not only did Prime Minister Jospin have to share power with conservative President Chirac (*cohabitation*); he was also restricted in his European policy by his ‘plural left’ coalition (*gauche plurielle*), made up of five left-wing parties, some of which had been very sceptical towards the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Single Market. During the 1997-2002 *cohabitation* President Chirac retained an important role in the making of European policy, and together with Jospin represented France at European Council summits. However, the PS leadership in government – mainly the prime minister, foreign secretary, and the finance minister - tried to pull their weight in the European policy-making process. The PS government managed to upload some of its policies to the European level. For example, Jospin achieved the inclusion of the employment chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty, which led to the European employment pact (adopted in 1999). As discussed throughout this thesis, Jospin and the rest of the PS leadership in government (e.g. the foreign minister and the minister for Europe) were pro-integrationist, but this outlook did not translate into a top-down Europeanisation of the party organisation. European policy-making was the prerogative of the party leadership when the PS was in office.

If we turn our attention to the Socialist parliamentary party we come to realise that institutional constraints prevented strong Europeanisation. Whilst the National Assembly has experienced legislative and institutional adaptation to the EU, the strategic Europeanisation of Socialist MPs has lagged behind. There are several explanations for this weak Europeanisation. The first one relates to the general weaknesses of the French parliament in the political system of the Fifth Republic. The parliament has virtually no power to hold the executive to account (Rozenberg, 2004). The 1958 Constitution grants governments the possibility to avoid plenary debates on
delicate issues such as new EU treaties or single market policy. In addition, until very recently, the EU affairs committee (DUE) was no fully-fledged parliamentary committee, which made its work seem even less rewarding to ambitious politicians. Given the weakness of parliamentary EU scrutiny, becoming a EU expert is no promising career path for a French MP. Moreover, during their time in opposition, the PS did not hold any major EU positions in the National Assembly that could have led to a more intense engagement with the EU. What is more, even when the PS was in government, being the chair of the EU committee did not translate into any particular statutory position on national party bodies (Ladrech, 2007: 95). EU experts in Parliament have thus not been empowered inside the party organisation. Perhaps as a consequence, very few Socialist MPs showed interest in European policy. This has been confirmed by six Socialist MEPs who revealed in interviews that contacts between themselves and Socialist MPs were sporadic and irregular. The PS has thus experienced weak Europeanisation in the National Assembly and in government overall (see table 9.9 below).

Table 9.9 The Europeanisation of the PS in government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Europeanisation</th>
<th>Degree of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The party leadership drove forward institutional adaptation of central government to the EU but was restricted by cohabitation and coalition partners.</td>
<td>➔ Intermediate Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU scrutiny powers of the French Parliament remain weak and MPs showed little interest in the EU.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment of EU experts in central government and parliament.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.3 The Europeanisation of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)

Overall, the SPD’s organisation has experienced relatively weak Europeanisation. Chapter 7 has found that when the SPD was in government, European policy was up to the leadership, namely the Chancellor, cabinet ministers and their support staff. Formal party bodies, such as the conference, had little say in the making of either long-term or day-to-day EU policy. Election manifestoes were written by the party leadership. The party’s other EU experts, the MEPs, MdBs with EU brief had little influence on the party leadership. In opposition, the balance of power shifted slightly towards the parliamentary party, which had more staff at their disposal than the the SPD’s headquarters. After 2009, day-to-day EU policy was made by the party group in the Bundestag, whilst the party’s executive committee, supported by the international department, only got involved in politically charged issues such as the management of the Eurocrisis, or in the making of long-term EU policy.

Neither the general public nor the SPD membership has ever been allowed to cast their votes in EU referendums. Consequently, EU debates do not often take place at the lower levels of the party organisation (for example in party branches at the local level, the Ortsverein). The majority of MEPs interviewed for this study (five out of eight) stated that they rarely got contacted by their constituency, but that they regularly took the initiative themselves and offered to give talks to the Ortsvereine about current issues in EU politics. EU working groups existed at different levels of the party organisation: at local, regional and federal level. Interviews with party officials have revealed that some of these working groups (such as the ones in Berlin and North-Rhine-Westphalia) were very active forums for networking and discussion. Yet again, only a small circle of Europhiles seem to attend these EU working group
meetings. A bottom-up Europeanisation of the party organisation has therefore not taken place. This lack of Europeanisation becomes visible during European parliamentary election campaigns. Chapter 8 has demonstrated that the June 2009 European elections were treated as a warm-up for the September 2009 federal elections. As a rule, national-level politicians spoke about domestic issues whilst the European dimension was neglected during the campaign. In general, the SPD has a close working relationship with the Party of European Socialists. As one of the largest member parties the SPD drafted one of the 2009 manifesto chapters and integrated parts of the document into their own European manifesto. It is therefore surprising that they did not use the PES manifesto and made very little reference to the PES during the 2009 campaign. It remains to be seen whether the PES activists can raise the awareness of the EU in future election campaigns. In 2009, the SPD was rather suspicious and did not support them. In summary, this study agrees with Poguntke who writes that ‘German party organizations have remained remarkably unaffected by the indisputable growth of the powers of the EU institutions of governance’ (2007: 128). Table 9.1.0 (below) summarises the findings of this section.

Table 9.10 The SPD’s Europeanisation as an organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Europeanisation</th>
<th>Degree of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European policy was made by a narrow circle of party elites without much involvement of formal policy-making bodies.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party membership was not involved in EU policy-making.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 European parliamentary elections: the campaign focused on domestic topics and national-level politicians.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD has established links with the PES and sister parties at different levels of the party organisation, but didn’t make much reference to the PES during the 2009 European elections.</td>
<td>➔ Intermediate Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Is this weak organisational Europeanisation reflected in how the SPD presents itself to the public? Yes, to a certain extent. The SPD has Europeanised its public face only to a limited degree. This is rather astonishing, given that in no other large member state of the EU has the elite consensus on European integration been as stable as in Germany (Lees, 2002). EU issue salience tends to be rather low (De Vries, 2010) and party-based Euroscepticism was absent in Germany until the left party Die Linke emerged in 2007 and criticised the European Single Market for being too neoliberal. Thus, for most of the time when the SPD was in government (1998 until 2009) there was no real conflict within the German party system over European integration (Poguntke, 2007).

CMP data summarised in Chapter 3 has demonstrated that the SPD has always been supportive of the EU, albeit to a varying degree. Between 1997 and 2000, EU support was stable within the SPD, but decreased during the early 2000s in line with the other mainstream parties at a time when the EU Constitutional Treaty was drafted; when Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU; and when the European Commission issued their directive on services in the internal market.

Given how pro-European the political environment in Germany was at the end of the 1990s it is surprising to note how little emphasis the SPD leadership put on European policy. Before and during the general election campaign in 1998, Gerhard Schröder showed no interest in European policy (Krell, 2009: 190). During his first years in office he was a more openly assertive actor at the European level than his predecessor, the arch-European
Helmut Kohl. Schröder was more concerned with the way his European policy might generate domestic political capital when he demanded a reduction of Germany’s contribution to the EU’s 2000-2006 budget. Yet he underwent a certain learning process over the years in government (Harnisch and Schieder, 2003; Krell, 2009). However, Schröder never delivered any high-profile speeches outlining his EU visions, neither at home nor abroad. He left this task to Joschka Fischer, the Green foreign secretary who was the most pro-integrationist member of cabinet between 1998 and 2005. After Schröder’s defeat in 2005, when the SPD became the CDU’s junior partner in a grand coalition, the SPD experienced a leadership crisis with four leaders in four years. Two of these party leaders, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Franz Müntefering, were very pro-integrationist in their views. Yet they were not staying in office for a long time, and European policy was not on the top of their agenda.

Did the SPD make its European policy easily accessible to the public via its website, as a fully Europeanised party would do? Did the website include a separate section presenting the SPD’s general views on the purpose and future of European integration in addition to its views on day-to-day issues? The SPD’s website has been and continues to be confusing for those voters and party members who want to learn more about the party’s European policy. It lists only a very limited number of policy areas - perhaps the most salient ones - such as health, renewable energies, equal opportunities and integration/immigration. Up-to-date information on the party’s European policy (and many other policy areas) is spread over different parts of the website such as documentaries, interviews, or most popular stories. The party executive’s EU working group
has its own website which is difficult to find and does not include any information on the SPD’s European policy. It is empty. There is a link leading to the SPD group in the European Parliament, but not to the SPD’s EU working group in the Bundestag. Manifestoes are not posted on this website. However, all of the SPD’s principal guidelines (Grundsatzprogramme) can be downloaded from the party’s homepage. German parties differ from most other parties in Europe - and certainly Labour and the PS - in that they publish principal guidelines presenting their fundamental values and policies. Between 1869 and 2007 the SPD has ratified seven principal guidelines. The most recent one, the 2007 Hamburg Programme, is translated into English, Spanish, and Turkish. It is very pro-integrationist in its tone and makes references to the EU in each section. In section three (‘our aims, our policy’) the subsection entitled ‘Social and democratic Europe’ deals exclusively with the EU, outlining the SPD’s views on the EU’s institutional make-up and policies. Both of the officials working for the SPD’s international department that were interviewed for this study referred to this document when asked about the party’s Europeanisation, highlighting its pro-integrationist tone. The Hamburg Programme is indeed a strongly Europeanised statement. Table 9.11 (below) summarises the findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mention of ‘Europa’, ‘Europäische Union’; ‘europäische; EU.</th>
<th>Is there a separate chapter/section on European policy?</th>
<th>In which other section(s) of the programme is ‘Europe’ mentioned?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 104                                                          | Yes.                                                   | • Introduction  
• Our lifetime  
• Our core values and core convictions  
• Our aims, our policy  
• Our way |

Table 9.11 The Europeanisation of the SPD’s Hamburg Programme (2007)
Is this Europeanisation reflected in the SPD’s general election manifestoes? Table 9.12 (below) demonstrates that the degree of Europeanisation varied between 1998 and 2009. Keeping in mind that Gerhard Schröder did not prioritise EU policy during the 1998 election campaign it is not surprising that the manifesto made relatively little reference to Europe. In contrast, and perhaps as a consequence of the SPD’s experience in government, the 2002 manifesto is far more Europeanised. The first chapter of the manifesto introduces the SPD’s European policy, and 101 references to Europe are made in eight other chapters. The next manifesto, the one from 2005, has relatively short chapters. The EU chapter comes last, which was reflected in an election campaign where Europe was barely mentioned. This manifesto clearly focuses on the domestic level and only refers to Europe 45 times. The 2009 manifesto is again strongly Europeanised. It has a very long and detailed chapter on the EU, but only at the end of the document. It is chapter 15 out of 16. Here, the SPD describes itself as ‘Germany’s European party’. Overall, Europe is mentioned 122 times in ten different chapters (excluding the one on the EU). This increased Europeanisation could be explained by the fact that 2009 was a Superwahljahr in Germany: European, federal and (in some Länder) regional elections all took place in the same year. Perhaps as a consequence, European policy was higher on the political agenda than usual. Overall, the SPD’s election manifestoes reflect a relatively strong Europeanisation of the party’s public face. They are all highly pro-European in their tone. Some make more reference to the EU than others, but in all of them European policy is treated as a policy in its own right and not as part of foreign policy. At the same time, reference to the EU is made
in many other policy areas, such as the economy, energy, or home affairs – which reflects the increasing Europeanisation of these policy areas.
### Table 9.12 SPD legislative election manifestoes (1998-2009) and the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of the Manifesto</th>
<th>Mention of ‘Europa’, ‘Europäische Union’, ‘europäische Union’, ‘EU’</th>
<th>Is there a separate chapter/section on European policy?</th>
<th>In which other section(s) of the manifesto is ‘Europe’ mentioned?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1998 | ‘Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit. SPD-Programm für die Bundestagswahl 1998’. | 60 | Yes. | • Stronger Economy  
• Complete the internal unification: a new chance for eastern Germany  
• Ecological modernisation |
• Economy and Employment  
• Labour Market  
• Employment Rights  
• Research, Innovation, Sustainability  
• Eastern Germany  
• Home Affairs  
• Modern State |
| 2005 | ‘Vertrauen in Deutschland. Das Wahlmanifest der SPD’. | 45 | Yes. | • Introduction  
• We want wages covering our basic needs  
• We want a competitive agriculture  
• We want a self-confident and peaceful Germany that takes global responsibility |
| 2009 | ‘Sozial und demokratisch. Anpacken. Für Deutschland. Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD’. | 122 | Yes. | • Time to take decisions  
• Social market economy  
• Our aims  
• Keeping and securing economic prosperity  
• Germany as a pioneer for sustainable energy policy and mobility  
• Society is changing  
• Treating our environment with respect  
• Dare more democracy  
• For a global community of responsibility  
• For global peace and disarming |
To summarise, the SPD has Europeanised its public face, but not to a very strong extent. Given that the party has been very pro-integrationist, the EU has played only a marginal role in the party leaderships’ speeches. The website does not give much information away; EU policy is spread over different sections and there is no general overview of the party’s long-term EU vision. There are however the principal guidelines available in which the SPD has outlined its EU policy in great detail. The election manifestoes differ in their degree of Europeanisation, but overall, they present the image of a party that thinks European. It is therefore surprising that the party organisation has Europeanised only to such a limited extent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Europeanisation</th>
<th>Degree of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European policy was not prioritised in party leaderships’ speeches.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the SPD’s website there was relatively little information on European policy.</td>
<td>➔ Weak Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In election manifestoes there was a separate section on European policy. Moreover, there were numerous EU references in other sections.</td>
<td>➔ Strong Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Has the SPD Europeanised in government? As can be expected from a founding member of the EU, Germany’s central government has Europeanised incrementally. The SPD’s role in this process is not very clear-cut, which is due to the nature of coalition governments. German EU policy coordination is less centralised than in Britain or even France. One of the ministries is traditionally in charge of coordinating the German position on a given piece of EU legislation, and as a consequence, sectorisation remains strong in German European policy-making (Bulmer and Burch,
2001: 88). When the SPD and Greens took over government in 1998, the EU policy-coordination system underwent further fragmentation. Yet Beichelt (2007) argues that that German EU policy coordination is ‘over-efficient’ as it involves several actors and levels of governance. He also notes that it is completely functional to the needs of the political system. However, he stresses that the growing efficiency of German EU coordination has been achieved by circumventing the public, political parties, and the Bundestag. Indeed, when the SPD was in government, European policy was government policy (Stroh, 2004; Lamatsch, 2004) with little involvement of the party organisation or the Bundestag – not to mention the public. Historically, the German Chancellor has played a key role in the formulation of European policy. Yet it has already been pointed out that Gerhard Schröder put little emphasis on EU policy. Nevertheless, he was the first Chancellor to create a EU division within the Chancellor’s Office in an attempt to keep EU policy-making under his control. However, this unit remained rather small and only focused on EU issues of relevance to Schröder, which were those relating to the EU internal market (Lamatsch, 2004: 40). Overall, Schröder’s involvement in the day-to-day aspects of EU policy remained rather modest, and most key decisions were made ‘at least as much in the Foreign Ministry as in the Chancellery’, as Helms (2005, 120) states. Thus, when the SPD was the senior partner in the coalition government (1998- 2005), the Chancellor focused on domestic policy, and the majority of European policy was formulated in the Foreign Ministry, which was controlled by the Greens. It has been argued that being in government and attending EU summits had a certain Europeanising effect on Gerhard Schröder (Krell, 2009: 195). Dr. Eva Högl (MdB and former government official on 20/07/2009) revealed that strong Europeanisation was however experienced by Franz Müntefering who held different ministerial and parliamentary
posts between 1998 and 2009. Being in government and exposed to EU-level
decision-making can thus lead to a certain Europeanisation of party leaderships.
However we still lack data measuring the EU attitudes of ministers before they enter
government and after, before we can draw final conclusions.

How about the Europeanising effects of the Bundestag on the SPD’s
parliamentary party? In Chapter 6 it was demonstrated that the Bundestag has
experienced institutional and legislative Europeanisation in the past two decades.
Critical junctures in this process were the ratification of new EU treaties, and most
notably the Maastricht Treaty, which led to the creation of a EU affairs committee.
Successive governments have facilitated institutional Europeanisation. For example,
in 2006, when the SPD was in government, a central EU affairs unit was set up with
the task of managing the heavy information load coming from Brussels. In cross-
national studies of the EU-15, Germany scores relatively high with regards to its level
of parliamentary EU scrutiny (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Bergman et al., 2003;
Raunio, 2005). The EU scrutiny rights of expert committees in the Bundestag are
considered strong, and so is the access to information (in its scope and timing). Do
these strong scrutiny rights lead to the Europeanisation of the Members of the
Bundestag? The answer is: not necessarily. One explanation is that the European
affairs committee and the expert committees only rarely make use of their formal
scrutiny rights. They rarely issue opinions that could limit the government in EU
negotiations. Interviews with three social democrat MdBs have confirmed that the
work of the European Affairs Committee was very consensual when the SPD was in
government. Even in 2010, when the SPD was in opposition, it hardly tried to attack
the government’s EU policy or limit the room for negotiations at the European level,
as two MdBs stressed (interview with Axel Schäfer, MdB on 25/06/2010, and
informal meeting with Dr. Eva Högl on 12/07/2010). SPD and CDU-led governments tend to avoid EU plenary debates in the Bundestag. For the past sixty years, European policy has not been politicised in the Bundestag.

Has strategic Europeanisation taken place within the SPD’s parliamentary group? Interviews with three MdBs and eight MEPs have revealed that there was only a small group of social democratic MdBs who took great interest in EU affairs. They tended to sit on the EU Affairs Committee and were part of the SPD’s parliamentary EU affairs working group. Furthermore, the interviews with the SPD’s MEPs have revealed that the contact between themselves and MdBs remained loose and irregular. Lack of time and overlapping work schedules were often blamed for this lack of communication, but also a general lack of interest in and knowledge of the work of the European Parliament. The majority of MdBs showed little interest in the EU. This situation is slowly changing according to MdB Dr. Eva Högl who said that the EU awareness of her colleagues was slowly increasing, but that Europeanisation was ‘a hard nut to crack’ (MdB, interviewed on 20/07/2009). However, whilst the strategic Europeanisation of MdBs is still lagging behind, the SPD leadership has empowered one parliamentary EU expert: at the time, the SPD was the only party group in the Bundestag to have a vice chairman responsible for coordinating the party group’s European policy. This MdBs also sat on the SPD’s executive committee (Vorstand) where she could push forward the party group’s positions. This overlap of personnel helped the party group to influence the government’s European policy. We can therefore conclude that the SPD has experienced an intermediate degree of Europeanisation in government. Interestingly, this has not rubbed off onto the party organisation. Table 9.14 (below) summarises the findings.
Table 9.14 The SPD’s Europeanisation in government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Europeanisation</th>
<th>Degree of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The SPD party leadership drove forward institutional adaptation of central government to the EU but showed rather little interest in the EU.</td>
<td>Intermediate Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SPD in government did improve EU scrutiny in the Bundestag by setting up a new central EU unit. Yet despite strong EU scrutiny powers, only a small number of MdBs have Europeanised.</td>
<td>Intermediate Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment of a social democratic EU expert in the Bundestag: The vice-chair of the party group was also responsible for coordinating the party group’s EU policy.</td>
<td>Intermediate Europeanisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.4 Conclusions

This chapter has pulled together the findings of the previous six empirical chapters. It has measured the degree of Europeanisation of Labour, the PS and SPD as organisations, in the electorate, and in government. The comparison of Europe’s biggest three social democratic parties has revealed that overall, Europeanisation is still in its infancy. The three parties have done relatively little to Europeanise their public faces: very few speeches were given by party elites outlining their EU policies to a domestic audience. Furthermore, the three parties’ websites provided little information on EU policy, which was dealt with under international affairs. It was therefore surprising to note that both the PS and SPD have Europeanised their election manifestoes by integrating EU policy into the formerly domestic policy areas. Labour’s manifestoes were pro-integrationist in their tone, but treated European policy as part of their broader foreign policy agenda.

The central governments of Britain, France and Germany have Europeanised over the past decades. Accordingly, the three parties have Europeanised in government, in the sense that the leaderships were exposed to EU-level policy-making. The same applied to the three parliaments, where EU policy is scrutinised. However, parliamentary EU scrutiny remained weak in the three countries, with the result that EU policy was under the tight control of the executive. One of the consequences is that MPs have experienced only weak Europeanisation, generally showing little interest in EU affairs. One exception to this rule was the SPD, who empowered one MP with a EU brief: one of the vice-chairs of the party group, who sat on the party’s executive committee, was also responsible for coordinating the party group’s EU policy. She acted as an important link between the parliamentary group and the party leadership.
Last but not least, having examined two core functions of a party organisation, namely policy-making and election campaigning, this chapter has concluded that only weak Europeanisation has taken place within Labour, the PS and SPD. The formulation of EU policy was in the hands of a small circle of party elites. Moreover, the 2009 European election campaigns were mainly fought by national-level politicians on national-level issues, with little mention of the Party of European Socialists. Strong Top-down or bottom-up Europeanisation of the party organisation has not taken place in the processes of EU policy-making and election campaigning. Given that the EU has extended its powers in recent years, and that Labour, the PS and SPD are pro-integrationist in their outlook, it seems surprising how little difference European integration has made to the three party organisations.

Comparative research has been helpful in pinpointing this lack of organisational change amongst three of the EU’s most important parties and revealing common trends. Furthermore, the creation of an ideal model has helped to grasp the three parties’ degree of Europeanisation. At the same time, however, the ideal model does not explain everything. Most notably, we still know little about the drivers of Europeanisation. Since none of the three parties has experienced strong Europeanisation, we still do not know which - if any - factors will eventually lead to a fully Europeanised party organisation. As the comparison of Labour, the PS and SPD has demonstrated, pro-integrationist leaderships in government and opposition have not actively encouraged a top-down Europeanisation of the party organisation. Neither has a grassroots-level, bottom-up movement led to strong Europeanisation within the parties. The ongoing Eurocrisis could be a moment for the party organisations to claim their right to participate in the European policy-making process, but so far this has not happened.
Chapter 10: Conclusions

This thesis has examined how the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party (PS) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) have ‘Europeanised’ their organisations in three different arenas: (1) in the electorate; (2) in central government and parliament; and (3) in their internal procedures and activities. This thesis has adapted Carter et al.’s (2007) definition of Europeanisation, viewing it as a process of intra-organisational change in national political parties, including the development of inter-organisational cooperation between sister parties in different member states, that is driven by the broader process of European integration.

Throughout the thesis, Europeanisation has been interpreted as a multidirectional process: as a top-down process (in which the party leadership encourages the lower levels of the party organisation to adapt to the process of European integration); as a bottom-up process (in which the local or regional levels of the party organisation actively engage with the EU and put pressure on the party leadership to involve them in the formulation of European policy); as a horizontal process (in which parties across the EU discuss European policy, publish common statements, and organise campaign exchanges at all levels of the party organisation).

The Europeanisation of party organisations has also been interpreted as an ongoing process in which parties adapt to a continuously changing system of EU governance. It can be an active process in which party activists set up EU working groups, organise discussions and talks, plan exchanges with sister parties or visits to Brussels. Yet it can also become a passive process, forced upon parties by external pressures such as EU treaty changes. Europeanisation can be strong, intermediate or weak, depending on a different set of indicators in each of the three arenas. An ideal
model of a fully Europeanised party has been developed. It has been applied to Labour, the PS and SPD.

Analysing and comparing the Europeanisation of party organisations is important. After all, national parties are very much affected by European integration, even if most effects are indirect. In the past two decades, an increasing number of policy areas have been transferred to the European level, and as a consequence, parties are constrained in their policy space. For instance, the European Single demands the reduction of state subsidies, and the Economic and Monetary Union sets limits to public spending. These constraints affect in particular social democratic parties, which tend to promote equality through state activity. Social democratic parties were expected to react to these challenges by Europeanising their organisations. In simple terms, the ideal model of a strongly Europeanised party would have a number of characteristics:

- It is one that does not shy away from communicating its EU policy. Party leaderships regularly give speeches and interviews in domestic forums outlining the party’s EU policies.

- European policy is easily available on the party’s website to those voters and party members who are interested to learn more.

- A strongly Europeanised party would treat European policy as domestic policy, acknowledging that an increasing amount of formerly domestic policies have become Europeanised. This approach would be reflected in party manifestoes where the party would refer to the EU in each policy area. Furthermore, there would be a separate section in the manifesto where the party outlines its general views on the process and future of European integration. This section would be separate from foreign policy if the party has
experienced strong Europeanisation and treats European policy as domestic policy.

- The leadership of a strongly Europeanised party would drive forward the Europeanisation of central government and parliament, thereby ensuring that they are equipped to make EU policy.

- A strongly Europeanised party leadership would empower EU experts in government and parliament.

- In a strongly Europeanised party organisation a broad range of actors would be involved in a democratic process of EU policy-making in order to increase EU awareness and knowledge across the party. This would involve the party leadership, but also official bodies such as the party conference and policy forums and the membership.

- A strongly Europeanised party organisation would engage actively with the Party of European Socialists in order to create pan-European networks and lead Europeanised election campaigns that focus on European issues. It would also encourage exchanges with sister parties from across the European Union at all levels of the party organisation.

In practice, of course, there are gradations of Europeanisation: Some parties have Europeanised more than others.

This concluding chapter first summarises the main findings of each chapter. The second part of this chapter discusses the general strengths and weaknesses of Europeanisation as a concept and the particular difficulties of its application to party organisations. The third part identifies a number of additional questions that emerged during the course of this research and points the way to future research. Finally, the
chapter discusses the broader normative implications of the findings for party-mediated democratic politics.

10.1 Summary of findings

Chapter 1, which is the introduction, has highlighted the relevance of political parties in the EU’s system of multi-level governance. It has argued that whilst national party organisations cannot participate in EU-level policy making, they are deeply affected by the increasing Europeanisation of formerly domestic policy areas. Next, chapter 1 has provided a short overview of Britain’s, France’s and Germany’s relationship with the European Union and Labour’s, the PS’s and SPD’s organisational structures. It has also introduced the research design of this dissertation and discussed the strengths and weaknesses of comparative research. It has moreover reflected upon the usefulness of elite interviews as a method of data gathering.

Chapter 2 has given an overview of the Europeanisation literature, highlighting the merits and shortfalls of the concept and its application to the polities, policies and politics of the EU member states. It has focused on the body of literature dealing with the Europeanisation of party politics. In its last section it has presented a definition of party organisational Europeanisation and presented an ideal model of a strongly Europeanised party. This model has been tested throughout the thesis and was re-visited in Chapter 9.

Chapters 3 and 4 have looked at the electoral arena and examined the public political environment in which the Labour Party, PS and SPD operate. Chapter 3 has compared the Europeanisation of the British, French and German party systems and the effect this has had on Labour, the PS, and the SPD. A Europeanised party system is one where EU membership has led to the emergence of new parties and has
changed the mechanisms of party competition. Within a Europeanised party system, it was argued, parties have an incentive to Europeanise their organisations. After all, if EU policy is a contentious issue, parties can be expected to discuss it during and outside of election campaigns. Europeanisation was expected to be a two-way process between individual parties and the system they are part of. It means that on the one hand, parties as agents can make EU policy salient during and outside of elections and thereby pressurise other parties to react. They thereby contribute to the Europeanisation of the structure, which is the party system. On the other hand, if the structure - the party system as a whole - is Europeanised, individual parties were expected to have Europeanised both their policies and organisations. Chapter 3 has found that of the three party systems, the British has Europeanised the most, both with regards to its format and mechanics. The emergence of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has changed the format of the party system. In general, EU policy is heavily contested in Britain amongst mainstream parties and at the right fringe of the party system. In France, the EU has not generated new parties, and none of the mainstream parties are Eurosceptic. However, smaller parties on the left and right fringes of the party system are highly critical of certain aspects of European integration, which means that EU policy has been contentious in the past. In Germany, up to now, European policy-making has taken place in a very consensual environment. Inter- and intra-party dissent on EU issues has been rather low and confined to a limited amount of topics such as EU enlargement. As a consequence, the German party system is the least Europeanised, both in terms of its format and its mechanics. The three parties thus operate in very different political contexts and this is expected to affect the way they exert their key roles and functions, such as policy-making and election campaigning.
Chapter 4 addresses the Europeanisation of public opinion and links this to the Europeanisation of the three parties. European integration has become increasingly contested since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and in this context, the interaction between voters and political parties has arguably become more important for the future of European integration. Parties are therefore thought to respond to public opinion. A Europeanised public, it was argued, could be an incentive for parties to Europeanise their policies and organisations. A Europeanised public would be one with a high level of knowledge of the functioning of the EU. Moreover, as various studies demonstrate that high levels of EU knowledge tend to be associated with positive attitudes towards European integration, we could expect a Europeanised public to be more likely to be pro-integrationist than a Eurosceptic public. The Europeanisation of parties vis-a-vis the public was expected to be a bi-directional process: In a bottom-up process, a Europeanised public was expected to exert pressure on parties to speak about the EU. Yet, in order to speak knowledgably about the EU, parties need EU expertise and adapt their organisational structures accordingly. In turn, party elites were expected to influence public opinion by shifting EU policy on the political agenda and Europeanise the electorate through policies, speeches and other statements. Chapter 4 has demonstrated on the basis of Eurobarometer data that neither the British, French, nor German public has Europeanised to a great extent. The mass-elite linkage is bi-directional but remains weak with regards to EU policy, regardless of the electoral system and EU referendums. Public pressure on Labour, the PS and SPD to Europeanise has therefore been very low. Party elites are more pro-European than the public and would be expected to give more importance to the EU in their speeches and programmes. However, the problem for centre-left parties is that their voters and members are a diverse group of people with divergent EU attitudes.
Therefore, it can be easier for parties to either refuse to differentiate themselves from each other on their EU policies, or to play down the differences between them by refusing to address the question of European integration. In the long term, if Labour, the PS and SPD do not address the lack of EU knowledge and enthusiasm, their supporters and the wider public might become even more indifferent and critical towards the EU, as Eurobarometer surveys for Britain, France and Germany indicate.

In Chapters 5 and 6, the Europeanisation of the three parties in the governmental arena was explored. The governmental arena included central government and parliament. Chapter 5 has analysed the Europeanisation of central government in Britain, France and Germany and has investigated how Europeanisation has affected party elites in government. After all, when a party is in government, the leaders (in particular the prime minister and senior cabinet ministers) are involved in EU-level policy-making, and this experience is expected to affect them. In return, party elites can actively Europeanise central government. A Europeanised central government was interpreted as one that has adapted gradually to the process of European integration and that seeks to shape the EU by uploading national institutional models and policy preferences to the European level. A Europeanised government is expected to have rubbed off onto the leadership of the three parties whilst they were in government between 1997 and 2009. Admittedly, the notion of a Europeanised party leadership is vague. It could best be defined as a group of politicians who recognises the importance of the EU and communicates it to the party and the wider electorate. A Europeanised party leadership would also initiate institutional reforms in order to make national processes of policy-making effective, efficient and compatible with the EU’s system of multi-level governance.
Chapter 5 has demonstrated that Labour, the PS and SPD operated in Europeanised central governments. However, the processes of European policy-making differed significantly between the three social democratic governments, which confirms the claim that Europeanisation does not lead to a harmonisation. The party leadership in office were generally Europeanised, although for the PS and SPD leaders, European policy was no priority. The EU preferences of the prime minister, or in the German case, the chancellor, are very important for the Europeanisation of central government and the party. It has been demonstrated that the EU policy network at the top of the three parties was very small. Only a few ministers were key players in the parties’ EU policy-making process, which could indicate that Europeanisation at the top of the parties did not necessarily rub off onto the party organisation.

Chapter 6 has analysed the degree of Europeanisation of the British, French and German parliaments. The basic assumption was that if national parliaments have Europeanised, MPs will perform Europeanised roles within the parliament, which, in turn, will frame their outlook on and knowledge of the EU and have party implications. Europeanised MPs, it was argued, are in a stronger position to scrutinise the government’s EU policy because they are well informed. Moreover, Europeanised MPs can discuss current EU policy issues with members and activists in their constituencies, which can contribute to the Europeanisation of the parties at grassroots level. Chapter 6 shows that the British, French and German parliaments have experienced Europeanisation. All three parliaments have set up EU affairs committees and a centralised filtering system to coordinate EU legislation. However, the powers of these committees vary significantly from one country to the other. Whether legislative and institutional Europeanisation has led to the Europeanisation of MPs is
another question. The majority of the MPs who showed interest in EU policy did so because of their positional roles and are not representative of their parties. This goes to show that it also depends on the MPs’ willingness whether they Europeanise or not. The parliamentary arena can be an arena for parties to Europeanise, if they wish to use the opportunity.

The two last empirical chapters, namely Chapters 7 and 8 have shed light on how the Labour Party, PS and SPD have Europeanised as political organisations. Two of a party’s key activities are policy-making and election campaigning, and both activities were examined with regards to their level of Europeanisation. Chapter 7 has investigated how the three parties have Europeanised their organisations in the process of EU policy-making. After all, the formulation of policy programmes for government is one of a political party’s core functions. Top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation of the party organisation, it has been argued, can only take place if different levels of the party contribute to the making of EU policy. This includes formal policy-making bodies such as the party conference, national policy forums, as well as EU experts such as MPs and MEPs. If EU expertise is spread across the party organisation, more politicians, activists and members may become interested in EU politics, which could contribute to the politicisation of the EU at the domestic level.

Chapter 7 has demonstrated that a small circle of high-level politicians (who are not necessarily elected) and civil servants makes European policy. European policy is government policy, and the broader party organisation has yet to find its place in the process. Even when a party is in opposition, as the example of the PS suggests, the formulation of day-to-day EU policy is left to the leadership. An exception was the internal referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2004, which was organised by the party leadership in a desperate attempt to unify a divided party.
In all three parties, the formal policy-making structures, such as party conferences, national policy forums etc. were barely integrated into the process of European policy-making. Europeanised policy-making therefore remains wishful thinking.

Chapter 8 has analysed the Europeanisation of the 2009 European parliamentary election campaigns. Election campaigns, it was argued, are moments when parties could be expected to display their degree of Europeanisation and prioritise their European policies. The argument was that a Europeanised party organisation would lead Europeanised election campaigns and in turn, Europeanised election campaigns contribute to the Europeanisation of the party organisation. In a Europeanised campaign, parties would (1) provide an adequate amount of funding; (2) use both their own manifestoes and campaign material and those provided by their Europarty; (3) discusse topics with a European dimension; (4) closely cooperate with their Europarty; and (5) appoint a common top candidate for the presidency of the European Commission. Chapter 8 shows that the Europeanisation of European parliamentary election campaigns is only in its infancy. The 2009 campaigns led by Labour, the SPD and PS were national contests. Some elements of Europeanisation were visible. For example, the PS based their campaign on the PES manifesto and integrated PES activists into the party. In the campaigns led by the three parties, however, national topics dominated the debate. The party leaderships showed little interest in Europeanised election campaigns, and the party organisations were not sufficiently Europeanised to exert pressure on the leaderships.

Chapter 9 has brought together the empirical material presented in the six empirical chapters. It has applied the ideal model of a fully Europeanised party to Labour, the PS and SPD in order to establish whether the three parties have Europeanised in the electoral arena, in government and as organisations. It came to
the conclusion that none of the three parties has experienced strong Europeanisation. There were however gradations of Europeanisation within and between the three arenas. For example, all three parties have Europeanised their public face to a certain extent. Especially the PS and SPD’s election manifestoes portray the image of highly pro-integrationist parties that prioritise European policy and view it as part of domestic policy. These perceptions, however, were not reflected in the party organisations.

10.2 The limits of Europeanisation

Having summarised the individual findings, it is time to take a step back and take stock of the concept of Europeanisation in general and the phenomenon of the Europeanisation of political parties in particular. As noted in the beginning of this thesis, Europeanisation has become a very popular concept over the past two decades. One reason for this popularity is that it helps to describe a process that is largely neglected by the major theories of European integration, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. The adaptation of domestic political institutions and processes to the EU is beyond the scope of such theories. Moreover, the concept is so broad and flexible that it can analyse and describe almost every aspect of domestic political change. As seen in Chapter 2, there are few areas of member states’ politics that have not been ‘Europeanised’ in one way or another. The concept thus appears to be broad enough to measure and explain EU-induced change within domestic political parties, their policy-making processes and their patterns of competition.

As Chapter 2’s survey of the extant literature on the Europeanisation of political parties revealed, the concept has not been applied uniformly or systematically to all
aspects of parties and party competition. Thus, in most previous studies, the
Europeanisation of parties and their organisations has been interpreted in a very
narrow sense. Europeanisation has tended to be perceived as a top-down process led
by party leaders. Much of the literature neglects the role of the lower levels of the
party organisation in the Europeanisation process. This is surprising, considering that
party members’ activities primarily take place at a local level. In addition, Europarties
and their potential contribution to the Europeanisation of national parties have been
neglected in the analysis of how and why party organisations have become
Europeanised.

This thesis has demonstrated the challenges and difficulties of applying the
concept of Europeanisation to party organisations. The principal reasons behind these
difficulties are twofold. First of all, despite two decades of elaboration, the concept
remains vague. For example, the exact process of Europeanisation is rarely analysed
in its multidirectional character. It is often interpreted as a top-down process in which
national actors are passive observers, although it is common knowledge that member-
state actors are heavily involved in the policy-making process at European level.
Thus, in many cases we still do not know who or what drives Europeanisation. In
particular, the role of individuals in the Europeanisation of polities, policies and
politics is still not sufficiently conceptualised. Secondly, applying Europeanisation to
party organisations is challenging because parties are multi-level organisations
operating in different arenas. They are too large and complex to be analysed on the
basis of a broad-brush definition of Europeanisation. This thesis has demonstrated that
Europeanisation is a different process in each of these arenas (in the electorate, in
government and in their internal activities).
Nevertheless, the concept of Europeanisation is still of some value in understanding how political parties have adapted to the demands of European integration. If the concept is well defined and applied rigorously and systematically to party politics, it can be a valuable tool for comparative studies.

10.3 Scope for further research

Although this thesis has concentrated on exploring how centre-left political parties have Europeanised in three distinct arenas, the relatively broad-brush approach adopted has also served to highlight the importance of other areas of domestic politics that merit further study. The first of these issues highlighted by the thesis is the need to investigate, conceptually and empirically, the Europeanisation of public attitudes and behaviour, which has been addressed to some extent in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. A number of questions suggest themselves for further research. For example, how can we more adequately define the Europeanisation of attitudes? How can we measure them? What makes an individual Europeanised, apart from the level of EU knowledge? Should Europeanisation be linked solely to the idea of being pro-European, or can a well-informed person who is a hard Eurosceptic and demands EU-withdrawal be considered Europeanised?

In a similar vein, the Europeanisation of political elites in government, as individual political actors, also deserves more scholarly attention. It seems that no cross-country study has systematically compared the EU attitudes of the party leadership before and during their time in government. Today, every cabinet minister is involved in EU-level policy-making, although the extent of involvement differs between policy areas. It would be revealing to find out whether the experience of being in government makes party elites generally more pro-European and whether it
changes their views on certain aspects of EU governance. In-depth interviews would be one research method to map the EU attitudes of individual politicians. However, this would be very costly and time-consuming. One could also track parliamentary speeches or parliamentary votes over time.

Further research specifically into party elites’ attitudes would also enable scholars to discover more about potential gaps in the preference and beliefs of party leaders, party activists and party supporters. For this thesis, relatively few interviews were conducted with party activists, and those who were interviewed were all PES activists and very pro-European in their views. Not surprisingly, they were also all fully aware of the importance of the EU and the roles played by Europarties in European parliamentary election campaigns. A broader study into the attitudes of social democratic party members and activists towards European integration could potentially reveal a gap between the elites and the members. The main question is whether party elites substantially and symbolically represent the members’ opinions towards European integration, and what this implies for intra-party power dynamics. Not only would it be interesting to find out more about party members’ EU attitudes; it would also be fascinating to learn more about the Europeanisation of the party organisation at the lower, local level. Parties operate at different levels of governance, and the Europeanisation of the party leadership, which is involved in EU policy-making at the European level, can be expected to differ from the Europeanisation of the party on the ground, which is likely to be more interested in the local impact of EU integration. Interviews conducted for this thesis have revealed that many local party branches in Britain, France and Germany have EU representatives and/or EU working groups. Whether members show interest in this institutional Europeanisation
and whether this development increases the members’ awareness of the EU has never been researched.

Finally, a systematic comparison of the Europeanisation of party organisations from all major party families across the EU could provide valuable insights into the differences and similarities between parties with different ideological backgrounds. This thesis has focused exclusively on centre-left parties, primarily because European integration, and in particular the strict rules imposed by the European Single Market, put constraints on social democratic policies. A broader study might reveal whether ideology plays any role in the Europeanisation process, which was beyond the scope of this thesis. The study should include parties from Eastern and Central Europe, for whom Europeanisation is a more recent experience. Such a study might potentially highlight differences and similarities between parties from the old and new EU member states.

10.4 Why parties still matter

The findings of this thesis reveal that in the case of the Labour Party, the Socialist Party and the German Social Democratic Party, Europeanisation, in the words of a German MEP, is ‘work in progress’. The interviews conducted for this thesis have also revealed a gap between the party leadership and other EU experts such as MPs and MEPs. Party elites generally stressed their parties’ pro-European credentials and how their parties have responded to the challenges of EU integration. For instance, at a fringe event organised by the Fabian Society at Labour’s 2009 party conference, Foreign Secretary David Miliband said: ‘Of course, Labour is a Europeanised party. We are a very pro-European party with close relationships to our sister parties’.
Whether he used ‘Europeanised’ to describe Labour’s general pro-EU policies, or whether he meant it in a more academic sense is, of course, open to question.

Echoing David Miliband’s words, the PS’ international secretary, Jean-Christophe Cambadélis (interviewed on 18/06/2009) was also rather optimistic about the PS’ degree of Europeanisation. He declared:

Europe is a very important issue for the French Socialists. It even creates trouble sometimes. The Socialist Party is divided, had an internal referendum on the Constitution, so it’s both an internal and an essential issue. Everybody reclaims Europe, everyone has an opinion on how to build it. But there is a Europeanisation of the Socialist Party which is the embodiment of a certain internationalism.

Again, what he meant by ‘Europeanisation’ is open to question.

SPD politicians and party officials appeared to be more cautious and critical about their party’s Europeanisation. Felix Porkert (Abteilung IV, the SPD’s international department, interviewed on 15/07/2009) said:

Yes, the SPD is Europeanised, but not sufficiently. Like most of my colleagues in the Willy-Brandt-Haus, including the party leader, I am a glowing European. But when it comes to European elections, we always find it particularly difficult to mobilise our voters, including our core voters. It means that at grassroots level, awareness of the importance of the EU is not wide spread. People are generally aware of the fact that the EU has become more important, but they don’t spend much time and effort on EU policy. But the party leadership has increasingly
Europeanised in the past five years, both with regards to their EU-awareness and the cooperation with the PES.

Porkert points to the gap between the Europeanisation of party elites and citizens. In a similar vein, most MPs, MEPs and party activists interviewed for this thesis were far more critical of their parties’ handling of European integration and generally deplored a lack of Europeanisation at all levels of the party. Labour MEP Claude Moraes summarised this when he said: ‘Social Democrats think globally but ultimately still act nationally’ (Labour Party Conference, 27/10/2010). However, it also needs to be stressed that ‘Europeanisation’ meant something different to each interviewee. Indeed, for most interviewees, Europeanisation simply meant pro-Europeanness and only included the party leadership and not the lower levels of the organisation. Moreover, it seems that politicians and party officials are generally unaware of the concept. One SPD official was aware of the academic debate surrounding the concept of Europeanisation, but this was rather an exception. This is unsurprising, considering the vagueness of the concept and also the tendency for many academic debates to pass by, or over the heads, of, many politicians.

The broader implications of this lack of EU-awareness should however worry the three parties. Their lack of organisational Europeanisation has implications for intra-party democracy, the democratic process at the domestic level and the quality of democracy within the EU as a whole. If party organisations do not become fully Europeanised at all levels and in all arenas, the gap between the leadership and the lower levels of the organisation might widen. Already, the parties’ formal policy-making bodies are excluded from EU policy-making, and it is a small group of (often
unelected) experts who makes European policy. This has led to the further empowerment of party leaders at the expense of the party organisation. In the long term, this power imbalance may threaten internal democracy within parties.

More generally, the lack of Europeanised party structures can lead to a situation in which supporters of social democratic parties can become indifferent towards the EU or even Eurosceptic and cast their vote for extremist single-issue parties such as the UK Independence Party. The SPD leadership is aware of the fact that many party supporters do not cast their votes in European parliamentary elections. After the SPD’s defeat in the 2009 EP elections, a social democratic MP suggested to penalise non-voters by making them pay € 50 (Welt Online, 09/06/2009). This however will not make party supporters (or citizens in general) aware of the importance of the EU. A more effective, long-term solution would be for parties to lead internal debates on EU issues and lead Europeanised election campaigns. At the moment, this is still wishful thinking. Interviews conducted for this thesis have revealed that during the 2009 European parliamentary election campaign, the London branches of the PS and the SPD were invited to support the Labour Party. After asking for instructions, they were told to praise Labour’s successes in reforming the National Health Service, but they were asked not to mention Europe. In such a political environment, citizens cannot be expected to understand the relevance of European elections and the EU in general. Parties could however provide an otherwise missing link between citizens and the EU by playing a more pro-active role in adapting their organisations to the demands of European integration.

This last point leads to a final note of caution about the role of political parties in the wider context of democracy within the European Union. As mentioned before, what national party organisations can achieve at the European level might be modest.
However, through their membership and engagement in the Europarties, they can contribute to the much needed politicisation of the EU. Moreover, all major Europarties offer some sort of individual membership (such as the PES activists) which allows party members to engage directly with them. It is, admittedly, a very small step towards European multi-level party politics, but it has the potential to grow.
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Appendix: List of Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and position</th>
<th>Place and date</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Giampi Alhadeff, Secretary General, European Parliamentary Labour Party</td>
<td>London, 17/06/2010</td>
<td>10.00-11.00h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kader Arif, MEP (PS)</td>
<td>Brussels, 05/10/2009</td>
<td>19.00-19.30h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Jürgen Aschmutat, Head of Office, SPD delegation to the European Parliament</td>
<td>Brussels, 05/10/2009</td>
<td>10.30-11.45h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Pervenche Berès, MEP (PS)</td>
<td>Brussels, 06/10/2009</td>
<td>12.45-13.15h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mrs. Sandrine Bertin, PES, Assistant: Relations with Members</td>
<td>Brussels, 17/06/2009</td>
<td>17.00-17.30h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mrs. Gabriele Bischoff, Federation of German Trade Unions (DGB), Department of European Affairs</td>
<td>Berlin, 23/07/2009</td>
<td>18.30-19.15h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Maurice Braud, PS, Secretariat for European and</td>
<td>Paris, 22/06/2009</td>
<td>9.30-10.30h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Markus Broich,</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>03/06/2009 15.00-16.00h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head of Liaison Office of the SPD’s party group in the Bundestag in Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Jean-Christophe Cambadélis</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>18/06/2009 10.00-10.30h</td>
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<td>PS, National Secretary for European and International Affairs</td>
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<td>Mrs. Françoise Castex,</td>
<td>Telephone Interview, 14/10/2009</td>
<td>11.15-11.40h</td>
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<td>MEP (PS)</td>
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<td>Mr. Yves Clairmont,</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>14/07/2009 16.00-17.00h</td>
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<td>PES Activist</td>
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<td>Mr. Richard Corbett,</td>
<td>Telephone interview, 27/01/2010</td>
<td>8.00-8.35h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour Party, former MEP (1996-2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Philip Cordery,</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>16/06/2009 13.00-13.30h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary General of the PES</td>
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<td>Mr. Franz Xaver Danner,</td>
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<td>24/07/2009 15.00-15.45h</td>
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<td>SPD, Jusos International Secretary</td>
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<td>Mr. Patrick Diamond,</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>16/03/2011 11.00-12.00h</td>
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<td>Policy Network. Former Head of Policy Planning in No. 10 Downing Street.</td>
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<td>Mr. Brian Duggan</td>
<td>Campaigns Officer, European Parliamentary Labour Party</td>
<td>London, 14/09/2009</td>
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<td>Dr. Katharina Erdmenger</td>
<td>German Trade Union Federation (DGB), Head of EU office</td>
<td>Brussels, 16/06/2009</td>
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<td>Dr. Marcus Fedder</td>
<td>Head of SPD-Freundeskreis London</td>
<td>London, 09/09/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Knut Fleckenstein</td>
<td>MEP (SPD)</td>
<td>Brussels, 05/10/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Gérard Fuchs</td>
<td>Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Researcher on International Cooperation. Former MEP and International Secretary of the PS</td>
<td>Paris, 03/07/2009</td>
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<td>Dr. Andrae Gärber</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Head of Brussels Office</td>
<td>Brussels, 16/06/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Jens Geier</td>
<td>MEP (SPD)</td>
<td>Brussels, 06/10/2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Aleksander Glogowski</td>
<td>PES Activist (PS, Federation Paris)</td>
<td>Paris, 10/06/2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Sebastian Gröning</td>
<td>Assistant to the SPD’s Parliamentary Working Group on European Affairs (Arbeitsgruppe Angelegenheiten der EU)</td>
<td>Berlin, 14/07/2009</td>
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<td>Mrs. Sylvie Guillaume</td>
<td>Brussels, 06/10/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Noel Hatch</td>
<td>London, 06/09/2009</td>
<td>16.30-17.30h</td>
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<td>Mrs. Jutta Haug</td>
<td>Brussels, 07/10/2009</td>
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<td>Dr. Eva Högl</td>
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<td>Mr. Marc Jütten</td>
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<td>Mrs. Petra Kammerevert</td>
<td>Telephone Interview, 16/10/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Pierre Kanuty</td>
<td>Paris, 23/06/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Jan Kreutz</td>
<td>Brussels, 15/06/2009</td>
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<td>Mrs. Axelle Lemaire</td>
<td>London, 14/09/2009</td>
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<td><strong>Mr. David Lebon,</strong></td>
<td>Paris, 02/07/2009</td>
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<td>PS, Advisor to Martine Aubry and former President of Mouvement des Jeunes Socialistes</td>
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<td><strong>Mr. Pierre-Yves Le Borgn,</strong></td>
<td>Paris, 27/06/2009</td>
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<td>PS, General Secretary of the Fédération des Français à l’Etranger</td>
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<td><strong>Mr. Roger Liddle,</strong></td>
<td>London, 12/10/2009</td>
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<td>Chair of Policy Network, former EU-adviser to Tony Blair (1997-2004)</td>
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<td><strong>Dr. Gero Maaß,</strong></td>
<td>Berlin, 23/07/2009</td>
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<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Head of ‘internationale Politikanalyse’</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mr. Stefan Marx,</strong></td>
<td>London, 11/11/2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Media Advisor to Frank-Walter Steinmeier during the federal election campaign 2009</td>
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<td><strong>Mr. Carsten Meeners,</strong></td>
<td>Berlin, 08/07/2009</td>
<td>11.00-12.00h</td>
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<td>Head of Office, the SPD group in the European Parliament</td>
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<td><strong>Mr. Michael Meier,</strong></td>
<td>Berlin, 13/07/2009</td>
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<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Department of International Dialogue</td>
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<td><strong>Mr. Henri Nallet,</strong></td>
<td>Paris, 30/06/2009</td>
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<td>PS, Former Secretary of State; International Secretary of the PS and</td>
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Vice-President of the PES.

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<td>Mr. Norbert Neuser, MEP (SPD)</td>
<td>Brussels, 06/10/2009</td>
<td>16.45-17.30h</td>
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<td>Mr. Mark Nottingham, Assistant to Mary Honeyball, MEP (Labour)</td>
<td>Telephone Interview, 14/10/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Mathieu Pagnoux, PES Activist</td>
<td>Berlin, 07/07/2009</td>
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<td>Mrs. Alexandra Pardal, PES, Coordinator: Office of the President</td>
<td>Brussels, 16/06/2009</td>
<td>17.00-17.30h</td>
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<td>Mr. Bernard Poignant, PS, former MEP (1999-2009) and head of the PS delegation to the European Parliament</td>
<td>Telephone Interview, 09/07/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Felix Porkert, SPD Parteivorstand, Department of International Affairs, European Institutions and Policies/European Union/Western Europe/Middle and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>Mrs. Lesia Radelicki, PES, Advisor: PES Women, migration, diversity and integration</td>
<td>Brussels, 16/06/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Bernhard Rapkay, MEP (SPD), Leader of the SPD delegation to the European Parliament</td>
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<td>Mrs. Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul,</td>
<td>Director of ‘Notre Europe’</td>
<td>Paris, 30/06/2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. David Schoibl,</td>
<td>Chair of Labour Movement for Europe (London and South East Branch); PES Activist, member of Compass Youth</td>
<td>London, 07/12/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Axel Schäfer,</td>
<td>Telephone Interview, MdB (SPD)</td>
<td>25/06/2010</td>
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<td>Dr. Angelica Schwall-Düren,</td>
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<td>Dr. Ania Skrzypek,</td>
<td>Former Secretary General of ECOSY, and Policy Advisor at FEPS</td>
<td>Brussels, 04/06/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Karl-Heinz Spiegel,</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Head of London Office</td>
<td>London, 10/09/2009</td>
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<td>Dr. Philipp Steinberg,</td>
<td>Head of EU working group of SPD</td>
<td>Berlin, 15/07/2009</td>
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<td>Mrs. Gisela Stuart,</td>
<td>MP (Labour Party)</td>
<td>London, 27/01/2010</td>
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<td>Mr. Klaus Suchanek,</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of the Land Schleswig-Holstein to the Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>Berlin, 16/07/2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Samuel Tarry</td>
<td>12.00-13.00h</td>
<td>London, 23/11/2009</td>
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<td>Chair of Young Labour, PES activist, former chair of Compass Youth</td>
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<td>Mrs Silke Thompson-Pottebohm</td>
<td>11.30-13.00h</td>
<td>London, 22/01/2010</td>
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<td>Media Advisor to the Party of European Socialists and Labour Candidate for European Elections in 2009</td>
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<td>Mr. Derek Vaughn</td>
<td>15.45-16.10h</td>
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<td>MEP (Labour Party)</td>
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<td>Mr. Thomas Vaupel</td>
<td>15.30-16.30h</td>
<td>Berlin, 08/07/2009</td>
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<td>SPD Parteivorstand, Abteilung V, Department of international affairs, European Institutions and Policies/European Union/Western Europe/Middle and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>Dr. Sven Vollrath</td>
<td>12.00-13.00h</td>
<td>Berlin, 17/07/2009</td>
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<td>Head of the Bundestag’s EU Unit (Referat Europa PA1)</td>
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<td>Mrs. Kathleen Walker-Shaw</td>
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<td>European Officer, GMB Brussels Office</td>
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<td>MEP (PS) and National Secretary for Globalisation</td>
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<td>Mrs. Barbara Weiler</td>
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<td>Mrs. Pia Wenningmann,</td>
<td>Head of the Representation of Rheinland-Pfalz to the European Union and member of SPD group</td>
<td>Brussels, 07/10/2009 15.00-15.30h</td>
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<td>Mrs. Kerstin Westphal,</td>
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<td>Mr. Nils Wörner,</td>
<td>PES, Advisor: PES Activists</td>
<td>Brussels, 12/05/2009 21.00-21.45h</td>
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<td>Mr. Frank Zimmermann,</td>
<td>SPD, Member of the Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus, SPD spokesperson for European affairs</td>
<td>Berlin, 15/07/2009 13.30-14.15h</td>
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