Voting with endogenous information acquisition : Experimental evidence. / Bhattacharya, Sourav; Duffy, John; Kim, SunTak.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 102, 03.2017, p. 316–338.

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Voting with endogenous information acquisition : Experimental evidence. / Bhattacharya, Sourav; Duffy, John; Kim, SunTak.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 102, 03.2017, p. 316–338.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Bhattacharya, S, Duffy, J & Kim, S 2017, 'Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 102, pp. 316–338. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.005

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Bhattacharya, Sourav ; Duffy, John ; Kim, SunTak. / Voting with endogenous information acquisition : Experimental evidence. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2017 ; Vol. 102. pp. 316–338.

BibTeX

@article{c7a5a203e0c74c81a7e2bebc235637b3,
title = "Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence",
abstract = "The Condorcet jury model with costless but informative signals about the true state of the world predicts that the efficiency of group decision-making increases unambiguously with the group size. However, if signal acquisition is made an endogenous and costly decision, then rational voters have disincentives to purchase information as the group size becomes larger. We investigate the extent to which human subjects recognize this trade-off between better information aggregation and greater incentives to free-ride in a laboratory experiment where we vary the group size, the cost of information acquisition and the precision of signals. We find that the theory predicts well in the case of precise signals. However, when signals are imprecise, free-riding incentives appear to be much weaker as there is a pronounced tendency for subjects to over-acquire information relative to equilibrium predictions. We rationalize the latter finding using a quantal response equilibrium that allows for risk aversion.",
author = "Sourav Bhattacharya and John Duffy and SunTak Kim",
year = "2017",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.005",
language = "English",
volume = "102",
pages = "316–338",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Voting with endogenous information acquisition

T2 - Experimental evidence

AU - Bhattacharya, Sourav

AU - Duffy, John

AU - Kim, SunTak

PY - 2017/3

Y1 - 2017/3

N2 - The Condorcet jury model with costless but informative signals about the true state of the world predicts that the efficiency of group decision-making increases unambiguously with the group size. However, if signal acquisition is made an endogenous and costly decision, then rational voters have disincentives to purchase information as the group size becomes larger. We investigate the extent to which human subjects recognize this trade-off between better information aggregation and greater incentives to free-ride in a laboratory experiment where we vary the group size, the cost of information acquisition and the precision of signals. We find that the theory predicts well in the case of precise signals. However, when signals are imprecise, free-riding incentives appear to be much weaker as there is a pronounced tendency for subjects to over-acquire information relative to equilibrium predictions. We rationalize the latter finding using a quantal response equilibrium that allows for risk aversion.

AB - The Condorcet jury model with costless but informative signals about the true state of the world predicts that the efficiency of group decision-making increases unambiguously with the group size. However, if signal acquisition is made an endogenous and costly decision, then rational voters have disincentives to purchase information as the group size becomes larger. We investigate the extent to which human subjects recognize this trade-off between better information aggregation and greater incentives to free-ride in a laboratory experiment where we vary the group size, the cost of information acquisition and the precision of signals. We find that the theory predicts well in the case of precise signals. However, when signals are imprecise, free-riding incentives appear to be much weaker as there is a pronounced tendency for subjects to over-acquire information relative to equilibrium predictions. We rationalize the latter finding using a quantal response equilibrium that allows for risk aversion.

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.005

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.005

M3 - Article

VL - 102

SP - 316

EP - 338

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -