Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns. / Koch, A K; Peyrache, E.

Egham, 2006. (Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.).

Research output: Working paper

Published

Standard

Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns. / Koch, A K; Peyrache, E.

Egham, 2006. (Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Koch, AK & Peyrache, E 2006 'Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns' Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns., Egham. <http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/unte/249/>

APA

Koch, A. K., & Peyrache, E. (2006). Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns. (Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.). http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/unte/249/

Vancouver

Koch AK, Peyrache E. Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns. Egham. 2006 May 5. (Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.).

Author

Koch, A K ; Peyrache, E. / Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns. Egham, 2006. (Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.).

BibTeX

@techreport{d73f949743004cb99de51ed3accf0905,
title = "Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns",
abstract = "Young professionals typically do not enter into life-long employment relations with a single firm. Therefore, future employers can learn about individuals' abilities from the observable facts regarding earlier work relations. We show that these informational spill-overs have profound implications for organizational design and the resulting incentive contracts. Through the organizational choice and the contracts that it offers individuals, a firm can strategically manipulate the flow of information to future employers and sharpen incentives. Using a simple moral hazard model, we demonstrate that relative performance contracts, such as rank-order tournaments, can be optimal even though the extant explanations for the optimality of such compensation schemes are absent.",
keywords = "Tournaments, Reputation, Asymmetric Learning, Relative Performance Contracts",
author = "Koch, {A K} and E Peyrache",
year = "2006",
month = may,
day = "5",
language = "English",
series = "Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns

AU - Koch, A K

AU - Peyrache, E

PY - 2006/5/5

Y1 - 2006/5/5

N2 - Young professionals typically do not enter into life-long employment relations with a single firm. Therefore, future employers can learn about individuals' abilities from the observable facts regarding earlier work relations. We show that these informational spill-overs have profound implications for organizational design and the resulting incentive contracts. Through the organizational choice and the contracts that it offers individuals, a firm can strategically manipulate the flow of information to future employers and sharpen incentives. Using a simple moral hazard model, we demonstrate that relative performance contracts, such as rank-order tournaments, can be optimal even though the extant explanations for the optimality of such compensation schemes are absent.

AB - Young professionals typically do not enter into life-long employment relations with a single firm. Therefore, future employers can learn about individuals' abilities from the observable facts regarding earlier work relations. We show that these informational spill-overs have profound implications for organizational design and the resulting incentive contracts. Through the organizational choice and the contracts that it offers individuals, a firm can strategically manipulate the flow of information to future employers and sharpen incentives. Using a simple moral hazard model, we demonstrate that relative performance contracts, such as rank-order tournaments, can be optimal even though the extant explanations for the optimality of such compensation schemes are absent.

KW - Tournaments

KW - Reputation

KW - Asymmetric Learning

KW - Relative Performance Contracts

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.

BT - Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns

CY - Egham

ER -