The Politics of Co-optation. / Bertocchi, Graziella; Spagat, Michael.

In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, 12.2001, p. 591-607.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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The Politics of Co-optation. / Bertocchi, Graziella; Spagat, Michael.

In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, 12.2001, p. 591-607.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Bertocchi, G & Spagat, M 2001, 'The Politics of Co-optation', Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 591-607. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.2001.1734

APA

Bertocchi, G., & Spagat, M. (2001). The Politics of Co-optation. Journal of Comparative Economics, 29(4), 591-607. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.2001.1734

Vancouver

Bertocchi G, Spagat M. The Politics of Co-optation. Journal of Comparative Economics. 2001 Dec;29(4):591-607. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.2001.1734

Author

Bertocchi, Graziella ; Spagat, Michael. / The Politics of Co-optation. In: Journal of Comparative Economics. 2001 ; Vol. 29, No. 4. pp. 591-607.

BibTeX

@article{33070bbee70a4b068f3f21798bb8ec16,
title = "The Politics of Co-optation",
abstract = "Our model consists of two groups. Group 1 holds political power and Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the probability of its upheaval by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign third group. Improvements in the upheaval technology lead to fewer but better co-optation offers. Increasing the size and/or the degree of fragmentation of Group 2 has the opposite effect. If the co-opted group also threatens Group 1, co-optation transfers are reduced. Our model provides a new explanation of why growth is a politically stabilizing force. The theory suggests that, in post-Communist privatizations, unstable governments will give large benefits to a small number of beneficiaries while stable governments will give small benefits to a large group.",
author = "Graziella Bertocchi and Michael Spagat",
note = "<p>(C) 2001 Elsevier Ltd, whose permission to mount this version for private study and research is acknowledged. The repository version is the author's final draft.</p>",
year = "2001",
month = dec,
doi = "10.1006/jcec.2001.1734",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "591--607",
journal = "Journal of Comparative Economics",
issn = "0147-5967",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Politics of Co-optation

AU - Bertocchi, Graziella

AU - Spagat, Michael

N1 - <p>(C) 2001 Elsevier Ltd, whose permission to mount this version for private study and research is acknowledged. The repository version is the author's final draft.</p>

PY - 2001/12

Y1 - 2001/12

N2 - Our model consists of two groups. Group 1 holds political power and Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the probability of its upheaval by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign third group. Improvements in the upheaval technology lead to fewer but better co-optation offers. Increasing the size and/or the degree of fragmentation of Group 2 has the opposite effect. If the co-opted group also threatens Group 1, co-optation transfers are reduced. Our model provides a new explanation of why growth is a politically stabilizing force. The theory suggests that, in post-Communist privatizations, unstable governments will give large benefits to a small number of beneficiaries while stable governments will give small benefits to a large group.

AB - Our model consists of two groups. Group 1 holds political power and Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the probability of its upheaval by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign third group. Improvements in the upheaval technology lead to fewer but better co-optation offers. Increasing the size and/or the degree of fragmentation of Group 2 has the opposite effect. If the co-opted group also threatens Group 1, co-optation transfers are reduced. Our model provides a new explanation of why growth is a politically stabilizing force. The theory suggests that, in post-Communist privatizations, unstable governments will give large benefits to a small number of beneficiaries while stable governments will give small benefits to a large group.

U2 - 10.1006/jcec.2001.1734

DO - 10.1006/jcec.2001.1734

M3 - Article

VL - 29

SP - 591

EP - 607

JO - Journal of Comparative Economics

JF - Journal of Comparative Economics

SN - 0147-5967

IS - 4

ER -