TY - JOUR
T1 - The Politics of Co-optation
AU - Bertocchi, Graziella
AU - Spagat, Michael
N1 - <p>(C) 2001 Elsevier Ltd, whose permission to mount this version for private study and research is acknowledged. The repository version is the author's final draft.</p>
PY - 2001/12
Y1 - 2001/12
N2 - Our model consists of two groups. Group 1 holds political power and Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the probability of its upheaval by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign third group. Improvements in the upheaval technology lead to fewer but better co-optation offers. Increasing the size and/or the degree of fragmentation of Group 2 has the opposite effect. If the co-opted group also threatens Group 1, co-optation transfers are reduced. Our model provides a new explanation of why growth is a politically stabilizing force. The theory suggests that, in post-Communist privatizations, unstable governments will give large benefits to a small number of beneficiaries while stable governments will give small benefits to a large group.
AB - Our model consists of two groups. Group 1 holds political power and Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the probability of its upheaval by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign third group. Improvements in the upheaval technology lead to fewer but better co-optation offers. Increasing the size and/or the degree of fragmentation of Group 2 has the opposite effect. If the co-opted group also threatens Group 1, co-optation transfers are reduced. Our model provides a new explanation of why growth is a politically stabilizing force. The theory suggests that, in post-Communist privatizations, unstable governments will give large benefits to a small number of beneficiaries while stable governments will give small benefits to a large group.
U2 - 10.1006/jcec.2001.1734
DO - 10.1006/jcec.2001.1734
M3 - Article
SN - 0147-5967
VL - 29
SP - 591
EP - 607
JO - Journal of Comparative Economics
JF - Journal of Comparative Economics
IS - 4
ER -