The Dynamics of Repressive Dictatorships. / Spagat, M.

2001. (Dictatorship).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Published

Standard

The Dynamics of Repressive Dictatorships. / Spagat, M.

2001. (Dictatorship).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Harvard

Spagat, M 2001 'The Dynamics of Repressive Dictatorships' Dictatorship.

APA

Spagat, M. (2001). The Dynamics of Repressive Dictatorships. (Dictatorship).

Vancouver

Spagat M. The Dynamics of Repressive Dictatorships. 2001 Dec 20. (Dictatorship).

Author

Spagat, M. / The Dynamics of Repressive Dictatorships. 2001. (Dictatorship).

BibTeX

@techreport{736bec15bf784a2a8e392bce2162b2db,
title = "The Dynamics of Repressive Dictatorships",
abstract = "We study the optimal strategy for a dictator hanging onto power by choosing how much repression to apply in every period. State variables are the amount of {"}hate{"} and {"}fear{"} in society which are both increasing in the amount of repression from the previous period. Hate, fear, and a random shock, determine the quantity of repression required for the dictator to survive period t. We show under certain conditions that in every period there are only two possible optimal choices: the minimal repression necessary to retain power ({"}No Demonstration{"}) or the maximum possible repression ({"}Demonstration{"}). When Demonstration is optimal it will remain optimal after fear is reduced and when No Demonstration is optimal it will remain optimal when fear is increased.",
keywords = "Dictators, Society, Repression, Demonstration",
author = "M Spagat",
year = "2001",
month = "12",
day = "20",
language = "English",
series = "Dictatorship",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - The Dynamics of Repressive Dictatorships

AU - Spagat, M

PY - 2001/12/20

Y1 - 2001/12/20

N2 - We study the optimal strategy for a dictator hanging onto power by choosing how much repression to apply in every period. State variables are the amount of "hate" and "fear" in society which are both increasing in the amount of repression from the previous period. Hate, fear, and a random shock, determine the quantity of repression required for the dictator to survive period t. We show under certain conditions that in every period there are only two possible optimal choices: the minimal repression necessary to retain power ("No Demonstration") or the maximum possible repression ("Demonstration"). When Demonstration is optimal it will remain optimal after fear is reduced and when No Demonstration is optimal it will remain optimal when fear is increased.

AB - We study the optimal strategy for a dictator hanging onto power by choosing how much repression to apply in every period. State variables are the amount of "hate" and "fear" in society which are both increasing in the amount of repression from the previous period. Hate, fear, and a random shock, determine the quantity of repression required for the dictator to survive period t. We show under certain conditions that in every period there are only two possible optimal choices: the minimal repression necessary to retain power ("No Demonstration") or the maximum possible repression ("Demonstration"). When Demonstration is optimal it will remain optimal after fear is reduced and when No Demonstration is optimal it will remain optimal when fear is increased.

KW - Dictators

KW - Society

KW - Repression

KW - Demonstration

M3 - Discussion paper

T3 - Dictatorship

BT - The Dynamics of Repressive Dictatorships

ER -