The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems. / Msgna, Mehari; Markantonakis, Konstantinos; Mayes, Keith.

Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 9th International ICST Conference. Vol. 127 Sydney, Australia, 2013. p. 288-304 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Information and Telecommunication Engineering; Vol. 127).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Abstract

The security of an embedded system is often compromised when a “trusted” program is subverted to behave differently. Such as executing maliciously crafted code and/or skipping legitimate parts of a “trusted” program. Several countermeasures have been proposed in the literature to counteract these behavioural changes of a program. A common underlying theme in most of them is to define security policies at the lower level of the system in an independent manner and then check for security violations either statically or dynamically at runtime. In this paper we propose a novel method that verifies a program’s behaviour, such as the control flow, by using the device’s side channel leakage.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSecurity and Privacy in Communication Networks
Subtitle of host publication9th International ICST Conference
Place of PublicationSydney, Australia
Pages288-304
Number of pages16
Volume127
DOIs
StatePublished - 25 Sep 2013

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Information and Telecommunication Engineering
PublisherSpringer
Volume127
This open access research output is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

ID: 22963435