Strong Post-Compromise Secure Proxy Re-Encryption. / Davidson, Alex; Deo, Amit; Lee, Ela; Martin, Keith.

Information Security and Privacy - 24th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2019, Proceedings. ed. / Julian Jang-Jaccard; Fuchun Guo. Springer-Verlag, 2019. p. 58-77 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11547 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

E-pub ahead of print

Standard

Strong Post-Compromise Secure Proxy Re-Encryption. / Davidson, Alex; Deo, Amit; Lee, Ela; Martin, Keith.

Information Security and Privacy - 24th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2019, Proceedings. ed. / Julian Jang-Jaccard; Fuchun Guo. Springer-Verlag, 2019. p. 58-77 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11547 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Harvard

Davidson, A, Deo, A, Lee, E & Martin, K 2019, Strong Post-Compromise Secure Proxy Re-Encryption. in J Jang-Jaccard & F Guo (eds), Information Security and Privacy - 24th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2019, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11547 LNCS, Springer-Verlag, pp. 58-77, 24th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2019, Christchurch, New Zealand, 3/07/19. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_4

APA

Davidson, A., Deo, A., Lee, E., & Martin, K. (2019). Strong Post-Compromise Secure Proxy Re-Encryption. In J. Jang-Jaccard, & F. Guo (Eds.), Information Security and Privacy - 24th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2019, Proceedings (pp. 58-77). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11547 LNCS). Springer-Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_4

Vancouver

Davidson A, Deo A, Lee E, Martin K. Strong Post-Compromise Secure Proxy Re-Encryption. In Jang-Jaccard J, Guo F, editors, Information Security and Privacy - 24th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2019, Proceedings. Springer-Verlag. 2019. p. 58-77. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_4

Author

Davidson, Alex ; Deo, Amit ; Lee, Ela ; Martin, Keith. / Strong Post-Compromise Secure Proxy Re-Encryption. Information Security and Privacy - 24th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2019, Proceedings. editor / Julian Jang-Jaccard ; Fuchun Guo. Springer-Verlag, 2019. pp. 58-77 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

BibTeX

@inproceedings{aa6d566a0c3d47969d600153ba50ada9,
title = "Strong Post-Compromise Secure Proxy Re-Encryption",
abstract = "Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) allows a ciphertext encrypted using a key to be re-encrypted by a third party so that it is an encryption of the same message under a new key, without revealing the message. We define Post-Compromise Security (PCS) in the context of PRE. This ensures that an adversary cannot distinguish which of two adversarially chosen ciphertexts a re-encryption was created from even when given the old secret key and the update token used to perform the re-encryption. We give separating examples demonstrating how PCS is stronger than existing security definitions for PRE achieving similar goals, before showing that PCS can be achieved using a combination of existing security properties from the literature. In doing so, we show there are existing PRE schemes satisfying PCS. Finally, we give a construction demonstrating that natural modifications of practical PRE schemes provably have PCS directly, without incurring overheads from the security reductions we have shown, and from weaker assumptions than existing schemes.",
author = "Alex Davidson and Amit Deo and Ela Lee and Keith Martin",
year = "2019",
month = may,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_4",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-030-21547-7",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag",
pages = "58--77",
editor = "Julian Jang-Jaccard and Fuchun Guo",
booktitle = "Information Security and Privacy - 24th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2019, Proceedings",
note = "24th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2019 ; Conference date: 03-07-2019 Through 05-07-2019",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Strong Post-Compromise Secure Proxy Re-Encryption

AU - Davidson, Alex

AU - Deo, Amit

AU - Lee, Ela

AU - Martin, Keith

PY - 2019/5/30

Y1 - 2019/5/30

N2 - Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) allows a ciphertext encrypted using a key to be re-encrypted by a third party so that it is an encryption of the same message under a new key, without revealing the message. We define Post-Compromise Security (PCS) in the context of PRE. This ensures that an adversary cannot distinguish which of two adversarially chosen ciphertexts a re-encryption was created from even when given the old secret key and the update token used to perform the re-encryption. We give separating examples demonstrating how PCS is stronger than existing security definitions for PRE achieving similar goals, before showing that PCS can be achieved using a combination of existing security properties from the literature. In doing so, we show there are existing PRE schemes satisfying PCS. Finally, we give a construction demonstrating that natural modifications of practical PRE schemes provably have PCS directly, without incurring overheads from the security reductions we have shown, and from weaker assumptions than existing schemes.

AB - Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) allows a ciphertext encrypted using a key to be re-encrypted by a third party so that it is an encryption of the same message under a new key, without revealing the message. We define Post-Compromise Security (PCS) in the context of PRE. This ensures that an adversary cannot distinguish which of two adversarially chosen ciphertexts a re-encryption was created from even when given the old secret key and the update token used to perform the re-encryption. We give separating examples demonstrating how PCS is stronger than existing security definitions for PRE achieving similar goals, before showing that PCS can be achieved using a combination of existing security properties from the literature. In doing so, we show there are existing PRE schemes satisfying PCS. Finally, we give a construction demonstrating that natural modifications of practical PRE schemes provably have PCS directly, without incurring overheads from the security reductions we have shown, and from weaker assumptions than existing schemes.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85068641714&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_4

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_4

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85068641714

SN - 978-3-030-21547-7

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 58

EP - 77

BT - Information Security and Privacy - 24th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2019, Proceedings

A2 - Jang-Jaccard, Julian

A2 - Guo, Fuchun

PB - Springer-Verlag

T2 - 24th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2019

Y2 - 3 July 2019 through 5 July 2019

ER -