Stealthy Injection Attacks Against IEC61850’s GOOSE Messaging Service. / Wright, James; Wolthusen, Stephen.

Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe. IEEE Press, 2018. p. 1-6.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

E-pub ahead of print

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Stealthy Injection Attacks Against IEC61850’s GOOSE Messaging Service. / Wright, James; Wolthusen, Stephen.

Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe. IEEE Press, 2018. p. 1-6.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Harvard

Wright, J & Wolthusen, S 2018, Stealthy Injection Attacks Against IEC61850’s GOOSE Messaging Service. in Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe. IEEE Press, pp. 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISGTEurope.2018.8571518

APA

Wright, J., & Wolthusen, S. (2018). Stealthy Injection Attacks Against IEC61850’s GOOSE Messaging Service. In Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe (pp. 1-6). IEEE Press. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISGTEurope.2018.8571518

Vancouver

Wright J, Wolthusen S. Stealthy Injection Attacks Against IEC61850’s GOOSE Messaging Service. In Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe. IEEE Press. 2018. p. 1-6 https://doi.org/10.1109/ISGTEurope.2018.8571518

Author

Wright, James ; Wolthusen, Stephen. / Stealthy Injection Attacks Against IEC61850’s GOOSE Messaging Service. Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe. IEEE Press, 2018. pp. 1-6

BibTeX

@inproceedings{db060259855c4891b8c7978ff72a88a5,
title = "Stealthy Injection Attacks Against IEC61850’s GOOSE Messaging Service",
abstract = "IEC61850 and IEC62351 combined provide a set of security promises for the communications channels that are used to run a substation automation system (SAS), that use IEC61850 based technologies. However, one area that is largely untouched by these security promises is the generic object oriented substation events (GOOSE) messaging service. GOOSE is designed to multicast commands and data across a substation within hard real time quality of service (QoS) requirements. This means that GOOSE is unable to implement the required security technologies as the added latency to any message would violate the QoS.",
author = "James Wright and Stephen Wolthusen",
year = "2018",
month = "12",
day = "13",
doi = "10.1109/ISGTEurope.2018.8571518",
language = "English",
pages = "1--6",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe",
publisher = "IEEE Press",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Stealthy Injection Attacks Against IEC61850’s GOOSE Messaging Service

AU - Wright, James

AU - Wolthusen, Stephen

PY - 2018/12/13

Y1 - 2018/12/13

N2 - IEC61850 and IEC62351 combined provide a set of security promises for the communications channels that are used to run a substation automation system (SAS), that use IEC61850 based technologies. However, one area that is largely untouched by these security promises is the generic object oriented substation events (GOOSE) messaging service. GOOSE is designed to multicast commands and data across a substation within hard real time quality of service (QoS) requirements. This means that GOOSE is unable to implement the required security technologies as the added latency to any message would violate the QoS.

AB - IEC61850 and IEC62351 combined provide a set of security promises for the communications channels that are used to run a substation automation system (SAS), that use IEC61850 based technologies. However, one area that is largely untouched by these security promises is the generic object oriented substation events (GOOSE) messaging service. GOOSE is designed to multicast commands and data across a substation within hard real time quality of service (QoS) requirements. This means that GOOSE is unable to implement the required security technologies as the added latency to any message would violate the QoS.

U2 - 10.1109/ISGTEurope.2018.8571518

DO - 10.1109/ISGTEurope.2018.8571518

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 1

EP - 6

BT - Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe

PB - IEEE Press

ER -