Representation and Sensation—A Defence of Deleuze’s Philosophy of Painting. / Somers-Hall, Henry.

In: Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology, Vol. 3, No. 1, 18.07.2016, p. 55-65.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

E-pub ahead of print

Standard

Representation and Sensation—A Defence of Deleuze’s Philosophy of Painting. / Somers-Hall, Henry.

In: Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology, Vol. 3, No. 1, 18.07.2016, p. 55-65.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Somers-Hall, Henry. / Representation and Sensation—A Defence of Deleuze’s Philosophy of Painting. In: Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology. 2016 ; Vol. 3, No. 1. pp. 55-65.

BibTeX

@article{cc3617899306496cb29deb8abc4ddc4f,
title = "Representation and Sensation—A Defence of Deleuze{\textquoteright}s Philosophy of Painting",
abstract = "Deleuze{\textquoteright}s philosophy of painting can be seen to pose certain challenges to a phenomenological approach to philosophy. While a phenomenological response to Deleuze{\textquoteright}s philosophy is clearly needed, I show in this paper how an approach taken in a recent paper by Christian Lotz proves inadequate. Lotz argues that through Deleuze{\textquoteright}s refusal to accept the place of representation in art, he is unable to distinguish art from decoration, or to give a coherent account of how the (non-representational) content of art can be represented. I show that this criticism emerges from a misreading of the place of representation in Deleuze{\textquoteright}s philosophy. I will argue that by failing to take account of some of the key features of Deleuze{\textquoteright}s wider ontology, such as the importance of both the virtual and the actual for his analysis of objects, Lotz{\textquoteright}s critique proves unsuccessful. In particular, I want to show that Lotz{\textquoteright}s criticisms rest on a failure to attend to the systematic nature of Deleuze{\textquoteright}s philosophy, and in particular, the place of Deleuze{\textquoteright}s analysis of Bacon within the system as a whole. I will further show that Lotz{\textquoteright}s phenomenological defence commits the fallacy of petitio principii, assuming the validity of the phenomenological method in order to justify the phenomenological approach.",
author = "Henry Somers-Hall",
year = "2016",
month = jul,
day = "18",
doi = "10.1080/20539320.2016.1187854",
language = "English",
volume = "3",
pages = "55--65",
journal = "Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology",
issn = "2053-9320",
publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Representation and Sensation—A Defence of Deleuze’s Philosophy of Painting

AU - Somers-Hall, Henry

PY - 2016/7/18

Y1 - 2016/7/18

N2 - Deleuze’s philosophy of painting can be seen to pose certain challenges to a phenomenological approach to philosophy. While a phenomenological response to Deleuze’s philosophy is clearly needed, I show in this paper how an approach taken in a recent paper by Christian Lotz proves inadequate. Lotz argues that through Deleuze’s refusal to accept the place of representation in art, he is unable to distinguish art from decoration, or to give a coherent account of how the (non-representational) content of art can be represented. I show that this criticism emerges from a misreading of the place of representation in Deleuze’s philosophy. I will argue that by failing to take account of some of the key features of Deleuze’s wider ontology, such as the importance of both the virtual and the actual for his analysis of objects, Lotz’s critique proves unsuccessful. In particular, I want to show that Lotz’s criticisms rest on a failure to attend to the systematic nature of Deleuze’s philosophy, and in particular, the place of Deleuze’s analysis of Bacon within the system as a whole. I will further show that Lotz’s phenomenological defence commits the fallacy of petitio principii, assuming the validity of the phenomenological method in order to justify the phenomenological approach.

AB - Deleuze’s philosophy of painting can be seen to pose certain challenges to a phenomenological approach to philosophy. While a phenomenological response to Deleuze’s philosophy is clearly needed, I show in this paper how an approach taken in a recent paper by Christian Lotz proves inadequate. Lotz argues that through Deleuze’s refusal to accept the place of representation in art, he is unable to distinguish art from decoration, or to give a coherent account of how the (non-representational) content of art can be represented. I show that this criticism emerges from a misreading of the place of representation in Deleuze’s philosophy. I will argue that by failing to take account of some of the key features of Deleuze’s wider ontology, such as the importance of both the virtual and the actual for his analysis of objects, Lotz’s critique proves unsuccessful. In particular, I want to show that Lotz’s criticisms rest on a failure to attend to the systematic nature of Deleuze’s philosophy, and in particular, the place of Deleuze’s analysis of Bacon within the system as a whole. I will further show that Lotz’s phenomenological defence commits the fallacy of petitio principii, assuming the validity of the phenomenological method in order to justify the phenomenological approach.

U2 - 10.1080/20539320.2016.1187854

DO - 10.1080/20539320.2016.1187854

M3 - Article

VL - 3

SP - 55

EP - 65

JO - Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology

JF - Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology

SN - 2053-9320

IS - 1

ER -