Related-Key Impossible-Differential Attack on Reduced-Round Skinny. / Ankele, Ralph; Banik, Subhadeep; Chakraborti, Avik; List, Eik; Mendel, Florian; Sim, Siang Meng; Wang, Gaoli.

Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ed. / Dieter Gollmann; Atsuko Miyaji; Hiroaki Kikuchi. Vol. 10355 Kanazawa, Japan : Springer International Publishing, 2017. p. 208-228 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 10355, No. 1).

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  • Ralph Ankele
  • Subhadeep Banik
  • Avik Chakraborti
  • Eik List
  • Florian Mendel
  • Siang Meng Sim
  • Gaoli Wang

Abstract

At CRYPTO'16, Beierle et al. presented SKINNY, a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers intended to compete with the NSA designs SIMON and SPECK. SKINNY can be implemented efficiently in both soft- and hardware and supports block sizes of 64 and 128 bits as well as tweakey sizes of 64, 128, 192 and 128, 256, 384 bits respectively. This paper presents a related-tweakey impossible-differential attack on up to 23 (out of 36) rounds of SKINNY-64/128 for different tweak sizes. All our attacks can be trivially extended to SKINNY-128/128.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationApplied Cryptography and Network Security
EditorsDieter Gollmann, Atsuko Miyaji, Hiroaki Kikuchi
Place of PublicationKanazawa, Japan
PublisherSpringer International Publishing
Pages208-228
Number of pages21
Volume10355
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-61204-1
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-61203-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer International Publishing AG 2017
Number1
Volume10355
This open access research output is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

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