Rational agents are the quickest. / Mandler, Michael.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 155, 01.2015, p. 206-233.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Rational agents are the quickest. / Mandler, Michael.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 155, 01.2015, p. 206-233.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Mandler, M 2015, 'Rational agents are the quickest', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 155, pp. 206-233. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.003

APA

Vancouver

Author

Mandler, Michael. / Rational agents are the quickest. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2015 ; Vol. 155. pp. 206-233.

BibTeX

@article{f85648e825774daca8c2c90a7ba2ea53,
title = "Rational agents are the quickest",
abstract = "Suppose an agent chooses by proceeding through a sequence of criteria: for any pair of alternatives the first criterion that ranks the pair determines the agent's choice. Given any constraint on the capacity of the criteria to discriminate, choices that maximize complete and transitive preferences are always the outcome of a {\textquoteleft}quick{\textquoteright} sequence that uses the minimum number of criteria. For any irrational preference on the other hand there is always a discrimination constraint such that the preference is not the outcome of a quick sequence. When an agent uses attributes to form criteria and each attribute is rationally ordered, a quick sequence that leads to rational preferences necessarily arises.",
author = "Michael Mandler",
year = "2015",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.003",
language = "English",
volume = "155",
pages = "206--233",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rational agents are the quickest

AU - Mandler, Michael

PY - 2015/1

Y1 - 2015/1

N2 - Suppose an agent chooses by proceeding through a sequence of criteria: for any pair of alternatives the first criterion that ranks the pair determines the agent's choice. Given any constraint on the capacity of the criteria to discriminate, choices that maximize complete and transitive preferences are always the outcome of a ‘quick’ sequence that uses the minimum number of criteria. For any irrational preference on the other hand there is always a discrimination constraint such that the preference is not the outcome of a quick sequence. When an agent uses attributes to form criteria and each attribute is rationally ordered, a quick sequence that leads to rational preferences necessarily arises.

AB - Suppose an agent chooses by proceeding through a sequence of criteria: for any pair of alternatives the first criterion that ranks the pair determines the agent's choice. Given any constraint on the capacity of the criteria to discriminate, choices that maximize complete and transitive preferences are always the outcome of a ‘quick’ sequence that uses the minimum number of criteria. For any irrational preference on the other hand there is always a discrimination constraint such that the preference is not the outcome of a quick sequence. When an agent uses attributes to form criteria and each attribute is rationally ordered, a quick sequence that leads to rational preferences necessarily arises.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.003

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.003

M3 - Article

VL - 155

SP - 206

EP - 233

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

ER -