Pareto-Optimal Assignments by Hierarchical Exchange. / Bade, Sophie.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. Acc. subject to minor revision, 03.06.2011.

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Pareto-Optimal Assignments by Hierarchical Exchange. / Bade, Sophie.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. Acc. subject to minor revision, 03.06.2011.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Bade, Sophie. / Pareto-Optimal Assignments by Hierarchical Exchange. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 2011 ; Vol. Acc. subject to minor revision.

BibTeX

@article{e6cfd1930ed24a60b07495cd9d7f2363,
title = "Pareto-Optimal Assignments by Hierarchical Exchange",
abstract = " A version of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics that applies to a money-free environment, in which a set of indivisible goods needs to be matched to some set of agents, is established. In such environments, {"}trade{"} can be identified with the set of hierarchical exchange mechanisms dened by Papai (2000). Papai (2000)'s result – that any such mechanism yields Pareto-optimal allocations – can be interpreted as a version of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics for the given environment. In this note, I show that for any Pareto-optimal allocation and any hierarchical exchange mechanism one can nd an initial allocation of ownership rights, such that the given Pareto-optimal allocation arises as a result of trade.",
author = "Sophie Bade",
year = "2011",
month = jun,
day = "3",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.1880928",
language = "English",
volume = "Acc. subject to minor revision",
journal = "Social Choice and Welfare",
issn = "0176-1714",
publisher = "Springer New York",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Pareto-Optimal Assignments by Hierarchical Exchange

AU - Bade, Sophie

PY - 2011/6/3

Y1 - 2011/6/3

N2 - A version of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics that applies to a money-free environment, in which a set of indivisible goods needs to be matched to some set of agents, is established. In such environments, "trade" can be identified with the set of hierarchical exchange mechanisms dened by Papai (2000). Papai (2000)'s result – that any such mechanism yields Pareto-optimal allocations – can be interpreted as a version of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics for the given environment. In this note, I show that for any Pareto-optimal allocation and any hierarchical exchange mechanism one can nd an initial allocation of ownership rights, such that the given Pareto-optimal allocation arises as a result of trade.

AB - A version of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics that applies to a money-free environment, in which a set of indivisible goods needs to be matched to some set of agents, is established. In such environments, "trade" can be identified with the set of hierarchical exchange mechanisms dened by Papai (2000). Papai (2000)'s result – that any such mechanism yields Pareto-optimal allocations – can be interpreted as a version of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics for the given environment. In this note, I show that for any Pareto-optimal allocation and any hierarchical exchange mechanism one can nd an initial allocation of ownership rights, such that the given Pareto-optimal allocation arises as a result of trade.

U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.1880928

DO - 10.2139/ssrn.1880928

M3 - Article

VL - Acc. subject to minor revision

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

ER -