Ordinal Allocation. / Chambers, Christopher P; Richter, Michael.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, 28.08.2020, p. 1-10.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Ordinal Allocation. / Chambers, Christopher P; Richter, Michael.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, 28.08.2020, p. 1-10.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Chambers, CP & Richter, M 2020, 'Ordinal Allocation', Social Choice and Welfare, pp. 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01280-0

APA

Chambers, C. P., & Richter, M. (2020). Ordinal Allocation. Social Choice and Welfare, 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01280-0

Vancouver

Chambers CP, Richter M. Ordinal Allocation. Social Choice and Welfare. 2020 Aug 28;1-10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01280-0

Author

Chambers, Christopher P ; Richter, Michael. / Ordinal Allocation. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 2020 ; pp. 1-10.

BibTeX

@article{f6f1f19635bb4656a054ed136c5f30c0,
title = "Ordinal Allocation",
abstract = "A generalization of the well-known Vickrey auctions are lottery qualification auctions – where the m highest bidders win the good with uniform probability, and pay the m+1st highest bid upon winning. A random lottery qualification mechanism decides the integer m randomly. We characterize the class of mechanisms which are payoff equivalent to the random lottery qualification auctions. The key property characterizing this class of mechanisms is one which states that only the ordinal comparison of willingness-to-pay across individuals is relevant in determining the allocation. The mechanisms can be seen as compromising between ex-post utility efficiency and monetary efficiency.",
author = "Chambers, {Christopher P} and Michael Richter",
year = "2020",
month = aug,
day = "28",
doi = "10.1007/s00355-020-01280-0",
language = "English",
pages = "1--10",
journal = "Social Choice and Welfare",
issn = "0176-1714",
publisher = "Springer New York",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Ordinal Allocation

AU - Chambers, Christopher P

AU - Richter, Michael

PY - 2020/8/28

Y1 - 2020/8/28

N2 - A generalization of the well-known Vickrey auctions are lottery qualification auctions – where the m highest bidders win the good with uniform probability, and pay the m+1st highest bid upon winning. A random lottery qualification mechanism decides the integer m randomly. We characterize the class of mechanisms which are payoff equivalent to the random lottery qualification auctions. The key property characterizing this class of mechanisms is one which states that only the ordinal comparison of willingness-to-pay across individuals is relevant in determining the allocation. The mechanisms can be seen as compromising between ex-post utility efficiency and monetary efficiency.

AB - A generalization of the well-known Vickrey auctions are lottery qualification auctions – where the m highest bidders win the good with uniform probability, and pay the m+1st highest bid upon winning. A random lottery qualification mechanism decides the integer m randomly. We characterize the class of mechanisms which are payoff equivalent to the random lottery qualification auctions. The key property characterizing this class of mechanisms is one which states that only the ordinal comparison of willingness-to-pay across individuals is relevant in determining the allocation. The mechanisms can be seen as compromising between ex-post utility efficiency and monetary efficiency.

U2 - 10.1007/s00355-020-01280-0

DO - 10.1007/s00355-020-01280-0

M3 - Article

SP - 1

EP - 10

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

ER -