Abstract
We study strategic interactions that may be affected by belief-dependent, conformist preferences. Specifically, we propose that beliefs about the behavior of individuals in the same role (i.e., beliefs about “peer behavior”) directly affect a player’s utility. In examining conformism we propose an experimental design that verifies the presence of the relevant causality direction. Our data reveal “opportunistically conformist” behavior, as subjects are more likely to follow the purported majority if doing so implies an increase in expected material payoff. We provide a general framework that accounts for such a pattern.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 100-134 |
Number of pages | 35 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 180 |
Early online date | 27 Dec 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2019 |
Keywords
- Conformist preferences
- Psychological games
- Peers
- Trust