On the Security of the Algebraic Eraser Tag Authentication Protocol. / Blackburn, Simon; Robshaw, M.J.B.

Applied Cryptology and Network Security: 14th International Conference, ACNS 2016, London (Guildford), UK, June 19-22, 2016. Vol. 9696 Springer-Verlang, 2016. p. 3-17 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9696).

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Abstract

The Algebraic Eraser has been gaining prominence as SecureRF, the company commercializing the algorithm, increases its marketing reach. The scheme is claimed to be well-suited to IoT applications but a lack of detail in available documentation has hampered peer-review. Recently more details of the system have emerged after a tag authentication protocol built using the Algebraic Eraser was proposed for standardization in ISO/IEC SC31 and SecureRF provided an open public description of the protocol. In this paper we describe a range of attacks on this protocol that include very ecient and practical tag impersonation as well as partial, and total, tag secret key recovery. Most of these results have been practically verified, they contrast with the 80-bit security that is claimed for the protocol, and they emphasize the importance of independent public review for any cryptographic proposal.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationApplied Cryptology and Network Security
Subtitle of host publication14th International Conference, ACNS 2016, London (Guildford), UK, June 19-22, 2016
PublisherSpringer-Verlang
Pages3-17
Number of pages15
Volume9696
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 9 Jun 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume9696
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
This open access research output is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

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