Multi-Lateral Strategic Bargaining Without Stationarity. / Ritzberger, Klaus; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.

In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 21.06.2021.

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Abstract

This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies
for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games, without assuming
a stationary setting. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are
continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on
the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even timevarying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), externalities, and other-regarding preferences. As a side result, we clarify the meaning of assumptions on “continuity at infinity.”
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages39
JournalJOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 21 Jun 2021

ID: 42453071