Moral Pluralism and Political Disagreement. / Rutherford, Nathaniel.

2018. 263 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

Unpublished

Standard

Moral Pluralism and Political Disagreement. / Rutherford, Nathaniel.

2018. 263 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

Harvard

Rutherford, N 2018, 'Moral Pluralism and Political Disagreement', Ph.D., Royal Holloway, University of London.

APA

Vancouver

Author

BibTeX

@phdthesis{ea5d8608077a4b7fb8f664774bd0e8dc,
title = "Moral Pluralism and Political Disagreement",
abstract = "This thesis addresses two crucial questions of contemporary political theory: why do we disagree about value and how should we respond politically to that disagreement? I make three major arguments that correspond to each of the three sections. I outline and analyse two theories of moral pluralism in Section I, value pluralism and epistemic pluralism, which offer explanations of disagreement about value. Value pluralism is a widely held metaphysical doctrine that makes a claim about the plural nature of value. Epistemic pluralism is a less widely known theory that makes a claim about the difficulty of reasoning about value. I argue that epistemic pluralism is the appropriate form of moral pluralism for political theory because, unlike value pluralism, it does not rely on controversial metaphysical ideas. In Section II I analyse two theories of public reason liberalism, John Rawls{\textquoteright}s political liberalism and Gerald Gaus{\textquoteright}s justificatory liberalism, both of which develop an account of political legitimacy in light of epistemic pluralism. I reject both theories on the basis that they are incompatible with a commitment to epistemic pluralism. In Section III I develop a political theory of modus vivendi which accords with my account of epistemic pluralism. Building on the work of other modus vivendi theorists I outline a theory of legitimacy that depends on two political conditions, peace and acceptance. In the final chapter I defend my conception of modus vivendi from various criticisms in order to show that a theory of modus vivendi is not a counsel of despair. ",
keywords = "Modus vivendi, John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Moral Pluralism, Epistemic Pluralism, Value Pluralism, Stability, Peace, Acceptance, Public Reason, Liberalism, Consensus, Disagreement",
author = "Nathaniel Rutherford",
year = "2018",
language = "English",
school = "Royal Holloway, University of London",

}

RIS

TY - THES

T1 - Moral Pluralism and Political Disagreement

AU - Rutherford, Nathaniel

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - This thesis addresses two crucial questions of contemporary political theory: why do we disagree about value and how should we respond politically to that disagreement? I make three major arguments that correspond to each of the three sections. I outline and analyse two theories of moral pluralism in Section I, value pluralism and epistemic pluralism, which offer explanations of disagreement about value. Value pluralism is a widely held metaphysical doctrine that makes a claim about the plural nature of value. Epistemic pluralism is a less widely known theory that makes a claim about the difficulty of reasoning about value. I argue that epistemic pluralism is the appropriate form of moral pluralism for political theory because, unlike value pluralism, it does not rely on controversial metaphysical ideas. In Section II I analyse two theories of public reason liberalism, John Rawls’s political liberalism and Gerald Gaus’s justificatory liberalism, both of which develop an account of political legitimacy in light of epistemic pluralism. I reject both theories on the basis that they are incompatible with a commitment to epistemic pluralism. In Section III I develop a political theory of modus vivendi which accords with my account of epistemic pluralism. Building on the work of other modus vivendi theorists I outline a theory of legitimacy that depends on two political conditions, peace and acceptance. In the final chapter I defend my conception of modus vivendi from various criticisms in order to show that a theory of modus vivendi is not a counsel of despair.

AB - This thesis addresses two crucial questions of contemporary political theory: why do we disagree about value and how should we respond politically to that disagreement? I make three major arguments that correspond to each of the three sections. I outline and analyse two theories of moral pluralism in Section I, value pluralism and epistemic pluralism, which offer explanations of disagreement about value. Value pluralism is a widely held metaphysical doctrine that makes a claim about the plural nature of value. Epistemic pluralism is a less widely known theory that makes a claim about the difficulty of reasoning about value. I argue that epistemic pluralism is the appropriate form of moral pluralism for political theory because, unlike value pluralism, it does not rely on controversial metaphysical ideas. In Section II I analyse two theories of public reason liberalism, John Rawls’s political liberalism and Gerald Gaus’s justificatory liberalism, both of which develop an account of political legitimacy in light of epistemic pluralism. I reject both theories on the basis that they are incompatible with a commitment to epistemic pluralism. In Section III I develop a political theory of modus vivendi which accords with my account of epistemic pluralism. Building on the work of other modus vivendi theorists I outline a theory of legitimacy that depends on two political conditions, peace and acceptance. In the final chapter I defend my conception of modus vivendi from various criticisms in order to show that a theory of modus vivendi is not a counsel of despair.

KW - Modus vivendi

KW - John Rawls

KW - Political Liberalism

KW - Moral Pluralism

KW - Epistemic Pluralism

KW - Value Pluralism

KW - Stability

KW - Peace

KW - Acceptance

KW - Public Reason

KW - Liberalism

KW - Consensus

KW - Disagreement

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

ER -