Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism. / Gascoigne, Neil.

Handbuch Richard Rorty. ed. / Martin Müller. Springer, 2020.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Submitted

Standard

Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism. / Gascoigne, Neil.

Handbuch Richard Rorty. ed. / Martin Müller. Springer, 2020.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Harvard

Gascoigne, N 2020, Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism. in M Müller (ed.), Handbuch Richard Rorty. Springer.

APA

Gascoigne, N. (2020). Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism. Manuscript submitted for publication. In M. Müller (Ed.), Handbuch Richard Rorty Springer.

Vancouver

Gascoigne N. Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism. In Müller M, editor, Handbuch Richard Rorty. Springer. 2020

Author

Gascoigne, Neil. / Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism. Handbuch Richard Rorty. editor / Martin Müller. Springer, 2020.

BibTeX

@inbook{663174d4100245409b6ae3429b42b24c,
title = "Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism",
abstract = "A critical outline is given of Rorty{\textquoteright}s early, {\textquoteleft}eliminativist{\textquoteright} attempt to formulate a materialist version of the mind-body identity theory that does not fall foul of the {\textquoteleft}irreducible properties objection{\textquoteright} (the thought that if mental states are brain states then the latter must exhibit the same properties as the former). An explanation is offered of why Rorty continued to describe himself as a materialist/physicalist despite having come to reject any version of mind-body identity.",
keywords = "Eliminative Materialism, Conceptual Change, Mind-Body Identity Theory, Reductive Materialism",
author = "Neil Gascoigne",
year = "2020",
month = oct,
day = "13",
language = "English",
editor = "Martin M{\"u}ller",
booktitle = "Handbuch Richard Rorty",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism

AU - Gascoigne, Neil

PY - 2020/10/13

Y1 - 2020/10/13

N2 - A critical outline is given of Rorty’s early, ‘eliminativist’ attempt to formulate a materialist version of the mind-body identity theory that does not fall foul of the ‘irreducible properties objection’ (the thought that if mental states are brain states then the latter must exhibit the same properties as the former). An explanation is offered of why Rorty continued to describe himself as a materialist/physicalist despite having come to reject any version of mind-body identity.

AB - A critical outline is given of Rorty’s early, ‘eliminativist’ attempt to formulate a materialist version of the mind-body identity theory that does not fall foul of the ‘irreducible properties objection’ (the thought that if mental states are brain states then the latter must exhibit the same properties as the former). An explanation is offered of why Rorty continued to describe himself as a materialist/physicalist despite having come to reject any version of mind-body identity.

KW - Eliminative Materialism

KW - Conceptual Change

KW - Mind-Body Identity Theory

KW - Reductive Materialism

M3 - Chapter

BT - Handbuch Richard Rorty

A2 - Müller, Martin

PB - Springer

ER -