Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents. / Richter, Michael.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 115, 05.2019, p. 30-47.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Published

Standard

Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents. / Richter, Michael.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 115, 05.2019, p. 30-47.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Richter, Michael. / Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2019 ; Vol. 115. pp. 30-47.

BibTeX

@article{ec805fe828d141a2b5f92f502563090a,
title = "Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents",
keywords = "Mechanism Design, Budget Constraints, Welfare Maximization, Revenue Maximization, Continuum Economy",
author = "Michael Richter",
year = "2019",
month = may
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009",
language = "English",
volume = "115",
pages = "30--47",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents

AU - Richter, Michael

PY - 2019/5

Y1 - 2019/5

KW - Mechanism Design

KW - Budget Constraints

KW - Welfare Maximization

KW - Revenue Maximization

KW - Continuum Economy

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009

M3 - Article

VL - 115

SP - 30

EP - 47

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -