Measles, magic and misidentifications : a defence of the two-factor theory of delusions. / McKay, Ryan.

In: Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, Vol. 24, No. 3, 16.04.2019, p. 183-190.

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

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Measles, magic and misidentifications : a defence of the two-factor theory of delusions. / McKay, Ryan.

In: Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, Vol. 24, No. 3, 16.04.2019, p. 183-190.

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

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APA

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McKay, Ryan. / Measles, magic and misidentifications : a defence of the two-factor theory of delusions. In: Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. 2019 ; Vol. 24, No. 3. pp. 183-190.

BibTeX

@article{8b42881b6dfc424a9c5a07be116c843b,
title = "Measles, magic and misidentifications: a defence of the two-factor theory of delusions",
abstract = "Corlett (this issue) provides a robust critique of the two-factor theory of delusions. The heart of his critique is two challenges he derives from a paper by Tranel and Damasio (1994), who illuminate the autonomic responses and brain damage of four patients often cited in support of the two-factor theory of Capgras delusion. I defend the two-factor theory against Corlett{\textquoteright}s two key challenges, arguing that his first challenge has been previously addressed, and that his second challenge is overstated. In my view, these challenges do not negate the two-factor account. Nevertheless, two-factor theorists – and computational psychiatrists – should continue to devise and test falsifiable predictions of their respective theories.",
author = "Ryan McKay",
year = "2019",
month = apr,
day = "16",
doi = "10.1080/13546805.2019.1607273",
language = "English",
volume = "24",
pages = "183--190",
journal = "Cognitive Neuropsychiatry",
issn = "1354-6805",
publisher = "Psychology Press Ltd",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Measles, magic and misidentifications

T2 - a defence of the two-factor theory of delusions

AU - McKay, Ryan

PY - 2019/4/16

Y1 - 2019/4/16

N2 - Corlett (this issue) provides a robust critique of the two-factor theory of delusions. The heart of his critique is two challenges he derives from a paper by Tranel and Damasio (1994), who illuminate the autonomic responses and brain damage of four patients often cited in support of the two-factor theory of Capgras delusion. I defend the two-factor theory against Corlett’s two key challenges, arguing that his first challenge has been previously addressed, and that his second challenge is overstated. In my view, these challenges do not negate the two-factor account. Nevertheless, two-factor theorists – and computational psychiatrists – should continue to devise and test falsifiable predictions of their respective theories.

AB - Corlett (this issue) provides a robust critique of the two-factor theory of delusions. The heart of his critique is two challenges he derives from a paper by Tranel and Damasio (1994), who illuminate the autonomic responses and brain damage of four patients often cited in support of the two-factor theory of Capgras delusion. I defend the two-factor theory against Corlett’s two key challenges, arguing that his first challenge has been previously addressed, and that his second challenge is overstated. In my view, these challenges do not negate the two-factor account. Nevertheless, two-factor theorists – and computational psychiatrists – should continue to devise and test falsifiable predictions of their respective theories.

U2 - 10.1080/13546805.2019.1607273

DO - 10.1080/13546805.2019.1607273

M3 - Comment/debate

VL - 24

SP - 183

EP - 190

JO - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

JF - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

SN - 1354-6805

IS - 3

ER -