Matching with single-peaked preferences. / Bade, Sophie.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 180, 03.2019, p. 81-99.

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Abstract

The crawler is a new efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational mechanism
for housing markets with single-peaked preferences. In a housing market
each agent is endowed with exactly one house. These houses are ordered -
by their size for example - and all agents preferences are single-peaked with
respect to that order. The crawler screens agents in order of their houses'
sizes, starting with the smallest. The first agent who does not want to move
to a larger house is matched with his most preferred house. Agents who currently
occupy houses sized between this agent's original and chosen houses
\crawl" to the next largest unmatched house. This process is repeated until
all agents are matched. The crawler is easier to understand than Gale's top
trading cycles and can be extended to allow for indierences.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-99
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume180
Early online date21 Dec 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2019
This open access research output is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

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