Managerial Pay Raise and Promotion Decisions for Workers with I-deals. / Tomprou, Maria; Simosi, Maria; Rousseau, Denise .

In: Group & organization management, 05.05.2022.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

E-pub ahead of print

Standard

Managerial Pay Raise and Promotion Decisions for Workers with I-deals. / Tomprou, Maria; Simosi, Maria; Rousseau, Denise .

In: Group & organization management, 05.05.2022.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Tomprou, Maria ; Simosi, Maria ; Rousseau, Denise . / Managerial Pay Raise and Promotion Decisions for Workers with I-deals. In: Group & organization management. 2022.

BibTeX

@article{c5c8e669a15b448381c8b2fd8aad92c1,
title = "Managerial Pay Raise and Promotion Decisions for Workers with I-deals",
abstract = "Managers use idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) to motivate and retain employees. Yet we know little about the subsequent effects i-deals have on decisions about pay raises and promotions. Two studies investigate how managers make pay raise and promotion decisions for workers with i-deals. Using a policy capturing design, managers (N=116) made pay raise and promotion allocations for workers presented as good performers, based on information provided regarding whether and what type of i-deal workers had and the extent to which they helped peers. Developmental i-deal recipients tend to be recommended for both pay raises and promotions, while such recommendations are less likely for employees with flextime i-deals (for promotions) or reduced workload i-deals (for promotions and pay raises). In addition, workers with i-deals who help their peers are viewed more favorably in both decisions. The second study, surveyed managers (N=174) regarding their actual subordinates (N = 806), both controlled for the manager{\textquoteright}s rating of subordinate performance. It supports the positive effect of developmental i-deals on pay and promotion decisions, but not the negative effects of flextime and reduced workload i-deals. Helping effects depend on the i-deal: Managers report that unhelpful recipients of developmental i-deals are less likely to be promoted than those with such i-deals who do help; unhelpful recipients of reduced workload i-deals are less likely to get pay raises than those with such deals who help. We discuss the implications of our findings for future research and career management.",
author = "Maria Tomprou and Maria Simosi and Denise Rousseau",
year = "2022",
month = may,
day = "5",
doi = "10.1177/10596011221086108",
language = "English",
journal = "Group & organization management",
issn = "1059-6011",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Managerial Pay Raise and Promotion Decisions for Workers with I-deals

AU - Tomprou, Maria

AU - Simosi, Maria

AU - Rousseau, Denise

PY - 2022/5/5

Y1 - 2022/5/5

N2 - Managers use idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) to motivate and retain employees. Yet we know little about the subsequent effects i-deals have on decisions about pay raises and promotions. Two studies investigate how managers make pay raise and promotion decisions for workers with i-deals. Using a policy capturing design, managers (N=116) made pay raise and promotion allocations for workers presented as good performers, based on information provided regarding whether and what type of i-deal workers had and the extent to which they helped peers. Developmental i-deal recipients tend to be recommended for both pay raises and promotions, while such recommendations are less likely for employees with flextime i-deals (for promotions) or reduced workload i-deals (for promotions and pay raises). In addition, workers with i-deals who help their peers are viewed more favorably in both decisions. The second study, surveyed managers (N=174) regarding their actual subordinates (N = 806), both controlled for the manager’s rating of subordinate performance. It supports the positive effect of developmental i-deals on pay and promotion decisions, but not the negative effects of flextime and reduced workload i-deals. Helping effects depend on the i-deal: Managers report that unhelpful recipients of developmental i-deals are less likely to be promoted than those with such i-deals who do help; unhelpful recipients of reduced workload i-deals are less likely to get pay raises than those with such deals who help. We discuss the implications of our findings for future research and career management.

AB - Managers use idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) to motivate and retain employees. Yet we know little about the subsequent effects i-deals have on decisions about pay raises and promotions. Two studies investigate how managers make pay raise and promotion decisions for workers with i-deals. Using a policy capturing design, managers (N=116) made pay raise and promotion allocations for workers presented as good performers, based on information provided regarding whether and what type of i-deal workers had and the extent to which they helped peers. Developmental i-deal recipients tend to be recommended for both pay raises and promotions, while such recommendations are less likely for employees with flextime i-deals (for promotions) or reduced workload i-deals (for promotions and pay raises). In addition, workers with i-deals who help their peers are viewed more favorably in both decisions. The second study, surveyed managers (N=174) regarding their actual subordinates (N = 806), both controlled for the manager’s rating of subordinate performance. It supports the positive effect of developmental i-deals on pay and promotion decisions, but not the negative effects of flextime and reduced workload i-deals. Helping effects depend on the i-deal: Managers report that unhelpful recipients of developmental i-deals are less likely to be promoted than those with such i-deals who do help; unhelpful recipients of reduced workload i-deals are less likely to get pay raises than those with such deals who help. We discuss the implications of our findings for future research and career management.

U2 - 10.1177/10596011221086108

DO - 10.1177/10596011221086108

M3 - Article

JO - Group & organization management

JF - Group & organization management

SN - 1059-6011

ER -