Law Breaking and Law Bending : How International Migrants Negotiate with State Borders. / Schwartz, Cassilde; Simon, Miranda; Hudson, David; Johnson, Shane D.

In: International Studies Quarterly, 13.11.2020, p. 1-13.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Law Breaking and Law Bending : How International Migrants Negotiate with State Borders. / Schwartz, Cassilde; Simon, Miranda; Hudson, David; Johnson, Shane D.

In: International Studies Quarterly, 13.11.2020, p. 1-13.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Schwartz, C, Simon, M, Hudson, D & Johnson, SD 2020, 'Law Breaking and Law Bending: How International Migrants Negotiate with State Borders', International Studies Quarterly, pp. 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa079

APA

Schwartz, C., Simon, M., Hudson, D., & Johnson, S. D. (2020). Law Breaking and Law Bending: How International Migrants Negotiate with State Borders. International Studies Quarterly, 1-13. [sqaa079]. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa079

Vancouver

Schwartz C, Simon M, Hudson D, Johnson SD. Law Breaking and Law Bending: How International Migrants Negotiate with State Borders. International Studies Quarterly. 2020 Nov 13;1-13. sqaa079. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa079

Author

Schwartz, Cassilde ; Simon, Miranda ; Hudson, David ; Johnson, Shane D. / Law Breaking and Law Bending : How International Migrants Negotiate with State Borders. In: International Studies Quarterly. 2020 ; pp. 1-13.

BibTeX

@article{b06d54e521134d2ebe311bbcf7befc5d,
title = "Law Breaking and Law Bending: How International Migrants Negotiate with State Borders",
abstract = "Many countries have become increasingly aggressive in their efforts to stop nauthorized migration, but most evidence suggests that immigration enforcement policies do not effectively deter migrants. We draw on literature from social psychology, specifically the dual-system model of decision-making, which differentiates between judgments that are subject to considerations of risks and costs and judgments that are `non-consequentialist'. Non-consequentialist decision-making is founded in moral intuition and rejects rational considerations of costs and benefits. This mental process would render the deterrence tools of the state powerless. We posit that some, but not all, forms of unauthorized migration will invoke non-consequentialist decision-making. When considering semi-legal strategies, which individuals may perceive as `bending the law' rather than breaking it, aspiring migrants are likely to weigh the risks and costs of enforcement policies. Meanwhile, when considering fully illegal migration strategies, aspiring migrants will prioritize moral considerations for breaking the law rather than the consequences of breaking the law. We find evidence for our theory using original population-based list experiments along with focus groups with aspiring migrants in an origin country.",
author = "Cassilde Schwartz and Miranda Simon and David Hudson and Johnson, {Shane D.}",
year = "2020",
month = nov,
day = "13",
doi = "10.1093/isq/sqaa079",
language = "English",
pages = "1--13",
journal = "International Studies Quarterly",
issn = "0020-8833",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Law Breaking and Law Bending

T2 - How International Migrants Negotiate with State Borders

AU - Schwartz, Cassilde

AU - Simon, Miranda

AU - Hudson, David

AU - Johnson, Shane D.

PY - 2020/11/13

Y1 - 2020/11/13

N2 - Many countries have become increasingly aggressive in their efforts to stop nauthorized migration, but most evidence suggests that immigration enforcement policies do not effectively deter migrants. We draw on literature from social psychology, specifically the dual-system model of decision-making, which differentiates between judgments that are subject to considerations of risks and costs and judgments that are `non-consequentialist'. Non-consequentialist decision-making is founded in moral intuition and rejects rational considerations of costs and benefits. This mental process would render the deterrence tools of the state powerless. We posit that some, but not all, forms of unauthorized migration will invoke non-consequentialist decision-making. When considering semi-legal strategies, which individuals may perceive as `bending the law' rather than breaking it, aspiring migrants are likely to weigh the risks and costs of enforcement policies. Meanwhile, when considering fully illegal migration strategies, aspiring migrants will prioritize moral considerations for breaking the law rather than the consequences of breaking the law. We find evidence for our theory using original population-based list experiments along with focus groups with aspiring migrants in an origin country.

AB - Many countries have become increasingly aggressive in their efforts to stop nauthorized migration, but most evidence suggests that immigration enforcement policies do not effectively deter migrants. We draw on literature from social psychology, specifically the dual-system model of decision-making, which differentiates between judgments that are subject to considerations of risks and costs and judgments that are `non-consequentialist'. Non-consequentialist decision-making is founded in moral intuition and rejects rational considerations of costs and benefits. This mental process would render the deterrence tools of the state powerless. We posit that some, but not all, forms of unauthorized migration will invoke non-consequentialist decision-making. When considering semi-legal strategies, which individuals may perceive as `bending the law' rather than breaking it, aspiring migrants are likely to weigh the risks and costs of enforcement policies. Meanwhile, when considering fully illegal migration strategies, aspiring migrants will prioritize moral considerations for breaking the law rather than the consequences of breaking the law. We find evidence for our theory using original population-based list experiments along with focus groups with aspiring migrants in an origin country.

U2 - 10.1093/isq/sqaa079

DO - 10.1093/isq/sqaa079

M3 - Article

SP - 1

EP - 13

JO - International Studies Quarterly

JF - International Studies Quarterly

SN - 0020-8833

M1 - sqaa079

ER -