Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies. / Andina-Diaz, Ascension; Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel Angel.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 204, 104532, 12.2021.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies. / Andina-Diaz, Ascension; Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel Angel.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 204, 104532, 12.2021.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Andina-Diaz, A, Feri, F & Meléndez-Jiménez, MA 2021, 'Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 204, 104532. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104532

APA

Andina-Diaz, A., Feri, F., & Meléndez-Jiménez, M. A. (2021). Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies. Journal of Public Economics, 204, [104532]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104532

Vancouver

Andina-Diaz A, Feri F, Meléndez-Jiménez MA. Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies. Journal of Public Economics. 2021 Dec;204. 104532. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104532

Author

Andina-Diaz, Ascension ; Feri, Francesco ; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel Angel. / Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2021 ; Vol. 204.

BibTeX

@article{85bfdff5acc4408994751423d08d48d1,
title = "Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies",
abstract = "This paper presents a novel explanation for political alternation in democracies, rooted in the benefit for the median voter of keeping policy from drifting too far to either extreme. Central to this argument is the idea that policy change is gradual and that this gradualism depends on the institutional flexibility/rigidity of the country. Built on this idea, we propose a model of dynamic elections and show that institutional rigidities cause alternation. We also show that, though institutional rigidities prevent governments from implementing extreme policies, they incentivize parties to polarize as much as they can. However, more flexible institutions can foster moderation. Last, we analyze the resilience of equilibrium policies to players{\textquoteright} impatience and discuss extensions of our model, including office-motivated parties, the cost of alternation, alternation every two terms, and asymmetric policies.",
author = "Ascension Andina-Diaz and Francesco Feri and Mel{\'e}ndez-Jim{\'e}nez, {Miguel Angel}",
year = "2021",
month = dec,
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104532",
language = "English",
volume = "204",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies

AU - Andina-Diaz, Ascension

AU - Feri, Francesco

AU - Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel Angel

PY - 2021/12

Y1 - 2021/12

N2 - This paper presents a novel explanation for political alternation in democracies, rooted in the benefit for the median voter of keeping policy from drifting too far to either extreme. Central to this argument is the idea that policy change is gradual and that this gradualism depends on the institutional flexibility/rigidity of the country. Built on this idea, we propose a model of dynamic elections and show that institutional rigidities cause alternation. We also show that, though institutional rigidities prevent governments from implementing extreme policies, they incentivize parties to polarize as much as they can. However, more flexible institutions can foster moderation. Last, we analyze the resilience of equilibrium policies to players’ impatience and discuss extensions of our model, including office-motivated parties, the cost of alternation, alternation every two terms, and asymmetric policies.

AB - This paper presents a novel explanation for political alternation in democracies, rooted in the benefit for the median voter of keeping policy from drifting too far to either extreme. Central to this argument is the idea that policy change is gradual and that this gradualism depends on the institutional flexibility/rigidity of the country. Built on this idea, we propose a model of dynamic elections and show that institutional rigidities cause alternation. We also show that, though institutional rigidities prevent governments from implementing extreme policies, they incentivize parties to polarize as much as they can. However, more flexible institutions can foster moderation. Last, we analyze the resilience of equilibrium policies to players’ impatience and discuss extensions of our model, including office-motivated parties, the cost of alternation, alternation every two terms, and asymmetric policies.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104532

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104532

M3 - Article

VL - 204

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

M1 - 104532

ER -