Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game. / Engelmann, D; Fischbacher, U.

Egham, 2004.

Research output: Working paper

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@techreport{e705cabb27854ffa9fa844a7fc5f0edc,
title = "Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game",
abstract = "We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic repuatation building on the helping rate. We ..nd that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.",
keywords = "indirect reciprocity, reputation, experimental economics",
author = "D Engelmann and U Fischbacher",
year = "2004",
month = sep,
day = "15",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

AU - Engelmann, D

AU - Fischbacher, U

PY - 2004/9/15

Y1 - 2004/9/15

N2 - We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic repuatation building on the helping rate. We ..nd that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.

AB - We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic repuatation building on the helping rate. We ..nd that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.

KW - indirect reciprocity

KW - reputation

KW - experimental economics

M3 - Working paper

BT - Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

CY - Egham

ER -