Identity Confidentiality in 5G Mobile Telephony Systems. / Khan, Haibat; Dowling, Benjamin; Martin, Keith.

Security Standardisation Research: 4th International Conference, SSR 2018. ed. / Cas Cremer; Anja Lehmann. Switzerland : Springer, [Cham], 2018. p. 120-142 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 11322).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

E-pub ahead of print

Standard

Identity Confidentiality in 5G Mobile Telephony Systems. / Khan, Haibat; Dowling, Benjamin; Martin, Keith.

Security Standardisation Research: 4th International Conference, SSR 2018. ed. / Cas Cremer; Anja Lehmann. Switzerland : Springer, [Cham], 2018. p. 120-142 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 11322).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

Harvard

Khan, H, Dowling, B & Martin, K 2018, Identity Confidentiality in 5G Mobile Telephony Systems. in C Cremer & A Lehmann (eds), Security Standardisation Research: 4th International Conference, SSR 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 11322, Springer, [Cham], Switzerland, pp. 120-142, Security Standardisation Research 2018, Darmstadt, Germany, 26/11/18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04762-7_7

APA

Khan, H., Dowling, B., & Martin, K. (2018). Identity Confidentiality in 5G Mobile Telephony Systems. In C. Cremer, & A. Lehmann (Eds.), Security Standardisation Research: 4th International Conference, SSR 2018 (pp. 120-142). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 11322). Switzerland: Springer, [Cham]. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04762-7_7

Vancouver

Khan H, Dowling B, Martin K. Identity Confidentiality in 5G Mobile Telephony Systems. In Cremer C, Lehmann A, editors, Security Standardisation Research: 4th International Conference, SSR 2018. Switzerland: Springer, [Cham]. 2018. p. 120-142. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04762-7_7

Author

Khan, Haibat ; Dowling, Benjamin ; Martin, Keith. / Identity Confidentiality in 5G Mobile Telephony Systems. Security Standardisation Research: 4th International Conference, SSR 2018. editor / Cas Cremer ; Anja Lehmann. Switzerland : Springer, [Cham], 2018. pp. 120-142 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

BibTeX

@inbook{f84c7ac2b6d44aff8b7be73f2448e5ae,
title = "Identity Confidentiality in 5G Mobile Telephony Systems",
abstract = "The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) recently proposed a standard for 5G telecommunications, containing an identity protection scheme meant to address the long-outstanding privacy problem of permanent subscriber-identity disclosure. The proposal is essentially two disjoint phases: an identification phase, followed by an establishment of security context between mobile subscribers and their service providers via symmetric-key based authenticated key agreement. Currently, 3GPP proposes to protect the identification phase with a public-key based solution, and while the current proposal is secure against a classical adversary, the same would not be true of a quantum adversary. 5G specifications target very long-term deployment scenarios (well beyond the year 2030), therefore it is imperative that quantum-secure alternatives be part of the current specification. In this paper, we present such an alternative scheme for the problem of private identification protection. Our solution is compatible with the current 5G specifications, depending mostly on cryptographic primitives already specified in 5G, adding minimal performance overhead and requiring minor changes in existing message structures. Finally, we provide a detailed formal security analysis of our solution in a novel security framework.",
author = "Haibat Khan and Benjamin Dowling and Keith Martin",
year = "2018",
month = "11",
day = "21",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-04762-7_7",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-030-04761-0",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",
publisher = "Springer, [Cham]",
pages = "120--142",
editor = "Cas Cremer and Anja Lehmann",
booktitle = "Security Standardisation Research",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Identity Confidentiality in 5G Mobile Telephony Systems

AU - Khan, Haibat

AU - Dowling, Benjamin

AU - Martin, Keith

PY - 2018/11/21

Y1 - 2018/11/21

N2 - The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) recently proposed a standard for 5G telecommunications, containing an identity protection scheme meant to address the long-outstanding privacy problem of permanent subscriber-identity disclosure. The proposal is essentially two disjoint phases: an identification phase, followed by an establishment of security context between mobile subscribers and their service providers via symmetric-key based authenticated key agreement. Currently, 3GPP proposes to protect the identification phase with a public-key based solution, and while the current proposal is secure against a classical adversary, the same would not be true of a quantum adversary. 5G specifications target very long-term deployment scenarios (well beyond the year 2030), therefore it is imperative that quantum-secure alternatives be part of the current specification. In this paper, we present such an alternative scheme for the problem of private identification protection. Our solution is compatible with the current 5G specifications, depending mostly on cryptographic primitives already specified in 5G, adding minimal performance overhead and requiring minor changes in existing message structures. Finally, we provide a detailed formal security analysis of our solution in a novel security framework.

AB - The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) recently proposed a standard for 5G telecommunications, containing an identity protection scheme meant to address the long-outstanding privacy problem of permanent subscriber-identity disclosure. The proposal is essentially two disjoint phases: an identification phase, followed by an establishment of security context between mobile subscribers and their service providers via symmetric-key based authenticated key agreement. Currently, 3GPP proposes to protect the identification phase with a public-key based solution, and while the current proposal is secure against a classical adversary, the same would not be true of a quantum adversary. 5G specifications target very long-term deployment scenarios (well beyond the year 2030), therefore it is imperative that quantum-secure alternatives be part of the current specification. In this paper, we present such an alternative scheme for the problem of private identification protection. Our solution is compatible with the current 5G specifications, depending mostly on cryptographic primitives already specified in 5G, adding minimal performance overhead and requiring minor changes in existing message structures. Finally, we provide a detailed formal security analysis of our solution in a novel security framework.

UR - https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/876

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-04762-7_7

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-04762-7_7

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 978-3-030-04761-0

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 120

EP - 142

BT - Security Standardisation Research

A2 - Cremer, Cas

A2 - Lehmann, Anja

PB - Springer, [Cham]

CY - Switzerland

ER -