Human Rights Conditions on Foreign Aid can Backfire. / Spagat, M; Mandler, M.

2005. (Conflict).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Published

Standard

Human Rights Conditions on Foreign Aid can Backfire. / Spagat, M; Mandler, M.

2005. (Conflict).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Harvard

Spagat, M & Mandler, M 2005 'Human Rights Conditions on Foreign Aid can Backfire' Conflict.

APA

Spagat, M., & Mandler, M. (2005). Human Rights Conditions on Foreign Aid can Backfire. (Conflict).

Vancouver

Spagat M, Mandler M. Human Rights Conditions on Foreign Aid can Backfire. 2005 Apr. (Conflict).

Author

Spagat, M ; Mandler, M. / Human Rights Conditions on Foreign Aid can Backfire. 2005. (Conflict).

BibTeX

@techreport{ee8916288b47458bb25acc8e784741bf,
title = "Human Rights Conditions on Foreign Aid can Backfire",
abstract = "A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase its likelihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid tothe power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. To avoid the need to compromise with the foreign patron, the domestic power may create (or stop supressing) independent paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once {"}atrocity overshooting{"} is reached, the domestic power shifts gears and tries to restrict the atrocity level that paramilitaries are committing. Case studies of Colombia and Northern Ireland illustrate the model.",
keywords = "Terrorism, Atrocities, Paramilitaries, Colombia, Northern Ireland",
author = "M Spagat and M Mandler",
year = "2005",
month = "4",
language = "English",
series = "Conflict",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Human Rights Conditions on Foreign Aid can Backfire

AU - Spagat, M

AU - Mandler, M

PY - 2005/4

Y1 - 2005/4

N2 - A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase its likelihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid tothe power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. To avoid the need to compromise with the foreign patron, the domestic power may create (or stop supressing) independent paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once "atrocity overshooting" is reached, the domestic power shifts gears and tries to restrict the atrocity level that paramilitaries are committing. Case studies of Colombia and Northern Ireland illustrate the model.

AB - A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase its likelihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid tothe power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. To avoid the need to compromise with the foreign patron, the domestic power may create (or stop supressing) independent paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once "atrocity overshooting" is reached, the domestic power shifts gears and tries to restrict the atrocity level that paramilitaries are committing. Case studies of Colombia and Northern Ireland illustrate the model.

KW - Terrorism

KW - Atrocities

KW - Paramilitaries

KW - Colombia

KW - Northern Ireland

M3 - Discussion paper

T3 - Conflict

BT - Human Rights Conditions on Foreign Aid can Backfire

ER -