How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games. / Czermak, Simon; Feri, Francesco; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Sutter, Matthias.

In: Journal of economic behavior & organization, Vol. 128, 08.2016, p. 265–285.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Published

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How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games. / Czermak, Simon; Feri, Francesco; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Sutter, Matthias.

In: Journal of economic behavior & organization, Vol. 128, 08.2016, p. 265–285.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Czermak, S, Feri, F, Glätzle-Rützler, D & Sutter, M 2016, 'How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games', Journal of economic behavior & organization, vol. 128, pp. 265–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.004

APA

Czermak, S., Feri, F., Glätzle-Rützler, D., & Sutter, M. (2016). How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 128, 265–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.004

Vancouver

Czermak S, Feri F, Glätzle-Rützler D, Sutter M. How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games. Journal of economic behavior & organization. 2016 Aug;128:265–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.004

Author

Czermak, Simon ; Feri, Francesco ; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela ; Sutter, Matthias. / How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games. In: Journal of economic behavior & organization. 2016 ; Vol. 128. pp. 265–285.

BibTeX

@article{11b9e7cd6dad4270aa78483629cebbfc,
title = "How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games",
abstract = "We examine the strategic sophistication of 196 children and adolescents, aged 10 to 17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides choices, we also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. The share of subjects playing Nash or expecting opponents to play Nash is fairly stable across all age groups. The likelihood of playing best response to own beliefs increases in math skills. Using a mixture model, about 40% of subjects are classified as a strategic type, while the others are non-strategic. The distribution of types is somewhat changing with age. The estimated error rates also show some dependency on age and gender.",
author = "Simon Czermak and Francesco Feri and Daniela Gl{\"a}tzle-R{\"u}tzler and Matthias Sutter",
year = "2016",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.004",
language = "English",
volume = "128",
pages = "265–285",
journal = "Journal of economic behavior & organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games

AU - Czermak, Simon

AU - Feri, Francesco

AU - Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela

AU - Sutter, Matthias

PY - 2016/8

Y1 - 2016/8

N2 - We examine the strategic sophistication of 196 children and adolescents, aged 10 to 17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides choices, we also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. The share of subjects playing Nash or expecting opponents to play Nash is fairly stable across all age groups. The likelihood of playing best response to own beliefs increases in math skills. Using a mixture model, about 40% of subjects are classified as a strategic type, while the others are non-strategic. The distribution of types is somewhat changing with age. The estimated error rates also show some dependency on age and gender.

AB - We examine the strategic sophistication of 196 children and adolescents, aged 10 to 17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides choices, we also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. The share of subjects playing Nash or expecting opponents to play Nash is fairly stable across all age groups. The likelihood of playing best response to own beliefs increases in math skills. Using a mixture model, about 40% of subjects are classified as a strategic type, while the others are non-strategic. The distribution of types is somewhat changing with age. The estimated error rates also show some dependency on age and gender.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.004

M3 - Article

VL - 128

SP - 265

EP - 285

JO - Journal of economic behavior & organization

JF - Journal of economic behavior & organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -