High Precision Laser Fault Injection using Low-cost Components. / Kelly, Martin; Mayes, Keith.

2020. 1-10 Paper presented at IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, San Jose, United States.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

E-pub ahead of print

Standard

High Precision Laser Fault Injection using Low-cost Components. / Kelly, Martin; Mayes, Keith.

2020. 1-10 Paper presented at IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, San Jose, United States.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Harvard

Kelly, M & Mayes, K 2020, 'High Precision Laser Fault Injection using Low-cost Components', Paper presented at IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, San Jose, United States, 6/12/20 - 9/12/20 pp. 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST45689.2020.9300265

APA

Kelly, M., & Mayes, K. (2020). High Precision Laser Fault Injection using Low-cost Components. 1-10. Paper presented at IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, San Jose, United States. https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST45689.2020.9300265

Vancouver

Kelly M, Mayes K. High Precision Laser Fault Injection using Low-cost Components. 2020. Paper presented at IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, San Jose, United States. https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST45689.2020.9300265

Author

Kelly, Martin ; Mayes, Keith. / High Precision Laser Fault Injection using Low-cost Components. Paper presented at IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, San Jose, United States.10 p.

BibTeX

@conference{91bdd5cd87d941e880d2e0eb79b46576,
title = "High Precision Laser Fault Injection using Low-cost Components",
abstract = "This paper demonstrates that it is possible to executesophisticated and powerful fault injection attacks on microcontrollersusing low-cost equipment and readily available components.Earlier work had implied that powerful lasers and highgrade optics frequently used to execute such attacks were beingunderutilized and that attacks were equally effective when usinglow-power settings and imprecise focus.This work has exploited these earlier findings to develop a lowcostlaser workstation capable of generating multiple discretefaults with timing accuracy capable of targeting consecutiveinstruction cycles. We have shown that the capabilities of thisnew device exceed those of the expensive laboratory equipmenttypically used in related work.We describe a simplified fault model to categorize the effectsof induced errors on running code and use it, along with thenew device, to reevaluate the efficacy of different defensive codingtechniques. This has enabled us to demonstrate an efficient hybriddefense that outperforms the individual defenses on our chosentarget.This approach enables device programmers to select an appropriatecompromise between the extremes of undefended codeand unusable overdefended code, to do so specifically for theirchosen device and without the need for prohibitively expensiveequipment. This work has particular relevance in the burgeoningIoT world where many small companies with limited budgetsare deploying low-cost microprocessors in ever more securitysensitive roles.",
keywords = "ault model, fault attack, smart card, test rig, micro controller, fault injection, laser pulse, software defence, defensive code, low power, flag corruption, chip surface, hardware defence",
author = "Martin Kelly and Keith Mayes",
year = "2020",
month = dec,
day = "25",
doi = "10.1109/HOST45689.2020.9300265",
language = "English",
pages = "1--10",
note = "IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, HOST ; Conference date: 06-12-2020 Through 09-12-2020",
url = "http://www.hostsymposium.org/",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - High Precision Laser Fault Injection using Low-cost Components

AU - Kelly, Martin

AU - Mayes, Keith

PY - 2020/12/25

Y1 - 2020/12/25

N2 - This paper demonstrates that it is possible to executesophisticated and powerful fault injection attacks on microcontrollersusing low-cost equipment and readily available components.Earlier work had implied that powerful lasers and highgrade optics frequently used to execute such attacks were beingunderutilized and that attacks were equally effective when usinglow-power settings and imprecise focus.This work has exploited these earlier findings to develop a lowcostlaser workstation capable of generating multiple discretefaults with timing accuracy capable of targeting consecutiveinstruction cycles. We have shown that the capabilities of thisnew device exceed those of the expensive laboratory equipmenttypically used in related work.We describe a simplified fault model to categorize the effectsof induced errors on running code and use it, along with thenew device, to reevaluate the efficacy of different defensive codingtechniques. This has enabled us to demonstrate an efficient hybriddefense that outperforms the individual defenses on our chosentarget.This approach enables device programmers to select an appropriatecompromise between the extremes of undefended codeand unusable overdefended code, to do so specifically for theirchosen device and without the need for prohibitively expensiveequipment. This work has particular relevance in the burgeoningIoT world where many small companies with limited budgetsare deploying low-cost microprocessors in ever more securitysensitive roles.

AB - This paper demonstrates that it is possible to executesophisticated and powerful fault injection attacks on microcontrollersusing low-cost equipment and readily available components.Earlier work had implied that powerful lasers and highgrade optics frequently used to execute such attacks were beingunderutilized and that attacks were equally effective when usinglow-power settings and imprecise focus.This work has exploited these earlier findings to develop a lowcostlaser workstation capable of generating multiple discretefaults with timing accuracy capable of targeting consecutiveinstruction cycles. We have shown that the capabilities of thisnew device exceed those of the expensive laboratory equipmenttypically used in related work.We describe a simplified fault model to categorize the effectsof induced errors on running code and use it, along with thenew device, to reevaluate the efficacy of different defensive codingtechniques. This has enabled us to demonstrate an efficient hybriddefense that outperforms the individual defenses on our chosentarget.This approach enables device programmers to select an appropriatecompromise between the extremes of undefended codeand unusable overdefended code, to do so specifically for theirchosen device and without the need for prohibitively expensiveequipment. This work has particular relevance in the burgeoningIoT world where many small companies with limited budgetsare deploying low-cost microprocessors in ever more securitysensitive roles.

KW - ault model, fault attack, smart card, test rig, micro controller, fault injection, laser pulse, software defence, defensive code, low power, flag corruption, chip surface, hardware defence

U2 - 10.1109/HOST45689.2020.9300265

DO - 10.1109/HOST45689.2020.9300265

M3 - Paper

SP - 1

EP - 10

T2 - IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust

Y2 - 6 December 2020 through 9 December 2020

ER -