Heterogeneity in Preferences and Behavior in Threshold Models. / Neary, Philip; Newton, J.

In: Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Vol. 2, No. 1, 12.2017, p. 141-159.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Heterogeneity in Preferences and Behavior in Threshold Models. / Neary, Philip; Newton, J.

In: Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Vol. 2, No. 1, 12.2017, p. 141-159.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Neary, P & Newton, J 2017, 'Heterogeneity in Preferences and Behavior in Threshold Models', Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 141-159. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2017.12.005

APA

Neary, P., & Newton, J. (2017). Heterogeneity in Preferences and Behavior in Threshold Models. Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2(1), 141-159. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2017.12.005

Vancouver

Neary P, Newton J. Heterogeneity in Preferences and Behavior in Threshold Models. Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design. 2017 Dec;2(1):141-159. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2017.12.005

Author

Neary, Philip ; Newton, J. / Heterogeneity in Preferences and Behavior in Threshold Models. In: Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design. 2017 ; Vol. 2, No. 1. pp. 141-159.

BibTeX

@article{5c2801e211be4f458ebc07143d982c76,
title = "Heterogeneity in Preferences and Behavior in Threshold Models",
abstract = "A coordination game is repeatedly played on a graph by players (vertices) who have heterogeneous cardinal preferences and whose strategy choice is governed by the individualistic asynchronous logit dynamic. The idea of potential driven autonomy of sets of players is used to derive results on the possibility of heterogeneous preferences leading to heterogeneous behavior. In particular, a class of graphs is identified such that for large enough graphs in this class, diversity in ordinal preferences will nearly always lead to heterogeneity in behavior, regardless of the cardinal strength of the preferences. These results have implications for network design problems, such as when a social planner wishes to induce homogeneous/heterogeneous behavior in a population.",
keywords = "heterogeneity, potential, contagion, networks",
author = "Philip Neary and J Newton",
year = "2017",
month = dec,
doi = "10.22574/jmid.2017.12.005",
language = "English",
volume = "2",
pages = "141--159",
journal = "Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design",
number = "1",

}

RIS

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AU - Neary, Philip

AU - Newton, J

PY - 2017/12

Y1 - 2017/12

N2 - A coordination game is repeatedly played on a graph by players (vertices) who have heterogeneous cardinal preferences and whose strategy choice is governed by the individualistic asynchronous logit dynamic. The idea of potential driven autonomy of sets of players is used to derive results on the possibility of heterogeneous preferences leading to heterogeneous behavior. In particular, a class of graphs is identified such that for large enough graphs in this class, diversity in ordinal preferences will nearly always lead to heterogeneity in behavior, regardless of the cardinal strength of the preferences. These results have implications for network design problems, such as when a social planner wishes to induce homogeneous/heterogeneous behavior in a population.

AB - A coordination game is repeatedly played on a graph by players (vertices) who have heterogeneous cardinal preferences and whose strategy choice is governed by the individualistic asynchronous logit dynamic. The idea of potential driven autonomy of sets of players is used to derive results on the possibility of heterogeneous preferences leading to heterogeneous behavior. In particular, a class of graphs is identified such that for large enough graphs in this class, diversity in ordinal preferences will nearly always lead to heterogeneity in behavior, regardless of the cardinal strength of the preferences. These results have implications for network design problems, such as when a social planner wishes to induce homogeneous/heterogeneous behavior in a population.

KW - heterogeneity

KW - potential

KW - contagion

KW - networks

U2 - 10.22574/jmid.2017.12.005

DO - 10.22574/jmid.2017.12.005

M3 - Article

VL - 2

SP - 141

EP - 159

JO - Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design

JF - Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design

IS - 1

ER -