Governors and directors : Competing models of corporate governance. / Shah, Neeta; Napier, Christopher.

In: Accounting History, Vol. 24, No. 3, 01.08.2019, p. 338-355.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Published

Standard

Governors and directors : Competing models of corporate governance. / Shah, Neeta; Napier, Christopher.

In: Accounting History, Vol. 24, No. 3, 01.08.2019, p. 338-355.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Shah, Neeta ; Napier, Christopher. / Governors and directors : Competing models of corporate governance. In: Accounting History. 2019 ; Vol. 24, No. 3. pp. 338-355.

BibTeX

@article{d77b2de418ef4a98acca7247eeac03e3,
title = "Governors and directors: Competing models of corporate governance",
abstract = "Why do we use the term {\textquoteleft}corporate governance{\textquoteright} rather than {\textquoteleft}corporate direction{\textquoteright}? Early British joint stock companies were normally managed by a single {\textquoteleft}governor{\textquoteright}. The {\textquoteleft}court of governors{\textquoteright} or {\textquoteleft}board of directors{\textquoteright} emerged slowly as the ruling body for companies. By the nineteenth century, however, companies were typically run by directors while not-for-profit entities such as hospitals, schools and charitable bodies had governors. The nineteenth century saw steady refinement of the roles of company directors, often in response to corporate scandals, with a gradual change from the notion of the director as a {\textquoteleft}representative shareholder{\textquoteright} to the directors being seen collectively as {\textquoteleft}representatives of the shareholders{\textquoteright}. Governors in not-for-profit entities, however, were regarded as having broader responsibilities. The term {\textquoteleft}governance{\textquoteright} itself suggests that corporate boards should be studied as {\textquoteleft}political{\textquoteright} entities rather than merely through economic lenses such as agency theory.",
keywords = "Corporate governance, Corporate scandals, Directors, Governors, Joint stock companies, Representatives of the shareholders, Not-for-profit entities",
author = "Neeta Shah and Christopher Napier",
year = "2019",
month = aug,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/1032373218800839",
language = "English",
volume = "24",
pages = "338--355",
journal = "Accounting History",
issn = "1032-3732",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Governors and directors

T2 - Competing models of corporate governance

AU - Shah, Neeta

AU - Napier, Christopher

PY - 2019/8/1

Y1 - 2019/8/1

N2 - Why do we use the term ‘corporate governance’ rather than ‘corporate direction’? Early British joint stock companies were normally managed by a single ‘governor’. The ‘court of governors’ or ‘board of directors’ emerged slowly as the ruling body for companies. By the nineteenth century, however, companies were typically run by directors while not-for-profit entities such as hospitals, schools and charitable bodies had governors. The nineteenth century saw steady refinement of the roles of company directors, often in response to corporate scandals, with a gradual change from the notion of the director as a ‘representative shareholder’ to the directors being seen collectively as ‘representatives of the shareholders’. Governors in not-for-profit entities, however, were regarded as having broader responsibilities. The term ‘governance’ itself suggests that corporate boards should be studied as ‘political’ entities rather than merely through economic lenses such as agency theory.

AB - Why do we use the term ‘corporate governance’ rather than ‘corporate direction’? Early British joint stock companies were normally managed by a single ‘governor’. The ‘court of governors’ or ‘board of directors’ emerged slowly as the ruling body for companies. By the nineteenth century, however, companies were typically run by directors while not-for-profit entities such as hospitals, schools and charitable bodies had governors. The nineteenth century saw steady refinement of the roles of company directors, often in response to corporate scandals, with a gradual change from the notion of the director as a ‘representative shareholder’ to the directors being seen collectively as ‘representatives of the shareholders’. Governors in not-for-profit entities, however, were regarded as having broader responsibilities. The term ‘governance’ itself suggests that corporate boards should be studied as ‘political’ entities rather than merely through economic lenses such as agency theory.

KW - Corporate governance

KW - Corporate scandals

KW - Directors

KW - Governors

KW - Joint stock companies

KW - Representatives of the shareholders

KW - Not-for-profit entities

U2 - 10.1177/1032373218800839

DO - 10.1177/1032373218800839

M3 - Article

VL - 24

SP - 338

EP - 355

JO - Accounting History

JF - Accounting History

SN - 1032-3732

IS - 3

ER -