Fully Absorbing Dynamic Compromise. / Richter, Michael.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 152, 07.2014, p. 92-104.

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Fully Absorbing Dynamic Compromise. / Richter, Michael.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 152, 07.2014, p. 92-104.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Richter, M 2014, 'Fully Absorbing Dynamic Compromise', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 152, pp. 92-104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.013

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Vancouver

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Richter, Michael. / Fully Absorbing Dynamic Compromise. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2014 ; Vol. 152. pp. 92-104.

BibTeX

@article{0aa354f35a074f638b7cf09d3fe4599b,
title = "Fully Absorbing Dynamic Compromise",
abstract = "I consider a repeated divide-the-dollar voting model with rejections leading to the implementation of the previous period's allocation (see Kalandrakis [14]). I show that if proposals can be non-exhaustive, then equal division can be achieved as an absorbing steady state from any initial allocation given a large enough discount factor as a part of a Markov Perfect equilibrium. This result is robust to changes in voting thresholds and persistence in proposal power outside of unanimity or total persistence.",
author = "Michael Richter",
year = "2014",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.013",
language = "English",
volume = "152",
pages = "92--104",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fully Absorbing Dynamic Compromise

AU - Richter, Michael

PY - 2014/7

Y1 - 2014/7

N2 - I consider a repeated divide-the-dollar voting model with rejections leading to the implementation of the previous period's allocation (see Kalandrakis [14]). I show that if proposals can be non-exhaustive, then equal division can be achieved as an absorbing steady state from any initial allocation given a large enough discount factor as a part of a Markov Perfect equilibrium. This result is robust to changes in voting thresholds and persistence in proposal power outside of unanimity or total persistence.

AB - I consider a repeated divide-the-dollar voting model with rejections leading to the implementation of the previous period's allocation (see Kalandrakis [14]). I show that if proposals can be non-exhaustive, then equal division can be achieved as an absorbing steady state from any initial allocation given a large enough discount factor as a part of a Markov Perfect equilibrium. This result is robust to changes in voting thresholds and persistence in proposal power outside of unanimity or total persistence.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.013

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.013

M3 - Article

VL - 152

SP - 92

EP - 104

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

ER -