Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities can Increase Them. / Spagat, M; Mandler, M.

2004.

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities can Increase Them. / Spagat, M; Mandler, M.

2004.

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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@techreport{f2b78c32e2864b4682af7d364037dbce,
title = "Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities can Increase Them",
abstract = "A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase the liklihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid to the power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. The domestic power responds by acquiescing in the creation of uncontrollable paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once the paramilitaries are set up, aid flows and the atrocity level is high. Now suppose the foreign patron is uncertin whether the domextic power can control the paramilitaries. At a pooling equilibrium the domestic power will commit more atrocities than it would commit in isolation to demonstrate to the foreign patron that the paramilitaries are beyond the domestic power's control. Case studies of Colombia, Northern Ireland, and Middle East illustrate the models.",
keywords = "Terrorism, Atrocities, Power, Foreign Patron, Domestic Power",
author = "M Spagat and M Mandler",
year = "2004",
month = "1",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities can Increase Them

AU - Spagat, M

AU - Mandler, M

PY - 2004/1

Y1 - 2004/1

N2 - A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase the liklihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid to the power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. The domestic power responds by acquiescing in the creation of uncontrollable paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once the paramilitaries are set up, aid flows and the atrocity level is high. Now suppose the foreign patron is uncertin whether the domextic power can control the paramilitaries. At a pooling equilibrium the domestic power will commit more atrocities than it would commit in isolation to demonstrate to the foreign patron that the paramilitaries are beyond the domestic power's control. Case studies of Colombia, Northern Ireland, and Middle East illustrate the models.

AB - A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase the liklihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid to the power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. The domestic power responds by acquiescing in the creation of uncontrollable paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once the paramilitaries are set up, aid flows and the atrocity level is high. Now suppose the foreign patron is uncertin whether the domextic power can control the paramilitaries. At a pooling equilibrium the domestic power will commit more atrocities than it would commit in isolation to demonstrate to the foreign patron that the paramilitaries are beyond the domestic power's control. Case studies of Colombia, Northern Ireland, and Middle East illustrate the models.

KW - Terrorism

KW - Atrocities

KW - Power

KW - Foreign Patron

KW - Domestic Power

M3 - Discussion paper

BT - Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities can Increase Them

ER -