Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities can Increase Them. / Spagat, M; Mandler, M.

2004.

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Published
  • M Spagat
  • M Mandler

Abstract

A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase the liklihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid to the power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. The domestic power responds by acquiescing in the creation of uncontrollable paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once the paramilitaries are set up, aid flows and the atrocity level is high. Now suppose the foreign patron is uncertin whether the domextic power can control the paramilitaries. At a pooling equilibrium the domestic power will commit more atrocities than it would commit in isolation to demonstrate to the foreign patron that the paramilitaries are beyond the domestic power's control. Case studies of Colombia, Northern Ireland, and Middle East illustrate the models.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2004
This open access research output is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

ID: 887328