Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems. / Bade, Sophie.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 165, 09.2016, p. 257–262.

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Abstract

No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of a randomization over all deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)257–262
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume165
Early online date22 Apr 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2016
This open access research output is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

ID: 26324269