Externalities aggregation in network games. / Feri, Francesco; Pin, Paolo.

In: International Economic Review, 03.06.2020, p. 1-24.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

E-pub ahead of print

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Externalities aggregation in network games. / Feri, Francesco; Pin, Paolo.

In: International Economic Review, 03.06.2020, p. 1-24.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Feri, F & Pin, P 2020, 'Externalities aggregation in network games', International Economic Review, pp. 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12467

APA

Feri, F., & Pin, P. (2020). Externalities aggregation in network games. International Economic Review, 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12467

Vancouver

Feri F, Pin P. Externalities aggregation in network games. International Economic Review. 2020 Jun 3;1-24. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12467

Author

Feri, Francesco ; Pin, Paolo. / Externalities aggregation in network games. In: International Economic Review. 2020 ; pp. 1-24.

BibTeX

@article{1bc677355c9b4b4f8eaffcf13cce66a7,
title = "Externalities aggregation in network games",
abstract = "We generalize the results on the monotonicity of equilibria for network games with incomplete information. We show that not only is the distinction between strategic complements and strategic substitutes important in determining the nature of the Bayesian Nash equilibria, but the nature of the statistic itself is also determinant. We show that understanding the underlying forces behind people's choices may be of fundamental importance for a policy maker that wants to incentivize efficient behavior.",
author = "Francesco Feri and Paolo Pin",
year = "2020",
month = jun,
day = "3",
doi = "10.1111/iere.12467",
language = "English",
pages = "1--24",
journal = "International Economic Review",
issn = "0020-6598",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Externalities aggregation in network games

AU - Feri, Francesco

AU - Pin, Paolo

PY - 2020/6/3

Y1 - 2020/6/3

N2 - We generalize the results on the monotonicity of equilibria for network games with incomplete information. We show that not only is the distinction between strategic complements and strategic substitutes important in determining the nature of the Bayesian Nash equilibria, but the nature of the statistic itself is also determinant. We show that understanding the underlying forces behind people's choices may be of fundamental importance for a policy maker that wants to incentivize efficient behavior.

AB - We generalize the results on the monotonicity of equilibria for network games with incomplete information. We show that not only is the distinction between strategic complements and strategic substitutes important in determining the nature of the Bayesian Nash equilibria, but the nature of the statistic itself is also determinant. We show that understanding the underlying forces behind people's choices may be of fundamental importance for a policy maker that wants to incentivize efficient behavior.

U2 - 10.1111/iere.12467

DO - 10.1111/iere.12467

M3 - Article

SP - 1

EP - 24

JO - International Economic Review

JF - International Economic Review

SN - 0020-6598

ER -